reflections upon some passages in a book, entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life. with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. by edmund elys. elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing e estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) reflections upon some passages in a book, entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life. with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. by edmund elys. elys, edmund, ca. -ca. . p. s.n., [london : ?] caption title. imprint form wing. begins on signature b. a reply to: norris, john. reflections upon the conduct of human life, with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng norris, john, - . -- reflections upon the couduct of human life, with reference to the study of learning and knowledge. society of friends -- apologetic works -- early works to . knowledge, theory of (religion) -- early works to . sermons, english -- th century. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion reflections upon some passages , in a book , entitled reflections upon the conduct of human life . with reference to the study of learning and knowledge . by edmvnd elys . reflection . sect. . perhaps we shall be found to be as much out in the conduct of our vnderstandings , as in that of our wills. answ. there is no irregularity in the vnderstanding , but what proceeds from the irregularity of the will. sect. . true knowledge ( whatever it be ) must be suppos'd to be a thing of uncommon difficulty , and the study of it a work fit only for sublimer wits ; the more elevated , and awakned part of mankind . answ. purity of heart , is that which doth principally conduce to the attainment of true knowledge . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . sophocles . the soul that 's truly just , and kind ; truth , hid from subtle wits , shall find . sect. . a thing may deserve to be known , not as perfecting the vnderstanding ; but meerly as touching upon our interest . answ. no man can have any true , or real interest , but what has some reference to the enjoyment of the sovereign good : therefore any thing that deserves to be known because it touches upon our interest ; deserves to be known as perfecting the understanding : the perfection of the understanding consisting in the apprehension of the truth , for the satisfaction of the will , in the possession of the true good. i agree with this ingenious author in that he says , no truth is perfective of the understanding , but only necessary truth . by necessary truth i understand the divine essence , and all those effects of infinite wisdom , power , and goodness , which it is our duty to contemplate . reflection . sect. . if now it be further demanded how this may be done ; ( viz. to apply our selves to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to consult the ideal world ) i answer that there are three ways of doing it , and i can think of no more : the first is by attention ; the second by purity of heart , and life ; and the third by prayer . i do not charge these words with falshood , but the reader will fall into an error , if he conceit that he may apply himself to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by any other attention of the mind , but what proceeds from such a temper , or disposition of will , which implies an aversion from any other speculation , but what may be vseful unto him , in doing the will of god. this holy disposition of the will , is the only true purity of heart , and the exercising of it is an effectual prayer , a worshiping of god in spirit , and in truth . these words sect. . are most perfectly agreeable to my conceptions : we ought to prosecute learning and knowledge , no further than as 't is conducieve to the great ends of piety , and virtue . and consequently whenever we study to any other purpose , or in any other degree than this ; we are unaccountably , impertinently , i may add , sinfully employ'd . but , then , say i , it must be consider'd , that no sinful exercise or employment of our intellective faculties , can ever tend to the improvement of the brightness of the vnderstanding , or intellectual perfection . nothing can properly be call'd wisdom , but the practical vnderstanding of true goodness . such expressions as i find in the and sections , seem to come short of that accuracy which is requisite for a christian philosopher , that has the confidence to pass so severe a censure upon our academical education , and learning . certainly rectitude of will is a greater ornament and perfection , than brightness of understanding ; and to be good is more divine than to be wise and knowing . the question is , whether we ought to be more solicitous for that intellectual perfection , which we cant have here , and shall have hereafter , or for that moral perfection , which we may have here , and cannot hereafter . a lover of this present world is a fool and an ignorant wretch : they that love the lord jesus in sincerity , are the only wise and knowing men. 't is one and the same thing to be good , or to partake of the divine nature , and to be wise and knowing . i think it my duty to declare to the world , that it seems to me , that this author deals most incuriously with the people call'd quakers in speaking so contemptuously of their notion of the light within . i pray god that he , and i , and they , and all those that profess themselves to be followers of jesus christ , may have our hearts duly affected with the sense of these sacred words , proverbs . , . the path of the just is as the shining light , that shineth more and more unto the perfect day . the way of the wicked is as darkness : they know not at what they stumble . iohn . . this was the true light , which lighteth every man that cometh into the world . iohn . . then spake jesus again unto them , saying , i am the light of the world : he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness , but shall have the light of life . iohn . . jesus saith unto him , i am the way , and the truth , and the life : no man cometh unto the father , but by me . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . finis . an abridgment of mr. locke's essay concerning humane [sic] understanding essay concerning human understanding locke, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing l estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an abridgment of mr. locke's essay concerning humane [sic] understanding essay concerning human understanding locke, john, - . wynne, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for a. and j. churchill ..., and edw. castle ..., london : . advertisement: p. [ ] at end. dedication signed: john wynne. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng knowledge, theory of. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an abridgment of m r. locke's essay concerning humane understanding . london , printed for a. and j. churchill at the black swan in pater-noster-row , and edw. castle next scotland-yard-gate , near whiiehall , . to the much esteemed mr. john locke . honoured sir , i send you this imperfect draught of your excellent essay concerning humane understanding , which i must confess , falls as much short of the perfection , as it does of the length of the original . nevertheless , as i lately intimated to you ( and you were pleased to think , that what i propos'd in reference to this design , would not be wholly lost labour ) i am not without hopes , that it may in this contracted form , prove in some measure serviceable to that noble end , which you have so successfully aimed at in it , viz. the advancement of real and useful knowledge . the inducement which moved me to think of abridging it , was a consideration purely extrinsical to the work it self ; and in effect no other than this ; that it would be better suited , to the ease and convenience of some sort of readers , when reduced into this narrow compass . in order to this , i thought the first book , which is employ'd in refuting the common opinion of innate notions and ideas , might be best spared in this abridgment ; especially , since the reader may be convinced by what he shall find here , that such a supposition is at least needless , in regard he may attain to all the knowledge he has , or finds himself capable of , without the help of any such innate ideas . besides this , i have retrench'd most of the larger explications ; and some useful hints , and instructive theories i have wholly omitted , not because they are less considerable in themselves ; but because they seemed not so necessary to be insisted on in this abridgment , considered as a previous instrument , and preparatory help , to guide and conduct the mind in its search after truth and knowledge . i did particularly pass by that accurate discourse , concerning the freedom and determination of the will contained in cap. . l. . because i found it too long to be inserted here at large , and too weighty and momentous to be but slightly and imperfectly represented . this i hope will prove no prejudice to the essay it self ; since none i presume will think it reasonable to form a judgment of the whole work , from this abridgment of it : and i perswade my self , that few readers will be content with this epitome , who can conveniently furnish themselves with the essay at large . however , i am apt to think , that this alone will serve to make the way to knowledge somewhat more plain and easie ; and afford such helps for the improvement of reason , as are perhaps in vain sought after in those books , which profess to teach the art of reasoning . but nevertheless , whether you shall think fit to let it come abroad , under the disadvantages that attend it in this form , i must leave you to judge . i shall only add , that i think my own pains abundantly recompenc'd by the agreeable , as well as instructive entertainment , which this nearer view , and closer inspection into your essay , afforded me : and i am not a little pleased , that it has given me this opportunity of expressing the just value and esteem i have for it , as well as the honour and respect i have for its author . i am honoured sir , your very humble and oblig'd servant , john wynne . oxon , ap. . . errata . page , line . r. for body . l. . r. to body . l. . r. to any . p. . l. . r. its stock . p. . l. . for esteem r. existence . p . l. . r. not the. p. . l. . r or jet ) p. . l. . r. vegetables many of them . p. . l. . r. receiv'd . p. . l. . r. occasions . p. . l. . universals . p. . l. . self . p. . l. . r. substances , thirdly . l. . beholder . theft . p. . l. . substances . p. . penult . dele the. p. . l. . r. than . p. . l. . r. observed , p. . l. . r. by the , p. . l. . r. complex one , p. . l. . r. disposition . p. . l. . r. ideas of . p. . l. . r. ideas . l. . r. idea . penult . r. capacities . p. . l. . r. one . is as . p. . l. . r. this notion . p. . l. . r. where . l. . dele they . p. . l. . r. united , l. . r. nourishment ; p. . l. . r. body , animal is . p. . l. . dele a. p. . l. . r. shall be . p. . l. . r. represent . p. . l. . r. because it agrees . l. . to be its . p. . l. . dele in l. . r. ideas . p. . l. . r. classing . p. . l. . r. pr●econcessis . p. . l. . r. then . p. . l. . dele are . p. . l. . dele out . p. . l. . r. one on another . p. . l. . r. veritates . p. . l. . r. an . p. . l. . r. very . p. . l. . r. capricie's . the introduction . . since it is the understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings , and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them ; it is certainly a subject , even , for its nobleness , worth the enquiring into . . my purpose therefore is to enquire into the original , certainty , and extent of human knowledge ; together with the grounds and degrees of belief , opinion , and assent , which i shall do in the following method . . first , i shall enquire into the original of those ideas or notions , which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind ; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them . secondly , what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas ; and the certainty , evidence , and extent of it . thirdly , i shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith and opinion . . if by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding , i can discover the powers thereof , how far they reach , and where they fail us , it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in medling with things exceeding its comprehension , to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether , and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things , which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities . we should not then perhaps be so forward , out of an affectation of universal knowledge , to perplex our selves with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited ; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions , or whereof ( as it has perhaps too often happened ) we have not any notions at all : but should learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this state. . for though the comprehension of our understanding comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things ; yet we shall have cause enough to magnifie the bountiful author of our being , for that portion and degree of knowledge , he has bestowed on us so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion . men have reason to be well satisfied with what god hath thought fit for them , since he has given them ( as st. peter says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) whatsoever is necessary for the conveniencies of life , and information of virtue ; and has put within the reach of their discovery , the comfortable provision for this life , and the way that leads to a better . how short soever their knowledge may come of an universal , or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is , it yet secures their great concernments , that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker , and the sight of their own duties . men may find matter sufficient to busie their heads , and employ their hands with variety , delight and satisfaction ; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution , and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with , because they are not big enough to grasp every thing . we shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds , if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us ; for of that they are very capable : and it will be an unpardonable , as well as childish pelvishness , if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge , and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us , because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it . it will he no excuse to an idle and untoward servant , who would not attend his business by candle-light , to plead that he had not broad sun-shine . the candle that is set up in us , shines bright enough for all our purposes . the discoveries we can make with this , ought to satisfie us . and we shall the● use our understandings right , when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion , that they are suited to our faculties ; and upon those grounds , they are capable of being proposed to us ; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration , and demand certainty , where probability only is to be had , and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments . if we will disbelive every thing , because we cannot certainly know all things ; we shall do much what as wiseiy as he who would not use his legs , but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly. . when we know our own strength , we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success . and when we have well survey'd the powers of our own minds , we shall not be enclin'd either to sit still , and not set our thoughts on work at all , in despair of knowing any thing ; nor on the other side , question every thing , and disclaim all knowledge , because some things are not to be understood . our business here , is not to know all things but those things which concern our conduct . if we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature , put into that state which man is in , in this world , may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon , we need not be troubled that some other things scape our knowledge . . this was that which gave the first rise to this essay concerning the understanding . for i thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into , was , to take a survey of our understandings , examine our own powers , and see to what things they were adapted . till that was done , i suspected we began at the wrong end , and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths that most concern'd us , whilst we let loose our thoughts in the vast ocean of being , as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings ; wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions , or that escaped its comprehension . thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities , and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing ; it is no wonder , that they raise questions , and multiply disputes , which never coming to any clear resolution , are proper only to continue and increase their doubts , and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism . whereas , were the capacities of our understandings well considered , the extent of our knowledge once discovered , and the horizon found , which sets bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things , between what is , and what is not comprehensible by us , men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd ignorance of the one , and imploy their thoughts and discourse , with more advantage and satisfaction to the other . book ii. chap. i. of ideas in general , and their original . by the term idea , i mean whatever is the object of the understanding , when a man thinks ; or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . i presume it will be easily granted me , that there are such ideas in mens minds : every one is conscious of them in himself ; and men's words and actions will satisfie him that they are in others . our first inquiry then shall be , how they come into the mind . it is an establish'd opinion amongst some men , that there are in the understanding certain innate principles , some primary notions , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) characters , as it were stamp'd upon the mind of man , which the soul receives in its very first being , and brings into the world with it . this opinion is accurately discuss'd , and refuted in the first book of this essay , to which i shall refer the reader , that desires satisfaction in this particular . it shall be sufficient here to shew , how men barely by the use of their natural faculties , may attain to all the knowledge they have , without the help of any innate impressions ; and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles . for i imagine , any one will easily grant , that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom god hath given sight , and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects . i shall shew by what ways and degrees all other ideas come into the mind ; for which i shall appeal to every one 's own experience and observation . let us then suppose the mind to be , as we say white paper , void of all characters , without any ideas : how comes it to be furnished ? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? to this i answer , in one word , from experience and observation . this , when employ'd about external sensible objects , we may call sensation : by this we have the ideas of bitter , sweet , yellow , hard , &c. which are commonly call'd sensible qualities , because convey'd into the mind by the senses . the same experience , when employ'd about the internal operations of the mind , perceiv'd , and reflected on by us , we may call reflection . hence we have the ideas of perception , thinking , doubting , willing , reasoning , &c. these two , viz. external material things , as the objects of sensation ▪ and the operations of our own minds , as the objects of reflection , are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings . the understanding seems not to have the least glimmering of ideas , which it doth not receive from one of these two sources . these , when we have taken a full survey of them , and their several modes and compositions , we shall find to contain out whole stock of ideas ; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways . 't is evident that children come by degrees to be furnish'd with ideas from the objects they are conversant with . they are so surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them , that some ideas will ( whether they will or no ) be imprinted on their minds . light and colours , sounds and tangible qualities , do continually sollicite their proper senses , and force an entrance into the mind . 't is late commonly before children come to have ideas of the operations of their minds ; and some men have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives . because , tho' they pass there continually ; yet , like floating visions , they make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind clear and lasting ideas , till the understanding turns inward upon its self , and reflects on its own operations , and makes them the objects of its own contemplation . when a man first perceives , then he may be said to have ideas ; having ideas , and perception , signifying the same thing . it is an opinion maintain'd by some , that the soul always thinks , and that it always has the actual perception of ideas , as long as it exists : and that actual thinking is an inseparable from the soul , as actual extension is from the body . but i cannot conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think , than for the body always to move : the perception of ideas being ( as i conceive ) to the soul , what motion is to the body , not its essence , but one of its operations : and therefore , though thinking be never so much the proper action of the soul ; yet it is not necessary to suppose , that it should always think , always be in action . that perhaps is the priviledge of the infinite author and preserver of all things , who never slumbers nor sleeps ; but is not competent in any finite being . we know certainly by experience , that we sometimes think ; and thence draw this infallible consequence , that there is something in us that has a power to think , but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no , we can be no farther assured than experience informs us . i would be glad to learn from those men , who so confidently pronounce , that the human soul always thinks , how they come to know it : nay , how they come to know that they themselves think , when they themselves do not perceive it . the most that can be said of it , is , that 't is possible the soul may always think ; but not always retain it in memory : and i say , it is as possible the soul may not always think ; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think , than it should often think , and that a long while together , and not be conscious to it self the next moment after that it had thought . i see no reason therefore to believe , that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on ; and as those are increas'd and retain'd , so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking , in the several parts of it ; as well as afterwards by compounding those ideas , and reflecting on its own operations , it increases in stock , as well as facility in remembring , imagining , reasoning , and other modes of thinking . chap. ii. of simple ideas . of ideas some are simple , others complex . a simple idea , is one uniform appearance or conception in the mind , which is not distinguishable into different ideas . such are sensible qualities , which though they are in the things themselves so united and blended , that there is no separation , no distance between them ; yet the ideas they produce in the mind , enter by the senses simple and unmix'd . thus , tho' the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax ; yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject , are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses . these simple ideas are suggested no other way than from the two ways above-mentioned , viz. sensation and reflexion . the mind being once stored with these simple ideas , has the power to repeat , compare , and unite them to an infinite variety : and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas . but the most enlarged understanding cannot frame one new simple idea ; nor by any force destroy them that are there . chap. iii. of ideas of one sense . ideas with reference to the different ways wherein they approach the mind , are of four sorts . first , there are some which come into our minds by one sense only . secondly , there are others convey'd into the mind by more senses than one . thirdly , others that are had from reflexion only . fourthly , there are some suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection . first , some enter into the mind only by one sense peculiarly adapted to receive them . thus colours , sounds , smells , &c. come in only by the eyes , ears , and nose . and if these organs are any of them so disorder'd as not to perform their functions , they have no postern to be admitted by ; no other way to bring themselves in view , and be perceiv'd by the understanding . it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense ; nor indeed is it possible ; there being a great many more than we have names for . chap. iv. of solidity . i shall here mention one which we receive by our touch , because it is one of the chief ingredients in many of our complex ideas ; and that is the idea of solidity : it arises from the resistance , one body makes to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses , till it has left it . there is no idea which we more constantly receive from sensation than this . in whatever posture we are , we feel somewhat that supports us , and hinders us from sinking downwards : and the bodies we daily handle , make us perceive that while they remain between them , they do by an unsurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them . this idea is commonly called impenetrability . i conceive solidity is more proper to express it , because this carries something more of positive in it than impenetrability , which is negative , and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity , than solidity it self . this seems to be the most essential property of body , and that whereby we conceive it to fill space : the idea of which is , that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance , we conceive it so to possess it , that it excludes all other solid substances . this resistance is so great , that no force can surmount it . all the bodies in the world pressing a drop of water on all sides , will never be able to overcome the resistance it makes to their approaching one another , till it be removed out of their way . the idea of solidity is distinguished from that of pure space , in as much as this latter is neither capable of resistance , nor motion : 't is distinguished from hardness , in as much as hardness is a firm cohaesion of the solid parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk , so that the whole doth not easily change its figure . indeed , hard and soft , as commonly apprehended by us , are but relative to the constitutions of our bodies : that being called hard , which will put us to pain sooner than change its figure , by the pressure of any part of our bodies ; and that soft , which changes the situation of its parts upon an easie and unpainful touch. this difficulty of changing situation amongst the parts gives no more solidity to the hardest body , than to the softests nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water : he that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water , will quickly find its resistance . by this we may distinguish the idea of the extension of body , from the idea of the extension of space : that of body , is the cohaesion or continuity of solid , separable , and moveable parts ; that of space , the continuity of unsolid , inseparable , and immoveable parts . upon the solidity of bodies depends their mutual impulse , resistance , and protrusion : of pure space and solidity there are several ( among which i confess my self one ) who perswade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas : and that they can think on space without any thing in it that resists or is protruded by body , as well as on something that fills space , that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies , or resist their motion ; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave surface , being equally clear without , as with the idea of any solid parts between . if any one ask what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him : let him put a flint or foot-ball between his hands , and then endeavour to joyn them , and he will know . chap. v. of simple ideas of divers senses ▪ some ideas we get into the mind by more than one sense , as space , extension , figure , rest and motion . these are perceivable by the eyes or touch. chap. vi. of simple ideas of reflection . some are had from reflection , only : such are the ideas we have of the operations of our minds : of which the two principal are perception or thinking ; and volition or willing . the powers of producing these operations are call'd faculties , which are the understanding and will , the several modes of thinking , &c. belong to this head. chap. vii . of simple ideas of sensation and reflection . there are some simple ideas convey'd into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection ; such are pleasure , pain , power , existence , unity , succession . pleasure or delight , pain or uneasiness accompany almost every impression of our senses , and every . action or thought of the mind . by pleasure or pain we mean whatever delights or molests us , whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds ; or any thing operating on our bodies . satisfaction , delight , pleasure , happiness and uneasiness , trouble , torment , misery , &c. are but different degrees , the one of pleasure , the other of pain . the author of our beings having given us a power over several parts of our bodies , to move or keep them at rest as we think fit ; and also by their motion to move our selves and other contiguous bodies ; having also given a power to our minds in several instances , to chuse amongst its ideas which it will think on : to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion he has joyn'd to several thoughts and sensations a perception of delight : without this we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another motion to rest : in which state man however furnish'd with the faculties of understanding and will , would be a very idle unactive creature , and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick dream . pain has the same efficacy to set us on work that pleasure has ; since we are as ready to avoid that , as to pursue this . this is worth our consideration , that pain is often produc'd by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us . this their near conjunction gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our maker , who designing the preservation of our being , has annex'd pain to the application of many things to our bodies , to warn us of the harm they will do us , and as advices to withdraw us from them . but he not designing our preservation barely , but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection , hath in many cases annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us . thus heat that is very agreeable to us in one degree , by a little greater increase of it , proves no ordinary torment : which is wisely ordered by nature , that when any object does by the vehemence of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation , whose structures cannot but be very delicate , we might by the pain be warn'd to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order . that this is the end of pain , appears from this consideration ; that tho' great light is insufferable to the eyes ; yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them : because that causes no disorderly motion in that curious organ the eye . but excess of cold , as well as heat pains us ; because it is equally destructive to the temper which is necessary to the preservation of life . another reason why god hath annex'd several degrees of pleasure and pain to all the things that environ and affect us , and blended them together in all things that our thoughts and senses have to do with , is , that we finding imperfection and dissatisfaction , and want of compleat happiness in all the enjoyments of the creatures , might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him with whom is fulness of joy , and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore . thô what is here said concerning pleasure and pain may not perhaps make those ideas clearer to us , than our own experience does , yet it may serve to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things , which is not unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries : the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts , and the proper business of all understandings . 〈◊〉 and unity are two other ideas suggested by every object without , and every idea within : when ideas are in our minds , we consider them as being actually there , as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is , that they exist , or have existence : and whatever we consider as one thing , whether a real being , or idea , suggests the idea of unity . power is anothér idea deriv'd from these sources : for finding in our selves that we can think , and move several parts of our bodies at pleasure ; and observing the effects that natural bodies produce in one another ; by both these ways we get the idea of power . succession is another idea suggested by our senses , and by reflection on what passes in our minds . for if we look into our selves , we shall find our ideas always whilst we are awake , or have any thought , passing in train , one going and another coming without intermission . chap. viii . some farther considerations concerning simple ideas . whatsoever is able by affecting our senses , to cause any perception in the mind , doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea ; which whatsoever be the cause of it , is look'd upon as a real positive idea in the understanding . thus the ideas of heat and cold , light and darkness , motion and rest , &c. are equally positive in the mind , thô some of their causes may be meer privations . an enquiry into their causes concerns not the ideas as in the understanding ; but the nature of the things existing without us . thus a painter has distinct ideas of white and black , as well as the philosopher , who tells us what kind of particles , and how rang'd in the surface occasion'd those colours . that a privative cause may produce a positive idea , appears from shadows , which ( thô nothing but the absence of light ) are discernible ; and cause clear and positive ideas . the natural reason of which may be this , viz. that since sensation is produced only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits , variously agitated by external objects ; the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation , as the increase and variation of it ; and thereby introduce a new idea . we have some negative names , which stand for no positive ideas : but consist wholly in negation of some certain ideas , as silence , invisible . these signify not any ideas in the mind , but their absence . it will be useful to distinguish ideas as they are perceptions in our minds , from what they are in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us : for we are not to think the former exact images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject . most of those of sensation being in the mind , no more the likeness of something existing without us , than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas , which yet upon hearing , they are apt to excite in us . whatsoever the mind perceives in it self , or is the immediate object of perception , thought or understanding , that i call an idea : and the power to produce any idea in our mind i call the quality of the subject wherein that power is : thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white , cold and round , those powers as they are in the snow-ball i call qualities ; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings i call them ideas : which ideas if i speak of sometimes , as in the things themselves , i would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us . these qualities are of two sorts , first original or primary , such are solidity , extention , motion or rest , number and figure . these are inseparable from body , and such as it constantly keeps in all its changes and alterations : thus take a grain of wheat , divide it into two parts , each part has still solidity , extension , figure , mobility : divide it again , and it still retains the same qualities , and will do so still , thô you divide it on till the parts become insensible . the next thing to be consider'd , is , how bodies operate upon one another , and that is manifestly by impulse , and nothing else . for body cannot operate on what it does not touch : nor when it does touch , any other way than by motion . if so , then when external objects ( which are not united to our minds ) produce ideas in us ; 't is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits to the brains , or seat of sensation . and since extension , figure , motion , &c. may be perceived at a distance by the sight , t is evident that some bodies must come from them to the eyes , and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces those ideas we have in us . secondly , secondary qualities , such as colours , smells , tasts ; sounds , &c , which whatever reality we by mistake may attribute to them , are in truth nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us ; and depend on the qualities before-mentioned . the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them ; and their patterns really exist in bodies themselves : but the ideas produced in us by secundary qualities , have no resemblance of them at all , and what is sweet , blue , or warm in the idea , is but the certain bulk , figure , and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves , which we call so . thus we see that fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth , which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of pain . now what reason have we to say that the idea of warmth is actually in the fire , but that of pain not in the fire , which the same fire produces in us the same way . the bulk , number , figure , and motion of the parts of fire , are really in it , whether we perceive them or no ; and therefore may be call'd real qualities , because they really exist in that body . but light and heat are no more really in it , than sickness or pain : take away the sensation of them ; let not the eyes see light or colours , nor the ear hear sounds ; let the palate not taste , or the nose smell , and all colours , tasts , odours , and sounds , as they are such particular ideas vanish and cease ; and are reduced to their causes , ( that is ) bulk , motion , figure , &c. of parts . these secondary qualities are of two sorts , first immediately perceiveable , which by immediately operating on our bodies , produce several different ideas in us . secondly , mediately perceivable , which by operating on other bodies , change their primary qualities , so as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what they did before . these last are powers in bodies which proceed from the particular constitution of those primary and original qualities , to make such a change in the bulk , figure , texture , &c. of another body , as to make it operate on our senses different from what it did before ; as in fire to make lead fluid : these two last being nothing but powers relating to other bodies , and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities are yet otherwise thought of ; the former being esteemed real qualities ; but the later barely powers : the reason of this mistake seems to be this ; that our ideas of sensible qualities containing nothing in them of bulk , figure , &c. we cannot think them the effect of those primary qualities which appear not to our senses to operate in their productions , and with which they have not any apparent congruity , or conceivable connexion : nor can reason shew how bodies by their bulk , figure , &c. should produce in the mind the ideas of warm , yellow , &c. but in the other case when bodies operate upon one another , we plainly see that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it , and therefore we look upon it as the effect of power : but our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us , and the quality of the object producing it , we imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not in the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of the primary qualities , with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us , have no resemblance . this little exeursion into natural philosophy was necessary in our present enquiry to distinguish the primary and real qualities of bodies which are always in them , from those secundary and imputed qualities , which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones , when they operate without being distinctly discern'd ; whereby we learn to know what ideas are , and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them . chap. ix . of perception . perception is the first idea we receive from reflection : it is by some called thinking in general : thô thinking in the propriety of the english tongue , signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas , wherein the mind is active ; where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention : for in bare perception the mind is for the most part only passive : and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving . what this is , we cannot otherwise know , than by reflecting on what passes in our minds when we see , feel , hear , &c. impressions made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within , cause no perception : as we see in those whose minds are intently busied in the contemplation of certain objects . a sufficient impulse there may be upon the organs of sensation : but if it reach not the observation of the mind , there follows no perception : so that wherever there is sense or perception , there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding . we may observe that the ideas we receive from sensation , are often in grown people alter'd by the judgment without our taking notice of it . thus a globe of any uniform colour ( as of gold ) or jet , being set before our eyes , the idea thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variously shadowed . but being accustomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us ; the judgment alters the appearances into their causes ; and from that variety of shadow or colour , frames to it self the perception of a convex figure of one uniform colour . this in many cases by a settl'd habit is perform'd so readily , that we take that for the perception of our sensation , which is but an idea formed by the judgment : so that one serves only to excite the other , and is scarce taken notice of itself . as a man who reads and hears with attention , takes little notice of the characters or sounds , but of the ideas that are excited in him by them . thus habits come at last to produce actions in us , which often scape our observation . the faculty of perception seems to be that which puts the distinction between the animal kingdom , and the inferior parts of nature : since vegetables have some degrees of motion , and upon the different application of other bodies to them , do very briskly alter their figutes and motions , and thence have obtain'd the name of sensitive plants : which yet is , i suppose , but bare mechanism , and no otherwise produced , than the shortning of a rope by the affusion of water . but perception , i believe , is in some degree in all sorts of animals : thô i think we may from the make of an oister or cockle , reasonably conclude that it has not so many , nor so quick senses as a man , or several other animals . perception is also the first step and degree towards knowledge , and the inlet of all the materials of it : so that the fewer senses any man has , and the duller the impressions that are made by them are , the more remote he is from that knowledge which is to be found in other men. chap. x. of retention . the next faculty of the mind whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge , i call retention : which is the keeping of those ideas it has receiv'd . which is done two ways . first , by keeping the idea which is brought into the mind for some time actuactually in view , which is called contemplation . secondly , by reviving those ideas in our minds which have disappeared , and have been as it were , laid out of sight ; and this is memory , which is as it were , the store-house of our ideas , for the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view at once , it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas which at another time it may have use of . but our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind which cease to be any thing , when there is no perception of them , this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this , that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions it has once had , with this additional perception annex'd to them , that it has had them before . and it is by the assistance of this faculty , that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings , which we can bring in sight , and make the object of our thoughts , without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there . attention and repetition help much to the fixing ideas in our memories : but those which make the deepest and most lasting impressions are those which are accompanied with pleasure and pain . ideas but once taken in and never again repeated are soon lost ; as those of colours in such as lost their sight when very young . the memory in some men is tenacious , even to a miracle : but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas , even of those which are struck deepest ; and in minds the most retentive : so that if they be not sometimes renewed , the print wears out , and at last there remains nothing to be seen . those ideas that are often refresh'd by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them , fix themselves best in the memory , and remain longest there : such are the original qualities of bodies , viz. solidity , extension , figure , motion , &c. and those that almost constantly affect us , as heat and cold : and those that are the affections of all kinds of beings , as existence , duration , number : these and the like , are seldom quite lost while the mind retains any ideas at all . in memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive ; for it often sets it self on work to search some hidden ideas ; sometimes they start of their own accord : and sometimes turbulent and tempestuous passions tumble them out of their cells . the defects of the memory are two. first , that it loses the idea quite , and so far it produces perfect ignorance . secondly , that it moves slowly and retrieves not the ideas laid up in store quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions . this if it be to a great degree is stupidity . in the having ideas ready at hand on all occasions , consists what we call invention , fancy , and quickness of parts . this faculty other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as man , as appears by birds learning of tunes , and their endeavour to hit the notes right . for it seems impossible that they should endeavour to conform their voices ( as 't is plain they do ) to notes , whereof they have no ideas . chap. xi . of discerning , and other operations of the mind . another faculty of the mind is , that of discerning between its ideas : on this depends the evidence , and certainty of several even general propositions , which pass for innate truths : whereas indeed they depend on this clear discerning faculty of the mind , whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different . in being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another , where there is the least difference , consists in a great measure , that exactness of judgment and clearness of reason , which is to be observed in one man above another ; which is quite opposite to wit , which consists most in the assemblage of ideas , and putting those together with quickness and variety , which have the least resemblance , to form agreeable visions : whereas judgment separates carefully those ideas , wherein can be found the least difference to prevent error and delusion . to the well distinguishing our ideas , it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate , and when they are so , it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them , thô the senses should convey them from the same object differently on different occasions . the comparing of our ideas one with another in respect of extent , degree , time , place , or any other circumstances , is another operation of the mind about its ideas , which is the ground of relations . brutes seem not to have this faculty in any great degree . they have probably several ideas distinct enough ; but cannot compare them farther than some sensible circumstances annex'd to the objects themselves . the power of comparing general ideas , which we may observe in men , we may probably conjecture beasts have not at all . composition is another operation of the mind whereby it combines several of its simple ideas into complex ones : under which operation we may reckon that of enlarging , wherein we put several ideas together of the same kind , as several unites to make a dozen . in this also i suppose brutes come far short of man ; for tho' they take in and retain together several combinations of simple ideas , as possibly a dog does the shape , smell and voice of his master ; yet these are rather so many distinct marks , whereby he knows him , than one complex idea made out of those several simple ones . abstraction is another operation of the mind , whereby the mind forms general ideas from such as it receiv'd from particular objects , which it does by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances seperate from the circumstance of real existence , as time , place , &c. these become general representatives of all of the same kind , and their names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas . thus the colour which i receive from chalk , snow , and milk , is made a representative of all of that kind ; and has a name given it ( whiteness ) which signifies the same quality , wherever to be found or imagin'd . and thus universally both ideas and terms are made . this puts the great difference between man and brutes : they seem to reason about particular objects , and ideas , but there appear no footsteps of abstraction in them , or of making general ideas . chap. xii . of complex ideas . in the reception of simple ideas the mind is only passive , having no power to frame any to its self , but as these simple ideas do exist in several combinations united together , so the mind may consider them as united , not only as they are really united in external objects , but as it self has joyned them . ideas thus made up of several ones put together , i call complex , as a man , army , beauty , gratitude , &c. by this faculty of repeating and joyning together its ideas , the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts . but it is still confin'd to those simple ideas which it received from the two sources of sensation and reflection . it can have no other ideas of sensible qualities , than what come from without by the senses , nor any other ideas of the operations of a thinking substance , than what it finds in it self , but having once got these simple ideas , it can by its own power put them together and make new complex ones , which it never received so united . complex ideas however compounded and decompounded , tho' their number be infinite , and their variety endless , may all be reduced under these three heads , first modes , secondly , substances , thirdly , relations . modes , i call such complex ideas which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves , but are consider'd as dependences on , and affections of substances , as triangle , gratitude , murder , &c. these modes are of two sorts , first simple , which are but the combinations of the same simple idea as a dozen , score , &c. which are but the ideas of so many distinct unites put together . secondly , mix'd , which are compounded of simple ideas of several kinds , as beauty , which consists in a certain composition of colour and figure , causing delight in the beholder . theft , which is the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor . these visibly contain a combination of several ideas , of several kinds . secondly substance , the ideas of substances are only such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves ; in which the confused idea of substance is always the chief . thus a combination of the ideas of a certain figure , with the powers of motion , thought , and reasoning joyn'd to substance , make the ordinary idea of man. these again are either of single substances , as man , stone , or of collective , or several put together , as army , heap : ideas of several substances thus put together , are as much each of them one single idea , as that of a man , or an unite . thirdly , relations which consist in the consideration and comparing one idea with another . of these several kinds we shall treat in their order . caap. xiii . of simple modes , and first of the simple modes of space . concerning simple modes we may observe that the modifications of any simple idea , are as perfectly different , and distinct ideas in the mind , as those of the greatest distance or contrariety ; thus two is as distinct from three , as blueness from heat . under this head i shall first consider the modes of space . space is a simple idea which we get both by our sight and touch. when we consider it barely in length between two bodies , 't is called distance , ; when in length , breadth , and thickness , it may be called capacity . when consider'd between the extremities of matter which fills the capacity of space with something solid , tangible and moveable , it is called extension , and thus extension will be an idea belonging to the body : but space may be conceived without it . each different distance is a different modification of space : and each idea of any different space is a simple mode of this idea . such are an inch , foot , yard , &c. which are the ideas of certain stated lengths , which men settle in their minds , for the use , and by the custom of measuring . when these ideas are made familiar to men's thoughts , they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will , without joyning to them the idea of body , and frame to themselves the ideas of feet , yards or fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies : and by adding these still one to another , enlarge their idea of space as much as they please . from this power of repeating any idea of distance , without being ever able to come to an end , we come by the idea of immensity . another modification of space is taken from the relation of the parts of the termination of capacity or extension amongst themselves : and this is what we call figure . this the touch discovers in sensible bodies , whose extremities come within our reach : and the eye takes both from bodies and colours , whose boundaries are within its view ; where observing how the extremities terminate either in straight lines , which meet at discernible angles ; or in crooked lines , wherein no angles can be perceiv'd : by considering these as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or space , it has that idea we call figure : which affords to the mind infinite variety . another mode belonging to this head , is that of place . our idea of place is nothing but the relative position of any thing with reference to its distance from some fix'd , and certain points . whence we say , that a thing has or has not changed place , when its distance either is , or is not altered with respect to those bodies with which we have occasion to compare it . that this is so , we may easily gather from hence ; that we can have no idea of the place of the universe , tho' we can of all its parts . to say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist . the word place is sometimes taken to signifie that space which any body takes up ; and so the universe may be conceived in a place . chap. xiv . of duration and its simple modes . there is another sort of distance , the idea of which we get from the fleeting , and perpetually perishing parts of succession which we call duration . the simple modes of it are any different lengths of it , whereof we have distinct ideas , as hours , days , years , &c. time and eternity . the idea of succession is got by reflecting on that train of ideas which constantly follow one another in our minds as long as we are awake . the distance between any parts of this succession is what we call duration : and the continuation of the existence of our selves , or any thing else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds , is what we call our own duration , or that of another thing co-existing with our thinking . that this is so , appears from hence , that we have no perception of succession or duration , when that succession of our ideas ceases , as in sleep : the moment that we sleep , and awake , how distant soever seems to be joyn'd and connected . and possibly it would be so to a waking man , could he fix upon one idea without variation , and the succession of others . and we see that they whose thoughts are very intent upon one thing , let slip out of their account a good part of that duration , : and think that time shorter than it is . but if a man during his sleep dream , and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind , one after another he hath then , during such dreaming , a sense of duration and of the length of it . a man having once got this idea of duration , can apply it to things which exist while he does not think : and thus we measure the time of our sleep , as well as that wherein we are awake . those who think we get the idea of succession from our observation of motion , by our senses , will be of our opinion , when they consider that motion produces in the mind an idea of succession , no otherwise than as it produces there a continu'd train of distinguishable ideas . a man that looks upon a body really moving perceives no motion , unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas . but wherever a man is , tho' all things be at rest about him , if he thinks , he will be conscious of succession without perceiving any motion . hence motions very slow are not perceived by us : because the change of distance is so slow , that it causes no new ideas in us , but after a long interval . the same happens in things that move very swift , which not affecting the sense with several distinguishable distances of their motion , cause not any train of ideas in our minds , and consequently are not perceived . thus any thing that moves round in a circle in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds , is not perceived to move , but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter which is in motion . such a part of duration as takes up the time of only one idea in our minds , wherein we perceive no succession , we call an instant . duration , as mark'd by certain periods and measures , is what we most properly call time : which we measure by the diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun , as being constant , regular , and universally observable by all mankind , and supposed equal to one another , it is not necessary that time should be measured by motion : any constant periodical appearance in seemingly equidistant spaces , may as well distinguish the intervals of time as what we make use of . for supposing the sun to be lighted , and then extinguish'd every day : and that in the space of an annual revolution , it should sensibly increase in brightness , and so decrease again ; such a regular appearance would serve to measure out the distances of duration , to all that could observe it , as well without , as with motion . the freezing of water , the blowing of a plant returning at equidistant periods in all the parts of the earth would serve for the same purpose . in effect , we find that a people of america counted their years by the coming and going away of birds at certain seasons . the mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun , can easily apply it to duration wherein that measure it self did not exist : and the idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun , is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration where no sun , nor motion was , as the idea of a foot or yard to distances beyond the confines of the world. by the same means we come by the idea of eternity : for having got the ideas of certain lengths of duration , we can in our thoughts add them to one another as oft as we please , without ever coming to an end . chap. xv. of duration and expansion considered together . time is to duration as place is to space or expansion . they are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out , and distinguished from the rest ; and so are made use of to denote the position of finite real beings in respect one to another , in those infinite oceans of duration and space . each of these have a twofold acceptation . first , time in general is taken for so much of infinite duration as is coexistent with the universe , and measured out by the motions of its great bodies . thus it is used in the phrases before all time , when time shall be no more . place is likewise taken for that portion of infinite space possessed by the material world , tho' this might be more properly called extension . within these two are confined the particular time or duration , extension or place of all corporeal beings . secondly , time is sometimes applied to parts of that infinite duration that were not really measured out by real existence , but such as we upon occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measur'd time. as in the julian period which makes an excursion of seven hundred sixty four years beyond the creation . thus we may speak of place or distance in the great inane , wherein i can conceive a space equal to , or capable of receiving a body of any assigned dimensions . chap. xvi . of numbers . the complex ideas of number are form'd by adding several unites together . the simple modes of it are each several combination , as , two , three , &c. these are of all others most distinct , the nearest being as clearly different from each other as the most remote : two being as distinct from one , as two hundred . but it is hard to form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension . hence demonstrations in numbers are more general in their use , and more determinate in their application than those of extension . simple modes of numbers , being in our minds but so many combinations of unites which have no variety , but more or less : names for each distinct combination , seem more necessary then in any other sort of ideas . for without a name or mark , to distinguish that precise collection , it will hardly be kept from being a heap of confusion . hence some americans have no distinct idea of any number beyond twenty : so that when they are discoursed with of greater numbers , they shew the hairs of their head. so that to reckon right two things are required . first , that the mind distinguish carefully two ideas which are different one from another , only by the addition or substraction of one unite . secondly , that it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from an unite to that number ; and that in exact order , as they follow one another . in either of which if it fails , the whole business of numbring will be disturbed : and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude : but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attain'd to . chap. xvii . of infinity : the idea signified by the name infinity , is best examined , by considering to what infinity is by the mind attributed , and then how it frames it . finite and infinite then are look'd upon as the modes of quantity , and attributed primarily to things that have parts , and are capable of increase or diminution , by the addition or substraction of any the least part . such are the ideas of space , duration , and number . when we apply this idea to the supream being : we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity ; more figuratively when to his wisdom , power , goodness , and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible : for when we call them infinite , we have no other idea of this infinity , but what carries with it some reflexion on the number , or the extent of the acts or objects of god's power and wisdom , which can never be supposed so great or so many , which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed , thô we multiply them in our thoughts , with the infinity of endless number . i do not pretend to say , how these attributes are in god , who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities : but this is our way of conceiving them , and these our ideas of their infinity . the next thing to be considered , is how we come by the idea of infinity . every one that has any idea of any stated lengths of space , as a foot , yard , &c. finds that he can repeat that idea , and joyn it to another , to a third , and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions : from this power of enlarging his idea of space , he takes the idea of infinite space or immensity . by the same power of repeating the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds , with all the endless addition of number , we come by the idea of eternity . if our idea of infinity be got by repeating without end our own ideas ; why do we not attribute it to other ideas , as well as those of space and duration ; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our minds as the other ? yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness , whiteness , thô he can repeat the idea of sweet or white as frequently , as those of yard or day . i answer , that those ideas that have parts , and are capable of increase , by the addition of any parts , afford us by their repetition an idea of infinity ; because with the endless repetition there is continued an enlargement , of which there is no end : but it is not so in other ideas : for if to the perfectest idea i have of white , i add another of equal whiteness ; it enlarges not my idea at all . those ideas that consist not of parts , cannot be augmented to what proportion men please , or be stretch'd beyond what they have received by their senses ; but space , duration and number being capable of increase by repetition , leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more ; and so those ideas alone lead the mind towards the thought of infinity . we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space , and the idea of a space infinite , the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind over any repeated idea of space . but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite , is to suppose the mind already passed over all those repeated ideas of space , which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it ; which carries in it a plain contradiction . this will be plainer , if we consider infinity in numbers . the infinity of numbers , to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach , easily appears to any one that reflects on it : but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be , there is nothing yet more evident , than the absurdity of the actual idea of infinite number . chap. xviii . of other simple modes . the mind has several distinct ideas of sliding , rolling , walking , creeping , &c. which are all but the different modifications of motion . swift and slow are two different ideas of motion , the measures whereof are made out of the distances of time and space put together . the like variety we have in sounds : every articulate word is a different modification of sound : as are also notes of different length put together , which make that complex idea called tune . the modes of colours might be also very various : some of which we take notice of , as the different degrees , or as they are termed shades of the same colour . but since we seldom make assemblages of colours , without taking in figure also , as in painting , &c. those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes , as beauty , rainbow , &c. all compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses : but they being such as generally we have no names for , cannot be set down in writing , but must be left to the thoughts , and experience of the reader . chap. xix . of the modes of thinking . when the mind turns its view inwards upon its self , thinking is the first idea that occurs : wherein it observes a great variety of modifications ; and thereof frames to it self distinct ideas . thus the perception annex'd to any impression on the body made by an external object , is call'd sensation . when an idea recurs without the presence of the object , it is called remembrance . when sought after by the mind , and brought again in view , it is recollection . when held there long under attentive consideration , it is contemplation . when ideas float in the mind without regard or reflection , 't is called in french resvery , our language has scarce a name for it . when the ideas are taken notice of , and as it were registred in the memory , it is attention . when the mind fixes its view on any one idea , and considers it on all sides , it is intention and study . sleep without dreaming is rest from all these . and dreaming , is the perception of ideas in the mind , not suggested by any external objects , or known occasions ; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding . of these various modes of thinking , the mind forms as distinct ideas , as it does of white and red , a square or a circle . chap. xx. of the modes of pleasure and pain . pleasure and pain are simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection . there are thoughts of the mind , as well as sensations , accompanied with pleasure or pain . their causes are termed good or evil. for things are esteemed good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain . that we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure , or diminish pain in us : to procure or preserve the possession of any good , or absence of any evil : and on the contrary , that we call evil , which is apt to produce or increase any pain , or diminish any pleasure in us ; or else to procure us any evil , or deprive us of any good , by pleasure and pain i would be understood to mean of body or mind , as they are commonly distinguished ; thô in truth they are only different constitutions of the mind , sometimes occasion'd by disorder in the body , sometimes by thoughts of the mind . pleasure and pain , and their causes good and evil , are the hinges upon which our passions turn : by reflecting on the various modifications or tempers of mind , and the internal sensations which pleasure and pain , good and evil produce in us , we may thence form to our selves the ideas of our passions . thus by reflecting upon the thought we have of the delight , which any thing is apt to produce in us , we have an idea we call love : and on the contrary , the thought of the pain , which any thing present or absent produces in us , is what we call hatred . desire is that uneasiness which a man finds in himself , upon the absence of any thing , the present enjoyment of which carries the idea of delight with it . joy is a delight of the mind arising from the present or assur'd approaching possession of a good. sorrow is an uneasiness of the mind , upon the thought of a good lost , or the sense of a present evil. hope is a pleasure in the mind upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight . fear is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a future evil , likely to befall us . anger is a discomposure of mind upon the receipt of injury , with a present purpose of revenge . despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good. envy is an uneasiness of mind , caused by the consideration of a good we desire , obtained by one we think should not have had it before us . it is to be considered that in reference to the passions , the removal or lessening of a pain , is considered , and operates as a pleasure : and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure , as a pain . and farther , that the passions in most persons operate on the body , and cause various changes in it : but these being not always sensible , do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion . besides these modes of pleasure and pain which result from the various considerations of good and evil , there are many others , i might have instanced in , as the pain of hunger and thirst , and the pleasure of eating and drinking ; and of musick , &c. but i rather chose to instance in the passions , as being of much more concernment to us . chap. xxi . of power . the mind being every day informed by the senses , of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without : reflecting also on what passes within it self , and observing a constant change of its ideas , sometimes by the impressions of outward objects upon the senses ; and sometimes by the determination of its own choice : and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been , that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things , by the same agents , and by the like ways , considers in one thing , the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed ; and in another , the possibility of making that change , and so comes by that idea which we call power . thus we say fire has a power to melt gold , and make it fluid ; and gold has a power to be melted . power thus considered is twofold , viz. . as able to make or able to receive any change : the one may be called active , the other passive power . of passive power all sensible things abundantly furnish us with ideas , whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in a continual flux , and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change . nor have we of active power , fewer instances : since whatever change is observed : the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change . but yet if we will consider it attentively , bodies by our senses do not afford us , so clear and distinct an idea of active power , as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds . for all power relating to action , and there being but two sorts of action , viz. thinking and motion , let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers , which produce these actions . of thinki●g , body affords us no idea at all : it is only from reflection that we have that ; neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion . a body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move ; and when it isset in motion it self , that motion is rather a passion than an action in it . the idea of the beginning of motion we have only by reflection on what passes in our selves ; where we find by experience , that barely by willing it , we can move the parts of our bodies , which were before at rest. we find in our selves a power to begin or forbear , continue or end several actions of our minds , and motions of our bodies , barely by a thought or preference of the mind . this power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea , or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest , and vice versa in any particular instance , is , that we call the will. the actual exercise of that power , is that which we call volition or willing : the forbearance or performance of that action , consequent to such order or command of the mind , is called voluntary : and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called involuntary . the power of perception is that we call the understanding . perception which we make the act of the understanding is of three sorts . first , the perception of ideas in our minds , secondly , the perception of the signification of signs . thirdly , the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any distinct ideas . these powers of the mind , viz. of perceiving and preferring are usually called by another name ; and the ordinary way of speaking is that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind . a word proper enough , if it be used so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts , by being supposed , ( as i suspect it has been ) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition . from the consideration of the extent of the power of the mind , over the actions of the man , which every one finds in himself , arise the ideas of liberty and necessity : so far as a man has a power to think , or not to think ; to move , or not to move , according to the preference or direction of his own mind , so far is a man free. wherever any performance or forbearance , are not equally in a man's power ; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind , there , he is not free , thô perhaps the action may be voluntary . so that the idea of liberty , is the idea of a power in any agent , to do or forbear any action according to the determination or thought of the mind , whereby either of them is preferred to the other ; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him , according to his volition , there he is not at liberty : that agent is under necessity . so that liberty cannot be where there is no thought , no volition , no will : but there may be thought , there may be will , there may be volition , where there is no liberty . thus a tennis-ball , whether in motion by the stroke of a racket , or lying still at rest , is not by any one taken to be a free agent ; because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think , and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest , or vice versâ . so a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm , which it is not in his power by volition or the direction of his mind , to stop or forbear ; no body thinks he has in this liberty , every one pities him as acting by necessity , and constraint . again , suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where is a person he longs to see , and be there locked fast in beyond his power to get out ; he awakes , and is glad to see himself in so desirable company , which he stays willingly in ; that is , prefers his staying to going away . is not this stay voluntary ? i think no body will doubt it , and yet being locked fast in , he is not at liberty to stay , he has not freedom to be gone . so that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring ; but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do , according as the mind shall chuse or direct . as it is in the motions of the body , so it is in the thoughts of our minds : where any one is such , that we have power to take it up , or lay it by according to the preference of the mind , there we are at liberty . a waking man is not at libetty to think or not to think , no more than he is at liberty , whether his body , shall touch any other or no : but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another , is many times in his choice . and then he is in respect of his ideas , as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on . he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another : but yet some ideas to the mind , like some motions to the body are such , as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by their utmost effort it can use . thus a man on the rack , is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain , and entertain other contemplations . wherever thought is wholly wanting , or the power to act or forbear , according to the direction of thought , there necessity takes place . this in an agent capable of volition , when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his mind , is called compulsion : when the hindring or stopping any action is contrary to his volition , it is called restraint . agents that have no thought , no volition at all , are in every thing necessary agents . and thus i have in a short draught given a view of our original ideas , from whence all the rest are derived , and of which they are made up . and which may be all reduc'd to these few primary and original ones , viz. extention , solidity , and mobility which by our senses we receive from body : thinking , and the power of moving , which by reflection we receive from our minds . existence , duration , number which belong both to the one , and to the other . by these i imagine might be explained the nature of colours , sounds , tasts smells , and all other ideas we have ; if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the several modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us . chap. xxii . of mixed modes . mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of different kinds , ( whereby they are distinguished from simple modes , which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind , put together by the mind ) as virtue , vice , a lie , &c. the mind being once furnished with simple ideas can put them together in several compositions , without examining whether they exist so together in nature : to form such ideas it suffices , if they are consistent : there are three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes . first , by experience and observation of things themselves : thus by seeing two men wrestle , we get the idea of wrestling . secondly , by invention or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds ; so he that first invented printing , had an idea of it first in his mind , before it ever existed . thirdly , by explaining the names of actions we never saw , or notions we cannot see ; and by enumerating all those ideas which go to the making them up . thus the mixed mode which the word lie stands for , is made up of these simple ideas : first , articulate sounds . secondly , certain ideas in the mind of the speaker . thirdly , words , the signs of these ideas . fourthly , those signs put together by affirmation or negation , otherwise than the ideas they stand for , are in the mind of the speaker . since languages are made , complex ideas are usually got by the explication of those terms that stand for them , for since they consist of simple ideas combined , they may by words standing for those simple ideas be represented to the mind of one who understands those words , thô that combination of simple ideas was never offer'd to his mind by the real existence of things . mixed modes have their unity from an act of the mind , combining those several simple ideas together , and considering them as one complex one : the mark of this union , is one name given to that combination . men seldom reckon any number of ideas to make one complex one : but such collections as there be names for . thus the killing of an old man , is as fit to be united into one complex idea , as that of a father : yet there being no name for it , it is not taken for a particular complex idea ; nor a distinct species of action , from that of killing any other man. those collections of ideas have names generally affixed , which are of frequent use in conversation : in which cases men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all possible dispatch . those others which they have seldom occasion to mention , they tie not together , nor give them names . this gives the reason , why there are words in every language , which cannot be rendred by any one single word of another . for the fashions and customs of one nation , make several combinations of ideas familiar in one , which another had never any occasion to make . such were , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the greeks , proscriptio among the romans . this also occasions the constant change of languages ; because the change of custom and opinions , brings with it new combinations of ideas , which , to avoid long descriptions , have new names annexed to them , and so they become new species of complex modes . of all our simple ideas , those that have had most mixed modes made out of them are thinking ; and motion ; ( which comprehend in them all action ) and power , from whence these actions are conceived to flow . for actions being the great business of mankind , it is no wonder if the several modes of thinking , and motion should be taken notice of , the ideas of them observed , and laid up in memory , and have names assigned them . for without such complex ideas with names to them , men could not easily hold any communication about them . of this kind are the modes of actions distinguished by their causes , means , objects , ends , instruments , time , place , and other circumstances ; as also of the powers , sitted for those actions : thus boldness is the power to do or speak what we intend without fear or disorder : which power of doing any thing , when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the same thing , is that idea we call habit : when forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action , we call it dispositions . thus testiness , is a disposition or aptness to be angry . power being the source of all action , the substances wherein these powers are , whenthey exert this power , are called causes : and the substances thereupon produced , or the simple ideas introduced into any subject , effects . the efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced , is called , in the subject exerting that power , action ; in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed , or produced , passion : which efficacy in intellectual agents , we can i think , conceive to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing : in corporeal agents , nothing else but modifications of motion . whatever sort of action , besides these produces any effect ; i confess my self to have no notion , or idea of . and therefore many words which seem to express some action , signify nothing of the action , but barely the effect , with some circumstances of the subject wrought on , or cause operating . thus creation , annihilation , contain in them no idea of the action or manner , whereby they are produced , but barely of the cause , and the thing done . and when a country-man says the cold freezes water , thô the word freezing , seem to import some action , yet it truly signifies nothing but the effect , viz. that water that was before fluid , is become hard , and consistent , without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done . chap. xxiii . of our complex ideas or substances . the mind observing several simple ideas to go constantly together , which being presumed to belong to one thing , are called , when so united by one name ; and by mistake afterwards considered as one simple idea . we imagine not these simple ideas to subsist by themselves , but suppose some substratum , wherein they subsist , which we call substance , the idea of pure substance is nothing but the suppos'd , but unknown support of these qualities , which are capable of producing simple ideas in us . the ideas of particular substances are composed out of this obscure , and general idea of substance , together with such combinations of simple ideas , as are observed to exist together , and supposed to flow from the internal constitution , and unknown essence of that substance . thus we come by the ideas of man , horse , gold , &c. thus the sensible qualities of iron , or a diamond make the complex idea of those substances , which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better , than a philosopher . the same happens concerning the operations of the mind viz. thinking , reasoning , &c. which we concluding not to subsist by themselves , nor apprehending how they can belong to body , or be produced by it ; we think them the actions of some other substance , which we call spirit : of whose substance or nature we have as clear a notion as of that of body ; the one being but the supposed substratum of the simple idea , we have from without ; as the other of those operations which we experiment in our selves within : so that the ideas of corporeal substance in matter , is as remote from our conceptions as that of spiritual substance . hence we may conclude that he has the perfectest idea of any particular substance , who has collected most of those simple ideas which do exist in it : among which we are to reckon its active powers , and passive capacities . tho' not strictly simple ideas . secondary qualities for the most part serve , to distinguish substances . for our senses fail us in the discovery of the bulk , figure , texture , &c. of the minute parts of bodies on which their real constitutions , and differences depend : and secondary qualities are nothing , but powers with relation to our senses . the ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances , are of three sorts . first , the ideas of primary qualities of things , which are discovered by our senses : such are bulk , figure , motion , &c. secondly , the sensible secondary qualities , which are nothing but powers to produce several ideas in us by our senses . thirdly , the aptness we consider in any substance to cause , or receive such alterations of primary qualities , as that the substance so altered , should produce in us different ideas , from what it did before : and they are called active and passive powers . all which , as far as we have any notice , or notion of them , terminate in simple ideas . had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies , it is not to be doubted , but they would produce quite different ideas in us ; as we find in viewing things with microscopes . such bodies as to our naked eyes are coloured and opaque , will through microscopes appear pellucid . bloud , to the naked eye appears all red ; but by a good microscope we see only some red globules swimming in a transparent liquor . the infinite wise author of our beings has fitted our organs , and faculties to the conveniences of life and the business we have to do here : we may by our sences know and distinguish things so far as to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life . we have also insight enough into their admirable contrivances , and wonderful effects to admire , and magnify the wisdom , power , and goodness of their author . such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition , we want not faculties to attain ; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living . besides the complex ideas we have of material substances ; by the simple ideas t●●en from the operations of our own minds , which we experiment in our selves , as thinking , understanding , willing , knowing , &c. coexisting in the same substance , we are able to frame the complex idea of a spirit . and this idea of an immaterial substance , is as clear as that we have of a material . by joyning these with substance , of which we have no distinct idea , we have the idea of a spirit : and by putting together the ideas of coherent , solid parts , and power of being moved , joyned with substance , of which likewise we have no positive idea , we have the idea of matter . the one is so clear and distinct as the other . the substance of spirit is unknown to us ; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us : two primary qualities or properties of body , viz. solid coherent parts , and impulse , we have distinct clear ideas of : so likewise have we , of two primary qualities or properties of spirit , thinking , and a power of action . we have also clear and distinct ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies , which are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts , and their motion . we have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking , viz. believing , doubting , hoping , fearing , &c. as also of willing and moving the body consequent to it . if this motion of spirit may have some difficulties in it , not easie to be explained , we have no more reason to deny or doubt of the existence of spirits , than we have , to deny or doubt of the existence of body : because the notion of body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard , and perhaps impossible to be explained . the divisibility in infinitum , for instance , of any finite extension involves us , whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated , or made consistent . we have therefore as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of spirit , as with our notion of body ; and the existence of the one , as well as the other . we have no other idea of the supream being , but a complex one of existence , power , knowledge , duration , pleasure , happiness , and of several other qualities , and powers which it is better to have than be without , with the addition of infinite to each of these . in which complex idea we may observe that there is no simple one , bating infinity , which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits : because in our ideas , as well of spirits as other things , we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection . chap. xxiv . of collective ideas of substances . there are other ideas of substances which may be call'd collective , which are made up of many particular substances considered as united into one idea , as a troop , army , &c. which the mind makes by its power of composition . these collective ideas , are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things remote , and independent into one view , the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception , and signified by one name . for there are no things so remote , which the mind cannot by this art of composition , bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name , universe . chap. xxv . of relation . there is another sett of ideas which the mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another . when the mind so considers one thing , that it does as it were bring it to , and set it by another , and carry its view from one to the other , this is relation or respect : and the denominations given to things intimating that respect , are what we call relatives . and the things so brought together related . thus when i call cajus , husband , or whiter , i intimate some other person , or thing in both cases , with which i compare him . any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation . where languages have failed to give correlative names , there the relation is not so easily taken notice of : as in concubine , which is a relative name , as well as wife . the ideas of relation may be the same , in those men who have far different ideas of the things that are related . thus those who have different ideas , of man , may agree in that of a father . there is no idea of any kind , which is not capable of an almost infinite number of considerations , in reference to other things : and therefore this makes no small part of men's words , and thoughts . thus one single man , may at once sustain the relations of father , brother , son , husband , friend , subject , general , european , englishman , islander , master , servant , bigger , less , &c. to an almost infinite number ; he being capable of as many relations , as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner of agreement , disagreement , or respect whatsoever . the ideas of relations are much clearer and more distinct , than of the things related ; because the knowledge of one simple idea , is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substantial being , an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary . chap. xxvi . of cause and effect and other relations . the ideas of cause and effect , we get from our observation of the vicissitude of things , while we perceive some qualities or substances begin to exist , and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of other beings : that which produces , is the cause ; that which is produced , the effect . thus fluidity in wax is the effect of a certain degree of heat , which we observe to be constantly produced by the application of such heat . we distinguish the originals of things into two sorts . first when the thing is wholly made new , so that no part thereof did ever exist before , as when a new particle of matter , doth begin to exist which had b●fore no being ; 't is ca●led creation . secondly , when a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist , but the thing so constituted of pre-existing particles , which altogether make up such a collection of simple ideas , had not any existence before , as this man , this egg , this rose , &c. when produced in the ordinary course of nature , by an internal principle , but set on work by some external agent , and working by insensible ways which we perceive not ; 't is called generation . when the cause is extrinsical , and the effect introduced by a sensible separation or juxta-position of discernible parts , we call it making ; and such are all artificial things . when any simple idea is produced , which was not in that subject before , we call it alteration . the denominations of things taken from time , are for the most part only relations . thus when it is said that queen elizabeth lived sixty nine , and reigned forty five years , no more is meant , than , that the duration of her existence , was equal to sixty nine , and of her government to forty five annual revolutions of the sun : and so are all words answering , how long . young and old , and other words of time , that are thought to stand for positive ideas , are indeed relative ; and intimate a relation to a certain length of duration , whereof we have the idea in our minds . thus we call a man young , or old , that has lived little or much of that time that men usually attain to . this is evident from our application of these names to other things ; for a man is called young at twenty , but a horse old , &c. the sun and stars we call not old at all , because we know not what period god has set to that sort of beings . there are other ideas , that are truly relative , which we signify by names that are thought positive and absolute ; such as great and little , strong and weak . the things thus denominated are referred to some standards with which we compare them . thus we call an apple great , that is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to . and a man weak , that has not so much strength or power to move as men usually have , or those of his own size . chap. xxvii . of identity and diversity . another occasion the mind takes of comparing , is the very being of things : when considering a thing as existing at any certain time , or place , and comparing it with it self as existing at any other time , &c. we form the ideas of identity , and diversity . when we see any thing in any certain time and place , we are sure , it is that very thing ; and can be no other how like soever it may be in all other respects . we conceiving it impossible , that two things of the same kind should exist together in the same place , we conclude that whatever exists any where at the same time , excludes all of the same kind , and is there it self alone . when therefore we demand whether any thing be the same , or no , it refers always to something that existed such a time , in such a place , which it was certain at that instant was the same with it self , and no other . we have ideas of three sorts of substances , first , god : secondly , finite intelligence : thirdly , bodies . first , god being eternal , unalterable , and every where concerning his identity , there can be no doubt . secondly , finite spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist , the relation to that time and place will always determine to each its identity , as long as it exists . thirdly , the same will hold of every particle of matter to which no addition or substraction is made . these three exclude not one another out of the same place , yet each exclude those of the same kind , out of the same place . the identity and diversity of modes and relations are determined after the same manner , that substances are : only the actions of finite beings , as motion and thought , consisting in succession , they they cannot exist in different times , and places as permanent beings : for no motion or thought considered as at different times can be the same , each part thereof having a different beginning of existence . from whence it is plain , that existence it self is the principium individuationis , which determins a being to a particular time , and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind . thus , suppose an atom existing in a determin'd time , and place ; it is evident that considered in any instant , it is the same with it self , and will be so , as long as its exstence continues . the same may be said of two , or more , or any number of particles , whilst they continue together . the mass will be the same however jumbled , but if one atom be taken away , it is not the same mass. in vegetables , the identity depends not on the same mass , and is not applied to the same thing . the reason of this is the difference between an animate body , and mass of matter ; this being only the cohesion of particles any how united . the other , such a disposition and organization of parts , as is sit to receive and distribute nourishment . so as to continue and frame the wood , bark , leaves , &c. of an oak , for instance , in which consists the vegetable life . that therefore which has such an organization of parts partaking of one common life , continues to be the same plant , thô that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant. the case is not so much different in brutes , but that any one may hence see what makes an animal , and continues it the same . the identity of the same man likewise consists in a participation of the same continued life , in succeeding particles of matter vitally united to the same organized body . to understand identity aright , we must consider what idea the word it is applied to , stands for . it being one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third the same person . an animal , is a living organized body and the same animal , is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter , united to that organized , living body ; our notion of man , is but of a particular sort of animal : should we see a creature of our own shape , thô it had no more reason than a parret , we should call it a man : or should we hear a parret discourse rationally , we should hardly call , or think it any thing but a parret . person stands for an intelligent being , that reasons and reflects , and can consider it self the same thing in different times and places ; which it doth by that consciousness that is inseparable from thinking . by this every one is to himself what he calls self , without considering whether that self be continued in the same , or divers substances . in this consists personal identity , or the sameness of a rational being : and so far as this consciousness extends backward to any past action , or thought , so far reaches the identity of that person . it is the same self now , it was then ; and it is by the same self , with this present one , that now reflects on it , that that action was done . self is that conscious thinking thing , whatever substance it matters not , which is conscious of pleasure or pain , capable of happiness or misery ; and so is concerned for it self , as far as that consciousness extends . that with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing , can joyn it self , makes the same person , and is one self with it ; and so attributes to its self , and owns all the actions of that thing , as its own , as far as that consciousness reaches . this personal identity , is the object of reward and punishment , being that by which every one is concerned for himself . if the consciousness went along with the little finger , when that was cut off it would be the same self , that was just before concerned for the whole body . if the same socrates , waking and sleeping , did not partake of the same consciousness , they would not be the same person : a socrates waking , could not be in justice accountable for what socrates sleeping did , no more than one twin , for what his brother twin did , because their outsides were so like , that they could not be distinguished . but suppose i wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life , beyond a possibility of retrieving them ; so that i shall never be conscious of them again : am i not again the same person that did those actions , thô i have now forgot them ? i answer , that we must here take notice what the word i is applied to , which in this case is the man only : and the same man being presumed to be the same person , i is easily here suppos'd to stand also for the same person . but if it be possible for the same man , to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times , it is past doubt the same man would , at different times , make different persons . which we see is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions , human laws not punishing the madman , for the sober man's actions , nor the sober man , for what the madman did ; thereby making them two persons . thus we say in english , such a one is not himself , or is besides himself , in which phrases it is insinuated , that self is changed , and the self same person is no longer in that man. but is not a man drunk or sober the same person ? why else is he punished for the same fact he commits when drunk , thô he be never afterwards conscious of it ? just as much the same person , as a man that walks , and does other things in his sleep , is the same person : and is as answerable for any mischief he shall do in it . human laws punish both , with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge : because in these cases , they cannot distinguish certainly what is real , and what is counterfeit : and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. for thô punishment be annexed to personality , and personality to consciousness ; and the drunkard perhaps is not conscious of what he did : yet human judicatures justly punish him , because the fact is proved against ; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him . but in the great day wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open , it may be reasonable to think no one should be made to answer , for what he knows nothing of ; but shall receive his doom , his own conscience accusing , or else excusing him . to conclude , whatever substance begins to exist , it must during its existence be the same : whatever compositions of substances begin to exist , during the union of those substances , the concrete must be the same . whatsoever mode begins to exist , during its existence it is the same : and so if the composition be of distinct substances , and different modes , the same rule holds . whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter , rather arises from the names ill used , than from any obscurity in the things themselves . for whatever makes the specifick idea , to which the name is applied , if that idea be steadily kept to , the distinction of any thing into the same , and divers , will easily be conceived , and there can arise no doubt concerning it . chap. xxviii . of other relations . all simple ideas , wherein are parts or degrees , afford an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those simple ideas . as whiter , sweeter , more , less , &c. these depending on the equality , and excess of the same simple idea , in several subjects may be called , proportional relations . another occasion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their origine , as father , son , brother , &c. these may be called natural relations . sometimes the foundation of considering things , is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right , power , or obligation to do something : such are general , captain , burgher ; these are instituted , and voluntary relations , and may be distinguished from the natural , in that they are alterable and separable from the persons to whom they sometimes belonged , thô neither of the substances so related be destroyed . but natural relations are not alterable , but are as lasting as their subjects . another relation is the conformity or disagreement of mens voluntary actions to a rule to which they are referred , and by which they are judged of : these may be called moral relations . it is this conformity or disagreement of our actions to some law ( whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law-maker , and is what we call reward or punishment ) that renders our actions morally good , or evil. of these moral rules or laws there seem to be three sorts with their different ensorcements . first , the divine law. secondly , civil law. thirdly , the law of opinion or reputation . by their relation to the first , our actions are either sins or duties : to the second , criminal or innocent : to the third vertues or vices . st . by the divine law , i mean that law which god has set to the actions of men , whether promulgated to them by the light of nature , or the voice of revelation . that god has given a law to mankind , seems undeniable , since he has , first , a right to do it , we are his creatures . secondly , goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to what is best . thirdly , power to enforce it by reward , and punishment of infinite weight , and duration . this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude , and by which men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions : that is , whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the almighty . ly . the civil law , is the rule set by the common-wealth , to the actions of those that belong to it . this law no body over-looks ; the rewards and punishments being ready at hand to enforce it , extending to the protecting or taking away of life , liberty , and estate of those who observe or disobey it . ly . the law of opinion or reputation . vertue and vice are names supposed every where , to stand for actions in their own nature , right and wrong . as far as they are really so applied , they so far are co-incident with the divine law. but it is visible that these names in the particular instances of their application , through the several nations and societies of men , are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each countrey and society , are in reputation or discredit . so that the measure of what is every where called and esteemed vertue and vice , is the approbation or dislike , praise or blame , which by a tacit consent establishes it self in the societies and tribes of men in the world ; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them , according to the judgment , maxims or fashions of the place . that this is so , appears hence ; that tho' that passes for vertue in one place , which is elsewhere accounted vice ; yet every where vertue and praise , vice and blame go together ; vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy : and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem , is called vertue . these have so close an alliance , that they are often called by the same name . 't is true , vertue and vice. do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong , which the laws of god have established ; because the observation of these laws visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind , and the neglect of them breeds mischief and confusion : and therefore men without renouncing all sense and reason , and their own interest , could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side , that deserved it not . they who think not commendation and disgrace sufficient motives to engage men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse , seem little skill'd in the history of mankind . the greatest part whereof govern themselves chiefly by this law of fashion . the penalties that attend the breach of god's laws are seldom seriously reflected on , and those that do reflect on them , entertain thoughts of future reconciliation . and for the punishment due from the laws of the common-wealth , men flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity : but no man escapes censure and dislike who offends against fashion ; nor is there one of ten thousand stiff and insensible enough , to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. morality then is nothing but a relation to these laws or rules ; and these rules being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas ; the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action , that the simple ideas belonging to it , may correspond to those which the law requires . by which we see how moral beings , and notions are founded on , and terminated in the simple ideas of sensation and reflection . for example , let us consider the complex idea signified by the word murder . first from reflection , we have the ideas of willing , considering , purposing , malice , &c. also of life , perception , and self-motion . secondly from sensation , we have the ideas of man , and of some action whereby we put an end to that perception , and motion in the man , all which simple ideas , are comprehended in the word murder . this collection of simple ideas being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country i have been bred in , and to be held worthy of praise or blame , i call the action vertuous , or vicious . if i have the will of a supreme invisible , law-maker for my rule , then , as i suppose the action commanded or forbidden by god , i call it good or evil , sin or duty : if i compare it with the civil-law of my country , i call it lawful or unlawful , a crime or no crime . moral actions may be considered two ways , first , as they are in themselves a collection of simple ideas , in which sense they are positive absolute ideas . secondly , as good , or bad , or indifferent : in this respect they are relative , it being their conformity or disagreement with some rule , that makes them be so . we ought carefully to distinguish between the positive idea of the action , and the reference it has to a rule : both which are commonly comprehended under one name , which often occasions confusion , and misleads the judgment . it would be infinite to go over all sorts of relations ; i have here mentioned some of the most considerable , and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations , and wherein they are founded . chap. xxix . of clear obscure , distinct and confused ideas . having shewn the original of our ideas , and taken a view of their several sorts : i shall offer some few other considerations concerning them . the first , is that some are clear , others obscure : some distinct , and others confused . our simple ideas are clear , when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken , did in a well-ordered sensation or perception present them . whilst the memory retains them thus , and can produce them so to the mind when it has occasion to consider them , they are clear ideas . our complex ideas are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear : and the number and order of those simple ideas , that are their ingredients , is determinate and certain . the cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be either dull organs , or slight impressions made by the objects , or a weakness in the memory , not able to retain them as received . a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other : and a confused , is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different . obscurity is opposed to clearness . confusion to distinctness . confusion is occasioned chiefly by the following defaults . first , when any complex idea ( for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion ) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas , and such as are common to other things : whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name , are left out . thus an idea of a leopard being conceived only as a spotted beast , is confused ; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a panther , and other sorts of beasts that are spotted . secondly , when the ideas are so jumbled together in the complex one , that it is not easily discernible , whether it more belongs to the name given it , than to any other . we may conceive this confusion by a sort of pictures , usually shewn , wherein the colours mark out very odd and unusual figures , and have no discernible order in their position . this , when said to be the picture of a man or caesar , we reckon confused , because it is not discernible in that state , to belong more to the name man or caesar , than to the name baboon or pompey . but when a cylindrical mirrour rightly placed , hath reduced those irregular lines on the table , into their due order and proportion , then the eye presently sees that it is a man , or caesar : that is , that it belongs to those names , and is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon or pompey ; that is , from the ideas signified by those names . thirdly , when any one of our ideas signified by a name is uncertain and undetermined . thus he that puts in , or leaves out an idea out of his complex one of church or idolatry , every time that he thinks of either , and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas , that makes it up , is said to have a confused idea of church or idolatry . confusion always concerns two ideas , and those most which most approach one another . to avoid confusion therefore we ought to examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with , or which it cannot easily be separated from ; and that will be found an idea belonging to another name , and so should be a different thing , from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct , and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different name imports . it is to be observed that our complex ideas may be very clear and distinct in one part , and very obscure and confused in another . thus in chiliaedrum , or body of a thousand sides , the idea of the figure may be confused , tho' that of the number be very distinct : we can discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of this complex idea which depends on the number thousand ; thô it is plain we have no precise idea of its figure , so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but nine hundred ninety nine sides . the not observing this , causes no small error in men's thoughts , and confusion in their discourses . chap. xxx . of real and fantastical ideas . our ideas in reference to things from whence they are taken , or which they may be supposed to represent , come under a threefold distinction , and are first either real or fantastical . secondly adequate or inadequate . thirdly true or false . by real ideas i mean such as have a foundation in nature ; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things , or with their archetypes . fantastical are such as have no foundation in nature , nor any conformity with that reality of being , to which they are referred as to their archetypes . by examining the several sorts of ideas we shall find , that first our simple ideas are all real ; not that they are images or representations of what does exist , but as they are the certain effects of powers in things without us , ordained by our maker , to produce in us such sensations : they are real ideas in us , whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves . their reality lies in the steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings . but whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns , it matters not : it suffices that they are constantly produced by them . complex ideas being arbitrary combinations of simple ideas put together , and united under one general name , in forming of which the mind uses its liberty ; we must enquire which of these are real , and which imaginary combinations , and to this i say , that , first , mixed modes and relations having no other reality , than what they have in the minds of men ; nothing else is required to make them real , but a possibility of existing conformable to them . these ideas being themselves archetypes , cannot differ from their archetypes , and so cannot be chimerical ; unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas . those indeed that have names assigned them in any language , must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them , that they may not be thought fantastical . secondly , our complex ideas of substances being made , in reference to things existing without us , whose representations they are thought , are no farther real , than as they are such combinations of simple ideas , as are really united , and co-exist in things without us . those are fantastical which are made up of several ideas , that never were found united , as centaur , &c. chap. xxxi . of ideas adequate or inadequate . real ideas are either . adequate , which perfectly represents those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from , and which it makes them to stand for . secondly , inadequate , which are such as do but partially or incompleatly represent those archetypes to which they are referred : whence it appears . first , that all our simple ideas are adequate , for they being but the effects of certain powers in things fitted and ordained by god , to produce such sensations in us ; they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to such powers , and we are sure they agree to the reality of things . secondly , our complex ideas of modes being voluntary collections of simple ideas , which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes , cannot but be adequate ideas . they are referred to no other pattern , nor made by any original , but the good-liking and will of him that makes the combination . if indeed one would conform his idea , to that which is formed by another person , it may be wrong or inadequate , because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern . in which respect only , any ideas of modes can be wrong , imperfect or inadequate . thirdly , our ideas of substances , have in the mind a double reference : first , they are sometimes referred to a supposed real essence , of each species of things . secondly , they are designed for representations in the mind of things that do exist , by ideas discoverable in them : in both which respects they are inadaequate . first , if the names of substances stand for things , as supposed to have certain real essences , whereby they are of this or that species , ( of which real essences men are wholly ignorant and know nothing ) it plainly follows that the ideas they have in their minds , being referr'd to real essences , as archetypes which are unknown , they must be so far from being adequate , that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all . our complex ideas of substances are , as has been shewn , nothing but certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed , or supposed constantly to exist together . but , such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance : for then the properties we discover in it would be deducible from it , and their necessary connexion with it be known , as all the properties of a triangle depend on , and are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space : but it is certain that in our complex ideas of substances , are not contained in such ideas on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them depend . secondly , those that take their ideas of substances from their sensible qualities , cannot form adequate idaeas of them : because their qualities and powers are so various , that no man's complex idaea can contain them all . most of our simple idaeas , whereof our complex ones of substances do consist , are powers which being relations to other substances ; we cannot be sure we know all the powers , till we have tryed what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other substances , in their several ways of application : which being impossible to be tryed upon one body , much less upon all , it is impossible we should have adequate idaeas of any substance , made of a collection of all its properties . chap. xxxii . of true and false ideas . truth and falshood in propriety of speech belong only to propositions ; and when ideas are termed true or false , there is some secret or tacit proposition , which is the foundation of that denomination . our ideas being nothing but appearances or perceptions in the mind , can in strictness of speech no more be said to be true or false , than single names of things . the idea of centaur has no more falshood in it , when it appears in our minds , than the name centaur when it is pronounced or writ on paper . for truth or falshood lying always in some affirmation or negation , our ideas are not capable any of them , of being false , till the mind passes some judgment on them ; that is , affirms or denies something of them . in a metaphysical sense they may be said to be true , that is , to be really such as they exist ; tho' in things called true , even in that sense , there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas , looked upon as the standards of that truth ; which amounts to a mental proposition . when the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to it , they are then capable of being true or false : because in such a reference the mind makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing ; which supposition , as it is true or false , so the ideas themselves come to be denominated , this happens in these cases : first , when the mind supposes its idea , conformable to that in other mens minds , called by the same name , such as that of justice , vertue , &c. secondly , when the mind supposes any idea conformable to some real existence . thus that of a man is true , that of centaur false , the one having a conformity to what has really existed ; the other not . thirdly , when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution , and essence of any thing whereon all its properties depend : and thus the greatest part , if not all our ideas of substances , are false . as to the first , when we judge of our ideas by their conformity to those of other men , they may be any of them false . but simple ideas are least liable to be so mistaken ; we seldom mistake green for blue , or bitter for sweet ; much less do we confound the names belonging to different senses , and call a colour by the name of a taste . complex ideas are much more liable to falshood in this particular : and those of mixed modes more than substances . because in substances their sensible qualities serve for the most part to distinguish them clearly : but in mixed modes we are more uncertain , and we may call that justice , which ought to be called by another name . the reason of this is , that the abstract ideas of mixed modes , being mens voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas , we have nothing else to refer our ideas of mixed modes as standards to ; but the ideas of those who are thought to use names in their proper significations : and so as our ideas conform or differ from them , they pass for true or false . as to the second , when we refer our ideas to the real existence of things , none can be termed false , but our complex ideas of substances . for our simple ideas being nothing but perceptions in us answerable to certain powers in external objects , their truth consists in nothing but such appearances , as are produced in us suitable to those powers : neither do they become liable to the imputation of falshood , whether we judge these ideas to be in the things themselves , or no. for god having set them as marks of distinguishing things , that we may be able to discern one thing from another ; and thereby chuse them as we have occasion : it alters not the nature of our simple ideas , whether we think the idea of blue ( for instance ) to be in the violet it self , or in the mind only : and it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue , whether it be that real colour , or only a peculiar texture in it , that causes in us that idea : since the name blue notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction , that is in a violet , discernible only by our eyes , whatever it consists in . neither would our simple ideas be false , if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered , that the same object should produce in several mens minds different ideas . for this could never be known , since objects would operate constantly after the same manner . it is most probable nevertheless , that the ideas produced by objects in different mens minds , are very near and undiscernibly like . names of simple ideas may be mis-applied , as a man ignorant in the english tongue may call purple , scarlet : but this makes no falshood in the ideas . complex ideas of modes , cannot be false in reference to the essence of any thing really existing ; because they have no reference to any pattern existing , or made by nature . our complex ideas of substances , being all referr'd to patterns in things themselves , may be false . they are so , first , when looked upon as representations of the unknown essences of things . secondly , when they put together simple ideas which in the real existence of things , have no union : as in centaur . thirdly , when from any collection of simple ideas , that do always exist together , there is separated by a direct negation any one simple idea , which is constantly joyned with them . thus , if from extension , solidity , fixedness , malleableness , fusibility , &c. we remove the colour observed in gold. if this idea be only left out of the complex one of gold , it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect , rather than a false one : since , thô it contains not all the simple ideas , that are united in nature : yet it puts none together , but what do really exist together . upon the whole , i think that our ideas as they are considered by the mind , either in reference to the proper signification of their names , or in reference to the reality of things , may more proproperly be called right or wrong ideas , according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred . the ideas that are in mens minds simply considered , cannot be wrong , unless complex ideas , wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together . all other ideas are in themselves right , and the knowledge about them right , and true knowledge . but when we come to refer them to any patterns , or archetypes , then they are capable of being wrong , as far as they disagree with such archetypes . having thus given an account of the original sorts and extent of our ideas , which are the materials of our knowledge , before i proceed to shew what use the understanding makes of them , and what knowledge we have by them , i find it necessary , because of that close connexion between ideas , and words ; and that constant relation , which our abstract ideas and general words have one with another , to consider , first , the nature , use , and signification of language , which therefore must be the business of the next book . book iii. chap. i. of words or language in general . god having design'd man for a sociable creature , made him not only with an inclination , and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind : but furnished him also with language , which was to be the great instrument and common tye of society . man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned , as to be fit to frame articulate sounds , which we call words . but besides articulate sounds ( which birds may be taught to imitate ) it was further necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions , and make them stand as marks of the ideas of his mind , whereby they might be made known to others . but neither is it enough for the perfection of language , that sounds can be made . signs of ideas , unless these can be made use of , so as to comprehend several particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use , had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by . to remedy this inconvenience , language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms , whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences , which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of . those names becoming general , which are made to stand for general ideas ; and those remaining particular , where the ideas they are used for are particular . there are other words which signify the want or absence of ideas , as ignorance , barrenness , &c. which relate to positive ideas , and signify their absence . it is observable that the words which stand for actions and notions , quite removed from sense , are borrowed from sensible ideas , v. g. to imagine , apprehend , comprehend , understand , adhere , conceive , instill , disgust , disturbance , tranquillity , &c. which are all taken from the operations of things sensible , and applied to modes of thinking . spirit in its primary signification is no more than breath ; angel a messenger . by which we may guess what kind of notions they were , and whence derived ; which filled the minds of the first beginners of languages , and how nature , even in the naming of things unawares suggested to men , the originals of all their knowledge : whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves , or any other ideas , that came not under their senses , they were fain to borrow words from the ordinary and known ideas of sensation . the better to understand the use and force of language , as subservient to knowledge , it will be convenient to consider , first , to what it is that names in the use of language are immediately applyed . secondly , since all ( except proper names ) are general , and so stand not for this or that single thing , but for sorts and ranks : it will be necessary to consider what those sorts and kinds of things are ; wherein they consist , and how they come to be made . this shall be considered in the following chapters . chap ii. of the signification of words . man , thô he have great variety of thoughts , yet are they all within his own breast , invisible and hidden from others , nor can of themselves be made to appear . it was necessary therefore , for the comfort and advantage of society , that man should find out some external signs , whereby those invisible ideas might be made known to others . for which purpose nothing was so fit , either for plenty or quickness , as those articulate sounds he found himself able to make . hence words came to be made use of by men , as signs of their ideas : not upon the account of any natural connexion between articulate sounds , and certain ideas ; for then there would be but one language amongst all men : but by a voluntary imposition , whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea . the use then of words , is to be sensible marks of our ideas : and the ideas they stand for , are their proper and immediate signification . in which they stand for nothing more but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them . for when a man speaks to another , it is that he may be understood ; that is , that his sounds may make known his ideas to the hearer . words being voluntary signs cannot be imposed on things we know not : this would be to make them signs of nothing , sounds without significations . a man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things , or of conceptions in the mind of another , whereof he has none in his own . words in all mens mouths ( that speak with any meaning ) stand for the ideas which those that use them have : and which they would express by them . thus a child that takes notice of nothing more in the mettal he hears called gold , than the yellow colour , calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold. another , that hath better observed , adds to shining yellow , great weight ; and then the sound gold stands , when he uses it , for a complex idea of a shining yellow , and very weighty substance . thô words signify properly nothing but the ideas in mens minds , yet they are in their thoughts secretly referred to two other things . first , they suppose their words to be marks of ideas , in the minds of other men with whom they communicate ; else they could not discourse intelligibly with one another : in this case men stand not to examine whether their ideas , and those of other men be the same ; they think it enough that they use the word in the common acceptation of that language . secondly , they suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things . words then being immediately the signs of mens ideas , whereby they express their thoughts and imaginations to others , there arises by constant use such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for ; that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas , as if the objects themselves were present to the senses . and because we examine not precisely the signification of words , we often in attentive consideration set our thoughts more on words , than things : nay , some ( because we often learn words before we know the ideas they stand for ) speak several words no otherwise than parrots do , without any meaning at all . but so far as words are of use and signification , so far there is a constant connexion between the sound and idea ; and a designation that the one stand for the other ; without which application of them , they are nothing but insignificant noise . since then words signifie only mens peculiar ideas , and that by an arbitrary imposition , it follows that every man has an inviolable liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases . it is true , common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages ; which so far limits the signification of each sound , that unless a man applies it to the same ideas , he cannot speak properly : and unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer , which he makes them stand for in speaking , he cannot speak intelligibly . but whatever be the consequence of any man's use of words , different either from their publick use , or that of the persons to whom he addresses them ; this is certain , their signification in his use of them is limited to his ideas , and they can be signs of nothing else . chap. iii. of general terms . all things that exist being particulars , it might be expected that words should be so too in their signification : but we find it quite contrary , for most of the words that make all languages are general terms . this is the effect of reason and necessity , for , first , it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name , because it is impossible to have distinct ideas of every particular thing ; to retain its name , with its peculiar appropriation to that idea . secondly , it would be useless , unless all could be supposed to have these same ideas in their minds . for names applyed to particular things , whereof i alone have the ideas in my mind , could not be significant or intelligible to another , who is not acquainted with all those particular things which had fallen under my notice . thirdly , it would be of no great use for the improvement of knowledge , which thô founded in particular things , enlarges it self by general views ; to which , things reduced into sorts under general names , are properly subservient . in things where we have occasion to consider , and discourse of individuals , and particulars we use proper names : as in persons , countreys , cities , rivers , mountains , &c. thus we see that jockeys have particular names for their horses , because they often have occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight . the next thing to be considered , is how general words come to be made . words become general by being made signs of general ideas : ideas become general by separating from them , the circumstances of time , place , or any other ideas that may determinate them to this or that particular existence . by this way of abstraction , they become capable of representing more individuals , than one : each of which having a conformity to that abstract idea , is of that sort . but it may not be amiss to trace our notions and names , from their beginning ; and observe by what degrees we proceed , and enlarge our ideas from our first infancy . it is evident that the first ideas children get , are only particular , as of the nurse or mother , and the names they give them are confined to these individuals . afterwards observing that there are a great many other things in the world , that resemble them in shape , and other qualities , they frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in ; to that they give with others the name man for example ; in this they make nothing new , but only leave out of the complex idea they had of peter , james , mary , &c. that which is peculiar to each , and retain only what is common to all . and thus they come to have a general name , and a general idea . by the same method they advance to more general names and notions . for observing several things that differ from their idea of man , and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name , to agree with man in some certain qualities , by retaining only those qualities , and uniting them into one idea , they have another more general idea , to which giving a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension . thus by leaving out the shape , and some other properties signified by the name man , and retaining only a body with life , sense , and spontaneous motion ; we form the idea , signified by the name animal . by the same way the mind proceeds to body , substance , and at last to being , thing , and such universal terms which stand for any ideas whatsoever . hence we see that the whole mystery of genus and species , is nothing else but abstract ideas more or less comprehensive , with names annexed to them . this shews us the reason why in defining words , we make use of the genus : namely to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas , which the next general term stands for : general terms then belong not to the real existence of things ; they are inventions of the understanding , and concern only signs , either words or ideas . it must be considered in the next place , what kind of signification it is that general words have . it is evident that they do not barely signify one particular thing : for then they would not be general terms , but proper names : neither do they signify a plurality : for then man and men would signifie the same thing ; but that which they signifie , is a sort of things , and this they do , by being made a sign of an abstract idea in the mind , to which idea , as things existing are found to agree , so they come to be ranked under that name , or to be of that sort . the essences then of the sorts or species of things , are nothing but these abstract ideas . it is not denyed here that nature makes things alike , and so lays the foundation of this sorting and cleansing : but the sorts of species themselves are the workmanship of human understanding : so that every distinct abstract idea , is a distinct essence , and the names that stand for such distinct ideas , are the names of things essentially different thus oval , circle , rain and snow are essentially different . to make this clearer , it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word essence . first , it may be taken for the very being of any thing whereby it is , what it is ; thus the real internal , ( but unknown ) constitution in substances , may be called their essence . this is the proper signification of the word . secondly , in the schools the word essence has been almost wholly applyed to the artificial constitution of genus and species ; it is true , there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things : and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution , on which any collection of simple ideas , co-existing , must depend . but it being evident , that things are ranked into sorts , under names only as they agree to certain abstract ideas , to which we have annexed those names , the essence of each genus , or species , is nothing but the abstract idea , which the name stands for ; this the word essence imports in its most familiar use . these two sorts of essence may not unfitly be termed the one real , the other nominal . between the nominal essence and the name , there is so near a connexion , that the name of any sort of things , cannot be attributed to any particular being , but what has the essence whereby it answers that abstract idea , whereof that name is the sign . concerning the real essences of corporeal substances , there are two opinions . first , some using the word essence for they know not what . suppose a certain number of those essences , according to which , all natural things are made , and of which they equally partake , and do become of this or of that species . secondly . others look on all natural things to have a real , but unknown constitution of their insensible parts , from whence flow their sensible qualities , which serve us to distinguish them one from another ; and according to which we rank them into sorts , under common denominations . the former supposition seems irreconcilable with the frequent production of monsters , in all the species of animals : since it is impossible that two things partaking of the same real essence , should have different properties . but were there no other reason against it ; yet the supposition of essences which cannot be known , and yet the making them to be that which distinguisheth the species of things , is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of knowledge , that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by . we may farther observe that the nominal , and real essences of simple ideas and modes , are always the same : but in substances always quite different . thus a figure including a space between three lines , is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle ; it being that foundation from which all its properties flow , and to which they are inseparably annexed ; but it is far otherwise in gold or any other sort of substance , it is the real constitution of its insensible parts , on which depend all those properties that are to be found in it ; which constitution since we know not , nor have any particular idea of , we can have no name that is the sign of it . but yet it is its colour , weight , fusibility , and fixedness , &c. which makes it to be gold , or gives it a right to that name ; which is therefore its nominal essence , since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity to that abstract complex idea , to which that name is annexed . that essences are but abstract ideas , may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible . this cannot be true of the real constitution of things . all things in nature ( save the author of it ) are liable to change : their real essences and constitutions are destroyed and perish : but as they are ideas established in the mind , they remain immutable . for whatever becomes of alexander or bucephalus , the ideas of man and horse remain the same . by these means the essence of a species rests safe and entire , without the existence of one individual of that kind . it is evident then that this doctrine of the immutability of essences is founded only on the relation established between abstract ideas and certain sounds : and will always be true , as long as the same name can have the same signification . chap. iv. of the names of simple ideas . words , thô they signifie nothing immediately , but the ideas in the mind of the speaker ; yet we shall find that the names of simple ideas , mixed modes , and natural substances have each of them something peculiar , and , first , the names of simple ideas and substances , with the abstract ideas in the mind , intimate some real existence , from which was derived their original pattern : but the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind . secondly , the names of simple ideas and modes signifie the real as well as nominal essences of their species : the names of substances signifie rarely , if ever any thing , but barely the nominal essences of those species . thirdly , the names of simple ideas are not capable of definitions ; those of complex ideas are : the reason of which i shall shew from the nature of our ideas , and the signification of words . it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the shewing the meaning of one word , by several other , not synonymous terms . the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for ; the meaning of any term is then shewed , or the word defined , when by other words the idea it is made the sign of , is as it were , represented or set before the view of another , and thus its signification ascertained . the names then of simple ideas are incapable of being defined , because the several terms of a definition signifying several ideas , they can altogether by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all , and therefore a definition , which is but the shewing of the meaning of one word , by several others not signifying each the same thing , can in the names of simple ideas have no place . the not observing this difference in our ideas , has occasioned those trisling definitions which are given us of those simple ideas : such as is that of motion , viz. the act of a being in power , as far forth as in power . the atomists who define motion to be a passage from one place to another , what do they more than put one synonymous word for another ? for what is passage other than a motion ? nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another , which the cartesians give us , prove a much better definition of motion when well examined . the act of perspicuous , as far forth as perspicuous , is another peripatetick definition of a simple idea , which it is certain can never make the meaning of the word light , which it pretends to define understood by a blind man , and when the cartesians tell us , that light is a great number of little globules striking briskly in the bottom of the eye ; these words would never make the idea the word light stands for , known to a man that understood it not before . simple ideas then can only be got by the impressions objects make on our minds , by the proper in-letts appointed to each sort . if they are not received this way , all the words in the world will never be able to produce in us the ideas they stand for . words being sounds , can produce in us no other simple ideas , but sounds , nor excite any in us , but by that voluntary connexion which they have with some ideas , which common use has made them signs of : and therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper in-lett the simple idea , which any word stands for , can never come to know the signification of that word , by any other words or sounds whatsoever . but in complex ideas which consist of several simple ones , the cause is quite otherwise ; for words standing for those several ideas that make up the composition , may imprint complex ideas in the mind , that never were there before , and so make their names be understood . in them definitions take place . thus the word rainbow , to one who knew all those colours , but yet had never seen that phaenomenon , might by enumerating the figure , largeness , position and order of the colours be so well defined , that it might be perfectly understood . the names of simple ideas , substances , and mixed modes have also this disserence ; that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly ararbitrary : those of substances are not perfectly so , but refer to a pattern , thô with some latitude : and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things , and are not arbitrary at all . the names of simple modes , differ little from those of simple ideas . chap. v. of the names of mixed modes and relations . the names of mixed modes being general , stand for abstract ideas in the mind , as other general names do ; but they have something peculiar which may deserve our attention . and first , the ideas they stand for , or if you please the essences of the several species of mixed modes , are made by the understanding ; wherein they differ from those of simple ideas . secondly , they are made arbitrarily , without patterns , or reference to any real existence , wherein they differ from those of substances . the mind unites and retains certain collections , as so many distinct specifick ideas , whilst other combinations that as often in nature occur , and are as plainly suggested by outward things , pass neglected without particular names , or specifications . the mind in forming these complex ideas , makes no new idea , but only puts together those which it had before , wherein it does three things . first , it chuses a certain number . secondly , it gives them connexion , and makes them into one idea . thirdly , it ties them together by a name ; all this may be done before any one individual of that species of modes ever existed : as the ideas of sacrilege or adultery might be framed , before either of them was ever committed ; and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions , which were only the creatures of their own understanding . but thô mixed modes depend on the mind , and are made arbitrarily ; yet they are not made at random , and jumbled together without any reason at all , but are always made for the convenience of communication , which is the chief end of language , and therefore such combinations are only made as men have frequent occasion to mention . thus men having joyned to the idea of killing the idea of father and mother , and so made a distinct species from the killing a man's son or neighbour , because of the different heinousness of the crime , and the distinct punishment due to it , found it necessary to mention it by a distinct name , which is the end of making that distinct combination . in mixed modes it is the name that seems to preserve their essences , and to give them their lasting duration . the collection of ideas is made by the mind , but the name is as it were the knot which ties them fast together ; hence we seldom take any other for distinct species of mixed modes , but such as are set out by names . we must observe that the names of mixed modes always signify the real essences of their species , which being nothing but the abstract complex ideas , and not referred to the real existence of things ; there is no supposition of any thing more signified by any name of a mixed mode , but barely that complex idea the mind it self has formed : which when the mind has formed , is all it would express by it , and is that on which all the properties of the species depend , and from which alone they flow : and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same . this also shews the reason why the names of mixed modes are commonly , got , before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known : because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of , but such as have names , and those species being complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind , it is convenient , if not necessary to know the names , before we learn the complex ideas ; unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas , which others having no names for , he has nothing to do with , but to lay by , and forget again . in the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name ; and so it is still , where a new complex idea is to be made , and a name given it . in simple ideas and substances i grant it is otherwise ; which being such ideas as have real existence and union in nature , the ideas or names are got , one before the other , as it happens , what has been said here of mixed modes , is with very little difference applicable to relations also , which since every man himself may observe , i may spare my self the pains to enlarge on . chap. vi. of the names of substances . the common names of substances stand for sorts as well as other general terms ; that is , for such complex ideas , wherein several particular substances do , or might agree , by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common conception , and be signified by one name ; i say do or might agree , for thô there be but one sun existing , yet the idea of it being abstracted , is as much a sort , as if there were as many suns as there are stars . the measure and boundary of each sort whereby it is constituted that particular sort , and distinguished from others ; is what we call its essence : which is nothing but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed , so that every thing contained in that idea , is essential to that sort. this i call nominal essence , to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances , on which this nominal essence , and all the properties of that sort depend , and may be called its real essence : thus the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for , let it be for instance a body , yellow , weighty , malleable , fusible , and fixed : but its real essence is the constitution of its insensible parts , on which those qualities , and all its other properties depend ; which is wholly unknown to us . that essence in the ordinary use of the word , relates to sorts , appears from hence , that if you take away , the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals , and rank them under common names , then the thought of any thing essential to any of them , instantly vanishes : we have no notion of the one without the other , which plainly shews their relation . no property is thought essential to any individual whatsoever , till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things , and then presently , according to the abstract idea of that sort , something is found essential ; so that essential or not essential , relates only to our abstract ideas , and the names annexed to them , which amounts to no more but this , that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for , cannot be ranked under that species , nor be called by that name ; since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species . thus if the idea of body with some people be bare extension , or space , then solidity is not essential to body : if others make the idea , to which they give the name body , to be solidity and extension ; then solidity is essential also to body . that alone therefore is considered as essential , which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for , without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort , nor be entituled to that name . substances are distinguished into sorts and species by their nominal essence ; for it is that alone , that the name which is the mark of the sort signifies : and the spicies of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names , according to the complex ideas in us , and not according to precise , distinct , real essences in them. we cannot rank and sort things by their real essences , because we know them not : our faculties carry us no farther in the knowledge of substances , than a collection of those sensible ideas we obobserve in them . but the internal constitution whereon their properties depend , is utterly unknown to us . this is evident when we come to examine but the stones we tread on , or the iron we daily handle : we soon find that we know not their make , and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them ; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and unconceivable real essences of plants and animals , every one knows . the workmanship of the all-wise and powerful god in the great fabrick of the universe , and every part thereof farther exceeds the comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man , than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man , doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures . in vain therefore do we pretend to range things into sorts and dispose them into certain classes , under names by their real essences , that are so far from our discovery or comprehension . but thô the nominal essences of substances are made by the mind , they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes . to the making of any nominal essence , it is necessary . first , that the ideas whereof it consists , have such an union as to make but one idea , how compounded soever . secondly , that the particular ideas so united , be exactly the same , neither more or less : for if two abstract complex ideas differ , either in number or sorts of their component parts , they make two different , and not one and the same essence . in the first of these , the mind in making its complex ideas of substances , only follows nature , and puts none together which are not supposed to have an union in nature . for men observing certain qualities always joyned and existing together therein copy nature , and of ideas so united , make their complex ones of substances . secondly , thô the mind in making its complex ideas of substances , never puts any together that do not really , or are not supposed to co-exist : yet the number it combines depends upon the various care , industry or fancy of him that makes it . men generally content themselves with some few obvious qualities , and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take . in bodies organized and propagated by seeds , as vegetables and animals , the shape is that which to us is the leading quality and most characteristical part that determines the species : in most other bodies not propagated by seed , it is the colour we chiefly fix on , and are most led by . thus where we find the colour of gold , we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea , to be there also . thô the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature ; yet they are all , or most of them very imperfect : and since the composition of those complex ideas is in several men very different , we may conclude that these boundaries of species are as men , and not as nature makes them ; if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds . it is true , that many particular substances are so made by nature , that they have an agreement and likeness one with another , and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts : but the sorting of things by us , being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms ; i cannot see how it can be properly said , that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things . but if it be so , our boundaries of species , are not exactly conformable to nature . if the first sorting of individuals depends on the mind of man , variously collecting the simple ideas , that make the nominal essence of the lowest species ; it is much more evident that the more comprehensive classes , called genera , do so . in forming more general ideas that may comprehend different sorts , the mind leaves out those qualities that distinguish them , and puts into its new collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts . thus by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to , gold , silver , &c. and retaining a complex idea , made up of those that are common to each species , there is a new genus constituted , to which the name metal is annexed . so that in this whole business of genera and species , the genus or more comprehensive , is but a partial conception of what is in the species , and the species but a partial idea , of what is to be found in each individual . in all which there is no new thing made , but only more or less comprehensive signs , whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things , as they agree in more or less general conceptions , which we have framed to that purpose . if these abstract general idaeas be thought to be compleat , it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them , and certain names , which are made use of to signify them , and not in respect of any thing existing as made by nature . this is adjusted to the true end of speech , which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions . this is the proper business of genus and species : and this men do without any consideration of real essences , and substantial forms , which come not within the reach of our knowledge , when we think of those things ; nor within the signification of our words , when we discourse with others . chap. vii . of particles . besides words which are the names of ideas in the mind , there are others made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to idaeas or propositions one with another , and to intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas . this it does several ways : as is , is not , are marks of the mind affirming or denying : besides which , the mind does in declaring its sentiments to others connect not only the parts of propositions , but whole sentences one to another with their several relations , and dependencies to make a coherent discourse . the words signifying , that connexion the mind gives to several affirmations and negations , that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration , are called particles . and it is in the right use of these , that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good stile . to express the dependance of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another , a man must have words to shew what connexion , restriction , distinction , opposition , emphasis , &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse . these cannot be understood rightly , without a clear view of the postures , stands , turns , limitations , exceptions and several other thoughts of the mind ; of these there are a great variety , much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by , for which reason it happens , that most of these particles have divers , and sometimes almost opposite significations . thus the particle but in english , has several very different significations , as , but to say no more : here it intimates a stop of the mind , in the course it was going , before it came to the end of it . i saw but two planets : here it shews that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other ; you pray , but it is not that god would bring you to the true religion , but that he would confirm you in your own . the former of these intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be : the latter shews , that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before . all animals have sense , but a dog is an animal . here it signifies the connexion of the latter proposition with the former . to these ; divers other significations of this particle might be added , if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude . i intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs , the instances i have given in this one , may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language , and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing , which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles , some whereof constantly , and others in certain constructions , have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them . chap. viii . of abstract and concrete terms . the mind as has been shewn , has a power to abstract its idea , whereby the sorts of things are distinguished : now each abstract idaea being distinct , so that the one can never be the other , the mind will by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference ; and therefore in propositions , no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another : nor does the common use of language permit that any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas , should be affirmed one of another . all our affirmations are only in concrete , which is the affirming one abstract idea to be joyned to another : which abstract ideas in substances , may be of any sort , thô the most of them are of powers : in all the rest these are little else but relations . all our simple ideas have abstract as well as concrete names , as whitness white , sweetness sweet , &c. the like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations , as justice just , equality equal , &c. but as to our ideas of substances , we have very few abstract names at all . those few that the schools have forged , as animalitas , humanitas , &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of substances , and could never get admittance into common use , or obtain the licence of publick approbation , which seems to intimate the confession of all mankind , that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances , since they have not names for such ideas . it was only the doctrine of substantial forms and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge they had not , which first coin'd , and then introduced animalitas , humanitas , and the like : which yet went very little farther than their own schools , and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. chap. ix . of the imperfection of words . to examine the perfection or imperfection of words , it is necessary to consider their use , and end : which is twofold , first , to record our own thoughts ; secondly , to communicate our thoughts to others : the first is for the help of our own memories , whereby we do as it were talk to our selves : for this purpose any words may serve turn : words being arbitrary signs , we may use which we please for this purpose ; and there will be no imperfection in them , if we constantly use the same sign for the same idea . secondly , as to communication by words ; that too has a double use : first , their civil use , which is such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words , as may serve in common conversation and commerce , about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life . secondly , the philosophical use of words , by which i mean such an use of them , as may serve to convey the precise notions of things , and to express certain truths in general propositions , these two uses are very distinct , and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one , than in the other . the end of language in communication is to be understood ; that is , to excite by sounds in the hearer , the same idea which they stand for in the mind of the speaker . the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification , which is the imperfection we are here speaking of has its cause more in the ideas themselves than in any incapacity in the sounds to signifie them ; for in that regard they are all equally perfect . that then which makes the difference , is the difference of ideas they stand for , which must be learned and retained by those , who would discourse together intelligibly . now this is difficult in these cases . first , where the ideas they stand for are very complex : hence the names of mixed modes are liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification . for here the idea being made up of many parts , it is not easy to form and retain it exactly ; of this sort chiefly are moral words , which have seldom in two different men , the same precise signification . secondly , where the ideas they stand for , have no certain connexion in nature , and therefore no settled standard to rectifie and adjust them by . this again is the case of the names of mixed modes , which are assemblages of ideas put together at pleasure . common use indeed regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation : but it is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses ; there being scarce a name of any very complex idea , which in common use has not a great latitude ; and is not made the sign of far different ideas . the way of learning these names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification . for we may observe that children are taught the names of simple ideas , and substances , by having the things shewn them ; and then they repeat the name that stands for it ; as white , sweet , milk , sugar , ctc. but in mixed modes the sounds are learned first , and men are to learn afterwards their signification , by their own observation and industry , or the explication of others : which is the reason that these words are little more than bare sounds in the minds of most , because few are at the pains to settle their ideas , and notions precisely ; and those which are , make them the signs of ideas , different from what others understand by them , which is the occasion of most disputes . thirdly , where the signification of a word is referred to a standard which is not easily known : this is the case of the names of substances , which being supposed to stand for their real essences must needs be of uncertain application , because these essences are utterly unknown ; and it will be impossible to know what is , or is not antimony , v. g. when that word is to stand for the real essence of it ; whereof we have no idea at all . or suppose these names only stand for simple ideas , found to co-exist in substances , yet thus they will be liable to great uncerainty too : because these simple ideas being very numerous , men frame different ideas os the same subjects , by putting different ideas into their complex one , of such substances . several men observe several properties in the same substance , and none of them all ; who having but imperfect descriptions of things , can have but uncertain significations of words . fourthly , where the signification of the word , and the real essence of the thing , are not the same . which is still the case of substances ; from hence we may observe . first , that the names of simple ideas are least liable to mistakes : first , because the ideas they stand for , being each but one single perception , are easier got , and more clearly retained , than the more complex ones of substances and mixed modes . secondly , because they are not referr'd to any other essence , but barely that perception they immediately signify . secondly , names of simple modes are next to simple ideas least liable to doubt or uncertainty , especially those of figure and number , of which men have so clear and distinct ideas . thirdly , in mixed modes , when they are composed of a few and obvious ideas , their names are clear and distinct enough ; otherwise doubtful and uncertain . fourthly , the names of substances being annexed to ideas , that are neither the real essences , nor exact representations of things , are liable yet to greater imperfection , when we come to a philosophical use of them . chap x. of the abuse of words . beside the natural and unavoidable imperfections of languages , there are wilful faults and neglects , which men are often guilty of in their use of words . for , first , they use words without clear and distinct ideas , or , which is worse , signs without any thing signified ; such are for the most part introduced by sects of philosopy and religion , either out of an affectation of singularity , or to support some strange opinion ; or to cover the weakness of their hypothesis . these are commonly such as had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them , when they were first invented ; or at least such , as if well examined , will be found inconsistent , and therefore may justly be called insignificant terms : instances of this kind may easily be had from the school-men and metaphysicians . others learn words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas , and often upon occasion use them without any distinct meaning at all : whence their notions being unsteady and confused , their discourse must be filled with empty unintelligible noise and jargon , especially in moral matters where the words stand for arbitrary , and numerous collections of ideas , not regularly and permanently united in nature . secondly , another abuse is inconstancy in the use of words ; it is hard to find a discourse on any subject wherein the same words are not used sometimes for one collection of ideas , sometimes for another . the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly , or greater dishonesty : and a man in his accompts with another , may with as much fairness make the characters of numbers , stand sometimes for one , and sometimes for another collection of unites ; as in his discourse , or reasoning , make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas . thirdly , another is an affected obscurity , either by using old words in new significations , or by introducing new and ambiguous terms , without defining them , or putting them together , so as to confound their ordinary meaning . thô the peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way , yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it . the admired art of disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages , whilst it has been made use of , and fitted to perplex the signification of words , more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things : and he that will look into that sort of learned writings , will find the words there much more obscure , uncertain , and undetermined in their meaning , than they are in ordinary conversation . fourthly , another is the taking words for things : this , thô it in some degree concerns all names in general ; yet more particularly affects those of substances . thus in the peripatetick philosophy , substantial forms , abhorrence of vacuum , &c. are taken for something real . to this abuse those men are most subject , who confine their thoughts to any one system ; and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis ; whereby they come to be perswaded , that the terms of that sect , are so suited to the nature of things , that they perfectly correspond with their real existence . fifthly , another is the setting them in the place of things , which they can by no means signify . we may observe that in the general names of substances , whereof the nominal essences are only known to us , when we affirm or deny any thing about them , we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances . thus when a man says , gold is malleable , he would insinuate something more than this , what i call gold is malleable , ( thô truly it amounts to no more ) namely , that what has the real essence of gold is malleable , that is , that malleableness depends on , and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. but a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists the connexion in his mind of malleableness , is not truly with an essence he knows not , but with the sound gold he puts for it . it is true , the names of substances would be much more useful ; and propositions exprest by them much more certain , were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds , which those words signified . and it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge , or certainty in our discourses about them . but to suppose these names to stand for a thing , having the real essence on which the properties depend , is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words , that by a plain abuse it adds to it ; when we would make them stand for something , which not being in our complex ideas , the name we use can no way be the sign of it . in mixed modes , any idea of the complex one being left out , or changed , it is allowed to be another thing , that is , to be of another species , as is plain in chance-medley , man-slaughter , murder , &c. because the complex idea signified by that name , is the real as well as nominal essence ; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence , but that . but in substances it is not so ; for thô in that called gold , one puts in his complex idea , what another leaves out , and vice versâ , yet men do not usually think the species changed , because they refer the name in their minds to a real immutable essence of a thing existing , on which those properties depend : but this reference of the name to a thing we have not the idea of , is so far from helping us at all , that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties . this reference is grounded on this supposition , namely , that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specifick name : in which are contained these two false suppositions . first , that there are certain precise essences , according to which , nature makes all particular things ; and by which they are distinguished into species . secondly , this tacitly insinuates as if we had ideas of these essences ; for why do we enquire , whether this or that thing have the real essence of that species man for instance , if we did not suppose it known , which yet is utterly false ; and therefore such applications of names as would make them stand for ideas we have not , must needs cause great disorder in discourse and reasonings about them ; and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words . sixthly , another more general , thô less observed , abuse of words , is , that men having by long and familiar use , annexed to them certain ideas , they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion , between the names , and the significations they use them in , that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is ; as if it were past doubt , that in the use of these common received sounds , the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas . and so likewise taking the words of others , as naturally standing for just , what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to , they never trouble themselves to explain their own , or understand anothers meaning : from whence commonly proceeds noise , and wrangling without improvement or information ; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions , which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas . thus life is a term , none more familiar : any one almost would take it for an affront , to be asked what he meant by it , and yet if it comes in question , whether such a thing has life , or not , it is easy to perceive , that a clear distinct settled idea , does not always accompany the use of so known a word . seventhly , figurative speech is also an abuse of language : for thô in discourses , where we seek rather pleasure and delight , than information and improvement , such ornaments as are borrowed from figurative speeches and allusions , can scarce pass for faults ; yet if we would speak of things as they are , we must allow , that all the art of rhetorick , besides order and clearness , all the artificial and figurative application of words , eloquence hath invented , are for nothing else , but to insinuate wrong ideas , move the passions , and thereby mislead the judgment , and so indeed are perfect cheat. and therefore however allowable , they may be in harangues and popular addresses ; they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform and instruct , wholly to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are concerned , cannot but be thought a great fault , either of the language or person that makes use of them . to conclude this consideration , the ends of language , in our discourse with others , are chiefly these three . first , to make our thoughts or ideas known to another ; this we fail in first , when we use names without clear and distinct ideas in our minds . secondly , when we apply received names to ideas , to which the common use of that language does not apply them . thirdly , when we apply them unsteadily , making them stand now for one , and by and by for another idea . secondly , to make known our thoughts with as much ease and quickness as is possible . this men fail in when they have complex ideas , without having distinct names for them , which may happen , either through the defect of a language , which has none , or the fault of that man who has not yet learned them . thirdly , to convey the knowledge of things : this cannot be done , but when our ideas agree to the reality of things . he that hath names without ideas , wants meaning in his words , and speaks only empty sounds : he that hath complex ideas , without names for them , wants dispatch in his expression . he that uses his words loosely and unsteadily , will either not be minded , or not understood . he that applies his names to ideas , different from their common use , wants propriety in his language , and speaks gibberish . and he that hath ideas of substances , disagreeing with the real existence of things , so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding , and has instead thereof , chimaeras . language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries , reasonings , and knowledge from one to another , he that makes an ill use of it , thô he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in things themselves ; yet he does as much as in him lies , break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the publick use , and advantage of mankind . he that uses words without any clear and steady meaning , what does he but lead himself and others into errors ? and he that designedly does it , ought to be looked on , as an enemy to truth and knowledge . if we look into books of controversy of any kind , we shall see that the effect of obscure , unsteady , and aequivocal terms , is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds , without convincing or bettering a man's understanding . for if the idea be not agreed on between speaker and hearer , for which the words stand , the argument is not about things but names . it deserves to be considered , and carefully examined , whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world , are not meerly verbal , and about the signification of words ; and that , if the terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their significations , to the single ideas they stand for , those disputes would not end of themselves , and immediately vanish . chap. xi . of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . to remedy the defects of speech above-mentioned , the following rules may be of use . first , a man should take care to use no word without a signification , no name without an idea for which he makes it stand . this rule will not seem needless to any one , who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words , as instinct , sympathy , antipathy . &c. so made use of , as he might easily conclude , that those that used them , had no ideas in their minds , to which they applied them . secondly , those ideas , he annexes them to , should be clear and distinct , which in complex ideas is by knowing the particular ones , that make that composition ; of which , if any one be again complex , we must know also the precise collection that is united in each , and so till we come to simple ones . in substances the ideas must not only be distinct , but also conformable to things as they exist . thirdly , he must apply his words as near as may be to such ideas , as common use has annexed them to ; for words , especially of languages already framed , are no man's private possession , but the common measure of commerce and communication ; and therefore it is not for any one to change the stamp they are current in , nor alter the ideas they are affixed to ; or at least , when there is a necessity to do so , he is bound to give notice of it . and therefore , fourthly , when common use has left the signification of a word uncertain , and loose , or where it is to be used in a peculiar sense ; or where the term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake , there it ought to be defined , and its signification ascertained . words standing for simple ideas being not defineable , their signification must be shewn either , first , by a synonymous word . secondly , by naming a subject , wherein that simple idea is to be found . thirdly , by presenting to the senses that subject , which may produce it in the mind , and make him actually have the idea that word stands for . mixed modes may be perfectly defined , by exactly enumerating those ideas that go to each composition . this ought more especially to be done in mixed modes belonging to morality : since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known ; and yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly , and without leaving any room for any contest about it . for the explaining the signification of the names of substances , both the forementioned ways , viz. of shewing , and defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of ; their names are best defined by their leading qualities , which are mostly shape in animals , and vegetables : and colour in inanimate bodies ; and in some , both together . now these leading qualities are best made known by shewing , and can hardly be made known otherwise . the shape of a horse or cassowary will be but imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words : the sight of the animals doth it much better . and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it , but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it . the like may be be said of those other simple ideas , peculiar in their kind to any substance , for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names . but because many of the simple ideas , which make up our specifick ideas of substances , are powers which lie not obvious to our sense in the things , as they ordinarily appear ; therefore in the signification of our names of substances , some part of the signification will be better made known , by enumerating those simple ideas , than in shewing the substance it self . for he that to the yellow shining colour of gold , got by sight , shall from my enumerating them have the ideas of great ductibility , fusibility , fixedness , and solubility in aqua regia will have a perfecter idea of gold , than he can have by seeing a piece of gold , and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities . it were to be wished that words standing for things , which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them . a vocabulary made after this fashion , would perhaps with more ease , and in less time teach the true signification of many terms , especially in languages of remote countreys , or ages ; and settle truer ideas in mens minds of several things , whereof we read the names in ancient authors , than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks . naturalists that treat of plants and animals , have found the benefit of this way : and he that consults them will find that he has a clearer idea of apium and ibex from a little print , of that herb or beast , than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them : and so no doubt he would have of strigil , and sistrum , if instead of a curry-comb or cymbal , which are the english names dictionaries render them by , he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments , as they were in use amongst the ancients . fifthly , the last rule that i shall mention is , that in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another , he should use the same word , constantly in the same sense ; if this were done ( which no body can refuse , without great disingenuity ) many of the books extant might be spared ; many of the controversies in dispute , would be at an end ; several of those great volumes swollen with ambiguous words , now used in one sense , and by and by in another , would shrink into a very narrow compass : and many of the philosophers ( to mention no other ) as well as poets works , might be contained in a nutshell . book iv. chap. i. of knowledge in general . since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings , has no other immediate object but its own ideas , which alone it does or can contemplate ; it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them . knowledge then seems to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas : where this perception is , there is knowledge ; and where it is not , there thô we fancy , guess , or believe , yet we always come short of knowledge . when we know that white is not black , what do we but perceive that these two ideas do not agree ? or that the three angles of a triangle , are equal to two rightones ; what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones , does necessarily agree to , and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle ? but to understand a little more distinctly , wherein this agreement or disagreement consists ; we may reduce it all to these four sorts ; first , identity or diversity ; secondly , relation ; thirdly , co-existence ; fourthly , real existence . . identity or diversity ; 't is the first act of the mind , to perceive its ideas ; and so far as it perceives them , to know each what it is , and thereby to perceive their difference , that is , the one not to be the other : by this the mind clearly perceives each idea to agree with it self , and to be what it is ; and all distinct ideas to disagree . this it does without any pains or deduction , by its natural power of perception and distinction . this is what men of art have reduced to those general rules , viz. what is is . and it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . but no maxime can make a man know it clearer , that round is not square , than the bare perception of those two ideas , which the mind at first sight perceives to disagree . . the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas may be called relative , and is nothing but the perception of the relation , between any two ideas of what kind soever : that is , their agreement or disagreement one with another in several ways the mind takes of comparing them . . the third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas , is co-existence or non-coexistence in the same subject ; and this belongs particularly to substances . thus when we pronounce concerning gold , that it is fixed , it amounts to no more but this , that fixedness , or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed , is an idea that always accompanies that particular sort of yellowness , weight , fusibility , &c. which make our complex idea , signified by the word gold. . the fourth sort is that of actual and real existence agreeing to any idea . within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement , i suppose is contained all the knowledge we have , or are capable of . for all that we know or can affirm concerning any idea , is , that it is , or is not the same with some other : as that blue is not yellow . that it does , or does not co-exist with another in the same subject : as that iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions ; that it has that or this relation to some other ideas : as that two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal : or that it has a real existence without the mind : as , that god is . there are several ways wherein the mind is possess'd of truth , each of which is called knowledge . first , there is actual knowledge , when the mind has a present view of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas , or of the relation they have one with another . secondly , a man is said to know any proposition , when having once evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , whereof it consists , and so lodged it in his memory , that whenever it comes to be reflected on again , the mind assents to it without doubt or hesitation , and is certain of the truth of it . and this may be called habitual knowledge : and thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory , by a foregoing clear , and full perception . of this there are vulgarly speaking two degrees . the one is of such truths laid up in the memory , as whenever they occur to the mind , it actually perceives the relation , that is between those ideas . and this is in all those truths , where the ideas themselves , by an immediate view , discover their agreement or disagreement one with another . the other is of such truths , whereof the mind having been convinced , it retains the memory of the conviction , without the proofs . thus a man that remembers certainly , that he once perceived the demonstration , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , is commonly allowed to know it , because he cannot doubt of the truth of it . but yet having forgot the demonstration , he rather believes his memory , than knows the thing ; or rather it is something between opinion and knowledge : a sort of assurance , that exceeds bare belief , which relies on the testimony of another ; and yet comes short of perfect knowledge . chap. ii. of the degrees of our knowledge . all our knowlede consisting in the view the mind has of its own ideas , which is the utmost light , and greatest certainty we are capable of ; the different clearness of our knowledge , seems to lye in the different way of perception , the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas . when the mind perceives this agreement or disagreement , of two ideas , immediately by themselves , without the intervention of any other ; we may call it intuitive knowledge , in which cases the mind perceives the truth , as the eye does light , only by being directed towards it ; of this sort are , that white is not black , that three are more than two , and equal to one and two. this part of knowledge is irresistible , and like the bright sun-shine , forces it self immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way . it is on this intuition , that depends all the certainty and evidence of our other knowledge ; which certainty every one finds to be so great , that he cannot imagine , and therefore not require a greater . the next degree of knowledge is , where the mind perceives not this agreement or disagreement immediately , or by the juxta-position as it were of the ideas , because those ideas , concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made , cannot by the mind be so put together , as to shew it . in this case the mind is sain to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches , by the intervention of other ideas : and this is that which we call reasoning : and thus if we would know the agreement or disagreement in bigness , between the three angles of a triangle , and two right angles ; we cannot by an immediate view , and comparing them do it ; because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once , and be compared with any other one , or two angles . and so of this , the mind has no immediate or intuitive knowledge . in this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles , to which the three angles of a triangle have equality , and finding those equal to two right ones , comes to know the equality of these three angles to two right ones . those intervening ideas , which serve to shew the agreement of any two others , are called proofs and where the agreement or disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived , it is called demonstration . a quickness in the mind to find those proofs , and to apply them right , is , i suppose , that which is called sagacity . this knowledge , thô it be certain , is not so clear and evident as intuitive knowledge . it requires pains and attention , and steady application of mind , to discover the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers , and there must be a progression by steps and degrees , before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty . before demonstration there was a doubt , which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind , that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas , no more than it can be a doubt to the eye ( that can distinctly see white and black ) whether this ink and paper be all of a colour . now in every step that reason makes in demonstrative knowledge ; there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof ; for if it were not so , that yet would need a proof ; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement . there is no knowledge produced . by which it is evident , that every step in reasoning , that produces knowledge , has intuitive certainty ; which when the mind perceives , there is no more required but to remember it , to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we enquire , visible and certain . this intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step and progression of the demonstration , must also be exactly carried in the mind ; and a man must be sure that no part is left out : which because in long deductions , the memory cannot easily retain ; this knowledge becomes more imperfect than intuitive ; and men often embrace falshoods , for demonstrations . it has been generally taken for granted , that mathematicks alone are capable of demonstrative certainty . but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may be intuitively perceived , being as i imagine not the priviledge of the ideas of number , extension and figure alone ; it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us , and not of sufficient evidence in things , that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge . for in whatever ideas the mind can perceive the agreement or disagreement immediately , there it is capable of intuitive knowledge : and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas , there the mind is capable of demonstration , which is not limited to the ideas of figure , number , extension , or their modes . the reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only , is because in comparing their equality or excess , the modes of numbers have every the least difference , very clear and perceivable : and in extension , thô every the least excess is not so perceptible , yet the mind has found out ways to discover the just equality of two angels , extensions or figures : and both , that is , numbers and figures can be set down by visible and lasting marks . but in other simple ideas , whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees , and not quantity , we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences , as to perceive , or find ways to measure their just equality , or the least differences . for those other simple ideas being appearances or sensations produced in us , by the size , figure , motion , &c. of minute corpuseles singly insensible ; their different degrees also depend on the variation of some , or all of those causes , which since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter , whereof each is too subtile to be perceived , it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas . thus for instance , not knowing what number of particles , nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness ; we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness , because we have no certain standard to measure them by , nor means to distinguish every the least difference : the only help we have being from our senses , which in this point fail us . but where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind ideas clearly distinct ; there ideas of colours , as we see in different kinds , blue and red ( for instance ) are as capable of demonstration , as ideas of number and extension . what is here said of colours , i think holds true in all secondary qualities . these two then , intuition and demonstration , are the degrees of our knowledge , whatever comes short of one of these , is but faith or opinion , not knowledge , at least in all general truths . there is indeed another perception of the mind employed about the particular existence of finite beings , without us , which going beyond probability , but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty , passes under the name of knowledge . nothing can be more certain , than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds : this is intuitive knowledge ; but whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us , corresponding to that idea , is that whereof some men think there may be a question made , because men may have such an idea in their minds , when no such thing exists , no such object affects their senses . but 't is evident that we are invincibly conscious to our selves of a different perception , when we look upon the sun in the day , and think on it by night ; when we actually taste wormwood , or smell a rose , or only think on that savour or odour : so that i think we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge , this also of the existence of particular external objects , by that perception and consciousness we have , of the actual entrance of ideas from them , and allow these three degrees of knowledge , viz. intuitive , demonstrative , and sensitive , but since our knowledge is founded on , and employed about our ideas only : will it follow thence that it must be con●ormable to our ideas , and that where our ideas are clear and distinct , obscure and confused , there our knowledge will be so too ? i answer , no : for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas ; its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves . a man ( for instance ) that has a clear idea of the angles of a triangle , and of equality to two right ones , may yet have but an obscure perception of their agreement ; and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it . but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear or distinct knowledge : because , as far as any ideas are obscure or confused , so far the mind can never perceive clearly , whether they agree or disagree . chap. iii. of the extent of humane knowledge . from what has been said concerning knowledge , it follows that , first , we can have no knowledge farther than we have ideas . secondly , that we have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement of our ideas , either by intuition , demonstration , or sensation . thirdly , we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend it self to all our ideas , and all that we would know about them ; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another , by juxta-position , or an immediate comparison one with another . thus we cannot intuitively perceive the equality of two extensions , the difference of whose figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact and immediate application . fourthly , our rational knowledge can not reach to the whole extent of our ideas ; because between two different ideas we would examine , we cannot always find such proofs , as we can connect one to another , with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction . fifthly , sensitive knowledge reaching no farther than the existence of things actually present to our senses , is yet much narrower than either of the former . sixthly , from all which it is evident , that the extent of our knowledge , comes not only short of the reality of things , but even of the extent of our own ideas . we have the ideas of a square , a circle and equality , and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square . the affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have , being reduced to the four sorts above-mentioned , viz. identity , co-existence , relation , and real existence ; i shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these . first , as to identity and diversity , our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves ; and there can be no idea in the mind , which it does not presently by an intuitive knowledge , perceive to be what it is , and to be different from any other . secondly , as to the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence : in this our knowledge is very short , thô in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge , concerning substances : for our ideas of substances being as i have shewed , nothing but certain collections of simple ideas , co-existing in one subject , ( our idea of flame for instance , is a body hot , luminous and moving upward . ) when we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of substance , what do we but enquire what other qualities or powers these substances have or have not ? which is nothing else but to know , what other simple ideas do , or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea . the reason of this is , because the simple ideas which make up our complex ideas of substances , have no visible necessary connexion or inconsistence with other simple ideas , whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about . these ideas being likewise for the most part secundary qualities , which depend upon the primary qualities of their minute or insensible parts , or on something yet more remote from our comprehension ; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union , or inconsistency one with another , since we know not the root from whence they spring , or the size , figure , and texture of parts on which they depend , and from which they result . besides this , there is no discoverable connexion between any secundary qualitie , and those primary qualities that it depends on . we are so far from knowing what figure , size or motion produces , ( for instance ) a yellow colour , or sweet taste , or a sharp sound , that we can by no means conceive how any size , figure , or motion can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour , taste or sound whatsoever ; and there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other . our knowledge therefore of co-existence reaches little farther than experience . some few indeed of the primary qualities have a necessary dependance , and visible connexion one with another : as figure necessarily supposes extension : receiving or communicating motion by impulse , supposes solidity . but qualities co-existent in any subject , without this dependance and connexion , cannot certainly be known to co-exist any farther , than experience by our senses informs us . thus , thô upon trial we find gold yellow , weighty , malleable , fusible and fixed , yet because none of these have any evident dependance , or necessary connexion with the other ; we cannot certainly know , that where any four of these are , the fifth will be there also , how highly probable soever it may be : but the highest degree of probability , amounts not to certainty ; without which there can be no true knowledge : for this co-existence can be no farther known , then it is perceived ; and it cannot be perceived , but either in particular subjects , by the observation of our senses ; or in general , by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves . as to incompatibility , or repugnancy to co-existence , we may know that any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities , but one particular at once . one extension , one figure ; and so of sensible ideas peculiar to each sense : for whatever of each kind , is present in any subject , excludes all other of that sort ; for instance , one subject cannot have two smells , or two colours at the same time . as to powers of substances , which makes a great part of our enquiries about them , and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge : our knowledge as to these reaches little farther than experience ; because they consist in a texture and motion of parts , which we cannot by any means come to discover ; and i doubt whether with those faculties we have , we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge much farther in this part . experience is that which in this part we must depend on ; and it were to be wished that it were improved : we find the advantages some mens generous pains , have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge . and if others , especially the philosophers by fire who pretend to it , had been so wary in their observations , and sincere in their reports , as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been : our acquaintance with the bodies here about us , and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater . as to the third sort the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in any other relation : this is the largest field of knowledge , and it is hard to determine how far it may extend . this part depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas , that may shew the habitudes and relations of ideas ; it is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries . they that are ignorant of algebra , cannot imagine the wonders in this kind , are to be done by it : and what farther improvements and helps , advantageous to other parts of knowledge , the sagacious mind of man may yet find out , it is not easy to determine . this at least i believe that the ideas of quantity , are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge : and that other , and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation , would afford us certainty , if vices , passions , and domineering interests , did not oppose or menace endeavours of this kind . the idea of a supream being , infinite in power , goodness , and wisdom , whose workmanship we are , and on whom we depend ; and the idea of our selves , as understanding rational creatures , would i suppose , if duly considered , afford such foundations of our duty , and rules of action , as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration : wherein i doubt not but from principles as incontestable as those of the mathematicks , by necessary consequences , the measure of right and wrong might be made out , to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one , as he does to the other of these sciences . the relations of other modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of number , and extension . where there is no property , there is no injustice , is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in euclid : for the idea of property , being a right to any thing ; and the idea of injustice , being the invasion or violation of that right : it is evident that these ideas being thus established , and these names annexed to them , i can as certainly know this proposition to be true , as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones . again , no government allows absolute liberty . the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws , which require conformity to them ; and the idea of absolute liberty , being for any one to do whatever he pleases , i am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition , as of any in mathematicks . what has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity , and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration , is , first , that they can be represented by sensible marks , which have a nearer correspondence with them , than any words or sounds . diagrams drawn on paper , are copies of the ideas , and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification . but we have no sensible marks that resemble our moral ideas , and nothing but words to express them by ; which thô , when written , they remain the same ; yet the ideas they stand for , may change in the same man ; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons . secondly , moral ideas are commonly more complex than figures : whence these two inconveniencies follow : first , that their names are of more uncertain signification ; the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for , not being so easily agreed on , and so the sign that is used for them in communication always , and in thinking often , does not steadily carry with it the same idea . secondly , the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary ; in the examination of the habitudes and correspondencies , agreements or disagreements of several of them one with another , especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions , and the intervention of several other complex ideas , to shew the agreement ' or disagreement of two remote ones . one part of these disadvantages in moral ideas , which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration , may in a good measure be remedied by definitions , setting down that collection of simple ideas which every term shall stand for , and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection . as to the fourth sort of knowledge , viz. of the real actual existence of things , we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence : a demonstrative knowledge , of the existence of god ; and a sensitive knowledge of the objects that present themselves to our senses . from what has been said we may discover the causes of our ignorance , which are chiefly these three ; first , want of ideas ; secondly , want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have . thirdly , want of tracing and examining our ideas . first , there are some things we are ignorant of for want of ideas . all the simple ideas we have , are confined to the observation of our senses , and the operations of our own minds , that we are conscious of in our selves . what other ideas it is possible other creatures may have , by the assistance of other senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have , or different from ours , it is not for us to determine ; but to say or think , there are no such , because we conceive nothing of them , is no better an argument , than if a blind man should be positive in it , that there was no such thing as sight and colours , because he had no manner of idea of any such thing . what faculties therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things , we know not . this we know , and certainly find , that we want other views of them , besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect . the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike , that the parts which we see of either of them , hold no proportion with that we see not , and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes , or our thoughts of either of them , is but a point , almost nothing , in comparison of the rest . another great cause of ignorance , is the want of ideas that we are capable of . this keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known . bulk , figure and motion we have ideas of : yet not knowing what is the particular bulk , motion and figure of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe , we are ignorant of the several powers , efficacies , and ways of operation , whereby the effects we daily see , are produced . these are hid from us in some things , by being too remote , in others by being too minute . when we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world , and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken , is but a small part of the immense universe ; we shall then discover an huge abyss of ignorance . what are the particular fabricks of the great masses of matter , which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings , how far they are extended , and what is their motion , and how continued , and what influence they have upon one another , are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in . if we confine our thoughts to this little canton , i mean this system of our sun , and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it ; what several sorts of vegetables , animals , and intellectual corporeal beings , infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth , may probably be in other planets , to the knowledge of which , even of their outward figures , and parts , we can no way attain , whilst we are confined to this earth , there being no natural means , either by sensation or reflection , to convey their certain ideas into our minds ? there are other bodies in the universe , no less concealed from us by their minuteness . these insensible corpuscles being the active parts of matter , and the great instruments of nature , on which depend all their secundary qualities and operations , our want of precise distinct ideas , and their primary qualities , keeps us in incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them . did we know the mechanical affections of rhubarb or opium , we might as easily account for their operations of purging and causing sleep , as a watch-maker can for the motions of his watch. the dissolving of silver in aqua fortis , or gold in aqua regia , and not vice versâ , would be then perhaps no more difficult to know , than it is to a smith , to understand why the turning of one key , will open a lock , and not the turning of another . but whilst we are destitute of senses , acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies , and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections , we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and operations ; nor can we be assured about them any farther , than some few trials we make , are able to reach : but whether they will succeed again another time , we cannot be certain . this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies : and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. and therefore i am apt to doubt , that how far soever humane industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things , yet scientifical will still be out of our reach ; because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us , and most under our command . this at first sight shews us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent , even of material beings : to which , if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be , and probably are , which are yet more remote from our knowledge , whereof we have no cognizance : we shall find this cause of ignorance , conceal from us in an impenetrable obscurity , almost the whole intellectual world : a greater certainly , and more beautiful world than the material . for bating some very few ideas of spirit , we get from our own mind by reflection , and from thence the best we can collect , of the father of all spirits , the author of them , and us , and all things : we have no certain information , so much as of the existence of other spirits but by revelation : much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures , states , powers , and several constitutions , wherein they agree or differ one from another , and from us . and therefore in what concerns their different species , and properties , we are under an absolute ignorance . the second cause of ignorance is the want of discoverable connexion between those ideas we have ; where we want that , we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge ; and are as in the former case , left only to observation and experiment . thus the mechanical affections of bodies , having no affinity at all with the ideas they produce in us ; we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience ; and can reason no otherwise about them , than as the effects or appointment of an infinitly wise agent , which perfectly surpass our comprehensions . the operation of our minds upon our bodies , is as unconceivable . how any thought should produce a motion in body , is as remote from the nature of our ideas , as how any body should produce any thought in the mind . that it is so , if experience did not convince us , the consideration of the things themselves , would never be able in the least to discover to us . in some of our ideas , there are certain relations , habitudes , and connexions , so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves , that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever : in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge . thus the ideas of a right lined triangle , necessarily carries with it , an equality of its angles to two right ones . but the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter ; the production of sensation in us , of colours and sounds , &c. by impulse , and motion , being such wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have , we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect . the things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly , we may conclude do act by a law set them ; but yet by a law that we know not ; whereby , thô causes work steadily , and effects constantly flow from them ; yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas , we can have but an experimental knowledge of them . several effects come every day within the notice of our senses , of which we have so far sensitive knowledge . but the causes , manner and certainty of their production , we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of . in these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact , and by analogy , guess what effects the like bodies are upon other tryals like to produce . but as to perfect science of natural bodies ( not to mention spiritual beings ) we are , i think , so far from being capable of any such thing , that i conclude it lost labour to seek after it . the third cause of ignorance is our want of tracing those ideas we have , or may have ; and finding out those intermediate ideas which may shew us what habitude of agreement or disagreement , they may have one with another : and thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths , for want of application in enquiring , examining , and by due ways comparing those ideas . hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge , in respect of the several sorts of beings that are . there is another extent of it , in respect of universality , which will also deserve to be considered ; and in this regard our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas . if the ideas are abstract , whose agreement or disagreement we perceive , our knowledge is universal . for what is known of such general ideas , will be true of every particular thing in which that essence , that is , that abstract idea is to be found : and what is once known of such ideas , will be perpetually , and for ever true . so that as to all general knowledge , we must search and find it only in our own minds : and it is only the examining of our own ideas , that furnishes us with the truths belonging to essences of things ( that is , to abstract ideas ) that are eternal , and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences ; as the existence of things is to be known only from experience . but i shall say more of this in the following chapters , where i shall speak of general , and rèal knowledge . chap. iv. of the reality of our knowledge . i doubt not but my reader by this time , may be apt to think that i have been all this while , only building a castle in the air : and be ready to object , if it be true , that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas , the visions of an enthusiast , and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain : it is no matter how things are , so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations , and talk conformably , it is all truth , all certainty , that an harpy is not a centaur , is by this way as certain knowledge , and as much truth , as that a square is not a circle . but of what use is all this knowledge of mens own imaginations , to a man that enquires after the reality of things ? to which i answer , that if our knowledge of our ideas should terminate in them , and reach no farther , where there is something farther intended ; our most serious thoughts would be of little more use , than the reveries of a crazy brain . but i hope before i have done , to make it evident , that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas , goes a little farther , than bare imagination : and that all the certainty of general truths a man has , lies in nothing else but this knowledge of our ideas . 't is evident that the mind knows not things immediately , but by the intervention of the ideas it has of them . our knowledge therefore is real , only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas , and the reality of things . but how shall we know when our ideas agree , with things themselves ? i answer , there be two sorts of ideas that , we may be assured agree with things : these are , first , simple ideas ; which since the mind can by no means make to it self , must be the effect of things operating upon the mind , in a natural way ; and producing therein those perceptions , which by the will of our maker , they are ordained and adapted to . hence it follows , that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies , but the natural and regular productions of things without us , really operating upon us ; which carry with them all the conformity our state requires , which is to represent things , under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us . thus the idea of whiteness , as it is in the mind , exactly answers that power which is in any body to produce it there . and this conformity between our simple ideas , and the existence of things , is sufficient for real knowledge . secondly , all our complex ideas , except those of substances , being archetypes , of the mind 's own making , and not referred to the existence of things as to their originals , cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge . for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self , can never be capable of a wrong representation . here the ideas themselves are considered as archetypes , and things no otherwise regarded , than as they are conformable to them . thus the mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only , as they are ideas in his own mind , which possibly he never found existing mathematically , that is , precisely true : yet his knowledge is not only certain , but real ; because real things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any such propositions , than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind . it is true of the idea of a triangle , that its three angles are equal to two right ones ; it is true also of a triangle , wherever it exists : what is true of those figures , that have barely an ideal existence in his mind , will hold true of them also , when they come to have a real existence in matter . hence it follows that moral knowledge , is as capable of real certainty as mathematicks . for certainty being nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas , , and demonstration nothing , but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas ; our moral ideas as well as mathematical , being archetypes themselves , and so adequate or complete ideas all the agreement or disagreement we shall find in them , will produce real knowledge as well as in mathematical figures . that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain , is the clearness of our ideas ; and that which is required to make it real , is , that they answer their archetypes . but it will here be said , that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas ; and those be of our own making , what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance ? what confusion of vertues and vices , if every man may make what ideas of them he pleases ? i answer , no confusion , nor disorder at all , in the things themselves , nor the reasonings about them ; no more , than there would be a change in the properties of figures , and their relations one to another , if a man should make a triangle with four corners , or a trapezium with four right angles ; that is in plain english , change the names of the figures , and call that by one name , which is called ordinarily by another . the change of name will indeed at first disturb him , who knows not what idea , it stands for : but as soon as the figure is drawn , the consequences and demonstration are plain , and clear . just the same is it in moral knowledge : let a man have the idea of taking from others , without their consent , what they are justly possessed of , and call this justice , if he pleases : he that takes the name here , without the idea put to it , will be mistaken by joyning another idea of his own to that name ; but strip the idea of that name , or take it such as it is in the speakers mind ; and the same things will agree to it , as if you called it injustice . one thing we are to take notice of , that where god , or any other law-maker has defined any moral names , there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs : and there it is not safe to apply , or use them otherwise . but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech , to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country they are used in . thirdly , but the complex ideas which we refer to archetypes without us , may differ from them , and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real : and thus are our ideas of substances . these must be taken from something , that does or has existed , and not be made up of ideas arbitrarily put together , without any real pattern . herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances , that all our complex ideas of them must be such , and such only , as are made up of such simple ones , as have been discovered to co-exist in nature . wherever then we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas , there is certain knowledge ; and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things , there is certain real knowledge . chap v. of truth in general . truth in the proper import of the word , signifies the joyning or separating of signs ; as the things signified by them , do agree or disagree one with another . the joyning or separating of signs , is what we call propositions ; so that truth properly belongs only to propositions ; whereof there are two sorts , mental and verbal , as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of , ideas and words . 't is difficult to treat of mental propositions without verbal : because in speaking of mental , we must make use of words , and then they become verbal . again , men commonly in their thoughts and reasonings , use words instead of ideas ; especially if the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas . if we have occasion to form mental propositions about white , black , circle , &c. we can , and often do , frame in our minds the ideas themselves , without reflecting on the names . but when we would consider , or make propositions about the more complex ideas , as of a man , vitriol , fortitude , glory , &c. we usually put the name for the idea ; because the idea these names stand for , being for the most part confused , imperfect , and undetermined ; we reflect on the names themselves , as being more clear , certain , and distinct , and readier to occur to our thoughts , than pure ideas : and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves , even when we would meditate and reason within our selves , and make tacit mental propositions . we must then observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making . first , mental propositions , wherein the ideas in our understandings are put together , or separated by the mind , perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement . secondly , verbal propositions , which are words put together , or separated in affirmative or negative sentences : so that proposition consists , in joyning or separating signs : and truth consists , in putting together or separating these signs , according as the things they stand for , agree or disagree . truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real ; that being only verbal truth , wherein terms are joyned according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for , without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in nature . but then it is they contain real truth , when these signs are joyned , as our ideas agree ; and when our ideas are such as we know , are capable of having an existence in nature : which in substances we cannot know , but by knowing that such have existed . truth is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as it is . falshood is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas , otherwise than it is ; and so far as these ideas thus marked by sounds , agree to their archetypes , so far only is the truth real . the knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for , and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas , according as it is marked by those words . besides truth taken in the strict sense before-mentioned ; there are other sorts of truths , as first , moral truth , which is , speaking things according to the perswasion of our own minds . secondly , metaphysical truth , which is nothing but the real existence of things conformable to the ideas , to which we have annexed their names . these considerations of truth , either having been before taken notice of , or not being much to our present purpose ; it may suffice here only to have mentioned them . chap. vi. of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . the prevailing custom of using sounds , for ideas , even when men think and reason within their own breasts , makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge , that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one , without explaining the other . and since general truths , which with reason are most sought after , can never be well made known , and are seldom apprehended , but as conceived and expressed in words ; it is not out of our way in the examination of our own knowledge to enquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions . but it must be observed , that certainty is twofold , certainty of truth , and certainty of knowledge . certainty of truth is , when words are so put together in propositions , as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for ; as really it is . certainty of knowledge , is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any propositions . this we usually call knowing , or being certain of the truth of any proposition . now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition , unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for ; it is necessary we should know the essence of each species , which is that which constitutes and bounds it . this in all simple ideas , and modes is not hard to do : for in these the real and nominal essence be-being the same , there can be no doubt how far the species extends , or what things are comprehended under each term : which it is evident are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for , and no other . but in substances , wherein a real essence , distinct from the nominal , is supposed to constitute , and bound the species , the extent of the general word is very uncertain ; because not knowing this real essence , we cannot know what is , or is not of that species , and consequently what may , or may not with certainty be affirmed of it . hence we may see that the names of substances , when made to stand for species , supposed to be constituted by real essences , which we know not , are not capable of conveying certainty to the understanding , of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms , we cannot be sure . for how can we besure that this or that quality is in gold , for instance , when we know not what is , or is not gold , that is , what has , or has not the real essence of gold , whereof we have no idea at all . on the other side , the names of substances when made use of for the complex ideas , men have in their minds ; thô they carry a clear and determinate signification with them , will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions , of whose truth we can be certain : because the simple ideas , out of which the complex are combined , carry not with them any discoverable connexion , or repugnancy , but with a very few other ideas . for instance , all gold is fixed , is a proposition we cannot be certain of how universally soever it be believed : for if we take the term gold , to stand for a real essence , it is evident we know not what particular substances are of that species , and so cannot with certainty affirm any thing universally of gold. but if we make the term gold stand for a species , determined by its nominal essence , be its complex idea what it will ; for instance , a body yellow , fusible , malleable , and very heavy ; no quality can with certainty be denyed or affirmed universally of it , but what has a discoverable connexion , or inconsistency with that nominal essence : fixedness , for instance , having no necessary connexion that we can discover with any simple idea that makes the complex one , or with the whole combination together : it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition , all gold is fixed . but is not this an universal certain proposition , all gold is malleable ? i answer , it is so , if malleableness be a part of the complex idea , the word gold stands for : but then here is nothing affirmed of gold , but that , that sound stands for an idea , in which malleableness is contained . and such a sort of truth and certainty it is , to say , a centaur is four-footed . i imagine amongst all the secundary qualities of substances , and the powers relating to them , there cannot any two be named , whose necessary co-existence or repugnance to co-exist can be certainly known , unless in those of the same sense , which necessarily exclude one another . thus by the colour we cannot certainly know what smell , tast , &c. any body is of . 't is no wonder then that certainty is to be found but in very few general propositions concerning substances : our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom farther than our senses reach , or inform us . inquisitive and observing men may by strength of judgment , penetrate farther ; and on probabilities taken from wary observations , and hints well laid together , often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them : but this is but guessing still , it amounts only to opinion ; and has not that certainty , which is requisite to knowledge . to conclude , general propositions of what kind soever , are then only capable of certainty , when the terms used in them , stand for such ideas , whose agreement or disagreement , as there expressed , is capable to be discovered by us . and we are then certain of their truth or falshood , when we perceive the ideas they stand for , to agree or not agree , according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another ; whence we may take notice , that general certainty , is never to be found but in our ideas . chap. vii . of maxims . there are a sort of propositions , which under the name of maxims and axioms , have passed for principles of science : and because they are self-evident , have been supposed innate . it may be worth while to enquire into the reason of their evidence , and examine how far they influence our other knowledge . knowledge being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by it self , without the intervention or help of any other , there our knowledge is self-evident : which being so , not only maxims , but an infinite number of other propositions partake equally with them in this self-evidence . for , in respect of identity and diversity , we may have as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas . t is the first act of the mind , to know every one of its ideas by it self , and distinguish it from others . every one finds in himself , that he knows the ideas he has ; that he knows also when any one is in his understanding , and what it is ; and that when more than one are there , he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly , one from another ; so that all affirmations , or negations concerning them , are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty ; and must necessarily be assented to , as soon as understood : that is , as soon as we have in our minds the ideas clear and distinct , which the terms in the proposition stand for . thus a circle is a circle , blue is not red , are as self-evident propositions , as those general ones , what is , is , and 't is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; nor can the consideration of these axioms add any thing to the evidence , or certainty of our knowledge of them . as to the agreement or disagreement of co-existence , the mind has an immediate perception of this , but in very few . and therefore , in this sort we have very little intuitive knowledge : thô in some few propositions we have . two bodies cannot be in the same place i think is a self-evident proposition . the idea of fitting a place equal to the contents of its superficies , being annexed to our idea of body . as to the relations of modes , mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality , as equals taken from equals , the remainder will be equal , &c. which however received for axioms , yet i think have not a clearer self-evidence than these , that one and one are equal to two , that if from the five fingers of one hand , you take two , and from the five fingers of the other hand two , the remaining numbers will be equal . these , and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers , which carry with them an equal , if not greater clearness , than those mathematical axioms . as to real existence , since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas , but that of our selves , and of a first being ; we have not so much as a demonstrative , much less a self-evident knowledge , concerning the real existence of other beings . in the next place let us consider what influence these maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge . the rules established in the schools , that all reasonings are ex praecognitis & praeconceptis , seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims , and to suppose them to be praecognita ; whereby i think is meant two things : first , that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind : secondly , that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend . first , that these axioms are not the truths first known to the mind , is evident from experience : for who knows not that a child perceives that a stranger is not its mother , long before he knows , that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ? and how many truths are there about numbers , which the mind is perfectly acquainted with , and fully convinced of , before it ever thought on these general maxims ? of this the reason is plain ; for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions , being nothing but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas , according as it finds them affirmed or denied in words one of another ; and every idea being known to be what it is , and every two distinct ideas not to be the same , it must necessarily follow , that such self-evident truths must be first known , which consist of ideas , that are first in the mind ; and the ideas first in the mind , it is evident , are those of particular things ; from whence , by slow degrees the understanding proceeds to some few general ones , which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense , are settled in the mind , with general names to them . thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished , and so knowledge got about them , and next to them the less general or specifick , which are next to particular ones . secondly , from what has been said , it plainly follows , that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge : for if there be a great many other truths , as self-evident as they , and a great many that we know before them , it is impossible that they should be the principles , from which we deduce all other truths . thus , that one and two are equal to three , is as evident , and easier known then that the whole is equal to all its parts . nor after the knowledge of this maxim , do we know that one and two are equal to three , better , or more certainly , than we did before . for if there be any odds in these ideas , the ideas of whole , and parts , are more obscure , or at least more difficult to be setled in the mind , than those of one , two and three . either therefore all knowledge does not depend on certain praecognita , or general maxims , called principles ; or else , such as these ( that one and one are two , that two and two are four , &c. ) and a great part of numeration will be so . to which if we add all the self-evident propositions that may be made about all our distinct ideas ; principles will be almost infinite , at least innumerable , which men arrive to the knowledge of , at different ages ; and a great many of those innate principles , they never come to know all their lives . but whether they come in view earlier or later , they are all known by their native evidence , and receive no light , nor are capable of any proof one from another ; much less the more particular , from the more general ; or the more simple from the more compounded : the more simple , and less abstract , being the most familiar , and the easier and earlier apprehended . these general maxims then , are only of use in disputes , to stop the mouths of wranglers ; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths ; or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge . several general maxims , are no more than bare verbal propositions ; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names , one to another , as , the whole is equal to all its parts : what real truth does it teach us more , than what the signification of the word totum , or whole does of it self import ? but yet , mathematicians do not without reason place this , and some other such amongst their maxims ; that their scholars having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions , made in such general terms , may have them ready to apply to all particular cases : not that if they be equally weighed , they are more clear and evident , than the particular instances they are brought to confirm , but that being more familiar to the mind , the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding . but this i say , is more from our custom of using them , than the different evidence of the things . so that if rightly consider'd , i think we may say , that where our ideas are clear and distinct , there is little , or no use at all of these maxims , to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them . he that cannot discern the truth , or falshood of such propositions , without the help of these and the like maxims , will not be helped by these maxims to do it . he that needs any proof to make him certain , and give his assent to this proposition , that two are equal to two , or that white is not black , will also have need of a proof to make him admit that , what is , is , or , that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be . and as these maxims are of little use , where we have clear and distinct ideas ; so they are of dangerous use , where our ideas are confused , and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct ideas ; but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification , sometimes standing for one , and sometimes for another idea , from which follows mistake and error , which these maxims ( brought as proofs to establish propositions wherein the terms stand for confused and uncertain ideas ) do by their authority confirm and rivet . chap. viii . of trifling propositions . there are universal propositions , which thô they be certainly true , yet add no light to our understandings , bring no increase to our knowledge , such are , first , all purely identical propositions . these at first blush , appear to contain no instruction in them : for when we affirm the same term of it self , it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before , whether such a proposition be either made by , or proposed to us . secondly , another sort of trifling propositions is , when a part of the complex idea is praedicated of the name of the whole ; a part of the definition , of the word defined , as ; lead is a metal , man an animal . these carry no information at all , to those who know the complex ideas , the names lead , and man stand for : indeed , to a man that knows the signification of the word metal , and not of the word lead , it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead , by saying it is a metal , than by enumerating the simple ideas one by one , which make up the complex idea of metal . alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the simple ideas of a complex one , of the name of the whole complex idea : as all gold is fusible ; for fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one , the sound gold stands for ; what can it be but playing with sounds , to affirm that of the name gold , which is comprehended in its received signification ? what instruction can it carry , to tell one that which he is supposed to know before ? for i am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me , or else he is to tell me . the general propositions that are made about substances , if they are certain , are for the most part but trifling . and if they are instructive , are uncertain ; and such as we have no knowledge of their real truth , how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing . hence it comes to pass , that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses , that amount yet to nothing . for names of substantial beings , as well as others , having setled significations affixed to them , may with great truth be joyned negatively and affirmatively in propositions , as their definitions make them fit to be so joyned ; and propositions consisting of such terms , may with the same clearness be deduced one from another , as those that convey the most real truths ; and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us . thus he that has learnt the following words , with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them , viz. substance , man , animal form , soul , vegetative , sensitive , rational , may make several undoubted propositions about the soul , without any knowledge at all of what the soul really is . and of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions , reasonings and conclusions in books of metaphysicks , school-divinity , and some part of natural philosophy ; and after all , know as little of god , spirits , or bodies , as he did before he set out . thirdly , the worst sort of trifling , is , to use words loosely and uncertainly , which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain to by them , or find in them . that which occasions this , is , that men may find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy , under the obscurity or perplexedness of their terms ; to which , perhaps , inadvertency and ill custom does in many men much contribute . to conclude , barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks . first , all propositions , wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another , are barely about the signification of sounds . for since no abstract idea can be the same with any other , but it self ; when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term , it can signifie no more but this , that it may , or ought to be called by that name ; or that these two names signify the same idea . secondly , all propositions , wherein a part of the complex idea , which any term stands for , is predicated of that term , are only verbal : and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive terms called genera , are affirmed of subordinate , or less comprehensive , called species , or individuals , are barely verbal . when by these two rules we examine the propositions that make up the discourses we ordnarily meet with , both in and out of books ; we shall , perhaps find , that a greater part of them , than is usually suspected , are purely about the signification of words , and contain nothing in them , but the use and application of these signs . chap. ix . of our knowledge of existence . hitherto we have only considered the essences of things , which being only abstract ideas , and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence , give us no knowledge of existence at all . we proceed now to enquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things , and how we come by it . i say then that we have the knowledge of our own existence , by intuition ; of the existence of god , by demonstration ; and of other things , by sensation . as for our own existence , we perceive it so plainly , that it neither needs , nor is capable of any proof . i think , i reason ; i feel pleasure and pain ; can any of these be more evident to me , than my own existence ? if i doubt of all other things , that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence , and will not suffer me to doubt of that . if i know i doubt , i have as certain a perception of the thing doubting , as of that thought which i call doubt . experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence ; and an internal infallible perception that we are . in every act of sensation , reasoning or thinking , we are conscious to our selves of our own being , and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty . chap x. of our knowledge of the existence of a god. tho' god has given us no innate ideas of himself , yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with , he hath not left himself without a witness , since we have sense , perception , and reason ; and cannot want a clear proof of him , as long as we carry our selves about us : nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point , since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover , and know him , so far as is necessary to the end of our being , and the great concernment of our happiness . but thô this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers , yet it requires thought and attention : and the mind must apply it self to a regular deduction of it , from some part of our intuitiv knowledge ; or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration . to shew therefore , that we are capable of knowing , that is , being certain , that there is a god , and how we may come by this certainty , i think we need go no farther than our selves , and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence . i think it is beyond question , that man has a clear perception of his own being : he knows certainly , that he exists , and that he is something . in the next place , man knows by an intuitive certainty , that bare nothing can no more produce any real being , than it can be equal to two right angles . if therefore we know there is some real being , it is an evident demonstration , that from eternity there has been something ; since what was not from eternity , had a beginning ; and what had a beginning , must be produced by something else next it is evident , that what has its being from another , must also have all that which is in , and belongs to its being from another too : all the powers it has must be owing to , and received from the same source . this eternal source then of all being must he also the source and original of all power ; and so this eternal being , must be also the most powerful . again , man finds in himself perception , and knowledge : we are certain then that there is not only some being , but some knowing , intelligent being in the world. there was a time then , when there was no knowing being , or else there has been a knowing being from eternity . if it be said , there was a time when that eternal being , had no knowledge ; i reply , that then it is impossible there should have ever been any knowledge . it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge , and operating blindly , and without any perception , should produce a knowing being , as it is impossible that a triangle should make it self three angles , bigger than two right ones . thus from the consideration of our selves , and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions , our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth , that there is an eternal , most powerful , and knowing being , which , whether any one will call god , it matters not . the thing is evident , and from this idea duly consider'd , will easily be deduced all those other attributes , we ought to ascribe to this eternal being . from what has been said , it is plain to me , we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a god , than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us . nay , i presume i may say , that we more certainly know that there is a god , than that there is any thing else without us . when i say , we know , i mean , there is such a knowledge within our reach , which we cannot miss , if we will but apply our minds to that , as we do to several other enquiries . it being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude , that something has existed from eternity ; let us next see what kind of thing that must be : there are but two sorts of beings in the world , that man knows or conceives ; first , such as are purely material , without sense or perception , as the clippings of our beards , and parings of our nails . secondly , sensible perceiving beings ; such as we find our selves to be . these two sorts we shall hereofter call cogitative and incogitative beings ; which to our present purpose are better than material and immaterial . if then there must be something eternal , it is very obvious to reason , that it must necessarily be a cogitative being , because it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being , as that nothing should of it self produce matter . let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal , we shall find it in it self unable to produce any thing . let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together : if there were no other being in the world , must it not eternally remain so , a dead unactive lump ? is it possible to conceive it can add motion to it self , or produce any thing ? matter then by its own strength cannot produce in it self , so much as motion . the motion it has , must also be from eternity , or else added to matter by some other being , more powerful than matter . but let us suppose motion eternal too , yet matter , incogitative matter and motion could never produce thought : knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce , as matter is beyond the power of nothing to produce . divide matter into as minute parts as you will , vary the figure and motion of it , as much as you please , it will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk , than it did before this division . the minutest particles of matter , knock , impell , and resist one another , just as the greater do , and that is all they can do , so that if we will suppose nothing eternal , matter can never begin to be . if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal , motion can never begin to be . if we suppose only matter and motion eternal , thought can never begin to be : for it is impossible to conceive , that matter either with , or without motion , could have originally in and from it self , sense , perception , and knowledge , as is evident from hence , that the sense , perception and knowledge , must be a property eternally inseparable from matter , and every particle of it . since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being , must necessarily be cogitative : and whatsoever is first of all things , must necessarily contain in it , and actually have , at least , all the perfections that can ever after exist , it necessarily follows , that the first eternal be●ng cannot be matter . if therefore it be evident that something necessarily must exist from eternity , it is also as evident that , that something must necessarily be a cogitative being . for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being , as that nothing , or the negation of all being should produce a positive being or matter . this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind , does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of god. for it will hence follow , that all other knowing beings , that have a beginning , must depend on him , and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power , than what he gives them : and therefore if he made those , he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe , all inanimate bodies , whereby his omniscience , power and providence will be established ; and from thence all his other attributes necessarily follow . chap. xi . of our knowledge of the existence of other things . the knowledge of our own being we have by intuition : the existence of a god , reason clearly makes known to us , as has been shewn : the knowledge of the existence of any other thing , we can have only by sensation ; for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea , a man hath in his memory ; nor of any other existence , but that of god , with the existence of any particular man ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only , when by actual operating upon him , it makes it self be perceived by him . the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing , than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream , make thereby a true history . it is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without , that gives us notice of the existence of other things , and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us , which causes that idea in us , thô perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it ; for it takes not from the certainty of our senses , and the ideas we receive by them , that we know not the manner wherein they are produced . this notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us , thô it be not altogether so certain as intuition and demonstration , deserves the name of knowledge , if we perswade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right , concerning the existence of those objects , that affect them . but besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves , that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us , we have other concurrent reasons : as first , it is plain those perceptions are are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses , because those that want the organs of any sense ; never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds . this is too evident to be doubted , and therefore we cannot but be assured , that they come in by the organs of that sense , and no other way . secondly , because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in our minds , as when my eyes are shut , i can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun , which former sensations had lodged in my memory ; but if i turn my eyes towards the sun , i cannot avoid the ideas which the light or the sun , then produces in me : which shews a manifest difference between those ideas laid up in the memory , and such as force themselves upon us , and we cannot avoid having . and therefore it must needs be some exterior cause , whose efficacy i cannot resist , that produces those ideas in my mind , whether i will or no. besides , no man but perceives the difference in himself , between actually looking upon the sun , and contemplating the idea he has of it in his memory ; and therefore he hath certain knowledge , that they are not both memory or fancy ; but that actual seeing has a cause without . thirdly , add to this , that many ideas are produced in us without pain , which we afterwards remember without the least offence . thus the pain of heat or cold , when the idea of it is received in our minds , gives us no disturbance : which when felt was very troublesome ; and we remember the pain of hunger , thirst , head-ach , &c. without any pain at all ; which would either never disturb us , or else constantly do it , as often as we thought of it , were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds , and appearances entertaining our fancies , without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad . fourthly , our senses in many cases , bear witness to the truth of each others report , concerning the existence of sensible things without us : he that doubts when he sees a fire , whether it be real , may , if he please , feel it too ; and by the exquisite pain he will be convinced , that it is not a bare idea or phantom . if after all this , any one will be so sceptical , as to distrust his senses , and to question the existence of all things , or our knowledge of any thing ; let him consider that the certainty of things existing in rerum naturâ , when we have the testimony of our senses for it , is not only as great as our frame can attain to , but as our condition needs . for our faculties being not suited to the full extent of being , nor a clear comprehensive knowledge of all things , but to the preservation of us , in whom they are , and accommodated to the use of life ; they serve our purpose well enough , if they will but give give us certain notice of those things , that are convenient or inconvenient to us . for he that sees a candle burning , and has experimented the force of the flame , by putting his finger in it , will little doubt , that this is something existing without him , which does him harm , and puts him to pain , which is assurance enough ; when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by , than what is as certain as his actions themselves : so that this evidence is as great as we can desire , being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain , that is happiness or misery , beyond which we have no concernment , either of knowing , or being . in fine , when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea , we are assured that there is something at that time really existing without us . but this knowledge extends only as far as the present testimony of our senses , employed about particular objects , that do then affect them , and no farther my seeing a man a minute since , is no certain argument of his present existence . as when our senses are actually employed about any object , we know that it does exist : so by our memory we may be assured , that heretofore things that affected our senses , have existed : and thus we have the knowledge of the past existence of several things ; whereof our senses having informed us , our memories still retain the ideas : and of this we are past all doubt , so long as we remember well . as to the existence of spirits , our having ideas of them , does not make us know , that any such things do exist without us ; or that there are any finite spirits ; or any other spiritual beings but the eternal god. we have ground from revelation , and several other reasons , to believe with assurance , that there are such creatures : but our senses not being able to discover them , we want the means of knowing their particular existence , for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing , by the idea we have of such beings , than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs , he can come to know that things answering those ideas , do really exist . hence we may gather , that there are two sorts of propositions , one concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea ; as that of an elephant , phenix , motion , or angel , viz. whether such a thing does any where exist : and this knowledge is only of particulars , and not to be had of any thing without us , but only of god , any other way than by our senses . another sort of propositions is , wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas , and their dependence of another . and these may be universal and certain : so having the idea of god , and my self , of fear and obedience , i cannot but be sure that god is to be feared and obeyed by me ; and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general ; if i have made an abstract idea of such a species , whereof i am one particular . but such a proposition , how certain soever , proves not to me the existence of men in the world ; but will be true of all such creatures , whenever they do exist : which certainty of such general propositions , depends on the agreement or disagreement discoverable in those abstract ideas . in the former case , our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things , producing ideas in our minds by our senses : in the later , the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds , and producing these general propositions , many whereof are called , eternae veritatis ; and all of them indeed are so , not from being written all , or any of them in the minds of all men , or that they were any of them propositions in any ones mind , till he having got the abstract ideas , joyned or separated them by affirmation or negation : but wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is , endowed with such faculties , and thereby furnished with such ideas , as we have ; we must conclude , he must needs , when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas , know the truth of certain propositions , that will arise from the agreement or disagreement he will perceive in his own ideas . such propositions being once made about abstract ideas , so as to be true , they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again , at any time past , or to come by a mind having those ideas , alway actually be true . for names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas ; and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another ; propositions concerning any abstract ideas , that are once true , must needs be eeternal verities . chap. xii . of the improvement of our knowledge . it being the received opinion amongst men of letters , that maxims are the foundations of all knowledge , and that sciences are each of them built upon certain proecognita , from whence the understanding was to take its rise , and by which it was to conduct it self in its inquiries in the matters belonging to that science , the beaten road of the schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general propositions , called principles , as foundations whereon to build the knowledge , was to be had of that subject . that which gave occasion to this way of proceeding , was , i suppose , the good success it seem'd to have in mathematicks , which of all other sciences , have the greatest certainty , clearness , and evidence in them . but if we consider it , we shall find that , the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge men arrived to in these sciences , was not owing to the influence of these principles , but to the clear distinct and compleat ideas their thoughts were employed about ; and the relation of equality and excess , so clear between some of them , that they had a intuitive knowledge ; and by that , a way to discover it in others : and this without the help of those maxims : for i ask , is it not possible for a lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger , but by virtue of this axiom , the whole is bigger than the part ; nor be assured of it , till he has learned that maxim ? let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said , which is known first and clearest by most people , the particular instance , or the general rule ; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other . these general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas , which ideas are made by the mind , and have names given them , for the easier dispatch in its reasonings : but knowledge began in the mind , and was founded on particulars , thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof : it being natural for the mind , to lay up those general notions , and make the proper use of them , which is to disburthen the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars . the way to improve in knowledge , is not to swallow principles , with an implicite faith , and without examination , which would be apt to mislead men , instead of guiding them into truth ; but to get and fix in our minds , clear and complete ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them proper , and constant names : and thus barely by considering our ideas , and comparing them together , observing their agreement or disagreement , their habitudes and relations , we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule , than by taking up principles , and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others . we must therefore , if we will proceed as reason advises , adapt our methods of enquiry , to the nature of the ideas we examine , and the truth we search after . general and certain truths , are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas . therefore a sagacious methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations , is the only way to discover all that can with truth and certainty be put into general propositions . by what steps we are to proceed in these , is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians , who from every plain and easie beginnings , by gentle degrees , and a continued chain of reasonings , proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths , that appear at first sight beyond humane capacity . this , i think i may say , that if other ideas , that are real as well as nominal essences of their species , were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians , they would carry our thoughts farther , and with greater evidence and clearness , than possibly we are apt to imagine . this gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture , which i suggest , chapter the third , viz. that morality is capable of demonstration , as well as mathematicks : for moral ideas being real essences , that have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another , so far as we can find their habitudes and relations , so far we shall be possessed of real and general truths . in our knowledge of substances , we are to proceed after a quite different method : the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas ( which are but nominal essences , will carry us but a very little way , in the search of truth and certainty . here experience must teach us what reason cannot : and it is by trying alone , that we can certainly know , what other qualities co-exist with those of our complex idea ; ( for instance ) whether that yellow heavy fusible body , i call gold , be malleable , or no , which experience ( however it prove in that particular body we examine ) makes us not certain that it is so in all , or any other yellow , heavy , fusible bodies , but that which we have tried ; because it is no consequence one way or the other from our complex idea : the necessity or inconsistence of malleability , hath no visible connexion with the combination of that colour , weight , and fusibility in any body . what i have here said of the nominal essence of gold , supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour , weight , and fusibility , will hold true , if other qualities be added to it . our reasonings from those ideas , will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties , in those masses of matter wherein all those are to be found . as far as our experience reaches , we may have certain knowledge , and no farther . i deny not , but a man accustomed to rational and regular experiments , shall be able to see farther into the nature of bodies , and their unknown properties , than one that is a stranger to them . but this is but judgment , and opinion , not knowledge and certainty . this makes me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science : from experiments and historical observations we may draw advantages of ease and health , and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life ; but beyond this , i fear our talents reach not ; nor are our faculties , as i guess , able to advance . from whence it is obvious to conclude , that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate the real essences of bodies , but yet plainly to discover to us the being of a god , and the knowledge of our selves ; enough to give us a clear discovery of our duty , and great concernment ; it will become us as rational creatures , to employ our faculties , about what they are most adapted to , and follow the direction of nature , where it seems to point us out the way . for it is rational to conclude , that our proper employment lies in those enquiries , and that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities , and carries in it our greatest interest , that is , the condition of our eternal state : and therefore it is , i think , that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general ( who are both concerned and fitted to search out their summum bonum ) as several arts conversant about the several parts of nature , are the lot and private talent of particular men , for the common use of humane life , and their own particular subsistance in this world. the ways to enlarge our knowledge , as far as we are capable , seem to me to be these two : the first is to get and settle in our minds , as far as we can , clear , distinct , and constant ideas of those things we would consider and know . for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas ; where they are either imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect , or clear knowledge . the other is the art of finding out the intermediate ideas , which may shew us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas , which cannot be immediately compared . that these two ( and not the relying on maxims , and drawing consequences from some general propositions ) are the right method of improving our knowledge , in the ideas of other modes , besides those of quantity , the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us . where first , we shall find that he that has not clear and perfect ideas of those angles or figures , of which he desires to know any thing , is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them . suppose a man not to have an exact idea of a right angle , scalenum , or trapezium , and it is clear , that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them . and farther it is evident , that it was not the influence of maxims or principles , that hath led the masters of this science into those wonderful discoveries they have made . let a man of good parts know all the maxims of mathematicks never so well , and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases , he will by their assistance , i suppose , scarce ever come to know , that the square of the hypotenuse , in a right angl'd triangle , is equal to the squares of the two other sides . this , and other mathematical truths have been discovered by the thoughts , otherwise applied . the mind had other objects , other views before it , far different from those maxims which men well enough acquainted with those received axioms , but ignorant of their method , who first made these demonstrations , can never sufficiently admire . chap. xiii . some farther considerations concerning knowledge . our knowledge , as in other things , so in this , has a great conformity with our sight , that it is neither wholly necessary , nor wholly voluntary . men that have senses cannot chuse but receive some ideas by them ; and if they have memory , they cannot but retain some of them ; and if they have any distinguishing faculty , cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them , one with another . as he that has eyes , if he will open them by day , cannot but see some objects , and perceive a difference in them , yet he may chuse whether he will turn his eyes towards an object , curiously survey it , and observe accurately all that is visible in it . but what he does see , he cannot see otherwise than he does : it depends not on his will , to see that black which appears yellow : just thus it is with our understanding ; all that is voluntary in our knowledge , is the employing or with-holding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects ; and a more or less accurate survey of them : but they being employed , our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind , one way or other . that is done only by the objects themselves , as far as they are clearly discovered . thus he that has got the ideas of numbers , and hath taken the pains to compare one , two and three , to six , cannot chuse but know that they are equal . he also that hath the idea of an intelligent , but weak and frail being , made by and depending on another , who is eternal , omnipotent , perfectly wise and good , will as certainly know that man is to honour , fear , and obey god , as that the sun shines when he sees it . but yet these truths , being never so certain , never so clear , he may be ignorant of either or both of them , who will not take the pains to employ his faculties as he should , to inform himself about them . chap. xiv . of judgment . the understanding faculties being given to man , not barely for speculation , but also for the conduct of his life ; a man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him , but what has the certainty of true knowledge : he that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him ; nor stir till he is infallibly assured of success in his business , will have little else to do , but sit still and perish . therefore as god has set some things in broad day-light , as he has given us some certain knowledge , thô limited to a few things , in comparison , probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of , to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state : so in the greatest part of our concernment , he has afforded us only the twilight , as i may so say , of probability , suitable to that state of mediocrity and probationership , he has been pleased to place us in here . the faculty which god has given man to enlighten him , next to certain knowledge is judgment , whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree , without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs . the mind exercises this judgment , sometimes out of necessity , where demonstrative proofs , and certain knowledge are not to be had ▪ and sometimes out of laziness , unskilfulness , or haste , even where they are to be had . this faculty of the mind when it is exercised immediately about things , is called judgment ; when about truths delivered in words , is most commonly called assent , or dissent . thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falshood : first , knowledge , whereby it certainly perceives , and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas . secondly , judgment , which is the putting ideas together , or separating them from one another in the mind , when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived , but presumed to be so . and if it so unites or separates them , as in reality things are , it is right judgment . chap. xv. of probability . probability is nothing but the appearance of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , by the intervention of proofs , whose connexion is not constant , and immutable ; or is not perceived to be so ; but is , or appears for the most part to be so , and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false , rather than the contrary . of probability there are degrees from the neighborhood of certainty and demonstration , quite down to improbability and unlikeliness , even to the confines of impossibility : and also degrees of assent from certain knowledge and what is next it , full assurance and confidence , quite down to conjecture doubt , distrust , and disbelief . that proposition then is probable , for which there are arguments or proofs to make it pass , or be received for true. the entertainment the mind gives to this sort of propositions , is called belief , assent or opinion . probability then being to supply the defect of our knowledge , is always conversant about a thing , whereof we have no certainty , but only some inducements to receive it for true . the grounds of it are in short these two following . first , the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge , experience or observation . secondly , the testimony of others , vouching their observation and experience . in the testimony of others , is to be considered ; first , the number ; secondly , the integrity ; thirdly , the skill of the witnesses ; fourthly , the design of the author , if it be a testimony cited out of a book ; fifthly , the consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation ; sixthly , contrary testimonies . the mind before it rationally assents or dissents to any probable proposition , ought to examine all the grounds of probality , and see how they make , more or less , for or against it ; and upon a due balancing of the whole , reject or receive it , with a more or less firm assent , according to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability , on one side or the other . chap. xvi . of the degrees of assent . the grounds of probability laid down in the foregoing chapter , as they are the foundations on which our assent is built ; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are , ( or ought ) to be regulated . only we are to take notice that no grounds of probability operate any farther on the mind , which searches after truth , and endeavours to judge right , than they appear ; at least in the first judgment , or search that the mind makes . it is indeed in many cases impossible , and in most very hard , even for those who have admirable memories , to retain all the proofs , which upon a due examination , made them embrace that side of the question . it suffices that they have once with care and fairness , sifted the matter as far as they could , and having once found on which side the probability appeared to them , they lay up the conclusion in their memories , as a truth they have discovered ; and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories , that this is the opinion , that by the proofs they have once seen of it , deserves such a degree of their assent as they assord it . it is unavoidable then that the memory be relied on in this case , and that men be perswaded of several opinions , whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts , nay , which perhaps they are not able actually to recall ; without this the greatest part of men , must be either scepticks , or change every moment , when any one offers them arguments , which for want of memory , they are not presently able to answer . it must be owned that men's sticking to past judgments , is often the cause of a great obstinacy in error and mistake . but the fault is not , that they relye on their memories , for what they have before well judged ; but because they judged , before they had well examined . who almost is there that hath the leisure , patience , and means to collect together , all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has , so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view , and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information ? and yet we are forced , to determine our selves on one fide or other : the conduct of our lives , and the management of our great concerns , will not bear delay . for those depend for the most part , on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain knowledge , and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other . the propositions we receive upon inducements of probability , are of two sorts : first , concerning some particular existence , or matter of fact , which falling under observation , is capable of humane testimony . secondly , concerning things which being beyond the discovery of our senses , are not capable of humane testimony . concerning the first of these , viz. particular matter of fa●t . first , where any particular thing , consonant to the constant observation of our selves , and others in the like case , comes attested with the concurrent reports of all that mention it , we receive it as easily , and build as firmly upon it , as if it were certain knowledge . thus , if all englishmen who have occasion to mention it , should report , that it froze in england last winter , or the like , i think a man would as little doubt of it , as that seven and four are eleven . the first and highest degree of probability then is , when the general consent of all men , in all ages , as far as can be known , concurs with a man 's own constant experience in the like cases , to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact , attested by fair witnesses : such are the stated constitutions and properties of bodies , and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature ; this we call an argument from the nature of things themselves . for what we and others always observe to be after the same manner , we conclude with reason , to be the effects of steddy and regular causes , thô they come not within the reach of our knowledge . as that fire warmed a man , or made lead fluid ; that iron sunk in water , swam in quick-silver . a relation affirming any such thing to have been , or a predication that it will happen again in the same manner , is received without doubt or hesitation : and our belief thus grounded , rises to assurance . secondly , the next degree of probability , is when by my own experience , and the agreement of all others that mention it : a thing is found to be for the most part so , and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses : thus history giving us such an account of men in all ages , and my own experience confirming it , that most men prefer their own private advantage , to the publick : if all historians that write of tiberius , say that he did so , it is extreamly probable : and in this case , our assent rises to a degree which we may call confidence . thirdly , in matters happening indifferently , as that a bird should fly this or that way : when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses , there our assent is also unavoidable . thus , that there is in italy such a city as rome ; that about one thousand and seven hundred years ago , there lived such a man in it as julius caesar , &c. a man can as little doubt of this , and the like , as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance , whereof he himself is a witness . probability , on these grounds , carries so much evidence with it , that it leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve , as demonstration does , whether we will know or be ignorant . but the difficulty is , when testimonies contradict common experience , and the reports of witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature , or with one another . here diligence , attention , and exactness is required to form a right judgment , and to proportion the assent to the evidence and probability of the thing , which rises and falls , according as the two foundations of credibility , favour , or contradict it . these are liable to such variety of contrary observations , circumstances , reports , tempers , designs , over sights , &c. of reporters , that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules , the various degrees wherein men give their assent . this in general may be said , that as the proofs upon due examination , shall to any one appear , in a greater or less degree , to preponderate on either side , so they are fitted to produce in the mind , such different entertainments , as are called belief , conjecture , guess , doubt , wavering , distrust , disbelief , &c. it is a rule generally approved , that any testimony the farther off it is removed from the original truth , the less force it has : and in traditional truths , each remove weakens the force of the proof . there is a rule quite contrary to this , advanced by some men , who look opinions to gain force by growing older : upon this ground , propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning , come by an inverted rule of probability , to pass for authentick truths ; and those which deserved little credit from the mouths of their first relators , are thought to grow venerable by age , and are urged as undeniable . but certain it is , that no probability can rise above its first original . what has no other evidence than the single testimony of one witness , must stand or fall by his only testimony , thô afterwards cited by hundreds of others ; and is so far from receiving any strength thereby that it becomes the weaker . because passion , interest , inadvertency , mistake of his meaning , and a thousand odd reasons , or caprichois mens minds are acted by , may make one man quote another's words or meaning wrong . this is certain , that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds , can never after come to be more valid in future ages , by being often repeated . the second sort of probability , is concerning things not falling under the reach of our senses , and therefore not capable of testimony : and such are , first , the existence , nature and operations of finite , immaterial beings without us , as spirits , angels , &c. or the existence of material beings , such as for their smallness or remoteness , our senses cannot take notice of : as whether there be any plants , animals , &c. in the planets , and other mansions of the vast universe . secondly , concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature , wherein , thô we see the sensible effects ; yet their causes are unknown , and we perceive not the ways , and manner how they are produced . we see animals are generated , nourished and move ; the loadstone draws iron , &c. but the causes that operate , and the manner they are produced in , we can only guess , and probably conjecture . in these matters analogy is the only help we have ; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability . thus observing , that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently upon one another , produces heat , and very often fire ; we have reason to think that what we call heat and fire , consists , in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter . this sort of probability , which is the best conduct of rational experiments , and the rise of hypotheses has also its use and influence . and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths , and useful deductions , which would otherwise lie concealed . thô the common experience , and the ordinary course of things , have a mighty influence on the minds of men , to make them give or refuse credit , to any thing proposed to their belief ; yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it . for where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by him , who has the power to change the course of nature ; there under such circumstances they may be the fitter to procure belief , by how much the more they are beyond , or contrary to ordinary observation . this is the proper case of miracles , which well attested , do not only find credit themselves , but give it also to other truths . there are propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent upon bare testimony , whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience , and the ordinary course of things or no : the reason whereof is , because the testimony is of such an one , as cannot deceive nor be deceived ; and that is god himself . this carries with it certainty beyond doubt , evidence beyond exception . this is called by a peculiar name , revelation , and our assent to it , faith ; which has as much certainty in it , as our knowledge it self ; and we may as well doubt of our own being , as we can , whether any revelation from god be true. so that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance , and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation ; only we must be sure , that it be a divine revelation , and that we understand it right ; else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm , and all the error of wrong principles , if we have faith and assurance , in what is not divine revelation . chap. xvii . of reason . the word reason in english , has different significations . sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles : sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles : sometimes for the cause , and particularly for the final cause ; but the consideration i shall have of it here , is , as it stands for a faculty , whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts ; and wherein it is evident , he much surpasses them . reason is necessary , both for the enlargement of our knowledge , and regulating our assent : for it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion , and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties ; and indeed , contains two of them , viz. first , sagacity . whereby it finds intermediate ideas . secondly , illation , whereby it so orders and disposes of them , as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain , whereby the extremes are held together , and thereby , as it were , to draw into view the truth sought for ; which is that we call illation or inference : and consists in nothing , but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas , in each step of the deduction , whereby the mind comes to see , either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , as in demonstration , in which it arrives at knowledge : or their probable connexion , on which it gives or with-holds its assent , as in opinion . sense and intuition reach but a little way : the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions , and intermediate ideas . in those cases where we must take propositions for true , without being certain of their being so , we have need to find out , examine , and compare the grounds of their probability : in both cases , the faculty which finds out the means , and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one , and probability in the other , is that which we call reason . so that in reason we may consider these four degrees ; first , the discovering and finding out of proofs . secondly , the regular and methodical disposition of them , and laying them in such order , as their connexion may be plainly perceived . thirdly , the perceiving their connexion . fourthly , the making a right conclusion . there is one thing more which i shall desire to be considered concerning reason , and that is , whether syllogism , as is generally thought , be the proper instrument of it ; ant the usefullest way of exercising this faculty . the causes i have to doubt of it , are these . first , because syllogism serves our reason , but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it , and that is to shew the connexion of the proofs of any one instance , and no more : but in this it is of no great use , since the mind can perceive such connexion , where it really is ; as easily , nay , perhaps better without it . we may observe that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly , who know not how to make a syllogism : and i believe scarce any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself . indeed , sometimes they may serve to discover a fallacy , hid in a rhetorical flourish ; or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language , shew it in its naked deformity . but the mind is not taught to reason by these rules ; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas , and can range them right , without any such perplexing repetitions : and i think every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations , that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogism . secondly , because thò syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an argument made use of in the usual way of discoursing , by supplying the absent proposition , and so setting it before the view in a clear light ; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal terms , wherewith this artificial way of reasoning , always abounds : it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in dispute , than the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair enquiries . but however it be in knowledge , i think it is of far less , or no use at all in probabilities : for the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy , after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides ; nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that , as syllogism ; which running away with one assumed probability , pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration . but let it help us ( as perhaps may be said ) in convincing men of their errors or mistakes ; yet still it fails our reason in that part , which if not its highest perfection , is yet certainly its hardest task ; and that which we must need its help in , and that is , the finding out of proofs , and making new discoveries . this way of reasoning , discovers no new proofs , but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already . a man knows first , and then he is able to prove syllogistically ; so that syllogism comes after knowledge ; and then a man has little or no need of it . but it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that shew the connexion of distant ones , that our stock of knowledge is increased ; and that useful arts and sciences are advanced . reason , thô of a very large extent fails us in several instances : as first , where our ideas fail . secondly , it is often at a loss , because of the obscurity , confusion , or imperfection of the ideas , it is employed about . thus having no perfect idea of the least extension of matter , nor of infinity , we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter . thirdly , our reason is often at a stand , because it perceives not those ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any two other ideas . fourthly , our reason , is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties , by proceeding upon false principles , which being followed , lead men into contradictions to themselves , and inconsistancy in their own thoughts . fifthly , dubious words , and uncertain signs often puzzle mens reason , and bring them to a non-plus . in reasoning , men ordinarily use four sorts of arguments . the first , is to alledge the opinions of men , whose parts , learning , eminency , power , or some other cause , has gained a name , and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority . this may be called argumentum ad verecundiam . secondly , another way is , to require the adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof ; or to assign a better . this i call argumentum ad ignorantiam . a third way , is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions . this is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem . fourthly , the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability . this i call argumentum ad judicium . this alone of all the four , brings true instruction with it , and advances us in our way to knowledge . for first , it argues not another man's opinion to be right , because i , out of respect , or any other consideration , but that of conviction , will not contradict him . secondly , it proves not another man to be in the right way , nor that i ought to take the same with him , because i know not a better . thirdly , nor does it follow , that another man is in the right way , because he has shewn me that i am in the wrong . this may dispose me perhaps , for the reception of truth , but helps me not to it : that must come from proofs and arguments , and light arising from the nature of things themselves ; not from my shame facedness , ignorance or error . by what has been said of reason , we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things , into those that are according to , above , and contrary to reason . according to reason , are such propositions , whose truth we can discover , by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection , and by natural deduction find to be true , or probable . above reason are such propositions , whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles . contrary to reason , are such propositions as are inconsistent with , or irreconcilable to , our clear and distinct ideas . thus the existence of one god , is according to reason : the existence of more than one god , contrary to reason : the resurrection of the body after death , above reason . above reason , may be also taken in a double sense , viz. above probability , or above certainty . in that large sense also , contrary to reason , is , i suppose , sometimes taken . there is another use of the word reason , wherein it is opposed to faith ; which , thô authorized by common use , yet is it in it self , a very improper way of speaking : for faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind , which if it be regulated , as is our duty , cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason ; and so cannot be opposite to it . he that believes without having any reason for believing , may be in love with his own fancies ; but neither seeks truth as he ought , nor pays the obedience due to his maker , who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him , to keep him out of mistake and error . but since reason and faith are by some men opposed , we will so consider them in the following chapter . chap xviii . of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . reason , as contra-distinguished to faith , i take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas , which it has got by the use of its natural faculties , viz. by sensation or reflection . faith on the other side , is the assent to any proposition , upon the credit of the proposer , as coming immediately from god ; which we call revelation : concerning which we must observe . first , that no man inspired by god , can by any revelation communicate to others , any new simple ideas , which they had not before from sensation or reflection : because words , by their immediate operation on us , cannot cause other ideas , but of their natural sounds , and such as custom has annexed to them , which to us they have been wont to be signs of , but cannot introduce any new , and formerly unknown simple ideas . the same holds in all other signs , which cannot signify to us things , of which we have never before had any idea at all . for our simple ideas , we must depend wholly on our natural faculties , and can by no means receive them from traditional revelation ; i say traditional , in distinction to original revelation . by the one , i mean that impression which is made immediately by god on the mind of any man , to which we cannot set any bounds . and by the other , those impressions delivered over to others in words , and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another . secondly , i say , that the same truths may be discovered by revelation , which are discoverable to us by reason ; but in such there is little need or use of revelation : god having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them : and truths discovered by our natural faculties , are more certain , than when conveyed to us by traditional revelation . for the knowledge we have , that this revelation came at first from god , can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct ideas . th●s also holds in matters of fact , know●●le by our senses : as the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings , which had their orignal from revelation , and yet no bo●y , i think , will say he has as certain and clear knowledge of the flood , as noah that saw it , or that he himself would have had , had he then been alive and seen it . for he has no greater assurance , than that of his senses , that it is writ in the book , supposed to be writ by moses inspired . but he has not so great an assurance , that moses writ that book , as if he had seen moses write it ; so that the assurance of its being a revelation , is still less than our assurance of his senses . revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason . for since no evidence of our faculties , by which we receive such a revelation , can exceed , if equal , the certainty of our intuitive knowledge ; we can never receive for a truth any , that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge . the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree , that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distinct places at once ; however , it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation : since the evidence first , that we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to god. secondly . that we understand it right , can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge , whereby we discern it impossible , for the same body to be in two places at once . in propositions therefore , contrary to our distinct and clear ideas , it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. for faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out knowledge . because , thô faith be founded upon the testimony of god , who cannot lye , yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation , greater than our own knowledge . for if the mind of man can never have a clearer evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation , than it has of the principles of its own reason ; it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason , to give place to a proposition , whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have . in all things therefore where we have clear evidence from our ideas , and the principles of knowledge above-mentioned reason is the proper judge ; and revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees ; nor can we be obliged , where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason , to quit it for the contrary opinion , under a pretence that it is matter of faith , which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason . but , thirdly , there being many things , of which we have but imperfect notions , or none at all ; and other things , of whose past , present , or future existence , by the natural use of our faculties , we can have no knowledge at all : these being beyond the discovery of our faculties , and above reason , when revealed , become the proper matter of faith. thus , that part of the angels rebelled against god : that the bodies of men shall rise and live again , and the like , are purely matters of faith , with which reason has directly nothing to do . first then , whatever proposition is revealed , of whose truth our mind , by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge ; that is purely mater of faith , and above reason . secondly , all propositions , whereof the mind by its natural faculties , can come to determine and judge from natural acquired ideas , are matter of reason : but with this difference ; that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence , and so is perswaded of their truth only upon probable grounds : in such i say , an evident revelation ought to determine our assent , even against probability . because the mind , not being certain of the truth of that , it does not evidently know , is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony , which it is satisfied comes from one , who cannot err , and will not deceive . but yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation , and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered . thus far the dominion of faith reaches ; and that without any violence to reason , which is not injured or disturbed , but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth , coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge . whatever god hath revealed is certainly true ; no doubt can be made of it , this is the proper object of faith : but whether it be a divine revelation , or no , reason must judge ; which can never permit the mind , to reject a greater evidence , to embrace what is less evident , nor prefer less certainty to the greater . there can be no evidence , that any traditional revelation is of divine original , in the words we receive it , and the sense we understand it , so clear and so certain , as those of the principles of reason : and therefore , nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident dictates of reason , has a right to be urged or assented to , as a matter of faith , wherein reason has nothing to do . whatsoever is divine revelation , ought to over-rule all our opinions , prejudices and interests , and hath a right to be received with a full assent . such a submission as this , of our reason to faith , takes not away the land-marks of knowledge : this shakes not the foundations of reason , but leaves us that use of our faculties , for which they were given us . chap. xix . of wrong assent or error . error is a mistake of our judgment , giving assent to that which is not true . the reasons whereof may be reduced to these four ; first , want of proofs . secondly , want of ability to use them . thirdly , want of will to use them . fourthly , wrong measures of probability . first , want of proofs , by which i do not mean only the want of those proofs which are not to be had , but also of those proofs which are in being , or might be procured . the greatest part of mankind want the conveniencies , and opportunities of making experiments and observations themselves , or of collecting the testimonies of others , being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition , whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living . these men are by the constitution of humane affairs , unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs , on which others build ; and which are necessary to establish those opinions . for having much to do to get the means of living , they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious enquiries . it is true , that god has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take , if they will but seriously employ them that way , when their ordinary vocations allow them leisure . no man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living , as to have no spare time at all , to think on his soul , and inform himself in matters of religion , were men as intent on this , as they are on things of lower concernment . there are none so enslaved to the necessity of life , who might not find many vacancies , that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge . secondly , want of ability to use them . there be many who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads , nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs , and testimonies . these cannot discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie ; nor follow that which in it self is the most probable opinion . it is certain that there is a wide difference in mens understandings , apprehensions and reasonings , to a very great latitude , so that one may , without doing injury to mankind , affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect , than between some men and some beasts ; but how this comes about , is a speculation , thô of great consequence ; yet not necessary to our present purpose . thirdly , for want of will to use them . some , thô they have opportunities and leisure enough , and want neither parts nor learning , nor other helps , are yet never the better for them , and never come to the knowledge of several truths that lie within their reach ; either upon the account of their hot pursuit of pleasure , constant drudgery in business , laziness and oscitancy in general , or a particular aversion for books and study : and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions , which best suit their prejudices , lives , designs , interests , &c. as many men forbear to cast up their accounts , who have reason to fear that their affairs are in no very good posture . how men , whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings , can satisfie themselves with a lazy ignorance , i cannot tell : but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls , who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body , and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge . i will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state , and their concernment in it , which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes : nor shall i take notice what a shame it is to the greatest contem●ers of knowledge , to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know . but this , at least , is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen ; that however they may think credit , respect , and authority , the concomitants of their birth and fortune ; yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition , who surpass them in knowledge . they who are blind , will always be led by those that see , or else fall into the ditch : and he is certainly the most subjected , the most enslaved , who is so in his understanding . fourthly , wrong measures of probability , which are , first , propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident , but doubtful and false , taken for principles . propositions looked on as principles , have so great an influence upon our opinions , that it is usually by them we judge of truth , and what is inconsistent with them , is so far from passing for probable with us , that it will not be allowed possible . the reverence born to these principles is so great , that the testimony , nor only of other men , but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected , when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established rules . the great obstinacy that is to be found in men , firmly believing quite contrary opinions , thô many times equally absurd , in the various religions of mankind , are as evident a proof , as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles : so that men will disbelieve their own eyes , renounce the evidence of their senses , and give their own experience the lye , rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred tenents . secondly , received hypotheses . the difference between these and the former , is , that those who proceed by these , will admit of matter of fact , and agree with dissenters in that ; but differ in assigning of reasons , and explaining the manner of operation . these are not at that open defiance with their senses as the former ▪ they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently : but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things ; nor be prevailed on by probabilities which would convince them , that things are not brought about just after the same manner , that they have decreed within themselves that they are . thirdly , predominant passions or inclinations : let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning , and mon●y on the other , it is easie to foresee which will prevail . thô men cannot always openly gain-say , or resist the force of manifest probabilities , that make against them , yet yield they not to the argument . not but that it is the nature of the understanding , constantly to close with the more probable side ; but yet a man hath power to suspend , and restrain its enquiries , and not permit a full and satisfactory examination . until that be done there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities . first , that the arguments being brought in words , there may be a fallacy latent in them ; and the consequences being perhaps , many in train , may be some of them incoherent . there are few discourses so short and clear , to which men may not , with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt , and from whose conviction they may not without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness set themselves free . secondly , manifest probabilities may be evaded upon this suggestion , that i know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side : and therefore , thô a man be beaten , it is not necessary he should yield , not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind . fourthly , authority , or the giving up our assent to the common received opinions , either of our friends or party , neighbourhood or country . how many men have no other ground for their tenents , than the supposed honesty or learning , or number of those of the same profession ? as if honest or bookish men could not err ; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude . yet this with most men , serves the turn . all men are liable to error , and most men are in many points by passion or interest under temptation to it . this is certain , that there is not an opinion so absurd , which a man may not receive upon this ground . there is no error to be named , which has not had its professors . and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in , if he thinks that he is in the right way , wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow ▪ but , notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions , i must do mankind that right as to say , there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed : not that i think they embrace the truth , but indeed , because , concerning those doctrines they keep such a stirr about , they have no thought , no opinion at all . for if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world , he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for , that they have any opinions of their own . much less would he have reason to think , that they took them upon the examination of arguments , and appearance of probability . they are resolved to stick to a party , that education or interest has engaged them in ; and there , like the common soldiers of an army , shew their courage and warmth , as their leaders direct , without ever examining , or so much as knowing the cause they contend for . chap. xx. of the division of the sciences . all that can fall within the compass of humane understanding , being either , first , the nature of things ; their relations , and their manner of operation : or , secondly , that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent , for the attainment of any end , especially happiness : or , thirdly , the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both of these are attained , and communicated : i think science may be properly divided into these three sorts . first , the knowledge of things , their constitutions , properties , and operations ; whether material or immaterial : this , in a litt●e more enlarged sense of the word , i call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or natural philosophy . the end of this is bare speculative truth , and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such , falls under this branch : whether it be god himself , angels , spirits , bodies , or any of their affections , as number , figure , &c. secondly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the skill of right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things , good and useful . the most considerable under this head , is ethicks , which is the seeking out those rules and measures of humane actions , which lead to happiness , and the means to practise them . the end of this is not bare speculation but right , and a conduct suitable thereto . thirdly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the doctrine of signs : the most usual being words , it is aptly enough termed logick : the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs , which the mind makes use of for the understanding of things , or conveying its knowledge to others . things are represented to the mind by ideas : and mens ideas are communicated to one another , by articulate sounds , or words . the consideration then of ideas and words , as the great instruments of knowledge makes no despicable part of their contemplation , who would take a view of humane knowledge in the whole extent of it . this seems to me the first and most general , as well as natural division , of the objects of our understanding . for a man can employ his thoughts about nothing , but either the contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth , or about the things in his own power , which are his actions , for the attainment of his own ends ; or the signs the mind makes use of , both in the one and the other , and the right ordering of them , for its clearer information . all which three , viz. things , as they are in themselves knowable : actions , as they depend on us in order to happiness , and the right use of signs , in order to knowledge , being toto coelo different , they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world wholly separate , and distinct one from another finis . the contents of the second book . the introduction . page chap. i. of ideas in general , and their original . chap. ii. of simple ideas . chap. iii. of ideas of one sense . chap. iv. of solidity . chap. . of simple ideas of divers senses . chap. . of simple ideas of reflection . chap. . of simple ideas of sensation and reflection . chap. . some farther considerations concerning simple ideas . chap. . of perception . chap. . of retention . chap. . of discerning , and other operations of the mind . chap. . of complex ideas . chap. . of simple modes ; and first of the simple modes of space . chap. . of duration , and its simple modes . chap. . of duration and expansion considered together . chap. . of numbers . chap. . of infinity . chap. . of other simple modes . chap. . of the modes of thinking . chap. . the modes of pleasure and pain . chap. . of power . chap. . of mixed modes . chap. . of our complex ideas of substances . chap. . of collective ideas of substances . chap. . of relation . chap. . of cause and effect , and other relations . chap. . of identity and diversity . chap. . of other relations . chap. . of clear , obscure , distinct , and confused ideas . chap. . of real and fantastical ideas . chap. . of ideas adequate or inadequate . chap. . of true and false ideas . the contents of the third book chap. . of words or language in general page chap. . of the signification of words . chap. . of general terms . chap. of the names of simple ideas . chap. . of the names of mixed modes and relations . chap. . of the names of substances . chap. . of particles . chap. . of abstract and concrete terms . chap. . of the imperfection of words . chap. . of the abuse of words . chap. . of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . the contents of the fourth book . chap. . of knowledge in general . page chap. . of the degrees of our knowledge . chap. . of the extent of humane knowledge . chap. . of the reality of our knowledge . chap. . of truth in general . chap. . of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . chap. . of maxims . chap. . of trifling propositions chap. . of our knowledge of existence . chap. . of our knowledge of the existence of a god. chap. . of our knowledge of the existence other things . chap. . of the improvement of our knowledge . chap. . some farther considerations concerning knowledge . chap. . of judgment . chap. . of probability . chap. . of the degrees of assent . chap. . of reason . chap. . of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . chap. . of wrong assent or error . chap. . of the division of the sciences . books printed for , and sold by a. and j. churchill at the black swan in pater-noster-row . a view of universal history , from the creation , to the year of christ , . by francis tallents , sometime fellow of magdalen colledge , cambridge . the whole graven in copper-plates , each inches deep , and broad ; bound up into books , the sheets lined . price s . the general hist ▪ of the air. by r. boyl , esq to . a compleat journal of the votes , speeches , and debates , both of the house of lords and commons , throughout the whole reign of queen elizabeth . collected by sir simonds dewes , baronet , and published by paul bowes of the middle temple . esq the d . edit . fol. the works of the famous nith . machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence . written originally in italian , and from thence faithfully translated into eng. fol. mr. lock 's essay concerning humane understanding . the d edition with large additions . fol. — his thoughts of education . octav. two treatises of government ; the first , an answer to filmer's patriarcha . the later an essay concerning the true original , extent , and end of civil government . octav. the resurrection of the ( same ) body asserted from the tradition of the heathens , the ancient jews , and the primitive church . with an answer to the objections brought against it . by humphry hody d. d. considerations about lowering the interest , and raising the value of money . oct. d par. by mr. lock . two treatises of natural religion , octav. gentleman's religion , with the grounds and reasons of it . sermons preached by dr. r. leighton , late arch-bishop of glasgow . the second edi. oct the reasonableness of christianity , as delivered in the scriptures . octav. prince arthur , an heroick poem . in ten books , by r. blackmore , m. d. fellow of the colledge of physicians , london . fol. scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of the vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned thomas albius / by joseph glanvill ... glanvill, joseph, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : , : ) scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of the vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned thomas albius / by joseph glanvill ... glanvill, joseph, - . v. printed by e. cotes, for henry eversden ..., london : . vol. has special t.p.: scire/i tuum nihil est, or, the authors defence of the vanity of dogmatizing, against the exceptions of the learned tho. albius in his late sciri ... london : printed by e.c. for h. eversden, . first ed. published under title: the way of dogmatizing. copy at reel : (g ) is volume ; copy at reel : (g ) is volume . "a letter to a friend concerning aristotle": v. , p. - . reproduction of original in library of congress (v. ) and british library (v. ) created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng white, thomas, - . philosophy -- early works to . knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john pas sampled and proofread - john pas text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion scire / i tuum nihil est : or , the authors defence of the vanity of dogmatizing ; against the exceptions of the learned tho. albius in his late sciri . no doubt but ye are the men , and wisdom shall dye with you ! job . london , printed by e. c. for henry eversden at the grey-hound in st. pauls-church-yard , . the authors apology for his style . it may perhaps seem to some incongruous , that my reply is not written in the language of the objections ; and i should have thought so too , had the objections spoke the language of my discourse . but since my assailant takes the liberty to recede from my style , i know no reason obligeth me to humour his . and 't is less improper for a book to differ in fashion from another that opposeth it ; than from that of which 't is a part and vindication . and this answer were sufficient for the seeming impropriety : but yet i have reasons more considerable to excuse it . i must confess then , that by that time sciri was extant , i was grown so indifferent to those matters , that i had much ado to perswade my self to a review of what i had written ; and could have ben content to have left it without any other vindication , then what it could it self obtain from the good nature and ingenuity , of impartial perusers . and in this coldness of humor had without doubt deserved it , but that my bookseller importun'd me for another edition : which request of his having consented to , i saw my self under a necessity of decorum to return something on an occasion , in which silence perhaps might have been ill-manners to an ingenious and learned adversary . but though the constraint of these circumstances overcame my aversness to writing any more on a subject , with which i thought i had done for ever ; yet could it not prevail against the humour i had of troubling my self no more then needs in a business , to which i was driven , rather then inclined or perswaded . so that after i had resolv'd an answer ; it had been more difficult to have drawn my self to put it into any other drss , then what is most easie and familiar . which yet was not the effect only of the indisposition and laziness of my humour ; but a dictate of my discretion . for the truth is , i foresaw the occasion would not engage me in any thing , that i could think worthy of the universal language ; except i should have written a discourse , and not an answer . besides which , had i used another style i must have been more diffuse in reiterating what i had said in the opposed essay ; otherwise those that understood not english , had been uncapable of my justification ; and my self , and those that do , nauseated by the repetition . these then were the chief reasons of my continuing the language i began with ; which i confess i was the more easily perswaded by , because there are late great examples of like practice , whose fashions 't is no discredit to imitate . and to all i might add , that i love not that my discourse should wear linsy-woolsy . sciri , a. sive sceptices & scepticorum à jure disputationis exclusio . remarques on the title . g. i should never have thought my self concern'd in a book , that wears such a title ; but that i found my name in the first page made an ungrateful adjunct : and the opposing a discourse i had publish't , profest the occasion , and mark it aim'd at . how unjust 't is to suggest that i am a sceptick , is i think clear enough from what i have said already , and shall make more fully appear in the process . and how little kindness i have for the disputing way of procedure , i have publiquely declared . how proper then that part of the title is in this application , any one may pass an easie judgement . but to what purpose old cato stands there , with that instructive oracle in his mouth , which i remember ever since i cap't verses , contra verbosos : i was posed to conjecture . especially since the insignificant prattle , and endless garrulity of the philosophy of the schools , which this gentleman seems to vindicate , is none of the least offences to those whom , whither they will or no , he will have be scepticks . in consideration of this , and some such other misapplyed appellations , i thought that this learned man had an other notion of sceptick then was usual ; and casting mine eye over his late purgation , presented to the cardinals of the inquisition , i found that his scepticks were some of the modern voluminous ●●sputing peripateticks , whom in that part of my discourse where i deal with the aristotelian philosophy , i bestow a particular reflection on . these it seems by the solicitation of their complaints against his writings had obtain'd a general condemnation of them from the pope and consistory of cardinals ; whom therefore in his appeal to the said cardinals he accuseth of ignorance , corruption of the aristotelian doctrines , and tendency to heresie and atheism . and that these are the scepticks of our philosopher , appears also from several passages both of the praeface and body of the discourse i am rejoyning to . but then upon what account the celebrated gassendus and the author of the vanity of dogmatizing should be comprised under a common name with these , with whom they have so little confederacy either in doctrin or design ; i cannot yet find the least ground for conjecture . a. junioribus academicis . etsi non dubitem validioribus & magis opportunis auxiliis obviam itum esse exitiali illi pyrrhonicae contagio , quod nova audere non ita pridem occaepit ; tamen , quia nil publici cauterii adactum ad ulous glanvillanum jam biennio integro aestuofum audiveram , visum est filentibus potioribus ad meam infirmitatem devolutum esse onus , iniquitatem indisciplinatae illius calumniae universo philosophantium choro impositae , si non avertere , certe aperire , & plumis disertioribus lacerandam exponere . — page . upon the supposal then that i am a sceptick , the learned g. gentleman invades my harmless and peaceable essay as a deadly pyrrhonical contagion , and an enemy to science . but with what ingenuity i am charg'd , with what i have so frequently disclaim'd , i appeal to the professions of the discourse it self to evidence : which whether they are arguments of a sceptical aim and temper , let the dogmatist judge between us . and though my apology for philosophy may perhaps be defective in point of judgement and argument , for the clearing of what i undertook to vindicate ; yet both the design and menage of it , one would think , should have secured me from suspicion of endeavouring to discourage philosophical enquiries , by introducing a despair of science . for on the contrary , one of my chief designs was , to remove that sloath and laziness which in these later ages hath cramp't endeavour , and made men content to sit down with their slender acquists , as certainties and demonstrations which are scarce probabilities . i desire it may be taken notice of once for all then , that i have nought to do with that shuffling sect , that love to doubt eternally , and to question all things . my profession is freedom of enquiry , and i own no more scepticism then what is concluded in the motto which the royal society have now adopted for theirs , nullius in verba . so that there was no need of so solemn a warning to the universities against my innocent discourse ; whose greatest fault is , that 'tas been so unhappy as to be mistaken . for the ulcus glanvillanum ( as my learned assailant is pleased to call it ) contains none of the supposed venome . nor will it inspire any but supine and passive tempers with any other spirit then that of more diligent research , and careful pursuits of nature . i am not therefore concern'd in the question our author propounds to his junior academicks to this purpose : whether they would be severely wise for the conduct of their manners and religion , or enticingly rhetorical , pleading for ignorance and uncertainty , and whistling their dependants into apparent precipices ? since one of the greatest quarrels i have against confident opinion , is , that it renders the dogmatist conceited , not wise . and is so far from being serviceable to good manners , that it mischievously corrupts them , sowring mens spirits with envy , ill nature , and moroseness ; and mingling their religion with schism , bitrer zeal , and sedition : and these are worse precipices then a modest and reserv'd belief can betray men into . to what follows within this period , i 'le say no more , then that there 's a medium between being blind and infallible . and vanitas dogmatizandi , is not well explained by vera pollicendi . a. viro non irascor , qui magno ingenio & eloquentiae cum annis maturandae flumine non vadando , — pag. . g. in this clause the learned gentleman acknowledgeth my confession of certainty in faith , and hopes of science from experiment ; neither of which can consist with a criminal and dangerous scepticism : which yet he seems not willing to have me free from , adding , that i point at one , as the ground of my expectation , whom this learned man will have believed a favourer of the pyrrhonian nihil sciri : the person aim'd at in this reflection , i conceive , is des-cartes ; though i confess , i remember not that sentence mention'd in his writings ; for after the proposal of what might be expected from experiment and the progress of enquiry , i adde , that those that are acquainted with the fecundity of the cartesian principles will dispair of nothing . and if that great man , possibly one of the greatest that ever was , must be believed a sceptick , who would not ambitiously affect the title ? and to give the pyrrhonians one of the noblest and happiest wits that hath shone upon the world , is to yield a greater advantage to their cause , then would be done by a thousand profest assertions of it so that had i been guilty of such a concession , i might thence more reasonably have been judged a favourer of the scepticks , then by any thing i have writ against the dogmatists . for i am apt to think , that mankind is like to reap more advantage from the ignorance of des cartes , then perhaps from the greatest part of the science was before him , and i cannot forbear pronouncing him the phosphoros of that clear and useful light , that begins to spring in plentifully upon an awakened world . so that though the following expostulations are proper and seasonable in reference to our authors peripatetical scepticks , yet are they most improper and injurious , if they have any aspect on des-cartes , or those that endeavour to promote that free and useful way of philosophizing which he hath insisted in . but i add no more on this occasion , because 't is possible i have mistaken the person intended by my assailant . however , if the reflection be not directed to him , 't is to the excellent gassendus , who is presently after introduced , under the title of the great interpreter of epicurus ; who hath as little reason to be suspected of criminal scepticism , as the other . it is well known that these great men were inquirers , and it becomes not such to be swearers , nor is it therefore reasonable to conclude them scepticks . a. aliud offendiculum est complurium modernorum effraenis impudentia , qui aristotelem — pag. . g. i am glad to find my learned assailant justifying all my censures of the modern aristotelians ; only he accuseth them of one fault which i seldom find among them , viz. modesty in proposing their opinions ; which our authour inveighs against as a criminal diffidence . but for my part i think the greatest number of that spirit can plead not guilty to the accusation . and for those of them that are less assured in their sentiments , i should not reckon it among their crimes , to be wary and sparing of assent in notions so lubricous and uncertain , as are those they deal in . though i confess , to keep such voluminous ado about acknowledg'd uncertainties , is a very reprehensible vanity . and doubtless the unprofitable toyes of these later peripateticks , have offended many against that philosophy . but whether most of them are not the genuine derivations of the hypothesis they claim to , may without difficulty be determin'd by any that will consider the natural flatulency of that aery scheam of notions . and i think they have no great reason to pretend to ingenuity or judgement , that accuse aristotle for the faults of his sectators . but from this last period of sence , i desire chiefly it may be noted , that our learned author pleads not for the modern aristotelianism , which yet obtains in most of the schools of christendom : all the advantage i shall make of which at present is to question , whether the reseuing men from an over fond value of such small wares , and the preventing the expence of time and pains upon such solemn trifles , as our philosopher deservedly calls them , be like to be a prejudice to their persuits of more useful knowledge , and the furtherance of science ? vos modo novi palmites surgentes in vinum quod a. laetificet corda hominum , memores quod — pag. . though i confess i have not so great a value for the g. aristotelian learning , as some others ; yet i am none of those , that would disswade junior academicks from the study of that philosophy . especially , i think aristotles logick and rhetorick are to be acknowledg'd ; though , i am not of the opinion of averroes that he was the inventer of either . and doubtless that reverence and observance is due to the statutes of those universities that recommend this author ; yea and the antiquity of that philosophy ( though it be far from being the antientest ) will commend it to the students of universal learning . besides , i would have nothing avoided or condemn'd till it be understood : and were i more an enemy to that philosophy then my assailant can suppose i am , yet should i not disswade the learning it ; since primus sapientiae gradus , est falsa intelligere . only , i think , 't would be very injurious to knowledge , if aristotle should ingross men , and should his placits be all receiv'd as the dictates of universal reason . there are other hypotheseis more antient , and possiby more useful , that deserve to be enquired into . and 't is an enlargement and enobling the minds of men to acquaint them with the various scheams in which things have been represented . my design was not then to discourage any from inquiring into the aristotelian doctrines , especially as they are in their original : but to prevent mens sitting down for ever on his composures , and making his placits the infallible measures of truth and nature . let aristotle be studied then , but not adored . let him have the first of our time , but not all ; the advantage of prepossession is great , which yet free philosophers i presume will grant him ; only let pythagoras , democritus , plato , and the more antient chaldaean wisdom , have their turns to be inquired into , and let the great and illustrious moderns have theirs . 't is an unaccountable vanity , to spend all our time in raking into the scraps and imperfct remains of former ages , and to neglect the knowledge and clearer notices of our own , which ( my lord bacon makes the third , but reckoning in the aegyptian ) is the fourth , and perhaps greatest enquiry of learning . for many have gone to and fro , and science is increased . methinks 't is pity that so many improveable wits as frequent the universities , should be hindred from enquiry ; and tyed up to the writings of a single authour , from the knowledge of the sentiments of the philosophick world , and studying the more instructive volumn of the universe . doubtless , since the dayes of aristotle , the face of things is alter'd , and new phaenomena are disclosed , which his hypotheseis will no more suit , then the coats of children will a body that is at full and advanced stature . besides , the greatest spirits of our dayes , proceed in another way of enquiry , which , if there were nothing in 't but the fashion of the learning of the age , it were however fit to be known by those that lay any claim to ingenuity , and have leisure for such researches . and it seems to me an unpardonable kind of sloath , ( especially in youth that useth to be busie and inquisitive ) to be contentedly ignorant of those great theories that make such noise in the age they live in ; and to spend all their time in that which will signifie little without the walls of a colledge . for the wiser world is of a differing opinion from our philosopher in the assertion of this paragraph , viz. that no progress can be made in sciences without the aristotelian grounds ; and i think will hardly be brought to believe , that those that have quitted those foundations must be alwayes to seek for principles , and necessarily come short of science . for to think that the principles of any man should be the only and infallible measures of things , seems a fond overvaluing credulity that hath nothing to warrant it . and he that phancies that all succeeding mankind cannot light upon principles as happy and likely , as those of aristotle , but must eternally despair of science , if they proceed in any other way , then he hath prescribed them ; hath no pretence for so bold a judgment of possibilities . actio prima . scepsin infaelici naturae aborsu antiquitùs natam , a. & ipsiusmet pudore è linguis disertorum ubi diu habitaverat elatam , & fidei christianae constantiâ tumulatam , à vermium & insectorum epulis raptam , magicâ quadam operâ vivis restituere conatus est petrus gassendus , acerrimae vir sagacitatis , nitidae eloquentiae , copiosae facundiae , suavissimorum morum , & diligentiae admirandae . idem ( quod his omnibus majus est ) catholicae fidei tenacissimus , & nusquam pravorum áogmatum suspectus , cùm tamen haec sceptica infinitorum errorum & omnium haereseôn mater sit , & illa ipsa seductrix philosophia , & inanis fallacia , quam cavendam apostoli monitu docuêre sancti . hanc vir ille , caetera magnus , in exercitatione suâ paradoxâ adversus aristotelaeòs , non ut priùs tectam & scortorum more in tenebris vagantem , sed effronti vultu & fucatâ formâ turbis & foro ostentare ausus est . . illius exemplo , apud nos linguâ vernaculâ eandem exornatam produxit vanitatis dogmatizandi author ; ipse quoque & ingenio pollens & eloquio . neque enim à vulgaribus mentibus timenda sunt grandia infortunia . haec mei laboris est occasio ; propositum verò , si lumen caelitùs affluat & vires calamo ministret , hanc cadaveream scientiae aemulam in sua sepulcreta compellere , & inominatis dentibus rodendam tradere . agedum igitur , quaesiti nodum evolvamus . g. the scepticism which the constancy of christianity lay'd in it's grave , i dare say the illustrious gassendus would never have redeemed from thence . the scepticism which consists in freedome of inquiry , that noble pen recommended , and adorned ; but did not restore : for campanella and the great verulam were before him ; yet , avicenna and others of his spirit among the antient peripateticks , were free philosophers . but what that scepticism should be , that is consistent with so sharpe a wit , so neat and copious an eloquence , such sweet manners , and admirable diligence , such firmness and fledfastness in the faith , and so unsuspected an orthodoxie , as are ascribed , and deservedly , to that great person : and yet be the source of infinite errorus and heresies , that seducing philosophy and vain deceit , against which we have the caveat of an apostle ; is beyond the reach of my conjecture . and i am the more confounded when i am told , that this mother of heresie , this vain deceit , is nothing but an endeavour to lessen the imposing authority of a vain-glorious heathen , whom some excellent persons , both fathers and philosophers , have accused , as one impious in manners , and worse in doctrine and belief . a suppressor of the more antient and more valuable wisdom : and one , that from a proud and insolent tassus contemned , and continually quarrel'd with his betters : yea , and who grew so far into this humour and contradiction that he would frequently unsay and contradict his own assertions . one , whose credit grew up in the night of barbarism and ignorance ; and whose principles are repugnant , many of them , to the nature of things , and the fundamentals of faith : i say , that an attempt to redeem the free ▪ born spirits of men , from an unworthy vassallage to so stigmatiz'd an authority , should be to this learned man so criminal and dangerous a business , is , i confess , to me , occasion of some surprise and wonder and if this be the faulty scepticism gassendus , and the author of the vanity of dogmatizing , are accused of ; let those that have a mind to pass their censure , make the worst they can of the imputation . that gassendus was no sceptick in the old and common notion , is apparent from the voluminous pains he hath taken in the building up a body of philosophy upon the principles of democritus and epicurus ; and if he was not so fond of the principles he undertook to illustrate , as to boast their certainty ; proposing them not in a confident and assertive form , but as probabilities and hypotheseis : i see no reason why his modesty should be made his crime , and be so severely animadverted on . nor doth the author of the impugned essay yet see any cause to be ashamed of having followed his example in an affair so innocent ; to say no more on 't . and he cannot yet decern how that discourse could yield an occasion to this learned man of opposing scepticism , which he may lay in the dust without concernment to the vanity of dogmatizing , or it's author : who is no otherwise interested in the paragraphs that follow for the asserting science , and opposition of the scepticks , but only to wish our author his desired success in the undertaking . i am not therefore concerned to take notice of any thing further , till the second section of the fourth action . for though possibly in the intermediate discourse , some things are said , which are not so cogent , and othersome which might appear obnoxious to one that would be quarrelsome ; yet because i wish well to the design , and attend not an assault , but defence , i shall pass all that without any other remarque ; but ; that if this learned gentleman had thought gassendus and my self scepticks in good earnest , his proof which must suppose the certainty of some principles , had been precarious ; or , if not , needless . a. actio quarta . sect. . ipsae jam loquantur querelae , illae nempe quibus quatuor a tertio capitula , cumulavit — pag. . g. it seems the learned gentleman had a desire to make an occasion to solve the motion of the sea , and magnetick attractions ; since in my discourse i gave him none , having only mention'd them as things i would not insist on , and confest them better accounted for then less acknowledg'd mysteries . whether the reason of these darke phaenomena be well assigned by this philosopher ; i 'le not put my self upon the occasion of inquiring . that they are the certain and infallible causes , i suppose this learned man's modesty will not permit him to affirm ; and if they are but confest probabilities , here 's no opposition to the scepticism of the author ; which allowes ingenious and hopeful conjecture in resolving the appearances of nature : though he fears , few accounts will amount to certainties and demonstrations . so that though for mine own part i acquiesce in the cartesian solution of these magnalia , as an hypothesis that may content one , that is not restlesly and unreasonably inquisitive : yet even in that , when i would look deep , i descern objections which perhaps will very difficulty be satisfied : and which speak those ingenious offers to be but attempts , no absolute performances . and if this acute philosopher think the impulse of the external winds a sufficient cause of the flux and reflux ; i shall not go about to disturbe him in his satisfactions . that will ease one man's mind , that will leave an others restless . only i cannot well apprehend how so constant and regular an effect as the motion of the sea , should depend upon so uncertain and proverbially inconstant a cause as the winds are . or , if there were no difficulty in that , yet the learned author may please to consider , that this is but the next cause of the phaenomenon , the cause of which , perhaps , is more hardly assigneable then the other . and the nature and original of the winds , is , it may be , as abstruse a theory as any in philosophy . for in assigning causes , in the second or third , commonly we are lost and non-plust , which is no inconsiderable evidence of humane ignorance and deficiency . actio quinta . sect. i. a. tertio itaque eloquentissimae dissertationis capite objicit ignorantiam illius rei quae notissima — pag. . my learned assailant is now descended to the difficulties g. i propounded , and judge not yet satisfactorily accounted for ; concerning which i affirm not , that they are doubts that cannot possibly be unriddled ; for this were to discourage , and not to awaken inquiry : but that they have not yet been sufficiently explain'd , or explicable by any yet extant hypothesis ; a sad argument of intellectual deficience , that after so much talk and indeavour after science , the whole world should yet be to seek in matters they have the greatest advantages of being acquainted with . i am not therefore an enemy to any essayes can be made towards the explication of the difficulties proposed ; but should heartily embrace any hopeful offers for the clearing of those mysterious theories . so that if this learned man propose any thing that may be probable ; though it come not near the title of certainty or science : i have so great a kindness for ingenuity , and such a desire for the quieting my anxious and inquiring mind , that i shall give it an entertainment not like the usual ones of angry disputants , who cannot endure any thing that proceeds from an antagonist ; but such a one as may evidence , that truth is welcome to me , though it comes in a way of opposition to the petty interest of mine opinions . to the business then , if to suppose the soul a distinct substance from the body and extrinsically advenient , be a great error in philosophy , almost all the world hath hitherto been mistaken : so that if this gentlemans opinion be true , he hath confirm'd the scepticism i endeavor to promote . but if we enquire into the philosophy of the soul , as high as any accounts are given of it , we shall find it's distinction from the body to have been the current belief of all the wiser ages . for , ( . ) the highest times of whose doctrines we have any history , believed it's praeexistence , and therefore certainly asserted it's diversity and substantial distinction from the body it informs . of which briefly . we have praeexistence among the chaldean oracles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and afterwards more clearly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and psellus in his exposition of the chaldean theology , tells us , that according to their doctrine souls descended hither ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again zoroaster , speaking of souls , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . besides which ( . ) trismegistus is express in the assertion of the same doctrine ; of which a testimony or two perhaps will not be impertinent . in his minerva mundi , he brings in god threatning those he had placed in an happy condition of life and enjoyment , with bonds and imprisonment in case of disobedience . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and they transgressing , he adds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and in another place , assignes this for the cause of their incarceration ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( . ) it was also the opinion of the ancient jews , that souls were first created together , and resided in a place they call golph , a coelestial region . ad therefore 't is said in the mishna , non aderit filius david priusquam exhaustae fuerint universae animae quae sunt in golph . so that they believed all generations on earth to be supplyed from that promptuary and element of soules in heaven ; whence they supposed them to descend by the north-pole , and to ascend by the south . hence the saying of the cabbalists , magnus aquilo scaturigo animarum . and probably that other omne malum nobis ex aquilone . from which tradition 't is likely also homer had this notion , — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( . ) what was the opinion of pythagoras , plato , and the greatest of the greek philosophers in this particular , is notoriously known to all men that know any thing of these matters . and i need no testimonies in so clear a business . it appears then from the allegations i have produced , that the most valuable wisdom of the antient world asserted a doctrine which necessarily inferres and supposeth their opinion of the souls being a distinct substance from the body . which also ( ) must be supposed by all that believe it 's natural immortality . for separability is the greatest argument of real distinction ; especially that , which the schools call mutual . now the souls immortality is a truth that hath had an unanimous reception from the better and wiser world . the aegyptians , chaldaeans , assyrians , indians , jews , greeks , and universally all that ever had a name for wisdom among the antients , believed it . and what hath been the apprehension of latter ages , i need inform no body that is capable of judging in such inquiries . a councel of the church of rome it self hath determin'd it , and recommended it's proof and demonstration to all christian philosophers . but what need of more ? 't is the belief of sir k. digby , and our authors own . and how real separability can consist with identity and indistinction , i know no possibility of apprehending . for that a thing can be separated from it self , can never be believed by any , but those that make a religion of absurdities . ( . ) the sacred and mosaical philosophy supposeth the like real distinction ; of which the expression of god's breathing into adams nostrils the breath of life , is sufficient evidence . yea , and all the arguments that are alledg'd to prove it's immediate creation , do strongly conclude it an other substance from the body . yea ( ) aristotle himself affirmes it ; for saith he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . elsewhere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet more clearly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and once more , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . other testimonies i could bring to like purpose , but these are sufficient to evince that if aristotle be consistent with himself , he believed the real distinction i contend for ; and his peripateticks i 'me sure unanimously affirm it . to all which if i can add sir k. digby's opinion , i shall bid fair for our authors assent to my conclusion , that 't was aristotle's , and the truth . ( ) then , that noble and celebrated friend of our authors , affirmes in his immortality [ that the soul is a substance , and a substance besides the body . ] yea , almost all that discourse of his leans upon that supposal . yea ( ) our philosopher himself in his peripatetical institutions , affirms as much as ever i supposed . for he saith that [ 't is most evident that the mind is something of an other kind from quantity and matter , that 't is noble and wholy opposite to the nature of quantity , that 't is a substantial principle of man , and no mode or determination of divisibility , and that there is nothing common to body and spirit . ] besides which , in the fifth book of the same institutions , he discourses of the souls separation from the body , and asserts it to be evident , that it perisheth not with it ; because it hath actions that belong not to a body , but hath of it self the vertue of a being . and that it's power of existence is not taken away when the body fails , the soul being apart from and besides it . and that matter is not necessary to the souls existence . many other expressions there are in that discourse to like purpose , which seem to speak the souls real distinction from the body in as great variety of phrase as diversity and distinction can be spoken . so that how such passages consist with the doctrine of it's identity with the body , i confess i am not metaphysical enough to comprehend . and i believe very few else can perceive the consistency besides this philosopher ; whose metaphysicks of whole and part , have yet been entertain'd by none that i know of ; and therefore though this should be acknowledged a good account , yet 't is an argument of the weakness of humane understanding that it hath not yet comprehended it . i think by this time 't is clear then , that the supposition of my procedure , the souls distinction from the body , is not peccant ; except all the world , both antient and modern , hath been mistaken , and our author also : which if it be granted , 't is an instance of what i plead for . if not , my supposition is good , and the emergent doubt unanswer'd . and if our learned author yet thinks it plain , that either man is no being , or that the soul and body are not two , i must acknowledge such palams to be the dogmatizing i suppose . and i am willing to put it upon the issue , whether it be so to any body else but this philosopher . but ( ) besides all this , it seems to me very clear from the nature of the things themselves abstracting from authority ; that the soul is a substance distinct from the body . for i think , ( ) 't is strongly concluded by the common arguments that prove it immaterial ; for perception , perception of spirituals , universals and other abstracts from sense , as mathematical lines , points , superficies , congenit notions , logical , metaphysical , and moral ▪ self-reflection , freedom , indifferency and universality of action : these , i say , are properties not at all competible to body or matter , though of never so pure a mixture . nor is it conceiveable how any of these should arise from modificaiions of quantity being of a diverse kind from all the phaenomena of motion but ( ) if the soul be not a distinct substance from the body , 't is then a certain disposition and modification of it ; which this gentteman in the lesson of his institutions seems to intimate , saying , [ that since the soul is a certain affection — which is introduced and expell'd by corporeal action — ] he thence inferrs some thing that is not to our purpose to relate . and if so ▪ since all diversities in matter arise from motion and position of parts , every different preception will require a different order and position of the parts of the matter perceiving , which must be obtained by motion . i demand then , when we pass from one conception to another , is the motion , the cause of this diversity , meerly casual ; or directed by some act of knowledge ? the former , i suppose , no man in his wits will affirm ; since then all our conceptions will be non-sense and confusion ; chance being the cause of nothing that is orderly and regular . if therefore there be a knowledge in us that directs the motions that form every distinct conception : i demand concerning that knowledge , whether it be in like manner directed by some other , or is it the effect of meer casual motions ? if the former , we must run up in infinitum in our inquiry : and the latter admits the alledged absurdities . there is no way then of defending the assertion of the souls being matter , or any modification of it : but by affirming with master hobbs a certain connexion between all our thoughts , and a necessary fate in all things : which who ever affirmes , will find difficulties enough in his assertion to bring him to mine , that there 's a vanity in dogmatizing , and confidence is unreasonable . but of this i have had occasion to discourse more in an other treatise , and i shall not repeat what i have there written , or what others have said on the subject . especially since perhaps this learned gentleman will not think himself concern'd in the proof of this conclusion , he having in his writings asserted it . but whether he have not unsaid it again in this , i appeal to any equal decerner . and that the soul should be a substance of another kind from matter , that hath nothing common with it ; a substance separable from all body , to which matter is not necessary , and actually in the other state divided from it : ( all which and more to like purpose our author hath in some of his books affirmed ; ) and yet not be a distinct substance , but really the same with the body to which it is united ; which he asserts in this ; i say ▪ how these so opposite affirmations can be reconciled , i have either not wit , or not charity enough to help me to imagine . i know this authors doctrine is , that there are no parts before separation and division , and therefore no real distinction . but whether things in their natures so divers as body and spirit , which almost in nothing , even according to this philosophy , communicate ; are not essentially divided , though not locally distant , i am willing to leave to the readers judgment . and i would fain know whereupon the separability of the soul and body is founded , if not upon the real distinction of their natures : so that though this notion may be less obnoxious when it relates only to substances of the same kind , and quality ; yet when it concerns those that are so essentially distinct , as body and spirit , it seems most strangely lyable . yea though it should be supposed a truth , yet it must be acknowledged unconceiveable ; which sufficeth to satisfie my conclusion . a. neque me terret distinctio ( quae pueris philosophiam garrientibus in sacco parata est ) entis perfecti & imperfecti — pag. . the distinction of the schools of a being perfect and g. imperfect , is not i think so childish and impertinent as our author would have believed . for though ens imperfectum in the metaphysical sence , be non-sence and a contradiction ; yet in genere physico , as they speak , 't is no absurdity : since a being may want some circumstances of natural compleatness and perfection ; and yet be metaphysically compleat and perfect : so that to affirm the soul an imperfect being nakedly in it self , is to say no more , then that 't was made with a natural aptitude , and congruity to a body by union with which 't is perfected and compleated , being then furnish't with the requisites of its nature ; which in like manner may be said of a body in humane form , viz. that 't is defective and incompleat till it be furnished with the principle of humane actions , for which it was designed . so that there 's no absurdity in affirming , that a thing may be one in a physiological and natural sense ; and two in a metaphysical ; and so out philosopher's inference is no sequel . a. . quando itaque petit , unde anima veniat ? reponendum est , an dubitet unde homo veniat ? — pag. . g. the foundation of our learned authors answers to the proposed difficulties being overthrown ; and it being made secure enough , that the soul is a distinct substance from the body ; 't is a pertinent and material enquiry to ask , whence the soul is ? and if our philosopher will call this the man according to the maxim , let the question be proposed in his own phrase , and there 's no danger of an absurdity . a. neque majorum quamtumvis reverendorum me quatit authoritas ; non dico illorum qui — pag. . g. it seems the learned gentleman would fain reconcile the authority of the church asserting the souls creation to his main conclusion , that 't is no distinct substance from the body ; and to his inference thereupon , that 't is improper and impertinent , to inquire whence it came . but whether what is said be a clear salve or a shuffle , let it be determin'd by any equal judgment . for either by homo quatenus intellectivus , our author means something that is the same with the body ; or really distinct and diverse . if the former , he hath not satisfied the authority of the church , which affirms , the soul as a distinct substance , to be the immediate subject of creation ; founded upon that clear distinction in the inspired writings [ the body to the dust , and the soul to god that gave it . ] but if he mean the latter , he hath not provided for his own assertion and hypothesis . besides ( . ) if man as intellective be created , then either he means the whole man , or only that by which he 's intellective ; the former is against all sense and experience . and the latter overthrows all our author's answers , with the proposition upon which they are erected . for if there be some thing in man which is the subject of divine power and action ; and some other thing that is the subject of natural production and generation ; it seems to me apparent that these must be two things really distinguish't . for the same thing cannot be created and naturally produced . for creation supposeth the production of the whole ex nihilo , both sui & subjecti ( as the schools phrase it ) without the co-operation of any thing with the divine superlative power : whereas all generation , according to truth and the same hypothesis , at least supposeth one of them , and is perform'd by natural agents . and i think the case is plain enough when 't is brought to this , whether the same thing can be produced of something and nothing , with created assistance , and without it ? since the actions then are so infinitely diverse , i think i shall not be reprehensibly dogmatical , in affirming the terms distinct . what the gentleman says more , seems to be involv'd , and looks like a designed evasion . and if [ one action produceth a man , a creature equivalent to a beast and angel ] i demand , whether this one action be divine or natural , from god or the generant ? if the former , every man is as immediately created as the first . and the latter quite excludes crea ion , and supposeth god no otherwise to act in giving being to our souls , then in each common production . 't is necessary therefore that the terms produced be distinct , when the actions whereby they are produced are so vastly diverse ; and that the soul have an origination different from the formation of the body , of which 't is more pertinent to inquire , then easie to return an answer . . ex hâc veritate derivamur ad sequentes duos a. nodos patentissimè solvendos . — pag. . in this and the following paragraphs our author supposeth g. his doctrin of the identity of the soul and body for an answer ; and i think after what hath been said , i have as good reason to suppose mine of the diversity for a reply . but how the definition of a part enervates my enquiry , i cannot imagine , since if [ parts are , out of which by composition are made one ] and the body and soul be supposed parts of the man ( which may well enough be allowed upon the account of what hath been said ) i see not but why we may inquire , how these parts , whose natures are so different , can be compounded and united . a. currit idem error in sequenti difficultate , quae luget nesciri quomodo anima moveat corpus , — pag. . g. whether my supposal be an error , we have seen already ; if it be not , our philosophers answer is so . and whither the implyed assertion that the soul moves not the body be not one , i appeal to any man , that understands he hath any claim to such a being . for though many of our actions , and possibly more then are suspected , may be allowed to be meer mechanick motions ; yet the experience of all the world attests , that our wills determine and excite not a few of our corporeal motions . what else means the distinction of the schools of actions imperate and elicit ? and how is it that we can speak and move at pleasure , and in spight of all corporeal impulse , desist from external action ! and if man be a meer mechanicks engine , farewel free-will , virtue , vice , laws , religion , rewards and punishments . a clock were as capable of these , according to our philosopher's hypothesis , as an humane automaton . a. vere enim unum membrum animatum movet aliud , sed non aliqua substantia quae sit pura anima — pag. . ▪ t is true , one animate member moves another , but the g. motion must somewhere begin . and though those which are purely corporeal in us are excited by material agents ; yet others we find , which derive from an higher principle , viz. a free and unconstrained will. and it seem strange to me that men should be so much in love with their private speculations , as for their sakes to confront their own , and all the worlds experience . what follows , no body that i know , affirms , viz. [ that a substance which is a pure soul moves a member wherein there is none ] . but to what concerns other animals , the learned author knows , that the platonists assign them souls independent on their bodies ; and the peripateticks , substantial forms distinct from matter , which are the source and principle of their actions . so that according to either of these hypotheseis , the question may as pertinently be proposed concerning their kind , as our own , and will be as difficultly answered . indeed the excellent monsieur des-cartes , and his followers that affirm , all bruit actions to be mechanical , are not concern'd in the inquiry . and if this be the belief of our philosopher , i 'le not indeavour to disturb his hypothesis . only this i 'le add to our purpose , that though we suppose the actions of beasts to be fatal and material , yet there 's no reason to infer the same of ours , since we feel it otherwise . and 't is no very reasonable method of arguing , to conclude from an opinion of things we can but conjecture , to the denyal of things we certainly feel , and know . so that though , as our author insinuates , there may perhaps be no kind of corporeal actions in our selves , which are not in bruits ; yet 't is not therefore necessary to inferr , that they proceed from a like principle in both : much less that we should conclude , that none of our own actions are begun by a principle distinct from the body and immaterial ; because we believe that theirs are not so . on the other side methinks the argument will be stronger to inferr , that because we feel a substance distinct from matter to be the cause of some of our motions ; that therefore there may likely be an incorporeal substance that is the principle and spring of some of theirs : and 't is better to conclude from certainty to conjecture , then from conjecture against certainty . a. . ultimae , quas in hoc capitulo plangit , tenebrae collocatae sunt in ignorantiâ illius motus , — pag. . g. the difficulties about the direction of the spirits concern not only man , but all other animals , supposing them to do any thing by a principle of knowledge and animadversion . or , though we judge all their actions m chanical , yet the account will be more difficultly rendred that way , then by supposing them to act by an animadversive principle . for how such an infinite variety of motions should be regularly menaged , and conducted in such a wilderness of passages and distinct avennues by meer blind impellents and material conveyances , i have not the least shadow of conjecture . and though des-cartes hath made the best attempts in this kind of any hath yet appear'd in the theory , yet there are mechanical difficulties in the way of his solutions , which perhaps will never be well satisfied . but our philosopher confesseth here the defect of his anatomy ; and though he thinks himself secure of the general cause , yet the particular direction he acknowledges wonderful , and not yet sufficiently discover'd . verùm author casum proprium homini constituere videtur , a. ostentans voluntatem & fortassis — pag. . to prove that the will is not alwayes moved by some g. precedent passion , and consequently that the soul is the immediate principle of some of our actions , i make this double offer : ( . ) 't is clear from experience , that , though many of our volitions are motions from the passion , yet some of our determinations are from the understanding and immaterial faculties . and sometimes we set our wills to determine in things that are purely indifferent , to make tryal of our liberty ; when we find not the least provocation or incitement to the action from any emotion of the body . and indeed to suppose every action of the will to depend upon a previous appetite or passion , is to destroy our liberty , and to inferr a stoical fatality with all the dangerous consequences of that doctrine ▪ ( . ) our author's proof that there is no dispassionate volition , is an insinuation , that there is no knowledge without an impulse from the phantasms ; a conclusion which may be easily disproved , by those highly abstract speculations which the mind of man sometimes entertains it self with , when it puts off all the cloathing of the imagination , and raiseth it self to a temper for those noble enquiries about god and immaterials : and if there be no intellect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as aristotle speaks , for ought i know , we lose one of our chiefest arguments for our immortality : besides which , i suppose our learned author will not think it for his credit , to be told , that he is in the very rode of the hobbian hypothesis ; which will clearly enough appear , if we consider these his assertions ; [ that the soul is no distinct substance from the body , that it contributes nothing towards its motion ; that our wills are moved by precedent or present passion , which doubtless is excited by something that is not in our power ; that all our intellections are from phantasms , and consequently , nothing else but elevated sense , and that all both natural and free actions are performed by motions deriv'd from the heart ] i say , who ever considers , how these symbolize , yea , and are one with the main principles of that irreligious philosophy , must without an excess of charity , suppose our philosopher to have shaken hands with the leviathan . briefly then , 't is confest , that the mechanical way of conveyance and direction of the spirits in animal performances is yet undiscover'd , and that the channels and particular passages of mechanical motions ( which all ours are supposed to be ) is yet occult and manifest . and though this gentleman affirms , the heart to be the fountain of animate operations , yet 't is but an unapproved presumption ; and the greatest master of mechanicks that ever was , the illustrious des-cartes has deriv'd all these motions from the brain , in which he 's follow'd by the greatest part of profoundest speculators ; so that it seems we are not certain of the first spring of the motions we enquire of ; much less can we certainly determin the minutes and particularities of direction : and if any of our actions are deriv'd from our souls , which our author seems unwilling to hear of , though i think i have made it sufficiently evident , the difficulties i urg'd upon that supposal have not had the least offer towards solution . a. . caput quartum sensationis & memoriae inexplicabiles esse naturas objicit . — pag. . i am no further concern'd in the beginning of this section , g. then to mind this learned gentleman how different his apprehension of des-cartes his hypothesis of the manner of sense , is , from that of his ingenuous and applauded friend sir k. digby ; who calls not his opinion a fanstatical conjecture , but thus prefaces to the recital of his hypothesis . [ monsieur des-cartes , ( who by his great and heroick attempts , and by shewing mankind how to steer and husband theit reason to the best advantage , hath left us no excuse of being ignorant of any thing that is worth the knowing ) explicating the nature of sense — and then goes on to declare his opinion of this matter , which he concludes with this character ; of a colour very diverse from our author 's [ this then is the sum of monsieur des-cartes's opinion , which he hath very finely exprest with all the advantages that opposite examples , significant words and clear method , can give unto a witty discourse ; which yet , is but a part of the commendations he deserveth , for what he hath done on this particular : he is over and above all this , the first i ever met with who hath published any conceptions of this nature , whereby to make the operations of sense intelligible , certainly , this praise will ever belong unto him that he hath given the first hint of speaking groundedly , and to the purpose upon this subject ; and whosoever shall carry it any further ( as what important mystery was ever born and perfected at one ? ) must acknowledge to have deriv'd his light from him . ] this is the censure that excellent person gives of des-cartes , and his opinion , which his dear friend our author , hath with so much severity reflected on . and the learned knight professeth himself of des-cartes's mind in all the other circumstances of this hypothesis , except the subject of this motion . so that i wonder that our philosopher should so far forget himself , as to put such a slurre upon the judgment of his admired friend , by speaking so contemptuously of a notion that learned man had so much , and so deservedly , applauded . what follows is already answer'd . a. sed nè nihil novi dicat , calumniatur sensu solo non posse agnosci quantitates rerum , distantias , — pag. . g. our author in this period , wonders at my assertion , and i wonder as much at his wonder ; which is not occasioned by any affirmation of mine , but by a mistake of his own : for my doubt ( as plain as i could express it ) is , how , since there is nothing in the brain , the seat of sense , to represent external objects but motion , ( for which i have the suffrage of his noble friend , whose method he professeth to follow ) how , i say , we should by that know figures , distances , magnitudes , and colours , things of another kind from motion ; which therefore cannot represent them , but by some knowledge in the soul , which we are not aware of ; and how the scant and narrow images in the brain should notifie the vastest objects , in their large dimensions , without some secret inference and geometry in the soul , is unconceiveable : but what this knowledge is , we know not . this is the sense of the difficulty propos'd , which , how it is explicated by the optical demonstrations the gentleman talks of , the opticks of my understanding cannot discover . for the rest i dare venture it without an answer . . proximus in memoriam labor expenditur . illius a. explanationem ut impossibilem declaret , — pag. . . imprimis , decîdi à moventibus sensum quasdam exuvias & corporis delibamenta , quoad tactum , — pag . i take not upon me to determin of possibilities ; and therefore g. from the present ignorance of the nature of memory i infer not , that it will never be explained hereafter : only i affirm , that no hypothesis extant hath yet made it manifest ; which is sufficient for my conclusion of the present narrowness of our knowledge , though not of my assailants of the impossibility of enlarging it . but our philosopher thinketh the nature of memory sufficiently explained already , and the account he gives is that of sir k. digby , which was one of the four that i examin'd in the discourse impugn'd . this is the hypothesis which our author hath adopted , and undertook the defence of ; with what success , we shall discover when we have examin'd the answer he makes to my impugnations . which after a large recital of the hypothesis he descends to in the ninth section . . attamen , perturbat novum naturae miratorem a. multitudo objectorum cavis cerebri — pag. . the difficulty i urg'd against the digbaean account of g. the memory , was , that 't is inconceiveable how those active particles , which are the images and representations of things remembred , should keep their distinct and orderly situations without confusion or dissipation in a substance wherein there is continual motion ? to which the learned gentleman returns ; that 't is as conceivable as how the rays of light should come in a direct line to the eye ; or how the atomical effluvia that continually flow from all bodies , especially the magnetical and sympathetick , should find their way to the place they tend to . to this i rejoyn briefly , ( ) what the gentleman himself suggests , were answer sufficient , that the multiplying of difficulty doth not solve it : for supposing the direction of the corpuscles of light , and those mention'd effluvia , to be of a difficult apprehension , as the continuance and regularity of those images in the brain : yet this only argues another defect in our knowledge , and so is a new evidence of the truth of my general conclusion . but ( ) the proposed instances are far more accountable then this before us . for , as to what concerns the light , supposing with des cartes ( as is most probable ) that the action of light consists in nothing but the conamen of the aethereal matter , receding from the centre of its motion : the direct tendency of it to the eye , is no difficulty worth considering , but as clear as the light it self the subject of the enquiry ; or , if the rays be atomical streams , and effluxes of the sun , there is no more difficulty in this hypothesis neither , then in the direct spouting of water out of a pipe ; yea no more , then in the beating of the waves against the sides of a ship , when it swims in the ocean . for there 's an whole sea of atomes which derive from the fountain illuminant , whose course can no more be diverted , by those little bodies that swim up and down in the air ; then that of the ocean can by those sands , pebles , fishes , and rocks , that are mingled with the waters . and as for the other instances of corporeal emissions , it would require to be prov'd that they perform all those feats that are ascrib'd to them : whereas perhaps it is more likely , that those strange operations are not mechanical but magical , being effected by the continuity of the great spirit of nature , which runs through all things : or however , to suppose this act of the memory to be as clear as magnetisme and sympathies , will be no great advantage to the belief of its certain intelligibility . at ego ipsum sic nodum scindo . in majoribus ubi facilior a. est experiendi facultas , palàm est multa — pag. . that what our author has answer'd in this period , g. should resolve the difficulty , is to me as great a wonder , as the mystery we are discoursing of . and if the knot be cut , 't is certainly by some occult and sympathetick instrument , for the gross of his answer comes not near it . the difficulty was ; how the images of such an infinite of objects , as we remember , should be kept distinct without confusion , be brought forth when we have occasion , and remanded back again into their own cells when they have done the errant they were sent for . to which our author saith no more , but to this purpose ( if i understand him ) that if the object stays not on the sense , it makes not impression enough to be remembred , but if it be repeated there , it leaves plenty enough of those images behind it to confirm and strengthen the knowledge of the object : in which radicated knowledge , if the memory consist , there would be no need of reserving those atomes in the brain , or calling them forth upon occasion , as the hypothesis supposeth ; or , if there be , the difficulty is untouched . besides all which , i might adde , that if these material images are a sufficient account of the memory , how will our remembrance of distances , magnitudes , relations , words , metaphysical notions , and those of immaterials , which leave no such idola , in the brain , be accounted for ? let this gentleman tell me how — et erit mihi magnus — a. . palàm est me in hâc responsione digbaeanam methodum caeteris praetulisse . ipsius enim — pag. . g. if i am mistaken in the opinion of aristotle in this matter , ( . ) i err with the great body of his commentators and followers ; yea , and all the schools in christendom , who unanimously concurr in the assignment of the doctrine of intentional species to their master aristotle ; so that if all the peripateticks hitherto have been so grossly out in imposing an opinion he never taught upon their ador'd philosopher , for ought i know , there is no such thing as the aristotelean philosophy in the universities of europe : for the taking in , or denying these intentional species will make material and mighty alterations in the whole frame of the hypothesis ; and i see not how the denial of them is consistent with the aristotelean doctrine of qualities and forms . but ( . ) if aristotle taught the digbaean philosophy , as our author sayes , he taught the atomical , which is notoriously known to have been the way of democritus and epicurus , which aristotle frequently and professedly opposeth . that democritus taught the atomical hypothesis , we have the affirmative of aristotle to justifie , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of leucippus and democritus ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and neerer to our purpose , that these solved the way of sensation , by material images , we have from plutarch ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this hypothesis aristotle endeavours to confute ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristotle then thought the doctrine of sensation by corporeal images absurd in democritus and epicurus ; and therefore certainly would not himself affirm it ; as he must do on the supposal of his having taught the same hypothesis with sir k. digby about the memory , which is exactly the same with that of these sages : for that learned knight affirms , sensation to be perform'd [ by driving of solid material bodies , exceeding little ones , that come from the objects themselves , ( they are his own words ) against that part of the brain where knowledge resideth , which same bodies rebounding thence into certain cells of the brain , perform the offices of the memory ] as he has largely discourst upon the subject . sir k. digby then proceeds in the corpuscularian method which aristotle opposeth , and particularly in the business of sensation ; and consequently cannot be of his belief in his hypothesis of the memory , which the learned knight gives account of by the same material idola , which aristotle laught at . and doubtless the memory is excited to action by the like instruments as are the external senses , consonantly to that of plato in his phaedo , speaking of the senses , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and aristotle himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i think 't is clear then that aristotle's doctrine of the memory is not the same with sir k. digby's . and if i have been out in intitling the opinion of intentional species to aristotle , my mistake is the more venial , because the whole army of his most devoted sectators are deceived with me . but our author is more reprehensible in his mistake , if it be one ; because he 's alone in his opinion . and an error hath by so much the more of guilt , as it hath of singularity and self-assurance . but whether this were aristotle's doctrine or not , i think 't is not very material , since i make this none of the charges against him . if it be not his , 't is the general opinion of his schools ; and i have proved it an insufficient account of the faculty we are discoursing of . actio sexta . a. . capite quinto formationis corporum naturalium , viventium praesertim , obscuritatem intentat : — pag. . g. two methods it seems our philosopher proposeth , for the giving an account of the formation of animals ; neither of which seems to me a sufficient solution of the doubt attempted . for first , he that supposeth all the vastly differing parts of a worm or insect to be actually contain'd , though in myriate and indivisible proportions , in a drop of dew out of which they are sometimes generated , believes gratis , without any ground of his supposal ; and therefore will be very bold to assert this the certain account of the phaenomenon . ( . ) if the seed contain , though invisibly , all the parts of the animal ; then either in the same site , and position , that they are found in in the compleated body ; or they lie there in a confused huddle and mixture ; the former , is contrary to all experience , which assures us , that the immediate matter of all generations is a certain fluid , and , as far as can be discern'd , an homogeneous substance . now fluidity consisting in the motion of the parts of the fluid body , as is testified by experience and the best philosophy , the seminal parts can be of no setled form or consistence . and if the second be supposed , which doubtless is the truth , the difficulty under debate will be unanswer'd , ( viz. ) how such an infinite of distinct parts should be brought into their regular and orderly positions without the guidance and conduct of some knowing agent ; to fly to a first cause is unphilosophical ; and he that pretends a second , let him shew it . and fortuitously it cannot be : for chance is the cause of no constant and regular effect ; and to suppose an undirected motion to shuffle these fluid parts into the wonderful and exact form of an animal , or any other regular body ; is as likely , as that the divided letters of an alphabet should be accidentally jumbled into an elegant and polite discourse ; which when once i see effected , i 'le believe , that there wants nothing to the formation of the world and all bodies therein , but matter and motion . some intelligent principle then must be suppos'd to guide these elementary parts into their orderly situations . but what that is , who is 't will determine ? ( . ) the second account also is too general , and flies very wide of my particular enquiry . for my quaery is concerning the principle of the conduct of the parts of the various matter in those rare and methodical composures ; and our philosopher's answer concerns only the gross and material parts of the composition . and therefore little can be collected from the chymical processes he speaks of , for our purpose ; and the elementary solutions mention'd , signifie nothing towards the accounting for the unerring exactness we find in animal formations . for all these being suppos'd , the matter is in the same circumstances of difficulty as before ; and this gentleman's solution seems to me to signifie no more , then if a man should answer to one that that desires an account of the art and method of the motions of a watch , or any other ingenious automaton ; that they are perform'd by steel , iron , brass , or silver , wherein the matter indeed of the work is declar'd , but not the artifice . and in the case before us , i inquire of the principle of direction of those intricate and methodical motions , and am answer'd with an account of the gross and material ingredients . nor is what follows of any whit more avail to the solution pretended ; for let the matter resolve into parts dry , subtle , and liquid ▪ let the dryer dispose themselves into divers figures , and constitute what vessels our philosopher is pleas'd to fancy ; yet how from hence forward the infinite variety of the parts of an animal will result , will require something more to help us to conjecture . a. . haec qui mente comprehenderit , non plorabit plasticam vanum nomen esse & vocem sine re . — pag. . g. though by a close and recondite search into the seminalities of plants , and vegetables , the future processes may be judg'd , as our philosopher assures us ; yet this only argues , that the grown parts were all contain'd pack't up in their seeds and berries ; so that in the growth and progress nature did only display and unfold , what before was in the minute proportions more closely laid together ; supposing which , the main doubt still remains unsatisfied , viz. how these smaller seminal parts were so order'd , and framed ? and this brachygraphy of nature cannot be thought less difficult then it 's text. and , secondly , what relates to animals we have seen already ; for 't is not likely , that the formed parts were ever actually contain'd in the seed , out of which they were produced . neque quemquam terreant artificum dicta , admirantium a. ea quorum causas non intelligunt , — pag. . i might well wonder at the specifical uniformity of things , if g. unguided matter were the only principle of their formation , against which hypothesis this doubt was raised ; and the variation from the kind which happens in some regions , would not be so observable , as an identity in any . . eodem capitulo duas alias quaestiones movet quas a. absolutè inexplicabiles putat ; mihi contra — pag. . if the doubts i propose of the union of the parts , and composition g. of quantity , contain scarce any difficulty at all ; our philosopher is more lucky in his enquiries , then others that have dealt in those theories ; most men confessing the perplexity of the mention'd phaenomena , especially of the latter . and the vast diversity of philosophers about it , testifies , that the speculation of them is not of so facile an explication . and 't is strange that the ancients should keep such ado about an easie probleme , and the moderns despair of a solution , so pretendedly obvious . i will not differ with the learned gentleman about the order of the questions , and grant , that they both suppose actual parts in quantity ; which because our author denies , & makes this the foundation of his answer to these , and some of my former propos'd difficulties , i must be fain to prove it ; which i attempt ( . ) by giving some evidence of my affirmative , and ( . ) by shewing the weakness and insufficiency of the grounds of the contrary assertion . for the first then , that there are actual parts in quantity , i evince it by these considerations . ( . ) the formal nature of quantity is extension in the notion of aristotle's schools ; and divisibility in the philosophy of sir kenelm digby , and our authour ; both which suppose parts , and parts actual : for to be extended , in the school phrase , is to have partes extrapartes ; and if the extension be actual , the parts must be so : for it is not conceiveable how a thing can be extended , but by parts which are really distinct one from another , though not separate : which seems to me so evident , that nothing can be spoken plainer ; and i appeal in this matter to the common sense of all men . nor can a thing be divided , except we suppose the parts praeexistent in the divisible : for divisibility is founded upon real distinction , and 't is impossible to divide what is one without diversity . ( . ) except there are parts in quantity before division , there are none at all : for after they are divided they are no parts , but have a compleatness and integrality of their own , especially if the subject were homogeneous . ( . ) except there are parts actually in quantity , contradictions may be verified de eodem , with all the other circumstances , which the metaphysicks teach impossible . for the same body may be black and white , cold and hot , seen and not seen , and partake of all other most contrary qualities . which contradictions , and inconsistences cannot be accommodated in the same subject , without supposal of the contended-for diversity . nor will the answer , which sir k. digby has provided for such objections help the hypothesis , viz. [ that it is not one part of the thing that shews it self , and another that doth not , one that is hot , and another cold , &c. but it is the same thing , shewing it self according to one possibility of division , and not another . ] for first , these distinct possibilities are founded upon distinct actualities , which are the parts i would have acknowledged . and such a capacity of receiving things so different , cannot be in the same subject , without the supposal of parts actually distinct and divers . ( . ) the subjects of these contrary qualities are things actual : whereas possibilities are but metaphysical notions . and these subjects are distinct , or contradictions will be reconcil'd de eodem ; from which the inference seems necessary , that quantity hath parts , and parts actual , and distinct possibilities will not salve the business . and ( . ) why must the common speech of all mankinde be alter'd , and what all the world cals parts , be call'd possibilities of division ? which yet if our philosopher will needs name so , they being acknowledg'd distinct , and prov'd actual , or at least founded immediately upon things that are so ; my question will as well proceed this way as in the common one , viz. how the things that answer to these distinct possibilities are united , and of what compounded ? there is another answer which i find in our authors peripatetical institutions , the sum of which is , [ that the contradictions have only a notional repugnance in the subject as 't is in our understandings : and since the parts have a distinct being in our understanding , from thence 't is that they are capable to sustain contradictions ] which answer , if i understand , i have reason to wonder at : for certainly the subject sustains the contradictories as it is in re . and , i never heard of a notion black or white , but in a metaphor ; 't is the real substance is the subject of these contrarieties ; which were impossible , if it had not divers realities answering to the qualities so denominating . and therefore 't is not the understanding that makes the divers subjects of these accidents , as our author suggests : but there being such is the ground that we so apprehend them . i hope i need say no more then to establish the supposal of the difficulty under consideration , that there are parts actually in quantity : only i am obliged by my proposed method to add further , ( . ) that the grounds of the excellent sir k. digby , and our author , on which they built their asserted paradox , seem to me very insufficient to sustain so great a weight as leans upon them . the reasons are ( . ) quantity is divisibility . ( . ) divisibility is capacity of division . ( ) what is only capable of division , is not actually divided . ( . ) quantity is not actually divided , and therefore hath no parts actually , to which in short , ( . ) that quantity is divisibility , is presumed ; but extension is before it , in nature , and our conception , and is the received notion , though perhaps impenetrability is the truest . however ( . ) even this supposeth parts , and those actual : for division is but solution of union . and union supposeth parts to be united . ( . ) what is only capable of division in a physiological and mechanical lense ; may , yea and ought , to be divided in a metaphysical . that is , they ought to be divers in their being , before they can be separate and distinct in their material bulk and quantity . for separability must presuppose diversity . ( . ) though quantity be not actually divided in one sense , 't is in another : every part having a distinct place and being of its own , though it doth not yet enjoy it separately and apart from others . but ( . ) it is pleaded against actual parts in quantity , that if we admit them , we cannot stop till we come down to indivisibles ; of which to suppose quantity composed , is said to be absurd and impossible . in return to which , i grant the inference , and have acknowledged the hypothesis of indivisibles to be full of seeming inconsistencies ; as is the other also : and therefore reckon both among the unconceiveables ; of which there can be no greater argument then their having driven so great and sagacious wits upon such an assertion , ( to which out of reverence to these celebrated persons , i shall not affix an epithete ) against the evidence of our senses , and the apprehension of all the world : that there are no parts in quantity . but ( . ) 't is no good method of reasoning , to deny what is plain and obvious , because we cannot conceive what is abstruse and difficult . and i think the assertor cannot answer it to his severer faculties , who affirms , there are no parts actually in quantity , against all his senses and the universal suffrage of mankinde ; because he cannot untie the difficulties that emerge from the supposal , that bodies are compounded of indivisibles ; a nice and in tricate theory . yea how will our author answer for the assertion to his master aristotle ? who saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . argumenta asserentium partes actu vel sensum a. citant , de quo nihil certius est quàm — pag. . i believe the assertors of actual parts may well appeal g. to the senses , notwithstanding what our author , and the learned knight have alledg'd to invalidate their evidence . for what though the sense discovers not the distinct term of the hand or finger ; can it not therefore discern them to be distant and distinguish't from the foot and toes ? and is not this enough to ground the belief of their diversity ? cannot we distinguish the motions of our parts ; though we know not their first springs and exact beginnings ? or discern a difference between the apple and the twig it grows on ; except we could see the point where one begins and the other endeth ? and whether an hypothesis is like to stand , that is put to such poor shifts to defend it self against the grossest of our faculties , i leave to be conjectured ? the supposition then of my doubts , being thus asserted and prov'd , we see yet but small hope to expect their solution . or , if this be an aenswer , t' is an evidence of our intellectual weakness , that all the world hath all this while been confounded about a plain problem upon a false supposal . the answer to my other difficulty about the union of the parts of quantity , is grounded also upon the presumption that there are actually none ; which i think i have sufficiently disprov'd . a. . caput sextum totum motui rotarum dedicatum est , neque si credimus authori de cujus — pag. . g. i conclude not only that no part can move , but the whole must ; but also that in the circular motion of a wheel , it seems that the motion of every part must be praerequired to it self , which i think is clear enough in the inference , though the proposition inferred , be impossible and absurd . and what inconvenience there is in this conclusion , that all the parts change their place at once , i have made sufficiently evident , in the place where the difficulty is urged . i confess in our authors hypothesis that there are actually no parts in bodies , the doubt is none ; and the whole matter will pass into words and air : but supposing that in quantity there are distinct realities , i think 't will be hard to dis-incumber this trite phaenomenon from the perplexities i mention'd . a. subjungit author secundam difficultatem , quomodo in rotâ circumvolutâ viciniores centro partes — pag. . g. i say again , however we find it in the event , while yet we consider the remote parts , moving swifter then the central ones , in the speculative notion , 't is hard to conceive , but that the line drawn from the centre to the circumference , should be inflected ; since one point of the line rests while the other moves , which in the theory seems to argue a disunion , and consequently an incurvation . so that though it be true in the experiment and event , yea and while we look upon the reason of the thing , in one position ; that the line would be made crooked , were it not for the unequal velocity of the parts ; yet it appears as clear to reason , in another posture , that this inequality should inferre it . for if b move swifter then a. a rests some instant while b is in motion . there 's no motion , but where there 's change of place , viz. of that place , in respect of which the body is said to move : the place in respect of which the body is said to move , is the next superficies that is considered as quiescen ' . and consequently it seems if b move any instant , in which a doth not : it is proportionably to its motion remov'd from that of a to which it was adjacent , and by consequence one would expect it should be disjoyn'd , or inflected . . jactatum tandem experimentum capite alto ingreditur a. author ille , prefatus audentisseme — pag. . since the publishing my discourse ; i have met an ingenious g. account , among some excellent geometricians of this probleme , which perhaps may satisfie the difficulty . the account briefly is , that in volutation the whole circumference moves by a motion both progressive and circular : but the centre by the progressive only . and consequently by how much the nearer the parts are to the centre the more they have of the progressive motion , and the less of circulation . so that the little wheel in our experiment draws , and hath so much more progression then the greater , as makes amends for it's defect of parts . which solution i 'le acknowledge perfect , if two things answer experiment , which i have not yet had occasion to make tryal of ; viz. ( . ) supposing both wheels to be denticulated , the little wheel will with it's teeth describe lines ; and the great one with it's make points . and ( . ) the disproportion being augmented , suppose to an hundred to one , the drawing of the lesser wheel will be exceeding palpable , and discoverable by the dullest sense . i say , if these circumstances answer experiment ; this difficulty is for ought i know well accounted for . and i need add no more to this confession : for our authors answer is either materially the same with this , or much less to purpose . actio septima . a. . in sequentibus aliquot capitulis satis exquisitè investigat causas errorum & ignorantiae — pag. . g. that the present age abounds with pratling ignorance , and vain shews of science falsly so called , will not be denyed by one , who hath directed some indeavours against them . and did i not deeply apprehend how much bold affirmers , and lazy inquisitors have prejudiced the advance of true and substantial knowledge , i had never engaged against dogmatizing and peripatetick philosophy . i wonder therefore that my learned assailant should object my omission of these causes of ignorance , which had the greatest interest in drawing from me the discourse he opposeth ; in which , i have largely insisted on those reasons of the defect of knowledge , viz. the depth of truth , the praecipitancy of mens understandings , and aversness to deep search , and close engagement of their mindes . besides which , i have professedly attacqued the disputing way of inquiry , and the verbal emptiness of the philosophy of the schools ; which how guilty it is of laying a foundation for sloath and loquacity , is particularly made appear in the discourse i directed against it . and while the schools of learning are under the regency of that kind of spirit , i fear little is to be expected from philosophy but bold talk ; and endless disputes and quarrels . for what else can be the fruit of a philosophy made up of occult qualities , sympathies , entelechia's , elements , celestial influences , and abundance other hard words and lazy generalities , but an arrest of all ingenious and practical indeavour ; and a wilderness of opinions instead of certainty and science ? but thanks be to providence , the world begins to emerge from this state of things , and to imploy it self in more deep and concerning disquisitions ; the issue of which , we hope , will be a philosophy fruitful in works , not in words , and such as may accommodate the use of life , both natural and moral . testis mihi esto author qui sub finem prioris capitis a. conqueritur de obscuritate speculationum , — pag . how justly the author is made an instance and witness g. of that , which , in the very discourse , by which only , i suppose , he is known to our philosopher , he hath so earnestly witnest against , which his spirit is so averse unto , which gave the occasion of the dispute between us ; i say , with what justice i am made an instance of that i have so professedly opposed , let it be judg'd by any , that is not unreasonably partial . 't is true , i complain of the obscurity of motion , gravity , light , colours , vision , and sounds ; and yet am not ignorant of the accounts sir k. digby , and other philosophers both antient and modern , have given of these phaenomena . my mind is anxious in speculation , and hath engag'd me to look as far , as my capacity could reach , into these theories ; i could never content my self with superficial put ▪ offs ; nor am i apt immediately to dispair , if i find not present satisfaction in my first enquiries . i have with my best diligence examined the most hopeful accounts are extant of these appearances , and yet must profess , that though the first sight of their respective solutions is pleasant and encouraging , and seems to promise my mind a requiem ; yet the longer i view the most likely of these hypotheses , the more liable and obnoxious i apprehend them . like pictures they will not bear to be look't upon , but at a distance , and when i come neer , i easily detect their imperfections . so that deep search discovers more ignorance , then it cures ; and confidence of science seems to be built upon a slight and superficial view of things ; as aristotle himself hath somewhere observed , and every one else may , that will but take notice , that young talking sophisters use to be far more assured of their assertions , then the deepest and most exercis'd philosophers . i 'le not disparage the account given by the learned sir k. digby of the mention'd phaenomena ; they are to be acknowledg'd pretty , and ingenious : but yet i cannot think , that 't is an argument of shallowness and impatience in enquiry , not fully to acquiesce in his hypotheses as infallible solutions . i suppose , that ingenious philosopher's own modesty and justice will not suffer him to own such a fondness for his notions , which i know he proposeth , but as likely and convenient supposals . i confess the most satisfaction . i any where meet with , is in the accounts of des-cartes , to whom sir k. digby himself bears this testimony , [ that he hath shown the world the way to science , ] and yet that great man , the excellence of whose philosophick genius and performances , the most improv'd spirits acknowledge , propounds his principles but in the modest way of hypotheses , and pretends not to have explain'd things as they are , but as they may be . and i believe our author will not reckon , him among the slight and talkative philosophers ; which is so far from being true , that such as love only to skim things , and have not the patience to keep their minds to a deep and close attention , cannot with any face as much as pretend acquaintance with his principles ; the comprehension of which , will require the most severe meditation , and fix't engagement of the mind , of any philosophy that is intelligible . not , that this excellent person affects obscurity either in matter , style , or method , being indeed very perspicuous in all of them : but because , his way is unusual , and his principles so coherent and closely pack't together , that the letting fall any link of connexion , will spoil the dependance , and hinder the understanding of the sequel . but i return from this excursion . if all then must be accounted impatient and shallow philosophers , who acquiesce not in the digbaean hypotheses ; all the learned cartesians , platonists , the whole stock of the ingenious recent philosophers ; yea and all , that follow not the way of sir k. digby , must unavoidably fall under the shame of these appellatives ; and perhaps that great person himself , who i dare say thinks not the light his philosophy hath afforded these perplexing speculations , to be so clear , as to admit of no shadow or obscurity . what ever haste therefore those discover , that will not be fully contented with the principles in which our philosopher is so well satisfied , i am confident that a little reflection will inform him , that he hath betrayed some , in his censure . a. . altera ab authore nostro neglecta ignorantiae causa mihi apparet esse quidam specialis — pag. . g. if any are so weak to affirm nothing can be demonstrated , against which any thing is , or can be objected ; let them answer for their assertion , i am not to account for the mistakes of others : and if there are those who will not admit of certainty or evidence in a conclusion that any hath made a doubt of , as our author intimates in the following paragraph , i have as little to answer for their scepticism and incredulity . for i never expect to see the world agree in any thing ; and therefore i assent where i see cause , and proportion the degree of my belief to that i have of evidence , without expecting the hopeless encouragement of a universal suffrage . though i confess , where deep and enquiring spirits differ , i judge i have reason to be cautious , and to suspect uncertainty . our author concludes with a reprehension of those endless talkers , the modern peripateticks , and their voluminous trifles , in which i dissent not from him : but pass from them to their master aristotle , whom our philosopher undertakes to vindicate from my reflections ; with what success , will be the subject of our next enquiry . actio octava . . et jam defunctus labore imperato videor , nisi a. summâ cum invidiâ aristotelem omnibus — pag. . our author in this paragraph is of a very different g. apprehension from all other aristotelians , if we 'l believe patritius , who saith , tritum vero jam est ac emnium aristotelicorum assensu comprobatum , nullam esse in aristotelicis libris scientificam demonstrationem . our philosopher then denies all science among the other antients , and the rest of the aristotelians allow none in aristotle . and if either be true , or both , 't is an evidence against dogmatizing , and fond doating upon authorities . but this action is professedly directed against gassendus ; some few of whose charges against aristotle our author indeavours to defeat and disable ; which should he succeed in according to his desires , yet the far greater , and perhaps the more formidable number stands unanswer'd . briefly then ( . ) he excepts at gassendus's animadverting on aristotle's manners , which he insinuates , to be more like a crafty orator , then a close and severe philosopher . to which in behalf of that excellent neoterick , it may be rejoyn'd , that if aristotle were vicious and immoral , there is much the less reason why we should revere his authority : for truth and vertue use to dwell together ; and the fear of the lord is the beginning of wisdom . vice drowns the noble idea's of the soul , and fills the mind with those foul steams of the body , which are prejudicial to deep and worthy enquiries ; so that with all good men and true philosophers 't will not a little detract from the credit of aristotle's intellectuals , if his morals are acknowledg'd , or can be prov'd obnoxious . whither the charge be just or not , our philosopher makes no enquiry , which seems a tacite confession of the truth of the accusation ; and then i think he hath no reason to object the impropriety . after this remark he descends ( . ) to some particular instances of gassendus's charge , to as many of which , as i am concern'd in , i make this brief rejoynder : ( . ) then aristotle expresly makes god an animal in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if he sayes otherwise elsewhere , 't is only an argument of the inconsistency of aristotle , not of the injustice of gassendus . ( . ) that god acts by necessity , aristotle clearly enough insinuates in that conclusion of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is testimony sufficient of the truth of my charge ; if gassendus accused him of more , 't is like he was able to make it good . ( . ) that aristotle made the world eternal , our author allows me . but that hereby he prov'd himself the chief of all the ethnick philosophers , i cannot grant him so easily . for ( . ) aristotle was not the first in this assertion , but had it from ocellus lucanus ; from whom also he transcrib'd the arguments he made use of to enforce it : which yet ( . ) are not such , as do so highly commend his philosophy , and faculty of arguing . he proves the world eternal then , because the heavens are so ; the assertion of which he attempts by five arguments : ( viz. ) ( . ) from the etymology of aether , viz. ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( . ) from the silence of history of any change or alteration they have undergone . ( . ) from the opinion of the antients . ( . ) from the freedom of the heavens from contrarieties . and ( . ) from the eternity of the caelestial motions , which he proves with the eternity of time by reasons borrow'd from ocellus , who was the author of the main argument . now whoever affirms that such arguings as these set aristotle so much above all the more antient philosophers , expresses more fondness towards him , then justice to his betters . nor can the comparative excellency of his wit be any more reasonably concluded from his allowing the natural inference of that acknowledg'd principle , ex nihilo nihil ; which doubtless the antients never meant in the general notion ; but in a sense which restrain'd it to natural productions ; else their assertion of the worlds beginning had been nonsense and a contradiction . ( . ) the learned gentleman admires that we should charge aristotle with the denyal of the resurrection of the dead ; which though he acknowledges truly to be alledg'd ; yet he thinks it unreasonably objected , since he supposes this doctrine only to be discoverable by supernatural light and revelation . to which briefly , ( . ) though the resurrection in the particular circumstances , in which christianity hath cloathed it , be not known by our unassisted faculties : yet that the soul shall live , and live united to a body in the other state , i think deducible from the meer principles of nature : for the philosophy of the soul informs us , that it uses matter in its highest operations , which is fair ground of conjecture , that it is alwayes united to some body . besides which , it may be argued from the analogy of nature , which useth not in other things , to leap from one extream unto another ; and therefore 't is not likely that the soul should pass immediately , from the state of so deep an immersion into the gross matter , to a condition of pure and absolute immateriality . to which may be further added , that , even according to the principles of aristotle , there can be no knowledge without sense , nor sense without corporeal motion , which cannot well be perceiv'd by a being that is perfectly disjoyn'd from matter . thus the principles of meer reason suggest , that the soul is joyn'd to another body after its discharge from the present . and ( . ) others of the greek philosophers , by the meer conduct of their natural light , believ'd it . the academicks generally assign'd bodies to those in the other state , and such as were suitable to the regions of the world they resided in ; and therefore plato calls some of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and to others of more inferior conditon he attributes aerial bodies ; yea , generally the greeks appointed corporeal punishments for the wicked in their acheron , and cocytus , as theocritus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and virgil , — aliis sub gurgite vasto infectum eluitur scelus , aut exuritur igni . but the business is so well known that it needs no testimony ; and from hence 't is sufficiently evident , that they believ'd the corporeal state of the soul after its separation from this terrestrial body : so that aristotle's assertion herein , is contrary both to the nature of the thing ; and the belief of most of his contemporaries ; nay , and the most venerable wisdom that was before him . and indeed , what he taught of the soul , is at the best uncertain , he using the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for the mind one while , and then for the phancy ; applying it now to angels , and at another time to brutes ; so that none of his sectators could ever tell what was his opinion about it . actio nona . . a gassendo ad authorem vanitatis dogmatizandi a. reducenda est oratio , postquam ipse — pag. . i think still that the many are very incompetent judges g. of worth either in men or things , admiring trash , and slighting excellence ; and 't is my lord bacon's observation , which signifies much more with me ; then all our learned author has said in this paragraph , viz. [ i hat the lowest vertues are the subjects of the peoples praise ; the middle ones of their admiration ; but the highest they have no sense at all of ; ] which saying holds not only in morals , but in all things else which the vulgar use to judge in : for they regard nothing , but what is like themselves , that is , mean and trivial ; which is the reason of that other observation of the same great philosopher ; that time , like a river bears up what is light and chaffy , while the things that are more weighty and considerable , are lost at the bottom . . subjicit author noster sapientium arbitrio peripateticam a. esse vocum nihil significantium — pag. . the excellent lord verulam is one of the wise men that g. hath reprov'd the arbritrariness of aristotle's words , particularly in his instauratio magna , where he saith , [ i cannot a little marvel at the philosopher aristotle , that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity , not only to frame new words of science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all antient wisdom ] and his affected obscurity , patricius sayes , all the greeks confessed ; yea themistius one of his great sectators sayes of him , se , veluti sepiam a●ramento suo sese occuluisse . and simplicius another , writes thus in his prolegomena to the praedicaments : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , besides which clear testimony the author of the censure prefixt to aristotle's works cited by gassendus after great praises of him , adds , ingenium viri tectum & callidum & metu●ns reprehensionis , quod inhibebat eum , ne proferret interdum aperiò , quae sentiret ; indè tam multa per ejus opera obscura & ambigua . and again the forementioned themistius , cum plerèque omnia aristotelis scripta quasi de composito caligine quadam offusa oppletaque habeantur : like unto which is that , which simplicius sayes of him : in acroamaticis datâ operâ obscurus esse voluit . we see then who the wise men are , that have accused the obscurity of the aristotelean processes . and that he was not so clear from aequivocatiens as our author suggests ; i 'le give but a double instance ( . ) of his applying the foremention'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to beasts and angels , to the imagination and abstracted intellect . and ( . ) his calling god , the quintessence , form , the soul , and motion , by the common appellative of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to all which might be added , that 't is an argument that the aristotelean method was not so clear and cautious , as our author would have it believed ; since his commentators have been infinitely divided about his meaning : and our author himself complains , that those of the latter schools have quite receded from his genuine doctrine , which either accuses their ignorance , or his obscurity . it appears then , that the wise men i mention to have accused aristotle's ambiguities and aequivocations were those that understood the aristotelean doctrines , being some of them his most genuine and ancient interpreters ; and not those who are so little acquainted with the matters of this philosophy , as to charge aristotle with the faults of , i know not what , apish peripateticks , and pyrrhonians . . prosequitur deinde actionem in peripateticos per a. dubia quaedam , quae illi clara non sunt , — pag. . in this paragraph i can understand nothing proved , but g. that a thing is possible to be before it is ; which possibility our author will have to be neither quid , nor quale , nor quantum : though not absolutely nothing . and if this learned gentleman take this posse of a thing for aristotle's materia prima , he mistakes the metaphysical , for the physical matter : or , if hereby he would only insinuate , that the first mater may be something , though neither quid , quale , nor quantum ; the instance is too short for his conclusion , since the posse of a thing before it is , is no real beeing , but an extrinsecal denomination , and a mode of our conception . . duae aliae voces molestae sunt sceptico nostro . hae a. sunt forma , & educi de potentiâ materiei ▪ — pag. . i call the aristotelean form an empty word , because i g. believe there 's nothing real that answers it ; all bodies are sufficiently distinguish'd by figure and position of parts , and i see no necessity to introduce such an arbitrary being ; however , if our author pleases , let him call that by which things are distinguish'd , their form : but if with aristotle he will make this a substantial principle of things ; i must be excused in a dissent to which my reason inforces me . and if his hypothesis be , that forms are accidents , ( as it seems , he supposes , by the instances alledged ) he recedes from his master aristotle , who expresly makes his form a substance . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a. . quoad posteriorem vocem , seu educi de potentiâ , videat vir ingeniosus an illud quod — pag. . g. that which was brought out of the dark , was in it . and caesar adds nothing to the marble , but the figure ; which is but a mode of matter , and answers not our case . but forms are not supposed praeexistent in the matter from whence they were educed ; and are substances really distinguisht from it : which i have prov'd from aristotle , and 't is the sense of his commentators , though it seems 't is not our authors . i inquire then , are these substantial forms produced of something , or of nothing ? an aristotelian will not allow the latter ; for this were against the maxime , ex nihilo nihil , and a creation . he affirms it produced of something then , and this something is potentia materia . i enquire further therefore , whether any thing of the form did actually praeexist in this power of the matter , or not ? if so , all possible forms reside in the subjects out of which they are educed , which is not consonant to their hypothesis . if not , the latter part of the disjunction is confest ; to avoid the shame of which , they fly to subjective dependence : and this is the potentia materiae , they talk of ; from which follow the absurdities i inferred . and this is the philosophy of the schools ; and this the peripateticism i charge : if our author saith , it is not according to aristotle's doctrine , let him dispute it out with aristotle's followers ; i charge it not on him , but on his schooles , in which all the world can justifie me . actio decima . . proximè sagittant duas aristotelis definitiones , a. utramque exactissimam & quicquam in — pag. . let 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie as our author would have it , g. viz. that which remains of an action , and is introduced by it . but i enquire then , ( . ) whether this interpretation be not arbitrary ? i 'me sure the word in this sense is so . ( . ) light is then something that remains of an operation : and this explication notably helps the perspicuity of the definition , which is as good a one as that was lately given of a thought in a university sermon , viz. a repentine prosiliency jumping into being . and if our author's description be all contain'd in actus perspicui ▪ i shall need no more proof of aristotle's obscurity in this ▪ instance . . idem est reliquae definitionis vitium . est autem a. ipsa definitio , motus est actus entis — pag. . g. if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the definition of motion signifie the mode , whereby the subject is affected in the end of action , according to our author ; with what congruity doth aristotle then apply it to the soul ? except he thought it a mode of matter , and then our philosopher had no reason to suppose he believed its immortality ; but whatever he concluded of this , he affirm'd it to be a substance , as in that passage , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and galen of him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a. . nova calumnia capite decimo septimo instruitur adversus aristotelem , tantò indigniùs — pag. . g. that aristotle was not so careful in distinguishing the signification of words , as is pretended , we have evinced already : and it appears clearly enough from the last instance ; in which things are coupled together by a common appellative that agree in nothing . and for the other mistake this period chargeth me with , i answer ; that if i take the scepticks for peripateticks , i hope our philosopher will henceforward absolve me from the so often objected scepticism . for according to our author my peripateticks are scepticks , and he knows how much friendship i have for those . but whether they are scepticks or not , they are aristotle's followers , if he have any in the schools of christendom ; and i leave them to justifie the title they have assumed . it sufficeth for me , that the genuine aristotelian method is a way of obscurity and dispute ; for which , besides the instances i have given , i have alledged the clear testimonies of his acknowledg'd sectators . and if the modern peripateticks can prove themselves aristotelians , we have a charge of sufficient aggravation from our author against them also . for thus he censures them under the name of scepticks [ scepticorum conatus esse vanissimos facile agnosco , illos parum de vocum usu sollicitos esse quo liberum sit iis quaslibet nugas vanitatis aut alterius lucri causa divendere , oratorculos vel magis rabulas , non philosophos esse , aristotelicorum nomen assumere ut corrumpant juventutem , & discipulos post sese abducant ; hos omnibus scientiae sectatoribus veluti pestem vitandos non inficior , neque quicquam ab iis solidi expectandum esse . ] . confirmant fictam adversus philosophum actionem a. ex ipsis philosophi dictis & gestis . — pag. . it seems it was not only the abstractedness of the matter , g. that rendred aristotle's physiology so difficult of comprehension , since our author confesseth that scarce any understand it , but who are assisted by the commentaries of the ancients . and certainly all the moderns had never receded so far from his sense , if his expressions had not been obscure and involved , as well as his matter difficult . and for that which the learned gentleman calls a more grievous and unhappy calumny : he confesseth it to be aristotle's instruction to perfect his scholars in the method of disputing , which is all i charge him with ; and i think ambiguity and obstinate garrulity in controversies , which the philosopher seems to advise them to , is a way of disputation that will not much commend the practisers , or instructor . a. . merebatur haec actio instantias ex opere . premit author tres ( ex fide credo gassendi — pag. . g. that i have done aristotle no wrong in the first instance alledged , will appear to any one that will take the pains to peruse the first chapter of his first de celo . for attempting there the proof of the perfection of bodies in order to the evincing that of the world , he doth it thus : the magnitude that is one way divisible , is a line ; two , is a superficies ; and what may three ways be divided , is a body . besides which there is no other magnitude , for this reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he proves by a saying of the pythagoreans , and this reason in nature ( if it be one ) viz. because the beginning , end , and middle , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also is confirmed by that i quoted from him : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and concludes , wherefore since all and perfect , differ not as to their form , body will be the only perfect magnitude , and that for the reason i assign'd from him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this is the genuine tenour of aristotle's argument , and our authors sense and interpretation seems to me , ( as i suppose 't will to any one else , who considerately compares it with the text ) forraign , arbitrary , and unnatural . as to the second instance , the learned gentleman hath mistaken the words of my charge . for if he pleaseth to look again into my book , he will find , that i object no such consequence to aristotle , as , that if there were more worlds then one , the moon would fall to the earth . but on the contrary , that the earth would fall to that other world. so that our authors justification of aristotle's argument , viz. that he fixt the centre of the world in the earth , is a strange one , and concludes the quite contrary to what aristotle would inferre . and why the moon should fall , upon the suppositions , that the earth is the centre , and that there are other worlds , ( as our author suggests ) rather then as things are at present , i cannot conjecture . my third instance of aristotle's trifling , and inconsequent arguings , was ; that he inferrs the heavens to move towards the west , because they move towards the more honourable , and before is more honourable then after . which is clearly his consequence in the . chapter of his second de coelo : for thus he argues , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , nature doth alwayes what is best . now saith he , as the motion which is upwards is more excellent then that which is downward , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; so in like manner is that which is forward more excellent then that which is backward . thence he concludes this the reason why the heavens move antrorsum . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . so that this seems the substance of the inference ; the heavens move by a motion that is natural , nature doth what is best , before is better then behind , and consequently that way the heavens move . the weakness of which argumentation consists in supposing , that those variable respects of before , and after , are realities in nature , which is a poor vulgar conceit , arising from the meere prejudice of misapplyed sensations , and very unbecomming a philosopher . and that this was the supposal of aristotle's argument , is confirmed by the margin of pacius's edition , in which he hath given this account of the contents of this period , coelum movetur ad anteriorem partem , quia hujusmodi motus est praestantior quam motus ad partem posteriorem . yea , when our author himself saith in the account he gives of the argument , motum naturalem esse ad honorabilius , unde clare sequitur occidentem esse nobiliorem oriente , he hath given me all i have contended for . actio undecima . a. indignatur sub finem capituli , quod doctorum opera ita in logicam , physicam , & metaphysicam — pag. . g. our author confesseth the schools neglect of the profitable doctrines of the heavens , meteors , minerals , and animals . but his scepticism , viz. the present peripateticism , is the cause . and this is that which i charge in the place animadverted on . so that i accuse not aristotle here ; but by name the modern retainers to the stagyrite : but whether the notionality and obscurity of the aristotelian method it self do not give occasion to the endless babble of those reprehended scepticks , i have already past my conjecture . a. . capite decimo octavo arguit doctrinam peripateticam , quasi ad phaenomena salvanda — pag. . g. i am not yet convinced , but that the aristotelian philosophy is insufficient for the solution of the phaenomena ; and yet question not aristotle's endeavours in that kind , but his success , upon what accounts my discourse declareth . i acknowledge the ingenuity of sir kenelm digbye's hypotheseis : but cannot yet understand that to have been aristotle's method . and i think our author is one of the first that asserts aristotle to have taught the corpuscularian and atomical philosophy ; for all the world hath hitherto taken his , to be the way of qualities and forms : yea aristotle mentions the atomical hypothesis of democritus in a way of dissent and profest opposition ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which last passage is the main substance of the corpuscularian philosophy . and elsewhere he recites the same hypothesis from leucippus and democritus , to the same purpose ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . urget adversarius systema coeli ab aristotele sequiùs a. esse constitutum . aperi accusationem . — pag. . i cannot see but that aristotle without optick instruments , g. the defect of which our author thinks excuseth his astronomy , might have discovered the motion of the earth , and fluidity of the heavens , as well as the more antient wisdom that believ'd them . he recites the former as the opinion of the pythagoreans , but could not overcome the prejudice of sense against it . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and in another place hath a profest redargution of this pythagorean opinion . as for the hypothesis of the fluidity of the heavens , 't is said in the jewish gemara , non orbes sed in coelo liquido moveri sidera , vetustissima haebreorum sententia est . and if aristotle had own'd a wit so much more excellent then others of the antients , as our author somewhere intimates , i see not why he might not have received these theories , as well as some of those , to whom optick tubes were as much strangers as to the contriver of the orbs. that the christian doctrine teacheth the motion of the heavens by intelligencies ▪ i cannot yet comprehend . and our author cannot think it so evident as to be believed without proof . our air according to the best computations can be made of the weight of the astmosphear , reacheth not much above miles upwards ; and the thin element there , is nothing to the sphear of fire supposed under the concave of the moon . a. . caput decimum nonum exagitat aristotelis doctrinam quasi infaecundam & sterilem . — pag. . g. if it belong not to philosophers to make experiments ; the noble lord bacon , des cartes , our illustrious royal society , and all experimental philosophers , have been needlesly imployed , and out of the way in their inquiries . and if we must use no experiments but those that are made by ordinary mechanicks without design of science , we shall never make any great progress into the knowledg of the magnalia ; which are not known by the common methods of action . he that will erect a lasting and stately fabrick , must have stones digged from the quarries , and not expect that the high-wayes should furnish him . what these common aristotelian principles are , without which no account can be given of natural effects , our author would do well to tell us . some principles indeed are necessary , and without them nothing can be inquired or determin'd : but such are common to all philosophers , and not peculiarly aristotle's . those that admit vacuities , think there can be no action without them ; holding it impossible there should be motion in absolute pleno ; and we have but our author 's bare assertion against their arguments . the cartesian vortices will serve to account for the phaenomena , and teach a way of theory not unserviceable to experiment . and for the salvo of aristotle's credit in those contradictory passages we meet in his writings ; viz. that they are the sayings of others , it seems to me an arbitrary shift and evasion : since we find them in his discourses without mention of any such matter . and if it be confest his custom to insert forrein doctrines and sayings into his works , without any intimation to distinguish them from his own ; who then can know when aristotle speaks himself , or when he speaks the words and sense of others ? . caput vicesimum manifestam reddit eminentiam a. peripatetices supra reliquas methodos — pag. . in that chapter i impugn not aristotle's philosophy , but g. had concluded my reflections in the former . causalities are first found out by concomitancy , as i intimated . and our experience of the dependence of one , and independence of the other shews which is the effect , and which the cause . definitions cannot discover causalities , for they are formed after the causality is known . so that in our authors instance , a man cannot know heat to be the atoms of fire , till the concomitancy be known , and the efficiency first presumed . the question is then , how heat is known to be the effect of fire ? our author answers by it's definition . but how came it to be so defined ? the answer must be , by the concomitancy and dependence ; for there 's nothing else assignable . but who is our authors peripatetick that concludes heat to be the atomes of fire ? and who that adorer of des-cartes that professeth scepticism ? a. . nihilo validius est argumentum à varietate opinionum philosophantium ad impossibilitatem — pag. ●● . g. i urge no such argument as the variety of philosophers opinions against the possibility of science , but from the notion of the dogmatists ; that demonstration supposeth certainty , as aristotle himself affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and certainty , impossibility of being otherwise ; as aristotle proceeds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i say , from hence i inferre 't is scarce modest to conclude any thing so a demonstration , and consequently , science in their notion ; the reason of my inference is fully declared in my discourse , the least view of which will be evidence enough of the wideness of this answer . sub finem capitis assumit nihil sciri posse nisi in primas a. causas resolvatur . unde diluxisse — pag. . when i affirm nothing can be known but by a resolution of things into their first causes , i mean the mechanical , not metaphysical : for i am of opinion with the excellent lord verulam ; that natural theory hath been very much hindered , and corrupted by metaphysical admixtures ; and this is a considerable fault of aristotle and his sectators . some general notices indeed are necessary to direct us in particular researches , but then they must be such as are concluded from induction in particulars ; and perhaps the instances our philosopher alledges to shew the necessity of metaphysicks to physiology will be better determin'd and accounted for in the way of experiment , then notion ; and i think our author 's metaphysical argument against a vacuum , ( the exploding of which he thinks so necessary for the establishment of a grounded philosophy ) i think , i say , his argument is a sophism , whose greatest force lies in the scarcity of words and defect in language : for this is the sum of the presumed demonstration . a vacuum is imaginary space ; imaginary space is nothing real , and those bodies are together , that have nothing between them : if the middle of which propositions be denyed , the argument comes to nothing ; and it may without absurdity be affirmed , that though space have not the nature of any of the beings that are in our praedicaments , yet 't is something real and not meerly imaginary : for the notion of space strikes so close to our minds , that we cannot conceive , but that 't is infinite and eternal , viz. is every where , and has been alwayes ; and therefore has a kind of being , that is no arbitrary figment ; though such a one , for the expressing of which our words are defective : we see then , how this pretended metaphysical impossibility may be answered ; for though supposing a vacuum there be nihil corporis between the bodies distant , yet is there aliquid spatii , which is sufficient to avoid the contradiction ; so that there may be a vacuum , notwithstanding our author's metaphysicks : yea , that aristotle himself asserted it , though i know he has opposed it also , is affirmed by aetius in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and there seems a strong necessity that there should be one , since it looks like an impossibility that there should be motion in pleno , or at least that any thing should be moved , but that all the world must be moved with it ; which i alledge only to shew , that metaphysicks may both ways be urged almost for any thing , and that all matters of notion are double-handed . and if we must determine nothing in physiology till metaphysicks have concluded it ; for ought i know we shall be at an eternal loss , and never fix on any thing . and by this method of mingling metaphysicks with natural philosophy , we shall fill plain theories with infinite intricacy and dispute . indeed , the impatient mind of man , as my lord bacon observes , is too apt to fly to general conclusions ; and more averse to the way of experiment and induction , which he thought the only method for the establishing of a solid and grounded theory : in which there is none has more happily succeeded then the philosopher des-cartes , whose philosophy is not a prescribed form how things should be made , as our author injuriously suggests , but professes it self only an hypothesis how they may be , and how by such principles the phaenomena may be salved : and the mechanicks of des-cartes are much more likely methods for the expounding nature , then the metaphysicks of aristotle ; which his own sectators have confest a meer rhapsody and confused ramble of they knew not what : yea , and 't is doubtful whither they are not the spurious issue of some more modern author , since diogenes laertius , who uses to give a full and faithful catalogue of the writings of philosophers , hath omitted this out of the works of aristotle , and philoponus affirms that book written by pasicrates rhodius . and if so , aristotle will lose the credit of demonstration in metaphysicks , with which our author hath invested him . . sequens capitulum laborat illo errore quem aristoteles a. saepius & detexit & confutavit : — pag . imperfect knowledge , according to the notion of the dogmatists , g. is not science , but opinion . scire , our author knows , is per causas scire ; and the conditions of those causes are that they be true , immediate , and necessary ; this is perfect knowledge , this is the science the dogmatist pretends to ; and to this according to his own maxime , every thing that is must contribute , as my discourse declareth . nor do our philosophers instances weaken my conclusion ; for they relate to another kind of knowledge , viz. that of the existence , not of the nature of things ; which latter is that which i am treating of ; and the knowledge of the being of a thing , as is its object , is a simple act , and consequently , to this , a single evidence is sufficient : but the comprehension of the nature , like the thing it self , is complex , and requires the knowledge of the things of which 't is constituted . what is added within this paragraph about two persons , seeing the same object in the same circumstances of sentiment , is our author 's bare assertion , against my proof of the contrary : and the last period is built upon the fore ▪ mentioned mistake of my design and intentions . a. . attamen academicus noster non dubitat generatim dogmaticè procedentibus affingere quaevis — pag. . g. the learned gentleman is now discended to my moral considerations against confident opinion : his reflections on the two first of which are built upon the supposal of my being a sceptick , which charge i think i 've sufficiently disabled . the truth of my third accusation is confest , but the guilt , not acknowledged ; since that which excites men to endless bawlings , and altercations ; schisms , heresies , and rebellions , by the vehemencies of dispute , is it seems with our author no more noxious and criminal , then the sun that stirrs men up to their work in the morning , by the importunity of it's beams . to the fourth absurdity of dogmatizing , our philosopher also gives a kind reception ; and it seems can be content with a confidence that accuseth all the world of ignorance . but whether be the more modest , the dogmatist that chargeth all that are not of his mind as ignorants ; or the sceptick that involves himself also in the common reproach , let them dispute it out when they will , i have nothing to do with their quarrel . in the last i 'me agreed with our author in the truth of his assertion , that science inlargeth mens mindes ; but cannot acknowledge the pertinency . for he could scarce have named things more opposite then confidence and science . science indeed inlargeth : but there 's a knowledge that only puffeth up . and i 'me of solomon's opinion , that 't is the fool that rageth and is confident . our author concludes as he began , in the supposition that i am a sceptick , and in this i 'me certain he is mistaken ; and will be dogmatical in affirming , that i am none . thus have i concluded my reply with a brevity , that shews i am not fond of an occasion of disputing ; and a carelesness , that will witness the little delight i have in matters that are not of very material speculation . the truth is , i dropt these reflections with such a dulness and inactivity of humor : that when my pen had traced one period , it was indifferent whether it began another . and i remember not an heat in the whole performance . for i felt no concernment to defend a discourse , which perhaps i had less kindness for then one , who hath professedly opposed it . not to mention the other reasons of my coldness and indifference in this action . and though i have still a quick resentment of the vanity of confiding in opinions , and possibly could with an humor brisk enough have reassailed the spirit of proud and unreasonable presumption ; yet i hitherto see no necessity of adding more to what i have said on the subject : and the reflections that engaged my pen , have made me but few new occasions . so that looking on my impugned discourse as too inconsiderable for a subject of publick vindication , and meeting but little opportunity for general and discursive notion in that which opposed it ; i was , i profess , sometimes more inclined to have throwne away these sheets among the rubbish of my papers , then to permit them thus to shew themselves to the publique . but my civility to this learned man obliged me to some answer , and whatever i apprehend of it otherwise , my laziness or my judgement made me think this sufficient for that service . what others will judge of it i am ignorant and careless , and am sufficiently satisfied with this , that i think it pertinent , and that i have finish't it . finis . a letter to a friend concerning aristotle . sir , i am very sensible how bold and adventurous a thing it is , for men of private condition to oppose what custom and great names have render'd venerable . and though i am still of opinion ▪ that a lazie acquiescence in the discoveries of any single author , how great and august soever , be a disadvantage to the encrease of knowledge ; yet i think it not wise in every man that hath only a naked reason to assist him , to confront such celebrated authorities . upon which account i acknowledge some juvenile heat and praecipitancy in those reflections your friendship has animadverted on . which , besides the pardon young pens may expect from those who are not unreasonably severe , hath a claim to your candour upon other considerations , which i intend this paper shall acquaint you with . in order to which , i suppose i need not tell you , that 't was no enmity to the learning of the universities , which with all duty i acknowledge , that drew my pen upon the sage their constitutions have made textuary . you know me too well , to think i designed any thing against the appointments and purposes of our pious ancestors in those venerable nurseries of piety and learning . i too well apprehend the danger of such innovations in an age so prone to fancies and dissettlements . in which nothing howsoever worthy and sacred , has been able to defend it self against the rude hands of proud , because successeful violence guilded with the plunder'd titles of reformation and religion . i 'le assure you then , though i had been so fond and unwise to engage in a design so unlikely in the undertaker ; i should never have been so disingenious and undutiful as to form a project so inconvenient and hazardous in the event , as to discourage young students from a method of studies the constitutions of the place they live in have enjoyn'd them : which indeed , considering the circumstances wherein things stand , 't is in a manner necessary they should be vers'd in ; since that philosophy is wrought into the current theology of europe : which therefore would not be comprehended without an insight into those hypotheses . nor can a man make a reasonable choice of his principles , except he have some knowledge of all that offer themselves candidates for his favour : and a wise man's belief is not chance , but election ; besides which , it enlarges and ennobles the minds of men to furnish them with variety of conception , and takes them off from doating on the beloved conclusions of their private and narrow principles . i blame not therefore the use of aristotle in the universities among the junior students , though i cannot approve the streightness and sloath of elder dijudicants , from whom more generous temper might be expected , then to sit down in a contented despair of any further progress into science , than has been made by their idolized sophy ; and depriving themselves and all this world of their liberty in philosophy by a sacramental adherence to an heathen authority . and i confess , 't was this pedantry and boyishness of humor that drew from me those reflections i directed against aristotle . which perhaps you 'le think not so censurable an action when you consider , ( . ) that whatever fondness these latter ages have express'd towards him , the pious fathers of the first and purest times of christianity , own'd for him no such regard and veneration ; but frequently reprehended him with a keen and impartial severity . and if we may believe the learned and industrious patricius [ multos ê patribus habuit oppugnatores , celebratorem neminem . ] clemens alex. epiphanius , and nazianzen accuse him of impiety against god and religion ; lactantius of contradiction and inconsistency ; justin martyr professedly wrote a book against him ; s. basil reprehends his ethicks ; and origen set's epicurus before him . theodoret accuses him for denying providence below the moon . and 't is notoriously known that platonism was the philosophy of the first christian centuries when aristotle was not much regarded . yea as the excellent gassendus has observ'd , in the flourishing times of rome and athens , the academicks and stoicks ; and laertius sayes in his , the epicureans , were the only valued sects of philosophers , while the peripateticks were but little accounted of . yea cicero , pliny , quintilian that had otherwise the greatest esteem of aristotle , prefer'd plato before him . and i find ( . ) not that aristotle had such an excess of respect and worship , till after barbarism had overrun rome and athens . for when the empire began to emerge from that black night of ignorance which had with it's rude conquerours invaded it ; averroes and some others of the arabian interpreters chanced to light upon the remains of this philosopher , which they translated into the language of the moors , and as 't is usual for men to dignifie what they have bestowed pains upon , especially if it be rare and new ; these first interpreters would not fail to celebrate the author , that they might reconcile credit to their writings upon him , and recommend their own elucubrations . and therefore aristotle shall be the prime of philosophers , that they may be next him . insomuch that his redeemer averroes arriv'd to that vanity in commendation as to affirm , that aristotle invented logick , divinity and physiology ; never spoke any thing without strong reason , and that there was nothing defective or superfluous in his writings , but all things in the most full and perfect order ; and that no errour had been found in his composures : which commendations coming down to the latines , with the books they celebrated , and they having no other philosopher , but aristotle , nor interpreter , but his idolater averroes , greedily swallowed both the books and the character together , making sacred text of the writings of the author , and axioms of the commendations of the interpreter . for the mighty cry of the first admirers , assisted by the ignorance of those times , and the natural temper that is in men to revere the first author that pleases them , bore down others to an assent to those applauses ; and being at last by the schoolmen mingled with divinity , and by others adopted into other faculties , grew in a manner sacred and universal . aristotle became an oracle , his placits were enacted laws , and his dixit an unquestionable argument ; and thus was the reasoning world despoil'd of that freedom which is the priviledge of humane nature , and subjected to a forreign authority , that could lay no reasonable claim to their respect or observance . so that the esteem of the aristotelean philosophy having been so small in the best and wisest times , and having sprung up to this bulk by accidental occasions in the latter and less cultivated ages , i cannot yet think it so piacular to question the dueness of those superlative praises are bestowed upon him in these , wherein mankind seems awaken'd to enquire into the world of things , not of words , and is resolv'd no longer to court names , but nature . and you 'le see less reason for your displeasure against that engagement of mine , when i shall have told you thirdly , that 't is very doubtful whether those writings that go under his name , are aristotle's or not . for besides that the antient greek interpreters have alwayes made this quaery in the beginning of their expositions , whether the books they were about to expound were aristotle 's ; besides this suspicion i say , several very learned men have professedly undertook to prove the uncertainty of all his writings , among whom are picus , patricius , and gassendus , and from these author's i 'le give you a brief account of this matter . ( first ) then theophrastus , aristotle's scholar , wrote several things that had the same title with those we presume are his : and who then can tell whether they were wrote by aristotle , or theophrastus ? to say aristotle's works are discoverable by their style , is to presume the question , that some are known to be his : which being supposed , the enquirer may notwithstanding be deceived in his judgment , since learned men in the same age are often delighted with the same mode of writing , especially the scholars of any great author use to imitate the way and method of their masters ; yea and diversity of age and matter make's them sometimes differ more in their styles from themselves , than others do from them . at least ( secondly ) theophrastus had great advantages of adding , altering , and mingling aristotle's works as he pleased : he himself putting forth few books while he lived , but leaving them in the hands of this his great scholar and sectator . and 't is the observation of strabo and plutarch that the first peripateticks had few or none of aristotle's writings among them ; upon which account impostures and forgeries might be more securely practiced . besides which , ( thirdly ) theophrastus himself did not publish these writings , but left them in the hands of neleus , as is testified by plutarch and athenaeus . now this neleus of two copies which he kept of aristotle's writings , sold one to ptolomy for the famous library at alexandria ; the other he kept himself and left with his posterity ; who , as strabo testifies , diligent search being made by the attalick kings after books to furnish the library at pergamus , hid them in a pit underground about . years till they were almost spoil'd with moths and rotteness , and after sold them to apellicon tejus an athenian , who got them transcribed and supplyed in those places in which they had been impair'd by their concealment , but as strabo says arbitrarily , and at a venture ; insomuch that the transcripts were full of errour and incurable defects . at length sylla taking athens , this library of apellicon , in which were the writings of aristotle , was transported to rome , as is testified by plutarch , and there fell into the hands of tyrannio grammaticus under whom they contracted new and worse errors . from him they pass to andronicus rhodius who distributed them into the order we now find them in , adding and altering as he pleased . after him , picus says the contending peripateticks still mended what they understood not ; and every man as he fancyed . all which circumstances are more than suspicions of much forgery and corruption in aristotle's composures . yea , if that be true which marius nizolius asserts , and largely endeavours to prove , that most of the books of aristotle that are extant are but epitomes and compendiums drawn up by nicomachus of his father's writings , 't will be another evidence against their authority . to which i add ( . ) what has been observed by the forecited learned men , that diogenes laertius , who lived when most of the antient authors might be seen , who was very industrious in the search of antiquities , and who perused above two hundred authors in order to the compiling of his history , forty of which had professedly wrote the lives of philosophers ; yet this diogenes hath omitted all we have now extant of aristotle's works except nine , viz. duo de plantis , physiogn . categoriae , de interpret . mechan . contra xenophanem ; contra gorgiam & zenonem . yea and patricius gives sufficient reason why all these but the four last should be suspected also . now why so many forged pieces were ascribed to aristotle , three reasons are given by ammonius . viz. ( . ) because there were several others of his name ( diogenes laertius sayes eight ) by reason of which 't was an easie matter to shelter the mean and contemptible products of others under his name and authority . ( . ) because several of his disciples wrote books on the same subjects , and with the same titles with their master . ( . ) there being great rewards propos'd by ptolomy to those that brought in any considerable author 's to his library , several out of a covetous design to enrich themselves by the forgery , inscribed other writings by the name of this philosopher , to render them more currant and vendible . so that there were . books of analyticks ascribed to aristotle in ptolomy's library , when as he wrote but four ; and two de categoriis , when he wrote but one . it appears then that the books of aristotle are of very uncertain and suspicious authority . yea , and though his writings were never so unsuspect and certain in the main , yet no man can be assur'd in particular what is aristotle's in them and what not , they having met with such hard usage as we mention'd . yea , the books themselves give notorious evidence of those abuses in the confusions , inversions , contradictions , tautologies , defects , abruptness , and other gross imperfections they abound with . upon the account of which gassendus sayes , he thought aristotle a greater man than to be the author of such mean and obnoxious writings . but however , whether these are genuine or not , they contain the aristotelianism of the present peripatetick schools , and if those works are none of his , there 's less reason why we should fall down before the ΕΦΗ of an uncertain authority . besides which , i must confess fourthly , that the reverence i have to the more antient sages , which aristotle frequently traduced , and unworthily abused , animated me to more severity against him , than upon another occasion had perhaps been so pardonable and becoming . and that aristotle dealt so invidiously with the philosophers were before him , will not need much proof to one , that is but indifferently acquainted with his writings . the great lord bacon hath particularly charged him with this unworthiness in his excellent advancement of learning , wherein he says , that [ aristotle as though he had been of the race of the ottomans , thought he could not reign , except the first thing he did , he kill'd all his brethren . ] and elsewhere in the same discourse [ i cannot a little marvel at the philosopher aristotle , that proceeded in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity , undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all the antient wisdom , insomuch that he never names any antient author , but to confute or reprove him ] consonant whereunto are the observations of patricius that he carpes at the antients by name in more than places , and without name in more than . he reprehends philosophers of worth , besides poets and rhetoricians , and most of all spent his spleen upon his excellent and venerable master plato , whom in above places by name he hath contradicted . and as plato opposed all the sophisters , and but two philosophers , viz. anaxagoras and heraclitus ; so aristotle that he might be opposite to him in , this also , oppos'd all the philosophers , and but two sophisters viz. protagoras and gorgias . yea , and not only assaulted them with his arguments , but persecuted them by his reproaches , calling the philosophy of empedocles , and all the antients stuttering ; xenocrates , and melissus , rusticks ; anaxagoras , simple and inconsiderate ; yea , and all of them in an heap , as patricius testifies , gross ignorants , fools and madmen . how fit then think you is it that the world should now be obliged to so tender and awful a respect to the libeller of the most venerable sages , as that it should be a crime next heresie to endeavour , though never so modestly , to weaken his textuary and usurp'd authority ? and how just think you is your charge of my reflections as a piece of irreverence to antiquity ? when my veneration of the greater antiquity extorted from me those strictures against the proud antagonist of all the ancient and more valuable wisdom ? of whose unworthy and disingenuous usage of the elder philosophers , i 'le present you among many with some particular instances , that most easily offer themselves to my pen and memory . briefly then , he accuses zeno for making god a body , because he call'd him a sphear in a metaphor . he sayes of parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he made hot and cold principles , and yet in two long chapters falls upon him as making all things one . these two principles of parmenides aristotle interprets of fire and earth , when 't is clear enough that the philosophers meant light and darkness . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he says of parmenides and melissus , that they denyed all generation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet in another place , having it seems forgot this charge , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he accused empedocles for constituting the soul of elements , for which he took occasion from that verse of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when as the elements he means are not corporeal , as aristotle would suggest to force an absurdity on that philosopher , but intellectual ones , as simplicius one of his own interpreters expounds empedocles . he blasphemes anaxagoras's mind in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and yet after gives excellent attributes to that mind of anaxagoras . he accuses the pythagoreans of making numbers the principles of things ; when as 't is evident that numbers were intended by pythagoras , but as symbolical representations of them , which serv'd him but for the same purposes the hieroglyphicks did the aegyptians , from whom that sage had his method of philosophy ; as philoponus himself confessingly affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ but of all the philosophers he quarrel'd with , there was none he pursued with so much gall and animosity , as his incomparable master plato , whom he not only insolently opposed and ingratefully thrust out of his school while he lived , but with a severe pen persecuted his very ashes , and followed him with injuries beyond the grave . and all for no other reason , but because that venerable old man reproved his evil life , and preferr'd the better deserving speucippus , xenocrates , and amyclas before him . the particular instances of those ungrateful abuses are too numerous to be insisted on ; therefore i shall only pitch my observation on plato's doctrine of idea's which aristotle in all his books inveigh's against , and hath render'd ridiculous among his credulous sectators . concerning which you may please to take notice , that this opinion was not originally plato's , though aristotle charge him as the author , but was the doctrine of the pythagoreans , aegyptians and chaldaeans . we have it in timaeus locrus the pythagorean , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and before him trismegistus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but originally this doctrine of idea's was chaldaean , for which i offer you the ensuing testimonies which will also clear the antient sense and nature of those idea's . we have them then in the oracles of zoroaster , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and these idea's , by which we may understand their natures , he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . briefly then , the chaldaeans by their idea's understood the forms of things as they were in their archetypa mente , which answers to the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the christian trinity . they called them also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as they were in this primaeval mind . in the soul of the world they call'd them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in nature , they were seeds ; and in matter , forms . thus therefore ; in the seeds of all things there is heat ; in that , spirit ; in this , nature which depends on the universal soul , and that on god , in whom 't is jynx or idea . this was the chaldaean notion of idea's , and this was the platonical ; which how unlike it is the chimaera of universal abstract notions , aristotle and his peripateticks falsly affix upon the divine philosopher , is of easie apprehension . so that aristotle in his impugnation of the platonical idea's , fights against notions of his own creating , and no assertions of his venerable master . and i must confess the reverence i have for that excellent sage and his philosophy , lessens my esteem of aristotle , and his . which i cannot without some regret behold so sacred in christendom , while the incomparable prince of philosophers with his divine theories seems to be neglected and forgotten ; especially since this latter is so consonant in his dogmata to the principles of christianity , and the other so opposite to most the articles of our belief in his . of which patricius has presented the world with a large catalogue of instances , and i 'le offer you a few of them . plato affirms god to be one ; aristotle make's one first mover , but other gods movers of the orbs. plato own 's god under the notion of the father ; which aristotle no where acknowledges . plato , that god is the supreme wisdom ; aristotle , that he is ignorant of particulars . plato , that god is omnipotent ; aristotle , that he can do nothing , but move the heavens . plato , that god made the world ; aristotle , that the world is uncreated , and eternal . plato , that god made the world of nothing ; aristotle , that of nothing is made nothing . plato that god is free from all body ; aristotle , that he 's tyed to the first orb. plato , that providence is over all things ; aristotle , that 't is confin'd to the heavens . plato , that god governs the universe ; aristotle , not god , but nature , chance , and fortune . plato , that god created the soul ; aristotle , that 't is the act of the body . plato , that the happiness of a man is in his likeness to god ; aristotle , that a man is happy in the goods of fortune . plato , there will come one that shall teach us to pray , a prophecy of our saviour . aristotle , prayers are in vain , because god knows not particulars . plato , that after death good men shall enjoy god. aristotle , no pleasure after this life . plato , the souls of the wicked shall be punish't after death ; aristotle , they shall perish with the body , and suffer nothing . plato , the dead shall rise . aristotle , à privatione ad habitum . plato that the soul and body of the wicked shall be punish't in hell. aristotle knew no such matter . these are some instances among many , of the divine temper of the platonical philosophy , and the impiety of the aristotelian ; for a further account of which i referre you to the fore-mentioned learned author . so that i doubt not , but when you have duly consider'd the matter , you 'l judge those reflections the effects of a laudable zeal for antiquity , and what is more sacred , truth . to which i adde ( . ) that the aristotelian was not the antient philosophy , but the corpuscularian and atomical , which to the great hinderance of science lay long buryed in neglect and oblivion , but hath in these latter ages been again restored to the light and it 's deserv'd repute and value . and that the atomical hypothesis was the first and most antient , of which there is any memory in physiology , is notoriously known to all , that know the age of democritus ; who was one of those four sages that brought the learning of the aegyptians among the grecians ; orpheus bringing in theology ; thales the mathematicks ; our democritus , natural philosophy ; and pythagoras all three , with the moral . now the learning of the aegyptians came from the chaldaeans , and was convey'd to them , as some learned men affirm , by abraham , who was of kin to zoroaster the great chaldaean legislatour and philosopher ; which zoroaster lived years after the flood , and as pliny saith , was the schollar of azonaces , whom antiquáries affirm to have been of the schoole of sem and heber . the atomical philosophy then coming from the aegyptians to the grecians , and from the chaldaeans to them ; is without doubt of the most venerable antiquity ; and the aristotelian a very novelty in compare with that grey hypothesis : at the best , a degeneracy and corruption of the most antient wisdom . yea , and 't is the complaint of several learned men , which whoever knows any thing of aristotles sectators will justifie , that the modern peripateticks have as farr receded from his sense , as from the truth of things . for it hath been the fashion of his interpreters both greeks , latins , and arabians , to form whole doctrines from catches and scraps of sentences , without attending to the analogy and main scope of his writings . from which method of interpretation hath proceeded a spurious medly of nice , spinose and useless notions , that is but little of kin to aristotle or nature . so that whatever of genuine aristotelian is in those works that bare his name ; there 's little of aristotle in his schools . and 't is no indignity to antiquity or the stagyrite , to oppose the corruption and abuse of both . and to endeavour to restore the antients to their just estimation , which hath been usurp't from them by a modern and spurious learning . and though i grudge not aristotles esteem while it is not prejudicial to the respect we owe his betters ; yet i regret that excessive and undue veneration which fondly sets him so much above all the more valuable antients . and i 'le propose it to your judgment ( . ) whether 't was likely that aristotle was so farr beyond other philosophers in his intellectuals , as these latter ages have presumed , when he came so farr short of most of them in his morals ? i believe there 's a near connection between truth and goodness , and there 's a taste in the soul whereby it relisheth truth , as the palate meats ; which sence and gusto vice depraves and vi●iates . so that though witt may make the vicious , cunning sophisters , and subtile atheists , yet i doubt seldom the best and most exercised philosophers . now what the ancients have related of aristotle's manners , i 'le present you in an instance or two , and dismiss this displeasing subject . suidas then accuseth him of sodomy with hermias , aeschriones , palephatus , and abydenus ; st. jerome of drunkenness : lycus and aristocles , two of his own disciples , charge him with avarice : aelian of cavelling , loquacity , scoffing , and ingratitude ; of which last , there are two notorious instances in his usage of alexander and plato . how he used his venerable master , i have already noted . and what return he made to the kindnesses of his glorious schollar , you may see in these few words from arrian , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and to sum up much in one , timaeus the historian in suidas gives this account of him , that he was forward , impudent , saucy , unwise , indocile , and hatefully glutinous , or in the words of suidas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but to conclude these ungrateful remarques , plutarch makes him a traytor to alexander ; and eusebius to his countrey . and being at last banisht for his impiety , he made himself away by poyson , according to the testimony of laertius . thus then you see an ill character of aristotle's manners from disinteressed authorities ; on consideration of which , 't is to me matter of some wonder , that the memory of the vitious should be so blessed , and his authority so irreproveable . unto all which may be added . ( lastly ) that there is less reason that aristotle should be valued beyond all others that have had a name for wisdom , if we consider , that he borrowed almost all he writ from the more antient philosophers , though he had not the ingenuity and gratitude to acknowledge it : particularly from architas and ocellus , transcribing them word for word in many places , especially the latter ; and yet never as much as mention'd him in all his writings . and i think you ascribe more to aristotle then is his due when you call him the inventour of sciences ; for we owe that honour to others of the antients ; particularly to zeno the invention of logick , and of rhetorick to empedocles , according to his own testimony in laertius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of zeno ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . perictione a pythagorean woman writ metaphysicks ▪ before aristotle . stobaeus in his morals hath a fragment of her book de sapientia , of which she declares the subject in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . besides whom plato , parmenides , xenophanes , pythagoras , the aegyptians , trismegistus , and before all , the chaldeans writ of this science , long before aristotle was extant . and , democritus brought natural philosophy , as did pythagoras the moral , from the aegyptians , before the stagyritè was an infant . and for the mathematicks , they were studied in aegypt , before he was born in greece , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is his own confession . thus then you see sir , we are not so much beholden to aristotle , as most men have presumed . and perhaps by this time you may be convinc't that we have no reason so passionately to revere his authority . but whither you are , or not , i am not much concerned , being willing to leave all men to the liberty of their own sentiments . it sufficeth for my purpose , that i have given you some of the grounds of my dissatisfactions in aristotle and his hypotheseis . if you are convinced , at the bar of your judgment , i am justified ; if you are not , your dissent i presume is rational , and when i have seen your reasons , i shall either be more disposed to your apprehensions , or be more confirm'd in the justice and reasonableness of mine own . to which i 'le add no more , but my desires of your pardon of this voluminous trouble , and acceptance of the affectionate regards of sir , your humble servant j. g. finis . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with itself, and with the articles of the christian faith. stillingfleet, edward, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with itself, and with the articles of the christian faith. stillingfleet, edward, - . , [ ] p. printed by j.h. for henry mortlock ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. knowledge, theory of. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter ; wherein his notion of ideas is prov'd to be inconsistent with it self , and with the articles of the christian faith . london , printed by i. h. for henry mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard , mdcxcviii . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. locke's second letter , &c. sir , i was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your second letter , considering the shortness of the answer contained in it : but it put me in mind of the springs of modená mention'd by ramazzini , which rise up with such a plenty of water upon opening a passage , that the undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it . i see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a person of such a fruitfull invention to write ; for letters become books , and small books will soon rise to great volumes , if no way be found to give a check to such an ebullition of thoughts , as some men find within themselves . i was apt to think the best way were , to let nature spend it self ; and although those who write out of their own thoughts do it with as much ease and pleasure as a spider spins his web ; yet the world soon grows weary of controversies , especially when they are about personal matters : which made me wonder that one who understands the world so well , should spend above fifty pages of a letter in renewing and enlarging a complaint wholly concerning himself . suppose i had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your words and anothers intentions together ; had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self , to have declared to the world , that you owned the doctrine of the trinity , as it hath been received in the christian church , and is by ours in the creeds and articles of religion ? this had stopt the mouths of the clamorous , and had removed the suspicions of the doubtfull , and would have given full satisfaction to all reasonable men. but when you so carefully avoid doing this , all other arts and evasions do but leave the matter more suspicious among the most intelligent and impartial readers . this i mention , not that you need be afraid of the inquisition , or that i intend to charge you with heresie in denying the trinity ; but my present design is to shew , that your mind is so intangled and set fast by your notion of ideas , that you know not what to make of the doctrines of the trinity and incarnation ; because you can have no idea of one nature and three persons , nor of two natures and one person ; as will fully appear afterwards . and therefore , out of regard to publick service , in order to the preventing a growing mischief , i shall endeavour to lay open the ill consequences of your way of ideas with respect to the articles of the christian faith. but i shall wave all unnecessary repetitions , and come immediately to the matter of your complaint as it is renewed in this second letter , which i shall briefly answer , before i proceed to that which i chiefly design . your complaint , you say , was , that you were brought into a controversie wherein you had never meddled , nor knew how you came to be concerned in . i told you , it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of christianity went upon your grounds , and made use of your words ; although i declared withall , that they were used to other purposes than you intended them ; and i confess'd , that the reason why i quoted your words so much , was , because i found your notion as to certainty by ideas , was the main foundation on which the author of christianity not mysterious went ; and that he had nothing that look'd like reason , if that principle were removed ; which made me so much endeavour to shew , that it would not hold , and so i supposed the reason why i so often mention'd your words , was no longer a riddle to you . these passages you set down in your second letter ; but you say , all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter . whether it doth or not , i am content to leave it to any indifferent reader ; and there it must rest at last , although you should write volumes about it . but for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied ? you tell us , it is , that the author mentioned , went upon this ground , that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty , but that is not your notion as to certainty by ideas ; which is , that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , such as we have , whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no : and you say , that you have no notions of certainty more than this one . this is no more than what you had said before in your former letter , and i took particular notice of it , and gave three several answers to it , which i shall here lay together and defend , because you seem to think i had not answered it . ( . ) that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas bid much fairer for certainty than you do ( according to this answer ) and speak more agreeably to your original grounds of certainty . for it is a very wonderfull thing in point of reason , for you to pretend to certainty by ideas , and not allow those ideas to be clear and distinct ? you say , the certainty lies in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas : how can i clearly perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , if i have not clear and distinct ideas ? for how is it possible for a man's mind to know whether they agree or disagree , if there be some parts of those ideas , we have only general and confused ideas of ? and therefore i had great reason to say , that if certainty be placed in ideas we must have clear and distinct ideas . you may as well say , a man may be certain of the agreement and disagreement of colours in a confused or uncertain light. for so much as the idea fails of clearness and distinctness , so much it fails of that evidence which it is necessary to judge by . where-ever there is obscurity , confusion or imperfection in the ideas , there must be so much uncertainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of them . and to pretend to certainty by ideas without pretending to clear and distinct ideas , is to judge without evidence , and to determine a thing to be certainly true , when we cannot know whether it be so or not ; for how can you be sure that your ideas agree with the reality of things ( wherein you place the certainty of knowledge ) if there be no such ideas of those things , that you can perceive their true nature , and their difference from all others ? for therein you will not deny that the notion of clear and distinct ideas consists . but you say more than once or twice , or ten times , that i blame those who place certainty in clear and distinct ideas , but you do it not , and yet i bring you in among them ; which is the thing you so much complain of . i will give you a full answer to this complaint . i do not deny , but the first occasion of my charge was the supposition that clear and distinct ideas were necessary in order to any certainty in our minds , and that the only way to attain this certainty was by comparing these ideas together : but to prove this , your words were produced , and your principles of certainty laid down , and none else ; and i could not imagine that you could place certainty in the agreement or disagreement of ideas , and yet not suppose those ideas to be clear and distinct . but finding your self joyned in such company which you did not desire to be seen in , you rather chose to distinguish your self from them , by denying clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty . but it must be here observed , that our debate about certainty by ideas is not about any other certainty , but about certainty of knowledge with regard to some proposition , whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement and disagreement . for your words are , certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in any proposition . this we usually call knowing or being certain of the truth of any proposition . so that a proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement , is the proper object of this certainty . and therefore this certainty is to be distinguished , . from a certainty by sense ; or that by which we come to know the existence of external objects . for you say , that the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation . for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him . but that this is quite another certainty from that of ideas , appears from these following words of yours ; for the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history . therefore this is a very different certainty from that of ideas . . from a certainty by reason ; when from the existence of some things evident to sense , we inferr the existence of another thing not evident to sense : as to take your own words in your former letter . as to the existence of bodily substances , i know by my senses , that something extended , solid and figur'd does exist ; for my senses are the utmost evidence and certainty i have of the existence of extended , solid , figured things . these modes being then known to exist by our senses , the existence of them ( which i cannot conceive can subsist without something to support them ) makes me see the connection of those ideas with a support , or as it is called , subject of inhesion , and so consequently the connection of that support , which cannot be nothing , with existence . granting all this , yet it by no means proves that we can have a certainty in the way of ideas , where the ideas themselves by which we have the certainty are obscure and confused ; but that supposing the ideas we have by our senses to be true , we may from them inferr the existence of something of which we have only an obscure and confused idea ; which is the case of bodily substances . of which i grant you may come to a certain knowledge , but not a certainty by ideas , but by a consequence of reason deduced from the ideas we have by our senses . and this can never prove that we may have a certainty by ideas , where the ideas themselves are not clear and distinct : for there is a great difference between having a certainty by reason , of a thing whose idea is confused and obscure , and having that certainty by obscure and confused ideas . for in this case the idea of substance is obscure : but the way of certainty is by a clear deduction of reason from the ideas we have by our senses . . from a certainty by remembrance ; by which i mean the remaining impression on the mind of an original certainty by demonstration . as to use your own instance ; a man hath found by mathematical evidence , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ; the perception of this at the time of the demonstration was clear and distinct ; but afterwards , the method of demonstration may have slipt out of his mind , yet he retains a certainty of the thing by virtue of that demonstration ; but this is not a clear perception , as you would have it , where the ideas are confused ; but it is an obscure remembrance of the grounds of that certainty which he once had ; and hath never seen any reason since , why he should call it in question . these things then being put out of the question , which belong not to it ; the question truly stated is , whether we can attain to any certainty of knowledge as to the truth of a proposition in the way of ideas , where the ideas themselves by which we come to that certainty be not clear and distinct ? another thing to be observed is , that des cartes who first started this way of certainty by ideas , thought it a ridiculous thing in any to pretend to it , unless their ideas were clear and distinct . he saith , that when we assent without clear perception , we are either deceived , or fall into truth by chance , but we do often err when we think we have clear perception , and have not . but to a certain iudgment , it is necessary that our perception be not only clear but distinct : that is , when the thing not only lies open to our view , but we see it on all sides , and so can distinguish it from all other things . you agree with him in placing certainty in ideas , but you differ from him in that which alone made his opinion reasonable , viz. that these ideas be clear and distinct . if it were possible for us to come to clear and distinct ideas of the things we pretend to be certain of , it were a just pretence to certainty in that way ; but since we cannot come at them , we must be content with such measures of knowledge as we are capable of . but for you to talk so much of certainty by ideas , and yet to allow obscurity and imperfection in those ideas , is like a purblind man who would pretend to judge exactly of the differences of colours in the twilight , because another pretended to do it at noon-day : or like one , who would undertake to shew certainly the agreement or disagreement of two men at a distance from him , in their habit , features , and stature , and yet at the same time confess that he could not clearly distinguish one from the other . so that if i did think you spake more consistently to your hypothesis , than you say now that you did , i hope you will forgive me that wrong , if at least it be a wrong to you ; for after all , there are several passages in your essay , which suppose clear ideas necessary to certainty . for in one place you say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know . what is this but to make clear ideas necessary to certainty ? in another , yet more plainly , that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain is the clearness of our ideas . in a third place you say ; for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas ; where they are either imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect or clear knowledge . in a fourth ; but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear and certain knowledge , because as far as any ideas are confused or obscure , the mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree . what can be more express ? and yet you have complained of me in near twenty places of your second letter for charging this upon you . by this the world will judge of the justice of your complaints , and the consistency of your notion of ideas . ( . ) i answer'd , that it is very possible the authour of christianity not mysterious , might mistake or misapply your notions , but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same , and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given you this occasion for the explaining your meaning , and for the vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend he had charged you with . here you enter upon a fresh complaint , and say ▪ this can be no reason why you should be joyned with a man that had misapplied your notions ; and that no man hath so much mistaken and misapplied your notions as my self , and therefore you ought rather to be joyned with me . but is this fair and ingenuous dealing , to represent this matter so , as if i had joined you together , because he had misunderstood and misapplied your notions ? can you think me a man of so little sense to make that the reason of it ? no , sir , it was because he assigned no other grounds but yours , and that in your own words , however now you would divert the meaning of them another way . and although i was willing to allow you all reasonable occasions for your own vindication , as appears by my words ; yet i was sensible enough , that you had given too just an occasion to apply them in that manner , as appears by the next page . but because these words follow some i had quoted out of your postscript , you fall into a nice piece of criticism about them , which , you say , in grammatical construction , must refer to the words of the postscript ; but any one that reads without a design to cavil , would easily interpret them of your words and notions about which the debate was ; and not of the postscript which comes in but as a parenthesis . this looks like chicaning in controversie ; which no man , who knows his cause is good , ever falls into . but if , you say , by an unintelligible new way of construction the word them be applied to any passages in your book : what then ? why then , whoever they are , you intend to complain of them too . but the words just before tell you who they are , viz. the enemies of the christian faith. and is this all that you intend , only to complain of them for making you a party in the controversie against the trinity ? but whether you have not made your self too much a party in it , will appear , before we have done . i had with great kindness , as i thought , taken notice of a passage in your postscript : in which i was glad to find that in general , you owned the mysteries of the christian faith , and the scripture to be the foundation and rule of it : from whence i inferr'd , that i could not believe you intended to give any advantage to the enemies of the christian faith. this passage , you say , you were surprized to find in a paragraph design'd to give you satisfaction . there are some persons i find very hard to be satisfied . for i speak of my satisfaction in this passage , and that i was glad you agreed so far with me , although you could not come up in all things to what i could wish . but what reason have you to express so much dissatisfaction at these words ? you call it an extraordinary sort of complement ; and that they seem to intimate as though i took you for a heathen before . how like a cavilling exception is this ? do not we know that in the debate about the mysteries of faith our adversaries are no heathens ; but they deny any mysteries : i was glad to find that you owned them ; and resolved your faith into the scripture as the foundation of it . did not this look more like a good opinion of you as to these matters , than any inclination to suspect you for a heathen ? but you say , it must not be taken for granted , that those who do not write or appear in print in controversies of religion do not own the christian faith , and the scriptures as the rule of it . i was far enough from any such apprehension ; but the case is quite otherwise , with those who are not sparing of writing about articles of faith , and among them take great care to avoid some which have been always esteem'd fundamental articles by the christian church . and i think it was no want of humanity or christian charity in me , that i was so glad to find you own the mysteries of the christian faith in general : which shews at least , that you cannot object against any articles of faith , because they contain something mysterious in them . but i said , that in all things your answer doth not come fully up to what i could wish . and i think i gave sufficient proof of it , as to your idea of substance , the nature of ideas , the materiality of the soul , the disparaging some arguments to prove the existence of god , the tendency of your principles ; and the ground of certainty , &c. which are put off to another letter , except the last , which is therefore now to be examin'd . ( . ) the third answer i gave was , that your own grounds of certainty , tend to scepticism ; and that in an age wherein the mysteries of faith are too much exposed by the promoters of scepticism and infidelity , it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of certainty , as are apt to leave men's minds more doubtfull than before . these words , you say , contain a farther accusation of your book , which shall be consider'd in its due place . but this is the proper place of considering it . for i said , that hereby you have given too just occasion to the enemies of the christian faith , to make use of your words and notions , as was evidently proved from your own concessions . and if this be so , however i was willing to have had you explained your self to the general satisfaction ; yet since you decline it , i do insist upon it , that you cannot clear your self from laying that foundation , which the author of christianity not mysterious built upon . for your ground of certainty is the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , as expressed in any proposition . which are your own words . from hence i urged , that let the proposition come to us any way , either by humane or divine authority , if our certainty depend upon this , we can be no more certain , than we have clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas contained in it . and from hence the author of christianity not mysterious thought he had reason to reject all mysteries of faith which are contained in propositions , upon your grounds of certainty . by this it evidently appears , that although i was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own sense ; yet i by no means thought that your words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that author : but rather that he saw into the true consequence of them , as they lie in you book . and what answer do you give to this ? not a word in the proper place for it . but afterwards ( for i would omit nothing that may seem to help your cause ) you offer something towards an answer . for there you distinguish the certainty of faith , and the certainty of knowledge , and you humbly conceive the certainty of faith , if i think fit to call it so , hath nothing to do with the certainty of knowledge ; and to talk of the certainty of faith seems all one to you as to talk of the knowledge of believing , a way of speaking not easie for you to understand . so that if i shake never so much the certainty of knowledge , it doth not at all concern the assurance of faith , that is quite distinct from it , neither stands nor falls with knowledge . faith stands by it self and upon grounds of its own , nor can be removed from them and placed on those of knowledge . their grounds are so far from being the same , or having any thing , that when it is brought to certainty , faith is destroyed , 't is knowledge then and faith no longer . so that , whether you are , or are not mistaken in the placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas , faith still stands upon its own basis , which is not at all alter'd by it ; and every article of that hath just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . this is the substance of what you say about this matter , and is the most considerable passage in your book towards clearing this matter . but i was aware of this , as appears by these words ; is faith an unreasonable act ? is it not an assent to a proposition ? then , if all certainty in acts of reason be derived from the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in it ; either there can be no certainty in the reasonable act of faith , or the grounds of certainty must be laid some other way . but this is a matter of too great weight and consequence to be easily past over , because the main strength of your defence lies in it , and therefore i shall more strictly examine what you say ; and set this point of the certainty of faith in as good a light as i can , and shew the inconsistency of your notion of ideas , with the articles of the christian faith. to talk of the certainty of faith , say you , seems all one to you as to talk of the knowledge of believing ; a way of speaking not easie for you to understand . but how comes the certainty of faith to become so hard a point with you ? have not all mankind , who have talked of matters of faith , allow'd a certainty of faith as well as a certainty of knowledge , although upon different grounds ? in your former letter you told us , that if we knew the original of words , we should be much helped to the ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for . now what is there in the original of the word certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to faith ? i had thought that our word was taken from the latin ; and that among the romans it was opposed to doubting , nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum . and therefore where the mind upon examination of the grounds of assent saw no reason for doubting , it might properly be said to be certain : if it sees no cause to doubt from the evidence of the thing it self , or the clear deduction of consequences , that is certainty of knowledge ; but where it sees no reason to doubt from the authority of him that speaks , that is certainty of believing ; and the greater the authority of him that speaks , the less reason there is to doubt , and therefore the greater certainty of faith. and this i think is very easie to be understood , and so have the generality of mankind thought to this day . but it seems our old words must not now pass in the current sense ; but then it is fit they be called in , and new stampt , that we may have none but new milled words to talk with ; but in common justice , a competent time ought to be allow'd for it , that none be surprized ; and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current sense ; and that is all the favour i desire in this matter . but i am utterly against any private mints of words ; and think those persons assume too much authority to themselves , who will not suffer common words to pass in their general acceptation ; but will set such bounds and limits to the sense of them , as suit best with their own speculations . but is not this all one as to talk of the knowledge of believing ? for what reason ? knowledge and faith are too distinct things , the one relates to evidence , and the other to testimony ; but certainty is common to them both , unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any testimony whatsoever . you tell us in your postscript ( which i hope may be brought hither without offence ) that it is a shame among christians to raise such a doubt of this , whether an infinitely powerfull and wise being be veracious or no. then i suppose the veracity of god is a certain and undoubted principle ; and if there be sufficient means to assure us of divine revelation ( as i doubt not but you yield there are ) what should hinder one , that believes upon such grounds as are sufficient to convince him , from attaining to a certainty of faith ? but you take certainty as belonging only to knowledge . so do the papists , as belonging only to infallibility , and say there can be no certainty of faith , where there is not an infallible proponent ; but neither you nor they are to impose upon the understandings of mankind , who know how to distinguish the grounds of certainty both from knowledge and infallibility . you allow such a thing as assurance of faith ; and why not certainty as well as assurance ? i know no reason , but that you have appropriated certainty to the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas in any proposition ; and now you find this will not hold as to articles of faith ; and therefore you will allow no certainty of faith ; which i think is not for the advantage of your cause . but you go on and tell us , that if this way of certainty by ideas doth not hold , yet it cannot affect matters of faith which stand immoveable upon other grounds ; faith in your own words stands still upon its own basis ; and every article of it has just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . this will appear to be an extraordinary answer , when we have throughly examin'd it . here we see faith is taken not with respect to the general grounds of certainty , but to the particular articles of faith , i. e. the propositions contained in that revelation which we embrace on the account of its divine authority ; now these propositions are of several kinds . . some that are more clearly expressed therein , but such as might be attained to by the light of reason without revelation . and such are the fundamental principles of natural religion , viz. the being of god and providence , and the rewards and punishments of a future state. these mankind may attain to a certainty in , without revelation , or else there can be no such thing as natural religion in the world ; but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the scriptures . let us now suppose a person by natural reason to attain to a certainty , as to the being of god and immortality of the soul ; and he proceeds upon your general grounds of certainty , from the agreement or disagreement of ideas ; and so from the ideas of god and the soul , he is made certain of those two points before mention'd . but let us again suppose that such a person upon a farther examination of your method of proceeding finds , that the way of ideas in these cases will not do ; for no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self , no more than the picture of a man proves his being , or the visions of a dream make a true history , ( which are your own expressions . ) and for the soul he cannot be certain , but that matter may think , ( as you affirm ) and then what becomes of the soul's immateriality ( and consequently immortality ) from its operations ? but for all this , say you , his assurance of faith remains firm on its own basis. now i appeal to any man of sense , whether the finding the uncertainty of his own principles which he went upon in point of reason , doth not weaken the credibility of these fundamental articles when they are consider'd purely as matters of faith ? for before , there was a natural credibility in them on the account of reason ; but by going on wrong grounds of certainty , all that is lost ; and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever . and if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that of reason , it must needs have less effect upon mens minds , when the subserviency of reason is taken away ; as it must be when the grounds of certainty by reason are vanished . is it at all probable , that he who finds his reason deceive him in such fundamental points should have his faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of revelation ? for in matters of revelation , there must be some antecedent principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the account of it . and the first is , that there is a god ; but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of certainty by ideas ; and how can his faith stand firm as to divine revelation , when he is made uncertain by his own way , whether there be a god or no ? besides , to suppose divine revelation , we must be certain that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world ; but here we find , that upon the principles of certainty by ideas he cannot be certain of this ; because he doth not know but matter may think ; and consequently , all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy , or the heats of a disordered imagination , as spinoza affirmed . again , before there can be any such thing as assurance of faith upon divine revelation , there must be a certainty as to sense and tradition ; for there can be no revelation pretended now without immediate inspiration ; and the basis of our faith is a revelation contained in an ancient book , whereof the parts were delivered at distant times , but conveyed down to us by an universal tradition . but now , what if your grounds of certainty can give us no assurance as to these things ? i do not mean , that they cannot demonstrate matters of fact , which it were most unreasonable to expect ; but that these grounds of certainty make all things uncertain ; for i think i have proved , that this way of ideas cannot give a satisfactory account as to the existence of the plainest objects of sense ; because reason cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and the ideas . how then can we arrive to any certainty in perceiving those objects by their ideas ? and i was in the right , when i said this way tended to scepticism ; and i do not think that consistent with the assurance of faith. but this is an imputation you take very ill , and say , that i have brought no argument for it , but only that my great prejudice against this way of certainty is , that it leads to scepticism . ( sceptism is the new mill'd word . ) this is very strange , when that expression is only the introduction to the arguments from p. to , to which no answer at all is given . and so i leave it . there are other propositions or articles of faith which wholly depend on the sense of words contained in the scripture , and we are to enquire , whether the assurance of faith , as you call it , be consistent with the overthrowing your grounds of certainty ; i. e. whether those who embrace the articles of faith in the way of ideas , can retain their certainty of those articles when these ideas are quitted . and this alone will be a plain demonstration in the case , that the certainty of faith cannot stand with such men , if this way of certainty by ideas be destroyed . and by this which i am now to make out , let any one judge how true your words are like to prove , when you say , let the grounds of knowledge or certainty be resolved into what they please , it touches not your faith ; the foundation of that stands as sure as before , and cannot be at all shaken by it . of this we shall judge by some important articles of christian faith according to your ideas . the first shall be that of the resurrection of the dead . the reason of believing the resurrection of the same body upon your grounds is from the idea of identity ; which i take to be this from your own words . . that the identity of living creatures depends not on a mass of the same particles , but on something else ; for in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity ; for which you instance in the growth of an oak and a horse . . that the identity of a man consists in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter , in succession vitally united to the same organized body . . that personal identity , i. e. the sameness of a rational being lies in self-consciousness , and in that alone , whether it be annexed only to one individual substance , or can be continued in a succession of several substances . . that those who place thought in a purely material , animal constitution , void of spirit , do place personal identity in something else that identity of substance , as animal identity is preserved in identity of life and not of substance . . that it matters not to this point of being the same self , whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances . . that in this personal identity of self-consciousness is founded all the right and iustice of reward and punishment , happiness and misery , being that for which every one is concerned for himself , not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to , or affected with that consciousness . . that the sentence at the day of iudgment will be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have that they themselves in what bodies soever they appear , or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to , are the same that committed those actions and deserve that punishment for them . this i suppose to be a true and just account of your sense of this matter ; and so the article of the resurrection is resolved into your idea of personal identity . and the question between us now is , whether your certainty of this matter from your idea have no influence on the belief of this article of faith ? for the main of your defence lies upon this point , whether your method of certainty by ideas , doth at all shake , or in the least concern the assurance of faith ? which you absolutely deny , and affirm , that faith stands upon its own basis , and is not at all altered by your method of certainty ; and every article of that has just the same unmoved foundation , and the very same credibility that it had before . now i take this article of the resurrection of the dead to be an article of faith , and we are to consider , whether if your method of certainty by ideas do hold in this matter , it continues as firm , and in the same credibility it had before ? i shall not urge you with the sense of our own or other christian churches in this point of the sameness of the body in the resurrection of the dead , but i shall continue my self to the scripture as the foundation and rule of our faith ; and the main point is , whether according to that , it be not necessary for the same substance which was united to the body to be raised up at the last day ? i do not say the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death ; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingring disease , as if a fat man falls into a consumption : i do not say , the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins ; for then a long sinner must have a vast body , considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration ; but that which i suppose is implyed in it is , that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here . you mention the hypothesis of those , who place thought in a purely material animal constitution void of spirit : but you agree , that the more probable opinion is , that this consciousness is annexed to the affection of one individual immaterial substance . it is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable opinion ; but it seems without any certainty as to the truth of it . for you have told us , what the effect of probability is , viz. that it is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition true or false rather than the contrary ; and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no certainty , but only some inducements to receive it for true . thence i cannot but observe , that we have no certainty upon your grounds , that self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial substance , and consequently that a material substance may , according to your principles , have self-consciousness in it ; at least , that you are not certain of the contrary . now i pray consider , whether this doth not a little affect the whole article of the resurrection ? for , if it may be only a material substance in us that thinks , then this substance , which consists in the life of an organiz'd body , must cease by death ; for how can that , which consisted in life , be preserved afterwards ? and if the personal identity consists in a self-consciousness depending on such a substance as cannot be preserved without an organiz'd body , then there is no subsistence of it separate from the body , and the resurrection must be giving a new life . to whom ? to a material substance which wholly lost its personal identity by death . so that here can be no personal identity at all ; unless you say the very same life which was long since at an end can be reproduced . which i suppose you will not assert . but let us take the more probable opinion ; which i think certain , viz. that self-consciousness depends upon an immaterial principle in us ; and then the question is , how far the scripture determines the sameness of the body at the resurrection , i. e. of that material substance , which was vitally united with that immaterial substance in this life . the doctrine delivered by our saviour is , that all that are in the graves shall hear his voice ; and shall come forth ; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life , and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation . what is the meaning of all that are in their graves ? doth this relate to any other substance than that which was united to the soul in life ? can a different substance be said to be in the graves and to come out of them ? is it not material , as you say , whether the present self be made up of the same or other substances ? if it be not so to your idea of identity , it is as to the sense of our saviour's words : unless you can make it out , that a substance which never was in the grave may come out of it . but it may be said , that if these words be taken strictly they confine the resurrection to those particles of matter only which were in the grave ; if not , then they may extend to another substance . i answer , that by comparing this with other places we find that the words are to be understood of the substance of that body to which the soul was united ; and not to those individual particles . so st. paul , for we must all appear before the iudgment seat of christ , that every one may receive the things done in his body , according to that he hath done , whether it be good or bad . can these words be understood of any other material substance , but that body in which these things were done ? how could it be said , if any other substance be joyned to the soul at the resurrection , as its body , that they were the things done in or by the body ? curcellaeus his copy reads it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and several of the fathers so took it ; either way , it must relate to that which was the real body in which the person lived and acted , whether good or evil. and st. paul's dispute about the manner of raising the body might soon have been ended , if there were no necessity of the same body . if there be no resurrection of the dead , then is not christ raised . it seems then , other bodies are to be raised as his was ; and can there be any doubt whether his body were the same material substance which was united to his soul before ? and the apostle lays so much weight upon it , that he saith , if christ be not raised your faith is vain ; doth he mean , if there were not the same personal identity , as to the soul of christ and the matter united to it after the resurrection ? that cannot be his meaning , for then there would have been no necessity of christs own body being raised ; which he asserts and proves by undoubted witnesses . were they witnesses only of some material substance then united to his soul ? he saith , he was seen of five hundred brethren at once . what he was this ? it was christ that died . yes , the person of christ ; but personal identity doth not require the same substance , but the same consciousness ; and so if christ were conscious to himself in another substance , there was no necessity of the same body . and so truly from the seeing the person of christ they could not prove it was the same individual body . but thomas said , except i shall see in his hands the print of the nails , and put my finger into the print of the nails , and thrust my hand into his side , i will not believe . the doing whereof convinced him it was the same individual body ; but there will be no such proof at the great day . and there is no reason there should , since the resurrection of christ was a sufficient proof of god's power to raise the dead , and the dissimilitude of circumstances can be no argument against it , since the power and wisdom of god are concerned in it . but the apostle insists upon the resurrection of christ , not meerly as an argument of the possibility of ours , but of the certainty of it ; because he rose as the first fruits ; christ the first fruits , afterwards they that are christs at his coming . st. paul was aware of the objections in mens minds about the resurrection of the same body ; and it is of great consequence as to this article , to shew upon what grounds he proceeds . but some man will say , how are the dead raised up , and with what body do they come ? first he shews , that the seminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary providence of god in the manner of their vegetation . they sow bare grain of wheat , or of some other grain , but god giveth it a body , as it hath pleased him , and to every seed his own body . here is an identity of the material substance supposed ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that proper body which belongs to it ; every seed having that body in little , which is afterwards so much inlarged ; and in grain the seed is corrupted before its germination ; but it hath its proper organical parts , which make it the same body with that which it grows up to . for although grain be not divided into lobes as other seeds are , yet it hath been found , by the most accurate observations , that upon separating the membranes these seminal parts are discerned in them ; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn. st. paul indeed saith , that we sow not that body that shall be ; but he speaks not of the identity but the perfection of it . and although there be such a difference from the grain it self , when it comes up to be perfect corn with root , stalk , blade and ear , that it may be said to outward appearance not to be the same body , yet with regard to the seminal and organical parts , it is as much the same as a man grown up is the same with the embryo in the womb. and although many arguments may be used to prove , that a man is not the same , because life which depends upon the course of the blood and the manner of respiration and nutrition is so different in both states , yet that man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm , that it was not the same man. and you grant , that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants , alters not the identity : and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life makes the identity of a plant ; so that in things capable of any sort of life , the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts ; and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown . and thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection is consistent with its identity , if its organization and life be the same ; and this is a real identity of the body which depends not upon consciousness . from whence it follows , that to make the same body , no more is required but restoring life to the organized parts of it . and you grant likewise , that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession vitally united to the same organized body . so that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body , if life were continued ; and if by divine power life be restored to that material substance which was before united , by a re-union of the soul to it , there is no reason to deny the identity of the body . not from the consciousness of the soul , but from that life which is the result of the union of soul and body . but st. paul still supposes that it must be that material substance to which the soul was before united . for saith he , it is sown in corruption , it is raised in incorruption : it is sown in dishonour , it is raised in glory ; it is sown in weakness , it is raised in power ; it is sown a natural body , it is raised a spiritual body . can such a material substance which was never united to the body be said to be sown in corruption , and weakness , and dishonour ? either therefore he must speak of the same body , or his meaning cannot be comprehended . for what doth all this relate to a conscious principle ? the apostle speaks plainly of that body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to corruption ; and is to be restored with more noble qualities . for this corruptible must put on incorruption , and this mortal must put on immortality . i do not see how he could more expressly affirm the identity of this corruptible body , with that after the resurrection , and that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness ; and so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith , this is an article of it , and so it hath been always understood by the christian church . and your idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it ; for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection , but any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body . the dispute is not , how far personal identity in it self may consist in the very same material substance ; for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter ; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital vnion between the soul and body and the life which is consequent upon it ; and therefore in the resurrection the same material substance must be reunited ; or else it cannot be called a resurrection , but a renovation ; i. e. it may be a new life , but not a raising the body from the dead . . the next articles of faith which your notion of ideas is inconsistent with , are no less than those of the trinity , and of the incarnation of our saviour . the former by the first article of our church is expressed by three persons in the vnity of the divine nature : the latter is said art. . to be by the vnion of the divine and humane nature in one person . let us now see whether your ideas of nature and person can consist with these . but before i come to that i must endeavour to set this matter right , as to the dispute about the notion of nature and person , which you have endeavour'd with all your art , to perplex and confound , and have brought in several interlocutors to make it look more like an entertainment . of which afterwards : the original question was , whether we could come to any certainty about the distinction of nature and person in the way of ideas ; and my business was to prove that we could not , because we had no simple ideas by sensation or reflection , without which you affirm that our vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least glimmering of ideas : and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways . these are your own words . and then i undertook to shew , that it was not possible for us to have any simple ideas of nature and person by sensation or reflection : and that whether we consider'd nature as taken for essential properties , or for that substance wherein that property lies : whether we consider it in distinct individuals or abstractly ; still my design was to shew that in your way of ideas , you could come to no certainty about them . and as to person i shew'd , that the distinction of individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our senses , but upon a different manner of subsistence , which is in one individual , and is not communicable to another . and as to this i said , that we may find within our selves an intelligent substance by inward perception ; but whether that make a person or not , must be understood some other way ; for if the meer intelligent substance make a person , then there cannot be the union of two such natures , but there must be two persons . which is repugnant to the article of the incarnation of our saviour . that this was the true state of the question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it . but what said you in your first letter in answer to it ? as to nature you say , that it is a collection of several ideas combined into one complex , abstract idea , which when they are found united in any individual existing , though joyned in that existence with several other ideas , that individual or particular being is truly said to have the nature of a man , or the nature of a man to be in him ; forasmuch as these simple ideas are found united in him , which answer the ●omplex , abstract idea , to which the specifick name is given by any one : which abstract specifick idea , he keeps the same when he applies the specifick name standing for it to distinct individuals . and as to person , in the way of ideas , you say , that the word person in it self signifies nothing , and so no idea belonging to it , nothing can be said to be the true idea of it . but as soon as the common vse of any language has appropriated it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person , and so of nature . against this i objected in my answer to that letter , that if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas , which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the signs of two ideas ; then it is plain that they are only notions of the mind , as all abstracted and complex ideas are ; and so one nature and three persons can be no more . to this you answer in your second letter , that your notion of the terms nature and person is , that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another , nor in themselves signifie any thing at all , but have the signification which they have barely by imposition . whoever imagined that words signifie any otherwise than by imposition ? but the question is , whether these be meer words and names , or not ? or whether there be not a real foundation in things for such a distinction between nature and person ? of which i gave this evident proof , that if it were not the same nature in different individuals , every individual must make a different kind . and what answer do you give to this plain reason ? nothing particular that i can find . but in the general you say , that all that you can find that i except against in your notion of nature and person is nothing but this , viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing . and is this all indeed ? did not i tell you in these words , ( which i am forced to repeat on this occasion , although i am very unwilling to fill pages with repetitions . ) the question now between us comes to this , whether the common nature or essence of things lies only in an abstract idea , or a general name , and the real essence consists only in particular beings from which that nature is abstracted ? the question is not whether in forming the notion of common nature , the mind doth not abstract from the circumstances of particular beings ; but it is whether there be not an antecedent foundation in the nature of things , upon which we form this abstract idea ? for if there be , then it cannot be called an universal name only ; or a meer sign of an idea , which we have formed from putting many simple ideas together , which name belongs to all of such a sort , as have those simple ideas united together . in these words , which you cannot deny to be in the place mention'd , i thought i had stated the case fairly between us . and why do you not return an answer to them ? but instead of that you only mention another passage more liable to cavilling , where i say , that upon your notions of nature and person , i do not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the trinity . for if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas , which the common use of language hath appropriated to be the sign of two ideas ; then it is plain that they are only notions of the mind , as all abstract and complex ideas are ; and so one nature and three persons can be no more . upon this you charge me with affirming that of you which you never said , viz. that these terms are only abstract or complex ideas : but your words are , taking therefore nature and person for the sign of two ideas they are put to stand for : and by enumerating all the simple ideas , that are contained in the complex idea , that each of them is made to stand for , we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them . these are your own words . now from thence it appears , that nature and person are terms which are the signs of two ideas by your own confession : but you never made these , or any other terms to be ideas : and you should be ashamed of such iargon . but have not you said in your essay , that it is a very common practice for names to be made use of instead of the ideas themselves , especially if the ideas be very complex . nature and person you grant to be complex ideas ; and these terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two ideas : therefore here is an ambiguity in the use of these words , for they are complex ideas themselves , and they are made the signs of them ; and so the words of the sentence are capable of both those senses . for it is true , according to you , that these terms , nature and person , really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only complex and abstract ideas ; and those terms are appropriated to be the signs of two ideas . so that nature and person are both ideas themselves , and those terms are the signs of two ideas : and the sense had not been liable to exception , if and had been inserted ; for if these terms really signifie nothing in themselves , but are only abstract and complex ideas ; and which the common use had appropriated to be the signs of two ideas , &c. but whether this be properly expressed or not , according to your sense of ideas , the weight of the controversie depends not at all upon it ; but whether nature and person can be any other but abstract ideas , according to your own plain expressions ; and if they are so , they are no more than notions of the mind , and then the consequence must hold , that one nature and three persons can be no more . upon which i said , i did not see how it was possible to defend the doctrine of the trinity , ( and i now add of the incarnation ) which was the thing i undertook to make out . but you very freely say , whether i rightly deduce from it this consequence , viz. and so one nature and three persons can be no more ; is what you neither know not are concerned to examin . which i think is an expression could hardly drop from a person , who did know how to declare his belief of three persons in the vnity of the divine nature . but you pretend these are none of your notions of nature and person , nor indeed any thing you can understand . but it is plain , that this consequence follows from your own notions of nature and person ; as they are set down expresly by your self in the former letter . you tell me , i made this inference a little in haste ! whether a man write in haste or not , the world will judge by what appears , and not by what he or any other saith . and i think it will appear , that i did not make this inference in haste , but from a deliberate consideration of your notion of the ideas of nature and person . but by those terms signifying nothing in themselves , you say , that you meant , that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another , nor in themselves signifie any thing at all , but have the signification which they have barely by imposition . and was this truly all that you meant by it ? and do you think that peter , and iames , and iohn signifie any thing by nature ? are not all words made significative by imposition ? but is there no difference in the signification of words as they stand for signs of things ? if they be words for particular substances , then you grant , that there is something really existing which is meant by those words ; but if they relate only to the conceptions of the mind , then they signifie them and no more . and the question is , which of these two you meant by those words nature and person ? and you plainly affirm both of them to be complex ideas , which are made only by an act of the mind , and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood . you presume , that upon more leisurely thoughts , both my self and the rest of mankind will concur with you . i never affected singularity , and am ready to comply with the rest of mankind in any reasonable thing . but you say , that this notion of nature and person , that they are two words that signifie only by imposition , is what will hold in the common sense of mankind . no doubt of it : but i must again and again tell you , that is not the point in question , but whether they are only abstract and complex ideas , which have no other being but in the mind . and to this you answer not a word . i do not in the least think as you suggest , that it is necessary to the defense of the trinity , that these two articulate sounds should have natural significations , and that unless they are used in those significations , it were impossible to defend the doctrine of the trinity . but i do affirm , that those who make nature and person to be only abstract and complex ideas ; can neither defend nor reasonably believe it . and this is making no extraordinary supposition necessary to the belief or defence of it ; but only that which in the common sense of mankind is necessary to it . for , if you have expressed your own mind in your former letter ; that must guide us in your notion of nature and person , where you undertook to explain them . for if nature and person be abstract , and complex ideas , as you say , and such are only acts of the mind , i do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these notions with the articles of the trinity and incarnation . i do not go about to accuse you of denying these doctrines ; i hope you do not . but i impute all this hesitancy , and doubting only to your notions of ideas ; which you had been so long forming in your mind , that as it often happens in such cases , one darling favourite notion proves too hard for some points of far greater consequence , when they are found inconsistent with it . and because you had first fixed your notion of ideas , and taken much pains about them , you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them . but you could not but find , that the articles of three persons , and one nature ; and two natures , and one person , were not reconcileable with your ideas of nature and person ; which is that they are complex ideas , which depend upon the act of the mind ; for this were to make the two natures in christ to be only two complex ideas . for if nature , as you say , be a collection of several ideas combined into one complex , abstract idea ; then two natures can be nothing else but two such collections , or two abstracted and complex ideas . it may be said , that when you make nature an abstracted and complex idea , you speak of a specifick idea , but the humane nature in christ was a particular substance , and this you assert to be a real thing , and not to depend on the act of the mind . but this doth not clear the matter . for in your former letter you said , that all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances , are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas : which in corporeal substances are sensible qualities , in incorporeal are operations of the mind . the utmost then which the idea of humane nature in christ comes to is , that there were in him the sensible qualities and intellectual operations of a man , with an unknown substance to support them : which belongs not to the simple ideas , but is supposed by them . this is all i can make of your way of ideas : and so the incarnation of christ is the assuming the sensible qualities , and intellectual operations of a man , to which a substratum doth belong : but is no part of the simple ideas . so that we can have no idea at all of the humane nature of christ ; but only an inference , that since those are but accidents , there must be a substratum to support them ; and consequently there was a particular substance in him made up of mind and body . but if this had come in the way of ideas , yet it cannot make out the humane nature of christ. for if it were in him no otherwise than in other men , then the mystery of the incarnation is quite gone , and christ is to be consider'd but like other men ; which doth not answer to what the scripture saith of the word 's being made flesh , and that god was manifest in the flesh. there must be therefore something beyond the meer humane nature in him ; and either it must be only some divine operation upon , and with it , and that is no substance ; or if it be a substance , it must either cohabit with it , or else be united to it . if it only co-habits , then there are two persons dwelling together in one body , and the actions of one cannot be attributed to the other ; if there be a real union between them , so as the acts belong to one person ; then there must be such a manner of existence in the humane nature of christ , which is different from it in other persons . for in all others , the acts belong to the humane person ; but if it were so in christ , then the divine acts of christ must flow from the humane nature as the principle of them ; which is to confound the divine and humane nature , and operations together ; if they come from the divine person , then the humane nature must have another kind of subsistence , than it hath in others , or else there must be two persons ; and person being as you say , a forensick term , there must be two different capacities of rewards and punishments ; which is so absurd an opinion as i think no one will assert . if there be then but one person and two natures , how can you possibly reconcile this to your way of ideas ? person , say you , in it self signifies nothing ; but as soon as the common use of any language has appropriated it to any idea , then that is the true idea of a person , i. e. men may call a person what they please , for there is nothing but common use required to it : they may call a horse , or a tree , or a stone a person if they think fit ; but since the common use of language hath appropriated it to an intelligent being , that is , a person . and so you tell us , that person stands for a thinking intelligent being that hath reason and reflection , and can consider it self as it self , the same thinking being in different times and place . how comes person to stand for this and nothing else ? from whence comes self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this idea of a person ? whether it be true or false , i am not now to enquire , but how it comes into this idea of a person ? hath the common use of our language appropriated it to this sense ? if not , this seems to be a meer arbitrary idea ; and may as well be denied as affirmed . and what a fine pass are we come to in the way of ideas , if a meer arbitrary idea must be taken into the only true method of certainty ? but of that afterwards . we now proceed in the way of ideas as you give it us . but if this be the true idea of a person , then there can be no union of two natures in one person : for if an intelligent conscious being be the idea of a person ; and the divine and human nature be intelligent conscious beings , then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one person is quite sunk , for here must be two persons in this way of ideas . again , if this be the idea of a person , then where there are three persons , there must be three distinct intelligent beings ; and so there cannot be three persons in the same individual essence . and thus both these doctrines of the trinity and incarnation are past recovery gone , if this way of ideas hold . so great a difference there is , between forming ideas first , and then judging of revelation by them ; and the believing of revelation on its proper grounds , and interpreting the sense of it by the due measures of reason . you may pretend what you please , that you hold the assurance of faith , and the certainty by ideas to go upon very different grounds ; but when a proposition is offered you out of scripture to be believed , and you doubt about the sense of it , is not recourse to be made to your ideas ? as , in the present case , whether there can be three persons in one nature , or two natures and one person ; what resolution can you come to upon your principles , but in the way of ideas ? you may possibly say , that where ideas are clear and distinct , there you are to judge of revelation by them ; and this is what you assert in your essay , that in propositions whose certainty is built on clear and perfect ideas and evident deductions of reason , there no proposition can be received for divine revelation which contradicts them ; from hence you conclude it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once . and yet there is a person who hath lately told the world , that there is one certain secret way how by divine power , the same body , but not the same person , may be in very distant places at once ; but he is advised to keep it up as a secret ; which was good friendly advice : but till it be discovered there is no judging of it . here i observe , that you require clear and distinct ideas ; and yet we find , if a man's word may be taken , these clear and distinct ideas do not prove the thing impossible . but what is to be said when the ideas are not clear and distinct ? you say , your method of certainty is by the agreement or disagreement of ideas , where they are not in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct . and this is your secret about certainty ; which i think had been better kept up too : for i pray , in the case now before us , are your ideas of nature and person clear and distinct or not ? if they are , then it is plain from your own doctrine , that if revelation be pretended , you are to reject it . how then comes the certainty of faith to be preserved firm and immoveable , although the grounds of certainty be disputed ? but suppose they are not clear and distinct ? what is to be done in a matter of revelation contrary to your ideas ? are you to submit to the revelation or not ? whatever god hath revealed is most certainly true , no doubt can be made of it . this is the proper object of faith ; but whether it be a divine revelation or no , you say , reason must judge . yes , reason proceeding upon clear and distinct ideas . but suppose you have ideas sufficient for certainty in your way , but not clear and distinct ; what is to be done then ? in things that are above reason , you say , when they are revealed , they are proper matters of faith. what is here being above reason ? either above the discovery of reason ▪ as the fall of angels , the resurrection of the body , &c. and about these , you say , reason hath nothing to do . ( what not if there be an idea of identity as to the body ? ) or such as are above the comprehension of reason when discovered . and they are either such as we have no natural ideas of ; and then you grant , that they are pure matters of faith ; or they are such , as you have certain ideas of , but not clear and distinct . now here lies the pinching difficulty , as to your way of ideas . you say indeed , that revelation must carry it against meer probabilities to the contrary ; because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know , but is only probably convinced of , is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony , which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive . i pray observe your own words , you here positively say , that the mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know : so that it is plain here , that you place certainty only in evident knowledge , or in clear and distinct ideas ; and yet your great complaint of me was , that i charged this upon you , and now i find it in your own words ( which i observed before . ) but let us allow you all you desire , viz. that there may be certainty by ideas , where they are not clear and distinct : and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a proposition delivered as a matter of faith , where you have a certainty by reason from your ideas , such as they are : can you assent to this as a matter of faith , when you are already certain by your ideas of the contrary ? how is this possible ? can you believe that to be true , which you are certain is not true ? suppose it be that there are two natures in one person ; the question is , whether you can assent to this as a matter of faith ? if you had said , there had been only probabilities on the other side , i grant that you then say , revelation is to prevail ; but when you say you have certainty by ideas to the contrary , i do not see how it is possible for you to assent to a matter of faith as true , when you are certain from your ideas that it is not true : for how can you believe against certainty ? the evidence is not so great as when the ideas are clear and distinct , but the bar against assent is as strong ; because the mind is actually determined by certainty . and so your notion of certainty by ideas must overthrow the credibility of a matter of faith in all such propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of divine revelation . i shall now summ up the force of what i have said about this matter . your answer is , that your method of certainty by ideas , shakes not at all , nor in the least concerns the assurance of faith ▪ against this i have pleaded . ( . ) that your method of certainty shakes the belief of revelation in general . ( . ) that it shakes the belief of particular propositions or articles of faith , which depend upon the sense of words contained in scripture . because you do not say , that we are to believe all that we find there expressed ; but in case we have any clear and distinct ideas which limit the sense another way than the words seem to carry it , we are to judge that to be the true sense . but in case our ideas are not clear and distinct , yet you affirm as your proper doctrine , that we may come to certainty by ideas , although not in all respects perfectly clear and distinct . from whence i infer , that where you have attained to a certainty by your imperfect ideas , you must judge of a matter of faith , by those ideas , and consequently , if the union of two natures and one person , or three persons in one nature be repugnant to your ideas ( as i have shewed that they are ) you must by virtue of your own principles reject these from being matters of faith. and thus i hope i have proved what i undertook , viz. that your notion of certainty by ideas is inconsistent with these articles of the christian faith. but you have this comfort left , that you are not the first person who hath run himself into insuperable difficulties as to matters of faith , by this way of ideas . for des cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner : he was a person of a great reach and capacity , and spent many thoughts in laying the foundations of certainty from ideas , both as to incorporeal and corporeal substances ; and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them . his demonstrations from his ideas in his metaphysical meditations , did not meet with the entertainment he promised himself from the inquisitive part of mankind ; for his objective reality from his idea gave no satisfaction ; and his other argument was thought to have no force , unless it were taken off from the idea and placed upon the necessity of existence in the nature of the thing . as to corporeal substances , his fundamental mistake was in a wrong idea of matter , which he made to be the same with extension ; and upon this he built his systeme of nature . but against this first false step many things were objected by his adversaries , as may be seen by the late disputes in france about his principles ; they objected , that his notion or idea of matter made it necessary , and impossible for god to annihilate it ; and his defenders are driven to such shifts as to god's will and power , that an indifferent person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with ideas as to the ground of certainty , although neither himself nor his followers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct ideas . but when they came to reconcile their ideas with matters of faith , they were so plunged , that they could see no way to get through their difficulties . for as monsieur huet observes , although des cartes professes great submission to divine revelation , yet when it came to the trial , he judged his opinions could not be repugnant to it , because he was certain of the truth of them ; which shews , that he judged of revelation by his rules of certainty , and whatever he pretended , he did not take his measures of truth from revelation . a late defender of des cartes in answer to this , produces the words used by him in his principles , wherein he owns , that in case of divine revelation if god declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our capacity , as the mysteries of the trinity and incarnation , he would not refuse to believe them , although he could not clearly understand them . this monsieur huet denies not , viz. that he made such a general profession of submission to revelation and owning the mysteries of faith ; but , saith he , when it comes to particular points , then ideas are to be the standard by which we are to judge of revelation . monsieur regis in his reply saith , that matters of faith and philosophical truths are of different kinds ; and that there can be no contrariety but between things of the same kind . which makes him run into that great absurdity , that although in a philosophical sense god cannot do things repugnant to reason , yet in the way of faith he may ; and all this to preserve the certainty by ideas , when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of certainty than such a supposition . but another great admirer of des cartes , thinks this way unreasonable ; but des cartes , he saith , hath shewn the right method of certainty by clear and distinct ideas , and therefore he calls it no less than a divine certainty ; and he adds , that truth cannot be contrary to it self ; and he laughs at the distinction of philosophical and theological truths ; or the two ways of certainty by knowledge and faith : for , truth is always one and the same , and changes not its countenance : and if truth be an agreement of words with things , how can the same words agree in one book and differ in another ? for the same god is the author of truth where-ever it is : and therefore he calls it , a most absurd opinion of those who say , that god who is immutable should teach that as truth in philosophy , which is false in divinity . but i return to you . you seem to be not a little concerned , that i say , that as you have stated your notion of ideas it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of the christian faith which i had endeavoured to defend . such an accusation , you say , brought into any court in england , would be thought to shew a great inclination to have the accused be suspected rather than any evidence of being guilty of any thing ; and so would immediately be dismissed without hearing any plea to it . but you must give me leave to say , that you have quite mistaken my design , which was not to accuse you , but to shew my own dissatisfaction , as to the way you had taken to clear your self . i hoped you would have said so much for your own vindication , as would have satisfied the world , that your notion of ideas was far from any tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your expressions : but , instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning . and that made me to say , that as you had stated it , it may be of dangerous consequence . it may be , say you , this is no evidence , but only an inclination to accuse you . so far from it , that it shewed an inclination to favour you , when i only said it may be ; for now you see , that i think it is of such dangerous consequence , and i must think so till you have cleared it better . but the notion of ideas as you have stated it , relates to your whole book : why should you carry it farther than i intended it ? the stating of it i mentioned was in your first letter ; where you told us what you meant by nature and person . but you have found out two particulars wherein it may be of dangerous consequence , first in making so much use of the word ideas , and your placing certainty in ideas . as to the term of ideas , i have no objection to the use of the word it self ; provided it be used in a common sense , and no weight be laid upon it more than it can bear ; for i am for no new affected terms which are apt to carry mens minds out of the way ; they are like ignes fatui , which seem to give light , but lead those that follow them into bogs : like fontanges , which seem to set peoples heads that wear them higher , but their understandings are just what they were before . i always dislik'd the stoical improvements by new words , or giving new senses to old ones . but i told you , i should never have mention'd this way of ideas , but for the ill use i found made of them : and you might have enjoy'd the satisfaction you had in them long enough , unless i had found them imploy'd in doing mischief . which , as you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more ; that i fear ideas ; i. e. the term ideas may some time or other be of dangerous consequence . can you possibly think this was my meaning ? i know of no antipathy i have to the term ideas ; nor do i understand any mischief that lies in the bare use of the term. if it gives you any satisfaction i pray make what use you please of it , so you do not set it up in your way of ideas for a new method of certainty ; nor weaken mens belief as to matters of faith by it . these were my prejudices against your ideas , and they are increased by your defences ; for i can find nothing that hath any force to remove them . you tell me , my quarrel must be with the term ideas as of dangerous consequence : but why so ? it was the way of certainty by ideas which i insisted upon , and the new terms as imploy'd to that purpose . i confess , i say , the world had been strangely amuzed with ideas of late , and we have been told , what strange things might be done by the help of ideas , i. e. as to matter of certainty . but you tell me more than once , that i own , that these come only to be common notions of things , which i have no aversion from . this is a way of turning things upon me , which i could not expect from you. for those words are brought in by me on this occasion , you had said , that you see no such opposition , but that ideas and sound reason may stand together , i. e. reason rightly managing those ideas , so as to produce evidence by them . upon this , i used these words . but what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty ; true and real certainty by ideas , if after all it comes only to this , that our ideas only represent such things , from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things ? but the world hath been strangely amused , &c. judge now how fair and ingenuous this answer is . that which i bring in as a consequence of your assertion , you make to be my own sense as to your notion of ideas : when i all along distinguish the way of reason , by deducing one thing from another , from your way of certainty , in the agreement and disagreement of ideas ; and i therefore mention it as an argument of your own departing from your beloved notion of ideas . i never said any thing against reason rightly managing ideas , so as to produce evidence by them . i was glad you came so far towards my own apprehension as to the use of ideas , and i declare soon after that if you mean no more by your certainty from ideas , but a certainty from reason , i was not so unreasonable a man to disagree with you . and yet you spend many pages to justifie your use of the term ideas : which is all lost upon me . for in short , it is not your way of ideas , but your way of certainty by ideas , which i was unsatisfied about , and am so much the more by the method you have taken to defend your self . and this was the thing i found fault with , as you could not but see ; but you found it much easier to run into a long discourse , to no purpose , about the use of the word ideas . how far your use of the term is new i will not dispute with you ; be it new or old the thing you do pretend to by your ideas is that which i disliked , and am forced to do so still ; for you give me no manner of satisfaction about it , as will appear by the examination of what you say , about the new method of certainty , which is the matter in question : you desire to know whether there be any other or older method of certainty ? that is not the point , but whether yours be any at all ? which i deny . if there be no older , you say , the world is obliged to you for this new one : very true , if it were what it pretends . but you tell me , i ought to set the world right in a thing of that great concernment , and to overthrow yours , and thereby prevent the dangerous consequence of your unseasonable starting this new method of certainty . i did never pretend to inform the world of new methods , and therefore am not bound to go any farther than to that i found fault with , which was your new method ; and although i thought i had said enough before , to shew how far it was from what it pretended ; yet because you call me to it in such a manner , i shall endeavour more freely to represent to you the vnsatisfactoriness and inconsistency of it . for it is still to me a strange thing , that you should talk so much of a new method of certainty by ideas ; and yet allow , as you do , such a want of ideas , so much imperfection in them , and such a want of connexion between our ideas , and the things themselves . one would think , that he that owned these things rather design'd to prove there could be no certainty by ideas . and when i had objected these things in the conclusion of my former answer , you do not deny them ; and all the return you make is , that it is better to have some way of certainty ( though it will not lead us to it in every thing ) than no way at all . as though the dispute between us had been , whether any certainty be not better than none . no doubt any true certainty is desirable , but it is , as i have often said , of ill consequence to set up such a method of certainty , as if it hold , will overthrow our faith , and if it doth not , must deceive all those that follow it . and it is the certainty of faith which i defend against your pretended certainty of knowledge . but to let you see what ground i had to be unsatisfied with it , i shall now wave all the instances of ideas i insisted on before , as to substances and sensible qualities ; and i shall single out one remarkable idea , by which the uncertainty of your way of ideas will be fully discover'd . and that is the idea of space ; upon which a famous systeme of natural philosophy hath been built , and as upon a clear and distinct idea ; and yet you will by no means allow it to be so ; and think you have a clear idea to the contrary ; although those who will not allow it to be true cannot deny it to be consistent with it self , and that the ideas in it have an agreement with one another . as to space , you say , that we have it both by sight and touch , which inform us of the distance between bodies : which in several respects may be called distance , capacity and extension ; and so extension , you say , is an idea belonging to body only , but space may , as is evident , be consider'd without it . but here now arises a great difficulty to me in the way of certainty by ideas : viz. that some very thinking men in this way of ideas , have look'd on the idea of space , and extended matter to be the same ; for say they , it appears to us from clear ideas , that body and extension are the same thing , and therefore if there be extension in space there must be body . but , you say , those that do so , either change the signification of words , and so render it a doubtfull idea , or they confound very different ideas with one another , and so can never come to certainty by the agreement or disagreement of ideas . but you conclude , that the clear and distinct idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body . here we see you pretend to a clear and distinct idea . but it falls out very unluckily for the way of ideas , that the first starter of this way of certainty is as positive , that the idea of space and extended body are the same . so that here we have clear and distinct ideas both ways . and is not this an admirable method of certainty , when in one of the plainest ideas which depend upon our senses , the greatest defenders of ideas differ so fundamentally . what can other men hope for in this way of ideas , if such men can agree no better in one of the most evident to our senses ? but then we must consider , who hath the better reason ? this is not certainty by ideas , but by reason upon them , which is another thing : let us go to reason . is that reason built only on some intermediate idea , which makes it clear ? i find intermediate ideas on both sides , and urged with equal assurance . des cartes saith , that from extension we rightly conclude a body to be a substance ; because it is a repugnancy that there should be an extension of nothing ; and therefore , if there be extension in space there must be body . and he proves it from the idea of body ; for , if we cast off all such things as are not necessary to body , as hardness , colour , gravity , heat , and cold , and all other qualities , we shall find nothing to remain but extension , and therefore nothing but extension is in the idea of body , which being likewise in space the idea of body and space are the same . but say you on the other side , i appeal to every man 's own thoughts , whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity , as it is from the idea of a scarlet colour . 't is true , that solidity cannot exist without extension ; but this hinders not but they are distinct ideas . one appeals to thoughts , and the other to reason : had des cartes no thoughts ? yet his reason convinced him , that whatever thoughts he had , he must be perswaded by reason , which was the true idea . you say , that is a clear and distinct idea that a man's thoughts dictate to him to be so . no , saith des cartes , that only is the true idea , which a man comes to by the exercise of his reason ; and he look'd upon those others as meer ideas of imagination , and not rational ideas . so that here we have another work to do , and that no easie one , which is to distinguish the ideas of imagination from those of reason : and what way have you laid down to prevent so great a mistake ? of what rules have you to judge , how far imagination is to be allowed in the matter of ideas ? for in all objects of sense the impression is made upon the imagination ; which is the seat of ideas , that come in by sensation . now here lies a very considerable difficulty , how far reason is to judge of these ideas or imagination ? for if all our simple ideas of things without us come in by sensation , then one would think those ideas are to be allow'd which come in that way ; and so the impressions of fancy are to be the standard and rule of certainty , which i think you will not affirm . but what rule then have you when , and where , and how far , you are to correct the erroneous ideas of imagination ? i cannot deny but you were sensible of the difficulty from the ideas of imagination , and thus you propose it . to what purpose is all this stir ? knowledge , say you , is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas , but who knows what those ideas may be ? is there any thing so extravagant as the imagination of men's brains ? where is the head that hath no chimaera's in it ? or if there be a sober and wise man , what difference will there be by your rules between his knowledge , and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world : they both have their ideas , and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another . let us now consider the answer you give to it , and by that we shall better judge of your way of certainty . your general answer is , that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in our fancies , our assurance would go no farther than that of dreams , or the visions of a heated fancy . but our knowledge is real , only so far , as there is a conformity between our ideas , and the reality of things . all this is undoubtedly true . but you say , how shall the mind , when it perceives nothing but its own ideas , know that they agree with things themselves ? there indeed lies the difficulty , but how do you remove it ? there are two sorts of ideas , you say , we may be sure , agree with things . and these are worth the knowing . . the first are simple ideas , which since the mind can by no means make to it self , must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way . and producing therein those perceptions which by the wisdom and will of our maker they are adapted to . from whence it follows , that simple ideas are not fictions of our minds . all that can be proved from hence is no more , but that the objects of our senses do make those impressions upon them , that from them we may be certain there are such things without us , which produce those impressions . and this is all you mean when you say , that you are certain these ideas are no fictions of our brains . but let us apply this to the present case . our senses truly inform us of a distance between bodies ; and so far we are certain of an idea of space , but the question about the idea of space goes farther ; viz. whether the idea of space imply something or nothing ? how can nothing be extended ? if it be something extended it must be body ; and so space and body are the same . and so your simple ideas give no manner of satisfaction in this matter . . all our complex ideas , except those of substances , you say , being archetypes of the mind 's own making , not referr'd to the existence of any thing , cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge ; for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self , can never be capable of a wrong representation , nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing by its dislikeness to it . where are we now ? what in the way to certainty still ? methinks it seems to be too intricate and winding to be that plain way . what is meant by these archetypes in the mind which cannot deceive us ? i confess here are such things said in order to certainty , which are above my understanding , if taken with respect to things ; as how we cannot but be infallibly certain , that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real , and reaches things themselves , and yet they are archetypes of the mind 's own making , not intended to be the copies of any thing , nor referr'd to the existence of any thing . how can the certainty by these ideas reach the things themselves , if they are archetypes of the mind , not referr'd to the existence of any thing ? but i suppose all this is meant of mathematical truths , and so reaches not the case , which is concerning the certainty of our knowledge of things that really exist . . you say , there is another sort of complex ideas , which being referr'd to archetypes without us may differ from them , and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real . now these were the things we desired to be made certain in ; and to find out such rules as would make our knowledge real . but for all that i can see , the hopes of any criterion is quite lost , as to the point in question : how shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own ideas , know that they agree with the things themselves ? for upon these grounds we can have no certainty as to simple ideas , but only as to the power of making impressions on our senses ; but as to complex ideas as of substances , our knowledge about them may come short of being real , i. e. we cannot arrive to certainty about them in the way of ideas ; because , they may differ from the archetypes without us . and you confess , that our ideas are not very exact copies , and yet are the subjects of real , ( as far as we have any ) knowledge of them ; which will not be found to reach very far . but to make it real concerning substances , the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things . and if our complex ideas may deceive us as to the things from whence they are supposed to be taken , what an account of certainty in the way of ideas is here ? and yet you conclude this chapter in that triumphant manner ; i think i have shewn wherein it is that certainty , real certainty consists , which whatever it was to others was to me heretofore one of those desiderata's , which i found great want of : and for all that i can see may do so still . for here is nothing said to distinguish the strong impressions of fancy from the appearances of things , from that certainty of knowledge which comes from the things themselves . for , a confident opiniator will talk with greater assurance of the agreement and disagreement of things with his ideas ; than a man of far greater judgment and more modesty . and you have given us no rules to make a difference between opinion and rational certainty ; especially when the ideas of fancy are found to agree with one another . but i shall go a step farther to shew , that the agreement of ideas is no ground of certainty , and that from a supposition relating to the present case . we have seen how possible it is for an ingenious person skilled in the phaenomena of nature to contrive such an hypothesis , that one part may agree with another , so as that no discernible inconsistency may be found in it , and yet all this may be built on such a foundation , as cannot be consistent with your certainty by ideas ; nay , such as you are certain cannot be true . the hypothesis , i mean , is that of des cartes ; for allowing him his laws of motion , and his three elements , the phaenomena of nature , or the ideas of it agree with one another , and yet all this is built upon space being the same with body ; and consequently , that there can be no vacuum : upon which his laws of motion , and his solution of the phaenomena is all built . and therefore , when a learned man of our own objected that to him , and thought it of no great consequence to his philosophy ; he replied with some smartness , that he was mistaken , for he took it for one of the most certain principles of his philosophy . what certainty then can there be in ideas , when so absurd a principle as that shall be look'd on by so great a man , as so certain a thing in the way of ideas , as to build his whole system of natural philosophy upon it ? and his followers to this day stifly defend it , who are otherwise ingenious men. nothing now remains to be answer'd in your second letter , but what relates to the defence of what i had said in my book concerning nature and person . for i cannot but observe , that instead of clearing some pressing difficulties in my answer to your former letter , you run back to my book , and begin a new critique upon that part of it ; and take in the help of some ingenious persons of your acquaintance , to whom i must shew so much civility as to take notice of their objections . which i shall the rather do , because the doctrine of the trinity is expressed in the first article of our religion by one nature and three persons , and so it hath been understood by the christian church long before . and it is the sense of the christian church which i am bound to defend , and no particular opinions of my own . you tell me , that there hath not been one of your acquaintance who owned that he understood my meaning ; but confessed that the farther he look'd into what i had said , the more he was at a loss about nature and person . but i hope i am not to answer for other men's want of understanding in these matters : which requires greater application of mind , than most men are willing to allow themselves about them . but i am to judge no otherwise of their sense and capacity , than as you have represented them . one said i began with giving two significations of the word nature ; one of them , as it stood for properties ; and this he understood ; but the other wherein nature was taken for the thing it self , wherein those properties were , he said he did not understand . but he said he was not very well acquainted with greek , and aristotle was brought to explain and settle the sense of nature . but why did not this gentleman in the first place consider what it was i undertook to shew , which was , that we had an idea of nature , which came not in by our senses ; and in the very next words i said , that nature and substance are of an equal extent ; and so , that which is the subject of powers and properties is the nature , whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual substances . and although by sensation and reflection we know the powers and properties of things ; yet it is by reason we are satisfied there must be such a nature or substance , because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . methinks if the gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him , you should have helped him out by your relative ideas : for hard things go down much better with some men's minds in the way of ideas , ( which is a sort of gilding the pills ) and i doubt not but you could have satisfied him , that the understanding may by virtue of a relative idea be very well satisfied of the being of nature , as well as substance , when i declared that i took them to be of equal extent ; as they were the subject of powers and properties . but he saith , that this he understood not , because nature extended to things that were not substances . did i not say , that nature was sometimes taken only for properties , but that there must be another sense proved , because there must be a subject wherein these properties are , and in that respect , i said , that nature and substance were of equal extent . but he doth not understand the deduction ; aristotle takes nature for a corporeal substance , therefore nature and substance are of an equal extent . what a hard fate doth that man lie under , that falls into the hands of a severe critick ! he must have a care of his but , and for , and them , and it ; for the least ambiguity in any of these will fill up pages in an answer , and make a book look considerable for the bulk of it . and what must a man do , who is to answer to all such objections about the use of particles ? but let any indifferent reader judge , how i am used in this place . my words are sometimes nature is taken for the thing it self in which those properties are ; and so aristotle took nature for a corporeal substance , which had the principles of motion in it self ; but nature and substance are of an equal extent . doth not any man of common sense see , that i oppose this to aristotle's sense of nature for a corporeal substance ? he confines it to that only ; i say , that it is of equal extent with substance whether bodily or spiritual : and those very words follow after . if you had really such a conversation with a gentleman , i am sorry for him ; and i think you did not deal so like a gentleman by him , to expose him thus to the world. but i perceive he is a philosopher too ; for he proves , that aristotle 's notion of nature for a corporeal substance will not hold . did i ever say that it would ? i am far enough from thinking , that a corporeal substance hath a principle of motion from it self ; but might not i mention aristotle's taking nature for a substance , although i presently add , his sense was too short and narrow , because nature and substance were of equal extent ? but did not his notion of nature imply that it was a principle of motion in it self ? whatever aristotle thought , the notion of nature doth not depend upon a principle of motion from it self ; but it was considered , not as in it self as the cause , but in it self as the subject . and that philosophical gentleman might be pleased to consider , that aristotle did not make motion to arise from matter , but asserted it to come from a first mover , and said , that those philosophers talked like men not well in their wits , who attributed motion to matter of it self ; as i could easily prove , if it were needful . and methinks you should not have been such a stranger to aristotle , to let your acquaintance run into such blunders , and then to print them for them . but the gentleman is farther plunged and knows not how to get out . he cannot for his life understand nature to be substance and substance to be nature ? where lies the difficulty ? is the repugnancy , in the words , or in the sense ? not in the words or sense either in greek or latin. for the greek , ( if i may have leave to mention that language in this case ) those who have been very well acquainted with the force of words therein , have made nature of the same importance with substance . so hesychius renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , substance ; but i shall not bring the testimony of criticks but of philosophers . and aristotle may be allowed to understand his own language , he saith positively , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; every substance is called nature , and the reason he gives for it is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because nature is a substance . it may be said , that aristotle said this , because he took nature for such a substance as had the power of motion in it self ; i do not deny , but he look'd on that as the proper acception of nature ; but from hence it follows , that whatever substance had such a principle of motion in it self was truly and properly nature ; not as exclusive of a superiour principle of motion , but as having an internal self-moving principle . and herein aristotle differed from some modern philosophers , who make all motion to come from the impulse of another body , and to be a meer mode of matter continued from one body to another . i confess aristotle was of another opinion from those gentlemen , and look'd on motion as an effect of an inward principle ; and not meerly of an external impulse : but whether aristotle were mistaken herein is not the question ; and it is possible he was not ; however , it plainly appears , that substance with a power of motion in it self , and nature , had the same sense ; and none of those who have been the most severe criticks upon aristotle have disputed , that i remember , against this sense of nature in him . one of them finds this fault , that it was but a repetition of what he had said in his physicks ; where he doth likewise treat of the sense of nature . and there he takes it for such a substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self and by it self ; which he opposes to artificial things , as a bed or a garment . and as much as this definition hath been run down by some men , if we set aside some affected obscurity in his philosophical writings , there is no such absurdity in it ; when he explains himself not to understand it of meer local motion , or change of place , but of all alterations incident to bodies . so that nature in his sense , was a substance endued with a principle of life and action . and all those things which did partake of nature in this sense , he said , were substances ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for nature is always a subject and in a subject ; i. e. the substance it self is nature , and that which is in it is according to nature . and this sense of aristotle plutarch relies upon , as the true notion of nature which he saith is the principle of motion and rest ; because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it : but plutarch by no means approves of those mens opinion who made nature to be an original self-moving principle ; for , saith he , matter of it self cannot move without an efficient cause , no more than any metal can frame it self into a particular form without an artificer . from whence we see that aristotle's notion of nature was very consistent with an efficient cause of nature . but your gentleman saith , that to those who admit not matter and motion to be eternal , no nature in that sense will be left , since nature is said to be a corporeal substance which hath the principles of motion in it self , and such a sort of corporeal substance those men have no notion of at all , and consequently none of nature , which is such a corporeal substance . but if aristotle did not suppose matter to move it self , without an efficient cause , ( as certainly he did not ) then all this falls to the ground , and his notion of nature for a substantial principle of life and action may remain good . but it may be said , that this was one of his singular notions , and that no other philosophers took it so . which is so far from being true , that a great enemy of aristotle's confesses , that the name of nature among the writers before him extended to all kinds of beings , and not only to individual but to specifick natures . aristotle's fault lay in applying nature only to corporeal substances ; and whatever was above them he look'd on as above nature ; but the pythagoreans and platonists took nature to extend to spiritual as well as bodily substances . which appears by timaeus locrus his book of nature ; in the beginning whereof he divides things into two kinds , intellectual and corporeal ; and the former , whose nature was more excellent , he derives immediately from the best principle , viz. god himself . but to make this plainer , we are to consider , that there were four opinions , among the old philosophers about nature . some held nature to be the same with matter , and attributed the beginning of all things to that alone ; such were the followers of anaximander and democritus . others rejected this doctrine as absurd and impious , and held a divine being above matter , which gave the beginning to motion and framed the world , and they asserted spiritual as well as corporeal natures , and these were the followers of pythagoras and anaxagoras . others asserted the beginning of motion and of the world from a first cause ; but confined the sense of nature to the course of things established in this visible world by an universal providence at first . and this was the notion of aristotle and his followers to the time of strato who attributed all to meer nature . lastly , there were some who made nature to be the first principle which formed all things ; which sometimes they called god , and sometimes nature , as is obvious in all the writings of the stoicks ; vis illum naturam vocare ? non peccabis ; saith seneca : and in another place , quid aliud est natura , quam deus & divina ratio ? and again , nec deus sine naturâ est , nec natura sine deo , sed idem est utrumque , which he elsewhere calls , incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex . with which balbus in cicero agrees , when he defines nature from zeno , to be an intelligent fire that produces all things . for what he calls ignem artificiosum ad gignendum , &c. laertius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and it is called in cicero , natura artifex , consultrix & provida , &c. which can agree to nothing but a spiritual substance ; and when he explains what nature is , he saith , that epicurus called all by the name of nature ; and divided it into matter and vacuity and the accidents of both : but we ( saith he of the stoicks ) by nature understand no inanimate things which have no principle within to unite them , as earth and stones ; but a living substance , as an animal , in which is no chance , but order and contrivance . and so plato said , that nature ordered all things with reason and vnderstanding . by which he understood the divide being . if we come lower down among the philosophers , we shall find nature taken for a principle of life . so sextus empiricus distinguishes the union of matter in stones and wood from that which is in plants , and this he calls nature , which is the lowest degree of it ; for afterwards , he speaks of rational and intellectual natures , and places god in the head of them . antoninus distinguishes nature in plants from a heap of the particles of matter in wood and stone . but in another place he distinguishes that which is meer nature in man , viz. what he hath in common with plants , from the nature of an animal in him ; and that again from the nature of a rational creature in him . here indeed he speaks of the properties of those natures ; but he still supposes , that where they are separate , they are founded in distinct substances . so that i hope , if the philosophers of old , of all kinds did understand the sense of nature and substance , the gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory humour of saying , that for his life he cannot understand nature to be substance , nor substance to be nature . for they all agreed in this , however they differed in their opinions of nature . but i have something farther to add concerning the sense of the christian church in this matter ; which i think is by no means to be despised . it is observed by damascen , that some of the philosophers made this difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that the former was taken for simple essence , but the latter for essence with a specifical difference ; but that the christian writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one , as an angel , a man , a horse , &c. so st. chrysostom calls angels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , st. basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but they all agree , that incorporeal and invisible substances are real natures . and the reason damascen gives is , that they have both the same original ( and you know that it is a good way to find out the true idea ) for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , both which are the same . so that if real existence belong to substance , and nature hath its name from thence too , then substance and nature must be of the same importance . and this notion of nature they do not take up meerly from the etymology of the word , but from the sense of it in scripture ; as when st. paul saith , they worshipped those which by nature are no gods ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the alexandrian copy hath it more clearly ; i. e. which are not really and substantially gods. they had the names of gods , and the divine properties were attributed to them ; but because they had not the divine essence , they are said not to be gods by nature . and what sense would this gentleman make of the apostle's words , who cannot for his life understand that nature is the same with substance ? he must understand this only of the properties which belong to god. but these properties must be somewhere , and so a substance must be supposed as the subject of them ; and what reason can there be to exclude that which is the subject of those properties ? for there must be a divine being , as well as properties ; and that being must have essential properties belonging to it ; and what imaginable reason can there be , why that should not be called the divine nature ? and if it be , then substance and nature are the same . i might easily pursue this farther , but i design to bring things into as little a compass as i can . but it may be there is something in our own language which hinders nature from being taken for a substance ; and for this i appeal to a late ingenious and honourable person and philosopher of our own ; i mean mr. boyle , who hath written a philosophical enquiry into the notion of nature ; and he tells us of the various acceptations of it . ( . ) for the author of nature . ( . ) for the essence of a thing . ( . ) for what comes to men by birth ; as a man is noble by nature . ( . ) for an internal principle of motion : as that a stone is carried downwards by nature . ( . ) for the established course of things ; as that nature makes the night to succeed the day . ( . ) for an aggregate of powers belonging to a living body ; as that nature is strong or weak . ( . ) for the system of the universe ; as when we say of a chimaera , there is no such thing in nature . ( . ) for a semi-deity ; which is the notion he opposes . but we may observe , that he allows god and all the real beings of the vniverse to have nature belonging to them ; and he saith , the word essence is of great affinity to it , if not of an adequate import . but the real essence of a thing is a substance ; and therefore nature and substance are of the like importance . the next thing fit to be considered is , how far your certainty by ideas and the certainty by reason differ from each other . the occasion of this debate stands thus . i had said in my book , that i granted , that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our reason is satisfied , that there must be something beyond these , because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves . so that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason and not to meer ideas . in answer to this you said , that you can find no opposition between ideas and reason ; but ideas are the objects of the vnderstanding , and vnderstanding is one of the faculties imployed about them . to which i replied , no doubt of it . but you might easily see , that by reason i understood principles of reason , allow'd by mankind ; which i think are very different from ideas . but i perceive reason in this sense is a thing you have no idea of , or one as obscure as that of substance . if there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the manner of expression , i do not go about to defend it ; but the worst of it is , that your idea of reason is as obscure as that of substance . and whether there were not a just occasion for it , the reader must judge when the faculty was put for the principles of reason . could any man judge otherwise , but that you had a very obscure idea of reason , who could mistake the vnderstanding for it ? but reason , you say , taken for the faculty is as different from ideas in your apprehension . but what is that to the point in dispute , whether the notion of nature be to be taken from ideas or from reason ? you say , the vnderstanding is imploy'd about them . and what then ? i shewed that the nature of things belongs to reason and not to bare ideas ; because ideas come in by sensation and reflection ; by which we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but we cannot come to know the notion of nature as the subject of them , but by this reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves . and is this no more than to say , the vnderstanding is imployed about ideas ? but now you answer farther , that if reason be taken for the faculty or the principles of reason allowed by mankind , reason and ideas may consist together . this leads me to the examination of that which may be of some use , viz. to shew the difference of your method of certainty by ideas , and the method of certainty by reason . and the way of certainty by reason lies in two things ; . the certainty of principles . . the certainty of deductions . as to the former , the gentleman your defender in your book saith , that in your essay , in more places than one , you have spoken , and that pretty largely of self-evident propositions and maxims ; so that if i have ever read them , i cannot doubt , but you have ideas of those common principles of reason . what ideas you have of them must appear from your book . and i do there find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims ; which i cannot but think extraordinary for the design of it ; which is thus summed up in the conclusion , viz. that it was to shew , that these maxims , as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct ideas , so they are of dangerous use , where our ideas are not clear and distinct . and is not this a fair way to convince me that your way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason ; when the way of reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon general principles ; and you assert them to be vseless and dangerous . your first design you say is to prove , that the consideration of these general maxims can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of knowledge ; which overthrows all that which hath been accounted science and demonstration , and must lay the foundation of scepticism . because our true grounds of certainty depend upon some general principle of reason . to make this plain , i shall put a case grounded upon your words , which are , that you have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually denied that they are men. these words , i. s. understands as spoken of themselves , and charges them with very ill consequences ; but i think they are capable of another meaning : however , let us put the case that men did in earnest question , whether they were men or not ; and then i do not see , if you set aside general maxims , how you can convince them that they are men. for , the way i look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical men , is by general maxims and principles of reason . as in the first place , that nothing can have no properties ; which i take to be the fundamental principle of certainty , as to real beings . for , all our inward perceptions are only of some acts or properties , as of thinking , doubting , reasoning , &c. and if a man proceeds so far as to question every thing , in order to the discovering the true ground of certainty , he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some modes of being ; but that which he aims at is , satisfaction as to his real existence . but this wholly depends upon the truth and certainty of this fundamental maxim ; that nothing can have no operations ; and therefore , whatever thinks , or doubts , or reasons , must certainly be . and since by another fundamental maxim , it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ; he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own existence . it may be said , that this reaches only to bare existence , and not to the being men. i answer , that for the certainty as to that , there are other general maxims of necessary use ; as , that all different sorts of beings are distinguished by essential properties ; that the essential properties of a man are to reason , discourse , &c. that these properties cannot subsist by themselves without a real substance : and therefore , where these properties are found , those who have them must be real and substantial men. you may possibly say , that these maxims are useless , because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us , than our own existence ; and that we have an internal infallible perception that we are . but i answer , that these maxims do not at all appear to be useless , because the certainty we enquire after is a certainty of reason , and not of bare perception . and if it be a certainty of reason , some ground of reason must be assigned for it : but all that the perception reaches to , are those acts mention'd by you . i think , i reason , i feel pleasure and pain : but the question goes farther as to the subject of those acts , and the nature of that subject , whether it be a man or not . now here lies the main difficulty , whether without the help of these principles you can prove to any that doubt , that they are men ? and i shall now shew , that in your way of ideas you cannot . for , ( ) you suppose that we must have a clear distinct idea of that which we are certain of in the way of ideas . ( ) you deny that we have any such clear and distinct idea of man. . you suppose , that we must have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of . for in your chapter of maxims , you say , that every one knows the ideas that he has , and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another . which always being so ( i pray mark that , and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty ) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind , that it is there , and is that idea it is , and that two distinct ideas when they are in his mind are there , and are not one and the same idea : from whence you infer the necessity of certainty , when the ideas are clear and distinct . this is so plain and clear , that i wonder how you came to forget it , and to think that i did you wrong when i charged you with holding clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty . but of that in the beginning of this discourse . . but let us now examine your idea of man , whether that be clear and distinct or not ; and if not , then according to your principles very rational men cannot be certain that they are men. for if they have no way of certainty but by ideas , and you allow no clear and distinct idea of man , then they can come to no certainty ; and i hope you will not deny them to be very rational men , if they follow the way of ideas . first , you shew , that there can be no demonstration in the way of principles what man is . secondly , that there are very different ideas of man , some , you say , make the idea of a man without a soul ; as children do . others add laughter and rational discourse , and these may demonstrate by general principles that ideots and infants are no men by this maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ; and you have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually denied that they are men. others take in the idea of body in general , and the powers of language and reason , and leave out shape ; and so a man may be a four-footed creature , or in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined , that was a man. but where is the clear and distinct idea of a man all this while ? we can have no certainty by principles , you say , and you offer none in the way of ideas ; for the ideas are very confused , imperfect and repugnant to each other ; and so in this new method of certainty by ideas , we cannot be so much as certain that we are men. but is it possible to suppose , that a rational man should talk of certainty by ideas , and not be able to fix the idea of a man ? one would have thought this had been only an omission in this place out of pure zeal against principles ; but certainly in other places this idea of a man must be made clear and distinct . so far from it , that in other places , you industriously set your self to disprove the common idea of a man. it could not possibly be , say you , that the abstract idea to which the name man is given , should be different in several men , if it were of natures making ; and that to one it should be animal rationale ; to another animal implume bipes latis unguibus . from whence it is plain , that you allow no clear and distinct idea of man ; and you endeavour to expose the sacred definition , as you call it , of animal rationale ; which was never exposed by any man without cause . but you conclude , that we are far from knowing certainly what man is ; though perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to doubt about it . and yet you think you may say , that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined , and the precise number of simple ideas , which make that nominal essence so far from being setled and perfectly known , that very material doubts may still arise about it . so that i begin to think i. s. was in the right , when he made you say , that you had discoursed with very rational men who denied themselves to be men. but this is a little too hard to deny themselves to be men. if it had been only , who doubted whether they were men or not ; you could not deny them to be very rational men , because they went upon your grounds , that we can have no certainty either by principles , or by any clear and distinct ideas , what a man is . thus i have shew'd how inconsistent your way of ideas is with true certainty ; and of what use and necessity these general principles of reason are . i now come to the certainty of reason in making deductions . and here i shall briefly lay down the grounds of certainty , which the ancient philosophers went upon , and then compare your way of ideas with them . aristotle observes , that socrates first brought in definitions and inductions in order to certainty ; and went no farther . plato allowed no certainty , but only opinion , as to external objects ; but he said ▪ that certainty depended upon abstract and separate ideas , which were always the same . this he took , ( as i observed in my former letter ) from the pythagoreans , only changing numbers into ideas . for by numbers , they understood first principles , not gross and material ; but immaterial and eternal , as iamblichus saith ; and therefore moderatus gaditanus , one of the most understanding men among them saith , the pythagoreans brought in numbers , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for a more decent way of instruction , following the practice of geometricians , who make use of figures to represent things to the mind ; and therefore their doctrine of numbers was the philosophy of principles , or the general grounds of certainty ; but this was so abstruse and so little understood , that it soon lost its reputation , as porphyry observes , or was mixed with plantonism ; and therefore photinus joins the pythagorean and platonick principles together . but aristotle was a great enemy to these abstracted speculations , and therefore set himself so much on all occasions against ideas and numbers , especially in his metaphysicks . but instead thereof , he endeavour'd to bring down certainty to material things , and to real beings . in order to this , he saw it necessary to avoid confusion , by explaining doubtfull terms , and by ranking things under several heads , which he called categories ; wherein all things are reduced to substance , and accidents belonging to them ; to which he joins some general discourses about the right apprehension of things simply consider'd . but it is observable , that in all the categories from archytas the pythagorean downwards , ( who first placed them in that order , ) substance was first ranked , as the most proper idea of the mind , and all accidents or modes were consider'd with respect to that . and the french cartesians in their logick , place substance as the first object of their ideas : and do not leave us a relative idea , to be supposed only , because accidents cannot subsist without a subject . then follows the way of understanding the truth and falshood of propositions ; after which , he pursues the way of reasoning , or inferring one thing from another , which he calls syllogizing , wherein he professes to go upon this common principle of reason , that what things do agree in a third must agree among themselves . but being not content with the ordinary dialectical way , which proceeded upon the concessions of the party , he attempted to bring in true demonstration . to which he supposes general axioms necessary , and definitions , and postulata : and he distinguishes between a necessary conclusion , and a demonstration ; for the former may arise from the manner of reasoning ; but a demonstration supposes a necessary cause , and that the propositions are such as that the conclusion necessarily follows from them . so that demonstration according to him must be of an inseparable property , and by the most immediate and necessary cause . how far aristotle's notion of demonstration can be applied to physical matters is not my business to enquire ; it being only to shew what his method of certainty was . but besides aristotle , the stoicks took upon them to lay down the true method of certainty ; and they went another way to work about it , viz. ( . ) by finding out the criterion of truth and falshood . ( . ) by examining the consequences and deductions of reason . as to things which had some degree of evidence to sense or reason , they made the criterion necessary , but for those which had not , but must be proved , the examination of that proof was necessary in order to certainty . the criterion was agreed to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the measure whereby we are to judge of things . but as in the use of balances for weight , there must be one to hold them , and the balances themselves , and the position of them ; and as in the judging of a line , whether straight or crooked , there must be the artificer , the rule and the application of it ; so in judging of truth and falshood , there must be the faculty of understanding as the artificer , sense and reason as the rule ; and the inward ideas of the mind , which answer'd to the position of the balances , or the application of the rule . now that which they placed their notion of certainty in , was that inward and comprehensive idea , which was called by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if it were a weak assent , they called it opinion ; for they made the assent voluntary , notwithstanding the criterion ; but if it were a firm and immoveable assent , that they called knowledge and certainty . but besides these comprehensive ideas they did allow of common notions , which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or anticipations : of which arrian speaks ; and simplicius saith , they are those wherein all are agreed , and are planted in us by right reason , and confirmed by time and observation . as to the other part , they took great pains about the true signification of words , the rank and order of things , the nature and kind of propositions , and the difference of signs , whereof some were monitory , and others demonstrative . and the proving a thing uncertain , by something granted to be certain , was that which they called demonstration . according to the principles of the eleatick school , the most simple and natural way of reasoning was supposed to be by drawing consequences upon suppositions , and the way the stoicks took to judge of reasoning , was by judging what approached nearest to the first principles of reasoning ; such as that every thing we talk about either must be or not be ; and in such disjunct propositions , one part or other must be taken , and then a train of consequences follows . and plutarch , no friend to the stoicks , thinks this faculty of drawing consequences , lays the best foundation for demonstration . for the principle of it , he saith , is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the connex way of reasoning ; that is as simplicius explains it , when two things are so joyned together as antecedent and consequent , that by position of the antecedent , the consequent follows , and by taking away the consequent , the antecedent is removed . thus i have , in as few words , as i could , laid together those old methods of certainty , which have obtained greatest reputation in the world. but your way of certainty by ideas is so wholly new , that here we have no general principles ; no criterion , no antecedents and consequents ; no syllogistical methods of demonstration ; and yet we are told of a better way of certainty to be attained , meerly by the help of ideas . but how comes there to be such a way of certainty by ideas , and yet the ideas themselves are so uncertain and obscure ? i confess , that the more i look into it , the farther it appears to be from a way of certainty to me . for in your chapter of the improvement of knowledge , you have these words ; for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas , where they are imperfect , confused or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , perfect , or clear knowledge . and yet how often do you confess , that our ideas are imperfect , confused , and obscure ? how then is it possible to attain to any certainty by them ? and notwithstanding these plain words , you assert it over and over in your second letter , as appears in the beginning , that you do not place certainty in clear and distinct ideas , ( as i observed in the beginning . ) how can these things consist ? can certainty be had with imperfect and obscure ideas , and yet no certainty be had by them ? i cannot blame you for finding fault with common principles of reason , if both parts of a contradiction may be true : but i forbear . however i cannot but join other words of yours to shew how resolved you were to be inconsistent with your self : but obscure and confused ideas can never produce any clear or distinct knowledge ; because as far as any ideas are confused or obscure , so far the mind can never perceive clearly , whether thy agree or disagree . and yet in the same place , you say , that our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves . how is it possible for us to have a clear perception of the agreement of ideas , if the ideas themselves be not clear and distinct ? if the mind can never perceive clearly , the agreement or disagreement of obscure and confused ideas , how can its knowledge lie in the perception of that which is not to be perceived ? this is a thing which i cannot make consistent . but besides , i have another charge upon your way of certainty , viz. that you have no criterion to distinguish false and doubtfull ideas from true and certain ; how then can any man be secure that he is not imposed upon in this way of ideas ? the academicks went too far in the way to scepticism , but they differ'd from the scepticks in two things . . they asserted , that there was no absolute certainty to be had , which the scepticks would not . . they held a far greater probability in some things than others , and that men were bound to follow the greatest probability in what concern'd their own welfare : but the scepticks said , that they would do as others did , or follow inclination , and the laws of their country , but they held no opinion in their minds , as they said . the academicks went much upon ideas , or representations of things to their minds , but they did not proceed upon every idea , but they examin'd and weighed all the circumstances belonging to it , before they allow'd it to prevail upon them to give an assent as to a greater probability . carneades , one of the subtilest of them , as appears by sextus empiricus , distinguished a three-fold idea . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a probable idea ; which the academicks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for , said he , neither that which appears false of it self ; nor that which is true , but doth not appear so , can perswade a man's mind . and of those things which do appear to be true , some have a very slender appearance , others have a mighty strong one , and therein he placed his criterion . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an undistracted idea ; i. e. when no circumstances disturb or shake the first impression , so as to make us question the truth of it ; which sextus empiricus calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a concurrence of ideas and none disagreeing , and yet he would not allow this to be a ground of certainty but only of probability . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a well examin'd idea , by the best reason a man hath and the greatest application of mind . and this was the foundation of the highest probability a man's mind could reach to . now to apply this to your case ; you tell us of a way of certainty by ideas , and never offer any such method for examining them , as the academicks required for their probability . as for instance , your first idea which you go upon , is that of solidity , which , you say , of all others seems the most intimately connected with and essential to body : and therefore must be of great moment . solidity , you say , consists in repletion and resistence ; and by this idea of solidity the extension of body , you say , is distinguished from that of space ; so that of pure space and solidity you have clear and distinct ideas . now here in the way of certainty i have two questions to ask . . how this idea comes to be clear and distinct to you , when others who go in the same way of ideas have quite another idea of it , and think they have as plain and distinct an idea that the extension of space and body are the same ? now , what criterion is there to come to any certainty in this matter ? i see none so much as offer'd , but only that they seem to you to be clear and distinct , but to others the contrary . so that here we are at a loss as to any certainty in the way of ideas . and the blind man who fansied the idea of scarlet to be like the sound of a trumpet , could hardly be convinced of his error in the way of ideas . this you mention to shew the different ideas men may fall into ; which i think is enough to shew that they have no way to certainty in themselves , if it be possible for men , even for philosophical and rational men , to fall into such contrary ideas about the same thing ; and both sides think their ideas clear and distinct . . but i have another question to propose ; viz. whether by this idea of solidity we may come to know what it is ? this is a very reasonable question in the way of certainty , which is to lead us to the certain knowledge of things . i pray therefore tell me from your idea , what it is , and wherein it consists ? the question you suppose might be very well asked ; and you give a most satisfactory answer to it . if any ask me what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him . i had thought by the design of your book you would have sent him to his ideas for certainty ; and are we sent back again from our ideas to our senses ? what do these ideas signifie then ? but you say farther ; that if this be not a sufficient explication of solidity , you promise to tell him what it is , when he tells you , what thinking is , or explains to you what extension and motion are . are we not now in the true way of certainty ; when such things as these are given over , of which we have the clearest evidence by sensation and reflection ? for here you make it as impossible to come to certain , clear and distinct notions of these things , as to discourse into a blind man the ideas of light and colours . is not this a rare way of certainty ? thus i have shewed that you have no security against false and uncertain ideas , no criterion to judge them by ; no light into the nature of things by them , as will farther appear by what you say of the ideas of sensible qualities . to discover , say you , the nature of our ideas the better , and to discourse of them intelligibly , it will be convenient to distinguish them , as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds ; and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us : that so we may not think ( as perhaps is usually done ) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject : most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us , than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas , which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us . now here again our ideas deceive us , in the way of certainty . we desire to know something of the nature of those objects of which we have the ideas in our minds , because these we are told , will bring us to a certainty of knowledge . of what ? of what we feel ? no certainly , but of that which causes these inward perceptions . can we then by these ideas know the nature of things without us ? no , you say we cannot ; for most of those of sensation are no more the likeness of something without us , than names are for things which they stand for . so that these ideas are really nothing but names , if they be not representations of things ; and if they be not , how can we understand things by them ; and if we cannot , what certainty is attainable by them ? but i will do you no wrong ; and therefore i must consider what you say about demonstration : for it cannot be denied that you own the thing , although you deny it to be ex proecognitis & proeconcessis , and say , it is a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings . we must therefore examine your way of demonstration without principles . certainty , you say , depends so wholly on intuition , that in demonstrative knowledge , this intuition is necessary in all the connexion of the intermediate ideas , without which we cannot attain knowledge or certainty . by intuition you mean self-evidence . for you say , in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining , but perceives the truth as the eye doth light only by being directed towards it . for hence you must suppose self evidence to be in the ideas of your mind ; and that every intermediate idea which you take to demonstrate any thing by , must have a self-evident connexion with the other idea : which is such a way of demonstration , as the old philosophers never thought of . for upon this ground every demonstration carries its own light with it ; and can no more be questioned , than whether two and two make four ; and i would be glad to see any demonstration ( not about figures and numbers ) of this kind , which i think is not to be expected in the way of ideas . but because in this lies the chief point as to a way of certainty by ideas , i shall more carefully examine the grounds you proceed upon , and shew them to be very insufficient for the purpose you intend them . your principal ground is from mathematical demonstrations , and your examples are brought from them . but his is quite a different case from yours . for you grant , that those ideas on which mathematical demonstrations proceed , are wholly in the mind , and do not relate to the existence of things ; but our debate goes upon a certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing ; so that , although we should grant all that you say , about the intuition of ideas in mathematical demonstrations , yet it comes not at all to your business , unless you can prove that we have as clear and distinct ideas of beings , as we have of numbers and figures . and yet herein you are not consistent with your self ; for you design to prove demonstrations without general principles ; and yet every one knows , that general principles are supposed in mathematicks , and that person would be thought ridiculous , who should go about to prove , that general principles are of little , or of dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations . and so in morality , which you place among the sciences capable of demonstration ; you confess , that the way of demonstration therein is from principles , as those of the mathematicks , by necessary consequences . this is a very intelligible way of demonstration : but how then comes it to pass , that in the way of certainty by ideas as to other points of knowledge , you deny general maxims to be the foundation we are to proceed upon ? and the method you lay down , is this , that ideas of particular things are first in the mind , which are first received and distinguished , and so knowledge got by them ; but general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind , which carry difficulty with them ; but that it is true of our particular distinct ideas , that they are all known by their native evidence , are wholly independent , receive no light , nor are capable of proof one from another ; much less the more particular from the more general , or the more simple from the more compounded , the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar , and the easier and earlier apprehended . but which ever be the clearest ideas , the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this , that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea , and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be two different ideas . for when a man has in his vnderstanding the ideas of one and of two , the idea of yellow and of blue , he cannot but certainly know , that this idea of one is the idea of one , and not the idea of two ; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow , and not of blue . for a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind , which he has distinct ; that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time , which is a contradiction : and to have none distinct is to have no use of our faculties , to have no knowledge at all . and therefore , what idea soever is affirmed of it self ; or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another , the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition , as infallibly true , assoon as it understands the terms without hesitation , or need of proof , or regarding those made in more general terms , and called maxims . these are your own words , which i have set down at large , that you may not complain that i misrepresent your sense . and if i understand the force of them , you take off the way of demonstration from general principles and consequences deduced from them , and place it in the self-evidence of ideas . but that it is impossible to come to a demonstration about real beings , in this way of intuition of ideas , i shall now make appear from your self , which will farther discover the inconsistency of your notion of ideas . and the reasons i go upon are these ; . that you confess , that some of the most obvious ideas are far from being self-evident . . that there may be contradictory opinions about some ideas , which you account most clear and distinct . . that granting the ideas to be true , there is no self-evidence of the connexion of them , which is necessary to make a demonstration . . that some of the most obvious ideas , are far from being self-evident by your own confession . among these you cannot deny those of matter and motion , of time and duration , and of light , to be very considerable . but i shall prove from your self , that we can have no intuition of these things , which are so obvious to us ; and consequently can have no self-evident ideas of them . as to the idea of matter : that you tell us , consists in a solid substance every where the same ; and a body is a solid extended figured substance . now there are two things concerning matter , which i would be glad to come to a certain knowledge of . and those are , . the manner of cohesion of the parts of matter , concerning which you have these words . for since no body is no farther , nor otherwise extended , than by the vnion and cohesion of its solid parts , we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body , without understanding , wherein consists the vnion and cohesion of its parts , which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking , and how it is performed . i would have any one intelligibly explain to me , how the parts of gold or brass ( that but now in fusion were as loose from one another , as the particles of water , or the sands of an hour-glass ) come in a few moments to be so united , and adhere so strongly one to another , that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them . a considering man will i suppose be here at a loss , to satisfie his own or another man's vnderstanding . and can you then imagine that we have intuition into the idea of matter ? or that it is possible to come to a demonstration about it by the help of any intervening idea ? the idea of solidity , or firm cohesion of parts cannot be said to come from the idea of matter it self , for then there could be no such thing as fluid matter . whence then comes the distinction between these ideas of solid and fluid matter ? that there is such a cohesion of the solid parts of matter is evident : now what other ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident , how this solidity and matter came to have this agreement with each other ? is it by the density or compactedness of the matter in a little compass ? but that is as hard to give an account of ; viz. how some parts of matter come to take up so much less room , and to stick closer than others . is it by bare rest of the parts ? but how comes the resistance of solid bodies to come only from rest ? is it from the pressure of the ambient air ? no you say , that in truth the pressure of an ambient fluid how great soever , can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter . so that we are not to look for any thing like a demonstration of the cohesion of the parts of matter . . and as little are we to expect it , as to the divisibility of it ; which was the other thing i hoped to find demonstrated in the way of ideas . for you tell us , that the notion of body is cumbred with some difficulties which are very hard , and perhaps impossible to be explained , or understood by us . and among these you particularly instance in the divisibility of matter ; which you say , whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum , it involves us in consequences , impossible to be explicated or made consistent . consequences that carry greater difficulty , and more apparent absurdity than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance . so that i think it is vain to expect a demonstration in the way of ideas as to this matter . the next is that of motion . concerning which you tell us , that the definition of the schools is exquisite iargon : that of the atomists is but putting one synonymous word for another ; viz. that motion is a passage from one place to another : for passage may as well be defined a motion from one place to another . and the cartesian definition , that it is the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another , will not prove a much better definition of motion when well examin'd . and what is there so evident as motion ? so that if our ideas fail us in so plain a case , what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our senses ? as to time and duration , you say , that the answer of a great man ( to one who asked what time was , si non rogas , intelligo , which amounts to this , the more i set my self to consider it , the less i understand it ) might perhaps perswade one , that time , which reveals all other things , is it self not to be discover'd . this shews , that there is no self-evident idea of time. but here you offer to furnish us with as clear and distinct ideas , as of many other which are thought much less obscure . however , then it is plain , that we have not the knowledge by intuition , but by rational deduction . for you proceed from the idea of succession , to that of duration ; by observing a distance in the parts of succession ; and then from observing periodical motions , we get ideas of the measures of duration , as minutes , hours , days , years , &c. from hence we proceed to imagine duration not yet come ; and such to which we can always add ; from which comes the idea of eternity : and by considering any part of duration with periodical measures , we come to the idea of what we call time in general . so that the idea of time in general is so far from being known by intuition , that many steps are to be taken in order to it ; and some such as one would hardly have thought of . as how the idea of succession should arise from a train of ideas in our minds : you say it is , because we have no perception of duration , but by considering the train of ideas , that take their turns in our vnderstandings . what think you of those people that fail'd not in reckoning the succession of time right for many years together by knots , and notches on sticks , and figures , without ever so much as thinking of ideas , or any thing like them ? but besides , such arbitrary measures of time , what need any recourse to ideas , when the returns of days and months and years by the planetary motions , are so easie and so universal ? if a man hath no perception of duration when he sleeps , yet the time runs on , and nights have as much their share in succession as days have . and although , you say , it seems very clear to you , that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another , yet i think the contrary so clear , that men may have a clear idea of succession without it , that i rather wonder how you came to think of this way . but it is sufficient to my purpose , that you could never know this idea of time by self-evidence . the last i shall mention is light , and one would think , if any idea be self-evident , it should be that . but let us see what you say about it ; you explode the peripatetick definition of it as unintelligible ; and the cartesian you allow to be but little better . for when they make it to be a number of little globules striking briskly on the bottom of the eye , you say , to a man that understands it not before , these words would make the idea of light no more known to him , than if one should tell him , that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls , which fairies all day long strook with rackets against some men's foreheads while they pass by others . and is this a self-evident idea of light ? thus we have seen what account your self have given of these self-evident ideas , which are the ground work of demonstration . . but suppose an idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct , and others should think the contrary to be so , what hopes of demonstration by clear and distinct ideas then ? as suppose a man entertain des cartes his idea of space , as the same with body , or extended matter , which he affirms to be clear and distinct ; the consequence from hence is , as your self confess , that he may from thence demonstrate that there can be no vacuum : but again , let us suppose another to have a clear and distinct idea of space from body , this man , you say , may demonstrate as easily that there may be a vacuum , or space without a body , as des cartes demonstrated the contrary . say you so ? what! demonstrations on both sides , and in the way of ideas too ? this is extraordinary indeed . but if we may be allow'd the use of common principles , we may be sure , that both parts of a contradiction cannot be true , and therefore there must be a fundamental mistake some where . you say , it is in wrong application of that general maxim , what is , is . but there is no fault in the principle , which is the true meaning of the other ; that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be , which undoubtedly holds true ; but it is in supposing the reality of the thing to be according to what you call a clear and distinct idea . so that the general principles of reason stand firm and good ; but your self-evidence of clear and distinct ideas is such a principle , we see , as serves for demonstrations of both parts of a contradiction . . but granting the ideas to be true , yet when their connexion is not self-evident , then an intermediate idea must complete the demonstration . but how doth it appear that this middle idea is self-evidently connected with them ? for you say , if that intermediate idea be not known by intuition , that must need a proof ; and so there can be no demonstration . which i am very apt to believe in this way of ideas ; unless these ideas get more light by being put between two others . this will best appear by a remarkable instance already mention'd , viz. in the ideas of space and body ; the question supposed is , whether they be the same or not ; some we see affirm it , and others deny it . so that here we must use an intermediate idea , and that is of motion , and we are to consider whether this hath a self-evident connexion , with the other ideas ? the motion of bodies , you say , that are in our view and neighbourhood , seems to you plainly to evince a vacuum . but how ? is it by intuition or self-evidence ? no , you do not pretend to it . but by reason : because there must be a void space equal to the bulk of that body , which moves within the bounds of such a superficies . and if there be a space without body there must be a vacuum . but gassendus attempted to prove motion impossible , if there were no vacuum : for every body must go into the place of another , and so in insinitum ; which he said was ridiculous and impossible . the cartesians answer'd , that the motion was circular . gassendus urged , that still it was impossible : for suppose a the first body , and x the last ; a cannot move , unless x can be moved : but x cannot move , because the place is filled with a. the cartesians say , this proves nothing , because in the same instant , that x goes into the places of a , that gives way . ioh. bapt. morinus ( professor of the mathematicks at paris , at the same time with gassendus ) answers to gassendus his argument , that the separation of two bodies and succession are at the same time ; and so there can be no vacuum . bernier defends gassendus his argument , and saith , that no motion can begin without a vacuum ; but other philosophers and mathematicians as stifly deny it . and is it possible to imagine , that there should be a self-evident connexion of ideas in this case ? but what hath reason now to do in this way of intuition ? yes , say you , reason is to discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas . but this is nothing but an imploying the faculty of reason in such a manner : and so in the beginning of your chapter of reason , you tell us , that it is sometimes taken for true and clear principles , and sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles ; but you take it for a saculty in man. but why , in a chapter of reason , are the other two senses neglected ? we might have expected here full satisfaction as to the principles of reason as distinct from the faculty , but you wholly avoid it ; and only shew how it is used in finding out the certain connexion of ideas in demonstration ; and the probable connexion in other things . so that the difference lies between us , as to this matter of reason , in these two things . ( . ) you affirm , that general principles and maxims of reason are of little , or no vse ; i say that they are of very great use , and the only proper foundations of certainty . ( . ) you say , that demonstration is by way of intuition of ideas , and that reason is only the faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing ideas with themselves , or with others intervening ; and that this is the only way of certainty . i affirm , and have proved , that there can be no demonstration by intuition of ideas ; but that all the certainty we can attain to , is from general principles of reason , and necessary deductions made from them . but before i conclude this discourse , i must observe that you prove that demonstration must be by intuition , in an extraordinary manner , from the sense of the word . for you say , it is called demonstration , it being shewn to the vnderstanding , and the mind made see , that it is so . i have told you formerly , how very uncertain a way of arguing it is , which is taken from the original signification of words ; and if it would hold in this case , it would be most proper for ocular demonstrations , or by the finger . but in the philosophical sense of the word , demonstration was never taken for intuition , or the knowing of a thing by its self-evidence . but you assert the necessity of intuitive knowledge , in every step of a demonstration . whereas , aristotle saith , things that are self-evident cannot be demonstrated ; and that it is weakness and folly not to know what things are capable of demonstration , and what not . it seems there were some philosophers , who would have first principles demonstrated ; this , saith aristotle cannot be done without running in infinitum , which is absurd . whence it is plain , that demonstration was supposed to lie in some antecedent proof ; and where any thing was self-evident it was absurd to look for it : so that the way of intuition and demonstration , were thought inconsistent . for what a man sees by its own light , he needs no proof of . but you say , that in a demonstration the intervenient ideas are called proofs ; and where by the help of these the agreement or disagreement is plainly perceived , that is demonstration : and that in every step there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea , which it uses as a proof ; for , if it were not so , that would need a proof . so that according to your method of demonstration , that which is used as a proof must need no proof , but must be known by immediate intuition . of which kind of demonstration , i would fain see any one instance in the knowledge of things , and not in abstracted and mathematical demonstrations . for it may be , it hath been the occasion of some great mistakes in the philosophy of this age , that ingenious and mathematical men have labour'd so much to accommodate the principles of that science to the nature of material things ; of which we have a remarkable instance in the system of des cartes . and supposing we could come to a certainty about the nature and tendency of bodies here within our reach , ( i mean with respect to the earth ) i do not know , how far the greatest mathematician can proceed in making demonstrations as to the nature and tendency of those bodies which are so much out of our reach , as the heavenly bodies are , both in themselves and with respect to one another . for , if the phaenomena depend upon a force given them by the great and wise creator , how can we know in what manner or degree that force is given to bodies at such a wonderfull distance from us , as the fixed stars are ? for , if god can alter the laws of motion in another system , as it is not denied ; how can we be mathematically certain , that the laws of motion in bodies , so much above us , are the very same that we find them here ? i do not by any means take off from the laudable endeavours of those who have gone about to reduce natural speculations to mathematical certainty : but i mention it to shew , that it is a very easie way for thinking men to deceive themselves , in talking so much of demonstrative certainty about natural things , when all their instances are brought from mathematical demonstrations . aristotle , whom i cannot despise so much as some do ( i do not say for want of reading him ) hath a discourse on purpose in the beginning of his books of animals , in what way natural things are to be handled ; and he saith , there are two ways . . by way of science . . by way of instruction , which must be suitable to the nature of the things . so that in natural history he saith , there must be certain bounds set for enquiry , without proceeding to strict demonstration . and , saith he , the manner of demonstration as to natural things , is different from what it is in speculative or mathematical things . in another place he laments the want of experiments as to natural history , ( although he made far more than any before him , and was better able to do it by the plentifull assistance of philip and alexander , while he lived at court ) and he looks on that as the best way of satisfying our reason about such things ; and our reasons , saith he , are then good , when they agree with the phaenomena . and he was so far from thinking he had made demonstrations in physicks , that in one place he saith , that in things not evident to sense , he thought it sufficient to shew the possibility of it ; and therefore he ought not to be run down for his modesty ; however his physical notions fall far short of demonstrations . in his morals , he saith , all principles must be suitable to the nature of the science ; for it would be absurd for a man to go about to prove the three angles of a triangle , equal to two right angles ; and take this for his principle , that the soul is immortal . for the proof must be proper and connected with it . and from hence he excludes plato's idea , from being a principle in morals . in his eudemia , the way of proceeding in morals , he saith , is by reasons , testimonies , and examples ; and he looks on it as great want of iudgment for men not to consider what reasons are proper for every science . so that according to him , morality is not uncapable of demonstration ; so it be upon moral principles : for that he lays down in the beginning of his ethicks , and afterwards that the same exactness is not to be required in all sorts of reasoning : but that it ought to be suitable to the matter it is about . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if therefore the principles in morality be clear and proper , and the deductions be plain and natural , i do not see , but that it is as capable of demonstration as any other science ; if men were as willing to be convinced in morals , as they are in mathematicks . and therein i fully agree with you : but the way of demonstration by ideas will not do , either there or any where else . i mean by this intuitive knowledge in every step of the demonstration : when the intervening ideas are far from being capable of this intuitive certainty . and as to your argument from the notation of the word , it is certain , that after the philosophical use of it , it signified no more among some philosophers , than the conclusion of an argument ; whereby we are brought from something we did perceive , to somethiug we did not . not by way of intuition , but by a deduction of reason . and plato makes use of the word demonstration in his phoedrus , for such a reason which wise men would believe , and others would not . but there could be no intuitive certainty in such a demonstration . i have been longer a clearing this matter than i thought i should have been ; but it is the main point as to certainty by ideas , and what remains will admit of an easier dispatch . i now return to the difference between nature and person ; and i shall only single out what is material and pertinent ; and now leave the interlocutory gentlemen to maintain their conversation by themselves . i had said in my vindication , that nature may be consider'd two ways . ( . ) as it is in distinct individuals . ( . ) abstractly without respect to individual persons . ( . ) as it is in distinct individuals , as the nature of a man is equally in peter , iames and iohn , and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence belonging to each of them . for the nature of man , as in peter , is distinct from the same nature , as it is in iames and iohn ; otherwise they would be but one person , as well as have the same nature . which to my understanding is plain and clear reason . and if so , then here we have an identity of nature , and a distinction of persons in the same nature . but to this you object these three things : ( . ) that you cannot put together one and the same , and distinct ; and consequently there is no foundation for the distinction of nature and person . ( . ) that what i say about common nature , and particular subsistence and individuals , is wholly unintelligible to you and your friends . ( . ) that to speak truly and precisely of this matter , as in reality it is , there is no such thing as one common nature in several individuals ; for all that is truth in them is particular , and can be nothing but particular . but the meaning is , that every particular individual man or horse , &c. has such a nature or constitution as agrees , and is conformable to that idea which that general name stands for . this is the substance of what i can gather out of your discourse in several pages , but as to the general reflections i pass them over , having no other design , but to set truth in as good a light as i can . and if i have the misfortune not to be understood , i cannot help it ; i wish it were in my power to help other men's capacities as well as to help my own . but you say , the notionists and ideists , ( as they are called ) seem to have their apprehensive faculties very differently turned ? i do not think , that there is any different turn in their faculties ; but there may be a very wrong turn in the method of reasoning in those , who go in this way of ideas , from what there is in those who pursue the general principles of reason , and from thence draw particular conclusions . if any man takes it for granted , that your way of ideas is the only way to certainty ( and he must take it for granted , if he will believe it ) then i cannot see how he can apprehend one and the same common nature in different persons or individuals , because all his ideas are taken from particulars ; and therefore a common nature is no more but one common name ; and every individual is consider'd as ranked under those names . but herein lies the fundamental mistake , that you presume that we are not to judge of things by the general principles of reason , but by particular ideas . for if men set aside this new way of judging only by these ideas ; things would appear in another light to them : but i find it is to very little purpose to argue with such men , who are resolved to stick to this way of ideas ; for they can apprehend nothing but just in their own way . and let us say what we will , it is jargon , and unintelligible to them ; although very rational men have said the same things that we do , and have been thought by the rest of mankind to have spoken intelligibly . but now it seems nothing is intelligible , but what suits with this new way of ideas , however repugnant it be to the common principles of reason ; which must be the standard to mankind , whatever becomes of this way of ideas . and therefore in this debate , i shall proceed upon these principles of reason , which have been receiv'd among mankind ; and from them i hope to make it appear , that the difference of nature and person is not imaginary and fictitious , but grounded upon the real nature of things . the principles of reason , which i go upon are these ; . that nothing hath no properties . . that all properties being only modes or accidents must have a real subject to subsist in . . that properties essentially different , must subsist in different essences . . that where there is an agreement in essential properties and a difference in individual , there must be both an identity and diversity in several respects . now upon these principles i build my assertion , that there is one real and common nature or essence in mankind , and a difference of persons in the several individuals . for , that there are such essential properties in mankind which are not in brutes , i suppose you will not deny . now these essential properties must subsist somewhere ; for nothing can have no properties , and these properties cannot subsist ( where individuals are multiplied ) in any one individual : for that is to exclude all the rest from the essential properties which belong to them ; and if they have them in common , there must be some common subject wherein they subsist , and that can be nothing but the common essence of mankind . for the essence of brutes or plants have them not ; and therefore these essences must be really different from one another . but because individuals of the same kind , have something to distinguish , as well as to unite them , therefore there must be a different subsistence in every individual : and so one and the same , and yet distinct , may very easily and intelligibly consist together . but you say , i have not told you what nature is ; i think my discourse sufficiently shew'd it , if you had a mind to understand it ; for you could not but see that i meant the subject of the essential properties , whether you call it nature , substance , or essence . your objection about nature and substance being of equal extent , i hope , i have sufficiently removed in the foregoing discourse . you tell me , that it is more than you know , that the nature of a man is equal in peter , james and john. i am sorry for it . for i thought you had ideas of particular substances . but they may be drills or horses for any thing you know . i am again sorry , that you know particular men no better ; but that for ought you know , they may be drills or horses . but you know a horse that was called peter , and you do not know but the master of the same team might call other of his horses , james and john. suppose all this . and could you not in the way of ideas distinguish them from those of your acquaintance who had the same names ? i confess , this tempts me to think that ideists ( as you call them ) have a particular turn of their understandings about these matters . for i cannot but think , that those who were not very rational men , might understand the difference between men and horses ; without being told , that although horses might be called by their names ; yet that these were real men , and their constitution and nature was conformable to that idea , which the general name man stands for . but this is no more than to say , that he that has the nature of a man is a man , or what has the nature of a drill is a drill ; and what has the nature of a horse is a horse ; whether it be called peter , or not called peter . if this were really the discourse of your friends in private conversation , you have been very obliging to them to publish it to the world : for mankind are not so stupid , as not to know a man from a horse or a drill , but only by the specifick name of man. you may have a horse called peter if you please , and another iames , and a third iohn ; but for all that , there is no one that hath the understanding of a man , but will be able without your specifick names to tell the difference of your horse peter from your man peter ; and call them by what names you please the difference will not depend upon them , but upon the essential properties which belong to them ; and so it will be owned by all that have not this new turn of their vnderstandings . but i plainly see , that a new notion when it hath got deep into a man's head doth give a strange turn to his understanding ; so that he cannot see that , which every one else can , that hath not the same tincture upon his mind . and i remember an observation of yours , how dangerous it is to a man's reason to fix his fancy long upon one sort of thoughts . these ideas are a very odd sort of spectacles to our understandings , if they make them see and understand less , than people of very , ordinary capacities do . for even the man who had the horse with the name peter , and might have others by the names of james and john , would not a little wonder at a grave philosopher that should seriously say to him ; you see , friend , that your horses have the names of men , how do you know but that they are men ? know , saith the country-man , i hope you are wiser than to ask me such a question ? or what do you take me for , if i cannot tell the difference of men from horses whatever names they have . do not tell me of your specifick names , and conformity to your ideas , i know well enough the difference between my horse peter and my man peter without such gibberish . my man peter and i can sit and chop logick together , about our country affairs , and he can write and read , and he is a very sharp fellow at a bargain ; but my horse peter can do none of these things , and i never could find any thing like reason in him , and do you think i do not know the difference between a man and a beast ? i pursue this no farther lest the country-man should be too rude to the gentlemen , with whom you had this learned conversation , about the difference of men , and horses , and drills . but you or your friend , or both , are very hard set again about a common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each person . for such is your misfortune , you say , that for your life you cannot find it out . this is a hard case ; before , for your life you could not understand nature and substance to be the same ; and now again , for your life you cannot find out this . where lies the monstrous difficulty of it ? you say , you repeated , and this twenty times to your self ; and your weak vnderstanding always rejolts . at what ? my words are , nature may be considered , as it is in distinct individuals , as the nature of man is equally in peter , iames and iohn . and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them . you say , that the nature of man in peter is the nature of a man , if peter be supposed to be a man , but if it be the name of a horse , your knowledge vanishes . cannot you , for your life , know the difference between a man and a horse , by their essential properties , whatever their names be ? if so , there is a greater turn of mens vnderstandings , than i imagined . but again say you , let it be impossible to give that name to a horse ( who ever said or thought so ? ) yet you cannot understand these words , the common nature of a man is in peter ; for whatsoever is in peter exists in peter ; and whatever exists in peter is particular ; but the common nature of man is the general nature of man , or else you understand not what is meant by common nature ; and it confounds your vnderstanding to make a general a particular . to this i answer , that the common nature of man may be taken two ways . in the way of ideas , and in the way of reason . in your way of ideas it is not at all to be wondered at , that you cannot understand such a common nature , as i spake of , which subsists in several persons , because you say , you can have no ideas of real substances but such as are particular ; all others are only abstract ideas , and made only by the act of the mind . but i say , that in the way of reason you may come to a better understanding of this matter . which is by considering the nature of beings , and the causes of the differences amongst the several kinds of them . i had told you before , in my answer to your first letter , that we are to consider beings as god hath ordered them in their several sorts and ranks , and that he hath distinguished them by essential properties from each other , as appears by mankind , and brutes , and plants : and that although the individuals of the several kinds agree in essential properties , yet there is a real difference between them in several accidents that belong to them , as to time , place , qualities , relations , &c. now that wherein they agree is the common nature ; and that wherein they differ , is the particular subsistence . and if this be so hard to be understood , why was it not answered here in the proper place for it ? is not that a real nature that is the subject of real properties ? is not that nature really in all those who have the same essential properties ? and therefore the common nature of man must exist in peter , because he is a man , and so in iames and iohn : and yet every one of these is so distinguished from the other , that we may justly say he hath a particular subsistence with that common nature . and this is no making a general a particular ; but distinguishing one from the other , which is a distinction so easie and necessary , that i cannot but wonder at those who say , that for their lives they cannot find it out . i had said , for the nature of man as in peter , is distinct from that same nature , as it is in iames and iohn , otherwise they would be but one person as well as one nature . and what reply is made to this ? you cannot understand what this is a proof of . it is plain that i meant it of a particular subsistence ; and if you cannot for your life understand such easie things , how can i for my life help it ? read the words over again which are before them , and join them together . and this is the common nature with a particular subsistence proper to each of them ; for the nature of man as in peter is distinct from that same nature as it is in iames and iohn . but i am really ashamed to be put to explain such things ; i hope ideas do not give another turn to common sense . but you say , that otherwise they could not be three persons , is to prove it by a proposition unintelligible to you , because you do not yet apprehend what a person is . of that in its proper place . these words of mine follow , and this distinction of persons in them , is discerned both by our senses as to their different accidents , and by our reason because they have a separate existence , not coming into it at once and in the same manner . and is this unintelligible too ? you say , it will hold as well for three physical atoms , which are three distinct individuals , and have three distinct natures in them , as certainly as three distinct men. but are three atoms as much three persons as three men ? but you cannot discern the distinction by our senses as to their accidents , nor by your reason as to separate existence , because god might create them at once . therefore we cannot distinguish three humane persons that way ? in this reasoning in the way of ideas ? or in any way ? suppose we put the common nature of an animal for the common nature of man. what follows ? therefore three animals are three distinct persons , as well as three men ? i thought there was some cause for your disliking the common principles and methods of reasoning . i am forced to give but short touches at such things , which i cannot answer more largely , without being thought to make marks of distinction . come we now therefore to the second sense of nature , as it is taken abstractly without respect to individual persons ; and then i said , it makes an entire notion of it self . for however the same nature may be in different individuals , yet the nature in it self remains one and the same ; which appears from this evident reason , that otherwise every individual must make a different kind . is this to be understood any better ? no. an entire notion of it self is an expression never met with before . an entire idea of it self had been very plain and easie ; but this is not to talk with men in their own dialect . but if we put it so , the difficulty remains . what difficulty ? it then makes no more an entire notion than the nature of peter . is it not the same nature considered as common to all individuals , distinct from that nature as in peter ? i wish among all the ways of inlarging knowledge , you could think of some new way of conveying notions into mens minds , for i find your way of ideas will never do it . for you cannot be brought one step beyond the first cast of ideas . and you will not allow , that which i give for an evident reason , to prove any thing towards clear apprehensions of one common nature . but if nature be one and the same in different individuals , then there must be one common nature , which makes an entire notion of it self : if it be not one and the same , then every individual must make a distinct kind ? can any thing be more evident ? but you give one common answer ; i understand not any thing that is meant in this whole paragraph , as to the right apprehension of one common nature . and so i am very well content to leave it to the reader 's understanding . and now i come at last to the idea of a person . and here i am glad to find something you do understand : which is great news . this , say you , i understand very well , that supposing peter , james and john to be all three men , and man being a name for one kind of animals , they are all of the same kind . do you mean that they have the same common essence , or have only the same common name ? if you mean the former , there must be a common nature ; if only the latter , that cannot make them of the same kind . for kind signifies nothing but a meer name without it . if it be asked you , whether men and drills be of the same kind or not ? could you give no other answer , but that the specifick name man stands for one sort , and the specifick name drill for the other ; and therefore they are not of the same kind ? are those names arbitrary , or are they founded on real and distinct properties ? if they be arbitrary , they have no other difference , but what a dictionary gives them . if they are founded on real and distinct properties , then there must be a real difference of kinds founded in nature ; which is as much as i desire . but to go on . you understand too very well , that peter is not james , and james is not john , but that there is a difference in these individuals . you understand also , that they may be distinguished from each other by our senses , as to different features and distance of place , &c. but what follows , you say , you do not understand , viz. that supposing there were no such external difference , yet there is a difference between them as individuals of the same nature . for all that this comes to , as far as you can understand , is that the ground of the distinction between several individuals in the same common nature is that they are several individuals in the same common nature . you understand , it seems , that they are several individuals , that peter is not james , and james is not john ; and the question is , what this distinction is founded upon ? whether upon our observing the difference of features , distance of place , &c. or on some antecedent ground ? i affirm , that there is a ground of the distinction of individuals antecedent to such accidental differences as are liable to our observation by our senses . and the ground i go upon is this , that the true reason of identity in man is the vital union of soul and body : and since every man hath a different soul united to different particles of matter , there must be a real distinction between them , without any respect to what is accidental to them . for , if peter have a soul and body different from iames , and iames from iohn , they must have different principles of individuation , without any respect to features or place , &c. you say , you cannot suppose a contradiction , viz. that there is no difference of place between them . but that is not the point , whether when we consider them with respect to place , there can be such a thing as identity of place to two different bodies ? but whether we cannot consider two several individuals of mankind without particular regard to place ? which i say , we may , and for this reason ; because relation to place , is an external difference , but the real distinction of individuals doth not relate to any accident of the body ; because the individual consists of the union of soul and body ; and you cannot judge of the existence of the soul by the place of the body . you say , that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time , we are sure ( be it what it will ) that it is that very thing , and not another which at that time exists in another place , how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other respects . and in this consists identity . but i think the identity of man depends neither upon the notion of place for his body ; nor upon the soul consider'd by it self , but upon both these , as actually united and making one person . which to me seems so clear and intelligible , that i can imagine no objection against it . i am certain , you produce none . my next words are , and here lies the true idea of a person , which arises from that manner of subsistence , which is in one individual , and is not communicable to another . in your answer to this , i pass over the trifling exceptions , about the dissyllable person , and the true idea and signification of the articulate sound ; and about here and herein , &c. being resolved to keep to what appears material . and the only thing of that kind is , that according to my sense of person , it will as well agree to bucephalus as to alexander ; and the difference will be as great , between bucephalus and podargus , as between alexander and hector , all being several individuals in the same common nature : but for your part you cannot understand that bucephalus and podargus are persons in the true signification of the word person in the english tongue . and whoever desired you should ? for i expresly say , that a person is a compleat intelligent substance , with a peculiar manner of subsistence . and again , for a person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent substance in the same nature . so that it is impossible to apply my notion of person to any irrational creatures , although they be bucephalus and podargus : and i think a man must strain hard to make such objections , so directly against that idea of a person which i set down . and it is very easie to understand the difference between a distinction of individuals as such , and of intelligent individuals , and that manner of subsistence in them , which makes them distinct persons . but you say , that i affirm , that an individual intelligent substance is rather supposed to the making of a person , than the proper definition of it ; and yet afterwards i make it to be the definition of a person , that it is a compleat intelligent substance . to this i answer , that in the former place i give an account of the reason of personality , which i say lies in the manner of subsistence , and not in the intelligent individual substance ; which is rather supposed to the making of a person : for that which critically distinguishes the person is the reason of personality ; but when we come to give a common definition of it , there is no such necessity of insisting upon the reason of the difference , but upon the common acception of it person . and upon that account i call it a complete intelligent substance , because , although the soul be so in it self ; yet we take person with relation to soul and body united together . and so the identity of person must take in both , not only here , but at the resurrection . and thus i have gone through all that i could find , that seem'd material in the dialogue between you and your friends as to this subject , and i assure you , i have omitted nothing which i apprehended had any appearance of difficulty in it . and i find not the least reason to be unsatisfied in the account i had given of the difference of nature and person : but i still think that it doth tend very much to the right apprehension of the doctrine of the trinity ; as i hope doth farther appear by the foregoing discourse . and now to come to a conclusion of this whole debate . ( for i intend not to draw this saw any longer : having done as much as i think sitting for my self to do . ) i saw no necessity of writing again for my own vindication as to your first charge , which i was contended to leave to the reader 's judgment . but in the conclusion of my former answer , i had said , that as you had stated your notion of ideas , it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of the christian faith , which i endeavour'd to defend . this you call a new charge against your book ; and you complain , that i do not specifie the particulars , wherein i apprehend it may be of such dangerous consequence ; and you blame me for this saying , without shewing that it is so : and that all the reason i give is , that it is made use of by ill men to do mischief : that when i say , it may be , it shews only an inclination to accuse , and proves nothing : that danger may be apprehended where no danger is ; that if any thing must be laid aside , because it may be ill used , you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept : and lastly , that the imputation of a tendency to scepticism , and to the overthrowing any article of the christian faith are no small charge ; and that you cannot see any argument i have brought , that your notion of ideas tends to scepticism . these things laid together , made me think it necessary to do that which i was unwilling 〈◊〉 do , till you had driven me to it ; which was to shew , the reasons i had , why i look'd on your notion of ideas , and of certainty by them , as inconsistent with it self , and with some important articles of the christian faith. what i have now done , i thought it my duty to do , not with respect to my self , but to some of the mysteries of our faith ; which i do not charge you with opposing , but with laying such foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them ; of which we have had too much experience already ; and may have more , if your way of certainty by ideas should obtain . which i cannot think it will among such as are capable , and willing , to judge impartially . i have now done with this matter : and as some may think it the first part of wisdom not to begin in such disputes ( and i am of their mind if they did not touch the christian faith ) so they cannot but judge it the next ( as i do ) to know when to make an end. i am , sir , your faithfull friend , and servant , ed. wigorn. sept. . . finis . errata . page . line . after thing , insert common . p. margin , r. p. . p. . l. . r. plotinus . p. . l. . r. this . p. . l. . blot out it . books written by the right reverend father in god , edw. l. bishop of worcester , and sold by h. mortlock at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yuard . a rational account of the grounds of the protestant religion ; being a vindication of the lord archbishop of canterbury's relation of a conference , &c. from the pretended answer of t. c. d . edit . fol. origines britannicae , or the antiquities of the british churches , with a preface concerning some pretended antiquities relating to britain , in vindication of the bishop of st. asaph . folio . irenicum , a weapon-slave for the churches wounds . quarto . origines sacrae , or a rational account of the grounds of christian faith , as to the truth and divine authority of the script ▪ and the matters therein contained . to . a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it . octavo . an answer to several late treatises occasioned by a book entituled , a discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , and the hazard of salvation in the communion of it ; part i. octavo . a second discourse in vindication of the protestant grounds of faith , against the pretence of infallibility in the roman church , in answer to the guide in controversie , by r h protestancy without principles , and reason and religion ; or the certain rule of faith , by e w. with a particular enquiry into the miracles of the roman church octavo . an answer to mr. cressy's epistle apologetical to a person of honour , touching his vindication of dr ▪ stillingfleet . octavo . a defence of the discourse concerning the idolatry practised in the church of rome , in answer to a book entituled , catholicks no idolaters : octavo . several conferences between a roman priest ▪ a fanatick chaplain , and a divine of the church of england ; being a full answer to the late dialogues of t g octavo . a discourse concerning bonds of resignation of benefices in point of law and conscience , in octavo . a discourse concerning the illegality of the ecclesiastical commission , in answer to the vindication and defence of it : wherein the true notion of the legal supremacy is cleared ; and an account is given of the nature , original and mischief of the dispensing power . the unreasonableness of separation , or an impartial account of the history , nature and pleas of the present separation from the communion of the ch. of england . quarto the grand question concerning the bishops right to vote in parliament in cases capital stated and argued , from the parliament-rolls and the history of former times ; with an enquiry into their peerage , and the three estates in parliament . octavo . a discourse concerning the doctrine of christ's satisfaction ; or the true reasons of his sufferings ; with an answer to the socinian objections . to which is added , a sermon concerning the mysteries of the christian faith , preached april . . with a preface concerning the true state of the controversie about christ's satisfaction . the second edition . vo . twelve sermons preached upon several occasions vol. i. octavo . ten sermons preached upon several occasions . vol ii. octavo . a third volume will be shortly published . a discourse in vindication of the doctrine of the trinity : with an answer to the late socinian objections against it , from scripture , antiquity and reason and a preface concerning the different explications of the trinity , and the tendency of the present socinian controversie . the second edition , octavo . the bishop of worcester's answer to mr. lock 's letter concerning some passages relating to his essay of humane understanding , mentioned in the late discourse in vindication of the trinity . with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late socinian pamphlet . the bishop of worcester's charge to the clergy of his diocess in his primary visitation begun at worcester , september . . to . the effigies of the right reverend father in god , edward lord bishop of worcester , engraven on a copper-plate by robert white . price d. the rule of faith : or an answer to the treatise of mr. i. s. entituled , sure-footing , &c. by iohn tillotson , d. d. to which is adjoyned , a reply to mr. i. s's third appendix , &c. by edward stillingfleet d. d. a letter to mr. g. giving a true account of a late conference at the d. of p's . a second letter to mr. g. in answer to two letters lately published concerning the conference at the d. of p s. veteres vindicati : in an expostulary letter to mr. sclater of putney , upon his consensus veterum , &c. wherein the absurdity of his method , and the weakness of his reasons are shewn ; his false aspersions upon the church of england are wiped off , and her faith concerning the eucharist proved to be that of the primitive church : together with animadversions on dean boileu's french translation of , and remarks upon bertram . an answer to the compiler of nubes testium : wherein is shewn , that antiquity ( in relation to the points in controversie set down by him ) did not for the first five hundred years believe , teach and practice as the church of rome doth at present believe , teach and practice ; together with a vindication of veteres vindicati from the late weak and disingenuous attempts of the author of transubstantiation defended , by the author of the answer to mr. sclater of putney . a letter to father lewis sabran jesuit , in answer to his letter to a peer of the church of england ; wherein the postscript to the answer to the nubes testium is vindicated , and father sabran's mistakes farther discoverd . a second letter to father lewis sabran jesuit , in answer to his reply . a vindication of the principles of the author of the answer to the compiler of nubes testium in answer to a late pretended letter from a dissenter to the divines of the church of england . a discourse concerning the nature and grounds of the certainty of faith , in answer to i. s. his catholick letters . the council of trent examin'd and disprov'd by catholick tradition , in the main points in controversie between us and the church of rome ▪ with a particular account of the times and occasions of introducing them . part. i. to which a preface is prefixed concerning the true sense of the council of trent , and the notion of transubstantiation . an historical examination of the authority of general councils , shewing the false dealing that hath been used in the publishing of them ; and the difference amongst the papists themselves about their number . the second edition corrected . to . the folly and unreasonableness of atheism demonstrated from the advantage and pleasure of a religious life : the faculties of human souls : the structure of animate bodies , and the origine and frame of the world ; in eight sermons : preached at the lecture , founded by the honourable robert boyle , esq in the first year , . by richard bentley , d. d. chaplain in ordinary , and library-keeper to his majesty . of revelation , and the messias : a sermon preached at the publick commencement at cambridge , july the th . . by richard bentley , d. d. chaplain in ordinary , and library-keeper to his majesty . the restoring of fallen brethren ; containing the substance of two sermons on gal vi. , preached at the performance of publick penance , by certain criminals , on the lord's day , usually called mid-lent-sunday , . in the parish church of old-swinford in worcester-shire : by simon ford , d. d and rector there ; with a preface , by the right reverend father in god , edward lord bishop of worcester . the new-years-gift complete , in six parts , composed of prayers and meditations for every day in the week , with devotions for the sacrament , lent , and other occasions . the first part may be had by it self books written by the late reverend anthony horneck , d. d. preacher at the savoy . the great law of consideration ; or a discourse , wherein the nature , usefulness , and absolute necessity of consideration , in order to a truly serious , and religious life , is laid open , in vo . the happy ascetick ; or the best exercise ; together with prayers suitable to each exercise : to which is added , a letter to a person of quality , concerning the holy lives of the primitive christians , in vo . delight and judgment represented , in a discourse , concerning the great day of judgment ; and its power to damp and embitter sensual delights , sports , and recreations , in vo . the exercise of prayer ; or , a help to devotion : containing prayers and devotions for several occasions . the antiquities of nottingham-shire , extracted out of records , original evidences , leiger-books , and other manuscripts , and authentick authorities ; beautified with maps , prospects , and portraictures : by robert thoroton dr. of physick , folio . some school-books sold by henry mortlok , at the phoenix in st. paul's church-yard . horatius , interpretatione & notis illustravit ludovicus des-prez , in usum delphini . huic editioni accessere vita horatii cum dacerii chronologia horatiana , & praefatio de satyra romana , vo . l. annaeus florus , in usum delphini , vo . leusdeni compendium graecum novi testamenti , in vo . quinta editio . janua linguarum trilinguis , sive johannis amos comenii janua linguarum , vo . graecae grammatices rudimenta in usum scholae westmonasteriensis busby's apolodorus , in usum scholae westmonast . nomenclatura brevis reformata , in usum scholae westmonasteriensis . an english introduction to the latin tongue , for the use of the lower forms in westminster school . graeca epigrammata , in usum scholae west . martialis epigram . in usum scholae west . juneval in usum scholae westmonasteriensis . a general examination of the common greek grammar , according to dr. busby's method , chiefly intended for grounding young beginners in the greek tongue , in the free-school in newark upon trent . a short exposition of the catechism of the church of england , with the church catechism it self , and order of confirmation in english and latin , the latin revised and much amended , by edw. boughen , d.d. fitted for the use of schools . an explanation of the additional rules for the genders of nouns in the oxford grammar , by way of question and answer : by iohn twells master of the free-school in newark , very proper to be bound up with the oxford grammar . with variety of other school-books . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e d . letter ▪ p. . answ. to first letter , p. . d. letter , p. . p. . p. . first letter , p. . p. . letter ii. ● . ● , , . , , , , , , , , , , , , , . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . first letter , p. . b. . ch . . sect. . letter p. . b. . ch . . sect. . princip . l. . n. , &c. b. . ch . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . answ. to let . p. . let. . p. . answer to letter . p. . letter . p. . p. ● ▪ p. . p. , . p. ● . answer to letter . p. . letter . p. . letter p. . answer to letter . p . postscript p. . p. . p. . p. . lett. ii. p. . . essay , b. . ch . . n. . n. . n. . n. . n. . n. . n. . letter . p. . n. . essay , e. . ch . . sect. . sect. . john . , . cor. . . cor. . . . . . john . . cor. . , . . , , . sect. . sect. . . . . , ● . essay b. . c. . sect. . vindication of the trinity , p. . &c. p. . letter . p. . p. answer to letter ▪ p. . letter . p. . p. . answer to letter . p. . p. . letter . p. . letter . p. . essay b. . c. . sect. . letter . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . letter . p. . essay l. . ch . . sect. . letter . p. . essay , l. . ch . . sect. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . evangel . medici art. . p. . ch. . sect. . sect. . censur . philos. cartes . c. . sect. . n. . philosophia scripturae interpres , c. . n. . c. . p. . p. . p. . p. , . from p. . to p. . p. . p. . p. , . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . sect. . sect. . princip . p. . n. . essay , l. . ch . . sect. . b. . ch . . sect. . sect. , sect. ▪ sect. . sect. . sect. . des cartes epist. ● . ep. , . p. ● p. . p. . p. . p. . arist. metaph . l. . c. . p. rami schol. metaph l. . c. . physic. ausc. l. . c. . plut. de plac. phil. l. . c. . c. . letter ii. p. . fr. patrit . discuss . peripat . t. ii. l. . p. . nat quaest. l. . c. . de benef . l. . c. , . de cons. ad helv. c. . cic. de nat. l. . plato in phileb . sext. empir . l. . c. . p. . anton. l. . sect . . l. . sect. . damasc. dial. c. . chrysost. hom. . in gen. theod. in gen. qu. . basil. in hex . or. . gal. . . mr. boyle of the notion of nature , p. . p. . discourse of the trinity , p. . p. . ibid. book ch . sect. ●● . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . solid philos. asserted preface , sect. . reflex . . p. . book . ch . . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . book ▪ ch . . sect. . sect. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . sect. ▪ aristot. metaph . l. . answer to the first lett. p. . iambl . in nicom . p. . porph vit . pythag. metaphys . l. . c. , . l. ▪ c. , . arrian . l. . c. . l. . c . simplic . in epict . c. . plut. de ei delph . simplic . in epict. c. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . sext. empiric . advers . mathem . l. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . sect. . book ii. ch . . sect. . b. iv. ch . sect. . sect. . b. iv. ch . . sect. . ch. . sect. . sect. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . ch. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . sect. . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . book . ch . . sect. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . joh. bapt. morini dissert . de atomis & vacuo , p. . bernier favilla ridiculi muris , p. . sect. . ch. . sect. ●● sect. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . sect. , . aristot. metaph . l. . c. . sect. . sect. . arist. de part. anim. l. . c. . ●● gen. a●●●● l. . c. . de meteor . l. . c. . moral . magn. l. . c. . eudem . l . c. . ethic ad nicom l. . c. , . l. . c. . itaque argumenti conclusio quae est graecè 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ità definitur ; ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit . cicero in lucullo , c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , plato in phaedro . v. dialect . ciceron . adam bu●sii , l. . c. . p. . p. , . . , &c. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . b. ii. ch . sect. . p. . p. . p. . answ to lett. l. p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . essay , b. . ch . . sect. . p. . p. . p. . p. . . . . . . ● . . an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing / by thomas white. white, thomas, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing / by thomas white. white, thomas, - . [ ], p. printed for john williams ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng glanvill, joseph, - . -- scepsis scientifica. philosophy, english -- th century. knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute : being an answer to the vanity of dogmatizing . by thomas white . — sciri hoc sciat alter . london , printed for john williams at the crown and globe in s. pauls church-yard ▪ . to the young witts of both universities . though i doubt not of more powerful and seasonabler provision against that destructive contagion of pyrronism , which , not long since , has begun to take fresh heart : yet , hearing no news of any publick cauterization apply'd to that tumour of glanvil's , which has rag'd now full two years ; methought this silence of my betters turn'd the task upon my weakness , if not to avert , at least to open & expose to be torn in pieces by eloquenter pens the injustice of that calumny impos'd on the whole profession of philosophers . reflect then o flourishing englands fertilest hope ! the joy and crown of your mother , whose beholding you - with pleasure swells her silent breast ! reflect , i say , and seriously ruminate what you strain to live and grow to ; what persons you hope and covet to become hereafter : whether wise and skilful to govern christian life and manners : or a crew of rhetoricians , pleasantly tattling unknown and uncertain things ; and betraying those under your tuition into all precipices that fall in their way : for , for such blind ones , and leaders of the blind , he sets you out to the world , who inculcates to your england the vanity of dogmatizing or promising truths . i am not angry with the man , who , with a great deal of wit and an unfordable stream of eloquence ( which will ripen with his years ) prosecutes what he proposes to himself , and takes for a truth ; not without some savour of modesty : for , neither does he derogote from faith the power of teaching its tenets , nor disclaim all hope of attaining science hereafter through a laborious amassment of experiments . but , he points to acertain person ( whom he owns his master ) that , giving us the heads of some books he had written , thus concludes the second , here it is where the chief foundations of pyrronism are laid ; and that mainly establisht , that nothing is known . well , indeed , may the future despair , if the pains of so may ages have brought it but to this , that there 's nothing known . have , then , the so many magnificent structures of your colledges been devis'd , only to delude the people with a deal of pretty talk , not a jot advancive of reason ? have so many prodigious wits of your ancesters been sent abroad over all the christian world , but to sell smoak and bubbles for jewels & pearls ? have you yourselves the patience to be till'd on through so many years exercises , only to the like emptiness ? scorn and hate that so foul a reproach should be cast on the fame of all past ages , and present industry . but , what , at length , has enveigled into these conceits that great interpreter of epicurus , a man never to my hearing , mis-spoken of , either for wit , or life and manners ? since i 'm utterly a stranger to his privy-councils , i 'le tell you what his book seems to offer . there are two sciences contested about : physick and metaphysick ( between which that of the soul and morals take their places ) . the first , content with few experiments , surprises truth by vertue of demonstration , and fixes it by that force which alone is inerrable , viz. the power of our spiritual intellect . this eye alone pierces into the strength of contradiction ; and is onlily certain and necessary , as far as it scapes ore-shadowing by the senses : but , it is not overlavish too , in making use of them ; and advances in growth by reflecting on it self its inmost eye . physick is more florid , and with a vernal look , as it were , sooth's our spirit inclin'd to body . 't is more abundant in experiments , and meer historical almost , unless assisted and forc'd into rules by this its companion . that many court this gay one , no wonder , and slight her elder sister as 't were but dry leaves ; whereas , yet , on her 't is the gallant depends , nor without her help and principles borrow'd from her , is able scarce to demonstrate any thing and advance by causes connectedly . the ignorance of this necessity has bin the ruin of this author , and many great mens endeavours ; nay , and will be , 'till the utter despair of getting forward teach first a retreat back again to settle principles . another rubb is the unbridled impudence of very many moderns , who loudly crack of aristotle and metaphysick , as oft as there falls occasion of setting themselves out . they fill the book-sellers shops with mighty tomes : they counterfeit the highest knowledge by pompous skirmishes in their own schools ; and by wonderful promises enkindle the native ardour of science . by these arts they heap on themselves the honours and fruits due to science ; they flourish gayly and are propos'd to be ador'd in the chairs . mean while , look but into the matter , and those vast mountains bring forth this solution of questions , perhaps i , perhaps no. histories are related of what the antients , what the moderns have thought of any propos'd thesis ; petty reasons for the i or no are shot out at random , as it were , from bands of slingers or archers : so their pages get bredth , their tomes bulk : but , when they come to give judgment , out comes an edict to this purpose , all the opinions are probable , but , this last seems to me the more probable . what could be look'd for more silly from midas's ears ? what blind tiresias could not as truly give verdict of colours , perhaps 't is white , perhaps not ? what wonder now is it , if that ingenious person derided such solemn trifles ? and imagining these men , because none contradicted it , entertainers of aristotle and his secrets , wholy neglected and contemn'd them . you , then , o yong branches , growing up into wine to rejoyce the hearts of men ! remembring that vertue 's the mean hedg'd in by both extreams , neither disclaim and detest aristotle , nor superstitiously adore and embrace him . those things he has demonstrated , though but few and seeming contemptible , yet receive . 't is the nature of principles to appear vulgar and despicable ; but there 's not a step can be made in sciences without them . the foundations of edifices lye buryed under ground , yet 't is they sustain the magnificent and towring fabrick . they that slight aristotle's grounds must of necessity , being always in quest of principles , ever fall short of science . yet , far worse than these are they who feign and profess themselves aristotelians , and are ignorants the while in the method of demonstrating , & neglect what he prescribes : circumventers of parents , spiriters of youth ; whom , enveigled with a shew of philosophy , they betray to vanity and prattle : worst enemies of the commonwealth ; to which owing youth adorn'd with science & vertue , they pay it foolishly-confident , sophisticate , and fitted by their education to ill and good alike . for you , let aristotle be your master , of few things indeed ; but those such as fructifie into thousands , viz. the whole race of separated substances , the things necessary to be fore-known to physical contemplation , and judgment , in fine , of experiments . you have now the pleas of both sides : 't is your part to call aside into council with you that candour and sollicitude which so weighty an affair deserves . the most earnest coveter of your sollid knowledge thomas white . the table . first plea. there is demonstration and science , page second plea. the scepticks alledge nothing sollid , page third plea. t is imprudent to deny the existence of science , p. fourth plea refells the preliminary objection , page fifth plea refells our ignorance of the soul and sensation , p. sixth plea displaies the pastick vertue , continuity , adhesion of parts , and the mysteries of rolling , page seventh plea inquires after the causes of our modern shortness in science , page eight plea wards off from aristotle the calumny of special impiety , page ninth plea wipes off the aspersions on aristotle's doctrine and terms , page tenth plea maintains certain definitions and arguings , p. eleventh plea refutes some topicks babbled against science , p. an exclusion of scepticism and scepticks from all title to dispute . first plea. there is demonstration and science . . scepticism , born of old by an unlucky miscarriage of nature , for her own credit , carryed off the tongues of the eloquent where it had long been fostred , and buryed by the steddiness of christian faith ; this monster snatcht from the teeth of worms and insects , peter gassendus , a man of a most piercing sagacity , of neat and copious eloquence , a most pleasing behaviour and wonderful diligence , by a kind of magick has endeavoured to restore again to life . he , a person ( which is the strangest of all ) most tenacious of catholick faith , and never suspected guilty of mischievous tenets : whereas , yet , this scepticism is the mother of infinite errors , and all heresies , and that very seducing philosophy and vain fallacy which the saints , warn'd by the apostles , have taught us to beware of . heard , this man , otherwise eminent in his paradoxical exercitation against the aristotelians , has dar'd to expose , not vail'd , as before , and wandring like a quean in the dark , but bold-fac'd and painted , to the multitude and market place . by his example , the author of the vanity of dogmatizing has produc'd her amongst us beauteously trick'd-up in english : he , too , a great master of wit and eloquence . nor indeed are vast mischiefs to be dreaded from vulgar heads . this is the occasion of my undertaking ; and this my design ( if heaven vouchsafe to enlighten and guide my pen ) to force back into her grave this carcass that would be rivalling science , and deliver her up a feast to her former worthy commoners . come on then , let 's untie the knot of the question . . since , then , 't is of science we are to speak , its genius would in some measure be look'd into . nature her self , therefore , teaches us , that man is an animal endued with reason , to fit him for governing his action , and reason is allowed to be that whereby what before was unknown is rendred known : dayly experience also convinces that our action consists for the most part in such things as are subject to an infinite and insuperable mutability and variation : whence it comes to pass , that that vertue which is immediate to action cannot properly be called science ( since 't is not infallible , and the effect of demonstrative discourse ) but a power of conjecturing aptly ; and uses commonly to be term'd prudence , either properly or derivatively ; properly , if it be concerning the thing to be done , as to its right proceeding from reason ; analogically , if of the action or thing to be done , as it regards some other inferior faculty subservient to the dominion of reason . now prudence depends on two previous powers , art and inference or experiment . art , though it ows its birth to experience , yet is sustained by universall and unfailing rules : but , it self understands not the necessary and indefectible efficacy of its rule ; but is content with the testimony of ever-corresponding effects . inference , or experience for the most part is true , but necessitates not assent , because not universal . . setting this therefore aside , 't is clear the decrees of art , since she is veracious , have necessitating and necessarily connected principles , which force the effect of art to be not possibly otherwise than as art teaches 't will succeed . whence follows , that the subject matter of science and art is the same ; and every art has a proper science due to it self , if the nature of man would stretch to attain it . but , the same warning we gave before concerning prudence , must be repeated concerning science . for , as he who behaves himself prudently in any artifice , is not therefore esteem'd and stil'd a prudent man ; but only he who rightly tempers his action in as much as 't is humane : so , neither is he , with propriety , to be called a knowing man , who skills the demonstration of duelling , or versifying ; but he that has the demonstration of those things which are principles for governing our life , in as much as 't is humane : the chief whereof is that which has merited the term of theology , or metaphysicks : the next is ethicks : then physicks , or natural science ; whether , because all corporeal natures , or the world , is proposed to the disputation of men ; or because , next metaphysical contemplation , nothing so much advances our desired beatitude as physicks . nor yet are mathematicks to be excluded ; both because quantity , their subject , is the vesture of those bodies which physicks speculate through ; as also , because the rules , and as it were , the demonstrableness of natural things at every step depends on them . out of all which 't is clear , that in nothing equivocation more lewdly cheats man-kind , than in this term of knowing , or learned men . for , if masters in sciences , analogically so called , are not really worthy this name : how much further off meriting so noble a title are those , whose ambition streins no higher than , like parrats , to repeat others sentiments ? and how manifestly pernicious are they that have the confidence to apply such learning to the government of humane life ; and vent poison , or at best , smoak , under the reverend name of science ? . it follows , that such science 't is we propose to our selves as is beneficial to humane life . and concerning this , three things offer themselves to our enquiry . whether there be at all any certainty attainable , at least of one proposition or one reasonment , which we call a sylogism ? at this hangs the next , whether at least , any habit , or series of more truths traced with certainty ( such as generally are esteem'd those which arithmeticians and geometricians profess ) may be acquired by humane industry ? the last question , by most ( at least in practise ) disputed ( whate're in words they pretend ) is limited to physicks and metaphysicks ; whether about the objects of these any beneficial multitude of truths may be spun out connectedly ; as the masters in mathematicks seem already to have done ? and herein consists the usefulness of my discourse ; and the desparation or difficulty of this conclusion compels me to clear the former ; which of themselves by their own evidence had stood unscrupled , had not the step , and almost necessary consequence they afford to the third , terrified those who feel such difficulty to yield this last . . to work , then ; let us fix the first step , and assert , as invincibly known , and unshakable by any art of the scepticks , that what is is , or that what terminates and specifies an identical proposition as its object is self-evident : as if we should say , that peter is peter , wood is wood , a stone is a stone ; and whatever others carry as open-fac'd an evidence . the scepticks i imagine , will laugh at this axiom as foolish : because identical propositions use to be excluded from the rank of scientifical ones , and the sciences themselves ; as nothing at all advancing the understanding . but , by this their very laugh they 'l yield us the victory ; as confessing evidence in these , however they be useless : and therefore that wherever the same necessity shall intervene , there cannot want evidence . one thing in this position occurs a little cloudy , obscuring it through a mist caus'd by the shadow of that most acute person , renatus des cartes ; who , severely prying to descry the very first thing falling under knowlege , beat it up at length to this , that the first thing every one knows , is , that himself thinks . but , the difference of our opinions , i conceive , has sprung from hence , that , whereas science may be consider'd both in its generation and in its subsistence ; he has taken the former method , i the later . for , really , if we examine by what degrees science is born in us , we see , the first thing that happens is to have a passion made in us by bodies ; and the first evident thing that strikes us is that we think . but , if , looking upon science now existing ▪ and as it s t were at rest in us , we enquire what 't is that fasten truth to our minds , so that we cannot doubt or , as were , waver about it : nothing will appear more simply or originally manifest then that what is is , wherein , in a manner , is formally included that what is so is , that , whilst it is , it cannot not-be ; which , indeed , is , that the understander is certain that the thing is , or has a fixedness concerning the truth which is in him . . it being determin'd that an identical proposition is evident , 't is equally determin'd that propositions term'd self-known are evident : for , if they be look'd into , t will be clearly seen , that a self-known proposition is in some sort composed of an identical proposition and another otherwise evident , or taken for evident . for , there are two sorts of self-known propositions ; one wherein the generical notion is predicated of a species ; another wherein the species are predicated divisively of the genus . take these for examples : a man is an animal : the sense is , a rational animal is a sort , or one of the animals : the evidence of the proposition consists in this , that the word animal signifies , as it were formally in predication , to be one of the animals ; and the word rational denotes that whereby a man is one of the animals . wherefore in this proposition , a man is an animal ; these two propositions shrowd themselves , one of the animals is one of the animals ; and that other , that rational is a determiner of animality : now this later is not affirmed , but taken for granted , either from sense as it were , or some other way supposed to be known and past doubt ; and in force of the former identification , t is concluded that a man is an animal . in like manner when 't is said , number is either even or odd , bulk is either finite or infinite ; and whatever predicates , contradictorily oppos'd , are predicated divisively of a subject ; two propositions lye in them ; one an identical one , for example , that even and not-even are all , or comprise all the kinds of number ; and another otherwise known , viz. that such a number , for example , ten , is a certain number . this later is known as it were by sense ; or suppos'd , not affirm'd : the former is equivalent to this all number is all number ; and one of all the numbers , for example ; ten , is affirm'd to be one of the even or odd , because , by force of the contradiction between even and not-even , even and odd must of necessity comprise all numbers , or even and odd and all number be the same . . the same force of identity is also clear in a sylogism : for example , when in the first mood , or barbara , two self-known propositions are taken and another truth , unknown before , is concluded out of them . as , when t is argu'd that every man is a living creature , because every man is an animal , and every animal is a living creature : there 's made an identification of man and living creature ; or rather it is discovered by the double identification of animal with the superior and inferior . the force therefore of the sylogism whereby it fixes the mind in this identity , tha● man is a living creature , lies in nothing but this , tha● through the former two identifications it rests fixed as to the premisses . plain therefore t is , that the light of an identical proposition shews it self both in self-known propositions , and in those which are concluded by sylogisms : and , which follows , either that the truth of an identical proposition is not evident , or else that self-known propositions , and such as are concluded by a legitimate sylogism are evident and most certain : and , that it cannot be doubted , so many truths are palpably certain as can be reacht by a legitimate deduction of sylogisms . since , therefore , he cannot be esteem'd other than a mad sot that should deny the evidence of an identical proposition ; he cannot be reputed rational who should at all reject propositions self-known , or collected by legitimate discourse . . be this , therefore , a demonstration a priori , as they term it , of this truth , that there is some certainty or science ; that , since t is undenyable that what is is , or , an identical proposition is true , and every proposition , whether self-known or sylogistically-concluded , has no other necessity than what shews it self in an identical one ; there can be no doubt of these , unless identical ones , too , be called in question . for , since , in a self-known proposition , t is evident , that the thing signified by one term is that which is signified by the other : and in a sylogistically-concluded proposition , it likewise appears , that because a is b , and b is c , a too is c ; or that , unless a be c , a will not be a ; for 't is not a unless it be b , nor b unless it be c : 't is evident that whatever is evinced by a legitimate sylogism , has the same necessity as an identical proposition . since therefore 't were meer perversness , and such as cannot fall into humane nature , to doubt whether an identical proposition be true ; t is absolutely manifest that whatever is concluded by ligitimate discourse out of self-known propositions is engrafted , beyond any danger of ambiguity ; or , that there is science of all such like : and therefore that there is some science , and that , indeed , of many truths . now , that which either in a self-known or in a demonstrated proposition , is assum'd beyond identical ones is not capable either of truth or falshood ; but , in a manner , is taken by way of snpposition ; as if 't were said , if he be a man ; if it be an animal : i say , for as much as man or animal are the subjects of the propositions or premisses . second plea. the scepticks alledge nothing sollid . . now , to the scepticks , or scepticism it self . what says the sceptick ? though , says he , nothing be certain , yet many things appear true to us ; and , out of such appearance we proceed to operation . thou entanglest thy self , sceptick ! for , how , whilst , in common , it most clearly appears to thee that nothing is true ; yet assertest thou , in particular , that this appears to thee true ? can these two stand together ; it appears that none of those things proposed us are true ; and at the same time , it appears that some of them are true ? besides , if any thing appears true , 't is because it deceives us with the face and similitude of certain or true , ( which two , as to us , speak the same thing ; for , we say , that is certain which we know to be true , or which is true to us ) : but , 't is clear , we cannot affirm any thing to be like another , if we know not that other : if therefore , there be amongst us no certainty , or nothing known to be true ; nothing can ever be or appear like certainty amongst men. 't is , therefore , stark folly to joyn these two togther , there is nothing certain , or ther 's no certainty ; and yet some things appear certain . . for all that , the sceptick will stand to it , that at least this appearance is enough for humane action : since all action is singular , that is , in infinite circumstances upon which demonstration has no force , but only prudence , or the power of conjecturing which is to be prefer'd before other . notwithstanding , if the action be truly humane , that is , purely and thoroughly govern'd by reason , this sceptical appearance is not enough for it . for , first , since prudence is an intellectual vertue , it cannot be indifferent to truth and falsity ; but always tenacious of truth . in action , therefore , govern'd by prudence two things fall under consideration ; that which is most conspicuous and spy'd by every one is , whether the action be like to attain its immediate and next end , to which 't is destin'd : and this for the most part is uncertain ; but withall , in this consists not the primary effect of prudence , but a certain faculty of guessing , which they call sagacity . the other thing , wherein especially prudence plays its part , is whether this action be to be done here and so : for which it suffices that two things be certain ; one , that the actor is led by no passion ; the other , that he has used pains , or disquisition enough ; which depends on the former ; since that will not fall short , unless some passion makes the actor precipitate . but , as far as the soul proves deficient in these two , so much , too , she deviates from the rule of prudence . now , these two may be very clear to an experienced person . farther , this tenet , again , of the scepticks fails of sufficiency for action in the very first root of acting , viz. whether any thing be to be done , or whether action be wholly to be suspended : for , in vain the understanding tugs at it , what action to perform ; unless it be first evident that something is to be acted : they therefore , who profess not so much as this is known , that something sometimes is to be done , cannot be mov'd to action out of pure understanding . nor can it be reply'd that it appears to the sceptick he is to act : for , since appearing is common to true and false ; nay , since 't is known that false is oft-times more probable and apparent , than true ; 't is plain that neither probability in general , nor the greater probability can have any force at all to cause assent . but , if one has not assented to this universal proposition , something is to be done ; 't is plain that , as to pure reason , he has no principle of acting : and , if he has any other principle besides , reason , the action , as far as it springs from that , is not rational . it must therefore be concluded that all action of the scepticks is utterly not-humane , but only brutal ; as rising purely from sense and imagination : or , rather worse than brutal ; in as much as they force reason to submit to and serve sense . . but , that which highlyest crosses this sect is , that professors of science much undervallue themselves , if they vouchsafe to dispute with them or endure to hear them babble . for , since in all humanenature , no sect is to be found more addicted to prattle , and more greedy of that vanity which follows tinckling cymbals : at what a distance will they be from their beatitude , if among the adorers of science they be not allow'd to vent their trifles ? let us , therefore , fairly weigh this , whether they are to be admitted among the professors of learning . scientifical persons , then , are either masters or disciples ; that is , such as have already attain'd the habit of science , or such as endeavour after it , or are seekers of truth . since , therefore , t is plain , the scepticks profess not themselves possessors of the science ; it remains they are to be reckoned among the seekers ; wherefore , since this contradicts it self , that one should seek what he thinks is no where , or at least , which dispairs possible to be found ; in vain they declare themselves candidates or seekers after sciences . add to this , that , since they neither admit self-known propositions , nor any legitimate consequence of discourse ; they have no way or method of seeking , or any trace from which to commence their search : but , if they admit any of these two , they cannot but acknowledge something certain . . it ought , therefore , be objected , at the very begining , to such contemners of sciences ; what attempt you ? what 's your aim ? how have you the confidence to attaque any one that 's truly a man ? for , whence shall what you say derive any appearance ? is it not just to press on you to prove first whatever you assume ; and this without ever coming to an end ? you therefore , will never be able to assume any thing that can prove our tenets false or uncertain . again , will you use any other form of discourse then sylogistical ? but , this you deny to be evident and certain . you , therefore , come but to deride , sillily to play the rooks , and chatter figments like poetical magpies . you i reply , perhaps , you dispute ad hominem ( as they term it ) , and shew , out of those things which our selves have accepted , that what we teach thereupon has no certainty . what 's your meaning ? if indeed you endeavoured this in any one tenet , it might be allow'd you to try what you were able to do : but , if universally you assert us unable to make good consequences , you call us beasts and deserve not the hearing . and , you your selves , how will you evince any one consequence to be ill ? will you tell us how it ought to be , to be good , you i say that grant none to be evident ? ' again , why will ours be false , and yours good ? but , if you affirm your own not good neither ; what madness possesses you , that you cannot suffer us to rest even in our error ; when you neither can nor strive to exempt us from erring ? t is sweeter , sure , to believe one-self in the light , then to know one-self in darkness and all light hopeless . . in fine , to what purpose do we amass arguments against those , who , as far as in them lies , have put off humane nature , and made themselves beasts ? for , if to reason be to advance our selves , out of certain and known things , to things before unknown and uncertain ; and nothing be certain : neither is any reasoning possible ; nor consequently any power of reasoning ; or animal endowed with it . but , if nothing be certain , nothing , too , will be true , since that is certain which we see to be true ; that is , truth had , our truth true to us , true by which we are true . for , clear it is , that our nature is covetous of truth in it self ; that , when we or our understanding is true , being impregnated with this truth , it may be made operative , and master of all things without it ; or , that it may pursue useful things , fear such as are to be fear'd contemn things contemptible , and reject all manner of counterfeit scare-crows . he frustrates , therefore , the whole bent of nature , that denies there 's any certainty ; and utterly evacuates , as nature her self , so also her most vehement desire and aim . what need i mention humane conversation , but especially negotiation ? for , if there can be nothing certain in humane matters , why do we instruct infants and boys ? why strive we to perswade youth into those things which seem true to us ? for , if there be no certainty acquirable , t is to be judg'd wholly indifferent what every youth does , or whither he tends : especially , since not so much as this is certain , that one thing is more probable than another ; and far less , that what now is more probable will be so when the boy comes to choose it . third plea. t is imprudent to deny the existence of sciences . . let us raise our style , and enlarge it to entire habits . can it be believed , that men of excellent wits should be so fond as to deny those things that humane life is full of ; and without which there 's no living , at least commodiously ? i mean arts. let 's consider what part of our action or life is exempt from their service : what arts go to the providing us food , cloaths , houses , delights ? our minds are cultivated with liberal ones : the fields , mountains , seas are mastred by arts. to conclude , what is there that falls under mans use , wherein some kind of art is not exercised ? art , therefore , what is it , but a rule which commonly fails not ? this , then ( if mens souls but own themselves ) is certain , that art , for the most part , fails not . what if i should say , that it never fails ? but either the artificer is unskilfull , or else , through laziness or knavery follows not the prescription of the art , as oft as any error happens . but , be it so , that art sometimes fails ; at least , the whole course of our actions is grounded on this that , commonly it fails not : wherefore since what never fails is certain , art , which in most cases never fails , in most cases is certain ; and whoever denies this , either out of ignorance or stomack , opposes himself to very nature and the order of things . this is , therefore , a throughly-attested truth , that there are intire and complete habits of certainties : since , both of the several arts , in common , t is certain that for the most part they attain their effect ; and the same is as evident of the several members and joints in each art in particular . . the next place mathematicks challenge , which have gain'd the true name of science : first , arithmetick and geometry , each of so large an extension , that they make up many entire habits ; and if they be acknowledg'd for sciences , they leave no room for opposing others , upon pretence of the abundance of their doctrines , or the largeness of their subject . such , again is the steddiness of attestatition to these sciences , of so many ages , so many eminent wits , by shewing and perpetuating so many effects , beyond the estimation of humane prudence ; that there can be no doubt but they winch against nature it self that calumniate these sciences . let 's behold the multiplicity of sylogisms ; the derivation of far distant truths by intermediate propositions , immediate to one another ; and how many principles or fore-known truths are sometimes made use of towards the search of some one : and we shall see these sciences will not sustain themselvs alone , but extend their power to others also ; and perswade , nay , evince , that there 's nothing but may be demonstrated , if there want not industry . . yet i am not ignorant what uses to be urg'd against these sciences , especially against geometry : which though in other works i have sometimes repell'd , yet here too , as in their properest place , they are again to be repeated ; chiefly because the scepticks no where , in my judgment deserve more applause . for , plain it is , though nothing be farther from the meaning of the geometricians than what the scepticks lay to their charge ; yet nothing appears clearer in the terms they use , than what they mean not : providence so ordering it , that those things which best guard themselves by their own evidence should be most infesed with prejudices ; to warn us , in more obscure points , not to desert evidence , though we be hard put to 't with weighty , perhaps , but obscure argments . for , what 's more manifest than that geometricians require a streight line to be drawn from one point to another ? that they dispute , whole volumes full , conconcerning lines and superficies ? that they demand a line to be drawn out in infinitum ? that a circle be made ? an equilateral triangle ? and a thousand such like : that none of all which , yet , can exist in the world , 't is either certain , or , at least , so ambiguous that it ought not to be presum'd without demonstration ; whereas the geometricians neither attempt nor promise any such thing . . notwithstanding in all these , t is no hard matter to satisfie an attentive reader . for , i ask , whether or why t is not lawful for a mathematitian to speak universally of his object , in the same manner as both the learned and unlearned talk of theirs ? he may then speak of the body proposed to him , as t is long , not treating at all about it , as t is broad ; since for a body to be broad is nothing else , but to be long according to two dimensions . in like manner , since a body to be deep signifies it to be long according to three dimensions ; what an envious part 't is not to allow the same to be considered as broad , abstracting from the third dimonsion ? these things being clear to the utmost pitch of evidence ; and so that we cannot speak otherwise according to nature ; let 's see wherein lyes the fault of the geometricians . you urge that they assert there is a line in being , that is , longitude without latitude ; i deny it : you prove it , alledging they mark a line with letters , saying the line a. b. i demand , to what purpose serves this marking ? is it for any thing but to notifie the longitude of the body they measure ? if that be all , then the sense which serves the mathematicians turn in the word is , that the body propos'd , according to longitude , is equivalent to the distance between a and b. and , if he assumes any more , it must of necessity be something impertinent to his discourse , which geometricians , of all men , are farthest from . . the very same may be said for their manner of speaking concerning a superficies . but , for points , the solution is more evident : for , in stead of this word the point a , or the point b , put the word end or term , and there will remain no shadow of difficulty . for , who can doubt but that a body , as long , is terminated : and therefore can forbid an end or term to be assign'd it ? for the rest , 't will easily appear the like discourse serves : for , when he demands a line to be produc'd in infinitum , the clear sense of the geometrician is to have it drawn out as far as is necessary for his work ; which never does or can happen to require it actually infinite . not an infinite , therefore , but an indefinite line the geometrician asks ; that he may use any as big a part of it as he needs . in like manner , if he demands a circle or streight line to be made ; 't were fond to think he expects them scor'd out mathematically on paper or sand : since the demonstration he intends is universal and exists in the understanding only , not in paper . it suffices therefore , that the accurateness of the circle or line be in his mind , to which the paper yields a phantasm ; a weak one , indeed , but fit enough to delineate the rigorous form in his mind . some , too , will not allow a line can be cut just in the middle . nor do i deny this to be petty work of geometry : but , neither do i expect the scepticks should be able to prove this impossible : and therefore , against a perfect demonstration , such as euclid's is , to listen to slight-babling reasons were to trifle , not philosophize . . is not this hugely remarkable , or rather to be admir'd ? that those things which advance geometry , above other sciences , in a great measure are false ; taken for granted in order to use , but not credited for science : for , mathematick is not certainer or more evident than other sciences ; but easier and more adapted to fancy , not understanding . for , if in geometry we were still to use strick terms , and always to repeat this body , as long , abstracting from its latitude , or , as broad , abstracting from its depth , the whole discipline , losing that inveiglement of clearness by which it tills on the reader , would be but tedious work . now , because we may use the names of points , lines , and superficies , as they were things ; and , according to this gross apprehension , make visible figures : geometrical truths strike almost our very corporeal eyes . whether as much may be done in other sciences , at least as to some part , is not yet clear ; but , from the way of algebra , it may be conjectur'd not utterly out of the reach of humane industry . . this , at least , may passe for evident , from the manner we have expressed of the geometricalcontemplation : that the geometricians use to draw their consequences and positions , not from the sounds of their words , but the notions in their minds . but , herein kind nature has been indulgent to those disciplines ; that they are excus'd from any necessity to resolve the equivocation of their terms : but having once explain'd them , they may , without any rub , proceed , whence we see that if at any time , they are put to explicate their words , geometry grows even as troublesom as metaphysick : as appears in that question bandy'd concerning an angle of contact ; because they reflect not that an angle speaks a quantum , whereas yet they confess it cannot exist without a space . plain then 't is rendred that the first task in the other sciences is , to make the question clear between the opposite parties , not only in term , but also in meaning : and that this is the main fault of the weak managers of other sciences , that they stick obstinately at using the words in a fore-received sense , and that no clear one ; nor can be bronght to an agreement about their explication . . it must be concluded , that , in physick also and metaphysick , there 's a capacity of infinite demonstrations , if industry be not wanting . for , who is so senselesse as pertinaciously to deny , that a formal sylogism may be made ev'n about the subjects of these sciences , or , when made , is of force ? it must , therefore , be said , either that the discoursers in these disciplines cannot comprehend their own meaning , and declare what they feel in their mind when they pronounce such words : or else , that they may reduce them into a sylogism and breed science . plain too , it is , that , in that part of physick , which is truly call'd such , viz. that which treats of sensible qualities , not so subject to obscurity through the equivocalnesse of the terms , demonstration will cost lesse pains : in metaphysicks 't will prove harder , because the commoner the words are , the more they are subject to equivocation . but , on the other side , because , the commoner the things treated are , the simpler are their notions , and consequently , more evident the connexion of the terms : demonstrations in metaphysicks must needs be most evident and secure , and such as deserve the evidence of all other sciences should depend on them . fourth plea refells the preliminary objections . . now we must give ear to the complaints , ( shall i call them ? ) or rather reproaches of the scepticks : though themselves are no slight causes of those ills which they object to the lovers of dogmatizing ; who , whilst they even acknowledge it the entire work of a man , and one minding his businesse too , to dilate the bounds of any science ; themselves , pursuing mean studies and the applause of a smooth-tongue , strive , under pretence of impossibility , to avert from that heroick thought the scientifically-dispos'd genius of others . yet , would they do even this but solidly , i should think it pardonable : but , if they fall not on this neither in a legitimate way ; how are they not to be exploded ? now , perhaps , the defects of mis-seekers may be more ; but i le content my self with the proposal of three . let the first be of those who seek things incapable of truth ; or who , of that which has no being at all , enquire how it is or may be made : as if one should require a triangle , equal to an assign'd circle , to be inscrib'd in it . let the second be of those , who complain that those things are unknown , which , though true in themselves , are yet , either , absolutely , or at least as yet , out of the reach of human power : as if one should be angry that the wars or government of the planetary common-wealths ( supposing those globes planted with rational creatures ) are unknown to us . for , 't is fondness to quarrel at our ignorance of such things , for reaching the knowledge whereof nature has afforded us no ladder of accidents . the last defect is of such as lament those things are unknown , which , by honest industry , may be searcht out , and will , if the ardour of inquisition grow ripe . for , 't is ignorance and importunity to allow no time for encrease of sciences . amongst these i reckon not those self-tormentors , who fret that those things are unknown , which are publickly known to others , but unknown to them ; because , upon some extrinsecal prejudice , they neglect inquiring into what others have said : which race of men is , at this day , most frequent among the courters of science ; but withall most insufferable : for , what can be viler than to shut the eyes against things most manifest to the understanding ; upon the calumnies of such as profess they know not these things which others constantly affirm are most evidently comprehended ? . let now the complaints themselves speak , viz. those with which the contemner of advancing dogmatically has stuft his , , , and chapters : but , first le ts examine those things which he indulgingly reproaches . they are the two , as it were , acknowledged ultra's of philosophers , viz. the causes of the seas ebbing and flowing , and of the wonders of the load-stone . i le endeavour to look into them severally . and , as to the first , though that may well be reckoned among the things whose accidents are not-yet-enough comprehended by us ; and therefore i might justly exact that they , who think it incomprehensible , should take care to have the phoenomena's clear'd , and teach us , by just calculations of seamen , what dayes , in the several regions , the sea ebbs and flows happen : otherwise , i may deservedly lay the blame on industry , and excuse philosophy : yet i will not proceed so rigorously with a courteous adversary ; but argue , that these things may be convinced concerning this vicissitude of the sea : that the motion is caus'd by an extrinsecal mover : that that is no other than the winde : that what rules the windes is but various aspects of the sun and moon to the divers climates of the earth . which , if they be true , if evident from the phoenomena's ; what remains , but that the phoenomena's be more acurately traced ; and the ignorance of particulars laid to the charge of industry , not of art : and so philosophy scape scot-free ? . le ts run over our proposals one by one . the first is that the seas motion is from something extrinsecal , or without it . this is demonstrated by aristotle in his books of physicks ; as they who have studyed him know : the dialogues , too , de mundo have made this some part of their pains ; and , if a proper place for it occurs in this treatise , i shall not be loath of my labour to explicate the same again : here this proposition is to be assum'd , not prov'd . that the author of this motion is the winde comprehends more than one thing , viz. that the winde is a sufficient stirrer of the sea ; and that it , in particular , concurs to this motion call'd the flux . as to the first part , ( not to mention how many deluges or overflowings of the sea have infested the coasts by the windes help ) , we need not travel beyond the thames ; in which , almost every winter , the flood happens , sometimes more than once in a day , to be beaten back or pour in more abundantly than ordinary , to the overflowing the streets in the subburbs of london , that , again , the winde causes this course of the tydes , besides the necessity which the perpetual west-winde , flowing from the atlantick sea to the east-indies , carries with it ; the six-months strong currents , which take their turns constantly backward and forward between africa and america , conformable to the windes always keeping the vicissitude there , are a manifest testimony . add to these , that , through the whole coast of china , certain tempests , with most vehement rains and overflowings of rivers , are daily expected at the new and full moons ; whence the variation of the fluxes at the same just periods is encreased . now , that the windes and rains and rising of storms depend from the sun and moon is so notorious that 't is past contest . these things , then being clear ; the causes of ebbing and flowing cannot be obscure : though the certain compasses they fetch be unknown , because the observations of them are not-yet exactly calculated . . nor is the magnetical philosophy less evident , if we 'l have but patience to look into 't by piece-male . for , it cannot be doubted , from the sudden turning of iron-tools fit for the purpose , and other bodies apt for magnetical direction ; but that power of direction , which we call magnetical , is attaind by a flux of unperceivable atoms deriv'd from one body into another : and as little , that because a perpendicular or horizontally-sidelong position of the magnetical body is apt to beget in it that vertue ; the primarily magnetical body is the earth we tread on , or at least the crust of it next us . nor , again , is it questionable , from the perpetual motion of corruption and generation of this magnetical vertue in those bodies ; but there is a certain perpetual flux of atoms upwards and downwards , as also between the equator and the poles ; whereby this vertue is infus'd and fed . neither , again , will any stick at it , that the magnetical body , if it be set at full liberty , must be carry'd according to the flux of the like atoms ; as that which swims in a river follows the violence of the stream : and consequently , the declination , too , or variation of the needle point out the channel of the earth's atoms , which are proper to it . all which if we solidly remark , and pursue with a steddy discourse ; i see not what great mistery lies in this magnetical vertue and operation , beyond possibility of bringing clearly to light . these secrets , therefore , of nature were , heretofore , like the head of nilus , undiscover'd ; but now , themselves attest not the defect but proficiency of science . these then thus touch'd on , let us fall to the objections themselves . fifth plea refells our ignorance of the soul and sensation . . in the third chapter , therefore , of his most eloquent discourse , he objects our ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with , viz. our own souls . concerning which , what a kind of thing 't is in this our earthly habitation , he neither teaches nor enquires at all , as far as i can discern ; only that it is , he asserts , may be most clearly gathered from its effects ; but , to ask what it is , he saies is like the mistake of infants , that look behind the glass for the body whose superficies they saw painted on its foreside . and , in my judgment , he had said rarely , had he stopt here : but in his following questions , he shews his deficiency even in this . for , he asks farther , whence the soul comes ? and how t is united to the body ? he is therefore most manifestly detected , to think that the soul , lying hid in the body , is of it self a certain substance , which may directly be made , come , and be joined to another thing : whence he terms it subsistence , which doubtless denotes a thing and substance . now , that this is a most important error in philosophy none can doubt , that 's able to discern the opposition of one and many . for , t is plain , that either a man is not a thing ; or else that his soul and body are not two things ; if one thing cannot at once be many , nor many one . nor am i scar'd with the distinction ( which the boys that gabble philosophy have always ready in their budget ) of a perfect and imperfect thing : which saies just nothing , unless imperfect signifie to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing ; which suppos'd , an imperfect thing is not a thing , and the distinction vanishes . otherwise , the same cannot be one thing and more things : wherefore either a man is not a thing , but a pair of things consisting of an intelligence and a beast ; or his soul and body are not two things . . when , therefore , he asks , whence comes the soul ? it must be answered with a question , whether he doubts whence the man comes ? for , if whilst the man lives , there be but one only thing which is call'd the man , 't is he alone can have come ; and he beats the wind that enquires whence the soul comes ? nor am i shaken with the authority of our fore-fathers , though never so reverend : i mean not of those who profess themselvs unable to grapple with the question ; for these deliver the candle into the hands of posterity , advising them to pursue on the same race , that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves , ready to patronize whoever shall clear the truth . but their opposition i resist , who clamor 't is the faith of all churches that rational souls are fram'd by god. for , now i 'm accustom'd to it , to distinguish between what 's due to the sincerity of faith , and what to scholastical subtilty . if i attribute the making of man , as he 's intellectual , to the singular power and operation of god , i have submitted my self to the keys of the churches doctrine , and subscrib'd to the tradition of the saints . but , whether that action , which is the generation of man , consists of two actual parts , or be but one alone , by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions , is a purely speculative question belonging to the schools . and so it must be said that one thing , a man , equivalent to a beast and an intelligence , is brought into existence , by one action , equivalent to two , the generation of an animal and the creation of an intelligence . . by this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots ; the econd being how the body and soul are united ? which , 't is plain , is herein faulty , that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the compound , or not destroyd but ty'd together in it : which is clearly false , not only out of the ' fore-declared truth , but also out the definition of a part. for , parts are call'd such , whereof , by a motion , call'd composition , one thing is made ; or into which , what was one is resolv'd by division , or destruction of the unity . now , unity , not union , is the form of what is one : and , in that which is one , to seek for the colligation or cement , is to seek by what the same is made the same . the same error runs through the following difficulty , which laments that 't is unknown how the soul moves the body : which is utterly knock'd on the head , by denying the soul moves the body . for , true it is , that one animated member moves another ; but not , that any substance , which is a pure soul , moves immediately any member in which the soul is not . i appeal to other animals , in which there 's frankly denied to be a soul independent of the body : and i desire to have shewn me what motion there is in man , which is not in them . i confess freely , that one member , the brain especially , moves the rest after another manner in man , than in other animals ; and this by reason of the difference in their souls : but first it ought to be made evident by experiments , that a humane soul , without the help of the body , or some member acting together with it , moves another member ; before we are to enquire into the manner how this either is or can be done . . the last darkness which he bemoans in this chapter lyes in our ignorance of that motion , whereby the spirits are deriv'd out of the brain into the fit nerves for the animal's natural action . and , if indeed the objection brandish an argument common to all animals , i should soon quit the field : for i confess my self not so skilful in anatomy , that i can lay before the eyes , why , from the motion of anger boyling in the heart , the spirits should start into those muscles , by whose streining the animal is carry'd towards its adversaries ; and , from the motion of fear , spirits flow into the opposite muscles , by which the animal flies fromwards them ; whereas they , in a manner , add strength to and enforce both alike . yet , i make no question at all but , by force of the brain 's motion , caus'd by the motion of the heart , it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of channels are shut , others opn'd , and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits . but , the authors seems to make mans case proper to himself ; alledging will , and perhaps election , to be , as it were , the first author of this direction . still , therefore , he slips into the same error . for , first , he should demonstrate some act of the will , without some either precedent or concomitant motion of the heart , ( which , when t is violent , we call passion ; when we endeavour at any thing , desire or flight , or some other such like we stile it ) : but , if there be no such , then the cause of this direction is purely mechanical , as he calls it , and not any certain inexplicable power . now , that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will , 't is clear enough to them who allow ther 's no knowledge without a beat of phansies : for , phansies cannot chuse but both be stird themselves and stir others , by the usual ways of nature . by motions , therefore , deriv'd from the heart , whether in man or in animals , all motions , whether natural or free , universally are perform'd : and , by consequence , are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of philosophy and acurate mechanicks . . the fourth chapter objects that the natures of sensation and memory are inexplicable . as to the former , first he acknowledges the substance of sensation is seated in the brain alone : then he inclines to des cartes's fantastical conjecture , shall i call it , or deviation from the manifest footsteps of nature ; about motion's being brought down from the heav'ns to our eyes , through the continuedness of a very thin ether : but , because he esteems aristotle's conceits , too , not incredible , i may be excus'd from that speculation . at length , therefore , he falls again into the old error , enquiring how corporeal things can have any force upon a naked spirit ? he supposes therefore , the soul in the body to be a kind of thing , not the form or affection of the thing , man ; and so , is upon the same false haunt again , nor needs repeating former discourses to beat him off it . but , left he should say nothing new , he objects that , by sense alone ; there 's no discerning the quantities , distances , figures and colours of things . i wonder , i must confess , at these objections from a curious and ingenious man ; things so clearly explain'd & demonstrated in opticks . who is so ignorant , that he knows not that bigger things , at the same distance , strike the eye in a more obtuse angle and stronglier ? who knows not that figure , if plain , as objected to the eye , is nothing else but quantity more spacious or contracted this or that way ? but , if it be a solid one and participate of the third dimension , it borrows its variety from distance . again , that distance is nothing else , but a certain magnitude spread between the eye and the object ; which if it be past judging of , neither can the eye attest the distance . lastly , that colour is nothing else , but the confused figuration of a superficies , according to its parts undistinguisht to sense . whence it remains clear , that the eye needs no other geometry for all these , than what is necessary to judge of a magnitude from the variety of an angle . . his next pains is about memory . to shew the explication of that impossible , he commemorates and rejects four waies of resolving it . i must take another path than any of those . first , i must weaken this consequence , that if any thing about memory has not hitherto been explicated , we must therefore make account it never will be , or that 't is impossible to be explicated . we must be aware too , that alwaies some things will be unknown ; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them ; or in that at length the bulk of things known will be grown so great , that more will be burthensome to the understanding . now , to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness . what , therefore , seems my task in this queston is , to bring into play those things which are already establisht and evident about memory ; and , for those that are unknown to make an estimate whether , some time or other , they too will come or merit to be known . first , then 't is evident , we must distinguish what is memory and what remembrance . for , memory is only a conserving of the impressions made by the objects , whereby the animal is rendred able to use them when he lists or needs . but , remembrance is a certain motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduc'd into act and use. concerning memory , therefore , a reason is to be given both of its station or rest , and of the causes or manner of its motion : and of both , if i be not mistaken , nature and experience offer evident footsteps , for tracing them . . in the first place , that all things that move the sense have certain minute particles of their body shorn off ; as to the touch , tast and smell , is too notorious to abide contest . he that denyes the same force to the light , returning from the things to our eyes , must deny , too , that the sun extracts exhalations from the earth and sea : there being no other diversity in the operations , but that the one is greater and stronger , the other weaker and less . now that these atoms get up to the brain , by the waftage of the spirits , ( that is , a certain liquid and most subtil substance ) can scarce be denied by one never so pievish , that 's but put in minde how waters and oyles are impregnated . these atoms , therefore , must of necessity strike , not without some violence , upon that part of the brain , whose being-struck causes perception . again , that a stream or any thing liquid dasht against a resister should not leap back again is most clearly repugnant , both to experience and reason . and , that a substance any thing viscuous , in a viscuous vessel besides ( such as those are about the brain ) being repuls'd , should not stick to any thing solid is equally impossible : as also , that a notable part of that stream should not cling together , is against the nature of gluyness . the walls therefore , of the empty and hollow places of the brain must of necessity be all hang'd and furnisht with little threads . conclude we , then , that through all the senses , except hearing , the animal is enabled , by atoms constantly sticking in it , to make use again of the impressions made by objects . in fine , since sound is made by a collision of the air ; 't is evident by anatomy , that it drives the hammer of the ear to beat upon the anvil , by which beat 't is not to be believ'd but certain particles must fly off and strike the fancy : the orderly storing up ▪ therefore , of these is apt to constitute the memory of sounds . the structure , then , of memory ( if i am not mistaken ) is rationally enough declared . . i cannot see why the like track may not carry us to the explaining of the symptoms of remembrance too ; or why their solution should be desparate . for , there 's nothing clearer than that the fore-explicated motion of the atoms is set on work by a wind , as it were . for , that passion is a certain ebullition of spirits reeking out of the heart , t is visible even to the eies , in anger , and love , and bashfulness . if we make inquisition what effect these motions have on the fancy , we experience , that those objects occur to the mind , tumultuously and all on a heap , as it were , which solicite these passions ; so hastily and in a huddle , that they prevent mature weighing . it appears , therefore , that the atoms , rouz'd from their places by such like vapours , fly about the cognoscitive part , in a kind of confused tumble . if then , there are certain winds and blasts , which we call motions of the appetitive faculty : is it not plain , that the cavities of the brain will be brusht , as it were , and the images sticking to the wals be moved to the place destin'd for attaining their effect ? and that these atoms are carried neither meerly by chance , nor yet in a certain order , is evident by this ; that , upon inquisition , the things we seek for do not suddenly and perfectly occur ; which were a sign of election ; and yet manifestly , such abundance of them suit to our purpose , that t is clear , they could not run thus without any industry at all . as , therefore , when we treated of directing the spirits into the nerves , we allowed the several passions each their waies into certain parts of the brain : so , here , t is also manifest , the same passions have the places and series of some certain atoms , in a manner more obvious to them , than others . . but our new admirer of nature is perplext , how this multitude of objects , swimming in the cavities of the brain , should possibly be , without entangling and confounding one another : and by what art they shift out of one anothers way , so as to be able to keep humane knowledge distinct . and here , i must confess , i had need crave the help of a machine : for , really , we have no candle , nor spectacles enabling us to look into the subtile paths by which the atoms avoid and slip by , to escape ruining one another by shocking . but , in exchange , i ask how many sun-beams ( which philosophy now questions not to be bodies ) pierce streight to our eies , through the vast continuity of air , and so many little bodies flying up and down in it ? there 's no body , if we credit experience and reason , without its steams , and a sphere of vapours derived from it : how do these steams find free paths to run in and attain such wonderful effects ? the magnetical , sympathetical , and smell-producing streams , have not their courses broken , or ends intercepted by one another . they that have not the confidence to deny these , why are they loath to allow the same may happen in the wide passages of the brain ? but you 'l reply , that to multiply a difficulty is not to salve it ; but to profess the rest of nature inscrutable , when t is our task to clear this particular . well then , thus i cut the very knot asunder : in currents of greater atoms , where t is easier to make experiment , t is plain , that many are confounded , many lost ; yet , out of the very nature of multitude , that some are preserved entire , and those enough to serve nature's turn . so it passes even in the brain : whatever object enters requires time for affecting the sense ; which , if it be too short , the object is lost almost before it be perceiv'd ; if long , it roots in the knowledge by the multiplicity of the images , and the frequent sight of the same object does as much ; nay , that knowledge often repeated , works the same effect , is evident beyond dispute . this being so , we must conclude , that such is the art of nature as , for things to be remembred , there shall not want that abundance of images , which is necessary and sufficient to force their way through the crowd of all others they meet . . 't is plain that , in this answer , i have prefer'd the digbaean method before the rest : because that , as neer as is possible , traces nature step by step . i concern not my self in the rest ; as studying philosophy , out of a design to build , not destroy . only , i 'd remember the ingenious author that he mis-imposes the third opinion ( which relishes nothing of philosophy ) upon aristotle ( who taught the digbaean way ) ; deceiv'd by the counterfeit stilers of themselves aristotelians , whereas they are nothingless . in this same chapter , the author seems sollicitous about the will 's following the understanding : but , because , he disputes nothing on 't , neither will i ; only , hint that the will , as spiritual , signifies not any thing else , but the very understanding perfect , or ripe for action to follow out of it . that mystery of whence comes ill , i deny not , has bin brought down , by the contests of the ancients , even to our ears ; nor question i but 't will last as long as the bold and ignorant shall endure : but , as the author mis-insinuates , i doubt not that st. augustine himself has most clearly convinc'd it ; nor can it any longer be troublesome to any , but those who either know not , or neglect his doctrine . sixth plea displaies the pastick vertue , continuity , adhesion of parts , and the mysteries of rolling . ▪ in his fifth chapter he falls upon the obscurity of the formation of natural bodies , especeially living ones : yet , not so smartly but that what he says may , with ease enough be repuls'd . i say , then , that there are two methods , by which the formation of living creatures may be rendred intelligible ; without any farther difficulty than what may , without a miracle , be refunded into the wisdome of our maker . conceive the first , thus : let 's say the seed of a plant or animal conteins invisible parts of all the animals members : these , le ts say , supply'd with moisture , encrease , with some slight mutation , whereof the reason may be easily rendred ( for example , that some parts dryer and harder , others are more throughly water'd and grow soft ) ; and what great matter will be apprehended in the formation of living things ? the other method is , that , observing the progress in chymicks , which must of necessity hold the very same in nature if self , we 'd see that things concocted with a gentle fire result into three more remarkable parts : a kind of thin and , as it were , fiery one , though condensablein to the species of water ; another oily and answerable to air ; a third expressing the nature of salt and , as it were , hardned water ; with all which ther 's mingled and lyes at the bottom a fourth , that 's dry and of an earthy quality , however they call it . the same we ought to expect from nature ; since the acting of heat upon moisture is the end of both fornaces . this laid for a ground , suppose , in a proper vessel , a drop of prepared liquor , so kept warm and preserv'd that it may be encreas'd , too ; is it not plain that , by the very action , some parts will become dryer , others more subtil and liquid ? and that the dryer will grow into different figures ? especially into certain hollow vessels ; if , by the beats of the boyling moisture , they be extended and thrust out in length ? and that all of them will cling together , where they begin first to divide ? and see you not now the figure of the animal and its respectively homogeneous parts form'd ? and that their connexion and variety , and its other heterogeneous parts follow the variety of either the fire or liquor . . he that shall comprehend these things well , will not lament that the plastick vertue is an empty name and a word without a thing . but , if he be ingenious and conveniently at leisure , he 'l either , in spring time close-observe the breeding plants in gardens or the fields ; or at home pluck up seeds buried in pots , just while they are taking life ; and daily rake into the bowels of berries and seeds : and i dare promise him so manifestly connected steps of advance , that , after many experiments , he shall fore-tel , meerly out of what he sees the day before , what will be the next days issue . those things which appear wonderful confusedly in the whole , taken asunder discover and fairly offer themselves to view . if one observe the spreading of figures or colours , he shall find the principles of these founded in the nature of juice ; the reasons of those chalk'd out by some manner of their production : for both fruits and even slips are , by art , variable into any kind of forms . much more the figures of different salts or concret juices spring , not from any intrinsecal nature , but from their usual generation and the diffidulty or facilness of their place and motions . nor let any be scar'd by the talk of artists , that admire and amplifie those things whose causes they understand not : or of our authour , amaz'd at the constancy of natural operations ; why our hens should never be colour'd like peacocks-tails or parrats . for , in different regions , great varieties spring from the diversity of food and air : and , for what is out of our reach about these things , we must be beholden to time . . in the same chapter he raises two other questions , which he thinks absolutely inexplicable : to me , on the other side , they seem to have scarce any difficulty in them . the later in him is concerning the composition of bulk or continuum : a question both debated by the antients and desperate to the modern's . the former , though the later in nature , is concerning the sticking together of parts , or , why one body is more divisible , another less . the former question supposes another , whether there be parts actually in a continuum , whereof the affirmative side , though they wrangle in words , yet is commonly taken by the modern's , as it were a self-or-sensibly-known truth ; but , by the whole school of the antient peripateticks and that of the thomists following them , hist out , as demonstratively convicted . the issue of the matter is that , about the composition of bulk , the moderns , after a world of laborious trifling , confess philosophy at a stand : the peripateticks deride them as groping in the dark . for , if there be no parts til they are made by division ; they are manifestly out of their wits that seek how those should be united which are-not at all ? the arguments of those that assert actual parts cite even sense ; concerning which ther 's nothing certainer than that it cannot discern any part in a bulk ; since the term of each part is invisible , whereas sence requires a notable quantity to judge of . their other arguments commonly assume our manner of speaking , and end in logical trifles , how we ought to speak , not what the thing it self has really in it . now , this no-very-difficult contest being decided , all the controversie concerning the composition of bulk is over . . about the other question there 's even as wise work . the followers of democritus strive to resolve it into hooks and corner'd hold-fasts : not seeing , that nothing can be imagin'd so one , or an atom , as that it self is not compos'd of many parts , concerning which it must be ask'd how they come to stick so fast together ? but , this difficulty they , at least , slip over , asserting that these in minutest bodies , by force of nature , resist whatever divisive power , not so the compounds of them : that is , the greatest and invincible coherence of parts they carelesly ascribe to the force and quality of nature , and are narrowly inquisitive about a less . the first resolution , therefore , 't is plain , is refunded into nature it self , and the division of body or bulk into rare and dense , or having more and less of quantity in equality of bulk . which differences most demonstrably dividing the notion of quantitative and constituting more species of it in things ; there remains no greater difficulty in the adhesion of the parts of the same continuum , than whether there be any such thing or not : for , if there be any , by its very being a continuum , of necessicity it must be whereof parts may be made , not wherein parts are ; else ( as we have press'd above ) the same thing would be one and many , divided and not-divided , in the same notion . therefore 't is that substance , from its very quantity , whence it has its refolvableness into parts , has also its easier or harder resolvableness , which they call its parts more or less sticking to one another . but , as soon as ever the speculation is strein'd up to intellectual notions , these naturalists's stomack turns : as if philosophy enjoyn'd us not to know our own thoughts , and made it unlawful to understand what we speak . . his sixth chapter is all dedicated to the motion of wheels ; nor , if we believe an author that wants for no wit , is it any ways solvable . but , before he attaques that fatal difficulty , he objects a certain previous one to us , which the antients object to aristotle ; but he , i confess , in a clearer form . for , he considers a wheel mov'd about its center , and plainly concludes that no part of it moves ; but the whole is mov'd , and the several parts together change place . but , what inconvenience this conclusion drags along with it , i am utterly ignorant : for , though he strives to reduce at large , that one part first quits the place before another is in it ; yet evidently the words , not the thing , breeds all the contest : for , what hinders that , altogether and at-once , both the quitter should first not-be and the succeeder first be in the same place ? another solution might be given , did the argument exact it : but , as i said , the quarrel is about the words and manner of speaking , not the thing . the author subjoyns a second difficulty , how , in a wheel turn'd about , the parts nearer the center , in the same time , come to run over so little a space ; whereas they are connected with the remoter , which fetch so large a compass ? and , after he has acknowledged it to arise from hence , because they are not carry'd alike swiftly ; he infers that , if the swiftness of the motions be unequal , the straight line drawn from the center to the circumference must be crook'd : whereas 't is most evident , the right line would be crook'd , if the nearer and distanter parts from the center were carry'd with equal velocity . . at length the author loftily enters upon his boasted experiment , professing before hand , hee 'l stop the mouth of the boldest obstinancy . thus he proposes it . let one axle-tree have three wheels on it , one at each end , both alike , and a third in the middle far less . let the bigger rest upon the floor , the lesse● upon some table . let them all be drawn in a progressive motion , till , having fetch'd a full compass , they mark the floor and the table with the very same points , in which , at first , they rested on them . the three scor'd lines will be found equal ; whereas the middle one is scor'd out by the contact of a circle far less than the other two , yet 't is as long as them : which , with no likely-hood , can be deny'd impossible ; since , 't is clear , things that touch , as far as they do so , are , necessarily equal . this is the knot ; this the evident repugnancy . but , alas ! let 's observe that motion is call'd in to help tye the knot the harder ; and that the motion is of two kinds , a right and a circular , compounding a third progressive motion of the wheel . observe we farther , that the right ( or streight ) motion of the three wheels is equal ; and that the circular motion of the great wheels is equal to the right motion ; but the circular motion of the middle little wheel is less than the right motion : and , which follows , that the greater wheels are mov'd with the same celerity according to both motions ; but the lesser is mov'd stronglyer in the right , than in the circular . now , the compounded motion is not that which is scor'd upon the floor or table , which , 't is clear , is a simple and purely right one ; but a certain crooked motion in the air , making , with the scored motion , a certain area ( whose quantity , torricellus has demonstrated ) : as is manifest beyond dispute to whoever but takes any one point of the circle or wheel ; and withall , that the progressive motion of the bigger wheels is greater than that of the lesser wheel . these things thus explicated , there appears nothing in this objection more intricate , than in this simple proposition , that of two bodies , which are carryed according to one line with equal velocity , one may , at the same time , be carried swiftlyer than the other , according to another line : which is so evident , that any one , that 's a mathematician , cannot doubt of it . . yet still galilaeus presses closer that , in the circumvolution , the several points of the lesser circle or wheel are just fitted , in an immediate succession , to the several points of the space in which 't is carried : and , therefore , that it cannot be understood how the right can be longer than the crooked . but , that which deceived galilaeus was his not having discussed aristotle himself , but bin overcredulous to his modern interpreters , or rather corrupters . for , aristotle has taught us that a moveable , in actual motion , alwaies possesses a bigger ( and not-equal ) place to it self ; which is most evident : for , since no part of motion can be but in time ; and , in every part of time , the thing moved quits some place and gets some new ; 't is plain , there cannot be found any so little motion , wherein the body moved , has not possessed both the place in which it had rested , and some part of a new one . this supposed , though the moveable were conceived indivisible ; yet certain it would be that , in whatever determinate part of time , or by however little a part of motion , it would score out not a space equal to it self , but some line ; and , in the conditions of our present dispute every point of the lesser wheel will draw a line proportionate to a part of the circle of the greater wheel . and , since really there are no either instants in time , or indivisibles in motion , or points in a circular line : 't is evident , this argument has no force ; but in vertue of that false apprehension which we have convinced in the ' fore-alledged defence of geometry . seventh plea inquires after the causes of our modern shortness in science . . in some of the following chapters he , exquisitely enough , searches into the causes of errors and human ignorance : yet , me-thinks , i could suggest two which he has over-slipt . one is the laziness or rather vanity of this age : for , whoever has got himself but talk enough to weave a learned story amongst the ignorant or half-learned , such as understandings unaccostomed to sciences are apt to be dazled with : partly out of irksomness to pursue harder things , partly out of confidence of his own wit , he slights descending into those mines whence our ancestors have dig'd out science ; and to take those pains himself which alone wisdom regards and follows . let this author be my witness ; who , about the end of his former chapter , complains of the obscurity of our speculations concerning motion , gravity , light , colours , sight , sound ; all which the digbaean philosophy makes as clear as day : whence also ( though there they are more copiously and clearly explicated ) we have borrowed our discourses of the load-stone , the derivation of the spirits into the members , the memory and remembrance , the formation of living creatures , and whatever almost we have alledged for solving the proposed difficulties : the very dictates of nature leading us the way . such like philosophers , therefore , read the eminent and highly elaborate works of others , as if they were romances invented for pleasure , or as spectators behold a comedy : what on the sudden takes them they commend ; if any thing more knotty than ordinary occurs , they either out of laziness let it pass unregarded , or break some bitter jest on 't . . another cause of ignorance , wav'd by our author , appears to me to be a certain special error in the nature of demonstration . for , they feign to themselvs a certain idea of demonstration , which should not only have this force on the vnderstanding , to render the truth propos'd evident ; but , so , besides , that no objection can with any likelihood be oppos'd against it . which is as much as if they should require this demonstration to clear whatever follows out of , or any way relates to it ; or , that one demonstration should be a kind of entire science . for , otherwise , how is it possible but opposition may be rais'd against this , out of things not-yet seen-through and conjoin'd with this truth ? an understanding then , adapted to sciences , out of very principles and what it already knows , is secure of a deduced truth : nor fears any thing can be infer'd opposite to the truth it knows ; whatever pains it may cost to get out of streights . for , it knows , that those things are certain , which the vnderstanding , out of a steddy sight that a thing is a thing , or that the same is the same , has fixt to and in it self : and patiently waits till the distinction between the entanglements shew it self , and the confusion vanish . . in that these contemners of sciences endeavour not at fixing any thing in themselves by a severe contemplation of truth : as soon as any truth pretends but to evidence , as if they were incapable of owning it , they quit their station , and betake themselves to enquiring whether any one has oppos'd that same : and if they find impugners , they assume it for most evident , that such a truth is not evident . for , say they , were it evident , 't would be so to all ; 't would convince every understanding . but , they may just as well say , the sun is not visible , because t is not seen by them who turn their backs on 't , or keep their eies shut . for , as in corporeal sight , some corporeal motion is necessary , by which the ball of the eye may be set against the object : no less to see and fix in the mind this very evidence , that the same cannot be and not-be at once , a certain application , and as it were , opening of the mind is required ; even to conceive and give birth to the very evidentest evidence . and , for want of this , so many of the ancients and moderns have not own'd , but corrupted , the evidence of that very first and most notorious principle . whence they can never attain that scientifical method which shines so clear in arithmetick and geometry , but are wholly entangled in logical and equivocal trifles ; and fill babbling volumes with fopperies . let these lusty compilers of tomes shew the world but one leaf , or one page deduc'd , or , at least , attempted in a geometrical method ; and then , let them complain there 's no science , or that it lies hid in an unfathomable well : now the sordid sluggards , only mettlesome at repaoaches , conceit a lion in the way , and stir not a foot , so much as to behold the very way . eighth plea wards off from aristotle the calumny of special impiety . . and now i seem at an end of the task set me : did not the same persons strein , as enviously as possible , to defame aristotle , with all manner of contumelies ; that the ignominy of that one man may make way for them to tear science it self out of the hands of the learned , and throw it into the dirt of probability . for , he alone , of all the ancients , has left any monument of demonstration in metaphysicks and physicks . the academicks , where they leave the peripateticks , were orators , not philosophers . for , socrates himself was meerly a disputer and a doubter . plato and aristotle divided his school . plato propos'd to himself , with his wholy-divine wit and purest eloquence , to set out probability , and make himself admir'd for speaking specious things concerning the principles necessary to human life . aristotle very concisely hunting after truth by experiments , and marrying with the inspection of nature , the power of deducing consequences , design'd to shew the world science in physicks and metaphysicks worthy to vye with geometry : and , therefore , as long as a popular form of common-wealth nourisht the power of orators , he was less esteem'd . for , those famous persons affected to manage science after the manner of civil causes , without a solid and firm judgment . the orators at length , wearing out of credit , the authority of aristotle grew stronger ; and has been deriv'd from the romans to the arabians ; from them , to our schools : the italians first ( to our knowledge ) re-calling into the west , the science of the arabians , which the wars long since had chas'd away . . 't is highly unjust , and a sign of a cavilling spirit , to pry into his life , whose doctine you go about to impugn : for , these oratorial preventions of the reader argue the writer has no mind a candid judgment should be given of the truth ; but lyes in wait to distort justice by stirring the affections . wherefore , hissing out those things which are tattled against aristotles manners , let 's trace what 's objected against his doctrine . peter gassendus , then , in his third exercitation , objects it as certain , that 't is aristotles opinion , in his book of metaphysicks , that god is an animal : whereas , on the contrary , in the . book of his physicks , chap. and . he so expresly makes god a substance immaterial , indivisible , immoveable either by himself or by accident ; that impudence it self cannot be able to deny god , in his opinion , not-an animal . he adds , that god is ty'd to the out-most superficies of the highest heaven , which is extream-heedlesly said in the peripatetical way : whether you construe without heaven , in imaginary spaces ( whereas aristotle most expresly attests there are no such ) ; or an indivisible adherent to heaven ; whereas , both the first mover must necessarily be said to be in that which is first moveable or moved ; and , t is well known , that , in aristotle's way , the superficies is mov'd only through the motion of the body whose it is ; as also , the superficies ( as we have said above ) is a certain being divided , or term , or no-farther of a body , and not any entity in which god may be placed . . the next accusation argues god bound up to the laws of fate and necessity . but , here , the calumniator is clearly in an error . for , there are two kinds of fate ; one a stoical ; their 's who assert that whatever things are , exist in force of contradiction , since , of necessity , every thing must either be or not-be ; and this fate aristotle rejects : the other fate is a course of causes . since , therefore , 't is evident and agreed by all , in the peripatetical way , that god is the first-being , and by consequence , the cause of the whole series of the rest ; most clear it is that , in aristotle's school , he is not subject to fate , but himself the fate of all other things ; which is the most wise tenet of the saints , and the marrow of christian doctrine . like this is the other , that he is subject to necessity . for , the term , necessity , is ambiguous : for , as t is attributed to animals contradistinctly from liberty , so it takes away perfect knowledge ; which no peripatetick ever deny'd to god , to whom aristotles doctrine forces the very top of knowledge to be attributed . there 's another necessity springing from prefect knowledge ; to which nothing lying undiscovered , one perfect in knowledge , and , consequently , god , can take but one way . but , this necessity implying the determination of an understander to particulars , out of common principles , manifestly speaks election or liberty actuated . . he is farther calumniated to have taught that god knows not despicable and petty things ; and , the . of his metaphysicks is cited , where this is not found but by way of doubting : but , his best interpreters conclude , out of other texts , that aristotle attributes the knowledge even of these too , to god. this crimination , therefore , argues an ill will , drawing the words of that excellent person to the worst sense . yet , at least , he makes the world increated . but this may easily be deny'd . he asserted it , indeed , not-generated , or , impossible to have begun by motion and the force of natural causes ; which is most consonant to christian faith : but , as to the creation of the world , he has not a word on 't : yet , 't is one thing not to have acknowledg'd it , or reacht so high ; another , to deny ; amongst modest men that babble not incertainties . yet , i confess , he thought the world it self eternal : but , in his very error , he shewed himself the chief of heathen philosophers . for , whereas , they all with one consent declared , that nothing is made of nothing , 't was inconsequent for the world to have begun by motion , which could not exist without time ; and no begining of time , either out of its own essence , or by the action of moving causes , could appear . t is plain , therefore , that this error of aristotle's argues his excellency above the rest , who by chance , and not by science light on the truth . . the last calumny about his tenets concerns the immortality of the soul , which gassendus saies , aristotle in many places denies : but as disfavourably as before ; since , his best interpreters attest that he acknowledged it ; and plutarch records him to have written concerning the soul , upon eudemus's death ; out of whom is cited that famous story of a dead man's soul begging revenge of his friend . whence is evidenc'd that those interpreters err , who , out of aristotle's principles , endeavour to conclude the soul not immortal , and that this was aristotle's own sence . it hits strangely in fine , that the author , otherwise very ingenious , should judge this a fit objection , that aristotle denyed the resurrection of the dead : which , t is most certain , the light of faith first discover'd to mortals ; though , after its acceptation on that account , its conformity also to the progress of nature might be discern'd . this farther , that he concludes , saying , that aristotle speaks many things wholly disagreeable to our h. orthodox faith : as if plato and the rest of the philosophers had tendred the world none but tenets agreeable to faith : which is by so much an unworthier part of gassendus , in that he himself in his preface , promises he 'l shew that , t is by faith alone , any thing comes to our knowledge of god and the intelligences ; and that all arguments about these things , drawn from the light of nature , are vain . a worthy epiphonema , indeed , to close up his sixth book , design'd against metaphysick , or the supreme science . ninth plea wipes off the aspersions on aristotle's doctrine and terms . . i must now return from gassendus to the author of the vanity of dogmatizing ; since he has selected the strongest mediums : justly preferring them before that numerable rabble which gassendus has heap'd together , even to cloying ; out of love to reproaching , rather than science . our english academick , then , first by way of preface , as it were , seems to decline that envy , which the honourable train of aristotle's followers would be apt to procure him ; applying that sentence of seneca's , the multitude is an argument of the worst : so prone we are to err , even in the plainest things . for , t is evident , the vulgar , in some things , follow men of excellence , as it were , their captains ; in other things are govern'd , or rather hurried by their own judgment . the former method is that of nature it self , that many ignorants may , by the vertue and authority of a few , be carried to good : but , that the vulgar should judge of things themselvs know not , and by a tumultuary consent , precipitate the counsels of the prudent ; this is opposite to the laws of nature and reason . here now enquire whence aristotle has got an authority with the vulgar ? and t will clearly appear he has been made the coripheus of philosophers by the sway of the very princes of scholastical theology : to whom if you compare the judgments of orators or criticks , they 'l dwindle away to nothing . the fathers themselves ( those great persons pardon me if i say so ) are of another different trade ; nor have fallen upon any philosophical explication of faith , otherwise than as forc'd to it by the importunity of hereticks . . the author subjoins , that in the opinion of the wise , peripeteticism is a mass of terms that signifie nothing . but this author knew not that his own terms are so equivocal , that themselves speak nothing . for , who has sufficiently fifted this , who , or by whose judgment they are called wise , that have pronounced this of the peripateticks ? if we consult aristotles works themselves , or his ancient emulators , t is clearer than the sun , none ever of the philosophers so industriously , and by distributing so many of his terms into obvious sences , took care for the clearness of his dictates , and eluded the entanglement of equivocations . t is manifest then , the wise men had little skill in aristotle . they have mistaken , therefore , for aristotelians some apes cloaking themselves with aristotle's name , and expose other mens tenets for peripatetical ones : and ( which he seems not to know ) in very truth pyrronians . for , whoever , in mighty volumes and questions piled one on another , teaches nothing else , but , that one part , indeed , is more likely , but either side is defensible ; in such a world of twattle saies no more , than had he pass'd sentence in one word , that nothing is clear . this calumny , therefore , touches his own friends , not aristotle . . then , he prosecutes his plea against the peripateticks by certain doubts ; which either are not , or seem not , clear to him , in spight of reason . the notion of materia prima , which asserts it to have neither quiddity , nor quantity , nor quality , he contests is a description of nothing . ' strange , that men be so humorsome ! are there , perhaps , in all nature more usual words than being and power ? who is so sottish , that he speaks not thus of a piece of brass or marble assign'd for the purpose , that it is not-yet , but may or will be a statue of mercury ? do they not , peradventure , understand themselves that speak thus ; or , when they say , it may be , or has an aptitude to be a mercury , do they say the brass or marble is nothing , or , is nothing of mercury ? how , then , besides mercury , or the form of mercury , is there not a certain power or aptitude to be mercury , which neither is mercury actually , nor yet a notion of no-thing or no-thing ? or if , in respect of the figure which constitutes mercury , there is some aptitude which neither is that , nor yet a notion of nothing ; why may we not affirm the same of a quantum or bulk , and say , a boy is not yet big , but may be big ? for he that asserts this does he not , at the same time , deny bigness ; and yet clearly he names an aptitude to bigness ? nor , perhaps , is there any difference in respect to entity ; for we scruple not to say that tallow or oile may be flame , and yet that they are not yet flame : the tallow , therefore , or oil neither are the thing , flame , which they may be , nor so big as they will be when they are flame , nor so hot ; and yet they may be flame , they may be greater , they may be hotter : and there is in them a certain power , which neither has quiddity , quantity , nor quality ; since they are refer'd to all these , and are in a present state of privation in respect to them . now whoever professes this unintelligible , directly condemns mankind for a company of fools , that know not what they say in their vulgarest speech and commerces : and , he that denies matter it self destroys that solemn maxim of philosophy , that nature makes nothing of nothing . . there are two other terms which trouble our sceptick , form and being educ'd out of the power of matter . as for the first , 't is strangely odd , that too much speculation should so render ingenious men no better than the most stupid . can any man be born such a bruit , as not to own that one thing is distinct from another ? or , if it be distinct , can he assert t is distinguish'd by nothing ? does the difficulty lie here , that this , by which t is distinguish'd should be called a form ? what a strange unreasonableness is this , not to let me call that a form , which i see distinguish one from the other ? may not i say of two brazen statues , that they agree in brass , and are distinguisht by their figures ? or , if there be a third of marble , shall i be chid for saying , the brazen ones are distinguisht from the marble one , in that this is of stone , those other of mettal ? as , therefore , before , i distinguisht power and being in substance , quantity , and quality ; i may , now , in the same , find grounds for the denominations of form and subject in each of them . . as to the later term , being educ'd out of power , let the ingenious man reflect whether that which , out of some dark hole , softly and by degrees comes forth n●o open view , is improperly said to be educ'd or brought out . again , let him remember ( if he have ever seen a peece of marble form'd by a statuary ) how , at first it cannot be imagin'd what the artist means to form : after a little pains , there appears a confus'd resemblance of a humane creature ; then , whether it be a man or woman ; and at length , what man it is . behold , how a man , which was potentially in the marble , and confused in the dark , as it were , is by little and little educ'd by art out of that confusion into clear light , and the marble is palpable and expresly made a caesar. philosophers consider as much in nature ; whether you observe the seeds of living things , or the community of the elements to be mixt into a compound , or the abstraction of matter from the elements , whence this phrase to be educ'd out of the power of matter signifies matter out of its aptitude to many , to be determin'd , by the operation of nature or art to one certain thing ; through a motion from confusion to distinctness : and not to be , as it were , infus'd , with a dependance from the subject , as this anti-peripatetick fancies out of i know not what dreamers . for , there are none of these triflles extant in aristotle . tenth plea maintains certain definitions and arguings . . next they shoot at two of aristotle's definitions , either of them most exact , and as clear as can be , to those that understand any thing in his way . the first is the definition of light , in these words , light is the act of a prespicuous thing : which seems obscure to this race of people , because the use of the word act is fram'd by philosophers , and not taken from tully , or found in calipine . let them know , therefore , that act is deriv'd from agere , to do , or agi , to be done , or the participle actum , done ; and us'd by philosophers for that , by which what was intended by the agent at the end of his action is term'd or demonstrated donc . in greek , perhaps , 't is more elegantly call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as it were , the operation of the causes , taking the operation , not for the flux of the action , but , for that which remains introduced by the operation , which is such a flux . but , because our language affords not a proper word correspondent to the term , act ; our sterling philosopher is all in choller against aristotle . for , if he had put but ordinary words , instead of terms of art , saying , light is a certain perfection of a body , that has this in its nature , to let coloured things appear through it , making them de facto appear through it ; as we experience objects are seen through illuminated air , which are not seen through it darkened : what had he found worth making such a wide mouth over ? now because he has spoken most neatly and briefly , poor aristotle smarts for it . . the other definition has the same fault . the definition is this , motion is the act of a thing in power , as in power . for , since a thing is said to be in power , to that it may be brought to by motion ; for example ; one that 's sick , to health ; wood , to firing , or to be fire : t is plain , that motion is that perfection , or act with which the subject is affected whilst 't is yet in power , or , till the sick person be in health , or the wood be fire ; as in power , or in that state by which it may attain the intended perfection . behold here a most clear and learned definition , and subject to no other reproach than a certain umbrage , from a ridiculous story concerning the greek term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which i believe fram'd by the philosopher to express his intention emphatically . the story 's this ; that a critick , i know not who , went to one ciccus , esteem'd a magician ( i imagine , because he wrote of magick ) to enquire of the devil what was the meaning of that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in aristotle ; and return'd as wise as he went , and mock'd at by the oracle . that it may appear then what a dunce devil our philosophers have consulted ; lte them take notice that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a word made up of three , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , with the addition of a foeminine termination , which is proper for signifying abstractions : and so signifies the manner the subject of motion is found in at the end of the action ; which is the very same thing with the term act , as t is explicated above . . in his seventeenth chapter there is a new calumny forg'd against aristotle ; the more unworthily , in that he ; above the rest , has endeavour'd at clearness . his philosophy is accus'd to be litigious , and through the wavering use of his terms , confused and obscure . this accusation is found guilty of a double ignorance : one , of what aristotle's use is ; for he 's the carefullest that ever writ , to distinguish and form the significations of his terms : the other is , that he takes scepticks for peripateticks . and , that the scepticks endeavours are the vainest that can be , i easily grant ; that they little trouble themselves about fixing the use of their words , to be left more at liberty to sell any trifles they list for vanity or profits sake ; that they are petty orators , or rather janglers , not philosophers ; that they take upon them the name of aristotelians , to corrupt youth and draw disciples after them . i deny not that these are to be shun'd like the plaigue , by all pursuers of science ; nor is any thing of sollidity to be expected from them : this one thing puts me out of patience , that persons , otherwise ingenious and desirous of knowledge , should be averted by these cheats , not only from true science , but from all hope of ever gaining any , in the things most necessary to human life . . they back their feigned plea against the philosopher out of his own words and actions . their first crack is upon that saying of his , that his books of physicks were so publisht , that they were not made publick . the sense whereof was , that the matter or subject handled in them is so abstracted , that , without the assistance of an experienc'd master , they could not be understood by those unus'd to his way ; which we see hold to this day : for , scarce any one comprehends those books , unless aided by the old commentators . whence our moderns , for the most part , are quite besides the cushion as to aristotles meaning ; though he himself has spoken , as clearly as possible the brevity he prefixt to himself could bear . the next calumny is grosser and more luckless ; that those things which he has collected , to furnish logical disputants , and perfect the act of disputing previously to giving judgment , should be applyed to his method of demonstrating , and to his practice not in disputing but defining . for , as , in plays , 't is a commendation to entangle the story , that it may come off at last with greater admiration : so , 't is the task of the inquirer to confound the question , with proposing difficulties before it , that the demonstrator may clearly vnidicate it , and , as it were , dispelling the clouds , restore it to light. . this plea requir'd instances out of that work of his . the author presses three : upon gassendus's credit , i believe , or some other slight lookers into it ; for , in the book it self there 's nothing to be seen : the first runs thus . he proves the world to be perfect , because it consists of bodies ; that bodies are perfect , because they consist of a triple dimension ; that a triple dimensions is , therefore , perfect , because consisting of three ; and that three is perfect , because two we call both , and never say all till we come to three . look into his first book de coelo , chap. . you shall find these last words make no part of the demonstration , but are additional only : and that the demonstration , it self is this ; because the world consists of bodies , the perfection of the world is to be perfect in the notion of body . now , the perfection of body lies in this , that it be spread every way upon three prependiculars , as the geometricians demonstrate . and thus are both the several bodies , and the world ; but in a divers manner ; for the several bodies are terminated each to others ; whence , though they are spread according to all the lines , yet not to the whole , or utmost extent of them . but , because there is no space beyond or without the world ( as 't is demonstrated in the fourth of his physicks ) , the world is spread according to all and the whole lines , or , perfectly every way ; and by consequence , must be said perfect in the notion of body , and , so , absolutely . . the second instance is , that aristotle asserts , were there more worlds , the moon would fall down upon the earth . this consequence the arguer thinks sprung from such a fancy as theirs , that fear the antipodes should drop into heaven . but , he reflects not how great pains the philosopher took to establish the center of the world in the earth : which granted , this consequence would depend not from fancy but reason , as himself seems to confess . . the third instance , too ( drawn out of lib. . cap. . de coelo . is utterly perverted . for , aristotle teaches not , that the heav'ns are , therefore , carry'd towards the west , because the west is the nobler , ( as the argument makes it ) ; but , that the west is the nobler , because the heav'ns are carry'd towards it . now , there 's this difference betwixt the two ; that in the former method , 't is assum'd without proof , that the west is the nobler ; in the later , it follows out of those things which aristotle had concluded ; viz. that there 's nothing accidental in eternal things ; and , by consequence , that the motion towards the west is natural to the heav'ns ; and natural motion is to the more honourable : whence it clearly follows , that the west is nobler than the east . it follows , i say ; for , if the principles were true , 't were a noble demonstration . eleventh plea refutes some topicks babbled against science . . about the end of the chapter he expresses indignation , that the learned so employ all their pains upon logick , physick , and metaphysick ; that the sciences , usefuller to human life , viz. concerning the heav'ns , meteors , fossils , and animals , but especially politicks and oeconomicks , are much neglected . nor can i deny that these are neglected in the schools : but , what 's guilty on 't , but the scepticism that reigns there ? for , if the sciences were taught in aristotle's method , there would be room enough for all ; nor would nature be taunted with the usual calumny , that mans life is too short for the arts : but , the necessary ones once known , there would advance still a surplusage of leisure , to take abundantly , in any of these sciences , that delight which human curiosity should be drawn to . but , they are the scepticks that envy this happiness to men ; confounding all things with endless contests ; especially those common truths which aristotle has demonstrated : such as are formal divisibility , that what ever is mov'd is mov'd by another , that a continuum or bulk is divisible in infinitum , that there 's no vacuum : and such like ; without the owning whereof before hand , 't is in vain to make experiments for acquiring science : since , they will all come at length to be resolv'd into these principles ; or else there will be ever a straining after science unproffitably , without any principles at all . . in his eighteenth chapter , he reproves the peripatetical doctrine as insufficient to solve phaenomena's . but , this he does out of error or spleen : for , if he takes the doctrine of our modern philosophical apes to be aristotle's own , he 's strangely in an error ; but , if he denyes aristotle to have taken pains to solve problem's , he 'l be shewn guilty of injustice by all his books of natural philosophy , those especially which usually follow his eight books . which of the moderns has more happily unbowel'd nature than digby , who at every turn is mindful of aristotle , and candidly accepts his dictates ? the adversary urges that the systeme of heaven is mis-contriv'd by aristotle . open the accusation , you 'l find the sum and very knot of it to be , that aristotle had not an optick table : else supposing those phaenomenas of the sun , which enlightened aristotle's age , his discourse , in his books de coelo , merits all admiration . that the intelligences are the movers of the heav'n is christian doctrine . that there is a certain fire swimming upon our air is nothing else but cartes's ether , or a kind of rarer element enbracing the convex of our sky . if aristotle has err'd in a very few things ; why , yet , so much anger ? shall we not allow philosophy its growing time ? if , yet , he may be said to err , and not rather ingeniously , and ingeniously to propose , who professes he conjectures , not demonstrates ; as aristotle does in his books de coelo . . his ninteenth chapter inveighs against aristotle's doctrine as unfruitful and barren ; but , weakly and falsely . weakly , because all the inventions he speaks of belong to artificers and handy-craft-men ; not philosophers , whose office 't is to make use of experiments for science , not to make them . falsly , because aristotle's way of doctrine being about common notions , without which there 's no comprehending particulars ; nothing is truly invented without it . i , but they are generals that are found in aristotle . it must be reply'd , that he and his disciples deserve thanks for devulging them , and fixing a step to climb thence farther and higher . but , ( if my divination fails me not ) i see , were aristotle's principles pluck'd up , philosophy unable to give an account of ordinary effects . i 'm sure , the philosophy which admits vacuities is reducible to no rules for acting : and cartes's vortices , i shrewdly suspect no way serviceable to invention . concerning his tenets , which savour of impiety , we have spoken before . for his contradictions , the places are not cited : but , whoever is skill'd in aristotle knows , he uses to draw examples out of others books and vulgar sayings ; and that nothing is to be esteemed his own , which falls not into the course of his doctrine . whence , 't is no hard matter to find contrary opinions in his works : but , those things alone are to be ascribed to him , which either are asserted in their proper places , or brought by him for confirmation of his known tenets . . the twentieth chapter renders manifest the eminence of peripateticism above all other methods , by its very impugnation of it . for , it assumes , it cannot be known that one thing is cause of another , otherwise than because they are found together : which we deny not to be an occasion of suspecting , but no argument of causality ; for , if nothing else be clear , 't will be still-unknown , which of the too is the cause , which effect . but , the peripateticks conclude not a. to be the cause of b. till , defining both , they find , out of their very definitions , that a cannot be , but it must follow out of its intrinsecals that b is . for example , a peripaterick collects that fire is the cause of heat ; because heat is nothing else but atoms flowing from fire : and on the other side , he knows that fire cannot exist , but it must send out such particles . cartes's paradox , of light and the sun , is just as if we should expect the skyes falling to catch larks . that wonderfully ingenious man is so coelestial , that he has not so much as sand to found his structures on . peripateticks chuse rather to collect a few certainties , acknowledging a multitude of uncertainties , than , grasping at all , to hold nothing . sure i am , none more largely pretends demonstration , than des cartes : so that , nothing is more unseemly than for his adorers to profess scepticism . . not a jot stronger , to establish the impossibility of science , is the argument from the variety of opinions amongst those that are call'd philosopers . for first , it must be evident that they are philosophers : before their judgements deserve esteem in philosophical matters . do they profess to demonstrate ? do they model their books in euclid's method ? do they interweave definitions with self-known truths ? and admit no other for proof ? all which may be observ'd in aristotle and his antient interpreters , though not express'd in euclids form . these things if they do , either they are not rational , or all will be of the same mind ; as geometricians are . if they neglect these , 't is not a pin matter for their judgments in philosophy . our author tells a story of the power of fancy , which i doubt is imperfect : for , it seems , he would have one man be able to order anothers thoughts without ever acting by his senses or fancy : since , he relates , that one compel'd others , absent from him , to think and speak what he pleas'd . for , though i allow men to have a very large power over animals , by the help of their fancies ; for example , to tame or enrage them , by means of sounds or shewing them figures ; perhaps , too , to strike them sick or cure them , and such like : yet , that the fancy should be mov'd to those things , which move it not by any sense , 't is hard to believe . for all that , i do not altogether deny the motion made upon the sense to be every way like , and univocal to that which is in the mind ; and , when it happens , to be deriv'd rather from the vehemencie of the affection , than the pure motion of the fancies impressing it . . in this twenty first chapter , he divines of future science ; particularly , of some not-yet discovered manners of acting at distance : which i 'le rather await , than discuss or hope for . about the end of the chapter , he assumes , that nothing can be known , unless it be resolv'd into the first causes . whence , he should have seen clearly that the first causes , and metaphysicks , which treats of them , is most known of all to nature , or next to our first knowledges : and that naturalists strive in vain , who negotiate much about the particulars of nature ; and comprehend nothing through their ignorance of metaphysick . take for example the stir about vacuum ; which metaphysicks declare as impossible , as for no-thing to be a thing : about the spring of rarity and density ; which the metaphysician most palpably demonstrates is out of , or , extrinsecal to the things that are rare and dense , and many such like ; whose truth those that essay by experiments , but without the light of metaphysick , shall find an endless work on 't . metaphysical principles must be taken from aristotle , not des cartes , though a person of most eminent wit. for , aristotle , by contemplation , form'd into method those things which he found engrafted in nature : des cartes , in his physical principles ( as if he meant to prescribe the creator an idea ) designs in the air and in the concave of the moon , as they say , what himself thought was to be done , according to art. from which kind of fabrick there 's no benefit to be hoped for by the reader . . the next chapter is sick of that error , which aristotle has very often detected and confuted ; viz. that nothing is known unless it be perfectly known : for example , that we know not god is , unlesse we see him , that any man cannot make use , and be sure of that cartes's first-known thing or object of knowledge , i think , therefore i am , unlesse he comprehends the all things of that i ; so , as to know the nature of his matter and form , the number of his elements and members , and the causes and motion by which he was begotten , and in short , whatever is connected with him . which is clearly to professe , he knows not the question in hand : for , none of the dogmatizers either arrogates to himself or hopes for so perfect a knowledge . 't is a piece of the same heedlesnesse , not to know that all that see a white wall have the same apprehension of whiteness , though their several sensations vary the degree and perfection of it . whence , our author had done more prudently to have sat down in silence , and pardon'd the affecters of science their error ; than , by meerly topical and delusory reasons , to have averted minds , born to excellent things , from the first desire of nature , and gathering fruit , at least , in some degree ; according to that of the moral poet , though you of glycons mighty lims despair , do not to keep away the gout forbear . . for all that , our academick makes no scruple , in general , to lay all kind of mischief to those that proceed dogmatically , such art ( as the philosophers says ) it requires to find a mean. first he asserts this method is the daughter of ignorance ? who would have look'd for this brand from a sceptick ? you that profess your selves to know nothing , do you object ignorance to others ? quis tulerit gracchos de seditione querentes ? next , he calls it the inmate of untam'd affections : upon what title ? for , if there be any science , that will the peaceful temples keep well fortifi'd , built by the sages doctrine . — you that profess you know not whether there be any or no ; how rashly do you affirm it to dwell alwayes with untam'd affections ? since , if there be none , it dwells no where . the third inconvenience of dogmatizing is , that it stirs men up to controversies . the rising sun seems to me guilty of the very same crime , in disturbin the slug-a-beds , and summoning every one to their work : for , such a kind of falt it is , to inculcate truth to those that live in ignorance and error . a fourth crime is , that one who adheres to any science , lays ignorance to the charge of those that know not his demonstration . i cannot deny it ; for , 't is the nature and title of light to reproach those things , as dark , which admit not its beams . but , herein the demonstrators are modester than the scepticks , that , at least , they except some , and speak well of nature ; whom , with all her children , the scepticks condemn to the dungeon of darknesse for ever . . like this is the next , that the confidence of science in error bars the gates against the liberty to get possession of truth . how blindly does the sceptick dispute these things ? who freely owns that truth is no where , which men might have the liberty to get possession of . he concludes at last , the dogmatizer has a petty and enthrall'd soul. so strangely things are nick-nam'd that are unknown ! for , t is science's part to dilate the soul , and render it capable of great things : and this the pleasure of one that knows , to look down on scepticks as all in a tumult below , and lucret. see them at a loss at every turn , and breathless hunting out the way of life . which to make ones life and task is the miserablest of all things , and an utter casting off rationality ; and the whole felicity humanity affords . these things , as they are all most true , and scarce deniable , even by a sceptick , to follow out of the possibility of demonstration , that is , if there be any rational nature , yet i would not have them so asserted , as to patronize palliated scepticks , who admit , indeed , that there is such a thing as some both physical and metaphysical science , in common ; but neither tend to it by any legitimate method , nor own any thing , in particular , demonstrated : and yet , by the press of the herd , in a society , thrusting one another on , and by loads of scriblers , they most absurdly fly at and arrogate to themselves the highest degree of doctorship , and the top of sciences and name of wisdom . the father of nature grant mankind may at length be eas'd of this yoak ; which galls the necks of the sons of adam : and , that the studious of truth may understand it alike dangerous to think every thing and nothing is demonstrated . finis . a treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: i. of falsely pretended knowledge, ii. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by richard baxter ... baxter, richard, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: i. of falsely pretended knowledge, ii. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by richard baxter ... baxter, richard, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for tho. parkhurst ..., london : . advertisements on p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng love -- religious aspects. knowledge, theory of. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a treatise of knowledge and love compared . in two parts : i. of falsly pretended knowledge . ii. of true saving knowledge and love. i. against hasty judging , and false conceits of knowledge , and for necessary suspension . ii. the excellency of divine love , and the happiness of being known and loved of god. written as greatly needful to the safety and peace of every christian , and of the church . the only certain way to escape false religions , heresies , sects , and malignant prejudices , persecutions and sinful wars : all caused by falsly pretended knowledge , and hasty judging , by proud ignorant men , who know not their ignorance . by richard baxter ; who by god's blessing on long and hard studies , hath learned to know that he knoweth but little , and to suspend his judgment of uncertainties , and to take great , necessary , certain things , for the food of his faith , and comforts , and the measure of his church-communion . prov. . a wise man feareth and departeth from evil : but the fool rageth and is confident . cor. . . but i fear lest by any means , as the serpent beguiled eve by his subtilty ; so your minds should be corrvpted from the simplicity which is in christ . cor. . . the foolishness of god is wiser than men , and the weakness of god is stronger than men . v. . hath not god made f●oli●h the wisdom of this world ? c. . . we speak wisdom among them that are perfect : yet not the wisdom of this world . tim. . . study to shew thy self approved to god ; a workman that needed not be ashamed , rightly dividing the word of truth . . but shun profane and vain o●●lings , for they will increase unto more ungodliness . august . enchirid. cap. . ( de corporibus angelorum ) cum ista queruntur ▪ & a sicut potest quisque conjectat , non inutiliter exercentur ingenia si adhibeatur disceptantia moderata , & absit error opinantium se scire quod nesciunt . quod enim opes est ut hec & hujusmodi affirmentur , vel negentur , vel definiantur cum dis●rimine , quando sine crimine nesciuntur ? london , printed for tho. parkhurst at the bible and three crowns , at the lower end of cheapside , near mercers chapel . . to the right worshipful sir henry ashhurst , and the lady diana his wife . sir , your name is not prefixed to this treatise , either as accusing you of the sin herein detected , or as praising you for those virtues , which good men are more pleased to possess and exercise , than to have proclaimed , though they be as light , that is hardly hid . but it is to vent and exercise that gratitude which loveth not the concealment of such friendship and kindness , as you and your lady eminently , and your relatives and hers , [ the children of the lord paget ] have long obliged me by : and it is to posterity that i record your kindness , more than for this age , to which it hath publickly notified it self , during my publick accusations , reproaches , sentences , imprisonments , and before and since : who knoweth you that knoweth not hereof ? and it is to renew the record of that love and honour which i owed to your deceased father ( formerly , pthough too slenderly recorded , ) to be the heir and imitater of whose faith , piety , charity , patience , humility , meekness , impartiality , sincerity and perseverance , is as great an honour and blessing as i can wish you , next to the conformity to our highest pattern . and though he was averse to worldly pomp and grandeur , and desired that his children should not affect it , yet god that will honour those that honour him , hath advanced his children , i believe partly for his sake : but i intreat you all ( and some other of my friends whom god hath raised as a blessing to their pious and charitable parents and themselves ) to watch carefully lest the deceitful world and flesh , do turn such blessings into golden fetters , and to be sure to use them as they would find at last on their account . and as you are a member of the present house of commons , i think the subject of this treatise is not unnecessary to your consideration and daily care : that when proof , and notorious , and sad experience telleth us what distractions have befaln church and state , by mens self-conceited , erroneous rushing upon sin and falshood , as if it were certainly good and true , and how little posterity feareth and avoideth this confounding vice , though history tell us that it hath been the deluge that in all ages hath drowned the peace and welfare of the world , you may be wary , and try before you venture , in doubtful cases , especially where the sacred and civil interest of this and many other lands , doth probably lye on the determination ? do you think all that ventured upon the actions and changes , that have tost up and down both churches and kingdoms , by divisions , persecutions and wars , had not done better to suspend their judgments , till they could have more certainly determined ? who should proceed more cautelously than bishops ? and where rather than in councils ? and in what rather than about faith and publick government and order ? and had bishops and councils torn the church , and empires , and kingdoms , as they have done by aspiring after superiority , and by contentious writings , and condemning each other , and by contradictory and erroneous , and persecuting canons , or by raising wars and deposing princes , ever since , or , or years after christ , if not sooner , if they had known their ignorance , and suspended in such dangerous cases till they were sure ? i know you are none of them who dare pretend to a certain knowledge , that all those oaths , declarations , covenants , practices imposed by laws and canons on ministers and people in this land , in the act of uniformity , the corporation act , the vestry act , the militia act , the five mile act of banishment , &c. are so good and lawful , as will justifie the execution of them , and the silencing , ejecting , ruining , and judging to lye from six months to six in the common jails till they die , as faithful ministers of christ as any nation hath under heaven , unless they forbear to preach the gospel to which they are vowed , or venture their souls on that which they fear to be sins so great as they are loth to name : when christ will sentence them to everlasting punishment , who did not visit , feed , clothe him in the least of them , whom he calls his brethren . before men silence conditionally the whole ministry of such a kingdom , and actually such , while the wounding , dividing consequents may be so easily foreseen , and before men deliberately and resolutely continue and keep up such battering engines on pretence of uniformity and obedience to men , and before they venture to own this to that lord who hath made other terms of church unity and peace , it nearly concerneth them to think , and think on it a thousand times : a suspended judgment is here safer than prefidence and confident rage . and also they that desire an abolition of episcopacy , should a thousand times bethink them first what true and primitive episcopacy is , and whether the episcopi gregis , or eorum praesides , or true evangelists , or apostolical general bishops , disarmed and duely chosen , be any injury to the church ? and whether the jews had not been a national christian church under the twelve apostles and seventy , if they had not rejected him that would have gathered them as the hen gathereth her chickens under her wings . they that cannot deny that christ setled a superior rank of ministers , appointing them besides their extraordinaries , the work of gathering and over-seeing many churches , promising therein to be with them to the end of the world , and that only matthias must make up the national number of such , though justus had been with christ as well as he , must be the provers that this rank and imparity was reversed by him that did institute it , if they affirm it : and not without proof charge christ with seeming levity and mutability , as setling a form of ministry and government , which he would have continue but one age : much less must they impose such an unproved affirmation as the terms of church concord . woe , woe , woe ! how effectually hath satan almost undone the christian world , by getting in naughty ministers and magistrates , where he could not utterly extirpate christianity by arms ? thereby making rulers and preachers the captains of the malignant enemies of seriousness in that religion which they profess and preach themselves : and if in such hypocrisie they convert a soul , they hate him as an enemy for believing them : and thereby tempt religious men to mistake the crime of the naughty preacher , as the fault of the office , and to oppose the office for the persons sake ; and so ministry and christianity is despised by too many . the shutting of their church doors , and condemning to scorn and beggery , and jails , those that were as wise and faithful as themselves ( unless fearing heinous sin made them worse , ) should have been by the persecutors long and deeply thought on , twenty eight years ago ▪ and ever since , by them that believe that christ will judge them . and so should all doctrines and practices that tend to unwarrantable separations and divisions by others . things of this moment should not be ventured on , nor papists made both lords and executioners by our distracted combates with each other , and the miserable nation and undone church , left to no better a remedy than a non putaremus , and to hear the worldly tyrants , and the tempted sufferers accusing each other , and disputing when the house is burnt who was in the fault . i think he was most faulty that could most easily have helped it , and would not : but if great and rich men will be the strength of the factious , as they have most to lose , they may be the greatest losers . all this hath been said , to tell you how nearly the doctrine of this book , for necessary doubting and a humble understanding , and for christian love , and against pretended knowledge and rash judging , doth concern the duty and safety of this nation , church and state. my late book of the english nonconformity fully evinceth this , and more ; but blinding prejudice , worldliness and faction , give leave to few of the guilty to read it . i rest your much obliged servant , rich. baxter . july . . to the reader . reader , upon the review of this book , written long ago , i find , . that it is a subject as necessary now as ever , experience telling us that the disease is so far from being cured , that it is become our publick shame and danger , and if the wonderful mercy of god prevent it not , is like to be the speedy confusion and ruine of the land. . as to the manner of this writing , i find the effects of the failing of my memory , in the oft repeating of the same things , with little diversification : but i will not for that cast it away , considering , . that perhaps oft repeating may make the matter the better remembered ; and if it do the work intended , no matter though the author be not applauded . . and men may think justly that what is oft repeated dropt not from the author inconsiderately , nor is taken by him to be small and useless ; but is that digested truth which he would most inculcate . . and those who blame their weakness , who accuse the church liturgy of too much repetition , i suppose will not be much offended with it in our writings , while the dulness and forgetfulness of many readers maketh it needful . aug. . . rich. baxter . the contents . the first part. cor. . , . chap. . the text opened : what philosophy paul depresseth , and why . ch. . what wisdom and esteem of it are not here condemned . ch. . what pretended knowledge is condemned , and what learning or philosophy it is which paul disliked further opened ; with thirty reasons . ch. . what are the certainties which must be known and held fast , and why , where certainty is distinctly described . ch. . of the various degrees of certainty . ch. . what are the unknown things or uncertainties , which we must not pretend a certain knowledge of , even scripture truths ? ch. . the first inference : the true reason and usefulness of the christian simplicity , in differencing the covenant and the principles of religion from the rest of the holy scriptures . ch. . infer . . of the use of catechizing . ch. . infer . . the true preservative of puzzled christians , from the errours of false teachers , who draw them to their several parties . ch. . infer . . what is the great plague and divider of the christian world. ch. . the common discoveries of mens proud , self-conceited understanding , and of pretended knowledge . ch. . of the mischievous effects of this proud pretence of more knowledge than men have . ch. . the commodities of a suspended judgment and humble understanding , which pretendeth to no more knowledge or certainty than it hath . ch. . the aggravations of the sin of prefidence . ch. . special aggravations of it in students and pastors . ch. . twenty clear proofs of the little knowledge that is in the world , to move us to a due distrust of our understandings . ch. . infer . . it is not the dishonour , but the praise of christ and his apostles , and the gospel , that they speak in a plain style and manner , of the certain necessary things , without the vanity of school uncertainty , and unprofitable notions . ch. . infer . . the true and false ways of restoring the churches , and healing our divisions , hence opened and made plain . ch. . of the causes of prefidence or proud pretended knowledge , in order to the cure. ch. . objections answered . ch. . directions for the cure. the second part. chap. . knowledge is a means to a higher end , according to which it is to be estimated . ch. . the end of knowledge is to make us lovers of god , and so to be known of him . ch. . therefore knowledge is to be sought , valued and used as it tendeth to our love of god. ch. . therefore they are the wisest and best knowing men that love god best ; and not they that have much unholy knowledge . ch. . the first inference : by what measures to estimate knowledge . ch. . the second inference : to abate our censures and contempt of the less-learned christians and churches . ch. . the third inference : how to judge of the knowledge necessary to church communion . ch. . the fourth inference : the aptness of the teaching of christ , to ingenerate the love of god and holiness . ch. . the fifth inference : what great cause of thankfulness men have for the constitution of the christian religion : and how unexcusable they are that will not learn so short and sweet , and safe a lesson . ch. . the sixth inference : how little reason ungodly men have to be proud of their learning , or any of their knowledge . ch. . the seventh inference : why the ungodly world hateth holiness , and not knowledge . ch. . the eighth inference : what is the work of a faithful preacher , and how it is to be done . ch. . the ninth inference : those that know god so far as to love him truely , may have comfort , notwithstanding their remaining ignorance . ch. . questions and objections answered . qu. . if so much knowledge will save men as causeth them to love god , may not heathens be saved who know god to be good , and therefore may love him ? qu. . may not a papist or heretick love god and be saved ? qu. . at least you make ignorant persons happy that can but love god , though they know not their catechism ? qu. . how are infants saved that have neither knowledge nor love ? qu. . if this hold true , universities , and most humane learning should be cast out as the turks and moscovites do ; and the armenians , abassines , greeks , and ignorant sort of papists , are the wisest : because multitudes of other notions must needs divert mens thoughts from god. ch. . use , exhort . i. deceive not your selves by over-valuing an unholy sort of knowledge , or common gifts . ch. . exhort . ii. love best those christians that love god best , and live in love and peace with others . ch. . exhort . iii ▪ pretend not your knowledge against the love of god or man , or against the interest of the church and souls . ch. . exhort . iv. bend all your studies to a life of increased and exercised love. how the love of god must be exercised and increased : the benefit hereof . ch. . exhort . v. place your comfort in health and sickness in mutual divine love. . see that you love god. how known . doubts answered . ch. . . but let it be the chief part of your comfort that you are known of god. what comfort this affordeth . what frame of soul it bespeaketh in us in life , and at our death . part i. cor. . , . and if any man think that he knoweth any thing , he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know . but if any man love god , the same is known of him. chap. i. the scope and text opened ; what philosophy or worldly wisdom paul depresseth ; and why . the calamitous divisions of the churches of christ , and the miscarriages and contentions of too many particular brethren , having been sad upon my thoughts above forty years , by this time without imputation of hastiness and rash judging , i may take leave to tell the world , what i have discovered to be the principal cause , which is falsly pretended knowledge , or ignorance of ignorance , or a proud unhumbled understanding , confident that it knoweth that which it knoweth not . and consequently what must be the cure ( if our calamity be here cureable , ) viz. to know as much as we can ; but withal to know how little we know , and to take on us to know no more than we do know , nor to be certain of our uncertainties . the text which i have chosen to be the ground of my discourse , is so plain , notwithstanding some little difficulties , that did not the nature of the disease resist the clearest remedy , so many good people had never here often read their sin described , as insensibly as if they read it not . the chapter hath so much difficulty , as will not stand with my intended brevity to open it : i refer you to expositors for that , whether they were the nicolaitans , or any other sort of hereticks that the apostle dealeth with , i determine not . it is plain that they were licentious professors of christianity , who thought that it was the ignorance of others that made them judge it unlawful to eat things offered to idols ; and that their own greater knowledge set them above that scruple . a mixture of platonick philosophy with christianity , made up most of the primitive hereticks , ( and for want of a due digestion of each , too much corrupted many of the greek doctors of the church . ) the unlearned sort of christians , were so much despised by some of the philosophical hereticks , that they were not thought worthy of their communion ; for as jude saith , they separated themselves , being sensual , having not the spirit , but more affected philosophical fancies : which made paul warn men to take heed lest any seduced them by vain philosophy ; not using the name of philosophy , for that solid knowledge of gods works which is desireable , but for the systemes of vain conceits and precepts , which the word was then used to signifie , as every sect derived them from their masters . and so the apostle taketh knowledge in this text ; not for solid knowledge indeed , but for gnosticism or philosophical presumptions ; such as even yet most philosophers are guilty of , who take a multitude of precepts , some useful , some useless , some true , and some false , and all but notionally or to little purpose , and joining these do call them philosophy . and paul tells them , that opinionative and notional knowledge ( were it true , like the devils faith ) is of no such excellency as to cause them to shelter their sins under the confidence and honour of it , and despise unlearned conscionable christians ; for such knowledge by inflation oft destroyeth the possessors , or becomes the fuel of the devilish sin of pride , when love buildeth up our selves and others to salvation . and to conceit that a man is wise because of such knowledge , and so to over-value his own understanding , is a certain sign that he is destitute of that knowledge in which true wisdom doth consist ; and knoweth nothing with a wise and saving knowledge , as every thing should be known : and indeed a mans excellency is so far from lying in vain philosophical speculations , that the use of all true knowledge is but to bring us up to the love of god , ( as the highest felicity ) to be approved and beloved by god : and those unlearned christians that have the spirit of sanctification , without your vain philosophy , have knowledge enough to bring them to this love of god , which is a thing that passeth all your knowledge , or rather to be known of god as his own , and loved by him : for our felicity lyeth in receiving from god , and in his loving us more than in our loving him ; but both set together , to love god , and so to be loved of him are the ultimate end and perfection of man ; and all knowledge is to be estimated but as it tendeth to this . this being the plain paraphrase of the text , i shall stay no longer on it , but thence deduce and handle these two observations . doct. i. falsly pretended knowledge is oft pernicious to the possessor , and injurious to the church . and , over-valuing ones own opinions and notions , is a certain mark of dangerous ignorance . ii. a man is so far truly wise , as he loveth god , and consequently is approved ( or loved ) by him , and as he loveth others to their edification . i. the first is but the same that solomon thus expresseth , prov. . . seest thou a man wise in his own conceit ? there is more hope of a fool than of him . and paul elsewhere , rom. . . be not wise in your own conceits : and rom. . . and prov. . , . for it is certain that we are all here in great darkness ; and it 's but little that the wisest know : and therefore he that thinks he knoweth much , is ignorant both of the things which he thinks he knoweth , and ignorant of his ignorance . therefore cor. . . let no man deceive himself : if any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world , let him become a fool , that he may be wise : to be wise in this world , is the same with that in the words following , the wisdom of this world is foolishness with god : and cor. . , , , . it is written , i will destroy the wisdom of the wise , &c. where is the wise ? where is the scribe ? where is the disputer of this world ? hath not god made foolish the wisdom of this world ? for after that , in the wisdom of god , the world by wisdom knew not god , it pleased god by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe . for the jews require a sign , and the greeks seek after wisdom &c. so chap. . , , , , . and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words ( or probable discourses ) of mans wisdom , but in demonstration of the spirit and of power , that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men , but in the power of god : howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect ; yet not the wisdom of this world , nor of the princes of this world that come to nought : but we speak that wisdom of god in a mystery , even the hidden wisdom which god ordained before the world unto our glory ( even christ the wisdom of god , chap. . . ) which none of the princes of this world knew — . in all this note , . that there is a wisdom which paul placeth christianity it self in : . that this is to know god in christ objectively , and to be taught of god by christ and his spirit efficiently . . that there is a wisdom which paul comparatively vilifieth . . this is called the wisdom of this world ( or age . ) . that most plainly he meaneth by it , that which then was called learning and philosophy ; which the greeks did value , and by which they judged of the gospel ; which comprehended the methods of all the sects , epicureans , academicks , peripateticks and stoicks ; but not their true morals , but their physicks , and logick , and metaphysicks ; which laertius and others tell us how variously they held . . that paul doth not absolutely prohibit such studies , nor yet despise any true knowledge . . but he vilifieth this philosophy on these accounts . . because it was the exercise of a poor , low , insufficient light : they did but grope after god in the dark , as acts . . . because it was mostly taken up with inferiour things , of small concernment comparatively : as things corporeal are good in themselves , and when sanctified and made subservient to things spiritual ; so the knowledge of physicks is to be esteemed : but as things corporeal yet are objectively the snare and ruine of those that perish , and therefore the world to be renounced and crucified , as it is our temptation , an enemy , or competitor with christ ; just so it must be with natural philosophy . . because it was greatly overvalued by the world , as if it had been the only wisdom , when indeed , it is of it self but an indifferent thing , or fit but to make a by-recreation of , till it be made to serve to higher ends ; even as riches , honour and pleasure are overvalued by worldlings , as if they were the only felicity ; when in themselves they are but more indifferent things , and prove beneficial or hurtful as they are used . therefore paul was to take down the pernicious esteem of this kind of philosophy , as preachers now must take down mens esteem of worldly things , however they are the works and gifts of god. and as christ would by his actual poverty and sufferings , and not by words only , take down the esteem of worldly wealth and pride ; so paul by neglecting and forbearing the use of artificial logick , physicks and metaphysicks , would depress their rate . . because that there was abundance of falshood mixt with the truth which the philosophers held ; as their multitude of different sects fully proves . . because the artificial , organical part was made so operous , as that it drowned real learning instead of promoting it ; and became but like a game at chess , a devise rather to exercise vain proud wits by , than to find out useful truth . as to this day when logick and metaphysicks seem much cultivated and reformed , yet the variety of methods , the number of notions , the precariousness of much , the uncertainty of some things , the falshood of many , maketh them as fit for boys to play with in the schools , and to be a wood into which a sophister may run , to hide his errours , as to be a means of detecting them . and therefore a knavish cheater will oft bind you strictest to the pedantick part of the rules of disputation , that when he cannot defend his matter , he may quarrel with your form and artifice , and lose time by questioning you about mood and figure . . because by these operous diversions , the minds of men were so forestalled or taken up , as that they had not leisure to study great and necessary saving truth : and if men must be untaught in the doctrines of life , till they had first learnt their logick , physicks and metaphysicks , how few would have been saved ? when at this day so many come from our universities after several years study , raw smatterers in these , and half-witted scholars , whose learning is fitter to trouble than to edifie : and if scripture had been written in the terms and method of aristotle , how few would have been the better for them ? but great good must be common . and as paul on all these accounts sets light by this philosophy , so he calls it , the wisdom of this world . . because this world was its chief object . . and the creatures were its only light. . and it led but few to any higher than worldly ends . . and it was that which worldly men that were strangers to heavenly light and holiness , did then most magnify and use . yet as christ when he said , how hard it was for a rich man to be saved , did not make riches absolutely unlawful , nor to have no goodness nor usefulness at all , but teacheth men , if they are wise , not to overvalue them , and to be too eager for them ; so is paul to be interpreted about philosophy , or the wisdom of this world . ( for it is not only craftiness for worldly ends that he so calls . ) and as god when he denyeth his servants riches and worldly fulness , doth it not because he taketh it to be too good for them , but because it is not good enough , and therefore he will give them better ; even the heavenly riches , and honour and delights : even so when paul comparatively vilifieth philosophy , it is not as being really a wisdom too high for christians , but too low ; nor doth he depress reason , or extol ignorance ; but would lead men to the truest learning , the highest knowledge and improvement of reason , the only wisdom , from trifling , pedantick , unprofitable notions , and ludicrous loss of time and studies . it is not therefore for want of wisdom that the scripture is not written according to the philosophers art . though erasmus overvalued his grammaticisms , it was not for want of learning in philosophy that he so much despised the philosophical schoolmen ! ( so that speaking of the bishop of london , who maligned dr. colet , and was a subtile scotist he saith of such ; [ that he had known some of them whom he would not call knaves , but he never knew one of them whom he could call a christian . ] vid. mr smiths life of dr. colet by erasmus . a smart charge : i suppose he meant it of them , rather as scotists , than as bishops . and therefore the apostle aptly joyneth both together , cor. . . not many wise men after the flesh , not many mighty , not many noble are called ; seeming to equal worldly wealth and greatness , with worldly wisdom or philosophy , as to the interest of religion and salvation . and the foolish wits that think he spake against learning because he had it not , may as truly say that he spake against worldly wealth and greatness because he had it not : for the possession , use and knowledge of worldly things , are near of kin. but they knew not paul so well as festus , who thought him not unlearned , though he thought him mad . nor was it the way of worldly wealth and greatness which he chose . doubtless neither christ , nor paul , did speak against any real knowledge , but . against nominal , pretended knowledge , which was set up to divert men from real knowledge , and was full of vanities and falshoods . . and against the overvaluing of that learning , which is of little use , in comparison of the knowledge of great , and excellent , and necessary things . for knowledge is valuable according to its object and its use . the knowledge of trifles for trivial ends , is it self a trifle . the knowledge of things great and necessary for great and necessary ends , is the great and necessary knowledge . and therefore how unmeasureably must the knowledge of god and our eternal happiness , excel the pedantick philosophy of the gentiles . however christians may sanctify and ennoble this by making it a help to higher knowledge . and therefore the platonists and the stoicks were the noblest philosophers ; because the former studied the highest things , and the other the necessary means of felicity , amending of mens hearts and lives . but in the present text the thing which the apostle reprehendeth is , the esteeming of a mans self to be wiser than he is ; and taking himself to be a wise man because of his trifling philosophical knowledge . and he would have them know that till they knew nobler things than those , & were guided by a nobler light , they were very fools . i have lookt over hutten , vives , erasmus , scaliger , salmasius , casaubone , and many other critical grammarians , and all gruterus his critical volumes . i have read almost all the physicks and metaphysicks i could hear of . i have wasted much of my time among whole loads of historians , chronologers and antiquaries : i despise none of their learning . all truth is useful ; mathematicks , which i have least of , i find a pretty manlike sport . but if i had no other kind of knowledge than these , what were my understanding worth ! what a dreaming dotard should i be ? yea had i also all the codes and pandects all cujacius , wesenbechius , and their tribe at my fingers ends ; and all other volumes of civil , national and canon laws , with the rest in the encyclopaedia , what a poppet play would my life be , if i had no more ? i have higher thoughts of the school-men , than erasmus and our other grammarians had : i much value the method and sobriety of aquinas , the subtility of scotus and ockam the plainness of durandus , the solidity of ariminensis , the profundity of bradwardine , the excellent acuteness of many of their followers , of aureolus , capreolus , bannes , alvarez , zumel , &c. of mayro , lychetus , trombeta , faber , meurisse , rada , &c. of ruiz , pennattus , suarez , vasquez , &c. of hurtado , of albertinus , of lud. à dola , and many others . but how loth should i be to take such sawce for my food , and such recreations for my business ? the jingling of too much and too false philosophy among them oft drowns the noise of aarons bells . i feel my self much better in herberts temple : or in a heavenly treatise of faith and love. and though i do not with dr. colet distast augustine above the plainer fathers , yet i am more taken with his confessions , than with his grammatical and scholastick treatises . and tho' i know no man whose genius more abhorreth confusion instead of necessary distinction and method , yet i loath impertinent useless art , and pretended precepts and distinctions , which have not a foundation in the matter . in a word , there is a divine knowledge , which is part of mans felicity , as it promoteth love and union , and there is a solid knowledge of gods word and works , a valuable grammatical knowledge , and a true philosophy , which none but ignorant persons will despise . but the vain philosophy and pretended wisdom or learning of the world , hath been and is , the cheat of souls , and the hinderer of wisdom , and a troubler of the church and world. chap. . what wisdom and esteem of it , are not here condemned . the order which i shall observe in handling the first doctrine shall be this ; i. i will tell you negatively what wisdom , and esteem of our own wisdom , is not here condemned . ii. what it is that is here condemned . iii. what are the certainties , which we must hold fast , and make our religion of . iv. what degrees of these certainties there are . v. what are the uncertainties , which we must not pretend to be certain of ; and the unknown things which we must not pretend to know . vi. what are the mischiefs of falsly - pretended knowledg . vii . what are the degrees or aggravations of this sin . viii . what are the causes of it . ix . what are the remedies . x. what are the uses which we should make of this doctrine . i. what wisdom , and what esteem of our wisdom is not here condemned ? ans . . not any real useful knowledg at all , whilst every thing keepeth its proper place , and due esteem , ( as is said . ) . that which of it self primarily is of so small use , as that it falleth under the contempt of the apostles , yet by accident , through the subtilty of satan , and the viciousness of the world , may become to some men in some measure necessary . and here cometh in the calamity of divines . of how little use is it to me in it self to know what is written in many a hundred books , which yet by accident , it much concerneth me to know ? and if god restrain him not , the devil hath us here at so great an advantage , that he can make our work almost endless , and hath almost done it already ; yea can at any time divert us from greatest truth and works , by making another at that time more necessary . if he raise up socinians , our task is increased ; we must read their books , that we may be able to confute them : so must we when he raiseth up libertines , familists , seekers , quakers , and such other sects . if he stir up controversies in the church , about government , worship , ceremonies , circumstances , words , methods , &c we must read so much as to understand all , that we may defend the truth against them . if papists will lay the stress of all their controversies on church history , and the words of ancients , we must read and understand all , or they will triumph . if school-men will build their theology on aristotle , all men have not the wit with the iberian legate at the florentine council in sagyrophilus , to cry against the preacher , what have we to do with aristotle ? but if we cannot deal with them at their own weapons , they will triumph . if cavillers will dispute only in mood and figure , we must be able there to over-top them , or they will insult . if the plica , pox , scurvey or other new diseases do arise , the physician must know them all , if he will cure them . and hence it is that we say , that a lawyer must know the law , and a physician must know physicks and medicine , &c. but a divine should know all things that are to be known : because the diseased world hath turned pretended knowledg into the great malady , which must be cured : but is the thing it self of any great worth ? is it any great honour to know the vanity of philosophical pedantry ? and to be able to overdo such gamesters , any more than to beat one at a game at chess , or for a physician to know the pox or leprosie ? . yet indeed , as all things are sanctified to the holy , and pure to the pure , a wise man may and must make great use of common inferiour kinds of knowledge : especially the true grammatical sense of scripture words , the true precepts of logick , the certain parts of real physicks and pneumatology : for god is seen in his works as in a glass ; and there to search after him and behold him , is a noble pleasant work and knowledg . and i would that no israelite may have need to go down to the philistines for instruments of this sort . . it is not forbidden to any man to know that measure of wisdom which he truly hath ; god bindeth us not to err , nor to call light darkness , or truth error , or to belie our selves , or deny his gifts . . it is desireable for a man absolutely to know as much as he can , preferring still the greatest things , and to know that he knoweth them , and not to be sceptical , and doubt of all . . it is a duty for a converted sinner comparatively to know that he is wiser than he was in his sinful state , and to give god thanks for it . . it is his duty who groweth in wisdom , and receiveth new accessions of light , to know that he so groweth , and to give god thanks , and to welcome each useful truth with joy . . it is the duty of a good and wise man comparatively to know that he is not as foolish as the ungodly , nor to think that every wicked man , or ignorant person whom he should pity and instruct is already wiser than he ; every teacher is not to be so foolish as to think that all his flock are more judicious than himself . in a word , it is not a true estimate of the thing or of our selves , that is forbidden us ; but a false : it is not belying our selves , nor ingratitude to god , nor a contradiction ( to know a thing , and not to know that i know it ) nor an ignorance of our own minds , which is commanded us under the pretence of humility ; but it is a proud conceit , that we know what we do not know that is condemned . chap. . what pretended knowledge is condemned , and what philosophy and learning it is that paul disliked . ii. more distinctly , . it is condemnable for any man to think himself absolutely or highly wise : because our knowledg here is so poor and dark and low , that compared with our ignorance it is little ; we know not what or how many or how great the things are which we do not know ; but in general we may know that they are incomparably more and greater than what we do know ; we know now but as children , and darkly , and in a glass or riddle , cor. . , . in the sence that christ faith , none is good but god , we may say that none is wise but god. for a man that must know ( unless he be a very sot ) that he knoweth nothing perfectly in the world ; that he knoweth but little of any worm or fly , or pile of grass which he seeth , or of himself , his soul or body , or any creature , for this man to assume the title of a wise man , is arrogant , unless comparatively understood , when he is ignorant of ten thousand fold more than he knoweth , and the predominant part denominateth . the old enquirers had so much modesty , as to arrogate no higher name than philosophers . . it is very condemnable for any man to be proud of his understanding : while it is so low and poor and dark , and hath still so much matter to abase us . he knoweth not what a dungeon poor mortals are in , nor what a darkened thing a sinful mind is , nor what a deplorable state we are in , so far from the heavenly light , no nor what it is to be a man in flesh , who findeth not much more cause of humiliation than of pride in his understanding , o how much ado have i to keep up from utter despondency under the consciousness of so great ignorance , which no study no means , no time doth overcome . how long lord shall this dungeon be our dwelling ? and how long shall our foolish souls be loth to come into the celestial light ? . it is sinful folly to pretend to know things unrevealed and impossible to be known , deut. . . the secret things belong unto the lord our god , but those things which are revealed belong to us , and to our children for ever , that we do them . rom. . . for who hath known the mind of the lord ? or who hath been his counsellor ? and how many such compose the theology of some , and the philosophy of more . . it is sinful folly to pretend to know that which is impossible or unrevealed to him , though it be possible and revealed to others . for as the eye , so the understanding must have its necessary light , and due constitution and conditions of the object and of it self , or else it cannot understand . . it is sinful folly to pretend to certainty of knowledge , when either the thing is but probable , or at best , we have but doubtful opinions or conjectures of it , and no true certainty . . it is sinful folly to pretend that we know or receive any thing by divine faith ( or revelation ) when we have it but by humane faith , or probable conjecture from natural evidence . as soon as men are perswaded by a sect , a seducer , or a selfish priest , to believe what he saith , abundance presently take such a perswasion for a part of their religion , as if it were a believing god. . it is sinful folly to take on us that we know what we know not at all , because we do but know that it is knowable , and that wise men know it , and as soon as we understand that it should be known , and that wise men conclude it to be true , therefore to pretend that we know it to be true . . and it is sinful folly to pretend that we truly know or apprehend the thing or matter , or incomplex object , meerly because we have got the bare words , and second notions of it , which are separable from the knowledge of the thing . all these are false and sinful pretences of knowledge , which men have not . but because paul so warneth us to take heed of vain philosophy , and atheists , and infidels deride him for speaking against the wisdom of the world , as if he spake against learning , because he had it not ; and because the disease which he attempted to cure remaineth among schollars to this day , and instead of a cure many contemn the physician , and dislike christ himself and the gospel , as defective of the learning which they overvalue , i will once again , and that more distinctly tell you some few of the faults of our common learning , even now that it is cultivated and augmented in this age , that you may see that paul did not injuriously accuse it , or christ injuriously neglect it . i. natural imperfection layeth the foundation of our common calamity ; in that it is so long before sense and reason grow up to a natural maturity , ( through the unripeness of organs , and want of exercise ) that children are necessitated to learn words before things , and to make these words the means of their first knowledge of many of the things signified ; so that most furnish themselves with a stock of names and words ; before ever they get any true knowledge of the matter . ii. and then they are exceeding apt to think that this treasury of words and second notions is true wisdom , and to mistake it for the knowledge of the thing : even as in religion we find almost all children and ignorant people , will learn to say by rote the creed and lords prayer , and commandments , and catechism , and then think that they are not ignorants , when it is long after before we can get them to understand the sense of the words which they can so readily speak , yea though they are plain english words , which they use for the most part in ordinary discourse . iii. when children come to school also their masters teach them as their parents did , or worse ; i mean that they bestow almost all their pains to furnish them with words and second notions : and so do their tutors too oft at the university : so that by that time they are grown to be masters of a considerable stock of words , grammatical , logical , metaphysical , &c. and can set these together in propositions and syllogisms , and have learnt memoriter the theorems or axioms , and some distinctions which are in common use and reputation , they are ready to pass for masters of the arts , and to set up for themselves , and leave their tutors , and to teach others the like sort and measure of learning , which they have thus acquired . like one that sets up his trade as soon as he hath gotten a shop full of tools . iv. and indeed the memories of young men are strong and serviceable so many years sooner than their judgments , that prudent teachers think it meet to take that time to furnish them with words and organical notions , while they are unmeet to judge of things : even as pious parents must teach them the words of the catechism , that when they grow riper , their judgments may work upon that which their memories did before receive . and in this they are in the right upon two suppositions . . that distinguishing things obvious and easily understood from things remote , abstruse and difficult , they would teach them those of the first sort with the words , though not the second : and while they make haste with them in the languages they would not make too much haste with the notions and theorems of the arts and sciences . . that they still make them know that words as to matter are but as the dish to the meat , and all this while they are but preparing for wisdom and true learning , and not getting or possessing it ; and that unless they will equalize a parrot , and a philosopher , they must know how little they have attained , and must after learn things , or not pretend to know any thing indeed . as children learn first to speak and then learn what to speak of . v. and the great mischief is , that multitudes of those notions which are taught us are false , not fitted to the things , but expressing the conceptions of roving , uncertain , erroneous , bewildred minds . words are the instruments of communication of thoughts . and when i hear a man speak i hear ( perhaps ) what he thinketh of things , but not always what they are . our universal notions are the result of our own comparing things with things . and we are so wofully defective in such comparings that our universal notions must needs be very defective , so that they abound with errour . vi. and the penury and narrowness of words is a great impediment to the due expressing of those poor confused conceptions which we have ; for a man can think more aptly and comprehensively than he can speak . and hence it cometh to pass that words and universal notions are become like pictures or hieroglyphicks , almost of arbitrary signification and use , as the speaker pleaseth . and ( as a multitude of school-distinctions tell us ) you can know little by the grammatical use or etymology of the words , what the meaning of them is in a theorem or distinction , till the speaker tell it you by other words . vii . and the conceptions of men being as various as their countenances , the same words in the mouths of several men , have several significations . so that when tutors read the same books to their schollars , and teach them the same notions , it is not the same conceptions always that they thus communicate . viii . and when all is done , recipitur ad modum recipientis . it 's two to one but the learner receiveth their notions with a conception somewhat different from them all . and when he thinks that he hath learnt what was taught him , and is of his teachers mind , he is mistaken , and hath received another apprehension . ix . and the narrowness of mans mind and thoughts is such , that usually there must go many partial conceptions , to one thing or object really indivisible : so that few things , or nothing rather in the world , is known by us with one conception , nor with a simplicity of apprehensions answerable to the simplicity of the things : and hereby it cometh to pass that inadequate conceptions make up a great part of our learning and knowledge . and ( yet worse ) our words being narrower than our thoughts , we are fain to multiply words more than conceptions , so that we must have ten conceptions perhaps of one thing , and twenty words perhaps for those ten conceptions . and then we grow to imagine the things to be as various as our conceptions , yea and our words : and so learning is become confused error , and the great and noble actions of the phantastical world , are a pitiful confused agitation of phantasms , and ( whether fortuitous or artificial ) a congress of atoms , sometimes digladiating , and sometimes seeming by amicable embraces to compose some excellent piece of art. and things seem to us to be multiplyed and ordered as our conceptions of them are . and the scotists may yet write as many more treatises de formalitatibus , before men will understand indeed what a conceptus formalis with them is , and whether diverse formalities be diverse realities , or only ejusdem conceptus inadequati . but thus learning is become like a poppet play , or the raising of the dust . x. the entia rationis being thus exceeding numerous , are already confounded with objective realities , and have compounded our common systems of logick , metaphysicks , and too much of physicks : so that students must at first see through false spectacles , and learn by seducing notions , and receive abundance of false conceptions , as the way to wisdom , and shadows and rubbish , must furnish their minds under the name of truth ( though mixt with many real verities . ) for young men must have teachers : they cannot begin at the foundation , and every one learn of himself , as if none had ever learnt before him : he is like to make but a slow proficient , that maketh no use of the studies and experience of any that ever learnt before him . and he that will learn of others , must receive their notions and words as the means of his information . xi . and when they grow up to be capable of real wisdom , o! what a labour is it , to cleanse out this rubbish , and to unlearn all the errors that we have learnt , so that it is much of the happiest progress of extraordinary successful studies , to find out our old mistakes , and set our conceptions in better order one by one : perhaps in one year we find out and reform some two or three , and in another year one or two more , and so on . even as when at my removal of my library , my servant sets up all my books , and i must take them half down again to set them in their right places . xii . and the difficulty of the matter is our great impediment , when we come to study things . for , . their matter , . their composure , . their numbers , . their order and relations , . and their action and operation , are much unknown to us . xiii . . the substance of spirits is so little known , as tempteth sadduces to dream that there are none . the notion of a spirit to some ( through ignorance ) is taken to be meerly negative , as if it signified no more , but [ not corporeal . ] the notion of immateriality is lubricous , and he that knoweth not the true bounds of the signification of materia , knoweth not what it is to be immaterial . the purest spirit is known only by many inadequate conceptions : one must answer the similitude of matter , in fundamental substantiality : another must be answerable to that of forms of simple elements ; and another answerable to accidents . and though nothing be so notorious of spirits as their operations , and from the acts we know the virtues or powers , yet that these virtues are not accidents , but the very essential form , and that they are ( in all spirits ) one in three , and many other things concerning their essentiality , are quite overlookt by the greater part of philosophers ; and those few that open it , do either with campanella , lose it again in a wood of mistaken ill gathered consequences ; or with lullius , drown it in a multitude of irregular arbitrary notions ; or with commenius , give us a little undigested , with the mixture of crudities and mistakes ; or with our learned dr. glisson de vitâ naturae , confound spirits and bodies , and make those spirits which are the vital constitutive principle of compounds , to be but the inadequate conception of bodies , as if they were all simply and formally vital of themselves , and for a body to be inanimate were a contradiction , or impossible . and they that treat more nobly of spirits ( as mr. got and many platonists ) do it so immethodically and confusedly , as greatly disadvantageth the learner . and yet to treat of bodies without treating of the spirits that animate or actuate them , is a lame , deluding , unedifying thing : as it is to treat of a kingdom , an army , a school , without mentioning a king , a captain , or a schoolmaster ; or as to describe a gun , without any mention of gunpowder or shooting : or a clock or watch without the poise or spring , or motion ; or a book or words without the sense ; and so of a man without a soul or reason , or a brute without any life or sense . i mean when we speak of compound beings , and not meerly of corporeity in the notion , as abstracted from all vital moving principles . xiv . . and what the true notion of matter or corporeity it self is , it is but darkly and uncertainly known , how confidently soever some decantate their moles or quantity , divisibility or discerptibility , and impenetrability : whether fire be material , and divisible and impenetrable , and how far fire and spirits herein differ , and so spirits and bodies , and how far sensible must enter the definition of corpus , is not easily known . xv. . nor do we well know the nature of the simple corporeal elements ; whether they agree only in materiality , quantity , and divisibility , and impenetrability ; and whether they differ only in magnitude , shape , sight and contexture of parts ; or by any essentiating formal virtues ; or both ; or ( as mr. got thought ) by a differencing proper spirit . xvi . . how little of the divine artifice is known in the composition of mixt bodies ? ( and we know of no existent simples in the world , that are not found only in compositions . ) all men confess that every plant , every worm , or fly , every sensitive , yea every sensible being , is so little known to us , as that the unknown part far exceedeth the known . xvii . . and we are not agreed of late of the number of the very elements themselves ; much less of compounds ; of which , while we know so few , that which we do know is the more defectively known ; because ( as in knowing of letters and syllables ) the knowledge of one thing is needful to the true and useful knowledge of another . xviii . but the order and relations of things to one another is so wonderfully unsearchable , and innumerably various , as quite surpasseth all humane understanding . yea , though order and relation constitute all morality , policy , literature , &c. so that it is as it were that world which humane intellects converse in , and the business of all humane wills and actions , yet few men know so much as what order and relation is : nay , nor whether it be any thing or nothing : and though health and sickness , harmony and discord , beauty and ugliness , virtue and vice , consist in it , and heaven and hell depend upon it , and law and judgment do make and determine it ; yet is it not easie to know what it is by an universal notion ; nor whether it be truly to be called any thing at all . we doubt not but order should be a most observable predicament , in the series of humane notions or nominanda : but yet i doubt not much but that gassendus who would make tempus and spatium two of his predicaments , doth ascribe to them that entity which they have not . xix . and though undoubtedly action is a noble predicament , and whatever the cartesians say , requireth more causation than non agere doth ; yea is it self the causation of the mutations in the world ; yet men scarce know what to call it . some say it is res : others it is but accidens rei ; and others modus rei ; some say , it is in passo : some say it is in agente : some say it is neither , but is agentis : some say immanent acts are qualities , as scotus , &c. xx. and which is yet worse , the very name , accident , mode and quality , are but general unapt notions , not well understood by any that use them , nor suited meetly to the severals contained under them . and when we call a thing , ( or nothing ) a quality , accident or mode , we are little the wiser , and know not well what we have said . sure i am that they are exceedingly heterogenea which aristotle comprizeth in the very predicament of quality . and gassendus thought all accidents may be as well called qualities or modes . xxi . and which is yet worse , all humane language is so wofully ambiguous , that there is scarce a word in the world that hath not many senses : and the learned world never came to agreement about the meaning of their common words , so that ambiguity drowneth all in uncertainty and confusion . xxii . and which is yet worse , the certain apprehension of sense and reason , is commonly by men called learned , reduced to , and tryed by , these dreaming ambiguous names and universal notions : and men are drawn to deny their certain knowledge , because they know not by what universal term to call it , e. g. i know as far as is useful to me , by seeing what light is ; but whether it be substantia , accidens , modus , &c. or what to call it universally , few know ! and no wonder , for their universal notions are their own works or entia rationis , fabricated by the imperfect comparing of things with things , by ignorant understandings ; but the sensibility of objects & the sensitive faculty & the intellect , are the works of god. i know much better what light is by seeing it , than i know what an accident or a quality is . so i know by feeling what heat is , i know what motion or action is , i know what pain and pleasure is , i know what love and hatred is , i know partly what it is to think , to know , to will , choose and refuse ; but what is the right universal notion of these , what true definition to give of any one of them , the learnedst man doth not well know ; insomuch , as i dare boldly say , that the vulgar ordinarily know all these better without definitions , than the most learned man living can know them by definitions alone . and here i will presume to step aside , to say as in the ears of our over-doing separatists , who can take none into christian communion , that cannot tell you how they were converted , or at least give them a fair account of their understanding all the articles of the faith , in words that are adapted to the matter : i tell you . that the knowledge of words , and second notions and definitions , is one thing , and the knowledge of matters or things is another . . and it is the knowledge of the things , and not of the words , that is primarily and absolutely necessary to salvation . . and that many an illiterate , ill bred person understand things long before they can utter their understandings in any intelligible words . . and therefore if any man do but these two things . . by yea or nay do signifie to me , that he understandeth the truth , when i put the matter of ( nothing but the baptismal covenant ) into my questions ; . and do manifest serious willingness accordingly , by avoiding evil , and using gods means ; i dare not , i will not refuse that person from the communion of the church ; though i would do as much as the rigidest censurer to bring such up to greater knowledge . xxiii . and on the other side men are made to think that they know the things because they know the names and definitions : and so that they are learned and wise when they know little the more by all their learning . for to be able to talk over all the critical books and lexicons and grammars ; all the logical notions and definitions , is nothing but organical knowledge ; like the shoemaker that hath a shop full of lasts , ( and that most of them unmeet for any mans foot ) but never made a shoe by any of them . and false and confused and idle names and notions , fill the learned world with false , confused and vain conceptions , which common-countrey people scape , so that it costeth many a man twenty years study , to be made more erroneous than he would have been , by following an honest trade of life . xxiv . nay our very articles of faith and practice , which salvation lyeth on , are commonly tryed by these arbitrary organical notions ; whole loads of school volumes are witnesses of this . though the school-men , where our grammarians deride them as barbarians , have often done well in fitting words to things , and making the key meet for the lock : yet old terms and notions and axioms too often go for current , and over-rule disputes , when they are not understood , nor are proper or univocal . what work doth aristotle make with actus and potentia , and the school-men after him ? what abundance of darkness do these two words contain in all their writings ? and for want of other words to supply our needs , what abundance of distinctions of actus and potentiae are the scotists and other schoolmen fain to use ? what abundance of disputes are kept up by the ambiguity of the word [ cause ] while it is applyed to things so different , as efficience , constitution , and finality ? the like may be said of many more . and then when it cometh to a dispute of the divine nature , of the soul , of the most weighty things , these confounding notions must over-rule the case . we must not have an argument for the souls immortality , but what these notions check or vitiate ; no nor scarce for an attribute of god. xxv . and it is so hard a thing to bring men to that self-denial and labour , as at age throughly and impartially to revise their juvenile conceptions , and for them that learnt words before things , to proceed to learn things now as appearing in their proper evidence , and to come back and cancel all their old notions , which were not found , and to build up a new frame , that not one of a multitude is ever master of so much virtue as to attempt it , and go through with it . was it not labour enough to study so many years to know what others say ? but they must now undo much of it , and begin a new and harder labour ? who will do it ? xxvi . and indeed none but men of extraordinary acuteness and love of truth , and self-denial and patience are fit to do it . for , . the common dullards will fall into the ditch when they leave their crutches . and will multiply sects in philosophy and religion , while they are unable to see the truth in itself . and indeed this hath made the protestant churches , so liable to the derision and reproach of their adversaries . and how can it be avoided , while all men must pretend to know and judge , what indeed they are unable to understand ? . yea the half-witted men , that think themselves acute and wise , fall into the same calamity . . and the proud will not endure to be thought to err , when they plague the world with error . . and the impatient will not endure so long and difficult studies . . and when all is done , as seneca saith , they must be content with a very few approvers , and must bear the scorn of the ignorant-learned crowd . who have no way to maintain the reputation of their own wisdom , orthodoxness and goodness , but by calling him proud , or self-conceited , or erroneous , that differeth from them by knowing more than they . and who but the truly self-denying can be at so much cost and labour for such reproach , when they foreknow that he that increaseth knowledge , increaseth sorrow ? xxvii . by these means mens minds that should be taken up with god and his service , are abused and vilified , and filled with the dust and smoak of vain , and false , and confused notions . and mans life is spent ( as david saith ) in a vain shew . and men dream waking with as great industry , as if they were about a serious work . alas how pitifully is much of the learned world employed . xxviii . by this means also mens precious time is lost : and he that had time little enough to learn and do things necessary , for the common good , and his own salvation , doth waste half of it on he knoweth not what . and satan that findeth him more ingenious than to play it away at cards and dice , or than to drink and revel it away , doth cast another bait before him , and get him learnedly to dream it away about unprofitable words and notions . xxix . and by this means the practice of goodness is hindred in the world , yea and holy affections quenched . while these arbitrary notions and speculations , ( being mans own ) are his more pleasant game ; and studies and pulpits must be thus employed , and heart and life thus stoln from god. yea it 's well if godliness grow not to be taken by such dreamers , for a low , a dull and an unlearned thing ; yea if they be not tempted by it to infidelity , and to think ( not only the zealous ministers and christians , but even ) christ and his apostles to be unlearned men , below their estimation . xxx . and by the same means the devilish sin of pride will be kept up , even among the learned , yea and the preachers of humility : for what is that in the world ( almost ) that men are prouder of than that learning which consisteth in such notions and words as are afore described ? and the proudest man , i think , is the worst . xxxi . and by this means the sacred chairs and pulpits will be possessed by such men , whose spirits are most contrary to a crucified christ , and to that cross and doctrine which they must preach . and when christ's greatest enemies are the pastors of his churches , all things will be ordered and managed accordingly ; and the faithful hated and abused accordingly . though i must add , that it is not this cause alone , but many more concurring to constitute a worldly wicked mind , which use to procure these effects . xxxii . and by false and vain learning contentions are bred and propagated in the churches . none are instruments so apt , and none have been so successful , as all church history recordeth and the voluminous contentions of many such learned parties testify . xxxiii . and this is an increasing malady , for new books are yearly written , containing the said arbitrary notions of the several authors . and whereas real and organical learning should be orderly and conjunctly propagated , and things studied for themselves , and words for things , the systems of of arts and sciences grow more and more corrupted , our logicks are too full of unapt notions , our metaphysicks are a meer confused mixture of pneumatology and logick ; and what part hath totally escaped ? xxxiv . and the number of such books doth grow so great , that they become a great impediment and snare ; and how many years precious time must be lost , to know what men say , and who saith amiss , or how they differ ? xxxv . and the great diversity of writers and sects increaseth the danger & trouble , especially in physicks ; by that time a man hath well studied the several sects , the epicureans and somatists , the cartesians , with the by-parties , ( regius , berigardus , &c. ) the platonists , the peripateticks , the hermeticks , lullius , patricius , telesius , campanella , white , digby , glisson , and other novelists ; and hath read the most learned improvers of the curranter sort of philosophy , ( scheggius , wendeline , sennertus , hoffman , honorat ▪ faber , got , &c. ) how much of his life will be thus spent . and perhaps he will be as far to seek , in all points saving those common evident certainties , which he might have learned more cheaply in a shorter time , than he was before he read them . and will wish that antonine , epictetus , or plutarch had served instead of the greater part of them . and will perceive that physicks are much fuller of uncertainties , and emptier of satisfying usefulness than morality , and true theology . xxxvi . by such false methods and notions men are often led to utter scepticism , and when they have found out their own errors , they are apt to suspect all the substance of sciences to be error . and he speeds well that cometh but with sanchez to a nihil scitur : and he better that cometh but with cornel. agrippa , to write vanity and vexation upon all the sciences : for many come to infidelity it self , and some to atheism : and , as dr. tho. jackson noteth , by such distrust of men and humane things , are tempted into a distrust or unbelief of christ ; or perhaps with hobbs grow to cry down all learning besides their own , which is worse than the worst that they decry . xxxvii . and by all this princes and states are tempted to hate learning it self , and banish it as a pernicious thing : as the case of the turkish , muscovian , and some other empires testifie . all this i have said , not to dishonour true learning , which i would promote with all my power ; but to shew the corruption and vanity of that philosophy and humane false learning , which paul and the ancient writers did decry ; and why the council of carthage forbad the reading of the gentiles books , and reproached apollinarius , and other hereticks for their gentile learning . of the great uncertainty of our physicks and metaphysicks , almost all the chief authors themselves make free confessions . see suarez , metaph. disp . . pag. , , . fromondus de anim. pag. . gassendus often ; and who not ? pious bonaventure hath written a tract de reductione artium ad theologiam ; and another de non frequentandis quaestionibus ; cornel. agrippa de vanitate scientiarum , is well worth the reading beforehand to prevent mens loss of time . chap. . iii. what are the certainties that must be known and held fast , and why ? it is none of the apostles meaning that men should be meer scepticks : nor am i seconding sanchez his nihil scitur , unless you take science for adequate science , or in a transcendent notion , as it signifieth that which is proper to another world , and therefore may be denyed of this . he can neither play the part of a christian or of a man , who doubts of all things , and is assuredly confident of nothing . that our discourse of this may be orderly and edifying , it is of great use that i first help you rightly to understand what certainty is . the word is ambiguous , and sometime is applied to the object , and sometime to the act and agent . the former is called objective certainty ; the latter subjective certainty . the objective is either certainty of the thing , or certainty of evidence , by which the thing is discernible or perceptible to us . and this either sensible evidence , or rational ; and the latter is either self-evidence of principles , or derived evidence of consequences . subjective certainty is also either considered in the nature of it , or in the degree : and as to the nature it is either the senses certainty , or the intellects ; and this either of incomplex objects , or complex : the first is either of sensed objects , or purely spiritual : the second of principles , or of conclusions . of all these there are certainty . the degrees are these : it being first supposed that no humane apprehension here is absolutely perfect ; and therefore all our certainties subjective are imperfect : the word therefore signifieth not only a perfect apprehension ; but it signifieth non falli , not to be deceived , and such an apprehension of the evidence as giveth us a just resolving and quieting confidence . and so . the due objects of sense , and . the immediate acts of the soul it self , are certain in the first and highest degree . i know certainly what i see clearly , so far as i see it : and i know certainly that i think , and know , and will. the next degree of certainty is of rational principles , and the next of consequents . it 's like in a scheme you will easilier understand it . certainty being an ambiguous word , is either , i. objective : which is , i. of being of the thing ; which is nothing but physical verity . ii. of evidence ; which makes things perceptible ; and it is evidence , . sensible ; viz. . to the external senses . . to the internal senses . . intelligible , . of the being of things , viz. . quod sint , . quid sint , . qualia sint , . things sensed and imagined ; as colours , light , heat , &c. . the acts of intellection and will. . of complex verity , which is , . of self-evident principles . . derivative evidence of conclusions . ii. subjective certainty ; by which i am certain of the object ; considerable , i. in its nature ; viz. certainty , . of sense , . of the outward senses , when they are not deceived . . of the inward sense and imagination . . of the intellect ; which is , . of beings , . sensed and imagined , . of the acts of the soul. . quod sint . . quid sint . . qualia sint . . of the complex verities , . of self-evident principles . . of conclusions . ( n. qu. whether there be not a third sort of certainty both objective and subjective ; viz. goodness not-sensible , certainly apprehended by the intellectual soul , not only sub ratione veri , sed & boni ? and whether the will by its natural gust have not a complacential perception of it as well as the intellect ? vid. pemble vindic. grot. ) ii. in the degrees of certainty ; which are in the order following . . sense perceiving the object and it self , is the first perceiver ; and hereof the surest . . imagination receiving from sense , hath more requisites to its certainty . . intellection about things sensible , hath yet more requisites to its certainty ; viz. . that the object be true ; . the evidence sensible ; . that the sense be sound , and the medium and other conditions of sense be just ; . that the imagination be not corrupt , . that the intellect it self be sound . . but intellection about it self and volition hath the highest certainty . we are surer of the quod than the quid and quale ; as that we think , than what and how. . we are certainer of self-evident principles than of the consequences . . consequences have various degrees of evidence and certainty . a few propositions may further help your understandings . i. all things in the world have their certainty physical of being ; that is , it is a certainty , or a truth that this thing is . ii. the thing which is most commonly called objective certainty , is such a degree of perceptibility or evidence as may aptly satisfie the doubting intellect . iii. evidence is called infallible ; . when he that receiveth it is never deceived ; and so all truth is infallible truth ; for he is not deceived who believeth it : . or when a man cannot err about it . and there is no such evidence in the world , unless you suppose all things else agreeable . iv. the perception is called infallible , . either quia non falsa , because it is not deceived : and so every man is infallible in every thing which he truly perceiveth : . or because it cannot or will not err . and so absolute infallibility is proper to god : but secundum quid , in certain cases upon certain objects , with certain conditions , all sound mens senses and intellects are infallible . v. certainty of evidence consisteth in such a position of the thing evident , as maketh it an object perceptible to the faculty perceiving ; to which many conditions are required : as . that the thing it self have such intrinsick qualifications , as make it fit to be an object . . that it have the due extrinsick conditions concomitant . . to the nature of an object of perception it is necessary . . that it be a thing which in its nature is within the reach of the perceiving faculty : and not ( as spirits are to sense ) so above us , or alien to us , as to be out of the orb of our perception . . that they have a perceptible quantity , magnitude or degree . . that , if it be an incomplex term and object , and not an universal of the highest notion , it be hoc aliquid , and have its proper individuation . . that it have some special distinct conformity to the distinct perceiving faculty . in sum , that it be ens , unum , verum , bonum , vel hisce contraria reductivè & per accidens cognita . . to the extrinsick conditions , it is necessary , . that the object have a due site or position . . and a due distance ; neither too near , nor too far off . . and that it have a due medium , fitted to it and to the faculty . . and that it have a due abode or stay , and be not like a bullet out of a gun , imperceptible through the celerity of its motion . vi. that the perception of sense be certain , it is necessary , . that the organ be sound , in such a measure as that no prevalent distemper undispose it . . that it be not oppressed by any disturbing adjunct . . that the sensitive soul do operate on and by these organs : for else its alienation will leave the organ useless : as some intense meditations make us not hear the clock . . that it be the due sense and organ which meeteth with the object ; as sounds with the ear , light with the eye , &c. besides the foresaid necessaries . vii . common notitiae or principles are not so called , because men are born with the actual knowledge of them ; but because they are truths , which mans mind is naturally so disposed to receive as that upon the first exercises of sense and reason , some of them are understood , without any other humane teacher . viii . even self-evident principles are not equal , but some of them are more , and some less evident . and therefore some sooner , and some later known . and some of them are more commonly known than others . ix . the self evidence of these principles ariseth from the very nature of the intellect which inclineth to truth , and the nature of the will which essentially inclineth to good , and the nature and posture of the objects , which are truth and goodness in the most evident position , compared together , or conjunct ; some call it instinct . x. it is not necessary to the certainty of a principle , that it be commonly known of all or most . for intellects have great variety of capacities , excitation , helps , improvements , and even principles have various degrees of evidence , and appearances to men . xi . mans mind is so conscious of its own darkness and imperfections , that it is distrustful of its own inferences unless they be very near and clear. when by a long series of ergo's any thing is far fetcht , the mind is afraid there may be some unperceived error . xii . he therefore that holdeth a true principle as such , and at once a false inference which contradicteth it , is to be supposed to hold the principle first and fastest , and that if he saw the contradiction he would let go the consequent , and not the principle . xiii . he that denieth the certainty of sense , imagination , and intellective perception of things sensed as such , doth make it impossible to have any certainty of science or faith about those same objects but by miracle . and therefore the papists denying and renouncing all these ( sense , imagination and intellective perception , ) when they say , that there is no bread nor wine in the sacrament , do make their pretended contrary faith impossible . for we are men before we are christians , and we have sense and intellects , before we have faith . and as there is no christianity but on supposition of humanity , so there is no faith , but on supposition of sense and understanding . how know you that here is no bread and wine ? is it because scripture or councils say so ? how know you that ? by hearing or reading ? but how know you that ever you did hear or read or see a book or man ? by sense or no way ! if sense be fallible here , why not there ? you 'l say that sense may be fallible in one case , and not in others . i answer , either you prove it infallible from nature , even by sense and intellective perception of and by sense , or else by supernatural revelation . if only by this revelation , how know you that revelation ? how know you that ever you heard , read or saw any thing which you call revelation . if by a former revelation , i ask you the same question in infinitum . but if you know the certainty of sense by sense and intellective perception , then where there is the same evidence and perception , there is the same certainty . but here is as full evidence and perception as any other object can have . . we see bread and wine . . we tast it . . we smell the wine . . we hear it poured out . . we feel it . . we find the effects of it ; it refresheth and nourisheth as other bread and wine . . it doth so by any other creature as well as by a man. . it corrupteth . . it becometh true flesh and blood in us , and a part of our bodies ; even in the worst : yea part of the body of a mouse or dog. . it 's possible for a mouse or dog to live only upon consecrated bread and wine . is his body then nothing but christ . . in all this perception the objects are not rare , but commonly exhibited in all ages ; they have all the conditions that other sensible evident objects have , as to site , magnitude , distance , medium . . and it is not one or two , but all men in the world of the soundest senses , who sense and perceive them to be bread and wine . so that here is as full evidence as the words which you read or hear can have to ascertain us . obj. but if god deny sense in this case and not in others , we must believe sense in others and not in this . ans . but again i ask you , how you know that god biddeth or forbiddeth you any thing , if sense be not first to be believed ? obj. but is it not possible for sense to be deceived ? cannot god do it ? ans . . it is possible for sense to be annihilated , and made no sense ; and it is possible that the faculty or organ , or medium , or object , be depraved , or want its due conditions , and so to be deceived . but to retain all these due conditions , and yet to be deceived is a contradiction : for then it is not the same thing : it is not that which we call now formally sense and intellect , or sensation and intellection . and contradictions are not things for omnipotency to be tryed about . god can make a man to be no intellectual creature : but thereby he maketh him no man : for to be a man , and not intellectual , is a contradiction . and so it is to be men , and yet to have no sense nor intellect , that can truly perceive sensible objects as before qualified : therefore they unman all the world , on pretext of asserting the power of god. . but suppose that all sense be fallible , and intellection of things sensible , yet it is the first and only entrance of all things sensible into the mind or knowledge of man : and therefore we must take it as god hath given it us , for we can have no surer : no sensible thing is in the intellect which was not first in the sense : whether my eyes and ears , and taste be fallible or not , i am sure i have no other way to perceive their objects ; but by them i must take them and use them as they are . all the words and definitions in the world will not give any man without sensation , a true conception of a sensible object . . such absurd suppositions therefore are not to be put , [ what if god should tell you by his word , that all the senses of all men are deceived , in one thing , or in all things ? would you not believe him ? ] it is not to be supposed that god will give us all our senses and intellective perception by them , to be our discerner of things sensible , and then bid us not believe them , for they are false ; unless he told us that all our perceptions are false , and our whole life is but deceit . and i further answer , if god tell me so , it must be by some word or writing of man or angel , or himself : and how should i know that word but by my sense ? but the great answer which seemeth to satisfie bellarmine and the rest , is , that sense is no judge of substances , but of accidents only ; therefore it is not deceived . but . it is false that sense perceiveth not substances : it is not only colour , quantity , figure , which i see , nor only roughness and smoothness which i feel , nor only sweetness which i taste ; but it is a coloured , extended , figured substance which i see ; a rough or smooth substance which i feel , and a sweet substance which i taste : and if the accident were the only primary object , the substance is the secondary and certain . else no one ever saw a man , a tree , a bird , a plant , the earth , a book , or any substance ; but only the colour , quantity or figure of them ! no man ever felt or touched a body , but only the accidents of it . . and i pray you tell me how substances come to the understanding if they were never in the sense : prove a substance without sensation as a medium if you can . do you perceive any substances intellectually or not ? if not , why pretend you that there are any ? if yea , it must be either as conclusions , or as intellectual principles , ( which are both logical complex objects , and therefore not substances ) or as the immediate immaterial objects of intellection ( which is only the souls own acts ) or what is by analogy gathered from them ; or else the objects of sense it self . it can be none of the former ; therefore it must be the latter : and how can the understanding find that in sense which was never there ? if it be said that it is there but by accidents ; i answer , . that is false , though said by many : i do as immediately touch substance as accidents , though not substance without the accidents . . whether it be there by the mediation of the accidents , or immediately it self , we are sure that the understanding no otherwise receiveth it , than as the sense transmitteth it ; we must know material substance as it is sensed , or not at all . we see then what a pass this roman religion bringeth the world to . that they may be christians , they must believe ( and swear by the trent oath ) that they are not men ; and that they may have faith , they must renounce their senses , and that they may be sure gods word is true , ( and the churches decrees , ) they must be sure that they are sure of nothing ; and how then are they sure of that ? and while they subvert all the order of nature in the world , they pretend that god can do it , and therefore we are to believe that he doth it , meerly because these doctors can call themselves the church , and then can so expound the scripture . when it is gods setled order in nature , that a man as an animal shall have sense to perceive things sensible by , and as a man shall have understanding to receive from the imagination and sense these objects , we must now suppose that god hath quite overturned the course of nature , either by making sense no sense , or the object no object , or the medium no fit medium ; and yet this is to be believed by men that have nothing but the same senses to tell their understandings that it is written or spoken , or that there is a man in the world. suppose we grant it to be no contradiction , and therefore a thing that god can do , no man can question but that he must do it as a miracle , by altering and overturning natures course . and shall we fain , . miracles to become ordinary things , through all the churches in the world , and every day in the week or every hour to be done ? . and miracles to be made a standing church ordinance ? . and every one in the church , even all the wicked , and every mouse that eateth the host , to be partaker of a miracle ? . yea that every such man and mouse , may all the week long live on a continued miracle , while accidents without substance do nourish them and turn to flesh and blood ? . and all this ordinary course of miracles to be wrought at the will of every priest , be he never so ignorant or wicked a man ? . and yet the same words spoken by the holiest of the protestant pastors will not do the miracle . . but if a papist priest should be unduely ordained , or forge his own orders , sobeit the church think him truly ordained , he can do the miracle . all this must be believed . and the plague of all is , all men must be burnt as hereticks , or exterminated , that cannot believe all this , and disbelieve their senses . and yet worse , all temporal lords must be dispossest of their dominions , who will suffer any such to live therein , and not exterminate them . an epicure and a sensual infidel who think man is but of the same species of brutes , do but unman us , and leave us the honour of being animals or brutes . but the papists do not leave us this much , but must reduce us to a lower order , and teach us to deny our sense it self ; and torment and kill them that will not do it . and what is it that must perswade us to all this ? why meerly a hoc est corpus meum , as expounded by the councils of laterane and trent . and is not davids [ i am a worm and no man , psal . . . ] as plain ; yea and that in a prophecy of christ ? must we believe therefore that neither david nor christ was a man , but a worm ? is not [ i am the vine , and ye are the branches , joh. . , . ] as plain ? must sense be renounced and ordinary miracles believed for such words as these ? and doth not paul call it [ bread ] after consecration three times in the three next verses ? and is not he as good an expositor of christs words as the council of trent ? and when did god work miracles which were meer objects of belief against sense ? miracles were done as sensible things , thereby to confirm faith , and that which no sense perceived was not taken for a miracle . to conclude , when the apostle saith , that flesh and blood cannot enter into the kingdom of god , ( plainly speaking of them formally as now called , and not as they signify sin , ) and consequently that christs body is now in heaven a spiritual body , and not formally flesh and blood , yet must the bread and wine be turned into his flesh and blood on earth , when he hath none in heaven ? and by their doctrine no baker nor vintner is secured but that a priest may come into his shop or celler and turn all the bread and wine in it , into christs body and blood : yea the whole city or garrison may thus be deprived of their bread and wine , if the priest intend it : and yet it shall not be so in the sacrament it self , if the priest intend it not . but i have staid too long in this . xiv . next to the act of cogitation and volition itself , and to the most certain objects of sence , there is nothing in all the world so certain , that is , so evident to the intellect , as the being of god : he being that to the mind which the sun is to the eye , certainliest known , though little of him be known , and no creature comprehend him . xv. that god is true is part of our knowing him to be perfect , and to be god ; and therefore is most certain . xvi . that man is made by god and for god ; that we owe him all our love , obedience and praise , that we have all from him , and should please him in the use of all , with many such like , are notitiae communes , certain verities , received by nature , some as principles , and some as such evident conclusions as are not to be doubted of . xvii . that the scripture is the word of god , is a certain truth , not sensible , nor a natural principle ; but an evident conclusion drawn from that seal or testimony of the spirit , antecedent , concomitant , impressed and consequent ; which i have oft opened in other treatises . xviii . that the scripture is true is a certain conclusion drawn from the two last mentioned premises , viz. that god is true ( verax ) and that the scripture is his word . xix . those doctrines or sayings which are parts of scripture evidently perceived so to be by sense and intellective perception , are known to be true , by the same certainty as the scripture in general is known to be true . xx. to conclude , then there are two sorts of certain verities in theology . . natural principles with their certain consequents . . scripture in general , with all those assertions which are certainly known to be its parts . and all the rest are to be numbred with uncertainties , except prophetical certainty of inspiration , which i pass by . chap. v. of the several degrees of certainty . . as certainty is taken for truth of being , it admitteth of no degrees : all that is true , is equally true. . but certainty of evidence hath various degrees : none doubteth but there are various degrees of evidence : all the doubt is whether any but the highest may be called certainty . and here let the reader first remember that the question is but de nomine , of the name , and not the thing . and next , the evidence is called certain , because it is certifying aptitudinally . it is apt to certify us . . and then the question will be devolved to subjective certainty , whether it have various degrees . for if it have so , then the evidence must be said to have so , because it is denominated respectively from the apprehensive certainty . and here de re it must be taken as agreed , . that certainty is a certain degree of apprehension . . that there are various degrees of apprehension . . that no man on earth hath a perfect intellectual apprehension , at least , of things moral and spiritual . for his apprehension , may be still increased , and those in heaven have perfecter than we . . that there are some degrees so low and doubtful , as are not fit to be called certainty . . that even these lowest degrees with the greatest doubting , are yet often true apprehensions : and whenever they are true they are infallible , that is , not deceived : therefore this infallibility , which is but , not to be deceived , is indeed one sort of certainty , which is so denominated relatively from the natural truth or certainty of the object : but it is not this sort of certainty which we enquire after . . therefore it followeth that this subjective certainty , containeth this infallible truth of perception , and addeth a degree which consisteth in the satisfaction of the mind . . but if the mind should be never so confident and satisfied of a falshood , this deserveth not the name of certainty , because it includeth not truth . for it is a certain perception of truth which we speak of ; and confident erring is not certainty of the truth . . as therefore the degrees of doubting are variously overcome , so there must needs be various degrees of certainty . . when doubting is so far overcome , as that the mind doth find rest and satisfaction in the truth , it may be called certainty . but when doubting is either prevalent , and so troublesome as to leave us wavering , it is not called certainty . . it is not the forgetting or neglect of a difficulty or doubt , nor yet the wills rejecting it , which is properly called certainty . this quieteth the mind indeed , but not by the way of ascertaining evidence . therefore ignorant people that stumble upon a truth by chance with confidence , are not therefore certain of it . and those that take it upon trust from a priest or their parents , or good peoples opinion , are not therefore certain of it . nor they that say as some papists , [ faith hath not evidence , but is a voluntary reception of the churches testimony , and meritorious , because it hath not evidence : therefore though i see no cogent evidence , i will believe , because it is my duty . ] whether this mans faith may be saving or no , i will not now dispute ; but certainly it is no certainty of apprehension . he is not certain of what he so believeth . this is but to cast away the doubt or difficulty , and not at all by certainty to overcome it . . when a man hath attained a satisfying degree of perception , he is capable still of clearer perception . even as when in the heating of water , after all the sensible cold is gone , the water may grow hotter and hotter still . so after all sensible doubting is gone , the perception may go clearer still . . but still the objective certainty is the same ; that is , there is that evidence in the object which is in suo genere sufficient to notifie the thing to a prepared mind . . but this sufficiency is a respective proportion ; and therefore , as it respecteth mans mind in common , it supposeth that by due means and helps , and industry , the mind may be brought certainly to discern this evidence . but if you denominate the sufficiency of the evidence , from its respect to the present disposition of mens minds , so it is almost as various as mens minds are . for recipitur ad modum recipientis ; and that is a certifying sufficient evidence of truth , to one man , which to a thousand others , is not so much as an evidence of probability . therefore mediate and immediate sufficiency and certainty of evidence , must be distinguished . from all this i may infer , . that though god be the original and end of all verities , and is ever the first in ordine essendi & efficiendi , and so à jove principium , in methodo syntheticâ ; yet he is not the primum notum , the first known , in ordine cognoscendi , nor the beginning in methodo inquisitivâ ( though in such analytical methods as begin at the ultimate end , he is also the first . ) though all truth and evidence be from god , yet two things are more evident to man than god is , and but two : viz. . the present evident objects of sense . . our own internal acts , of intellective cogitation and volition . and these being supposed the being of god is the third evident certainty in the world. . if it be no disparagement to god himself , that he is less certainly known of us , than sensibles , and our internal acts , ( de esse ) it is then no disparagement to the scripture , and supernatural truths , that they are less certainly known : seeing they have not so clear evidence as the being of god hath . . the certainty of scripture truths , is mixt of almost all other kinds of certainty conjunct . . by sense and intellective perception of things sensed , the hearers and see-ers of christ and his apostles , knew the words and miracles . . by the same sense we know what is written in the bible , and in church history concerning it , and the attesting matters of fact : and also what our teachers say of it . . by certain intellectual inference i know that this history of the words and fact is true . . by intellection of a natural principle i know that god is true . . by inference i know that all his word is true . . by sense i know ( intellectually receiving it by sense ) that this or that is written in the bible , and part of that word . . by further inference therefore i know that it is true . . by intuitive knowledge , i am certain that i have the love of god , and heavenly desires , and a love of holiness , and hatred of sin , &c. . by certain inference i know that this is the special work of the spirit of christ by his gospel doctrine . . by experience i find the predictions of this word fulfilled . . lastly , by inspiration the prophets and apostles knew it to be of god. and our certain belief ariseth from divers of these , and not from any one alone . . there are two extreams here to be avoided , and both held by some not seeing how they contradict themselves . i. of them that say that faith hath no evidence , but the merit of it lyeth in that we believe without evidence . those that understand what they say , when they use these words , mean that things evident to sense , as such , that is , incomplex sensible objects are not the objects of faith. we live by faith and not by sight . god is not visible : heaven and its glory , angels and perfected spirits are not visible . future events , christs coming , the resurrection , judgment , are not yet visible : it doth not yet appear ( that is , to sense ) what we shall be . our life is hid ( from our own and others senses ) with christ in god. we see not christ when we rejoice in him with joy unspeakable , and full of glory . thus faith is the evidence of things not seen , or evident to sight . but ignorant persons have turned all to another sense ; as if the objects of faith had no ascertaining intellectual evidence . when as it is impossible for mans mind to understand and believe any thing to be true , without perceiving evidence of its truth ; as it is for the eye to see without light. as rich. hooker saith in his eccl. pol. let men say what they will , men can truly believe no further than they perceive evidence . it is a natural impossibility : for evidence is nothing but the perceptibility of the truth : and can we perceive that which is not perceptible ? it 's true that evidence from divine revelation is oft without any evidence ex natura rei : but it may be nevertheless a fuller and more satisfying evidence . some say there is evidence of credibility , but not of certainty . not of natural certainty indeed . but in divine revelations ( though not in humane ) evidence of credibility , is evidence of certainty , because we are certain that god cannot lie . and to say , i will believe , though without evidence of truth , is a contradiction or hypocritical self-deceit . for your will believeth not . and your understanding receiveth no truth but upon evidence that it is truth . it acteth of itself per modum naturae , necessarily further than it is sub imperio voluntatis ; and the will ruleth it not despotically ; nor at all quoad specificationem , but only quoad exercitium . all therefore that your will can do ( which maketh faith a moral virtue ) is to be free from those vicious habits and acts in itself which may hinder faith , and to have those holy dispositions and acts in itself which may help the understanding to do its proper office , ( which is to believe evident truth on the testimony of the revealer , because his testimony is sufficient evidence . the true meaning of a good christian , when he saith , i will believe , is , i am truly willing to believe , and a perverse will shall not hinder me , and i will not think of suggestions to the contrary . but the meaning of the formal hypocrite when he saith , i will believe , is , i will cast away all doubtful thoughts out of my mind , and i will be as careless as if i did believe , or i will believe the priest or my party , and call it a believing god. evidence is an essentiating part of the intellects act . as there is no act , without an object , so there is no object sub formali ratione objecti , without evidence . even as there is no sight but of an illustrated object , that is , a visible object . ii. the other extream ( of some of the same men ) is , that yet faith is not true and certain if it have any doubtfulness with it . strange ! that these men cannot only see what is invisible ; believe what is inevident as to its truth , that is , incredible , but also believe past all doubting , and think that the weakest true believer doth so too ! certainly there are various degrees of faith in the sincere . all have not the same strength ! christ rebuketh peter in his fears , and his disciples all at other times , for their little faith : when peters faith failed not , it staggered , which abrahams did not : lord increase our faith , and lord , i believe , help my unbelief , were prayers approved by christ . i will call a prevalent belief which can lay down life and all this world for christ and the hopes of heaven , by the name of certainty ( which hath various degrees . ) but if they differ de nomine , and will call nothing certainty but the highest degree , they must needs yet grant that there is true saving faith that reacheth to no certainty in their sense . yea no man on earth then attaineth to such a certainty , because that every mans faith is imperfect . to conclude . though all scripture in itself ( that is indeed the true canon ) be equally true , yet all is not equally certain to us , as not having equal evidence that it is gods word . but of that in the next chapter of the uncertainties . chap. . what are the unknown things , and uncertainties , which we must not pretend a certain knowledge of . somewhat of this is said already , cap. . but i am here to come to more particular instances of it . but because that an enumeration would be a great volume of it self , i shall begin with the more general , that i may be excused in most of the rest ; or mention only some particulars under them as we go . i. a very great , if not the far greatest part of that part of philosophy called physicks , is uncertain ( or certainly false ) as it is delivered to us in any methodist that i have yet seen ; whether platonists , peripateticks , epicureans , ( the stoicks have little , but what seneca gives us , and barlaam collecteth , i know not whence , as making up their ethicks , and what in three or four ethical writers is also brought in on the by , and what cicero reporteth of them ) or in our novelists , patricius , telesius , campanella , thomas white , digby , cartesius , gassendus , &c. except those whose modesty causeth them to say but little , and to avoid the uncertainties ; or confess them to be uncertainties . to enumerate instances would be an unseasonable digression . gassendus is large in his confessions of uncertainties . i think not his brother hobs , and his second spinosa worth the naming . nor the paracelsians and helmontians as giving us a new philosophy , but only as adding to the old . there needs no other testimony of uncertainty to a man that hath not studied the points himself , than their lamentable difference , and confutation of each other , in so many , very many things ; even in the great principles of the science . yet here no doubt , there are certainties , innumerable certainties , such as i have before described . we know something certainly of many things , even of all sensible objects . but we know nothing perfectly and comprehensively , not a worm , not a leaf , not a stone , or a sand , not the pen , ink or paper , which we write with ; not the hand that writeth , nor the smallest particle of our bodies ; not a hair or the least accident . in every thing nearest us , or in the world , the uncertainties and incognita are far more than that which we certainly know . ii. if i should enumerate to you the many uncertainties in our common metaphysicks , ( yea about the being of the science ) and our common logick , &c. it would seem unsuitable to a theological discourse . and yet it would not be unuseful , among such theologues as the schoolmen , who resolve more of their doubts by aristotle than by the holy scriptures ; doubtless , as aristotles predicaments are not fitted to the kinds of beings , so many of his distributions and orders , yea and precepts are arbitrary . and as he left room and reason for the dissent of such as taurellus , carpenter , jacchaeus , gorlaeus , ritschel , and abundance more , so have they also for mens dissent from them . even ramus hath more adversaries than followers . gassendus goeth the right way , by suiting verba rebus , if he had hit righter on the nature of things themselves . most novel philosophers are fain to make new grammars and new logicks , for words and notions , to fit their new conceptions , as campanella , and the paracelsians , helmontians , ( and if you will name the behmenists , rosicrucians , weigelians , &c. ) lullius thought he made the most accurate art of notions ; and he did indeed attempt to fit words to things : but he hath mist of a true accomplishment of his design , for want of a true method of physicks in his mind , to fit his words to . as cornelius , agrippa , who is one of his chief commentators , yet freely confesseth in his lib. de vanitate scientiarum , which now i think of ; i will say no more of this , but desire the reader to peruse that laudable book , and with it to read sanchez his nihil scitur , to see uncertainty detected , so he will not be led by it too far into scepticism . as also mr. glanviles scepsis scientifica . as for the lamentable uncertainties in medicine , the poor world payeth for it . anatomy as being by ocular inspection hath had the best improvement ; and yet what a multitude of uncertainties remain ? many thousands years have millions yearly died of feavers , and the medicating them is a great part of the physicians work ; and yet i know not that ever i knew the man , that certainly knew what a feaver is . i crave the pardon of the masters of this noble art for saying it ; it is by dear experience that i have learnt how little physicians know ; having passed through the tryal of above thirty of them on my own body long ago , meerly induced by a conceit that they knew more than they did , and most that i got was but the ruine of my own body , and this advice to leave to others , [ highly value those few excellent men , who have quick and deep conjecturing apprehensions , great reading and greater experience , and sober , careful , deliberating minds , and had rather do too little than too much : but use them in a due conjunction with your own experience of your self : but for the rest , how learned soever , whose heads are dull , or temper precipitant , or apprehensions hasty or superficial , or reading small , but especially that are young , or of small experience , love and honour them , but use them as little as you can , and that only as you will use an honest ignorant divine , whom you will gladly hear upon the certain catechistical principles , but love not to hear him meddle with controversies . so use these men in common easie cases , if necessary , and yet there the less the better , lest they hinder nature that would cure the disease . if you dislike my counsel , you may be shortly past blaming it ; for though their successes have tongues , their miscarriages are mostly silent in the grave . o how much goeth to make an able physician ? but enough of such instances . iii. but though errors in politicks the world payeth yet much dearer for , i must not be too bold in talking here . but i will confess that here the uncertainties are almost all in the applicatory part , and through the incapacity of the minds of men : for the truth is the main principles of policy are part of the divine law , and of true morality , and in themselves are plain , and of a satisfying certainty , could you but get mens heads and hearts into a fitness duely to consider and receive them . iv. but to come nearer to our own profession , there is much uncertainty in those theological conclusions , which are built on such premises , where any one of these physical , metaphysical or logical uncertainties are a part ; yea , though it be couched in the narrowest room , even in one ambiguous term of art , and scarce discerned by any but accurate observers . with great pomp and confidence many proceed to their ergo's , when the detection of the fraud not only of an uncertain medium , but of one ambiguous syllable , will marr all . and the conclusion can be no stronger or furer , than the more weak and doubtful of the premises . v. when the subject is of small and abstruse parts , far from the principles and fundamentals of the matter , usually the conclusions are uncertain . nature in all matters beginneth with some few great and master parts , like the great boughs or limbs of the tree , or the great trunks and master vessels in our bodies ; and from thence spring branches , which are innumerable and small : and it is so in all sciences , and in theology it self . the great essential and chief integral parts , are few , and easily discerned : but two grand impediments hinder us from a certain knowledge in the rest : one is the great number of particles , where the understanding is lost , and , as they say , seeketh a needle in a bottle of hay , or a leaf in a wood ; and the other is the littleness of the thing , which maketh it undiscernible to any but accurate and studious minds . and therefore how much soever men that trade in little things , may boast of the sublimity of them , and their own subtilty , their perceptions usually are accompanied with uncertainty ; though in some cases an uncertain knowledge , known to be so , is better than none . vi. yea , though the matters themselves may be more bulky , yet if in knowing and proving them , we must go through a great number of syllogisms and inferences , usually the conclusion is very uncertain to us , whatever it may be to an extraordinary accurate and prepared mind : for . we shall be still jealous ( or may be ) lest in so many terms and mediums some one of them should be fallacious and insufficient , and weaken all . and we are so conscious of our own weakness , and liableness to forget , oversee or be mistaken , that we shall or may still fear lest we have mist it , and be overseen in something , in so long a course and series of arguings . vii . those parts of history which depend meerly on the credit of mens wisdom and honesty , and so are meerly of humane faith , must needs be uncertain . for the conclusion can be no surer than the premises , all men as such are liars , that is , untrusty , or such as possibly may deceive . . they may be deceived themselves . . and they may deceive others where they are not themselves deceived . every man hath some passion , some ignorance , some error , some selfish interest and some vice. this age , if we never had known other instance , is so sad a proof of this , that tears are fitter than words to express it , most confident reporters totally differ about the most notorious matters of fact. i must not name them , but i pity strangers and posterity . if it come especially to the characterizing of others , how ordinarily do men speak as they are affected ? and they are affected as self-interest and passion leadeth them , with cochlaeus , bolseck , and such others , what villains were luther , zwinglius , calvin , &c. with their faithfullest acquaintance ; what good and holy men ( saving luthers animosity ? ) if the inquisitors torment protestants , or burn them , is it not necessary that they call them by such odious names as may justify their fact ? if they banish and silence faithful , holy , able , ministers , they must accuse them of some villanies which may make them seem worthy of the punishment , and unworthy to preach the gospel of christ ! what different characters did constantius and valens and their party on one side , and athanasius and the orthodox on the other side , give of one another ? what different characters were given of chrysostom ? how differently do hunnerichus and gensericus on one side , and victor uticensis and other historians on the other side , describe the bishops and christians of africk , that then suffered ? they were traytors and rebels , and rogues , and enemies to the king , and hereticks to hunnerichus : but to others , they are holy blameless men , and those were tyrants and hereticks that persecuted them . what difference between the histories of the orthodox , and that of philostorgius , and sondius ? what different characters do eusebius and eunapius give of constantine ? and eunapius and hilary , &c. give of julian ? what different characters are given of hildebrand on one side , and of the emperours henrys on the other side , by the many historians who followed the several parts ? how false must a great number of the historians on one side be ? i know that this doth not make all humane faith and history useless . it hath its degree of credibility answerable to its use . and a wise man may much conjecture whom to believe . . a man that ( like thuanus ) sheweth modesty and impartiality , even towards dissenters . . a man that had no notable interest to byas him . . a man that manifesteth otherways true honesty and conscience . . supposing that he was himself upon the place , and a competent witness . but there is little or no credit to be given , . to a factious , furious railer . . to one that was a flatterer of great men , or depended on them for preferment , or lived in fear of speaking the truth , or that speaketh for the interest of his riches and honour in the world ; or for his engaged personal reputation , or that hath espoused the interest of a sect or faction . . there is little credit to be given to any knave and wicked man. he that dare be drunk , and swear and curse , and be a fornicator or covetous worldling , dare lie for his own ends. . nor to the honestest man that taketh things by rumours , hear-say and uncertain reports , and knoweth not the things themselves . but how shall strangers and posterity know when they read a history , whether the writer was an honest man or a knave ? a man of credit , or an impudent liar ? both may be equal in confident asserting , and in the plausibility of the narrative . meer humane belief therefore must be uncertain . from whence we see the pitiful case of the subjects of the king of rome ( for so i must rather call him than a bishop . ) why doth a lay-man believe transubstantiation , or any other article of their faith ? because the church faith it is gods word . what is the church that saith so ? it is a faction of the popes , perhaps at laterane , or forty of his prelates at the conventicle of trent . how doth he know that these men do not lie ? because god promised that peters faith should not fail , and the gates of hell should not prevail against the church ; and the spirit should lead the apostles into all truth . but how shall he know that this scripture is gods word ? and also that it was not a total failing , rather than a failing in some degree that peter was by that promise freed from ? or that the spirit was promised to these prelates which was promised to the apostles ? why , because these prelates say so ! and how know they that they say true ? why , from scripture , as before . but let all the rest go . how knoweth the lay-man that ever the church made such a decree ? that ever the bishops of that council were lawfully called ? that they truely represented all christs church on earth ? that this or that doctrine is the decree of a council , or the sence of the church indeed ? why , because the priest tells him so . but how knoweth he that this priest saith true , or a few more that the man speaketh with : there i leave you : i can answer no further ; but must leave the credit of scripture , council and each particular doctrine , on the credit of that poor single priest , or the few that are his companions . the lay-man knoweth it no otherwise . q. but is not the scripture it self then , shaken by this , seeing the history of the canon and incorruption of the books , &c. dependeth on the word of man ? ans . no. . i have elsewhere fully shewed how the spirit hath sealed the substance of the gospel . . and even the matters of fact are not of meer humane faith. for meer humane faith depends on the meer honesty of the reporter : but this historical faith dependeth partly on gods attestation , and partly on natural proofs . . god did by miracles attest the reports of the apostles and first churches , . the consent of all history since , that these are the same writings which the apostles wrote , hath a natural evidence above bare humane faith. for i have elsewhere shewed , that there is a concurrence of humane report or a consent of history , which amounteth to a true natural evidence , the will having its nature and some necessary acts , and nothing but necessary ascertaining causes , could cause such concurrence . such evidence we have that k. james , q. elizabeth , q. mary , lived in england : that our statute books contain the true laws , which those kings and parliaments made whom they are ascribed to . for they could not possibly rule the land , and over-rule all mens interests , and be pleaded at the bar , &c. without contradiction and detection of the fraud , if they were forgeries : ( though it 's possible that some words in a statute book may be misprinted . there is in this a physical certainty in the consent of men , and it depends not as humane faith , upon the honesty of the reporter ; but knaves and liars , have so consented , whose interests and occasions are cross , and so is it in the case of the history of the scripture books : which were read in all the churches through the world , every lords day , and contenders of various opinions took their salvation to be concerned in them . viii . those things must needs be uncertain to any man , as to a particular faith or knowledge , which are more in number than he may possibly have a distinct understanding of ; or can examine their evidence whether they be certain or not . for instance the roman faith containeth all the doctrinal decrees , and their religion also all the practical decrees of all the approved general councils , ( that is , of so much as pleased the pope , such power hath he to make his own religion . ) but these general councils ( added to all the bible , with all the apocrypha ) are so large , that it is not possible for most men to know what is in them . so that if the question be whether this or that doctrine be the word of god , and the proof of the affirmative is , because it is decreed by a general council , this must be uncertain to almost all men , who cannot tell whether it be so decreed or no : few priests themselves knowing all that is in all those councils : so that if they knew that all that is in the councils is gods word ; they know never the more whether this or that doctrine ( e. g. the immaculate conception of the virgin mary , &c. ) be the word of god. and if a heathen knew that all that is in the bible is the word of god , and knew not a word what is in it , would this make him a christian or saint him ? you may object , that most protestants also know not all that is in the scripture . ans . true ; nor any one . and therefore protestants say not that all that is in the scripture is necessary to be known to salvation , but they take their religion to have essential parts , and integral parts and accidents . and so they know how far each is necessary . but the papists deride this distinction , and because all truths are equally true , they would make men believe that all are equally fundamental or essential to christianity : but this is only when they dispute against us ; at other times they say otherwise themselves , when some other interest leads to it , and so cureth this impudency . it were worthy the enquiry whether a papist take all the bible to be gods word , and de fide , or only so much of it as is contained particularly in the decrees of councils ? if the latter , then none of the scripture was de fide , or to be particularly believed for above years , before the council of nice . if the former , then is it as necessary to salvation to know how old henoch was , as to know that jesus christ is our saviour ? ix . those things must needs be uncertain which depend upon such a number of various circumstances as cannot be certainly known themselves . for instance , the common rule by which the papist doctors do determine what particular knowledge and faith are necessary to salvation , is that so many truths are necessary as are sufficiently propounded to that person to be known and believed . but no man living , learned nor unlearned , can tell what is necessary to the sufficiency of this proposal . whether it be sufficient , if he be told it in his childhood only , and at what age ? or if he be told it but once , or twice , or thrice , or how oft ? whether by a parent or layman that can not tell him what is in the councils ? or by a priest that never read the councils ? and whether the variety of natural capacities , bodily temperaments , education and course of life before , do not make as great variety of proportions to be necessary to the sufficiency of this proposal ? and what mortal man can truly take the measure of them ? and how then can any man be certain what those points are which are necessary for him to believe ? x. those things are uncertain which depend upon an uncertain author or authority . for instance , the roman faith dependeth on the exposition of the scriptures by the consent of the fathers , and on the tradition of the church , and the decrees of an authorized council . and here is in all this , little but uncertainties . . it is utterly uncertain who are to be taken for fathers , and who not . whether origen , tatianus , arnobius , lactantius , tertullian , and many such , be fathers or not . whether such a man as theophilus alexandrinus , or chrysostom was the father , when they condemned each other . whether such as are justly suspected of heresy , ( as eusebius ) or such as the romanists have cast suspicions on ( as lucifer calaritanus called a heretick , socrates , sozomens falsly called novatians , hilary , arelatensis condemned by the pope leo , and claud. turovens . rupertus tuitiens . and such others . ) when the ancients renounced each others communion , ( as martin did by ithacius and idacius and their synod , ) when they describe one another as stark knaves , as socrates doth theophil . alexandrin . and sulpitius severus doth ithacius , which of them were the fathers . . how shall we know certainly which are the true uncorrupted writings of these fathers among so many forgeries and spurious scripts ? . how shall it be known what exposition the fathers consented on , when not one of a multitude , and but few in all have commented on any considerable parts of the scripture , and those few so much often differ ? . when in the doctrine of the trinity it self petavius largely proveth that most of the writers of the three first centuries after the apostles were unsound , and others confess the same about the millennium , the corporeity of angels and of the soul , and divers other things ; doth their consent bind us to believe them ? if not , how shall we know in what to believe their consent , according to this rule ? . and as to the church , they are utterly disagreed among themselves , what that church is which hath this authority . . whether the pope alone . . or the pope with a provincial council . . or the pope with a general council . . or a general council without the pope . . or the universality of pastors . . or the universality of the people with them . . and for a council . . there is no certainty what number of bishops , and what consent of the comprovincial clergy is necessary to make them the true representatives of any church . . and more uncertain in what council the bishops had such consent . . and uncertain whether the popes approbation be necessary . ( the great councils of constance and basil determining the contrary . ) . and uncertain which were truly approved . . and most certain that there never was any general council in the world ( unless you will call the apostles a general council ) but only general councils of the clergy of one empire ( with now and then a stragling neighbour , ) even as we have general assemblies and convocations in this kingdom : and who can be certain of that faith which dependeth upon all , or any of these uncertainties ? xi . that must needs be an uncertainty which dependeth on the unknown thoughts of another man. for instance , with the papists the priests intention , which is the secret of his heart , is necessary to the being of baptism , and transubstantiation . and so no man can be certain whether he or any other man be baptized or not . nor whether it be bread or christs body which he eateth . we confess that it is necessary to the being of a sacrament , that the minister do seem or profess to intend it as a sacrament ; but if the reality of his intent be necessary to the being of it , no man can be certain that ever he had a sacrament . xii . it is a hard thing to be certain on either side , in those controversies which have multitudes , and in a manner equal strength , of learned , judicious , well-studyed , godly , impartial men for each part . i deny not but one clear-headed man , may be certain of that which a multitude are uncertain of , and oppose him in . but it must not be ordinary men , but some rare illuminated person , that must get above a probability , unto a certainty , of that which such a company as aforesaid are of a contrary mind in . xiii . there is great uncertainty in matters of private impulse . when a man hath nothing to prove a thing to be gods will , but an inward perswasion or impulse in his own breast , let it never so vehemently incline him to think it true , it 's hard to be sure of it . for we know not how far satan or our own distempered phantasies may go . and most by far that pretend to this , do prove deceived . that which must be certain , must be somewhat equal to prophetical inspiration . which indeed is its own evidence : but what that is , no man can formally conceive but he that hath had it . therefore we are bid to try the spirits . xiv . it is a hard thing to gather certainties of doctrinal conclusion from gods providences alone . providential changes have their great use , as they are the fulfilling or execution of the word . but they that will take them instead of the scripture , do usually run into such mistakes , as are rectifyed to their cost , by some contrary work of providence ere long . these times have fully taught us this . xv. it is hard to gather doctrinal certainties from godly mens experiences alone . even our experimental philosophers and physicians find , that an experiment that hits oft-times , quite misseth afterwards on other subjects , and they know not why . a course of effects may oft come from unknown causes . and it 's no rare thing for the common prejudices , selfconceitedness , or corruption of the weaker and greater number of good people , which needeth great repentance and a cure , to be mistaken , for the communis sensus fidelium , the inclination and experience of the godly . especially when consent or the honour of their leaders or themselves hath engaged them in it . in my time , the common sense of the strictest sort was against long hair , and taking tobacco and other such things , which now their common practice is for . in one countrey the common consent of the strictest party is for arminianism . in another they are zealously against it . in poland where the socinians are for sitting at the sacrament , the godly are generally against it . in other places they are for it . in poland and bohemia where they had holy , humble , perswading bishops , the generality of the godly were for that episcopacy , as were all the ancient churches , even the novatians : but in other places it is otherwise . so that it 's hard to be certain of truth or error , good or evil , by the meer consent , opinion or experience of any . xvi . but the last and great instance is , that in the holy scriptures themselves , there is a great inequality in point of certainty , yea many parts of them have great uncertainty ; even these that follow . i. many hundred texts are uncertain through various readings in several copies of the original . i will not multiply them on capellus his opinion . though claud. saravius ( who got the book printed ) and other worthy men approve it . i had rather there were fewer varieties , and therefore had rather think there are fewer . but these that cannot be denied must not be denied : nor do i think it fit , to gather the discrepancies of every odd copy and call them various readings . ●ut it is past denial that the world hath no one ancient copy which must be the rule or test of all the rest , and that very many copies are of such equal credit , as that no man living can say that this , and not that where they differ hath the very words of the holy-ghost ; and that even in the new testament alone the differences or various readings , of which no man is able to say which is the right , are so great a number as i am not willing to give every reader an account of ; even those that are gathered by stephanus and junius and brugensis , and beza , if you leave out all the rest in the appendix to the polyglot bible . in all or most of which we are utterly uncertain which reading is gods word . ii. there are many hundred words in the scriptures that are ambiguous , signifying more things than one ; and the context in a multitude of places determineth not the proper sense ; so that you may with equal authority translate them either thus or thus : the margin of your bibles giveth you no small number of them . it must needs here be uncertain which of them is the word of god. iii. there are many hundred texts of scripture , where the phrase is general , and may be applyed to more particulars than one : in some places the several particulars must be taken as included in the general . ( and where there is no necessity , a general phrase should not be expounded as if it were particular . ) but in a multitude of texts the general is put for the particular , and must be interpreted , but of one sort , and yet the context giveth us no certain determination which particular is meant . this is one of the commonest uncertainties in all the scriptures . here it is gods will that we be uncertain . iv. in very many passages of the history of christ , the evangelists set both words and deeds in various orders , one sets this first , and another sets another first . ( as in the order of christs three temptations , mat. . and luk. . and many such like . ) though it is apparent that luke doth less observe the order than the rest , yet in many of these cases it is apparent that it was gods will to notifie to us the matter only , and not the order . and that it must needs be uncertain to us , which was first said or done , and which was last . the same is to be said of the time and place of some speeches of christ recorded by them . v. many of christs speeches are recorded by the evangelists in various words . even the lords prayer it self , mat. . and luk. . besides that matthew hath the doxology which luke hath not ( which grotius and many others think came out of the greek liturgy into the text. ) and even in christs sermon in the mount , and in his last commission to his disciples , mat. . , , . and mar. . now in some of these cases ( as of the lords prayer ) it is uncertain whether christ spake it once or twice : ( though the former is more likely . ) in most of them , it is plain that it was the will of gods spirit to give us the true sense of christs sayings in various words , and not all the very words themselves : for the evangelists that differ do neither of them speak falsly , and therefore meant not to recite all the very words : if you say that one giveth us the true words and another the true sense , we shall never be certain that this is so , nor which that one is . so that in such cases no man can possibly tell which of them were the very words of christ . vi. there are many texts of the old testament recited in the new , where it is uncertain whether that which the penman intended was an exposition or proof of what he said , or only an allusion to the phrase of speech , as if he should say , [ i may use such words to express my mind or the matter by . ] as matth. . . he shall be called a nazarene . so v. , . rom. . , , , . and others . i know the excellent junius in his parallels hath said much , and more than any other that i know , to prove them all , or almost all to be expository and probatory citations : but withal confessing that the generality of ancient and modern expositors think otherwise , he thereby sheweth a great uncertainty ; when he himself saith not that he is certain of it ; and few others thought it probable . vii . there are many texts cited in the new testament out of the septuagint , where it differeth from the hebrew : wherein it is utterly uncertain to us , whether christ and his apostles intended to justifie absolutely the translation which they use , or only to make use of it as that which then was known and used for the sake of the sense which it contained . if they absolutely justifie it , they seem to condemn the hebrew , so far as it differeth . if not , why do they use it , and never blame it ? it seemeth that christ would hereby tell us , that the sense is the gold , and the words but as the purse ; and we need not be over-curious about them , so we have the sence . as if i should use the vulgar latine , or the rhemists translation with the papist , because he will receive no other . viii . there are many aenigmatical and obscure expressions , which a few learned men only can probably conjecture at , & few or none be certain of the full sense . if any certainly understand much of the prophecies in daniel and the revelations , it must needs be very few : when calvin durst not meddle with the latter : and though most of the famous commentators on the revelations are such as have peculiarly made it their study , and set their minds upon it above all other things , and rejoiced in conceit that they had found out the true sense which others had overseen , ( as men do that seek the philosophers stone ) yet how few of all these are there that agree ? and if ten be of nine minds , eight of them at least are mistaken . franc. du jon , the lord napier , brightman , dent , mede , and my godly friend mr. stephens yet living , ( since dead , ) with many others , have studied it thus with extraordinary diligence , but with different successes : and lyra with other old ones turn all quite another way . and then come grotius and dr. hammond and contradict both sides , and make it all ( saving a few verses ) to have been fulfilled many ages since . and can the unlearned , or the unstudied part of ministers then , with any modesty pretend a certainty , where so many and such men differ ? i know it is said , blessed is he that readeth , and they that hear the words of this prophecy , and keep those things which are written therein : but that proveth no more than . that some of it ( as ch . , , . ) is plain and commonly intelligible . . that it is a desirable thing to understand the rest ; and worthy mens endeavour in due time and rank ; and he that can attain to certainty may be glad of it . i pass by the darkness of many types and prophecies of christ in the old testament , and how little the jews or the apostles themselves , till after christs resurrection , understood them . with very many other obscurities , which yet are not written in vain , nay , which make up the true perfection of the whole . ix . there are very many proverbial speeches in the scripture , which are not to be understood as the words properly signifie , but as the sense of those proverbs then was among the jews . but disuse hath so totally obliterated the knowledge of the sense of many of them , that no man living can certainly understand them . x. there are many texts which have words adapted to the places , the animals , the utensils , the customs , the coins , the measures , the vegetables , &c. of that place and time , which are some hard , and some impossible now to be certainly understood : and therefore such as bochart , salmasius , casaubone , scaliger , &c. have done well to add new light to our conjectures ; but leaving great uncertainty still . xi . because the jewish law is by paul plainly said to be ceased or done away , it remaineth very difficult to be certain of abundance of passages in the old testament , how far they are obligatory to us ? for when they now bind no otherwise than as the continued law of nature , or as reassumed by christ into his special law , where the latter is not found , in the former there is often insuperable difficulty . for most lyeth upon the proof of a parity of reason , which puts us upon trying cases hardly tryed , unless we knew more of the reason of all those laws . ( as about vows and dispensations , num. . about prohibited degrees of marriage , and such like ; which makes divines so much differ about the obligation of the judicials , ( of which see junius vol. . p. , &c. de polit. mos . observ . ) and about usury , priesthood , magistrates power in religion , and many such . xii . there are abundance of texts which only open the substance of the matter in hand to us , and say nothing about abundance of difficulties of the manner , and many circumstances , ( as the manner of the divine influx , and the spirits operation on the soul , &c. ) and here all that which is unrevealed must needs be unknown . xiii . there are many precepts which were local , personal , particular , and so temporary , and bind not universally all persons , at all times afterwards : such as the rechabites precepts from their father , and such as the love feasts , the kiss of love , womens veil and long hair , mens being uncovered , &c. now it is very hard to know in all instances whether the precepts were thus temporary or universal and durable : which makes divines differ about the anointing of the sick , the office of deacons and deaconesses , the power of bishops , and extent of their diocesses , the eating things strangled , and blood , ( against which chr. beckman in his exercit. hath abundance of shrewd arguments , though few are of his mind . ) in these cases few reach a certainty , and none so full a certainty as in plainer things . xiv . it is very hard to be certain when , and how far examples of holy men in scripture bind us : though i have elsewhere proved that wherever the apostles practice was the execution of their commission for setling church orders , in which christ promised them the help of his spirit , their practice was obligatory . yet in many instances the obligation of examples is very doubtful : which occasioneth the controversies about imitating john baptist's life in the wilderness , and anna , and about lent , and about baptizing by dipping over head , and about the lords supper , whether it should be administred to a family , or at evening only , or after supper , or sitting , or in a private house , &c. and about washing feet , and many church orders and affairs . xv. there are many things in scripture that are spoken but once or twice , and that but as on the by , and not very plainly : and we cannot be so certain of any doctrine founded on these , as on passages frequently and plainly written . xvi . there are so many seeming differences in scripture , especially about numbers , as that if they be reconcileable , few or none in the world have yet found out the way . if we mention them not our selves , such paultry fellows will do it , as bened. spinosa in his tractatus theolog. polit. i will not cite any , but desire the learned reader to consider well of what that learned and godly man , ludov. capellus saith in his critic . sacr. l. c. . and l. . c. , . ( i own not his supposition of a better hebrew copy used by the sept. ) i think an impartial considerer of his instances will confess , that as god never promised all or any of the scribes or printers of the bible any infallible spirit , that they should never write or print a word falsly , and as it is certain by the various lections that many such there have been in many and most books ; so there is no one scribe that had a promise above the rest , nor any one hebrew or greek copy which any man is sure is absolutely free from such miswritings . for how should we be sure of that one above all the rest ? and i wish the learned reader to consider bibliander's preface to his hebr. grammar , and casaubone's exercit. . § . and pellicanus his preface to his coment . on the bible . hierom on mic. . . is too gross , de matth. . quod testimonium nec haebraico nec interpretibus convenire , &c. let him read the rest that will , which is harsher ; he that will not confess miswritings of numbers , and some names and words heretofore , as well as some misprintings now , doth but by his pretended certainty tempt men to question the rest for the sake of that , and injureth the sacred word . xvii . we have not the same degree of certainty of the canonicalness or divineness of every book of scripture : though they are all gods word , they have not all the same evidence that they are so . the new testament had a fuller attestation from heaven for its evidence to man , than most of the old had . and of the new testament , it was long before many churches received the epist . to the hebrews , the second of peter , jude , revel . &c. even in eusebius days , in his praepar . evangel . he sheweth that they were not received by all . and of the old testament , moses , and the psalms and prophets have fuller attestation than the rest . and indeed , as it is probable that the chronicles were written in or after ezra's time at soonest , so they do in so many places differ in numbers from the book of kings , where all would agree with the rest of the history , if those numbers were but reduced to those in the kings , that if any man should doubt of the divine authority of that book , that thereby he may be the less tempted to question any others , i should not think his error inconsistent with salvation . put but that man to prove what he saith , who asserteth that we have equal evidence of the divinity of the chronicles , canticles , esther , as we have of moses , the prophets , the psalms , and the new testament , and you shall quickly find that he did but pretend an equal degree of certainty which indeed he had not . the papists pretend that they are as certain of the divinity of the apocrypha , as we are of the rest : but they do but pretend a certainty , for interest and custom sake . xviii . though it be to be held that certainly the holy writers had no falshoods in doctrine or history , but delivered us the truth alone , yet no one of them delivereth us all the truth , no not of many particular histories , and speeches of christ which they mention : and therefore we must set them altogether for the understanding of them : ( as in the instance of christs appearing and the angels speeches after his resurrection . ) and when all 's done we have not all that christ said and did , but all that was necessary to our faith and salvation . for as paul citeth christ , saying , it is more honourable to give , than to receive , so john tells us that the world could not contain the books that should be written , we must take heed therefore how far we go with negatives , of such unmentioned things . xix . though all that the holy writers have recorded is true , ( and no falshood in the scripture but what is from the error of scribes and translators ) yet we are not certain that the writers had not human infirmites in the phrase , method and manner of expression . it is apparent that their style , yea their gifts were various , as paul oft openeth them , cor. . &c. therefore paul rather than barnabas was the chief speaker . and apollo was more eloquent than others : hence some were of paul and some of apollo and some of cephas : and paul is put to vindicate his ministerial abilities to the corinthians . therefore though weaker mens gifts put no sinful imperfection into the scriptures , yet a humane natural imperfection of style , and order might be more in some than others . it is certain that they were not all perfect in knowledge and holiness . and how far every sermon which they preached was free from all that imperfection ( any more than peters carriage , gal. . ) we are uncertain . and how far their writings had a promise of being free from natural modal imperfections more than their preachings , we know not fully . and yet god turned this weakness of theirs to the confirmation of our faith ; shewing us that heavenly power , and not human wisdom and ability did his work . as davids sling in conquering goliath shewed gods power . and out of the mouths of babes doth god ordain strength , and the weak things of the world are used to confound the strong . xx. lastly , though all be certainly true which they have recorded , yet we have not the same degree of certainty , that no writer erred through lapse of memory in some less material passage , as we have that they infallibly delivered us the gospel . but this i have said so much of already in a small book called more reasons for the christian religion , that i must now refer you thither for the rest . q. but if there be so many things either uncertain or less-certain ▪ what is it that we are or may be fully certain of ? ans . . what you are or are not certain of your self , you should know if you know your self without my telling you . . i deny not but you may come to a certainty of all those things which are never so difficult , that have any ascertaining evidence ; if you live long enough , & study hard enough , and have an extraordinary measure of divine illumination : i do not measure others by my self : you may know that which i know not . god may bless your studies more , as being better men and fitter for his blessing : he may give you extraordinary inspirations , or revelations if he please . but i am thankful for my low degree , and confess my ignorance . . but i have told you before what certainties we have . . we are certain of things sensible . . and of our elicite and imperate acts . . and of natural principles . . and of clear inferences thence . . and of the truth of all the certain holy scriptures which are evidently the word of god . and particularly therein of the plain historical parts . . and of all that which is the main design and scope of the text in any book or chapter . . and of all that which is purposely and often repeated , and not only obscurely once spoken on the by . . therefore we may be certain of all that is necessary to salvation : of every article of the creed ; of every petition in the lords prayer , and every necessary common duty : we may be certain of the truth and sense of all the covenant of grace concerning the father , son , and holy ghost , his relation to us , and our relation and duty to him , and of the benefits of the covenant ; of the necessity and nature of faith , repentance , hope , love , obedience , patience , &c. it 's tedious to recite all , in a word , all that is of common necessity , and all ( how small soever ) which is plainly revealed and expressed . . and you may be certain of the fulfilling of much of this holy word already by sufficient history and experience . chap. . inference . the true reason and usefulness of the christian simplicity , in differencing the covenant , and principles of religion from the rest of the holy scriptures . it hath ever been the use of the church of god , to catechise men before they were baptized ; and therein to teach them the true meaning of the baptismal covenant , by opening to them the creed , the lords prayer , and the decalogue : and when they understood this covenant they were admitted ( upon consent ) by baptism into the church , and accounted christians and members of christ , without staying to teach them any other part of the bible , no not so much as the sacrament of the lords supper . ( though indeed the opening of baptism was the opening of the life of that . because it is the same covenant which is solemnized in both . by doing thus the church notoriously declared that they took not all the scripture to be equally necessary to be understood ; but that the govenant of grace , and the catechism explaining it , is the gospel it self , that is , the essence of it , and of the christian religion , and that all the rest of the scriptures contain but partly the integrals , and partly the accidents of that religion . he is the wisest man that knoweth most and best ; and every man should know as much of the scriptures as he can : but if you knew all the rest , without this ( the covenant of grace , and its explication ) it would not make you christians or save you . but if you know this ( truly ) without all the rest , it will. the whole scripture is of great use and benefit to the church . it is like the body of a man ; which hath its head , and heart , and stomach , &c. and hath also fingers , and toes , and flesh ; yea nails and hair. and yet the brain and heart it self fare the better for the rest , and would not be so well seated separate from them : though a man may be a man that loseth even a leg or arm. so is it here . but it is the covenant that is our christianity and the duly baptized are christians , whatever else they do not understand . these are the things that all must know , and daily live upon . the creed is but the exposition of the three articles of the baptismal covenant . [ i believe in god , the father , son and holy ghost . ] though the jews that had been bred up to a preparing knowledge , were quickly baptized by the apostles upon their conversion , acts . yet no man can imagine that either the apostles or other ministers did use to admit the ignorant gentiles into the covenant of god , without opening the meaning of it to them ; or baptize them as christians without teaching them what christianity is . therefore reason and the whole churches subsequent custom assure us that the apostles used to expound the three great articles to their catechumens ; and thence it is called , the apostles creed . marcus bishop of ephesus told them in the florentine council ( as you may see sgyropilus ) that we have none of the apostles creed : and vossius de symbolis ( besides many others ) hath many arguments to prove that this so called was not formally made by the apostles . bishop usher hath opened the changes that have been in it . sandford and parker have largely ( de descensu ) shewed how it came in as an exposition of the baptismal articles . others stifly maintain that the apostles made it . but the case seemeth plain . the apostles used to call the baptized to the profession of the same articles ( which paul hath in . cor. . , , , &c. ) and varied not the matter . all this was but more particularly to profess faith in god the father , son and holy ghost . two or three further expository articles are put into the creed since : otherwise it is the same which the apostles used ; not in the very syllables , or forms of words ; but in the same sense , and the words indeed being left free , but seldom much altered , because of the danger of altering the matter . of all the antientest writers , not one repeateth the creed in the same words that we have it ; nor any two of them in the same with one another . irenaeus once , tertullian twice hath it , all in various words , but the same sense . that of marcellus in epiphanius cometh nearest ours called the apostles , and is almost it . afterward in ruffinus and others we have more of it . yet no doubt but the western churches ( at least ) used it with little variation still . the nicene creed is called by some antients the apostles creed too . and both were so ; for both are the same in sense and substance : for it is not the very words that are truly fathered on the apostles . about ● years a go mr. ashwel having published a book for the necessity and honour of the creed , i wrote in the postscript to my reformed pastor , ed. . a corrective of some ▪ passages , in which he seemeth to say too much for it , or at least to depress the scripture too much in comparison of it . but long experience now telleth me , that i have more need to acquaint men with the reasons and necessity of the creed : seeing i find a great part of ignorant religious people much to slight the use of it , and say , it is not scripture , but the work of man : especially taking offence at the harsh translati●n of that article , [ he descended into hell. ] which from the beginning it 's like was not in . it is the kernel of the scripture ; and it is that for which the rest of the scripture is given us , even to afford us sufficient help to understand and consent to the covenant of grace , that our belief , our desires , and our practice may be conformed principally to these summaries . it is not every child or woman that could have gathered the essential articles by themselves out of the whole scripture , if it had not been done to their hands : nor that could have rightly methodized the rule of our desires , or gathered the just heads of natural duty , if christ had not done the first in the lords prayer , and god the second in the decalogue . obj. but i believe these only , because the matter of the creed , and the words also of the other two are in the scripture , and not on any other authority . ans . if you speak of the authority of the author , which giveth them their truth , it is neither scripture nor tradition , but god , for whose authority we must believe both scripture and them . but if you speak of the authority of the deliverers , and the evidence of the delivery , be it known to you , . that the creed , lords prayer , decalogue , and the baptismal covenant have been delivered down to the church from the apostles by a distinct tradition , besides the scripture tradition . even to all the christians one by one that were baptized , and admitted to the lords table , and to every particular church . so that there was not a christian or church that was not even constituted by them . . be it known to you , that the church was long in possession of them , before it had the scriptures of the new testament . it 's supposed to be about eight years after christ's ascension before matthew wrote the first book of the new testament , and near the year of our lord one hundred , before the revelation was written . and do you think that there were no christians or churches all that while ? or that there was no baptism ? or no profession of the christian faith in distinct articles ? no knowledge of the lords prayer and commandements ? no gospel daily preached and practised ? what did the church-assemblies think you , do all those years ? no doubt , those that had inspiration used it by extraordinary gifts : but that was not all . those that had not did preach the substance of the christian religion contained in these forms , and did pray and praise god , and celebrate the lords supper , provoking one another to love and to good works . . be it known to you that these three summaries come to us with fuller evidence of certain tradition from god , than the rest of the holy scriptures . though they are equally true , they are not equally evident to us . and this i thus prove . . the body of the scriptures were delivered but one way ; but the covenant , creed , lords prayer and decalogue , are delivered two ways . they are in the scripture , and so have all the evidence of tradition which the scriptures have . and they were besides that delivered to the memories of all christians . if you say that the creed is not in the scripture , or that the scripture is not altered as it is ; i answer , . that it is in the scripture as to the matter signified in as plain words , even of the same signification . . there is no alteration made , but a small addition , which is no disparagement to it , because the ancient substance of it is still known , and the additions are not new made things , but taken out of scripture . and if yet any heretick should deny that god is wise and good , and just and merciful , it were no dishonour to the creed nor weakening of its certainty to have these attributes yet added to it . . these summaries , as is said , were far ancienter than the rest of the new testament , as written and known , and used long before them . . these summaries being in every christians mind and memory were faster held , than the rest of the scriptures . therefore parents could and did teach them more to their children . you never read that the catechizers of the people did teach them all the bible , nor equally ask them who jared , or mehaleel or lamech was , as they did who christ was . nor put every history into the catechism , but only the historical articles of the creed . . therefore it was far easier to preserve the purity of these summaries , than of the whole body of the scriptures : for that which is in every mans memory , cannot be altered without a multitude of reprovers : which makes the greeks since photius keep such a stir about [ filioque , ] as to think that the latines have changed religion , and deserved to be separated from , for changing that word . but no wonder that many hundred various readings are crept into the bible , and whole verses and histories ( as that of the adulterous woman , ) are out in some that are in others . for it is harder to keep such a volume uncorrupt than a few words . though writing as such is a surer way than memory , and the whole bible could never have been preserved by memory . yet a few words might , especially when they had those words in writings also . . add to this , that the catechistical summaries aforesaid , were more frequently repeated to the people , at least every lords day . whereas in the reading of the scriptures , one passage will be read but seldom , perhaps once or twice in a year . and so a corruption not so easily observed . . and if among an hundred copies : of the scripture ten or twenty only should by the carelesness of the scribes be corrupted , all the rest who saw not these copies would not know it , and so they might fall into the hands of posterity , when many of the sounder might be lost . . and lastly , the danger of depravation had no end . for in every age the scripture must be written over anew , for every church and person that would use it . and who that knoweth what writing is , could expect that one copy could be written without errors , and that the second should not add to the errors of the st , as printers now do , who print by faulty copies . and though this danger is much less since printing came up , that is but lately . and the mischiefs of wars and heretical tyrants burning the truest copies , hath been some disadvantage to us . obj. thus you seem to weaken the certain incorruption of the scriptures . ans . no such thing : i do but tell you the case truly as it is . the wonderful providence of god , and care of christians hath so preserved them , that there is nothing corrupted which should make one article of faith the more doubtful . i assert no more depravation in them than all confess ; but only tell you how it came to pass , and tell you the greater certainty that we have of the essentials of religion than of the rest . and whereas every man of brains confesseth that many hundred words in scripture ( by variety of copies ) are uncertain , i only say , that : it is not so in the essentials . and i do not wonder that virgil , ovid , horace , cicero , &c. have not suffered such depravations . for , . it is not so easy for a scribes error to pass unseen in oratione ligata as in oratione soluta , in verse as in prose . . and cicero with the rest was almost only in the hands of learned men ; whereas the scriptures were in the hands of all the vulgar , women and children . . and the copies of these authors were comparatively but few : whereas every one almost got copies of the scripture that was able . and it 's liker that some depravation should be found among ten thousand copies than among a hundred . so that i have proved to you that the creed , lords prayer , commandments and covenant of baptism are not to be believed only because they are in the scripture , but also because they have been delivered to us by tradition , and so we have them from two hands as it were , or ways of conveyance , and the rest of the scriptures but by one , for the most part . i will say yet more , because it is true , and needful . if any live among papists , that keep the scripture from the people , or among the poor greeks , armenians or abassines where the people neither have bibles commonly , nor can read , or if any among us that cannot read , know not what is in the bible ; yea if through the fault of the priest , any should be kept from knowing that ever there was a bible in the world : yet if those persons by tradition receive the baptismal covenant , the creed , lords prayer , and commandments as gods word , and truly believe , and love and practice them , those persons shall be saved . for they have christs promise for it . and the very covenant itself is the gift of christ and life to consenters . whereas he that knoweth all the scripture can be saved only by consenting to and performing this same covenant . but having greater helps to understand it , and so to believe it and consent , he hath a great advantage of them that have not the scripture ; and so the scripture is an unspeakable mercy to the church . and it is so far from being too little without the supplement of the papists traditions and councils , as that the hundredth part of it as to the bulk of words , is not absolutely it self of necessity to salvation . yet i say more ; if a man that hath the scripture should doubt of some books of it , whether they be the word of god ) as of ruth , judges , joshua , chronicles , &c. ) yea if he doubted of all the old testament , and much of the new ; yet if he believe so much as containeth all the covenant of grace , and the foresaid summaries , though he sin , and lose much of his helps , yet he may and will be saved , if he sincerely receive but this much . the reason is before given . though no man can believe any thing truly who believeth not all that he knoweth to be gods word , yet a man may doubt whether one thing be gods word , who doubteth not of another , by several occasions . and here you see the reason why a particular or explicite belief of all the scripture it self , was never required of all that are baptized , nor of all or any man that entered into the ministry . for the wisest doctor in the world doth not attain so high . for no man hath a particular explicite belief of that which he doth not understand . for it is the matter or sence that we believe : and we must first know what that sence is before we can believe it to be true . and no man in the world understandeth all the scripture . yea more , it is too much to require as necessary to his ministry , a subscription in general that he implicitely believeth all that is in that bible which you shall shew him . for . many faults may be in the translation , if it be a translation . . many errors may be in the copy , as aforesaid . nay such a subscription should not , as absolutely necessary , be required of him as to all the real word of god. for if the man by error should doubt whether job or the chronicles or esther were canonical , and none of the rest , i would not be he that should therefore forbid him to preach christs gospel . i am sure the ancient church imposed no such terms on their pastors , when part of the new testament was so long doubted of ; and when some were chosen bishops before they were baptized ; and when synesius was chosen a bishop before he believed the resurrection . i would not have silenced luther , althamer or others that questioned the epistle of james . what then shall we say of the roman insolence , which thinketh not all the scripture big enough , but ministers must also subscribe to many additions of their own , yea and swear to traditions and the expositions of the fathers , and take whole volumes of councils for their religion ? no wonder if such men do tear the churches of christ in pieces . . by this time i hope you see to what use baptism and the summaries of religion are . . and of how great use catechizing is . . and that christianity hath its essential parts . . and how plain and simple a thing true christianity is which constituteth the church of christ ; and how few things as to knowledge are necessary to make a man a christian , or to salvation . multitudes of opinions have been the means of turning pastors and people from the holy and diligent improvement of these few truths in our practice , where we have much to do which might take up all our minds and time . chap. viii . inference . of the use of catechizing . though it be spoken to in what is said , i would have you more distinctly here note the use of catechizing . . it collecteth those few things out of many , which the ignorant could not themselves collect . . it collecteth those necessary things , which all must know and believe that will be saved . . it containeth those great practical things , which we have daily use for , and must still live upon ; which are as bread and drink for our food . other things may be well added ; the more the better , which god hath revealed . but our life and our comfort and our hope is in these . . and it giveth us the true method or order of holy truths : which is a great advantage to understand them . not but that the things themselves have the same orderly respect to one another in the scripture , but they are not delivered in the same order of words . therefore . catechisms should be very skilfully and carefully made . the true fundamental catechism is nothing else but the baptismal sacramental covenant , the creed , the lords prayer and the commandments , the summaries of our belief , desires and practice . and our secondary catechism must be nothing else , but the plain expositions of these : the first is a divine catechism : the second is a ministerial expository catechism . and here . o that ministers would be wiser at last , than to put their superfluities , their controversies , and private opinions into their catechisms ? and would fit them to the true end , and not to the interest of their several sects . but the roman-trent catechism ( and many more of theirs ) must needs be defiled with their trash , and every sect else must put their singularities into their catechisms ; so hard is it for the aged decrepit body of the diseased church ( for want of a better concoction of the common essentials of christianity ) to be free from these heaps of inconcocted crudities , and excrementitious superfluities , and the many maladies bred thereby . i deny not but a useful controversie may be opened by way of question and answer . but pretend it not then to be what it is not , milk for babes . him that is weak in the faith receive , but not to doubtful disputations . the servant of the lord must be apt to teach , but must not strive . . and it is not commonly believed , how great skill is needful to make a catechism , that the method may be true , and that it may neither be too long for the memory , nor too short for the understanding , for my part , it is the hardest work save one ( which is the full methodizing and explaining the whole body of divinity ) that ever i put my hand to ; and when all 's done , i cannot satisfy my self in it . ii. why is not catechizing more used , both by pastors and parents ? i mean not the bare words unexplained without the sence , nor the sence in a meer rambling way without a form of words . but the words explained . o how much fruit would poor souls and all the church receive , by the faithful performance of this work , would god but cure the prophaneness and sloth of unfaithful pastors and parents which should do it . but i have said so much of this in my reformed pastor , that i may well forbear more here . chap. ix . inference . the true preservative of puzled christians , from the errours of false teachers , who vehemently sollicite them to their several parties . it is the common out-cry of the world. how shall we know which side to be on ? and who is in the right among so many who all with confidence pretend to be in the right ? ans . your preservative is obvious and easie : but men usually bestow more labour and cost for error and hell , than for truth and heaven . pretend not to faith or knowledge before you have it , and you are the more safe . suspend your judgments till you have true evidence to establish them . . it is only christians that i am now instructing : and if you are christians you have already received the essentials of christianity even the baptismal covenant , the creed , the lords prayer and decalogue . and i need not tell you that moreover you must receive all those truths in nature , and scripture which are so plain that all these dissenting sects of christians are agreed in them . and when you have all these , and faithfully love and practice them , you are sure to be saved , if you do not afterward receive some contrary doctrine which destroyeth them . mark then which is the safe religion . as sure as the gospel is true , he that is meet for baptism before god , is meet for pardon of sin , and he that truely consenteth to the baptismal covenant , and so doth dedicate himself to god , is made a member of christ , and is justified , and an heir of heaven . your church catechism saith truly of all such , that in baptism each one is made , a member of christ , a child of god , and an heir of heaven . so that as sure as the gospel is true , every true baptized christian whose love and life doth answer that faith , shall certainly be saved . ask all parties , and few of them but impudent designers can deny this . well then , the baptismal covenant expounded in the creed , lords prayer and commandments is your christian religion . as a christian you may and shall be saved : that a true christian is saved all confess . but whether a papist be saved is questioned by the protestants ; and so is the salvation of many other sects by others . you are safe then if you take in nothing to endanger you . and is it not wisdom then to take heed how you go further , and on what grounds , lest you over-run your safe religion . obj. but then i must not be a protestant : for the papists say that they cannot be saved . ans . a protestant is either one that holdeth to the ancient simple christianity without the papists manifold additions : or one that positively also renounceth and opposeth those additions . in the first sense , a protestant and a meer christian is all one ; and so to say that a protestant cannot be saved is to say that a christian as such cannot be saved . if it be the meer name of a protestant that the papist accounteth damnable , tell him that you will not stick with him for the name : you are contented with the old name of christian alone . but protestantism in the second sense is not your religion , but the defensative of your religion ; as flying from the plague is not my humanity or life , but a means to preserve it . and so protestants are of many sizes : some oppose some points , and some others , some more , some less , which the papists have brought in : and yet they are not of so many religions . but whoever condemneth you , if christ save you , he doth but condemn himself as uncharitable . christianity is certainly a state of salvation ; but whether popery be , or whether the greek opinions be , or whether this or that difference and singularity stand with salvation , is the doubt . cast not your self then needlesly into doubt and danger . obj. but then you will have us be still but infants , and to learn no more than our catechisms , and not to learn and believe all that god hath revealed in his word . ans . no such matter . this is the sum of what i advise you to . . hold fast to your simple christianity as the certain terms of salvation . . receive nothing that is against it . . learn as much more as ever you can . . but take not mens words , nor their plausible talk for certifying evidence : and do not think if you believe a priest , that this is believing god , nor if his reasons seem plausible to you , and you are of his opinion , that this is divine knowledge . if you do incline to one mans opinion more than another , tell him that you incline to his opinion , but tell him that you take not this for divine knowledge or any part of your religion . if you will needs believe one side rather than another , about church history , or the matters of their parties interest , tell them , i believe you as fallible men ; but this is none of my divine faith or religion . to learn to know , is to learn scientifical evidence , and not to learn what is another mans opinions ; nor whether they are probable or not ; much less to read a councils decrees , or the propositions of a disputing systeme , and then for the mens sake , to say , this is orthodox : nor yet because it hath a taking aspect . to learn of a priest to believe god is one thing ; and to believe him , or his party , church or council is another thing . learn to know as much as you can ; and especially to know what god hath revealed to be believed : and learn to believe god as much as you can : and believe all your teachers and all other men , as far as they are credible in that case , with such a humane belief as fallible men may justly require . and where contenders do consent , suspect them the less . but where they give one another the lie in matters of fact , try both their evidences of credibility before you trust them ▪ and then trust them not beyond that evidence . but still difference your divine faith and religion from your opinion and humane faith. and let men sollicite you never so long ; take not on you to know or believe till you do ; that is , not beyond the evidence . i do but perswade you against presumption and hypocrisie . shall i say , suspend till you have true evidence , and you are safe ? why if you do not , you will know never the more , nor have ever the more divine faith : for i can mean no more than suspend your presumptions , and do not foolishly or hypocritically take on you to know what you do not , or to have a faith which you have not . if you can know truly , do it with fidelity , and be true to the truth , whoever offer it , or whatever it cost you . but suspend your profession or hasty opinions and conceits of what you know not . obj. but every side almost tells me that i am damned if i do not believe as they do ? ans . . by that you may see that they are all deceived at least save one ( which ever it be ) while they differ , and yet condemn each other . . thereby they do but give you the greater cause to suspect them . for by this shall all men know christs disciples , if they love one another . right christians are not many masters , as knowing that themselves shall have the greater condemnation else ; for in many things we offend all . and the wisdom which hath envy and strife is not from above , but from beneath , and is earthly , sensual and devilish , introducing confusion and every evil work , jam. . , , . christs disciples judge not , lest they be judged . . by this you may see that unless you can be of all mens minds , you must be damned by the censures of many . and if you can bear it from all the sects save one , why not from that one also ? . but i pray you ask these damning sectaries , is it believing your word , and being of your opinion that will save me ? or must i also know by scientifical evidence that you say true , and that god himself hath said what you say ? if he say that believing him and his party ( though he call it the church ) is enough to save you , you have then less reason to believe him : for unless he can undertake himself to save you , he cannot undertake that believing him shall save you ? if he say , god hath promised to save you if you believe me , believe that when he hath proved it to you . but if it be knowledge and divine faith which he saith must save you , it is not your believing his word or opinion that will help you to that . i would tell such a man , help me to knowledge and faith , by cogent or certifying evidence , and i will learn , and thank you with all my heart . but till i have it , it is but mocking my self and you to say that i have it . obj. but the papists herein differ from all other sects : for they will say , that if i believe the church concerning divine revelations , and take all for divine revelation which the church saith is so , and so believe it , then i have a divine faith. ans . . and is this to you a certifying evidence that indeed god revealed it , because their church saith so ? if their church agree with greeks , armenians , syrians , copties , abassines , protestants , and all other christian churches , then it will be no part of the contest in question ; and it is a stronger foundation of the two , to believe it , because all say it , than because they say it . but if they differ from the rest , know their proof that their church can tell gods mind , and not the rest of the christian world. and that about a third part of the christians in the world have such a promise , which all the rest have not . . and how doth their church know that it is gods word ? is it by any certifying evidence , or by prophetical inspiration ? if by evidence , let it be produced ? is it not revealed to others as well as to them ? must not we have a faith of the same kind as the church hath ? if so , we must believe by the same evidence as that church believeth . and what is that ? it is not their own words : doth a pope believe himself only ? or a council believe themselves only ? or hath god said , you shall be saved if you will believe your selves , and believe that i have said all that you say i have said ? where is there such a promise ? but if pope and council be not saved for believing themselves , how shall i know that i shall be saved for believing them , and that one kind of faith saveth me , and another them . i ask it of each particular bishop in that council , is he saved for believing himself or the rest ? if no man be saved for believing himself , why should another be saved for believing him ? and the faith of the council is but the faith of the individual members set together . obj. but they are saved for believing themselves as consenters , and not singly . ans . all consenters know nothing , as consenters , but what they know as individuals . and what is the evidence by which they know , and are brought to consent ? must not that evidence convince us also ? obj. but the present church are saved for believing not themselves but the former church . ans . then so must we : it is not the present church then that i must believe by a saving faith : but why then was the last age saved , and so the former ? and so on to the first ? is any thing more evident than that all men must be saved for believing god ? and that his word must be known to be his word , by the same evidence by one man and another ? and that evidence i have proved in several treatises to be another kind of thing , than the decree of a pope and his council . but if it be not evidence , but prophetical inspiration and revelation by which the council or church knoweth gods word , i will believe them when by miracles or otherwise they prove themselves to be true prophets ; till then , i shall take them for phanaticks , and hear them as i do the quakers . should i here stay to bid you ask them , as before , how you shall be sure that their council was truly general , and more authentick and infallible than the second at ephesus , or that at ariminum , or that at constance and basil , &c. and whether the more general dissent of all the other christians from them be not of as great authority as they that are the smaller part ? and how you shall be sure of that ? and also how but on the word of a priest you can know all that the church hath determined ? with abundance such questions , of the meaning of each council , the ambiguity of words , the errour of printers , the forgery of publishers , &c. i should help you to see , that saying as a priest saith , is not knowing the thing , nor believing god. stop therefore till you have evidence : follow no party as a party in the dark : or if probability incline you more to them than to others , call not this certainty , religion , divine faith. thus your faith will be faith indeed , and you will escape all that would corrupt and frustrate it . the business is great . god requireth you to refuse no light : but withal he chargeth you to believe no falshood , nor put darkness for light : much less to father mens lies , or errours , or conceits on god , and to lay your salvation on it , that they are all god's word . how dreadful a thing is this if it prove false ! is it not blaspheming god ? no man in his wits then but a partial designer can look that you should make haste , or go any further than you have assuring or convincing evidence : if you know that any sect doth err , you need no preservative : if you do not , tell them , i am ignorant of this matter , i will learn as fast as i can ; not neglecting greater matters ; and i will be neither for you , nor against you , further than i can know . and as to the former objection , of being still infants , i further answer , that as feigned knowledge is no knowledge ; so manhood consisteth not in being of many uncertain opinions , no not so much in knowing many little controverted things , as in getting a clearer , more affecting powerful practical knowledge and belief of our christianity , and the great and sure things which we know already ; and in love and obedience practising of them . he is the strongest christian who loveth god best , and hath most holiness ; and he knoweth god better than any others do . by this much you may see that the world is full of counterfeit faith , and knowledge , and religion ; even fancy and belief of men , and their own opinions , which go under these names . one turneth an anabaptist , and another a separatist , and another an antinomian , and another a pelagian , and another a papist , when if you try them you shall find that they neither understand what they turn to , nor what they are against : they do but turn to his side who hath the best advantage to perswade them , either by insinuating into their affections , or by plausible reasonings ; they talk for one doctrine , and against another , when they understand neither ; much less discern true evidence of their truth . and as for the papists , what wonder is it , when their religion is to believe as the church believeth ? and what the church believeth , they know not perhaps but by believing a priest : and then though they know not what the church believeth , some say they are catholicks , and others that this implicite faith is that in the virtue of which all the explicite must proceed . and if god may but be allowed to be equal herein with their church , and so that all should be saved who implicitely believe that all that he saith is true , though they know not what he saith at all , then i think few infidels would perish , that believe there is a god. reader i advise thee therefore as thou lovest thy soul , . not to neglect or delay any true knowledge that thou canst attain . . but not to be rash and hasty in judging . . nor to take shews and mens opinions , or any thing below a certifying or notifying evidence of truth , to make up thy christian faith and knowledge . . and till thou see such certain evidence , suspend , and tell them that sollicite thee that thou understandest not the matter , and that thou art neither for them nor against them ; but wilt yield as soon as truth doth certainly appear to thee . if an anabaptist perswade thee , yield to him as soon as thou art sure that god would not have believers children now to be infant-members of his church , as well as they were before christs coming ; and that the infants of believing jews were cut off from their church state ; and that there is any way besides baptism appointed by christ , for the solemn initiating of church-members with the rest which in my treat . of baptism i have produced . if thou art sollicited to renounce communion with other churches of christ as unlawful , either because they use the common prayer and ceremonies , or because that ministers are faulty ( if tolerable ) or the people undisciplined , before thou venture thy soul upon an uncharitable and dividing principle , make sure first that christ hath commanded it . try whether thou art sure that christ sinned by communicating ordinarily with the jewish church and synagogues , when the corruption of priests , people and worship was so much worse than ours ? or whether that be now a sin to us , which ( in the general ) christ did then . and whether pauls compliance , and his precept , rom. . and . was an error ; and peters separation , gal. . was not rather to be blamed . with much more the like . are you sure that notwithstanding all this , god would have you avoid communion with the churches that in such forms and orders differ from you ? so if a papist sollicite you , yield to him as soon as you are certain that the church is the body or church of the pope , and that none are christians that are not subject to him , and that therefore three or two parts of all the christian world are unchristened ; and that when the roman emperor made patriarchs in his own dominion only , and there only called general councils , all the world must now take such as the churches heads , and must be their subjects : when you can be sure that all the senses of all the sound men in the world , are by a constant miracle deceived , in taking the consecrated bread and wine , to be bread and wine indeed , and that it is none : and that the bread only without the cup must be used , though christs command be equal for both : when you are certain , truly certain of these and many other such things , then turn papist . if you do it sooner , you betray your souls by pretending to know and believe gods word , when you do but believe and imbody with a faction . chap. x. inference . what is the great plague and divider of the christian world. falsely pretended knowledge and faith , are the great plague and dividers of the christian world . i. as to the number of articles , and opinions , and precepts , what abundance of things go with many for certain truth of which no mortal man hath certainty ! and abundance which some few rare wits may know , must go for evident certainties to all . it is not only our philosophy books , nor only our philosophical schoolmens books , which are guilty of this . there is some modesty in their videtur's : and indeed , if they would not pretend to certainty , but profess only to write for the sport and exercise of wit , without condemning those that differ from them , a man might fetch many a pleasant vagari , if not in an over subtile cajetane ( who so oft feigneth notions and distinctions ) yet in a scotus , ockam , ariminensis , with abundance of their disciples , and in thomas and many of his learned followers . but their successors can hardly forbear hereticating one another . how many such a wound hath poor durandus suffered ? from many for his doctrine of concurse ; and by others for his pretty device to save the credit of our senses in transubstantiation , ( that there is still the matter of bread , but not the form , as being informed by the soul of christ , as digested bread in us is turned to flesh . ) which saith bellarmine is an heresy , but durandus no heretick , because he was ready to be taught of the church . but no where do these stinging hornets so swarm as in the councils and the canon law : so that saith the preface to the reformatio legum ecclesiast . edw. . ( john fox . ) in quo ipso jure , neque ullum modum tenet illius impudentia , quin leges legibus , decreta decretis , aciis insuper decretalia , aliis alia , atque item alia accumulet , nec ullum pene statuit cumulandi finem , donec tandem suis clementinis , sixtinis , intra & extravagantibus , constitutionibus provincialibus & synodalibus , paleis , glossulis , sententiis , capitulis , summariis rescriptis , breviculis , casibus longis & brevibus , ac infinitis rhapsodiis adeo orbem confarcinavit , ut atlas mons quo sustineri coelum dicitur , huic si imponeretur oneri , vix ferendo sufficeret . which made these two kings , ( h. . and edw. . ) appoint that compendium of ecclesiastical laws as their own , k. h. first abolishing the popes laws ( whatever some say to the contrary ) his words being . [ hajus potestatem huic cum divino munere sublatam esse manifestum est , ut quid superesset , quo non plane fractam illius vim esse constaret , leges omnes , decreta atque instituta , quae ab authore episcopo romano profecta sunt prorsus abroganda censuimus . ] is it possible that all the clergy and nobles of the roman kingdom , can be so ignorant of their own and other mens ignorance , as to take all the decrees of the huge volumes of their councils for certain truths ? either they were certain in their evidence of truth , before they decreed them , or not : if they were so , . how came the debates in the councils about them to be so hard , and so many to be dissenters as in many of them there were . i know where arrians or other hereticks make up much of the council , it is no wonder : but are the certainties of faith so uncertain to catholick bishops , that a great part of them know not certain truths till the majority of votes have told them they are certain . have the poor dissenting-bishops in council nothing of certainty on which their own and all the poor peoples faith and salvation must depend , but only this , that they are over-voted ? as if the dissenters in the council of trent should say , we thought beforehand the contrary had been true ; but now the italian bishops being so numerous as to over-vote us , we will lay our own and all mens salvation on it , that we were deceived , though we have no other reason to think so . o noble faith and certainty ! it 's possible one or two or three poor silly prelates may turn the scales and make up a majority , though as learned men as jansenius , cusanus or gerson were on the other side . and if the jansenists articles were condemned , or cusanus his antipapal doctrine , lib. de concordia , or gersons for the supremacy of councils and de auferibilitate papae , they must presently believe that they were certainly deceived . but what 's become then of the contrary evidence which appeared before to these dissenters ? as suppose it were in the council of basil about the immaculate conception of mary , or the question whether the authority of the pope or council be greatest , decided there , and at constance , and whereof at trent the emperor and the french were of one opinion , and the pope of another : was it evidently true before , which is made false after by a majority of votes ? . and if all these decreed things were evident truths before the said decrees , why have we not those antecedent evidences presented to us , to convince us ? . but if they were not evident truths before , what made those prelates conclude them for truths ? did they know them to be such without evidence ? this is grosser than a presumptuous mans believing that he shall be saved because he believeth it ; or their doctrine that teach men to believe the thing is true ( that christ died for them ) that thereby they may make it true ; as if the object must come after the act . for then these prelates do decree that to be true , which before was false ( for ex-natura rei , one party had evidence of its falshood ) that so they might make it true , by decreeing that it is so ▪ a man might lawfully have believed his own and other mens senses , that bread is bread , till the council at lateran sub innoc. . decreed transubstantiation . and o what a change did that council make ! all christ's miracles were not comparable to it , if its decrees be true . from that day to this , we must renounce sense , and yet believe ; we must believe that by constant miracles all christians senses are deceived : and so that this is the difference between christians , and infidels , and heathens , that our religion deceiveth all mens senses ( even heathens and all , if they see our sacrament , ) and their religion deceiveth no mans senses , saith the grave author of the history of the trent council ( ed. engl. p. . ) [ a better mystery was never found , than to use religion to make men insensible . ] and what is the omnipotent power that doth this ? such a convention as that of trent , while with our worcester pate , and olaus magnus , they made up a great while two and forty things called bishops : and after such a pack of beardless boys , and ignorant fellows , created by , and enslaved to the pope , as dudithius quinqueccles . one of the council describeth to the emperour ; and which bishop jewel in his letter to seign . scipio saith , he took for no council , called by no just authority , &c. where were neither the patriarchs of constantinople , alexandria , or antioch , nor abassines , nor graecians , armenians , persians , egyptians , moors , syrians , indians , nor muscovites , nor protestants , pag. , . for , saith he after , pag. . [ now-a-days ( merciful god! ) the intent or scope of councils is not to discover truth , or to confute falshood : for these latter ages , this hath been the only endeavour of the popes to establish the roman tyranny ; to set wars on foot , to set christian princes together by the ears , to raise money — to be cast into some few bellies for gluttony and lust : and this hath been the only cause or course of councils for some ages last past . ] so here . and can the vote of a few such fellows oblige all the world to renounce all their senses , who were never obliged to it before ? and all this consisteth in pretended faith and knowledge , when men must take on them to know what they do not know , and make decrees and canons , and doctrines suited to their conjectures , or rather to their carnal interests , and then most injuriously father them on god , on christ and the apostles . ii. and as the number of forgeries and inventions detecteth this publick plague , so doth the number of persons that are guilty of it . how many such superfluities the * abassines ( in their oft baptizings , and other trifles , ) and the armenians , syrians , georgians , jacobites , maronites , the russians , &c. are guilty of , the describers of their rites and religion tell us . some would have the state of the church in gregory , ●sts days to be the model of our reformation ( that pope whom authors usually call the last of the good ones , and the first of the bad ones : ) but is there either necessity or certainty in all the superfluities which the churches then had , and which that great prelates writings themselves contain ? or were there not abundance of such things then used as things indifferent ( of which see socrates and sozomene in the chapters of easter , ) and must all their indifferents be now made necessary to the churches concord and communion ? and all their uncertainties become certainties to us ? some will have the present greek church to be the standard : but alas , poor men , how many of these uncertainties , crudities and superfluities are cherished among them by the unavoidable ignorance which is caused by their oppressions ? to say no more of rome , o that the reformed churches themselves had been more innocent ? but how few of them unite on the terms of simple christianity and certainties ? had not luther after all his zeal for reformation , retained some of this leven , he could better have endured the dissent of zuinglius , carolostadius and oecolampadius about the sacrament . and if his followers had not kept up the same superfluities , they had never so torn the churches by their animosities , nor resisted and wearied peaceable melanchthon , nor frustrated so many conventions and treaties for concord , as they have done . bucer had not been so censured ; agreement had not been made so impossible : all dury's travels had not been so uneffectual . schlusserburgius had not found so many heresies to fill up his catalogue with ; nor calovius so much matter for his virulent pen ; nor so many equalled calvinism with turcism ; nor had calixtus had such scornful satyrs written against him ; nor the great peace-makers , lud. crocius , bergii , martinius , camero , amyraldus , testardus , capellus , placaeus , davenant , ward , hall , and now le blank , had so little acceptance and success . had it not been for this spreading plague , ( the over-valuing of our own understandings , and the accounting our crude conceits for certainties ) all these church wars had been prevented or soon ended : all those excellent endeavours for peace had been more successful , and we had all been one. had it not been for this , neither arminians nor antiarminians had ever so bitterly contended , nor so sharply censured one another , nor written so many confident condemning volumes against each other , which in wise mens eyes do more condemn the authors ; and self-conceit , or pretended knowledge , should have been the title of them all : how far i am able to prove that almost all their bitter and zealous contentions are about uncertainties , and words , the reader may perceive in my preface to the grotian religion , and if god will , i shall fuller manifest to the world. † the synod of dort had not had so great a work of it , nor the breme and brittain divines so difficult a task , to bring and hold them to that moderation of expressions which very laudably they have done : ( one of the noblest successful attempts for peace , though little noted , which these ages have made . ) in a word , almost all the contentions of divines , the sects and factions , the unreconciled fewds , the differences in religion which have been the harvest of the devil and his emissaries in the world , have come from pretended knowledge and taking uncertainties for certain truths . i will not meddle with the particular impositions of princes and prelates ; not so much as with the german interim : nor the oaths which in some place they take to their synodical decrees : much less will i meddle at all with any impositions , oaths , subscriptions declarations , or usages of the kingdom where i live . as the law forbiddeth me to contradict them , so i do not at all here examine or touch them , but wholly pass them by : which i tell the reader once for all , that he may know how to interpret all that i say . nor is it the error of rulers that i primarily detect , but of humane corrupted nature , and all sorts of men : though where such an errour prevaileth , alas , it is of far sadder consequence in a publick person , a magistrate , or a pastor , that presumeth to the hurt of publick societies , than of a private man , who erreth almost to himself alone . i profess to thee , reader , that ( next to god's so much deserting so great a part of this world ) there is nothing under the sun , of all the affairs of mankind , that hath so taken up my thoughts with mixtures of indignation , wonder , pity and sollicitude for a cure , as this one vice ; a proud or unhumbled understanding by which men live in pretended knowledge and faith , to the deceit of themselves and others , the bitter censuring and persecuting of dissenters , yea of their modest suspending brethren , tear churches and kingdoms , and will give no peace , nor hopes of peace to themselves , their neighbours , or the world ! lord ! is there no remedy , no hope from thee , though there be none from man ? . among divines themselves , that should not only have knowledge enough to know their own ignorance , but to guide the people of god into the ways of truth , and love , and peace ; o how lamentably doth this vice prevail ! to avoid all offence , i will not here at all touch on the case of any that are supposed to have a hand in any of the sufferings of me , and others of my mind ; or of any that in points of conformity differ from me : remember that i meddle not with them at all : but even those that do no way differ among themselves as sect and sect , or at least , that all pretend to principles of forbearance , gentleness and peace , yet are wofully sick of this disease . and yet that i may wrong none , i will premise this publick declaration to the world , that in the countrey where i lived , god in great mercy cast my lot among a company of so humble , peaceable , faithful ministers ( and people ) as free from this vice as any that ever i knew in the world ; who , as they kept up full concord among themselves , without the least disagreement that i remember , and kept out sects and heresies from the people ; so their converse was the joy of my life , and the remembrance of it will be sweet to me while i live ; and especially the great success of our labours , and the quiet and concord of our several flocks , which was promoted by the pastors humility and concord . though we kept up constant disputations , none of them ever turned to spleen , or displeasure , or discord among us . and i add , in thankfulness to god , that i am now acquainted with many ministers in and about london , of greatest note , and labour , and patience , and success , who are of the same spirit , humble and peaceable , and no confident troublers of the churches with their censoriousness , and high esteem of their own opinions : who trade only in the simple truths of christianity , and love a christian as a christian , and joyn not with back-biters nor factious self-conceited men , but study only to win souls to christ , and to live according to the doctrine which they preach : and both the former and these , have these ten * years since they were ejected , continued their humility and peaceableness , fearing god and honouring the king. and i further add that those private christians with whom i most converse are many of them of the same strain , suspecting their own understandings , and speaking evil of no man so forwardly as of themselves . so that in these ministers and people of my most intimate acquaintance , experience convinceth me , that this grand disease of corrupted nature is cureable , and that god hath a people in the world , that have learnt of christ to be meek and lowly , who have the wisdom from above , which is first pure , and then peaceable , gentle , easy to be intreated full of mercy and good fruits , and the fruit of mercy is sown in peace of these peace-makers . i see in them a true conformity to christ , and a grand difference between them and the furious fiery pretenders to more wisdom ; and the two sorts of wisemen and wisdom excellently described by james , chap. . i have seen in two sorts of religious people among us , most lively exemplified before our eyes . god hath a people that truly honour him in the world . but o that they were more ! and o that they were more perfect ! alas what a number are there that are otherwise ? even among divines this plague is most pernicious , as being of most publick influence . take him that never had a natural acuteness of wit , nor is capable of judging of difficult points , if he be but of long standing and grey hairs , and can preach well to the people , and have studied long , he is not only confident of his fitness to judge of that which he never understood , but his reputation of wisdom must be kept up among the people by his supercilious talking against what he understandeth not : yea if he be one that never macerated his flesh with the difficult and long studies of the matter , without which hard points will never be well digested and distinctly understood , yet if he be a doctor , and have lived long in a reputation for wisdom , his ignorant flashy conjectures , and hasty superficial apprehensions , must needs go for the more excellent knowledge : and if you put him to make good any of his contradictions to the truth , his magisterial contempt , or his uncivil wrath and unmannerly interruptions of you in your talk must go for reason : and if he cannot resist the strength of your evidence , he cannot bear the hearing of it , but like a scold rather than a scholar , taketh your words out of your mouth before you come to the end : as if he said , hold your tongue and hear me who am wiser : i came to teach , and not to hear . if you tell him how uncivil it is not patiently to hear you to the end , he thinks you wrong him , and are too bold to pretend to a liberty to speak without interruption ; or he will tell you that you are too long ; he cannot remember all at once . if you reply that the sense of the forepart of a speech usually depends much on the latter part ; and he cannot have your sence till he have all ; and that he must not answer , before he understandeth you ; and that if his memory fail he should take notes , and that to have uninterrupted turns of speaking is necessary in the order of all sober conferences , without which they will be but noise and strife ; he will let you know that he came not to hear or keep any laws of order or civility , but to have a combat with you for the reputation of wisdom or orthodoxness and what he wants in reason and evidence , he will make up in ignorant confidence and reviling , and call you by some ill name or other , that shall go for a confutation . but yet this is not the usual way : it is too great a hazard to the reputation of their wisdom to cast it on a dispute . the common way is never to speak to the person himself , but if any one cross their conceits , or become the object of their envy , they backbite him among those that reverence their wisdom , and when they are sure that he is far enough out of hearing , they tell their credulous followers , o such a man holdeth unsound or dangerous opinions ! take heed how you hear him , or read his writings , [ this or that heresie they savour of : ] when the poor man knoweth not what he talketh of . and if any one have the wit to say to him , [ sir , he is neither so sottish , nor so proud , as to be uncapable of instruction ; if you are so much wiser than he , why do you not teach him ? ] he will excuse his omission and his commission together with a further calumny , and say , these erroneous persons will hear no reason : it is in vain . if he be asked [ sir , did you ever try ? ] it 's like he must confess that he did not ; unless some magisterial rebuke once went for evidence of truth . if the hearers ( which is rare ) have so much christian wit and honesty , as to say , [ sir , ministers above all men must be no back-biters , nor unjust : you know it is unlawful for us to judge another man , till we hear him speak for himself : if you would have us know whether he or you be in the right , let us hear you both together : ] his answer would be like cardinal turnon at the conference at poisie , and as the papists ordinarily is , [ it is dangerous letting hereticks speak to the people , and it agreeth not with our zeal for god to hear such odious things uttered against the truth . in a word , there are more that have the spirit of a pope in the world than one , even among them that cry out against popery ; and that would fain be taken for the dictators of the world , whom none must dissent from , much less contradict . and there are more idolaters than heathens , who would have their ignorant understandings to be instead of god , the uncontrolled director of all about them . but if these men have not any confidence in their self-sufficiency , if they can but embody in a society of their minds , or gather into a synod , he must needs go for a proud and arrogant schismatick at least , that will set any reason and evidence of truth , against their magisterial ignorance , when it is the major vote . the very truth is , the great benefactor of the world hath not been pleased to dispense his benefits equally , but with marvellous disparity : as he is the god of nature , he hath been pleased to give a natural capacity for judiciousness and acuteness in difficult speculations but to few . and as he is the lord of all , he hath not given men equal educacation , nor advantages for such extraordinary knowledge : nor have all that have leisure and capacity , self denyal and patience enough for so long and difficult studies : but the devil and our selves have given to all men pride enough to desire to be thought to be wiser and better than we are : and he that cannot be equal with the wisest and best would be thought to be so : and while all men must needs seem wise , while few are so indeed , you may easily see what must thence follow . . and it is not divines only , but all ranks of people , who are sick of this disease . the most unlearned ignorant people , the silliest women , if they will not for shame say that they are wiser than their teachers in the general , yet when it cometh to particular cases , they take themselves to be always in the right ; and o how confident are they of it ! and who more peremptory and bold in their judgments than those that least know what they say ? it is hard to meet with a person above eighteen or twenty years of age , that is not notably tainted with this malady . and it is not only these great mischiefs in matters of religion which spring from self-conceitedness , but even in our common converse , it is the cause of disorder , ruin and destruction : for it is the common vice of blinded nature , and it is rare to meet with one that is not notably guilty of it : when they are past the state of professed learners . . it is ordinary for self-conceited persons to ruine their own estates , and healths , and lives . when they are rashly making ill bargains , or undertaking things which they understand not , they rush on till they find their error too late , and their poverty , prisons or ruined families , must declare their sin . for they have not humility enough to seek counsel in time , nor to take it when it is offered them . what great numbers have i heard begging relief from others , under the confession of this sin ? and far more , even the most of men and women , overthrow their health , and lose their lives by it . experience doth not suffice to teach them , what is hurtful to their bodies ; and as they know not , so you cannot convince them that they know not . most persons by the excess in quantity of food , do suffocate nature , and lay the foundation of future maladies . and most of the diseases that kill men untimely are but the effects of former gluttony or excess . but as long as they feel not any present hurt , no man can perswade them but their fulness is for their health , as well as for their pleasure . they will laugh perhaps at those that tell them what they do , and what diseases they are preparing for : let physicians ( if they be so honest ) tell them , [ it is the perfection of the nutritive juices , the blood and nervous oyl , which are the causes of health in man : perfect concoction causeth that perfection : nature cannot perfectly concoct too much , or that which is of too hard digestion : while you feel no harm , your blood groweth dis-spirited , and being but half concocted , and half blood , doth perform its office accordingly by the halves ; till crudities are heaped up , and obstructions fixed , and a dunghil of excrements , or the dis-spirited humours are ready to take in any disease , which a small occasion offereth ; either agues , feavers , coughs , consumptions , pleurisies , dropsies , colicks and windiness , head-achs , convulsions , &c. or till the inflammations or other tumors of the inward parts , or the torment of the stone in reins or bladder , do sharply tell men what they have been doing . a clean body and perfect concoction , which are procured by temperance and bodily labours , which suscitate the spirits , and purifie the blood , are the proper means which god in the course of nature hath appointed , for a long and healthful life . ] this is all true , and the reason is evident , and yet this talk will be but despised and derided by the most ; and they will say , [ i have so long eaten what i loved , and lived by no such rules as these , and i have found no harm by it . ] yea if excess have brought diseases on them , if abstinence do but make them more to feel them ; they will rather impute their illness to the remedy , than to the proper cause . and so they do about the quality as well as the quantity : self-conceitedness maketh men uncureable . many a one have i known that daily lived in that fulness which i saw would shortly quench the vital spirits ; and fain i would have saved their lives ; but i was not able to make them willing : had i seen another assault them , i could have done somewhat for them , but when i foresaw their death , i could not save them from themselves . they still said , they found their measures of eating and drinking ( between meals ) refresh them , and they were the worse , if they forbore it , and they would not believe me against both appetite , reason and experience : and thus have i seen abundance of my acquaintance wilfully hasten to the grave : and all long of an unhumbled , self-conceited understanding , which would not be brought to suspect it self , and know its error . . and o how often have i seen the dearest friends thus kill their friends ; even mothers kill their dearest children , and too oft their husbands , kindred , servants and neighbours by their self-conceit and confidence in their ignorance and error ? alas what abundance empty their own houses , gratifie covetous landlords , that set their lands by lives , and bring their dearest relations to untimely ends , and a wise man knoweth not how to hinder them ! how oft and oft have i heard ignorant women confidently perswade even their own children to eat as long as they have an appetite , and so they have vitiated their blood and humours in their childhood , that their lives have been either soon ended , or ever after miserable by diseases ! how oft have i heard them perswade sick or weak diseased persons , to eat , eat , eat , and take what they have a mind to , when unless they would poyson them , or cut their throats , they could scarce more certainly dispatch them ? how oft have these good women been perswading my self , that eating and drinking more would make me better , and that it is abstinence that causeth all my illness , ( when excess in my childhood caused it ; ) as if every wise woman that doth but know me , knew better what is good for me , than my self after threescore years experience , or than all the physicians in the city ? and had i obeyed them , how many years ago had i been dead ? how ordinary is it for such self-conceited women to obtrude their skill and medicines on their sick neighbours , with the greatest confidence , when they know not what they do ? yea upon their husbands and their children ? one can scarce come about sick persons , but one woman or other is perswading them to take that , or do that which is like to kill them : many and many when they have brought their children to the grave , have nothing to say but [ i thought this or that had been best for them . ] but you 'l say , [ they do it in love ; they meant no harm . ] i answer , so false teachers deceive souls in love. but are you content your selves to be kill'd by love ? if i must be kill'd , i had rather an enemy did it than a friend , i would not have such have the guilt or grief . love will not save mens lives if you give them that which tends to kill them . but you 'l say , [ we can be no wiser than we are : if we do the best we can , what can we do more ? i answer , i would have you not think your selves wiser than you are : i would write over this word five hundred times if that would cure you . about matters of diet and medicines , and health , this is it that i would have you do to save you from killing your selves and your relations . . pretend not to know upon the report of such as your selves , or in matters that are difficult and beyond your skill ; or where you have not had long consideration and experience . meddle with no medicining , but what in common easy cases the common judgment of physicians and common experience have taught you . . if you have not money to pay physicians and apothecaries , tell them so , and desire them to give you their counsel freely , and take not on you to know more than they that have studied and practised it all their ( riper part of their ) lives . . suspect your understandings , and consider how much there may be unknown to you , in the secresie and variety of diseases , difference of temperatures , and the like , which may make that hurtful which you conceit is good . therefore do nothing rashly and in self-conceited confidence , but upon the best advice ask the physician whether your medicines and rules are safe . . and be sure that you do rather too little than too much : what abundance are there , especially in the small pox and feavers , that would have scaped , if women ( yea and physicians ) would have let them alone , that die because that nature had not leave to cure them , being disturbed by mistaken usages or medicines . diseases are so various and secret , and remedies so uncertain , that the wisest man alive that hath studied and practised it almost all his riper days ( were it an hundred years ) must confess that physick is a hard , a dark , uncertain work , and ordinary cases ( much more extraordinary ) have somewhat in them which doth surpass his skill : and how then come so many medicining women to know more than they ? but you 'l say , [ we see that many miscarry by physicians , and they speed worst that use them most . ] i answer . but would they not yet speed worse if they used you as much ? if they are too ignorant , how come you to be wiser ? if you are , teach them your skill . but i must add , that even physicians guilt of the sin which i am reproving doth cost many a hundred persons their lives , as well as yours . even too many physicians who have need of many daies enquiry and observations truly to discover a disease , do kill men by rash and hasty judging ( i talk not of the cheating sort that take on them to know all by the urine alone , but of honester and wiser men . ) it is most certain that old celsus saith , that a physitian is not able faithfully to do his office , for very many patients : a few will take up all his time . but they that gape most after money , must venture upon a short sight , and a few words , and presently resolve before they know , and write down their directions while they are ignorant of one half , which if they knew , would change their counsels ! and such is mans body and its diseases , that the oversight or ignorance of one thing among twenty is like enough to be the patients death . and how wise , expedient and vigilant must he be that will commit no such killing oversight ? and as too many medicine a man whom they know not , and an unknown disease , for want of just deliberation ; so too many venture upon uncertain and untryed medicines , or rashly give that to one in another case , which hath profited others . in a word , even rash physicians have cause to fear lest by prefidence and hasty judging , more should die by their mistakes than do by murderers , that i say not by souldiers in the world : and lest their dearest friends should speed worse by them , than by their greatest enemies . for as seamen and souldiers do boldly follow the trade , when they find that in several voyages and battels they have escaped ; but yet most or very many of them are drowned or killed at the last ; so he that is tampering over-much with medicines , may scape well and boast of the success a while : but at last one blood-letting , one vomit , one purge or other medicine may miscarry by a small mistake or accident , and he is gone . and there are some persons so civil , that if a rash or unexperienced physician be their kinsman , friend , or neighbour , they will not go to an abler man , lest they be accounted unfriendly , and disoblige him ; and if such scape long with their lives , they may thank gods mercy and not their own wisdom . souldiers kill enemies , and unskilful rash physicians kill their friends . but you 'l say ; they do their best , and they can do no more . i answer as before , . let them not think that they know what they do not know ; but sufficiently suspect their own understandings . . let them not go beyond their knowledge : how little of our kind of physick did the old physicians ( hypocrates , galius , celsus , &c. ) give ? do not too much . . venture not rashly without full search , deliberation , counsel and experience . o how many die by hasty judging , and rash mistakes ! physicians must pardon my free speaking or endure it : for i conceive it necessary : it hath not been the least part of the calamity of my life to see my friends and other worthy persons killed by the ignorance or hastiness of physicians : i greatly reverence and honour those few that are men . . of clear searching judicious heads , . of great reading , especially of other mens experiences , . of great and long experience of their own , . of present sagacity and ready memory to use their own experiments , . of conscience and cautelousness to suspect and know before they hastily judge and practice . i would i could say that such are not too few . but i must say to the people , as you love your lives take heed of all the rest : a high-way robber you may avoid or resist with greater probability of safety , than such men : how few are they that are kill'd by thieves or in duels , in comparison of those that are kill'd by physicians , especially confident young men that account themselves wits , and think they have hit on such philosophical principles as will better secure both their practice and reputation than old physicians doctrine and experiences could do ? confident young men of unhumbled understandings presently trust their undigested thoughts , and rashly use their poor short experiments , and trust to their new conceptions of the reasons of all operations ; and then they take all others for meer empyricks in comparison of them : and when all is done , their pretended reason for want of full experience and judgment to improve it , doth but enable them to talk and boast , and not to heal ; and when they have kill'd men , they can justify it , and prove that they did it rationally , or rather that it was something else , and not their error that was the cause . they are wits and men of rare inventions , and therefore are not such fools as to confess the fact. how oft have i seen men of great worth , such as few in an age arise too who having a high esteem of an injudicious unexperienced physician , have sealed their erroneous kindness with their blood ? how oft have i seen worthy persons destroyed by a pernicious medicine clear contrary to what the nature of the disease required , who without a physician might have done well ? such sorrows just now upon me make me the more plain and copious in the case . and yet alas i see no hope of amendment probable ! for , . many hundred ministers being forbidden to preach the gospel and cast out of all their livelyhood , for not promising , asserting , swearing and doing all that is required of them , many of these think that necessity alloweth them to turn physicians , which they venture on upon seven years study when seven , and seven , and seven , is not enough , though advantaged by the help of other mens experiments . . and others rush on practice in their youth , partly because they have not yet knowledge enough to discern uncertainties and difficulties in the art , or to see what is further necessary to be known . and partly , because they think that seeing skill must be got by experience , use must help them to that experience , and all men must have a beginning . . and when they do their best , they say , god requireth no more . . and they hope if they kill one , they cure many . but o that they had the sobriety to consider , . that the physician is but one man ; and will his maintenance or livelyhood excuse him for killing many ? . that even one mans life is more precious than one mans maintenance , or fuller supply : is it not honester to beg your bread ? . that killing men by virtue of your trade without danger to you doth but hinder your repentance , but not so much extenuate your sin as many think : which is aggravated in that you kill your friends that trust you , and not enemies that oppose you or avoid you . . your experience must not be got by killing men , but by accompanying experienced physicians till you are fit to practice : and if you cannot stay so long for want of maintenance , beg rather than kill men , or betake you to some other trade . but if you be too proud or confident to take such counsel , i still advise all that love their lives , that they choose not a physician under fourty years old at least , and if it may be , not under sixty , unless it be for some little disease or remedy , which hath no danger , and where they can do no harm , if they do no good : old men may be ignorant , but young men must needs be so , for want of experience , though some few rare persons are sooner ripe than others . and whereas they say that they cure more than they kill ; i wish that i had reason to believe them : i suppose that if more of their patients did not live than die , they would soon lose their practice : but it 's like the far greatest part of those that live , would have lived without them , and perhaps have been sooner and easier cured , if nature had not by them been disturbed . and what calling is there in which hasty judging and conceits of more knowledge than men have , doth not make great confusion and disappointment ? if a fool that rageth and is confident be a pilot ; woe to the poor seamen and passengers in the ship. if such a one be commander in an army , his own and other mens blood or captivity , must cure his confidence and stay his rage . for such will learn at no cheaper a rate . how oft hear we such workmen , carpenters , masons , &c. raging confident that their way is right , and their work well done , till the ruin of it confute and shame them ? if this disease take hold of governours , who will not stay to hear all parties , and know the truth , but take up reports on trust , from those that please or flatter them , or judge presently before impartial tryal , and hearing all , woe to the land that is so governed . the wisest and the best man must have due information , and time , patience and consideration to receive it , or else he may do as david between mephibosheth and ziba , and cannot be just . what an odious thing is a partial , blind , rash , hasty and impatient judge , that cannot hear , think and know before he judgeth ? such the old christians had to do with among their persecutors , who knew not what they held or what they were , and yet could judge them , and cruelly execute them . and such were tacitus and other old historians that from common prejudice spake words of contempt or reproach of them . the christians were glad when they had a trajan , an antonine , an alexander severus , &c. to speak to , that had reason and sobriety , to hear their cause . among the papists , the old reformers and martyrs took him for a very commendable judge or magistrate , that would but allow them a patient hearing , and give them leave to speak for themselves . truth and godliness have so much evidence , and such a testimony for themselves in the conscience of mankind , as that the devil could never get them so odiously thought of and so hardly used in the world , but only by keeping them unknown , which is much by expelling and silencing their defenders , ( who speed well sometime if an obadiah hide them by fifties in a cave , ) and by tempting their judges to hear but some superficial narrative of their cause , and to have but a glimpse of the outside as in transitu , [ and to see only the back-parts of it , yea but the clothing ; which is commonly such as are made by its enemies ; good men and causes are too oft brought to them , and set out by them , as christ with his scarlet robe , his reed and crown of thorns , and then they say , behold the man ; and when they have cryed out , [ blasphemy , and an enemy to caesar ] they write over his cross in scorn ; the king of the jews . cain had not patience to hear his own brother ▪ and weigh the case , no not after that god had admonished him : but he must first hate and murder , and afterward consider why , when it is too late . judas must know his masters innocency , and what he had done , in despair to hang himself . and so wise achitophel cometh to his end . if david would have pondred his usage of uriah as much in time as he did when nathan had awakened his reason , o what had he prevented : if paul had weighed before , the case of christians , as he did when christ did stop his rage , he had not incurred the guilt of persecution and the martyrs blood : but he tells us that he was exceedingly mad against them : and it is madness indeed to venture on cruelty and persecution , and not stay first to understand the cause , and consider why , and what is like to be the end . how ordinarily in the world are the excellentest men on earth , for wisdom and holiness ( such as ignatius , cyprian , and the rest of the antient martyrs ; and such as athanasius , chrysostom , &c. ) reviled , and used as if they were the basest rogues on earth , laid in jails , banished , silenced , murdered , and all this by men that know not what they are , and have no true understanding of their cause ? men of whom the world was not worthy , wandred up and down , in dens , and caves , and suffered joyfully the spoiling of their goods , yea and death it self , heb. . from men that judged before they knew ? many a great man and judge that hath condemned christ's ministers as hereticks , false teachers , unworthy to preach the gospel , have been such as understand not their baptism , creed or catechism , and have need of many years teaching to make them know truly but those principles that every child should know . there needs no great learning , wisdom , sobriety or honesty to teach them to cry out , [ you are a rogue , a seducer , a heretick , a schismatick , disobedient , seditious ; or , away with such a fellow from the earth ; it is not fit that he should live , act. . . and . . or , away with him , crucifie him , give us barabbas : or to say , we have found this man a pestilent fellow , a mover of sedition , a leader of a sect , that teacheth contrary to the decrees of caesar , &c. ] but patience till the cause were fully tryed , and all things heard and equally weighed , would prevent most of this . i know that ignorance and weakness of judgment is the common calamity of mankind , and there is no hope of curing us by unity in high degrees of knowledge . and though teachers are , and must be a great stay to ignorant learners ; yet alas ! how can they tell which are the wisest teachers , and whom to chuse ? when all pretend to wisdom , and no man can judge of that which he neither hath nor knoweth ; and even the roman sect who pretend most to infallibility , have so exceeded all men in their errour , as to make it a part of religion , necessary to our possessions , communion , dominion , and salvation , to maintain the falshood of god's natural revelations to the senses of all sound men in the world . how shall one that would learn philosophy know in this age , what sect to follow , or what guide to chuse ? hence is our calamity , and the remedy will be but imperfect till the time of perfection come . but yet we are not remediless , . if men would but well lay in , hold fast , love , and faithfully improve the few necessary essential principles . . if they would make them a rule in trying what is built upon them ; and receive nothing that certainly contradicteth them . . if they would stay , think and try , till their thoughts are well digested , and all is heard , before they take in doubtful things . . if they will carry themselves as humble learners to those whose wisdom is conspicuous by its proper light , especially the concordant pastors of the churches . . and if they will not quarrel with truth for every difficulty which they understand not , but humbly , as learners , suspect their own wit , till their teachers have helpt them in a leisurely and faithful tryal ; by such means the mischief of errour and rashness might be much avoided . in common matters necessity and undeniable experience doth somewhat rebuke and restrain this vice . if children should set their wits against their parents , or scholars presently dispute it with their masters , nature and the rod would rebuke their pride and folly . if they that never used a trade , should presently take themselves to be as wise as the longest practicers , who would be apprentices ? and if an unskilful musician , painter , poet , or other such like , shall be confident that he is as good at his work as any , standers by will not easily cherish his folly , as being not blinded by his self-love . a good workman shall have most praise and practice . buyers will convince the ignorant boasters by forsaking such mens shops : as it is with self-conceited ignorant writers , who are restrained by the people , who will not buy and read their books . and usually good and bad judges , magistrates , lawyers , souldiers , pilots , artificers , are discerned by most that are capable of judging ; because , . these are matters where the common sense and experience of mankind doth render them somewhat capable of judging , and save them from deceit . . and here is not usually such deep and long plots and endeavours to deceive as in matters of speculation , and specially religion and policy there is . . and the devil is not so concerned and industrious to deceive men in matters of so low importance . . and if one be deceived , many are ready to rectifie him . . and mens interest here is better understood in bodily matters , and they are not so willing to be deceived . a poor man can easily discern between a charitable man , and an uncharitable ; between a merciful and an oppressing landlord : we discern between diligent and slothful servants ; but in matters that are above our reach , which we must take on trust , and know not whom to trust , the difficulty is greater : where the errour and haste of either party will breed mischief , but much more of both : if the physician , or other undertaker be confident in his errour , and precipitant , he will impose ruine on mens health , as i have said : and if the patient be self-conceited and rash in his choice , he is like to suffer for it : but when both physician and patient are so , what hope of escape ? and especially when through the great imperfection of mans understanding , not one of a multitude is clear and skilful in things that are beyond the reach of sense : and if one man , after great experience , come to be wiser than the rest , the hearer knoweth it not , and he must cast out his notions among as many assailing warriours , as there are ignorant self-conceited hearers present ( and that is usually as there are persons : ) and when every one hath poured out his confidence against it , and perhaps reproached the author as erroneous , because he will know more than they , and will not reverence their known mistakes , alas ! how shall the person that we would instruct ( be it for health or soul ) be able to know which of all these to trust as wisest ? but the saddest work is that forementioned , in churches , kingdoms , families and souls . i must expect that opening the crime will exasperate the guilty : but what remedy ? . should i largely open what work this maketh in families , i have too much matter for the complaint . if the wife differ from the husband , she seemeth always in the right : if the servant differ from the master , and the child from the parent ( if a little past infancy ) they are always in the right . what is the contention in families , ( and in all the world ) but who shall have his way and will ? if they are of several parties in religion , or if any be against religion it self , if they be foolish , erroneous , or live in any sin , that can without utter impudence be defended , still they are able to make it good : and , except children at school , or others that professedly go to be taught , whom can we meet with so ignorant or mistaken , that will not still think when even superiours differ from them , and reprove them , that they are in the right . . and what mischiefs doth it cause in churches ? when the papal tyrannical part are so confident that they are in the right , that when they silence preachers , and imprison and burn christians , they think it not their duty so much as to hear what they have to say for themselves . or if they hear a few words , they have not the patience to hear all , or impartially to try the cause : but they are so full of themselves and over wise , that it must seem without any more ado a crime to dissent from them , or contradict them . and thus proud self-conceitedness smiteth the shepherds , scattereth the flocks , and will allow the church of christ no unity or peace . and the popular croud are usually or oft as self-conceited in their way ; and if they never so unreasonably oppose their teachers , how hard is it to make them know or once suspect that they are mistaken ? o what mutinies in christs armies , what schisms , what confusions , what scandals , what persecutions in the church , what false accusations , what groundless censures , do proud self-conceited understandings cause ? but scarce any where is it more lamentably seen than among injudicious , unexperienced ministers . what work is made in the christian world , by sect against sect , and party against party , in cases of controversy , by most mens bold and confident judging of what they never truly studied , tried or understood ? papists against protestants , protestants against papists , lutherans ( or arminians ) and calvinists , &c. usually charge one another by bare hear-say , or by a few sentences or scraps collected out of their writings by their adversaries , contrary to the very scope of the whole discourse or context . and men cannot have leisure to peruse the books and to know before they judge . and then they think that seeing their reverend doctors have so reported their adversaries before them , it is arrogance or injury to think that they knew not what they said , or else belied them . and on such supposition the false judging doth go on . of all the pulpits that oft trouble the people with invectives against this side or that , especially in the controversies of predestination , grace and free-will , how few do we hear that know what they talk against ? yea those young or unstudied men , who might easily be conscious how little they know , are ready to oppose and contemn the most ancient studied divines ; when if ever they would be wise men , they should continue scholars to such even while they are teachers of the people . i will not presume to open the calamities of the world , for want of rulers true knowing their subjects case , but judging hastily by the reports of adversaries : but that rebellions ordinarily hence arise i may boldly say : when subjects that know not the reasons of their rulers actions , are so over wise as to make themselves judges of that which concerneth them not : and how few be they that think not themselves wiser than all their guides and governours ? and lastly , by this sin it is that the wisdom of the wisest is as lost to the world : for let a man know never so much more than others , after the longest , hardest studies , the self-conceitedness of the ignorant riseth up against it , or maketh them uncapable of receiving it , so that he can do little good to others . i conclude again that this is the plague and misery of mankind and the cause of all sin and shame and ruines , that ignorant unhumbled understandings will be still judging rashly before they have throughly tried the case , and will not suspend till they are capable of judging , nor be convinced that they know not what they know not , but be confident in their first or ungrounded apprehensions . chap. . the signs and common discoveries of a proud self-conceited understanding , and of pretended knowledge . by such effects as these the most of men , do shew their guilt , of overvaluing their own appprehensions . . when they will be confident of things that are quite above their understandings , or else which they never throughly studied ; some are confident of that which no man knoweth ; and most are confident of that which i think they are unlike to be certain of themselves , without miraculous inspiration , which they give us no reason to believe that they have . things that cannot ordinarily be known , . without the preparation of many other sciences , . or without reading many books , . or without reading or hearing what is said against it . . or at least without long and serious studies we have abundance that will talk most peremptorily of them , upon the trust of their teachers or party , without any of this necessary means of knowledge . . the hastiness of mens conclusions discovereth this presumption and self-conceit . when at the first hearing or reading , or after a few thoughts they are as confident , as if they had grown old in studies ; the best understandings must have a long time to discern the evidence of things difficult , and a longer time to try that evidence by comparing it with what is brought against it : and yet a longer time to digest truths into that order and clearness of apprehension , which is necessary to distinct and solid knowledge , when without all this ado ▪ most at the first lay hold of that which cometh in their way : and there they stick , at least till a more esteemed teacher or party tell them somewhat that is contrary to it . it is but few of our first apprehensions that are sound , and need not reformation ; but none that are well digested , and need not much consideration to perfect them . . is it not a plain discovery of a presumptuous understanding , when men will confidently conclude of things which their own tongues are forced to confess that they do not understand ? i mean not only so as to give an accurate definition of them , but really not to know what it is that they talk of . many a zealous anabaptist i have known , that knoweth not what baptism is . and many a one that hath disputed confidently for or against free-will , that knew not at all what free-will is . and many a one that hath disputed about the lords supper , and separated from almost all churches for want of sufficient strictness in it , and especially for giving it to the ignorant , who upon examination have not known the true nature of a sacrament , nor of the sacred covenant which it sealeth . many a one forsaketh most churches as no churches , that they may be of a right constituted church , who know not what a church is . what abundance will talk against an arminian , a calvinist , a prelatist , a presbyterian , an independent , that really know not what any of them are ? like a gentleman the other day that after long talk of the presbyterians , being urged to tell what a presbyterian was , could tell no more but that he was one that is not so merry and sociable as other men , but stricter against sports or taking a cup. and if i should tell you how few that can judge the controversies about predestination , do know what they talk of , it were easy to evince it . . may i not discern their prefidence , when men that hold contraries , five men of five inconsistent opinions , are yet every one confident that his own is right ? when at best it is but one ▪ that can be right . when six men confidently expound a text in the revelation six ways . when five men are so confident of five several ways of church government , that they embody themselves into several policies or parties to enjoy them . is not here self-conceitedness in all ( at least ) save one ? . when men themselves by turning from opinion to opinion , shall confess their former opinion was false ; and yet made a religion of it while they held it ; was not this a presumptuous understanding ? when a man shall be one year of one sect , and another of another , and yet always confident that he is in the right . . when men that are known to be ignorant in other parts of religion , shall yet in some one opinion which they have espoused , seem to themselves much wiser than their teachers and make nothing of the judgments of those that have studied it many a year , is not this a presuming mind ? take the ablest divine that ever you knew living , suppose him to be jewel , andrews , usher , davenant , calvin , chamier , camero , armesius , gataker , &c. let him be one that all learned men admire , whose judgment is sent for from several kingdoms ; who hath spent a long life in hard and very successful studies , every boy and silly woman every ignorant vicious clown , that differeth from him in any point , shall slight all the wisdom of this man , as if in comparison of himself he were a fool . let it come but to the point of anabaptistry , separation , antinomianism yea the grossest opinions of the quakers , and what senseless fellow or wench is not much wiser than all these divines ? and they will pity him as a poor carnal ignorant person , which hath not the teaching of god which they have . yea let him but seek to draw a sensualist from his voluptuousness , this poor sot doth presently take himself to be the wiser man , and can prove all his gaming , his idleness , his wantonness , his precious time wasted in plays and long feastings , his gluttony , his tipling , his prodigal wastefullness to be all lawful things , whatever the learned pastor say . but why do not such men suspect their understandings , and consider with themselves , what likelihood is there that men as holy as i , that have studied it all their days , should not be wiser than i that never searcht as they have done ? doth not god say , he that seeketh shall find ; and wisdom must be laboriously searched for , as a hidden treasure ? and doth not god use to give his blessing on supposition of mens faithful endeavours ? . is it not palpable pride when a few men , no wiser nor better than others , can easily believe that all the rest of the christian world , the most learned , godly and concordant christians , are all deceived ignorant souls , and they and their few adherents only are in the right , in some doubtful controversies , wherein they have no advantage above others , either for capacity or grace ? i know that when the world is drowned in wickedness , we must not imitate them , be they never so many , nor follow a multitude to do evil ; and i know that the certain truth of the gospel must be held fast though most of the world be infidels : and that when the arrians were the most , they were not therefore the rightest ; and that even among christians , carnal interests use to breed and keep up such corruptions , as must not for the number of the vicious be approved . but when those that truely fear god , and seek the truth and faithfully serve him , as self-denyingly as any others , shall agree in any part of holy doctrine or worship , for a few among them to rise up in a conceit of their own understandings , and separate from them as they separate from the world , and this upon less study than many of the rest have used , to find out the truth ; i am sure none but a proud person will do this , without great jealousie of his own understanding , and great fear of erring , and without long and serious search and deliberation at the least . . is it not pride of understanding , when we see men confident upon inconsiderable reasons : when they bring nothing that should move a man of any competent understanding , and yet they build as boldly on this sand , as if they built upon a rock . . and when they slight the strongest and clearest arguments of another : and in their prefidence disdain them , before they understand them , as not worthy of consideration , and as silly things . . when they obtrude all their conceits magisterially upon others ; and expect that all men presently be of their mind and say as they do : when they value men just as they agree with or disagree from their opinion , and all are dear to them that hold with them , and all are slighted that think they err . when a man that without chewing presently swalloweth their conceits , is taken for a sounder man than he that will take nothing as sure till evidence prove it to him : is not this notorious pride of understanding ? and o how common is this imposing pride , even in them that cry out against it and condemn it ? they that will vilify one party as imposing all their own conceptions , even in words and forms and ceremonies , on the churches of christ , will yet themselves be rigid imposers ; no man shall be of their communion , nor judged meet for the holy sacrament , who cometh not to their opinions in many of their singularities ; nay worse , that will not abstain from communion with other churches ; whom their presumption separateth from . . and do not those people most value their own understandings , who choose teachers to please them , and not to teach them , and hear them as judges or censurers , and not as learners ? how ordinary is this ? if they be to choose a pastor , they will rather have the most injudicious man who thinks as they think , than the wisest man that is able to teach them better . if they hear any thing which agreeth not with their former conceits , they go away magisterially , censuring the preacher ; he taught unsound doctrine , dangerous things ; and neither understand him , nor endeavour to learn . i have seldom preached in strange congregations , nor seldom written on any subject , but among many learners , some such hearers and readers i have had that neither have understanding enough to teach , nor humility enough to know it , and to learn : but they go away prating among their companions of what they never understood ; and if it fall out that i know of it , and answer them , they have nothing to say ; but a putarem , or non-putarem : i thought you had meant thus or thus ( contrary to what i spoke ) or i noted not this or that word ( which the sence depended on . ) do but say as they would have you , and you are an excellent man ! but if you tell them more than they knew , if it detect any error or ignorance which they had before , they condemn your teaching , instead of learning of you . poor souls ! if you are wise enough already , what need you a teacher ? if you are not , why will you not learn ? if you were wiser than he , why did you choose or take him for your teacher ? if you are not , why will you not learn of him ? . the deep and cruel censures which they pass against dissenters , doth shew their self-conceitedness . none more censorious than raw unexperienced persons , not only ignorant preachers , but women and boys . how readily and boldly without any fear of god doth one seek to make his brother odious as a schismatick and a fanatick , and worse than words can describe him ; and another to reproach others as antichristian and carnal , whom he never understood ? nothing but pride could make men so ready and bold and fearless in their most foolish censures . . and it further sheweth their proud presumption , when they dare do all this upon bare rumors and hear-say , and ungrounded suspicions . were they not proud and presumptuous , they would think , alas , my understanding is not so clear and sure , nor my charity so safe and strong , as that i should in reason venture to condemn my brother , upon uncertain rumors , and so slight reports ? have i heard him speak for himself ? or is it charity or common justice to condemn a man unheard ? what though they are godly men that report it ? so was david that committed adultery and murder , and hastily received a lie against mephibosheth ; and perhaps many of those corinthians , against whose false censures , paul was put so largely to vindicate himself . . yea , when they dare proceed to vend these false reports and censures upon hear-say , to the destruction of the charity of those that hear them . and so entangle them all in sin : as if it were not enough to quench their own love to their brother by false surmises , but they must quench as many others also as they can . . yea , when they dare venture so far as to unchurch many churches , yea , most in the world , and degrade most ministers , if not unchristen most christians , or at least themselves withdraw from the communion of such churches , and all for something which they never understood ; about a doctrine , a form , a circumstance , where self-opinion or self-interest draweth them to all this bold adventure . to say nothing of condemnations of whole churches and countreys , the tyrannical , proud impositions , the cruel persecutions , which the papal faction hath been guilty of by this vice , judge now whether it be not too common a case to be guilty of an unhumbled understanding , and of pretended knowledge ? obj. if it be so , is it not best do as the papists , and keep men from reading the scriptures , or medling with divine things which they cannot master , any further than to believe what the church believeth . ans . . it is best no doubt , to teach men to know the difference between teachers and learners , and to keep in a humble learning state , and in that state to grow as much in knowledge as they can : but not to cast away knowledge , for fear of over-valuing it , nor renounce their reason , for fear of errour . no more than to put out their eyes for fear of mistaking by them , or chusing madness lest they abuse their wits : else we might wish to be brutes , because abused reason is the cause of all the errours and mischiefs in the world. . the popish clergy who give this counsel for the blinding of the vulgar , are worse themselves , and by their proud contendings , censures and cruelties , shew more self-conceitedness than the vulgar do . . the truth is , the cause is the common frailty of man , and the common pravity of corrupted nature , and it is to be found in persons of all ranks , religions and conditions ; of which more after in due place . chap. . of the mischievous effects of this proud pretence of more knowledge than men have . if the mischiefs of this sin had not been very great , i had not chosen this subject to treat of . . it is no small mischief to involve mens souls in the guilt of all the sins , which i named in the last chapter , as the discovery of this vice. sure all those disorders , censures , slanders , and presumptions , should not seem small in the eyes of any man that feareth god , and loveth holiness , and hateth sin . . pretended knowledge wasteth men some time in getting it , and much more in abusing it : all the time that you study for it , preach for it , talk for it , write for it , is sinfully lost and cast away . . it kindleth a corrupt and sinful zeal ; such as james describeth , jam. . , . which is envious and striving , and is but earthly , sensual and devilish : a zeal against love , and against good works , and against the interest of our brother , and against the peace and concord of the church ; a hurting , burning , devouring , excommunicating , persecuting zeal . and a feaver in the body is not so pernicious as such a sinful zeal in the soul. such a zeal the jews had as paul bears them witness , rom. . . such a zeal , alas , is so common among persecuting papists on one side , and censorious sectaries and separatists on the other , that we must all bear the sad effects of it . and self-conceited knowledge is the fuel of this zeal , as james . fully manifesteth . . this pretended knowledge is the fixing of false opinions in the minds of men , by which the truth is most powerfully kept out . a child will not wrangle against his teacher , and therefore will learn ; but these over-wise fools do presently set their wits against what you say , to keep out knowledge . you must beat down the garrison of his pride , before you come within hearing to instruct him : he is hardlier untaught the errours which he hath received , than an unprejudiced man is taught to understand most excellent truths . . by this the gifts of the most wise and excellent teachers are half lost : it is full bottles that are cast into these seas of knowledge , which have no room for more , but come out as they went in : if an augustine , or an aquinas , or scotus were among them , yea , a peter or paul , what can he put into these persons that are full of their own conceits already ? seest thou a man wise in his own conceit ? there is more hope of a fool than of him . . yea , they are usually the perverters of the souls of others : before they can come to themselves , and know that they were mistaken , what pains have they taken to make others of their own erroneous minds , whom they are not able afterward to undeceive again ? . it is a vice that blemisheth many excellent qualifications : to hear of a man that valueth his own judgment but according to its worth , and pretendeth to know but so much as he knoweth indeed , is no shame to him ; though knowledge is a thing fitter to be used than boasted of : but if a man know never so much , and can never so well express it , if he think that he is wiser than he is , and excelleth others more than indeed he doth , and over-valueth that knowledge which he hath , it is a shame which his greatest parts cannot excuse or hide . . it exposeth a man to base and shameful mutability . he that will be hasty and confident in his apprehensions , is so oft mistaken , that he must as oft change his mind , and recant , or do much worse . i know that it cannot be expected that any man should have as sound apprehensions in his youth , as in his age , and that the wisest should not have need of mutations for the better , and retractations of some youthful errours ; and he that changeth not , and retracteth nothing , it seems is in his childish ignorance and errour still : but when natural frailty exposeth us all to much of this disgrace , we should not expose our selves to so much more . a hasty judger , or prefident man must be a very weathercock , or be defiled with a leprosie of errour . whereas if men would but be humble and modest , and self-suspicious and suspend their presumption , and not take on them to know before they know indeed , how safely might they walk , and how seldom would they need to change their minds , or either stick in the sink of errour , or make many shameful retractations ? . prefidence and false judging engageth a man in a very life of sin . for when falshood goeth for truth with him , it will infect his affections , and pollute his conversation , and all that he doth in the obedience and prosecution of that errour will be sin . yea the greatest sin that he can but think no sin , may be committed ; as was the persecution of christ and christians , by the jews , and paul , and others like them ; and the papists bloodiness for their religion throughout christendom . . it disturbeth the peace of all societies : this is the vice that disquieteth families : every one is wisest in his own eyes : the servant thinketh his own way better than his masters : what are all the contentions between husband and wife , or any in the family , but that in all their differences , every one thinketh himself to be in the right ? his own opinion is right , his own words and ways are right ; and when every one is wise and just , and every one is in the right , the effects are such as if no one were wise or in the right . and in civil societies , seditions , rebellions oppressions , tyranny , and all confusions come from this , that men pretend to be sure of what they are not . rulers take up with false reports from idle malicious whisperers and accusers against their inferiours , and have not the justice and patience to suspend their judgments , till they have searcht out the matter , and fully heard men speak for themselves . subjects make themselves judges of the secrets of ●overnment , and of the councils and actions of their rulers , of which they have no certain notice , but venture to conclude upon deceitful suspicions . and the contentions and factions amongst nobles and other subjects , come from misunderstandings , through hasty and ungrounded judgings . but the wofullest effects are in the churches ; where , alas , whilst every pastor will be wiser than another , and the people wiser than all their pastors , and every sect and party much wiser than all that differ from them , their divisions , their separations , their alienations and bitter censurings of each other , their obtruding their own opinions , and rules and ●eremonies upon each other , their bitter envyings , strife and persecutions of each other , do make sober standers-by to ask , as paul , is there not a wise man among you ? o happy the world , happy kingdoms , but most happy the churches of christ , if we could possibly bring men but to know their ignorance ! if the pastors themselves were not prefident and presumptuous over-valuers of their own apprehensions ! and if the people knew how little they know ! but now alas , men rage against each other in their dreams , and few of them have the grace to awake before death , and find to repentance , that they were themselves in errour . hear me , with that remnant of meekness and humility which thou hast left , thou confident , bitter , censorious man ! why must that man needs be taken for a heretick , a schismatick , a refractory , stubborn , self-willed person , an antichristian , carnal , formal man , who is not of thy opinion in point of a controversie , of a form , of an order , of a circumstance , or subscription , or such like ? it 's possible it may be so ! and its possible thou maist be more so thy self . but hast thou so patiently heard all that he hath to say , and so clearly discerned the truth on thy own side , and that this truth is made so evident to him as that nothing but wilful obstinacy can resist it , as will warrant all thy censure and contempt ? or is it not an over-valuing of thy own understanding , which makes thee so easily condemn all as unsufferable that differ from it ? hath not pride made thy silly wit to be as an idol , to which all must bow down on pain of the heat of thy displeasure ? do not some of those men whom thou so magisterially condemnest , study as hard and as impartially as thy self ? do they not pray as hard for gods assistance ? have they not the same books , and as good teachers ? do they not live as well , and shew as much tenderness of conscience , and fear of erring and sinning as thy self ? why then art thou so hasty in condemning them that are as fair for the reputation of wisdom as thou art ? but suppose them mistaken ; hast thou tryed that they are unwilling to be instructed ? it may be you have wrangled with them by disputes , which have but engaged each other to defend his own opinion : but call them to thee in love , and tell them , you are ignorant , and i am wise : i will teach you what you know not , and open to them all the evidence which causeth your own confident apprehensions : wish them to study it , and hear patiently what they have to say ; and i am perswaded that many or most sober men that differ from you , will not refuse thus to become as your scholars , so far as to consider all that you have to offer to convince them , and thankfully receive as much of the truth as they can discern . but , alas , no men rage so much against others as erroneous and blind , as the blind and erroneous ; and no men so furiously brand others with the marks of obstinacy , factiousness and schism , as the obstinate , factious and schismatical . the prouder the obtruder of his own conceits is , the more he condemneth all dissenters as proud , for presuming to differ from such as he ? and all for want of a humble mind . . moreover it is this pretended knowledge which is the cause of all our false reformations . men are so over-wise , that they presently see a beam in their brothers eye , which is but a mote ; and they magnifie all the imperfections of others , pastors and churches , into mountains of iniquity : every mis-expression or disorder , or inconvenient phrase in a prayer , or a sermon , or a book , is an odious , damning , intolerable evil . o! say such , what idolaters are they that use a form of prayer , which god did not command ? what large consciences have they that can join with a parish church ? that can communicate kneeling , and among bad men , or those whose conversion is not tryed ? what abundance of intolerable evils do such men find in the words and forms , and orders , and circumstances of other mens worship , which god mercifully accepteth through christ , taking all these but for such pardonable imperfections as he mercifully beareth with in all . and then the reformation must be presently answerable to the apprehension of the evil . yea , sometimes the very injudicious sort of zealous people make the cry of the greatness of this or that corruption , how antichristian and intolerable it is ? and then the reformation must satisfie this vulgar errour , and answer the cry and expectation of the people . i would here give instances of abundance of mis-reformings , which all need a reformation , both in doctrine , discipline and worship , but that i reserve it for another treatise if i live to finish it , and can get it printed , called over-doing is undoing . . lastly , this vice of pretended certainty and knowledge , hath set up several false terms of christian unity and peace , and by them hath done more to hinder the churches peace and unity , than most devices ever did , which satan ever contrived to that end : by this church-tearing vice , abundance of falshoods , and abundance of things uncertain , and abundance of things unnecessary , have been made so necessary to the union and communion of the churches and their members , as that thereby the christian world hath been grinded to powder by the names and false pretences of unity and peace . just as if a wise statesman would advise his majesty , that none may be his subjects that are not of one age , one stature , one complexion , and one disposition , that so he might have subjects more perfectly concordant , than all the princes on earth besides : and so might be the most glorious defender of unity and peace ! but how must this be done ? why , command them all to be of your mind ? but that prevaileth not , and yet it is undone ? why then they are obstinate , self-will'd persons . well , but yet it is undone ! why lay fines and penalties upon them ? well , but yet it is undone : all the hypocrites that had no religion , are of the religion which is uppermost ; and the rest are uncured . why require more bricks of them , and let them have no straw , and tell them that their religion is their idleness , stubbornness and pride , and let your little finger be heavier than your fathers loins ! but hearken , young counsellors ! jeroboam will have the advantage of all this , and still the sore will be unhealed . why then banish them , and hang them that obey not , till there be none left that are not of one mind . but sir , i pray you , who shall do it ? and who shall that one man be that shall be left to be all the kingdom ? you are not such a fool as to be ignorant , that no two men will agree in all things , nor be perfectly of the same complexion : if there must be one king and but one subject , i pray you , who shall that one subject be ? i hope not he that counselleth it ; neque enim lex justior ulla est , quàm necis artifices arte perire suâ . but hark you sir , shall that one man have a wife or not ? if not , the kingdom will die with him ? if yea , i dare prognosticate he and his wife will not be in all things of a mind . if they be , take me for a mistaken man. by this vice of pretended knowledge and certainty , it is , that the papacy hath been made the center of the unity of the universal church . unity we must have , god forbid else : there is no maintaining christianity without it . but the pope must be principium unitatis : and will all christians certainly unite in the pope ? well , and patriarchs must be the pillars of unity : but was it so to the unity of the first churches ? or is it certain that all christians will unite in patriarchs ? but further all the mass of gregory the too great , and all the legends in his dialogues , or at least all the doctrines and ceremonies which he received , and the form of government in his time , must be made necessary to church union : say you so ? but it was not all necessary in the apostles times , nor in cyprian's times , no nor in gregory's own times ; much of those things being used arbitrarily : and what was made necessary by canons of general councils in the empire , ( mark it ) was never thereby made necessary in all the rest of the churches . and are you sure that meer christians will take all these for certain truths ? why , if they will not , burn and banish them . this is , as tertullian saith , solitudinem facere & pacem vocare . but hark sir , this way hath been tryed too long in vain : millions of albigenses and waldenses are said by historians to be kill'd in france , savoy , italy , germany , &c. the french massacre killed about forty or thirty thousand : the irish massacre in that little island killed about two hundred thousand . but were they not stronger after all these cruelties than before ? alas , sir , all your labour is lost , and your party is taken for a blood-thirsty generation , and humane nature which abhorreth the blood-thirsty , ever after breedeth enemies to your way . this is the effect of false principles , and terms of unity and peace , contrived by proud self-conceited men , that think the world should take their dictates for a supream law , and obey them as the directive deities of mankind . if all this be not enough to tell you what proud pretended certainty is , read over the histories of the ages past , and you shall find it written in ink , in tears , in blood , in mutations , in subversions of the empires and kingdoms of the world , in the most odious and doleful contentions of prelates , lacerations of churches , and desolations of the earth . and yet have we not experience enough to teach us ? chap. xiii . the commodities of a suspended judgment , and humble understanding , which pretendeth to no more knowledge or certainty than it hath . the commodities of an humble mind , which pretendeth not to be certain till he is certain , you may gather by contraries from the twelve forementioned mischiefs of prefidence ; which to avoid prolixity , i leave to your collection . moreover i add , . such a humble suspended mind doth not cheat it self with seeming to have a knowledge , a divine faith , a religion when it hath none . it doth not live on air and dreams , nor feed on shadows , nor is puft up with a tympanite of vain conceits , instead of true substantial wisdom . . he is not prepossessed against the truth , but hath room for knowledge , and having the teachableness of a child , he shall receive instruction , and grow in true knowledge , when the proud and inflated wits , being full of nothing , are sent empty away . . he entangleth not himself in a seeming necessity of making good all that he hath once received and entertained : he hath not so many bastards of his own brain to maintain , as the prefident hasty judgers have : which saveth him much sinful study and strife . . he is not liable to so much shame of mutability : he that fixeth not , till he feel firm ground , nor buildeth till he feel a rock , need not pull down , and repent so oft as rash presumers . . unless the world be bedlam mad in proud obtrudings of their own conceits , methinks such a wary humble man , should offend but few , and better keep both his own , and the churches peace than others . can persecutors for shame hang and burn men for meer ignorance , who are willing to learn , and will thankfully from any man receive information ? what if in queen marys days the poor men and women had told my lords of winchester and london , [ we are not persons of so good understandings as to know what a spiritual body is , as paul describeth it , cor. . and seeing most say that the sun it self is a body , and not a spirit ; and late philosophers say , that light is a substance , or body , which yet from the sun in a moment diffuseth it self through all the surface of the earth and air , we know not how far locality , limitations , extension , impenetrability , divisibility , &c. belong to the body of christ , and consequently how far it may be really present ; we can say nothing , but that we know not . would my good lord bishops have burnt them for [ i know not ? ] perhaps they would have said , you must believe the church . but which is the church , my lord ? why , it is the pope and a general council . but alas , my lord , i have never seen or heard either pope or council : why , but we have , and you must believe us : must we believe you , my lords , to be infallible ? or only as we do other men that may deceive and be deceived ? is any infallible besides the pope and his council ? truly , my lords , we are ignorant people , and we know not what the pope and councils have said ; and we are uncertain whether you report them truly , and uncertain whether they are fallible or not ; but we are willing to hear any thing which may make us wiser . would their lordships have burnt such modest persons ? suppose in a church where men are put to profess or subscribe to , or against the opinions of free-will , or reprobation , or predetermination , or such like , a humble man should say , these are things above my understanding ; i cannot reach to know what free-will is , nor whether all causes natural and free be predetermined by divine premotion , &c. i can say neither it is so , nor it is not , they are above my reach ; would they silence and cast out such an humble person , and forbid him to preach the gospel of christ ? perhaps they would : but there are not so many hardened to such inhumanity as there are men that would deal sharply with one that is as confident as they are on the other side . and those few that were thus silenced , would have the more peace , that they procured it not by self-conceited singularities ; and the silencers of them would be the more ashamed , before all sober persons that shall hear it . other instances i pass by . chap. . the aggravations of this sin of prefidence . though there be so much evil in this sin of presumption as i have noted , yet is it not in all alike culpable or unhappy : but differeth in both respects as i shall tell you . i. for culpability it is worst in these sorts and cases following . . it is a great sin in those who have least reason to think highly of their own understandings , and greatest reason to distrust themselves : as. . in those that are young and unexperienced , and must be miraculously wise , if they are wiser than old experienced persons ( caeteris paribus . ) . in the unlearned or half-learned who have had but little time or helps for study , or at least have made but little use of them . . in duller wits , and persons that in other matters are known to be no wiser than others . . in those that take up their prefidence upon the slightest grounds , as bare surmises , and reports from others that were uncertain . . in those that have been oft deceived already , and should by their sad experience have been brought to humble self-suspicion . . and it is an aggravated sin in those whose place and condition obligeth them to learn from others . as for the wife to be self-con●eited of all her apprehensions against her husband ( unless he be a fool : ) for the servant to set his wit against his masters ; where he should obey him . for children to think that their wits are righter than their parents or masters , and apprentices and learners to think that they know more than their teachers : and for the ignorant people to censure over-hastily the doctrine and practice of their pastors , as if they were wiser than they : perhaps they are . but it must be some rare person who is fit to be a teacher himself , or the teacher some sot that hath intruded into the office , or else it must be a wonder . for god usually giveth men knowledge according to the time , and means , and pains that they have had to get it , and not by miraculous infusions without means . doth not the apostle expresly tell you this , heb. . , . when for the time you ought to have been teachers , &c. men should be wise according to time and means of wisdom , which they have had . . it is the greater crime when men will seem wisest in other mens matters and concernments . when the subject will know best what belongeth to a king or governor , and the people will know best how the pastor should teach them , and when he faileth , and whom he should receive into the church or exclude . when the servant will know best his masters duty , and every man his neighbours , and least his own . . it is the greater crime when men will be the judges of their own understandings , and think highly of them in cases where they should be tryed by others . as if an empyrick , or woman do think that they know better how to cure a disease than the ablest physicians ; why do they not offer themselves to the tryal , and before them make good their skill by reason ? if an unexperienced young student think himself able to be a physician , he is not to be judge , but must be tryed and judged by physicians : if a self-conceited professor , or a young student think himself fit for the ministry , he must not presently contrive how to get in , and how to shift off examination , but freely offer himself to be tried by able godly ministers , and then by the ordainers , who are to judge . but when such persons can think themselves sufficient if no body else do , or if but a few ignorant persons do , that are unfit to judge , this proves their pride and presumption to be a great and heinous sin . . and it is yet more heinously aggravated , when to keep up the reputation of their own understandings , they use to depress and vilify the wiser , even those whom they never knew : as he that affecteth to be a preacher and dare not pass the examination , hath no way to hide his shame , but . by crying down the learning which he wanteth , as a humane carnal thing . and . by reproaching those that should judge of him and ordain him , as poor carnal persons who understand not the things of the spirit as he doth , and as proud self-seeking men , that will approve of none but those that flatter them , and are of their way . some such there may be : but sure all are not such . why do you not desire the judgment of the wisest most impartial men , but take up with the applause of unlearned persons that are of your own mind and way , and magnify you for humouring them ? so you shall hear empyricks and she-physicians vilify doctors of physick , as men that have less knowledge than they , and are so proud and covetous and dishonest , that there is no trusting them . when pretended knowledge must have so base a cloak , it is the greater sin . . and it is the heinouser sin when they venture to do heinous mischief by it : as a papist , a quaker , or a separatist will in his confidence , be a perverter of others , and a condemner of the just , and a defamer of those that are against him , and a troubler of the church and world. he that in his self-conceitedness dare resist the wisest , and his teachers , and rulers , and set countries on fire , is wickedly presumptuous . so in the practice of physick , when people will be self-conceited , when the lives of others lie upon it , and a silly fellow or woman will venture to purge , to let blood , to give this or that , who know neither the disease nor proper cure . . it is therefore a heinous sin in rulers , who must judge for the life and death of others , or for the peace or misery of thousands about them . i mean pastors and commanders in armies , and navies , and other governours on whom the publick welfare of the church , or army , or navy , or countrey doth depend . o how wise should that person be , whose errours may cost thousands , so dear as their destruction ! or if their understandings be not extraordinary how cautelous should they be in judging ; upon hearing the wisest , and hearing dissenters , and not only flatterers or consenters ; and hearing men of several minds , and hearing all witnesses , and evidence , and hearing every man speak for himself : and after all considering throughly of it : specially of laws and wars , and impositions in religion , where thousands of conscience , say what you can , will expect satisfaction . when a woman called to antigonus to hear her cause and do her justice , he told her that he could not have leisure : she answered , you should not have while to be king then : whereupon he heard her , and did her right . had it been to an inferior judge she had spoken reason . . lastly , pretended certainty is the greater sin when it is falsly fathered on god. but the pope and council dare pretend that god hath promised them infallibility , and god hath certified them that the consecrated bread is no bread , and that our senses are all deceived ; and god hath made the pope the universal ruler of the world or church , and made him and his council the only judges by which all men must know what is the word of god. so when fanaticks will pretend that by revelation , visions or inspirations of the spirit , god hath assured them that this or that is the meaning of a text which they understand not , or the truth in such or such a controversy . alas among too many well meaning persons , god is pretended for a multitude of sinful errors ; and they that preach false doctrine , will do it as the old prophet spake to the young , as from the lord : and they that rail at godliness and they that censure , backbite , cast out or persecute their brethren , will do it as rabshakeh ; hath not god sent me , &c. men will not make any snares for the church or their brethrens consciences , but in the name of god : they will not divide the church , nor cast out infants , nor refuse communion with their brethren , but in the name of god. one man saith , god forbiddeth him all book prayers , or all imposed forms of prayer . and another saith , god forbiddeth him all but such . and all bely god , and add this heinous abuse of his holy word and name unto their sin . chap. . some special aggravations more of this sin , in students and pastors , which should deter them from pretended knowledge or prefidence . to such i will suppose that to name the evils may suffice ( on my part ) without sharp amplifications . though i have spoken to you first in what is said , i will briefly add , . that this sin will make you slothful students . few study hard who are quickly confident of their first conceptions . . while you do study , it keepeth out knowledge : you are too full of your selves to receive easily from others . . it is the common parent of errour and heresy . ignorance is the mother , and pride the father of them all : and prefidence and pretended knowledge is but proud ignorance in another name . . what a life of precious time will you waste in following the erroneous thoughts of your bewildred minds . . as food altereth the temperament of the body which it nourisheth , so the very temperament of your minds and wills and affections will become vain , and frothy , and shadowy , or malignant and perverse , according to the quality of your errour . . it is the common parent of superstition : it defileth god's worship with humane inventions , with duties and sins of our own making : all such mens dreams will seem to them to be the laws of god. . it will entail a corrupt education of youth upon us , and consequently a corrupt degenerate kind of learning , and so a degenerate ministry on the churches . when youths are possessed with abundance of uncertainties under the name of learning and religion , it will grow the custom to teach , and talk , and live accordingly : do i say , it will do ? if the schoolmens errour in this deserve but half as much as faber , valla , hutten , erasmus , charge upon them , you should hear and take warning : not to avoid the most accurate knowledge by the hardest studies , but to avoid pretending that you know what you do not . . and you will make vain strife and contention about vanity , your very trade and business when you come abroad in the world . they that make uncertainties or errours to be their studies and honourable learning , must keep up the honour of it by living as they learnt , and talking vainly for the vanities of their minds . . and you are like hereby to become the chiefest instruments of satan , to trouble the church either with heresies , schisms or persecutions . . and truly it should much turn your hearts against it , to know that it is a continual habit or exercise of pride . and pride ( the devil's sin ) is one of the most heinous and odious to god. if you hate any sin , you should hate pride . and it is one of the worst sorts of pride too . as nature hath three principles , active power , intellect and will , and man three excellencies , greatness , wisdom and goodness ; so pride hath these three great objects : men are proud that they are greater , or wiser , or better than others : that is , they think themselves greater , or wiser , or better than they are , and they would have others think so too . as for pride of beauty , or clothing , or such like corporeal things and appurtenances , it is the vice of children , and the more shallow and foolish sort of women . but greater things make up a greater sort of pride . o what a number of all ranks and ages do live in this great sin of pride of wisdom , or an over-valued understanding , who never feel or lament it ! . moreover your prefidence prepareth you for scepticism , or doubting of the most certain necessary truths : like some of our sectaries , who have been falsly ▪ confident of so many religions , till at last they doubt of all religion . he that finds that he was deceived while he was an anabaptist , and deceived when he was a separatist , and deceived while he was an antinomian or libertine , and deceived when he was a quaker , is prepared to think also that he was deceived when he was a christian , and when he believed the immortality of the soul , and the life to come . when you have found your understandings oft deceive you , you will grow so distrustful of them , as hardly ever to believe them when it is most necessary . he that often lyeth , will hardly be believed when he speaketh truth . and all this cometh from believing your first and slight apprehensions too easily and too soon , and so filling up your minds with lyes , which when they are discovered , make the truth to be suspected . like some fanciful , lustful youths , who hastily grow fond of some unsuitable unlovely person , and when they know them , cannot so much as allow them the conjugal affection which they are bound to . . lastly , consider what a shame it is to your understandings , and how it contradicteth your pretence of knowledge . for , how little knoweth that man who knoweth not his own ignorance ? how can it be thought that you are like to know great matters at a distance , the profundities , sublimities and subtilties of sciences , who know not yet how little you know ? chap. . proofs of the little knowledge that is in the world , to move us to a due distrust of our understandings . if you think this sin of a proud understanding , and pretended knowledge , doth need for the cure a fuller discovery of its vanity , i know not how to do it more convincingly , than by shewing you how little true knowledge is in the world , and consequently that all mankind have cause to think meanly of their understandings . i. the great imperfection of all the sciences , is a plain discovery of it : when mankind hath had above years already to have grown to more perfection ; yet how much is still dark , and controverted ? and how much unknown in comparison of what we know ? but above all , though nothing is perfectly known which is not methodically known ; yet how few have a true methodical knowledge ? he that seeth but some parcels of truth , or seeth them but confusedly , or in a false method , not agreeable to the things , doth know but little , because he knoweth not the place , and order , and respects of truths to one another , and consequently neither their composition , harmony , strength or use . like a philosopher that knew nothing but elements , and not mixt bodies , or animate beings : or like an anatomist that is but an atomist , and can say no more of the body of a man , but that it is made up of atoms , or at most , can only enumerate the similar parts : or like a man that knoweth no more of his clock and watch , but as the pieces of it lie on a heap , or at best , setteth some one part out of its place , which disableth the whole engine : or like one that knoweth the chess-men only as they are in the bag , or at best in some disorder . who will make me so happy as to shew me one true scheme of physicks , of metaphysicks , of logick , yea of theology , which i cannot presently prove guilty of such mistake , confusion , misorder , as tendeth to great errour in the subsequent parts , i know of no small number that have been offered to the world , but never saw one that satisfied my understanding . and i think i scarce know any thing to purpose , till i can draw a true scheme of it , and set each compounding notion in its place . ii. and the great diversity and contrariety of opinions , of notions and of methods , proveth that our knowledge indeed is yet but small . how many methods of logick have we ? how many hypotheses in physicks , yea how many contentious volumes written against one another , in philosophy and theology it self ▪ what loads of videtur's in the schoolmen ? how many sects and opinions in religion ? physicians agree not about mens lives . lawyers agree not about mens estates ; no nor about the very fundamental laws . if there be a civil war , where both sides appeal to the law , there will be lawyers on both sides . and doth not this prove that we know but little ? iii. but mens rage and confidence in these contrarieties doth discover it yet more . read their contentious writings of philosophy and theology ; observe their usage of one another , what contempt , what reproach , what cruelties they can proceed to ? the papist silenceth and burneth the protestant ; the lutheran silenceth and revileth the calvinist ; the calvinist sharply judgeth the arminians , and so round : and may i not judge that this wisest part of the world is low in knowledge , when not the vulgar only , but the leaders and doctors are so commonly mistaken in their greatest zeal ? and that solomon erred not in saying , [ the fool rageth , and is confident . ] iv. if our knowledge were not very low , the long experience of the world would have long ago reconciled our controversies . the strivings and distractions about them ( both in philosophy , politicks and theology ) have torn churches , and raised wars , and set kingdoms on fire , and should in reason be to us as a bone out of joint , which by the pain should force us all to seek out for a cure : and sure in so many thousand years , many remedies have been tryed : the issues of such disingenuous-ingenious wars , do furnish men with such experience as should teach them the cure . and yet after so many years war of wits , to be so witless as to find no end , no remedy , no peace , doth shew that the wit of man is not a thing to be proud of . v. the great mutability of our apprehensions doth shew that they are not many things that we are certain of . do we not feel in our selves how new thoughts and new reasons are ready to breed new conjectures in us , and that looketh doubtful to us , upon further thoughts , of which long before we had no doubt . besides the multitudes that change their very religion , every studious person so oft changeth his conceptions , as may testifie the shallowness of our minds . vi. the general barbarousness of the world , the few countreys that have polite learning , or true civility or christianity , do tell us that knowledge in the world is low : when besides the vast unknown regions of the world , all that are of late discovery in the west-indies , or elsewhere , are found to be so rude and barbarous ; some little differing from subtile brutes : when the vast regions of africk , of tartary , and other parts of asia , are no wiser to this day . when the roman eastern empire so easily parted with christianity , and is turned to so much barbarous ignorance ; this sheweth what we are : for these men are all born as capable as we . vii . especially the sottish opinions which the heathen and mahometan world do generally entertain , do tell us how dark a creature man is . that four parts of the whole world ( if not much more , that is unknown ) should receive all the sottish opinions as they do , both against the light of nature ( knowing so little of god ) and by such vain conceits of their prophets and petty deities : that above the fifth part of the known world , should receive , and so long and quietly retain , so sottish an opinion as mahometanism is , and build upon it the hopes of their salvation . if the greek church can be corrupted into so gross a foolery , why may not the latine , and the english , if they had the same temptations ? o what a sad proof is here of humane folly . viii . but in the latine church ( be it spoken without any comparing mahometanism with christianity ) the wonder is yet greater , and the discovery of the fallaciousness of mans understanding is yet more clear : were there no proof of it , but the very being of popery in the world , and the reception of it by such and so many , it affordeth the strongest temptation that ever i thought of in the world , to the brutist , to question whether instinct advance not brutes above man ! the brutes distrust not their right disposed senses ; but the papists not only distrust them , but renounce them : bread is no bread , and wine is no wine with them , all mens senses are deceived that think otherwise : it is necessary to salvation to believe that gods natural revelations to sense here are false , and not to be believed . every man that will be saved must believe that bread is no bread , that quantity , locality , colour , weight , figure , are the quantity , locality , colour , weight , figure , of nothing : and god worketh grand miracles by every priest , as frequently as he consecrateth in the mass : and if any man refuse to swear to this renunciation of humane sense , and the truth of these miracles , he must be no priest , but a combustible heretick . and if any temporal lord refuse to exterminate all those from their dominions who will believe their senses , and not think it necessary to renounce them as deceived , he must be excommunicated and dispossest himself , his subjects absolved from their oaths and allegiance , and his dominions given to another : and this is their very religion , being the decree of a great general council , ( questioned indeed by some few protestants , but not at all by them , but largely vindicated : ) later . sub . innoc. . can. , . the sum is , no man that will not renounce not only his humanity , but his animality , must be suffered to live in any ones dominions , and he that will suffer men in his dominions , must be himself turned out ? this is plain truth : and yet this is the religion of popes and emperors , and kings , of lords and councellors , of prelates and doctors , universities , churches and famous kingdoms ; and such as men , all these wise men dare lay their salvation upon ; and dare massacre men by thousands and hundred thousands upon , and burn their neighbours to ashes upon ; and what greater confidence of certainty can be exprest ! and yet shall man be proud of wit ? o what is man ! how dark , how sottish and mad a thing ! all these great princes , doctors , cardinals , universities and kingdoms , are born with natures as capacious as ours . they are in other things as wise : they pity us as hereticks , because we will not cease to be men : the infidel that denieth mans reason and immortality , would but level us with the brutes , and allow us the pre-eminence among them in subtlety : but all these papists forswear or renounce that sense which is common to brutes and us , and sentence us either below the brutes , or unto hell. pretend no more , poor man , to great knowledge ▪ as the sight of a grave and a rotten carcass may humble the fool that is proud of beauty , so the thought of the popish , mahometan and heathen world , may humble him that is proud of his understanding . i tell thee , man , thou art capable of that madness as to believe that an ox or an onion is a god ; or to believe that a bit of bread is god ; yea more , to believe as necessary to salvation that thy own and all mens senses about their proper objects are deceived , and the bread which thou seest and eatest is no bread ; yea though it be three times in the three next verses , cor. . called bread after consecration by an inspired expositor of christs words . ix . moreover the poverty of mans understanding appeareth by the great time and labour that must be bestowed for knowledge : we must be learning as soon as we have the use of reason , and all our life must be bestowed in it ; i know by experience ; knowledge will not be got , without long , hard and patient studies ; o what abundance of books must we read ! what abundance of deep meditations must we use ! what help of teachers , do we need ? and when all 's done , how little do we obtain ? is this an intellect to be proud of ? x. and it is observable how every man slighteth anothers reasons , while he would have all to magnify his own . all the arguments that in disputation are used against him , how frivolous and foolish are they ? all the books that are written against him , are little better than nonsence , or heresie or blasphemy . contempt is answer enough to most that is said against them . and yet the men in other mens eyes , are perhaps wiser and better than themselves . most men are fools in the judgment of others ! whatever side or party you are of , there are many parties against you , who all pity your ignorance , and judge you silly deceived souls . so that if one man be to be believed of another , and if the most of mankind be not deceived , we are all poor silly cheated souls : but if most be deceived , mankind is a very deceivable creature . how know i that i must believe you when you befool twenty other sects , any more than i should believe those twenty sects when they as confidently befool you ; if no other evidence turn the scales ? xi . and verily i think that the wars and contentions , and distractions of the kingdoms of the world , do shew us that man is a pitiful , silly deceiveable thing . i am not at all so sharp against wars and souldiers as erasmus was ; but i should think that if men were wise , they might keep their peace , and save the lives of thousands , which must be dearly answered for . were all the princes of christendom as wise as proud wits conceit themselves to be , how easy were it for them to agree among themselves , and equally to distribute the charge of two or three armies , which might quickly shake in pieces the turks dominions , and recover constantinople , and free the greek church from their captivity . xii . and what need we more than every days miscarriages to tell us of our folly ▪ do we not miss it in one degree or other in almost all that we take in hand ! hence cometh the ruine of estates , the ill education of children , the dissentions among neighbours and in families : parents have scarce wit enough to breed and teach a child ; nor husbands and wives to live together according to their relations ; nor masters to teach their servants . if i write a book how many can find folly and errour in it : and i as easily in theirs . if i preach , how many faults can the silliest woman find in it : and i as many perhaps in other mens . do we live in such weakness , and shall we not know it ? xiii . and the uncureableness of ancient errours is no small evidence of our folly : if our ancestors have but been deceived before us , though their errour be never so palpable , we plead their venerable antiquity , for an honour to their ignorance and mistakes : the wisdom of wise ancestors almost dieth with them ; but the errours of the mistaken must be successive , lest they be dishonoured . we will deny reason , and deny scripture , and deny sense for fear of being wiser for our souls than some of our forefathers were . xiv . the self-destroying courses of mankind , one would think should be enough to evince mans folly . who almost suffer but by themselves ? few sicknesses befall us which folly brings not on us by excess of eating or drinking , or by sloth or some unwise neglect . few ruines of estates but by our own folly ! few calamities in families and relations but by our selves ! what churches distracted and ruined , but by the pastors and children of the church themselves ! what kingdom ruined without its own procurement . it need not be said , quos perdere vult jupiter hos dementat ; it is enough to say , insaniam eorum non curat : if he cure not our madness , we shall certainly destroy our selves . whose hands kindled all the flames that have wasted the glory , wealth and peace of england in state and church except our own ? were they forreign enemies that did it , and still keep open our wounds , or is it our selves ? and yet are we wise men ? xv. but the greatest evidence in all the world of the madness of mankind , is the obstinate self-destruction of all the ungodly . consider but . the weight of the case ; . the plainness of the case ; . the means used to undeceive them ; . and yet the number of the madly erroneous ; and then bethink you what man's understanding is . . it is their souls and everlasting hopes that are cast away ! it is no less than heaven and endless happiness which they reject : it is no better than hell and endless misery which they run into ; and are these men in their wits ? . it is themselves that do all this ; neither man nor devils else could do it : they do it for nothing : what have the wretches for their salvation ! a few cups of drink ; a filthy whore ; a little preferment or provision for a corruptible flesh , which must shortly lie and rot in darkness : the applause and breath of flatterers as silly as themselves . o profane persons , worse than esau , who will fell their birth-right for so poor a morsel ! come see the madness of mankind ! it is a doubt to them whether god or a filthy lust should be more loved and obeyed ! it is a doubt with them whether heaven or earth be better worth their labour ! whether eternity or an inch of time ; whether a soul or a perishing body should be more cared for ! are these wise men ? did i say , it is a doubt ? yea their choice and practice sheweth that at the present they are resolved : vanity , and shadows and dreams are preferred : heaven is neglected : they are lovers of pleasure more than god : they set less than a feather in the ballance against more than all the world , and they chuse the first , and neglect the latter ! this is the wise world ! . and all this they do , against common reason , against daily teaching of appointed pastors , against the judgment of the learnedest and wisest men in the world ; against the express word of god ; against the obligation of daily mercies ; against the warnings of many afflictions ; against the experience of all the world , who pronounce all this vanity which they sell their souls for ; even while men die daily before their eyes , and they are certain that they must shortly die themselves ; while they walk over the church-yard , and tread on the graves of those that went before them ; yet will they take no warning , but neglect god and their souls , and sin on to the very death . . and this is not the case only of here and there one ; we need not go to bedlam to seek them . alas ! in how much more honoured and splendid habitations and conditions may they be found ! in what reverend and honourable garbs ! and in how great numbers throughout the world ! and these are not only sots and idiots , that never were told of better things ; but those that would be accounted witty , or men of learning and venerable aspect and esteem . but this is a subject that we use to preach on to the people ; it being easie , by a multitude of arguments , to prove the madness of all ungodly persons . and is this nothing to humble us , who were naturally like them , and who , so far as we are sinners , are , alas ! too like them still ? xvi . and the fewness of wise men in all professions , doth tell us how rare true wisdom is : among men , whose wisdom lieth in speculation , where the effects of it do not openly difference it much from prefidence , the difference is not commonly discerned : a prating speculator goeth for a wise man : but in practicals the difference appeareth by the effects . all men see , that among physicians and lawyers , those that are excellent are few . and even among the godly preachers of the gospel , o that it were more easie and common , to meet with men suited to the majesty , mystery , greatness , necessity and holiness of their works , that speak to god , and from god , like divines indeed , and have the true frame of found theology ready in their heads and hearts ; and that in publick and private speak to sinners , as beseemeth those that believe that they and we are at the door of eternity , and that we speak , and they hear for the life of souls , and that are uncertain whether ever they shall speak again . alas ! lord , thy treasure is not only in earthen vessels , but how ordinarily in polluted vessels , and how common are empty sounding vessels , or such as have dirt or air instead of holy treasure ! and as for philosophers and judicious speculators in divinity , do i need to say , that the number is too small ? of such as are able judiciously to resolve a difficulty , to answer cases of conscience , to defend the truth , to stop the mouths of all gainsayers , and to teach holy doctrine clearly and in true method , without confusion , or running into any extreams ? we bless god this land , and the other reformed churches , have had a laudable degree of this mercy : the lord restore it to them and us , and continue the comfortable measure that we possess . xvii . and it is a notorious discovery of the common ignorance , that a wise man is so hardly known : and men that have not wisdom to imitate them , have not wit enough to value them : so that as seneca saith , he that will have the pleasure of wisdom , must be content with it for it self , without applause : two or three approvers must suffice him . the blind know not who hath the best eye-sight . swine trample upon pearls . nay , it is well if when they have increased knowledge they increase not sorrow ? and become not the mark of envy and hatred , and of the venom of malignant tongues and hands , yea and that meerly for their knowledge sake . all the learning of socrates , demosthenes , cicero , seneca , lucane , and many more ; and all the learning and piety of cyprian , and all the martyrs of those ages ; of boetius , of the african bishops that perished by hunnerichus ; of peter ramus , marlorate , cranmer , ridley , philpot , bradford and abundance such , could not keep them from a cruel death : all the excellency of greg. nazianzene , chrysostome , and many others could not keep them from suffering by orthodox bishops : no nor all the holiness and miracles of martin . insomuch that nazianzene leaveth it to his people as a mark of the man whom he would have them value and choose , when he was dead . this one thing i require ; that he be one of those that are envyed , not pitied by others : who obey not all men in all things ; but for the love of truth in some things incurreth mens offence . and of himself he professeth , that , though most thought otherwise than he did , that this was nothing to him who cared only for the truth , as that which must condemn him or absolve him , and make him happy or miserable . but what other men thought was nothing to him , any more than what another dreameth . orat. . page . and therefore he saith , orat. . p. . [ as for me , i am a small and poor pastor , and to speak sparingly , not yet grateful and accepted with other pastors , which whether it be done by right judgment and reason , or by malevolence of mind and study of contention , i know not ] — and orat. . p. . [ i am tired , while i fight both with speech and envy , with enemies and with those that are our own : those strike at the breast , and obtain not their desire : for an open enemy is easily taken heed of : but these come behind my back and are more troublesome . ] such obloquy had hierome , such had augustine himself , and who knoweth not that envy is virtues shadow ? and what talk i of others , when all godly men are hated by the world , and the apostles and christ himself were used as they were , and christ saith , which of the prophets did not your fathers kill and persecute , math. . if hating , persecuting , slandering , silencing , killing men that know more than the rest be a sign of wisdom , the world hath been wise since cains age until this . even a galilaeus , a savonarola , a campanella , &c. shall feel it , if they will be wiser than the rest : so that solomons warning , eccl. . . concerneth them that will save heir skin ; be not righteous over-much , neither make thy self over wise : why wilt thou destroy thy self ? but again i may prognosticate with antisthenes in laert. then cities are perishing , when they are not wise enough to know the good from the bad . and with cicero , rhet. . that mans safety is desperate whose ears are shut against the truth , so that even from a friend he cannot hear it . xviii . and this leadeth me to the next discovery , how rare wisdom is in the world , in that the wisest men and learnedst teachers have so small success . how few are much the wiser for them ? if they praise them , they will not learn of them , till they reach to their degree . men may delight in the sweetness of truth themselves ; but it is a feast where few will strive for part with them . a very few men that have first sprung up in obscure times have had great success ; so had origine at alexandria , and chrysostom at constantinople , but with bitter sauce . pythagoras , plato , and aristotle at athens , and augustine at hippo had the most that history maketh mention of ( with demosthenes and cicero in oratory ; ) melanchthon at wittenberge ( with luther ) and zwinglius in helvetia , and calvin at geneva prevailed much : and now and then an age hath been fruitful of learned , wise and godly men : and when we are ready to expect , that each of these should have a multitude of scholars like themselves , suddenly all declineth , and ignorance and sensuality get uppermost again . and all this is because that all men are born ignorant and sensual ; but no man attaineth to any excellency of wisdom , without so long and laborious studies , as the flesh will give leave to few men to perform . so that he that hath most laboriously searcht for knowledge all his days , knoweth not how to make others partakers of it : no not his own children of whom he hath the education : unless it be here and there one scaliger , one paraeus , one tossanus , one trelcatius , one vossius , &c. how few excellent men do leave one excellent son behind them ! o what would a wise man give , that he could but bequeath all his wisdom to others when he dieth . xix . and it 's evident that great knowledge is more rare than prefidence , in that the hardest students , and most knowing men , complain more than others of difficulties and ignorance . when certainly other men have more cause . they that study a little , know little , and think they know much : they that study very hard , but not to maturity , oft become sceptick , and think nothing certain . but they that follow it till they have digested their studies , do find a certainty in the great and necessary things , but confess their ignorance in abundance of things which the presumptuous are confident in . i will not leave this out , to escape the carping of those that will say , that by this character i proclaim my self one of the wisest , as long as it is but the confession of my ignorance which is their occasion . but i will say as augustine , to hierome , epist . . adversus eos qui sibi videntur scire quod nesciunt , hoc tutiores sumus , quod hanc ignorantiam nostram non ignoramus . xx. lastly , every mans nature , in the midst of his pride , is conscious of the fallibility and frailty of his own understanding . and thence it is that men are so fearful in great matters of being over-reacht . and where ever any conclusion dependeth upon a contexture of many proofs , or on any long , operous work of reason , men have a natural consciousness of the uncertainty of it . yea though our doctrines of the immortality of our own souls , and of the life of retribution after this , and the truth of the gospel , have so much certain evidence as they have , yet a lively certain faith is the more rare and difficult , because men are so conscious of the fallibility of their own understandings , that about things unseen & unsensible , they are still apt to doubt , whether they be not deceived in their apprehensions of the evidence . by these twenty instances it is too plain that there is little solid wisdom in the world ; that wise men are few , and those few are but a little wise . and should not this suffice to make all men , but especially the unlearned , half-learned , the young and unexperienced , to abate their ungrounded confidence and to have humble and suspicious thoughts of their own apprehensions . chap. . inference . that it is not the dishonour , but the praise of christ , his apostles and the gospel , that they speak in a plain manner of the certain , necessary things , without the vonity of school-uncertainties , and feigned unprofitable nations . i have been my self oft scandalized at the fathers of the th carthage council , who forbad bishops the reading of the heathens books ; and at some good old unlearned christian bishops who spake to the same purpose , and oft reproach apollinaris , aetius and other hereticks for their secular or gentile learning , logick , &c. and i wondered that julian and they should prohibit the same thing . but one that is so far distant from the action , is not a competent judge of the reasons of it . perhaps there were some christian authors then , who were sufficient for such literature as was best for the church : perhaps they saw that the danger of reading the heathens philosophy was like to be greater than the benefit : both because it was them that they lived among , and were to gather the churches out of , and if they put an honour upon logick and philosophy , they might find it more difficult to draw men from that party which excelled in it , to the belief of the scriptures which seemed to have so little of it : and they had seen also how a mixture of platonick notions with christianity , had not only been the original of many heresies , but had sadly blemished many great doctors of the churches . whatever the cause was , it appeareth that in those days it was the deepest insight into the sacred scriptures which was reckoned for the most solid learning ; philosophy was so confounded by differences , sects , uncertainties , and falshoods , that made it the more despicable , by how much the less pure . and logick had so many precarious rules and notions , as made it fitter to wrangle and play with , than to further grave men in their deep and serious enquiry in the great things of god , and mysteries of salvation . but yet it cannot be denied but that true learning of the subservient arts and sciences is of so great use , to the accomplishing of mans mind with wisdom , that it is one of the greatest offences that ever was taken against christ and the holy scriptures , that so little of this learning is found in them , in comparison of what is in plato , aristotle , demosthenes , or cicero . but to remove the danger of this offence , let these things following be well considered . i. every means is to be judged of by its aptitude to its proper use and end : morality is the subject and business of the scriptures : it is not the work of it to teach men logick and philosophy , any more than to teach them languages : who will be offended with christ for not teaching men latine , greek , or hebrew , architecture , navigation , or mechanick arts ? and why should they be more offended with him for not teaching them astronomy , geometry , physicks , metaphysicks , logick , &c. it was none of his work . ii. nature is presupposed to grace ; and god in nature had before given man sufficient helps to the attainment of so much of the knowledge of nature , as was convenient for him . philosophy is the knowledge of gods works of creation . it was not this ( at least chiefly ) that man lost by his fall : it was from god , and not from the creature that he turned : and it was to the knowledge of god , rather than of the creature that he was to be restored . what need one be sent from heaven to teach men the order and rules of speaking ? or to teach men those arts and sciences which they can otherwise learn themselves . as it is presupposed that men have reason , so that they have among them the common helps and crutches of reason . iii. the truth is , it is much to be suspected , lest as an inordinate desire of creature-knowledge was a great part of our first parents sin ; so it hath accordingly corrupted our nature with an answerable vicious inclination thereunto : not that the thing in it self is evil to know gods works ; but good and desireable in its place and measure : but it is such a good as by inordinacy may become a dangerous evil : why should we not judge of this desire of knowing the creatures , as we do of other creature-affections ? it is lawful and meet to love all gods creatures : his works are good , and therefore amiable . and yet i think no man is damned but by the inordinate loving of the creature , turning his heart from the love of god. and as our appetites are lawful and necessary in themselves ; and yet natures pravity consisteth much in the prevalency of them against reason , which is by reasons infirmity , and the inordinacy of the sensitive appetite ; even so a desire to know gods works , is natural and good ; but its inordinateness is our pravity and a sinful lust . doubtless the mind and phantasie may find a kind of pleasure in knowing , which is according to the nature and use of the thing known . when it is vain or low , and base , the pleasure is vain , and low , and base ! when the object is ensnaring and diverting from higher things , it doth this principally by delight . verily this inordinate desire of creature-knowledge is a lust , a vicious lust . i have been guilty of it in some measure my self since i had the use of reason . i have lived a life of constant pleasure , gratifying my intellect and phantasie with seeking to know as much as i could know : and if i could not say truly , that i referred it as a means to the knowledge and love of god , i should say that it was all sin : but because i have loved it too much for it self , and not referred it to god more purely and intirely , i must confess that it was never blameless . and the corruption of the noblest faculty is the worst : the delights of eating , drinking , venery , are the matter of common sensuality , when they are inordinately desired : and is not the inordinate desire of creature-knowledge , ( if it be desired from the like principle , and to the like ends ) as bad or worse in some respects . consider , . i am sure that it doth as much take up and pre-possess the mind , which should be employed on god , and take up those thoughts and affections which should be holy . tell me why one man should be accounted carnal and ungodly , for delighting to see his own houses , fields , woods , corn , rivers , cattle , &c. rather than another that hath as much delight to peruse a map of pleasant countreys ( setting aside the covetous desire of having much . ) do we not justly account it as unfit a work for the lords day to be for pleasure perusing maps , as to be for pleasure viewing the woods and fields ? many a poor student is as long and perilously entangled in his thoughts and affections , and kept from god and heaven , and holiness , by deep study of languages , customs , countreys , chronology , logick , physicks , mathematicks , metaphysicks , law , &c. as worldlings are by over-minding the world. . and it wasteth their precious time as much as other lusts do . one sensualist spendeth his hours in gaming , feasting , wantonness , idle courtship , hunting , hawking , bowling , and other excess of sports : another spends his precious time in hearing comedies ; and another in reading play-books and romances ; and another in reading true and useful history , and other parts of useful learning : and though the matter of the latter be better than the former , a man may make up the same sensuality in one as in the other ; in reading mathematicks or history , as in reading or beholding , and hearing comedies . . and some turn this learning to as powerful a perversion of the mind , as others do their sensual delights . many think so highly of their languages and chronology , and philosophy , that secretly they are drawn by it to despise the gospel , and to think a holy life to be but an employment for women , & persons that live more by affection than by judgment : so perniciously doth learning make them mad. . and abundance make it the fuel of their pride , and think that they are excellent persons , because they have got some ornaments of the mind ; as vain women are proud of fine clothes instead of real comeliness and worth . i will not dishonour some famous writers by naming them here , lest i seem to take down their due praise . but in general i may say , that it is more than one , of our late famous philological and grammatical criticks , who openly shew so much pride of their kind of wordy knowledge , as may warn humble men to fear such temptations , and to see that this learning may be made a snare . . and the worst of all is , that while such learned men think highly of themselves for that , they are kept from the knowledge and sense of their sinful corruption and misery , and feel not the need of a saviour and a sanctifier ; they cry not for grace ; they seek not after god and everlasting happiness ; they neglect a holy heavenly life : they take up some easie formalities and words to make up an image of religion of ; and then they think that ( in their unhumbled , unsanctified state ) they have as good right to be esteemed godly , as any other , and if any question it , they are accounted proud , self-conceited phanaticks , who appropriate the reputation of holiness to themselves : and to question a learned formalists sincerity , ( as martin and sulpitius severus did ithacius his , and his fellow bishops ) is to expose himself to the censure of proud hypocrisie . yea , no man is so fit for church preferment and honour , and to be the governor of all the religious persons and affairs , as one of these unsanctified learned men is in his own eyes ; from whence it is , that the state of the churches is so low in the east and west ( the roman i mean ) because those that have truly no religion must dispose of religion , and the churches of christ must be instructed and ruled by his real enemies ; and those that hate godliness at the heart , must be the teachers of godliness , and the chief managers of the sacred work . lay all this together , and think whether our inordinate desire of common learning , which is the knowledge of the creature , be not the fruit of adams sin. and if it prove so , consider how far it was the work of christ to cure it . sure he was sent to destroy the works of the devil ( not learning , but this inordinate desire of it . ) and he was to mortify it in the same way , as he mortified other sinful lusts . therefore as he mortified venereous and all sensual lusts , by holy example , and by condemning them , and calling men off them to spiritual delights ; and as he mortified worldliness in men , by living himself a life of poverty and inferiority in the world , and calling men off from the love of the world , to the love of god and glory ; even so no wonder if he mortified in men , the inordinate desire of greater knowledge , by calling them up to higher things , and shewing them the vanity of this alone . and as he saith , love not the world , nor the things that are in the world ; if any man love the world , the love of the father is not in him , joh. . . when yet the ordinate love of the world is lawful : and as he saith , john . . labour not for the meat that perisheth , when he meaneth , labour not for it inordinately : even so no wonder if christ omit this common philosophy , and if paul bid them take heed that none deceive them by vain philosophy , when it is the inordinacy only which they condemn . if you ask me , when this desire of common learning is inordinate ? i answer . when it 's desired most for the phantastical , sensual or intellectual delight of knowing ! or from the overvaluing of the thing known ? not but a delight in knowledge as such is good and lawful , but not as our chief end. . when it is desired as a step to serve a proud aspiring mind , that we may be magnified as learned men : or to serve any worldly covetous design . . when it is not duely subordinate and subservient to the love of god , and to his service , and the common good : if god be not first intended , and all our studies and learning desired purely as a means to god , that is , as a means to know him , and to love him , and to please him , and praise him , and do him service in the world , and enjoy him for ever , but be desired for it self or carnal ends , it is a carnal lust . . when it hath a greater measure of our time and affection and industry comparatively than its due ; and the study of higher things is put behind it , or neglected by it , at least in a great degree . . when it cometh not in due order , but is taken first and in the hours and place which higher things should have . in a word ; god , and our duty to him , and the common good , and our salvation , are the great and necessary things , in comparison of which , all other things are vain : as riches , and pleasure , with its appetite , may be used holily , as god's mercies , to raise us unto spiritual delights , and to serve him the better our selves , and to be helpful to others : and for these ends they are given us , and may be sought and used ; when yet , as they are the fuel of lust , they are the snares of satan , the mammon , the god of this world , the damnation of souls : so is it with the knowledge of the creature ; sanctified and made serviceable to god and holiness , it is of great utility ; but out of its place it is poison and perdition . yea , as appetite and sensual delight is necessary , while we are in a body in which the soul must operate and receive : even so is some knowledge of creatures and common things ( called learning ) of necessity , as a means to better . and while we see , as in a glass , we must not cast away the glass , nor neglect it , though it be but a help to see the species . i conclude then , . that it is hard to say that any man can know too much , except it be , . matter of temptation : . and of penal knowledge , raising terrours , and tormenting the soul. in these two cases we may know too much ; and i fear some mens knowledge is much of the first sort . but so far am i from disswading any from true knowledge , or studies to attain it , that i think ignorance is the mother , as pride is the father of all heresies , and almost all sins : and that the lazy student shall never be wise , though one may take his years in the university , the greatness of his library , or the titles which he hath obtained , instead of wisdom ; and another as slothful , may boast that the spirit hath saved him the labour of long and hard studies ; for my part i shall account both sorts as they are , and leave them to be admired by such as themselves : and verily they have their reward . he that will be wise , must spare no pains , and be diverted by no worldly things , but take wisdom for his welfare here , and the getting and using it for all his work . never was slothful , or impatient , or presumptuous person wise . . god hath not made and set before us his works in vain : great and wonderful are all his works , sought out of them that have pleasure therein : the image of his power , wisdom and goodness is imprinted on them all . who can look up to the sun and moon and stars ; to the vast and numerous globes above us ; to this earth and all its furniture and inhabitants , and not see the footsteps of the great and wise , and good creator , and be edified and made more holy ; that doth not use the eye of sense alone , while he winketh with the eye of reason ? our redeemer came to recover us to the knowledge , love and obedience , of our creator , and by faith to lead us up to the love of god , and to sanctifie us to our makers praise and service . far was it from his design to call us from studying the works of creation ; which he prepareth us better to understand and use : nor would he deprive reason of its spectacles , but help us to better , than we had before . mans wit and tongue are apt to be so irregular , that we have need of the rules of true logick to keep them to order , and save them from deceit . too little true logick and philosophy is much of their unhappiness who think they have enough , to deserve veneration and applause . . but all this is dreaming , insignificant , incoherent nonsence , deliration , worse than childrens chat ( as it troubleth the world more ) if god be not the beginning , guide , and end of it , and if we know not how to please him and be saved ; and if all learning be not directly or indirectly a learning to know god and life eternal : when conscience is awakened all things are as dreams and signify nothing in comparison of god and life eternal , to be obtained by christ . when men come to die , the most learned die in this mind . and further than it is divine and holy and felicitating , they cry out of all their fame and learning , vanity of vanities , all is vanity . though learning be the most splendid of all vanities : fear god and keep his commandments , is the end of true learning , and the whole learning of man. of writing many books there is no end ; and much reading is a weariness to the flesh , and he that increaseth knowledge contracteth envy and contradiction , and increaseth sorrow : but sanctified learning maketh a man indeed ; so it be true , and not false pretended learning . . therefore the industry of a mans study , the most of his time , the zeal of his soul , must be laid out on god , and the great and endless concernments of his own and others souls ; and learning must be desired , esteemed , sought and used , according to its usefulness to these high and glorious ends : then it is the lower part of wisdom : which all that want it must esteem and honour , and desire : else it is a dream and folly , which leaveth the awakened soul in shame . but i have been too long on this . iv. consider next , that as this lower sort of learning is presupposed by christ as true , and the desire of it cured as it is a lust ; so plainness and intelligibleness were altogether necessary to his ends ; what came he on earth to do , but to reconcile us to god , and make known his kingdom , and his love to sinners : to procure us pardon and a spirit of vivification , illumination , and sanctification ? and the word that must be the means of this must be fitted to its end , and be intelligible to the unlearned ; or else he should have been the saviour of a few learned men only , and not of the world. kings and parliaments write their laws in a stile suitable to the matter : and so do men draw up their covenants ; and princes their pardons , and physicians their bills and directions : and none of these useth to write a grammar or logick instead of their proper work , nor to fill their writings , with ludicrous , logical tricks , and toys . he that is but to tell men how to be saved from sin and hell , and brought to heaven , and live so here that he may live with god and angels for ever , must speak in plainness and in good earnest . v. and consider that the scripture is not void of so much logick and philosophy as is suitable to its design . in a well flesht body the distinction and compagination of the parts are hid , which in an ugly sceleton are discerned . so the scripture is a body of essentials , integrals and accidentals of religion , and every unstudied fellow cannot anatomize it : but it hath its real and excellent method , for all that it is hid to the unskilful . there is a method of scripture theology , which is the most accurate that ever the world knew in morality . i have drawn up the body of theology into schemes . in which i doubt not but i have shewn , that the method of theology contained in the holy scriptures , is more accurate than any logical author doth prescribe : and the lords prayer and decalogue , especially will prove this , when truly opened : and the doctrine of of the trinity and the baptismal covenant , is the foundation of all true method of physicks , and morality in the world. what if a novice cannot anatomize cicero or demosthenes , doth it follow that they are immethodical ? brand-miller and flaccher upon the scripture text , and steph. tzegedine , sohnius , gomarus , dudley fenner , and many others upon the body of theology have gone far in opening the scripture method . but more may be yet done . vi. consider also that the eternal wisdom , word and son of god our redeemer , is the fountain and giver of all knowledge : nature to be restored , and grace to restore it , are in his hands . he is that true light that lighteneth every one that cometh into the world : the light of nature and arts , and sciences are from his spirit and teaching , as well as the gospel . whether clemens alexandrinus and some other ancients were in the right or not , when they taught that philosophy is one way by which men come to salvation , it is certain that they are in the right , that say it is now the gift of christ : and that as the light which goeth before sun-rising ( yea which in the night is reflected from the moon , ) is from the sun , as well as its more glorious beams ; so the knowledge of socrates , plato , zeno , cicero , antonine , epictetus , seneca , plutarch , were from the wisdom and word of god , the redeemer of the world even by a lower gift of his spirit , as well as the gospel and higher illumination : and shall christ be thought void , of what he giveth to so many in the world ? vii . lastly , let it be considered above all that the grand difference between the teaching of christ and other men , is that he teacheth effectively ( as god spake when he created , and as he said to lazarus , arise . ) he giveth wisdom by giving the holy ghost : all other teachers speak but to the ears ; but he only speaketh to the heart : were it not for this he would have no church . — i should never have else believed in him my self , nor would any other , seriously and savingly . aristotle and plato speak but words , but christ speaketh life and light , and love , in all countreys , through all ages to this day . this above all is his witness in the world. he will not do his work on souls , by ludicrous enticing words of the pedantick wisdom of the world ; but by illuminating minds , and changing hearts and lives by his effectual operations on the heart . god used not more rhetorick nor logick than a philosopher , when he said only [ let there be light , ] but he used more power . indeed the first chapter of genesis ( though abused by ignorants and cabalists ) hath more true philosophy in it than the presumptuous will understand , ( as my worthy friend mr. samuel gott lately gone to god , hath manifested in his excellent philosophy , ( excepting the style and some few presumptions . ) but operations are the glorious oratory of god , and his wisdom shineth in his works , and in things beseeming the heavenly majesty , and not in childish laces and toys of wit. let us therefore cease quarrelling , and learn wisdom of god , instead of teaching and reprehending him . let us magnifie the mercy and wisdom of our redeemer , who hath brought life and immortality to light , and certified us of the matters of the world above , as beseemed a messenger sent from god ; and hath taught us according to the matter and our capacity , and not with trifling childish notions . chap. xviii . inference vi. the true and false ways of restoring the churches , and healing our divisions , hence opened and made plain . having opened to you our disease , it is easie , were not the disease it self against it , to discern the cure. pretended knowledge hath corrupted and divided the christian world. therefore it must be certain verities which must restore us , and unite us . and these must be things plain and necessary , and such as god hath designed to this very use , or else they will never do the work . one would think that it should be enough to satisfie men of this , . to read scripture . . to peruse the terms of concord in the primitive church . . to peruse the sad histories of the churches discord and divisions , and the causes . . to peruse the state of the world at this day , and make use of universal experience . . to know what a christian is , what baptism is , and what a church is . . to know what man is , and that they themselves , and the churches are but men. but penal and sinful infatuation hath many ages been upon the minds of those in the christian world , who were most concerned in the cure , and our sin is our misery , as i think , to the damned it will be the chief part of their hell. but this subject is so great and needful , and that which the wounds and blood of the christian world do cry for a skilful cure of , that i will not thrust it into this corner , but design to write a treatise of it by it self , as a second part of this . this book is since printed with some alteration , and called , the true and only way of the concord of the churches . chap. xix . of the causes of this disease of prefidence , or proud pretended knowledge , in order to the cure. the cure of prefidence and pretended knowledge could it be wrought , would be the cure of souls , families , churches and kingdoms . but alas , how low are our hopes ? yet that may be done on some , which will not be done on all or most . and to know the causes , and oppugn them , is the chief part of the cure , so far as it may be hoped for . . the first and grand cause is the very nature of ignorance it self ; which many ways disableth men , from knowing that which should abate their groundless confidence . for . an ignorant man knoweth but little parcels and scraps of things : and all the rest is unknown to him : therefore he fixeth upon that little which he knoweth , and having no knowledge of the rest , he cannot regulate his narrow apprehensions by any conceptions of them . and all things visible to us ( not light it self excepted which as seen by us is fire incorporated in air ) being compounds , the very nature or being of them , is not known where any constitutive part is unknown . and in all compounds each part hath such relation and usefulness to others , that one part which seemeth known is it self but half known , for want of the knowledge of others . such a kind of knowledge is theirs that knowing only what they see , do take a clock or watch to be only the index moving by the hours , being ignorant of all the causal parts within : or that know no more of a tree or other plant , than the magnitude , site , colour , odour , &c. or that take a man to be only a body without a soul ; or the body to be only the skin and parts discerned by the eye in converse . now that which such persons do sensibly apprehend , they are confident of , because that nature teacheth them to trust their senses : but not knowing the rest , their little partial conceptions are lame , defective and deceitful . for most will hence rashly conclude of the negative , that there is no more , because they know no more . but if any be more wise and modest , yet do they want the conception of the unknown parts , to make the rest to be true knowledge , or to tell them what is yet unknown : and such use to turn a judicial rule , into a physical , that non apparere & non esse are to them all one . . and an ignorant man doth not know what conceptions other men have of the same things which he is ignorant of : so that he neither knoweth the thing intelligible ( what it is ) nor yet the act of knowing it , which he never had : but as a man born blind hath no formal conception either of sight , or of light , or visible objects ; so is it here . . nor hath he usually a true knowledge of his own ignorance ; how imperfect his understanding is , and how much to be suspected , as liable to mistake : though in some sensible matters it is easie to convince men of a total ignorance ; yet when they know any thing , it is hard to convince them what more is to be known , and to keep them from false and hasty conclusions . a man that cannot read at all , is easily convinced that he cannot read : but he that can read a little , is apt to think that he readeth rightly when he doth not . a man that never heard of physick , is easily convinced that he hath no skill in it : but if he have read , heard of , and tryed a few medicines , he is apt to grow conceited , and venture mens lives upon his skill . a man that never saw building , navigation , or any art or manufacture , is easily convinced that he is ignorant of it : but if he have got some smattering knowledge , he is ready to think that it is more than it is , because he knoweth not what he wants . and to err , and know that a man erreth ( at the same time , about the same thing ) is a contradiction : for he that erreth judgeth a falshood to be a truth : but to know that so to judge , is to err , is certainly not so to judge : for intellectus vult verum , that is , truth is the object which it is naturally inclined to . the same light which discovereth errour cureth it : and that light which discovereth the thing it self , is it that must convince me that i before erred about it , by misapprehensions . . and an ignorant man doth not so much as know the difficulties of the case , and what may be said on the other side : what contrary evidence convinceth others , or what weight there is in the objections , which are or may be brought against him . so that all men being naturally ignorant , and little being known for much that 's unknown , even to the wisest ; alas , the temptation to errour and false confidence is so strong , that few escape it . ii. another cause of it is , the radical master sin of pride : an unhumbled mind ; never well acquainted with its own dark and erroneous condition , and its great need of natural and supernatural helps . i find it hard to convince men of this ; but the formentioned effects do certainly prove it . the vice is born with us at the very heart . it is the devils image : he that is not naturally proud is not a son of adam : it liveth first , and dieth last : and there is nothing that a man is apter to be proud of than his reason , which is his humanity , and next to that of his goodness , and of his greatness . men perceive not this in themselves , because they know not what pride is while it ruleth in them . they think that it is only some womanish or childish extrinsical ostentation , ( boasting ) or perking up above others in garb and place , or peacock-like looking upon their own train , or setting it up for others to look on . but pride is ( as i said before ) an over-valuing our selves , and a desire that others should over-value us : and how few be there that be not tickled when their wisdom is applauded , and netled when it is accounted small : it 's hard to bear to be accounted and reported a fool , or a person of little wit. many a man spendeth all the studies of his life , more for a fame of learning than for learning it self ; what is pride if this be not ? what grosser pride , than for a woman or unexperienced lad , to scorn and despise the eldest and hardest students in divinity as dark souls in comparison of them ? the quakers in their shops , when i go along london streets , say , alas , poor man , thou art yet in darkness : they have oft come into the congregation , ( when i had liberty to preach christs gospel ) and cryed out against me as a deceiver of the people . they have followed me home , crying out in the streets , the day of the lord is coming , when thou shalt perish as a deceiver . they have stood in the market-place , and under my window year after year , crying out to the people , take heed of your priests , they deceive your souls : and if they saw any one wear a lace or neat clothing , they cryed to me , these are the fruit of thy ministry . if they spake to me with greatest ignorance or nonsence , it was with as much fury and rage , as if a bloody heart had appeared in their faces ; so that though i never hurt , or occasioned the hurt of one of them , that i know of , their truculent countenances told me what they would have done had i been in their power : ( this was , , , . ) and yet they were poorly clothed : ( some of them went through the streets stark naked ) and cryed out over and over all the year , [ woe to the proud. ] wonderful ! wonderful ! o the blindness of a corrupted mind ! that these poor souls did not perceive their superlative pride . how highly did these people think of their own wisdom and holiness , while they cryed down laces , points and cuffs ? and when did i ever know either a true church-tyrant , or a true sectarian separating humorist , which were not both notorious proud over-valuers of their own conceits . to which those that bowed not must be persecuted as unruly schismaticks by the one sort , and excommunicated , separated from , and damned as ungodly , carnal or antichristian by the other sort ? several ways doth pride cause pretended knowledge . . by thinking that our understandings are so good as that without great study we can know truth from falshood ; and so making us venture to judge of things at the first hearing or reading ; which we cannot be capable of judging of under long and diligent studies : because recipitur ad modum recipientis . therefore it is that when a man by great success in studies hath made things as plain as words can make them , so that you would think that all students should presently be wise at easie rates by the light which he hath set up to them , they are half as long in learning for all that , as if he had never given them such a help . and therefore it is that we cannot leave our learning to posterity ; because still the stop is in the receivers incapacity . and he cannot be capable of the plainest precepts , but by much time and study . . pride maketh men hasty in concluding , because they are not humbled to a just suspicion of their own apprehensions . and men stay not to prove and try things , before they judge . . pride maketh men insensible how much they are ignorant of , in all their knowledge . . and it causeth men to slight the reasons and judgments of other men , by which they might learn , or at least might be taught to judge considerately , and suspend their own . if over-valuing a mans own apprehensions be pride ( as it is ) then certainly pride is one of the commonest sins in the world , and particularly among men professing godliness who upon every poor surmise or report are condemning those that they do not throughly know , and in every petty controversy , they are all still in the right , though of never so many minds . iii another cause of pretended knowledge is the want of a truly tender conscience : which should make men fear , lest they should err , lest they should deserve the curse of putting light for darkness , & darkness for light ; evil for good , & good for evil : & should make them afraid lest they should defile their minds , resist the truth , blaspheme god or dishonour him , by fathering errors on him , and lest they should prove snares to mens souls , and a scandal and trouble to the church of god. a tender conscience would not have espoused such opinions under a year or two or manies deliberation , which an antinomian , or other sectary will take up in a few days , ( if they were true . ) o saith , the tender conscience , what if i should err , and prove a snare to souls , and a scandal and dishonour to the church of god , &c. iv. another cause of pretended knowledge is a blind zeal for knowledge and godliness in the general , while men know not what it is that they are zealous of . they think that it is a necessary part of sincerity , to receive the truth speedily without delay : and therefore they take a present concluding , for a true receiving it . and he that soonest taketh up that which is offered him , probably as a part of godliness , is taken for the most resolved down-right convert . which is true in case of evident truths , where it is the will that by vice suspendeth the mind . but not in dark and doubtful cases . v. another cause is , an inordinate trust in man : when some admire the learned too much , and some the religious , and some this or that particular person , and therefore build too confidently on their words : some on great men , some on the multitude , but most on men of fame for great learning , or great piety . a credit is to be given by every learner to his teacher : but the confounding this with o● belief of god , and making it a part of our religion , and not trusting man as man only , that is , as a fallible wight , doth cause this vice of pretended knowledge , to pass with millions for divine faith. especially when men embody themselves into a sect as the only orthodox or godly party , or as the only true church ( as the papists do ) then it emboldeneth them to believe any thing which their sect or church believeth . for they think that this is the churches faith , which cannot err , or is the safest : and that god would not let so many good men err . and thus they that should be made their teachers , and the helpers of their faith , become the lords of it , and almost their gods. vi. and it much increaseth this sin , that men are not sufficiently acquainted with the original and additional corruption of mans nature , and know not how blind all mankind is . alas man is a dark creature ! what error may he not hold . what villany may he not do ? yea and maintain ? truly said david , all men are liars . pitifully do many expound this , as an effect of his unbelief and passion , because he saith , ( i said it my haste ; ] when it is no more than paul saith ; let god be true , and every man a liar , rom. . and than solomon and isaiah say , all men are vanity : and jeremy , cursed be he that trusteth in man : all men are untrusty in a great degree ! weak , false , and bad. and his haste was either as dr. hammond translateth it , his flight , or else that his tryal and distress made him more passionately sensible of the vanity or untrustiness of man , than he was at other times . for vanity and a lie to the hebrews were words of the same importance , signifying deceivableness and untrustiness . and indeed among mankind there is so great a degree of impotency , selfishness , timorousness , ignorance , errour , and viciousness , as that few wicked men are to be believed , where there is any strong temptation to lying . and the devil is seldom unprovided of temptations : and abundance of hypocrites are as untrusty as open wicked men : and abundance of sincere godly persons , especially women , have loose tongues , and hasty passions , and a stretching conscience , but specially injudicious heads , so that frequently they know not truth from falshood , nor have the tenderness of conscience to be silent till they know : so that if one say it , another will say it , till a hundred say it , and then it goeth for currant truth . good-mens over-much credulity of one another hath filled the church with lies and fables : many of the papists s●●●rstitions , purgatory , praying to saints and angels , pray●● for the dead , &c. were bred by this credulity : it is so visible in venerable beda , gregory the first , yea before them in sulpitius severus of martius life , and abundance more , that to help up christianity among the pagans , they laid hold of any old womans or ignorant mans dreams , and visions , and stories of pretended miracles & revelations , that it made even melchior canus , cry out of the shameful ridiculous filth that hence had filled their legends : even baronius upon tryal , retaineth no small number of them , and with his brethren the oratorians on their prophesying days told them to the people . i am ashamed that i recited one out of him before my treatise of crucifying the world , though i did it not , as perswading any that it was true : for i quickly saw , that sophronious on whom he fathered it , was none of the reporters of it , that book being spurious , and none of sophronius his work . indeed i know of such impudent false history lately printed of matters of publick fact in these times , yea divers concerning my own words and actions , by persons that are far from contemptible , that strangers and posterity will scarce believe that humane nature could be guilty of it in the open light . and i know it to be so customary a thing , for the zealots professing the fear of god , on one side and the other , to receive and rashly tell about lies of one another , that i confess i am grown to take little heed of what such say in such a case , unless the report continue a year uncontrolled ! for it 's common for them to tell those things as unquestionable , which a few months prove false : and yet never to manifest any repentance , but to go on with the like ; one month disproving what the former hatcht and vended . and indeed the very wisest and best of men are guilty of so much ignorance , temerity , suspiciousness of others partiality , &c. that we must believe them ( though far sooner than others , yet ) still with a reserv●●o change our minds , if we find them mistaken , 〈◊〉 still on supposition that they are fallible persons , and that all men are liars . vii . another great cause of pretended false knowledge and confidence is the unhappy prejudices which our minds contract even in our childhood , before we have time and wit and conscience to try things , by true deliberation . children and youth must receive much upon trust , or else they can learn nothing : but then they have not wit to proportion their apprehensions to the evidence , whether of credibility or certainty : and so fame and tradition , and education and the countreys vote , do become the ordinary parents of many lies ; and folly maketh us to fasten so fearlesly in our f●rst apprehensions , that they keep open the door to abundance of more falshoods ; and it must be clear teachers , or great impartial studies , of a self-denying mind , with a great blessing of god , that must deliver us from prejudice , and undeceive us . and therefore all the world seeth , that almost all men are of the religion of their country or their parents , be it never so absurd ; though with the mahometans they believe the nonsence of a very sot , ( once reading a quarter of whose alcoran one would think should cure a man of common reason , of any inclination to his belief . ) and among the japonians even the eloquent bonzii believe in amida and xaca ; to mention the belief of the chinenses , the people of pegu , siam , and many other such ; yea the americans , the brasilians , lappians , &c. that correspond with devils , would be a sad instance of the unhappiness of mens first apprehensions and education . and what doth the foresaid instance of popery come short herein , which tells us how prejudice and education , and company , can make men deny all mens common sence , and believe common unseen miracles pretended in the stead ? viii . another cause is the mistaking of the nature of the duty of submitting our judgment to our superiours and teachers , especially to the multitude or the church , or antiquity : no doubt but much reverence and a humane belief , is due to the judgment of our teachers credibly made known . but this is another thing ▪ quite different , . from knowing by evidence . . and from believing god ; ( of which before and after . ) ix . another cause is base slothfulness , which makes men take up with the judgment of those in most reputation ( for power , wisdom , or number ) to save them the labour of searching after the scientifical evidence of things ; or the certain evidence of divine revelations . x. another frequent cause is , an appearance of something in the truth , which frighteneth men from it ; either for want of a clear , methodical , advantageous representation ; or by some difficult objection ; or some miscarriage in the utterance , carriage , or life of them that seem most zealous for it : such little things deceive dark man : and when he is turned from the truth , he thinks that the contrary errour may be embraced without fear . xi . another great cause of confidence in false conceits , is the byass of some personal interest prevailing with a corrupted will , and the mixture of sense and passion in the judgment . for , as interested men hardly believe what seemeth against them , and easily believe that which they would have to be true ; so sense and passion ( or affections ) usually so bear down reason , that they think it their right to possess the throne . not but that sense is the only discerner of its own sensible object as such , ( and reason by sense as it is intelligible : ) but that 's not the matter in hand . but the sensualist forceth his reason to call that best for him , which his sense is most delighted with , and that worst which most offendeth sense . the drunkard will easily judge that his drinking is good for him , and the glutton that his pleasant meats are lawful , and the time-waster that his plays are lawful , and the fornicator , the wrathful revenger , &c. that their lusts and passions are lawful , because they think that they have feeling on their side . it 's hard to carry an upright judgment against sense and passion . xii . sometimes a strong deluded imagination , maketh men exceeding confident in errour ; some by melancholy , and some by a natural weakness of reason , and strength of phantasie ; and some by misapprehensions in religion , grow to think that every strong conceit which doth but come in suddenly , at reading , or hearing , or thinking on such a text , or in time of earnest prayer , especially if it deeply affect themselves , is certainly some suggestion or inspiration of god's spirit . and hence many errours have troubled poor souls and the church of god , which afterward they have themselves retracted . hence are the confidence of some ignorant christians in expounding difficult scriptures prophecies ; and the boldness of others in expounding dark providences ; and also in foretelling by their own surmises things to come . xiii . and not a few run into this mischief in some extreams , by seeing others run into errour on the other side . some are so offended at the credulity of the weak , that they will grow confident against plain certainties themselves . as because there are many feigned miracles , apparitions , possessions and witchcrafts in the world , divulged by the credulity of the injudicious ; therefore they will more foolishly be confident that there are no such things at all . and because they see some weak persons impute more of their opinions , performances and affections to god's spirit , than they ought ; therefore they grow mad against the true operations of the spirit , and confident that there is no such thing . some deride praying by the spirit , and preaching by the spirit , and living by the spirit ; when as they may as well deride understanding , willing , working by a reasonable soul ; no holy thing being holily done without god's spirit , any more than any act of life and reason without the soul : and they may on the same grounds deride all that live not after the flesh , and that are christians , rom. . , , , , , . or that love god , or that seek salvation . yea , some run so far from spiritual fanaticisms , that they deny the very being of spirits ; and many confidently set up a dead image of true religion , in bitter hatred and opposition of all that hath life and serious holiness : so mad are some made by seeing some feverish persons dote . xiv . another cause is conversing only with those of our own mind and side , and interest , and not seeking familiar loving acquaintance with those that differ from us : whereby men deprive themselves of hearing half that is to be heard , and of knowing much that is to be known . and their proud vice hardeneth them in this way , to say , i have read , and i have heard enough of them ; i know all that they can say : and if a man soberly speak to them , their vices of pride , presumption and passion will scarce patiently bear him to go on without interruption to the end ; but the wizzard saith , i know already what you will say , and you are tedious ; and do you think that so wise a man as i , hath nothing to do but hear such a fool as you talk ? thus proud men are ordinarily so full of themselves , that they can scarce endure to hear , or at least learn any thing from others , nor restrain their violent list to speak so long as either just information , or humane civility requireth . xv. another cause is malignity and want of christian love ; whereby men are brought if not to a hatred , yet to a proud contempt of others , who are not of their mind , and side , and way . o they are all — as foolish and bad as any one hath list to call them ; and he that raileth at them most ingeniously , and impudently , giveth them but their due . and will a man full of himself and his own , be moved from his presumptions , by any thing that such a hated or scorned people can say ? nay , will he not be hardened in his self-conceit , because it is such as these that contradict him ? many such causes of this vice there be , but pride and ignorance are the proper parents of it , whatever else be the nurse or friend . chap. xx. objections answered . i easily foresee that besides the foresaid impediments , all these following objections will hinder the cure of false pretended knowledge and self-conceitedness , and false belief , if they be not answered . obj. i. you move men to an impossibility : to see without light ; and for an erring man to believe that he erreth . he that hath not light to see the truth , hath not light to see his ignorance of it : this is no more than to perswade all men to be wise and not to err ; which you may do long enough to little purpose . ans . it is impossible indeed for an erring man , while such , to know that he erreth : but it is not impossible . for an ignorant man to know that he is ignorant , ( nor for a man without light or sight to know that he seeth not ; though he cannot see that he seeth not . ) for though nescience be nothing ; and nothing is not properly and directly an object of our knowledge , no more than of our sight : yet as we see the limited quantity of substances , and so know little from big , by concluding that it hath no more quantity than we see ; so we know our own knowledge , both as to object and act , and we know the degree of it , and to what it doth extend : and so can conclude , i know no more : and though nescience be nothing , yet this proposition , [ i know no more ] is not nothing . and so nothing is usually said to be known reductively ; but indeed it is not properly known at all ; but this proposition de nihilo is known , which is something ▪ ( i will not here meddle with the question , whether god know non-entities . ) . to think and to know are not all one : for i may think that i may know , that is , i study to know : now i can know that i study or think ; and i can perceive that my studies reach not what i desire to reach , but fall short of satisfaction : and so as in the body , though emptiness be nothing , and therefore not felt as nothing , yet a hungry man feeleth it in the consequents , by accident ; that is , feeleth that by which he knoweth that he is empty : and so it is with a student as to knowledge . . and a man that hath so much experience as we all have of the stated darkness of our understandings , and frequent errors , may well know that this understanding is to be suspected , and so blind a guide not over-confidently and rashly to be trusted . . and a man that knoweth the danger of errour , may know that it is a thing that he should fear : and fear should make him cautelous . . and though an erring man while such cannot know that he erreth , yet by the aforesaid means he may cease to err , and know that he hath erred . . and lastly , it is a shame for a man to be unacquainted with himself , and especially with his understanding , and not to know the measure of his knowledge it self . obj. ii. you talk like a cartesian that must have all that would know , suppose first that they know nothing , no not that he feeleth and liveth . ans . no such matter : some things , we know necessarily , and cannot chuse but know : for the intellect is not free of it self , but only as quoad exercitium actus , it is sub imperio voluntatis : and it is vain to bid men not to know what they cannot chuse but know : and it is as vain to tell them that they must suppose ( falsly ) that they know not what they know , as a means to know : for ignorance is no means to knowledge , but knowledge is : one act of knowledge being necessary to more , and therefore not to be denied . i have told you before what certainties are , which must be known and never forsaken . obj. iii. but your discourse plainly tendeth to draw men to scepticism , and to doubt of all things . ans . . i tell you i describe to you many certainties not to be doubted of . . and it is indeed your prefidence that tendeth to scepticism , as is shewed : for men that believe hastily and falsly , find themselves so oft deceived , that at last they begin to doubt of all things : it is scepticism which i prevent . . but i confess to you that i am less afraid of scepticism in the world than ever i was ; as finding corrupt nature so universally disposed the contrary way . as when i first saw the books of jacob behmen , and some such others , i adventured to prognosticate , that the church would never be much indangered by that sect , or any other which a man cannot understand and join in without great study and acuteness ; because few men will be at so much labour ; even so i say of scepticism ; here and there a hard-impatient half-knowing student may turn sceptick ; but never any great number : for pride and ignorance , and other causes of self-conceitedness are born in all men , and every man that apprehendeth any thing , is naturally apt to be too confident of his apprehensions ; and few will have the humility to suspect themselves ; or the patience and diligence to find out difficulties . i must say in my experience , that except the congregation which i long instructed , and some few-such , i meet with few women , boys , or unlearned men , when they are past or years old , but they are in conceit wiser than i , and are still in the right , and i am in the wrong , in things natural , civil , religious , or almost any thing we talk of , if i say not as they say ; and it is so hard to abate their confidence , or convince them , that i have half ceased to endeavour it , but let every one believe and say what he will , so it be not to the dishonour of god , the wrong of others , and the hazard of his salvation : for i take it for granted before-hand , that contradiction ofter causeth strife than instruction ; and when they take not themselves for scholars , they seldom learn much of any but themselves : and their own thoughts and experience must teach them that in many years which from an experienced man they might have cheaplier learnt , in a few days . obj. iv. you speak against taking things on trust , and so would keep children from believing and learning of their parents and masters , and from growing wise . ans . i oft tell you that humane faith is a necessary help to divine faith ; but it must not be mistaken for divine faith. men are to be believed as fallible men : but in some things with diffidence ; and in some things with confidence , and in some things , ( where it is not the speakers credit that we rely upon , but a concurrence of testimonies , which make up a natural certainty ) belief and knowledge go together , and the thing is sure . but man is not god. obj. v. may not a man more safely and confidently believe by the churches faith , than his own ! that is , take that for more certain which all men believe , than that which i think i see a divine word for my self ? ans . this is a popish objection thus confusedly and fallaciously often made . . properly , no man can believe by any faith but his own , any more than understand with any understanding but his own . but the meaning being , that we may better trust to the churches judgment , that this or that is gods word , than to our own perswasion that it is gods word , from the evidence of the revelation . i further answer , . that the churches judgment is one part of our subordinate motive ; and therefore not to be put in competition with that divine evidence which it is always put in conjunction with . and the churches teaching , is the means of my coming to know the true evidences of divinity in the word . and the churches real holiness caused by that word , is one of the evidences themselves , and not the least . now to put the question , whether i must know the scripture to be gods word because i discern the evidences of its divinity , or rather because the church teacheth me that it is gods word , or because the church saith it is gods word , or because the church is sanctified by it , are all vain questions ; setting things conjunct and co-ordinate as opposite . . by the churches judgment or belief , i am moved to a high reverence of gods word , by a very high humane faith , supposing it credible that it may be gods word indeed . . next by the churches ( or ministers ) teaching , the evidences of divinity are made known to me . . the effect of it , in the churches holiness is one of these evidences . . and by that and all other evidences , i know that it is gods word . . and therefore believe it to be true . this is the true order and resolution of our faith. . but because the popish method is , barely to believe the scripture to be gods word , because a pope and his council judgeth so , i add , . that we have even of that humane sort of testimony far more than such . for theirs is the testimony of a self exalting sect of christians , about the third part of the christian world : but we have also the testimony of them and of all other christians ; and in most or much of the matter of fact , ( that the scriptures were delivered down from the apostles ) the testimony of some heathens and abundance of hereticks . . and with these we have the evidences of divinity themselves . . but if we had their churches ( or pope and councils ) decrees for it alone , we should take it but for a humane fallible testimony . for , . they cannot plead gods word here as the proof of their infallibility : for it is the supposed question , what is gods word , which ( they say ) cannot be known but by their infallible judgment . . and they cannot plead number ; for , . the mahometans are more than the christians in the world ( brierwood reckoneth that they are six parts of thirty , & we but five . ) and yet not therefore infallible nor credible . . and the heathens are more than the mahometans and christians ( being four sixth parts , of the world , ) and yet not infallible . but of this i have the last week wrote a book of the certainty of christianity without popery ; and heretofore my safe religion and others . obj. vi. at least this way of believing and knowing things by proper evidences of truth , will loosen the common sort of christians , ( even the godly ) from their faith and religion : for whereas now they quietly go on without doubting , as receiving the scriptures from the church or their teachers as the word of god , when they fall on searching after proofs , they will be in danger of being overcome by difficulties , and filled with doubts , if not apostatizing to infidelity , or turning papists . ans . either these persons have already the knowledge of certain evidence of the divinity of the scripture , or christianity , or they have none . if they have any the way of studying it more will not take it from them , but increase it : else you dishonour christianity to think that he that knoweth it to be of god , will think otherwise if he do but better try it . upon search he will not know less , but more . but if he have no such certainty already , . i further answer , that i take away from him none of that humane belief which he had before : if the belief of his parents , teachers or the church only , did satisfy him before , which was but a strong probability , i leave with him the same help , and probability and only perswade him to add more , and surer arguments . and therefore that should not weaken , but confirm his faith. obj. but you tell him that the churches or his teachers judgment or word is uncertain , and that sets him on doubting . ans . . i tell him of all the strength and credibility that is in it , which i would have him make use of . . and it is not alone , but by his teachers help that i would have him seek for certainty . . but if he did take that testimony for certain which was not certain ; if he took man for god , or took his teachers , or pope for inspired prophets , and a humane testimony for divine , do you think that this errour should be cherished , or cured ? i think that god nor man have no true need of a lie in this case ; and that lies seldom further mens salvation ? and that though they do some job of present service the next way , at the end we shall find that they did more harm than good . and that to say the contrary , and that men will cease to be christians unless they be kept to it by deceit , is the way to downright infidelity . and yet that you may see how much more than ordinary i favour the weaknesses of such , i will here answer a great question . quest . whether a man can have true saving faith , who believeth the gospel or scripture to be gods word , and christ to be the saviour of the world , upon reasons or grounds not sure nor cogent and concluding ; yea possibly not true , for the most part . ans . he that readeth mr. pinks excellent sermons , and many other such divines , will find them thus describing the faith of hypocrites , ( that they conclude have no true saving faith ) that they believe in christ , but on the same or like reasons as a turk may believe in mahomet , that is , because the most , the greatest , the learnedst and the best , and all the countrey are of their minds , and in that way their parents did educate them in . for my part , i easily confess , . that such a belief which buildeth on unsound grounds , is wanting proportionably in its own soundness ; . and that it should not be rested in ; . much less cherished against all counsels that would cure it . . and that though uncertain reasons are , . the first , . and the most prevailing with him afterwards , yet every true believer discerneth some intrinsick signs of divinity at least as probable in the word it self . but yet supposing that wrong motives be his chief , and that he discerneth not that in the word it self which most prevaileth with him , i am of opinion that , . if the end of such a believer be sound , ( the reducing of the soul to god , and attainment of glory , and the perfect love of god. ) . and if that man unfeignedly believe all that is gods word to be true . . and if he believe all the substance of the gospel to be gods word , though by an unsound and non-concluding medium as his chief . . and if he by this belief be brought himself to the actual love of god as god ; this unsound believer is sound in the essentials of christianity , and shall be saved . the objection is , an uncertain , yea deceived belief upon false suppositions , is no true belief , and therefore cannot save . i answer , there is a double truth in such a belief , . that all gods word is true . . that this gospel is gods word , and christ is the messiah . you will say that there can be no more , no surer , no better in the conclusion , than is in the weaker of the premises . * i answer , i grant it . and all that will follow is , that the conclusion is not necessary from these premises ; and that the believer was mistaken in the reason of his inference , and that he concluded a truth upon an unsound medium ; i grant all this , and consequently that his faith hath some unsoundness or diseasedness in it . but for all this , i see not but such a believer may be saved . . because christs promise is , that whoever believeth in him shall not perish , but have everlasting life , without excepting such as are drawn to it by non-cogent arguments . and he that will put in an exception against the covenant of grace , must prove it , or be injurious to christ , to his gospel and to mens souls . . because by experience i find , that it is but a small part of serious godly christians , who believe the scriptures upon cogent evidence , ( or at least many do not : ) but abundance take it upon trust from godly preachers or parents , and go on without much examining of their grounds ; and are not able to bring a cogent proof of the divinity of the scriptures , when they are called to it : and i am not willing to conclude so great a part of humble upright christians , to damnation , as know not such reasons for their faith as would hold good in strict disputation . not that our charity must bend the scripture to it . but that scripture commandeth such charity ; and it no where condemneth any man that believeth upon uncogent reasons . for he that doth so , may yet firmly trust on jesus christ , and firmly believe that the gospel is true , as being the very word of god , and may take heaven for his portion , and love god , as god , and therefore may be saved . though yet i think it impossible that any man should truly believe the scriptures , and not perceive in them some characters of divinity , which as an intrinsical evidence much encourage and induce him to believe them ; and-though this secret gust and perception be not the medium that he useth in arguing , or be not the chief , yet it may have an effectual force with his soul to hold him close to christ . but if you suppose the man to have no spiritual sight and tast of a difference between gods word and a common book , then he cannot be supposed to be a sound believer . as a man that hath one ingredient in his medicine which is effectual , may be cured , though in the composition the main bulk be vanities ; or as a debtor that hath many insufficient sureties , may do well if he have one sufficient one , though he more trust the rest ; or as a mans cause may go for him in judgment that hath one or two good witnesses , and twenty bad ones which he put more trust in ; and as he truly proveth his position , who bringeth one sound argument for it , and twenty bad ones ; so i think that the common way of the illiterate in believing is , first to believe gods word to be his word by humane faith ; and after upon trial to find a spiritual light and goodness in the word it self , and by both together to believe that it is gods word . and the worser reasons may be the more powerful with him , and yet not destroy the sincerity of his faith. nor doth this make his faith meerly humane : for the question now is not , why he believeth god's word to be true , & trusteth on it : for that is , because it is god's word ( discerned by him so to be ) but he that by an insufficient medium ( at least with a better , though less understood ) doth take it to be god's , may yet by a divine faith believe it , because he judgeth it his word . if a man should counterfeit himself an angel from heaven , and come in some splendid deceitful appearance in the night to an heathen , and tell him that he is sent from god to bring him this bible as his certain word , and if the man receive it , and believe it on his credit to the death , and by that believing it be brought to see an excellency and credibility , and taste a spiritual sweetness in it , and be brought by it ( as he may be ) to holiness and the love of god , that man shall be saved , though i cannot say that the intrinsick evidence of the word alone would have prevailed with him without that false belief of a deceiver : when it is once become a sanctifying belief , then there is no doubt but the man hath better evidence than the uncertain word of man : he hath the witness in himself . and it is not a glorifying faith , till it be a sanctifying faith. but the question is , what soundness of reason or proof that this is god's word , is necessary to make it a sanctifying faith ? at least , as most prevalent and trusted in ? by this you may know what i judge of the faith of honest illiterate papists , and of illiterate protestants , for a great number of them , who live in love and obedience to god. and yet to speak both more concisely and distinctly , i. i may believe by historical tradition all that matter of fact , which those that saw christ's and the apostles miracles , and heard their words , did know by sense , and those that saw not believed on the credit of the reporters . ii. and yet i may know by reason , through god's help , that these miracles , and this scripture impress and efficacy are god's attestation ; and none but god could do it . and of this all believers have some perception in various degrees . iii. and then we know it to be true , because it is sealed by those attestations , and is the word of god. obj. vii . but would you have men take the matters of fact for uncertain ( that this is a true bible and copy , and was given the church by the apostles , &c. ) and so not pretend to be certain of them . ans . i have oft said , and elsewhere largely proved , that as , . a humane faith of highest probability prepareth the way ; so . these things are known by an historical evidence , which hath a proper certainty above meer humane faith : for humane faith resteth on mens veracity or fidelity , which is uncertain : but there is a history ( such as that there is such a city as rome , venice , &c. ) which is evident by a surer ground than mens fidelity ; even from such a concurrence of consenters and circumstances , as will prove a forgery impossible . obj. viii . you seem to favour the popish doctrine of ignorance , while you would have all our knowledge confined to a few plain and easie things , and perswade men to doubt of all the rest . ans . . i perswade no man to doubt of that which he is certain of , but not to lie , and say he is certain when he is not . . i am so far from encouraging ignorance , that it is ignorance of your ignorance which i reprove : i would have all men know as much as possibly they can of all that god hath revealed . and if the self-conceited knew more , they would doubt more ; and as they grow wiser , will grow less confident in uncertainties . it is not knowing , but false pretending to know , that i am against . do you think that a thousand self-conceited men and women do really know ever the more , for saying they know , or crying down that ignorance , doubting and uncertainty which they have themselves ? how many a one ( yea preachers ) have cryed down the popish doctrine of uncertainty of salvation , who had no certainty of their own ; but their neighbours thought by their lives were certainly in the way to hell. obj. ix . but you would have men resist the spirit that convinceth them , and make so long a work in doubting , and questioning , and proving every thing , as that christians will come but to little knowledge in your way . ans . they will have the more knowledge , and not the less for trying . peremptory confidence is not knowledge . the next way here is farthest about . receive all evidence from god and man , from the word and spirit with all the desire , and all the delight , and all the speed that possibly you can : study earnestly ; learn willingly ; resist no light ; neglect no truth . but what 's all this to foolish conceit that you know what you do not ? what 's this to the hasty believing of falshoods , or uncertainties , and troubling the church and world with self-conceit and dreams ? i remember two or three of my old acquaintance , who suddenly received from a seducer the opinion of perfection , that we might be perfectly sinless in this life : and because i denied it , they carryed it as if i had pleaded for sin against perfection ; and they presently took themselves to be perfect and sinless , because they had got the opinion that some are such . i told them that i desired perfection as well as they , and that i was far from hindering or disswading any from perfection ; but wisht them to let us see that they are so indeed , and never to sin more in thought , word or deed : and ere long they forsook all religion , and by drunkenness , fornication and licentiousness , shewed us their perfection . so here , it is not a conceit that men have faith and knowledge , and quickly saying , i believe ; or turning to the priest or party that perswadeth them , which maketh them ever the wiser men , or true believers . obj. x. but that may seem certain to another which seemeth uncertain or false to you : therefore every man must go according to his own light. ans . . nothing is certain which is not true : if that seem true to you which is false , this is your errour : and is every man , or any man bound to err , and believe a falsehood ? being is before knowing : if it be not true , you may think it to be so ( which is that which i would cure ; ) but you cannot know it to be so ; much less be certain of it . . if it be certain to you , it is evidently true : and if so , hold it fast and spare not : it is not any mans certainty , but errour , which i oppose . obj. xi . but if we must write or utter nothing but certainties , you would have but a small library . ans . . the world might well spare a great many uncertain writings . . but i say not that you must think , say or write nothing but certainties : there is a lawful , and in some cases necessary exercise of our understandings about probabilities and possibilities . the husbandman when he ploweth and soweth is not certain of an increase . . but call not that certain which is not . . and be not as vehement and peremptory in it as if it were a certainty . . and separate your certainties and probabilities asunder , that confusion fill not your minds with errour . obj. xii . while you perswade us to be so diffident of mens reports , and to suspend our belief of what men say , you speak against the laws of converse . ans . i perswade you not to deny any man such a belief as is his due : but give him no more . if a man profess himself a christian , and say that he sincerely believeth in christ , and consenteth to his covenant , though you may perceive no ascertaining evidence that he saith true , yet you must believe him , because he is the only opener of his own mind , and the laws of god , and human converse require it . but what is this believing him ? not taking it for a certain truth : but taking it for a thing probable , which may be true for ought you know , and which you must hope is true ; and this in different degrees according to the different degrees of the persons credibility . if you hear men confidently report any news in these times , when half that we hear oft proveth false , you may believe the reporter as a fallible person , that is , believe that he doth not wilfully lie , and so not uncivilly contradict him ; and yet suspend your belief of the thing it self , and whether he took it up rashly on uncertain rumors . but if you hear a man speak evil of another behind his back , when the thing is not notorious and certain otherways , the law of justice and charity obligeth you not to believe him , but to suspend your belief till you hear both sides , or have surer proof ; yea , and to suspend , not with an indifferency , but with a hope that it is not true which he speaketh . obj. xiii . but then i shall be as uncharitable in judging the reporter ( who perhaps is a godly man ) to be a liar and slanderer , as i should be in believing that the other is guilty . ans . . i say not that you are to conclude that certainly he lieth , and that it 's false , but to suspend your belief , and to hope that it 's false . . he that maketh himself the accuser of another man behind his back , in a way of talk , doth expose himself to that disadvantage , and maketh it our duty to begin our charitable opinion on the side of him that is accused , and rather to hope that he is innocent ( caeteris paribus ) than the accuser . for god forbiddeth backbiting and slandering , and biddeth us speak evil of no man. and he that in our hearing backbiteth and speaketh evil ( how godly otherwise soever ) without a clear necessary cause , doth forfeit our charity and belief , more than a man can do whom we do not see or hear . for if i was bound to judge him innocent before this backbiting , i am bound so to judge him still . therefore i do but continue that good opinion of my neighbour which i was bound to : and that i must suspect the backbiter of a lie , is the consequent of his own act , and long of himself . for i cannot believe contraries : and it is not his backbiting which will disoblige me from my former duty , of judging the other innocent . so that it is the reporter that casteth away the reputation of his own veracity . obj. xiv . when you have written all this against pretended knowledge , who is more guilty than your self ? who so oppresseth his reader with distinctions ? are all your large writings evident certainties ? even those controversies in which you have so many adversaries ? ans . i put in this objection , because i have a book ( called methodus theologiae ) which i know will occasion such thoughts in many readers . but . it is one thing to assert uncertainties ; and another thing to anatomize , and distinctly , and methodically , explain a certain truth . in all my large writings , if you find that i call any thing certain which is uncertain , that is , which i give not ascertaining evidence of , acquaint me with the particulars , and i shall retract them . . i never perswaded any man to write or say no more than all men certainly know already , no not all learned divines : for then how should we receive edification . subjective certainty is as various as mens intellects , where no two are of a size . and objective certainty must be tryed by the evidence , and not by other mens consenting to it . nor must a major vote of dissenters go for a proof of objective uncertainty : for heathens are more than the rest of the world ; and mahometans more than christians ; and papists more than protestants ; and the ungodly more than the godly ; and yet this is no proof of our own , or the things uncertainty . . part of my writings are against uncertainties ; and to deliver the church from false opinions that go for certainties ; and these are they that have most contradicters : and may i not write against false and uncertain opinions which religion is corrupted with , and defend the ancient simplicity , without being guilty of the introduction of uncertainties my self . . i deny not but i have many things that are uncertain : but then i acknowledge them uncertain ; and treat of them but as they are . . lastly , if really my writings are guilty of that which i here reprehend , ( false pretended knowledge ) the sin is never the better for that , nor my accusation of it , ever the less true , nor your duty to avoid it ever the less . think what you will of me , so you will but think rightly of sin and duty . if i go contrary to my doctrine , and you can prove it , take warning by me , and do not you the like . chap. xxi . directions for the cure of pretended knowledge , or self-conceit . the cure of this plague of prefidence of pretended knowledge is it which all the rest is written for ; and must now be the last in execution as it was the first in my intention . and could men be perswaded to this following course it might be done : but natures vitious inclination to the vice , and the commonness and strength of temptations to it , do make me expect to prevail but with a few . direct . i. labour to understand the true nature and principles of certainty before opened . false measures will make you judge certainties to be falshoods or uncertain , and falshoods to be certain truths . and when you know the conditions of certainty , try all things by them accurately ; and if any would by art , perswade you of the uncertainty of natures just perceptions ( by sense or intellect ) remember that be they what they will , you have no better or surer : they are such as our creator hath given you to trust to for your use , even for the ends of life . direct . ii. discern the helps of knowledge from knowledge or certainty itself . believing your teachers as men , and believing historians according to their credibility and reverencing the judgment of seniors , and of the church , are all preparative helps to certainty ; and humane faith is such as to divine faith. but do not therefore think that it is the same : nor give men that prerogative of infallibility which belongeth to god , or to inspired prophets who prove their word by gods attestation . the belief of logicians is needful to your understanding logick , and logick is a great help to your certain discerning of physical and metaphysical and moral verities . and yet many rules of your logick may be uncertain , and you must not take the helps of your knowledge , for evidence it self . some think that nothing is known till we have second notions for it , or can define it : when things sensible are better known by sensing them , and usually second notions deceive men and make them doubt of what they better apprehended without them . be very suspicious of all words or terms ; . as ambiguous , as almost all are : and therefore he that cannot distinguish them must needs err by confusion : . lest you take the names for things , most disputes using to carry controversies de nomine as if they were de re , or slide from this into that . dir. iii. therefore also trust not too far to the artificial forms of argument without or instead of the evidence of the truth of the thing it self . for there are many things supposed to the infallibility of your art , which may not themselves be infallibly true : and mans wit is conscious of its own fallibility , and therefore is doubtful lest it should be deceived in its collections and ratiocinations ; especially when the engine hath many tacklings , and the chain many links , we are still in doubt lest some one should break : but the evidence of the thing in its own reality , which is not wholly laid on the form of an artificial argument , ( which is of great use ) doth satisfy more . direct . iv. take truths in order ; the principles first , and the rest in their true exurgence and dependance upon them ; and take nothing to be well known which is not known , not only in a method , but in a method clearly suitable to the things : as words and notions , so rules and methods must be fetcht from the things , and fitted to the things , or they are vain . sense , and intellect must first perceive the things themselves , and be your first tutors in somatology and pneumatology ; and then these must do much in making your logick . the foot must be the measure of the shoe. and remember that you have but a half , fallacious knowledge , till you know the true place and order , and respects , of the thing , as well as the nature and quality of it in it self ; and till you can draw up a true scheme of the things which you know ; it is dreams that are incoherent . direct . v. let the great radical verities have your greatest confidence , and not only so , but the most of your thoughts and estimation and time ; and proportionably let the lesser things have but that share of your esteem and time , and studies , which they deserve ; ( which comparatively will be little . ) and make them the test of what is further offered to you : and believe nothing which is certainly contrary to them . argue always à notioribus , and reduce not certainties to uncertainties , but contrarily . direct . vi. keep all your perceptions distinct according to the distinction of their natures ; let both your books and your intellects be like an apothecaries shop , where there are different boxes with different titles for different things . let sensible perceptions be by themselves : and the intellective perception of things sensate be by themselves : and the intellective perception of its own and the wills acts be by themselves : and the collection of the nature of spirits and intellective agents thence , be by themselves ; & the knowledge of principles , physical and moral , be by themselves : and the certainty of conclusions be ranked according to the variety of their degrees : the confusion of these different things , causeth so confused a kind of knowledge , as is next to no knowledge , and fitter to trouble than to satisfy . direct . vii . look to all things , or as many as is possible : when half is unknown the other half is not half known . respicere ad omnia is proper to god : respicere ad plurima is necessary to the competent wisdom of a man : to be of a narrow mind and prospect , is the property of the ignorant and erroneous . he that seeth only a hand or foot knoweth not what a man is by it : and he that seeth only a word knoweth not by that what a sentence is ; gods works are all one : i know not what we shall see in commenius his pansophy , which they say is yet to see the light ; how far he hath reduced all sciences to one . but i little doubt but they may and should be all reduced to two , which are as the soul and body that yet make up one man , though not one nature , viz. . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or real part , distinguished into that of substances and of modes ( where morality cometh in , &c. ) . the organical part , which fitteth words and notions to things . and i am sure that as the knowledge of one thing or of many much conduceth to further knowledge ; so the ignorance of one thing conduceth to ignorance and error about others : it is here as in the knowledge of a clock or watch or musical instrument : know all or you know little , and next to none . no man is a fit judge of church affairs , who hath not the state of the world in some good measure in his eye ; else he will be like most sectaries who judge and talk and live , as if the world were no bigger than their synagogues or sects . he must have all the scripture in his eye , and all the body of divinity and all the world in his eye ; and god himself who is more than all , who will not by a narrow mind be cheated into a multitude of errours . there are abundance of truths unknown to you , which were they known , would rectify your other errours . d. viii . conclude not hastily of negatives . you may easilier know that you do know what you do know , than know what it is that you do not know . it doth not follow that there is no more , because you know no more . st. john tells you , that if all that christ did should be written , the world could not contain the books : you cannot therefore conclude from what is recorded , that he said and did no more than is recorded : though i am sure against popery , by my sense and intellect , that there is real bread and wine in the sacrament , i am not sure by sense that there is no spiritual body of christ : the negative must be otherwise proved . i am sure by my five senses ( as they are commonly distinguished and numbred ) that there are existent all the sensible qualities which are their objects : but whether the world may not have more sensible qualities , suited to many other sort of senses , which we have no conception , notion or name of , is a thing that no mortal man can know . you hear many things , and know many things by another man , which make his cause seem bad : but do you know how many more things may be existent unknown to you , which if you knew , would change your judgment ? allow still room and supposition for abundance of unknown things , which may come hereafter to your knowledge , and make things seem to you quite other than they do . how can you possibly know how much more may be unknown to you ? if i have a servant that stayeth out much longer than i expected , i may conjecture that he could have no business to stay him , but his negligence : but there may be many accidents to cause it , which i cannot judge of till i hear him speak . d. ix . be sure that you suspect your first apprehensions of things , and take few conceptions ( conclusive ) for certain that are not digested . fasten not over tenaciously upon opinions in the beginning at the first hearing : take it for granted that your first conceptions of things must alter , either as to the truth , or the evidence , or the order , or the degree . few men are so happy in youth , as to receive at first such right impressions , which need not after to be much altered . when we are children , we know as children ; but when we become men , childish things are done away . where we change not our judgment of the matter , yet we come to have very different apprehensions of it . i would not have boys to be meer scepticks ( for they must be godly and christians . ) but i would have them leave room for increase of knowledge , and not be too peremptory with their juvenile conceptions , but suppose that a further light will give them another prospect of the same things . d. x. chuse such teachers , if possible , as have themselves attained the things you seek ; even that most substantial wisdom which leadeth to salvation . for how else shall they teach others what they have not learnt themselves ! o the difference between teachers and teachers ! between a rash flashy unexperienced proud wit , and clear headed , well studied , much experienced , and godly man ! happy is he that hath such a teacher , that is long exercised in the ways of truth , and holiness , and peace , and hath a heart to value him ! d. xi . value truth for goodness , and goodness above truth ; and estimate all truths and knowledge by their usefulness to higher ends. that is good as a means , which doth good. there is nothing besides god that is simply good , in , of , and for it self ; all else is only good derivatively from god the efficient , and as a means to god the final cause . as a pound of gold more enricheth than many loads of dirt : so a little knowledge of great and necessary matters , maketh one wiser , than a great deal of pedantick toyish learning . no man hath time and capacity for all things : he is but a proud fool that would seem to know all , and deny his ignorance in many things . even he that with alstedius , &c. can write an encyclopaedia , is still unacquainted with abundance that is intelligible . for my own part , i humbly thank god , that by placing my dwelling still as in the church-yard , he hath led me to chuse still the studies which i thought were fittest for a man that is posting to another world . he that must needs be ignorant of many things , should chuse to omit those which he can best spare . distinguish well between studying and knowing for use , and for lust : for the true ends of knowledge , and for the bare delight of knowing . one thing is necessary , luke . . and all others but as they are necessary to that one . mortifie the lust of useless knowledge as well as other lusts of flesh and fantasie . dying men commonly call it vanity . remember what a deal of precious time it wasteth ; and from how many greater and more necessary things it doth divert the mind ; and with what wind it puffs men up ; as is aforesaid . how justly did the rude tartarians think the great libraries , and multitudes of doctors , and idle priests , among the chinenses to be a foolery , and call them away from their books to arms ( as palafox tells us ) when all their learning was to so little purpose as it was , and led them to no more high and necessary things ? d. xii . yet because many smaller parts of knowledge are necessary to kingdoms , academies and churches , which are not necessary nor greatly valuable to individual persons ; let some few particular persons be bred up to an eminency in those studies , and let not the generality of students waste their time therein . there is scarce any part of knowledge so small and useless , but it is necessary to great societies that some be masters of it , which yet the generality may well spare . and all are to be valued and honoured according to their several excellencies . but yet i cannot have while to study as long as politian how virgil should be spelt ; nor to decide the quarrels between phil. pareus and gruter , nor to digest all his grammatical collections , nor to read all over abundance of books which i allow house room to . nor to learn all the languages and arts which i could wish to know , if i could know them without neglecting greater things . but yet the excellent professors of them all i honour . d. xiii . above all , value , digest , and seriously live upon the most great and necessary certain truths : o that we knew what work ( inward and outward ) the great truths of salvation call for from us all ! if you do not faithfully value and improve these , you prepare for delusion : you forget your premises and principles : god may justly leave you in the dark , and give you up to believe a lie . did you live according to the importance of your certain principles , your lives would be filled with fruit , and business , and delight , and all this great : so that you would have little mind or leisure for little and unnecessary things . it is the neglect of things necessary , which fills the world with the trouble of things unnecessary . d. xiv . study hard , and search diligently and deeply , and that with unwearied patience and delight . unpleasant studies tire and seldom prosper . slight running thoughts accomplish little . if any man think that the spirit is given to save us the labour of hard and long studies , solomon hath spent so many chapters in calling them , to dig , search , cry , labour , wait for wisdom , that if that will not undeceive them , i cannot : they may as well say , that god's blessing is to save the husbandman the labour of plowing and sowing : and that the spirit is given to save men the labour of learning to read the bible , or to hear it , or think of it , or to pray to god. whereas the spirit is given us to provoke and enable us to study hard , and read , and hear , and pray hard , and to prosper us herein . and as vain are our idle lads that think that their natural wits , or their abode and degrees in the universities , will serve the turn instead of hard studies ! and so they come out almost as ignorant , and yet more proud than they went thither , to be plagues in all countreys where they come , to teach others by example the idleness and sensuality which they learnt themselves ; and being ignorant , yet the honour of their functions must be maintained , and therefore their ignorance must be hid , which yet themselves do weekly make ostentation of in the pulpit , where they should be shining lights ; and when their own tongues have proclaimed it , those of understanding that observe and loath it , must be maligned and railed at for knowing how little their teachers know . nothing without long and hard studies furnisheth the mind with such a stock of truth , as may be called real wisdom . that god is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him , ( and not of the lazy neglecters of him ) is the second principle in religion , heb. . . they that cannot be at this labour , must be content to know but little , and not take on them to know much . for they are not able to discern truth from falshood : but while they sleep the tares are sowed : or while they open the door , all croud in that can come first ; and they cannot make a just separation . ignorant persons will swarm with errors ; and he that erreth will think that he is in the right : and if he think that it is a divine and necessary truth which he embraceth , how zealously may he pursue it ? d. xv. take heed of a byas of carnal interest , and of the disturbing passions which selfish partiality will be apt to raise . men may verily think that they sincerely love the truth , when the secret power of a carnal interest , their honour , their profit or pleasure , is it that turneth about their judgment , and furnisheth them with arguments , and whets their wits , and maketh them passionately confident , and they are not aware of it . is your worldly interest on that side that your opinion is for ? though that prove it not false , it proveth that you should be very suspicious of your selves . d. xvi . keep up unfeigned fervent love to others , even as to your selves . and then you will not contemn their persons and their arguments , beyond certain cause . you will not turn to passionate contentions , and reproaches of them when you differ ; and the reverence of your elders , teachers , superiors , will make you more ready to suspect your selves than them . most of our self-conceited pretenders to knowledge have lost their love and reverence of dissenters , and are bold despisers of the persons , reasons and writings of all that contradict their errour . and most that venture to cast the churches into flames , and their brethren into silence and sufferings , that they may plant their own opinions , are great despisers of those that they afflict , and either hate them , or would make them hateful , lest they should be thought to be unjust in using them like hateful persons . love that thinketh not evil of others , is not apt to vaunt it self . d. xvii . reverence the church of god , but give not up your understandings absolutely to any men ; but take heed of taking any church sect or party instead of the infallible god. with the universal church you must embody and hold concord : it is certain that it erreth not from the essentials of christianity : otherwise the church were no church , no christians , and could not be saved : if a papist say , [ and which is this church ? ] i answer him , it is the universality of christians , or all that hold these essentials ; and when i say that this church cannot fall from these essentials , i do but say it cannot cease to be a church : the church is constituted of , and known by the essentials of faith ; and not the essentials of faith constituted by the church , nor so known by it ; though it be known by it as the teacher of it . he that deserteth the christian universality , ( in deed though not in words ) and cleaveth too close to any sect , ( whether papal or any other ) will be carried down the stream by that sect , and will fill his understanding with all their errors and uncertainties , and confound them with the certain truths of god , to make up a mixt religion with ; and the reverence of his party , church or sect , will blind his mind , and make him think all this his duty . d. xviii . fear error and ungrounded confidence . consider all the mischiefs of it , which the world hath long felt , and the churches in east and west are distracted by unto this day ; and which i have opened to you before . he that feareth not a sin and mischief is most unlikely to escape it . a tender conscience cannot be bold and rash , where the interest of god , the church , and his own and others souls is so much concerned : when you are invited to turn papist , or quaker , or anabaptist , or antinomian , or separatist , think , what if it should prove an errour ; and as great an errour as many godly learned men affirm it to be ? alas what a gulf should i plunge my soul in ? what injury should i do the truth ? what wrong to souls ? and shall i rashly venture on such a danger , any more than i would do on fornication , drunkenness , or other sin ? and doth not the sad example of this age , as well as all former ages warn you to be fearful of what you entertain ? o what promising , what hopeful , what confident persons , have dreadfully miscarried , and when they once began to roll down the hill , have not stopt till some of them arrived at infidelity and prophaneness , and others involved us all in confusions ? and yet shall we not fear , but rage and be confident ? and to see on the other side what darkness and delusion hath faln upon thousands of the papal clergy , and what their errour hath cost the world , should make those that are that way inclined also fear . direct . xix . above all pray and labour for a truely humble mind , that is well acquainted with its own defects ; and fear and fly from a proud overvaluing of your own understanding . be thankful for any knowledge that you have , but take heed of thinking it greater than it is . the devils sin , and the imitation of adam , are not the way to have the illumination of gods spirit . it is not more usual with god to bring low those that are proud of greatness , than to leave to folly , deceit and errour , those that are proud of wisdom ; and to leave to sin and wickedness those that are proud of goodness . a proud understanding cannot be brought to suspect it self , but is confident of its first undigested apprehensions : it either feeleth no need of the spirits light , but despiseth it as a fancy ; or else it groweth conceited that all its conceptions are of the spirit , and is proud of that spirit which he hath not . nothing maketh this peremptory confidence in false conceits so common , as pride of a knowledge which men have not . would the lord but humble these persons throughly , they would think , alas ! what a dark deceitful mind have i ? how unfit to despise the judgment of them that have laboured for knowledge far more than i have done , and how unfit to be confident against such as know much more than i ? but so deep and common is this pride , that they that go in rags , and they that think themselves unworthy to live , and are ready to despair in the sense of sin , do yet ordinarily so overvalue their own apprehensions , that even these will stifly hold their vain and unpeaceable opinions , and stifly reject the judgment and arguments , of the wisest and best that will not be as envious as they . direct . xx. lastly , keep in a child-like , teachable , learning resolution , with a sober and suspended judgment , where you have not sure evidence to turn the scales . when christ saith , mat. . . except ye be converted and become as little children , ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven ; as he hath respect to the humility of children in general ( and their inception of a new life ) so in special he seemeth to respect them as disciples : set children to school and their business is to hear and learn all day ; they set not their wits against their masters and do not wrangle and strive against him , and say , it is not so ; we know better than you . but so abominably is humane nature corrupted by this intellectual pride , that when once lads are big enough to be from under a tutor , commonly instead of learning of others , they are of a teaching humour , and had rather speak two hours than hear one ; and set their wits to contradict what they should learn , and to conquer those that would instruct them ; and to shew themselves wiser than to learn to be more wise ; and we can scarce talk with man or woman , but is the wisest in the company , and hardliest convinced of an errour . but two things here i earnestly advise you : . that you spend more time in learning than in disputing : not but that disputing in its season is necessary to defend the truth : but usually it engageth mens wits in an eager opposition against others , and so against the truth which they should receive : and it goeth more according to the ability of the disputants , than the merits of the cause . and he that is worsted is so galled at the disgrace , that he hateth the truth the more for his sake that hath dishonoured him : and therefore paul speaketh so oft against such disputing , and saith that the servant of the lord must not strive , but be gentle , and apt to teach , and in meekness instruct opposers . i would ordinarily if any man have a mind to wrangle with me , tell him ; [ if you know more of these things than i , if you will be my teacher , i shall thankfully hear and learn ] and desire him to open his judgment to me in its fullest evidence : and i would weigh it as the time and case required ; and if i were fully satisfied against it , i would crave leave to tell him the reasons of my dissent , and crave his patient audience to the end . and when we well understood each others mind and reasons , i would crave leave then to end in peace ; unless the safety of others required a dispute to defend the truth . . and my specially repeated counsel is , that you suspend your judgment till you have cogent evidence to determine it . be no further of either side than you know they are in the right , cast not your self into other mens opinions hastily , upon slight reasons at a blind adventure . if you see not a certainty judge it not certain , if you see but a probability , judge it but probable . prove all things , and hold fast that which is good . the bereans are commended for searching the scripture , and seeing whether the things were so which paul had spoken . truth feareth not the light . it is like gold , that loseth nothing by the fire . darkness is its greatest enemy and dishonour . therefore look before you leap : you are bid , believe not every spirit , but try the spirits whether they be of god. stand still till you know that the ground is safe which you are to tread on . when poysoners are as common as physicians , you will take heed what you take . it 's safer when once you have the essentials of christianity , to take too little than too much : for you are sure to be saved if you are meer true christians ; but how far popery , antinomianism , &c. may corrupt your christianity is a controversie . wish them that urge you , to forbear their haste in a matter of everlasting consequence : these are not matters to be rashly done . and as long as you are uncertain , profess your selves uncertain ; and if they will condemn you for your ignorance when you are willing to know the truth , so will not god. but when you are certain , resolve in the strength of god , and hold fast whatever it cost you , even to the death , and never fear being losers by god , by his truth , or by fidelity in your duty . part ii. of true saving knowledge : i. causing our love to god. ii. thereby qualifying us for his love. cor. . . but if any man love god , the same is known of him . chap. i. knowledge is to be estimated more , by the end it tendeth to , than by it self . having done with that epidemical mortal disease , ( self-conceitedness or prefidence or overhasty judging , and pretending to know that which we know not ) which i more desire than hope to cure ; i have left but a little room for the nobler part of my subject , true saving knowledge , because the handling of it was not my principal design . the meaning of the text i gave you before : the true paraphrase of it is as followeth : as if paul had said ; [ you overvalue your barren notions , and think that by them you are wise ; whereas knowledge is a means to a higher end ; & is to be esteemed of as it attaineth that end ; and that end is to make us lovers of god , that so we may be known with love by him ; for to love god and be beloved by him is mans felicity and ultimate end ; and therefore that which we must seek after and live for in the world ; and he is to be accounted the wisest man that loveth god most ; when unsanctified notions & speculations will prove but folly . ] this being the true meaning of the text , i shall briefly speak of it by parts , as it containeth these several doctrines or propositions . doct. . knowledge is a means to a higher end , according to which it is to be estimated . doct. . the end of knowledge is to make us lovers of god , and so to be known with love by him . doct. . therefore knowledge is to be valued , sought and used , as it tendeth to this holy blessed end . doct. . and therefore those are to be accounted the wisest or best-knowing men , that love god most ; and not those that are stored with unholy knowledge . for the first of these , that [ knowledge is a means to a higher end ] i shall first open it , and then prove it . i. aquinas and some other schoolmen make the vision or knowledge of god , to be the highest part of mans felicity : and i deny not but that the three faculties of mans soul , ( vital activity , intellect and will ) as the image of the divine trinity , have a kind of inseparability and coequality . and therefore each of their perfections and perfect receptions from god , and operations on god , is the ultimate end of man : but yet they are distinguishable , though not divisible ; and there is such an order among them , as that one may in some respects be called the inceptor and another the perfecter of humane operations ; and so the acts of one be called a means to the acts of the other . and thus though the vision or knowledge of god be one inadequate conception ( if not a part ) of our ultimate end ; yet the love of god , and living to god , are also other conceptions or parts of it : yea and the more completive perfect parts , which we call finis ultimate ultimus . ii. the proof shall be fetcht , . from the order and use of the faculties of the soul. . from the objects . . from the constitution of the acts. . from express scripture . i. it is evident to our internal perception , . that the understanding is but the guide of the will , and its acts but mediate to determine the will : as the eye is to lead the appetitive and executive faculties , by presenting to them their proper objects . to know is but an initial introductory act . yea , . it is evident that the soul is not satisfied with bare knowing if no delight or complacency follow : for what is that which we call satisfaction but the complacency of the will ? suppose a man to have no effect upon his will , no pleasure , no contentation in his knowledge , and what felicity or desireable good to him , would there be , in all the knowledge in the world ? yea when i name either [ good ] or [ desirable ] every one knoweth that i name an object of the will. therefore if you stop at bare intellection , it is not to be called good or desireable as to the intellect , these being not proper intellectual objects : though remotely i confess they are ; that is , that which is called good , amiable and desireable primarily as the proper object of the will , must be discerned to be such by the understanding : when yet the formal notion of the intellects object , is but quid intelligibile , which materially is ens , unum , verum , bonum : but goodness is the formal notion of the object of the will , and not only the material . if any say that i seem here to take part with epicurus , ( and cicero's torquatus ) who erred by placing the chief excellency of virtue in the pleasure of it ; and consequently making any thing more excellent which is more pleasant , though it be sin itself ; i answer , he that will decide that great controversy , must distinguish , . between sensitive pleasure , and the complacency of the will. . between that which is good only to me , and that which is good to others , and that which is good in relation to the supream and final will of god. . between the exterior and the interior acts of virtue . and then you shall see cicero and torquatus easily reconciled , thus . . it is certain that goodness and the will are so essentially related to each other , that they must each e●●●r the others definition . to be bonum is to be volibile ; and to will is ever velle bonum . . it is certain that god's will is the original and end of all created good , which hath its essence in relation to his will. and therefore if it were possible for virtue to be unpleasant or pernicious to the possessor , it would be good as it is suited and related to the will of god. . therefore it cannot be said , that virtue as virtue is better than virtue as it pleaseth god : but it is most certain that virtue as virtue is pleasing to god , ( as to the objective aptitude , ) and that virtue as pleasing to god , and consequently as virtue , is better than virtue , as it is pleasant to the possessor . . and it is certain that virtue , as it is profitable , and justly pleasing to mankind , to the church , to kingdoms , to publick societies or multitudes , is better than as it is pleasing unto one : because the good of many is better than of one . . and it is certain that virtue , as it pleaseth the rational will , is better than as it pleaseth the meer sensitive appetite , which it seldom doth : and therefore sensuality hath no advantage hence . . and virtue as it profiteth , though at present it occasion sorrow or displicence in its consequents , is better than that which at the present only pleaseth ; and quickly vanisheth . but that profit lieth in this , that it prepareth for everlasting ▪ or more durable pleasure . and a long pleasure attained by present sorrow , is better than a momentany pleasure ; which is another difference between sensual sinful ; and spiritual durable delights . . and to end all this controversie between us and epicurus , it is notorious , that the internal vital acts of true virtue , are nothing else radically but pleasure it self : for it is radically and summarily nothing but the love of god and goodness : and love in its properest notion is nothing but the complacency of the will. to say , i love it , is but to say , it pleaseth me ; unless when you speak of either sensual appetite and delight , or love as conjunct with some other act or passion . and ( though occam here stretch it a little too far ) it is certain that the external act of man hath no virtue in it that is moral , but secondary and derived from the will , even as far as it is voluntary : so that the informing root of all virtue is will , love , or complacency ; which austin useth to call delectation , asserting what i now assert . so that the question now is , whether virtue , which is nothing but complacency in good , be better as complacency or as virtue , that is , under one name or another ? or whether it be better as virtue , or as virtue ? as complacency , or as complacency ? if you think i make cicero and the older philosophers fools , by feigning them to agitate such a question ; i answer , . if they do so , it is not my doing , but their own . . but i think cicero meant not so foolishly , but understood epicurus only of sensual pleasure , and not of rational . . or at least of private pleasure of a single person , as opposite to the utility and pleasure of multitudes . . and whether he had so much theology as to remember that which is it that resolveth the whole doubt , i know not ; viz. that virtus as virtue is objectively pleasing to the will of god , and as pleasing to god , it is better than as pleasing to me , and all the world . so that notwithstanding this objection ( thus fully answered ) the acts of the intellect meerly as such , without their respect to some will ( either of god or man ) are not so much as formally amiable , desirable or good. . i further add , that the acts of the intellect may be forced , involuntary , displeasing , and both morally and penally evil . a man may by god be forbidden to search after , and to know some things ; and to know them ( as voluntarily done ) may be his sin . and all know that a man may be necessitated to know many things ; and that knowledge may torment him : as to know dangers , losses , enmities , injuries , future evils ; especially sins , by an accusing conscience , and god's displeasure : and devils and damned souls have such knowledge . obj. all this is true of some knowledge , but not of the knowledge of god or goodness . ans . . it is granted then that knowledge as such is not sufficient to be man's felicity , or final act . . and as to the object , i easily grant that the true knowledge of god is the initial part of man's felicity : but that is much , because it ever inferreth that love or complacency of the will , which is the more completive part . . but there is a knowledge even of god , which being separated from love , is sin and misery : as the devils and damned that believe and tremble , and hate and suffer , are not without all knowledge of god. so much for the first proof , fetcht from the order of the faculties of the soul. ii. the second proof is fetcht from the objects : it is not meer intelligibility that blesseth a man , but goodness , which as such is the formal object of the will , though the material object of the understanding . it is a pleasant thing for the eyes to behold the sun : and as pleasant , it is good ; and also as useful to further pleasure of our selves or others . nothing maketh a man good or happy but as it is good. therefore the goodness of god , ( his transcendent perfection by which he is first essentially good in himself , and amiable to himself , and then good and amiable to us all ) is the ultimately ultimate object of mans soul , to which his intelligibility is supposed . iii. the third proof is from the constitution of these several 〈◊〉 a knowledge being but an introductive act , supposeth not love , as to its essence ( though it produce it as an effect : ) but love included knowledge in it ; as the number of two includeth one , when one doth not include two . therefore 〈◊〉 ●ogether must needs be perfecter than one alone . iv. the fourth proof is from express scripture ; i will only cite some plain ones which need no tedious comment . . for love it 's said , joh. . , , . we have known and believed the love that god hath to us : god is love ; and he that dwelleth in love , dwelleth in god , and god in him . herein is our love made perfect , ( or in this the love with us is perfected ) that we have boldness in the day of judgment . because as he is , so are we , in this world : there is no fear in love , but perfect love casteth out fear . he that feareth is not made perfect in love. ] so that love is the perfection of man. cor. . . and . , &c. yet shew i unto you a more excellent way : though i understand all mysteries and all knowledge , and have not charity , i am nothing . — charity never faileth — . the greatest of these is charity . ] rom. . . who shall separate us from the love of god , &c. rom. . . love is the fulfilling of the law. rom. . . the love of god is poured out on our hearts by the holy-ghost which is given to us . ] gal. . . faith which worketh by love. mat. . . the first and great commandment is , thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thy heart , &c. luk. . . deut. . . and . . . . and . . and . . and . . . . josh . . . and . . psal . . . and . . and . . and . . and . . jam. . . he shall receive the crown of life , which the lord hath promised to them that love him . so . . prov. . . i love them that love me . see joh. . . and . . joh. . . joh. . , , . joh. . . heb. . , &c. and of knowledge it is said , [ joh. . . if ye knew these things , happy are ye if ye do them . see jam. . . to the end , joh. . . but now they have both seen and hated , both me and my father . luk. . . knowing gods will , and not doing it prepareth men for many stripes . see rom. . and as barren knowledge is oft made the aggravation of sin , so true knowledge is usually made the cause or means of love and obedience . , joh. . . he that loveth not , knoweth not god. pet. . . grace and peace be multiplied to you , through the knowledge of god. — pet. . . and many such like . i conclude therefore that the knowledge of creatures is not desirable ultimately for itself , but as it leadeth up the soul to god. and the knowledge of god , though desirable ultimately for it self , yet not as the perfect , but the initial part of our ultimate act or end , and as the means or cause of that love of god , which is the more perfect part of that ultimate perfection . chap. ii. the end of knowledge is to make us lovers of god , and so to be known with love by him. this is the second doctrine contained in the meaning of the text. where is included , . that all knowledge of creatures ( called learning ) must be valued and used but as a means to the knowledge and love of god : which is most evident in that the whole creation is the work of god , bearing the image or impress of his perfections , to reveal him to the intellectual creature , and to be the means of provoking us to his love , and helping us in his service . to deny this therefore is to subvert the use of the whole creation , and to set up gods works as an useless shadow , or as an idol in his place . . it is included as was afore-proved , that all our knowledge of god himself , is given us to kindle in us the love of god. it is the bellows to blow up this holy fire . if it do not this it is unsound and dead . if it do this it hath attained its end ; which is much of the meaning of james in that chap. . which prejudice hindereth many from understanding . . this love of god hath its degrees and effects : knowledge first kindleth but some weak initial act of love ; which through mixtures of fear , and of carnal affections is hardly known to be sincere by him that hath it . but afterward it produceth both stronger acts , and the holy ghost still working as the principal cause , infuseth or operateth a radicated habit. so that this holy love becometh like a nature in the soul , even a divine nature : and it becometh in a sort natural to us to love god and goodness , though not as the brutish nature , which is exercised by necessity and without reason . and this new nature of holy love , is called the new creature , and the holy ghost dwelling in us , and the spirit of adoption ; and is our new-name , the white-stone , the witness in our selves that christ is the saviour , and that we are the regenerate children of god , the pledge , the earnest , the first-fruits , and the fore-taste of life eternal . and all the works of a christian are so far truly holy , as they are the effects of holy love : for . holy love is but a holy will ; and the will is the man , in point of morality . . and the love of god is our final act upon the final object ; and all other gracious acts are some way means subservient to this end : and the end is it that informeth all the means , they being such only as they are adapted to the end . and in this sense it is true which is said in the schools ( though many protestants misunderstanding it , have contradicted it ) that love is the form of all other graces : that is , it is the heart of the new creature ; or it is that by which the man is morally to be reputed and denominated : and it is the final grace which animateth or informeth the rest as means . and thus it is true , that when you will prove any grace to be sincere and saving , or any evidence certain , you must prove it to participate of the love of god and goodness , or you have failed and said nothing . ( yea , you must prove it to be conjunct with predominant love , which setteth god above all creatures . ) and if you will prove any good work to be acceptable to god , ( prayer , praise , alms , justice , &c. ) you must prove that it cometh from this predominant love . for it is so far and no further acceptable to god. and their ignorance is but to be pitied , who tell you that this is to make our love of god to be instead of christ to us , or to set up an acceptable righteousness or merit in our selves : for we dream not that our love of god was a sacrifice for our sins , and the expiatory atonement and satisfaction to justice , nor that merit which procured us love it self , or purchased us the holy ghost . our meaning is that goodness is the only proper object of love : and god loveth his essential goodness first , and created goodness next : and our moral goodness which is his image is holy love ( produced by and joined with holy wisdom and vitality . ) and so though god love us in christ , or as related to him , it is as holy members of him ; and not that he loveth complacentially the haters of god for their relation to christ , without respect to any goodness in themselves . and to say that christ maketh us acceptable and amiable to god , is all one as to say that he procureth us the pardon of sin , and the gift of the holy ghost , and maketh us holy lovers of god : or that he is indeed our saviour . he that commendeth health as wrought by his physician , doth not set health instead of the physician . christ is the physician ; the holy ghost or holy love in us , is our health : to procure and give us the holy ghost , is christs office. he pardoneth our sin when he pardoneth the punishment : the privation of the holy ghost and his operations is our principal punishment : and therefore ( not all , but ) the principal part of our pardon lyeth in the giving us the holy ghost . but some will say , that if god love nothing but goodness , and love us no further than we are good , how then did he love us first , and while we were his enemies ? are not election , creation , redemption and conversion acts of love ? and is not our love , the fruit of his love ? ans . thus names not opened , by confounding heads , are made the matter of a thousand controversies . as our love is nothing but our will , so the word love is taken strictly and properly , or largely and less properly . a mans will is considered as efficient or as final . as it respecteth a future effect , or a present existent good . and so gods will as it final , and respecteth things existent , either , . in esse cognito . . or in esse reali , is called complacence , and only complacence is love in the strict and properest sense . but gods will as efficient of good , may in a laxer sense be called love . gods will is the fountain or efficient cause of all good , natural and moral in the world. and so you may call gods causing or making good , by the name of love , if you please ; remembring that it is but the name that is questioned : but his complacency in good foreseen or existent is strictly called his love . and so still god loveth nothing in either sense but good . for . he causeth nothing but good . . and he is pleased in nothing but good as good . quest . but how then doth god love his enemies ? ans . . he maketh us men , which may be called one act of efficient love : and he redeemeth them ; and he giveth them all the good things which they possess : and he sanctifieth some , and maketh them lovers of him , that is , holy . and thus he willeth their good , while they are nothing or evil ; which is called benevolence , and love efficient . . and he hath true love of complacency in them . . as they have the good of humane nature . . and thereby are capable of grace , and all the love and service which after they may perform . . and as they are related to christ as his redeemed ones . . and as by relation they are those that god fore-knoweth will love and serve him here , and in the perfections of eternal glory . there is all this good in some enemies of god , to be the matter of his complacency . and beyond their goodness he hath no complacency in them . . and to clear up all this , still remember , that though mans will is changed by or upon the various objects , yet so is not the will of god. and therefore all these words signifie no variety or change in god ; but only how his simple immutable ▪ essential will is variously related to and denominated from the connotation of effects and objects . . also it must be noted , as included in the text , that god loveth all that truly love him : for to be known of him , here meaneth , to be known with approbation and love as his peculiar people . as psal . . . it is said , the lord knoweth the way of the righteous ; and so oft : and of the wicked , mat. . . depart from me , i know you not . god owneth with love all those that love him . what parts , what quality , what degree soever men are of , whatever difference else there be among them , if they are true lovers of god , they are certainly approved and beloved by him . this being the very heart and essence of the new creature , and the divine nature in us , must needs prove that man to be amiable to god that hath it . other things are true marks of a child of god , only so far as they participate of love : but love is the primary proper character , which proveth us adopted directly of it self . and here you may resolve the question that seemeth so difficult to many : whether when the scripture either by describing the godly , or by promising life , doth mention some one grace or duty , as the character of a saint , or the condition of salvation , it be to be understood with a caeteris paribus , if other graces and duties concur , as supposing them separable ? or absolutely , as supposing that one mark infallible , because it is never separated from the rest ? ans . the new man hath . it s essential parts ; and . its integrals ; and . its accidents . the essentials are ever infallible marks , and are inseparable from each other : any one of them will prove us holy , and will prove the presence of the rest . these essentials are an united trinity of graces , holy life , light and love ; where each one hath the common essence of holiness , which is their objective termination upon god ; and each is linked by participation to another . holy vitality is vital activity towards god , in mind , will and practice ; holy light is that knowledge and belief which kindleth love , and causeth a holy life . holy love is that complacency of the will in god and goodness , which is kindled by holy life and light , and operateth in holy practice . any one of these thus described , where love is the heart of all , is an infallible mark of holiness . but all other graces and duties which are but the integrals of holiness , are in all characters and promises to be understood with a caeteris paribus , that is , supposing them to be animated with holy love , and caused by holy life and light ( knowledge and belief . ) and that god doth most certainly love all that love him , besides the forementioned proofs from scripture is further evident . . the love of god and goodness is the divine nature : and god cannot but love his own nature in us : it is his image , which ( as in its several degrees ) he loveth for himself , and next to himself . . the love of god is the rectitude of man's soul ; its soundness , health and beauty : and god loveth the rectitude of his creatures . . the love of god is the final , perfect operation of the soul ; even that end which it was created and redeemed for : and god loveth to have his works attain their end , and to see them in their perfection . . the love of god is the goodness of the soul it self : and goodness is amiableness , and must needs be loved by him that is goodness and perfection himself . . the love of god is our uniting adhesion to him : and god that first draweth up the soul to this union , will not himself reject us , and avoid it . . love is a pregnant , powerful , pleasing grace : it delivereth up our selves , and all that we have to god : it delighteth in duty : it conquereth difficulties : it contemneth competitors , and trampleth on temptations : it accounteth nothing too much , nor too dear for god. love is the soul's nature , appetite and pondus , according to which it will ordinarily act . a man's love , is his will , his heart , himself : and if god have our love , he hath our selves , and our all : so that god cannot but love the soul that truly loveth him as god. but here are some doubts to be resolved . q. . what if the same soul have love and sin mixed ; or sincere love in a degree that is sinfully defective , and so is consistent with something of its contrary : god must hate that sin : how then can he love that soul ? ans . remember still that diversity is only in us , and not in god : therefore god's will is related and denominated towards us , just as its object is . all that is good in us god loveth : all that is evil in us he hateth . where goodness is predominant , there god's love is predominant , or greatest ( from this relation and connotation . ) where sin is predominant , god's aversation , displicency or hatred is the chief . and we may well expect that the effects be answerable . obj. but we are beloved as elect before conversion . ans . that was answered before . that is , god from eternity purposed to make us good , and amiable , and happy ; if you will call that ( as you may ) his love. obj. but we are beloved in christ , for his righteousness and goodness , and not for our own . ans . the latter is false : the former is thus true : for the merits of christ's righteousness and goodness , god will pardon our sins , and make us good , holy and happy ; and will love us as the holy members of his son ; that is , both as related to him , and as holy. obj. but if god must needs love sincere imperfect lovers of him as such , with a predominant love ( which will not damn them ) then sin might have been pardoned without christ's death , and the sinner be loved without his righteousness , if he had but sincerely loved god. ans . the supposition is false , that a sinner could have loved god without pardon and the spirit , purchased by the death and righteousness of christ . god perfectly loveth the perfected souls in glory for their own holy perfection : but they never attained it but by christ . and god loveth us here according to the measure of our love to him : but no man can thus love him , till his sin be pardoned , for which he was deprived of the spirit which must kindle love. and imperfect love is ever joyned with imperfect pardon ( whatever some falsly say to the contrary ; ) i mean that love which is sinfully imperfect . quest . . doth not god's loving us make us happy ? and if so , it must make us holy. and then none that he loveth will fall away from him : whereas the fallen angels and adam loved him , and yet fell from him : how then were they beloved by him ? ans . i before told you that god's will ( or love ) is first efficient causing good , and then final , being pleased in the good that is caused . god's efficient will or love , doth so far make men holy and happy as they are such , even efficiently . but god's will or love , as it is our causa finalis , and the termiting object of our love , and is pleased in us , and approveth us , is not the efficient cause of our holiness and happiness ; but the objective and perfect constitutive cause . now you must further note , that god's benevolent efficient will or love , doth give men various degrees of holiness . to adam in innocency he gave but such a degree , and upon such terms as he could lose and cast away ; which he did . but to the blessed in glory , he giveth that which they shall never lose . these degrees are from god's efficient love or will , which therefore causeth some to persevere , when it left adam to himself to stand or fall . but it is not god's final love of complacency as such , that causeth our perseverance : for adam had this love as long as he loved god and stood , and he after lost it ; so that it is not that final complacency which is the terminus of our holiness , and constitutive cause of our happiness , which alone will secure the perpetuity of either of them . obj. thus you make god mutable in his love , as loving adam more before his fall than after . ans . i told you , loving and not loving the creature , are no changes in god , but in the creature . it is man that is mutable , and not god. it is only the relation of god's will to the creature as varying in it self , and the extrinsick denomination , by connotation of a changed object , which is changed as to god. as the sun is not changed when you wink , and when you open your eyes : nor a pillar changed when your motion sets it sometimes on your right hand , and sometimes on your left . . lastly , it must be noted as included in the text , that our own loving god is not the only or total notion of our end , perfection or felicity ; but to be known and loved by god is the other part , which must be taken in , to make up the total notion of our end . in our love , god is considered as the object : but in god's complacential love to us , he is considered as active , and his love as an act , and man as the object : but yet not as an object of efficiency , but of approbation and a pleased will or delight . here then the great difficulty is in resolving which of these is the highest perfective notion of man's felicity , perfection or ultimate end ; our love to god , or god's love to us . ans . it is mutual love and union which is the true and compleat notion of our end : and to compare god's love and ours as the parts , and tell which is the final principal part or notion , is not easy , nor absolutely necessary . but i conceive , . that our love to god is objectively or as to the object of it , infinitely more excellent than gods love to us as to the object : which is but to say , that god is infinitely better than man : god loveth man who is a worm : but we love god who is perfect goodness . . gods love to us as to the agent and the act ex parte agentis , is infinitely more excellent than our love to him : for it is gods essential will which loveth us ; and it is the will of a worm that loveth god. . that mans felicity as such , is not the chief notion of his ultimate end : but he must love god as god better than his own felicity as such , or better than god as our felicity . . that mans true ultimate end , containeth these five inadequate conceptions . . the lowest notion or part of it is our own holiness and felicity . . the next notion of it is the perfection of the church and universe , to which we contribute , and which we must value above our own ; including the glory of christs humanity . . the third notion is the glory or lustre of gods perfections as they shine forth in us and all his perfected glorious works . . the fourth notion is , gods own essential goodness as the object of our knowledge , love and praise . . the fifth and highest notion is , the active love or complacency of gods fulfilled will , in us and in the whole creation . so that the pleasing of gods will is the highest notion of mans ultimate end . though all these five are necessarily contained in it . chap. iii. doct. . therefore knowledge is to be valued , sought and used , as it tendeth to our love of god. this third doctrine is much of the scope of the text : all means are for their end : so far as knowledge is a means of love , it must needs hence have the measure of its worth , and we the motives of our desires of it , and the direction for our using of it . . all knowledge that kindleth not the love of god in us , is so narrow , and small that it deserveth not indeed the name of knowledge : for the necessary things that such a person is ignorant of , are a thousand times more or greater , than that little which he knoweth : for , . what is it that he is ignorant of ? . he hath no sound and real knowledge of god. for if he knew god , truly , he could not but love him : goodness is so naturally the object of the will , that if men well knew the infinite good , they must needs love him : however there is a partial knowledge that is separable from sincere love. . he that knoweth not and loveth not god , neither knoweth nor loveth any creature truly and effectually either as it is of god , or through him , or to him ; either as it beareth the impress of the glorious efficient , or as it is ordered to its end by the most wise director , or as it is a means to lead up souls to god , or to glorify and please him , no nor to make man truly happy . and can he be said indeed to know any creature that knoweth it not in any of these respects that knoweth neither its original , order or use ? doth a dog or a goose know a book of philosophy , because he looketh on it , and seeth the bulk ? doth he know a clock or watch , who knoweth no more of it , but that it hath such parts and shapes , made of iron and brass ? it is most evident that an unholy person knoweth nothing , that is , no one being , though he may know aliquid de re aliqua , something of some being : for he that knoweth not the nature , order or use and end of a being , cannot properly be said to know that being , but only secundum quid , or some accidents of it , or to have a general knowledge that it is a substance , or a something , he knoweth not what . as an epicurean can call all things compacted atomes , or matter and motion . an ungodly man is just like one that studieth the art of a scrivener or printer , to make the letters , and place them by art , but never learnt to read or know the signification of the letters which he maketh or composeth . or if any may be said to have a speculative knowledge of all this in the creature ( the nature , order , and use , ) yet he is without the true practical knowledge , which is it that only is knowledge indeed , and of use and benefit to man. for to be able to speak or write a true proposition about god or the creature , is not properly to know god or the creature , but to know names and words concerning them : it is but a logical knowledge of notions , and not the knowledge of the thing it self , to be able to say and know that this or that concerning it , is true or false . nothing more deceiveth mankind , both in point of learning and of religion , and salvation , than mistaking the organical or logical knowledge of second notions , words , propositions , inferences and methods , for the real knowledge of the things themselves ; and thinking that they know a thing , because they know what to say of it . he knoweth not a countrey , who is only able by the map or hear-say to describe it . he knoweth not motion , light , heat , cold , sweet , bitter , that knoweth no more than to give a true definition of it . and as this is true of things sensible , which must themselves be perceived first by sense , so is it of things spiritual , which must themselves be perceived first by intellection , and not only the notions and definitions of them . he that doth not intuitively or by internal immediate perception , know what it is to understand , to remember , to will and nill , to love and hate , and consequently to be able to do these acts , doth not know what a man is , or what a reasonable soul is , and what an intellectual spirit is , though he could ( were it possible ) without these , learn the definition of a man , a soul , a spirit . a definition or word of art spoken by a parrot , or a madman proveth not that he knoweth the thing . practical objects are not truly known without a practical knowledge of them . he knoweth not what meat is , that knoweth not that it must be eaten , and how to eat it . he only knoweth his clothing that knoweth how to put it on . he only knoweth a pen , a gun , or other instrument , that knoweth how to use it . now the ungodly , not knowing how any creature signifieth the divine perfections , nor how by it to ascend to the knowledge and love of god , do indeed know nothing with a proper formal knowledge . . and what is it that such men know or seem to know , which may be compared with their ignorance ? to give them their due praise , they know how to eat as well as a dog , though not so subtilly as an ox or sheep , that can distinguish grass before he taste it . he can tell how to drink , tho' not by so constant a temperance as a beast . he can speak better than a parrot : he can build him a house as apt for his use , as a swallow or other birds can do for theirs . he can lay up for the time to come , more subtilly than a fox , or ant , though nothing so orderly and by wonderful self-conficiency , as the bees : he can look upwards , and see the birds that soar and fly in the air , though he cannot imitate them : he can look into the surface of the waters , and artificially pass over them in ships , though he cannot live in them , or glide through them as the fish : he can master those that are weaker than himself , as the great dogs do the little ones , and carry away the bone from them all : he can glory in his strength , though it be less than a horse's , an oxe's , an elephant's , or a whale's . he can kill and eat his fellow animals , as well as a pike among the fishes , a kite among the birds , or a wolf or dog among the beasts : he can more craftily than the fox entrap and ensnare them ( the fishes , birds and beasts ; ) yea as artificially as a spider doth the flies , to make up what he wants , of the hawk , or dog for swift pursuit , or of the lyon for rapacious strength . he can sing ; and so can the linnet , the owsel the lark and nightingale : he can make his bed as soft as the birds their nests , or as other creatures that love their ease : he can generate and breed up his off-spring , though not with that constancy of affection , and accurateness of skill and industry , as a hen her chickens , or most other animals do their young . yea he can live in society , families , commonwealths ▪ though much more disorderly , contentiously and to the disturbance if not destruction of each other , than pigeons in their dove-house or the flight of stares , or larks , or lapwings , or the flocks of sheep , and less accurately than the bees do in their hive . all this and more we can speak of the praises of the knowledge or wisdom of an ungodly man , that never learnt to know and love his god , nor any thing truly worthy of a man : and is all this worthy the name of knowledge ? their character could not be fitlier given , than here it is by the apostle : they know nothing as they ought to know . but of this more next . chap. iv. and therefore those are to be accounted the wisest and best knowing men , that love god most ; and not those that are stored with unholy knowledge . this fourth doctrine , is also a discernable part of the meaning of the apostle in the text. his purpose is to humble those that judge themselves wise for that which is no wisdom , but useless , ludicrous notions and self-conceitedness : and to shew men wherein true wisdom doth consist . many thousands there are that heartily love god , and are devoted to him , and live to his service in the world , who never read logick , physicks , metaphysicks or mathematicks ; nor laid in that stock of artificial notions , which are the glory and utensils of the learned world. and yet that these are truly and happily wise and knowing , the apostle judgeth , and i thus further prove . . because they know the things themselves , and not only the names and definitions of them : as he that knoweth food by eating it , the military art , or navigation by experience , or a countrey by travelling or dwelling in it . others lick the outside of the glass , but taste not the sweet that is within . . because they know the greatest and most excellent things : god is infinitely greater and better than the creatures : and heaven incomparably better than the riches and pleasures of this earth . to know how to build a city , or a navy , and how to govern an army or a kingdom , is more than to know how to pick sticks or straws , or to dress and undress us . understanding is valuable by the dignity of its objects ; therefore how much doth the wisdom of a holy soul excell all the craft and learning of the ungodly ? let not the rich man glory in his riches — but let him that glorieth glory in this , that he knoweth god ; if he so know him as to love him . . because they know the most necessary things , and the most profitable . they know how to be good , and how to do their duty , and how to attain their end , and how to please god , and how to escape damnation , and how to be happy in everlasting joy and glory . and i think he is wise , that is wise enough to be happy , and to attain all that the soul of man can well desire . but who will desire the wisdom that maketh a man never the better ? and that will not save his soul from hell ? what soul in hell doth think that wisdom brought him thither ? it were a thousand times better , not to know how to speak or go , to dress or undress us , than not to know how to be holy and happy , and to escape sin and everlasting misery . . a holy soul understandeth that which his understanding was made for ; and for which he hath his life , and time , and teaching ; which is but to be good , and love god and goodness , and to do good . and wisdom , as is afore proved , as as all other means , is to be estimated by its end . but an ungodly man knoweth not that which he was made for . he is like a knife that cannot cut ; a ship that will not endure the water ; a house that is not fit to dwell in . what is a man's wit worth , but for its proper end ? if man was made but to eat , and drink , and play , and sleep , and build , and plant , and stir a while about the earth , and have his will over others , and his fleshly pleasure , and then die , then the ungodly may be called wise : but if he be made to prepare for another world , and to know , and love , and live to god , they are then worse than bedlams , and more dangerously beside themselves . . a holy soul knowing god the beginning and end , knoweth all things ; because he knoweth them , . in the chiefest excellency of their natures , as they bear the impress of god ; . and in their order as governed by him ; . and in their usefulness as tending to him : though neither they , nor any others , be well acquainted with their material part , which the philosopher thinketh that he knoweth best . who think you best knoweth what money is ? he that knoweth the king's impress , and the value , and what it is good for , and how to get and use it ? or he that can only tell you whether it be copper or silver , or gold ( not knowing well what any of these are , ) and knoweth nothing of the impress , or value , or use ? i tell you , the humble holy person , that seeth god in all , and knoweth all things to be of him , and by him , and to him , and loveth him in and for all , and serveth him by all , is the best philosopher , and hath the greatest , most excellent and profitable knowledge . in comparison of which , the unholy learning of the world is well called foolishness with god. ( for i believe not that paraphraser who would perswade us , that it is but the phanatick conceits and pretensions of the gnosticks , that the apostle here and elsewhere speaketh of . but i rest satisfied that it is primarily the unholy arts and sciences of the philosophical heathens ; and secondarily the platonick hereticks pretensions to extraordinary wisdom , because of their speculations about angels , spirits , and other invisible and mysterious things , which they thought were peculiarly opened unto them . ) doting about questions that engender strife , and not edification , and do increase to more ungodliness , is the true description of unholy learning . . the lovers of god are wise for perpetuity : they see before them : they know what is to come ; even as far as to eternity : they know what will be best at last , and what will be valued , and serve our turn in the hour of our extremity : they judge of things as all will judge of them , and as they shall constantly judge of them for ever . but others are wise but for a few hours , or a present job : they see not before them : they are preparing for repentance : they are shamefully mutable in their judgments ; magnifying those pleasures , wealth and honours to day , which they vilifie and cry out against at death and to eternity ! a pang of sickness , the sight of a grave , the sentence of death , the awakening of conscience , can change their judgments , and make them speak in other language , and confess a thousand times over that they were fools : and if they come to any thing like wisdom , 't is too late , when time is past , and hope is gone . but the godly know the day of their visitation , and are wise in time ; as knowing the season of all duties , and the duties of every season . and as some schoolmen say , that all things are known to the glorified , in speculo trinitatis ; so i may say , that all things are morally and savingly known , to him that knoweth and loveth god , as the efficient , governour and end of all . yet , to avoid mistakes and cavils , remember , that i take no true knowledge as contemptible . and when i truly say , that he knoweth nothing as he ought to know , that doth not know and love his god , and is not wise to his duty and salvation ; yet if this fundamental knowledge be presupposed , we should build all other useful knowledge on it , to the utmost of our capacity : and from this one stock , may spring and spread a thousand branches , which may all bear fruit . i would put no limits to a christian's desires and endeavours to know , but that he desire only to know useful and revealed things . every degree of knowledge tendeth to more : and every known truth befriendeth others ; and like fire , tendeth to the spreading of our knowledge , to all neighbour truths that are intelligible . and the want of acquaintance with some one truth among an hundred , may hinder us from knowing rightly most of the rest ; or may breed an hundred errours in us . as the absence of one wheel or particle in a watch , or the ignorance of it , may put all the rest into an useless disorder . what if i say that wisdom lieth more , in knowing the things that belong to salvation , to publick good , to life , health , and solid comfort , than in knowing how to sing , or play on the lute , or to speak or carry our selves with commendable decency , &c. it doth not follow that all these are of no worth at all ; and that in their places these little matters may not be allowed and desired : for even hair and nails are appurtenances of a man , which a wise man would not be without ; though they are small matters in comparison of the animal , vital and nobler parts . and indeed he that can see god in all things , and hath all this sanctified by the love of god , should above all men value each particle of knowledge , of which so holy an use may be made : as we value every grain of gold. chap. v. the first inference : by what measures to estimate mens knowledge . from hence then we may learn how to value the understandings of our selves , and others : that is good which doth good . would god but give me one beam more of the heavenly light , and a little clearer knowledge of himself , how joyfully could i exchange a thousand lower notions for it ! i feel not my self at all miserable , for want of knowing the number and order of the stars , the nature of the meteors , the causes of the ebbing and flowing of the sea , with many hundred other questions in physicks , metaphysicks , mathematicks : nor do i feel it any great addition to my happiness , when i think i know somewhat of such things which others know not . but i feel it is my misery to be ignorant of god , and ignorant of my state and duty , and ignorant of the world where i must live for ever . this is the dungeon where my wretched soul doth lie in captivity night and day , groaning and crying out , o when shall i know more of god! and more of the coelestial habitations ! and more of that which i was made to know ! o when shall i be delivered from this darkness and captivity ! had i not one beam that pierceth through this lanthorn of flesh , this dungeon were a hell , even the outer darkness . i find books that help me to names , and notions : but o for that spirit that must give me light to know the things , the spiritual , great and excellent things , which these names import ! o how ignorant am i of those same things , which i can truly and methodically speak and write of ! o that god would have mercy on my dark understanding that i be not as a clock , to tell others that which it self understandeth not ! o how gladly would i consent to be a fool in all common arts and sciences , if i might but be ever the wiser in the knowledge of god! did i know better him by whom i live , who upholdeth all things , before whom my soul must shortly appear ; whose favour is my life , whom i hope to love and praise for ever ; what were all other things to me ? o for one beam more of his light ! for one tast of his love ! for one clear conception of the heavenly glory ! i should then scarce have leisure , to think of a thousand inferiour speculations , which are now magnified and agitated in the world . but much more miserable do i find my self , for want of more love to the blessed god , who is love it self . o happy exchange ! did i part with all the pleasures of the world , for one flame , one spark more of the love of god ? i hate not my self for my ignorance in the common arts and sciences : but my god knoweth , that i even abhor and loath my self , because i love and delight in him no more ! o what a hell is this dead and disaffected heart ! o what a foretast of heaven would it be , could i but feel the fervours of divine love ! well may that be called the first-fruits of heaven , and the divine nature and life , which so uniteth souls to god , and causeth them to live in the pleasures of his goodness . i dare not beg hard for more common knowledge : but my soul melteth with grief for want of love ; and forceth out tears , and sighs , and cries ; o when will heaven take acquaintance with my heart , and shine into it , and warm and revive it , that i may truly experience the delightful life of holy love ! i cannot think them loathsom and unlovely , that are unlearned , and want the ornaments of art. but i abhor and curse those hateful sins , which have raised the clouds , and shut the windows , and hindred me from the more lively knowledge , and love of god. would god but number me with his zealous lovers , i would presume to say , that he had made me wise , and initially happy . but , alas ! such high and excellent things will not be gotten with a lazy wish , nor will holy love dwell with iniquity in unholy and defiled souls . but if wisdom were justified of none but her children , how confidently durst i call my self a son of wisdom ? for all my reason is fully satisfied , that the learned ungodly doctors are meer fools , and the lovers of god are only wise : and o that my lot may be with such , however i be esteemed by the dreaming world ! chap. vi. the second inference : to abate our censures and contempt of the less learned christians and churches upon earth . i must confess that ignorance is the great enemy of holiness in the world ; and the prince of darkness , in his kingdom of darkness , oppugneth the light , and promoteth the works of darkness by it : and it is found that where vision ceaseth , the people perish , even for lack of knowledge : and the ignorantest countreys are the most ungodly . but i must recant some former apprehensions : i have thought the armenians , the syrians , the georgians , the copties , the abassines , the greeks , more miserable for want of polite literature , than now i judge them . though i contemn it not as the turks do , and the moscovites ; yet i perceive that had men but the knowledge of the holy scriptures , yea of the summaries of true religion , they might be good and happy men , without much more . if there be but some few among them , skill'd in all the learning of the world , and expert in using the adversaries weapons against themselves , as champions of the truth , the rest might do well with the bare knowledge of god , and a crucified christ . it is the malice of assaulting enemies , that maketh all other learning needful in some for our defence . but the new creature liveth not on such food , but on the bread of life , and living waters , and the sincere milk of the sacred word . the old albigenses and waldenses in piedmont , and other countreys , did many ages keep up the life and comfort of true religion , even through murders and unparallel'd cruelties of the worldly learned church ; when they had little of the arts and common sciences . but necessary knowledge was propagated by the industry of parents and pastors : their children could say over their catechisms , and could give account of the principles of religion , and recite many practical parts of scripture : and they had much love and righteousness , and little division or contention among them ; which made the moderate emperor maximilian profess to crato , that he thought the picards of all men on earth were likest the apostolick primitive churches . and brocardus , who dwelt among them in judea , tells us that the christians there that by the papists are accounted hereticks , ( as nestorians or eutychians ) were indeed good harmless simple men , and lived in piety , and mortifying austerities , even beyond the very religious sort ( the monks and fryars ) of the church of rome , and shamed the wickedness of our learned part of the world. and though there be sad mixtures of such superstitions and traditions , as ignorance useth to breed and cherish , yet the great devotion and strictness of many of the abassines , armenians , and other of those ruder sort of christians , is predicated by many historians and travellers . and who knoweth but there may be among their vulgar , more love to god and heaven , and holiness , than among the contentious learned nations , where the pastors strive who shall be the greatest , and preach up that doctrine and practice which is conformable to their own wills and worldly interests ; and where the people by the oppositions of their leaders , are drawn into several sides and factions , which as armies , militate against each other . is not the love of god like to be least , where contentions and controversies divert the peoples minds from god and necessary saving truths ? and where men least love one another ? and where mutual hatred , cruelty and persecution , proclaim them much void of that love which is the christian badge ? i will not cease praying for the further illumination and reformation of those churches : but i will repent of my hard thoughts of the providence of god , as if he had cast them almost off , and had few holy souls among them . for ought i know they may be better than most of europe . and the like i say of many unlearned christians among our selves ! we know not what love to god and goodness doth dwell in many that we have a very mean esteem of . the breathings of poor souls towards god by christ , and their desires after greater holiness is known to god that kindleth it in them , but not to us . chap. vii . the third inference : by what measures to judge of the knowledge necessary to church communion . i know that there are some that would make christ two churches ; one political and congregate ( as they phrase it ) and the other regenerate : or one visible and the other invisible : and accordingly they say that professed faith is the qualification of a member of the church-congregate ( and obedience to the pope , say the papists , ) and real love is the qualification of the church-regenerate . but as there is but one catholick church of christ , so is there but one faith , and one baptism , by which men are stated as members in that church . but as heart-consent and tongue-consent are two things , but the latter required only as the expression and profession of the former ; so heart-consenters and tongue-consenters should be the same men ; as body and soul make not two men , but one . but if the tongue speak that consent which is not in the heart , that person is an hypocrite ; and is but analogically or equivocally called a christian or member of christ : and such among the sincere are not a distinct church or society , ( if they were , they should be called the hypocritical church , and not the political or congregate church . ) but they are as traytors in an army , or as stricken ears in a corn field . but the true church being one is considered , as consenting with heart and with the tongue : as a corn field hath straw , chaff and grain ; and as a man hath soul and body . so that it is the same church that is visible by baptism and profession , and invisible by heart-consent or sincerity . but it is the same thing ( and not divers ) that is in the hearts of the sincere , and that is to be professed by the tongue : even that voluntary practical faith which is described in baptism , and no other . the same faith which is accepted to salvation in the sincere and invisible members of the church ( as they are called ) must be professed by all that will ( at age ) be visible members . and the knowledge and belief required in baptism is so much as prevaileth with the person to give up himself to god the father , son and holy ghost , as his reconciled creator , his saviour and sanctifier . and he that hath so much knowledge as will do this , hath as much as is necessary to his reception into the church . doubtless he that is capable of baptism , is capable of church membership ; and he that is capable of church membership , is capable de jure as to right , of so much church communion as he is capable of by real aptitude : an infant is not naturally capable of the actions of the adult ; nor half-witted persons , of the receptions and performances of the judicious ; some cannot understand a sermon , or prayer , or praise , the twentieth part so well as others can do , and so cannot receive and do beyond their understanding : some may not so well understand the nature of the lords supper , as to be really fit at present to receive it : and some may be unfit through some extraordinary doubts , opinions , or lapses : but still de jure a church member hath right to so much church communion as their real qualifications make them capable of . for that right is part of the definition of a church member ; and to be made a church member is the work of baptism . and here we must consider of the reason , why god would have baptism to be the profession of that faith which maketh us christians : sometime we are called believers , and said to be justified by faith , as if it were faith alone that were our christianity : and yet when it cometh to church entrance , and to the solemn profession of our faith , and reception of a sealed and delivered pardon , we must do more than profess that we believe with the understanding ; we must give up our selves absolutely by a vow and covenant , to god the father son and holy-ghost , renouncing the flesh , the world and the devil ; which is the act of a resolved will. and to will , is rationally to love and choose . by which christ telleth us , that ( as words of knowledge in scripture usually imply affection , so ) the faith that he means and requireth to our justification , is not a meer assent or act of intellection ; but it is also the wills consent , and a practical affiance : as a man believing the skill and fidelity of a physician , doth desire , will or choose him for his physician , and practically trust him , or cast himself upon his fidelity and care for cure . therefore christ joyneth both together , mark . . he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved , not principally intending the washing of the flesh , but the answer of a good conscience , as peter expoundeth it ; that is , [ he that so believeth as by hearty consent to devote and give up himself openly and absolutely , and presently to god the father , son and holy ghost , shall be saved . ] and so the apostle saith , eph. . , . there is one baptism , as part of the uniting bond of christians : that is there is one solemn covenant between god and man , in which we profess our faith , and give up our selves to god the father son , and holy ghost , and are stated in a gracious relation to him and one another . ] and thus it is that baptism is reckoned , heb. . among the principles ; and that the ancient doctors unanimously conclude , that baptism washeth away all sin , and certainly puts us into a present state of life ; that is , the delivering up our selves sincerely to god in the baptismal covenant , is the condition of our right to the benefits of that covenant from god. from all which it is plain , that the head is but the guide of the heart , and that god looketh more to the heart than to the head , and to the head for the heart : and that we are not christians indeed , till christ have our hearts indeed ; nor christians by profession , till by baptismal covenant and profession we deliver up the heart to christ ; now so far as consent and will may be called love , fo far even love is essential to our christianity , and to this faith , which is required to our baptism and justification . and no other faith is christianity , nor will justify us . but to them that are here stalled with the great difficulty , how love is that grace of the holy ghost which is promised to believers , in the covenant , as consequent , if it go before it in the covenanters , i answer at present , that they must distinguish between , . love to christ as a saviour of our selves , proceeding principally from the just love of our selves , and our salvation ; and love to god above our selves , for his own infinite goodness , as our ultimate end : . between the act of love , and a habit ; . between that spark of love which consisteth in the said consent , and is contained in true faith ; and that flame of love which it self carryeth the name , as being the most eminent operation of the soul. and if hereupon they cannot answer this question themselves , i must refer them to the appendix of the third chapter of my christian directory , in which i have largely opened this case , with as much exactness as i could reach unto . all that remaineth very difficult then as to our judging of the knowledge of men to be admitted to christian church communion , is but , what knowledge is necessary in the adult unto their lawful baptism ? and to that i say , so much as is necessary to an understanding consent to the baptismal covenant , or to an hearty giving up themselves to god the father son and holy-ghost : and here we must know that the same covenanting words being comprehensive , are understood in different degrees , according to mans different capacities , even of true believers : insomuch that i do not think that any two men in the world , have in all notions and degrees just the same understanding of them . and therefore it is not the same distinctness and clearness of understanding which we must expect in all , which is found in some , or which is desireable . when one man nameth god , he hath an orderly conception of his several attributes ( in which yet all men are defective , and most divines themselves are culpably ignorant : ) when another man conceiveth but of fewer of them , and that disorderly : and yet these must not be accounted atheists , or denied to believe in the same god , or refused baptism , nor is it several gods that men so differently believe in . i. he that knoweth god to be a most perfect spirit , most powerful , wise and good , the father son and holy ghost , the creator of the world , our owner , governour and most amiable lover , ( benefactor and end ) i think knoweth as much of god as is of necessity to baptism and church communion . ii. he that knoweth [ that jesus christ is god and man , the redeemer of the sinful world , and the mediator between god and man , who was conceived by the holy-ghost in the virgin mary , fulfilled all righteousness , was crucified as a sacrifice for mans sin ; and being dead and buried rose again , and ascended into heaven , and is the teacher , king and intercessor of his church , and hath made the new covenant , and giveth the holy-ghost to sanctify believers , and pardoneth their sins , and will raise our bodies at last , and judge the world in righteousness according to his gospel , and will give everlasting happiness to the sanctified ] i think knoweth as much of christ as is necessary to baptism and church communion . iii. he that knoweth that [ the holy ghost is god , proceeding from the father and the son , the sanctifier of souls , by holy life and light , and love , by the holy gospel of which he is the inditer and the seal ] i think knoweth all that is necessary unto baptism , concerning the holy ghost . iv. and as to the act of knowing this trinity of objects , there is great difference between , . knowing the notions or words , and the matter . . between an orderly clear , and a dark and more confused knowledge . . and between apt significant words , and such as any way notify a necessary true conception of the mind . . between such a knowledge as maketh a man willing , and consent to give up himself to this trinity in covenant , and that which prevaileth not for such consent . and so , . it 's true that we know not the heart immediately ; and therefore must judge by words and deeds : but yet it is the knowledge of the things ( as is aforesaid ) that is necessary to salvation , because it is the love of the things , is chiefly necessary . but by what words to express that love or knowledge , is not of equal necessity in itself . . there being no man whose conceptions of god , christ , the holy ghost , the covenant , &c. are not guilty of darkness and disorder , a great degree of darkness and disorder of conceptions , may consist with true grace in those of the lowest rank of christians . . the second notions and conceptions of things ( and so of god our redeemer , and sanctifier ) as they are verba mentis in the mind itself , are but logical , artificial organs ; and are not of that necessity to salvation as the conception of the matter or incomplex objects . . many a man in his studies findeth that he hath oft a general and true knowledge of things in themselves , before he can put names and notions on them , and set those in due order , and long before he can find fit words to express his mental notions by ; which must cost him much study afterward . and as children are long learning to speak , and by degrees come to speak orderly and composedly and aptly ( mostly not till many years use hath taught them ; ) so the expressive ability is as much matter of art , and got by use , in men at age : and they must be taught yet as children to speak of any thing , new and strange , and which they learned not before . as we see in learning arithmetick , geometry , and all the arts and sciences . even so men , how holy internally soever , must by study and use ( by the help of gods spirit ) learn how to speak of holy things , in prayer , in conference , in answering such as ask an account of their faith and knowledge : and hypocrites that are bred up in the use of such things , can speak excellently in prayer , conference or preaching : when true christians at first that never used them , nor were bred up where they heard them used , cannot tell you intelligibly what is in their minds , but are like men that are yet to learn the very language in which they are to talk in , i know this by true experience of my self , and many others , that i have examined . . therefore , i say again , if men cannot aptly answer me of the very essentials of religion , but speak that which in its proper sense is heresie , or unsound and false : yet if when i open the questions to them my self , and put the article of faith into the question , and ask them ( e. g. ) do you believe that there is but one god ? or , are there many ? doth god know all things , or not ? is he our owner , or not ? doth he rule us by a law , or not , & c ? if they by yea or nay , do speak the truth , and profess to believe it , i will not reject them for lack of knowledge , if the rest concur . i meet with few censorious professors ( to say nothing of teachers ) that will not answer me with some nonsense or falseness , or ineptitude , or gross confusion , or defectiveness , if i examine them of the foregoing notions of the very baptismal covenant : as , what is a spirit ? what doth the word [ god ] signifie ? what is power in god ? what knowledge ? what will ? what goodness ? what holiness ? what is a person in the trinity ? what is the difference between the three persons ? how is god our end ? had christ his humane soul from the virgin , or only his flesh ? had he his manhood from man , if not his soul , which is the chief essential part ? what is the union of the divine and humane nature ? wherein different from the union of god and saints , or every creature ? with an hundred such . in which i must bear with ignorant false answers from eminent professors , that separate from others as too ignorant for their communion : and why then must i not bear with more in those that are new beginners , and have not had their time and helps ? . but if a man can speak never so well , and profess never so confident a belief , if he consent not to the covenant and vow of baptism , to give up himself presently and absolutely to christ , i must reject that man from the communion of the church . but if these two things do but concur in any , . the foresaid signification of a tolerable knowledge and belief , by yea or nay , ( dost thou believe in god , &c. as the ancient churches used to ask the baptized ; ) . and a ready professed consent to be engaged by that holy vow and covenant to god the father , son and holy ghost ; i will not deny baptism to such , if adult , nor after church communion to them , if they are already in the covenant . and all this is because that the will is the man ; and if any man truely love jesus christ , he is a true believer in christ ; and if any man love god , the same man is known and loved of him , and hath so much knowledge as will save his soul. i confess in private catechizing and conference i have met with some ancient women that have long lived as godly persons , in constant affectionate use of means , and an honest godly life , and been of good repute in the church where they lived , who yet have spoken downright heresie to me , through ignorance , in answering some questions about jesus christ : but i durst not therefore suspend their communion , nor condemn their former communion : for as soon as i told them better , they have yielded , and i could not perceive whether it was from gross ignorance , or from unreadiness of notions , or from the want of memory , or what , that they spake amiss before . so that i shall be very loth to reject one from communion , that sheweth a love of god , and jesus christ , and holiness , by diligent use of means , and an upright life . . and he that will impartially be ruled by the holy scriptures , will be of the same mind . for no one was ever taken to be a church member at age , without so full a consent , as was willingly exprest by devotedness to god in the solemn covenant : the jews by the sign of circumcision , and the christians by baptism ; and both by covenanting with god were initiated : and consent is love . but the articles and objective degrees of knowledge and belief have greatly varied . the jews were to know and profess more than the gentiles ; and the jews since the egyptian deliverance , more than before ; and john baptized upon a shorter profession than the apostles did ; and the apostles till christs resurrection , believed not many great articles of our faith , not knowing that christ must die , and be an expiatory sacrifice for sin , and sin to be pardoned by his blood ; nor that he was to rise again , and send the holy ghost for the work which he was sent for , &c. and acts . there were disciples that had not heard that there was a holy ghost ( i confidently think , twice baptized . ) and if we mark how the apostles baptized , with what orders for it they received from christ , it will confirm my conclusion . for christ could have given a particular creed , and profession of faith , if he had pleased ; but he taketh up with the general three articles , of believing in the father , son , and holy ghost , mat. . , . lest any should cast out his weak ones for want of distinctness of knowledge and belief . and he maketh the covenant-consent in baptism the necessary thing , as the end and measure of their knowledge . he that hath knowledge enough to cause him to thirst , may come and drink of the waters of life , rev. . . and he that hungreth and thirsteth after righteousness shall be satisfied ; and he that cometh to christ he will in no wise cast out . and the apostles baptized so many thousands in a short time , that they could not examine each person about a more particular knowledge and belief , acts . &c. nor do we read in scripture of such particular large professions , as go much beyond the words of baptism . and though , no doubt , they did endeavour to make the ignorant understand what they profest and did , and so had some larger creed , yet was it not all so large , as the short creed called the apostles now is ; several of its articles having been long since added . i have spoken all this , not only to ministers , who have the keys of admission , but especially for the religious persons sakes , who are too much enclined to place godliness in words and ability to speak well , in prayer or conference , or answering questions , and that make a more distinct knowledge and profession necessary than god hath made : yea , if all the articles of the creed are professed , when the understanding of them is not clear and distinct , they deride it , and say , a parrot may be taught as much ; and they separate from those pastors and churches that receive such to their communion . many do this of a godly zeal , lest ignorance and formality be encouraged , and the godly and ungodly not sufficiently distinguished : but their zeal is not according to knowledge , nor to the holy rule ; and they little know how much pride oft lurketh unobserved , in such desires to be publickly differenced from others , as below us , and unmeet for our communion : and less know they how much they injure and displease our gracious lord , who took little children in his arms , and despiseth not the weak , and carrieth the lambs , and refuseth no one any further than they refuse him . i tell you , if you see but true love and willingness in a diligent , reformed , pious and righteous life , there is , certainly there is , saving knowledge and faith within ; and if words do not satisfactorily express it , you are to think that it is not for want of the thing it self , but for want of use and exercise , and for want of well studied notions , or for want of natural parts , education or art to enable them to act that part aright . but if god know the meaning of abba , father , and of the groans of the spirit , in his beloved infants , i will not be one that shall condemn and reject a lover of god and christ , and holiness , for want of distinct particular knowledge , or of words to utter it aright . chap. viii . the fourth inference : the aptness of the teaching of christ , to ingenerate the love of god and holiness . if love be the end and perfection of our knowledge , then hence we may perceive , that no teacher that ever appeared in the world , was so fit for the ingenerating of true saving knowledge as jesus christ . for none ever so promoted the love of god. . it was he only that rendered god apparently lovely to sinful man , by reconciling us to god , and rendering him apparently propitious to his enemies , pardoning sin , and tendering salvation freely to them that were the sons of death . self-love will not give men leave to love aright a god that will damn them , though deservedly for sin . but it is christ that hath made atonement , and is the propitiation for our sins , and proclaimeth gods love , even to the rebellious : which is more effectually to kindle holy love in us , than all the precepts of naturalists without this could ever have been . his cross , and his wounds and blood were the powerful sermons , to preach gods winning love to sinners . . and the benefits are so many and so great which he hath purchased and revealed to man , that they are abundant fewel for the flames of love. we are set by christ in the way of mercy , in the houshold of god , under the eye and special influence of his love ; all our sins pardoned , our everlasting punishment remitted , our souls renewed , our wounded consciences healed , our enemies conquered , our fears removed , our wants supplied , our bodies , and all that is ours under the protection of almighty love ; and we are secured by promise , that all our sufferings shall work together for our good . and what will cause love if all this will not ? when we perceive with what love the father hath loved us , that of enemies we should be made the sons of god , and of condemned sinners we should be made the heirs of endless glory , and this so freely , and by so strange a means , we may conclude that this is the doctrine of love , which is taught us from heaven by love it self . . and especially this work of love is promoted , by opening the kingdom of heaven to the foresight of our faith ; and shewing us what we shall enjoy for ever ; and assuring us of the fruition of our creators everlasting love ; yea , by making us fore-know that heaven consisteth in perfect mutual endless love . this will both of it self , draw up our hearts , and engage all our reason and endeavours , in beginning that work which we must do for ever , and to learn on earth to love in heaven . . and besides all these objective helps , christ giveth to believers the spirit of love , and maketh it become as a nature in us ; which no other teacher in the world could do . others can speak reason to our ears , but it is christ that sendeth the warming beams of holy love into our hearts . if the love of god and holiness were no better than common philosophical speculations , then aristotle , or plato , or such other masters of names and notions , might compare with christ and his apostles , and athens with the primitive church ; and the schoolmen might be thought the best improvers of theology . but if thousands of dreaming disputers wrangle the world into misery , and themselves into hell , and are ingenious artificers of their own damnation ; and if the love of god and goodness , be the healthful constitution of the soul , its natural content and pleasure , the business and end of life , and all its helps and blessings , the soder of just societies , the union of man with god in christ , and with all the blessed ; and the fore-taste and first-fruits of endless glory ; then christ the messenger of love , the teacher of love , the giver of love , the lord and commander of love , is the best promoter of knowledge in the world. and as nicodemus knew that he was a teacher come from god , because no man could do such works unless god were with him ; so may we conclude the same , because no man could so reveal , so cause , and communicate love , the holy love of god and goodness , unless the god of love had sent him . love is the very end and work of christ , and of his word and spirit . chap. ix . the fifth inference : what great cause men have to be thankful to god for the constitution of the christian religion : and how unexcusable they are that will not learn so short and sweet , and safe a lesson . so excellent and every way suitable to our case is the religion taught and instituted by christ , as should render it very acceptable to mankind . and that on several accounts . . the brevity and plainness of christian precepts , greatly accommodateth the necessity of mankind . i say his necessity , lest you think it is but his sloth . ars longa , vita brevis , is the true and sad complaint of students . had our salvation been laid upon our learning a body of true philosophy , how desperate would our case have been ? for , . mans great intellectual weakness ; . his want of leisure would not have allowed him a knowledge that requireth a subtile wit and tedious studies . . most men have wits of the duller sort : such quickness , subtilty and solidity , as is necessary to great and difficult studies , are very rare . so rare , as that few such are found even amongst the preachers of the gospel : of a multitude who by hard studies and honest hearts , are fit to preach the doctrine of salvation , scarce one or two are found of so fine and exact a wit as to be fit judiciously to manage the curious controversies of the schools . what a case then had mankind been in , if none could have been wise and happy indeed , but these few of extraordinary capacity ? the most publick and common good is the best . god is more merciful than to confine salvation to subtilty of wit : nor indeed is it a thing it self so pleasing to him as a holy , heavenly heart and life . . and we have bodies that must have provision and employment : we have families and kindred that must be maintained : we live in neighbourhoods and publick societies , which call for much duty , and take up much time . and our sufferings and crosses will take up some thoughts . were it but poverty alone , how much of our time will it alienate from contemplation ? whilst great necessities call for great care and continual labour ? can our common poor labourers , ( especially husbandmen ) have leisure to inform their minds with philosophy or curious speculations ? nay , we see by experience , that the more subtile and most vacant wits , that wholly addict themselves to philosophy can bring it to no considerable certainty , and consistency to this day , except in the few rudiments or common principles that all are agreed in . insomuch that those do now take themselves to be the chief or only wits , who are pulling down that which through so many ages , from the beginning of the world , hath with so great wit and study been concluded on before them ; and are now themselves no higher than new experimenters , who are beginning all anew again , to try whether they can retrieve the errours of mankind , and make any thing of that which they think the world hath been so long unacquainted with : and they are yet but beginning at the skin or superficies of the world , and are got no further with all their wit , than matter and motion , with figure , site , contexture , &c. but if they could live as long as methusalem , it is hoped they might come to know that besides matter and motion ; there are essential virtues called substantial forms , or active natures , and that there is a vis motiva , which is the cause of motion , and a virtus intellectiva , and wisdom which is the cause of the order of motion , and a vital will and love which is the perfection and end of all : in a word , they may live to know that there is such a thing in the world as life , and such a thing as active nature , and such a thing as sense and soul , besides corporeal matter and motion , and consequently that man is indeed man. but , alas , they must die sooner , perhaps before they attain so far , and their successors must begin all anew again , as if none of all these great attempts had been made by their predecessours , and so ( by their method ) we shall never reach deeper than the skin , nor learn more than our , a b c and would we have such a task made necessary to the common salvation , even for all the poor and vulgar , wits , which is so much too hard for our most subtile students ? . and christianity is as suitable to us , in the benefit and sweetness of it . what a happy religion is it that employeth men in nothing but receiving good to themselves , and in doing good to themselves and others . whose work is only the receiving and improving of gods mercies , and loving and delighting in all that is good , rejoycing in the tasts of gods love on earth , and in the hopes of perfect felicity , love and joy for ever . is not this a sweeter life , than tiresom , unprofitable speculations . o then how unexcuseable are our contemners of religion , that live in wilful ignorance and ungodliness , and think this easy and sweet religion , to be a tedious and intolerable thing ! what impudent calumniators and blasphemers are they of christ and holiness , who deride and revile this sweet and easy way to life , as if it were a slavery and an irksom toil , unnecessary to our salvation , and unfit for a freeman , or at least a gentleman , ( or a servant of the flesh and world ) to practise . if christ had set you but such a task as aristotle , or plato did to their disciples ; so many notions , and so many curiosities to learn ; if he had written for you as many books as chrysippus did ; if he had made necessary to your salvation , all the arbitrary notions of lullius , & all the fanatick conceits of campanella , and all the dreaming hypotheses of cartesius , and all the astronomical & cosmographical difficulties of ptolomy , tycho-brache , copernicus and galilaeus , and all the chronological difficulties handled by eusebius , scaliger , functius , capellus , petavius , &c. and all the curiosities in philosophy and theology of cajetane , scotus , ockam , gabriel , &c. then you might have had some excuse for your aversation : but to accuse and refuse , and reproach so compendious , so easie , so sweet , so necessary a doctrine and religion , as that which is brought and taught by christ , this is an ingratitude that hath no excuse , unless sensuality and malignant enmity may pass for an excuse . doth christ deliver you from the maze of imaginary curiosities , and from the burdens of worldly wisdom called philosophy , and of pharisaical traditions , and jewish ceremonies , and make you a light burden , an easy yoak , and commandments that are not grievous , and after all this , must he be requited with rejection and reproach , and your burdens and snares be taken for more tolerable than your deliverance ? you make a double forfeiture of salvation , who are so unwilling to be saved . be thankful , o christians , to your heavenly master , for tracing you out so plain and sweet a way . be thankful that he hath cut short those tiresom studies , by which your task-masters would confound you , under pretence of making you like gods , in some more subtile and sublime speculations than vulgar wits can reach . now all that are willing may be religious , and be saved : it is not confined to men of learning . the way is so sweet , as sheweth it suitable to the end . it is but [ believe gods love and promises of salvation by christ , till you are filled with love and its delights , and live in the pleasures of gratitude and holiness , and in the joyful hopes of endless glory : ] and is not this an easy yoak ! saith our heavenly poet mr. g. herbert , in his poem called divinity p. . as men for fear the stars should sleep and nod , and trip at night , have spheres supply'd ; as if a star were duller than a clod , which knows his way without a guide , just so the other heaven they also serve , divinities transcendent sky , which with the edge of wit they cut and carve , reason triumphs , and faith lies by . — but all his doctrine which he taught and gave , was clear as heav'n from whence it came ; at least those beams of truth which only save , surpass in brightness any flame : love god , and love your neighbours , watch and pray , do as you would be done unto . o dark instructions ! even as dark as day ! who can these gordian knots undo ? chap. . the sixth inference : how little reason ungodly men have to be proud of their learning , or of any sort of knowledge or wisdom whatsoever . as the ancient gnosticks , being puffed up with their corrupt platonick speculations , lookt down with contempt upon ordinary christians , as silly ignorants in comparison of them , and yet had not wisdom enough to preserve them from the lusts and pollutions of the world ; even so is it with abundance of the worldly clergy and ungodly scholars in this age . they think their learning setteth them many degrees above the vulgar , and giveth them right to be reverenced as the oracles or rabbies of the world ; when yet ( poor souls ! ) they have not learned ( by all their reading , studies and disputings ) to love god and holiness , better than the riches and preferments of the world. and some of them not better than a cup of strong drink , or than the brutish pleasures of sense and flesh . it is a pitiful thing to see the pulpit made a stage for the ostentation of this self-shaming , self-condemning pride and folly : for a man under pretence of serving god , and helping other men to heaven , to make it his errand to tell the hearers , that he is a very wise and learned man ; who hath not wit enough to choose a holy , humble life , nor to make sure of heaven or to save his soul ; nor perhaps to keep out of the tavern , or ale-house the next week , nor the same day to forbear the venting of his worldly , carnal mind . what is such learning , but a game of imagination , in which the phantasie sports it self with names and notions ; or worse , the materials which are used in the service of sin , the fuel of pride , the blinder and deceiver of such as were too ignorant before , being a meer shadow and name of knowledge ? what good will it do a man tormented with the gout , or stone , or by miserable poverty , to know the names of various herbs , or to read the titles of the apothecaries boxes , or to read on a sign-post , here is a good ordinary ? and what good will it do a carnal , unsanctified soul , that must be in hell for ever , to know the hebrew roots or points , or to discourse of cartesius his materia subtilis & globuli aetherei , &c. or of epicurus and gassendus atomes , or to look on the planets in galileus glasses , while he casteth away all his hopes of heaven , by his unbelief , and his preferring the pleasures of the flesh ? will it comfort a man that is cast out of gods presence , and condemned to utter darkness , to remember , that he was once a good mathematician , or logician , or musician , or that he had wit to get riches and preferments in the world , and to climb up to the heighth of honour and dominion ? it is a pitiful thing to hear , a man boast of his wit , while he is madly rejecting the only felicity , forsaking god , esteeming vanity , and damning his soul ! the lord deliver us from such wit and learning . is it not enough to refuse heaven and choose hell ( in the certain causes ) to lose the only day of their hopes , and in the midst of light , to be incomparably worse than mad , but they must needs be accounted wise and learned , in all this self-destroying folly ? as if ( like the physician who boasted that he killed men according to the rules of art ) it were the heighth of their ambition to go learnedly to hell , and with reverend gravity and wit , to live here like brutes , and hereafter with devils for evermore . chap. . the seventh inference : why the ungodly world hateth holiness , and not learning . from my very child-hood , when i was first sensible of the concernments of mens souls , i was possest with some admiration , to find that every where the religious , godly sort of people , who did but exercise a serious care of their own and other mens salvation , were made the wonder and obloquy of the world ; especially of the most vitious and flagitious men , so that they that professed the same articles of faith , the same commandments of god to be their law , and the same petitions of the lords prayer to be their desire , and so professed the same religion , did every where revile those that did endeavour to live according to that same profession , and to seem to be in good sadness in what they said . i thought that this was impudent hypocrisie in the ungodly , worldly sort of men ! to take them for the most intolerable persons in the land , who are but serious in their own religion , and do but endeavour to perform , what all their enemies also vow'd and promised . if religion be bad , and our faith be not true , why do these men profess it ? if it be true and good , why do they hate and revile them that would live in the serious practice of it , if they will not practise it themselves ? but we must not expect reason , when sin and sensuality have made men unreasonable . but i must profess that since i observed the course of the world , and the concord of the word and providences of god , i took it for a notable proof of mans fall , and of the verity of the scripture , and the supernatural original of true sanctification , to find such an universal enmity between the holy and the serpentine seed , and to find cain and abels case so ordinarily exemplified , and him that is born after the flesh to persecute him that is born after the spirit . and methinks to this day it is a great and visible help for the confirmation of our christian faith. but that which is much remarkable in it is , that nothing else in the world ( except the crossing of mens carnal interest ) doth meet with any such universal enmity . a man may be as learned as he can , and no man hate him for it . if he excel all others , all men will praise him and proclaim his excellency : he may be an excellent linguist , an excellent philosopher , an excellent physician , an excellent logician , an excellent orator , and all commend him . among musicians , architects , souldiers , seamen , and all arts and sciences , men value , prefer and praise the best ; yea even speculative theology , such wits as the schoolmen and those that are called great divines , are honoured by all , and meet , ( as such ) with little enmity , persecution or obloquy in the world . though i know that even a galilaeus , a campanella , and many such have suffered by the roman inquisitors , that was not so much in enmity to their speculations or opinions , as through a fear lest new philosophical notions should unsettle mens minds , and open the way to new opinions in theology , and so prove injurious to the kingdom and interest of rome . i know also that demosthenes , cicero , seneca , lucan , and many other learned men , have died by the hands or power of tyrants . but that was not for their learning , but for their opposition to those tyrants wills and interests . and i know that some religious men have suffered for their sins and follies , and some for their medling too much with secular affairs , as the councellours of princes , as functius , justus jonas , and many others . but yet no parts , no excellency , no skill or learning is hated commonly , but honoured in the world , no not theological learning , save only this practical godliness and religion , and the principles of it , which only rendereth men amiable to god ( through christ ) and saveth mens souls . to know and love god , and live as those that know and love him , to seek first his kingdom and the righteousness thereof , to walk circumspectly , in a holy and heavenly conversation , and studiously to obey the laws of god , this which must save us , this which god loveth and the devil hateth , is hated also by all his children ; for the same malignity hath the same effect . but methinks this should teach all considering men to perceive what knowledge it is that is best , and most desirable to all that love their happiness . sure this sort of learning , wit and art , which the devil and the malignant world do no more dispraise , oppose and persecute , ( though as it is sanctified to higher ends it be good , yet ) of it self is comparatively no very excellent and amiable thing . i know satan laboureth to keep out learning it self ( that is truly such ) from the world , because he is the prince and promoter of darkness , and the enemy of all useful light : and lower knowledge is some help to higher , and speculative theology may prepare for practical ; and the most gross and brutish ignorance best serveth the devils designs and turn . and even in heathen rome the arts prepared men for the gospel ; and learning in the church reformers hath ever been a great help and furtherance of reformation . but yet if you stop in learning and speculation , and take it as for it self alone , and not as a means to holiness of heart and life , it is as nothing . it is paul's express resolution of the case , that if we have all knowledge without this holy love , we are nothing , but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal , cor. . but surely there is some special excellency in this holy knowledge , and love , and obedience , which the devil and the malignant world so hate , in high and low , in rich and poor , in kindred , neighbours , strangers , or any , where they meet with it . it is not for nothing . this is the image of god ; this is it that is contrary to their carnal minds , and to their fleshly lusts , and sinful pleasures . this tells them what they must be and do ( or be undone for ever ) which they cannot abide to be or do . let us therefore be somewhat the wiser for this discovery of the mind of the devil and all his instruments : i will love and honour all natural , artificial , acquired excellencies , in philology , philosophy , and the rest : as these expose not men to the worlds obloquy , so neither unto mine or any sober mans . in their low places they are good , and may be used to a greater good . but let that holy knowledge and love be mine , which god most loveth , and the world most hateth , and costeth us dearest upon earth , but hath the blessed end of a heavenly reward . chap. xii . the eighth inference : what is the work of a faithful preacher , and how it is to be done . if that knowledge which kindleth in us the love of god , be the only saving knowledge , then this is it that ministers must principally preach up and promote . could we make all our hearers never so learned , that will not save their souls : but if we could make them holy , and kindle in them the love of god and goodness , they should certainly be saved . the holy practical preacher therefore is the best preacher , because the holy practical christian is the best and only true christian . we work under christ , and therefore must carry on the same work on souls which christ came into the world to carry on . all our sermons must be fitted to change mens hearts , from carnal into spiritual , and to kindle in them the love of god. when this is well done , they have learnt what we were sent to teach them ; and when this is perfect , they are in heaven . those preachers that are enemies to the godliest of the people , and would make their hearers take them all for hypocrites , that go any further than obedience to their pastors , in church-forms and orders , observances and ceremonies , and a civil life , are the great enemies of christ , his spirit , his gospel and the peoples souls ; and the eminent servants of the devil , in his malignant war against them all . all that knowledge , and all those formalities , which are set up instead of divine love and holy living , are but so many cheats , to deceive poor souls till time be past , and their convictions come to late . i confess that ignorance is the calamity of our times , and people perish for lack of knowledge : and that the heart be without knowledge it is not good : and lamentable ignorance is too visible in a great degree , among the religious sort themselves ; as their manifold differences and errours too openly proclaim : and therefore to build up men in knowledge , is much of the ministerial work . but what knowledge must it be ? not dead opinions , or uneffectual notions , or such knowledge as tendeth but to teach men to talk , and make them pass for men of parts : but it is the knowledge of god and our redeemer , the knowledge of christ crucified , by which we crucifie the flesh with all its affections and lusts : and by which the world is crucified to us , and we to it . if the gospel be hid it is hid to them that are lost in whom the god of this world hath blinded their eyes ; when there is no truth and mercy , and knowledge of god in the land , no wonder if such a land be clad in mourning . when men have not so much knowledge of the evil of sin , and their own sin and misery , and of the need and worth of christ , of the truth of gods word , of the vanity of the world , of the greatness , wisdom and goodness of god , and of certain , most desirable glory of heaven , as shall humble their souls , and turn them from the world to god , and absolutely deliver them up to christ , and mortifie fleshly lusts , and overcome temptations , and renew them unto the love of god and goodness , and set their hearts and hopes on heaven . this is the ignorance that is mens damnation : and the contrary effectual knowledge is it which saveth souls . chap. xiii . the ninth inference : those that know god so far as to love him above all , may have comfort notwithstanding their remaining ignorance . a great number of upright hearted christians , who love god sincerely , and obey him faithfully , are yet under so great want of further knowledge , as is indeed a great dishonour to them , and a hinderance of them in their duty and comfort , and to many a great discouragement : and o that we knew how to cure this imperfection , that ignorance might not feed so many errours , and cause so many fractions and disturbances in the church , and so many sinful miscarriages in its members ! but yet we must conclude that the person that hath knowledge enough to renew his soul to the love of god , shall be loved by him , and shall never perish , and therefore may have just comfort under all the imperfections of his knowledge . more wisdom might make him a better and more useful christian : but while he is a christian indeed , he may rejoyce in god. i blame not such for complaining of the dulness of their understandings , the badness of their memories , their little profiting by the means of grace : i should blame them if they did not complain of these : and i think their case far more dangerous to the church and to themselves , who have as much ignorance and know it not , but proudly glory in the wisdom which they have not . but many a thousand christians , that have little of the notional and organical part of knowledge , have powerful apprehensions of the power , wisdom and love of god , and of the great mercy of redemption , and of the evil of sin , the worth of holiness , and the certainty and weight of the heavenly glory : and by how much these men love god and holiness more than the more learned that have less grace ; by so much they are more beloved of god , and accounted wiser by the god of wisdom ; and therefore may rejoice in the greatness of their felicity . i would have none so weak as to under-value any real useful learning : but if pharisees will cry out against unlearned , godly christians , [ these people know not the law and are accursed ; ] remember the thanksgiving of your lord , i thank thee , father , lord of heaven and earth , that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent , and hast revealed them to babes . and as the ( reputed ) foolishness of god ( that is , of gods evangelical mysteries ) will shortly prove wiser , than all the reputed wisdom of men ; so he that hath wisdom enough to love god and be saved , shall quickly be in that world of light , where he shall know more than all the doctors and subtile disputers upon earth , and more ( in a moment ) than all the books of men can teach him , or all their authors did ever ( here ) know . jer. . , . thus saith the lord , let not the wise man glory in his wisdom , neither let the mighty man glory in his might , let not the rich man glory in his riches . but let him that glorieth glory in this , that he understandeth and knoweth me , that i am the lord , which exercise loving kindness and righteousness in the earth : for in these things do i delight , saith the lord. chap. xiv . questions and objections answered . quest . . if so much knowledge will save a man as helpeth him to love god as god , may not heathens or infidels at least be saved ? for they know that there is one god who is infinitely good and perfect , and more amiable than all the world , and the great benefactor of man , and of the whole creation : so that there is no goodness but what is in him , or from him , and through him , and finally to him : and mans will is made to love apprehended good , and followeth the last practical act of the intellect , at least where there is no competitor , but omnimoda ratio boni . and all men know that god is not only best in himself , but good , yea best to them , because that all they have is from him : and they have daily experience of pardoning grace contrary to their commerit . it seemeth therefore that they may love god as god. ans . . to cause a man to love god as god , there is necessary both objective revelation of god's amiableness , and such subjective grace which consisteth in a right disposition of the soul. . objective revelation is considered as sufficient either to well disposed , or to an ill disposed soul. . this right disposition consisteth both in the abatement of mens inclinations to contrary ( sensual ) objects , and in the inclining them to that which is divine and spiritual . and now i answer , . it cannot be denied but that so much of god's amiableness or goodness is revealed to infidels that have not the gospel , by the means mentioned in the objection , as is sufficient to bring men under an obligation to love god as god , and to leave them unexcusable that do not . . therefore to such the impossibility is not physical , but moral . . and there is in that objective revelation , so much sufficiency , as that if the soul it self were sanctified and well disposed , it might love god upon such revelation . ( which amyraldus hath largely proved . ) . but to an unholy and undisposed soul no objective revelation is sufficient without the spirits help and operations . . only the spirit of christ the mediator , as given by and from him , doth thus operate on souls , as savingly to renew them . . whether ever the spirit of christ doth thus operate on any that hear not of christs incarnation , must be known either by the scripture or by experience . by the scripture i am not able to prove the universal negative , though it 's easy to prove sanctification incomparably more common in the church , than on those without , if any there have it . the case of infants , and of the churches , and the world before christs incarnation , must here come into consideration . . and by experience no man can prove the negative ; because no man hath experience what is in the hearts of all the persons in the world. q. . may a papist or an heretick by his knowledge be a lover of god as god ? ans . what is said to the former question is here to be reviewed . and further , . a papist and such heretick as positively holdeth all the essentials of christianity , and seeth not the opposition of his false opinions hereto , and holdeth christianity more practically than those false opinions , may be saved in that state , for he is a lover of god : but no other papists or hereticks can be saved but by a true conversion . . there is a sufficiency in the doctrine of christianity which they hold , to save them , as to objective sufficiency . and that god giveth not subjective grace ( of sanctification ) to any such , notwithstanding their errours , is a thing that no man can prove , nor any sober charitable christian easily believe : and experience of the piety of many maketh it utterly improbable , though we know not certainly the heart of another . there are many murmurings against me in this city ( behind my back : for never one man of them to my remembrance to this day , did ever use any charitable endeavour to my face to convince me of my supposed errour ) as one that holds that a papist may be saved , yea , that we are not certain that none in the world are saved besides christians ; and the sectaries whisper me to one another to be like origen , a person in these dangerous opinions , forsaken of god , in comparison of them : what really i assert about these questions , i have here briefly hinted ; but more largely opened in my catholick theology : but i will confess that i find no inclination in my soul , to desire that their doctrine may prove true , who hide the glorified love of god , and would contract his mercy and mans salvation into so narrow a room , as to make it hardly discernable by man , and the church to be next to no church , and a saviour to save so very few , as seem scarce considerable among the rest that are left remediless . and who would make us believe that the way appointed to bring men to the love of god , is , to believe that he hath elected that particular person , and left almost all the world ( many score or hundreds to one ) unredeemed , and without any promise or possibility of salvation : i am sure that the covenant of innocency is ceased ; and i am sure that all the world was brought under a law of grace made after the fall to adam and noe : and that this law is still in force to those that have not the more perfect edition in the gospel . and that christ came not to bring the world that never hear of him nor can do , into a worse condition than jews and gentiles were in before : nor hath he repealed that law of grace which he before made them ; nor hath god changed that gracious name which he proclaimed even to moses , exod. . , . and i am sure that abraham the father of the faithful conjectured once , even when god told him that sodom was ripe for destruction , that yet there might be fifty righteous persons in it ; by which we may conjecture what he thought of all the world * . and i know that in every nation he that feareth god , and worketh righteousness , is accepted of him ; and that he that cometh to god must believe that god is , and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him , and therefore without faith none can please god : and that men shall be judged by that same law which they were under and obliged by , whatever it be . and they that have sinned under the law ( of moses ) shall be judged by it ; and they that sinned without that law shall be judged without it . and i know that god is love it self and infinitely good ; and will shew us his goodness in such glorious effects to all eternity as shall satisfy us and fill us with joyful praise : and as for the papists , i know that they are seduced by a worldly clergy , and that by consequence many of the errours in that church do subvert the fundamentals ; and so do many errors of the antinomians and others among us that are taken for religious persons ; yea and as notoriously as any doctrines of the popish councils do : but i know that as a logical faith or orthodoxness , which consisteth in holding right notions and words , deceiveth thousands that have no sound belief of the things themselves expressed by these words ; so also logical errors about words , notions and sentences , may in unskilful men consist with a sound belief of the things which must necessarily be believed . and that christ and grace may be thankfully received by many that have false names and notions , and sayings about christ and grace . and i know the great power of education and converse , and what advantage an opinion hath even with the upright , which is commonly extolled by learned , godly , religious men , especially if by almost all . therefore i make no doubt but god hath many among the papists , and the antinomians , ( to name no others ) who are truly godly , though they logically or notionally hold such errours as if practically held would be their damnation , and if the consequents were known and held : much more when thousands of the common people , hold not the errours of the church which they abide in . and it shall not be my way of perswading my own soul or others to love god , by first perswading them that he loveth but few besides them . and when such have narrowed gods love and mercy to all save their own party , and made themselves easily believe that he will damn the rest of the world , even such as are desirous to please god as they are , they have but prepared a snare for their own consciences , which may perhaps when it is awakened as easily believe that he will damn themselves . let us give all diligence to make our own calling and election sure , and leave others to the righteous god , to whose judgment they and we must stand or fall . who art thou that judgest anothers servant ? as the covenant of peculiarity was made only with the israelites , though the common law of grace ( made to adam and noe ) was in force to other nations of the world ; so the more excellent covenant of peculiarity is since christs incarnation made only with the christian church , though the foresaid common law of grace be not repealed to all others : nor can it be said that they sin not against a law of grace ; or mercy leading to repentance . and as the covenant of peculiarity was not repealed to the ten tribes ( though the benefit●s were much forfeited by their violation ; ) but god had still thousands among them in elias time that bowed not the knee to baal , and such as obadiah to hide the prophets ; though yet the jews were the more orthodox : even so though the reformed churches , as the two tribes , stick closer to the truth , the kingdoms where popery prevaileth , have yet many thousands that god will save ; and notwithstanding their errours and corrupt additions , they have the same articles of faith and baptismal covenant as we . and if any man think himself the wiser or the happier man than i , for holding the contrary , and thinking so many are hated of god more than i do ( and consequently rendering him less lovely to them , ) i envy not such the honour nor comfort of their wisdom . obj. iii. you will thus confirm our ignorant people in their presumption , that tell professors of godliness , i love god above all , and my neighbour as my self , though i do not know and talk , and pray so much as you do . ans . either they do so love god and man , or they do not : if they do , they are good and happy men , though you call them ignorant : yea he is far from being an ignorant man that knoweth god and christ , and heaven and holiness so well as to be unfeignedly in love with them . but if he do not , what say i to his encouragement in presumption ! but you must take another course to cure him , than by calling him to a barren sort of knowledge . you must shew him that the love of god is an operative principle , and where it is will have dominion and be highest in the soul , and that telling god that we love him , while we love not his law , his service , or his children , yea while we love our appetite , our wealth , our credit , and every beastly lust above him , and while we cannot abide much to think or hear talk of him , this is but odious hypocrisie , which deceiveth the sinner , and maketh him more abominable to god. but if really you see a poor neighbour whom you count ignorant , live as one that loveth god and goodness , take heed that you proudly despise not christs little ones ; but love and cherish those sparks that are kindled and loved by christ : the least are called by christ , his brethren , and their interest made as his own , mat. . and the least have their angels which see the face of god in heaven . qu. iv. how then are infants saved that neither have knowledge nor love. ans . . while they have no wills of their own , which are capable of holy duties , they are as members of their parents whose wills are theirs ; and who know god and love him , for themselves and their infants : as the hand and foot doth not know or love god in itself , and yet is holy , in that it is the hand or foot of one that doth know and love him . . sanctified infants have that grace which is the seed of holy love , though they have not yet the act nor proper habit of love. i call it as seed , because it is a holy disposition of the soul , by which it is ( not only physically as all are , but ) morally able to love god , when they come to the use of reason , or at least mediately to do that which shall conduce to holy love. . and in this state being loved of god and known of him as the children of his grace and promise , they are happy in his love to them : for he will give their natures their due capacity in his way which we are not yet fit to be fully acquainted with , and he will fill up that capacity with his love and glory . obj. v. if this hold , away with universities , and all our volumes and studies of physicks , mathematicks and other sciences ; for they must needs divert our thoughts from the love of god! and then turks , muscovites and other contemners of learning are in the right . ans . there is a right and a wrong use of all these : as there is of arts and business of the world : one man so followeth his trade and worldly business as to divert , distract or corrupt his mind , and drown all holy thoughts and love ; and leave no due place for holy diligence . and another man so followeth his calling , as that heaven hath still his heart and hope , and his labour is made but part of his obedience to god , and his way to life eternal , and all is sanctified by holy principles , end and manner : and so it is about common learning , sciences or arts : and i have proved to you , that among too many called great scholars in the world , many books and much reading and acquaintance with all the arts of speaking , with grammar , logick , oratory , metaphysicks , physicks , history , laws , &c. is but one of satans last and subtlest means of wasting precious time , deceiving souls , and keeping such persons from pursuing the ends of their excellent wit , and of life itself , that would not have been cheated , diverted and undone , by the grosser way of brutish pleasures : but holy souls have a sanctified use of all their common knowledge , making it serve their high and holy ends . but o that some learned men would in time , as well understand the difference between common learning ( which serveth fancy , pride or worldly hopes ) and the love of god and a heavenly life , as they must know it when they come to die . chap. xv. use , exhort . not to deceive our selves by over-valuing a dead or an unholy knowledge . it grieveth my soul to observe how powerfully , and how commonly satan still playeth his first deceiving game , of calling off man from love , trust and obedience , to an ensnaring and troublesome , or unprofitable sort of knowledge : and how the lust of knowing carryeth away many unsuspected to misery , who escape the more dishonourable sort of lust ! and especially what abundance in several ways , take notional knowledge , which is but an art of thinking and talking , for real knowledge , which is our acquaintance with god and grace , and which changed the soul into the image of him that we seek and know , and filleth us with love , and trust , and joy. two sorts are especially here guilty . i. the learned students before described . ii. the superficial sort of people accounted religious . i. i have already shewed how pitiful a thing it is , that so many academical wits , and so many preachers , ( to say nothing of the grosly proud , tyrannical and worldly clergy ) do spend so many years in studies , that are used but in the service of the flesh , to their own condemnation , and never bend their minds to kindle in themselves the love of god , nor a heavenly desire or hope , nor to live in the comfortable prospect of glory : how many preach up that love and holiness , ( as the trade that they must live by ) which they never fervently preached to themselves , nor practised sincerely one hour in their lives ! how many use to preach funeral sermons , and bury the dead , that are unprepared for death themselves , and hardened in their security and unholy state , by those sights , those studies , those words which should awaken and convince them , and which they plead themselves for the conviction of their hearers ! o miserable scholars ! miserable preachers ! miserable doctors and prelates , who study and preach to their own condemnation , and have not knowledge enough to teach them to love god , nor to set more by the heavenly glory , than this world ; but by spiritual words do both hide and cherish a fleshly and a worldly mind ! you will find at death that all your learning was but a dream , and one of the vanities that entangle fools , and you will die as sadly as the unlearned , and be beaten with more stripes than they that knew not their masters will. . unholy knowledge is but a carkass , a shadow , the activity of a vain mind , or a means without the end , and unfit to attain it . a map is not a kingdom , nor doth it much enrich the owner . the names of meats and drinks will not nourish you : and to know names and notions giveth you no title to the things so named . you may as well think to be saved for being good musicians , physicians , or astronomers , as for being learned divines , if your knowledge cause not holy love : it may help others to heaven , but it will be but vanity to you , and you will be a sounding brass , or a tinkling cymbal , cor. . . you glory in a lifeless picture of wisdom , and hell may shortly tell you that you had better have chosen any thing to play the fools with , than with the notions and words of wisdom mortified . . nay , such prophanation of holy things is a heinous sin . who is liker the devil than he that knoweth most , and loveth god least ? to know that you should love , and seek god most , and not to do it , is wilfully to despise him in the open light . as the privation of god's love is the chief part of hell ; so the privation of our love to god is the chief part of ungodliness or sin ; yea and much of hell it self . knowledge puffeth up , but charity edifieth . unholy knowledge is a powerful instrument of satan's service ; in the service of pride , and ambition , and heresie ; one learned and witty ungodly man , will merit more of the devil by mischieving mankind , than many of the common unlearned sort : and none are so like impenitently to glory in this sin : they will be proud of such adorned fetters ; that they can sin philosophically , and metaphysically , in greek and hebrew , and with logical subtilty , or oratorical fluency , prove against unlearned men , that they do well in damning their own souls , and that god and heaven are not worthy of their chiefest love and diligence ; such men will offend god more judiciously than the ignorant , and will more discreetly and honourably fool away their hopes of heaven , and more successfully deceive the simple : their wisdom , like achitophel's , will serve turn to bring them to destroy themselves : and is it any wonder if this be foolishness with god ? cor. . . the understanding of a man is a faculty unfit to be abused and prostituted to the slavery of the flesh . the abuse of the senses is bad , but of the understanding worse ; because it is a nobler faculty . when they that knew god , glorified him not as god , but became vain in their imagination , their foolish heart was darkened , and professing themselves wise ( philosophers or gnosticks ) they became fools , rom. . , . and as they did not like to retain god in their knowledge , god gave them up to vile affections . and yet many are proud of this mortal tympanite , as if it were a sound and healthful constitution ! and think they have the surest right to heaven for neglecting it knowingly , and going learnedly in the way to hell. . you lose the chiefest delight of knowledge : o that you knew what holy quietness and peace , what solid pleasure that knowledge bringeth , which kindleth and cherisheth holy love , and leadeth the soul to communion with god ; and how much sweeter it is to have a powerful and experimental knowledge , than your trifling dreams ? the learnedst of you all have but the husks or shells of knowledge ; and what great sweetness is in shells , when the poorest holy experienced christian hath the kernel , which is far more pleasant ? o try a more serious practical religion , and i dare assure you , it will afford you a more solid kind of nourishment and delight . the pleasure of the speculative divine in knowing , is but like the pleasure of a mathematician or other speculator of nature ; yea below that of the moral philosopher : it is but like my pleasure in reading a book of travels or geography ; in comparison of the true practical christians , which is like their pleasure that live in those countreys , and possess the lands and houses which i read of . . nay , ( yet worse ) this unholy knowledge doth often make men the devils most powerful and mischievous instruments : for though christ oft also so over-rule the hearts of men , and the course of the world , as to make the knowledge and gifts of bad men serviceable to his church ( as wicked souldiers oft fight in a good cause , and save the lives of better men ) yet a worldly mind is likest to follow the way of worldly interest ; and it is but seldom that worldly interest doth suite with , and serve the interest of truth and holiness , but more commonly is its greatest adversary : therefore most usually it must be expected that such worldly men should be adversaries to the same truth and holiness which their worldly interest is adverse to . and hence hath arisen that proud and worldly , and tyrannical clergy , which hath set up and maintained the roman kingdom , under the name of the holy catholick church ; and which hath by their pope and pretended general councils usurped a legislative and executive power over the whole christian world , and made great numbers of laws without authority , and contrary to the laws of christ ; multiplying schisms on pretence of suppressing them , and making so many things necessary to the concord of christians , as hath made such concord become impossible ; presumptuously voting other men to be hereticks , while their own errours are of as odious a kind , yea , when holy truth is sometime branded by them as heresie . and when they cannot carry the judgments , consciences and wills of all men along in obedience to their tyrannical pride and lust , and interest , they stir up princes and states to serve them by the sword , and murder , and persecute their own subjects , and raise bloody wars against their neighbours , to force them to obey these proud seducers : yea , and if kings and states be wiser than thus to be made their hangmen or bloody executioners ( to the ruine of their best subjects , and their own everlasting infamy and damnation ) they stir up the foolish part of the subjects against such rulers , and in a word , they will give the world no peace : so that i am past all doubt that the ten heathen persecutions so much cryed out of , was but a small matter as against the christians blood , in comparison of what hath been done by this tyrannical clergy : and the cruelest magistrates still seem to come short of them in cruelty , and seldom are very bloody or persecuting , but when a worldly or proud clergy stirs them up to it . and all the heresies that ever sprang up in the church , do seem to have done less harm on one side , than by pretences of unity , order and government , they have done on the other . o how unspeakably have been and still are the churches sufferings , by a proud and worldly clergy , and by mens abuse of pretended learning and authority ! . i will add yet one more considerable mischief ; that is , that your unholiness and carnal minds for all your learning , corrupteth your judgments , and greatly hindereth you from receiving many excellent truths , and inclineth you to many mortal errours . to instance in some particulars . . about the attributes and government of god , a bad man is inclined to doubt of gods particular providence , his holy truth and justice , and to think god is such a one as he would have him to be . whereas they that have the love of god and goodness , have his attributes as it were written on their hearts ; that he is good , and wise , and holy , and just , and true , they know by an experimental certain knowledge , which is to them like nature and life it self . joh. . . hos . . . psal . . . &c. . the very truth of the gospel and mystery of redemption is far hardlier believed by a man that never felt his need of christ , nor ever had the operations of that spirit on his soul , which are its seal , than by them that have the witness in themselves , and have found christ actually save them from their sins : who are regenerated by this holy seed , and nourished by this milk. joh. . , , . pet. . , . and pet. . . . yea the very truth of our souls immortality , and the life and glory to come , is far hardlier believed by them who feel no inclination to suc● a future glory , but only a propensity to this present life , and the interest and pleasures of it , than by them that have a treasure , a home , a heart , and a conversation in heaven , and that long for nearer communion with god , and that have the earnest and first-fruits of heaven within them . math. . , . phil. . , . col. . , , , . rom. . , , , . . the evil of sin in general , and consequently what is sin in particular , is hardlier known by a man that loveth it , and would not have it to be sin , than by one that hateth it , and loveth god and holiness above all . they that love the lord hate evil . . most controversies about the nature of grace , are hardlier understood by them that have it not , than by them that have it as a new nature in them . and consequently what kind of persons are to be well thought of as the children of god ? the pharisees were strict , and yet haters of christ and christians : many preach and write for godliness , that yet when it cometh to a particular judgment , deride the godly as hypocrites or superstitious . . in cases about the worship of god , a carnal mind , how learned soever , is apt to relish most an outside , carnal , ceremonious way , and to be all for a dead formality , or else for a proud ostentation of their own wits , opinions and parts , or some odd singularity that sets them up to be admired as some extraordinary persons , or teacheth their own consciences so to flatter them : when a spiritual man is for worshipping god ( though with all decent externals , yet ) in spirit and in truth ; and in the most understanding , sincere and humble manner , and yet with the greatest joy and praise . rom. . , , &c. . specially in the work of self-judging , how hard a work have the most learned that are ungodly truely to know themselves ? when learning doth but help their pride to blind them ? and yet none so apt to say as the pharisees , john . . are we blind also ? and to hate those that honour them not as erroneously as they do themselves : and therefore augustine so lamenteth the misery of the clergy , and saith that the unlearned take heaven by violence , when the learned are thrust down to hell with all their learning ! who are prouder and more self-ignorant hypocrites in the world ( expecting that all should bow to them and reverence them , and cry them up as wise and excellent men ) than the unholy , worldly fleshly clergy . . and in every case that themselves are much concerned in , their learning will not keep them from the most blind in justice : let the case be but such as their honour , or profit , or relations and friends are much concerned in , and they presently take all right to be on their side ; and all these to be honest men that are for them , and all those to be wicked hypocrites , hereticks , schismaticks , factious , or liars , that are against them ; and dare print to the world that most notorious truths in matters of fact are lies , and lies are truths , and corrupt all history where they are but concerned : so that experience hath taught me to give little credit to any history written by men , in whom i can perceive this double character , . that they are worldly and unconscionable ; . and concerned by a personal interest ; especially when they revile their adversaries . and money , friends or honour will make any cause true and just with them , and can confute all evidences of truth and innocency . learned judges are too oft corrupt . . and in cases of great temptation , how insufficient is learning to repel the tempter , when it 's easily done by the holy love of god and goodness ? how easily is a man's judgment tempted to think well of that which he loveth , and ill of that which his heart is against ? many such instances i might give you , but these fully shew the misery and folly of ungodly scholars , that are but blinded by dead notions , and words of art , to think they know something , when they know nothing as they ought to know ; and to hate truth and goodness , and speak evil of the things they know not , while for want of holy love , these tinkling cymbals do but deceive themselves , and ascertain their own damnation . ii. i should next have said as much of the vanity and snare of the knowledge of such gnosticks , as in an over-valuing of their own religious skill and gifts , cry out as the pharisees , this people that know not the law are cursed . but what is said is applicable to them . chap. xvi . love best the christians that have most love to god and man. if god love those most that have most love , and not those that have most barren knowledge ; then so must we , even all that take god's wisdom as infallible : of whom can we know better whom to love and value , than of him that is wisdom and love it self ? there is more savoury worth in the experience , affections , and heavenly tendency of holy souls , than in all the subtilties of learned wits . when a man cometh to die , who savoureth not more wisdom in the sacred scripture , and in holy treatises , than in all aristotle's learned works ? and who had not then rather hear the talk and prayers of a holy person , than the most accurate logick or mathematicks ? alas ! what are these but trifles to a dying man ? and what they will be to a dying man , they should be much to us all our life ; unless we would never be wise till it is too late . and among men seeming religious , it is not the religious wrangler or disputer , nor the zealous reviler of his brethren , that can hotly cry down on one side , these men are heretical ; or on the other , these are antichristian , that are the lovely persons : not they that on one side cry out , away with these from the ministry and church as disobedient to us ? or on the other , away with these from our communion as not holy enough to join with us ? it is not they that proudliest persecute to prove their zeal , nor they that proudliest separate from others to prove it ; but it is they that live in the love of god and man , that are beloved of god and man. nature teacheth all men to love those that love them . and the divine nature teacheth us to love those much more that love god and goodness . though love be an act of obedience as commanded , yet hath it a nature also above meer obedience ; and bare commanding will not cause it . no man loveth god or man only because he is commanded so to do ; but because he perceiveth them to be good and amiable . and the most loving are the most lovely so be it their love be rightly guided . doth it not kindle love in you to others , more , to hear their breathings after god , and grace , and glory , and to see them loving and kind to all , and delighting to do all the good they can , and covering tenderly the infirmities of others , and practising , cor. . and living at peace among themselves , and as much as is possible with all men , and loving their enemies , and blessing those that curse them , and patiently bearing and forgiving wrongs , than to come into one congregation and hear a priest teach the people to hate their brethren as schismaticks or hereticks ; or in another , and hear a man teach his followers to hate others as antichristian or ceremonious ? or to hear silly men and women talk against things that are quite beyond their reach ; and shaking the head to talk against dissenters , and say , such a one is an erroneous or dangerous man , take heed of hearing him ? such a one is for or against reprobation , free will , universal redemption , mans power , and such like , which they little understand . in a word , the proudly tyrannical , and the proudly schismatical , with all their pretence of learning on one side , or of the spirit and holiness , and gifts on the other , are no whit so amiable as the single-hearted , honest , peaceable christian , who preacheth love , and prayeth love , and liveth , and breatheth , and practiseth love . paul saith , that all the law is fulfilled in love ; and fulfilling is more than knowing it . and christ himself did not in vain sum up all the commandments in the love of god and man , nor in vain ask peter thrice : lovest thou me ? nor in vain so often charge it on them , as his new ( that is his last ) commandment , that they love one another ? nor doth his beloved apostle john in vain so earnestly write for love . chap. xvii . exhort . plead not against love or works of love , upon pretence of a cross interest of learning , knowledge , gifts , church-order , discipline , &c. or any other thing . if love be that which is most amiable in us to the god of love , then as nothing in the world can excuse him that is without it , nor render him lovely indeed to god and man , so nothing must be made a pretence against it . and no pretence will excuse that man , or that society that is against it . even corrections and severities when they must be used , must come from love , and be wholly ordered to the ends and interest of love . and when necessity calls for destructive executions , which tend not to the good of him that is executed , yet must they tend to the good of the community or of many , and come from a greater love than is due to one , or else that which otherwise would be laudable justice , is but cruelty : for the punishment of offenders is good and just , because tending to the common good , debentur reipublicae , the community have jus , a right to them as a means to their good : so that it is love that is the amiableness of justice it self . if any think that gods justice is a cross instance , let him consider , . that though the most publick or common good be our end next the ultimate , yet the true ultimate end of all things , is god himself : and the love of god is the highest love : and gods justice is not without that love of himself , and tendeth to that good which he is capable of receiving , which is but the fulfilling or complacency of his own will , which is but improperly called his receiving . . and we little know how many in another world , or in the renewed earth , are to be profited by his justice on the damned , as angels and men are by his justice on the devils . . love is the life of religion , and of the soul , and of the church : and what can be a just pretence for any , to destroy or oppose the very life of religion , the life of souls , and the life of the church of christ ! physick , blood-letting and dismembring may be used for life : but to take away life , except necessarily for a good that is better than that life , is murder : and what is it that is better than the life of religion in all matters of religion ? or than the life of the church in all church affairs ? or than the life of mens souls in all matters of soul concernment ? . love is the great command and summary of all the law : and what can be a just pretence for breaking the greatest command , yea , and the whole law ? . love is gods image , and he that dwelleth in love , dwelleth in god , who is love , and god in him : and what can be a pretence sufficient for destroying the image of god , which is called by his name ? . there is nothing in man that god himself loveth better than our love ▪ and therefore nothing that as better can be set against it . and yet alas , what enmity is used in the world against the love of god and man ? and many things alledged as pretences to justify it ? let us consider of some few of them . . the great tyrants of the world , such as in several ages have been the plagues of their own and neighbour nations , care not what havock they make of religion , and of mens lives , by bloody wars and cruel persecutions ▪ destroying many thousands , and undoing far more thousands of the country families where their armies come , and sacrificing the lives of the best of their subjects by butcheries or flames ? and what is the pretence for all this ? perhaps they would be lords of more of the world , and would have larger kingdoms : or more honour : perhaps some prince hath spoken a hard word of them , or done them some wrong : perhaps some subjects believe not as they bid them believe ; or forbear not to worship god in a manner which they forbid them : perhaps daniel will not give over praying for a time , or the apostles will not give over preaching , or the three confessors will not fall down to the golden image ; and so nebuchadnezzar , or the other rulers seem despised : and their wills and honour are an interest that with them seemeth to warrant all this . but how long will it seem so ? i had rather any friend of mine had the sins of a thief or drunkard or the most infamous sinner among us to answer for , than the sins of a bloody alexander , caesar or tamerlane . . the roman clergy set up inquisitions , force men by cruelties to submit to their church keys , whose very nature is to be used without force , and they silence , yea torment the faithful ministers of christ , and have murdered thousands of his faithful people raised rebellions against princes and wars in kingdoms ; and taught men to hate gods servants as hereticks , schismaticks , rebels , factious , and what not ? and what pretence must justify all this ? why the interest of the pope and clergy , called in ignorance or craft by the name of the holy church , religion , unity , and such other honourable name . but must their church live on blood ? and holy blood ? and be built or preserved by the destruction of christs church ? must their doctrine be kept up by silencing faithful ministers ? and their worship by destroying or undoing the true worshippers of christ ? are all these precious things which die with love , no better than to be sacrificed to the clergies pride and worldly lusts ? . among many schismaticks and sectaries ( that are not miscalled so , but are such indeed ) their discipline consisteth in separating from most other christians , as too bad ( and that is , too unlovely ) to be of their communion ; and their preaching is much to make those seem bad ( that is , unlovely ) that are not of their way ; and their worship is much such as relisheth of the same envy and strife , to add affliction or reproaches to their brethren ; or to draw the people from the love of others unto them ; and their ordinary talk is back-biting others for things that they understand not , and reporting any lie that is brought them , and telling the hearers something of this minister , or that person or the other , that is unlovely , as if satan had hired them to preach down love , and prate and pray down love , and all this in the name of christ : and the third chapter of james is harder than hebrew to them ; they do not understand it , but though they tear it not out of the bible , they leave it out of the law in their hearts , as much as the papists leave the second commandment out of their books . and it is one of the marks of a good man among them to talk against other parties , and make others odious , to set up them . and what are the pretences for all this ? why truth and holiness . . others have not the truth which they have . and . others are not against the same doctrines and ceremonies , and bishops and church orders and ways of worship which they are against ; and therefore are ungodly , antichristian or men of no religion . but truth seldom dwelleth with the enemies of love and peace : they that are strangers and enemies to it indeed do often cry it up , and cry down those as enemies to it that possess it : the wisdom that hath bitter envying and heart-strife is from beneath ; and is earthly , sensual and devilish . i admonish all that care for their salvation that they set up nothing upon love killing terms : if you are christs disciples you are taught of god to love each other , you are taught it as christs last and great commandment : you are taught it by the wonderful example of his life , and specially , joh. . . by his washing hi● disciples feet : you are taught it by the holy ghosts uniting the hearts of the disciples , and making them by charity to live as in community , acts . and . you are taught it by the effective operation of the spirit on your own hearts : the new nature that is in you inclineth you to it . and will you now pretend the necessity of your own interest , reputation , your canons , and things indifferent , your little church orders of your own making , yea or the positive institutions of christ himself , as to the present exercise , against this love ? hath christ commanded you any thing before it , except the love of god ? you say , if such and such men be suffered , this and that disorder and inconvenience will follow : but is it a greater thing than love that you would maintain ? is it a greater evil than the destruction of love that you would avoid ? did not christ prefer mercy before sabbath rest , and before the avoiding familiarity with sinners ? pretend nothing against love that is not better than love. obj. but what is this to the love of god which the text speaketh of ? ans . as god is here seen as in a glass , so is he loved : he that loveth not his brother whom he seeth daily , how shall he love god , whom he never saw ? he that saith he loveth god , and hateth his brother , is a liar ? what you do to his brethren you do as to christ : if you can find as full a promise of salvation to those that observe your canons , ceremonies , orders , or are of your opinion and sect , as i can shew you for them that love christ and his servants , then prefer the former before love. i know that the love and good of church and state and of many must be preferred before the love and good of few . but take heed of their hypocrisie that make these also inconsistent when they are not ; and make publick good and peace a meer pretence for their persecutions on one side , or their schisms on the other . love is so amiable to nature itself , that few of its enemies oppose it but under pretence of its own interest and name : it is as in love to the church & to mens souls that the inquisition hath murdered so many , and the laws de hereticis comburendis have been made and executed . but this burning , hanging , tormenting , and undoing kind of love , needeth very clear proof to make good its name and pretences , before impartial men will take it for love indeed . whatever good you seem to do , by the detriment of love to god and man , you will find it will not bear your charges . chap. . exh. bend all your studies and labours to the exercise and increase of love , both of god and man , and all good works . the greatest , best and sweetest work should have the greatest diligence . this great commandment must be obeyed with the greatest care . the work of love must be the work of our whole life : if you cannot learn to pray and preach , no nor to follow a worldly trade , without study and much exercise , how think you to be proficients in the love of god without them ? do this well , and all is done . o happy souls that are habituated and daily exercised in this work ! whose new nature , and life and study , and business , is holy love. . how divine , how high and noble is this life ; to live in a humble friendship with god and all his holy ones ? all animals naturally love their like , and converse according to their love : and men as men have as much sociable love to men as the love of sin and inordinate self-love will allow them : and they that truly love god and holiness , and saints , do shew that they have some connatural suitableness to these excellent objects of their love . nothing more aptly denominateth any man divine and holy , than divine and holy love. how else should souls have communion with god ? his common influx all creatures receive ? in him all live and move and have their being : but when his love kindleth in us a reflecting love , this is felicity itself . yea it is much nobler than our felicity : for though our felicity consist in loving god , and being beloved of him , yet it is a far more excellent thing by reason that god is the object of our love , than by reason that it is our felicity : gods interest advanceth it more than ours : and though they are not separable , yet being distinguishable , we should love god far more as god , and perfect goodness in himself , than as he or this love is our own felicity . . this life of love is the true improvement of all gods doctrines , ordinances , mercies , afflictions , and other providences whatsoever ! for the use of them all is to lead us up to holy love , and to help us in the daily exercise of it . what is the bible else written for , but to teach us to love and to exercise the fruits of love ? what came christ from heaven for , but to demonstrate and reveal gods love and loveliness to man , and by reconciling us to god , and freely pardoning all our sins , and promising us both grace and glory , to shew us those motives which should kindle love , and to shew us that god is most suitable and worthy of our love , and to fill us with the spirit of love , which may give us that which he commandeth us . what is it that we read books for , and hear sermons for , but to kindle and exercise holy love ? what joyn we for in the sacred worship of the assemblies , but that in an united flame of holy love , we might all mount up in praise to jehovah ? what is the lords day separated to , but the tidings of love , the sufferings victories , and triumphs of our saviours love , the tasts and prospects of gods love to us , and the lively and joyful exercise of ours to him , and to each other ? what use are the sacraments of , but that being entertained at the most wonderful feast of love , we should tast its sweetness and pour out the grateful sense of it in holy thanksgiving and praise , and the exercise of uniting love to one another ? what are church societies or combinations for but the loving communion of saints ? which the primitive christians expressed by selling all , and living in a community of love , and stedfastly continuing in the apostles doctrine , and fellowship , and breaking of bread and prayer ? what are all gods mercies for but that as by love tokens we should tast that he is love and good , and should by that tast be inclined to returns of love ? nay what are civil societies , but loving communions , if used according to their natures . did they not love each other , so many bees would never hive and work together , nor so many pigeons dwell peaceably in one dove-house , nor fly together in so great flocks . what is the whole christian faith for , but the doctrine of holy love believed , for the kindling and exercise of our love ? what is faith itself but the bellows of love ? what is the excellency of all good works , and gifts and endowments , but to be the exercises of love to god and man , and the incentives of our brethrens love ? without love all these are dead carkasses , and as nothing , and without it we our selves are as nothing ; yea though we give all that we have to the poor , or give our bodies like martyrs to be burnt , or could speak with the tongue ) the orthodoxness and elegancy ) of angels , we were but as sounding brass and as a tinkling cymbal . james knew what he said , when he said that faith without works is dead , because without love it is dead , which those works are but the body or the fruit of . . this life of love is the perfection of mans faculties as to their intended end and use . as all the operations of the lower faculties , ( vegetative and sensitive ) are subordinate to the use and operations of the intellectual part , which is the higher , so all the acts of the intellect itself , are but subservient and dirigent to the will ( or love ) and practice . the understanding is but the eye by which the soul seeth what to love , and choose or refuse , and what to do or to avoid . love is the highest act of our highest faculty ; and complacency in the highest infinite good , is the highest of all the acts of love. this is the state of the soul in its ripeness and mellow sweetness , when it is delightful , embracing its most desired object , and is blessed in the fruition of its ultimate end . all other graces and duties are servants unto this . they are the parts indeed of the same new creature , but the hands and feet are not the heart . . for love is the very foretast of heaven ; the beginning of that felicity which shall there be perfect . in heaven all saints shall be as one ; and all united to their glorious head , as he is united to the father ( disparities allowed , ) joh. . . and what more uniteth souls than love ? heaven is a state of joyful complacence ; and what is that but perfect love ? the heavenly work is perfect obedience and praise : and what are these but the actions and the breath of love ? . therefore they that live this life of love , are fitter to die , and readier for heaven , than any others . belief is a foresight of it ; but love is a foretast ; the first fruits , and our earnest and pledge . he that loveth god , and christ , and angels , and saints , and perfect holiness , and divine praise , is ready for heaven , as the infant in the womb is ready for birth , at the fulness of his time : but other christians , whose love is true , but little to their fears , and damped by darkness , and too much love of the body and this world , do go as it were by untimely birth to heaven ; and those in whom the love of the body is predominant , come not thither ( in that state ) at all . the god of grace and glory will meet that soul with his felicitating embracements , who panteth and breatheth after him by love : and as love is a kind of union with the heavenly society , the angels , who love us better than we love them , will be ready to convey such souls to god. as the living dwell not in the graves among the dead , and the dead are buried from among the living ; so holy souls , who have this life of love , cannot be among the miserable in hell , nor the dead in sin among the blessed . . therefore this life of holy love , doth strengthen our belief it self . strong reasons that are brought for the immortality of souls , and the future glory , are usually lost upon unsanctified hearers ; yea with the doctors themselves that use them : when they have perswaded others that there is a heaven for believers , and that by arguments in themselves unanswerable , they have not perswaded their own hearts ; but the predominant love of flesh and earth , doth byass their understandings , and maketh them think that they can confute themselves . their gust and inclination prevaileth against belief : and therefore the greatest scholars are not always the strongest believers . but holy love , when it is the habit of the soul , as it naturally ascendeth ; so it easily believeth that god , that glory to which it doth ascend . the gust and experience of such a soul assureth it that it was made for communion with god , and that even in this life such communion is obtained in some degree ; and therefore it easily believeth that it is redeemed for it , and that it shall perfectly enjoy it in heaven for ever . though glory be here but seminally in grace , and this world be but as the womb of that better world for which we hope , yet the life that is in the embrio and seed , is a confirming argument for the perfection which they tend to . o that men knew what holy love doth signifie and foretel ! as the seed or embrio of a man becometh not a beast or serpent ; so he that hath the habitual love of god , and heaven , and holiness , is not capable of hell , no more than the lovers of worldliness and sensuality are capable of present communion with god , and of his glory . god doth not draw mens hearts to himself , nor kindle heavenly desires in them in vain . he that hath the spirit of christ , hath the witness in himself , that christ and his promises of life are true , john . , , . and what is this spirit , but the habit of divine and heavenly love , and its concomitants ? may i but feel my soul inflamed with the fervent love of the heavenly perfection , surely it will do more to put me quite out of doubt of the certainty of that blessed state , than all arguments without that love can do . . and holy love will be the surest evidence of our sincerity ; which many old writers meant , that called it , the form of faith and other graces : as means , as means , are informed by their aptitudinal respect unto the end ; so love , as it is the final act upon god the final object , thus informeth all subordinate graces and duties as they are means . and as all morality is subjected in the will as the proper primary seat , and is in the intellect , executive power , and senses only by participation , so far as their acts are imperate by the will ; so love and volition being really the same thing , it may accordingly be said , that nothing is any further acceptable to god , than it is good ; and nothing is morally good any further than it is voluntary or willed ; and to be willed ( as good , as end , or as means ) and to be loved , are words that signifie the same . no preaching , praying , fasting , &c. no fear of punishment , no belief of the truth , &c. will prove us sincere and justified , any further than we can prove , that all this either cometh from , or is accompanied with love , that is , with a consenting will. with the heart man believeth unto righteousness , rom. . and , if thou believe with all thy heart , thou mayest be baptized , saith philip to the eunuch , acts . my son , give me thy heart , is wisdom's invitation . all 's nothing without the heart , that is , without willingness or love. they that love most are sureliest forgiven , and have most holiness or grace , how unskifull soever they may be in their expressions . the sealing spirit of adoption , is the spirit of love , and the abba father , and the unexpressed groans of filial love , are understood and acceptable to god. a loving desire after god and holiness , is a better evidence , than the most taking tongue , or largest knowledge . . this life of holy love will make all our religion and obedience easy to us ; it will give us an alacrity to the performance , and a pleasure in the practice of it ; and so our obedience will be hearty , willing and universal . who is averse to that which he loveth ( unless for something in it which he hateth ? ) all men go willingly and readily to that which they truly love. therefore it is said that the law is not made for a righteous man : that is , a man that loveth piety , temperance and justice , and their several works , so far hath no need of threatning laws and penalties to constrain him to it : and he that hateth sin , so far hath no need of legal penalties to restrain him from it . thus is the law said to be written in our hearts ; not as it is meerly in our knowledge and memory , but as the matter commanded is truly loved by us , and the sin forbidden truly hated . even our horses will carry us cheerfully that way which they love to go , and go heavily where they go against their wills. win mens love , and the life and lips and all ( according to power ) will follow it . . and such persons therefore are likest to persevere : men go unweariedly ( if they be but able ) where they go with love. especially such a love , which groweth stronger as it draweth nearer the state of perfection which it loveth ; and groweth by daily renewed experiences and mercies , as rivers grow bigger as they draw nearer to the sea. we easily hold on in that we love ; but that which men loath , and their hearts are against ; they are quickly weary of : and the weary person will easily be perswaded to lie down : the root of a apostasie is already in those persons , who love not the end which they pretend to seek , nor the work which they pretend to do . . lastly , holy love is a pregnant , spreading , fruitful grace : it kindleth a desire to do good to others , and to draw men to love the same god and heaven , and holiness which we love . it made gods word to be to jeremy as a burning fire shut up in his bones , he was weary of forbearing , jer. . . as fire kindleth fire , and is the active principle of vegetation ( as i suppose ) so love kindleth love , and is a kind of generative principle of grace . gods love is the first cause ; but mans love maketh them meet instruments of gods love : for love will be oft praising the god and holiness which is loved ; and earnestly desireth that all others may love and praise the same . the soul is not indeed converted , till its love is won to god and goodness : a man may be terrified into some austerities , superstitions or reformations , but he is not further holy than his heart is won . and as every thing that generateth is apt to produce its like , so is love , and the words and works of love. and as love is the heart of holiness , so must it be of all fruitful preaching and conversation , whatever the words or actions are , they are like no farther to win souls , than they demonstrate the love of god , and of holiness , and of the hearers or spectators . as among amorous and vain persons strong love appearing though by a look or word , doth kindle the like more than all complements that are known to be but feigned and affected words ; so usually souls are won to god , as by the preachers words and works of love , the love and loveliness of god in christ , are fulliest made known . quest . but how should we reach this excellent life of holy love , which doth so far excel all knowledge . ans . i have said so much of this in the first part of my christian directory , and other writings , that i must here say but little of it , lest i be overmuch guilty of repetitions . briefly , direct . i. believe gods goodness to be equal to his greatness . gods three great primary attributes are coequal , viz. his power , his wisdom , and his goodness ! and then look up to the heavens and think how great and powerful is that god that made and continueth such a frame , as that sun , and those stars , and those glorious unmeasureable regions where they are : think what a world of creatures god maintaineth in life , on this little lower orb of earth , both in the seas and on the land. and then think , o what is the goodness which is equal to all this power ! direct . . consider how communicative this infinite goodness is : why else is he called love it self ? why else made he all the world ? and why did he make the sun so glorious ? why else did he animate and beautify the universe , with the life and ornaments of created goodness ? all his works shine by the splendor of that excellency which he hath put upon them ; all are not equal , but all are good , and their inequality belongeth to the goodness of the universe . the communicative nature with which god hath endowed all active beings , ( and the most noble most ) is an impress of the infinite communicative love . fire would communicate its light , heat and motion to all passive objects which are capable of receiving it : how pregnant and fertile is the very earth , with plants , flowers and fruits of wonderful variety , usefulness and beauty ! what plant is not natured to the propagation of its kind , yea to a plenteous multiplication ? how many seeds which are virtual plants , doth each of them bring forth at once ; and yet the same plant , with all its off-spring , perhaps liveth many years for further multiplication : so that did not the far greatest part of seeds yearly perish , there must be very many such earths to receive and propagate them : this earth hath not room for the hundredth part : to shew us that the active natures even of vegetatives , do quite exceed in their pregnant communicative activity , the receptive capacity of all passive matter : which teacheth us to observe that all created patients are unconceiveably too narrow to receive such communicative influences , as infinite pregnant love can communicate , were there subjects to receive them . it is wonderful to observe in all sorts of animals , the same multiplying communicative inclination ! and what use the god of nature maketh even of sensual love to all generation ? uniting and communicative love is in all creatures the incentive principle of procreation . and what a multitude of young ones will some one creature procreate , especially fishes to admiration ? so that if other fishes , with men and other creatures did not devour them , all the waters on earth could not contain them . yea our moral communicativeness also hath the same indication : he that knoweth much would fain have others know the same ; secret knowledge kept to our selves only hath its excellent use ; but it satisfieth not the mind , nisi te scire hoc sciat alter , unless others know that you have such knowledge , and unless you can make them know what you know : holy souls therefore have a fervent , but a regular desire , and endeavour by communicative teaching to make others wise : but proud heretical persons , that overvalue their conceits , have an irregular fornicating lust of teaching ; and adulterously invade the charge of others , presuming that none can do it so wisely and so well as they . men will compass sea and land to make a proselyte ; and tares and weeds are as much inclined to propagation as the wheat . there is a marvellous desire in the nature of man to make others of their own opinion ; and when it is governed by gods laws , it is greatly beneficial to the world. and even in affections , as well as knowledge , it is so : we would have others love those that we love , and hate what we hate . though where , by the insufficiency of the narrow creature , men must lose and want that themselves , which they communicate to others , selfishness forbiddeth such communication . and doubtless all the creatures in their several ranks , have some such impresses from the creator , by which his transcendent perfections may be somewhat observed . that god is now so communicative as to give to all creatures in the world , whatever being , motion , life , order , beauty , harmony , reason , grace , glory , any of them possess is past all question to considering sober reason . which tempted aristotle to think that the world was eternal , and some christians to think that though this present heaven and earth were created , as in gen. . is said , yet that from eternity some intellectual world at least , if not also corporeal , did flow from the creator as an eternal effect of an eternal cause ; or an eternal accident of the deity : because they could not receive it , that a god so unspeakably communicative now ( who hath made the sun to be an emblem of his communicativeness , ) should from all eternity be solitary and not communicative , when yet to all eternity he will be so . but these are questions which uncapable mortals , were far better let alone than meddle with , unless we desire rather to be lost than to be blessed in the abyss of eternity , and the thoughts of infinite pregnant love . but it is so natural for man and every animal to love that love and goodness which is beneficent , ( not only to us , but to all ) rather than a meer self-lover , that doth no good to others , that it must needs conduce much to our love of god , to consider that he is good to all , and his mercy is over all his works ; and that as there is no light in the air but from the sun , so there is no goodness but from god in all the world , who is more to the creation than the sun is to this lower world. and a sun that lighteth all the earth , is much more precious than my candle : a nilus which watereth the land of egypt , is more precious than a private well : it is the excellency of kings and publick persons , that if they are good , they are good to many : and o what innumerable animals in sea and land , besides the far greater worlds of nobler wights do continually live by one god of love ! study this universal , infinite love. direct . . especially study divine love and goodness in the face of our redeemer jesus christ , and all the grace which he hath purchased and conferreth . as we may see that magnitude of the stars in a telescope , which without it no eye can discern ; so may we see that glory of the love of god , by the gospel of jesus , which all common natural helps are insufficient to discover to such minds as ours . love is the great attribute which christ came principally to manifest , ( as was afore-said ) joh. . . joh. . , &c. and love is the great lesson which he came to teach us ; and love is the new nature which by his spirit he giveth us . and love is the great duty , which by law and gospel he requireth of us . love hath wrought its miracles in christ to the posing of the understandings of men and angels . there we may see god in the nearest condescending unity with man : in christ we may see the divine wisdom and word incorporate in such flesh as ours , conceived in a virgin by the power of the spirit of love ; by which spirit this incorporate word did live , preach , converse familiarly with man ; work miracles , heal diseases , suffer reproachful calumnies and death ; rising , triumphing , ascending , interceeding , sending the embassies of love to the world , calling home the greatest sinners unto god , reconciling enemies , and making them the adopted sons of god , forgiving all sin to penitent believers , quickening dead souls , illuminating the blind , and sanctifying the wicked by the spirit of life , and light , and love ; and making it his office , his work , his delight and glory , to rescue the miserable captives of the devil , and to make heirs of heaven of those that were condemned to hell , and had forsaken life in forsaking god. as this is shining , burning love , so it is approaching and self-applying love ; which cometh so near us , in ways and benefits so necessary to us , and so exceeding congruous to our case , as that it is easier for us to perceive and feel it , than we can do things of greater distance . the clearer the eye of faith is , by which we look into this mysterious glass , the more the wonders of love will be perceived in it . he never knew christ , nor understood the gospel , that wondered not at redeeming saving love ; nor did he ever learn of christ indeed , that hath not learned the lesson , work and life of love . direct . . keep as full records as you can of the particular mercies of god to your selves ; and frequently peruse them , and plead them with your frozen hearts . these are not the chiefest reasons of christian love ; because we are such poor inconsiderable worms , that to do good to one of us , is a far smaller matter , than many things else that we have to think of for that end . but yet when love doth chuse a particular person for its object , and there bestow its obliging gifts , it helpeth that person far more than others to returns of thankfulness and love : it 's that place , that glass which the sun doth shine upon , doth reflect its beams , rather than those that are shut up in darkness . self-love may and must be regulated and sanctified , to the furthering of higher love . it is not unmeet to say with david , psal . . . i love the lord , because he hath heard the voice of my supplication . we should say as heartily , i love the lord because he hath prospered , recovered , comforted my neighbour : but this is not all so easie as the other : and where god by personal application , maketh our greatest duty easie , we should use his helps . obj. but if it be selfishness as some tell us , to love one that loveth us , better than another of equal worth , who doth not love us , is it not selfishness to love god on so low an account as loving us ? god may say well , i love those that love me , prov. . . because to love him is the highest virtue , but to love us is as inconsiderable as we are . ans . . you may love another the more for loving you on several accounts . . as it is a duty which god requireth him to perform ( but so you must love him equally for loving others also . ) . as he rendereth himself more congruous and obliging to you , by chusing you for the special object of his love , by which he taketh the advantage of your natural self-love , to make your love to him both due and easie , ( as is said of the reflection of the sun-beams before . ) . but two things you must take heed of , . that you under-value not your neighbours good , but love another for loving your neighbours also , and doing them good ; and he that arriveth at that impartial unity as to make the smallest difference between his neighbour and himself , doth seem to me to be arrived at the state that is likest to theirs that are one in heaven . . and you must not over-love any man by a fond partiality for his love to you ; as if that made a bad man good , or fitter for your love : they that can love the worst that love them , and cannot love the best that set light by them ( deservedly , or upon mistake ) do shew that self-love overcometh the love of god. but god cannot be loved too much , though he may be loved too selfishly and carnally . his greatest amiableness is his essential goodness and infinite perfection : the next is his glory shining in the universe , and so in the heavenly society , especially ( christ and all his holy ones ; ) and so in the publick blessings of the world , and all societies . and next his goodness to your selves , not only as parts of the said societies , but as persons whose natures are formed by god himself , to a capacity , of receiving and reflecting love. who findeth not by experience that god is most loved , when we are most sensible of his former love to us , in the thankful review of all his mercies , and most assured or perswaded of his future love in our salvation . therefore make the renewed commemoration of gods mercies , the incentives of your love . direct . . but yet could you get a greater union and communion not only with saints as saints , but with mankind as men , it would greatly help you in your love to god : for when you love your neighbours as your selves , you would love god for your neighbours mercies , as well as for your own . and if you feel that god's love and special mercies to one person , even your selves , can do so much in causing your love , what would your love amount to , if thousand thousands of persons to whom god sheweth mercy , were every one to you as your selves , and all their mercies as your own ? thus graces mutually help each other . we love man , because we love god ; and we love god the more for our love to man. direct . . especially dwell by faith in heaven where love is perfect , and there you will learn more of the work of love. to think believingly that mutual love is heaven it self , and that this is our union with god , and christ , and all the holy ones , and that love will be an everlasting employment , pleasure and felicity , this will breed in us a desire to begin that happy life on earth . and as he that heareth excellent musick will long to draw near , and joyn in the consort or the pleasure ; so he that by faith doth dwell much in heaven , and hear how angels and blessed souls do there praise god in the highest fervours of rejoycing love , will be inclined to imitate them , and long to partake of their felicity . direct . . exercise that measure of love which you have in the constant praises of the god of love. for exercise exciteth , and naturally tendeth to increase , and praise is the duty in which pure love to god above our selves and all , even as good and perfect in himself , is exercised . as love is the highest grace , or inward duty ; so praise is the highest outward duty , ( when god is praised both by tongue and life . ) and as soul and body make one man , of whose existence generation is the cause ; so love and praise ( of mouth and works ) do make one saint , who is regenerated such by believing in the redeemer , who hath power to give the spirit of holiness to whom he pleaseth . but of this more afterwards . direct . . exercise your love to man , especially to saints , in doing them all the good you can ; and that for what of god is in them . for as this is the fruit of the love of god , and the evidence of it ; so doth it tend to the increase of its cause : partly as it is an exercise of it , and partly as it is a duty which god hath promised to the reward . as it is the spirit of christ , even of adoption , which worketh both the lov● of our father , and our brethren in us ; so god will bless those that exercise love , ( especially at the dearest rates , and with the fullest devotedness of all to god , with the larger measures of the same spirit . ) chap. xix . exh. v. place your comforts in health and sickness in mutual divine love. . see that you sincerely love god. how known ? doubts answered . it is of greatest importance to all mankind , to know what is best for them , and in what they should place and seek their comforts : to place them most with the proud , in the applauding thoughts or words of others , that magnifie them for their wit , their beauty , their wealth , or their pomp and power in the world , is to chuse somewhat less than a shadow for felicity , and to live on the air ; even an unconstant air : and will such a life be long , or happy ? should not a man in misery rather take it for a stinging deriding mockery or abuse , to be honoured and praised for that which he hath not , or for that which is his snare , or consisteth with his calamity ? would not a malefactor at the gallows take it for his reproach to hear an oration of his happiness ? will it comfort them in hell to be praised on earth ? this common reason may easily call , an empty vanity . to place our comforts in the delights of sensuality , had somewhat a fairer shew of reason , if reason were made for nothing better ; and if these were the noble sort of pleasures that advanced man above the brutes ; and if they would continue for ever , and the end of such mirth were not heaviness and repentance , and they did not deprave and deceive mens souls , and leave behind them disappointment and a sting . but he is unworthy the honour and pleasures of humanity , who preferreth the pleasures of a beast , when he may have better . to place our comforts in those riches , which do but serve this sensuality with provisions , and leave posterity in as vain and dangerous a state as their progenitors were , is but the foresaid folly aggravated . to place them in domination , and having our wills on others , and being able to do hurt , and exercise revenge , is but to account the devils happier than men , and to desire to be as the wolf among the sheep , or as the kite among the chickens , or as the great dogs among the little ones . to place them in much knowledge of arts and sciences , as they concern only the interests of the body in this life ; or as knowledge is but the delight of the natural phantasie or mind , doth seem a little finer , and sublime , and manly , but it is of the same nature and vanity as the rest . for all knowledge is for the guidance of the will and practice ; and therefore meer knowing matters that tend to pride , sensuality , wealth or domination , is less than the enjoyment of sensual pleasures in the things themselves . and the contemplation of superiour creatures , which hath no other end than the delight of knowing , is but a more refined sort of vanity , and like the minds activity in a dream . but whether it be the knowledge or the love of god , that man should place his highest felicity in , is become among the schoolmen and some other divines , a controversy that seemeth somewhat hard . but indeed to a considering man , the seeming difficulty may be easily overcome : the understanding and will and executive activity , are not several souls , but several faculties of one soul ; and their objects and order of operation easily tell us , which is the first , and which the last which tendeth to the other as its end , and which object is the most delightful and most felicitating to the man , viz. that truth is for goodness , and that good as good is the amiable , delectable and felicitating object ; and therefore that the intellect is the guide of the will , and faith and knowledge are for love and its delight . and yet that mans felicity is in both and not in one alone , as one faculty alone is not the whole soul , ( though it be the whole soul that acteth by that faculty . ) therefore the later schoolmen have many of them well confuted aquinas in this point . and it is of great importance in our christian practice . as the desire of more knowledge first corrupted our nature , so corrupted nature , is much more easily drawn to seek after knowledge , than after love . many men are bookish that cannot endure to be saints : many can spend their lives in the studies of nature and theology , and delight , to find increase of knowledge , who are strangers to the sanctifying , uniting , delightful exercise of holy love . appetite is the pondus or first spring of our moral actions , yea and of our natural , though the sense and intellect intromit or illuminate the object . and the first act of natural appetite ( sensitive and intellectual ) is necessitated . and accordingly the appetite as pleased is as much the end of our acts and objects , as the appetite as desiring is the beginning : even as ( si parvis magna , &c. ) gods will as efficient is the absolutely first cause , and his will as done and pleased is the ultimate end of all things . it is love by which man cleaveth unto god , as good , and as our ultimate end . love ever supposeth knowledge ; and is its end and perfection . neither alone , but both together are mans highest state ; knowledge as discerning what is to be loved , and love as our uniting and delighting adherence to it . i. labour therefore with all your industry , to know god that you may love him ; it is that love that must be your comforting grace , both by signification , and by its proper effective exercise . . true love will prove that your knowledge and faith are true and saving , which you will never be sure of , without the evidence of this and the consequent effects . if your expressive art or gifts be never so low , so that you scarce know what to say to god or man , yet if you so far know god as sincerely to love him , it is certainly true saving knowledge , and that which is the beginning of eternal life . knowledge , belief , repentance , humility , meekness , patience , zeal , diligence , &c. are so far , and no further sure marks of salvation , as they cause or prove true love to god and man , predominant . it is a hard thing any otherwise to know whether our knowledge , repentance , patience , zeal or any of the rest be any better than what an unjustifyed person may attain : but if you can find that they cause or come from , or accompany a sincere love of god , you may be sure that they all partake of sincerity , and are certain signs of a justified soul. it is hard to know what sins for number , or nature , or magnitude , are such as may or may not consist with a state of saving grace . he that considereth of the sins of lot , david , solomon and peter will find the case exceeding difficult : but this much is sure , that so much sin may consist with a justified state , as may consist with sincere love to god and goodness . while a man truly loveth god above all , his sin may cause correction , but not damnation ; unless it could extinguish or overcome this love. some question whether that the sin of lot or david , for the present stood with justification : if it excussed not predominant habitual love , it intercepteth not justification : if we could tell whether any or many heathens that hear not of christ , have the true love of god and holiness , we might know whether they are saved . the reason is , because that the will is the man in gods account ; and as voluntariness is essential to sin , so a holy will doth prove a holy person . god hath the heart of him that loveth him . he that loveth him would fain please him , glorify him , and enjoy him : and he that loveth holiness would fain live a holy life . therefore it is that divines say here that desire of grace is a certain sign of grace , because it is an act of will and love. and it is true , if that desire be greater or more powerful than our averseness , and than our desire after contrary things , that so it may put us on necessary duty , and overcome the lusts and temptations which oppose them : though cold wishes which are conquered by greater unwillingness and prevailing lusts , will never save men . . and as love is our more comforting evidence , so it is our most comforting exercise . those acts of religion which come short of this , come short of the proper life and sweetness of true religion . they are but either lightnings in the brain that have no heat ; or a feaverish zeal which destroyeth or troubleth , but doth not perform the acts of life ; or else ( even where love is true , but little ; and opprest by fears and grief , and trouble , ) it is like fire in green wood , or like young green fruits , which is not come to mellow ripeness . love of vanity is disappointing , unsatisfactory and tormenting : most of the calamities of this life proceed from creature-love : the greatest tormentor in this world is the inordinate love of life ; and the next is the love of the pleasures and accommodations of life ; which cause so much care to get and keep , and so much fear of losing , and grief for our losses , especially fear of dying , that were it not for this , our lives would be much easier to us ( as they are to the fearless sort of brutes . ) and the next tormenting affection is the love of children , which prepareth men for all the calamity that followeth their miscarriages in soul and body : their unnatural ingratitude , their lewdness , and debauchery , and prodigality , their folly and impiety would nothing so much torment us , were they no more loved than other men . and our dearest friends do usually cost us much dearer than our sharpest enemies . but the love of god and satisfying everlasting good is our very life , our pleasure , our heaven on earth . as it is purest and highest , above all other because of the object , so is it yet more pleasant and contenting , because it includeth the hopes of more , even of those greater delights of heavenly everlasting love , which as a pledge and earnest it doth presignify . as in nature , conception and the stirring the child in the womb do signify that same life is begun , which must shortly appear and be exercised in the open world . so the stirrings of holy love & desires towards god , do signify the beginning of the heavenly life . humility and patience , and diligent obedience do comfort us by way of evidence , and as removing many hinderances of our comfort , and somewhat further they go . but faith , hope and love , do comfort us by way of direct efficiency : faith seeth the matter of our joy ; love first tasteth it so far as to stir up desires after it . then hope giveth some pleasure to us in expecting it . and lastly , complacential love delightfully embraceth it , and is our very joy itself , and is that blessed union with god and holy souls , the amiable objects of true love , which is our felicity it self . to work out our comforts by the view of evidences and signs , is a necessary thing indeed , but it requireth a considerate search , by an understanding and composed mind ; and it 's often much hindered and interrupted , by mens ignorance of themselves , and weakness of grace , and darkness or smalness of evidence , and divers passions , especially fear ( which in some is so tyrannical that it will not suffer to believe or feel any thing that is comfortable . ) but love taketh in the sweetness of that good which is its object , by a nearer and effectual way , even by immediate taste ; as we feel in the exercise of our love to a dear friend , or any thing that is amiable and enjoyed . the readiest and surest way therefore to a contented and comfortable life is , ( to keep clear indeed our evidence , especially , sincere obedience , but ) especially to bend all our studies and religious endeavours , to the kindling and exercise of holy love , and to avoid all ( though it may come on religious pretence of humiliation or fear ) which tendeth to quench or hinder it . i. in health and prosperity as you live upon gods love , be sure that you do not atheistically overlook it , but take all as from it , and savouring of it . the hand of divine love perfumeth each mercy with the pleasant odour of itself , which it reacheth to us . every bit that we eat is a love token , and every hour or minute that we live ; all our health , wealth , friends and peace are the streams which still flow from the spring of unexhausted love . love shineth upon us by the sun ; love maketh our land fruitful , or cattel useful , our habitations convenient for us , our garments warm , our food pleasant and nourishing ; love keepeth us from a thousand unknown dangers night and day : it giveth us the comforts of our callings , our company , our books , our lawful recreations ; it blesseth means of knowledge to our understandings , and means of holiness to our wills , and means of health and strength to our bodies : mercies are sanctified to us when we tast gods love in them , and love him for them , and are led up by them to himself , and so love him ultimately for himself , even for his infinite essential goodness . as god is the efficient life of our mercies , and all the world without his love could never give us what we have , so is gods love the objective life of all our mercies , and we have but the corps or carkass of them , and love them but as such , if we love not in them the love that giveth them . ii. and even in adversity and pain , and sickness , whilst gods love is unchanged , and is but changing the way of doing good , our thoughts of it should be unchanged also . we must not think that the sun is lost when it is set , or clouded : we live by its influence in the night , though we see not its light , unless as reflected from the moon : our mother 's brought us into the world in sorrow ; and yet they justly accounted it a mercy that we were born : our lives are spent in the midst of sorrows ; & yet it is a mercy that we live : and though we die by dolour , all is still mercy to believers , which faith perceiveth contrary to sense : and here is the greatest and final victory which faith obtaineth against the flesh , to believe even the ruine of it to be for our good . even antonine the emperor could say that it was the same good god who is the cause of our birth and of our death : one as well as the other is his work , and therefore good : it was not a tyrant that made us , and it is not a tyrant that dissolveth us . and that is the best man , and the best will , which is most pleased with the will of god , because it is his will. yet just self-love is here a true coadjutor of our joy : for it is the will of god that the justified be glorified . and infinite love is saving us when it seemeth to destroy us . to live upon the comforts of divine love in sickness , and when death approacheth , is a sign that it is not the welfare of the body that we most esteem , and that we rejoice not in god only as the preserver and prosperer of our flesh , but for himself and the blessings of immortality . it is a mercy indeed which a dying man must with thankfulness acknowledge , if god have given him a clear understanding of the excellent mysteries of salvation : knowledge as it kindleth and promoteth love , is a precious gift of grace , and is with pleasure exercised , and may with pleasure be acknowledged . but all other knowledge is like the vanities of this world , which approaching death doth take down our esteem of , and causeth us to number it with other forsaking and forsaken things : all the unsanctified learning and knowledge in the world , will afford no solid peace at death ▪ but rather aggravate natures sorrows , to think that this also must be left . but love and its comforts ( if not hindered by ignorance or some strong temptation ) do then shew their immortal nature : and even here we feel the words of the apostle verified , of the vanishing nature of knowledge , and the perpetuity of holy love , whilst all our learning and knowledge will not give so much comfort to a dying man , as one act of true love to god and holiness kindled in us by the communication of his love . make it therefore the work of your religion , and the work of your whole lives , to possess your minds with the liveliest sense of the infinite goodness and amiableness of god , and hereby to live in the constant exercise of love. ii. and though some men hinder love by an over fearful questioning whether they have it , or not ; and spend that time in doubting , and complaining that they have it not , which they should spend in exciting and exercising it , yet reason requireth us to take heed lest a carnal mind deceive us with any counterfeits of holy love : of which having written more in my christian directory , i shall here give you but these brief instructions following . it is here of grand importance , i. to have a true conception of god as he must be loved ; ii. and then to know practically how it is that love must be exercised towards him . i. god must be conceived of at once , both . as in his essence , . and as in his relations to the world and to our selves , . and as in his works . and those that will separate these , and while they fix only on one of them leave out the other , do not indeed love god as god , & as he must be loved . . to think in general that there is an infinite eternal spirit of life , light and love , and not to think of him as related to the world , as its creator , preserver and governor , nor as related to us and to mankind as our owner , ruler and benefactor , is not to think of him as a god to us or to any but himself : and a love thus exercised cannot be true saving love . . and because his relations to us result from his works , either which he hath done already , or which he will do hereafter , therefore without the knowledge of his works , and their goodness , we cannot truly know and love god in his relations to us . . and yet when we know his works , we know but the medium , or that in which he himself is made known to us ; and if by them we come not to know him and love him in his perfect essence , it is not god that we know and love . and if we knew him only as related to us and the world , ( as that he is our creator , owner , mover , ruler and benefactor , ) and yet know not what he is in his essence that is thus related viz , that he is ( the perfect , first , being , life , wisdom and love , ) this were not truly to know and love him as he is god. these conceptions therefore must be conjunct . god is not here known to us but by the revelation of his works and word , nor can we conceive of him but by the similitude of some of his works : not that we must think that he is just such as they , or picture him like a creature ; for he is infinitely above them all : but yet it is certain that he hath made some impressions of his perfections upon his works ; and on some of them so clear as that they are called his image . nothing is known to us but either , . by sense immediately perceiving things external and representing them to the phantasie and intellect , or . by the intellects own conceiving of other things by the similitude of things sensed ; . or by immediate internal intuition or sensation of the acts of the soul in it self : . or by reasons collection of the nature of other things , from the similitude and effect of such perceived operations . i. by the external senses , we perceive all external sensed things , and we imagine and know them as so perceived . ii. by the intellection of these , we conceive of other things as like them , forming universal conceptions , and applying them to such individuals as are beyond the reach of our senses . ( as we think of men , trees , beasts , fishes , &c. in the indies as like those which we have seen ; and of sounds there as like those which we have heard , and of the taste of fruits by the similitude of such as we have tasted , &c. iii. how sense it self , intellection it self , volition it self , and internal affections are perceived , is no small controversie among philosophers . that we do perceive them , ( by the great wisdom and goodness of our creator ) we are sure ; but how we do it we can scarce describe , as knowing it better by the experience of that perception it self than by a knowledge of the causes and nature of the acts . it is most commonly said that the intellect knoweth its own acts by reflection , or as ockam , by intuition , and that it knoweth what sense is , and what volition by some species or image of them in the phantasie which it beholdeth . but such words give no man a true knowledge of the thing enquired of , unless withal he read the solution experimentally in his own soul. i know not what the meaning of a reflect act is : is it the same act which is called direct and reflect ? and doth the intellect know that it knoweth by the very same act by which it knoweth other things ? if so , why is it called reflect , and what is that reflection ? but the contrary is commonly said , that divers objects make divers acts , and therefore to know e.g. that this is paper , and to know that i know this , are two acts , and the latter is a reflecting of the former . but the former act is gone , and nothing in the instant that it is done , and therefore is in it self no intelligible object of a reflecting act : but as remembred it may be known , or rather that remembring is knowing what is past , by a marvellous retention of some impress of it which no man can well comprehend , so as to give an account of it : and why may not the same memory which retaineth the unexpressible record of an act past an hour or many years ago , be also the book where the intellect readeth its own act as past immediately in the foregoing instant ? but sure this is not the first knowing that we know ? before the act of memory , the intellect immediately perceiveth its own particular acts : and so doth the sense : by one and the same act we see and perceive that we see ; and by one and the same act ( i think ) we know and know that we know , and this by a consciousness or internal sense which is the immediate act of the essence of the faculty : and chuse whether you will say that such two objects may constitute one act ? or whether you will say that the latter ( the act it self ) is not properly to be called an object : for the various senses of the word object must be considered in the decision of that : mans soul is gods image : when god knoweth himself and his own knowledge , and when he willeth or loveth himself , and his own will or love , here we must either say that himself , his knowledge and will is not properly to be called an object , or else that the object and the act are purely the same , without the least real difference ; but we name them differently as inadequate conceptions of one being : and why may it not be so in a lower sort in the soul that is gods image ? that is , that the understandings most internal act , viz. the knowing or perceiving when it knoweth any thing that it knoweth . it is not really compounded of an act and an object ( as the knowledge of distinct objects is ; ) but that either its act is not properly to be called its object , or that act and object are not two things , but two inadequate conceptions of one thing . and how doth the soul perceive its own volitions ? to say that volitions which are acts of the intellectual soul must be sensate , and so make a species on the phantasie , as sensate things do , and be known only in that species , is to bring down the higher faculty , and subordinate it to the lower , that it may be intelligible ; while it is certain that we shall never here perfectly understand the solution of these difficulties , is it not pardonable , among other mens conjectures , to say , that the noble faculty of sense ( because brutes have it ) is usually too basely described by philosophers ? and that intellection and volition in the rational soul are a superior eminent sort of sensation transcending that of brutes ; and that intelligere & velle are eminenter sentire ; and that the intellect doth by understanding other things , eminently see or sense , and so understand that it understandeth : and that the will doth by willing feel that it willeth : when i consult my experience , i must either say thus , or else that intellection and volition so immediately ever move the internal sense , that they are known by us only as acts compounded with that sense . but i am gone too far before i was aware . iv. the soul thus knowing or feeling its own acts , doth in the next place rationally gather , . that it hath power to perform them , and is a substance so empowered . . that there are other such substances with the like acts . . and there is one prime transcendant substance , which is the cause of all the rest which hath infinitely nobler acts than ours . and thus sense and reason concur to our knowledge of god , by shewing us , and perceiving that image in which by similitude we must know him . the fiery , ethereal or solar nature is ( at least ) the similitude of spirits : and by condescending similitude god in scripture is called light , and the father of lights , in whom is no darkness , allowing and inviting us to think of his glory by the similitude of the sun or light. but intellectual spirits are the highest nature known to us , and these we know intimately by most near perception : by the similitude of these therefore we must conceive of god. a soul is a self-moving life or vital substance ; actuating the body to which it is united . god is super-eminently essential-life , perfect in himself , as living infinitely and eternally , and giving being to all that is , and motion to all that moveth , and life to all that liveth . a reasonable soul is essentially an understanding power : and god is super-eminently an infinite understanding knowing himself and all things perfectly . a reasonable soul is essentially a rational appetite or will , necessarily loving himself , and all that is apprehended every way , and congruously good . god is super-eminently an infinite will or love , necessarily loving himself ; and his own image , which yet he freely made by communicative love. all things that were made by this infinite goodness , were made good and very good . all his works of creation and providence ( however misconceived of by sinners ) are still very good . all the good of the whole creation is as the heat of this infinite , eternal fire of love. and having made the world good , in the good of nature , and the good of order , and the good of mutual love , he doth by his continual influx maintain and perfect it . his power moveth , his wisdom governeth , and his love felicitateth . and man he moveth as man , he ruleth him by moral laws as man ; and he is his perfect lo●er , and perfect amiable object and end. as our creator making us in this natural capacity and relation ; as our redeemer restoring and advancing us to blessed union with himself ; and as our sanctifier and glorifier preparing us for , and bringing us to coelestial perfection . and thus must god be conceived of that we may love him : and false and defective conceptions of him , as the great impediments of our love : and we love him so little , ( much ) because we so little know him : and therefore it is not the true knowledge of god , which paul here maketh a competitor with love . ii. and as we know god by ascending from his works and image , in the same order must our love ascend . the first acts of it will be towards god in his works , and the next will be towards god in his relation to us , and the highest towards god as essentially perfect and amiable in himself . i will therefore now apply this to the soul that feareth lest he love not god , because he perceiveth not himself either to know or love him immediately in the perfection of his essence . . do you truely love the image of god on the soul of man ? that is , a heavenly life , and light , and love ? do you not only from bare conviction commend , but truly love a soul devoted to god , full of his love , and living in obedience to his laws , and doing good to others according to his power ? this is to love god in his image ! god is infinite power , wisdom and goodness , or love ▪ to love true wisdom and goodness as such is to love god in his works . especially with these two qualifications ; . do you love to have wisdom and goodness , and love as universal as is possible ? do you long to have families , cities , kingdoms and all the world , made truly holy , wise and united in love to one another ? the most universal wisdom and goodness is most like to god : and to love this is to love god in his image . . do you love wisdom and goodness in your selves , and not in others only ? do you long to be liker to god in your capacity , and more near him and united to him ? that is , do you long to know him , and his will more clearly and to enjoy a holy communion with him and his holy ones in the fullest mutual love , ( loving and being beloved ) and to delight your souls in his joyful praises , in the communion of saints ? this is certainly the love of god. our union is by love ; he that would be united to god and his saints in jesus christ , that would fain know him more , and love him better , and praise and obey him joyfully in perfection , doth undoubtedly love him . and here i would earnestly caution you against two common deceits of men by counterfeit love . i. some think that they love god savingly because they love him as the god of nature , and cause of all the natural being , order and goodness which is in the whole frame of heaven and earth ; this is to love somewhat of god , or to love him secundum quid , in one respect : but if they love him not also as he is the wise and holy , and righteous ruler of mankind , and as he requireth , us to be holy , and would make us holy , and love not to please his governing will , they love him not as god with a saving love . i have elsewhere mentioned the saying of adrian ( after pope ) in his quodlib . that an unholy person may not only love god as he is the glorious cause of the world and natural good , but may rather choose to be himself annihilated , and be no man , than that there should be no god , were it a thing that could be made the matter of his choice : and indeed i dare not say that every man is holy who had rather be annihilated than one kingdom should be annihilated , when many heathens would die to save their countrey or their prince ; much less dare i say that all shall be saved that had rather be annihilated than there should be no world , or be no god : but ( saith the foresaid schoolman ) it is the love of god as our holy governour , and a love of his holy will , and of our conformity thereto , that is saving love . ii. and i fear that no small number do deceive themselves in thinking that they love holiness as the image of god in themselves and others , when they understand not truly what holiness is , but take something for it that is not it . holiness is this uniting love to god and man , and a desire of more perfect union ! to love holiness , is to love this love it self ; to love all of god that is in the world , and to desire that all men may be united in holy love to god and one another , and live in his praise and the obedience of his will. but i fear too many take up some opinions that are stricter than other mens , and call some things sin which others do not , and get a high esteem of some particular church order , and form of manner of worshiping god , which is not of the essence or holiness , and then they take themselves for a holy people , and other men for prophane and loose , and so they love their own societies , for this which they mistake for holiness ; and instead of that uniteing love which is holiness indeed , they grow into a factious enmity to others , reproaching them as rejoicing in their hurt as taking them for the enemies of god. . and as god must be loved in his image on his servants , so must he in his image on his word . do you love the holy laws of god , as they express that holy wisdom and love , which is his perfection ? do you love them as they would rule the world in holiness , and bring mankind to true wisdom and mutual love ? do you love this word as it would make you wise and holy ; and therefore love it most when you use it most , in reading , hearing , meditation and practice ▪ surely to love the wisdom and holiness of gods laws and promises , is to love god in his image there imprinted , even in that glass where he hath purposely shewed us that of himself which we must love . . but no where is gods image so refulgent to us , as in his son our saviour jesus christ : in him therefore must god be loved : though we never saw him , yet what he was , even the holy son of god , separate from sinners , the gospel doth make known to us : as also what wonderous love he hath manifested to lost mankind ! in him are all the treasures of wisdom and goodness : both an example , and a doctrine and law of wisdom , holiness and peace he hath given to the world : in this gospel , faith seeth him , yea seeth him as now glorified in heaven , and made head over all things to the church ; the king of love , the great high priest of love , the teacher of love , and the express image of the fathers person : are the thoughts of this glorious image of god now pleasing to you , and is the wisdom , holiness and love of christ now amiable to you in believing ? if so , you love god in his blessed son. and as he that hath seen the son hath seen the father , so he that loveth the son loveth the father also . . yet further , the glory of god will shine most clearly in the celestial glorified church , containing christ and all the blessed angels and saints who shall for ever see the glory of god and love , obey and praise him , in perfect unity , harmony and fervency ! you see not this heavenly society and glory , but the gospel revealeth it , and faith believeth it : doth not this blessed society and their holy work , seem to you the most lovely in all the world ? is it not pleasing to you to think in what perfect joy and concord they love and magnify god , without all sinful ignorance , disaffection , dullness , discord or any other culpable imperfection ? i ask not only whether your opinion will make you say that this society and state is best ? but whether you do not so really esteem it as that it hath the pleasing desires of your souls ? would you not fain be one of them and be united to them , and joyn in their perfect love and praise ? if so , this is to love god in that most glorious appearance where he will shew forth himself to man to be beloved . but here true believers may be stopt with doubting because they are unwilling to die , and till we die this glory is not seen . but it 's one thing to love heaven and god there manifested , and another thing to love death which standeth in the way . nature teacheth us to loath death as death , and to desire , if it might be , that this cup might pass by us ? though faith make it less dreadful , because of the blessed state that followeth : but he that loveth not blood-letting or physick , may love health . it is not death , but god and the heavenly perfection in glory which we are called to love. what if you could come to this glory , without dying as henoch and elias did , would you not be willing to go thither ? . and he that loveth god in all these his appearances to man , in his works and image on his saints , in the wisdom , holiness and goodness of his word , in the wisdom , love and holiness of his son , and in the perfection of his glory in the heavenly society , doth certainly also love him in the highest respect , even as he is himself that blessed essence , that perfect greatness , wisdom and goodness , or life , light and love , which is the beginning and end of all things , and the most amiable object of all illuminated minds , and of every sanctified will , and of all our harmonious praise for ever . for whatever become of that dispute , whether we shall see gods essence in itself , as distinct from all created glory , ( the word seeing being here ambiguous ) it is sure that we can even now have abstracting thoughts of the essence of god as distinct from all creatures , and our knowledge of him then will be far more perfect . it should be most pleasant to every believer to think that god is ; even that such a perfect glorious being is existent : as if we heard of one man in another land whom we were never like to see , who in wisdom , love , and all perfections excelled all men that ever were in the world , the thoughts of that man would be pleasing to us , and we should love him because he is amiable in his excellency . and so doth the holy soul when it thinketh of the infinite amiableness of god. . but the highest love of the soul to god , is in taking in all his amiableness together , and when we think of him as related to our selves , as our creater , redeemer , sanctifier and glorifier , and as related to all his church and to all the world , as the cause and end of all that is amiable , and when we think of all those amiable works which these relations do respect , his creation and conservation of the whole world , his redemption of mankind , his sanctifying and glorifying of all his chosen ones , his wonderful mercies to our selves for soul and body , his mercies to his church on earth , his unconceivable mercies to the glorified church in heaven , the glory of christ , angels and men , and their perfect knowledge love , and joyful praises , and then think what that god is in himself that doth all this ? this complexion of considerations causeth the fullest love to god. and though unlearned persons cannot speak or think of all these distinctly and clearly as the scripture doth express them , yet all this is truly the object of their love , though with confusion of their apprehensions of it . but i have not yet done , nor indeed come up to the point of tryal . it is not every kind or degree of love to god in these respects that will prove to be saving . he is mad that thinks there is no god : and he that believeth that there is a god doth believe that he is most powerful , wise and good , and therefore must needs have some kind of love to him . and i find that there are a sort of deists or infidels now springing up among us , who are confident , that all , or almost all men shall be saved , because say they , all men do love god. it is not possible say they that a man can believe god to be god , that is , to be the best , and to be love itself , and the cause of all that is good and amiable in heaven and earth , and yet not love him : the will is not so contrary to the understanding , nor can be . and say the same men , he that loveth his neighbour , loveth god ; for it is for his goodness that he loveth his neighbour , and that goodness is gods goodness appearing in man : he that loveth sun and moon , and stars , meat and drink , and pleasure loveth god , for all this is gods goodness in his works ; and out of his works he is unknown to us ; and therefore they say , that all men love god , and all men shall be saved , or at least all that love their neighbours ; for god by is us no otherwise to be loved . for answer to these men , . it is false that god is no otherwise to be loved than as in our neighbour : i have told you before undeniably of several other respects or appearances of god , in which he is to be loved : and he that is not known to us as separate from all creatures , is yet known to us as distinct from all creatures , and is , and must be so loved by us : else we are idolaters if we suppose the creatures to be god themselves , and love , and honour them as god : even those philosophers that took god for the inseparable soul of the world , yet distinguished him from the world which they thought he animated , ( and indeed doth more than animate . ) . and it is false that every one loveth god who loveth his neighbour , or his meat , drink and fleshly pleasure , or any of the accommodations of his sense . for nature causeth all men to love life , and self , and pleasure for themselves : and these are beloved even by atheists that believe not that there is a god! and consequently such men love their neighbours not for god , but for themselves , either because they are like them , or because they please them , or serve their interest , or delight them by society and converse , as birds and beasts do love each other that think not of a god. and if all should be saved that so love one another , or that love their own pleasure , and that which serveth it , not only all wicked men , but most brute creatures should be saved . if you say , they shall not be damned , it 's true , because they are not moral agents , capable of salvation or damnation , nor capable of moral government and obedience ; and therefore even the creatures that kill one another are not damned for it : but certainly as man is capable of salvation or damnation , so is he of somewhat more as the means or way , than brutes are capable of , and he is saved or damned for somewhat which brutes never do . many a thousand love the pleasure of their sense , and all things and persons which promote it , that never think of god or love him . and it is not enough to say that even this natural good is of god , and therefore it is god in it which they love ; for it will only follow that it is something made and given by god which they love , while they leave out god himself . that god is essentially in all things good and pleasant which they love , doth not prove that it is god which they love , while their thoughts and affections , do not include him . . but suppose it were so that to love the creature were to love god , is not then the hating of the creature the hating of god ? if those same men that love meat and drink , and sensual delight , and love their neighbours for the sake of these , or for themselves , as a dog doth love his master , do also hate the holiness of gods servants , and the holiness and justice of his word and government , and that holiness and order of heart and life which he commandeth them , do not these men hate god in hating these ? and that they hate them , their obstinate aversation sheweth , when no reason , no mercy , no means , can reconcile their hearts and lives thereto . . i therefore ask the infidel objector , whether he shall be saved that loveth god in one respect , and hateth him in another ? that loveth him as he causeth the sun to shine , the rain to fall , the grass to grow , and giveth life and prosperity to the world , but hateth him as he is the author of those laws , and duties , and that holy government , by which he would bring them to a voluntary right order , and make them holy , and fit for glory , and would use them in his holy service , and restrain them from their inordinate lusts and wills ? how can love prepare or fit any man for that which he hateth or doth not love : if the love of fleshly interest and pleasure prepare or fit them to seek that , and to enjoy it , ( the little time that it will endure ) how should this love make them fit for heaven , for a life of holiness with god and saints ? it is this that they love not , and will not love , ( for if they truely loved it they should have it ; ) yea , it is this that they hate , and will not accept or be perswaded to . and what a fond conceit then is it to think that they shall have heaven that never loved it , no nor the small beginnings here of the heavenly nature and life , and all because they loved the pleasures of the flesh on earth , and loved god and their neighbours for promoting it ? . yea , i would ask the infidel , whether god will save men for rebelling against him ? their love to their flesh and to the creature , as it is inordinate , and taketh gods place , and shutteth out the love of holiness and heaven , is their great sin and idolatry ? and shall this be called a saving love of god ? what gross self-deceit hath sensuality taught these men ? . i grant them therefore that all men that believe that there is a god , do love somewhat of god , or secundum quid , or in some partial respect have some kind of love to god. but it is not a love to that of god , which must save , felicitate and glorifie souls : meat and drink , and fleshly sports do not this ; but heavenly glory , wisdom , holiness and love to god , and man for god , and this they love not , and therefore never shall enjoy : nay , that of god which should save and felicitate them they hate , and hated holiness is none of theirs , nor ever can be , till they are changed . and so much to the infidels objection . . i add therefore in the last place to help men in the tryal of their love to god , that their love must have these two qualifications . . they must love that of god which maketh man happy , and is indeed the end of his nature , and sanctification ; and that is , not only the comforts of this transitory natural life and flesh , but the fore described union and communion with god , in perfect knowledge , love and praise . . this love to god must be predominant , and prevail against the power of alluring objects , which satan would use to turn our hearts from him , and to keep out holy heavenly love . damning sin consisteth in loving somewhat that is good and lovely , and that is of god ; but it is not simply in loving it , but in loving it inordinately , instead of god or greater things , and out of its due time and rank , and measure , and so as to hinder that love which is our holiness and happiness . moral good consisteth not in meer entity , but in order ; and disorderly love even of real good is sinful love. therefore when all is said , the old mark which i have many and many times repeated , is it that must try the sincerity of your love ; viz. if . in the esteem of a believing mind , . and in the choice and adherence of a resolved will , . and in the careful , serious endeavours of your lives , you prefer the knowing , loving , obeying and joyful praising of god , begun here and perfected in glory , as the benefit of our redemption by christ , before all the interests of this fleshly life , the pleasures , profits and honours of this world , that is , before the pleasures of sin and sensuality for this transitory season . or in christs words , mat. . . if you seek first the kingdom of god , and his righteousness , and trust him to superadd all other things . this is that love of god and goodness which must save us : and he that loveth god even in these high respects , a little , and loveth his fleshly pleasure so much more , as that he will not consent to the regulating of his lusts , but will rather venture or let go his salvation than his sins , hath no true saving love to god. obj. there is scarce any fornicator , drunkard , glutton , swearer , or other rash and sensual sinner , but believeth that god is better than the creature , and that it were better for him to live to god in love and holiness , than to live in sinful pleasures : and therefore though he live in sin against this knowledge , it seemeth that with the rational will he loveth god and goodness best , because he judgeth them best . ans . . it is one thing , what the judgment saith ; and another thing , how it saith it . a speculative judgment may drowsily say , that god and holiness are best ▪ when yet it saith it but as a dreaming opinion , which prevaileth not with the will to choose them , having at the same time so strong an apprehension of the pleasures of sin as carryeth away the will and practice . . it is one thing therefore to love god under the notion of being best , and another thing to love him best . for the will can cross such a notion of the understanding ; at least by an omission , as appeareth by the sin of adam , which began in the will ( or else had been necessitated . ) the same understanding which sluggishly saith , god or holiness is better , yet may more clearly and vehemently say [ lust is pleasant , or pleasure of the flesh is good ] and being herein seconded with the strong apprehensions of sense and fantasie , the will may follow this simple judgment , and neglect the comparate . . it is one thing for the understanding to say , that god is more amiable to one that hath a heart to love him , and a suitable disposition ; and another thing to say , he is now more amiable to me : those can say the first , that cannot truly say the latter , and therefore love not god as best , and above all . . it is one thing for the understanding sometimes under conviction to say , god and holiness are best for me , and i ought to love them best , and then to lay by the exercise of this judgment in the ordinary course of life , ( though it be not contradicted ) and to live in the continual apprehension of the goodness of sensual pleasure ; and another thing to keep the judgment that god and holiness are best , in ordinary exercise . for the will doth not always follow the judgment that we had before , but that which we have at present : and that which we exercise not , we have not at that time in act : and it is not a meer power or habit of knowledge which ruleth the will , but the present act . many a man is said to know that which he doth not think of , when indeed he doth not know it at that time , but only would know it if he thought of it : as a man in his sleep is said to know what he knew awake , when indeed he knoweth it not actually till he be awake . obj. but true grace is rather to be judged of by the habit , than by the present acts . ans . by the habit of the will it is , that is , by habitual love , for that will command the most frequent acts : but i propose it to the consideration of the judicious , whether an ordinary habit of drowsy knowledge , or belief that god and holiness are best , may not be ordinarily kept out of act , and consist with a prevailing habit of sensuality or love of forbidden pleasure in the will , and with a privation of prevalent habitual love to god and holiness . i suppose with most such sinners this is the true case : the understanding said lately , it is best for thee to love god , and live to him , and deny thy lust : and it oft forgetteth this , while it still saith with sense , that fleshly pleasure is desireable : and at other times it saith , though god be best , thou maist venture at the present on this pleasure ; and so le ts loose the corrupted will , reserving a purpose to repent hereafter , as apprehending most strongly at the present , that just now sensual delight may be chosen , though holiness will be best hereafter . obj. but if a habit will not prove that we sincerely love and prefer god , how shall any man know that he loveth and preferreth him , when the best oft sin ; and in the act of sin god is not actually preferred . ans . . i told you that a habit of true love will prove sincerity , though not a habit of true opinion or belief , which is not brought into lively and ordinary act : uneffectual faith may be habitual . yea such an uneffectual counterfeit half love , which i before described to you , may be habitual , and yet neither act nor habit saving . . the sins of godly men are not prevalent absolutely against the being , operation or effects of the love of god and holiness ; for even when they sin , these live , and are predominant in all other things , and in the main bent and course of life ; but only they prevail against some degree of holy love , perhaps both in the act and habit for such sins are not ungodliness , but imperfection of godliness and the effects of that imperfection . . when godly men fall into a great extraordinary sin , it is not to be expected that they should comfortably discern the sincerity of their love to god either by that sin , or in that sin ; but they may discern it , . by the course of a godly life , where the prevalency of the habit appeareth in the power and stream of acts ; and . by their repentance for , and abhorring and forsaking of that sin , which stopt and darkened their love to god. and these two together viz , a resolved course of living unto god , and repentance and hatred of every sin which is against it , and especially of greater sins , will shew the sincerity and power of holy love . obj. but then one that sinneth daily , e. g. by passion , or too much love to the world , or creatures , and by omissions , &c. shall never be sure that he sincerely loveth god , because this is a course of sin , and he cannot have such assurance till he forsake it . ans . one that ordinarily committeth gross and wilful sin , that is , such sin as he had rather keep than leave , and as he would leave if he were but sincerely willing , hath no predominant love of god ; at least in act , and therefore can have no assurance of it : but one that is ordinarily guilty of meer infirmities may at the same time , know that the love of god doth rule both in his heart and life . the passion of fear or of anger , or of sorrow may be inordinate , and yet god loved best , because the will hath so weak a power over them , that a man that is guilty of them may truly say , i would fain be delivered from them . and some inordinate love of life , health , wealth , friends , honour , may stand with a more prevailing love of god , and the prevalency be well perceived . but what greater actual sin ( as noahs or lots drunkenness , davids adultery and murder , peters denial of christ ) are or are not consistent with true love to god , is a case that i have elsewhere largely handled , and is unmeet for a short decision here . obj. but when i feel my heart , desires and delights all cold to god and holiness , and too hot after fleshly , worldly things , may i not conclude that i love these better ? ans . sensible near things may have much more of the passionate part of our love , our desires and delights , and yet not be best loved by us . for god and things spiritual being out of the reach of sense , are not so apt or like to move our sense and passion immediately to and by themselves . as i said before , that is best loved , which hath , . the highest esteem of the understanding . . the most resolved prevalent choice of the will , . and the most faithful endeavours of our life . and many a christian mistaketh his affection to the thing it self , because of his strangeness to the place and to the change that death will make . if the weakest christian could have without dying , the clear knowledge of god , the communion of faith and love by his spirit ; could he love god but as much as he would love him , and answerably tast his love , in every prayer , in every promise , in every sacrament , in every mercy ; could his soul keep a continual sabbath of delight in god , and in his saints and holy worship , this seemeth to him more desireable and pleasing than all the treasures of the world. and he that desireth this communion with god desireth heaven in reality , though he fear the change that death will make , because of the weakness of faith , and our strangeness to the state of separated souls . chap. xx. the second part of the exhortation ; rest in this that you are known with love to god. . to be known of god here signifieth to be approved and loved of him , and consequently that all our concerns are perfectly known to him and regarded by him . this is the full and final comfort of a believer . our knowledge and love of god in which we are agents are , . the evidence that we are known with love to god , and so our comfort ( as is said ) by way of evidence ; . and they are our comfort in their very exercise . but the chief part of our comfort is from god , not only as the object of our love , but as the lover of us and all his saints , even in our passive receiving of the blessed effects of his love for ever : when a christian therefore hath any discerning of his interest in this love of god , by finding that he loveth god and goodness , here he must finally anchor his soul , and quietly rest in all temptations , difficulties , and tribulations . . our enemies know us not , but judge of us by blinding interest , and the biass of their false opinions , and by an easy belief of false reports , or by their own ungrounded suspicions : and therefore we are odious to them , and abused , slandered and persecuted by them . but god knoweth us , and will justify our righteousness , and bring all our innocency into light , and stop the mouth of all iniquity . . strangers know us not , but receive such characters of us as are brought to them with the greatest advantage : and even good men may think and speak evil of us ( as bernard and others of the waldenses , and many fathers of many godly men that were called hereticks , and many called hereticks of such fathers . ) but to us it is a small thing to be judged of man , that is not our final judge , and knoweth not our cause , and is ready to be judged with us ; we have one that judgeth us and them , even the omniscient god , who knoweth every circumstance of our cause . . our very friends , know us not : no not they that dwell with us : in some things they judge us better than we are , and in some things worse : for they know not our hearts ; and interests and cross dispositions may deceive them ; and even our bosom friends may slander us and think they speak the truth . and when they entirely love us , their love may hurt us , while they know not what is for our good : but god knoweth us perfectly and knoweth how to counsel us , conduct us , and dispose of us : he seeth the inwards and the outwards , the onwards and the upwards of our case , which our dearest friends are utter strangers to . . we know not our selves throughly , nor our own concerns : we oft take our selves to be better or worse than indeed we are : we are oft mistaken in our own hearts and our own actions , and in our interest . we oft take that to be good for us that is bad , and that to be bad which is good and necessary : we long for that which would undo us , and fear and fly from that which would save us : we oft rejoyce when we are going to the slaughter , or are at least in greatest danger ; and we lament and cry when god is saving us , because we know not what he is doing . paul saith , [ i know nothing by my self , yet i judge not my own self , ] that is , though i have a good conscience , yet that is not my final judge : it must go with me as god judgeth of me , and not as others or my self . is it not then an unspeakable comfort in all these cases that we are known of god ? desiring to know inordinately for our selves was our first sin ; and this sin is our danger and our constant trouble . but to be to god as a child to his father , who taketh care to love him and obey him , and in all things trusteth his fathers love , as knowing that he careth for him , this is our duty , our interest and our only peace . remember then with comfort , o my soul ; . thy father knoweth what it is fittest for thee to do . his precepts are wise and just , and good ; thou knowest not but by his word ! love therefore and submit to all his laws : the strictest of them are for thy good : thy guide , and not thou , must lead the way ; go not before him nor without him ; nor stay behind him : in this night and wilderness if thou have not his light and presence , how forlorn , erroneous and comfortless wilt thou be ? he knoweth thy heart , and knoweth thy enemies , temptations and dangers , and therefore best knoweth how to guide thee , and what to put into his laws and into thy duty . . he knoweth what place , what state of life , of health , of wealth , of friends , is best for thee . none of these are known to thee : he knoweth whether ease or pain be best : the flesh is no fit judge , nor an ignorant mind : that is best which will prove best at last ; which he that foreknoweth all events knoweth . that therefore is best which infinite wisdom and love doth choose . ease and pain will have their end : it is the end that must teach us how to estimate them : and who but god can foretell thee the end ? he knoweth whether liberty or imprisonment be best : liberty is a prison if sin prevail , and god be not there . a prison is a pallace if god by his love will dwell there with us . there is no thraldom but sin and gods displeasure , and no true liberty but his love. . he knoweth whether honour or dishonour be best for thee : if the esteem of men may facilitate their reception of the saving truth of god which is preached to them , god will procure it if he have work to do by it : if not , how little is it to be regarded ? what doth it add to me to be highly esteemed or applauded by men , who are hasting to the dust , where their thoughts of me and all the world are at an end ? when i see the skulls of the dead who perhaps once knew me , how little doth it now concern me what thoughts of me were once within that skull ? and as for the immortal soul , if it be in the world of light , it judgeth as god judgeth by his light : if in hell , i have no more cause to be troubled at their malice than at the devils ? and i have little cause to rejoyce that those damned souls did once applaud me . oh miserable men that have no better than the hypocrites reward , to be seen and honoured of men ! gods approbation is the felicitating honour ! he will own all in me that is his own , and all that he owneth is everlastingly honoured . the lord knoweth the way of the righteous , psal . . . for it is his way : the way which he prescribed them , and in which he did conduct them . good and evil are now so mixed in me , that it is hard for me fully to discern them : but the all-seeing god doth discern them ) and will separate them . . thy heavenly father knoweth whether it be best for thee to abound or want : and with what measure of worldly things it is fittest for thee to be entrusted ! abundance hath abundant snares and cares , and troubling employments which divert our thoughts from things of real and perpetual worth : provision is desirable according to its usefulness to our work and end : it is far better to need little and have little , than to have much and need it all : for it cannot be got , or kept , or used , without some troublesome and hurtful effects of its vanity and vexation . let the foolish desire to be tired and burdened with provision , and lose the prize by turning their helps into a snare , and miss of the end by over-loving the way : my father knoweth what i want , and he is always able to supply me with a word : it doth not impoverish him to maintain all the world. his store is not diminished by communication . the lord is my shepherd , what then can i need ? psal . . . how oft have i found that he careth for me , and that it is better to be at his finding and provision , than to have been my own carver , and to have cared for my self ? blessed be my bounteous father who hath brought me so near to the end of my race , with very little care for provision in my way , and with lesser want ! necessaries i never wanted , and superfluities are not wanted . blessed be that wise and gracious lord , that hath not given me up to greedy desires ; nor ensnared and burdened me with needless plenty . how safe , how easie and comfortable a life is it , to live in the family of such a father , and with a thankful carelesness to trust his will , and take that portion as best which he provideth for us ? and into what misery do foolish prodigals run , who had rather have their portion in their own hand , than in their fathers ? . thy heavenly father knoweth with what kind and measure of tryals and temptations it is fit that thou shouldst be exercised ! it is his work to permit and bound , and order them : it is thy work to beg his grace to overcome them , and watchfully and constantly to make resistance , and in tryal to approve thy faithfulness to god : blessed are they that endure temptations ; for when they are tryed they shall receive the crown of life , james . if he will try thee by bodily pain and sickness , he can make it turn to the health of thy soul : perhaps thy diseases have prevented some mortal soul-diseases which thou didst not fear . if he will try thee by mens malice , injury or persecution , he knoweth how to turn it to thy good ; and in season to bring thee out of trouble : he will teach thee by other mens wickedness to know what grace hath cured or prevented in thy self ; and to know the need of trusting in god alone , and appealing to his desireable judgment : he that biddeth thee when thou art reviled , and persecuted , and loaded with false reports for righteousness sake , to rejoyce and be exceeding glad , because of the great reward in heaven , can easily give thee what he doth command , and make thy sufferings a help to this exceeding joy . if he will try thee by satans molesting temptations , and suffer him to buffet thee , or break thy peace by melancholy disquietments and vexatious thoughts ( from which he hath hitherto kept thee free ) he doth but tell thee from how much greater evil he hath delivered thee , and make thy fears of hell a means to prevent it , and call thee to thy saviour to seek for safety and peace in him . if it please him to permit the malicious tempter to urge thy thoughts to blasphemy or other dreadful sin ( as it ordinarily falleth out with the melancholy , ) it telleth thee from what malice grace preserveth thee , and what satan would do were he let loose : it calleth thee to remember that thy saviour himself was tempted by satan to as great sin as ever thou wast , even to worship the devil himself ; and that he suffered him to carry about his body from place to place , which he never did by thee : it tells thee therefore that it is not sin to be tempted to sin , but to consent ; and that satans sin is not laid to our charge : and though our corruption is such , as that we seldom are tempted but some culpable blot is left behind in us , ( for we cannot say as christ , that satan hath nothing in us : ) yet no sin is less dangerous to mans damnation , than the melancholy thoughts which such horrid vexatious temptations cause ; both because the person being distempered by a disease , is not a volunteer in what he doth ; and also because he is so far from loving and desiring such kind of sin , that it is the very burden of his life ; they make him weary of himself , and he daily groaneth to be delivered from them . and it is certain that love is the damning malignity of sin ; and that there is no more sin than there is will ; and that no sin shall damn men which they had rather leave than keep ; and therefore forgiveness is joyned to repentance : drunkards , fornicators , worldlings , ambitious men , love their sin : but a poor melancholy soul that is tempted to ill thoughts , or to despair , or terrour , or to excessive griefs , is far from loving such a state . the case of such is sad at present : but o how much sadder is the case of them that are lovers of pleasure more than of god , and prosper and delight in sin . . god knoweth how long it is best for me to live . leave then the determination of the time to him ; all men come into the word , on the condition of going out again : die we must ; and is it not fitter that god choose the time than we ? were it left to our wills how long we should live on earth , alas how long should many of us be kept out of heaven , by our own desires ? and too many would stay here till misery made them impatient of living . but our lives are his gift , and in his hand , who knoweth the use of them , and knoweth how to proportion them to that use ; which is the justest measure of them . he chose the time and place of my birth , and he chuseth best : why should i not willingly leave to his choice also , the time and place , and manner of my departure . i am known of him ; and my concerns are not despised by him . he knoweth me as his own , and as his own he hath used me , and as his own he will receive me , psal . . . the lord knoweth the days of the upright , and their inheritance shall be for ever . and if he bring me to death through long and painful sickness , he knoweth why , and all shall end in my salvation . he knoweth the way that is with me , and when he hath tryed me , i shall come forth as gold , job . . he forsaketh us not in sickness or in death . [ like as a father pityeth his children , the lord pityeth them that fear him ; for he knoweth our frame , he remembreth that we are dust : as for man his days are as grass ; as a flower of the field , so he flourisheth : for the wind passeth over it , and it is not , and the place thereof shall know it no more : but the mercy of the lord is from everlasting to everlasting to them that fear him . ] if the ox should not know his owner , nor the ass his masters crib , the owner will know his own and seek them . that we understand and know the lord , is matter of greater joy and glorying , than all other wisdom or riches in the world , jer. . . but that he knoweth us in life and death , on earth and in heaven , is the top of our rejoycing . the lord is good , and strength in the day of trouble ; and he knoweth them that trust in him , nah. . . sickness may so change my flesh that even my neighbours shall not know me ; and death will make the change so great , that even my friends will be unwilling to see such an unpleasing , loathsome spectacle : but while i am carried by them to the place of darkness , that i may not be an annoyance to the living , i shall be there in the sight of god , and my bones and dust shall be owned by him , and none of them forgotten or lost . . it may be that under the temptations of satan , or in the languishing weakness or distempers of my flesh , i may doubt of the love of god , and think that he hath withdrawn his mercy from me ; or at least may be unmeet to tast the sweetness of his love , or to meditate on his truth and mercies : but god will not lose his knowledge of me , nor turn away his mercy from me . the foundation of god standeth sure , having this seal , the lord knoweth them that are his , and let him that nameth the name of christ depart from iniquity , tim. . . he can call me his child , when i doubt whether i may call him father : he doubteth not of his right to me , nor of his graces in me , when i doubt of my sincerity and part in him . known unto god are all his works , act. . . what meaneth paul thus to describe a state of grace , gal. . . now after ye have known god , or rather are known of of god ? but to notify to us , that though our knowledge of god be his grace in us , and our evidence of his love , and the beginning of life eternal , ( joh. . . ) yet that we are loved and known of him is the first and last , the foundation and the perfection of our security and felicity . he knoweth his sheep , and none shall take them out of his hand . when i cannot through pain or distemper remember him , or not with renewed joy or pleasure , he will remember me , and delight to do me good , and to be my salvation . . and though the belief of the unseen world be the principle by which i conquer this , yet are my conceptions of it lamentably dark : a soul in flesh , which acteth as the form of a body , is not furnished with such images , helps , or light , by which it can have clear conceptions of the state and operations of separated souls : but i am known of god , when my knowledge of him is dark and small : and he knoweth whither it is that he will take me , & what my state and work shall be ! he that is preparing a place for me with himself , is well acquainted with it and me : all souls are his ; and therefore all are known to him : he that is now the god of abraham , isaac , and jacob , as being living with him while they are dead to us , will receive my departing soul to them , and to himself , to be with christ , which he hath instructed me to commend into his hands , and to desire him to receive . he that is now making us living stones for the new jerusalem , and his heavenly temple , doth know where every one of us shall be placed . and his knowledge must now be my satisfaction and my peace . let unbelievers say , how doth god know ? psal . . . but shall i doubt whether he that made the sun , be father of lights , and whether he know his dwelling , and his continued works ? be still o my soul , and know that he is god , psal . . . and when he hath guided thee by his counsel he will take thee to glory ; and in his light thou shalt have light : and though now it appear not ( to sight , but to faith only ) what we shall be yet we known that we shall see him as he is , and we shall appear with him in glory . and to be known of god undoubtedly includeth his practical love , which secureth our salvation and all that tendeth thereunto . it is not meant of such a knowledge only as he hath of all things , or of such as he hath of the ungodly . and why should it be hard to thee , o my soul , to be perswaded of the love of god ? is it strange that he should love thee who is essential infinite love : any more than that the sun should shine upon thee , which shineth upon all capable recipient objects , though not upon the uncapable , which through interposing things cannot receive it ? to believe that satan or wicked men , or deadly enemies should love me , is hard : but to believe that the god of love doth love me , should in reason be much easier than to believe that my father or mother , or dearest friend in the world doth love me : if i do not make and continue my self uncapable of his complacence by my wilful continued refusing of his grace , it is not possible that i should be deprived of it , prov. . . i love them that love me . psal . . . the lord loveth the righteous . john . . . why should it be hard to thee to believe that he loveth thee , who doth good so universally to the world , and by his love doth preserve the whole creation , and give all creatures all the good which they possess ? when his mercy is over all his works , and his goodness is equal to his wisdom and his power , and all the world is beautified by it , shall i not easily believe that it will extend to me ? the lord is good to all , psal . . . luk. . . none is good ( essentially , absolutely and transcendently ) but he alone , psal . . . the earth is full of the goodness of the lord , psal . . . the goodness of god endureth continually : he is good and doth good , psal . . . and shall i not expect good from so good a god , the cause of all the good that is in the world ? . why should i not believe that he will love me , who so far loved the world , yea his enemies , as to give his only begotten son , that whoever believeth in him should not perish , but have everlasting life ? joh. . . having given me so precious a gift as his son , will he think any thing too good to give me ? rom. . . yea still he followeth his enemies with his mercies , not leaving himself without witness to them , but filling their hearts with food and gladness , and causing his sun to shine on them , and his rain to fall on them , and by his goodness leading them to repentance . . why should i not easily believe his love , which he hath sealed by that certain gift of love , the spirit of christ which he hath given ? the giving of the holy ghost is the shedding abroad of his love upon the heart , rom. . i had never known , desired , loved , or served him sincerely but by that spirit : and will he deny his name , his mark , his seal , his pledge , and earnest of eternal life ? could i ever have truly loved him , his word , his ways and servants , but by the reflection of his love ? shall i question whether he love those whom he hath caused to love him ? when our love is the surest gift and token of his love , shall i think that i can love him more than he loveth me , or be more willing to serve him than he is willing and ready to reward his servants ? heb. . . joh. . . and . . . shall i not easily hope for good from him , who hath made such a covenant of grace with me in christ ? who giveth me what his son hath purchased , who accepteth me in his most beloved , as a member of his son ? who hath bid me , ask and i shall have ? and hath made to godliness , the promise of this life and that to come , and will with-hold no good thing from them that walk uprightly ? will not such a gospel , such a covenant , such promises of love secure me that he loveth me , while i consent unto his covenant terms ? . shall i not easily believe that he will love me , who hath loved me while i was his enemy , and called me home when i went astray , and mercifully received me when i returned ? who hath given me a life full of precious mercies , and so many experiences of his love as i have had ? who hath so often signified his love to my conscience ? so often heard my prayers in distress , and hath made all my life , notwithstanding my sins , a continual wonder of his mercies ? o unthankful soul , if all this will not persuade thee of the love of him that gave it ! i that can do little good to any one , yet have abundance of friends and hearers , who very easily believe that i would do them good , were it in my power , and never fear that i should do them harm ! and shall it be harder to me to think well of infinite love and goodness , than for my neighbours to trust me and think well of such a wretch as i ? what abundance of love-tokens have i yet to shew , which were sent me from heaven to perswade me of my fathers love and care . . shall i not easily believe and trust his love who hath promised me eternal glory with his son , & with all his holy ones in heaven ? who hath given me there a great intercessor to prepare heaven for me , and me for it and there appeareth for me before god ? who hath already brought many millions of blessed souls to that glory , who were once as bad and low as i am ? and who hath given me already the seal , the pledge , the earnest and the first-fruits of that felicity . therefore , o my soul , if men will not know thee , if thou were hated of all men for the cause of christ and righteousness ; if thine uprightness be imputed to thee as an odious crime ; if thou be judged by the blind , malignant world , according to its gall and interest ; if friends misunderstand thee ; if faction and every evil cause which thou disownest , do revile thee , and rise up against thee : it is enough , it is absolutely enough , that thou art known of god : god is all ; and all is nothing that is against him , or without him : if god be for thee who shall be against thee ? how long hath he kept thee safe in the midst of dangers ? and given thee peace in the midst of furious rage and wars ? he hath known how to bring thee out of trouble , and to give thee tolerable ease , while thou hast carried about thee night and day the usual causes of continual torment ! his loving kindness is better than life , psal . . . but thou hast had a long unexpected life , through his loving kindness . in his favour is life , psal . . and life thou hast had by and with his favour . notwithstanding thy sin , while thou canst truly say , thou lovest him , he hath promised that all shall work together for thy good , rom. . . and he hath long made good that promise : only ask thy self again and again as christ did peter , whether indeed thou love him ? and then take his love as thy full , and sure , and everlasting portion ; which will never fail thee , though flesh and heart do fail ; for thou shalt dwell in god and god in thee for evermore joh. . , , . amen . finis . a catalogue of books printed for , and sold by tho. parkhurst , at the bible and three crowns in cheapside , near mercers chapel . a christian directory , or body of practical divinity . . christian ethicks . . oeconomicks . . ecclesiasticks . . politicks , resolving multitudes of cases on each subject . by rich. baxter . folio . mr. baxters catholick theology . folio . mr. baxters methodus theologiae christianae . folio . a third volume of sermons preached by the late reverend and learned tho. manton d.d. in two parts . folio . a hundred select sermons on several texts , of fifty on the old testament , and fifty on the new. folio . choice and practical expositions on four select psalms . folio . both by the reverend and learned tho. horion d.d. late minister of st. hellens , london . the true prophecies and prognostications of michael nostrodamus , physician to henry the second , francis the second , and charles the ninth , kings of france , and one of the best astronomers that ever were . folio . sixty one sermons , preached mostly on publick occasions , whereof five formerly printed by adam littleton d.d. rector of chelsea in middlesex . folio . the novels and tales of the renowned john boccasio , the first refiner of italian prose , containing a hundred curious novels . folio . a key to open scripture metaphors , in two volumes . by benjamin keach and tho. delawn . folio . the saints everlasting rest , or a treatise of the blessed state of the saints in their enjoyment of god in glory . to . the english nonconformity , as under king charles ii. and king james ii. truly stated and argued , by richard baxter . to . a discourse concerning liturgies . by the late learned and judicious divine , mr. david clarkson . vo . a discourse of the saving grace of god. by the late reverend and learned david clarkson minister of the gospel . vo . the vision of the wheels seen by the prophet ezekiel ; opened and applyed : partly at the merchants lecture in broad-street , and partly at stepney , on january . . being the day of solemn thanksgiving to god for the great deliverance of this kingdom from popery and slavery , by his then highness the most illustrious prince of orange . whom god raised up to be the glorious instrument thereof . by matthew mead pastor of a church of christ at stepney ▪ to . a call to the unconverted to turn and live. mo . the right method for settled peace of conscience , and spiritual comfort . vo . the life of faith in every state. to . alderman ashursts funeral sermon . to . a key for catholicks to open the juglings of the jesuits : the first part of answering all their common sophisms : the second against the soveraignty and necessity of general councils . to . the certainty of christianity without popery . vo . full and easy satisfaction , which is the true religion : transubstantiation shamed . vo . naked popery : answering mr. hutchinson . to . which is the true church : a full answer to his reply : proving that the general councils and the popes primacy were but in one empire . to . the history of bishops and their councils abridged , and of the popes . to . the cure of church divisions . to . a full treatise of episcopacy , shewing what episcopacy we own , and what is in the english diocesan frame , for which we dare not swear never to endeavour any alteration of it , in our places . to . a search for the english schismatick ; comparing the canoneers and nonconformists . to . an answer to mr. dodwell and dr. sherlock , confuting an universal-humane church soveraignty , aristocratical and monarchical , as church tyranny and popery ; and defending dr. iz. barrows excellent treatise . to . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e had i been supposed to have written this book , to hide my sloth and ignorance , men would not have neglected my methodus theologie and catholick theology thro' meer sloth , and saying , that it 's too high and hard for them . a country-man having sent his son to the university , when he came home askt him what he had learned . he told him he had learnt logick . he askt him what that logick was , and what he could do with it : and it being supper-time , and the poor people having but two eggs for supper , he told them that he could prove that those eggs were three : this is one , saith he , and that is two , and one and two are three : the father gave him the better , and told him that his art was useful ; for he had thought himself to have gone without his supper , but now , saith he , i will take one egg , and your mother the other , and take you the third . such kind of logick the world hath gloried in as learning . m. antomine l. . §. . doth thank god that he made no greater progress in rhetorick , poetry , and such like studies , which might have hindered him from better things , if he had perceived himself to have profited in them . and ( in fine ) quod cum philosophandi cupiditas incessisset , no● in sophistam aliquem incidelin , nec 〈◊〉 evolvendis , vel syllogismis resolvendis , vel mettorologicis dis●●●iendi● tem●●● des●s contriverim . cor. . pet. . . heb. . . rom. . see a book written long since this called the samaritan of excellent use , by mr. jones of suffolk . it is most probable that christ and the apostles then spake in the chaldee called hebrew , and so that the four gospels are but translations of christs words , and so not the the words , but the sence was christs : and what wonder then if the translating evangelists use divers words ? rev. . . it is very hard to be sure what the apostles setled as an universal perpetual law , in church matters , and what they setled only as suited to that time and place by the common rule of doing all to edification : i will have mercy and not sacrifice being a standing rule , it 's hard to plead their use of any rites against common good : perhaps more is mutable than most think . without approving all that is in it , i may wish the reader to peruse father simon 's second book now newly printed in london . as antonine saith , ) in greater darkness ) li. . § . [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. ] vides quam pauca sint , quae siquis tenuerit , prosperam ac divinam propemodum vitam degere detur : siquidem & dii ipsi nihil amplius exigent ab eo , qui ista observaverit . rom. . . since this i have published a book called the catechizing of housholds . ☞ ☞ fathering errours on god , and saying that he saith what he never said , and forbade or commanded what he doth not , is the most direct breach of the third commandment . to father lies on god , is the taking of his name in vain . * and yet saith zaga-zabo in damnian a go●s pag. . nec patriarcha nec episcopi nostri , per se , nec in conciliis putant aut opinantur ul●as leges se condere posse , quibus ad mortale peccatum obligari quis posset . and pag. . indignum est peregrinos christianos tam acriter & hostiliter reprehendi ut ego de hac re ( de delectu ciborum ) & de aliis , quae minimè ad fidem veram spectabant , reprehensus fui ; sed multo consultius , fuerit , hujusmodi christianos homines sive graecos , sive armenos , sive aethiopes ; sive ex quavis septem christianarum ecclesiarum in charitate & christi amplexibus sustinere , & eos sine contumeliis permittere , inter alios fratres christianos vivere ac versari ; quoniam omnes filii baptismi sumus , & de vera fide unanimiter sentimus . nec est causa cur tam acriter de caeremoniis disceptetur nisi ut unusquisque suas observet , sine odio & insectatione aliorum , nec commerciis ecclesiae ob id excludendus est , &c. learn of a ceremonious abassine . † since done in catholick theology . ☜ * now it is above years that they have been ejected . james . . yea now it is also young ignorant novices that are sick of the same feaverish temerity . of this oft before . concil . carth. . can. . ☞ psal . , isa . . . ☜ * of which see smiglicius logicks , and albertinus in his philosoph . disputat . at large . because i must not oft repeat the same things , i must refer the reader to what i have more fully said of this in directions for certainty of knowledge in my christian directory , part . chap. . cor. . thes . . act. . john. . notes for div a -e ☞ of all this i have discoursed more largely in my cath. theology , and the applyed epitome . * read , ma● . . . with all the old translations in the polyglot bible , and consider it . rom. . , . cor. . , , . and . , , , &c. cor. . . joh. . . natures picture drawn by fancies pencil to the life being several feigned stories, comical, tragical, tragi-comical, poetical, romanicical, philosophical, historical, and moral : some in verse, some in prose, some mixt, and some by dialogues / written by ... the duchess of newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing n estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) natures picture drawn by fancies pencil to the life being several feigned stories, comical, tragical, tragi-comical, poetical, romanicical, philosophical, historical, and moral : some in verse, some in prose, some mixt, and some by dialogues / written by ... the duchess of newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, ?- . the second edition. [ ], p., leaf of plates. printed by a. maxwell, london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng conduct of life. mind and body. knowledge, theory of. judgment. virtue. good and evil. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - apex covantage rekeyed and resubmitted - allison liefer sampled and proofread - allison liefer text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion here on this figure cast a glance , but so as if it were by chance , your eyes not fixt , they must not stay , since this like shadowes to the day it only represent's ; for still , her beuty 's found beyond the skill of the best paynter , to imbrace , those lovely lines within her face , view her soul's picture , judgment , witt , then read those lines which shee hath writt , by phancy's pencill drawne alone which peece but shee , can justly owne . natures picture drawn by fancies pencil to the life . being several feigned stories , comical , tragical , tragi-comical , poetical , romancical , philosophical , historical , and moral : some in verse , some in prose ; some mixt , and some by dialogues . written by the thrice noble , illustrious , and most excellent princess , the duchess of newcastle . the second edition . london , printed by a. maxwell , in the year . the duke of new castle upon all the works of his duchess . you , various readers , various judgments give ; and think , books are condemn'd , or ought to live , according to your censures , bad or good , before you read them , or they 're understood : laying aspersions with a jeering brand . but read these first ; and , if you understand what 's to be lik'd , you 'l like what here is writ ; else you will forfeit your judgment and wit. for your own sakes , dislike not these books then , have mercy on your selves , you censuring men : for when you 're dead , with all your envious looks , these writings will out-live all other books . o , but a woman writes them ! she does strive t' intrench too much on man's prerogative . then that 's the crime , that her fame pulls yours down . if you be scholars , she 's too of the gown ; therefore be civil to her : think it fit she should not be condemn'd cause she 's a wit. if you be soldiers , ladies you 'l defend , and your sheath'd arguments , when drawn , will end the small male-gossipings . but , gallants , pray be not ye factious , though your mistris say , the books are naught ; but do you talk with those , of ribbans , point de gen's , and curious clothes , their better reading ; and let books alone : but these i will compare to every one that here doth follow . nay , old homer writ not clearer fancies , nor with clearer wit : and that philosophy she doth dispense , is beyond aristotle's hard non-sense . her observations of diseases new , hippocrates the grecian never knew . as eloquent she is as cicero , and sweeter flowers of rhet'rick here do grow . her lofty high descriptions do shame still the swell'd lines of th' imitator virgil. as good odes too as horace : nay , i can compate her dialogues to rare lucian . lucan , the battel of thy civil-war is lost ; this lady doth exceed thee far . more fame , by morals , she , than plutarch , gains . as useful fables she , as aesop , feigns . and as good language as e're terence writ . thy comedies , poor plautus , have less wit. her rare epistles all epistles sully , even the too-familiar of vain tully . and as wise sentences she still doth say , as marcus aurelius , or seneca . verses as smooth and sweet as ovid writ : and may compare with sweet tibullus wit. what takes the soul more than a gentle vain , that charms the charming orpheus with its strain ? if all these wits were prais'd for several ways , what deserves this that hath them all ? what praise ? the preface . the design of these my feigned stories , is , to present virtue to your view , the muses leading her , and the graces attending on her : to defend innocence , help the distressed , lament the unfortunate , and shew that vice is seldom crown'd with good success . i have described in this work many sorts of passions , humours , behaviours , actions , accidents , governments , laws , customs , peace , warrs , climates , arts and sciences ; but have not painted them all alike , some being done with oily-colours of poetry , others with water-colours of prose : some upon dark grounds of tragedy , and others upon light grounds of comedy . nor are those descriptions so lively exprest by my pen , as sir anthony vandike's pictures by his pencil , being rather form'd by fancy , than copied from the true originals of immediate action ; for i have not read much of history to inform my self of what was done in former times , where i might unhappily have found , to my grief , that some of my sex have out-done all the glory i can aim at , or hope to attain to . that my ambition of extraordinary fame , is restless , and not ordinary , i cannot deny : and since all heroick actions , publick employments , as well civil as military , and eloquent pleadings , are deni'd my sex in this age , i may be excused for writing so much ; for that is the reason i have run , more busily than industriously , upon every subject i can think of . though some of these stories be romancical , i would not be thought to delight in romances , having never read a whole one in my life ; and if i did believe that these tales should neither benefit the life , nor please the mind , more than what i have read in them , did either instruct or satisfie me ; or that they could create amorous thoughts in idle brains , as romances do , i would never suffer them to be printed , and would make blots instead of letters . but partiality perswades me otherwise ; and i hope , that this work will rather quench passion , than enflame it ; will beget chast thoughts , nourish the love of virtue , kindle human pity , warm charity , encrease civility , strengthen fainting patience , encourage noble industry , crown merit , and instruct life : will damn vices , kill follies , prevent errors , forewarn youth , and arm the mind against misfortunes ; and in a word , will admonish , direct , and perswade to that which is best in all kinds , wherein i have my wishes and reward . i have not dress'd these discourses with constraint fashions , which are hard words , set-phrases , and bombast sentences : but though it be done carelesly , yet not loosly ; and when i use any forreign words , do not , i beseech you , attribute it to affectation , or to the vanity of being thought skilful in those languages from whence they are taken : for i have never learn'd any , besides my mother-tongue , which is ( at this time ) extreamly enrich'd with the wise and lawful plunder of others ; and is like mithridate and cordial-waters , which are much the better for being compounded of the choicest ingredients . for method , i do neither understand perfectly what it is ; nor , if i should , have i the patience to be ty'd to its exact rules , which in my opinion fetters nature more often than it helps it by its pretended order . and therefore do not expect in this book any artificial contrivances , and be contented to find my expressions clear , natural , and very intelligible , without the least art in the world. if i cannot be so happy to deserve your commendations , let me deserve your censure ; which cannot be ( in relation to you ) till you have read the whole work ; and chiefly , the stories of the anchoret , and of the experienced traveller ; and then ( i hope ) the prejudices you may have against an unlearned woman , will be taken off . as i was writing , by a little fire , these feigned histories ; i did desire to see my native countrey , native friends , that lov'd me well , and had no other ends than harmless mirth to pass away dull time , with telling tales either in prose or rime . but though desire did then like a wind blow the sails of wishes on love's ship to go ; yet banishment to my dear lord , was then a dangerous rock , made of hard-hearted men . and hearing of such dangers in my way , i was content in antwerp for to stay ; and in the circle of my brain to raise the figures of my friends crowned with praise : these figures plac'd in company together , all setting by a fire in cold weather ; the fire was of fancy , which i made within the glandule of a chimney laid : my lord and i amongst our friedns was set in the midst of them that were thither met . but afterwards perceiving i could make as many figures as my thoughts could take . then i invited all the learned men , and best of poets that the age had then : the poorest guess , though they no birth inherit , to entertain according to their merit . thus was my mind as busie as a bee , to entertain this noble company . then my imaginations a large room built , furnish'd most curiously , and richly gilt : i hired all the arts for to provide choice of provisions , and pastime beside . the wit i had unto the muses sent , with love's request , which humbly did present my mind's desire ; which was , without delay , to come and help to pass the time away . wit travell'd far , and search'd them all about , at last in nature's court wit found them out . then first to nature , wit did bow down low ; to wit , dame nature did her favours show ; and , with a pleasing-smile , she bid him say , whether be came to fetch her maids away . wit answered , yes . then nature bid them take the helicon water , and with it make the company all poets . which they did , although they were but pictures in my head ; their real persons at great distance were : but on my thoughts that did their figures bear , the marvellous waters could not work well , which is the cause no better tales i tell ; but hope those friends my fancy do present , vvill take it well , and for a good intent : for i did trouble much my poor weak brain , this worthy company to entertain . margaret newcastle . several feigned stories in verse . the first book . readers , my works do not seem ( in my mind ) so bad as you make them , if faults you find : for if you find much fault , you would not spare your ridgid censures , but their faults declare . for i perceive the world is evil bent , judging the worst of that which was well meant . when they a word to wantonness can wrest , they 'l be well-pleas'd , and often at it jest : when every foolish tongue with words can play , and turn good sense , with words , an evil way . but at my writings let them do their worst , and for their pains with ignorance be curst . in vvinter cold , a company was met , both men and vvomen by the fire were set ; at last they did agree ( to pass the time ) that every one should tell a tale in ryme . the vvomen said , vve no true measures know ; nor do our rhymes in even numbers go . why , said the men , all women's tongues are free to speak both out of time , and follishly . and , drawing lots , the chance fell on a man , who having spit and blown his nose , began : of the mournful widow . i travelling , it was my chance to spy a little house , which to a tomb stood nigh . my curiosity made me inquire vvho dwelt therein : to further my desire , i knocked at the door ; at last came one which told me , 't was a lady liv'd alone . i pray'd that i the lady might but see : she told me , she did shun all company . by her discourse , the lady had been wife , but being a widow , liv'd a lonesome life . i told her , i did travel all about , only to find a constant woman out . she answer'd , if the world had any where a constant woman , surely she dwelt there . i waited there , in hope my fortune might at length direct me to this lady's sight : and lying underneath a tomb at night , at curfue-time , this lady with a light came forth out of the house all cloth'd in white , and to the tomb her walk she bended right ; with a majestick-grace she walk'd along , she seem'd to be both beautiful and young ; and when she came , she kneeled down to pray , and thus unto her self did softly say . give leave , you gods , this loss for to lament ; give my soul leave to seek which way his went : o let my spirits with his run a race , not to out-go , but to get next in place : amongst the sons of men raise up his fame , let not foul envy canker-fret the same : and whilst , great gods , i in the world do live , grant i may honour to my husband give : o grant that all fond love away may flye , but let my heart amongst his ashes lye . here do i sacrifice each vainer dress , and idle words , which my youth did express . here , dear , i cancel all self-love , and make a bond , thy loving memory to take , and in my soul always adore the same ; my thoughts shall build up altars to thy name : thy image in my heart shall fixed be : my tears from thence shall copies take of thee , and on my cheeks those tears as pictures plac't , or , like thy carved statue , ne're shall waste . thy praise my words ( though air ) shall print so deep , by repetition shall for ever keep . with that , tears from her eyes in show'rs did flow : then i rose up , to her my self did show . she seemed not to be mov'd at my sight , because her grief was far above her fright . said i , weep , weep no more , thou beauteous saint , nor over these dull ashes make complaint ; they feel not thy warm tears , which liquid flow ; nor thy deep sighs , which from thy heart do go : they hear thee not , nor thank thee for thy love ; nor yet his soul , that 's with the god's above . take comfort , saint , since life will not return ; and bury not thy joys within this urn. she answered . i have no joys , in him they did reside ; they fled away when as his body dy'd : not that my love unto his shape was ty'd , but to his virtues , which did in him ' bide . he had a generosity beyond all merit , a noble fortitude possest his spirit ; foreseeing-prudence , which his life did guide ; and temperate thoughts did in his soul abide : his speech was sweet and gentle to the eat ; delight sate close , as listning for to hear his counsel wise , and all his actions good : his truth and honesty as judges stood for to direct and give his actions law : his piety to gods was full of awe . wherefore return , your counsels are in vain ; for i must grieve whilst i'n the world remain : for i have sacrific'd all my delight upon my noble husband 's grave , and slight all vanities , which women young do prize , though they entangle them , as webs do flies . lady , said i , you being young and fair , by pleasures to the world invited are : bury not all your youth and beauty here , which like the sun may to all eyes appear . o sir , said she , the sun that gave me light , death hath eclips'd , and taken from my sight . in melancholy shades my soul doth lie , and grieves my body which will not yet die . my spirits long to wander in the air , hoping to find its loving partner there . though fates my life have power to prolong , yet they have none my constant mind to wrong . but when i did perceive no rhetorick could perswade her to take comfort , grieve she would ; then taking my leave for to go away , with adoration thus to her did say : farewell thou angel of a heavenly breed , for sure thou com'st not from a mortal seed , thou art so constant unto virtue fair , which very few of either sexes are . and after a short time i heard she dy'd ; her tomb was built close by her husband's side . after the man , a woman did begin to tell her tale ; and thus she entred in . a description of diverted grief . a man had once a young and handsom wife , whose virtue was unspotted all her life . her words were smooth , which from her tongue did slide ; all her discourse was wittily appli'd . her actions modest , her behaviour so , as when she mov'd , the graces seem'd to go . whatever ill she chanc'd to see or hear , yet still her thoughts as pure as angels were . her husband 's love seem'd such , as no delight nor joy could take him out of his wife's sight . it chanc'd this virtuous wife fell sick to death , and to her husband spake with dying-breath : farewell my dearest husband , dye i must , yet do not you forget me in the dust ; because my soul would grieve if it should see another in my room , your love to be : my ghost would mourn , lament ; that never dyes , though bodies do ; pure loves eternalize . you gods , said he , that order death and life , o strike me dead , unless you spare my wife . if your decree be fix'd , nor alter can , but she must dye , ( o miserable man ! ) here do i vow ( great gods all witness be ) , that i will have no other wife but thee : no friendship will i make , converse with none ; but live an anchoret my self alone . thy spirits sweet , my thoughts shall entertain ; and in my mind thy memory remain . farewell , said she , for now my soul 's at peace , and all the blessings of the gods encrease upon thy soul ; but i pray do not give away that love i had whilst i did live . turning her head , as if to sleep she lay , in a soft sigh her spirits flew away . vvhen she was dead , great mourning he did make , vvould neither eat , nor drink , nor rest could take ; kissing her cold pale lips , her cheeks , each eye ; cursing his fate he lives , and cannot dye : tears fell so fast , as if his sorrows meant , to lay her in a watry monument . but when her corps upon the hearse was laid , no tongue can tell what mournful cries he made . thus did he pass his time , a week or two , in sad commplaints , and melancholy wo ; at last he was perswaded for to take some air abroad , ev'n for his own healths sake . but first , unto the grave he went to pray , kissing that earth wherein her body lay . after a month or two , his grief to ease , some recreations sought himself to please ; and calling for his horses , and his hounds , he went to hunt upon the champian grounds : his thoughts by these pastimes diverted are , pass'd by the grave , and never dropt a tear. at last he chanc'd a company to meet of virgins young , and fresh as flowers sweet ; their cloathing fine , their humours pleasant , gay , and with each other they did sport and play , giving his eyes a liberty to view ; vvith interchanging looks , in love he grew . one maid amongst the rest , most fair and young , vvho had a ready wit , and pleasant tongue , he courtship made , to her he did address , cast off his mourning , love for to express . rich clothes he made , and wondrous fine they were ; he barb'd , and curl'd , and powder'd sweet his hair : rich gifts unto his mistress did present , and every day to visit her he went. they like each other well , they both agree , that in all haste they straight must married be . to church they went , for joy the bells did ring : when married were , he home the bride did bring . but when he married was some half a year , he curtain-lectures from his vvife did hear : for whatsoe're he did , she did with spight and scorn dislike , and all his kindness slight : cross every word , she would , that he did say ; seem'd very sick , complaining every day , unless she went abroad ; then she would be in humour good , in other company . then he would sigh , and call into his mind . his dear dead wife that was so wondrous kind . he jealous grew , and was so discontent , ( and of his later marriage did repent ) with melancholy thoughts fell sick and dy'd ; his vvife soon after was another's bride . vvhen she had done , the men aloud did cry ; said she had quit her tale most spitefully . another man , to answer what she told , began to tell , and did his tale unfold . the feminine description . a man a walking , did a lady spy ; to her he went : and when he came hard by , fair lady , said he , why walk you alone ? because ( said she ) my thoughts are then my own : for in a company my thoughts do throng , and follow every foolish babling tongue . your thoughts , said he , 't were boldnessfor to ask . to tell , said she , it were too great a task : but yet to satisfie your mind , said she , i 'le tell you how our thoughts run commonly : sometimes they mount up to the heavens high , then straight fall down , and on the earth will lye ; then circling run to compass all they may , and then sometimes they all in heaps do stay . at other times they run from place to place , as if they had each other in a chace . sometimes they run as phansie doth them guide , and then they swim as in a flowing-tide : but if the mind be discontent , they flow against the tide , their motion 's dull and slow . said he , i travel now to satisfie my mind , whether i can a constant vvoman find . o sir , said she , it 's labour without end , vve cannot constant be to any friend : vve seem to love to death , but 't is not so , because our passions still move to and fro : they are not fix'd , but do run all about ; every new object thrusts the former out . yet we are fond , and for a time so kind , as nothing in the world should change our mind : but if misfortune come , we weary grow ; then former fondness we away straight throw : although the object alter not , yet may time alter our fond minds another way . we love , and like , and hate , and cry , vvithout a cause , or reason why . wherefore go back , for you shall never find any vvoman to have a constant mind : the best that is , shall hold but for a time , wav'ring like wind , which women hold no crime . a woman said , this tale i will requite , to vindicate our sex which you did slight . a man in love was with a lady fair , and for her sake would curl , perfume his hair. professions thousands unto her did make , and swore for her a pilgrimage would take . i swear , said he , truth shall for me be bound , constant to be , whilst life in me is found . with all his rivals he would quarrels make ; in duels fought he often for her sake . it chanc'd this lady sick was , like to dye of the small pox , beauty's great enemy . when she was well , her beauty decay'd quite , he did forsake her , and her friendship slight ; excuses made , her did not often see , then asked leave a traveller to be . and thus , poor lady , when her beauty 's gone , without her lover she may sit alone . then was the third man's turn , his tale to tell , which to his company he fitted well . a description of constancy . there was a noble man that had a vvife young , fair , and virtuous ; yet of so short life , that after she had married been a year , a daughter 's born , which daughter cost her deer ; no sooner born , the mother laid in bed , before her lord could come , his vvife was dead ; where , at the sight , he did not tear his hair , nor beat his breast , nor sigh , nor shed a tear ; nor buried her in state , as many do , and with that funeral-charge a new wife wo : but silently he laid her in a tomb , where , by her side , he meant to have a room : for by no other side he meant to lye , in life and death to keep her company . the whilst he of his daughter care did take , and fond he was ev'n for his dear vvife's sake : but grief upon his spirits had got hold , consum'd him more than age , that makes men old . his flesh did waste , his manly strength grew weak ; his face grew pale , and faintly did he speak : as most that in a deep consumption are , where hectick-fevers do with life make warr : and though he joy'd he had not long to live , yet for to leave his daughter young , did grieve ; for he no kindred had to take a care of his young child , and strangers he did fear they would neglect their charge , not see her bred according to her birth , when he was dead ; or rob her of her wealth , or else would sell her to a husband might not use her well : or else ( by servants brib'd ) might her betray with some mean man , and so to run away . these cares of his , his mind did much torment , and her ill fortune to his thoughts present . at last he did conclude , if any be true , just , and full of generosity , they 're such as are like to the gods on high , as powerful princes , and dread majesty . the soveraign was dead , but left to reign his widowed-queen , whose prudence did maintain the government , though forreign warrs she had , which was a charge , and oft-times made her sad . this noble-man sent to the queen to crave , that she upon his child would pity have , to take her to the court , there to be bred , that none might wrong her after he was dead . the queen most willingly his suit did sign , and so in peace his soul he did resign . this lady soon did to the court repair , where she was bred with tender love and care ; and youth , that 's bred in courts , may wisest be , because they more do hear , and more do see than other children that are bred obscure , because the senses are best tutors sure . but nature in this maid had done her part , and in her frame had shew'd her curious art ; compos'd her every way , body and mind , of best extracts that were to form mankind : all which she gave to time for to distill , and of the subtil'st spirits the soul to fill ; as reason , wit , and judgment ; and to take the solid'st part the body for to make . for though that nature all her works shapes out , yet time doth give strength , length , and breadth about . and as her person grew in stature tall , and that her beauty did encrease withall ; so did affection in her heart grow high , which there was planted in her infancy . there was a subject , prince within the land , although but young , the army did command : he being chose for birth , wealth , valour , wit , and prudence , for to lead and martial it ; the whilst his father did the queen assist to manage state-affairs , as knowing best the kingdom 's constitutions , natures bad of common-people , who are sometimes mad , and wildly in distempers , ruins bring ; for most rebellions from the commons spring . but he so just and loyally did serve his queen and countrey , as he did preserve himself within her favour , and her love , as great respect , and honour'd praise did prove ; and in the warrs his son such fame did get , that in fame's chariot he triumphant set . for he was valiant , and of nature free , courteous , and full of generosity : his vvit was quick , yet so as to delight , not for to cross , or in disputes to fight : for gallant sword-men that do fight in warr , do never use with tongues to brawl and jarr . he was exact in body and in mind , for no defects in either could you find . the queen , that had a neece both young and fair , did strive to match her to this prince , and heir of all his father's vvealth , who had such store , as all the nobles else did seem but poor : and the young princess lik'd so well the choice , that thoughts of marrying him did her rejoice : and through her eyes such messages love sent , on smiling-rays and posting-glances went. the other lady did hear the report , for every one did talk of it in court : besides , she saw his person still attend upon the princess , and did presents send : and every day to visit her did go , as being commanded by his father so . at which she sad and melancholy grew ; yet her disease not thorowly she knew . like as a plant , that from the earth doth spring , sprouts high , before a full-blown flower it bring . so did her love in bud obscurely lye , not any one as yet did it descry : nor did the prince the least affection find , she being reserv'd in action , and in mind . sober she was , and of a bashful look , of but few words ; yet she good notice took , and much observ'd , for love hath a quick eye , and often by her countenance doth spy the hidden thoughts , that the tongue dare not tell : for in the mind obscurity doth dwell . but yet she did espy something lay cross to his desires , but guess'd not what it was ; but griev'd that any thing should him displease : for those that love , do wish their lov'd much ease : nay , so much ease , they torments would endure , if these , for those they love , might good procure . but she grew restless , and her thoughts did run about him , as about the vvorld , the sun : for he was her sole vvorld , and wish'd her love had influence , as planets from above , to order his affections , and to bring from several causes , one effect to spring ; and the effect , that he might love her so , as love her best , or at least he might know how well she lov'd him ; for she wish'd no more than love for love , as saints which do adore the gods in heaven , whose love is wholly pure , and nothing can of drossy flesh endure . at last she and her thoughts in councel sate , what was best to be done , or this , or that : they all agree , that she her love should own , since innocent and pure , and make it known by her epistles , and her pen to write what her pure heart did dictate and indite : no forfeit of her modesty , because she had no ends , but only virtuous laws . then took she pen and paper , and her wit did tell her love the truth ; and thus she writ : sir , you may wonder much that i do send this letter , which by love doth recommend it self and suit unto your judging-ear , and that it was not stopt by bashful fear : but let me tell you , this pure love of mine is built on virtue , not on base design . it hath no dross , nor proudly doth aspire ; a flame inkindled by immac'late fire , which i to th' altar of your merits bring , from whence the flame to heaven high may spring . your glorious fame within my heart , though young , did plant a slip of honour , from whence sprung pure love , and chast desires ; for i do crave , only within your heart a place to have . i do not plead , hoping to be your wife , nor 'twixt you and your mistress to breed strife ; or wish i that her love you should forsake , or unto me a courtly friendship make : but only , when i 'm dead , you would inshrine within your memory , this love of mine ; which love to all the world i may proclame without a blush , or check , or spotted-fame : 't is not your person i do so admire , nor yet your wealth or titles i desire : but your heroick soul , and generous mind , your affability and nature kind ; your honest heart , where justice still doth raign ; your prudent thoughts , and a well-temper'd brain ; your helping hand , and your industrious life , not to make broils , but to decide all strife ; and to advance all those are in distress , to help the weak , and those are powerless ; for which my heart and life to love is bound , and every thought of you with honour crown'd . these are not feigning lines that here i write , but truths as clear and pure as heaven's light. nor is it impudence to let you know , love of your virtues in my soul doth grow . her love thus innocent she did enroll , which was the pure platonick of her soul : though in black characters the envious may call the sense clear , as is the morning's day ; and every word appear unto the sight , to make her smoother paper yet more white . thus she infolded honour , and more truth , than ever yet was known in female-youth . blush-colour'd silk her letter then did bind , for to express how modest was her mind : and virgins wax did close it with her seal : yet did that letter all her love reveal . then to her nurse's husband she did trust these loving lines , knowing him faithful , just to all her family ; he obey'd her will , and would have done , no doubt , though 't had been ill : for his obedience never ask'd the cause ; nor was he casuist in divine laws , but faithful and most trusty : so was sent with this most sacred letter ; then he went. in the mean time that she her letter sent , the prince to her a letter did present by a servant , in whom he put much trust , as finding him both dextrous , prudent , just in all employments ; he this letter brought , which'mongst this lady's thoughts much wonder wrought ; even so much , as she could not believe , but thought he did mistake , and did conceive she was the princess . whereupon , said she , i doubt this letter was not writ to me . but he confirm'd , to her that it was writ . she to her closet went , and open'd it : with trembling hands the vvaxen seal she broke , and what he writ , with a faint voice thus spoke : fairest of all your sex , for so you are unto all others ; as a blazing-starr , vvhich shews it self , and to the vvorld appears as a great vvonder once in many years ; and never comes , but doth portend on earth either the fall of princes , or their birth . o let your influence only at me aim , not for to work my overthrow , or fame ; but love , to make me happy all my life ; then yeeld your self to be my virtuous vvife . but if you ( this request ) to me deny , the gods , i hope , will grant me soon to dye . she , when she this had read , was in a maze , and senslesly did on the letter gaze ; by which her spirits discomposed were , in quarrelling-disputes , 'twixt hope and fear . at last hope got the better , then did they triumph with joy , and in her heart did play . for when the spirits mutually agree , both in the eyes and heart they dancing be . then to the gentleman that came , she went , and told him civilly that she had sent unto the prince , and that she could not fit so well an answer to return as yet . the prince as melancholy sate alone , but all the while his mistress thought upon : staid for the messenger's return ; for he , till answer came , refus'd all company . at last one of his pages to him ran , to tell him , without was an ancient man that would not be deny'd , for speak he must unto the prince , or else must break his trust he was in charge with ; and rather than so , would venture life , before he back would go , and not his message to the prince to tell . whereat the prince , liking his courage well , sent for him , who came with humility , the letter gave upon his bended knee . the prince the letter read , and pleased so , as by his smiling-countenance did show ; which made all cloudy thoughts disperse , & clears his mind , as in dark days when sun appears . sure , said the prince , the gods our loves decree , and in our unions they do all agree : they joyn our hearts in one , our souls so mix , as if eternally in heaven would fix . then soon he ( all delays for to prevent ) another letter writ ; which to her sent in answer of her own ; this letter gave unto her foster-nurse , who was as grave as old bald father time , of courage stout , a rustick plainness , and not eas'ly out of countenance ; trusty to be employ'd , and in her lady's service would have dy'd . the prince commended her fidelity , and pleas'd he was at her blunt quality : but with the letter quickly did return , ( for she , though old , yet every step did run ) and then the letter which the prince had sent , she to her lady did in mirth present ; who then the letter broke with joyful speed , and to her foster-nurse she did it read : sweetest , you have exprest your love to me with so much plainness and sincerity ; and yet your stile severely have you writ , and rul'd your lines with a commanding-wit : heroick flourishes your pen doth draw , or executes as in a martial-law . then solemnly doth march in mourning-trail , and melancholy words all hopes do vail . as golden dust on written lines strewn were , your written lines seem sprinkled with a tear ; as by the heat of passion spread about , for fear that cruelty should blot it out . but let me tell you , that my love is such , as never lover loved half so much , and with so fervent zeal , and purest flame , nay , something above love , that wants a name for to express it ; like to gods on high : for , who can comprehend a deity ? and though i honour all your sex , yet my having another mistress , i deny , besides your self ; and though i do obey to visit the fair princess , nothing say concerning love , nor yet professions make , as common lovers , promise for her sake wonders ; and yet my life to her will give to do her service : but whilst i do live , my heart and soul is yours ; and when i dye , still will my soul keep yours in company : though by honour my active life is bound unto your sex , you only will be found within my heart , and only love to be , from whence my brain doth copies take of thee : on which my soul doth view with much delight , because the soul sees not with vulgar sight : for souls do see , not as the senses do , but as transparent glass , the minds quite through : or rather as the gods see all that 's past , present , or what 's to come , or the world vast ; or what can be , all unto them is known ; and so are souls to one another shown : and if our souls do equally agree , our thoughts and passions to each known will be . but after this letter , they both did get an opportunity , by which they met : no complemental-wooing they did use ; true love all flattering words it doth refuse . but they agreed , and both did think it fit , their love to hide , not to discover it . at last the queen and father did agree , the prince and princess straight should married be ; ne're made a question , for they doubted not but youth and beauty had each other shot with amorous loves . but when the prince made known , how that his heart was now none of his own ; his father seem'd , with trouble , discontent : but the enraged queen , with malice bent , did strive all ways she could for to disgrace the sweet young lady , oft disprais'd her face , her person , dress , behaviour , and her wit ; and for to match with such a prince , not fit . the prince's love so firm , no words could break ; impatiently did hear , but little speak . but the princess heard the prince to be a lover to another ; then did she tear , rail , and rave , as if she frantick were ; and of her rival , words she would not spare . one day a company of nobles met , and in a room they were together set ; the prince and his fair mistress she did spy , and often at them cast a spightful eye . at last her malice set a-work her tongue , and at the prince she evil words out flung , which he receiv'd with a submissive face , turning those scorns as favours of her grace . but when she had with scorns his patience try'd , she ( for to vent her spleen ) in passion cry'd . some of the company there jesting by the other lady , ask'd if she would cry : she answer made , she had not the like cause ; nor had she broke the modest civil laws : but if her passion had misled her tongue , she would have wept to water , or else flung her self to dust , for want of moisture dye , unless her life could issue through her eye . but when the prince perceiv'd such storms to rise , and showring tears to fall from beauteous eyes , he did absent himself , and shun'd to be a trouble to the princess company . but when the queen had try'd all means she could to alter his affections , nothing would ; she then their marriage strove for to prevent , and to the army she the prince soon sent ; then order gave , not to return again , but with the army there for to remain . he to his mistress went , his leave to take , perswading her a journey she would make unto the army , and there to agree , when they should meet , & straight-way married be . at last she did resolve to leave the court , and privately with great speed to transport her person to the prince where he was gone , for ne're till then she found her self alone . when the army began for to retire to winter-quarters , he did there desire his mistress company , and then did write to those he had entrusted , how they might convey her safely : but by some mistake , the queen had means this his letter to take ; which when she read , all in a rage she grew , and then his letter into the fire she threw . which when sh' had told her neece , they both did strive , and both in council sate , for to contrive to hinder her wish'd-meeting ; wherefore they did think it best , the lady to convey unto some private place , and then give out that she was dead , which soon was spread about , and every one in censuring spent some breath , and most did judg she dy'd a violent death . but the queen's anger only would destroy their loves , because her neece then should enjoy the prince , on whom her heart in love was set , and us'd all means she could , his love to get . but though at first they thought the prince might mourn ; yet when his grief had been by time out-worn , he then might take the princess for his wife , concealing the young lady all her life . and though they did not murther her , yet they did strive to grieve and cross her every way : wherefore they did agree that some should tell her , that the prince in battel fell . the report of her death spread far and near ; and at last came unto the prince his ear : the news struck him so hard , as it did make his strength grow weak , and all his limbs to shake . but when his strength return'd , his mind sad grew , and from all company himself withdrew : no orders he would give , but left the care of all the army to an officer : and from th' army , without the queen's consent , he did return , and to his father went , and told him , he all worldly things did wave , had buri'd them all in his mistress grave , and the remainder of his days would spend in holy devotion , his prayers would send unto the gods ; and my dear saint , said he , will be a mediator there for me : his father did disswade him all he could , but all in vain , a hermit be he would . instead of palaces , he chose a cell , left courts and camps , did solitary dwell : instead of clothes that rich and costly were , he wore a garment made of camel's hair . instead of arms , a hermit's habit took ; and for a sword , he us'd a prayer-book : instead of treading measures in a dance , and wanton eyes that oft would side-ways glance ; his knees upon hard stone did bowing bend , and his sad eyes unto the earth descend : instead of flattering words to tempt maids fair , no words did speak but what were us'd in prayer . all wild & wandring thoughts were now compos'd , and the dead object of his mistress clos'd , like multitudes that gather in a ring , to view some curious or some wondrous thing : or like a devout congregation met , will strive about the altar near to set : so did his thoughts near her idea get , which , as a goddess , in his soul did set : then he an altar built of marble white , and waxen tapers round about did light : her picture on this altar plac'd was high , there to be seen with an up-lifted eye . she was his saint , and he there every day did offer tears and sighs , to her did pray , and her implore , she would the gods request to take his soul , his body lay to rest . in th' mean time his mistress's made believe that he was kill'd , for which she much did grieve : for when she at the first the news did hear , her face turn'd pale , like death it did appear : then gently sinking , she fell to the ground ; grief seiz'd her heart , and put her in a swound : at last , life got the better , and then wept , and wisht to heaven , that she in death had slept . but melancholy her whole soul possest , and of all pleasing thoughts it self divest : all objects shuns , that pleasing were , and fair ; and all such sounds as were of a leight air : the splendrous light and glorious sun shut out , and all her chamber hung with black about : no other light but blinking lamps would have : some earth and turf therein , like to a grave , the which she often view'd , or sate close by , imagining the prince therein did lye ; and on that grave , her tears , like show'rs of rain , keep fresh the turf , on the green grass remain as pearled dew before the sun doth rise ; or as refreshing show'rs from cloudy skies : and often this supposed grave doth dress with such significant flow'rs as did express his virtues , and his dispositions sweet , more than those flowers when in posies meet : his various virtues , known to all so well more fragrant than those flowers were for smell . but first , she set a lawrel-garland green , to shew that he a victor once had been ; and in the midst a copious branch did place , for to express he dyed in the chace of his fierce enemies ; his courage was so true , that , after a long fight , away they flew . thus melancholy past her time away , besides sad solemn musick ' twice a day : for ev'ry sense with melancholy fill'd , and always dropping-tears from thence distill'd , with which her melancholy soul did feed , and melancholy thoughts her mind did breed : then on the ground her head aside-ways hung , would lye along whilst these sad songs were sung . a song . titan , i banish all thy joys of light , turning thy glorious rays , to darker night ; clothing my chamber with sad black , each part , thus suitable unto my mournful heart : only a dimn wax taper there shall wait on me , to shew my sad unhappy fate . with mournful thoughts my head shall furnisht be , and all my breath sad sighs , for love of thee : my groans to sadder notes be set with skill , and sung in tears , and melancholy still . languishing-musick to fill up each voice with palsied trembling strings , is all my choice . a song . since he is gone , oh then salt tears , drown both mine eyes , and stop mine ears with grief ; my grief it is so much , it locks my smell up , taste , and touch. in me remains but little breath , which quickly take away , oh death . a song . why should i live ? but who doth know the way to him , or where to go ? death's ignorant , the dead they have no sense of grief , when in the grave . forgetful and unthankful death , hast thou no love , when gone's our breath ? no gratitude , but there dost lye , in dark oblivion for to dye ? no sense of love , or honour , there : then death i prethee me forbear : thousands of years in sorrow i would live in grief , and never dye . a song . my bed of sorrow 's made , since no relief ; and all my pillows shall be stuff'd with grief , my winding-sheets are those whereon i lye , my curtains drawn with sad melancholy . watching shall be my food , weeping my drink , sighing my breath , and groaning what i think : trembling and shaking , all my exercise ; disquiet and disorder'd thoughts now rise . wringing of hands , with folded arms lamenting , is all the joy is left me of contenting : for he is gone that was my joy , my life ; i 'm left his widow , who ne'er was his wife . but all the while , the queen was angry bent against the prince , because away he went , and left the army without a general ; for which she rebel , traytor , him did call : but she another general did make , which of the army all the charge did take : yet his success in warrs proved but bad , for afterward the queen great losses had . and all the soldiers they were discontent : whereat the queen another general sent ; but he no better fortune there could meet , the enemy did force him to retreat ; then did the enemy so pow'rful grow , the forces of the queen they overthrow in every fight and skirmish which they had ; for which the queen and kingdom did grow sad . at last the queen the prince did flatter , and entreated him again for to command : but he deny'd the queen , would not obey ; said , earthly power to gods they must give way . at last she sent him word she would not spare his life , and therefore bid him to prepare himself for death , for dye he should for disobedience , and revenge she would have on him : then his father to him went for to perswade him , and there did present show'rs of tears , which sadly pouring fell upon his only son , his grief to tell . he round about his neck one arm did wind , the other arm embrac'd his body kind : his cheeks his son did joyn to his , and often he his lips did kiss : o pity me , my son , and thy life spare , thou art my only child , and only heir . th' art my sole joy , in thee i pleasure take , and wish to live but only for thy sake . the prince , his father answer'd ; and said he , i am not worth those tears you shed for me . but why do you thus weep , and thus lament , for my death now ? when to the warrs i went , you did encourage me to fight in field for victory , or else my life to yeeld : i willingly obey'd , and joy'd to find my father's sympathy unto my mind . besides , it shew'd a greater love to me , than parents self-lov'd fondness us'd to be ; for to prefer my honour , and my fame , before the perpetu'ty of your name : and as you priz'd my honour and renown , so i a heavenly , not an earthly crown : and give me leave the better choice to make , to quit all troubles , and sweet peace to take : i ne'er more willing , nor more fit can dye , for heaven , and the gods pure company : for had i dy'd in warrs , my soul had been stained with blood , and spotted o're with sin. but now , my mistress is a saint , in heaven hath intercession made , my sins forgiven . and since she 's gone , all joys with her are fled , and i shall never happy be , till dead : she was my soul's delight , in her i view'd the pure and celestial beatitude . but were i sure the soul that never dyes , should never meet , nor bodies never rise by resurrection ; yet sure those are blest that pass this life , and in the grave do rest . then said the duke ( his father ) to his son , what ever comes , son , heaven's will be done ; but since you are resolv'd , and needs will dye , i in the grave will keep you company . the young prince said , i cannot you disswade , since none are happy but those death hath made . the day of execution drawing nigh of the young prince , his father too would dye . then the young prince askt leave , and leave he had , that he like to a soldier might be clad : when he was brought to dye , and on that day death he did meet in soldierly array : instead of mourning-garments , he had on a suit of buff , embroidered thick upon ; and a rich scarf that was of watchet-dye , set thick with pearls ; instead of strings to tye it close together , were rich diamonds , so as like a ring or garter it did show , of but one entire diamond ; this did bind the scarf so firm as an united mind : a scarlet coat embroidered thick with gold ; and hangers like to it , his sword did hold ; and in his hat a plume of feathers were , in falling-folds , which hung below his hair. he being thus accouter'd , death to meet in gallantry , yet gently , friendly , sweet : he would embrace it , and so gladly yeeld , yet would he dye as soldiers in the field : for gallant valiant men do court death so , as amorous courtly men a wooing go . his father all in mourning-garments clad , not griev'd to dye , but for his son was sad : millions of people throng'd about to see this gallant mourning prince's tragedy . but in the time these preparations were , the queen sent to th' young lady to prepare her self to dye : when she the news did hear , joy in her countenance did then appear : then she her self did dress like to a bride , and in a rich and gilded coach did ride : thus triumphing as on her wedding-day , to meet her bridegroom death ; but in the way the people all did weep that she should dye , and youth and beauty in death's arms should lye . but she did smile , her countenance was glad , and in her eyes such lively spirits had , as the quick-darting rays the sun out-shin'd , and all she look'd on , for a time were blind . but when the queen and nobles all were set , and the condemned on the scaffold met : where when the lovers they each other spy'd , their eye-strings seem'd as if together ty'd : so firmly they were fix'd , and did so gaze , and with each other struck in such a maze , as if with wonder they were turn'd to stone , and that their feet unto the ground were grown ; they could not stir ; but at the last mov'd he in a slow pace , amazed , went to see that heav'nly object ; for , thought he , it may an angel be , my soul to take away . her limbs did shake , like shiv'ring agues cold , for fear upon her spirits had got hold , when she did see him move ; for she had thought he was a statue , and by carvers wrought , and by the queen's command was thither brought . when he came near , he kneeled down to pray , and thus unto her sofrly he did say : my sense my spirits surprise , thy spirit my mind ; and great disturbance in my thoughts i find : my reason's misty , understanding blind ; tell me whether thou art of mortal kind . said she , that question i would ask of you , for i do doubt my senses are not true intelligencers ; are you the prince i see ? or are you a spirit that thus speaks to me ? with that , the queen did come , their doubts to clear ; it was my plot , said she , to bring you here : and why i crost your loves , i will forbear to tell you now , but afterwards declare . then did she cause a priest to join their hands , which he devoutly ty'd in wedlock-bands . then did the queen unto her nobles say , that she a debt to gratitude must pay : and to the prince's father straight she went ; here , sir , said she , i do my self present to be your wife ; for by your counsel i have rul'd and reign'd in great felicity . he , kneeling , kist her hand ; and both agree , that in few days the wedding kept should be . such joys of acclamation loud , of wonder , echo'd the air , louder than is jove's thunder . her princely neece so noble was , that then for joy she modestly threw up her fan ; since to a high-born prince she well knew she in glorions nuptials soon should joined be . the marriage-song . were all the joys that ever yet were known ; were all those joys met , and put into one , they 'd be , than these two lovers joys , far less ; our lovers height of joys , none can express : they 've made another cupid , i am told , and buri'd the blind boy that was so old . hymen is proud , since laurel crowns his brow , he never made his triumphs until now . the marriage-song for the old duke and the old queen's marriage . now the old cupid he is fled unto the queen ; she to her bed brought the old duke ; so ends all harms in love's embraces , in their arms. this elder wedlock , more than ripe , was of the younger but a type : what wants of cupid , hymen's cup , ceres and bacchus make it up . a marriage-song of the queen's neece . see the old queen's beloved neece , for beauty , favour , such a piece as love could feign , not hope to see ; just such a miracle was she . she doth congratulate , and 's eas'd to see these noble lovers pleas'd above repining : the fates since are just , and gave her a brave prince . a song . hymen triumph in joy , since overcom'd love's boy : each age , each sex and place , the wedlock-laws embrace , the looser sort can bind , monarch of what 's mankind . all things do fall so pat in this triumvirat , which now in wedlock mix ; now three , though once were six . a lady said , such constant love was dead , and all fidelity to heaven fled . another lady said , she fain would know , when marri'd , if they did continue so . o , said a man , such love ( as this was ) sure doth never in a married pair endure : but lovers cross'd , use not to end so well : which , for to shew , a tale i mean to tell . the description of the violence of love. there was a lady , virtuous , young , and fair , unto her father only child and heir : in her behaviour modest , sweet , and civil ; so innocent , knew only good from evil : yet in her garb had a majestick grace , and affable and pleasant was her face . another gentleman ( whose house did stand hard by her father's , and was rich in land ) he had a son whom beauty did adorn , as some might think , of venus he was born : his spirit noble , generous , and great ; by nature valiant , dispositions sweet : his wit ingenious , and his breeding such , that his sci'nces did not pedantry t'uch . this noble gentleman in love did fall with this fair lady , who was pleas'd withall : he courted her , his service did address ; his love by words and letters did express . though she seem'd coy , his love she did not slight , but civil answers did in letters write . at last so well acquainted they did grow , that but one heart each other's thoughts did know . mean time their parents did their love's descry , and sought all ways to break that unity : forbad each other's company frequent ; did all they could love's meetings to prevent . but love regards not parents , nor their threats ; for love , the more 't is barr'd , more strength begets . thus being cross'd , by stealth they both did meet , and privacy did make their love more sweet ; although their fears did oft affright their mind , lest that their parents should their walks out-find . then in the kingdom did rebellion spring , most of the commons fought against their king : and all the gentry that then loyal were , did to the standard of the king repair . amongst the rest , this noble youth was one ; love bade him stay , but honour spurr'd him on : when he declar'd his mind , her heart it rent ; rivers of tears out of her eyes grief sent ; and every tear , like bullets , pierc'd his breast , scatter'd his thoughts , and did his mind molest . silent long time they stood , at last spake he , why doth my love with tears so torture me ? why do you blame my eyes , said she , to weep , since they perceive you faith nor promise keep ? for , did you love but half so true as i , rather than part , you 'ld chuse to stay and dye : but you excuses make , and take delight , like cruel thieves , to rob and spoil by night . now you have stole my heart , away you run , and leave a silly virgin quite undone . if i stay from the warrs , what will men say ? they 'l say , i make excuse to be away : by this reproach , a coward i am thought ; and my disgrace will make you seem in fault , to set your love upon a man so base ; bring infamy to us , and to our race . to sacrifice my life for your content , i would not spare ; but ( dear ) in this consent , 't is for your sake honour i strive to win , that i some merit to your worth may bring . she. if you will go , let me not stay behind , but take such fortune with you as i find : i 'le be your page , attend you in the field ; when you are weary , i will hold your shield . he. dear love , that must not be ; for women are of tender bodies , and minds full of fear : besides , my mind so full of care will be , for fear a bullet should once light on thee , that i shall never fight , but strengthless grow , through feeble limbs be subject to my foe . when thou art safe , my spirits high shall raise , striving to get a victory of praise . with sad laments these lovers did depart ; absence , as arrows sharp , doth wound each heart : she spends her time , to heaven-high doth pray , that gods would bless , and safe conduct his way . the whilst he fights , and fortune's favour had , fame brings this honour to his mistress sad : all cavaliers that in the army were , there was not one could with this youth compare : by love his spirits all were set on fire , love gave him courage , made his foes retire . but , o ambitious lovers , how they run without all guidance , like apollo's son * , run out of moderation's line ; so he did through the thickest of the army flee singly alone , amongst the squadrons deep fighting , sent many one with death to sleep . but numbers , with united strength , at last , this noble gallant man from horse did cast : his body all so thick of wounds was set , safety , it seems , in fight he did forget , but not his love , who in his mind still lyes ; he wish'd her there , to close his dying-eyes . soul , said he , if thou wandrest in the air , thy service to my mistress by thy care : attend her close , with her soul friendship make , then she perchance no other love may take . but if thou sink down to the shades below , and ( being a lover ) to elyzium go ; perchance my mistress soul you there may meet , so walk and talk in love's discourses sweet : but if thou art like to a light put out , thy motion 's ceas'd , then all 's forgot no doubt . with that a sigh , which from his heart did rise , did mount his soul up to the airy skies . the whilst his mistress being sad with care ; her knees were worn , imploring gods with prayer . a drowsie sleep did all her senses close , but in her dreams fancy her lover shows with all his wounds ; which made her loud to cry , help , help , you gods , said she , that dwell on high . these fearful dreams her senses all did wake ; in a cold sweat , with fear , each limb did shake . then came a messenger as pale as death , with panting sides , swoln eyes , and shortned breath ; and by his looks , his sadder tale did tell ; which when she saw , straight in a swoun she fell : at last her stifled spirits had recourse unto their usual place , but of less force : then lifting up her eyes , her tongue gave way , and thus unto the gods did mourning say : why do we pray , and offer to high heaven , since what we ask , is seldom to us given ? if their decrees are fix'd , what need we pray ? nothing can alter fates , nor cross their way . if they leave all to chance , who can apply ? for every chance is then a deity . but if a power they keep to work at will , it shews them cruel to torment us still . when we are made , in pain we always live ; sick bodies , grieved minds , to us they give : with motions which run cross , compos'd we are , which makes our reason and our sense to jar . when they are weary to torment us , must we then return , and so dissolve to dust ? but if i have my fate in my own power , i will not breathe , nor live another hour : then with the gods i shall not be at strife , if my decree can take away my life . then on her feeble legs she straight did stand , and took a pistol charg'd in either hand : here , dear , ( said she ) i give my heart to thee , and by my death , divulg'd our loves shall be ; then constant lovers , mourners be ; when dead , they 'l strew our graves , which is our marriage-bed : upon our hearse a weeping-poplar set , whose moistning-drops our death's-dri'd cheeks may wet . two cypress garlands at our head shall stand , that were made up by some fair virgin 's hand : and on our cold pale corps such flowers strow , as hang their heads for grief , and downward grow . then shall they lay us deep in quiet grave , wherein our bones long rest and peace may have . let no friends marble-tombs erect upon our graves , but set young mirtle-trees thereon : those may in time a shady grove become , fit for sad lovers walks , whose thoughts are dumb : for melancholy love seeks place obscure , no noise nor company it can endure : and when to ground they cast a dull sad eye , perhaps they 'l think on us who therein lye : thus , though w' are dead , our memory remains ; and , like a ghost , may walk in moving-brains ; and in each head love's altars for us build , to sacrifice some sighs , or tears distill'd . then to her heart the pistol set , she shot a bullet in , and so her grief forgot . fame with her trumpet blew in every ear ; the sound of this great act spread every where : lovers from all parts came , by the report ; unto her urn , as pilgrims did resort : there offer'd praises of her constancy , and vow'd the like unto love's deity . a woman said , that tale exprest love well , and shew'd , that constancy in death did dwell . friendship , they say , a thing is so sublime , that with the gods there 's nothing more divine . with wonder lovers , having but one will , their two bodies one soul doth govern still : and though they be always dis-joined much , yet all their senses equally do t'uch : for , what doth strike the eye , or other part , begets in all like pleasure , or like smart . so though in substance , form divided be , yet soul and senses , join'd in one , agree . a man that to the lady plac'd was nigh , said , he would tell another tragedy . humanity , despair , and jealousie , express'd in three persons . walking along , close by a river's side , the waters smooth ran with a flowing-tide : the sun thereon did dart such shining-light , as made it than a diamond-chain more bright . the purling-streams invited me to swim , pull'd my clothes off , then enter'd every limb. but envious cold , alas , did me oppress , and darting-arrows sharp me backwards press . the river to embrace me , made great haste , her moist soft arms incircled round my waste . streams coming fast , strove there to force me stay , but that my arms did make my body way . my hands did strike the soft smooth waters face , as flatt'ring them to give my body place . but when i found them apt higher to rise , striving to stop my breath , and blind my eyes ; then did i spread my arms , and circles make , and the united-streams asunder brake : my legs did kick away those waters clear , to keep them back , lest they should croud too near : and as i broke those streams , they run away , yet fresh suppli'd their place , to make me stay : long did i struggle , and my strength did try , at last got hold upon a bank near by ; on whose side was a hill where trees were plac'd , which on the waters did a shadow cast : thither i went ; and when i came close by , i saw a woman there a weeping lye ; vvhich seeing , i began to slack my pace : straight did my eyes view there a lovely face under a tree ; close by the root she sate , vvhich with her tears as falling-show'rs she wet : at last she spake , and humbly thus did pray , you gods , said she , my life soon take away : no slander on my innocency throw , let my pure soul into elyzium go : if i drown here within this watry lake , o let my tears a murmuring river make : give it both voice and vvords , my grief to tell ; my innocence , and why therein i fell . then straight she rose , the river leapt she in , vvhich when i saw , i after her did swim : my hands , as oars , did well my body row , though panting-breath made waters rough to grow ; yet was my breast a keel for to divide , and by that help my body swift did glide : my eyes the needle to direct the way , vvhich from the north of grief did not estray ; she , as the load-stone , drew me to her aid , though storms within did make my mind afraid . her garments loose did on the waters flow , which were puft up like sails when winds do blow . i catch'd thereat , to draw her to the brink ; but when i went to pull , she down did sink : yet did not i my hold thereof let go , but drew her to the shore with much ado ; i panting with short breath , as out of wind , my spirits spent , my eyes were dimly blind ; my strength so weak , forc'd me to lye down straight , did fill , because , alas , my life was over-fraight . vvhen life got strength , my mind with thoughts then to the lady us'd all art and skill ; bowing her forwardsth ' waters to let out , vvhich from her nose & mouth gusht like a spout : at last her breath ( before restrain'd ) out-broke , and thus to me she passionately spoke : o who are you that do my soul molest , not giving leave in death to take my rest ? is there no peace in nature to be found ? must misery and fear attend us round ? o gods , said she , here grant me my desire ; here end my life , and let my breath expire . i answered . thus you with nature set your self at odds ; and by this wish you do displease the gods : by violence you cut off their decree , no violence in nature ought to be . but what makes you thus strive for to destroy that life which god did give you to enjoy ? she answered , o sir if you did know the torments i do feel ; my soul is rackt upon ill fortune's wheel : my innocency by aspersion whipt , and my pure chastity of fame is stript : my love 's neglected and forsaken quite , banisht from that my soul took most delight . my heart was plac'd upon a valiant man , who in the warrs much honour bravely wan . his actions all by wisdom placed were , and his discourse delighted every ear : his bounty , like the sun , gave life and light to those whom misery had eclipsed quite . this man my person seem'd for to admire ; my love before the world he did desire : told me , the gods might sooner heaven leave , than he forsake my love , or truth deceive . but o vile jealousie , a lover's devil ! tormenting thoughts with suspitions evil ; frighting the mind with false imaginations , burying all joys in deepest contemplations : long lay it smuther'd , but at last out-broke vvith hate ; in rage and spleen base words it spoke . slander and infamy in circles round , my innocent youth with sharpest tongues do wound : but his inconstancy did wound me more than slander , spite , or malice did before : for he another married , and left me clouded in dark disgrace , black infamy . vvith that she fetch'd a sigh ; heav'n bless , said she , this cruel unkind man , who e're he be . i faint , death digs my grave , o lay me in this watry monument ; then may the spring in murmures soft , with blubbering words relate , and dropping weep at my ill fortune's fate . then on a groan her soul with wings did flie up to the heavens , and the gods on high : vvhich when i saw , my eyes with grief did flow , although her soul i thought to heaven did go . and musing long , at last i chanc'd to see a gentleman which handsome seem'd to be . he coming near , ask'd me who there did lie ? i said , 't was one for love and grief did die . hearing my words , he started back , brows bent , vvith trembling legs he to the body went ; vvhich when he view'd , his blood fell from his face , his eyes were fix'd , and standing in one place . at last kneel'd down , and thus did say , no hope is left , life 's fled away . thou wandring soul , where e're thou art , hear my confession from my heart : i lov'd thee better far than life , thought to be happy in a vvife : but o suspition , that false thief , seiz'd on my thoughts , ruling as chief . suspition , malice , spight , commanded still , to carry false reports thy ears to fill . my jealousie did strive thee to torment , and glad to hear when thou wast discontent : i strove always my love for to disguise ; ' t was . said i married was , when all were lies . but jealousie begets all actions base , and in the court of honour hath no place . forgive me , soul , where ever thou dost rest , for , of all vvomen , i did love thee best . here i do offer up my life to thee , both dead , we in one grave may buried be . swifter than lightning , straight his sword he drew , upon the point himself he desperate threw ; and to his panting breast made such dispatch , that i no help could bring , on hold could catch : turning his pale and ghastly eyes to me , mix both our ashes in one urn , said he . with that he fell close by his mistress side , embrac'd , and kist , and groan'd , and there he dy'd : which when i saw , i drest , my clothes put on , to celebrate their funeral-rites alone : first , i did lay a heap of cypress dry , with striking flints i made a fire thereby , laid both their bodies thereupon to burn , which in short time did into ashes turn : and being mixt , i took them thence away , and digg'd a grave those ashes in to lay : then did i gather cockle-shells , though small , with art i strove to build a tomb withall ; placing some on , others in even lays , others join'd close , till i a tomb did raise . and afterwards i planted myrtle green , where turtle-doves are daily building seen : and there young nightingals come every spring ; to celebrate their fames , do sit and sing . a merry lass , amongst the rest , began her tale , and thus exprest : a master was in love with his fair maid , but of his scolding wife was sore afraid : for she in every place would watch and pry , and peep through every key-hole to espy ; and if she found them out , aloud would call , and cry she was undone , her maid had all her husband's love , for she had none sh' was sure ; wherefore this life she never would endure : but he did woo his maid still by his eye ; she , apprehensive , understood thereby ; and oft would find some work to come in place , because her master should behold her face ; excuses make , that business she had great , ( her business was , her master for to meet ) . with pretty smiles she trips it by , and on him casts a kind-coy eye : to all the house besides , would seem demure , oft singing psalms , as if she were right pure ; repeating scripture , sigh , turn up her eyes , as if her soul straight flew unto the skies , and that her body were as chast cold ice , and she were only fit for paradice : though her words were precise , her thoughts were not ; she , with her master , scripture quite forgot : she then a goddess was , prayed unto ; her master did , as priests , with offering woo : her mistress , like to juno , fret and frown'd , when that her husband and her maid she found ; and in the clouds of night would seek about , sometimes she mist them , sometimes found them out : but when she did , lord , what a noise was there ! how jove and she did thunder in the air ! she with an ishmael big away was sent ; like unto hagar , out of doors she went ; where he , like abraham good , a bottle ty'd , and gave her means for the child to provide : whereat her mistress angry was , and cry'd ; and wisht her maid ( like ishma'l ) might have dy'd . another man , amongst the rest , said , they their tales bad well exprest . but they that study much , and seldom speak , for want of use of words , are far to seek : their tongue is like a rusty key grown rough , which hardly turns , so do their words come forth : or like an instrument that lies unstrung , till it be tun'd , cannot be plaid upon : for custom makes the tongue both smooth & quick , and moving oft , no words thereon will stick ; like to a flowing-tide , makes its own way , runs smooth or clear , without a stop or stay : that makes a lawyer plead well at the barr , because he talks there four parts of the year : that makes divines in pulpits well to preach , because so often they the people teach : but those that use to contemplate alone , may have fine thoughts , good words t' express , they none : good language they express in black and white , although they speak it not , yet well they write : much thoughts keep back the words from running out ; the tongue 's ti'd up , the sluce is stopt no doubt : for fancy's quick , and flies such several ways , for to be drest in words it seldom stays . fancy is like an eele , so slippery glides , before the tongue takes hold , away it slides . thus he that seldom speaks , is like to those that travelling , their mother-tongues do lose . now , says a lady that was sitting by , pray let your rusty tongue with silence lye , and listen to the tale that i shall tell ; mark the misfortunes that to them befell . a description of love and courage . a gentleman was riding all about , as in a progress , he chanc'd to spy out : ( growing upon a rising-hill ) a wood , in midst whereof a little house there stood : it was but small , yet was it wondrous fine , as if 't were builded for the muses nine : the platform was so well contriv'd , that there was ne're a piece of ground lay waste or spare . this house was built of pure rich marble-stone , and marble-pillars wholly stood upon ; so smooth 't was polish'd , as like glass it show'd , which gave reflection to the wood there grow'd . those trees upon the walls , seem'd painted green , yet every leaf thereon was shaking seen : the roofs therein were arch'd with artful skill , which over-head hung like a hanging-hill ; and there a man himself might entertain with his own words , rebounding back again . the doors to every room were very wide , and men , like statues , carv'd on either side ; and in such lively postures made they were , they seem'd like guards or porters waiting there . the winding-stairs rising without account of any steps , up to the top did mount : it on the head a cap of lead did wear , like to a cardinal's cap , 't was made four-square ; but flat it was ; close to the crown did lye , from cold and heat it kept it warm and dry : and in the midst , a tower plac'd on high , like to ulysses monster , with one eye : but standing there , did view through windows out , on every side , fine prospects all about . when that his eyes were satisfi'd with sight , and that his mind was fill'd with such delight , he did descend back by another way , chance was his only guide , which did convey him to a gallery both large and long , where pictures , by apelles drawn , there hung , and at the end , a door half ope , half shut , where , in a chamber , did a lady sit . to him so beautiful she did appear , she seem'd an angel , not a mortal here : cloth'd all in white she was , and from her head her hair hung down , and on her shoulders spread ; and in a chair she sate , a table by , leaning theron , her head did side-ways lye upon her hand , the palm a pillow made , on which , being soft , her rosie cheeks she laid ; and from her eyes the tears in show'rs did fall upon her breast , sparkling like diamonds all : at last she fetch'd a sigh , heart break , said she ; gods take my life , or give me liberty : when those words were exprest , she was constrain'd ; he courage took on what she there complain'd , and boldly entring in , she seem'd afraid ; he kneeling down , askt pardon , and thus said : celestial creature , do not think me rude , or want of breeding made me thus intrude ; but fortune me unto this house did bring , whereby a curiosity did spring from my desires this house to view throughout , seeing such shady groves to grow about : and when i came near to the gate , not one was there to ask or make opposition : the house seem'd empty , not a creature stirring , but every room i entred , still admiring the architect and structure of each part ; those that design'd , were skilful in that art. vvandring about , at last , chance favouring me , hath brought me to this place , where i do see abeauty far beyond all art , or any that nature heretofore hath made , though many of all the sex creates she sweet and fair , yet never any of your sex so rare : this made me stand and gaze , amaz'd to see what wondrous glorious things in nature be . but when i heard your words for to express some grief of heart , and wisht for a redress , my soul flew to your service , here i vow to heaven high , my life to give to you ; not only give my life , but for your sake suffer all pains nature or hell can make : nor are my proffers for a base self-end , i 'm to your sex a servant and a friend : pure is my zeal , and my flame being clear , chuse me your champion , and adopt me here . if i cannot your enemy destroy , i 'le do my best , no rest i will enjoy ; because my fortune , life , and industry , i 'le sacrifaice unto thy liberty . when that the lady heard him speak so free , and with such passion , and so honestly : i do accept your favour , sir , said she , for no condition can be worse to me than this i now do live in ; nor can i my honour hazzard in worse company : vvherefore , to your protection i resign ; heaven , o heaven , prosper this design . but how will you dispose of me ? pray tell . i will , said he , convey you to a cell which is hard by ; and there will counsel take what way is best to make a clear escape : with that , his riding-coat which he did wear , he pull'd straight off , which she put on ; her hair she ty'd up short , and covered close her face , and in this posture stole out of that place . an old ill-natur'd bawd that did wait on her , being then asleep , did never think upon her . but when sleep fled , awak'd , she up did rise , sitting upon her bed , rubbing her eyes that were seal'd up with matter and with rheum ; when that was done , she went into the room vvherein the lady us'd , alone to be : straight missing her , cry'd out most piteously , calling the servants to search all about ; but they unto a vvake were all gone out . the peasant's ball is that we call a vvake , vvhen men & maids do dance , and love do make ; and she that danceth best , is crown'd as queen , vvith garlands made of flow'rs , & laurel green : those men that dance the best , have ribbans ti'd by every maid that hopes to be a bride . youth loves these kind of sports , and to a fayre , 't will venture life , rather than not be there . which made the servants all , although not many , to be abroad , and leave the house for any to enter in , which caused this escape , and to the owner brought so much mishap . a lord came galloping as from his palace , with pleasing thoughts , thinking alone to solace himself with his fair mistress , who admired her beauty more than heaven , and desired her favour more than jove's ; her angry words did wound him more than could the sharpest swords . her frowns would torture him as on a rack , muffling his spirits in melancholy black : but if she chanc'd to smile , his joys did rise much higher than the sun that lights the skies . but riding on , the castle coming nigh , the vvoman running 'bout he did descry : his heart misgave him , with doubts he alighted , asking the reason she was so affrighted : she shak'd so much , no answer could she make ; he , being impatient , unto her thus spake : devil , said he , what is my mistress dead , or sick , or stole away ? or is she fled ? she kneeling down , cry'd out , o she is gone , and i left to your mercy all-alone . with that he tore his hair , his breast did beat , and all his body in a cold damp sweat ; which made his nerves to slack , his pulse beat slow , his strength to fail , so weak he could not go , but fell upon the ground , seeming as dead , until his man did bear him to a bed : for he did only with him one man bring , vvho prov'd himself trusty in every thing : but when his diffus'd spirits he did compose , into a deep sad melancholy he grows ; could neither eat , nor drink , nor take his rest , his thoughts and passions being so opprest . at last this lady and her noble guide , got to a place secure , yet forc'd to hide her self a time , till such friends could make that would protect vertue for vertue 's sake ; because her loving foe was great in power , which might a friendless innocent devour . this noble gentleman desir'd to know from what misfortunes her restraint did grow . willing she was to tell the gentleman the story of her life , and thus began : after my birth , my mother soon did dye , unto my father leaving a son and i : my father nor my brother liv'd not long , then was i left alone ; and being young , my aunt did take the charge to see me bred , to manage my estate ; my brother dead , i was the only child and heir ; but she was married to a lord of high degree , who had a son , and that son had a vvife , they disagreed , led an unhappy life . vvhen i was grown to sixteen years of age , my aunt did dye , her husband did engage to take the charge , and see me well bestow'd , and by his tender care great love he show'd . but such was my misfortune , o sad fate ! he dy'd , and left me to his son's vvife's hate ; because this younger lord grew much in love , vvhich when his vvife by circumstance did prove , she sought all means she could to murther me ; yet she would have it done with privacy : the whilst her amorous lord fresh courtships made , vvith his best rhetorick , for to perswade my honest youth to yeeld to his desire , my beauty having set his heart on fire : at last , considering with my self , that i having a plentiful estate whereby i might live honourable , safe , and free , not subject to be betray'd to slavery ; then to the lady and the lord i went , as a respect i told them my intent . the lady my design she well approv'd ; he nothing said , but seem'd with passion mov'd . but afterwards , when i my leave did take , he did rejoice , as if 't were for my sake ; and so it was , but not unto my good , for he with treachery my ways withstood ; for as i travell'd , he beset me round , and forc'd me from my servants , which he found to be not many ; when he had great store for to assault , but my defence was poor . yet were they all disguis'd , no face was shown , ( such unjust acts desire to be unknown ) . vvhen i was in their power , help , help , said i , you gods above , and hear a vvretch's cry : but no assistance from heav'n did i find , all seem'd as cruel as the mad mankind . then he unto the castle me convey'd ; the lord , himself discovering , thus said : cruellest of thy sex , since no remorse can soften thy hard heart , i 'le use my force ; unless your heart doth burn with equal fire , or condescend to what i shall desire . i for my own defence , 'gainst this abuse , soft flattering words was forced for to use ; gently entreating his patience , that i a time might have my heavy heart to try ; that by perswasions it might entertain not only love , but return love again . he seem'd well-pleas'd , his temper calm did grow , vvhich by his smiling-countenance he did show : he said , if in your favour i may live , a greater blessing heaven cannot give . then to a vvoman old he gave the charge for to attend , but not for to enlarge my liberty ; with rules my life did bind ; nothing was free , but thoughts within my mind . thus did i live some half a year , and more , and all this while the gods on high implore ; for still he woo'd , and still i did deny ; at last h'impatient grew , and swore that i deluded him , and that no longer would he be denied , but yeeld to him i should . with much entreaty i pacifi'd his mind with words and countenance that seemed kind ; but prayers to heav'n more earnestly i sent with tears and sighs , that they would still prevent , by their great power , his evil design , or take away this loathed life of mine : although at first they seem'd to be all deaf , yet now at last they sent me some relief . the whilst the champion knight , with his fair prize , was struck with love by her quick-darting eyes ; yet mov'd they so as modesty did guide , not turning wantonly , or leer'd aside : nor did they stern or proudly pierce , but gentle , soft , with sweet commerce : and when those eyes were fill'd with watry streams , seem'd like a brook gilded with the sun-beams ; at last perswading-love prevail'd so far , as to present his suit unto her care : fair maid , i love thee , and my love so pure , that no corrupted thoughts it can endure : my love is honest , my request is just ; for one man's fault , do not all men mistrust . i am a batchelor , and you a maid , for which we lawfully may love , he said : wherefore , dear saint , cast not my suit aside ; chuse me your husband , and be you my bride . i am a gentleman , and have been bred as to my quality ; my father dead , me his possessions left , which are not small , nor yet so great to make me vain withall . my life is yet with an unspotted fame ; nor so obscure , not to be known by name ; amongst the best and most within this land , favours receiv'd , yet none like your command . she stood a time , as in a musing-thought , at last she spake , sir , said she , you have brought my honour out of danger , and civilly have entertain'd me with your company ; for which i owe my life , much more my love ; should i refuse , i should ungrateful prove . 't is not for wealth that i would marry to , nor outward honours that my love can woo : but it is virtue , and a heroick mind , a disposition sweet , noble , and kind ; and such a one i judg you for to be , wherefore i 'le not refuse , if you chuse me . when they were thus agreed , they did repair unto his house , and went to marry there : the whilst the lord , the kingdom all about , he privately had sent to search her out . at last news came , with whom , and where she dwelt ; with that much grief within his heart he felt , that any man should have her in his power ; he , like a devil , could his soul devour . but when he heard the messenger to say , there 's preparation gainst her wedding-day ; he grew outragious , cursed heaven and earth , the marriage of his parents , and his birth : at last he did resolve , what e're befell , that he would have her , though he sank to hell. when he had got a company together , such as he fed , that would go any whither ; no act they would refuse , that he desired , obey'd most desperately what he required . unto his house they went in a disguise , intending then the lady to surprise : but be'ng upon her wedding-day , were there a company of guests that merry were ; this lord desir'd to part them , if he might , 'cause lye together they should not that night . so in they went : the servants all did think them maskerades , and made them all to drink : but when they went into an inward room where all were dancing , bride and the bridegroom ; the bride acquainted with that maskard-sight , she ran away as in an extream fright : the bridegroom soon imagin'd what they were , and , though unarm'd , his courage knew no fear . their swords they drew , aim'd only at his life ; that done , they thought to get away his wife : his hat and cloak , arms of defence did make ; the tongs , for to assault , he up did take : the women scriecht , murther , murther , cry'd out ; the men flung all the chairs and stools about , with which they did resist , and did oppose , for some short time , the fury of his foes . it chanc'd a sword out of a hand did fall ; the bridegroom straight took 't up & fought withall ; so well did manage it , and with such skill , he many of his enemies did kill : yet he was wounded sore , and out of breath ; but heat of courage kept out dull cold death . at last his friends got arms to take his part , vvho did th' oppression of his foes divert . the vizzard of the lord fell off at length ; vvhich when the bridegroom saw , with vigorous strength , he ran upon him with such force , that he struck many down , to make his passage free . the trembling bride was almost dead with fear , yet for her husband had a listening ear . at last the noise of murther did arrive : o is he dead , said she , and i alive ! with that she run with all her power and might , into the room , her husband then in fight with her great enemy ; and where they stood , the ground was like a foaming sea of blood ; wounded they were , yet was each other's heart so hot with passion , that they felt no smart . the bride did pass and re-pass by their swords , as quick as flashing lightning , and her words cryed out , desist , desist , and let me dye , it is decreed by the great gods on high , which nothing can prevent ; then let my fall be an atonement to make friends withall . but death and courage being long at strife about her husband's honour and his life , they both did fall , and on the ground did lye ; but honoured courage receiv'd fame thereby . when death had turned out his life , it went into his fame , and built a monument . the bride , when that she saw her husband faint , she weeping mourn'd , and made a sad complaint : o gods , said she , grant me but this request , that i may dye here on my husband's breast . with that she fell , and on his lips did lye , suckt out each other's breath , and so did dye . when that the lover saw her soul was fled , and that her body was cold , pale , and dead ; then he impatient grew his life to hold , with desperate fury then both fierce and bold , he gave himself a mortal wound , and so fell to the ground , and sick did grow . then did he speak to all the company , i do entreat you all for charity , to lay me by my mistress in a grave , that my free soul may rest and quiet have : with that a voice heard in the air to say , my noble friends , you ought to disobey his dying-words ; for if you do not so , from our dead ashes jealousie will grow : but howsoe're , their friends did so agree , that they did put them in a grave all three : and ever since fierce jealousie doth rage throughout the world , and shall from age to age . a batchelor that spightful was , and old , unto the company his tale he told . women care not , nor seek for noble praise ; all their delight runs to romantick ways ; to be in love , and be belov'd agen ; and to be fought-for by the youngest men , not for their vertue , but their beauty fair , intangling men within their amorous snare , and turning up their eyes , not for to pray , unless it be to see their love that day : with whining voice , and foolish words implore the gods ; for what ? unless to hold the dore . and what is their desire , if i should guess , i straight should judg it tends to wantonness : perchance they 'l say , it is for conversation ; but those conversations bring temptation . what youth 's in love with age , where wisdom dwells , that all the follies of wild youth still tells ? but youth will shun grave age's company , and from them flye as from an enemy . say they , their wit is all decay'd and gone ; and , that their wit is out of fashion grown : say , they are peevish , froward , and displeas'd , and full of pain , and weak , and oft diseas'd . but that is fond excuse to plead for youth : for age is valiant , prudent , full of truth : and sickness often on the young takes hold , making them feeble , weak , before they 're old . if women love , let it be for the sake of noble virtue , and the wiser take ; else virtue is depress'd , forsaken quite , for she allows no revellers of night . this sex doth strive by all the art they can , to draw away each other's courtly-man . and all the allurements that they can devise , they put in execution for the prise . their eyes are quick , and sparkling like the sun , yet always after mankind do they run : their words are smooth , their faces in smiles drest ; their heart is by their countenance exprest : but in their older age they spightful grow , and then they scorns upon their youngers throw ; industrious are , a false report to make : lord ! lord ! what poor employments women take to carry tales on tongues . from ear to ear , vvhich faster run than dromedaries far : in heat , with speed and haste they run about from house to house , to find their comrades out : and when they meet , so earnest they are bent , as if the fate 's decrees they could prevent : the best is rubbish ; they their minds do load with several dresses , and what is the mode : but if they spightful are , they straight defame those that most virtue have , or honoured name ; or else about their carriage they find fault , and say their dancing-masters were stark naught . but for their several dressings , thus will say , how strangely such a one was drest to day ! and if a lady dress , or chance to wear a gown to please her self , or curl her hair , if not according as the fashion runs , lord , how it sets a-work their eyes and tongues ! straight she 's fantastical , they all do cry , yet they will imitate her presently ; and for what they did laugh at her in scorn , vvith it think good themselves for to adorn . thus each of them doth into other pry , not for to mend , but to find fault thereby . vvith that the vvomen rose , and angry were , and said , they would not stay such tales to hear . but all the men upon their knees did fall , begging his pardon , and their stay withall . and women's natures being easie , free , did soon consent to keep them company . the tale to tell , unto a woman's turn befell : and when their rusling twatling silks did cease , their creaking chairs , and whisperings held their peace ; the lady did a tragick tale unfold , forcing their eyes to weep , whilst she it told . the description of the fondness of parents , and the credulity of youth . a gentleman had liv'd long , and was old , a wife he had , which fifty years had told : their love was such , as time could not decay ; devout they were , and to the gods did pray : yet children they had none to bless their life ; she happy in a husband , h'in a wife . but nature , in the world her power to show , from an old stock caus'd a young branch to grow : at length this aged dame a daughter bore , got by her husband when threescore , and more . they are so joy'd , they nature's bounty praise , and thank the gods that did the issue raise . they were so fond , that none this child must t'uch , only themselves ; their pains they thought not much . she gave it suck , and dress'd it on her lap , the whilst he warm'd the clouts , then cool'd the pap. they , when it slept , did by the child abide , both sitting near the cradle on each side . but when it cry'd , he danc'd it on his arm , the whilst she sung , its passion for to charm . thus did they strive to please it all they could , and for its good yeeld up their lives they would . vvith pains and care they nurs'd their daughter well , and with her years her beauty did excel . but when she came to sixteen years of age , her youth and life by love she did engage unto a gentleman that liv'd hard-by close to her father's house , who seem'd to dye if he enjoy'd her not ; yet did he dread his father's curse to light upon his head ; his father to his passion being cruel , although he was his only son and jewel ; charging , upon his blessing , not to marry this fairest maid ; nor servants for to carry letters or tokens , messages by stealth ; despising her , because of no great vvealth : yet she was nobly born , not very poor , but had not vvealth to equal his great store . but he did woo his love in secret guise , courting her privately for fear of spies . he strove to win her unto his embraces ; muffle the faults he would , and the disgraces . said he , why may not we our senses all delight ? our senses and our souls heaven unite that we call honour , only man creates , for it was never destin'd by the fates . it is a word nature ne're taught us , nay it is a precept she forbids t' obey . then follow nature , for that follows god , and not the arts of men , they 're vain and odd . let every sense lye steep , not drown'd , in pleasure : let us keep up their height in balanc'd measure . first , let our eyes all beauteous objects view ; our ears all sounds , which notes and times keep true . then scent all odours to refresh the brain ; with tastes delicious palates entertain . touch things most pleasing , that all parts may feel expansion of the soul , from head to heel : thus we shall use what nature to us gave ; for by restraint , in life we dig our grave : and in the grave our senses useless lye ; just so is life , if pleasures we deny . thus heav'n , that gave us sense , may take it ill , if we refuse what 's offered to us still : then let our sense and souls take all delight , not to surfeit , but feed each appetite . come pleasure , circle me within thy arms , inchant my soul with thy delightful charms . said she , it is not always in our power to feed , delight , nor pleasure to devour . man no free power hath of any thing ; only himself can to destruction bring : can kill his body , and his soul can damn , although he cannot alienate the same ; nor can he make them always to remain , nor turn them to what they were first again . thus can we cross and vex our selves with pain , but being sick , cannot be well again : we can disturb great nature's work at will ; but to restore and make , is past our skill . but he did plead so hard , such vows did make , such large professions , and such oaths did take , that he would constant be , and that his bride he would her make , when that his father dy'd : she , young and innocent , knew no deceits , nor thought that words and vows were us'd as baits . so yeelded she to all he did desire , thinking his vows as much as laws require . but they so oft did meet , till it befell , she sick did grow , her body big did swell ; which she took care to hide , and would not be , as she was wont , in other company : but to her parents she would often cry , and said she swell'd so , with a tympany . they did believe her , and did make great moan , their only child was now so sickly grown . his father old , the marriage to prevent , now , in all haste , his son to travel sent ; gave him no time nor warning to be gone ; nor , till he saw him ship'd , left him alone . but he , to ease his mistress of her fear , for to return , he only now took care . but she no sooner heard that he was gone , but in her chamber lock'd her self alone ; complain'd against her destiny and fate , and all her love to him was turn'd to hate . you gods , said she , my fault 's no wilful sin ; for i did think his vows had marriage been : but by his stealth , so privately to leave me , i find my crime , and that he did deceive me : for which , said she , you gods torment him more than ever any man on earth before . with that she rose , about her neck she flung a silken string , and in that string she hung . her parents to her chamber did repair , calling her forth to take the fresh sweet air ; supposing it might do her health some good ; and at her chamber door long time they stood : but when they call'd , and knock'd , no answer made , she being sick , they ' gan to be afraid : their limbs did shake with age , nerves being slack't , those nervous strings with fear were now contract : at last , though much a-do they had to speak , they servants call'd to open , or to break the lock : no sooner done , but with great fear they entred in ; and after they were there , the horrid sight no sooner struck their eyes , but it congeal'd their hearts , and straight both dyes . the fame of their sad fates all round was spread , the lover heard his mistress then was dead ; his clothes , his hair he tore , his breast did beat , his spirits issu'd out in a cold sweat. said he , o cursed death come kill me quick , and in my heart thy spear or arrow stick ; because my love in thy cold arms doth lye , i now desire , nay , am resolv'd to dye . but o! love is a powerless god ; in vain he strives with 's flame to melt death's icy chain : for though with love my heart so hot doth burn , yet cannot melt , i fear death's icy urn. then he all in a rage to the earth fell , and there invoking up the devils of hell , saith he , ye powerful terrors me assist , for to command or force death when i list , that by your help and pow'r my love may rise from the dark vault or grave wherein she lies ; or else by death's cold hand alone , convert me into marble-stone . then running , as distracted , in and out , by fancies , visions strange saw all about : and crying loud , my mistress , she is there ; he seem'd to catch , but grasp'd nought else but air : see , see her ghost , how it doth slide away , her soul is pure , and shines as glorious day . but my foul soul , which is as black as night , doth shadows cast upon the soul that 's bright ; which makes her walk as in a gloomy shade , like shadows which the silver moon hath made . hark how my love sings sweetly in the skye , her soul is mounted up to heavens high , and there it shall be made a deity , and i a devil in hell tormented lye . his spirit being spent , fell to the ground ; and lying there a while , as in a swound , at last he rose , and with a sober pace he bent his steps , as to her burying-place ; and with his cloak he muffled him about , his hatpull'd o're his brows , his eyes look't out to guide his way ; but far he had not gone , that straight he saw the funerals coming on : three hearses all were born , as on a breast , black cover'd two , with white the third was drest : a silver crown upon that hearse did stand , and myrtle-boughs young virgins bore in hand : the graver sort did cypress-branches bear , the mournful parents death for to declare . with solemn musick to the grave them brought ; with tears in-urn'd their ashes in a vault : but he , before the people did return , did make great haste to get close to the urn ; his hat pulls off , then bows , le ts loose his cloak ; with dropping eyes , & countenance sad , thus spoke : you charitable friends , whoe're you be , to see the dead thus buri'd solemnly ; the like to me your favour i do crave , stay all , and see me buri'd in this grave . giving himself a private wound , there fell into the grave ; and dying , there did tell of his sad love ; but now , said he , our souls nor bodies ne're shall parted be . with that he sighs , and breathing out his last , about his mistress corps his arms he cast . the urn seal'd up , his friends a tomb did build ; famous it was , such love therein it held . most parents do rejoyce , and offerings bring of thankful hearts , or pray'rs for their off-spring . these thought their age was blest ; but they were blind with ignorance , and great affections kind , more than with age ; but who knows destiny ? or thinks that joy can prove a misery ? some parents love their wealth more than their breeds , hoording up more than love or nature needs : and rather than poor virtue they will take , by crossing love , childless themselves will make . a sober man , who had a thinking-brain , of vice and vanity did thus complain : 't is strange to see the follies of mankind , how they for useless things do vex their mind : for what superfluous is , serves them for nought ; and more than necessary is a fault : yet man is not content with a just measure , unless he surfeits with delight and pleasure ; as if true pleasure only liv'd in pain , for in excess pain only doth remain : riches bring care to keep , trouble to spend ; beggars and borrowers have ne're a friend : and hospitality is oft diseased , and seldom any of their guests are pleased : in feasts , much company disturbs the rest , and with much noise it doth the life molest . much wine and women makes the body sick ; and doting-lovers they grow lunatick . playing at cards and dice , men bankrupts grow , and with the dice away their time they throw , their manly strength , their reason , and their wit , which might in warrs be spent , or letters writ . all generosity seems buried here ; gamesters seem covetous , as doth appear : but when they spend , most prodigally wast , as if their treasures were the indies vast , or else their purse an endless myne of gold ; but they 'l soon find it doth a bottom hold . titles of honour , offices of state , bring trouble , envy , and malicious hate . ceremony restrains our freedom , and state-offices commands , men tott'ring stand . and vanities inchanters of the mind , that muffle reason , and the judgment blind ; do lead the life in strange fantastick ways , to seek that pleasure which doth live in praise . praise is no real thing , an empty name , only a sound which we do call a fame ; yet for this sound men always are at strife , do spend their fortunes , and do hazzard life : they give their thoughts no rest , but hunt about , and never leave until the life goes out . that man that seeks in life for more than health , for rest and peace within his commonwealth , ( which is his family ) sure is not wise , and know not where true happiness still lies . nor doth he guess that temperance doth give the truest pleasure , makes it longest live . you gods , said he , give me a temperate mind , an humble cottage , a chast wife and kind , to keep me company , to bear a part of all the joys or sorrows of my heart ; and let our labours , recreations be , to pass our time , and not a misery . banish all cares , you gods , let them not lye as heavy burthens ; and when we must dye , let 's leave the world , as in a quiet sleep ; draw gently out our souls , our ashes keep safely in urns ; not separate our dust , or mix us so , if transmigrate we must , that in one body we may still remain ; when that 's dissolved , make us up new again . a lady said , she his discourse would fit ; a story tell that should his humour hit . there was a man and woman married were , they liv'd just so as should a married pair ; though their bodies divided were in twain , their souls agreed , as one they did remain : they did so mutually agree in all , this man and wife we only one may call . they were not rich , nor were they very poor ; not pinch'd with want , nor troubled with great store . they did not labour for the bread they eat , nor had they various or delicious meat ; nor many servants had to vex their mind , only one maid that faithful was , and kind ; whose vvork was just so much as to employ her so , as idleness might not her annoy . thus decently and cleanly did they live , and something had for charity to give . her pastime was to spin in winter cold , the whilst he read , and to her stories told : and in the pleasant spring , fresh air to take , to neighbouring-villages short journeys make . in summer-evenings they the fields did round , or sit on flow'ry-banks upon the ground : and so , in autumn they their walks did keep , to see men gather grapes , or sheer their sheep . nor did they miss jove's temple , once a day , both kneeling down unto the gods to pray for gracious mercy , their poor souls to save , a healthful life , an easie death to have . thus did they live full forty years , and more ; at last death comes , and knocketh at the dore , and with his dart he struck the man full sick , for which the wife was almost lunatick : but she with care did watch , great pains did take ; broths , julips , jellies , she with skill did make . she most industrious was his pains to ease , studying always his humour for to please : for oft the sick are peevish , froward , cross , and with their pains do tumble , groan , and toss , on their sad couches ; quietly he lay , and softly to himself to heaven did pray . yet was he melancholy at the heart , for nothing else , but from his vvife to part . but when she did perceive his life decay , close by his side , upon a bed she lay , embrac'd and kist him oft , until his breath and soul did part , drawn forth by powerful death : art gone , said she ? then i will follow straight ; for why , my soul upon thy soul shall wait . then turn'd her self upon the other side , in breathing-sighs and show'ring-tears she dy'd . a single-life best . a man said , he liv'd a most happy life , because he was not ty'd unto a wife : said he , marriage at best obstructs the mind . with too much love , or wives that are unkind . besides , a man is still ty'd by the heel , unto the cradle , bed , table , and wheel ; and cannot stir , but , like a bird in string , may hop a space , but cannot use his wing . but those who 're free , and not to wedlock bound , they have the liberty the world to round ; and in their thoughts much heav'nly peace doth dwell , when marriage makes their thoughts like pains of hell. and when they die , no care doth grieve their mind , for any thing that they shall leave behind . a lady said , if women had but wit , men neither wives nor mistresses should get : no cause should have to murmure and complain , if women their kind freedom would restrain . but marriage is to women far more worse than 't is to men , and proves the greater curse : and i , said she , for proof , a tale will tell , what to a virtuous married wife befell . there once a lord and lady married were , and for sev'n years did live a happy pair : he seem ; d to love his wife , as well he might , for she was modest , virtuous , fair , and bright ; a disposition suitable and kind ; no more obedience man in vvife could find : she did esteem him so , and priz'd him such , of merit , she thought no man had so much ; and lov'd him more than life lov'd perfect health , or princes for to rule a commonwealth . but such the natures of most husbands be , that they love change , and seek variety ; or else like fools or children , eas'ly caught with pleasing looks , or flatt'ring tongues are brought from virtues side , in wicked ways to run , and seldom back with virtue do return . but misery may drive them back again , or else with vices they do still remain . it chanc'd this lord a lady fair did meet , her countenance was pleasing , speech was sweet ; and from her eyes such wanton glances went , as from her heart love-messages had sent ; whereby this lord was catch'd in cupid's snare , how to address , he only now takes care . but he straight had access , and courtships makes , the lady in his courtships pleasure takes ; and pride she takes , that she could so allure a husband from a wife , that was so pure as heaven's light , and had the praise and fame of being the most fair and virtuous dame. at last this lady by her wanton charms , inchanted had this lord , till in his arms he might embrace her in an amorous way , his thoughts were restless , working night and day to compass his designs ; nor did he care to lose his wife's affection , but did fear his mistress to desplease ; and as her slave , obey'd her will in all that she would have . but she was subtil , and of nature bad ; a crafty wit , in making quarrels , had : for which she seemed to be coy and nice , and sets her beauty at so great a price , that she would never yeeld unless that he from his chast wife would soon divorced be : straight he , to please her , from his wife did part , for which his vvife was grieved at the heart , and sought her self obscurely for to hide , and in a solitary house did ' bide , as if she had a grievous criminal been , or causer was of his adulterous sin ; and for a penance , she did strictly live ; but she was chast , and no offence did give : yet she in sorrow liv'd , no rest could find , sad melancholy thoughts mov'd in her mind : most of her time in prayers she did spend , which as sweet incense did to heav'ns ascend ; did often for her husband mercy crave , that they would pardon all his faults , and save him from destruction , and that they would give him happy days as long as he should live . but after he his mistress had enjoy'd , and that his amorous appetite was cloy'd ; then on his virtuous wife his thoughts did run , the later lady he did strive to shun : for often they did quarrel and fall out ; he gladly would be rid of her , no doubt . at last he was resolv'd his vvife to see , and to be friends , if that she would agree . but when he saw his vvife , his heart did ake , as being guilty , all his limbs did shake : the terror of his conscience did present to him her wrongs , but yet to her he went. she being set near to a fountain low , her tears did make the stream to overflow . thither he came , and on the earth did kneel , but in his soul such passions did he feel of shame , fear , sorrow , as he could not speak : at last his passion through his lips did break , begging her pardon , and great vows did make of reformation , and that for her sake he would all pain or punishment endure , and that no husband should to wife be truer . which when she heard , she sighing , did reply , you come too late , my destiny is over-fraught , my bark of life with grief is over-fraught , and ready is to sink with its own weight : for show'rs of tears , and stormy sighs do blow me to the ports of death , and shades below . he being affrighted at the word she spake , in haste he rose , her in his arms did take : wherewith she pleas'd , and smiling , turn'd her eye upon his face , so in his arms did dye . and being dead , he laid her on the ground ; he in the fountain , and her tears , was drown'd . impatiently in a high discontent there dy'd , so had a watry monument . another lady said , such men i hate that wrong their wives , and then repent too late . but all adulterers i wish might have a violent death , and an untimely grave . the next man's turn to speak was one that in the warrs was bred ; and thus be did begin : a description of natural affection . there were two potent princes , whose great fames for actions in the warrs got mighty names . it chanc'd these potent princes both did greet , and were resolv'd in open warrs to meet , their courages to try , their strengths and pow'r , their prudent conducts , or their fatal hour . in short , these armies meet , a battel fight , vvhere one side beaten was by fortune's spight . the battel won , that army routed , ran , and for to save his life , strove every man , and their artillery they left behind , each for himself a shelter hop'd to find . vvhen from pursuit the victors did come back , the solidiers for to plunder were not slack : and every tent they search'd , and sought about to see if they some treasure could find out . to th'prince's tent did some commanders go , vvhere they did find an object of much wo. that prince being dead , upon the ground was laid , and by him sate a fair and sweet young maid : her beauty was so splendrous , and so bright , through clouds of grief , it shone like heavens light . vvhich the commanders saw , then straight did go to let their general of this beauty know . vvho when he came , amazed was in mind , such beauty for to see , and grief to find . for this fair princess by her father set , her eyes being fixt , her tears his cheeks did wet ; she leaning o're his head , her eyes down bend , from whence her tears upon his face descend . upon his mouth such deep-fetch'd sighs did breathe , as if therein her soul she would bequeathe ; for which this general did her admire , her tears quench'd not , but kindle did love's fire . with that he did command the solidiers there , the dead to take , the body up to bear . but then she spake : for pity have remorse , remove not from me my dead father's corpse : for had not fortune ( which he never trust with any business , but what needs he must ) conspir'd with death to work his overthrow , his wisdom crossing her , she grew his foe . but all her spight could never do him harm , for he with prudence still himself did arm : but when that death assisted her design , she struck him dead when battels were to join ; his solidiers forc'd to fight , when that their mind was press'd with grief , which fast th' spirits did bind ; it was his death that made him lose the day , and made you victors that now wear the bay. but look , said she , his hands now strengthless lye , in fight which made his enemies to flye : his eyes , now shut by death , in life gave light unto his soldiers , in the warrs to fight . his tongue , that silenc'd is by death's cold hand , in life mov'd wisely , and could well command : it knowledg gave to those that little knew , and did instruct what was the best to do . his heart lyes still , no motion doth remain : ceas'd are the thoughts in his well-temper'd brain ; where in his heart all virtues did abide , and in his brain strong reason did reside : but all is vanquish'd now , and life doth seem no better than a shadow , or a dream . 't is strange in nature to observe and see the unproportion'd links in destinie . for man's the wisest creature nature makes , and best extracts to form his figure takes ; and yet so short a life to him she gives , he 's almost dead before he knows he lives : yet she from man receives the greatest praise , he doth admire all her curious ways : with wonder he her sev'ral vvorks doth see , and studies all her laws , and each decree ; doth travel sev'ral ways within his mind , his thoughts are restless , her effects to find . but in his travels death cuts him off short , and leads him into dark oblivion's court. thus nature is unjust , heaven unkind , which strikes the best , the worst do favour find . my father's merits might have challeng'd still a longer life , had it been heavens will. but he is dead , and i am left behind , which is a torture to my troubled mind . if soldiers pity have , grant my desire , here strike me dead , and let my breath expire . said the victorious prince : heaven forbid ! all horrid acts we shun ; for in the field the purest honour 's won : we stake our lives for lives , and justly play a game of honour on a fighting-day . perchance some cheats may be among the rout , but if they 're found , the noblest throw them out . but since you cannot alter destiny , nor none that live , but have some misery ; raise up your spirits , unto heaven submit , and do not here in grief and sorrow sit . your father was a soldier of great fame , his valiant deeds did get an honoured name : and for his sake judg us , which soldiers be , to have human'ty , and civility . your father he shall safely be convey'd , that he may be by his ancestors laid . but you must stay , yet not as prisoner ; you shall command and rule our peace and war. she answered not in words , her tears did plead , that she with her dead father might be freed : but her clear advocates could not obtain their humble suit , but there she must remain with the victorious prince ; but he deny'd , as victor , in a triumph for to ride : for though the battel i have won , he said , yet i am prisoner to this beauteous maid . she is the conqueress , therefore 't is fit i walk as prisoner , she triumphant sit . then all with great respects to her did bow ; so doth the prince , and plead , protest , and vow , to be her servant , and to yeeld his life to death's sad strokes , unless she 'ld be his wife . but she still weeps , his suit no favour gains ; of fates and destiny she still complains . why , said the prince , should you my suit deny , since i was not your father's enemy ? soldiers are friends , though they each blood do spill , 't is not for spight , nor any malice ill ; but honour to maintain , and power to get , and that they may in fame's house higher set : for those of greatest pow'r , to gods draw near ; for nought but pow'r makes men like gods appear . but had i kill'd your father in the field , unto my suit in justice you might yeeld . but i was not the cause your father dy'd , for victory doth still with him abide : and though that death stid strike him to the heart , yet his great name and fame will never part . men will suppose the loss is loss of life , and had he liv'd , there would be greater strife between our armies ; but if you 'l be mine , our kingdoms in a friendly peace shall join . then she began to listen , and give ear ; she of her countrey in distress took care : and in short time they were both man and wife ; long did they live , and had a happy life . the next , a virgin 's turn her tale to tell ; her youth and modesty did fit it well . the surprisal of death . a company of virgins young did meet , their pastime was , to gather flowers sweet : they white straw-hats upon their heads did wear , and falling-feathers , which wav'd with the air , fanning their faces , like a zephyrus wind , shadowing the sun , that strove their eyes to blind ; and in their hands they each a basket held , which baskets they with fruits or flowers fill'd : but one amongst the rest such beauty had , that venus for to change might well be glad . her shape exact , her skin was smooth and fair ; her teeth white , even set , a long curl'd hair : her nature modest , her behaviour so , as when she mov'd , the graces seem'd to go . her wit was quick , and pleasing to the ear , that all who heard her speak , straight lovers were . but yet her words such chast love did create , that all impurity they did abate . and every heart or head where wild thoughts live , she did convert , and wise instructions give : for her discourse such heavenly seeds did sow , that where she strew'd , there virtues up did grow . these virgins all were in a garden set , and each did strive the finest flowers to get . but this fair lady on a bank did lye of most choice flowers , which did court her eye ; and every one did bend their heads full low , bowing their stalks , which from the roots did grow ; and when her hands did touch their tender leaves , each seem'd to kiss , and to her fingers cleaves . but she , as if in nature 't were a crime , vvas loath to crop their stalks in their full prime ; but with her face close to those flowers lay , that through her nostrils those sweets might find way ; not for to rob them , for her head was full of flow'ry phansies , which her wit did pull , and posies made , the world for to present vvith a more lasting and a sweeter sent. but as she lay upon this pleasant bank , for which those flowers did great nature thank ; death envious grew she such delight did take , and with his dart a deadly wound did make : a sudden cold did seize her every limb , with which her pulse beat slow , and eyes grew dim . some that sate by , observ'd her pale to be , but thought it some false light ; yet went to see : and when they came , she turn'd her eyes aside , spread forth her arms , then stretch'd , and sigh'd , and dy'd . the frighted virgins ran with panting-breath , to tell the sadder story of her death : the whilst the flowers to her rescue bend , and all their med'cinable virtues send : but all in vain , their power 's too weak ; each head then droop'd , seeing they could not help the dead . their fresher colours did no longer stay , but faded straight , and wither'd all away . for tears , they dropp'd their leaves , and thought it meet to strew her with them , as a winding-sheet . the airy choristers hover'd above , and sung her last sad funeral-song of love. the earth grew proud , now having so much honour , that odoriferous corpse lying upon her . when that pure virgin 's stuff dissolv'd in dew , was the first cause new births of flowers grew , and added sweets to those it did renew . the grosser parts the curious soon did take , of it transparent purslain they did make : her purer dust they keep for to refine best poets verse , and gild every line ; and all poetick flames she did inspire : so her name lives in that eternal fire . a mock-tale of his grace the duke of newcastle . cupid love-birding went , his arrow laid , aiming to hit a young fresh countrey-maid : being pur-blind , his arrow it did glance , and hit an old-old woman there by chance . she presently with love sighs shorter breath , groan'd so , as all the neighbours thought her death . little she had of feeling , nor no ground to guess where cupid us'd to make the wound . a long forgetfulness there was , no doubt , of what was love , and all those thoughts worn out . at last , love rub'd her mem'ry up , and then she thought some threescore years ago , and ten , was wounded so ; but then was in her prime ; the surgeon cured her , was father time ; but he 's not skilful for love's wounds ; all those , though they seem cured , yet they 'l never close , but break out still again ; not winter's cold will freeze them up , nor age , though ne're so old . she , with laborious hands , and idle breech , us'd to weed gardens , and for her grown rich ; some twenty pounds she 'd got , which she did hide for her great , great , great grandchild , when a bride . o powerful love ! to see thy fatal curse , now to forget her noble race and purse ; enquires out the best taylors in the town , to make her wastcoats , petticoats , and gown : new shooes of shoo-maker she did bespeak , and bids him put three-penny-worth of creak into the soles , that dew when them it fills , like hero's buskins , chirrup through the bills . hunts pedlars out , and buys fresh ribbans blew , to shew that she is turn'd a lover true . and now those hands , not white as venus doves , not to preserve , but hide with dog-skin gloves . takes keener nettles up , that by her stood , to rub her skin and cheeks , but found no blood. no dangling tresses there could any find ; sister to time , no locks before , behind . yet smooth she was not , as the billiard-ball ; but bald as it all over , you might call . when met her love , he thought she smil'd to grace her self , when 't was but wrinkles in her face . and all love's arts she try'd , and oft she met him , this lusty young and labouring-man , to get him . his poverty with her purse join'd their hands , and so did enter in the marriage-bands . but to describe their sumptuous marriage feast , their richer clothes , and every honour'd guest ; their melting love-songs , softer musick 's t'uch , are not to be express'd , not half so much as you may now imagine ; all my skill , and fainter muse , too weak ; nay , virgil's quill , with that description , it would blunter grow ; and homer's too , with all his furies ; so they blush'd for shame , when saw this lovely bride put them all down ; thus triumphs she in pride . now after supper , when they were both fed , your thoughts must go along with them to bed : there being laid , he mounted now love's throne ; she sigh'd with love , then fetch'd a deeper groan : and so expir'd there in height of pleasure , and left him to enjoy her long-got treasure . nay , so belov'd she was , that now lies low , that all the women wish'd for to dye so . then came a lady young , that had not been in that society ; and coming in , they told her , she a tale must pay , or , as a bankrupt , she must go away . truly , said she , i am not rich in wit , nor do i know what tales your humours fit . yet in my young and budding muse , will draw the seasons of the year , like ' prentice-painters , which do use the same to make their skill appear . but nature is the hand to guide the pencil of the brain , and place the shadows so , that they may hide all the defects , or giv 't a grace . phansie draws pictures in the brain , not subject to the outward sense ; they are imaginations vain , yet are they the life's quintessence . for when life 's gone , yet they will live , and to the life a fame will give . the tale of the four seasons of the year . the spring is dress'd in buds & blossoms sweet , and grass-green socks she draws upon her feet . of freshest air a garment she cuts out , with painted tulips fringed round about , and lines it all within with violets blew , and yellow primrose of the palest hew : then wears an apron made of lillies white , and lac'd about it is with rays of light. cuffs of narcissus her fair hands do tye , pinn'd close with stings of bees which buzzing flye to gather honey-dew which thereto cleaves , and leave their stings when they do prick the leaves . ribbons of pinks and gilliflowers makes ; roses both white and red , for knots she takes . when she 's thus dress'd , the birds in love do fall , and chirping , then , do to each other call to sing , and hop , and merry make , and joy'd they are all for the spring 's sake . but of all birds , the nightingal delights to sing the spring to bed in warmer nights ; because the spring at night draws in her head into the earth , for that she makes her bed ; and in the morning , when asleep she lies , the nightingal doth sing to make her rise ; and calls the sun to open her fair eyes , who gallops fast , that he might her surprise . but when the spring is past her virgin 's prime , and married is to old bald-father time ; the nightingal , for grief , doth cease to sing , and silent is till comes another spring . the summer 's cloth'd in glorious sun-shine bright , and with a trailing-veil of long-day-light : some dust , as powder , on her hair doth place , and with the morning's dew doth wash her face . a zephyrus-wind she for a fan doth spread , to cool her cheeks , which are hot-burning-red ; and with that heat so thirsty she doth grow , as she drinks all the fresh sweet springs that flow . then in a thundring-chariot she doth ride , for to astonish mortals with her pride : before her chariot flashing-lightning flyes , a fluid fire that spreads about the skyes . as princes great , that in dry ways do travel , have water thrown t' allay the dust and gravel . this fire allays , cleanses all vapours gross , lest , rising , they should stop the thunder's force : and when she from her chariot doth alight , then is she waited on by sun-beams bright : or else the rays that from the moon do spread , as waxen tapers , light her to her bed , and with refreshing-sleeps a while doth rest ; there sweet air breathing from her panting breast . yet summer's proud , ambitious , high , and hot , and full of action , idle she is not : chol'rick she is , and oft doth quarrels make ; but yet sometimes she doth her pleasure take : at high-noon with the butter-flyes doth play , in th' evening with the bats doth dance the hay : or at the setting of the sun doth flye with swallows swift , to keep them company . but if she 's cross'd , she straight malicious grows , and in a fury plagues on men she throws , or other sickness , and makes beasts to dye , and cause the marrow in the bones to fry . but creatures that with long time are grown old , or such as are of constitution cold , she nourishes , and life she doth restore , in flyes , bats , swallows , many creatures more : for some do say , these birds in winter dye , and in summer revive again to flye . of all the four seasons of the year , this season doth most full and fat appear . her blood is hot , and flowing as full tide , she 's only fit to be apollo's bride : but she , as all young ladies , in their prime , doth fade and wither with old father time ; and all their beauty , which they much admire , doth vanish soon , and quickly doth expire . just so the summer dries , withers away ; no powerful art can make sweet beauty stay . the autumn , though she 's in her fading years , and sober , yet she pleasantly appears : her garments are not deck'd with flowers gay , nor are they green , like to the month of may , but of the colour are of dapple deer , or hares , that to a sandy ground appear : yet she is rich , with plenty doth abound , all the encrease of earth is with her found : most creatures , nourishment to them doth give , and by her bounty , men , beasts , birds , do live ; besides , the grieved heart with joy doth fill , when from the plump grapes wine she doth distill ; and gathers fruits , which lasting are , and sound , her brows about with sheaves of corn are crown'd , in those are seeds , whereof man makes some bread , with which the poor and rich are nourished . yet 't is not bounty can hinder nature's course , for constantly she change in one source : for though the matter may be still the same , yet she doth change the figure and the frame : and though in principles she constant be , and keeps to certain rules , which well agree to a wise government ; yet doth not stay , but as one comes , another glides away : so doth the autumn leave our hemisphere to winter cold , at which trees shake for fear , and in that passion all their leaves do shed , and all their sap back to the root is fled : like to the blood , which from the face doth run , to keep the heart , lest death should seize thereon . then comes the winter , with a lowring brow , no pleasant recreations doth allow : her skin is wrinkled , and her blood is cold ; her flesh is numb , her hands can nothing hold : her face is swarthy , and her eyes are red ; her lips are blew , with palsie shakes her head ; she often coughs , and 's very rheumatick , her nose doth drop , and often doth she spit ; her humour 's melancholy , as cold and dry , yet often she in show'ring rain doth cry , and blustring storms , as in a passion sent , which on the earth , and on the water vent ; as rheums congeal to flegm , the waters so , by thickning cold , congeal to ice , hail , snow , which she spits forth ; upon the earth they lye in lumps and heaps , which makes the plants to dye : she 's poor and barren , little hath to give , for in this season all things hardly live : but often those who 're at the worst estate , by change of times do grow more fortunate : so when the winter 's past , then comes the spring , and plenty doth restore to every thing . a poet in the company said to his lady : your fingers are minerva's loom , with which your sense in letters weave , no knots or snarls you leave ; work fancy's thread in golden numbers rich . your breasts are helicon , which poets fits : for though they do not drink , if thereon they do think , their brains are fill'd with high and sparkling wits . your tongue 's parnassus hill , on high it stands ; her muses sit and sing , or dance in fayrie's ring , crown'd with your rosie lips , and sweet garlands . your eyes diana's arrows ; and no doubt your arched brow her bow , like ebony black doth show , from whence sweet gentle modesty shoots out . your hairs are fatal threads , lovers hang by ; your brain is vulcan's net , fine fancies for to get , which , like to winged birds , aspiring flye . the next , a man of scholarship profest , he in his turn this tale told to the rest . an expression of the doubts and curiosity of man's mind . there was a man which much desir'd to know , when he was dead , whither his soul should go ; whether to heaven high , or down to hell , or the elyzium fields , where lovers dwell ; or whether in the air to flie about ; or whether it , like to a light , goes out . at last the thoughts , the servants to the mind , which dwell in contemplation , to find the truth ; they said , no pains that they would spare to travel every where , and thus prepare : each thought did clothe it self with language fit , for to enquire , and to dispute for it : and reason they did take to be their guide , then straight unto a colledg they did ride ; where scholars dwell , and learned books are read , the living works of the most wise , who 're dead . there they enquired , the truth for to know , and every one was ready for to show ; though every sev'ral work , and sev'ral head , and sev'ral tongue , a sev'ral path still lead ; where the thoughts were scattering several ways , some tedious long , others like short essays . but reason , which they took to be their guide , with rest and silence quietly did ' bide , till their return , who ragged and all torn , came back as naked as when they were born : for in their travels hard disputes had past , yet all were forc'd for to return at last . but when reason saw their poor condition , naked of sense , their words , and expedition , and expectation too , and seeming sad , ( but some were frantick , and despairing , mad . ) she told them , they might wander all about , but she did fear the truth would ne're find out . which when they heard , with rage they angry grew , and straight from reason they themselves withdrew . then all agreed they to the court would go , in hopes the courtiers then the truth might know : the courtiers laugh'd , and said they could not tell ; they thought the soul in sensual pleasures dwell , and that it had no other heaven or hell ; the soul they slight , but wish the body well . this answer made the thoughts not long to stay among the courtiers , but soon went their way . then to the army straight they did repair , hoping the truth of souls they should find there ; and of the chief commander they enquire , who willing was to answer their desire . they said for certain , that all souls did dye , but those that liv'd in fame or infamy . those that infamous were , without all doubt were damn'd , and from reproach should ne'r get out : but such whose fame their noble deeds did raise , their souls were blest with an eternal praise ; and those that dy'd , and never mention'd were , they thought their souls breath'd out to nought but air. with that the thoughts were very much perplext , then did resolve the chymists should be next which they would ask : so unto them they go to be resolv'd , if they of souls did know . they said unto the thoughts , when bodies dye , souls are th' elixir , and pure chymistry : for gold , said they , can never wasted be , nor can it alter from its purity . eternal 't is , and shall for ever last , and as pure gold , so souls do never wast . souls are the essence , and pure spirits of gold , which never change , but shall for ever hold : and as fire doth the pure from dross divide , so souls in death are cleans'd and purifi'd from grosser parts of body ; and no doubt the soul , as spirits , death exhaleth out : it is the essence of great nature's store ; all matter hath this essence , less or more . after the thoughts had mused long , in fine , said they , we think the soul is more divine , than from a metal'd earth for to proceed ; well known it is , all metals earth doth breed : and though of purest earth the true gold be , being refin'd by heat to that degree of pureness , by which it long doth last , yet may long time and labour make it wast , to shew 't is not eternal ; and perchance some slight experience may that work advance , which man hath not yet found ; but time , said they , may chymists teach ; and so they went away . but travelling about , they weary grew ; to rest a while , they for a time withdrew the search of truth , into a cottage went , where liv'd an aged cottage , well content , a man and wife , which pious were , and old ; to them the thoughts their tedious journeys told , and what they went to seek , the truth to find concerning souls , to tell unto the mind : for we desire , said they , the truth to know , from whence the soul proceeds , or where 't will go , when parted from the body . the old man said , of such employment he should be afraid , lest nature or the gods should angry be for his presumption and curiosity . if it be nature's work , there is no doubt but it doth transmigrate all things about : and who can follow nature's steps and pace , and all the subtil ways that she doth trace ? her various forms , which curious motion makes ; or what ingredients for those forms she takes ? who knows , said he , the cause of any thing , or what the matter is whence all doth spring ? or who at first did matter make to move so wisely , and in order , none can prove ; nor the decrease , nor destinies can find , vvhich are the laws that every thing do bind . but who can tell that nature is not vvife to mighty jove ? and he begets the life of every creature which she breeds , and brings forth several forms ; each figure from her springs . thus souls and bodies joined in one gin , though bodies mortal be , the soul 's divine , as being first begot by jove , and so the purest part of life 's the soul , we know ; for th' animated part from jove proceeds , the grosser part from nature self she breeds . and what 's more animated than mankind , unless his soul , which is of higher kind ? thus ev'ry creature to jove and nature are , as sons and daughters , and their off-spring fair . and as their parents of them do take care ; so they , as children , ought not for to fear how they dispose of them , but to submit obediently to all that they think fit ; not to dispute on idle questions still , but shew obedience to their maker's will. man asketh blessing of his father jove , and jove doth seem mankind the best to love . and nature she her blessing doth bestow ; when she gives health , makes plenty for to flow . the blessings which jove gives unto mankind , are peaceful thoughts , and a still quiet mind : and jove is pleas'd , when that we serve his vvife ( our mother nature ) with a virtuous life : for moral virtues are the ground whereon all jove's commands and laws are built upon . thoughts trouble not your selves , said he , which way the soul shall go to jove , and nature pay : for temperance , wherein the life is blest , that temperance doth please the life the best . intemperance doth torture life with pain ; and what 's superfluous , to us is vain . therefore return , and temper well the mind , for you the truth of souls shall never find . at last came reason , which had been their guide , and brought them faith ; in her they did confide . taking their leave , away with faith they ride , and faith e're since doth with the mind reside . a lady which all vanities had left , since she of youth and beauty was bereft : she said , that pride in youth was a great sin ; of which a tale did tell , thus entring in : a description of the fall of foolish and self-conceited pride . there was a lady rich , that sate in state , and round about her did her servants wait : where every tongue did walk still in their turn , but in the ways of flattery they run . you are , said one , the finest drest to day ; a heavenly creature , did another say : your skin is purer far , than lillies white , and yet is clear and glassy as the light : and from your eyes such splendrous rays do spread , that they seem like a glory round your head : your wit is such , 't is supernatural ; and all that hear you speak , straight lovers fall : the sound but of your voice , charms every ear , and when you speak , your breath perfumes the air . thus by these flatteries most proud she grew , and scornful looks on every object threw : all men she scorn'd that did to her address ; and laugh'd at all did love to her profess . her senses for to please , she was so nice , that nothing serv'd but what was of great price . thus did she live in lux'ry , pride , and ease , and all her thoughts were still her self to please . she never pray'd unto the gods on high , for she did think her self a deity ; that all mankind was made her to admire , and ought her favours most for to desire : that every knee that bow'd not to her low , or whose demeanors did not reverence show . she thought them beasts that did not merit know , or that her frowns should work their overthrow . her smiles and frowns she thought such power had , as destiny , to work both good and bad . at last the gods , that always have an eye upon the earth , who all things do descry amongst poor mortals , they this lady spy'd , whose heart was swell'd , and thoughts were big with pride , begot by pluto's wealth , and nature's paint , bred in the soul , which makes it sick and faint . but pride is nurs'd still by the senses five , vvhat from each sense it sucks , it keeps alive . but if no nourishment it gets from those , as touch , taste , sound , sweet pleasant scent orshows . it faints and pines a way as starv'd , so dyes , and in a grave of melancholy lyes . but , as i said , when gods poor mortals view'd , they for their sins , with punishment pursu'd . then with this lady they did first begin , many ill accidents at her they fling : first , they did set her house and goods on fire , where her rich furniture did soon expire : then envy sought all ways to pull her down , and tax'd her land as due unto the crown ; and in that suit great sums of money vast lawyers ingross'd , which made those sums to wast . and when those lawyers got all that she had , they cast her suit , as if her cause was bad : by which her lands she lost ; then only left her rich with beauty , but of lands bereft : in which she pleasure took , although but poor of fortune's goods , of nature's giftssh ' had store . but when the gods did see her still content , at last they to her body sickness sent . she patient was , her beauty still did last : but when that they their judgment on that cast , making a grave to bury beauty in , which beauty once did tempt the saints to sin : because her face so full of pock-holes were , that none could judg that beauty once dwelt there . then did she sit and weep , turn'd day to night , asham'd she was to shew her face the light . time , an ingraver , cuts the seal of truth ; and , as a painter , draws both age and youth : his colours , mix'd with oyl of health , lays on ; the plump smooth youth he pencils thereupon : shadows of age he placeth with much skill , making the hollow places darkest still . but time is slow , and leisure he doth take , no price will hasten him his works to make ; but accidental chance , who oft doth jarr with aged time , and then some works doth marr . but when her wealth was gon , and state was down , then did her friends and servants on her frown ; so far now from professing slavery , as they did use her most uncivilly ; would rail against her , spightful words throw out ; or had she been but guilty , would ( no doubt ) betray her life : such natures have mankind , that those in misery no friends can find : for fortune's favours only friendships make . but few are friends only for virtue 's sake ; in fortune's frowns man will not only be a neuter , but a deadly enemy : nay , ev'n a devil to torment the mind , if he no mischief ' gainst the body find . but after she had mourn'd three hundred days , consid'ring nature's , fortune's various ways ; she did repent , weeping for what was past , imploring gods to pity her at last . good gods ! forgive my vanity and pride , let not my soul with sinful spots be dy'd ; let your great mercies scour those spots off clean , that by your justice no spots may be seen . consider , lord , the works that nature makes , the matter , motion , and the form she takes ; the grounds and principles on which she builds ; the life and death in all things she distills , is various still ; in what she doth compose , nothing but wild inconstancy she shows . nor is it only the substantial part that is compos'd thus by her curious art : but what we call immortal , as the soul , doth various passions appetites controul . and as all bodies that are young , want strength , and wait for time to give them breadth and length ; so doth the soul want understanding too , and knows not what is best to think or do : wherefore , great jove , i never shall despair of thy sweet mercy , nor yet devils fear . to punish ignorance , youth rash ways runs , which age by long-experienc'd knowledg shuns : but age oft time 's as faulty , as youths be corrupted with bad principles : we see that length of time and custom makes them shew as if in man they naturally grew . but to conclude , the time she had to live , she heartily unto the gods did give : though young , into a nunnery she went , her vows unto the gods she did present : her days not being long , she soon there dy'd , and now her soul with angels doth reside : for with her penance , tears , and contrite spirit , she wash'd away her sins , and heav'n did merit . the next tale when you read , it will discover the fortunate or the unfortunate lover . a mock-tale of the lord duke of newcastle , which his grace was pleased to say , out of his great civility , that it would serve for shadows to set off the rest ; he loving truth so well , that he was never good at telling tales . a young and lusty cheshire-lad did move in venus sphere , and was so fill'd with love when first he saw a lovely lass at chester , whose badg of christianity was hester . so beautiful and fair she did appear , fresh as the welcome spring to the new year ; and odoriferous as flower 's birth ; as fair as new-born lillies from the earth . this set the young man's heart in love's flame fire , struck dumb in love , turn'd all now to admire . at last love found a tongue , which did not fail to burst out violently , and thus to rail ; cursing now partial nature , that did give more beauty to her than elsewhere doth live . bankrupt in beauty , since her store is gone , mankind condemn'd to foul ones now , or none . was nature lavish ? or else made the thest upon her self , since she hath nothing left of what is handsom ? so i now do find , he enjoys thee , enjoys all womankind : for beauty , favour , and what 's height of pleasure , since thou art nature's store-house , & her treasure . o love me then , since all my hopes are crost ; if i enjoy you not , i 'm wholly lost . for what i can call happiness ; nay worse , my life then to me 's but a fatal curse : but if you yeeld , i 'le bless dame nature's gift , and bounty to you , since 't was all her drist to make her master-piece in you , and vex the envious females , angring all your sex : and if her bounty to you , you give me , i shall be deifi'd in love by thee . here on my knees i beg thy love thus low ; until i have it , my knees here shall grow : therefore be kind . she answer'd with sweet eyes , which spoke , not speaking , for to bid him rise : and then discours'd with modest blushes , so as that did tell him all her heart did know . trembling and shaking with love's palsi'd tung , with broken sighs , and half words it was strung ; love's comma's , full-points , and parenthesis , and this love's rhetorick , oratory is . with love's pale-difficulty then afraid , she softly said , o i 'm a tender maid , and never heard such language ! you 'l deceive me ; and now i wish , i could wish you would leave me . why d' ye inchant a silly maid ? alas , i never saw such beauty in my glass , and yet i 've heard of flatt'ring glasses too ; but nothing flatters like you men that woo : your tongue 's love's conjuration , without doubt ; circles me here in love , cannot get out , by your love 's magick whispering . then did yield , and said , you 've conquer'd , and have won the field . such joy between them , such new passions rais'd , which made the god of love himself amaz'd ; since by no tongue or pen can be exprest ; cupid and hymen ne're hop'd such a feast . but see the fate of business , which doth move so cross , for business hath no sense of love. o thou dull bus'ness ! yet some states-men pry into love's secrets with a glancing eye . but here our lover was arraign'd to stand condemn'd to bus'ness , that in ireland necessity doth urge him : that word part , so cruel was , it struck each other's heart , which inwardly did bleed with sorrow's grief , since nothing now but hopes were their relief . sadly he goes aboard , love fills his sails , and cupid with his wings fanns gentle gales to waft him over ; he thus thought to please his wounded lover o're those rocky seas ; love would not leave him : nor was he content , unless this dangerous passage with him went. in the mean time , his mistress did commit her self to sorrow , and with her to sit as her close prisoner , this was all her end , and grieved more than widows do pretend . safely is landed now our lover o're , and cupid with him , on the irish shore . love is so various , which some lovers see ; now love an irish cupid's turn'd to be : and takes all memory thus from our lover , of his first mistress , and doth now discover love's new plantation in the irish pale , in love's rich island there , which doth not fail to take our lover , and inflame him more under an irish mantle , than what 's store of gowns of cloth of gold. curls , painted art , cheats love , when simple nature wounds love's heart . this change of love is blown so up and down , by fame's loud trumpet , through all chester town : the women gossip'd it , and could not hold till to his former mistress they it told . this was the first time that she smil'd to see impossible reports of him to be : they might as well say , phoebus gives no light , or starrs to fall , or make a day of night , as he inconstant was : yet love doth doubt , not doubting , yet enquires all about , and sets her love-spies to enquire a-new : but those reports each minute stronger grew : so she resolv'd her self to know the truth , and was disguis'd in clothes now like a youth , and went in cavalier : the gentle wind did favour her , and landed to her mind . the port was dublin , and could not forbear to make enquiries for her love , and there she found him at an inn. he then began to take such liking to his countrey-man , all his discourse enquiring for his ends , to know the welfare of his english friends : which she so fully satisfied , as he was now enamour'd of her company ; and was so fond , in her took such delight , as supp'd , and lay together too that night . never suspecting her , his mistress , then blindly went on , and took her for a man ; so full of love and friendship , could not hold , but to her all his irish love he told , desiring her to go along and see this miracle of beauty , which was she ; and so she did . her love turn'd now disdain , to see his falshood , and no love remain : so base , unworthy , and unconstant too , as now began to think what she should do . she quench'd her passion , which is wise and better than love's complaints : so writ to him a letter of her whole voyage , and love's constant hist'ry , all her designs , disguises in love's myst'ry ; and left this letter in the window : so three or four days it was 'fore he did know , or found it out . in the mean time she 's gone , and shipp'd for england , leaving him alone . when found her letter was , such passions grew stronger upon him than e're lover knew ; resolv'd the foaming billows to embrace , those liquid steps of hers he meant to trace , and lay himself in pickled tears of love , now at her feet , to see what that would move : but all in vain , he thought too long had tarri'd , when landed , found the same day she was marri'd : fell in such extasies , cursing his fate , the ship and winds , that made him come so late . with love's new hopes , his sails he fill'd , and then invok'd god neptune to go back again : and all the passage as he went along , challeng'd the mermaids in a loving song ; with love's assurances so over-joy'd , as now his loving heart was not annoy'd , but fill'd with pleasure , and with all delight , thinking t' embrace his irish love that night . no sooner landed so — he thought to woo his mistress , but he found her marri'd too . cursing the starrs of his nativity , thus short of wedlock at both ends to be ; made him grow desperate ; and , as they say , then in despair he made himself away upon a wench , and some swear without doubt , that there he knock'd the brains of 's cupid out ; so murther'd love , and there he did enroul each one a fool , with a platonick soul : and so despis'd and scorn'd the old god hymen , that with so easie words so long did tye men , to make them galley-slaves in marriage , so ti'd in his chains , condemn'd for life to row in wedlock's galley — give me freedom then , thy godhead i invoke , whilst foolish men to love and hymen's prisons there do sit , justly committed for their want of wit : for he 's a fool that 's ti'd when might be free : and thus he rav'd and talk'd non-sense you see , as he that writ this story , you may mend it ; so for his sake , and yours , and mine , i 'le end it . a lady said , his tale of love did tell ; she with a tale of death would fit it well : for death , said she , unties the lover's knot , when deadly arrows from his bow are shot . a lady on her death-bed panting lay , she call'd her friends , and thus to them did say : farewel my dearest friends , for i must go unto a place which you nor i yet know : may be my sp'rit will wander in the shade of glimmering light , which is by moon-shine made : or in my tomb in peace may lye asleep , so long as ashes in my urn do keep . or else my soul , like birds , may have its wings , or like to herc'les flyes that want their stings . but howsoever , friends , grieve not , nor cry , for fear my soul should be disturb'd thereby : clothe not your selves with melancholy black ; call not your grief unto remembrance back : but let your joys a resurrection have , call'd forth by comfort from the sorrowful grave . let not delight intombed lye in the sad heart , or weeping eye : let not pale grief my soul affright , shrouded in melanch'ly's dark night : but death , said she , i fear him not ; so turn'd her head , and death her shot . then on a cypress hearse was laid forth dead ; as scorning death , aside was turn'd her head : by cruel death her arms were careless flung ; her hands over the sides as strengthless hung : her eyes were clos'd , as if she lay asleep ; though she was pale , her face did sweetness keep . her elogie was thus : tears rain a-pace , and so a river make , to drown all grief within a watry lake . make seas of tears , for wind of sighs to blow salt billows up , the eyes to overflow : let ships of patience traffick on the main , to bring in comfort to sad hearts again . the next turn , a man ; and he thus began : the silk-worm and the spider houses make , all their materials from their bowels take ; they cut no timber down , nor carve they stone ; nor buy they ground to build their houses on : yet they are curious , built with art and care , like lovers , who build castles in the air , which ev'ry puff of wind is apt to break , as imaginations , when reason's weak . they said , his tale was short , he answer made , i 'le piece it out . and thus he said : the silk-worm digs her grave as she doth spin , and makes her winding-sheet to lap her in : and from her bowels takes a heap of silk , which on her body as a tomb is built : out of her ashes do her young ones rise ; having bequeath'd her life to them , she dyes . they only take that life to spin a death ; for as they wind up silk , they wind out breath . thus , rather than do nought , or idle be , they 'l work , and spin out life's small thread we see . when all their work is done , ready to dye , their wings are grown , for life away to flye . the silk-worm is first a small seed ; then turneth into a worm ; at last grows to have wings like a flye , but lives not to make use of them . as soon as she is big enough , she spins a ball of silk all about her self ; wherein , being grown to be a fly , she makes a hole to come out , to leave seed for the generation of her young ones : after which she immediately dyes . the women said , the men made quick dispatch in telling tales , like dogs that bones do snatch . but howsoe're , a woman did begin to tell a tale , and thus she entred in . a description of the passion of love misplaced . a lady on the ground a mourning lay , complaining to the gods , and thus did say : you gods , said she , why do you me torment ? why give you life , without the mind's content ? why do you passions in a mind create , then leave it all to destiny and fate ? with knot and snarls they spin the thread of life , then weave it cross , and make a web of strife . come death , though fates are cross , yet thou' rt a friend , and in the grave dost peace & quiet send . it chanc'd a gentleman that way came by , and seeing there a weeping beauty lye ; alas , dear lady , why do you so weep , unless your tears you mean the gods shall keep ? jove will present those tears to juno fair , for pendants , and for neck-laces to wear : and so present that breath to juno fair , that she may always move in perfum'd air . forbear , forbear , make not the world so poor ; send not such riches , for the gods have store . i 'm one , said she , to whom fortune's a foe , crossing my love , working my overthrow : a man which to narcissus might compare : for youth and beauty , and the graces fair , do him adorn ; on him my love is plac'd : but his neglect doth make my life to wast . my soul doth mourn , my thoughts no rest can take ; he , by his scorn , doth me unhappy make . with that she cry'd , o death , said she , come quick , and in my heart thy leaden arrow stick . take comfort , lady , grieve and weep no more , for nature handsome men hath more in store : besides , dear lady , beauty will decay , and with that beauty love will flee away . if you take time , this heat of love will wast , because 't is only on a beauty plac'd . but if your love did from his virtue spring , you might have lov'd , though not so fond have been . the love of virtue is , for to admire the soul , and not the body to desire : that 's a gross love , which only dull beasts use ; but noble man to love the soul will chuse : because the soul is like a deity , therein pure love will live eternally . o sir , but nature hath the soul so fix'd unto the body , and such passions mix'd , that nothing can divide or dis-unite , unless that death will separate them quite : for when the senses in delights agree , they bind the soul , make it a slave to be . he answered , if that the soul in man should give consent in every thing the senses to content , no peace , but war amongst mankind would be , and desolation would have victory : no man could tell or challenge what 's his own ; he would be master that is strongest grown . lady , love virtue , and let beauty dye , and in the grave of ruins let it lye . with that she rose , and with great joy , said she , farewell , fond love , and foolish vanity . the men condemn'd the tale , because ( said they ) none but a fool would preach so , wise men pray . but ladies hear me , did another say . to love but one , is a great fault , for nature otherwise is taught : she caus'd varieties for us to taste , and other appetites in us she plac'd ; and caus'd dislike in us to rise , to surfeit when we gormandise ; for of one dish we glut our palat , although it be but of a salat . when solomon the wise did try of all things underneath the sky ; although he found it vanitie , yet by it nature made us free : for by the change her works do live by several forms that she doth give : so that inconstancy is nature's play ; and we , her various works , must her obey . a woman said , that men were foolish lovers , and whining passions love oft discovers : they 're full of thoughts , said she , yet never pleas'd , always complaining , and yet never eas'd : they 'l sigh , they mourn , they groan , they make great moan , they 'l sit cross-legg'd , with folded arms alone . sometimes their dress is careless , with despair , with hopes rais'd up , 't is costly , rich , and rare , setting their looks and faces in a frame ; their garb's affected by their mistress name , flattering their loves , forswearing ; then each boasts what valiant deedsh ' has done in forreign coasts ; through what great dangers his adventures run ; such acts as hercules had never done : that every one that hears , doth fear his name ; and every tongue that speaks , sounds forth his fame . and thus their tongues extravagantly move , caus'd by vain-glorious , foolish , amorous love , which only those of his own sex approve . but when their rallery was past , the tale upon a man was cast : then crying peace to all that talking were , they were bid hold their tongues , and lend an ear. the man , more than the rest , was somewhat old ; they said to him , your tale you have not told : alas , said he , my memory is bad , and i have none so good as you have had . he , musing a short time , thus did begin ; i hope , said he , my tale may credit win . a description of civil-warrs . a kingdom which long time had liv'd in peace , her people rich with plenty , fat with ease ; with pride were haughty grown ; pride envy bred ; from envy factions grew : then mischief spread ; and libels every where were strew'd about , which after into civil-warr broke out . some for the commons fought , some for the king , and great disorder was in ev'ry thing : battels were won and lost on either side ; where fortune ebb'd and flow'd , like to a tide . at last the commons won ; and then astride fierce tyranny on noble necks did ride : all monuments pull'd down , that stood long time ; and ornaments were then thought a great crime . no law was pleaded but the martial law ; the sword did rule , and keep them all in aw . no prayers offer'd to the gods on high ; all ceremony in the dust did lye : nothing was done in order , truth , and right : nought govern'd then , but malice , spleen , & spight . but mark how justly gods do punish men , to make them humble , and to bow to them . though they had plenty , and thereof did eat , they relish'd not that good and savoury meat ; because their conscience did them so torment , for all their plenty they were discontent : they took no rest , cares so oppress'd their mind , no joy nor comfort in the world could find . when drowsie sleep upon their eyes did set , then fearful visions in their dreams they met : in life no pleasure take , yet fear to dye ; no mercy can they hope from gods on high . o serve the gods , and then the mind will be always in peace and sweet tranquillity . a woman said , a tale i mean to tell , that in those warrs unto a cross befell . an ancient cross liv'd in our father's time , with as much fame as did the worthies nine : no harm it did , or injury to none , but dwelt in peace , and quietly alone : on times or government did not complain , but stood stone-still , not stirr'd in no king's reign . both winter's snow , and summer's scorching sun , it did endure , and urin'd was upon . yet peaceful nature , nor yet humble mind , shall not avoid rude ignorance that 's blind : that superstitiously beats down all things which smell but of antiquity , or springs from noble deeds ; nor love , nor take delight in laws or justice , hating truth and right : but innovations love , for that seems fine ; and what is new , adore they as divine : that makes them so neglect the gods above , for time doth waste both their respect and love . and so this cross , poor cross , all in a rage they pull'd down quite , the fault was only age. had it been gilded gloriously and brave , they vanity for an excuse might have : but it was poor , its mortar all off worn , which time had eaten , as when dogs have torn the flesh from bones of hares , or harmless sheep ; or like to skeletons , that scholars keep . if they had pious been , it might have stood , to mollifie the minds of men to good . but they were wicked , hating every thing that by example might to goodness bring . then down they pull'd it , leaving not one stone upon another , for it to be known to after-ages ; for the ground lies bare , and none can know that once the cross stood there . then said a man , i can this tale well fit , for i a tale can tell that 's like to it . in old times , when devotion false did reign , a church was built , although to use prophane , was consecrated as diana's right , who was their goddess of the moon-shine bright . but afterwards , when truth with zeal did flame , it christned was , and bore jove's mighty name , and dedicated to the sun above , then married was , became his spouse and love. long did she live in duty , peace , and zeal , became an honour to the commonweal ; was curiously adorn'd within , without , the quoire all hung with hangings rich about ; with marble tombs and statues carv'd and cut , wherein the bodies of good saints were put . there polish'd pillars long the iles did stand , and arched roofs built by a skilful hand ; with painted windows plac'd on either side : at every end were gates , large , open , wide : and all the inside was most bravely gilt , as all the outside with free-stone were built : there choristers did sing each several note , and organs loud did answer ev'ry throat : and priests there taught men how to pray and live , rewards and punishments which jove did give . but mark , this temple was destroy'd by sin , since they did leave to worship jove therein , because this church profan'd by sinful men , was made a stable , and for thieves a den. no surer mark of wrath when gods do frown , then to give leave to pull their temples down . a lady said , these vvarrs her soul did shake , and the remembrance made her heart to ake . my brother then was murther'd in cold-blood , incircled round with enemies he stood ; where he , like to a fixed starr shin'd bright ; they like to black and pitchy clouds of night : he like the sun , his courage like that heat ; their envy , like bad vapours , strove to beat . his light of honour out ; but pow'rful fame did throw their spight back on their heads with shame . and though they struck his body , not his mind , ( for that in death through all their malice shin'd . ) he valiant was , his spirits knew no fear , they never chill'd when they in battel were ; and strove to give more blows than safety sought : his limbs most vigour had , when most he fought . he spoke not loud , nor sung , his fear to hide ; with silence march'd , and quietly did ride , viewing the armies with a watchful eye ; and careful was , advantages to spye . if that his soldiers chanc'd to run away , he ran not after them to make them stay , as some commanders , which will call and run after the soldiers , when the flight's begun : but when once gone , seldom return again , but with their soldiers they will safe remain . but he amongst his foes , like earth , was fix'd ; or , like to fire , himself was intermix'd ; and their great solid bodies did divide , pulling their fabrick down on either side ; until his mercy did for favour pray unto his courage , so to run away . he made them know he was a soldier good , train'd up in warrs , which art he understood : besides , his genius was prompt thereunto ; wit , skill , invention , knew what best to do : which made the foe more fierce his life to take , for fear that he their ruin soon would make . for they , so soon as he was in their pow'r , like greedy vulturs , did his life devour . he stood their rage , his courage knew no fear ; nor on grim death with terror did he stare ; but did embrace her with a generous mind , vvith noble thoughts , and kisses that were kind . vollies of shot did all his body tear ; vvhere his blood 's spilt , the earth no grass will abear . as if , for to revenge his death , the earth vvas curs'd with barrenness ev'n from her birth . and though his body in the grave doth lye , his fame doth live , and will eternally . his soul 's immortal , and so is his fame ; his soul in heav'n doth live , and here his name . the next time had a man his turn to speak ; who said , that civil-warrs made rich men break . populous kingdoms , that do flourish well in peace and plenty , then to ruin fell . when i , with grief , unto remembrance bring the blessed time men liv'd with a goodking ; to think at first how happy such do raign , and in what peace such kingdoms do remain ; vvhere magistrates do sit in justice throne , few crimes committed , punishments scarce known ; the nobles liv'd in state and high degree , all happy , even to the peasantry : where easie laws , no tax to make them poor , all live plenty , full is every store : they customs have to recreate the mind , not barbarous , but civil , gentle , kind : and those where chance and fortune bad do fall , have means straight given to be kept withall : their lands are fertil , and their barns are full , orchards thick planted , from whence fruit to pull : of cattel store feeding in meadows green , where crystal brooks run every field between ; with cowslips growing , which makes butter yellow ; and fatted beasts , two inches thick with tallow : and many parks for fallow deer to run , shadow'd with woods , to keep them from the sun : and in such kingdoms , beasts , fowls , fish , are store ; those that industrious are , can ne're be poor . but o sad fate and fortune , if it chance the sword of civil-warr for to advance ; as when rebellions , like a watry flood , o'reflows a monarchy ; in royal blood builds aristocracy with cruel hands , on unjust grounds of tyranny it stands . then into wicked states such kingdoms go , where virtue 's beaten out , no truth they know : and all religion flies away for fear , and atheism is preached every where . their magistrates by bribes do govern all , no suit is heard but what injustice call : for covetousness and malice pleads at barr against poor honesty , with whom they jarr : calamity doth find no pity ; for all pity 's buri'd in a civil-warr . a lady's turn was next , which told this tale perplext : she said , i over sea to lapland went , my husband being then in banishment : his estate gone , and being very poor , i thought some means compassion might restore : but when i ask'd , no pity could i find ; hard were their hearts , and cruel every mind . fye , saith a man , you do all orders break , so long on melancholy themes you speak . the prologue to the beggars marriage . i 've serv'd two ' prentiships , and now am made free of the beggars company to trade : my stock , in secret to your ear i speak , is such , as i am sure i shall not break . let boreas burst his cheeks , and the sea rore , the beggars bark can ne're be tumbled o're . what fitter subject for my muse can be , than make descriptions of our company ? the beggar 's theme too well my fortunes fit , my begg'rly fancy too , and so my wit. the duke of newcastle's description of the beggars marriage . while'om , there was a ragged beggar old , who in his time full fourscore winters told ; his head all frozen , beard long , white as snow , with a staff's prop , for else he could not go : with bleared eyes , all parched , dry , and cold ; with shaking-palsie , little could he hold : his clothes so tatter'd , for they were so worn , older than he , in many pieces torn : the subtill'st brain , and prying'st eye , those seen , both could not guess what stuff they 'd ever been . on 's cloak more several patches there did stick , than labour'd algebra's arithmetick could once tell how to number ; and was fuller , than was the rainbow , of each various colour , but not so fresh ; so faded when th'were seen , that none could guess which red , which blew , which green . his turf-house lean'd to an old stump of oak ; a hole at top there for to void the smoak of stollen scatter'd boughs ; could not be fed but by his daily begging daily bread . there on his little bench i 'le leave him , then within a while i 'le speak of him again . a wither'd beggar-woman , little sundred from him , who all the town said , was a hundred : toothless she was , nay more , worn all her gums , and all her fingers too were worn to thumbs : wrinkles , deep graves to bury all delight ; eyes now sunk holes , little she had of sight , little could speak , as little sense could tell ; seldom she heard , sometimes the great towns-bell : a long forgetfulness her legs had seiz'd ; for many years her crutches them had eas'd : clothes , thousand rags torn with the wind & weather , her huswifry long since had sew'd together . no livelihood , but charity grown cold as she was , this more than her years made old . in a hot summer's day , they out did creep , enliven'd just like flyes , for else they sleep ; creeping , at last each one to other get , lousing each other , kindly thus they met : apollo's master-piece shining , did aim to light dead ashes sparks , not make a flame to stir up nature in them , now so cold , and whether cupid dwelt in them who 're old : now heat and kindness made him try to kiss her ; her palsi'd head so shak'd , he still did miss her : he thought it modesty ; she ' gainst her will , striving to please him , could not hold it still : she mumbl'd , but he could not understand her : he cry'd , sweet hero , i 'le be thy leander : she said , before we met , cold as a stone is , i was ; but now am venus , thou adonis . such heights of passion's-love utter'd these two , as youngest lovers , when they 'gin to woo : for cupid , reign o're mankind still will have ; he governs from the cradle to the grave . their virtue 's such , they would not sin , nor tarry , so heated , vow'd a contract , then to marry . this marriage now divulg'd was every where to neighbour beggars , beggars far and near ; the day appointed , and the marriage set , the lame , the blind , the deaf , they all were met : such throngs of beggars , women , children , seen , muster'd all on the town 's fair grassy-green : the bridegroom 's led between two lame men , so , because our bridegroom fast he could not go . the bride was led by blind-men ; him behind , because you know that love is always blind . the hedg-priest then was call'd for , did him bring , marri'd them both with an old curtain-ring : no father there was found , or could be ever ; she was so old , that there was none to give her . with acclamations now of louder joy , pray'd hymen priapus to send a boy , to shew a miracle ; in vows most deep the parish swore their children all to keep . then tom-a-bedlam wound his horn , at best ; their trumpet now , to bring away the feast ; pick'd marrow-bones they had found in the street , carrots kick'd out of kennels with their feet ; crusts gather'd up , for bisket , 't was so dri'd , alms-tubs olio podridoes had beside : many such dishes had , but it would cumber any to name them ; more than i can number . then came the banquet ( that must never fail ) which the town gave , that 's white-bread , & strong ale. each was so tipsie , that they could not go , and yet would dance , and cry'd for musick ho ; gridirons and tongs , with keys , they play'd on too , and blind-men sung to them , as use to do : some whistled then , and hollow sticks did sound , and thus melodiously they play'd a round : lamemen , lame women , mingled , said , advance ; and so , all limping , jovially did dance : the deaf-men too , for they could not forbear when they saw this , although they did not hear , which was their happiness . now to his house the bridegroom brought the bride , each drunk as mouse . no room for any but them two , they saw , so laid them both in bed of good fresh straw . then took their leave , put out their rushen-light ; but they themselves did revel all the night . the bridegroom ruffles now , kiss'd , and said , friend ; but when he kiss'd , thought 't was at t'other end , and cry'd her mercy , said he could not look , it was so dark , and thought he had mistook . no , said the bride most sweetly , you are right , as if our taper here was shining bright . now love's hesperides would touch the same , that place , o place ! which place no tongue should name . she , gentle dame , with roving hand , indeed , instead of crutches , found a broken reed . they both , now fill'd with ale , brains in 't did steep ; so , arm in arm , our lovers fell asleep . so for the will , though nothing else indeed , to love the beggars built a pyramid . a tale of his grace the duke of newcastle , called , the philosopher's complaint . i through a cranny there did spy , a grave philosopher all sad , with a dim taper burning by , his study was in mourning clad . he sigh'd , and did lament his state , cursing dame nature , for 't was she , that did allot him such a fate , to make him of mankind to be . all other animals , their mold of thousand passions makes them free , since they 're not subject unto gold , which doth corrupt mankind we see . the busie merchant plows the main , the pleading-lawyer for his fee ; pious divines for lawful gain , mechanicks all still coz'ners be . with plow-shares , farmers wound the earth , look to their cattel , swine , and sheep , to multiply their seed , corn's birth , and all for money , which they keep . the sun-burnt dame prevents the day , ( as her laborious bees for honey ) doth milk her kine , and spins away her fatal thread of life for money . mankind doth on god pluto call , to serve him still , is all their pleasure : love here doth little , money all ; for of this world it is the measure . beasts do despise this orient mettle ; each freely grazing fills his maw : after love's procreating , settle to softer sleep , wise nature's law. they 're not litigious , but are mute ; false propositions never make : nor of unknown things do dispute ; follies , for wise things do not take . or flow'ry rhet'rick to deceive ; nor logick to enforce the wrong : or tedious history to weave , troubling the hearers all along . nor study the enamell'd sky , thinking they 're govern'd by each starr ; but scorn man's false astrology , and think themselves just as they are . their pride not being so supream , celestial bodies moving thus , poor mortals each awaking dream , to think those lights were made for us . nor are they troubled where they run ; what the sun's matter it might be ; whether the earth moves , or the sun , and yet they know as well as we . nor do they with grave troubled looks , by studious learning for to stay , or multiplicity of books , to put them out of truth 's right way . for policies , beasts never weave , or subt'ler traps do ever lay , with false dissembling , which deceive , their kind to ruin , or betray . no hot ambitions in them are ; trumpets are silent , drums do cease : no troublers in their kind in warr , for to destroy , but all for peace . the stranger valu'd jemms that dress our beauteous ladies like the day , a parrot's feathers are no less ; and gossips too as well as they . man's ever troubled 'bout his fame , for glory and ambition hot : when beasts are constantly the same ; in them those follies enter not : nor hope of worlds to come , that 's higher , with several sects divisions make ; or fear an everlasting fire , but quiet sleep , and so awake . man still with thoughts himself torments , various desires , what shall be ; and in his life hath small contents : beasts pleas'd with what they have , not we . repining man , for what is past , hating the present what they see , frighted with what 's to come at last : beasts pleas'd with what is , and must be . ease man doth hate , and business store ; a burthen to himself he is : weary of time , yet wishes more : beasts all these vanities they miss . self-loving man so proud a durt , vain 'bove all things , when understood ; studies always himself to hurt : when beasts are wise to their own good . man makes himself a troubled way , runs into several dangers still , vvhen in those thoughts beasts never stray , but do avoid them with their will. man's troubled head and brain still swelling beyond the power of senses five , not capable of those things telling : beasts beyond senses do not strive . nature's just measure , senses are , and no impossibles desire : beasts seek not after things that 's far , or toys or baubles still admire . beasts slander not , or falshoods raise , but full of truth , as nature taught ; and wisely shun dissembling ways , follow dame nature as they ought . nor to false gods do sacrifice , or promise vows to break them ; no : no doctrine to delude with lyes , or worship gods they do not know . nor envy any that do rise , or joyful seem at those that fall ; or crooked ways 'gainst others tries ; but love their kind , themselves , and all . hard labour suffer when they must ; when over-aw'd , they wisely bend ; only in patience then they trust , as misery's and affliction 's friend . they seek not after beauty's blaze , to tempt their appetite when dull ; but drink the stream that tempests raise , and grumble not when they are full . they take no physick to destroy that health which nature to them gave : nor rul'd by tyrants laws , annoy , yet happy seem with what they have . with cares men break their sweet repose , like wheels that wear with turning round : beasts quiet thoughts their eye-lids close , and in soft sleep all cares they drown'd . no rattles , fairings , ribbons , strings , fiddles , pipes , minstrelses , them move , or bugle bracelets , or fine rings , and without cupid maketh love. o happy beasts ! that spend the day in pleasure with their nearest kin , and all is lawful in their way , and live and dye without a sin . their conscience ne're troubled is ; we made so , yet forbid it too : for nature here is not amiss , we strive 'gainst what w' are made to do . beasts need not language , they despise unuseful things , all men's delight : those marks which language from doth rise , if pleas'd with them , discourse they might . and out of words they argue not , but reason out of things they do : when we vain gossipings have got , they quiet silent lives have too . complain'd of scholars , that they sought with envious watching , and with spight , to leave the good to find a fault in any author that doth write . o vain philosophy ! their laws with hard words still for matter brings , which nothing is , nor knows the cause of any thing ; unuseful things . why are our learned then so proud , thinking to bring us to their bow ? and ignorance , wisdom allow'd , and know not that they do not know ? motion's cessation is the end of animals , both beasts and men ; the longest lives to that do tend , and to death's palace , his dark den. or that beasts breath doth downwards go , and that men's souls do upward rise ; no post from that world comes you know : it puzzled solomon the wise. thus he complain'd , and was annoy'd , our grave philosopher for 's birth , that he was made to be destroy'd , or turn'd to sad or colder earth . i piti'd him , and his sad case , wishing our vicar him to teach ; for to infuse a saving-grace , by his tongue 's rhet'rick for to preach . several feigned stories in prose the second book . the strict associate . there was a gentleman came to a lady with a message from his lord , which was to tell her , his lord would come to visit her . sir , said she , is your lord a poet ? no , lady , said he . then he hath no divine soul , said she . is he a philosopher ? no , madam , said he . then , said she , he hath no rational soul. is he an historian ? neither , said he . then , said she , he hath no learned soul. is he an ancient man ? no , lady , said he . then he hath no experienced soul , said she . is he an orator ? no , lady , said he . then he hath no eloquent soul , said she . and if he hath neither poetical wit , philosophical wisdom , studious learning , experienced knowledg , nor eloquent language , he cannot be conversable ; and if he be not conversable , his visit can neither be profitable nor pleasant , but troublesome and tedious ; therefore i do entreat your lord that he will spare his pains , and mine , in giving me a visit. but , said the man , though my lord is neither a poet , a philosopher , an historian , an orator , nor aged ; yet he is a young beautiful man , which is more acceptable to a fair lady . sir , said she , youth and beauty appears worse in men , than age and deformity in women ; wherefore , if it were in my power , i would make a law , that all young men should be kept to their studies so long as their effeminate beauty doth last ; and old women should be put into cloysters when their youth and beauty is past : but i must confess , that the custom of the world is otherwise ; for old women and young men appear most to publik view in the world ; when young vvomen and aged men often retire from it . the judgment . there were two gentlemen that had travelled both into england and france ; and meeting another gentleman , he asked one of them , which he liked best , england or france ? who said , he liked both well where they were alike worthy ; and disliked them both in things that were not worthy of praise . then he said to the second gentleman , and which like you best ? vvhich do you mean , answer'd he ? the countreys or kingdoms ? vvhy , what difference is there betwixt saying a countrey and a kingdom , was reply'd to him ? great difference , said he : for , to say a countrey , is but such a circumference of earth ; and to say a kingdom , is to say such a countrey manured , inhabited , or rather populated with men that dwell in cities , towns , and villages , that are governed by laws either natural or artificial . well , which kingdom do you like best , then ? truly , said he , i cannot give a good judgment unless i had travelled through every part in both kingdoms , and had taken strict surveys of their forts , havens , woods , plains , hills , dales , meadows , pastures , arrable ; also of their architectures , as cities , towns , villages , palaces , churches , theaters ; of their laws , customs , and ceremonies ; of their commodities , trafficks , and transportations ; of their climates and situations ; and of the several humours of the several people in each kingdom : which will not only require a solid judgment , and a clear understanding , but a long life to judg of it all . but , said the other , judg of as much as you have seen . to judg of parts ( answered he ) , is not to judg of the whole : but to judg of as much as i have seen , i will compare them , or similize the parts of those two kingdoms , to two ladies , whose faces i have only seen , their bodies and constitutions being unknown ; the one that a larger and fairer forehead than the other , and a more sanguine complexion ; the other hath better eyes , eye-brows , and mouth . so france is a broader and plainer countrey , and the climate is more clear , and somewhat hotter than england ; and england hath better sea-ports , heavens , and navigable rivers , than france hath ; also , the one hath a more haughty look than the other ; and the other a more pleasing and modest countenance . so france appears more majestical , and england more amiable . the vulgar fights . a young gentleman , of a good natural wit , had a desire to travel : but first , he would visit every province in his own countrey , before he went into forreign kingdoms ; preferring the knowledg of his own native soil , before those wherein he was neither born , nor meant to dwell . so he went to the chief metropolitan city , where he did intend to stay some time , that he might inform himself best of the several trades , trafficks , imposts , laws , customs , offices , and the like . when he was come to it , he sent his man to seek him out some lodgings in some private house , because inns are both troublesome , and more chargeable . his man had not gone far , but he saw a bill over a trades-man's door , to let passengers know there were lodgings to be lett. the mistress sitting at the door , he asked her if he might see the lodgings that were to be lett ? she answered , no ; she would first see them that were to take them : who is it that would take them , said she ? my master , said he . hath he a wife , said she ? why ask you that , said he ? because ( said she ) i will not lett my lodgings to any man that brings a wife : for , women to women are troublesome guests ; whenas men are very acceptable : and i thank the gods ( said she ) i am not so poor as i care for the profit , but for company and conversation : for , to have no other company but my husband , is very dull and melancholy . the man said , my master hath no wife . is he a young man , said she ? yes , said he . is he a handsome man , said she ? yes , said he . then , said she , my lodging is at his service . at what rate are they , said the man ? she said , your master and i shall not fall out about the price . so he returned to his master , and told him , he had found not only lodgings , but ( as he thought ) a fair bed-fellow for him ; for the mistress would make no bargain but with himself . so thither he went , where he found all things accommodated for his use ; and his landlady , who was a handsome woman , and her husband a plain man , bid him very welcome ; then taking their leave , left him to himself : after which , the good man seldom troubled him ; but the wife was so officious , as he seldom mist of her company ; and so wondrous kind as might be , making him whitewine-caudles for his break-fast , and giving him very oftern collations : besides , if he stay'd out , she would send her husband to bed , and wait for his coming home : for which kindness he would return her courtly civilities . he went often abroad to view the city , and to see the course of the people , and the several passages that happen in such places : and one day , as he went through a large street , a coach-man and carman man fell out for out for the right side of the way ; the carman said he was loaded , and therefore would not give way ; the coach-man said , it was not fit for a coach to give way to a cart , and therefore he should give way : so after words , follow'd blows ; and their whips were their mettle-blades , wherewith they fought and lashed one another soundly . the gentleman , seeing them lashing one another so cruelly , spake to his man to part the fray. in troth , master , said the man , if i shall go about to part all foolish frays , or but one in a city , i may chance to go home with a broken pate , and get no reputation for the loss of my blood . thence they went to the market place , and there were two women which had fallen out about their merchandize , and their fight was much fiercer than the coach-man and carters , and their words more offensive , and their nails more wounding than whips , insomuch as they had scratched each other so , that the blood trickled down their faces : whereupon the gentleman , being of a pitiful nature , commanded his man to part them : the man said , i will adventure on the feminine sex , for i believe i can pacifie them , at least make my party good : so he went and spoke to them to forbear each other ; but their ears were stopt with the sound of their scolding ; and when he went to part them , it did so enrage their fury , as they left fighting with each other , and fell upon him ; who , to help himself , was forced to fight with them both : at last it grew to be a very hot battel ; first off went his hat , then down fell his cloak ; he thrust them from him , they prest upon him ; he cuft them , they laid on blows on him ; they tore his band , he tore their kerchers ; they pull'd his hair , he pull'd their petticoats ; they scratch'd his face , he beat their fingers ; he kick'd them , they spurned him : at last , with strugling , they all three fell into the kennel ; and so close they fought , as those three bodies seemed but one body , that moved as a whale on a shallow shore , which wants water to swim ; even so they lay waving and rolling in the kennel : in this time a number of people were gathered about them to see them fight , ( for it is the nature of common people to look on combats , but part none ; to make frays , but not friends ) who enrag'd them the more , and enflam'd their angers with their shooting-noises : but the gentleman , that was concerned for his man , desired the people to part them ; who cryed out , let them fight , let them fight ; and they that had so much good nature as to offer to pull them asunder , were hindered by the rest . at last the constable came , and did cause them all three to be put into the stocks ; the man was placed betwixt the two women , which made him almost deaf of both his ears ; for though their legs were fast , their tongues were loose ; with which they rung him such a scolding-peal , as made his head dizzy ; whereas he , without speaking one word , sate in a most lamentable posture , with his clothes all rent and torn , his face all scratch'd and bloody , and that hair they left on his head , all ruffled , and standing an end , as if he were affrighted : but at last his master , by bribing the constable , got his man out of the stocks , and gave the constable so much more to keep the women shackled a longer time ; who , when they saw the man let loose , and they still fast , were stark mad . the man was so dogged , that he would not speak to his master , because it was by his command he came into that womanish quarrel . his master , to pacifie him , and to reward him for his obedience , gave him new clothes , and all things suitable , and money , to be friends again . but though the money did qualifie his passion , yet he was wonderful angry for the disgrace ( as he thought it ) to be beaten by women , and prayed his master to give him leave to depart from him , that he might retire to some meaner man's service , where he might hide his dishonour . his master told him , he thought he never had much honour to lose ; neither would any trouble their thoughts , and burthen their memory , with such foolish quarrels : but howsoever ( said his master ) if you be a man of honour , as you imagine your self , you should glory in this combat ; for honourable and gallant men will not refuse to grasp with women , and take it as an honour to receive blows from them ; a rent band is their victory , and a scratcht face their trophy , and their scolding speech is their chariot , wherein they ride in triumph . heaven ( said the man ) deliver me from that honour ; for i had rather grasp a fury of hell , than an angry woman ! so home they went ; and when they came to their lodging , they found the man and his wife together by the ears ; the man cursing , the wife scolding , and the wares in their shop flung about ; for they had hurled all they could lay hold on , at each other's head : both master and man stood at the door , not daring to enter the house , for fear they should partake of the quarrel . at last said the man to his master , sir , now you may have those honourable victories , trophies , and triumphs , you spake of , if you will endeavour to part them . his master answered , that one man was enough for one woman , and two would be too much . the man said , i found two women too much for one man , and i dare lay a wager our landlady will be too hard for our landlord . he had no sooner spoke , but the wife had broke her husband's head with a measure that lay by ; which as soon as she had done , she run into the kitchin , and shut the door to secure her self , making it her castle of defence ; where her husband followed with threatning-language , then bounced and beat against the door to break it open ; but she had not only barred and lock'd it , but set all the pots , pans , and spits against it , as a barricado to make it strong . at last the gentleman went to his landlord , and perswaded him to be friends with his wife . at first he would not hear him ; but at last , when he found he could not get in , and that his fury was wasted with the many assaults against the door , he was contented to have a parley : then there was a truce agreed upon for two hours ; in which time the gentleman managed the quarrel so well , as he made them friends ; the wife being contented to be friends with her husband for the gentleman's sake , and the husband for quiet 's sake . the man was also contented to stay with his master , when he saw he was not the only man that was beaten by women , but triumphed that the landlord was beaten by one , when he had two against him . the tobacconist . there were two maids talking of husbands , which is for the most part the theam of their discourse , and the subject of their thoughts . the one said , i would not marry a man that takes tobacco , for any thing . then said the other , it is likely you will have a fool for your husband ; for tobacco is able to make a fool a wise man : and though it doth not always work wise effects , by reason some fools are beyond all improvement ; yet it never fails , where any improvement is to be made . why , said the first , what wise effects does it work ? the second said , it composes the mind , it busies the thoughts , represents several objects to the mind's view , settles and stays the senses , clears the understanding , strengthens the judgment , spies out errors , evaporates follies , heats ambition , comforts sorrow , abates passions , excites to noble actions , digests conceptions , enlarges knowledg , elevates imaginations , creates fancies , quickens wit , and makes reason pleader , and truth judg , in all disputes or controversies betwixt right and wrong . the first said , it makes the breath stink . you mistake , said the second , it will make a stinking breath sweet . it is a beastly smell , said the first . said the second , civet is a beastly smell , and that you will thrust your nose to , although it be an excrement ; and , for any thing we know , so is ambergreece ; when tobacco is a sweet and pleasant , wholsome and medicinable herb. the school-quarrels , or scholars-battels . a man travelling , and being very weary , seeing a large house , a-lighted , and went to the gates , which he found open for any to pass without opposition : entring in , he came into a large paved court ; and walking about it , he heard a noise as of a great wind , which made him look up towards the clouds ; and seeing the air not much agitated , he wondred at it : at last he looked in at a door that was open , but there was such a mist , that he could see no further than the entrance ; yet going in , he perceived a long gallery , wherein were books placed in long rows , and men in old tatter'd gowns reading them , and turning their leaves ; which shewed him his error to think he heard a wind , for it was the shuffling of the leaves of the numerous books that were turned over by those many men . but desiring to instruct himself of their several studies , he went softly to observe them . the first man he took notice of , was one that ( as he read ) did beat his hands upon the desk whereon his book lay ; and looking over his shoulder , he perceived he was studying the laws , and acted , against he pleaded at the barr. then he went to the next , who was counting on his fingers , and looking in his book ; by which he saw he was studying arithmetick . a third was with a celestial globe , and a pair of compasses , very busie studying of astronomy , measuring of the planets , and their distance . the fourth was with a terrestrial globe before his book ; and one while he would read , then view the globe , and then read again , studying geography . on the other side he saw one very serious in his study , and he was reading moral philosophy . another he saw reading , who would often lay his hand upon his breast , and cast up the black of his eyes , and he was studying theology . then there were others who as they read , would often scratch their heads , and they were natural philosophers . but one amongst the rest looked very merrily , and he was studying the old poets . likewise there were very many more , as , historians , grammarians , logicians , geometricians , physicians , and the like . at last a little bell rung , whereupon they all left off their studying , and began to walk about , discoursing to each other of their several studies . so the grammarians and the logicians began to dispute , one for the words , or rather for the letters ; the other for the sense , subject , and matter of discourse ; the one troubling himself with derivations , the other about quantities and qualities . then fell into dispute two divines , about the controversies of theology : but they grew so hot with zeal , that their discourse flamed up high , and their fiery words flew above all respects or civility , calling one another heretick , and beelzebub , and the whore of babylon , and the like terms , that the rest of the scholars had much ado to appease them . but amongst the rest , there were two historians , the one a grecian , the other a roman ; who talking of caesar and alexander , the roman historian said , there was no comparison between those two worthies : for , said he , alexander was only a darling of fortune , whose favour gave him a free passage without opposition , and had no occasion to shew his courage , skill , conduct , or industry ; and , said he , fools , cowards , and slothful persons , have had good fortune sometimes . at this discourse the grecian grew very angry , saying , that alexander was born from a warrier , and bred a soldier , and was a valiant , wise commander ; and that caesar was only a man of fortune , traiterous , desperate ; and whatsoever he got , was all by chance . in this dispute , one defending alexander , the other caesar , they fell from words to blows ; and , like two school boys , to cuffs they went ; and such notable thumping-blows they gave each other , that either had a bloody-nose ; whereupon the rest of the scholars began to side in factions , some taking one part , some another , that at last they were all together by the ears ; and so fierce in fight they were , that the drums and the trumpets of their several clamours , arrived to the master of the colledg's hearing ; at which noise he went running up to inform himself of the cause : but when he came , his questions could not be heard , nor his commands obeyed ; for all the scholars were divided so equally , as if it had been a pitched-battel : for all the scepticks were against the mathematicians , the natural philosophers against the divines , the severe moralists against the poets ; and in the like opposition were all the rest : but at last they grew out of all order , and there became such a confusion , that they cared not whom they did strike , so they did fight , although 't were their own parties : whereupon the master of the colledg hollow'd so loud , and bestirr'd himself so prudently , that he appeased them ; and after their fury was quenched , at least abated , they began to consider , and finding their quarrels needless , they were ashamed ; and feeling their received blows painful , they did repent . but howsoever , it was a strange sight to behold them , some having black and blew eyes , others swelled foreheads , like camels backs , others scratched faces ; some blowing blood out of their nostrils , others spitting blood out of their mouths , and some their teeth also ; and all the hair both of their heads and beards , was in a ruffled and affrighted posture , and the poor library was , like a ship after a storm at sea , in great disorder ; for there was strewed about pieces of papers rent from books , and old patches of cloth and stuff torn from gowns , slippers kick'd from their feet , caps flown from their heads , handfuls of hairs pulled from their crowns , and pens and ink sans nombre . the man that came by chance , was crept into a hole , and was in such an agony and fear to see this distraction , that he had not power to come forth : but at last , when they were all gone out of the library to supper , or prayers , he took courage , and came out of the corner , stealing forth the same way he came in : and being clearly got from the colledg , full glad he was , and then began to call into his mind their quarrels ; which when he had considered , well ( said he to himself ) , if there be no more tranquillity and order amongst scholars , i will keep the company of my merry , harmless , and ignorant neighbours ; and so returned home . the observer . a gentleman desirous to travel to see the varieties of several countreys and governments , at last he arrived in a kingdom , where he went to the chief city , and there wandring about , came to the king's palace ; and though there was a guard , yet there was a porter sitting at the outward gate of the palace , to whom he went and said to him , i am a stranger that travel to see several kingdoms and courts , and have heard great praises and fame of your king for his peaceable and wise government ; wherefore i desire you would please to assist me , if you can , to see the king. so putting two or three pieces of gold into his hand , that the porter might as well feel his bounty , as hear his desire , to help to make his passage free ; the porter making legs without thanks ( for bribes have only civil congies ) , he told him there was a gentleman at court that was his very good friend , and that he used to come and go through the gates late at night , and early in the morning ( which he need not have told , but he thought he should have as much knowledg for his money as he could give ) ; but , said he , i will try if i can find this gentleman , my good friend , and he will shew you the king for my sake . no sooner had he spoke , but the gentleman came by ; who , at the porter's entreaty , conducts this stranger to the sight of the king and queen ( for courtiers will oblige one another for interest sake , although they have neither kindness , nor civility , where they cannot have ends or designs ) : he guided this gentleman through a great court-yard , wherein were many walking and talking , like merchants in an exchange , or as a court of judicature ; and so up a pair of stairs into a large room , where was a guard of soldiers with halberts , which were more for shew than safety ; for the halberts lay by , and great jacks of beer and wine were in their hands , and some at their mouths , drinking to one another : by their strong large stature , and swell'd bulk , they seemed as if they did use to eat to the proportion of their drinking . from thence he was guided into a long-gallery , at the end of which was the presence , where were many young gallants , and fair ladies , the young men courting their fair mistresses , in repeating of love-verses and sonnets , some dancing , others singing , some congie-ing , some complementing , and thus diverting themselves in pleasant pastimes . thence he was guided into the privy-chamber , where the king and queen were set , with many of their nobles about them , discoursing of plays masques , balls , huntings , progresses , and the like , after he had been there a little while , the king and queen rose to go to supper , and the gentleman invited the stranger to sup at the waiters table ; which offer he civilly received . when he was there , he found good store of company full of discourse ; and amongst much talk , they complained of their long peace , saying , that peace was good for nothing but to breed laziness ; and that the youth of the kingdom were degenerated , and become effeminate : concluding , that there ought to be a warr , were it for no other reason , but to exercise their youth in arms , which would breed courage , and inflame their spirits to action . but after supper , the stranger was guided into the presence again , where there was a great company of lords and ladies waiting for the king and queen's coming forth , which gave the stranger some time for observation . it was his chance to stand by a lord that had many of his friends , or rather flatterers , about him , speaking to him of another lord at the other side of the room , who stood also with his friends or flatterers ; he said to his company , do you think that lord worthy of those favours the king throws on him , having neither merit nor worth to deserve them ; when men of noble qualities , and great deserts , are neither regarded nor rewarded ? gentlemen , said he , this must not be ; for we are born free subjects to the king , not slaves to his favourite , who makes our estates the exchequer to supply his vanities by the way of large taxes , which is not to be suffered : for , though the king commands by his advice , yet he receives the sums . the stranger ( that had but a little time to stay ) removed from that side to the other , where the other lord was talking to his faction , and said , do you see that formal lord , who loves and affects popularity , and would be the absolute man in the kingdom , to rule and govern all ? let me tell you gentlemen , said he , he is a dangerous man , whom the king should be ware of : but alas , said he , the king is so facil , that whosoever comes with a clear brow , and a smooth tongue , he believes all he says is truth . besides , he is so cockered up with a long peace , that he cannot believe any body dares be traitors . and thus he lives in secure credulity , and is so timorous , that he dares not displease any one : for , those that are against him , he preferrs ; and those that are faithful to him , he cares not for , and rejects them . from that company , the stranger removed to the women's side ; where was a lady , wity others by her ; who said to one of them , prithee look on yonder lady , how she is painted and curled , to allure the youth of the court ; but ifaith , said she , it will not do ; for if one comes near , she is as withered and dry as a leaf in autumn . so he ( desiring to hear all parts ) removed to the other lady , where she said to some others , do you see , said she , the wit of the court ( meaning the other lady that was opposite ) ? ifaith ( said she ) if i were her , i would rather conceal my wit , than discover my pratling : she is so full of talk , that she will suffer none to speak but her self . every lady of each company , flung spightful words upon each other's back : but the musick beginning to play , they all flock'd together , and did all embrace , kiss , profess , and protest such affections , and vowed such friendships , that neither their lives nor fortunes should be wanting in one another's service : which the stranger hearing , went out of the court as fast as he could , for fear of the court's infection . and when he came to the gate , the porter ( to whom he first spoke ) ask'd him , why he went away so soon ? for , said he , the company seldom parts until one or two of the clock in the morning , nay , said he , some not all the night long , if their mistresses favour them , or at least take some pity of them . the stranger said , he had seen so much , that it did fright him : what , said the porter , some devils in the play , or in the masque ? yes , said the gentleman , they could change into as many shapes as they would . that is only in their clothes , answered the porter . no , said the stranger , it was in their tongues and faces : and so god give you good-night . the discreet virgin. there was a grave matron who came to visit a young virgin ; whom she ask'd , why she did not marry , since she was of marriageable years ? truly , said she , i am best pleased with a single life . what ( answered the matron ) , will you lead apes in hell ? the young lady said , it was better to lead apes in hell , than live like devils on earth : for , said she , i have heard , that a married couple seldom or never agree ; the husband roars in his drink , and the wife scolds in her choler ; the servants quarrel , the children cry , and all is in more disorder than 't is thought hell is , and a more confused noise . the matron said , such are only the meaner sort of people ; but the noble and rich men and their wives live otherwise : for the better sort ( the noble and rich ) when they are drunk , are carried straight to bed , and laid to sleep ; and their wives dance until their husbands are sober . the lady said , if they dance until their husbands be sober , they will dance until they be weary . so they do , replied the matron . why , said the lady , the husbands are , for the most part , always drunk . and the other answered , and the ladies are , for the most part , continually dancing . but , by your favour , said the matron , men are not so often , nor so constantly drunk , as you report them . the young lady answered , you shall be judg if i slander them : they drink drunk at dinner ; and before they are throughly sober , they go to supper , and they drink so , as they go drunk to bed ; and in the morning they will have their refreshing-draughts : but , said she , i perceive you think none are drunk but those that drink in tavern ; but they , let me tell you , are sober men to home drunkards ; and taverns are quiet orderly houses , to great , noble , and rich men's houses : for palaces are oft-times but hospitable taverns , inns , and bawdy-houses , only their guests pay nothing for their fare : but when they are gaming-houses , then they pay the box sometimes to their grief . fie , lady , fie , said the matron , why do you abuse noble persons ? i do not abuse them , answered she , they abuse themselves . we will leave off this discourse , said the matron , and talk of husbands . we have talk'd ( said the young lady ) of husbands already : besides , the theme is so bad , that the discourse of them cannot be good . i am come ( said the matron ) to offer you a husband . she replied , she was offered husbands enough , but there were none worth the taking : for , said she , men in this age are far worse than women , and more ridiculous in their behaviours , discourses , dressings , vanities , and idleness : as for their humours , said she , they are either apish , constrained , or rude : if they be apish , they put themselves into a hundred several postures in an hour ; and so full of apish actions , as scratching their heads , combing their perwicks , or gogling their hats , with jogging their heads , one while backwards to the noddle of their heads , and then forwards , to their brows ; or fumbling with their buttons , band-strings , or boot-hose ; or pulling their cloaks one while upon one shoulder , and then on another , and then back again ; or else pull their cloak with one hand , and hold it fast with the other ( this pulling-motion being a mode-motion ) : but those that are very much in the mode , lay it about their waste , all in a crumple , like a scarf ; or else ( like male-contents ) muffle themselves therein . as for their behaviour , those that are fantastical , their bodies are in a perpetual motion , winding , or turning , or wreathing about or dancing affectedly , singing fa , fa , la ; or whistling , like a carter ; or lye careless upon the ground , kicking back with their heels ; or with the end of their feet lye kicking the ground . but when they affect a careless behaviour , as thinking it dignifies them ( as all those that have been meanly born or bred , and have had some advancement either by riches , offices , royal favours , or by fortune ) then they will sit lolling upon their breech , or lean on their elbows , gaping or stretching themselves , or else laying the ankle of one leg upon the knee of the other , heaving their feet up towards the nostrils of their company , especially when ladies are by . methinks ( said the matron ) that is an ill behaviour , to thrust their feet towards a fair lady's nose . they do so , answered she : also , they have a restless mode , to stand up one minute , the next sit down ; dividing the time of visiting , in neither going , nor staying , but between both : for they neither quietly stay , nor civilly take their leave : and in winter , where there is fire , as soon as they come into a room , they straight go the fire , and there turn their backs to warm their breeches , with their hands turned back upon them : but if it be in summer , then they lean their breech upon the chimney-side , or against a wall , standing cross-legg'd ; or else they stand bowing over a chair's back , or set their stomacks against the edg of a table , and lay the upper part of the body upon it ; and sometimes they rest their elbows thereon , and hold up their chins with the palm of their hands , or wrist ; and in all these actions their tongues run with nonsense . but the rudest behaviour is , to pull out the ladies fanns or muffs out of their hands , to fling their cloaks or coats on their beds , couches , or tables ; or to lye rudely upon their beds or couches ; or to come unawares and kiss their necks , or embrace their waste ; and twenty such like tricks , which no woman of honour can like , but will be very angry : yet they know not how to be revenged , unless they engage their nearest friends , fathers , brothers , uncles , or husbands , in a quarrel ; for they cannot fight with men themselves , their strength being too weak , although their will is good . the discourses of the most part of them , are , swearing , bragging , ranting , rallery , railing , or lascivious : and in their dressings and fashions they are more fantastical , various , and unconstant , than women : for , they change their blocks for their hats ( although they cannot their block-heads ) forty times oftner than women change the shapes of their bags or hoods for their heads , and mens bands , cuffs , and boot-hose-tops , are changed into more several shapes , than women's gorgets , handkerchiefs , or any linnen they wear : and for their doublets , breeches , cloaks , coats , and cassocks , they change their fashions oftner than the winds change their corners : whereas women will keep to the fashion of their gowns , petticoats , and wastcoats , two or three years before they alter their shapes . neither do men change for convenience , grace , or behaviour ; but out of a fantastical vanity . and are not men more perfumed , curled , and powdred , than vvomen ? and have they not greater quantities of ribbons of several colours ti'd and set upon their hats , clothes , gloves , boots , shooes , and belts , than vvomen on their heads and gowns ? have not men richer and more gaye clothes than women have ? and where women make clothes once , men make clothes three times ; yet men exclaim against the vanities of women , when they are a hundred times vainer , and are more unnecessarily expensive than women are : women may be allowed by the severest judgments , to be a little vain , as being women ; when it ought to be condemned in men as an effeminacy , which is a great vice. the last is their idleness : for , do not men spend their time far more idly ( not to say wickedly ) than women ? do not men run visiting from house to house , for no other purpose but to twattle , spending their time in idle and fruitless discourse ? do not men meet every day in taverns and ordinaries , to sit and gossip over a cup of wine ? when women are condemned for gossiping once in a quarter of a year , at a labour , or a christning , or at the up-sitting of a child-bed woman . and do not men run and hunt about for news , and then meet to gossip on it with their censuring-verdicts ? besides , they are so greedy of twattle , that rather than want idle matter to prate of , they will invent news , and then falsly report it ; and such are accounted wits that can make the most probable lyes , which they call gulling . have not men also more foolish quarrels than vvomen have ? are not men more apt to take exceptions at each other , than women are ? will not men dissemble , lye , and flatter with each other , more than women do ? will not men rail and back-bite each other , more than vvomen will ? are not men more spightful , envious , and malicious at each other , than vvomen ? vvill not men imitate each other 's fantastical garb , dress , and the like , more than vvomen ? vvill not men ride from place to place , to no purpose , more than women ? and do not men take more delight in idle pastimes , and foolish sports , than vvomen ? and in all this time of their visiting , club , gossipping , news-travelling , news-venting , news-making , vain-spending , mode-fashioning , foolish-quarrelling , and unprofitable-journeying , what advantage do they bring to the commonwealth , or honour to their posterity , or profit to themselves ? none at all ; but they are like flyes bred out of a dunghill , buzzing idly about , and then dye : when vvomen are like industrious ants , and prudent bees , always employed to the benefit of their families . therefore unless i can have a husband that is so wise that he can entertain himself with his own thoughts , to dwell quietly in his own house , governing prudently his own family ; also , to behave himself civilly , to speak rationally , to accoutre himself manfully , to defend himself , and maintain his honour valiantly ; to do nobly , to judg charitably , to live honestly , to temper his appetites , rule his passions , and be very industrious ; i will never marry : for it is not only a good husband , but a vvise man , that makes a vvoman happy in marriage . of three travellers . there were three travellers that enquired of each other about their travels ; and after they had recounted their tedious journeys , dangerous passages , and their many inconveniences ; they discoursed of the climates of each countrey they had been in , their scituations , commodities , trade , and traffick ; the customs , fashions , and humours of the people , the laws and government of their princes , the peace and vvarrs of neighbour-nations ; at last they became to question one another , vvho had seen the greatest vvonders in their travels ? said one , i have seen the greatest vvonder : for i have seen a mean man become an emperor . pish , said the second , that is nothing ; for i have seen a mean fellow , without merit , a powerful emperor's bosome-friend , and chief ruler : for , though the power of fortune can enthrone slaves , and unthrone kings ; yet fortune hath no power over the souls of kings : for , although fortune hath power over the body , she hath none over the mind . vvhy , said the third , that is no more vvonder for nature to put a subject's soul ( fill'd with mean thoughts ) into an emperor's body , than for fortune to set an emperor's crown on a slave's head. but i can tell you , said he , a vvonder indeed , which is , that where i travelled , there was an emperor , the wisest man in the world . that is no wonder , answered the other ; for all great monarchs and emperors ought to be the wisest , because they rule all others . but though they ought to be so , said the other yet they are not always so : for , were not many of the roman emperors called , the foolish emperors ? and when there are so few wise men in the world , that there is scarce a wise man to be found in an age , it is a vvonder when vvisdom lights in the right line , i mean in a royal line . no , answered the third , it is no wonder ; for the gods take a particular care to endue a royal head with understanding , and a royal heart with justice : for , hereditary royalty is sacred , since the gods annoint those lines to that dignity . but those that have not a right by inheritance , the gods take no care of ; nay , many times the gods punish with plagues , and other miseries , those people that make a king of their own chusing , and justly ; since kings are god's vicegerents , or deputies on earth : for , as the gods are chief in heaven , and rule the works of nature as they will ; so kings are chief on earth , and rule the rest of mankind as they please . but , said the other ; if they rule not well , they are to give an account . yes , answered the other ; but not unto those men they rule , but to the gods that placed them . in their thrones . the loving-cuckold . there was a gentleman that had married a wife , beautiful , modest , chast , and of a mild and sweet disposition ; and after he had been married some time , he began to neglect her , and make courtship to other women : which she perceiving , grew very melancholy ; and sitting one day very pensive alone , in comes one of her husband's acquaintance to see him , whom this lady told , her husband was abroad . he said , i have been to visit him many times , and still he is gone abroad . she said , my husband finds better company abroad than he hath at home , or at least thinks so , which makes him go so often forth . so he , discoursing with the lady , told her , he thought she was of a very melancholy disposition . she said , she was not naturally so , but what her misfortunes caused . he said , can fortune be cruel to a beautiful lady ? 't is a sign , said she , i am not beautiful , that she would match me to an unkind husband . he said , to my thinking it is as impossible for your husband to be unkind , as for fortune to be cruel . she said , you shall be judg whether he be not so : for first , said she , i have been an obedient wife , observed his humours , and obeyed his will in every thing . next , i have been a thrifty , cleanly , patient , and chast wife . thirdly , i brought him a great portion . and lastly , my neighbours say , i am handsome ; and yet my husband doth neglect me , and despise me , making courtships to other women , and sometimes ( to vex me the more ) before my face . he said , your husband is not worthy of you : therefore , if i may advise you , i would cast aside the affection i had placed upon him , and bestow it upon a person that will worship you with an idolatrous zeal ; and if you please to bestow it on me , i will offer my heart on the altar of your favours , and sacrifice my services thereupon ; and my love shall be as the vestal fire , that never goeth out , but perpetually burns with a religious flame . thus speaking and pleading , he made courtship to her ; which she at first did not receive : but he having opportunity , by reason her husband was much from home , and using importunity , at last corrupted her ; and she , making a friendship with this gentleman , began to neglect her husband as much as he had done her : which he perceiving , began to pull in the bridle of his loose carriage ; and finding that his acquaintant was her courtly admirer , he began to woo her a-new to gain her from him ; but it would not be : for she became from a meek , modest , obedient , and thrifty wife , to be a ranting , flanting , bold , and imperious one . but her husband grew so fond of her , that he sought all the ways he could to please her ; and was the most observant creature to her , that might be ; striving to please her in all things or ways he could devise ; insomuch , as observing she was never pleased but when she had gallants to court her , he would invite gentlemen to his house , and make entertainments for them ; and those she seemed most to favour , he would make his dear friends ; and would often be absent , to give them opportunities to be with his wife alone ; hoping to get a favourable look , or a kiss , for his good services , which she would craftily give him to encourage him . but the other gentleman that made the first addresses to her , being a married-man , his wife hearing her husband was so great a lover of that lady , and that that lady's husband was reformed from his incontinent life , and was become a doting fond wittal , loving and admiring her for being courted and made love to ; esteeming that most , which others seemed to like best ; she began to imitate her : which her husband perceiving , gave her warning not to do so ; which she would not take , but entertained those that would address themselves to her : whereupon her husband threatned her ; but she was at last so delighted with variety , that she regarded not his threats : whereupon he used her cruelly ; but nothing would reclaim her ; only she would make more secret meetings , wherewith she was the better pleased ; for secret meetings , as i have heard , give an edg to adultery ; and it is the nature of mankind to be most delighted with that which is most unlawful . but her husband , finding no reformation could be made , he parted with her , because he thought it a greater dishonour to be a wittal than a cuckold , although he was very much troubled to be either : for , though he was willing to make a cuckold , yet he was not willing to be one himself . thus you may see the different natures of men. the converts in marriage . there were four young gentlewomen , whose fathers were near neighbours ; whereupon there grew an acquaintance , and so a society between them . the first was reserved and coy . the second was bold and ranting . the third was merry and gay . the fourth was peevish and spightful . she that was reserved and coy , was generous and ambitious . she that was bold and ranting , was covetous and wanton . she that was merry and gay , was vain and fantastical . she that was peevish and spightful , was cross and unconstant . it chanced that the four fathers ( by reason they had good estates ) were offered four husbands for their four daughters , all at one time . the husband that was to marry the first lady , was covetous , miserable , and timorous ; as all miserable , covetous persons , for the most part , are : but being very rich , the father to this lady forced her to marry him . he that was to marry the second lady , was temperate , prudent , and chast. he that was to marry the third lady , was melancholy , solitary , and studious . and he that was to marry the fourth lady , was cholerick and impatient . after they had been married some time , the covetous and timorous man became hospitable , bountiful , valiant , and aspiring ; doing high and noble deeds . and she that was bold and wanton , became chast , sober , and obedient . he that was melancholy , became sociable , conversable , and pleasant ; and she , thrifty and staid . but he that was cholerick and impatient , who married her that was peevish and spightful , they live like dogs and cats , spit , scrawl , scratch , and bite ; insomuch as they were forced to part : for , being both faulty , they could not live happily , because they could never agree : for errors and faults multiply , being joined together . age's folly . there was a man and his wife that had been married many years together ; and had agreed and lived happily , loving each other wondrous well : but at last , after they were stricken in years , the husband was catch'd with a crafty young wench , ( like a woodcock in a noose or net ) wherein he was entangled in love's fetters ; and though he fluttred and fluttred to get loose , yet she kept him fast ; not that she loved age , but wealth : for amorous age is prodigal , and though more self-conceited than those that are young , or in their prime of years , yet are easily catched ; which is strange : for , most commonly , those that are self-conceited , are proud , disdainful , despising , thinking few or none worthy of their love . but amorous age , although they are self-conceited , take a pride , and brag , that they can have a love as well as those that are young ; which makes each smile and every amorous glance from youthful eyes , to be snares , or rather baits , which age doth nibble at . but his wife observing her husband to prank and prune , to jet and set himself in several postures , to be extravagant in his actions , fantastical in his dress , loose in his discourse ; wondred to see him on a sudden transformed from a sober , grave , staid , wise man , to a jack an-apes : at last concluded with her self , that for certain he was mad ; with which opinion she became wondrous melancholy . but , by chance , finding him making amorous addresses to a young woman , she then perceived the cause was love , and nothing but love ; i mean amorous love , that powerful amorous love , which blindfolds long and wise experience , with a foul , false appetite ; making not only young , but old men fools . his wife , like a discreet woman , moderated her passion for a while , hoping it was but a sudden flash , or faint blast , that would soon dye . but when she perceived his amorous humorou not to quench , but rather to burn , though smutheredly , and no perswasions could reform him , but rather make him worse , as cordials in hot fevers ; she parted from him , after that they had been , and as she thought , happily married many years ; and so resigned that part of the command and government of his family that was left her ; for the maid had encroach'd by her master's favour , and had ingross'd the chiefest power of rule in the houshold-affairs , as well as in the affection of the heart . thus his wife left him , and his dotage ; but death in a short time did come and revenge her quarrel ; and that tinder-fire cupid had made , death put out . by this we see , there is no certainty of constancy , nor no cure in time , nor no settlement in life . the three wooers . there were three knights went a wooing : a covetous knight . an amorous knight : and a judicious knight . the covetous knight sought a rich wife , not caring for her birth , breeding , or beauty . the amorous sought for a beautiful wife , not caring for her wealth or birth . the judicious sought for a wife virtuous , well bred , and honourably born , not caring for the wealth or beauty . and having all three good estates , every man that had daughters , invited and feasted them . so they went to visit all noble , hospitable house-keepers , such as gentlemen are , and honourable persons , that live in the countrey . the amorous knight made love to all those ladies and gentlewomen that were handsome ; but as soon as he was to treat with their parents or friends about marriage , or to appoint a wedding-day , he would find some excuse or other to break off . the covetous knight would be so far from wooing , that he would not speak to any of the young ladies , nor look on them oftenl , for fear they should claim marriage ; but he still would treat with their parents or friends , to know what portions they had , or what estates were likely to befall them by the death of their friends . the judicious knight would neither woo the ladies , nor treat with their parents or friends , but discoursed with them civilly , observing strictly what capacities , wits , and behaviours , the women had ; also employing agents secretly to enquire of their servants , neighbours , and acquaintance , of what natures , dispositions , and humours , they were ; not trusting to their sober outsides , and formalities they use to strangers . after they had visited all noble entertainers , they went to the city . for , said the covetous knight , i will not chuse a wife in these families ; for these daughters , sisters , and neeces , are too prodigally bred to make thrifty wives . so they went to visit the city . but the amorous knight said , he would not chuse a wife out of the city ; because ( said he ) i shall never love my wife but on holy-days , or sundays ; for they then appear indifferent handsom , when they have their best clothes ; but on vvorking days they smell of the shop , and appear like their father 's faded , mouldy , withered vvares . besides , said he , they discoursing to none but their journey-men and ' prentice-boys , cannot tell how to entertain a gentleman , or a lover , with romancical speeches , or pieces of plays , or copies of verses , or the like . the covetous knight said , you condemn that i shall commend , and dislike that which i shall like , and love that which i shall hate : for i hate whining-love ; and i shall be unwilling to marry a woman ( although she should bring me a great portion ) that would be reading romances , and the like ; and be entertaining with repeating verses , and singing love-sonnets , when she should be looking to my servants , ordering my family , and giving directions : or such a one that would be half the day dress'd so fine , she cannot stir about her house , or will not , for fear of dirtying or crumpling her clothes ; besides the infinite expence their bravery will put me to . but when they dress fine but on sundays and holy-days , ( i mean , only at such good-times as christmas , easter , whitsuntide , or so ) a silk-gown will last some seven years . he is a good husband that will or can love his wife sometimes , as on holy-days ; although i shall love my vvife best those days she is most in her huswifry ( which is , in her sluttery ) , and not on holy-days , when she is in her bravery . but he that loves his wife every day , and at all times , is luxurious , and ought to be banished a commonwealth : for , fond husbands make proud , vain , idle , and expensive wives , who spoil servants , kill industry and all good huswifry , which is the ruin to noble and ancient families . but after they had traversed the city , they went to the court. and when the covetous man saw the bravery of the court , he would by any means be gone from thence . the other two asked him the reason : he said , he was afraid that they would cheat him , or bring some false witness to accuse him of treason , to get his estate ; or at least to bring him into some court of justice , to get a fine : for , said he , i verily believe they have no money , having no lands but what they get by such shifting , sharking , flattery , bribery , betraying , and accusing : for , said he , poor courtiers are like starved prisoners , devour all they can get , and sometimes they devour one another . but the amorous knight was ravished with the glistering shews ; and was more enamoured with the gay clothes , than with the fair ladies ; and did long to embrace their silver-lace ; which made him use all his rhetorick to the covetous knight , to stay . as for the judicious knight , he was neither moved with fear , as the covetous ; nor struck with admiration , as the amorous knight ; said little , but observed much ; and was willing to go or stay , as the others could agree . but when the covetous knight heard them to talk of nothing but fashions , gowns , gorgets , fanns , feathers , and love-servants , he fell into a cold-sweat , for fear he should be forced by the king and queen to marry one of those maids of honour . and when he heard them talk of love , justice , and justifying loving-friendships , he was forced to go out of the room , or otherwise he should have swooned with an apoplexy , or lethargie , or the like sudden disease : for he did imagine himself married to one of them , and all his estate spent , and he only left with a pair of horns ; and , like a horned-beast , in the wild forest of poverty . but these sorts of discourse did enslave the amorous knight , binding him in love's fetters , insomuch as he became a servant to them all : but then finding it was impossible to please them all , he only applied , and at last yeelded himself to one ; to whom , after a short time , he was married . the covetous knight , being afraid of being forced to marry a courtier , took a wife out of the city . the judicious knight , seeing his wooing-travellers married , thought it would shew an unconstant humour not to marry , since he travelled about with them to get a wife ; or else it would seem as if he thought no woman virtuous , or at least discreet . so he went to a noble gentleman , who had a fair , well-bred , virtuous lady to his daughter , although but a small portion ; and having the father's consent , and the lady's affection , at least her good-will , married . when these three knights were married , each carried his wife to his dwelling-house . where the covetous knight did spare from his back and belly , rise early , and go to bed late ; yet his wife and servants did agree , at least did wink at each other , to cozen him : let him do what he could to spare , they outwitted him with craft , to get . the amorous knight , when he had lived at home a little while to himself , and his wive's gay clothes were faded , and she appeared in her natural complexion , and became like her neighbours , he courted others , and despised his wife ; then she strives to spruce up , and to get others to court her , which courtships did cause expences , in dancing , meetings , revelling , and feasting . the judicious knight and his lady , lived happily , loved dearly , governed orderly , thrived moderately , and became very rich , when the other two were bankrupts ; the one being cozen'd by his wife and servants ( he not allowing them sufficiently ) ; the other being impoverished with mistresses and vanities . ambition preferr'd before love. there was a noble gallant man , made love to a virtuous fair lady ; and after he had express'd his affection , and desired a return , and so agree to marry ; she told him , if she would marry , and had her liberty to chuse a husband through all the vvorld , it should be him : for , said she , the same of your worth , and praise of your merits , hath planted a root of affection in my infant-years , which hath grown up with time : but , said she , there was another root also planted therein by encouragement , which is ambition ; which ambition , says she , hath out-grown that ; so that the tree of love is like an oak to a cedar ; for though it may be more lasting , yet it will never be so high . on this high tree of ambition , said she , my life is industrious to climb to fame's high tower , for the top reaches to it ; which , if i marry , i shall never do . why , said her lover , marriage can be no hindrance . o , yes , said the lady ; husbands will never suffer their vvives to climb , but keep them fast lock'd in their arms , or tye them to houshold-employments ; or , through a foolish-obstinacy , barr up their liberty : but did they not only give them liberty , but assist them all they could ; yet the unavoidable troubles of marriage would be like great storms , which would shake them off , or throw them down , before they had climbed half the way : vvherefore , said she , i will never marry , unless you can assure me that marriage shall not hinder my climbing , nor cause me to fall . her lover said , i will give you all the assurance i can : but , said he , you cannot be ignorant , but know , that fortune , fates , and destiny , have power in the ways to fame , as much as in the ways to death ; and fates , said he , do spin the thread of fame as unevenly , as they do threads of life . yes , said she ; but there is a destiny belongs to industry ; and prudence is a good decree in nature : vvherefore , said she , i will be so prudent , as not to marry ; and so industrious , that all the actions of my life , and studious contemplations , shall be busily employed to my ambitious designs : for i will omit nothing towards the life of my memory . the matrimonial agreement . a handsome young man fell in love with a fair young lady ; insomuch that if he had her not , he was resolved to dye ; for live without her , he could not . so wooing her long , at last , although she had no great nor good opinion of a married life , being afraid to enter into so strict bonds , observing the discords therein that trouble a married life , being raised by a disagreement of humours , and jealousie of rivals . but considering withall , that marriage gave a respect to women , although beauty were gone ; and seeing the man personable , and knowing him to have a good fortune , which would help to counterpoise the inconveniences and troubles that go along with marriage , she was resolved to consent to his request . the gentleman coming as he used to do , and perswading her to chuse him for her husband , she told him she would ; but , that she found her self of that humour , that she could not endure a rival in wedlock ; and the fear of having one , would cause jealousie , which would make her very unhappy ; and the more , because she must be bound to live with her enemy ( for so she should account of her husband , when he had broken his faith and promise to her ) . he smiling , told her , she need not fear ; and that death was not more certain to man , than he would be constant to her ; sealing it with many oaths and solemn protestations ; nay , said he , when i am false , i wish you may be so , which is the worst of ills. she told him , words would not serve her turn ; but , that he should be bound in a bond , that not only whensoever she could give a proof , but when she had cause of suspition , she might depart from him ; with such an allowance out of his estate , as she thought fit to maintain her . he told her , he was so confident , and knew himself so well , that he would unmaster himself of all his estate , and make her only mistris . she answered , a part should serve her turn . so the agreement was made and sealed ; they married , and lived together as if they had but one soul : for , whatsoever the one did , or said , the other disliked not ; nor had they reason : for their study was only to please each other . after two years , the wife had a great fit of sickness , which made her pale and wan , and not so full of lively spirits as she was wont to be ; but yet as kind and loving to her husband , as she was afore : and her husband , at her first sickness , wept , watched , and tormented himself beyond all measure ; but the continuance made him so dull and heavy , that he could take no delight in himself , nor in any thing else . his occasions calling him abroad , he found himself so refreshed , that his spirits revived again ; but returning home , and finding not that mirth in the sick , as was in the healthy wife , it grew wearisome to him ; insomuch that he always would have occasions to be abroad , and thought home his only prison . his wife , mourning for his absence , complained to him at his return , and said , she was not only unhappy for her sickness , but miserable , in that his occasions were more urgent to call him from her , when she had most need of his company to comfort her in the loss of her health , than in all the time they had been married : and therefore , pray husband , said she , what is this unfortunate business that employs you so much , and makes me see you so seldom ? he told her , the worldly affairs of men , women did not understand ; and therefore it were a folly to recite them : besides , said he , i am so weary in following them , that i hate to repeat them . she , like a good wife , submitted to her husband's affairs , and was content to sit without him . the husband returning home one day fromjolly company , whose discourse had been merry and wanton , he met with his wife's maid at the door , and ask'd her how her mistris did ; she said , not very well : thou lookest well , said he , and chucks her under the chin . she , proud of her master's kindness , smerks and smiles upon him ; insomuch , that the next time he met her , he kiss'd her . now she begins to despise her mistris , and only admires her self , and is always the first person or servant that opens the door to her master ; and , through the dilgence of the maid , the master 's great affairs abroad were ended ; and his only employment and busie care is now so much at home , that whensoever he was abroad , he was in such hast , that he could scarce salute any body by the way ; and when his friends spake to him , his head was so full of thoughts , that he would answer quite from the question ; insomuch that he was thought one of the best and carefullest husbands in the world. in the mean time his vvife grew well , and his maid grew pert and bold towards her mistris ; and the mistress , wondering at it , began to observe more strictly , what made her so : for she perceived the vvench came oftner than accustomed where her husband and she were ; and found also , that her husband had always some excuse to turn his head and eyes to that place where she was ; and that whensoever the wench came where they were , he would alter his discourse , talking extravagantly . vvhereupon , not liking it , she examined her husband , vvhether his affections were as strong to her as ever they were : he answered , he was the perfectest good husband in the world , and so he should be until he dyed . it chanc'd he was employed by the state into another countrey ; where , at the parting , his wife and he lamented most sadly , and many tears were shed . but when he was abroad ( being in much company who took their liberty , and had many mistresses ) , he then considered with himself , he was a most miserable man that must be bound only to one ; but withall , did consider what promises he made his wife , and what advantages she had on him in his estate ; which kept him in good order for a time . but at last he was perswaded by his companions to fling off all care , and take his pleasure whilst he might : for , said they , what do our wives know what we do ? besides , said they , wives are only to keep our house , to bring us children , not to give us laws . thus preaching to him , he at last followed their doctrine , and improved it so well , that he became the greatest libertine of them all ; like a horse that having broken his reins , ( when he finds himself loose ) skips over hedges , ditches , pales , or whatsoever is in his way ; and runs wildly about , until he hath wearied himself . but his wife having some intelligence ( as most commonly they want none ) , or may be out of pure love , comes to see him : he receives her with the greatest joy , and makes the most of her in the world , carrying her to see all the countrey and towns thereabouts , and all the varieties , curiosities , and sights , that were to be seen . but when she had been there a month , or such a time , he tells her how dangerous it is to leave his house to servants who are negligent , and his estate to be entrusted he knows not to whom ; so that there is no way but to return both for his and her good , especially if they had children ; although , said he , i had rather part with my life , than be absent from you ; but necessity hath no law. so she , good woman , goeth home to care and spare , whilst he spends ; for in the mean time he follows his humours : and custom making confidence , and confidence carelesness , begins to be less shie , and more free ; insomuch as when he returned home , his maid , whom he did but eye , and friendly kiss , now he courts in every room ; and were it not for his having his estate made over , even before his wive's face ; but that made him fawn and flatter , and somewhat for quietness sake . but his wife , one day being in his closet , by chance opened a cabinet , wherein she found a letter from a mistris of his ; whereat she was much amazed : and being startled at it , at last calling her self to her self again , shewed it to her husband ; he fain would have excused it , but that the plainness of truth would not give him leave : whereupon he craved pardon , promising amendment , and swearing he never would do so again . no , said she , i never will trust a broken wheel : do you know what is in my power , said she ? yes , said he , a great part of my estate . o how i adore dame nature , said she , that gave me those two eyes , prudence to foresee , and providence to provide : but i have not only your estate , but your honour and fame in my power ; so that , if i please , all that see you , shall hiss at you , and contemn whatsoever you do . for , if you had the beauty of paris , they would say , you were but a fair cuckold . if you had the courage of hector , they would say , you were but a desperate cuckold . had you the wisdom of ulysses , or solomon , they would laugh , and say , there goes he that is not yet so wise as to keep his wife honest. if you had the tongue of tully , and made as eloquent orations , they would say , there is the prating cuckold . if you were as fine a poet as virgil , or as sweet as ovid , yet they would laugh , and scorn , and say , he makes verses , whilst his wife makes him a cuckold . now jealousie and rage are her two bawds to corrupt her chastity ; the one perswading her to be revenged , to shew her husband she could take delight , and have lovers , as well as he . this makes her curl , paint , prune , dress , make feasts , plays , balls , masques , and have merry-meetings abroad : whereupon she began to find as much pleasure as her husband , in variety ; and now begins to flatter him , and to dissemble with him , that she may play the whore more privately , finding a delight in obscurity , thinking that most sweet which is stoln : so they play , like children , at bo-peep in adultery , and face it out with fair looks , and smooth it over with sweet words , and live with false hearts , and dye with large consciences . but these , repenting when they dyed , made a fair end . of two ladies different humours . there were two young ladies bred together ; the one proved a stoick , living a retired life ; the other proved a gossip , her head being full of vain designs , her tongue full of idle discourses , her body busily-restless , running from place to place , spending her life in fruitless visits , and expensive entertainments ; gleaning up all the news of the town ; and when she had gathered up a bundle , or sheaf , of this unprofitable grain , her custom was to come and thresh it out with the flail of her tongue , at the door of the other lady's ears ; which she , although with great inconvenience , suffered , by reason of their long acquaintance , which many times breeds a kind of friendship , although between different humours , natures , and dispositions : for custom of acquaintance begets some small affections even in the most obdurate hearts . but this stoical lady did comply so much with her friend's humour , as to give her the hearing , although she would often advise and perswade her to that course of life she lived ; which course of life the other lady would often dislike , and speak against , saying , that solitariness was a grave that buried the life ; and , that a contemplatory mind was a tomb , wherein lay nothing but insipid thoughts . the other lady said , that solitariness was a paradice of true happiness ; and , that contemplation was a heaven of fruition : for in imagination ( said she ) we enjoy all things with ease , and as we will ; whereas iu action we find great disturbance and opposition ; are cross'd in every thing , and enjoy nothing . at last the lady gossip married , whereat the stoick-lady rejoiced , imagining her friend would become grave and staid , and that her thoughts would be more composed and setled to a retired life , being married , than when she was a maid , by reason married wives have more employment than maids , in ordering their families , directing and over-seeing their servants , nursing their children , and the like . but after she had been married some time , she came with her eyes full of tears , and her mouth full of complaints , one while for the debaucheries of her husband , and other times for the carelesness and cozenage of her servants . other times she would come in a cholerick humour , with railing-speeches , telling her friend what quarrels she hath had with such a lady , and such a neighbour , and what abuses she had received : which the stoick lady would endeavour to pacifie , and perswade her to patience , as much as she could . but at last the stoick-lady married to a gallant heroick man. but soon after , a civil-warr broke out ; where these two ladies husbands being for the emperor , after great dangers , and many wounds got in their royal master's service , with the loss of their estates , and banishment of their persons , they were forced to wander into other nations , to live with strangers upon cold charity ; and these two ladies were forced also to take up their crosses , and travel with their husbands ; wherein the stoick lady did bear her part patiently . the other lady was impatient with her misfortunes , which made her quarrel with every thing , even vvith her self ; and yet sometimes vvould take delight with the least hopes of a repair , and would lend a credulous ear to every hopeful report , although never so improbable . but the stoick-lady , as she bare her misfortunes patiently , so she lived quietly , making her necessities a school of wisdom , where truth taught , and judgment corrected ; wherein she learned neither to be credulous , nor obstinate ; not to believe every report , nor to reject all reports ; but setled her self , if good came , so ; if not , she knew how to suffer without repining at that which could not be avoided nor amended . but one day the lady - gossip came to the stoick-lady with a pleased humour , and merry countenance , and told her , that her husband had been with the emperor , and that the emperor used him very kindly , and had spoke to him very affectionately . the other lady said , that princes would do so to them that had deserved no favour . nay , said the lady - gossip , he told my husband , that when he hath his power , he would reward his service . o , said the other lady , princes forget to reward when they have power , although they never forget to promise rewards when they have none . nay , said the lady - gossip , the emperor's favourite said , the emperor had a great esteem of my husband ; and that he takes an occasion in all his discourse to commend my husband , and to express his love and kindness to him . the stoick lady said , that was but a petty favourite's policy , to keep off envy from himself , and to feed half-starved sufferers : for it is not to your husband only , who is a gallant man , and deserves much ; but to every one he says the like ; even to grooms , trumpeters , cooks , and scullions , making no difference in promises nor commendations . the like they do in letters ; for one kind of stile serves for all qualities and degrees , which is as one deed of gift to several friends , which in effect proves nothing ; and though they think it is not perceived , yet it is as publick as a proclamation , which begins , may it be known to all people . but , said she , although this kind of policy may deceive unpractised men , and please young men , and foolish women , with vain hopes , causing them to build castles in the air : yet they that are wise and experienced , are not muffled nor blinded therewith , nor build any design thereon , by reason that politick foundation is rotten and weak ; and that such poor , smooth , smiling , dissembling policies , will sooner pull down monarchy , than defend it , much less set up one that hath been cast down by rebellion . no , said she , wise men know , that the best policy is true and plain dealing . and , said she , let me fore-warn you , not to feed upon court-promises , smiles , commendations , and letters ; for they will breed in you vain crudities , and fill you with hydropsical spleen , and spightful vapours , and hot malicious humours , which are apt to make honest men turn knaves . the lady - gossip said , if i thought my husband 's great losses and faithful services should not be rewarded , i should hate the favourite for playing the politician with my husband ; and , for revenge , i would work up a faction of women against him ; and ifaith , said she , they would not fail to pull him down . indeed , said the stoick-lady , our sex is prevalent and prompt in any revengeful-design ; and those in authority might safer displease ten men , than one woman : for , though they can do no good ( said she ) in state-affairs , yet we can do hurt . yes , said the lady - gossip , and so secretly , that men shall not perceive it . but , said the stoick-lady , it is against the nature and temper of our sex to do so . no , said the lady - gossip , we were born to do it ; and so went out in choler . the drunken poets . there were a company of men met at a well called helicon ; which place of society is the cause , many times , of good fellowship ; and drinking they take for their pastime . but here , at first , they drank soberly , and discoursed orderly ; but at last they began to drink healths , and so many , that they grew so drunk that they could not stand ; and so drowsie , that they all fell asleep . but , in their sleep , this drink did work such effects , that when they waked , they became all mad in poetry ; some merry , some melancholy , others envious ; some amorous , some divinely , poetically mad. those that were mad-merry , were lyrick poets , who did nothing but sing sonnets . the melancholy were tragedians . the envious were satyrists , who describe the world a hell , and the men therein devils . the amorous run all into blank-verses , putting them into such numbers as to raise the voice to a passionate whining , folding their arms , fixing their eyes . but a grave moral philosopher walking that way , seeing a company together , out of a curiosity went to them . the first that he saw , was blind homer , acting of paris ; who hearing one come towards him , imagined straight it was a woman , because his desire would have it so ; and would have him act the part of helen . the philosopher told him , he was not fit to make a courtezan . why , said homer , pythagoras was one in his transmigrations . whereat the philosopher was very angry , and left him , and went to see who the rest were . the next he met , was virgil , acting of aeneas ; who as soon as saw the philosopher , would needs take him up for his father anchises . the philosopher desired to be excused : for though ( said he ) i am old enough to be thy father , yet i love not the few remainder of my days so well , as to have them be a cause to burthen my son ; nor am i so uncharitable as he was to his daughter-in-law , to expose her to danger , and so to be lost , whilst he rid lazily upon his son's shoulders . the third person he saw , was ovid , transforming gods , men , and beasts . as soon as he saw the philosopher , he would needs have him europa , and himself jupiter ; and lay tumbling upon the grass , feigning himself like a bull , and would have him get upon him , as europa did , and bid him lay hold upon his horns . the philosopher said , he thought them all horn'd-mad , and so left him . the fourth he met , was lucan , describing the battel between caesar and pompey : and when he saw the philosopher , he would have him stand for pompey , whilst he represented caesar , and so would have had them fight . but the philosopher told him , he was a man of peace , and not for warr ; my study , said he , is , to conquer unsatiable ambition , and not to fight and kill for power and authority by usurpation . the fifth he met , was martial ; who was writing epigrams , and would needs write one of the philosopher . but he prayed him to forbear : for , said he , my ways are so dull and sober , that they will not produce such fancies as must go to the making of jestings-epigrams . the sixth he met , was horace ; who was describing , in his discourse , a countrey-life ; and would needs have the philosopher a countrey-lass ; he would have had him sit down upon a bank by him , that he might make love to him , by repeating of amorous poems . but after much strugling , the philosopher got from him ; and growing weary of their company , left them to their vain fantasms , and fantastical humours . love's cure . there was a man , amorous by nature , and of a courtly behaviour , who made love to a young lady , and she returned him affection for his kind professions : but after a while he forsook her , and made love to another ; of whom he had also the good fortune to be beloved , as oft-times amorous men have , by reason they address their suits to credulous women , who are self-conceited and opinionated , easily believe , and soon perswade themselves , that men's praises and promises , vows and protestations , are real ; and , that their affections are unalterably fix'd , when they address themselves as suitors and servants . but this gallant left her , as he did the other , and made love to a third : for it is the nature of amorous persons to love variety , and seek for change , being soon weary of one and the same object . whereupon these two forsaken-ladies became very melancholy ; and though they were enemies whilst he made love to either , yet now became dear friends , since he made love to neither : and every day they would visit one another , to condole and bewail their misfortunate loves . but the second forsaken-lady having been some time in the countrey , and returning thence , went to visit her friend , with a face clothed in a sad countenance , and veiled with dull eyes ; and seeing her friend ( who had wont to have as mourning a face as she ) to have now a merry countenance , a lively behaviour , and a healthful complexion ; began to be jealous , thinking her unconstant lover had renewed his love-suit to her : for friendships made by loss , dissolve , when either get what they before did lose ; and think they had a right to , or at least a share in it . but , to be resolved , she asked her the reason she seemed so well disposed to be pleasant ; for when she parted from her last , she seemed to be like one newly raised from the dead ; or like a statue made of stone , that had no life nor motion . truly , said she , my mind is in such peace , that my thoughts take a harmless freedom to sport and play , and it gives also my body leave to nourish life . the second lady said , would my mind could find the same tranquillity . the first said , truly if your mind be troubled still , and finds no rest , i pity you , by what i have felt my self ; for when my mind was troubled , there was a civil-warr amongst my passions , such factions , side-takings , and disputations , with anger , spight , spleen , and malice , against love , hope , and jealousie , that it caused many tears to be shed , and groans to be sent forth . but how came you to be cured , said she ? i tell you ( answered she ) ; after a long civil-warr amongst my passions , my body became almost wasted to skin and bone , for want of rest and nourishment ; for my passions had devoured sleep , and banished appetite , whereby my mind began to be infected with a feverish distemper ; which reason perceiving , came to the rescue , bringing an army of arguments , of which understanding and truth were chief commanders ; and after many skirmishes , those passions being often foiled , and put to a rout , they grew weak , and so dispersed several ways . but after these warrs , a dark melancholy cover'd my mind like a cloud , which eclipsed all the light of comfort , and made it murmur against the gods decree , and complain against nature's works , and curse fortune's instability : at which , poor virtue , whom education had put to be my governess , was very angry , and said , the gods had been too merciful , nature too bountiful , and fortune too favourable , unless i were more thankful . yet she commanded patience and charity ( who were two of her handmaids ) to stand by me . but as my mind was musing , in came my grave and sober companions , the sciences ; and seeing me in that posture , began to counsel me , perswading me to follow their studies : for , said they , nothing can compose and settle the mind more than we do . my mind , bowing to them , gave them thanks for their advice : but as soon as they were gone , in came my domestick acquaintance , the arts , who offered me all their industry and ingenuity , to do me service . but i told them , i was past the cure of any . art : whereupon they very sorrowfully departed . no sooner were they gone , but in came my play-fellows , the muses ; who seeing me sit so dejected , began to sport with me ; one pulled me out to dance ; another would have me sing ; another repeated love-verses ; another described battels and warrs ; another , like a mimmick , imitated several humours : and so every one endeavoured to please me in their turns . but the tragedian muse said , that she liked my humour very well ; and , that i was the only fit company for her . but my moral governess chid them away , and said , she would order me better , than to suffer such wanton wenches , and idle huswives , to keep me company ; for they were able to spoil and corrupt a whole nation with their wildness , and impoverish a kingdom with their laziness : whereupon some went laughing away , but others went weeping . so after i had been some time chastised by virtue , the sciences returned in a chariot which the arts had made , being finely carved , neatly cut , and lively painted , joined with curious screws , and subtil engines , and the wheels mathematically compassed : which chariot was drawn by six new , sound , strong , and well-breath'd opinions , harnessed with speculations , shod with disputations , wherewith they often stumble upon the ridg of ignorance , or plunge into holes of nonsense . he that drove the chariot , was ambition ; the postillion , was curiosity ; the sciences sat in it , and doubts and hopes run by , as lacquies ; which lacquies did bear me upon their shoulders , and placed me in the midst of the chariot , the sciences being round about me . where i was no sooner set , but rhetorick presented me with a posie of sweet eloquence , and the mathematicks crown'd me with truth . but they all , in their turns , encouraged me with promises , that they would carry me to fame's palace , and there i should remain . no sooner had ambition given a lash , to make the opinions run , but the muses came in another chariot made by contemplation , cut out of imagination , lined with several-colour'd fancies , embroidered with rhymes , rowling upon the wheels of numbers , drawn by distinguishings , whose trappings were similizing , plumed with delight , shod with pleasure , which makes them run smooth , swift , and easie : he that did drive the chariot , was judgment ; and the postillion , wit. but when the muses , who were therein , saw i was in the chariot of the sciences , they began to quarrel , and draw out their satyrical swords . the sciences , being more grave and temperate , received their assaults very civilly , as coming from fair ladies . but after some dispute , they did agree to take turns to carry me to fame's palace . after i had travelled some time with the sciences , i was received into the chariot of the muses , where i was received with great joy , and crowned with a wreath of flame . and thus i am travelling with very wise and pleasant company , though as yet i have no sight of the palace ; but howsoever , my mind is so pleased with the journey , so delighted with the society , and so proud of the favours and gifts it receives from them every day , that it despises the follies , and hates the falshood of mankind , and scorns the proffers of fortune , not regarding the vanities of the world. would you could bring me into that society , said the second lady . the first answered , i will do my endeavour . so , after a short time , she pleaded so earnestly in her friend's behalf , that she was received into their company , in their chariots ; where each lady took their turns to ride in each chariot , whereby the muses and sciences were both pleased , having always one of them with each . and when at any time they rested from travelling , the sciences and muses made pastimes for those two ladies , like those of the olympick-games ; the sciences found out new places to play in , and took the height , the longitude and latitude of them . also , by the help of the arts , they fortified and made them strong , and built thereon ; and the muses invented masques , made plays , and the like : for the sciences , arts , and muses , were so proud , and did so glory that they had gotten two of the feminine sex , that they strove with all their industry to delight them , and to entertain them after the best manner . the propagating souls . there was a handsom young lord , and a young beautiful lady , who did love one another so passionately and entirely , that their affections could never be dissolved : but their parents not agreeing to it , would by no means be perswaded to let them marry , nor so much as to let them converse like strangers , setting spyes to watch them . but when they found they would meet , in despight of their spies , they enclosed them up from coming at each other : whereat they grew so discontent and melancholy , that they both dyed , and just at one and the same time , to the great grief of their parents , who now wish'd they had not been so cruel . but when their bodies were dead , these lovers souls , leaving their fleshly mansions , went towards the river of styx , to pass over to the elyzium-fields ; where , in the way , they met each other : at which meeting they were extreamly joyed , but knew not how to express it , for they had no lips to kiss , nor arms to embrace , being bodiless , and only spirits . but the passion of love being always ingenious , found out a way , that their souls ( which are spirits ) did mingle and intermix , as liquid essences , whereby both their souls became as one . but after these gentle , smooth , soft loveexpressions , they began to remember each other of their crosses and oppositions whilst they lived in their bodies : but , at last , considering of the place they were moving to , the masculine soul was unwilling to go to it ; for , since he had his beloved soul , he cared not to live in the elyzium : then , speaking in the soul's language , he perswaded his love not to go thither : for , said he , i desire no other company but yours ; nor would i be troubled or disturbed with other lovers souls . besides , i have heard , said he , that those that are there , do nothing but walk and talk of their past-life , which we may desire to forget . then let us , said he , only enjoy our selves by intermixing thus . she answered , she did approve of his desire ; and , that her mind did join and consent . but where ( said she ) shall be our habitation ? he answered , he would build a mansion in the air , of poets fancies , and philosophers imaginations , and make gardens of oratory : wherein should flow'rs of rhetorick grow , by which rivers of divine faith should flow . that place ( said she ) a paradice would be ; but i no strong foundation there can see ; for it will shake with every puff of wind ; no certainty nor surance will you find . my soul , said be , then we will higher fly , and there another mansion we will try . and after they had argued some time , at last they did agree to dwell in one of the planets ; but before such time as they could arrive to the lowest planet , these two noble souls , by conjunction , produced several flames , which were called meteors : these , being not able to travel so high , lived in the lower region ; and by intermixing together , as their parents did , produced more of their kind . but after those productions of these souls , they went to the planets , where they found some of their climates too cold , others too moist , others too cold and moist ; others hot , and others hot and moist ; others hot and dry , others cold and dry ; with which they did not agree , being not equally temper'd . but yet in every planet , these souls being fruitful , they left many of their issues , called meteors , which are shining-lights , like starrs ; but being produced from the mortal temper of the souls , are subject to mortality : for , amorous thoughts are the bodily-dregs of mortality , which made these meteors subject to dye , as other generations , being the mortal effects of their immortality ; otherwise they would be starrs : for , whatsoever is mortal , may beget their like , or kind , which other things that are immortal , never do . but when these two souls had travelled above the planets , they became one fix'd starr , as being eternal , and not subject to dye . and when they were thus , they did produce no more issues ; for what mortality the body left , those souls to earth and planets did resign , which in a generation of meteors shine . fancy's monarchy in the land of poetry . in the land of poetry , reason was king ; a gallant prince he was , and of a heroick spirit , a majestical presence , and of a sober and grave countenance : he was tall of stature , and strong of limbs . his queen was the lady wit ; a lady of a quick spirit , of a pleasant conversation , amiable countenance , free behaviour , and of a sweet disposition : she was neatly shap'd , fair complexion'd , and finely , but variously attired . this king and queen loved one another with an extraordinary affection , and lived very happily and peaceably , for he governed wisely . his kingdom was large , and fully populated ; well manured , and of great traffick . he made profitable laws , set strict rules , and kept good orders both in the church and state. as for the church , faith and zeal were the two arch-bishops , who were sworn to consecrate none but moral virtues , to preach good life , and leave all sects , opinions , superstitions , idolatry , and the like . neither were they suffered to make lectures of learning , because it is always about controversies , puzling belief with nice distinctions , vain fantasms , and empty words , without sense . the cathedral church , was the conscience . the two universities , were study and practice , wherein all the masculine youth of the kingdom were bred . as for the state , there were superintendent officers and magistrates made of all degrees . the sen ces were the five ports to this kingdom ; the head and the heart were the two magazines . there were two governours made to every port to command and rule , judgment and understanding always sit at the ports called the ears , to examine all that enter there , having a strict command from the king to let in no sound but harmony , no reports but truth , no discourses but rational or witty ; and that they should shut the gates against flattery , falshood , discord , harsh loud strains , scraping , creaking , squealing noises . love and skill were the two commanders to the port , eyes , who were commanded to let none in , but uniformity , cimmetry , beauty , graceful motions , pleasing aspects , light and well-mixt colours ; and to shut the gates against deformity or monstrosity , rude or cruel actions , glaring lights , illmix'd colours , false shadows , and darkness , and to set up the light of dreams when they are shut . also to let no tears pass through the eyes , but those that have a pass-port from the governour of the heart . at the port of the nostrils sate like and dislike , who were commanded to let in none but sweet smells , such as refresh the brain ; as , the scent of sweet flowers , savoury herbs , earth new-plough'd , new-bak'd bread ; also , sweet gums , sweet essences , and the like ; but to shut the gates of the nostrils against snuffs of candles , stinking breaths , corrupted flesh , stale fish , old apples , strong cheese , spilt drink , foul gutters , especially the pump or sink in a ship : also , no smells of suet or grease ; and from many more stinking scents , which would be too tedious to mention . but in case of necessity they were to be allowed , or at least commanded , to let in some sorts of stinks , as assafoetida , and burnt feathers , to cure the fits of the mother . then the two commanders of the mouth were , truth and pleasure ; one was to govern the words , the other the taste . pleasure was commanded to let nothing into the mouth that was either too sharp , too bitter , too salt , or too deliciously sweet . truth was commanded to suffer no lyes , cursing , slandering , railings , flattering ; nor amorous , lascivious , factious discourses . likewise , never to let pass an oath , but to confirm a truth ; no threatning , but to terrifie or reclaim the wicked , or cross-natur'd ; no pleading , but for right ; no commands , but for good ; no praises , but for worth. also , to let no sighs nor groans pass , nor no professions , except they have a pass-port from the heart . nor no promises , but when they have a pass-port from the king , which is reason . the two commanders of touch , were pain and pleasure ; who were commanded to keep out all sharp colds , burning heats , bruises , pinches , smartings , cuttings , prickings , nippings , pressing , razing ; and to let in none but nourishing warmth , soft rubbing , gentle scratching , refreshing colds , and the like . and upon pain of death , or at least high displeasure , these rules were to be kept . yet , sometimes , bribery corrupted the commanders . the privy-council-chamber was the breast ; the privy-councellors were , secrecy , constancy , fidelity , unity , truth , justice , fortitude , prudence , and temperance . these privy-councellors helped the king to manage the affairs of the kingdom . the secretaries of state were intelligence and dispatch . the treasurer , was memory . the lord keeper , was remembrance . the mayors of every city , were authority . the constables were care. the judges were , commutative and distributive justice . honesty was the commander of all the forces , of the actions and thoughts . the heroick actions , are the chief commanders , as captains , and colonels , and the like . the common-soldiers are the ordinary and necessary actions , which are employed in offensive and defensive warrs . the merchants are the imaginations , which traffick and trade all over the world. the inventions , are the handicrafts-men and labourers . the appetites are the citizens , that are so covetous as to engross all commodities , and the wealth of the kingdom ; and are the most luxurious people in the land. but , as i said , the king was a wise prince ; and to divert his subjects from too serious studies , dull contemplations , and laborious dictatings , he had masques , plays , pastorals , and the like ; being attended by his nobles , the sciences ; and the gentry of the kingdom , which were the several languages . the queen , by the muses and graces . the marriage of life and death . death went a wooing to life ; but her grim and terrible aspect did so affright life , that she ran away , and would by no means hearken unto her suit. then death sent age and weakness , as two ambassadors , to present her affection : but life would not give them audience . whereupon death sent pain ; who had such a perswasive power , that made life yeeld to death's embracements . and after they were agreed , the wedding-day was set , and guests invited . life invited the five senses , and all the passions and affections , with beauty , pleasure , youth , wit , prosperity ; and also , virtue , and the graces . but health , strength , cordials , and charms , refused to come ; which troubled life much . none that death invited , refused to come ; they were , old father time , weakness , sickness , all sorts of pains , and all sorts of diseases , and killing-instruments ; as also , sighs , tears , and groans ; numbness , and paleness . but when life and death met , death took life by the hand ; then peace married them , and rest made their bed of oblivion , wherein life lay in the cold arms of death . yet death got numerous issues ; and ever since , whatsoever is produced from life , dyes . whereas , before this marriage , there was no such thing as dying ; for death and life were single , like batchelors and maids . but life proved not so good a wife , as death a husband ; for death is sober , staid , grave , discreet , patient , dwelling silently and solitary ; whereas life is wild , various , unconstant , and runs about , shunning her husband death's company . but he , as a loving and fond husband , follows her ; and when he embraces her , she grows big , and soon produces young lives . but all the off-spring of death and life , are divided ; half dwelling with life , and half with death . at this wedding , old father time , which looked the youngest , although he was the oldest in the company , and danced the nimblest and best , making several changes in his dances ; he trod so gently , and moved so smoothly , that none could perceive how he did turn , and wind , and lead about . and being wiser than all the rest , with long experience , he behaved himself so handsomely , insinuated so subtilly , courted so civilly , that he got all the ladies affections ; and being dextrous , got favours from every one of them , and some extraordinary ones ; for he devirginated youth , beauty , pleasure , prosperity , and all the five sences ; but could not corrupt , wit , virtue , nor the graces . but nature , hearing of the abuse of her maids , was very angry , and forced him to marry them all . but they , although they were inamoured of him before they were married , yet now they do , as most other wives , not care for him ; nay , they hate him , rail and exclaim against him ; that what with his peevish , froward , and cross wives , and with the jealousie he hath of sickness , pains , and mischances , that ofen ravish them , he is become full of wrinkles , and his hair is turned all gray . but virtue and wit , which are his sworn friends , and sweet companions , recreate him with their pleasant , free , honest , and honourable societies . of the indispositions of the mind . the mind was very sick , and sent for physicians ; and the first that came , were divines ; who disputed so long , and contradicted one another so much , that they could conclude of nothing . one advising the mind to take a scruple of calvin's institutions ; others , a dram of luther's doctrine ; some , two drams of the romish treacle , or opinions ; some , of the anabaptists water ; others , to take some of the brownists spirits . but there were some quite from these opinions , and would advise the mind to lay some of mahomet's pigeons at the feet , cutting them with the turkish scimitar , then bind it up with his alcaron ; others would have the mind bind the head with the talmud of the jews . but the mind grew sicker and sicker ; insomuch that it was almost at the last gasp : whereupon the mind desired them to depart ; for , said he , your controversies will kill me sooner than your doctrine will cure me ! the mind being very sick , sent for other sects of physicians , who were moral philosophers ; who being come , set round a table , and there began to discourse and dispute of the diseases of the mind . one said , grief is a lethargie . no , said another , stupidity is a lethargie ; for grief rather weeps , than sleeps . o , but said another , there are dry griefs , that sweat no tears . pray , gentlemen , dispatch , said the mind , for i am in great pain . one says , hate is an apoplexy ; for it is dead to it self , though it lives to the beloved . no , said he , but hate is a dead-palsie , no , said the other , ignorance is a dead-palsie , but hate is an apoplexie , caused by the stopping of the spirits , either animal or vital ; the vital spirits being compassion ; the animal spirits , generosity . you are most strangely mistaken , said another ; for all the spirits are composed of fortitude ; the vital spirits are active , the animal are passive . but they disputed so long upon this point , that they had almost fallen out ; and the mind prayed them not to quarrel ; for wrangling noise did disturb him much . then one said , that spight and envy were cancers ; the one caused by sharp humours , the other by salt , another said , that spight was not a cancer , but a fistula , that broke out in many several places ; and that envy was the scurvy , that speckled the whole body of the mind , like flea-bites . the mind prayed them to go no further in that dispute . then one of them said , that anger was a hot burning fever . nay , by your favour , said another , anger is an epilepsie , that soams at the mouth , and beats its breast , strugling and striving , and will be often in cold-sweats , and as pale as death . then another said , that an ague in the mind was doubt and hope ; the cold fit being doubt ; and the hot fit , hope . a second answered , that agues were fear , which caused shaking-fits . a third said , that jealousie was an ague , that had cold and hot fits. nay , said a fourth , jealousie is an hectick fever , that is , an extraordinary heat got into the arteries , which inflames the spirit of action , drinks up the blood of tranquillity , and at last wasts and consumes the body of love. a fifth said , jealousie is the gout ; which is a burning , beating pain , never letting the mind be at rest . said a sixth , jealousie is a head-ake , caused from an ill affected friend . but there grew such a dispute upon this , as whether it was the head , heart , or arteries ; that the mind was forced to threaten them , they should have no fees if they did dispute so much . as for the wind-cholick in the mind , some said , it was an overflow of imaginations and conceptions : others , that it was strange opinions : others said , it was wild fancies : others , that it was the over-dilating of the thoughts : and many more several judgments were given ; whereupon they were ready to fight . to which the mind replied , that it is impossible you should prescribe effectual medicines , if you cannot agree about the disease . then another said , slander was the spotted-fever . another said , a spotted-fever was malice . says another , a spotted-fever and the plague have near relation : but the plague , said he , is discontent , that is caused by envy , slander , malice , and the like . this plague of discontent breaks out into factions , sores , and great spots of rebellion , which causeth death and destruction . but one of the former doctors was about contradicting him ; but the mind forbid him . then one said , melancholy was the stone , caused by a cold congealment of the spirit . another said , cruelty was the stone , caused by hot revenge , or covetous contractings , which bakes all the tender and softer humours into a hard confirmed body , the stone . then one said , that rage and fury were convulsions . no , said another , inconstancies are convulsions . then one said , pity was a consumption , pining and wasting by degrees . nay , by your favour , said a second , forgetfulness is a consumption , which fades as light and colours , or moulders as dust. then another said , desire was a dropsie , which was always dry . nay , said a second , desire is that disease which is called a dog-like-appetite ; which causes the appetite of the mind to be always hungry , and the stomack of the mind seeming always empty , which makes the thoughts hunt after food . but a dropsie ( said he ) is a reluctancy , which always swells out with aversions . o , said a third , a dropsie in the mind is voluptuousness . nay , said a fourth , a dropsie is pride , that swells out with vain-glory. but they disputed so much , whether a dropsie , or a dog-like-appetite , or a reluctancy , or voluptuousness , or pride , that they fell together by the ears . and the mind was well content to let them fight . but for fear the mind should be disturbed , his friends parted them , and pray'd the doctors that they would prescribe the mind something to take . then they began their prescriptions . for the lethargie of grief , said one , you must take some crumbs of comfort mix'd with the juice of patience , the spirits of grace , and sprigs of time , and lay it to the heart of the mind , and it will prove a perfect cure. another said , a lethargie is stupidity ; and therefore you must take hot and reviving drinks , as the vapour of wine , or the like drinks , variety of objects , pleasant conversation ; mix these together : then put this liquor into a syringe of musick , and squirt it into the ears of the mind , and this will bring a perfect cure. the doctor , who said an apoplexy was hate , said , the mind must take a few obligations , and mix them with a mollifying-oyl of good-nature , and spirits of gratitude , and bind them upon the grieved part , and that would cure it . no ( said the doctor that said apoplexies were love ) , you must take the drug of misfortunes , and the sirrup of misery ; and when you have mix'd them together , you must set them a stewing on the fire of trial , then drink it off warm ; and although it will make the mind sick with unkindness for the present , yet it will purge all the doting humours out of the mind . but he that said , hate was a dead-palsie , prescribed the same medicine as he that said it was an apoplexy ; for he said , an apoplexy is a kind of a dead-palsie . he that said , ignorance was a dead-palsie , said , the mind must take some good books , whose authors were learned persons , and squeeze them hard through a strainer of study , and mix some practised experience thereto , and make a salve of industry , then spread it upon a strong canvase of time , and lay it upon the malady , and it will be a perfect cure. and he that said , spight and envy were cancers , bid the mind take the honey of self-conceit once in two or three hours , and it would abate that sharp or salt humour . the other , that said that spight and envy were fistula's , bid the mind get some of the powder of inferiors , or the tears of the distressed , and mix them well together , and lay it to the sore , and it will be a perfect cure. he that said , that envy was the scurvy , bid him bathe in solitariness , and drink of the water of meditation , wherein run thoughts of death , like mineral-veins , and it will cure him . and the doctor that said , anger was a fever , bid the mind drink cold julips of patience . he that said , anger was an epilepsie , bid the mind take the powder of discretion . and the doctor that said , an ague was doubts and hopes ; bid him take the powder of watchfulness , and mix it with a draught of courage , and drink it in his cold fit ; and take the powder of industry in the liquor of judgment , in his hot fit , and it will cure him . he that said , an ague in the mind was fear , gave the same prescription of the former medicine for the cold fit. but he that said , jealousie was an ague , bid the mind take some of the spirits of confidence . and he that said , jealousie was a consumption ; bid the mind take nourishing-broths of variety , and bathe in the river of oblivion , which would cool the fever of suspition . but he who said , that jealousie was the gout in the mind ; bid the mind lay a plaster of absence , spread on the canvase of time , and it would cure him . as for the wind-cholick , he that said it was the overflow of the imaginations and conceptions , bid the mind take some several noises , both instrumental and vocal , and mix them with much company , and lay them to the ears of the mind , and it will cure . probatum est . and those that said , that wind-cholick was strange opinions , or wild fancies ; bid the mind take some pills of employment to purge out those crude , flatulent , and undigested humours . but he that said , it was caused by a dilatation of the thoughts , bid him take the eyes of dice , and the spots of cards , and the chequers of chess-boards , and the points of table-men , and put them together ; and when they are throughly mix'd , and dissolved into an oil , annoint the fingers-ends , the palms of the hands , the wrist , the elbows , and the eyes of the mind ; this , says he , will contract the thoughts to the compass of a single-penny , which will cure that disease . as for the disease called the spotted-fever , which is slander ; they bid the mind take a good quantity of repentance , and distil it , from whence will drop tears ; and take a draught of that distilled water every morning fasting . but he that said , that malice was the spotted . fever , bid the mind distil merits , from whence will drop praises ; and bid the mind take a draught of that water every evening . he that said , discontent was the plague , being a part of all the diseases ; bid the mind take humility , magnanimity , obedience , loyalty , fidelity , and temper ; and put all these together , and make a pultis , and lay it upon the swelling , it will keep it from breaking , asswage the pain , and cure the patient . but if they come out in spots of rebellion , there is no remedy to avoid death . as for melancholy , he that said it was the stone in the mind , caused by a cold congealment in the spirits , which stupifies the senses of the mind into stone ; bid him take beauty , wit , fine landskips , prospects , musick , fresh air ; put this into the liquor of mirth , and drink of it every day ; it would prove a perfect cure. but he that said , the stone in the mind was cruelty , caused by the sharpness of envy , the bitterness of hate , and greedy covetousness ; bid drink a draught of prodigality once a week , and it would cure him . and he that said , cruelty was the stone , that baked the tender and soft humours , into a hard confirmed body of stone ; bid him take an ounce of compassion , two ounces of charity , two ounces of generosity , as much clemency , and bray them all together ; then divide them into two parts , and lay one half to the heart , and another to the reins of the mind ; and those medicines will soon dissolve the stone . as for convulsions of the mind , he that said it was fury , bid the mind take an ounce of discretion , half an ounce of judgment , a scruple of gravity ; mix them all together , as in an electuary , and take it fasting , and it will cure him . and he who said , that inconstancy was the convulsion in the mind , bid him take an ounce of temperance , and an ounce of judgment ; one ounce of understanding , two of resolution ; mix these into an electuary , and take a good quantity of it every morning , and this will cure him . as for a consumption , he that said , pity was a consumption ; bid the mind take a heart , and bake it dry ; and when it was dried to powder , mix it in his ordinary drink , and it will cure him . but he that said , forgetfulness was a consumption ; bid him only take a draught of remembrance every day . as for dropsies , he that said desires were dropsies , bid the mind take a bunch of reason , that grows in a well-temper'd brain ; and as much humility , that grows in a good heart ; boil them in the water of content ; and drink a draught three times a day ; this ( said he ) will dry up the superfluous matter . but he who said , that desire was that disease which was called the dog-like-appetite ; bid the mind make a bisk of vanity , an oil of curiosity , and a hodg-podg of variety ; and eat so long , till he did vomit it up again ; and if he could surfeit thereof , it would prove a cure , otherwise there was no remedy , unless the mind could get some fruition , which is seldom to be had ; yet sometimes it is found , said he . but he that said , a dropsie was a reluctancy , that swelled out with an aversion ; bid the mind only use abstinence , and it would cure him . and he that said , it was voluptuousness , said , that the same medicine was to be prescribed . he that said , it was pride that swelled out with vain-glory ; bid the mind take a great quantity of humility ; but if you take it from the hand of misfortunes , said he , it will make you sick . but the mind , perceiving that they agreed not in any one medicine or disease , desired that they would depart from him : for , said he , gentlemen , it is impossible you should prescribe an effectual medicine , or remedy , since you cannot agree about the disease . so he paid them their fees , and they departed ; and the mind became his own physician , apothecary , and chyrurgeon . first , he let himself blood , opening the wilful vein , taking out the obstinate blood. then he did take pills made of society and mirth , and those purged all strange and vain conceits . also , the mind eat every morning a mess of broth , wherein was herbs of grace , fruit of justice , spice of prudence , bread of fortitude ; these were boiled with the flesh of judgment , in the water of temperance . this breakfast was a soveraign remedy against the malignant passions ; for it did temper heat , qualifie sharpness , allay vapours , and mollifie obdurate passions , and foolish affections . likewise , he did take , to his service , the strongest , soundest , and quickest senses , which were five ; these waited on him : and each in their turn gave him intelligence of every thing , and brought him all the news in the countrey , which was a recreation and a pastime for him . and in thus doing , he became the healthfullest and jolliest man in the parish . the thoughts feasted . there were two men , great companions ; one of them told the other , that he had made a particular search , and a strict enquiry for him , three days together , and could not hear of him ; insomuch that he had thought some unfortunate accident or violent death had befallen him . he answered , his senses had been to visit the soul , which was the cause of his body's retirement . the other said , i have heard that the soul did use to visit the senses , but never heard that the senses did use to visit the soul. he answered , that the sensitive spirits did as often , in some men , visit the rational , as the rational did the sensitive . well , said he , and how doth the soul live ? he said , as a great prince should do : for the mansion of the soul is nobly situated upon a high hill of ambition , which ascends by steps of desires , whereon stands a very curious castle of imaginations , and all about are solitary walks of contemplations , and dark groves of melancholy , wherein run rivers of tears . the castle is walled with vain-glory , and built upon pillars of hope . within the walls are fine gardens of eloquence , set full with flowers of rhetorick , and orchards of invention , wherein grow fruitful arts. in this orchard are many birds of fancies , which flie from tree to tree , from branch to branch , from bough to bough , singing fine notes of poetry in a sweet strain of verse , and chirping rhymes , and building their nests in arbours of love , wherein they hatch conceits . likewise , said he , the soul hath another house , which is a most stately palace ; it stands in the midst of a large plain of good nature , wherein run rivers of generosity . this palace is walled about with fortitude , and stands upon pillars of justice . there are long , straight , level walks of temperance , where is fresh air of health . this palace is built very convenient : for on the out-side are stables of discretion , wherein are tyed up wild opinions , phantasms , and all skittish humours , and a large riding-room of judgment , where all opinions are managed . also , there are granges of thrifty contrivance , wherein are cattel of prudence , that give the milk of profit . besides , there are kitchins of appetite , dining-rooms of luxury , galleries of memory , cellars of forgetfulness , chambers of rest , and closets of peace . but , said he , after my senses had viewed every place , they took their leave of the soul , who told them , that they should stay and feast with her . so the soul invited all his subjects , the thoughts . the first of all , were the generous thoughts , who are the nobles ; then the gentry , who are the obliging and graceful thoughts ; the heroick thoughts were commanders of warr ; the factious thoughts were the commons ; the mercenary were trades-men ; the plodding-thoughts were the yeomantry ; the ordinary thoughts were labourers and servants . then there were the politick thoughts , which were statists ; the proud thoughts , magistrates ; and the pious thoughts , priests ; the censuring thoughts , were the judges ; the wrangling and pleading thoughts , lawyers ; and the terrifying thoughts , sergeants ; the arguing thoughts were logicians ; the doubting thoughts , scepticks ; the hoping thoughts physicians ; the inquisitive thoughts , natural philosophers ; the humble thoughts , moral philosophers ; the phantastical thoughts , poets ; the modest thoughts , virgins ; the jealous thoughts , wives ; the incontinent thoughts , courtesans ; the amorous thoughts , lovers ; the vain thoughts , courtiers ; and the bragging or lying thoughts , travellers . and when all these thoughts were met , the soul feasted them with delight , and the senses with pleasure , presenting them with reason and truth . the travelling spirits . there was a man went to a witch , whom he entreated to aid his desires : for , said he , i have a curiosity to travel ; but i would go into such countreys , which , without your power to assist me , i cannot do . the witch asked him , what those countreys were ? he said , he would go to the moon . why , said she , the natural philosophers are the only men for that journey : for they travel all the planets over ; and indeed , study nature so much , and are so diligent and devout in her services , that they despise our great master the devil , and would hinder us in our ways very much , but that they travel most by speculation . then , said he , i would go to heaven . truly , said she , i cannot carry you thither ; for i am as unpractised in those ways , and have as little acquaintance there , as the natural philosophers have ; for they believe that there is no such kingdom . but if you desire to travel to that kingdom , you must go to the divines , who are the only guides ; yet you must have a care in the choice : for , some will carry you a great way about , and through very troublesome and painful places ; others , a shorter , but a very strait , narrow way ; others , through ways that are pleasant , and easie ; and you will find , not only in natural philosophers , but also in divines , such combats and dissentions amongst them , that it is both a great hindrance and a trouble to the passengers ; which shews they are not very perfect themselves in their ways : for many travellers go , some a quarter , and some half , and some three parts of the way , and then are forced to turn back again , and take another guide ; and so from guide to guide , until they have run them all over , or are out of breath ; and yet be as far to seek of their way , as when they first set out . why , then ( said the man ) carry me to hell. truly , said the witch , i am but a servant extraordinary , and have no power to go to my master's kingdom , until i dye ; although the way be broad and plain , and the guides sure : yet , being the devil's factor to do him service on the earth , i can call forth any from thence , although it were the king himself . well then , said he , carry me ( i beseech you ) to the center of the earth . that i can do ( said she ) , and so obscurely , that the natural philosophers shall never spye us . so she prayed him to come into her house ; for , said she , it is a great journey , therefore you must take some repast before you go . besides , said she , your body will be too cumbersome ; wherefore we will leave that behind , that you may go the lighter , being all spirit . so she went out , and came and brought a dish of opium , and prayed him to eat well thereof : so he eat very heartily , and when he had done , his senses grew very heavy , insomuch as his body fell down , as in a swound , remaining without sense ; in the mean while his spirit stole out , and left the body asleep . so the witch and he took their journey ; and as they went , he found the climate very intemperate , sometimes very hot , and sometimes very cold : great varieties they found in the way ; in some places , monstrous great and high mountains of the bones of men and beasts , which lay mixed with one another . then he saw a very large sea of blood , which had issued from slain bodies ; but those seas seemed very rough : whereupon he asked , what was the reason ? she answered , because their deaths were violent . and there were other seas of blood , which seemed so smooth , that there was not a wave to be seen . whereat he ask'd , how comes this to be so smooth and calm ? she said , it was the blood of those that dyed in peace . then he asked her , where was the blood of other creatures , as beasts , birds , fish , and the like . she said , amongst the blood of men : for , said she , the earth knows no difference . and as they went along , they came through a most pleasant place , which ( she said ) was the store-house of nature , where were the shapes and sub . stances of all kind of fruits , flowers , trees , or any other vegetables , but all were of a dusky colour . there he gathered some fruit to eat , but it had no tast ; and he gathered some flowers , and they had no smell : of which he asked the reason ? she said , that the earth gave only the form and substance ; but the sun was the only cause of the tast , smell , and colours . going farther , they saw great mines , quarries , and pits ; but she , being vers'd , and knowing the way well , did avoid them , so that they were no hindrance in their journey , as otherwise it would have been . but going down further , it began to grow very dark , being far from the face of the earth ; insomuch that they could hardly see the plainest way : whereupon he told the witch , that the hill was so hideously steep , and the place began to grow so dark , that it was very dangerous . no , said she , there is no danger , since our bodies are not here : for our spirits are so light , that they bear up themselves . so they went a great length , until the place grew so strait , that it began to be a pain even to their spirits : and so he told the witch , his spirit was in pain . she said , he must endure it : for , the center of the earth was but a point in a circle . so when he came to the center of the earth , he saw a light like moon-shine ; of which , when he came near , he saw that the first circle about the center , was glow-worms tails , which gave that light ; and in the center was an old man , who did neither stand nor sit , for there was nothing to stand or sit on ; but he hung ( as it were ) in the air ; nor ever stirr'd out of his place ; and had been there ever since the world was made ; for he , having never had a woman to tempt him to sin , never dyed . and although he could never remove out of his place ; yet he had the power to call all things on the earth unto him , by degrees ; and to dispose of them as he would . but , being near the old man , the witch excused her coming , and prayed him not to be offended with them : for , there was a man desired knowledg , and would not spare any pains or industry to obtain it : for which he praised the man , and said , he was welcome ; and any thing he could inform him of , he would . the old man asked him about the chymists that lived upon the face of the earth . the man answered , they made much noise in talk , and took great pains , and bestowed great costs , to find the philosophers stone , which is to make the elixir , but could never come to any perfection . alas , said the old man , they are too unconstant to bring any thing to perfection ; for they never keep to one certain ground or track , but are always trying of new experiments ; so that they are always beginning , but never go on towards an end . besides , said he , they live not long enough to find the philosophers stone : for , said he , 't is not one nor two ages will do it , but there must be many ages to bring it to perfection . but , i said he , living long , and observing the course of nature strictly , am arrived to the height of that art ; and all the gold that is digged out of the mines , was converted by me : for , in the beginning of the world , there was very little gold to be found ; and neither my brother adam , nor his posterity after him , for many ages , knew any such thing : but since i have attained to the perfection of that art , i have made so many mines , that it hath caused all the outward parts of the world to go together by the ears for it : but i will not hereafter make so much as to have it despised . as for my stills , said he , they are the pores of the earth ; and the waters i distill , are the sweet dews : the oily part is the ambergreece ; and the chymists know not how , or from whence , or from what it comes : for some say , from trees ; others , that it is the spawn of some kind of fish ; so some think it one thing , some another . the saltness of the sea comes also from chymistry ; and the vapour that arises from the earth , is the smoak that steems from my stills . but , said he , the world is not to continue long as it is ; for i will , by my art , turn it all into glass ; that as my brother adam transplanted men from earth , by his sin , some to heaven , some to hell ; so i will transplant the world from earth to glass , which is the last act of chymistry . then the man observing a great concourse of waters , that went with a violent force close by the center ; he asked the old man , how came that water there ? he answered , it was the gutter and sink of the earth : for , whatsoever water the sun drank from the sea , and spued upon the earth , run through the veins , into the sea again , by the center , all little pipe-veins meeting there , or else ( said he ) the world would be drowned again : for , at noah's flood , those pipe-veins were commanded by jove to be stopt , and after such a time to be opened again . i wonder , said the man , that all the weighty materials in the world do not fall upon your head , and so kill you . why so they would , said he , if they lay all together on a heap : but , as every thing hath a several motion ; so , every thing hath a proper place : for , gold and iron never dwell together in the earth ; neither are all kinds of stones found in one quarry ; nor do all the mines or quarries join together ; but some are in one place , and some in another ; which poises the weight of the earth equally , and keeps it from falling . the man said , you have but a melancholy life , being none here but your self . o , said the old man , the riches of the earth , and all the varieties thereof , come into my compass : this place is the heart or soul of plenty : here have i sweet dormice , fat moles , nourishing worms , industrious ants , and many other things , for food . here are no storms to trouble me , nor tempests to disorder me ; but warmth to cherish me , and peace and quiet to comfort and joy me : the drilling-waters are my musick , the glow-worms my lights , and my art of chymistry , my pass-time . when he had done speaking , they took their leaves , craving pardon for their abrupt visit , and giving him thanks for his gentle entertainment . but the old man very kindly prayed them to have a care of themselves as they returned : for , said he , you must go through cold , crude , aguish , and hot , burning , pestilent places ; for there are great damps in the earth , as also a great heat and fire in the earth ; although it gives not light like the sun ; for the heat of the earth , said he , is like the fire in a coal ; and that of the sun , like that of a flame , which is a thinner part of substance set on fire , and is a weaker or fainter heat ; but the sun , said he , gives more heat by his quick motion , than the heat gives motion . and though , said he , the fire be the subtillest of all elements , yet it is made slower , or more active , by the substance it works upon : for , fire is not so active upon solid bodies , as it is upon leighter and thinner bodies . so the witch and the young man's spirit , gave him thanks , and departed . but going back , they found not the ways so pleasant as when they went : for , some ways were deep and dirty , others heavy and clayie , some boggy and sandy , some dry and dusty , and great waters , high mountains , stony and craggy hills , some of them very chalky and limy . but at last , arriving where they set out , he found his body there ; and putting it on as a garment , gave thanks to the witch , and then went home to rest his weary spirits . the tale of the lady in the elyzium . there was a lord that made love to a lady upon very honourable terms , for the end was marriage . this lady received his love with great affection ; and it chanced that upon the hearing of a report , that he was married to another , she fell into a swound for above an hour , insomuch that they all thought her to be dead : but at last , returning to her self again , one told her , that he thought her soul had utterly forsaken her mansion , the body . no , said she , 't was only the sudden and violent passion , which had hurried my soul to charon's boat , in a distracted whirlwind of sighs ; where , in the croud , i was ferried over to the elyzium-fields . they ask'd her , what manner of place it was ? she answered , just such a place as the poets have described ; pleasant green fields , but as dark as a shady grove , or the dawning of the day ; or like a sweet summer's evening , when the nightingal begins to sing , which is at the shutting up of the day . but when i was there , said she , i met with such company as i expected not ? who were those , said they ? julius caesar and the vestal nunn , nero and his mother , agrippa and catiline , and his daughter cornelia ; and such as anthony and cleopatra , dido and aeneas , sans nomber . but finding not my chast lover there , said she , i went to charon , and told him , the fates had neither spun out my thread , nor cut it in sunder ; but they , being careless in the spinning , it was not so hard twisted as it should have been ; insomuch , that the report of my lover's marriage had given it such a pull , that ( if the fates had not had great care in slacking it ) it had broke from the spindle . so i told charon , he must carry me back again ; where , with much entreaty , he set my soul where he had taken it up ; and from thence it returned into my body , to be alive again . the speculators . a man having occasion to travel , being in the heat of summer , for more ease took his journey when night was running from day , for fear the glorious sun should overtake her . and looking earnestly , to observe how her darker clouds retired or were illuminated ; at last , in the dawning , before the sun appeared in glory , he thought he saw something appear in the air , more than usual ; which fancy of his caused him to a-light from his horse ; and fastning his bridle to a bush , himself went and lay upon his back on the ground , that he might fix his eyes on the strange sight the more stedfastly . but his desires were cross'd with the dulness and dimness of his eyes , which ( by over-earnestness ) could view nothing at all . but a grave old man coming there , asked him , why he lay in that posture ? he answered , it was to look up to see more perfectly that which in the air he had but a glimpse of : but , said he , striving to see more , i saw less ; for i have not only lost the vision , but almost my sight that may well be , said the old man ; for the body is like the mind , whereinto if you take more learning than the understanding can discuss , it overwhelms it , and knocks reason on the head ; as , if you take more meat into the stomack than it can digest , it surfeits ; if the ear receives too swift or harsh a sound , it makes it deaf , smuthering the distinct notes . likewise , if you draw more species than can pass through the eye , in order to the optick nerve , it 's like a croud of people at a narrow pass , every one striving to get in first , wedging themselves so close , sticking so fast , one binding in the other , that they can neither pass backward nor forward , but stop up the place . just so come the eyes to be dimmed or obstructed . besides , said the old man , nature is not only curious in her workings , but secret in her works : for , none of her works know themselves perfectly ; not man , who seems to have the best understanding ; because nature governs her creatures by ignorance ; and if any had perfect knowledge , they would be as great as she. the other man says , doth she know her self ? the answer was , that it is a question not to be resolved : but surely , if her creatures knew her , she would be slighted ; for what they know , they despise : but ignorance begets fear ; fear , superstition ; superstition , admiration ; and admiration , adoration . by that we perceive , that nature takes delight that her creatures should search her ways , and observe her several motions ; and those are esteemed her perfectest and best works that do so . and because your desires flye high , i will give you such glasses as shall satisfie your mind concerning the celestial globe . here be three glasses ; the first shews you the lower region ; the next , the second region ; and the third glass shews you the upper region ; that is , as high as can be observed . so taking leave of the gentleman , he left him to his observation . soon after , the gentleman takes the first glass , and laying his eye to it , he saw a vapour arise from the earth , straight upward , in small lines or streams , streaming through every pore of the earth , which pores were like a sieve full of small holes : this was a fine sight , to see how small , straight , and thick , those streams were : for it seemed as an ascending-rain ; and those streams , at a certain height , gathered together , and became spongy clouds ; which clouds were of the fashion of honey-combs , where , in every hole , lye drops of water , which are squeezed by the agitation of the air ; or , by the heat of the sun , made to bubble out ; or , those holes being over-full , they fall down with their own weight ; or , as one may say , they overflow . then turning his glass to the two poles , first to the north , then to the south ; he saw they were like two crystal squirts , which some call syringes ; those suck and draw in a certain quantity of water from those honey-comb-clouds ; and when they are full , they spout that water with such a force back , that it goeth a great length ; and the smalness of the passage , wire-draws it , as it were ; and by the agitation it becomes so powerful , that it drives all before it , if they be not very firmly fix'd ; it enters all porous bodies ; and those that are sensible , it puts to pain , as if they were sharp ; for the smalness , thinness , and quickness , makes it cut and divide ; and the force makes it break and cast down all that doth oppose it . these are called the south and north winds . then directing his perspective to the midst , between the east and the west , which is called the torrid zone ; he perceived it was like a cymbal of fire , which had three holes ; the one in the midst , by which it drinks in water ; the other two holes of each side , which are called the east and west : for , the water that is drawn in , being in this hollow ball , the heat rarifies it so thin , that it breathes forth at the lesser holes : for , as the water is rarified into air by the heat ; so the air is rarified into wind ; and those two small holes let out the thinner part , and keep the grosser in , until it be more rarified into wind. those winds that are made thus , are much gentler and softer than those that proceed from the squirts , because this is only a voluntary motion , which breathes out , and spreads gently ; the other is forced , and goeth out with violence . now the hole that is in the midst of this cymbal , which serves as the mouth , drinking perpetually , being very dry , by reason of the heat within , cannot digest it all at once , but by degrees . now if that part of the water be rarified soonest , which is of that side we call the east , that blows out first ; if it be rarified of that side first , that we call the west , that blows soonest : but if it blows from several places or parts , then that predominates that is most powerful . after he had perceived how the vvinds were made , he laid by that glass , and took up the second , and looked into the middle-region ; then he saw curling , folding , and rowling vvaves of air , every wave as thin as the thinnest cypress ; and through those waves he saw many cities , which had great champanes of air , full of flowers , fruits , and sweet herbs ; which champanes of air the winds plough or dig ; and the sun plants , sows , and sets incorporeal vegetables with his instrumental beams ; for they draw the vapours or scents of all herbs , flowers , fruits , and the like , from the earth , and plants them there : so there grows nothing but the sweet and delicious scents , and not the gross corporeal part . as for the people in that region , they are of upright shapes , and very slender ; but their sub . stance is of the same of fish , and they swim in the air , as fishes in the sea , which do not admit of a firm footing ; so that they swim or ride upon waves of clouds every where . as for their houses , they are made of the azure sky ; and are so clear , that the inhabitants are seen in them , when the sun shines ; being only obscured when the sun is from them . these houses are covered with flakes of snow , and all their streets are pitch'd with hail-stones . but when the chariot of the sun runs through their streets in the winter time , their furious horses being more heady in winter , run then the swifter ; for in summer they are lazy and faint with heat : but with the trampling they loosen the stones , and then they fall to earth , and there melt to water . neither are their tiles or slats safe ; for the wheels of the chariot do so shake their houses , that the flakes of snow fall many times from their houses upon the earth . but they , being of a nature as industrious as little ants , do straight pitch their streets a new , and repair their houses , having enough materials : for there are there great rocks of hail stones , and huge mountains of snow . but when the chariot runs in summer-time , the streets being dryed and hard , or , as i may say , crystalined , it makes a ratling noise , which we call thunder ; and the horses being very hot , great flashes of fire proceeds out of their nostrils , which we call lightning ; and many times their breath is so exceeding hot , and being moist withall , that it softens their streets ; and , melting their hail-stones , cause great overflows , which fall down in pouringshowers of rain , as we oft see when it thunders . now snow and hail are as naturally engendered there by cold , as minerals in the earth by heat , both being wrought by contraction ; only the one is more dissolvable than the other , because the matter contracted , is different in solidity ; but they meet at one end at last , though by different ways . when he had observed the middle region , he takes the third glass to view the highest region . there he saw six moving-cities , which we call planets ; every city had a governing-prince ; their compass was very large , their from round , and moving in a circular motion . the midst of those cities , was a center city , as i may say , a metropolitan city , which we call the sun , the king thereof ; and all his people are of the nature of salamanders , for they live always in fire , as fishes in water ; for it is not so hot as is imagined ; because that which feeds the flame , is not a gross , combustible , and solid matter , to burn like coals ; but a thin , voluble , and oily substance , which makes only a flame clear and bright , having no dross mix'd in it ; and whatsoever is wasted by the flame , is supplied by the six cities , which is the tribute they pay to the seventh , the monarchical city , whom all the rest are some ways or other subject unto . but indeed , these cities are forced , by necessity , to send oily matter , or the like , or else they should be in perpetual darkness , wanting light ; so that this oily matter comes into the metropolitan-city , and the flame goeth out like the water into the sea ; for the water of the sea goeth out salt , and returns fresh , being clarified by the earth : so this oil , when it runs to the center-city , is refined , and made more thin and pure , and is sent back in streams and beams of light. but though the king and people be of the nature of salamanders , yet their shapes are like those we describe angles to be , and flye about through beams of light , though our grosser sense cannot see them without the help of some miraculous glasses , as these were . some of them perceiving this man saw them , went to the king , and complained thereof ; which when he heard , he was very angry , and rose in great rage , casting a blaze of light , which dazled his eyes , blinded his sight , and in this heat melted his glasses . the body , time , and mind , disputed for preheminency . the dispute was begun by time , who said , if it were not for me , the body would neither have growth nor strength , nor the mind knowledg or understanding . the mind answered , that though the body had a fix'd time to arrive to a perfect growth , and mature strength , yet the mind had not : for i , said the mind , can never know and understand so much , but i might know and understand more ; nor hath time such a tyrannical power over the mind , to bring it to ruin , as it hath over the body . why , said the body , time hath not an absolute power over me neither : for chance and evil accidents prevent time's ruins ; and sickness and evil diers obstruct and hinder time's buildings . neither is it only time that nourishes the body , but food ; for without food the body would waste to nothing : for , the stomack is as the pot , and the heart as the fire , to boil the food , to make it fit for nourishment , making a broth for blood , a jelly for sinews a gravy for flesh , and oil for fat ; from which a vapour steems forth to make spirits ; and the several parts of the body , are the several vessels , wherein , and by which , the body is nourished , and life maintained . neither doth time give the mind knowledg and understanding , but the senses , which are the porters that carry them in , and furnish the mind therewith ; for the eyes bring in several lights , colours , figures , and forms ; and the ear several sounds , both instrumental and vocal ; the nose , several scents ; the tongue , several tasts ; and every part of the body , several touches ; without which , the mind would be as an empty , poor , thatch'd house with bare walls , did not the senses furnish it . besides , said the body , the mind could have no pleasure nor delight , were it not by my senses . but the mind answered , that delight belonged only to the soul , and pleasure only to the body . 't is true , says the mind , they often make a friendship , as the soul and the body do ; yet they consist by , and of themselves . and for time , said the mind , he is only like a page or lacquey , which brings messages , runs of errands , and presents necessaries for the mind's use : but , said the mind , had time no employment , or the senses no goods to bring in , and neither would or could do the mind any service ; yet the mind would not be like a thatch'd house , empty and unfurnished ; for delight would be there as queen , were it not for discontent , which is begot in the body , but born in the mind ; and if he lives , becomes a tyrant , unthroning delight , which is the natural queen thereof , as pleasure is in the body ; and if it were not for this tyrannical usurper , delight would have more perfect fruition than pleasure hath , by reason perfection lives more in the mind , than in the senses . and let me tell you , said the mind , nature builds some minds like a curious and stately palace , and furnishes them so richly , that it needs neither time nor the senses , laying reason as the foundation , and judgment for the building ; wherein are firm and straight pillars of fortitude , justice , prudence , and temperance ; is paved with understanding , which is solid and hard ; walled with faith ; which is roofed with love , and bows like an arch , to embrace all towards a round compass ; is leaded with discretion , which sticks close , keeping out watry errors , and windy vanities ; it hath passages of memory and remembrance , to let objects in ; and doors of forgetfulness , to shut them out ; likewise , it hath windows of hopes , that let in the light of joy ; and shutts of doubts , to keep it out : also , it hath large stairs of desire , which arise by steps or windings up , by degrees , to the towers of ambition . besides , in architecture of the mind , there are wide rooms of conception , furnish'd richly with invention , and long galleries of contemplation , which are carved and wrought with imaginations , and hung with the pictures of fancy . likewise , there are large gardens of varieties , wherein flow rivers of poetry , with full streams of numbers , making a purling noise with rhymes , on each side are banks of oratory , whereon grow flowers of rhetorick , and high trees of perswasion , upon which a credulous fool , helped by the senses , will climb ; and , from the top , falls on the ground of repentance , from whence old father time takes him up , and puts him into the arms of expence , who carries him in to the chyrurgeon of expence , and is healed with the plaster of warning , or else dyes of the apoplexical disease , called stupidity . but wisdom will only look up to the top , viewing the growth , and observing what kind they are of , but never adventures to climb : she will sit sometimes under the branches , for pleasure ; but never hang on the boughs of insinuation . while they were disputing , in comes grim death , whose terrible aspect did so affright the mind , that the very fear put out its light , and quenched out its flame ; and the body , being struck by death , became sensless , and dissolved into dust. but old father time run away from death as nimbly as a light-heel'd boy , or like those that slide upon the ice ; but never turned to see whether death followed or no : death called him ; but he made himself , as it were , deaf with age , and would not hear . a tripartite government of nature , education , and experience . nature , education , and experience , did agree to make a juncto to govern the monarchy of man's life , every one ruling by turns , or rather in parts , being a tripartite government , the soul , the senses , and the brain ; where nature creates reason as the chief magistrate , to govern the soul. education creates virtue to govern the appetites ; for virtue is bred , not born in man. and experience creates wit to govern the brain : for wit ( though native ) without experience , is defective . as for the soul , which natural reason governs , it hath large territories of capacity and understanding , and many nobles living therein ; as , heroick passions , and generous affections ; subtil enquiries , strong arguments , and plain proofs . the senses ( which virtuous education governs , are five great cities ; and the various appetites , are the several citizens dwelling therein ; which citizens are apt to rebel , and turn traitors , if virtue , the governess , be not severe and strict in executing justice with courage , cutting off the heads of curiosity , nicety , variety , luxury , and excess ; and though temperance must weigh , measure , and set limits ; yet prudence must distribute to necessity and conveniency , the several gifts of nature , fortune , and art. the third is the brain , wherein experienc'd wit governs , which is the pleasantest part , and hath the larrgest compass ; wherein are built many towers of conceptions , and castles of imaginations ; grounds ploughed with numbers , and sowed with fancies ; gardens planted with study , set with practice ; from whence flowers of rhetorick grow , and rivers of elegancy flow through it . this part of the kingdom hath the greatest traffick and commerce of any of the three parts , and flourishes most , being populated with the graces and muses ; wit , being popular , hath great power on the passions and affections , and in the senses makes civil entertainments of pleasure and delight , feeding the appetites with delicious banquets . nature's house . the whole globe is nature's house ; and the several planets are nature's several rooms ; the earth is her bed chamber ; the floor is gold and silver ; and the walls marble and porphyrie ; the portals and doors are lapis-lazarus ; instead of tapistry hangings , it is hung with all sorts of plants ; her bed is of several precious stone ; the bed-posts are of rocks of diamonds ; the bed's-head , of rubies , saphires , topasses , and emeralds : instead of a feather-bed , there is a bed of sweet flowers ; and the sheets are fresh air ; her table is of agats , and the like : yet the roof of the chamber is earth ; but so curiously vaulted , and so finely wrought , that no dust falls down : it is built much like unto a martin's nest : the windows are the pores of the earth . saturn is her gallery ( a long , but a dark room ) , and stands at the highest story of her house . sol is her dining-room , which is a round room built with heat , and lined with light. venus is her dressing-room . cynthia is her supping-room , which is divided into four quarters , wherein stand four tables ; one being round , at which she sits , being furnished with all plenty ; the other are side-board tables . mercury is her room of entertainment . the rational creatures are her nobles . the sensitive creatures are her gentry . the insensible creatures are her commons . life is her gentleman-usher . time is her steward . and death is her treasurer . a dispute . the soul caused reason and love to dispute with the senses and appetites . reason brought religion : for , whatsoever reason could not make good , faith did . love brought will : for whatsoever love said , will confirmed . the senses brought pleasure and pain , which were as two witnesses : pleasure was false witness ; but pain would not , nor could not be bribed . appetite brought opinion , which in somethings would be obstinate , in others very facil . but they had not disputed long , but they were so entangled in their arguments , and so invective in their words ( as most disputers are ) , that they began to quarrel ( as most disputers do ) . whereupon the soul dismist them , although with much difficulty : for , disputers are captains or colonels of ragged regiments of arguments ; and when a multitude are gathered together in a rout , they seldom disperse until some mischief is done ; and then they are well pleased , and fully satisfied . the preaching-lady . dearly beloved brethren , ihave called you together to instruct , exhort , and admonish you : my text i take out of nature ; the third chapter in nature , at the beginning of the fourth verse ; mark it , dearly beloved , the third chapter , beginning at the fourth verse : ( the text ) in the land of poetry there stands a steep high mount , named parnassus ; at the top issues out a flame , which ascends unto fame's mansion . this text , dearly beloved , i will divide into seven parts : first , in the land of poetry . secondly , there stands a mount. thirdly , a steep mount. fourthly , a high mount. fifthly , the name is parnassus . sixthly , there issues from the top a flame . seventhly , and lastly , the flame ascends to fame's mansion . first , in the land of poetry . which land , dearly beloved , is both large , sweet , pleasant , and fertile ; and hath been possessed by our fore-fathers , ever since the time of our father adam in poetry , which was homer ; from whom all poets are descended ( as the ancients say ) . this our very great grandfather , named homer , did excel all other men ; for he did not only give some names to creatures on earth , but he gave names to all the gods in jove's mansion , and to all the devils in the infernal parts . nay , he did more ; for he made heavens and hells , gods and devils ; and described them , that his posterity might know them in after-ages . in this land of poetry he lived , which land flowed with wit and fancy ; and is so large , that it doth not only reach to all parts and places of or in the world ( spreading it self , like air , about , and into every nook and corner in this world ) , but beyond it , as into many other worlds . in this most spacious land runs a clear stream , called helicon ; it is a most pleasant spring , and refreshes not only the life of the senses , but the sense of life . in this spring did our very great-grandfather bathe himself in ; also , with this spring he watered numbers of several roots growing in this land , that the sweet flowers of rhetorick might sprout forth in due season , and that the trees of invention might bear their fruitful arts , for the nourishment of common-weals . secondly , in the midst of this land there is a mount : a mount , dearly beloved , is a swell'd , contracted , and elevated matter or form : but you must not conceive this mount to be of earth , but of thoughts ; it is a swell'd , contracted , and elevated form in the mind . thirdly , it is a steep mount : that is , dearly beloved , it is not slope , or shelving ; but so straight , as to be perpendicular : insomuch , that those that have not sure and sinewy feet , can never wald up this mount : indeed , it requires mercury's feet , which have wings , that when they are in danger to slip , their wings might bear them up . fourthly , it is a high mount : that is , dearly beloved , there is a great space , or long line , from the bottom to the top ; unto which top , all that have light and empty heads can never attain ; for the height will soon make them dizzy , and cause them to fall into the gulph of oblivion . fifthly , the name of this mount is parnassus : a name , dearly beloved , is a word ; not a thing , but the mark of things , to distinguish several things , or conceptions of things , to know and understand them . sixthly , from the top of this mount parnassus , issues out a flame : a flame , dearly beloved , is the fluid part of fire . but , beloved , you must know , there are two sorts of fire ; the one , a bright shining fire , which is visible to the vulgar sense ; the other is so pure and subtil a fire , that it is not subject to the outward sense , but is only perceived by the understanding ; indeed it is a spiritual fire , which causes a spritely and pure flame : the other a corporeal fire , which causeth a gross and smoaking flame . seventhly and lastly , this insensible flame ascends to fame's mansion : and though , dearly beloved , fame's mansion is but an old library , wherein lies ancient records of actions , accidents , chronologies , moulds , medals , coins , and the like ; yet fame her self is a goddess , and the sister to fortune ; and she is not only a goddess , but a powerful goddess ; and not only a powerful goddess , but a terrible goddess ; for she can both damn and glorifie ; and her sentence of damnation is , most commonly , of more force than her sentence of glorification ; for those that she damns , she damns without redemption ; but she sets , many times , a period to those she glorifies . thus , beloved brethren , i have interpreted to you the text. now i am to exhort you , that none should venture up this mount , but those that can flye with fancy's wings , or walk with a measured pace , on velvet feet , or comick socks , or tragick buskins ; not to venture , if you find any infirmity or weakness in the head , or brain , or other parts : for , the flame which issues out of the mount called parnassus , is not only a flame , but a wondrous hot , sindging , scorching , burning flame ; insomuch , that ( many times ) it is insufferable , and oft-times burns the brains into cinders , and consumes the rational understanding ; at least , it sindges the health , and endangers the life of the body . but to conclude , beloved brethren in poetry : let me admonish you to be devout to the name of great fame , who is able to save or damn you : wherefore be industrious in your actions ; let no opportunity slip you , neither in schools , courts , cities , camps , or several climates , to gain the favour of great fame ; offer up your several conceptions upon her white altars ( i mean white paper ) , sprinkling golden letters thereon ; and let the sense be as sweet incense to her deity , that the perfumes of your renown may be smelt in after-ages , and your noble actions recorded in her ancient mansion . and so the love of fame be with you , and the blessing of fortune light upon you . a moral tale of the ant and the bee. in the midst of a pleasant wood , stood a large oak in its prime , and strength of years , which by long time was brought to a huge bigness . a company of ants meeting together , chose the root , or bottom thereof , to build a city ; but wheresoever any of them build , they build after one fashion , which is like a hill , or half-globe , the outside being convex , the inside concave ; a figure , it seems , they think most lasting , and least subject to ruin ; having no corners , points , or joints , to break off ; and every one of the little creatures industrious for the common-good , in which they never loyter , but labour and take pains ; and not only laboriously , but prudently ; for those that bring the materials to build , lay those materials in such a manner , that they do not hinder one another by any retardments : among men , one brings the brick , another the mortar , and a third builds with them ; and if any come to a mischance , the work is not only hindred , and time lost , but the builder is forced to be idle for want of materials ; and if the builder comes to any mischance , the materials are useless for want of a worker . but they , being wiser than man , know time is precious ; and therefore judiciously order it , forecasting while they work , and taking up the whole time with contrivance , leaving none for practice ; neither do they prefer curiosity before convenience . likewise , they are careful of repairs , lest ruin should grow upon them ; insomuch , that if the least grain of dust be misplaced , they stop , or close it up again . they are also as prudent for their provisions , having a magazine of meat in their city , as men have of arms : but this magazine is like a farmer 's cupboard , which is never without bread and cheese ; wholsome , although not delicious fare ; so is theirs . neither do they shut their door , for all is open and free : they need not beg for victuals , since every one labours and takes pains for what they eat : neither are they factious and mutinous , through envy ; by reason there is no superiority amongst them , for their common-wealth is composed of labourers . they have no impertinent commanding magistrates , nor unjust judges , nor wrangling lawyers : for , as their commonwealth is as one body ; or rather , all those little bodies are as one great head ; or rather , as one wise brain ; so are they united by a general agreement , as one mind ; and their industries are united as to the general good ; which makes the profit thereof return equally to each particular : for as their industry , so power and riches are levelled amongst them , which makes them free from those inconveniences and troubles , and oft-times ruins , that are incident to those commonwealths that make distinctions and degrees , which beget pride , ambition , envy , covetousness , treachery , and treason ; causing civil-warrs , tyrannical laws , unjust judgments , false accusations , cruel executions , faint friendships , dissembling affections , luxury , bribery , beggery , slavery , heavy taxes , and unconscionable extortions . but these citizen-ants , have little heads , and great wisdom ; which shews , it is not the quantity of brains that makes any particular creature wise ; for then an ox would be wiser than a man : nor is it the bigness of the heart that makes a creature good-natur'd ; for these little creatures , although they have little hearts , yet they have great generosity , compassion , and charity to each other : and as their assistance is always ready and free to bear a part of a burthen ; so their care and affection is not less to bury their dead . i know not whether they have the passion of sorrow , or rather ( i may say ) the moisture of tears , to weep at their funerals ; but they do lay the dead into the earth , and cover them with earth , with great solemnity . but they have , as all other creatures that nature hath made , enemies : for , though they are friends among themselves , yet they cannot make friendships with all nature's works , by reason some creatures live upon other creatures ; and they have many forreign enemies , as swallows , and other birds , which come with their sharp and digging bills , and pull down their city , devour their eggs , and make a massacre of their citizens ; which cruelty makes them fearful , and careful in concealing themselves , crepping always out at little holes , lest they should be discovered . it happened , upon a hot summer's day , a company of bees flying to that tree , to swarm on a bough thereof ; that they , thinking it might be some of their enemy-birds , were in an extraordinary fright : whereupon they withdrew all into the city , shutting up the gates thereof ; only sending out a few spies at postern-doors , and setting cen-tinels to view their approaches . at last they ob-served , these birds ( which men call bees ) gathered in a round figure , or globe , like the world ; which shews , the round figure is not only the most profitable ( having the least waste , and largest compass ) , but the securest figure , being the most united , not only by drawing in all loose and wandring parts , but it combines them all together with a round line . but when these bees were swarmed ( which swarming is a general meeting , to make up one councel ) , there was such a humming-noise , as did more affright the ants than it had before : for bees do not , as men in publick councels , speak by turns ; but they speak all at once , after the leading-bee hath spoke ; i suppose , either all consenting , or not consenting to the chief bee's proposition . neither can i perceive that they speak studied speeches , as men do , taking more care and pains therein , than for thecommon good. neither do they , as men do , which is , to speak as passion perswades them , not as reason advises , or truth discovers , or honesty commands them ; but as self-love or self-will draws them , driving their own particular interest , following their own appetites , preferring their own luxuriousness and pleasure , before the publick felicity or safety ; venturing the publick ruin , for a title of honour , or bribe , or office , or envy , or hate , or revenge , or love , or the like ; nay , for a vain and affected speech . but bees are wiser ; for they know , that if the commonwealth be ruinated , no particular person can be free . also , bees do like those that send colonies out of over-populous kingdoms , to make new plantations : for , if there should be more mouths than meat , and more men than business , they would devour one another in civil-warrs , and pull down the fabrick of the commonwealth , by breaking the laws and civil customs thereof . but this colony of bees swarming together , agreed where to settle , and so to meet all at the appointed place : whereupon the councel broke up , and every one took their flight several ways , to gather honey and wax , wisely providing for food , and store-houses to lay their provisions in , building them a city in some hollow tree , or cleaved part of the earth , or the like places ; and their several apartments are built so close together , and in such a curious mathematical figure , that there is not the least waste or loss ; and they are so industriously wise , that they carry their provisions of victuals , and their materials to build withall , at one time , as one burthen ; for they have a natural bag , like a budget , which they fill with honey ; and they carry their wax on their thighs . but when the ants had heard their wise propositions , their general agreements , their firm conclusions , their quick executions , their methodical orders , their prudent managements or comportments , and their laborious industry ; they did admire , commend , and approve of their common-wealth ; and the more , because it was somewhat like to theirs . but the truth is , the ant and the bee resemble one another more in their wise industry , than in their government of the commonwealth ; for the bees are a monarchical government , as any may observe ; and the ants are a republick . but by this we may perceive , it is not such and such kinds of government , but such and such ways of governing , that make a commonwealth flourish with plenty , conveniency , peace , and tranquillity : for , the monarchical government of the bees , is as wise and happy as the republick of the ants. the second tale of the ant and the bee. an ant and a bee meeting together upon a gilliflower , condemned each other for doing wrong to the flower : for , said the ant to the bee , you luxuriously and covetously come and suck out the sweet and nourishing juice . you are deceived , said the bee ; for i only gather off the sweet dew that lies thereon ; i neither draw out the juice nor scent , nor fade the colour , nor wither the leaves , nor shorten the life ; for it may live as long as nature pleases , for all mee : but you eat out the seeds , which are their young off-springs ; and the earwigs eat off the leaves , and the worms devour the roots ; when i bear nothing away , but what is free for all , which is that which falls from the heavens . by this we may perceive , that it is the nature of most creatures that are guilty , and do the greatest wrongs , to be the first accusers . the third tale of the ant and the bee. it chanced , that an ant and a bee , wandring about , met in a honey-pot ; the honey being very clammy , stuck so close to the ant , and weighed so heavy , that she could not get out , but ( like a horse in a quagmire ) the more pains she took to get out , the deeper she sunk in : whereupon she entreated the bee to help her . the bee denied her , saying , she should become guilty of theft , in assisting a thief . why , said the ant , i do not entreat you to assist my stealth , but my life : but , for all your pretended honesty , and nicety of conscience , you endeavour to steal honey , as much as i. no , said the bee , this honey was stoln by man out of our commonwealth ; and it is lawful not only to challenge our own , but to take it wheresover we find it . besides , man ( most commonly ) doth cruelly murther us , by smuthering us with smoak , then destroys our city , and carries away the spoils . but men are not only the most wicked of creatures , in making the greatest spoils and disturbances in nature ; but they are the subtillest of all creatures , to compass their designs ; and the most inventive for several destructive and enslaving arts. but nature , knowing the ingenuity of man to evil , and the proneness of his nature to cruelty , gave us stings ( for weapons ) to oppose and defend our selves against them ; which they finding , by experience , invented the way of smuthering us with smoak . the ant said , i hope that the cruelty you condemn , and have found by experience in man , will cause you to be so charitable , as to help me out of my misery . there is no reason for that , answered the bee : for if man doth unjustly strive to destroy me , it doth not follow , i must unjustly strive to help you . but whilst the bee was thus talking , the honey had clammed the bee's wings close to her sides , so that she could not loosen them to flye ; and in strugling to get liberty for flight , plunged her whole body in the honey . o , said the bee , i shall be swallowed up , and choaked immediately . what , said the ant , with your own honey ? o , said the bee , the quantity devours me : for , water refreshes life , and drowns life ; meat feeds the body , and destroys the body by surfeits : besides , a creature may choak with that which might nourish it . o unhappy creature that i am , said the bee , that my labour and industry should prove my ruin ! but the honey rising above her head , stopped her speech , and kill'd her . the ant , after a short languishing , dyed also . thus we see , the same mercy and assistance we refused to others , is refused to us in the like distress . and , many times , in the midst of abundance , are our lives taken away . when we are too greedily earnest in keeping or taking what we can justly call our own , we seldom enjoy it , either by losing it , or our selves . which shews , there is no secure safety , nor perfect felicity , nor constant continuance in the works of nature . a tale of the woodcock and the cow. a cow seeing a woodcock sitting close to a a green turf , and observing him not to stir , asked him why he sate so lazily there , having so strong a wing as he had to flye . o , said the woodcock , it is a laborious action to flye ; but sitting here , i take my ease and rest . the cow said , if i had wings to flye , i would never lye upon the cold earth , but i would mount up near to the warm sun , whose heat clarifies the air to a crystalline skye ; whereas the earth is only a gross body , sending forth thick and stinking fogs , which many times give us the rot , and other diseases , by the unwholsome vapours that arise from it , and cold dews that lye upon the ground ; when the air is sweet and refreshing , warm and comfortable . 't is true , said the woodcock , the sun is a glorious and powerful planet ; his heat is our comfort , and his light is our joy ; and the air is a thin and fine element . but alas , said he , though we be birds that can flye therein , yet we cannot rest therein ; and every creature requires rest sometimes : neither can we live only by the sun ; for the sun cannot fill us , though he warms us ; his light fills not our crops , although it doth our eyes ; nor is the seed sown in the air : and though the winds furrow and plow the clouds , yet the air is too soft an element to bear corn , or any other vegetable ; nor doth there grow sweet berries on the sun-beams , as on the bushes : besides , great winds beat down our sailing-wings ; and when the air is thick , and full of water , it wets and cleaves our feathers so close , they will not spread ; which causeth difficulty of flight ; which tires us , and puts our limbs to pain , when you sit lazily here all day long , chewing the cud , having your meat brought by man , to encrease your milk ; and in the summer you are put to rich pasture , or lye in green meadows , growing thick with cowslips and dazies ; or else , for change , you walk up to the mountains tops , to brouse on wild thyme , or sweet marjoram ; and yet you rail against our good mother earth , from whose bowels we receive life , and food to maintain that life she gives us : she is our kind nurse , from whence we suck ( out of her springing breasts ) fresh water ; and are fed by her hand of bounty , shaded under her spreading-boughs , and sheltred from storms in her thick groves . besides , said the woodcock , you are safe from dangers ; whenas we have many airy-enemies , as the tyrant-eagle , and murtherous hawk : but , said the cow , we that only live upon the earth , are dull and melancholy creatures , in comparison of those that flye in the air : for , all birds are ingenuous , and seem to have more wit than beasts : besides , they are of chearfuller dispositions , and have clearer voices , by reason their spirits are more refined , whereof the serene air , and the hot sun , is the cause , by agitating the spirits to that degree , that they seem to have more life than we beasts have , or any other creature ; for those bodies that are most active , and those minds that are more cheerful , have most , although not longest life , having more of the innated matter ( which is self-motion ) in them , than duller creatures have . and since nature hath given you a greater proportion of life ( that is , more lively spirits ) , slight not her benefits , but make use of them ; for to that purpose she gives them . wherefore get up , and sit not idly here ; mount up on high , above the clouds appear . the woodcock said , when we are up on high , we rather swim like fishes , and not flye : the air is like the ocean , liquid , plain ; the clouds are water , and the roof is rain : where , like a ship , our bodies swift do glide ; our wings , as sails , are spread on either side : our head 's the card , our eyes the needles be , for to direct us in our airy sea. our tail 's the rudder , moves from side to side : and by that motion we our bodies guide . our feet's the anchors ; when to ground them set , we mend our sails , that 's prune our feathers wet : and every bush , like several ports they be : but a large haven is a broad-spread tree . o , said the cow , this voyage to the skie i fain would see , whilst on the ground i lie . to satisfie you , said the woodcock , i will mount ; so rose , and shak'd his wings to flie . but the woodcock had not flown above a cast high , but a faulcon ( who had soared above for a prey ) seeing the woodcock underneath him , came down with such force , that he knocked him on the head with his pounces . which when the cow saw , she lowed out with sorrow , and made a most lamentable voice , bewailing the woodcock 's misfortune ; and out of a sad , melancholy , and discontented grief for the woodcock his death , and for the unfortunate counsel she gave him , she mourned and lamented , putting on a black hide ; which hide she wore to her dying-day , and all her posterity after her ; and not only her posterity , but many of her acquaintance . the moral . some are so busily-good , that they will perswade and counsel not only all those they have relation to , or all they know and have acquaintance with , but all they meet , although they be meer strangers to them . but although some do it out of a meer busie nature , and intermedling humour and disposition ; yet questionless some do it out of a desire and natural inclination they have for a general fruition of happiness , putting themselves in the last place . but these sort of men have more good-nature than judgment ; for their counsel oft-times brings ruin , at least sorrow , both to those that take it , and those that give it , through a blind ignorance of both parties . but those that are prudently wise , never give counsel but when it 's asked ; and then , not without great caution ; chusing the safest ways , and the likeliest means , joining their own reputation with the party 's good ; fearing to lose the one , or hurt the other by a rash advice . of a butcher and a fly. in shamble-row , a butcher walking in his shop , where meat was lying upon his shop-board , and ( being in the heat of summer ) a number of flies were busily working thereupon ; which the butcher seeing , was very angry , and said , that flies were good for nothing but to corrupt dead flesh. at which words , the flies murmured against the butcher , making a humming-noise , to express their passion . but one of the ancientest and gravest flyes amongst them ( which fly living long , and observing much , had studied natural and moral philosophy ) , having observed the humours and actions of all creatures , especially of man , and more especially of butchers , by reason they most commonly frequent the shambles ; she answered the butcher thus : why ( said the fly ) do you rail and exclaim against us , when we do nothing against nature , but do good service to the countrey ? for , we create living creatures out of that you destroy ; whereby we keep nature from ruin : and those only that destroy life , are nature's enemies ; but those that maintain or create life , are nature's friends . thus we are friends , and you are enemies to nature : for you are cruel , striving to destroy nature , not only by taking the life of barren creatures , that are past producing ; but of young creatures , that would encrease , had they been suffered to live , in not killing them before their natural time to dye . besides ( said the fly to the butcher ) you are a cheat and a robber , as well as a murtherer ; for you cozen and rob time of the goods he is intrusted to keep until such time as nature requires them , to whom he carefully , easily , peaceably , delivers them to the right owner . also , you do not only rob him of those goods he hath in charge ; but you maliciously or covetously spoil his work : for , those creatures that he hath but newly made and shaped , and some before they are quite finished ; nay , some which he hath but moulded in a lump together , you destroy ; which not only spoils old father time's labours , but defaces his architecture , disgracing his skill . likewise , you do not only endeavour to destroy nature , and rob and disgrace time ; but you take away divine worship from the gods , who receive their worship from life , which you destroy ; for which , they may justly punish you to death . after the fly had made an end of this discourse , now ( saith the butcher to the fly ) you think you have spoke wisely , honestly , and piously ; but your speeches shew you to be a formal , prating coxcomb : for first , nature creates more creatures from death , than from life ; from the grave , than from the womb : for those creatures she creates from the womb , she creates ( for the most part ) by single ones , or couples , as mankind , and most sorts of beasts ; but those that she creates from death and the grave , as from dead carkasses , and corruption , she produceth by numbers , as maggots , worms , and the like : and , most commonly , your impertinent worships are created in that manner . and if the gods are only served by life , we serve the gods best ; for we , by killing of single creatures , are the cause of creating millions of living creatures . neither have you reason to brag ; for it is not you that are the only cause that those creatures are produced from those carkasses , but corruption , which is the mother of life , and which ( by your bloth ) you hasten , whereby you take time's work out of his hands , and so you do usurp on time's prerogative , for which i will whisk you out of my shop as a company of busie , prating , idle , foolish creatures you are . whereat they , being frighted , flew away . of a man and a spider . a man , whose thoughts were not busily employed upon potent affairs , but lazily sitting in his chair , leaning his head on his hand , with his face towards the window , viewing a crafty spider , and marking what pains she took in spinning a web to entangle the innocent flyes ; saw , that her work was no sooner done , but a fly was catch'd therein . he seeing this poor fly dragg'd along , and ready to be murthered by the cruel spider ( who had watched her coming thither ) , thus spake : mischievous spider ( says he ) who art only industrious to an evil design , spinning out thy own bowels only to entrap a creature that never did nor meant thee harm : hadst thou spun out of a charitable intention to clothe the naked , thou hadst been worthy of my commendation ; but now thy malice falls justly under my wrath : and taking the tongs , intended to kill her . but the spider , perceiving his intention , thus spake : sir , you that pretend to justice , be just to me , and hear me first speak : for , what is more unjust , than to censure , strike , or kill , before you know whether your doom be deservedly given ; and you must be clear from the same faults , before you can justly punish another for the like crimes ; as also , be free from partiality , lest you become cruel to one , through your tender pity to the other . but to answer for my self : i do not only spin thus to catch the flyes , but it is my house in which i dwell ; which no sooner have i built it up , but the flyes strive to break it down : for , if you would but observe , that when i have spun my web , they straight flye into it ; which i no sooner see , but i run upon my threads to assault them , and so catch them , if i can : for , since i cannot keep my house from being assaulted , i strive to make it a snare to intangle my foes therein ; and by that means i make it a mischief to fall on their own heads : and , what creature hath nature made , but ( if they had power ) would defend themselves . but say , i spun this web only to catch flyes to feed upon , it were no crime in nature : for , what creature is there that will spare the life of another , if it be to maintain his own ? since self-preservation is the chief of nature's works ; and of all her works , man seeks it most : and not only so , but he delights in spoil , which is against nature : for , doth not man take delight , and account it as one of his recreations , to kill those creatures that he refuses to eat ? nay , man will destroy his own kind : for , what warrs and slaughter do they make , out of a covetous ambition for power and authority ? but , if you be so just as you pretend , then first cast out all intemperate desires . make peace among your selves , then may you be fit judges to decide the quarrels of other creatures , and to punish offendors , when you are innocent ; otherwise you will but shew your self an usurper , wresting that power that belongs not to you ; and a tyrant , to execute with the sword of cruelty , destroying truth and right . the man , when he had heard the spider's discourse , turned his back , and went his ways . a dialogue betwixt a great lady , and her maid of honour . there was a great rich lady talking to one of her maids of honour of several things , at last she began to speak of the false reports envy and malice had raised in the world. her maid told her , if she would not be angry , she would tell her what they said of her . do so , said she ; for i do not censure my self according as the world's reports , which most commonly are false ; but i judg my self according to my life , which is my thoughts and actions : wherefore , they cannot move my anger at any thing they say ; and so you may relate without offence . maid . they say , you are proud. lady . i am so , in scorning what is base . maid . they say , you prize your title of honour at too high a rate . lady . that 's false , said she ; i only prize such titles , as being the mark of merit : for , only merit dignifies a man , and not those titles of honour , which gain a luster from the worth of those they are placed upon . maid . they say , you are vain , in making shews of state , and stately shews . lady . why , answered she , the gods delight in ceremonies , which are devout shows ; and this world which they have made , is like a pageant , or masquing-scenes ; and when great kings neglect their ceremonies , their state goes down ; and with their state they lose their kingly crown . maid . they say , you are so proud , that you will not sit , because all others by you should stand . lady . they are deceived , said she ; for i would rather stand whilst others sit ; for as they sit , they bow lower towards the earth ; by which , my slaves and vassals they do shew . maid . they say , you will not eat your meat , but by your self alone ; which proves you proud , or covetous lady . it proves me neither : for , why should i disgust my palat , in hearing a confused noise ? for , when good meat and wine fumes to their brains , their tongues become unruly . neither is it out of covetousness : for , i do not only keep one well-furnished table , but many ; and do allow entertainment to all civil guests . maid . they say , you are proud , because you will receive no visits but at set and certain times . lady . why should i spend my time in idle talk , since life is short ? or to disturb my solitary hours , which is the best and happiest time of life , wherein man only doth enjoy himself ? maid . they say , you are not sociable , in not carrying abroad your neighbours , or your friends , as other ladies of great titles do ; which send about to other ladies to accompany them abroad , to fill their train , and make a shew . lady . i hate to be attended upon courtesie , or make a shew of borrowed-favours , or fill my train with bare acquaintance , or humble companions ; to have my estate none of my own , only to make a seeming-shew ; and when they are gone , my estate is gone , and i left alone , naked and bare , having none that i can command about me . no , when i appear abroad , i will only be attended and waited upon by such as live upon my bounty , or are raised by my favours . i will have no patch'd train , made up of strangers ; it shall be all my own , although it be the shorter ; otherwise , what shews soever it makes , it is but mean and poor , expressing more vain-glory , than it doth state. besides , it cheats and cozens noble honour : for , should a king be attended and served in state with other subjects than his own , upon another king's charge or courtesie ; he would not seem , to those that are wise , to have great power . but he is great , whose kingdom is fully populated , and all do bow with an obedient knee , and are ready to serve his will. so , like potent kings , in my degree , will i be served and waited on by my own family , with duty and obedience ; and not by strangers , who are like forreigners , and are apt to mutiny , and make a warr , or think they do me honour . no , i will have none but such as think i honour them ; and if i have merit , i do so ( although they be of equal rank ) , if by my worth or fortune i do grace or assist them any way : for , it is an honour to receive a bounty or a favour from persons of merit . maid . they say , you do dislike , when any man falutes you , although of quality . lady . how ! salutes me ? maid . why , to kiss you . lady . why ought not every honest woman so to do ? for , kisses are cupid's gentlemen-ushers , and venus waiting-maids , which oft betray the men to wild desires , and kindles in their hearts unlawful fire : wherefore , i would have that custom banished quite , especially by husbands that do prize their honour . but envy doth misemploy the tongue , and leads mankind to base actions , making their life like leaking-vessels , where precious time doth idly drop away . maid . i have heard , that all the vvorld was pictured in fool 's cap. lady . 't is strange it should be so : for nature that did make it , and gods that rule it , are wise : but men are bad , which makes me not care what they say : for , i divide mankind into four parts , whereof three are naught : one part i hate , as being wicked . the second i scorn , as being base . and , the third i pity , as being ignorantly foolish . maid . vvhat is the fourth part , madam ? lady . the fourth part i may divide into four parts more : one part i admire , as being vvise. the second part i honour , as being noble . the third part i love , as being good. the fourth part i rely on , as being valiant . maid . there would be little security , if only the fourth part of the fourth part were valiant ; for the other parts might overpower them . lady . o no , cowards know not their own strength , because they dare not try it ; and one valiant man , if fortune sits but idle , will beat at least twenty cowards . but fortune , for the most part , is a friend to cowards and to fools , more than to the valiant and the vvise ; yet oft-times the valiant and the vvise do make a passage through , though fortune do obstruct . maid . but , madam , if there were so few valiant , there would not be so much vvarr amongst mankind , as is . lady . o yes ; for cowards fight for fear , and valiant men do set them on ; and were it not for those that are valiant and vvise , there would neither be justice nor propriety . maid . indeed , justice is pictured with a sword in one hand , and a pair of balances in the other . lady . that shews , that vvisdom doth justly weigh truth , and valour doth maintain the right . maid . i have heard a proverb , madam , that be that is wise , is honest . lady . and those that are not valiant , can never be constantly honest ; for , said the , fear would put them out of honest ways . and so she left off discoursing . a dialogue betwixt a contemplating lady , and a poet. poet. pray , madam , think me not rude to intrude upon your contemplation . lady . a poet's wit is a companion fit for a vain imagination . poet. that is not vainly done , which gives a delight to the mind , without endangering the soul , or distempering the body : for , vanity lives only in that which is useless or unprofitable . lady . indeed , to delight the mind is more necessary than to feed the body : for , a discontented mind is worse than death ; but the most part of the world think nothing useful to the life , but what is substantial . poet. if they do so , they must account thoughts vain : for , thoughts are only an incorporeal motion , or at least believed to be so . lady . but without the incorporeal motion , the world would be a dead carkass only : for , were it not for contemplation , there would be no invention ; if no invention , no conveniency ; if no conveniency , no ease ; if no ease , no pleasure ; if no pleasure , no happiness ; and to be unhappy , is worse than death : but contemplation is the mother of invention . poet. but language is the midwife , and practise the nurse . besides , if there were no practise or conversation , all invention and industry would be abortive : and language utterly unknown , the trumpet loud of fame unblown : no ladder set unto ber throne , the hill untrod she sits upon . wherefore , we ought not to bury our selves in contemplation , nor to banish our selves from conversation : for , conversation gives the mind breath , and makes the imagination the stronger , the conception larger , the invention apter , and fancy livelier ; otherwise we shall smuther the thoughts for want of vent , and put out their light for want of oil , and then the life would sit in darkness . lady . certainly the greatest delight that life gives , is contemplation ; and the life of contemplation , is silent solitariness . poet. 't is true : but the mind , as the body , may feed so long of pleasures , that they may prove tormenting-pain : so that the mind must be exercised with discourse , cleansed with writing , otherwise the streams of fancy , which arise in several springs from the imaginations , may overflow the mind , causing it to be flatuous and hydropcal ; or the several and singular opinions , which are most commonly tough and hard , may obstruct the mind , causing it to be pursie and short-breath'd ; and the cold and hot passions , for want of purgingwords , may either stupifie or inflame the mind ; and too much solitariness will bed-rid the mind , making it faint and weak . besides , if the mind do not travel to several objects , and traffick with the senses and discourse , it would have no acquaintance with the world , no knowledg of men , nor famous monuments . and give me leave , lady , to tell you , extreams in nature are an enemy to life , and to life's delight : wherefore , let me advise you to intermingle with your harmless contemplations , rational discourses , knowing societies , and worthy actions ; and employ your senses on profitable labours , and not suffer them to live idly and useless to the mind . lady . let me tell you , sir , the mind needs them not ; for the mind is so well attended , so richly furnished , has such witty companions , such wise acquaintance , such numbers of strangers , such faithful friends , such industrious servants , such various pleasures , such sweet delights , such spacious walks , such safe habitations , and such a peaceable life , that it neither needs to converse or have commerce either with the senses , mankind , or the world ; for it is a world within it self . the mind a vaster world it self doth prove ; where several passions , like the planets , move : poetick fancies , like fix'd starrs , shine bright upon the brain , mhich makes a day of night . the flux of things produceth from the earth ; as some decays , to others gives new birth . nature and time are equal in their ends , as some decay , to others new life sends . the circulation of time's world , we see , may prove eternal , the mind immortal be . all the material world hath compass round , but in the mind no compass can be found : t is infinite , like nature can create thoughts , several creatures , destiny and fate : and life and death do in the mind still lye ; death to forget , and life is memory . poet. but , lady , in justice the body , as well as the mind , must share in the pleasures of life : for it were unjust that only the body should endure restraint and pain , and take no delight : wherefore you ought not to imprison it to dark and solitary places , to chain it up with contemplation , and to starve it with abstinency ; but let it take a moderate pleasure . lady . well , i will try to be more sociable , and not starve the life of my body with over-feeding my mind . but hard 't will be to me for to abstain , and leave the banquet of a thinking-brain ; where all delicious pleasures and delight are there set forth to feed each appetite . the dialogue of the wise lady , the learned lady , and the witty lady . learned lady . some are of opinion , that the world is a living creature , and the sun is the soul of it . a wise and learned philosopher held , that the world was made of atoms , the chaos being nothing but an infinite confus'd quantity of them . wit. i think the chaos was a great lump of wit , which run it self into several figures , creating several forms . thus the chaos being wit , and the wit being motion , hath invented this world , and many more , for all we know : for wit is never idle , but is still producing something either of delight or profit . wis. the best is , not to dispute of what matter it is , or how it was made , or when it was made ; but to enjoy the pleasures thereof , to make use of the profits it hath , and to avoid ( as much as we can ) the inconveniences and troubles therein : for disputes carry more out of the ways of truth , and leads further into the ways of ignorance , than all the reason nature hath given can add to our knowledg ; and there is no reason so strong , but may be contradicted by another . wit. if our reason be so false a guide , and not only the creation , but the tract of the world , is so hard to be found out ; how shall we find a direct way to jove's mansion ? wis. i will tell you : the way to walk , is by the line of a good life , and to take hold of faith , and to climb up to heaven by the ladder of prayers . lear. nature is a chymist , and water is the mercury , fire is the sulphur , air is the volatil salt , earth is the fixed salt , the fixed starrs are the crystalline part , life is the spirits or essences , death is the caput mortuum . wit. wit , which is the scholar of nature , is as good a chymist : for , wit doth extract something out of every thing . wis. and wisdom knows how to apply the extraction to the best use . learn . as the agitation of the air makes us draw our breath ; so the agitation of the world makes it continue . wit. the agitation of the brain makes a sharp ready wit. wis. the agitation of virtue makes a peaceable commonwealth . learn . some moral philosophers hold , that no creature hath reason , but man. wis. men only talk of reason , but live like beasts , following their appetites without rules . wit. men may as soon set rules to eternity , as to themselves : for , their desires are so infinite , and so intricate , that we may as soon measure eternity , as them : for , desires are like time , still run forward ; and what is past , is as it had never been . wis. but man may set rules to himself , not to his desires ; and as wise laws govern the life , so that reason ( which men say they have ) should govern their insatiable desires . learn . 't is said , history instructs the life , it registers time , it enthrones virtue , it proclaims noble natures , it crowns heroick actions , it divulges baseness , and hangs up wickedness : it is a torch , that gives light to dark ignorance : it is a monument to the dead , and a fame to persons of merit . wit. in poetry is included musick and rhetorick , which is number and measure , judgment and fancy , imitation and invention : it is the finest art in nature ; for it animates the spirits to devotion , it fires the spirits to action , it begets love , it abates hate , it tempers anger , it asswages grief , it eases pain , it encreases joy , allays fear , and sweetens the whole life of man , by playing so well upon the brain , that it strikes the strings of the heart with delight , which makes the spirits to dance , and keeps the mind in tune , whereby the thoughts move equally in a round circle , where love sits in the center as mistress and judg. learn . some philosophers hold , that all the changes in the world are only caused by dilatation and contraction . wit. i am sure , too much dilatation of the spirits , causeth a weakness , by dis-uniting their forces , and contracting of humours , causeth diseases . yet a dilatating wit is best , spreading it self , smoothly flowing , and easily ; which if it be contracted , it makes it constraint , hard , and unpleasant , and becomes difficult to the understanding . vvis . let us contract our vanities , and moderate our appetites with sober temperance , and dilate our virtues and good graces , by noble actions , and pious endeavours . learn . the mind , some say , is nothing but local motion in the brain , which we call spirits in animals , that is , vapour ; indeed , vapour of vapours ; that is , the thin and sharp vapours ; it is an extract of vapour from vapours , like essences or smoak , that arises from the porous and liquid parts of the body , especially the blood. this essence hath an innated motion , arising from the acuteness thereof ; yet its strength is often allayed by the dulness and coldness of grosser vapours , or obstructed or hindred by the thickness of dull matter ; and oft-times it evaporates out of the body , by too much rarification , caused by too quick a motion . wit. the mind is , like a god , an incorporeal thing ; and so infinite , that it is as impossible to measure the mind , as eternity . indeed , vapour is a great instrument to the wit : for , gross vapour stops up the wit , cold vapour congeals it , hot vapour inflames it , thin and sharp vapour quickens it . thus all sorts of vapours make variety of wit ; and the several figures , and works , and forms , that the vaporous smoak ariseth in , causeth several fancies , by giving several motions to the brain . vvis . well , sisters , to conclude your dispute , the best ingredient of the mind , is honesty ; and the best motion of the brain , is reason ; otherwise the brain would be mad , and the mind wicked : wherefore moderate the one , and temper the other . learn . learning encreases knowledg , begets understanding , employs time , and enriches the mind . wit. wit invents profitable arts , it creates sciences , it delights the mind , it recreates the life , and entertains time. vvis . vvisdom guides the life safe , gives honest laws to the vvill , sets noble rules to the actions ; it governs misfortunes easily , it prevents misfortunes prudently , it employs time thristily , it makes peace , it gets victory , it tempers those passions that would disturb the soul ; it moderates those appetites that would cause pain to the body ; it endures sickness patiently , and suffers death valiantly . learn . there are many several kinds of arts , as arts of pleasure , enticing arts , vain-glorious arts , vain arts , superfluous arts , superstitious arts , ambitious arts , covetous arts , profitable arts , destructive arts. arts of pleasure are , gardens , groves , bowers , arbours , grots , fountains , prospects , landskips , gilding , painting , sculpture : likewise , musick of all sorts , confectionary , cookery , and perfumes . enticing arts are , artificial singing , artificial speaking , artificial dressing , dancing , powdring , curling , perfuming , rich clothing , luxurious entertainments . vain arts are , feathers , fancies , ribbons , black-patches , and side-glasses . amorous arts are , flattering complements , false professions , affected garbs , affected speeches , affected countenances , affected actions ; sonnets , poems , frolicks , questions and commands , proposes and riddles , presents , private meetings , and conference . expensive arts are , feasting , masquing , balling , carding , dicing , racing , betting , and the like . ill-natur'd arts are , bull-baiting , cock-fighting , dog fighting , cudgel-playing . exercising arts are , bowling , shooting , hunting , wrestling , pitching the barr , and tennis-court play. vain-glorious arts are , oratory , pleading , disputing , proposing , objecting , magnisicent entertainments , great revenues , sumptuous palaces , and costly furnitures . covetous arts are , bribery , monopolies , taxes , excises , and compositions . ambitious arts are , time-serving , observing , insinuating . malicious arts are , impeachings , back-bitings , and libels . superstitious arts are , interpretations , false visions , impostures , imprecations , ceremonies , postures , garbs , countenances , and paces ; and particular customs , habits , and diets . idolatrous arts are , groves , altars , images , and sacrifices . dangerous arts ( though necessary for the safety of honour ) are , fencing , riding , tilting , vaulting , wrestling , and swimming . murthering arts are , swords , knives , hatchets , saws , sythes , pick-axes , pikes , darts , granadoes , guns , bullets , shot , powder . arts of safety are , trenches , moats , bridges , walls , arms , and chyrurgery . profitable arts , are , geometry , cosmography , arithmetick , navigation , fortification , architecture , fire-works , water-works , wind-works , cultivating , manuring , distilling , extracting , pounding , mixing , sifting , grinding , as malting , brewing , baking , cooking , granging , carding , spinning , weaving , colouring , tanning , writing , printing . wit. why , learned sister , all these arts , and innumerbale more , are produced from the forge of the brain , being all invented by wit ; and the inventer is to be more valued than the art ; the cause , more than the effect : for as without a cause , there would be no effect ; so , without an inventive brain , there could be no ingenuous art. wis. dear witty sister , do not engross more than what is justly your own ; for there are more arts produced from accidents and experiments , than from ingenious wit. learn . some learned men hold , that the motion of the sun makes the heat : others , that heat makes motion . wit. then it is like the brain ; for a hot brain makes a quick wit ; and a quick wit makes the brain hot . wis. we ought not to spend our time in studying of the motions and heat of the sun , but of the motions and passions of the heart . learn . some are of opinion , that light hath no body : others , that it hath a body ; and that the light of the sun enlightens the air , as one candle doth another . wit. light is like imagination , an incorporeal thing , or an accidental proceeding from a substance ; and as one candle doth light another , so one fancy produceth another . vvis . pray discourse of virtues , which is the light of the soul ; and generosity , an effect thereof , which distributes to necessity , producing comfortable relicfs therewith . learn . and some say , colours are no colours in the dark , being produced by light on such and such bodies . wit. vve may as well say , vvit is no wit , or thoughts no thoughts in the brain , being produced by such and such objects ; nor passion is no passion in the heart , being raised by such and such causes . vvis . i pray dispute not how colours are produced , whether from the light , or from their own natures , or natural substances ; but consider , that good vvorks are produced from a soul that is pure and bright . learn . the learned say , that sounds are numbers , and opticks are lines of light. vvit. vvit sets the number , and motion draws the lines . vvis . there is no musick so harmonious , as honest professions , nor no light so pure as truth . learn . and they say , discord in musick well applied , makes the harmony the delightfuller . vvit. so satyr in vvit makes it more quick and pleasant . vvis . so truths , mix'd with falshood , make flattery more plausible and acceptable . learn . time , which is the dissolver of all corporeal things , yet it is the mother , midwife , and nurse to knowledg ; whereby we find all modern romancy-vvriters , although they seem to laugh and make a scorn of amadis de gall , yet make him the original-table , or ground , from whence they draw their draughts , and take out covertly their copies from thence . indeed , amadis de gall is the homer of romancy-writers . wit. although wit is not a dissolver , yet 't is a creator . wit doth descry and divulge more knowledg than time : for that which time could never find out , wit will discover . wit is like a goddess in nature : for , though it cannot dissolve , yet it can produce , not only something out of something , but something out of nothing ( i mean , from the imaginations , which are nothing ) ; and wit needs no other table or ground to draw its draughts , or take copy from , but it s own brain , which creates and invents , similizes and distinguisheth . wis. but time and wit would soon produce a chaos of disorder , if it were not for wisdom , which is composed of judgment , justice , prudence , fortitude , and temperance : for , judgment distinguishes times and wits ; justice governs times and wits ; prudence orders times and wits ; fortitude marshals times and wits ; and temperance measures times and wits . learn . scholars say , that one man can see higher and further , when he is set upon another man's shoulders , than when he stands or sits on the ground by himself : so , when one is raised by another man's opinion , he can descry more in hidden mysteries . wit. but if a man see a lark tow'r in the sky , which another man doth not , having weaker eyes ; yet he is no wiser than the other , that only saw the lark picking corn on the ground . but he that sees her not in the sky , knows she is in the sky , as well as the other , because he saw from whence she took her flight . but if the other , that is raised , can see a bird in the sky that was never seen before , it were something to add to his knowledg . besides , a sharp , quick eye will see further on his own legs , than on the shoulder of another : for most grow dizzy , if set on high , which casts a mist on the eyes of the understanding . wis. leave the shoulders of your neighbours , and let your eye of faith reach to heaven . as some meats nourish the body , and some destroy the body : so some thoughts nourish the soul , and some destroy it . the senses are the working-labourers , to bring life's materials in . as nature is the best tutor to instruct the mind , so the mind is the best tutor to instruct the senses . and my mind instructs my senses to leave you . there are learned arts and sciences ; a poetical and satyrical wit ; a comical and tragical wit ; an historical and romancical wit ; an ingenious and inventive wit ; a scholastical wit ; a philosophical wit. there is moral , human , and divine wisdom . the contract . a noble gentleman that had been married many years , but his wife ( being barren ) did bear him no children ; at last she dyed , and his friends did advise him to marry again , because his brother's children were dead , and his wife was likely to have no more . so he took to vvife a virtuous young lady ; and after one year she conceived with child , and great joy there was of all sides : but in her child-bed she dyed , leaving only one daughter to her sorrowful husband , who in a short time ( oppressed with melancholy ) dyed , and left his daughter ( who was not a year old ) to the care and breeding of his brother , and withall left her a great estate , for he was very rich . after the ceremonies of the funeral , his brother carried the child home , which was nursed up very carefully by his vvife ; and being all that was likely to succeed in their family , the unkle grew extream fond and tender of his neece , insomuch that she was all the comfort and delight of his life . a great duke , which commanded that province , would often come and eat a breakfast with this gentleman , as he rid a hunting ; and so often they met after this manner , that there grew a great friendship betwixt them : for this gentleman was well bred , knowing the vvorld by his travels in his younger days ; and though he had served in the warrs , and fought many battels , yet was he not ignorant of courtly entertainments . besides , he was of a very good conversation , for he had a voluble tongue , and a ready understanding ; and in his retired life , was a great student , whereby he became an excellent scholar ; so that the duke took great delight in his company . besides , the duke had a desire to match the neece of this gentleman , his friend , to his younger son , having only two sons ; and knowing this child had a great estate left by her father ; and was likely to have her unkle's estate joined thereto , he was earnest upon it : but her unkle was unwilling to marry her to a younger brother , although he was of a great family : but , with much perswasion , he agreed , and gave his consent , when she was old enough to marry ; for she was then not seven years old . but the duke fell very sick ; and when the physicians told him , he could not live , he sent for the gentleman and his neece , to take his last farewell ; and when they came , the duke desired his friend , that he would agree to join his neece and his son in marriage . he answered , that he was very willing , if she were of years to consent . said the duke , i desire we may do our parts ; which is , to join them as fast as we can : for youth is wild , various , and unconstant ; and when i am dead , i know not how my son may dispose of himself when he is left to his own choice : for he privately found his son very unwilling , being a man grown , to marry a child . the gentleman seeing him so desirous to marry , agreed to what he desired . the duke called his son privately to him , and told him , his intentions were to see him bestowed in marriage , before he dyed . his son desired him , not to marry him against his mind , to a child . his father told him , she had a great estate , and it was like to be greater , by reason all the revenue was laid up to encrease it : and besides , she was likely to be heir to her unkle , who loved her as his own child ; and her riches may draw so many suiters when she is a woman , said he , that you may be refused . he told his father , her riches could not make him happy , if he could not affect her . whereupon the duke grew so angry , that he said , his disobedience would disturb his death , leaving the world with an unsatisfied mind . whereupon he seemed to consent , to please his father . then were they as firmly contracted , as the priest could make them , and two or three witnesses to avow it . but after his father was dead , he ( being discontented ) went to the warrs , and in short time was called from thence , by reason his elder brother dyed , and so the dukedom and all the estate came to him , being then the only heir . but he never came near the young lady , nor so much as sent to her ; for he was at that time extreamly in love with a great lady , who was young and handsome , being wife to a grandee which was very rich , but was very old ; whose age made her more facil to young lovers , especially to this young duke , who was favoured by nature , fortune , and breeding : for he was very handsom , and of a ready wit ; active , valiant , full of generosity ; affable , well-fashion'd ; and had he not been fullied with some debaucheries , he had been the compleatest man in that age. the old gentleman perceiving his neglect towards his neece , and hearing of his affection to that lady , strove by all the care and industry he could , to give her such breeding as might win his love : not that he was negligent before she was contracted to him ; for from the time of four years old , she was taught all that her age was capable of ; as , to sing , and to dance : for , he would have that artificial motion become as natural ; and so to grow in perfections , as she grew in years . when she was seven years of age , he chose her such books to read , as might make her wise , not amorous ; for he never suffered her to read in romances , nor such leight books : but moral philosophy was the first of her studies , to lay a ground and foundation of virtue , and to teach her to moderate her passions , and to rule her affections . the next study was history , to learn her experience by the second hand ; reading the good fortunes and misfortunes of former times ; the errors that were committed , the advantages that were lost , the humours and dispositions of men , the laws and customs of nations ; their rise , and their fallings ; of their warrs and agreements , and the like . the next study to that , was the best of poets , to delight in their fancies , and in their wit ; and this she did not only read , but repeat what she had read every evening before she went to bed. besides , he taught her to understand what she read , by explaining that which was hard and obscure . thus she was always busily employed ; for she had little time allowed her for childish recreations . thus did he make her breeding his only business and employment : for he lived obscurely and privately , keeping but a little family , and having little or no acquaintance , but lived a kind of a monastical life . but when the neece was about thirteen years of age , he heard the duke was married to the lady with which he was enamoured : for being by the death of her husband left a rich widow , she claimed from him a promise that he made her whilst her husband was living , that when he dyed ( being an old man , and not likely to live long ) to marry her : which he was loth to do ; for men that love the pleasures of the world , care not to be encumbred and obstructed with a vvife ; and so did not at all reflect neither upon his contract with the young lady ; for after his father dyed , he resolved not to take her to wife ; for she being so young , he thought the contract of no validity . but the vvidow seeming more coy than in her husband's time , seeking thereby to draw him to marry her ; and , being overcome by several ways of subtilty , he married her . vvhereupon the unkle was mightily troubled , and very melancholy ; which his neece perceived , and desired of him to know the cause ; which he told her . is this the only reason , said she ? yes , said he : and doth it not trouble you ? no , said she , unless i had been forsaken for some sinful crime i had committed against heaven , or had infringed the laws of honour , or had broken the rules of modesty , or some misdemeanour against him , or some defect in nature , then i should have lamented , but not for the loss of the man , but for the cause of the loss ; for then all the vvorld might have justly defamed me with a dishonourable reproach : but now i can look the world in the face with as confident a brow as innocence can arm . besides , it is likely i might have been unhappy in a man that could not affect me . wherefore , good unkle , be not melancholy , but think that fortune hath befriended me , or that destiny had decreed it so to be : if so , we are to thank the one , and it was impossible to avoid the other : and if the fates spin a long thread of your life , i shall never murmur for that loss , but give thanks to the gods for this blessing . o , but child , said he , the duke was the greatest and richest match , since his brother dyed , in the kingdom : and i would not have thy virtue , beauty , youth , wealth , and breeding , stoop to a low fortune , when thou mayest be a match fit for the emperor of the whole world , in a few years , if you grow up , and go on as you have begun . o unkle , said she , let not your natural affection make you a partial judg , to give the sentence of more desert in me , than i can own : if i have virtue , it is a reward sufficient in it self : if i have beauty , it is but one of nature's fading favours ; and those that loved me for it , may hate me when it is gone : and if i be rich , as you say i am like to be : who are happier than those that are mistresses of their own fortunes ? having bred me well , i shall be happy in what condition soever i am in , being content ; for that is the end and felicity of the mind . but if thou hadst been in love with him ( said her unkle ) , where had been your content then ? for no education can keep out that passion . i hope ( said she ) the gods will be more merciful , than to suffer in me such passions as i cannot rule . what manner of man he , said she ? for i was too young to remember him . his person ( said he ) is handsom enough . that is his outside , said she ; but , what is his inside ? what is his nature and disposition ? debauch'd , said he , and loves his luxuries . heavens have bless'd me from him , said she . well , said her unkle , since i am cross'd in thy marriage , i will strive to make thee a mirror of the time : wherefore i will carry thee to the metropolitan city for thy better education ; for here thou art bred obscurely , and canst learn little , because thou hearest and seest little . you shall not appear to the world this two or three years , but go always veiled , for the sight of thy face will divulge thee ; neither will we have acquaintance or commerce with any ; but observe , hear , and see so much as we can , without being known . sir , said she , i shall be ruled by your direction ; for i know my small bark will swim the better and safer for your steerage : wherefore i shall not fear to launch it into the deepest or most dangerous places of the world , which i suppose are the great and populous cities . so , making but small preparations , only what was for meer necessity , they took their journey speedily , carrying no other servants but those that knew and used to obey their master's will. and when they came to the city , they took private lodging ; where , after they had rested some few days , he carried her every day ( once or twice a day ) abroad , after her exercise of dancing and musick was done . for , being careful she should not only keep what she had learn'd , but learn what she knew not ; after her lessons at home , he carried her to lectures , according as he heard where any were read , either of natural philosophy , ( for this she had studied least : but taking much delight therein , she had various speculations thereof ) or of physick and chymistry , of musick , and of divers others , on such days as they were read . also , he carried her to places of judicature , to hear great causes decided ; and to hear the several pleadings , or rather wranglings , of several lawyers ; but never to court , masques , plays , nor balls : and she always went to the publick places aforementioned , masqu'd , muffl'd , or scarf'd : and her unkle would make means to get a private corner to sit in , where they might hear well ; and when he came home , he would instruct her of all that was read , and tell her where they differed from the old authors ; and then would give his opinion , and take hers , of their several doctrines . and thus they continued for two years . in the mean time , her beauty encreased with her breeding , but was not made known to any , as yet ; till being come to the age of sixteen years , her unkle did resolve to present her to the world : for he knew , youth was admired in it self ; but when beauty and virtue was joined to it , it was the greater miracle . so he began to examine her , for he was jealous she might be catch'd with vain gallants ; although he had observed her humour to be serious , and not apt to be catch'd with every toy ; yet he knew youth to be so uncertain , that there was no trusting it to itself . so he ask'd her , how she was taken with the riches and gallantry of the city ; for she could not chuse but see lords and ladies riding in their brave gilt coaches , and themselves dress'd in rich apparel , and the young gallants riding on praunsing horses upon embroidered foot-clothes , as she pass'd along the streets . she answered , they pleased her eyes for a time ; and that dressings were like bridal-houses , garnished and hung by some ingenious wit ; and their beauties like fine flowers drawn by the pencil of nature ; but being not gathered by acquaintance , said she , i know not whether they are vertuonsly sweet , or no ; as i pass by , i please my eye , yet no other ways than as upon sensless objects : they entice me not to stay ; and a short view satisfies the appetite of the senses , unless the rational and understanding part should be absent ; but to me they seem but moving-statues . well , said he , i hear there is a masque to be at court ; and i am resolved you shall go , if we can get in , to see it : for though i am old , and not fit to go , since my dancing-days are done ; yet i must get into some corner , to see how you behave your self . pray , said she , what is a masque ? he said , it is painted scenes , to represent the poets heavens and hells , their gods and devils , the clouds , sun , moon , and starrs : besides , they represent cities , castles , seas , fishes , rocks , mountains , beasts , birds , and what pleaseth the poet , painter , and surveyor . then there are actors , and speeches spoke , and musick ; and then lords or ladies come down in a scene , as from the clouds ; and after that , they begin to dance , and every one takes out one or other , according as they fancy . if a man takes out a woman , if she cannot , or will not dance , then she makes a curt'sie to the king , or queen , or chief grandee , if there be any one ; if not , to the upper end of the room ; then turns to the man , and makes another to him : then he leaves , or leads her to them she will take out ; and she doth the like to him , and then goeth to her place again . and the men do the same , if they will not dance ; and if they do dance , they do just so when the dance is ended ; and all the chief of the youths of the city ( or all those that have youthful minds , and love sights and fine clothes ) come to see it , or to shew themselves . then the room is made as light with candles , as if the sun shined ; and their glittering bravery makes as glorious a shew as his gilded beams . sir , said she , if there be such an assembly of nobles , beauty , and bravery , i shall appear so dull , that i shall be only fit to sit in the corner with you . besides , i shall be so out of countenance , that i shall not know how to behave my self ; for private breeding looks mean and ridiculous , i suppose , in publick assemblies of that nature , where none but the glories of the kingdom meet . ashamed , said he , for what ? you have stoln no body's goods , nor good names ; nor have you committed adultery ; for on my conscience you guess not what adultery is : nor have you murthered any ; nor have you betrayed any trust , or concealed a treason ; and then why should you be ashamed ? sir , said she , although i have committed none of those horrid sins ; yet i may commit errors through my ignorance , and so i may be taken notice of only for my follies . come , come , said he , all the errors you may commit ( although i hope you will commit none ) will be laid upon your youth ; but arm your self with confidence , for go you shall , and i will have you have some fine clothes , and send for dressers to put you in the best fashion . sir , said she , i have observed how ladies are dress'd when i pass the streets ; and , if you please to give me leave , i will dress my self according to my judgment ; and if you intend i shall go no more than once , let me not be extraordinary brave , lest liking me at first , and seeing me again they should condemn their former judgment , and i lose what was gained ; so i shall be like those that make a good assault , and a bad retreat . but , sir , said she , if you are pleased i shall shew my self to the most glorious , let me be ordered so , that i may gain more and more upon their good opinions . well , said her unkle , order your self as you please , for i am unskilled in that matter : besides , thou needest no adornments ; for nature hath adorn'd thee with a splendid beauty , another thing , is ( said he ) , we must remove our lodgings , for these are too mean to be known in ; wherefore , my steward shall go take a large house , and furnish it nobly ; and i will make you a fine coach , and take more servants , and women to wait upon you ; for , since you have a good estate , you shall live and take pleasure . but i will have no men-visitors but what are brought by my self : wherefore , entertain on masculine acquaintance , nor give them the least encouragement . sir , said she , my duty shall observe all your commands . when her unkle was gone , lord ( said she ) , what doth my unkle mean , to set me out to shew ? sure he means to traffick for a husband ; but heaven forbid those intentions , for i have no mind to marry . my unkle is wise , and kind , and studies for my good ; wherefore i submit , and could now chide my self for these questioning thoughts . now ( said she ) i am to consider how i shall be dress'd ; my unkle saith , i am handsome ; i will now try whether others think so as well as he ; for i fear my unkle is partial on my side : wherefore i will dress me all in black , and have no colours about me ; for if i be gay , i may be taken notice of for my clothes , and so be deceived , thinking it was for my person ; and i would gladly know the truth , whether i am handsome , or no ; for i have no skill in faces : so that i must judg of my self by the approbation of others eyes , and not by my own . but if i be ( said she ) thought handsome , what then ? why then ( answered she her self ) i shall be cryed up to be a beauty . and what then ? then i shall have all eyes stare upon me . and what am i the better , unless their eyes could infuse into my brain wit and understanding ? their eyes cannot enrich me with knowledg , nor give me the light of truth ; for i cannot see with their eyes , nor hear with their ears , no more than the meat which they do eat , can nourish me ; or rest when they do sleep . besides , i neither desire to make , nor catch lovers ; for i have an enmity against mankind , and hold them as my enemies ; which if it be a sin , heaven forgive , that i should for one man's neglect and perjury , condemn all that sex. but i find i have a little emulation , which breeds a desire to appear more beautiful than the duke's wife , who is reported to be very handsome : for i would not have the world say , he had an advantage by the change : thus i do not envy her , nor covet what she enjoys ; for i wish her all happiness : yet i would not have her happiness raised by my misfortunes , for charity begins at home ; and those that are unjust or cruel to themselves , will never be merciful and just to others . but , o my contemplations ! whither do you run ? i fear , not in an even path : for , though emulation is not envy , yet the bias leans to that side . but , said she , to this masque i must go ; my unkle hath press'd me to the warrs of vanity , where cupid is general , and leads up the train : but i doubt i shall hang down my head through shamefac'dness , like a young soldier when he hears the bullets flye about his ears : but , o confidence , thou goddess of good behaviour , assist me ! well , said she , i will practise against the day , and be in a ready posture . so , after two or three days , the masque was ; and she being ready to go , her unkle comes to her , and sees her dress'd all in black. he said , why have you put your self all in black ? sir , said she , i mourn like a young widow , for i have lost my husband . by my troth , said he , and it becomes thee : for , you appear like the sun when he breaks through a dark cloud . i would have you go veiled , says he ; for i would have you appear to sight only when you come into the masquing-room ; and after the masque is done , all the company will rise , as it were , together , and join into a croud ; then throw your hood over your face , and pass through them as soon as you can , and as obscure ; for i will not have you known , until we are in a more courtly equipage . so away they went , only he and she , without any attendants ; and when they came to enter through the door of the masquing-room , there was such a croud , and such a noise , the officers beating the people back , the women squeaking , and the men cursing ; the officers threatning , and the enterers praying , that so great a confusion made her afraid . lord , unkle , said she , what a horrid noise is here ? pray let us go back , and let us not put our selves unto this unnecessary trouble . o child , said he , camps and courts are never silent ; besides , where great persons are , there should be a thundering-noise , to strike their inferiors with a kind of terror and amazement : for poets say , fear and wonder makes gods. certainly , said she , there must be a great felicity in the sight of this masque , or else they would never take so much pains , and endure so great affronts , to obtain it . but pray unkle , said she , stay while they are all pass'd in . why then , said he , we must stay until the masque is done ; for there will be striving to get in , until such time as those within are coming out . but when they came near the door , her unkle spoke to the officer ; pray sir , said he , let this young lady in to see the masque . there is no room , said he ; there are more young ladies already , than the viceroy and all his courtiers can tell what to do with . this is a dogged fellow , said her unkle : whereupon he told her , she must put up her scarf , and speak her self ; for every one domineers in their office , though it doth not last two hours ; and are proud of their authority , though it be but to crack a lowse : wherefore you must speak . pray sir , said she to the door-keeper , if it be no injury to your authority , you will be so civil as to let us pass by . by my troth , said he , thou hast such a pleasing-face , none can deny thee : but now i look upon you better , you shall not go in . why sir , said she ? why , said he , you will make the painter and the poet lose their design ; for one expects to enter in at the ears of the assembly , the other at their eyes ; and your beauty will blind the one , and stop the other . besides , said he , all the ladies will curse me . heaven forbid , said she , i should be the cause of curses ; and to prevent that , i will return back again . nay , lady , said he , i have not the power to let you go back ; wherefore pray pass . sir , said she , i must have this gentleman along with me . even who you please , said he , i can deny you nothing : angels must be obeyed . when they came into the masquing-room , the house was full : now ( said her unkle ) i leave you to shift for your self ; and he went and crouded himself into a corner at the lower end . when the company was called to sit down , that the masque might be represented , every one was placed by their friends , or else they placed themselves . but she , being unaccustomed to those meetings , knew not how to dispose of her self ; and observing there was much justling and thrusting one another to get places , she consider'd she had not strength to scamble amongst them , and therefore she stood still . when they were all set , it was as if a curtain was drawn from before her , and she appeared like a glorious light ; whereat ali were struck with such a maze , that they forgot a great while the civility in offering her a place . at last , all the men ( which at such times sit opposite to the women , to view them the better ) rose up , striving every one to serve her . but the vice-roy bid them all sit down again , and called for a chair for her . but few looked on the masque , for looking on her ; especially the vice-roy and duke , whose eyes were rivetted to her face . when the masquers were come down to dance , ( who were all women , the chief of them being the daughter of the vice-roy , who was a widower , and she was his only child ) they took out such men as their fancy pleased , and then they sate down ; after which , one of the chief of the men chose out a lady , and so began to dance in single couples ; the duke being the chief that did dance , chose out this beauty , not knowing who she was , nor she him : but when she danced , it was so becoming ! for , she had naturally a majestical presence , although her behaviour was easie and free ; and a severe countenance , yet modest and pleasing ; and great skill in the art , keeping her measures just to the notes of musick ; moving smoothly , evenly , easily ; that it made her astonish all the company . the vice-roy sent to enquire who she was , and what she was , and from whence she came , and where she lived ; but the enquirer could learn nothing . but as soon as the masque was done , she was sought about for , and enquired after ; but she was gone , not to be heard of ; whereupon many did think she was a vision , or some angel , which appear'd , and then vanished away : for , she had done as her unkle had commanded her , which was , to convey her self as soon away as she could , covering her self close : so home they went , and her unkle was very much pleased to see the sparks of her beauty had set their tinder-hearts on fire . but as she went home , she enquired of her unkle of the company : pray sir , said she , was the duke or duchess there ? i cannot tell , said he ; for my eyes were wholly taken up in observing your behaviour , that i never considered or took notice who was there . who was he that first took me out to dance , said she ? i cannot tell that neither , said he ; for i only took the length of your measures ; and what through a fear you should be out , and dance wrong , and with joy to see you dance well , i never considered whether the man you danced with , moved or no , nor what he was : but now i am so confident of you , that the next assembly i will look about , and inform you as much as i can : so home they went but her beauty had left such stings behind it , especially in the breast of the vice-roy and the duke , that they could not rest . neither was she free ; for she had received a wound , but knew not of it ; her sleeps were unsound , for they indeed were slumbers rather than sleeps ; her dreams were many and various : but her lovers , that could neither slumber nor sleep , began to search , and to make an enquiry ; but none could bring tidings where she dwelt , nor who she was . the vice-roy cast about to attain the sight of her once again . so he made a great ball , and provided a great banquet , to draw an assembly of all young ladies to his court ; which her unkle understanding , told his neece she must prepare to shew her self once again ; for i will ( said he ) the next day after this ball , remove to our new house . sir , said she , i must have another new gown . as many as thou wilt , said he , and as rich ; i will also buy you jewels . no sir , said she , pray spare that cost ; for they are only to be worn at such times of assemblies , which i shall not visit often , for fear i tire the courtly spectators , which delight in new faces , as they do in new scenes . so her unkle left her to order her self ; who dressed her self this time all in white sattin , embroidered all over with silver . when her unkle saw her so dress'd ; now by my troth , thou lookest like a heaven stuck with starrs ; but thy beauty takes off the gloss of thy bravery : now , said he , you shall not go veiled ; for thy beauty shall make thy way : besides , we will not go too soon , nor while they are in disorder ; but when they are all placed , you will be the more remarkable . the cavaliers ( especially the duke , and the vice-roy ) began to be melancholy , for fear she should not come : their eyes were always placed at the doors , like centinels , to watch her entrance ; and when she came to the court , all the crouds of people , as in a fright , started back , as if they were surprised with some divine object ; making a lane , in which she pass'd through ; and the keepers of the doors were struck mute , there was no resistance , all was open and free to enter . but when she came in , into the presence of the lords and ladies , all the men rose up , and bowed themselves to her , as if they had given her divine worship ; only the duke , who trembled so much ( occasioned by the passion of love ) that he could not stir ; but the vice-roy went to her . lady , said he , will you give me leave to place you ? your highness , said she , will do me too much honour . so he called for a chair , and placed her next himself ; and when she was set ; she produced the same effects as a burning-glass ; for the beams of all eyes were drawn together as to one point , placed in her face ; and by reflection she sent a burning heat , and fired every heart . but he could not keep her ; for as soon as they began to dance , she was taken out , not by the duke , for he had not recovered as yet love's shaking-sit . the young gallants chose her but too often to dance ; for every one took it for a disgrace not to have the honour to dance with her ; insomuch that few of the other ladies danced at all , as being creatures not worthy to be regarded whilst she was there . the vice-roy , fearing they should tire her ( for she durst not deny them , by reason it would be thought an affront , and rude , or want of breeding ) call'd sooner for the banquet than otherwise he would have done . besides , he perceived the rest of the ladies began to be angry , expressing it by their frowns : and knowing nothing will so soon pacifie that bitter humour in ladies , as sweet-meats , he had them brought in . but when the banquet came in , he presented her the first with some of those sweet-meats , still filling her ears with complements , or rather chosen words , for no complement could pass on her beauty , it was so beyond all expressions . at last he asked her where her lodging was , and whether she would give him leave to wait upon her ? she answered him , it would be a great grace and favour to receive a visit from him ; but , said she , i am not at my own disposing : wherefore i can neither give , nor reccive , without leave . pray , said he , may i know who is this happy person you so humbly obey ? she said , it is my unkle , with whom i live . where doth he live , said he ? truly , said she , i cannot tell the name of the street . is he not here , lady , said he ? yes , said she , and pointed to him . and though he was loath , yet he was forced to leave her so long , as to speak with her unkle : but the whilst he was from her , all the young gallants , which were gathered round about her , presented her with sweet-meats , as offerings to a goddess ; and she , making them curt'sies , return'd them thanks for that she was not able to receive , as being too great a burthen ; for she was offer'd more sweet-meats than one of the vice-roy's guard could carry . but all the while the duke stood as a statue , his eyes were fix'd only upon her ; nor had he power to speak ; and she perceiving where he was ( for her eyes had secretly hunted him out ) , did as often look upon him , as her modesty would give her leave ; and desired much to know who he was , but was ashamed to ask . at last the duke , being a little encouraged by her eye , came to her . lady , said he , i am afraid to speak , lest i should seem rude by my harsh discourse : for there is not in the alphabet , words gentle nor smooth enough for your soft ears , but what your tongue doth polish ; yet i hope you will do as the rest of the gods and goddesses , descend to mortals , since they cannot reach to you . sir , said she , but that i know it is the courtly-custom for men to express their civilities to our sex in the highest words , otherwise i should take it as an affront , and scorn to be called by those names i understand not , and to be likened to that which cannot be comprehended . the duke said , you cannot be comprehended ; nor do your lovers know what destiny you have decreed them . the vice-roy came back with her unkle , who desired to have his neece home , the banquet being ended . but when the duke saw her unkle , he then apprehending who she was , was so struck , that what with guilt of conscience , and with repenting-forrow , he was ready to fall down dead . her unkle , seeing him talking to her , spoke thus to the duke : sir , said he , you may spare your words , for you cannot justifie your unworthy deeds . whereat she turned as pale as death , her spirits being gathered to guard the heart , being in distress , as overwhelmed with passion . but the bussle of the croud helped to obscure her change , as well as it did smuther her unkle's words , which pierced none but the duke's ears , and hers . the vice-roy taking her by the hand , led her to the coach , and all the gallants attended ; whereat the ladies , that were left behind in the room , were so angry , that they shoot forth words like bullets , with the fire of anger , wounding every man with reproach ; and at the vice-roy they sent out whole volleys , which battered his reputation . but as for the young lady , they did appoint a place of purpose to dissect her , reading satyrical lectures upon every part , with the hard terms of dispraises . so all being dispersed , the vice-roy long'd for that seasonable hour to visit her . but the duke wish'd there were neither time nor life : i cannot hope ( said he ) for mercy , my fault is too great ; nor can i live or dye in quiet , without it ; and the miseries and torments of despairing-lovers , will be my punishment . the old gentleman was so pleased to see his neece admired , that as he went home , he did nothing but sing after a humming way ; and was so frolick , as if he were returned to twenty years of age : and after he came home , he began to examine his neece : how do you like the duke , said he ? for that was he that was speaking to you when i came . she answered , that she saw nothing to be disliked in his person . and how ( said he ) do you like the vice-roy ? as well ( said she ) as i can like a thing that time hath worn out of fashion . so , said he , i perceive you despise age : but let me tell you , that what beauty and favour time takes from the body , he gives double proportions of knowledg and understanding to the mind . you use to preach to me , the outside is not to be regarded ; and i hope you will not preach that doctrine to others that you will not follow your self . sir , said she , i shall be ruled by your doctrine , and not by my own . then , said he , i take my text out of virtue , which is divided into four parts , prudence , fortitude , temperance , and justice . prudence is to foresee the worst , and provide the best we can for our selves , by shunning the dangerous ways , and chusing the best . and my application is , that you must shun the dangerous ways of beauty , and chuse riches and honour , as the best for your self . fortitude is to arm our selves against misfortunes , and to strengthen our forts with patience , and to fight with industry . my application of this part is , you must barricado your ears , and not suffer , by listning , the enticing perswasions of rhetorick to enter : for if it once get into the brain , it will easily make a passage to the heart , or blow up the tower of reason , with the fire of foolish love. temperance is to moderate the appetites , and qualifie the unruly passions . my third application is , you must marry a discreet and sober man , a wise and understanding man , a rich and honourable man , a grave and aged man ; and not be led by your appetites , to marry a vain fantastical man , a proud conceited man , a wild debauched man , a foolish prodigal , a poor shark , or a young unconstant man. fourthly and lastly , is justice , which is to be divided according to right and truth , to reward and punish according to desert , to deal with others as we would be dealt unto . and my last application is , that you should take such counsel , and follow such advice from your friends , as you would honestly give to a faithful friend , as the best for him , without any ends to your self ; and so good-night , for you cannot chuse but be very sleepy . when he was gone , lord ! said she , this doctrine , although it was full of morality , yet in this melancholy humour i am in , it sounds like a funeral-sermon to me : i am sure it is a preamble to some design he hath ; pray god it be not to marry me to the vice-roy : of all the men i ever saw , i could not affect him ; i should more willingly wed death than him ; he is an antipathy to my nature . good jupiter , said she , deliver me from him . so she went to bed , not to sleep , for she could take little rest ; for her thoughts worked as fast as a feverish pulse . but the vice-roy came the next day , and treated with her unkle , desiring her for his wife . her unkle told him , it would be a great fortune for his neece , but he could not force her affection : but , said he , you shall have all the assistance that the power and authority of an unkle , and the perswasions as a friend , can give , to get her consent to marry you . pray , said the vice-roy , let me see her , and discourse with her . he desired to excuse him , if he suffered him not to visit her : for , said he , young women that are disposed by their friends , must wed without wooing . but he was very loth to go without a sight of her : yet pacifying himself with the hopes of having her to his wife , he presented his service to her , and took his leave . then her unkle sate in counsel with his thoughts , how he should work her affection , and draw her consent to marry this vice roy ; for he found she had no stomack towards him . at last he thought it best to let her alone for a week , or such a time , that the smooth faces of the young gallants that she saw at the masque and ball , might be worn out of her mind . in the mean time she grew melancholy , her countenance was sad , her spirits seemed dejected , her colour faded ; for she could eat no meat , nor take any rest ; neither could she study nor practise her exercises , dancing and musick was laid by ; and she could do nothing , but walk'd from one end of the room to the other ; where her eyes fix'd upon the ground , she would sigh and weep , and knew not for what ; but at last spoke thus to her self : surely an evil fate hangs over me ; for i am so dull , as if i were a piece of earth , without sense ; yet i am not sick , i do not find my body destempered : then surely it is in my mind ; and what should disturb that ? my unkle loves me , and is as fond of me as ever he was : i live in plenty ; i have as much pleasure and delight as my mind can desire . o but the vice-roy affrights it ! there is the cause : and yet methinks that cannot be , because i do verily believe my unkle will not force me to marry against my affections : besides , the remembrance of him seldom comes into my mind ; for my mind is so full of thoughts of the duke , that there is no other room left for any other : my fancy orders , places , and dresses him a thousand several ways . and thus have i thousand several figures of him in my head ; heaven grant i be not in love ; i dare not ask any one that hath been in love , what humours that passion hath . but why should i be in love with him ? i have seen as handsome men as he , that i would not take the pains to look on twice : and yet when i call him better to mind , he is the handsomest i ever saw . but what is a handsome body , unless he hath a noble soul ? he is perjured and inconstant ; alas , it was the fault of his father to force him to swear against his affections whilst she was reasoning thus to her self , in came her unkle , who told her , he had provided her a good husband . sir , said she , are you weary of me ? or , am i become a burthen , you so desire to part with me , in giving me to a husband ? nay , said he , i will never part ; for i will end the few remainder of my days with thee . she said , you give your power , authority , and commands , with my obedience , away : for , if my husband and your commands are contrary , i can obey but one , which must be my husband . good reason , said he ; and for thy sake i will be commanded too : but , in the mean time , i hope you will be ruled by me ; and here is a great match propounded to me for you , the like i could not have hoped for , which is the vice-roy ; he is rich . yet , said she , he may be a fool. o he is wise and discreet , said he . i have heard , said she , he is ill-natured and froward . her unkle answered , he is in great power and authority . he may be ( said she ) never the honester for that . he is ( said he ) in great favour with the king. sir , said she , princes and monarchs do not always favour the most deserving ; nor do they always advance men for merit ; but most commonly otherwise , the unworthiest are advanced highest : besides , bribery , partiality , and flattery , rule princes and states . her unkle said , let me advise you not to use rhetorick against your self , and overthrow a good fortune , in refusing such a husband as shall advance your place above that false duke's duchess ; and his estate , with yours joined to it , will be greater than his ; with which you shall be served nobly , attended with numbers of servants , live plentifully , adorned richly , have all the delights and pleasures your soul can desire ; and he , being in years , will dote on you : besides , he having had experience of vain debaucheries , is become staid and sage . sir , said she , his age will be the means to barr me of all these braveries , pleasures , and delights , you propound ; for he , being old , and i young , will become so jealous , that i shall be in restraint , like a prisoner ; nay , he will be jealous of the light , and of my own thoughts , and will enclose me in darkness , and disturb the peace of my mind , with his discontents : for jealousie , i have heard , is never at quiet with it self , nor to those that live near it . come , come , said he , you talk you know not what : i perceive you would marry some young , fan'tastical , prodigal fellow , who will give you only diseases , and spend your estate , and his own too , amongst his whores , bawds , and sycophants : whilst you sit mourning at home , he will be revelling abroad ; and then disturb your rest , coming home at unseasonable times : and if you must suffer , you had better suffer by those that love , than those that care not for you : for , jealousie is only an overflow of love. wherefore be ruled , and let not all my pains , care , and cost , and the comfort of my labour , be lost through your disobedience . sir , said she , i am bound in gratitude and duty to obey your will , were it to sacrifice my life , or the tranquillity of my mind , on the altar of your commands . in the mean time , the duke was so discontented and melancholy , that he excluded himself from all company , suffering neither his duchess , nor any friend , to visit him , nor come near him ; only one old servant to wait upon him : all former delights , pleasures , and recreations , were hateful to him , even in the remembrance , as if his soul and body had taken a surfeit thereof . at last , he resolved she should know what torment he suffered for her sake ; and since he could not see , nor speak to her , he would send her a letter . he called for pen , ink , and paper , and wrote after this manner : madam , the wrath of the gods is not only pacified , and they do not only pardon the greatest sins that can be committed against them , taking to mercy the contrite heart ; but give blessings for repentant tears ; and i hope you will not be more severe than they : let not your justice be too rigid , lest you become cruel . i confess , the sins committed against you , were great , and deserve great punishment : but if all your mercies did flye from me , yet if you did but know the torments i suffer , you could not chuse but pity me ; and my sorrows are of that weight , that they will press away my life , unless your favours take off the heavy burthen . but bomsoever , pray let your charity give me a line or two of your own writing , though they strangle me with death ; then will my soul lye quiet in the grave , because i dyed by your hand ; and when i am dead , let not the worst of my actions live in your memory , but cast them into oblivion , where i wish they may for ever remain . the gods protect you . sealing this letter , he gave it to his man to carry with all the secrefie he could ; bidding him to enquire which of her women was most in her favour , and to pray her to deliver it to her mistress when she was all alone , and to tell the maid , he would be in the street to wait her command . the man found such access as he could wish ; and the letter was delivered to the lady ; which when she had read , and found from whom it came , her passions were so mix'd , that she knew not whether to joy or grieve ; she joy'd to live in his thoughts , yet griev'd to live without him ; having no hopes to make him lawfully hers , nor so much as to see or speak to him , her unkle was so averse against him ; and the greatest grief was , to think she must be forced to become anothers , when she had rather be his , though once forsaken by him , than to be beloved by another with constancy . then musing with her self for some time , considering whether it was fit to answer his letter or no ; if my unkle should come to know ( said she ) i write to him without his leave ( which leave i am sure he will never give ) , i shall utterly lose his affection ; and i had rather lose my life , than lose his love : but if i do not write , i shall seem as if i were of a malicious nature , which will beget an evil construction of my disposition in that mind , in whose good opinion i desire to live . if i believe , as charity and love perswades me , that he speaks truth , i shall endanger his life ; and i would be loth to murther him with nice scruples , when i am neither forbid by honour nor modesty , religion nor laws , to save him . well , i will adventure , and ask my unkle pardon when i have done . my unkle is not of a tyger's nature , he is gentle , and a pardon may be gotten : but life , when once it is gone , will return no more . then taking pen , ink , and paper , writ to him after this manner : sir , i am obedient , as being once tied to you , until you did cut me off , and throw me away as a worthless piece , only fit to be trodden under the feet of disgrace ; and certainly had perished with shame , and been left destitute , had not my unkle own'd me . and though you are pleased to cast some thoughts back upon me , yet it is difficult for me to believe , that you that did once scorn me , should humbly come to sue to me : and i fear you do this for sport , angling with the bait of deceit , to catch my innocent youth . but i am not the first of my sex , nor i fear shall not be the last , that has been , and will be deceived by men , who glory in their treacherous victories ; and if you beset me with stratagems , kill me outright , and lead me not a prisoner , to set out your triumph . if you have warrs with your conscience , or fancy , or both , interrupting the peace of your mind , as your letter expresses ; i should willingly return to your side , and be your advocate : but the fates have destin'd it otherwise . and yet what unhappy fortune soever befalls me , i wish yours may be good . heavens keep you . here , said she , give the man that brought me the letter , this . the man returning to his lord so soon , made him believe he had not delivered her his letter . well , said the duke , you have not delivered my letter ? yes , but i have , said he , and brought you an answer . why , said the duke , it is impossible , you staid so short a time ! then , said he , i have wrought a miracle , or you did lengthen my journey in your conceits with the foul ways of dissiculties . i hope , said the duke , thou art so blessed , as to make as prosperous a journey , as a quick dispatch . leave me a while , said he , till i call you . but when he went to open the letter , time brings not more weakness , said he , than fear doth to me ; for my hands shake as if i had the palsie ; and my eyes are so dim , that spectacles will hardly enlarge my sight . but when he had read the letter , joy gave him a new life . here , said he , she plainly tells me , she would be mine : she saith , she would return to my side , if the fates had not destin'd against it ; by which she means , her unkle is against me . well if i can but once get access , i shall be happy for ever . so after he had blessed himself in reading the letter many times over , i will ( said he ) strengthen my self to be able to go abroad , for as yet i am but weak ; and calling to hisman , he bid him get him something to eat . did your grace , said the man , talk of eating ? yes , answered the duke , for i am hungry . by my troth , said the man , i had thought your hands , mouth , appetite , and stomack , had made a bargain ; the one , that it never would desire meat nor drink : the other , that it would digest none : the third , that it would receive none : and the fourth , that it would offer none : for on my conscience you have not eat the quantity of the pestle of a lark this week ; and you are become so weak , that if a boy should wrestle with you , he would have the better . you are deceived , said the duke ; i am so strong , and my spirits so active , that i would beat two or three such old fellows as thou art ; and to prove it , i will beat thee with one hand . no pray , said he , i will believe your grace , and leave your active grace for a time to fetch you some food . when his man came in with the meat , he found the duke a dancing . i helieve , said he , you carry your body very leight , having no heavy burthens of meat in your stomack . i am so airy , said the duke , as i will caper over thy head. by my troth , said he , then i shall let fall your meat out of my hands , for fear of your heels . whist the duke was at his meat , he talkt to his man : why hast thou lived an old batchelor , and never married ? o sir , said he , wives are too chargeable . why , said the duke , are you so poor ? no , sir , answered he , women are so vain ; and do not only spend their husbands estates , but make his estate a bawd to procure love servants ; so as his wealth serves only to buy him a pair of horns . prithee let me perswade thee to marry , and i will direct thee to whom thou shalt go a wooing . troth sir , i would venture , if there had been any example to encourage me . why , what do you think of my marriage ? do not i live happily ? yes , said he , when your duchess and you are asunder ; but when you meet , it is like jupiter and juno ; you make such a thundring noise , as it frights your mortal servants , thinking you will dissolve our world ( your family ) ; consuming your hospitality by the fire of your wrath ; rouling up the clouds of smoaky vapour from boil'd-beef , as a sheet of parchment . when you were a batchelor , we lived in the golden age ; but now it is the iron age , and doomsday draws near . i hope , saith the duke , thou art a prophet ; but when doomsday is past , you shall live in paradice . in my conscience , sir , said he , fortune hath mis-match'd you ; for surely nature did never intend to join you as man and wife , you are of such different humours . well , said the duke , for all your railing against women , you shall go a wooing , if not for your self , yet for me . sir , said he , i shall refuse no office that your grace shall employ me in . go your ways , said the duke , to that lady's maid you gave the letter to , and present her with a hundred pounds , and tell her , if she can help me to the speech of her lady , you will bring her a hundred pounds more ; and if you find her nice , and that she says , she dares not ; offer her five hundred pounds , or more ; and so much , until you have out-bribed her cautious fears . sir , said the man , if you send her many of these presents , i will woo for my self , as well as for your grace : wherefore , by your grace's leave , i will spruce up my self before i go , and trim my beard , and wash my face ; and who knows but i may speed ? for i perceive it is a fortunate year for old men to win young maids affections ; for they say , the vice-roy is to be married to the sweetest young beautifullest lady in the world ; and he is very old , and ( in my opinion ) not so handsome as i am . with that , the duke turned pale . nay , said the man , your grace hath no cause to be troubled , for 't is a lady you have refused : wherefore he hath but your leavings . with that the duke up with his hand , and gave him a box on the ear ; thou lyest , said he , he must not marry her . nay , said the man , that is as your grace can order the business : but your grace is a just performer of your word ; for you have tried your strength , and have beaten me with one hand . the duke walked about the room ; and after he had pacified himself , at last spoke to his man : well ( said he ) , if you be prosperous , and can win the maid to direct me the way to speak to her lady , i will cure the blow with crowns . sir , said he , i will turn you my other cheek , to box that , if you please . go away , said the duke , and return as soon as you can . sir , said he , i will return as soon as my business is done , or else i shall lose both pains and gains : good fortune be my guide , said he , and then i am sure of the world's favour : for they that are prosperous , shall never want friends . although he were a coward , a knave , or a fool ; the world shall call , nay , think him , valiant , honest , and wife . sir , said he to the duke , pray flatter fortune , and offer some prayers and praises to her deity in my behalf , though it be but for your own sake ; for he that hath not a feeling interest in the business , can never pray with a strong devotion for a good success ; but their prayers will be so sickly and weak , that they can never travel up far , but fall back , as it were , in a swoun , without sense . in the mean time the vice-roy and the unkle had drawn up articles , and had concluded of the match , without the young lady's consent : but the unkle told her afterwards , she must prepare her self to be the vice-roy's bride : and , said he , if you consent not , never come near me more , for i will disclaim all the interest of an unkle , and become your enemy . his words were like so many daggers , that were struck to her heart ; for her grief was too great for tears . but her maid , who had ventured her lady's anger for gold , had conveyed the duke into such a place , as to go into her chamber when he pleased . he seeing her stand , as it were , without life or sense , but as a statue carved in a stone , went to her ; which object brought her out of a muse , but struck her with such a maze , as she fixt her eyes upon him as on some wonder ; and standing both silent for a time , at last she spake : sir , said she , this is not civilly done , to come without my leave , or my unkle's knowledg ; nor honourably done , to come ( like a thief in the night ) to surprise me . madam ( said he ) , love , that is in danger to lose what he most adores , will never consider persons , time , place , nor difficulty , but runs to strengthen and secure his side , fights and assaults all that doth oppose him : and i hear you are to be married to the vice-roy ; but if you do marry him , i will strive to make you a widow the first hour , cutting your vows asunder ; and your husband , instead of his bride , shall embrace death ; and his grave shall become his wedding-bed , or i will lye there my self , shrowded in my winding-sheet , from the hated-sight of seeing or knowing you to be anothers . but if knowledg lives in the grave , think not your self secure when i am dead ; for if ghosts ( as some imagine ) can rise from the earth , mine shall visit you , and fright you from delights ; and never leave you , until you become a subject in death's kingdom . but if you are cruel , and take delight to have your bridal-health drunk in blood , marry him , where perchance we may be both dead-drunk with that warm red liquor . sir , answered she , it is an unheard-of malice to me , or an impudent and vain-glorious pride in you , neither to own me your self , nor let another ; but would have me wander , that the world may take notice , and say , this is your forsaken maid ; and i live to be scorned , and become friendless : for my unkle will never own me ; which will prove as a proclamation to proclaim me a traitor to gratitude and natural affection , by committing the treason of disobedience . the duke said , you cannot want an owner whilst i live ; for i had , nor have , more power to resign the interest i have in you , than kings to resign their crowns that come by succession ; for the right lies in the crown , not in the man : and though i have played the tyrant , and deserved to be uncrowned ; yet none ought to take it off my head , but death : nor have i power to throw it from my self ; death only must make way for a successor . then said she , i must dye , that your duchess may have right , and a free possession . nay , said he , you , must claim your own just interest , and place your self where you should be . what is that , said she ? go to law for you ? yes , said he . if i be cast , said she , it will be a double shame . you cannot plead , and be condemned , said he , if justice hears your cause : and though most of the actions of my life have been irregular , yet they were not so much corrupted or misruled by nature , as for want of good education , and through the ignorance of my youth : but time hath made me see my errors . and though your beauty is very excellent , and is able to enamour the dullest sense ; yet it is not that alone disturbs the peace of my mind , but the being conscious of my fault ; which unless you pardon and restore me to your favour , i shall never be at rest . i wish there were no greater obstacle ( said she ) than my pardon , to your rest : for i should absolve you soon ; and sleep should not be more gentle , and soft on your eyes , than peace to your mind , if i could give it ; but my unkle's dislike may prove as fearful dreams to disturb it : though indeed , if his anger were like dreams , it would vanish away ; but i doubt it is of too thick a body for a vision . the duke said , we will both kneel to your unkle , and plead at the barr of either ear : i will confess my fault at one ear , whilst you ask pardon for me at the other : and though his heart were steel , your words will dissolve it into compassion , whilst my tears mix the ingredients . my unkle , said she , hath agreed with the vice-roy ; and his word hath sealed the bond , which he will never break . the duke said , i will make the vice-roy to break the bargain himself , and then your unkle is set free : besides , you are mine , and not your unkle's ; unless you will prove my enemy to deny me ; and i will plead for my right . heaven direct you for the best , said she ; it is late , good-night . you will give me leave , said he , to kiss your hand ? i cannot deny my hand , said she , to him that hath my heart . the next day the duke went to the vice-roy , and desired to have a private hearing , about a business that concerned him : and when he had him alone , he shut the door , and drew his sword ; which when the vice-roy saw , he began to call for help . call not , nor make a noise ; if you do , hell take me , said the duke , i 'le run you through . what mean you , said the vice-roy , to give me such a dreadful visit ? i come , said the duke , to ask you a question , to forbid you an act , and to have you grant me my demand . the vice-roy said , the question must be resolvable , the act just , the demand possible . they are so , said the duke : my question is , whether you resolve to be married to the lady delicia . yes , answered he . the act forbidden is , you must not marry her . why , said the vice-roy ? because ( said he ) she is my wife ; and i have been married to her almost nine years . why , said he , you cannot have two wives ? no , said he , i will have but one , and that shall be she . and what is your demand ? my demand is , that you will never marry her . how , says the vice-roy ? put the case you should die , you will then give me leave to marrie her ? no , said the duke ; i love her too well , to leave a possibility of her marrying you . i will sooner die , than set my hand to this , said the vice-roy . if you do not , you shall die a violent death , by heaven , answered he ; and more than that , you shall set your hand never to complain against me to the king : will you do it ? or will you not ? for i am desperate said the duke . the vice-roy said , you strike the king in striking me . no disputing , says he ; set your hand presently , or i will kill you . do you say , you are desperate ? yes , answered he . then i must do a desperate act , to set my hand to a bond i mean to break . use your own discretion , to that . come , said he , i will set my hand before i read it ; for whatsoever it is , it must be done . after he set his hand , he read . here i do vow to heaven , never to woo the lady delicia , nor to take her to wife : whereunto i set my hand . to this paper too , said the duke . here i do vow to heaven , never to take revenge , nor to complain of the duke to the king my master : whereunto i set my hand . the duke said , i take my leave ; rest you in peace , sir. and the devil torment you , said the vice-roy ! o fortune ! i could curse thee , with thy companions , the fates ; not only in cutting off my happiness , in the enjoying of so rare a beauty ; but in stopping the passages to a sweet revenge . and though i were sure there were both gods and devils , yet i would break my vow ; for the one are pacified by prayers and praises , and the other terrified with threats . but o! the disgrace from our fellow-creatures ( mankind ) , sets closer to the life , than the skin to the flesh : for , if the skin be flea'd off , a new one will grow again , making the body appear younger than before : but if a man be flea'd once of his reputation , he shall never regain it ; and his life will be always bare and raw , and malice and envy will torment it , with the stings of ill tongues ; which to avoid , i must close with this duke in a seeming-friendship , and not defie him as an open enemy , lest he should divulge my base acts done by my cowardly fear : but they are fools that would not venture their reputations , to save their life , rather than to dye an honourable death , as they call it ; which is , to dye to gain a good opinion ; and what shall it avail them ? a few praises ; it will be said , he was a valiant man : and what doth the valiant get ? is he ever the better ? no , he is tumbled into the grave , and his body rots , and turns to dust ; all the clear distinguishing senses , the bright flaming appetites , are quenched out : but if they were not , there is no fuel in the grave to feed their fire ; for death is cold , and the grave barren : besides , there is no remembrance in the grave , all is forgotten ; they cannot rejoice at their past gallant actions , or remember their glorious triumphs ; but the only happiness is , that as there is no pleasure in the grave , so there is no pain : but , to give up life before nature requires it , is to pay a subsidy before we are tax'd ; or to yeeld up our liberties before we are prisoners : and who are wise that shall do so ? no , let fools run head-long to death , i will live as long as i can ; and not only live , but live easily , freely , and as pleasantly as i can . wherefore , to avoid this man's mischiefs ( which lyes to entrap my life ) , i will agree with him ; and i had rather lose the pleasures of one woman , than all other pleasures , with my life : but from a secret mischief he shall not escape , if i can prevail : for i perceive this duke , since he can have but one wife , intends to set up a seraglio of young wenches ; and , by my troth , he begins with a fair one ; and whilst he courts his mistress , i mean to woo his wife ; for he hath not sworn me from that : so that my revenge shall be , to make him a cuckold . so the vice-roy went to the duchess ; and after he had made his complemental-addresses , they began to talk more seriously . madam , said he , how do you like the rare beauty , which your husband doth admire so much , that he is jealous of all that look on her , and would extinguish the sight of all mens eyes , but his own ; and challenges all that make love to her ; and threatens ruin and murther to those that pretend to marry her ? she answered , if he be so enamoured , i shall not wonder now that my beauty is thought dead , my embraces cold , my discourse dull , my company troublesome to him , since his delight is abroad . but , said she , i am well served ; i was weary of my old husband , and wished him dead , that i might marry a young one : i abhorred his old age , that was wise and experienced ; despised his gray hairs , that should have been reverenced with respect . o what happiness i rejected , that i might have enjoyed ! for he admired my beauty , praised my wit , gave me my will , observed my humour , sought me pleasures , took care of my health , desired my love , proud of my favours ; my mirth was his musick , my smiles were his heaven , my frowns were his hell : whenas this man thinks me a chain that enslaves him ; a shipwrack , wherein all his happiness is drown'd ; a famine to his hopes , a plague to his desires , a hell to his designs , and a devil to damn his fruitions . nay certainly , said he , that woman is the happiest that marries an ancient man ; for he adores her virtue , more than her beauty ; and his love continues , though her beauty be gone ; he sets a price of worth upon the honour and reputation of his wife ; uses her civilly , and gives her respect , as gallant men ought to do to a tender sex ; which makes others to do the like : when a young man thinks it a gallantry , and a manly action , to use his wife rudely , and worse than his lacquey ; to command imperiously , to neglect despisingly , making her the drudg in his family , flinging words of disgrace upon her ; making her , with scorn , the mirth and pastime , in his idle and foolish discourse amongst his vain and base companions ; when an ancient man makes his wife the queen of his family , his mistress in his courtship , his goddess in his discourse ; giving her praise , applauding her actions , magnifying her nature ; her safety is the god of his courage ; her honour the world to his ambition ; her pleasure his only industry ; her maintenance the mark for his prudence ; her delights are the compass by which he sails ; her love his voyage ; her advice his oracle : and doing this , he doth honour to himself , by setting a considerable value upon what is his own : when youth regards not the temper of her dispotion , slights her noble nature , grows weary of her person , condemns her counsels , and is afraid his neighbour should think his wife wiser than himself ; which is the mark of a fool , and a disease most men have ( being married young ) . but a man in years is solid in his counsels , sober in his actions , graceful in his behaviour , wise in his discourse , temperate in his life , and appears ( as nature hath made him ) masculine . whereas a young man is rash in his counsels , desperate in his actions , wild in his behaviour , vain in his discourses , debauch'd in his life ; and appears not like his sex , but effeminate . a fair forehead , and a smooth skin ; a rosie cheek , and a ruby lip ; wanton eyes , and a flattering tongue , are unmanly ; appearing like women or boys , let them be never so valiant ; and as if they would sooner suffer the whip , than handle the sword. in an ancient man , every wrinkle is a trench made by time , wherein lies experience to secure the life from errors ; and their eyes are like active soldiers , who bow and sink down by the over-heavy burthens of their spoils , which are several objects that the sight carries into the brain , and delivers to the understanding , as trophies , to hang up in the magazine of the memory . his white hairs are the flage of peace , that time hangs out on the walls of wisdom , that advice and counsel may come to and fro safely . nay , the very infirmities of age , seem manly ; his seeble legs look as if they had been over-tired with long marches , in seeking out his foes ; and his palsey-hands , or head , the one seems as if they had been often used in beating of their enemies ; and the other in watching , as if they knew not what rest meant . sir , said the duchess , you commend aged husbands , and dispraise young ones , with such rhetorick , torick , as i wish the one , and hate the other ; and in pursuit of my hate , i will cross my husband's amours as much as i can . in the mean time , the duke was gone to the old gentleman , the young lady's unkle ; who when he saw him enter , he started , as if he had seen an evil he desired to shun . sir , said he , what unlucky occasion brought you into my house ? first , repentance ( answered the duke ) , and then love ; and lastly , my respect , which i owe as a duty . my repentance begs a forgiveness : my love offers you my advice and good counsel : my respect forewarns you of dangers and troubles , that may come by the marriage of your neece to the vice-roy . why , what danger ( said he ) can come in marrying my neece to a wise , honourable , rich , and powerful man , and a man that loves and admires her , that honours and respects me ? but , said the duke , put the case he be a covetous , jealous , froward , ill-natured , and base cowardly man , shall she be happy with him ? but he is not so , said he . but , answered the duke , if i can prove him so , will you marry her to him ? pray , said he , spare your proofs of him , since you cannot prove your self an honest man. sir , said the duke , love makes me endure a reproach patiently , when it concerns the beloved : but though it endures a reproach , it cannot endure a rival . why , said the old gentleman , i hope you do not challenge an interest in my neece . yes , said the duke , but i do ; and will maintain that interest with the power of my life , and never will quit it , till death ; and if my ghost could fight for her , it should . heaven bless my neece , said the old gentleman ! what is your design against her ? is it not enough to fling a disgrace of neglect on her , but you must ruin all her good fortunes ? is your malice so inveterate against my family , that you strive to pull it up by the roots , to cast it into the ditch of oblivion , or to fling it on the dunghill of scorn ? the duke said , my design is , to make her happy , if i can ; and will oppose all those that hinder her felicity , disturbing the content and peace of her mind : for , she cannot love this man ; besides , he disclaims her , and vows never to marry her . sir , said the gentleman , i desire you to depart from my house , for you are a plague to me , and bring an evil infection . sir , said the duke , i will not go out of your house , nor depart from you , until you have granted my request . why , said the gentleman , you will not threaten me . no , said the duke , i do petition you . the gentleman said , if you have any quarrel to me , i shall answer it with my sword in my hand : for , though i have lost some strength with my years , yet i have not lost my courage ; and when my limbs can fight no longer , the heat of my spirits shall consume you : besides , an honourable death i far prefer before a baffled life . sir , said he , i come not to move your anger , but your pity ; the sorrows i am in ( for the injuries i have done you ) being extream great ; and if you will be pleased to take me into your favour , and assist me , by giving my wife ( your neece ) leave to claim the laws of marriage and right to me , all my life shall be studious to return gratitude , duty , and service , to you . yes , answered he , to divulge her disgrace , declaring your neglect in an open court , and to make my self a knave to break my promise . sir , said the duke , your disgrace by me , is not so much as you apprehend : but it will be a great disgrace , when it is known the vice-roy refuses her , as i can shew you his hand to it ; and if he deserts your neece , you are absolved of your promise made to him ; and to let you know this is a truth , here is his hand . the whilst the old gentleman was reading the papers , the vice-roy comes in . o sir , said he , you are timely come ! is this your hand , says he ? yes , answered the vice-roy . and do you think it is honourably done , said the gentleman ? why , said the vice-roy , would you have me marry another man's wife ? well , said the old gentleman , when your vice-roy-ship is out ( as it is almost ) , i will give you my answer ; till then , fare you well . but the duke went to the young lady , and told her the progress he had had with her unkle , and his anger to the vice-roy . after the old gentleman's passion was abated towards the duke , by his humble submission , and the passion enflamed towards the vice-roy , he hearkned to the law suit , being most perswaded by his neece's affection , which he perceived was unalterably placed upon the duke . and at last , advising all three together , they thought it sit ( since the parties must plead their own cause ) to conceal their agreements , and to cover it by the duke's seeming dissent , lest he should be convicted as a breaker of the known laws , and so be liable to punishment , either by the hazzard of his life , or the price of a great fine . being thus agreed of all sides , the law-suit was declared ; which was a business of discourse to all the kingdom ; and the place of judicature , a meeting for all curious , inquisitive , and idle people . when the day of hearing was come , there was a barr set out , where the duke and the two ladies stood ; and after all the judges were set , the young lady thus spake : grave fathers , and most equal judges , i come here to plead for right , undeck'd with eloquence ; but truth needs no rhetorick ; so that my cause will justifie it self : but if my cause were foul , it were not pencil'd words could make it seem so fair , as to delude your understanding eyes . besides , your justice is so wise , as to fortisie her forts with fortitude , to fill her magazine with temperance , to victual it with patience , to set centinels of prudence , that falshood might not surprise it , nor bribery corrupt it , nor fear starve it , nor pity undermine it , nor partiality blow it up ; so that all all right causes , here , are safe , and secured from their enemies , injury and wrong . wherefore , most reverend fathers , if you will but hear my cause , you cannot but grant my suit. whereupon the judges bid her declare her cause . i was married to this prince , 't is true ; i was but young in years when i did knit that wedlock-knot ; and though a child , yet since my vows were holy , which i made by virtue and religion , i am bound to seal that sacred bond with constancy , now i am come to years of knowing good from evil . i am not only bound , most pious judges , to keep my vow , in being chastly his as long as he shall live but to require him by the law , as a right of laberitance belonging to me , and only me , so long as i shall live , without a sharer or co-partner : so that this lady , who lays a claim , and challenges him as being hers , can have no right to him , and therefore no law can plead for her : for , should you cast aside your canon law ( most pious judges ) , and judg it by the common-law , my suit must needs be granted , if justice deals rightly , and gives to truth her own : for , should an heir , young , before he comes to years , run on the lenders score ; though the lender had no law to plead against nonage ; yet if his nature be so just to seal the bonds he made in non-age , when he comes to full years , he makes his former act good , and fixes the law to a just grant , giving no room for cozenage to play a part , nor falshood to appear . the like is my cause , most grave fathers ; for my friends chose me a husband , made a bond of matrimony , sealed it with the ceremony of the church ; only they wanted my years of consent , which i give now freely and heartily . the judges asked , what says the duke ? then the duke thus spake : i confess , i was contracted to this lady by all the sacred and most binding ceremonies of the church , but not with a free consent of mind : for , being forced by the duty to my father , who did not only command , but threatned me with his curse , he being then upon his death-bed , and i being afraid of a dying-father's curses , yeelded to those actions which my affections and free-will renounced : and after my father was dead , placing my affections upon another lady , married her , thinking my self not liable to the former contract , by reason the lady was but six years of age , whose non-age i thought was a warrantable cancel from the engagement . most upright judges , my non-age is not a sufficient reason to set him free , he being then of full age ; nor can his fear of offending his parents , or his loving-duty towards them , be a casting-plea against me : his duty will not discharge his perjury ; nor his fear could be no warrant to do a wrong : and if a fool by promise binds his life to inconveniences , the laws that wise men have made , must force him to keep it . and if a knave , by private and self ends , doth make a promise , just laws must make him keep it . if a coward makes a promise through distracted fear , laws ( that carry more terrors , than the broken promise , profit ) will make him keep it . a wise , just , generous spirit , will make no promise but what he can , and durst , and will perform . but say , a promise should pass through an ignorant zeal , and seeming good ; yet a right honourable and noble mind will stick so fast to its engagements , that nothing shall hew them asunder : for , a promise must neither be broken upon suspition , nor false construction , nor upon enticing perswasions , nor threatning ruins ; but it must be maintained with life , and kept by death , unless the promise carry more malignity in the keeping , than the breaking of it . i say not this to condemn the duke , though i cannot applaud his second action concerning marriage : i know he is too noble to cancel that bond his conscience sealed before high heaven , where angels stood as witnesses : nor can he make another contract , until he is free from me : so that his vows to his lady were rather complemental , and love's feignings , than really true , or so authentical as to last . he built affections on a wrong foundation , or rather castles in the air , as lovers use to do , which vanish soon away : for , where right is not , truth cannot be . wherefore , she can claim no lawful marriage , unless he were a free-man , not bound before ; and he cannot be free , unless he hath my consent , which i will never give . then the other lady spake . noble judges , this crafty , flattering , dissembling child , lays a claim to my husband , who no way deserves him , she being of a low birth , and of too mean a breeding to be his wife : neither hath she any right to him in the law , she being too young to make a free choice , and to give a free consent . besides , he doth disavow the act , by confessing the disagreeing thereto in his mind ; and if she was to give a lawful consent , and his consent was seeming , not real , as being forced , it could not be a firm contract . wherefore , i beseech you , cast her suit from the barr , since it is of no validity . just judges , answered she : what though he secretly disliked of that act be made ? yet human justice sentences not the thoughts , but acts : wherefore those words that plead his thoughts , ought to be waved as useless , and from the barr of justice cast aside . and now , most upright judges , i must entreat your favour and your leave to answer this lady , whose passions have flung disgraces on me ; which i , without the breach of incivility , may throw them off with scorn , if you allow me so to do . the judges said , we shall not countenance any disgrace , unless we knew it were a punishment for crimes : wherefore speak freely . well then , to answer this lady , who says , that i am meanly born : 't is true , i came not from nobility , but i can draw a line of pedigree five hundred years in length , from the root of merit , from whence gentility doth spring . this honour cannot be degraded by the displeasure of princes ; it holds not in fee-simple from the crown , for time is the patron of gentility , and the older it groweth , the more beautiful it appears ; and having such a father and mother , as merit and time , gentry is a fit and equal match for any , were they the rulers of the whole world. and whereas she says , most patient judges , i am a false dissembling child . i answer , as to my childhood , it is true , i am young , and unexperienced ; a child in understanding , as in years : but to be young , i hope , is no crime ; but if it be , 't was made by nature , not by me . and for dissembling , i have not had time enough to practice much decev my youth will witness for me . it is an art , not an in-bred nature , and must be studied with pains , and watch'd with observation , before any can be masters thereof . and i hope this assembly is so just , as not to impute my innocent simplicity to a subtil , crafty , or a deceiving glass , to show the mind 's false face , making that fair , which in it self is foul . and whereas she says , i have been meanly bred , 't is true , honoured judges , i have been humbly bred , taught to obey superiors , and to reverence old age ; to receive reproofs with thanks , to listen to wise instructions , to learn honest principles , to huswife time , making use of every minute ; to be thrifty of my words , to be careful of my actions , to be modest in my behaviour , to be chast in my thoughts , to be pious in my devotions , to be charitable to the distressed , to be courteous to inferiors , and to be civil to strangers : for the truth is , i was not bred with splendid vanities , nor learnt the pomp and pride of courts ; i am ignorant of their factions , envies , and back-bitings ; i know not the sound of their stattering tongues ; i am unacquainted with their smiling faces ; i have not wit to perceive their false hearts ; my judgment is too young , and too weak , to fathom their deep and dangerous designs . neither have i lived so long in populous cities , as to share of their luxuriousness : i never have frequented their private nor publick meetings ; nor turned the day into night by disorders : i can play at none of their games ; nor can i tread their measures . but i was bred a private countrey-life , where the crowing of the cocks served as waights of the town ; and the bleating of the sheep , and lowing of the cows , are the minstrels we dance after ; and the singing of the birds are the harmonious notes by which we set our innocent thoughts , playing upon the heart-strings of content , where nature there presents us a masque with various scenes of the several seasons of the year . but , neither low birth , nor mean breeding , nor bad qualities ; nay , were i as wicked as i am young , yet it will not take away the truth of my cause , nor the justness of my plea : wherefore i desire you to give my suit a patient trial , and not to cast me from the barr , as she desires ; for i hope you will not cast out my suit by unjust partiality ; nor mistake the right measure , and so cut the truth of my cause too short : but i beseech you to give it length by your serious considerations , and make it fit by your just favour : for , though truth it self goeth naked , yet her servants must be clothed with right , and dress'd by propriety , or they will dye with the cold of usurpation , and then be flung into the ditch of sorrow , there to be eaten up with the ravens of scorn , having no burial of respect , nor tomb of tranquility , nor pyramids of felicity , which your justice may raise as high as heaven , when your injustice may cast them as low as hell. thus you become , to truth , gods or devils . madam , said the judges to the young lady , the justice of your cause judges it self : for , the severest judg , or strictest rules in law , can admit of no debate . and truly , madam , it is happy for us that sit upon the bench , that your cause is so clear and good ; otherwise your beauty and your wit might have proved bribes to our vote : but yet there will be a fine on the duke , for the breach of the laws . with that the duke spake : most careful , learned , and just judges , and fathers of the common-wealth : i confess my fault , and yeeld my self a prisoner to justice , which may either use punishment or mercy : but , had i known the laws of custom , religion , or honour , then ( as well as i do now ) i had not run so fast , nor plunged my self so deep in the foul ways of error : but wild youth , surrounded with ease , and fed with plenty ; born up with freedom , and led by self will , sought pleasure more than virtue ; and experience hath learn'd me stricter rules , and nobler principles ; insomuch as the reflection of my former actions , clouds all my future happiness , wounds my conscience , and torments my life . but i shall submit to what your wise judgments shall think fit . my lord , answered the judges , your grace being a great peer of the realm , we are not to condemn you to any fine , it must be the king : only we judg the lady to be your lawful wife , and forbid you the company of the other . the duke said , i shall willingly submit . with that the young lady spake : heaven ( said she ) send you just rewards for your upright actions : but i desire this assembly to excuse the faults of the duke in this , since he was forced , by tyrant love , to run in uncouth ways ; and do not wound him with sharp censures : for , where is he , or she , though ne're so cold , but sometimes love doth take , and fast in fetters hold ? the vice-roy being by , said to the other lady , madam , since the law hath given away your husband , i will supply his place , if you think me so worthy , with whom perchance you may be more happy than you were with him . i accept of your love , said she , and make no question but fortune hath favoured me in the change. with that the court rose , and much rejoicings there were of all sides . the ambitious traitor . there was a noble-man in fairy-land , which was in great favour with king oberon ; but the favour of the king made him so proud and haughty , that he sought to usurp the crown to himself . his design was , to kill the king , and then to marry queen mabb ; and to bring his evil designs to pass , he feasted the nobility , devised sports for the commonalty , presented the old ladies with gifts , flattered the young ones , in praising their beauties ; made balls , plays , masques , to entertain them ; bribed the courtiers , corrupted the soldiers with promises of donatives ; fired the youth with thoughts of chivalry , and expectations of honours ; and was industrious to present the petitions of suitors , and to follow the causes of the distressed , and to plead for his clients ; and all to get a popular esteem and love . but there is none so wise and crafty , that can keep out envy from searching into their ways with the eyes of spight . his popular applause begot in him private enemies , which advertised the king to look to himself , and to cut off his growing-power ; not out of loyalty to the king , but out of hate to the favourite : and kings being jealous , are apt to suspect the worst ; which made him observe with a stricter eye , setting spies and watches on all his actions , until he catcht him in the trap of his rebellion : for , speaking some dangerous and seditious words , he was cast into prison until further trial . a day being appointed for his hearing , a council was called of all the peers of the land , which were his judges ; and the witnesses being brought , he was cast , and condemned to dye . great preparations were made against the day of execution , scaffolds were set up , windows were pulled down , that people might behold him : guards were set at each corner of the streets , and the multitude did so throng , that when this noble-man passed along , every eye strove to out-stare each other ; and every neck stretch'd to out reach his fore-standers head ; and every ear listned to hear if he did speak ; and every tongue moved with enquiries ; every mind was filled with expectation of the event ; and every one as busie as a judg , to condemn him , or a hang man to execute him ; and those that profest most friendship to him in his prosperity , were his greatest enemies , upbraiding him with the name of traytor , though truly , yet not seemly , from former profest friends : but he ( with a slow pace , and a sad countenance , habited in black ) went on , until he came to the scaffold : then turning his face to the people , he thus spake : i do not wonder to see so great a multitude gathered together , to view the death of a single person ; although death is common to every one , and that there is as many several ways to dye , as eyes to look on : yet beasts do not gather in troops to see the execution of their kind . but i wonder men should change their opinion with the change of fortune , as if they did applaud her inconstancy , hating what she seemed to hate , and loving what she seemed to love ; calling them fools which she casts down , and those wise which she raises up , although it be without desert : for , had i been prosperous in my evil intention , i should have had as many acclamations , as now i have accusations ; had been called wise , valiant , generous , just , and all the names that praise could honour me with : and not only they would have called me so , but have thought me to have been so . but , o odd man ! how art thou made ! to have so much ambition as to desire the power of gods , and yet to be more foolish than beasts , and as ill-natur'd as devils of hell ! for , beasts follow the laws of nature , but men follow their own laws , which make them more miserable than nature intended them to be . beasts do not destroy themselves ; nor make they laws to entangle themselves in the nets of long strong suits ; but follow that which pleaseth them most . unless men vex them , they weary not themselves in unprofitable labours , nor vex their brain with vain phantasms ; they have no superstitious fear , nor vain curiosity , to seek after that which ( being found ) they are never the better : nor strange opinions , to carry them from the truth ; nor rhetorick , to perswade them out of the right way . and when beasts prey upon one anothe , it is out of meer hunger ; not to make spoil , man , who is so disorderly , as that he strives to destroy nature her self , and ( if he could ) pull jupiter out of heaven : but when we come near to be destroyed by death , then we have a seeming-repentance , and flatter the gods to have pity on us . and though my nature is so bad ( as being of mankind ) that i may dissemble so nicely , as not to perceive it in my self ; yet i hope the gods will have as much mercy on me , as i think i am truly sorrowful for my fault : and then kneeling , thus said : o jupiter ! how should weak and frail men agree amongst themselves , when there have been quarrels in thy heavenly mansions , envying thy glory , and being ambitious of thy power , conspiring against thee ? and since ambition hath been in heaven , pardon it on earth : for it was not against thee , my maker , but against my fellow-creature . o jupiter ! check thy vice-gerent nature for making me of such an aspiring quality , coveting to be the chiefest on earth : for she might have made me humble and lowly , and not of so proud and haughty a disposition ; for it was in her power to have made me in what temper she had pleased . i do not expostulate this out of a murmuring-discontent , but to draw down thy pity for my unhappy nature , which ( in a manner ) enforced me thereunto . but i submit , as thou hast commanded me , and am content to obey thy will and either to undergo pulto's punishments , or to be annihilated : but if thy judgment may be diverted , send me to the blessed elyzium . then turning to the block , he was executed . no sooner was his head off , but all his acquaintants , friends , and kindred , forgot him , as the living usually do any the dye . and although most rejoyce at the fall of those that are most eminent ( as if the chiefest ingredient of man were malice and spight , which produceth cruelty ) ; yet when the multitude saw all was done , and that their greedy appetite was satisfied with blood , then a lazy and sleepy pity seized on them ; and with yawning wishes , would have had him alive again . but king oberon and queen mabb , after the execution , having given order for his quarters to be set up on the gates of the city , rid to their palaces in state , hoping they should have no more such traiterous subjects disturb their peace . assaulted and pursued chastity . preamble . in this following tale or discourse , my endeavour was , to shew young women the danger of travelling without their parents , husbands , or particular friends , to guard them : for , though virtue is a good guard , yet it doth not always protect their persons , without other assistance : for , though virtue guards , yet youth and beauty betrays ; and the treachery of the one , is more than the safety of the other ; for young , beautiful , and virtuous women , if they wander alone , find but very often rude entertainment from the masculine sex , witness jacob's daughter dinah , which shechem forced : and others , whose forcement is mentioned in holy scripture , and in histories of less authority ( sans nombre : ) which shews , that heaven doth not always protect the persons of virtuous souls from rude violences ; neither doth it always leave virtue destitute , but sometimes sends a human help ; yet so , as never but where necessity was the cause of their dangers , and not ignorance , indiscretion , or curiosity : for , heaven never helps , but those that could not avoid the danger ; nay , if they do avoid the danger , they seldom avoid a scandal : for , the world in many cause judges according to what may be , and not according to what is : they judg not according to truth , but shew ; nor by the heart , but by the countenance ; which is the cause that many a chast woman hath a spotted reputation . but to conclude , i say , those are in particular favoured by heaven , that are protected from violence and scandal , in a wandring-life , or a travelling-condition . in the kingdom of riches , after a long and sleepy peace , over-grown with plenty and ease , luxury broke out into factious sores ; and feverish ambition , into a plaguy rebellion , killing numbers with the sword of unjust warr ; which made many flye from that pestilent destruction , into other countreys ; and those that stayed , sent their daughters and wives from the fury of the inhuman multitude ; chusing to venture their lives with the hazzards of travels , rather than their honours and chastities , by staying at home amongst rough and rude soldiers . but in ten years warrs , the ignorant-vulgar , being often ( in the schools of experience ) whipt with misery , had learnt the lesson of obedience ; and peace , that laid all that time in a swound , was revived to life ; and love , the vital spirits thereof , being restored to their orderly motions ; and zeal , the fire of the publick heart , flaming a-new , did concoct the undigested multitudes to a pure good government ; and all those that fear or care had banished , were invited and called home , by their natural affections to their countrey . a lady , amongst the rest , enricht by nature , with virtue , wit , and beauty ; in her returning-voyage , felt the spight of fortune , being cast by a storm , from the place she steered to , upon the kingdom of sensuality , a place and people strange unto her : no sooner was she landed , but treachery beset her ; and those she entrusted , left her : her years , being but few , had not gathered experience enough to give her the best direction . thus , knowing not how to dispose of her self , wanting means for support , and calling her young and tender thoughts to counsel ; at last they did agree , she should seek a service : and going to the chief city , which was not far from the haven-town , with a skipper , whom she had entreated to go along with her ; he left her in a poor and mean house , to chance , time , and fortune ; where her hostess , seeing her handsome , was tempted ( by her poverty and covetousness ) to consider her own profit , more than her guest's safety , selling her to a bawd which used to traffick to the land of youth , for the riches of beauty . this old bawd , having commerce with most nations , could speak many languages , and this lady 's amongst the rest ; and what with her languages , and her flattering words , she inticed this young lady to live with her ; and this old bawd ( her supposed vertuous mistress ) used her kindly , fed her daintily , clothed her finely ; insomuch as she began to think she was become the darling of fortune ; but yet she keeps her closely from the view of any , until her best customers came to the town , who were at that time in the countrey . in the mean time her mistress began to read her lectures of nature , telling her , she should use her beauty while she had it , and not to waste her youth idly , but to make the best profit of both , to purchase pleasure and delight : besides , said she , nature hath made nothing in vain , but to some useful end ; and nothing meerly for its self , but for a common benefit , and general good ; as you see by the earth , water , air , and fire ; sun , moon , starrs , light , heat , cold , and the like . so is beauty ( with strength and appetites ) either to delight her creatures that are in being , or to procure more by procreation ; for nature only lives by survivers ; and that cannot be , without communication and society . wherefore , it is a sin against nature , to be reserved and coy ; and take heed , said she , of offending nature ; for she is a great and powerful goddess , transforming all things out of one shape into another ; and those that serve her faithfully , and according as she commands , she puts them in an easie and delightful form ; but those that displease her , she makes them to be a trouble and torment to themselves : wherefore serve nature , for she is the only and true goddess , and not those that men call upon , as jupiter , juno , and a hundred more , that living-men vainly offer unto , being only men and women which were deified for invention , and heroick actions : for unto these dead , though not forgotten gods and goddesses ( as they are called through a superstitious fear , and an idolatrous love to ceremony , and an ignorant zeal to antiquity ) , men fruitlesly pray : but nature is the only true goddess , and no other ; wherefore follow her directions , and you shall never do amiss : for , we that are old , said she , are nature's priests , and being long acquainted with her laws and customs , do teach youth the best ways to serve her in . the young lady , being of a quick apprehension , began to suspect some design and treachery against her : and though her doubts begot great fears , yet her confidence of the gods protection of virtue , gave her courage ; and , dissembling her discovery as well as she could for the present , gave her thanks for her counsel : but when she was gone , considering in what a dangerous condition she stood , and that the gods would not hear her if she lazily called for help , and watch'd for miracles , neglecting natural means : whereupon she thought the best way was , secretly to convey her self out of that place , and trust her self again to chance , by reason there could not be more danger , than where she was . but those thoughts being quickly cut off , because she could find no possibility of an escape , being strictly kept by the care of the old bawd , for fear she should give away that by enticement , which she meant to sell at a high rate : wherefore she was forced to content her self , and to satisfie her fears , with hopes of finding some means to be delivered from those dangers ; praying to the gods for their assistance , to guard her from cruel invaders of chastity . but after two or three days , a subject prince of that countrey , which was a grand monopolizer of young virgins , came to the town ( which was the metropolitan city of that countrey ) ; where as soon as he came , he sent for his chief officer , the old bawd , to know of her how his customers encreased ; who told him , she had a rich prize , which she had seized on , and kept only for his use ; telling him , she was the rarest piece of nature's works , only ( faith she ) she wants mature confidence ; but time , and heat of affection , would ripen her to the height of boldness . so home she went to prepare for his coming , adorning her house with costly furniture , setting up a rich bed , as an altar to venus ; burning pleasant and sweet perfumes , as incense to her deity , before the sacrifice of chastity , youth , and beauty ; and instead of garlands , dress'd her with costly and rich jewels : but the fair aspect of her beauty , her lovely features , exact proportion , graceful behaviour , with a sweet and modest countenance , was more adorned thus , by nature's dress , than those of art. but these preparations turned miseriae ; for so she was called from doubts , to a perfect belief of what she feared before ; and not knowing how to avoid the shipwrack , she grew into a great passion , and great controversies she had with her self , whether she should lose her honour , and live ; or save her honour , and dye : dishonour she hated , and death she feared ; the one she blusht at , the other she trembled at . but at last , with much strugling , she got out of that conflict , resolving to dye ; for in death ( said she ) there is no pain ; nor in a dishonourable life , any content : but though death ( says she ) is common to all , yet when it comes not in the ordinary ways of nature , there must be used violence by artificial instruments ; and in my condition , there must be used expedition . and , considering what ways to take , she bethought of a maid-servant that used to make clean the rooms , and such kind of works ; to whom she had often talked , as she was about her employments , and had gotten much of her affections : her she called , and told her , that a wife wizard had advised her , that ever on her birth-day , she should shoot off a pistol ; and in so doing , she should be happy , so long as she used the same custom ; but if she neglected , she should be unfortunate ; for by the shooting thereof ( said she ) , i shall kill a whole year of evil from doing me hurt : but she told her withall , that it must be that day ; and it must be a small one , for fear of making a great noise ; and done privately , for fear her mistress should know of it , or any body else ; for it will be of no effect if above one know of it besides my self . the simple wench , easily believing what she said , was industrious to supply her wants , and in a short time brought her desires ; which when she had got , her dejected spirits rose with an overflowing joy ; and setting down with a quiet mind , since before she could not stand nor set still : for her troubled and rough thoughts , drove her from one end of the room to the other , like a ship at sea that is not anchored nor ballasted , or with storm tost from point to point ; so was she : but now with a constant wind of resolution , she sailed evenly , although she knew not to what coast she should be driven . but after some expectation , in came the old bawd and the prince ; who was so struck with her beauty , as he stood some time to behold her : at last coming near her , earnestly viewing her , and asking her some leight questions , to which she answered briefly and wittily ; which took him so much , as he had scarce patience to bargain with the old bawd for her . but when they were agreed , the wicked bawd left them to themselves ; where he , turning to the young lady , told her , that of all the women that ever he met with , his senses were never so much delighted ; for they had wedded his soul to admirations . she answered , that if his senses , or his person , did betray her to his lust , she wished them all annihilated , or at least buried in dust : but i hope ( said she ) by your noble and civil usage , you will give me cause to pray for you , and not to wish you evil : for , why should you rob me of that , which nature freely gave ? and it is an injustice to take the goods from the right owners , without their consents ; and an injustice is an act that all noble minds hate ; and all noble minds usually dwell in honourable persons , such as you seem to be ; and none but base or cruel tyrants , will lay unreasonable commands , or require wicked things , from the powerless , or vertuous . wherefore , most noble sir , said she , shew your self a master of passion , a king of clemency , a god of pity and compassion ; and prove not your self a beast to appetite , a tyrant to innocents ; a devil to chastity , virtue , and piety ; and with that , tears did flow from her eyes , as humble petitioners , to beg her release from his barbarous intention . but he by those tears ( like drink to those that are poyson'd ) grows more dry , and his passions more violent : he told her , no rhetorick could alter his affections . which when she heard , and he ready to seize on her , she drew forth the pistol which she had concealed , bending her brows , with a resolute spirit told him , she would stand upon her guard : for why , said she , it is no sin to defend my self against an obstinate and cruel enemy ; and know , said she , i am no ways to be found by wicked persons , but in death : for whilst i live , i will live in honour ; or when i kill or be kill'd , i will kill or dye for security . he for a time stood in a maze to see her in that posture , and to hear her high defiance : but considering with himself , that her words might be more than her intentions , and that it was a shame to be out-dared by a woman ; with a smiling-countenance said , you threaten more evil than you dare perform ; besides , honour will be buried with you in the grave , when by your life you may build palaces of pleasure and felicity . with that he went towards her , to take away the pistol from her : stay , stay , said she ; i will first build me a temple of fame upon your grave , where all young virgins shall come and offer at my shrine ; and , in the midst of these words , shot him . with that , he fell to the ground ; and the old bawd , hearing a pistol , came running in : where , seeing the prince lye all smeared in blood , and the young lady ( as a marble statue ) standing by , as if she had been fixt to that place , looking stedfastly upon her own act ; she , running about the room , called out , murther , murther , help , help ; not knowing what to do , fear had so possest her . at last she drew her knife , thinking to stab her ; but the prince forbid her , saying , he hoped he should live to give her her due desert ; which if the gods grant , said he , i shall ask no more . so desiring to be laid upon the bed until the chirurgeons came to dress his wounds , stenching the blood as well as they could , the mean time . but after the chirurgeons had search'd his wounds , he ask'd them , whether they were mortal ? they told him , they were dangerous , and might prove so ; but their hopes were not quite cut off with despair of his recovery . but after his wounds were drest , he gave order for the young lady to be lockt up close , that none might know there was such a creature in the house ; nor to disclose how or by what means he came hurt . then being put in his litter , he was carried into his own house , which was a stately palace in the city . the noise of his being wounded , was spread abroad , and every one enquiring how he came so , making several tales and reports , as they fancied , but none knew the truth thereof . after some days , his wounds began to mend , but his mind grew more distemper'd with the love of the fair lady ; yet loath he was to force that from her , she so valiantly had guarded and kept : and to enjoy her lawfully , he could not , because he was a married man , and had been so five years : for as the years of twenty , by his parents perswasion ( being a younger brother at that time , although afterwards he was lest the first of his family , by the death of his eldest brother ) , he married a widow , being noble and rich , but well stricken in years , never bearing child . and thus being wedded more to interest than love , was the cause of his seeking those societies which best pleased him . but after long conflicts and doubts , fears , hopes , and jealousies , he resolved to remove her from that house , and to try to win her by gifts and perswasions : and sending for a reverent lady , his aunt ( whom he knew loved him ) , he told her the passage of all that had hapned , and also his affection , praying her to take her privately from that place , and to conceal her secretly , until he was well recovered ; entreating her also , to use her with all the civility and respect that could be . going from him , she did all that he had desired her ; removing her to a house of hers a mile from the city , and there kept her . the young lady , in the mean time , expecting nothing less than death , was resolved to suffer as valiantly as she had acted . so , casting off all care , she was only troubled she lived so idly . but the old lady coming to see her , she prayed her to give her something to employ her time on : for , said she , my brain hath not a sufficient stock to work upon it self . whereupon the old lady asked her , if she would have some books to read in ? she answered , yes , if they were good ones ; or else , said she , they are like impertinent persons , that displease more by their vain talk , than they delight with their company . will you have romances , said the old lady ? she answered , no ; for they extol virtue so much , as begets an envy in those that have it not , and know they cannot attain unto that perfection ; and they beat infirmities so cruelly , as it begets pity , and by that a kind of love . besides , their impossibilities makes them ridiculous to reason ; and in youth they beget wanton desires , and amorous affections . what say you to natural philosophy , said she ? she answered , they were meer opinions ; and if there be any truths , said she , they are so buried under falshood , as they cannot be found out . will you have moral philosophy ? no , said she ; for they divide the passions so nicely , and command with such severity , as it is against nature to follow them , and impossible to perform them . what think you of logick ? she answered , it is nothing but sophistry , making factious disputes , but concludes nothing . will you have history ? no , said she ; for they are seldom writ in the time of action , but a long time after , when truth is forgotten ; but if they be writ at present , partiality , ambition , or fear , bears too much sway ? will you have divine books ? no , said she ; they raise up such controversies that cannot be allayed again , tormenting the mind about that , they cannot know whilst they live ; and frights their consciences so , that it makes men afraid to dye . but , said the young lady , pray give me play-books , or mathematical ones ; the first , said she , discovers and expresses the humours and manners of men , by which i shall know my self and others the better , and in shorter time than experience can teach me . and in the latter , said she , i shall learn to demonstrate truth , by reason ; and to measure out my life by the rule of good actions ; to set marks and figures on those persons to whom i ought to be grateful ; to number my days by pious devotions , that i may be found weighty when i am put in the scales of god's justice . besides , said she , i may learn all arts useful and pleasant for the life of man , as musick , architecture , navigation , fortification , water-works , fire-works ; all engines , instruments , wheels , and many such like , which are useful : besides , i shall learn to measure the earth , to reach the heavens , to number the starrs , to know the motions of the planets , to divide time , and to compass the whole world. the mathematicks is a candle of truth , whereby i may peep into the works of nature , to imitate her in little : it comprises all that truth can challenge : all other books disturb the life of man ; this only settles it , and composes it in sweet delight . the old lady said , by your beauty and discourse , you seem to be of greater birth , and better breeding , than usually ordinary young maids have ; and , if it may not be offensive to you , pray give me leave to ask you , from whence you came ? and , what you are ? and , how you came here ? she ( sighing ) said , i was , by an unfortunate warr , sent out of my countrey , with my mother , for safety , being very young , and the only child my parents had : my father ( who was one of the greatest and noblest subjects in the kingdom , and being employed in the chief command in that warr ) sent my mother ( not knowing what the issue would be ) to the kingdom of security . where he had been formerly sent embassador . so my mother and i went to remain there , until the troubles were over . but , my father being killed in the warrs , my mother dyed for grief , and left me destitute of friends , in a strange countrey , only with some few servants . i hearing a peace was concluded in the kingdom , was resolved to return to my own native soil , to seek after the estate which my father left me as his only heir . when i embarked , i only took two servants , a maid and a man ; but , by an unfortunate storm , i was cast upon a shore belonging to this kingdom ; where , after i was landed , my two servants most treacherously robb'd me of all my jewels , and those moneys i had , and then most barbarously left me alone ; where afterwards my host sold me to an old bawd , and she to one of her customers , who sought to force me ; whereas i , to defend my self , shot him ; but whether he be dead , or alive , i know not : afterwards i was brought hither , but by whose directions , you ( i suppose ) can give a better account to your self , than i ; yet i cannot say , but that since i came hither , i have been civilly used , and courteously entertained by your self , who seem to be a person of worth , which makes my fears less ; for i hope you will secure me from injuries , though not from death . and since you are pleased to enquire what i am , and from whence i came , i shall entreat the same return , to instruct me in the knowledg of your self , and why i was brought hither , and by whose order ? the old lady said , she was sister to the prince's mother , and a tender lover of her nephew ; and to comply with his desires , she was brought there to be kept until he should dispose of her . then she told her what he was , but never mentioned the affection he had for her , but rather spoke as if her life were in danger . so , taking her leave , she left her , telling her , she would send her such books as she desired . thus passing some weeks , in the mean time the prince recovered , resolving to visit this young lady , having heard by his aunt the relation of what she was ; whose birth made him doubt she would not be so easily corrupted as he hoped before : and she knowing his birth , had more hopes of honourable usage : yet sitting in a studious posture , with a sad countenance , and heavy fixt eyes , accompanied with melancholy thoughts , contemplating of her misfortunes past , with a serious consideration of the condition she stood in , advising with her judgment for the future ; in comes the prince , whom she no sooner saw , but she trembled for fear , remembring her past danger , and fore-seeing the trouble she was like to run through : but he , with an humble behaviour , and civil respect , craved pardon for his former faults , promising her , that if she would be pleased to allow him her conversation , he would never force that from her , which she was not willing to grant : for there was nothing in this world he held dearer than her company ; and , sitting down by her , began to question her of love ; as , whether she had engaged her affection to any person of her own countrey , or any where else ? she told him , no. by which answer ( he being jealous before , imagining she might be so valiant as to wound him more for the sake of her lover , than out of a love to honour or reputation ) received great content and joy ; esteeming it the next happiness , that since she loved not him , she loved no other . i wonder at your courage , said he ; for usually your sex are so tender and fearful , and so far from using instruments of death , as swords , guns , or the like , that they dare not look at them , but turn their head aside . she answered , that necessity was a great commandress . and thus discoursing some time , at last he took his leave until the next day . but when he was gone , how glad she was . o what a torment will this be , said she , to be affrighted every day with this ravenous lyon ! but ( said she ) i must get a spell against his fury , and not only against him , but against all such like ; and ( by her industry ) she got a subtil poyson , which ( being put in a very small bladder ) she fastned to her arm , that when any occasion served , she might have it ready to put in her mouth , which in great extremity she might use , and crushing it but betwixt her teeth , she was sure it would expel life suddenly . the next morning the prince sent her a present of all kinds of rich persian silks and tissues , fine linnen and laces , and all manner of toys , wherewith young ladies use to make themselves fine and gay . but she returned them with great thanks , bidding the bringer tell the prince , that she did never receive a present , but what she was able to return with advantage , unless it were from those to whom she had a near relation , as parents and kindred , or the like . but he , when he saw them returned , thought it was because they were not rich enough ; and sent her another present of jewels of great value : which when she had viewed , she said , they were very rich and costly : but returning them back , she said , i dare not trust my youth with the riches and vanities of the world , lest they may prove bribes to corrupt my free and honest mind : wherefore tell the prince , i am not to be catch'd with glorious baits ; and so returned them back . the prince , when he saw he could fasten no gifts on her , was much troubled ; yet hoped , that time might work her to his desires : so went to visit her ; and when he saw her , he told her , he was very unfortunate , that not only himself , but even his presents , were hateful ; for he could guess at no other reason why she should refuse them , since they were neither unlawful , nor dishonourable to receive . she answered , that the principles that she was taught , were , that gifts were both dangerous to give , and to take , from designing or covetous persons . he said , he was unhappy ; for by that he saw she would neither receive love , nor give love. thus he daily visited her , and hourly courted her , striving to insinuate himself into her favour , by his person and services ; used powdering , perfuming , and rich clothing ; though he was so personable and well-favoured , and had such store of eloquence , as might have perswaded both ears and eyes to have been advocates to a young heart , and an unexperienced brain . his service was , in observing her humour ; his courtship , in praising her disposition , admiring her beauty , applauding her wit , and approving her judgment ; insomuch that at the last she did not dislike his company , and grew to that pass , as to be melancholy when he was gone , blush when he was named , start at his approaching ; sigh , weep , and grow pale and distempered , yet perceived not , nor knew her disease . besides , she would look often in the glass , curl heir hair finely , wash her face cleanly , set her clothes handsomely , mask her self from the sun ; not confidering why she did so : but he ( as all lovers have watchful eyes ) observed , she regarded her self more than she used to do ; which made him more earnest , for fear her passion should cool ; protesting his love , vowing his fidelity and secresie , and swearing his constancy to death . she said , that he might make all that good , but not the lawfulness : can you ( said she ) make it no sin to god , no dishonour to my family , no infamy to my sex , no breach to virtue , no wrong to honesty , no immodesty to my self ? he answered , it was lawful by nature . sir , said she , it is as impossible to corrupt me , as to corrupt heaven . but , were you free , i should willingly embrace your love in lawful marriage . he told her , they were both young ; and his wife old , almost ripe enough for death , and a little time more would cut her down : wherefore , said he , let us enjoy our selves in the mean time ; and when she is dead , we will marry . no , said she , i will not buy a husband at that deer rate ; nor am i so evil , as to wish the death of the living for any advantage , unless they were enemies to virtue , innocency , or religion . but he was so importunate , as she seemed displeased ; which he perceiving , left off persisting , lest he might nip off the young and tender buds of her affection . but it chanced , not long after , there was a meeting of many nobles at a feast , where healths to their mistresses were drank round ; and the prince ( who thought it a sin to love , to neglect that institution ) offered , with great ceremony and devotion , for his mistress's health , sprinkling the altar of the brain with fume , and burning the incense of reason therein . after the feast was ended , he went to see his mistress , whose beauty ( like oyl ) set his spirits in a flame ; which made his affection grow to an intemperate heat . whereat she became so afraid , as she puts the poyson into her mouth ( the antidote of all evil , as she thought ) , and then told him her intention . but he , having more passion then doubt , would not believe her . which she perceiving , broke the bladder asunder betwixt her teeth , and immediately fell down as dead . whereat he was so amazed , as he had not power to stir for a time . but at last , calling for help , the old lady came to them , he telling her what she had done , as well as his fear would give him leave . the lady having skill in physick ( as most ladies have , reading in herbals , and such kind of books ) gave her something to make her vomit up the poyson , wherewith she weakly revived to life again . but she was so very sick , as almost cut off all hopes of keeping that life . whereat he lamented , tearing his hair , beating his breast , cursing himself , praying and imploring his pardon , and her forgiveness ; promising and protesting , never to do the like again . she returning no answer , but groans and sighs . but he , being a diligent servant , and much afflicted , watch'd by her , until she mended by the lady's care and skill . when she was indifferently well recovered , she began to lament her ill condition , and the danger she was in , employing her thoughts how she might escape the snares of spightful fortune , and gain her friendship ; where , soon after , finding opportunity to take time by the fore-lock , the prince being sent for to court , and the old lady being not well , whereby she had more liberty ; and searching about the room , found a suit of clothes of the old lady's page ; which suit she carried into her chamber , and privately hid it ; then taking pen and ink , writ two letters , the one to the prince , the other to the old lady : so , sealing the letters up , and subscribing them , left them upon the table . then she straight stripped her self of her own clothes , which she flung in a dark place , with her hair that she had cut off , and putting the page's clothes on , in this disguise she went towards the chief city , to which came up an arm of the sea , making a large haven for many ships to lye at anchor in : but as soon as she came to the sea-side , there was a ship just going off ; which she seeing , got into it ; her fears being so great , as not to consider nor examine , whither they were bound ; and they were so employed , hoisting their sails , and fitting their tacklings , that they took no notice when she came in . but being gone three or four leagues from the shore , and all quiet , and free from labour ; the master , walking upon the deck , seeing a handsome youth stand there in page's clothes , ask'd him , who he was ? and , how he came there ? she said , i do suppose you are bound for the kingdom of riches , where i desire to go ; but coming late , seeing every one busily employed , i had no time to bargain for my passage ; but i shall content you with what in reason you can require . the master said , we are not bound to that kingdom , but are sent for new discoveries towards the south ; neither have we provision for any more than those that are appointed to go . which when she heard , the tears flowed from her eyes , becoming her so well , that they moved the master to pity and affection . then asking him , what he was ? she answered him , that she was a gentleman's son , who ( by the reason of civil-warrs ) was carried out of his own countrey very young , by his mother ; and so related the very truth of his being cast into that kingdom ; only she feigned , that she was a boy that had served a lady as her page ; but ( desiring to return into his own countrey ) had mistaken , and put himself into a wrong vessel ; but ( said she ) i perceive the fates are not willing i should see my native countrey , and friends , and ( being young ) travel may better my knowledg ; and i shall not neglect any service i am able to do , or you are pleased to employ me in , if you will accept of it . at last , her graceful and humble demeanour , her modest countenance , and her well-favoured face , preferr'd her to this master's service , who was a grave and a discreet man , and told her ( as supposing her a boy ) , that , since he was there , he would not cast him out ; and although it will be hard for me to keep you , yet you shall parrake of what i have allowed for my self . she giving him many thanks , said , she would strive to deserve it . but after some weeks , the master fell very sick ; in which sickness she was so industrious to recover his health , by her diligent attendance and care , that it begot such affection in the old man , that he adopted him his son , having no children of his own , nor none like to have , he being in years . they sailed five or six months , without any tempestuous winds , yet not without danger of rocks and shelves of sand , which they avoided by their skill , and many times refreshed themselves in those harbours they met with in their way ; which made them hope a pleasant and prosperous voyage . but fortune playing her usual tricks , to set men on high hopes , and then to cast them down to ruin ; irritated the gods against them , for their curiosity , in searching too far into their works ; which caused them to raise a great storm , making the clouds and seas to meet , showers to beat them , winds to toss them , thunder to affright them , lightning to amaze them ; insomuch as they had neither strength to help , nor sight to guide , nor memory to direct , nor courage to support themselves ; the anchor was lost , the rudder was broke , the masts were split , the sails all torn , the ship did leak , their hopes were gone : nothing was left but black despair , and grim death on their face to stare : for every gust of wind blew death into their face , and every billow digg'd their burial place . in this time of confusion , the traveller ( for so now she calleth her self ) followed close her old new father , who had as many careful thoughts , and as great a regard for her safety , as she of her self ; and giving order to the pilate , that had lost his steerage , to cast over the cock-boat ; which no sooner done , but a gust of wind drave them on a rock that split the ship ; and as soon as he perceived it , he took his beloved and supposed boy , and put him ( with himself and the pilate ) into the boat , cutting the cable , emploring the favour of the gods , committing themselves to the fates , and setting up a little sail for the wind to carry them which way it pleased . no sooner put off , but the ship ( and all therein ) sunk : but the gods , favouring the young lady for her virtue , tied up the strong winds again into their several corners ; after which , sailing six days , at last they were thrust through a point into a large river , which for the greatness might be called a large sea : for , though it was fresh water , yet it was of that longitude and latitude , that they could not perceive land for four days together : but at the last , they espied land ; and coming nigh , they perceived a multitude of people , which when they came to the shore , were affrighted , having never seen any bark ( or the like ) swim upon the water , for they had themselves the propriety to swim naturally like fishes : nor had they in the boat ever seen such complexion'd men ; for they were not black , like negroes ; nor tauny , nor olive , nor ash-colour'd , as many are ; but of a deep purple , their hair as white as milk , and like wool ; their lips thin , their ears long , their noses flat , yet sharp ; their teeth and nails as black as jet , and as shining ; their stature tall , and their proportion big ; their bodies were all naked , only they had somewhat from their waste , down to their twist , which was brought through their legs , up to the waste again , and tyed with a knot ; 't was a thin kind of stuff , which was made of the barks of trees , yet looked as fine as silk , and as soft : the men carried long darts in their hands , spear-fashion , so hard and smooth , as it seemed like metal , but made of whale-bones . but when they landed , the people came so thick about them , as almost smuthered them ; and the grave and chief of them ( which seemed like their priests ) sent them straight to the chief governours of those parts , according to their custom ( as it seemed to them afterwards ) ; all that was strange or rare , was usually presented to their chiefs : but they staid not so long as to see the ceremony of the sacrifice they were then offering , only they perceived it was a sacrifice of fish to some sea-god ; then they were set on a creature half fish , half flesh ; for it was in shape like a calf , but had a tail like a fish , a horn like a unicorn ; that lives in the river , but yet would lye upon the sands in great herds or sholes , as seils do ; so as they might take them for their use at any time , without the trouble of keeping them up , for they were tame and gentle of themselves . thus they rid along the sands two or three leagues , to the governour 's house ; for all along those sands only , upon a bank , were houses all in a row , built with fishes bones , which bones were laid with great art , and in fine works , and as close as stone or brick ; the tops of these houses were scales of fishes laid like tile or slat , which glistered so in the sun , that they looked some ways like silver , other ways like rain-bows in all manner of colours . when the governour had viewed them , he sent them ( with other messengers , but on the same beasts ) to the next governour : and thus they rid upon the sands for some days , their food being fish broiled upon the hot sands ; for there was no other food but fish and water-fowl , whereof they had great store , but yet of strange kinds to strangers ; for there was no pasture , nor any thing like green . at last they came to a place which seemed like a forest , for there were a number of bodies of trees ( if one may call them so , having no branches ) which were so big , as to hold a family of twenty , or more , of the governour 's house , as big as four other ; and the bark of those trees , or indeed the wood of the tree quite through , was of all manner of flowers , both for colour , shape , and scent ; painted , and set by nature in the wood : so that the wood being cut one way , the flowers were all perfect in shape ; but cut another way , and they seemed like flowers shedded from the stalks : and this wood was so sweet , that all the forest smelt thereof . after the governour of this place had viewed them , he set them on other beasts , and sent them by other messengers ; so leaving there their fleshy-fishy beasts , they run back again to the place they were taken from . but those they rid after , were like a stag in the body ; which was as big as a horse , black as a coal , a tail like a dog , horns like a ram , tipt with green , like buds of trees , and as swift as a roe . and thus they rid until they came to another forest , where all the trees were very high and broad , whose leaves were shadowed with several greens , lighter and darker , as if they were painted ; and many birds there were of strange colours and shapes ; some birds had wings like flyes , beaks , bodies , and legs , like other birds ; some the bodies like squirrels , but had feather'd wings : there was one ( a very fine kind of bird in shape ) both for beak , head , body , and legs , like a parrot ; but instead of feathers , it was covered with hair , like beasts , which hairs were of the colour of parrots feathers , and the like batts wings , streak'd like a rain-bow ; the eyes looked yellow , and sent forth a kind of a light like to small rays of the sun : in the midst of the forehead it had a small horn , which grew winding , and sharp at the end , like a needle . this bird did mount like a hawk , in circle ; and after would flye down at other birds , as they do ; but instead of talons , that horn struck them dead ; for it would thrust its horn into their bodies , and so bear their bodies upon their horn , and flye some certain lengths , as in triumphs , and then would light , and eat them . there were some birds no bigger than the smallest flyes , yet all feather'd ; besides , there were many sorts of beasts , some had beaks like birds , and feathers instead of hair , but no wings , and their bodies like a sheep . there was one kind of beast in the shape of a camel , and the neck as white as a swan , and all the head and face white ; only a lock of hair on the top of his crown , of all manner of colours ; the hair of his body was of a perfect gold-yellow , his tail like his fore-top , but it would often turn up like a pea-cock's tail , and spread abroad ; and the hairs being of all several colours , made a most glorious shew : the legs and feet of the colour of the body , but the hoofs as black as jet . at last they were carried to another governour , who lived in a town , whose house was built with spices , the roof and beams as big as any house need to have , made of cinnamon ; and the walls were plaistered with the flakes of mace , which flakes were a foot square ; the planks were cut thick , like bricks , or square marble pieces , out of nutmegs ; the long planks out of ginger ( for their nutmegs and races of ginger , were as great as men could carry ) : the houses were covered on the top , some with pomegranat-rines , others with oranges and citrons ; but the pomegranats last the longer , and the other smelt the sweeter , and looked the pleasanter to the eye . they never have rain there , nor in any part of the kingdom ; for the air is always serene and clear : nor no higher winds than what fanns the heat : their exercise was hunting ; the women hunted the females , and the men the males . as they went to the governour , all the people run about to see them , wondering at them , and viewing them round . but the governour seemed to admire the youth much ; yet durst not keep him , being against the custom ; but sent them straight towards their chief city , where their king was . after some days riding , they came out of the forest into great plains and champains , which were cover'd with a sea-green and willow-colour'd grass ; and some meadows were cover'd with perfect shadows of all manner of sorts of greens . as they drew near the city , they saw great quarries of crystal , as we have of stone ; and when they came up to the city , all about without the walls were orchards and root-gardens , where there grew roots as sweet as if they were preserved , and some all juicy : most of their fruits grew in shells like nuts , most declicious to the tast ; but their shells were like a net or caul , that all the fruit was seen through ; and some kind of fruits were as big as one's head ; but some were no bigger than ours ; others , very small . there never fell rain , but dews to refresh them , which fell upon the earth every night , like flakes of snow , and being upon the earth , they melted , and did look and tast like double-refined sugar . at last they entred the city , which was walled about with crystal ; and so were the houses , which were built both high and large , and before them were arched walks with great pillars of crystal ; through the midst of the street ran a stream of golden sands ; and cross the stream were little silver bridges to pass and re pass over to each side of the street ; on each side of this stream grew rows of trees , which were about the height of cypress trees ; but instead of green leaves , upon every stalk grew a particular flower , which smelt so sweet , that when zephyrus blew ( for they never had high winds ) , they gave so strong a scent , that it did almost suffocate the spirits of those that were not used to them . the king's palace stood in the midst of the city , higher than all the other houses ; the outward wall was crystal , cut all in triangles , which presented millions of forms from one object ; and all the ridg of the wall was all pointed crystals , which points cut and divided the beams of the sun so small , that the wall did not only look sparkling , but like a flaming hoop , or ring of fire , by reason the wall went round . to this vvall were four open passages , arched like gates ; from those passages went vvalks , and on each side of these vvalks were trees : the barks thereof were shadowed with hair-colour , and as smooth as glass ; and the leaves of a perfect grass-green , which is very rare in that countrey , because nature hath every where intermix'd several colours made by light on several grounds or bodies of things ; and birds do so delight on those trees , that they are always full of birds , every tree having a several quyer by it self , which sing such perfect notes , and keep so just a time , that they do make a most ravishing melody : besides , the variety of their tunes are such , that one would think nature did set them new every day . these vvalks lead to another court , which was walled about with agats , carved with all sorts of imagery ; and upon ' the ridg of the vvall such were chose out as most resemble the eyes ; for in some agats their colours are naturally mix'd , and lye in circles , as eyes ; these seem as if so many centinels lay looking and watching round about . from this vvall went a vvalk , where on each side were beasts cut artificially , to the life , out of several-colour'd stones , according as those beasts which they were to resemble . this vvalk leads to another court which was not walled , but rather railed vvith vvhite and red cornelians , cut spearfashion . from the rails went only a plain vvalk paved vvith gold , vvhich went straight to the palace . this palace stood on a little mount , whereto went up a pair of stairs ; the stairs went round about the house , ascending by degrees on steps of amber , leading up to a large and wide door ; the frontispiece thereof was turky-stones curiously carved ; the palace-walls were all pure porcelline , and very thick and strong , yet very clear : it was all roofed or covered with jett , and also paved with the same ; so that the black jett was set forth by the white porcelline ; and the white porcelline seemed whiter , by the blackness of the jet . the windows were only arched holes to let in air. in the midst of the palace was a large room , like a little enclosed meadow ; in the midst of which ran a spring of clear water , where the king bathed himself . also , there were brave gardens of all sorts of flowers ; in the midst of which , was a rock of amethists ; and artificial nymphs , cut out to the life , of mother-pearl ; and little brooks , winding and streaming about , of golden sands : the wonder was , that although there were many mines in that kingdom , yet the soil was very fertile . at last they were brought to the king's presence , who was laid upon a carpet made of thistle-down , with great attendance about him : he , and all those of the royal blood , were of a different colour from the rest of the people ; they were of a perfect orange-colour , their hair coal-black , their teeth and nails as white as milk ; of a very great height , yet well shaped . but when the king saw them , he wondred at them : first , at the old man's beard , for they have none : the next , at their habit , which were seamens clothes ; but above all , at the youth , who looked handsome in despight of his poor and dirty garments . the king did command to have their clothes pull'd off ; but no sooner did they come to execute that command , but travelia was so affrighted , that he fell down in a swound : those that touched him , started back when they saw him dead . but the old man , bending him forward , brought him to life again . whereupon they straight thought that their touching him , killed him ; and that the old man had power to restore life , which made them afraid to touch them any more ; for that disease of swouning was not known to them . then their priests and wizzards were called for , to know from whence they came , and what should be done with them . the priests were only known from the rest of the people , by a tuft of hair growing just upon the crown of the head , and all the head else had no hair ; whereas other priests are only bald upon the crown . the king and they fell presently into great dispute . the king pleaded hard to keep the youth ; but at last the priests had the better ( as most commonly they have in all religions ) , and so carried them away , and kept them a twelve-month ; but never dar'd to touch them , for fear they should dye , because travelia swouned ; but they beckned and pointed to them . they gave them ease , not employing them to any labour ; and fed them daintily of what they could eat ; for some meats they could not eat , as man's flesh : for , they had a custom in that countrey , to keep great store of slaves , both males and females , to breed on , as we do breed flocks of sheep , and other cattel ; the children were eaten , as we do lambs or veal , for young and tender meat ; the elder for beef and mutton , as stronger meat . they kill five males for one female , for fear of destroying the breed ; although they be so fruitful , that they never bear less than two at a birth , and many times three ; and they seldom leave child-bearing , until they are threescore years old ; for they usually live there until they are eight score , and sometimes two hundred years : but the ordinary age is a hundred , unless plagues come ; not out of sluttery , or evil or corrupt air , but with too much nourishment , by reason of their delicious diet , which breeds such a superfluity of humours , that it corrupts their blood . as for their houses , they are kept very cleanly , by reason they never eat in them ; for their custom was , to eat all together in common halls , as the lacedemonians did , only they had better cheer , and more liberty . likewise , their women were common to every one's use , unless it were those women of the royal blood , which is a sort by themselves , as was described before , and therefore never mixt with the rest ; but if they did , and were known , it was death : these of the royal blood , had all their skins wrought , like the britans . as for their government , it was tyrannical ; for all the common people were slaves to the royal race . but to return to the old man , observing how careful and choice they were kept , he told his son what he thought was their intention , which vvas , to sacrifice them ; and ( said he ) there is no vvay to escape , unless vve had their language , and could make them believe vve came from the gods ; and that the gods vvould punish them if they put us to death ; and you are young ( said he ) , and apt to learn ; but i am old , and my memory decayed ; vvherefore , novv or never , study for your life . well , said he , since my life lyes in my learning , i vvill learn for my life : which he did so vvell , that he got ( in that tvvelve-month ) their language so perfect , as he understood , and could speak most of it : in vvhich time he understood all that i have delivered in this relation ; and besides , understood that they had many gods and goddesses . the sun was their chief god , and the earth the chief goddess ; their next god was the sea , and their goddess the moon ; and they prayed to the starrs ( as some do to saints ) to speak in their behalf , and to present their prayers to the sun and moon , which they thought to be as man and wife , and the starrs their children . to their gods they offered none but the males ; and those offerings were offered by men : and the men pray'd only to the gods ; and to their goddesses none but the women ; nor none but female-offering were offered unto them . at last , by their discourse and preparation , they perceiv'd they were to be sacrificed to the sun , as being both males ( as they thought ) ; and with great ceremony , as being strangers , and such rarities ; yet they did not touch travelia , as supposing ( if they should ) ' he would dye before he was brought to the place of sacrifices : in all this time , he never disclosed that he could speak their language , nor understand them . but in this time the old man had got some salt-peeter and brimstone , and burnt wood into charcoal , so made gunpowder ( for they had the liberty to go where they would about their temples ) : and after he had made the gun-powder , he made two things like pistols , although not so curious and neat , yet well enough to serve his turn ; and directed his son what he should do and say . against that day he made himself a garment of a grass , which was like to green silk ; which he had woven so finely , as it look'd like sattin : he had also upon the calfs of his legs like buskins of several-colour'd flowers , and a garland of flowers on his head ; the soles of his sandals were of that green , but the stripes a-top was of flowers like his buskins ; in each hand he held the two pistols ; his hair ( which was grown in that time , for he never discovered it , keeping it tyed up ) untied , and let down , spread upon his back : but when the priest ( which came to fetch him forth ) saw him thus drest , never seeing hair before ( for they had none but wool , and very short , as negroes have ) , was amazed at the sight ; and not daring to touch him , went by him , guarding him ( as the chief sacrifice ) to the place ; where the king and all his tribe , and all his people , waited for their coming : the king being placed at the head of the altas , with a dart in his right hand , the spear of the dart being an entire diamond , cut with a sharp point , to signifie the piercing beams of the sun ; which spear he usually struck into the heart of the sacrificed ; which heart the priest used tb cut out , and give the king to eat raw ; the whilst the priest sung songs in the praise of the sun , as the father of all things . thus , after some expectation , the priests came with their sacrifices ; which when the king and people saw , they were all amazed , as well they might ; for the youth appear'd most beautiful . but at last they all shouted , and cryed out , their gods had beautified and adorned their sacrifices , as being well pleased therewith ; making great shouts and noises of joy. but when he came to the altar , he call'd to them in their own language ; at which they grew mute with wonder : and , being silent , he thus spake : oking , and you spectators ! why do you offend the gods , in destroying their messengers which come to bring you life , and to make you happy ? hed i brought you plagues , then you might have sacrifieed me to your god of lights , as coming from death and darkness , his enemies : but for this your false devotion , the great sun ( saith he ) will destroy you with one of his small thunder-bolts , killing first your priests , and then the rest . with that , shot off his pistol into the breast of the chief priest , wherewith he straight fell down dead . the noise of the pistol , and the flash of the fire , which they never saw before , and the effect of it upon the priest , struck them with such a horror , and did so terrifie them , as they all kneeled down , imploring mercy and forgiveness , with trembling limbs , and weeping eyes . whereupon he told them , there was no way to avoid punishment , but first , to fast two days from any kind of nourishment : next , not to open their lips to speak : and then , to obey whatsoever he shall teach them , as being sent from the gods ; bidding them go home , until their time of fasting were out , and then to return to the temple again ; commanding none to remain there , but to leave it to the old man , and himself . the temple was most rich and curiously built , having ( in that countrey ) great art and skill in architecuture . after which , the king and all the people , rising up , bowed their heads down low , as in humble obedience to the commands he had receiv'd ; praying to him , as a god , to divert the punishments intended to them ; and in sorrow lamenting their fault , went home , each to his house , sealing up their lips ( for such a time ) from receiving meat , or sending forth words : in the mean time , the old man and he had leisure to bethink themselves what to do , having at that time the temple , as a palace , to live in ; none to disturb them , nor to hinder their thoughts from working out their advantage ; and , sitting in counsel a long time , disputing with each other what was best to do , at last resolved , that the old man should go to the king , as sent from the gods , to bid him send a command to all his people , to eat such herbs for sallads , and drink their water without mixture , just before they came : for else ( said the old man ) their hunger will make them impatient , or so dull , as it may stop their ears by the faintness of their spirits , caused by their empty stomacks ; and too much ( said he ) makes them furious , sending up malignant vapours to their brains , which may cause our ruins . but after he had been with the king , he returned back to the temple again , and the king obeyed his desire , as a command from the gods ; and brought the people all to the temple : where , after they were all gathered together , travelia advanced himself so much higher than rest , as they might hear him round about . then thus spake : pious friends , for so i may call you , being willing to please the gods ; though your ignorance hath led you wrong ways : but the gods seeing your zeal , though through a false devotion , pitying your ignorance , have by their wisdom found means to appease the wrath of their justice ; for every attribute of the gods must have a satisfaction : for , right is their kingdom , and truth is their scepter , wherewith they govern all their works : but the gods have strowed lots amongst mankind , of movable things , which chance gathers up ; and chance , being blind , mistakes both in the gathering and distributing . now the gods made this chance by their providence , when they made man : for , man hath no more knowledg of the transitory things of the world , than what fortune gives them , who is an unjust distributer : for , all external gifts come from her hand ; and , for want of sight , she gives oft-times the beggar 's lot to the king , the servants to the master , the master 's to the servant : and for the internal gifts which the gods have bestowed on men , they are different , as the external are transitory ; for some are nearer to perfection , some farther off ; yet none have perfect knowledg : for , the gods mix man's nature with such an aspiring ambition , that if they had a perfect knowledg of the glory of the gods , and a perfect knowledg of the first cause , and of the effects produced therefrom , they would have warr'd with the gods , and have strove to usurp their authority : so busie and vain-glorious hath the gods made the minds of men ! wherefore , the gods govern the world by ignorance ; and though the goodness of the gods is great , yet it is bound in with their justice , which is attended with terrors , to punish the crimes of men , and even to punish the innocent errors that proceed from that ignorance which they have muzled man withall . but as their power made the world , their wisdom rules the world , their justice punishes the world ; so their mercy keeps the world from destruction ; and their love not only saves man , but preferrs man to a glorious happiness . and some of this love the gods have sent to you , although by your ignorance you had almost cast it from you . and since the gods have sent you knowledg by us , take hold of it , and do not wilfully fall in your superstitious errors ; although it is a difficult pains , even for the gods themselves , to perswade man , who is of a cross , suspitious , inquisitive , and murmuring nature , accusing the gods of partiality ; saying , they prefer or cast out whom they please , not as man deserves . thus they judg of the gods by their own passions ; but the gods , by variation , are pleased to continue the world ; and by contradiction to govern it ; by sympathy delight it : for , delight lives not altogether in the power of chance , being created in the essence and soul of man : for , though chance can present those things ( with antipathies or sympathies ) to the senses , which present them to the soul ; yet it hath not the power to rule it : for , the soul is a kind of god in it self , to direct and guide those things that are inferior to it ; to perceive and descry into those things that are far above it ; to create by invention , and to delight in contemplations : and though it hath not an absolute power over it self , yet it is a harmonious and absolute thing in it self : and though it is not a god from all eternity , yet it is a kind of deity to all eternity , for it shall never dye : and though the body hath a relation to it , yet no otherwise than the mansion of jove hath unto jove : the body is only the residing-place , and the sensitive spirits are as the soul's angels or messengers , and intelligencers : so the souls of men are to the gods , as the sensitive spirits to the soul : and will you dislodg the sensitive spirits of the gods , by destroying and unbuilding each other's body by violent deaths , before it be the gods pleasure to dissolve that body , and so remove the soul to a new mansion ? and though it is not every creature that hath that soul , but only man ( for beasts have none , nor every man , for most men are beasts ; only the sensitive spirits , and the shape may be , but not the soul ) ; yet none know when the soul is out or in , but the gods ; and not only other bodies may not know it , but the same body is ignorant thereof . the soul is as invisible to the sensitive spirits , as the gods to men : for , though the soul knows , and hath intelligence by the sensitive spirits , yet the sensitive have none from the soul : for , as gods know men , but men know not gods ; so the soul knoweth the senses , but the senses know not the soul : wherefore , you must seek all the ways to preserve one another , as temples of the gods , not to destroy and pull them down ; for whosoever doth so , commits sacriledg against the gods : wherefore , none must dye , but those that kill , or would kill others ; death must be repaid with death , saith jove ; and only death is in the power of man to call when they please ; but life is in the power of the gods ; and those that displease the gods , shall have a miserable life , not only in the bodily part , which is sensible of pain , and may be tormented out of one shape into another , and be perpetually dying , or killing , with all manner of torments , and yet never dye ; in the shape of a man , feels stabs in the sides ; in the shape of a bull , knocks on his head ; in the shape of a hart , arrows in the haunch ; in the shape of a fish , hooks tearing the jaws ; besides all manner of diseases and infirmities ; it may be , burning , hanging , drowning , smuthering , pressing , freezing , rotting , and thousands of these kinds ; nay , more than can be reckoned . thus several bodies , though but one mind , may be troubled in every shape . but those that please the gods , live easie in every shape , and dye quietly and peaceably ; or when the gods do change their shapes , or mansions , 't is for the better , either for ease or newness . thus have the gods sent us to instruct you , and to stay so long amongst you , as you can learn and know their commands , and then to return unto them . with that , the king and people bowed their faces to the ground , adoring him as a god , and would have built altars , and offered sacrifices unto him : but he forbad them ; telling them , they must build altars in their hearts of repenting , humbling , and amending-thoughts , and offer sacrifices of prayer and thanksgiving , to the great and incomprehensible jove , and not altars built with hands unto men ; nor to offer inhuman sacrifices to gods , of their own making . thus preaching every day for some time , forbidding vain and barbarous customs , and inhuman ceremonies ; teaching and perswading them to believe , the gods were not to be known nor comprehended ; and , that all that they have discovered of themselves to their creatures , was only by their works , in which they should praise them . by which doctrine they were brought to be a civilized people , and approved of their teacher so well , that they would do nothing concerning religion , or any other affairs of government , without him : and being dismist for that time , departed , leaving them to themselves in the temple ; where , at certain and set-times , the king and people repaired to hear him preach ; who taught them according to his belief : and whensoever they moved out of the temple , all the people flocked about them with acclamations of joy ; and whensoever the king sent for them ( as he often did for their counsels ) , all the princes attended , and people waited upon them . and thus they lived with great splendor , love , and admiration , amongst them ; their persons were thought divine , their words were laws , and their actions examples , which the people followed . thus for a while we leave them , and return to the old lady , and the prince . the old lady sending into affectionata's chamber ( as then called , for so she named her self there ) to entreat her company , for therein she took great delight , she being witty in her conversation , and pleasing in her humour . but the messenger miss'd of the mark ; for looking about , and calling aloud , he could neither hear nor see her . so returning , told the old lady , she was not to be found . whereat she grew into a great passion , not only for her loss ( which she thought great , since her love to her , and esteem of her , was not small ) ; but that she apprehended the prince would think that she had neglected that charge he had entrusted her with . whilst she was in this passion , the prince came in , who had been in the young lady's chamber , but missing her , thought she had been there ; but seeing her not , and the old lady weeping , straight asked her for his mistress ; but she through tears and sobs could not answer . whereupon some about her answered , she was gone none could tell where . at whose words the prince's countenance and complexion exprest his grief , the one being sad , the other pale ; standing in a fix'd posture , his body seeming like a statue without soul , which was gone to seek after her . but at last , as if it had returned in despair , grew frantick with grief , tearing himself , cursing his misfortunes ; at length , goeth into her chamber again , looking in every corner , even where she could not be , as much as where she might be : for , lovers leave no place nor means unsought , or untried . at last he espied a letter upon the table , directed to the lady , which he opened , considering not the incivility of breaking up the seal without the lady's leave ( for jealous lovers break all such ceremonies ) : and thus read : madam , pray think me not ungrateful , after all your noble favours , that i go away without your leave or knowledg : for , could i have staid with security , nothing but your commands could have forced me from you ; or could my life have served you , i would have offered it as a sacrifice to obligation . but , madam , it is too dangerous for a lamb to live near a lion : for , your nephew is of so hungry an appetite , that i dare not stay , which makes me seek safety in some other place . but when my thoughts forget your honourable memory , let them cease to think . the gods protect your virtue , and send you health . fare you well . affectionata . when he had read this letter , and went to lay it on the table again , he perceived another letter directed to him , which he opened and read . sir , you cannot condemn me for going away , since my stay might prove my ruin , you having not power over your passions . but had my life been only in danger , i should have ventured it : not that i am so fond of death , as to give my life willingly away ; but i am so true a votress to chastity , that i will never forsake her order , but will carry her habit to my grave : nor will i give virtue an occasion to weep over my follies , nor truth to revile me with falshood ; but honour , as a garland , shall crown my hearse , whilst innocency enshrines my corps , that fame may build me a monument in noble minds . had you been master of your passion , or bad the temperance of your affections been equal to your other virtues , i should have joyed to live near you , as saints do to the gods ; and though my hard fortune have driven me into many dangers ( and more i am like to run through , by the unknown ways you have forced me into ) yet the blessing of jupiter fall upon you , whatsoever chance befalls me . farewell . affectionata . when he had read his letter , he sits down musing with himself a long time ; then rose , and without speaking any words , departed to his house in the city . the old lady , his princess , seeing him so sad , asked him what was the cause ? he answered , he was sick , and went to bed . the next day , calling his steward , he setled his estate , and ordered every thing according to his mind , and bid him provide so much moneys : which done , he sent for his wife , telling her , she must not take it ill , if he left her for a short time , for he was resolved to travel : for , said he , i have a quarrel to one that is stoln out of the kingdom , and i cannot 〈◊〉 at quiet until i have found the party out , to be evenged for the injury done me ; which he bid her to conceal . she , with tears , entreated his stay ; but no perswasions could prevail to alter his intention , or rather resolution : for , love is obstinate ; and if it finds not a like return , but a neglect , grows spightful , rather wishing evil to what they love , than another should enjoy what they would have ; and hate themselves , out of a displeasure , in not having what they desire : so did he , and was impatient until he was shipt and gone ; who steered his course towards the kingdom of riches , as believing she was sailed towards her own countrey ; and resolved he was to find her out , or to end his days in the search ; his life being a burthen to him without her company . thus love , sailing in the ship of imagination , on the ocean of the mind , toss'd on the troubled waves of discontented thoughts , whilst his body sailed in the ship on the sea , cutting the salt waves , they were set on by pyrates , and taken prisoners ; so that he was doubly captivated , his soul before , & now his body . at first they used him but roughly , according to their barbarous natures ; but , by degrees , his noble disposition , and affable behaviour , got indifferent entertainment . it chanced some time after , in the sharing of those prizes they got with him , and some others they had got before , they fell out , and from rude words they fell to ruder blows : the prince apprehending the danger that might befall to himself , strove to pacifie them ; giving them such reasons in elegant words , that it charmed their ears , and softned their hearts , and ended the strife amongst them ; and begot from them such love and respect , that they made him their albitrator , and divider of the spoils ; which he performed with that justice and discretion to each one , that they made him their governour , and chief ruler over them ; which power he used with that clemency and wisdom , that he was 〈◊〉 father as their god , than their captain , giving him all ceremonious obedience . and thus reigning in his watry kingdom with his three-forked trident , we leave him for a time , and visit the old man and adopted son , who now began to grow weary of their divine honours , and ( like wise men , that seek a retired and secured life from the pomp of dangerous glories ) bethought themselves how they might get away , and to return into their own countreys again : for , an humble and mean cottage is better beloved by the owner , than the bravest and stateliest palace , if it be another's . thus , putting their designs in execution , they invited the king and people to a solemn meeting in the temple ; where travelia , standing in his usual place , thus spake : the gods ( said he ) will have us to return from whence we came ; and to you ( great king ) their command is , to love your people , and to distribute justice amongst them ; guarding the innocent , punishing the offendor ; and not to use any cruel ceremony to destroy your own kind ; but to instruct them in the right , and to lead them into the ways of truth , as being their high-priest amongst them : also , to make as warrs against your neighbouring kingdoms , but as a defence and guard to your own : for , in peace lives happiness , when warrs bring ruin and destruction ; and in doing this , tranquillity shall be as a bed of ease for life to sleep on ; and length of days as a chariot for life to ride in to heaven , where your souls shall dwell in the height of bliss : and , in this world , fame shall crown your deeds , and your posterity shall glory in your name . and to you , beloved people , the gods command piety in your devotion , obedience to your king , love to your neighbour , mercy to your enemies , constancy to your friends , liberty to your slaves , care and industry for your children , duty to your parents : and in doing this , plenty shall flow in amongst you , mirth shall dance about you , pleasures shall invite you , delight shall entertain you , peace shall keep you safe , till the gods call you to partake of the glories of heaven ; and my prayers shall always be , that jove may preserve you all . then going off from the place where he stood , they went to the king to take their leaves : whereat the king and people wept , and wish'd the gods had given them leave to dwell amongst them . but since they could not have their desire therein , they travelled to the river-side in attendance on them , offering them great riches to carry with them : but they desired , nor took they any more with them , than they thought would defray their charges in a time of necessity : neither did they build a new ship to sail in , but went in the same boat they came , which had been kept , as a relick , safe : for the old man considered with himself , that a bigger vessel would be more dangerous , without sea-men , than the small boat , which they could manage themselves . and so with great sorrow of either side , the one to lose their angels ( as they thought them to be ) , the others for the dangers they were to run through . and thus they parted from the kingdom of fancy , putting forth their boat from the shore ; the old man ( who was very skilful at sea ) observing what angle they came in , returned the same way : where , after six days , they were upon the main sea , the winds being fair , and the waters smooth , the boat went as swift as an arrow out of a parthian's bow ; and as even , as if it meant to hit a mark ; but if by a fresh gale the waves did chance to rise , the boat would as nimbly skip each ridg , as a young kid over a green hillock ; being as leight as mercury's winged heels : so joy filled their hearts with hopes , as winds filled their sails . but various fortune , causing several changes in the world , did raise such storms of fears , as drowned all their joys : for a ship fraughted with pyrates , like a great whale , seized on them . pyrates let nothing escape which they can get to make advantage of ; so ravenous is their covetous appetite : but finding not such a prize as they did expect , but such as might rather prove a burthen , consulted to put the old man into the boat again , and to keep only the young youth , whom ( being very handsom ) they might sell for a slave , and get a sum of money . but when the old man was to depart , travelia clasped about him so close , that his tears , and the tears of the old man , mix'd and joined , and flowed as waters through a channel , swell'd with several brooks . but when he was forced to leave his hold , down on his kness he fell , begging he might go , or keep his father there : pity , said he , my father's age : cast him not out alone to sail on the wide and dangerous sea ; for though my help is weak , yet i am a stay and staff for his decayed life to lean upon ; and i hope the gods have destin'd me to that end ; but if no pity can move your hearts for him , o let it do it for me : cut me not from the root , though old and dry ; for then , poor branch , i wither shall , and dye . nay , said he , i will dye when i can no longer help him ; for death is in my power , though life is not . but the prince , who was their commander , hearing a noise , came on the deck ; who no sooner saw him , but was struck with compassion , raised by a resemblance of his mistress appearing in the face of the youth ; and going to him , bid him dry his eyes , and cease his sorrow , for they both should live together so long as he could keep them . heaven bless you , said he , and may you never part from that you most do love . but when travelia's tears were stopped , and sight got a passage through her eyes again , and looking up to view that man from whom his obligations came , no sooner saw his face , but terror struck his heart , and trembling seized her limbs , as if she had seen some hideous and prodigious thing . the prince observing her in that agony , asking him ( as supposing her a boy ) , what made him shake and tremble so ? in quivering words she answered , as fear before had shrunk his sinews short , so now joy had extended them too far . the prince then stroaking his head , promised they should both be well used ; and so returned into his cabin . thus travelling on the sea , as on a great champain ; the ship , like a horse , went several paces , according as the waves did rise and fall . but at last this ship became like a horse diseased with spavins , which broke out , and sprung a leak , which they stopt as well as they could for the time ; but doubting it could not long hold out , grew very sad , some weeping , some praying , some murmuring , some raving , according as their fear and hopes were . but the prince , who was valiant by nature , expected death with as much patience , as they with fear did apprehend it ; neither was he struck with terror , but yeelded to the fates , and was willing to dye . but , in the midst of their afflictions , at last they espied an island ; at which sight they all shouted for joy . thus , in the life of man , many several accidents pass about ; and it chances , many times , that out of the midst of grief and sorrow , rises up objects of comfort ; so was it here : and setting up all their sails , made haste to it ; but before they could come close to it , although they were not far from it , the leak broke out again , and likewise their fears ; for the ship grew sick of a lingring disease , that it could swim no farther , but perished by little and little ; which perceiving , they hoist out their boat , where the prince gave order , that those which were most afraid , should go first ; he himself was the last that went therein , though the boat did go and unload , and return'd many times ; insomuch , that not only the passengers were saved , but all their goods , which no sooner were out , but the ship sunk , and dyed of that incurable dropsie . but in these dangers the prince forgot not travelia ; for why , the prince was more fond of him , than travelia was of himself ; for her fears of being known , gave her no rest . but being all safely arrived in the island , they began to consider what to do ; the prince counselled them to chuse out some of the company to build up hutts to lay their goods in ; and also to cut down some trees , there being great store of wood , chusing that which was most proper and fit to build a new ship ; whilst the rest of the company went to seek food , and to discover the place . this being agreed upon , they divided themselves ; and those that travelled up into the island , found it very small , as being not above thirty miles long , and twenty broad , and unpeopled ; but great store of fish and fowl ; few beasts ; but those that were , were of a gentle kind ; fine meadows full of grass and sweet flowers ; refreshing and shady woods , wherein ran clear springs , and bubling brooks . thus , though it were little , it was very pleasant ; the greatest inconvenience they found there , was want of houses ; for they found the ground somewhat damp with dews , which ( being an island ) it was subject to : but the air was ferene and clear , the climate a little more than temperately hot . but the time that the ship was a building , the prince had a little house , or thing like an arbour , built in the midst of the island , to lodg in ; and the rest made hutts for themselves ; and several recreations they found to pass away the time . being in so solitary a place , the prince ( who was melancholy for the loss of his mistress ) grew full of thoughts ; and having her picture in his mind drawn to the life , comparing it to travelia's face , which he often looked upon , began to reason with himself why that might not be she , considering her private escape , and the little acquaintance she had in that countrey ; and seeming of a better breeding than a ship-master's son could have , it did almost confirm his hopes . but discoursing one day with the old man of several accidents , telling their misfortunes and good hap of both sides , and being both of one countrey ; the old man , thinking no harm , discovered by his talking , that travelia was none of his son , begotten from his loins , but adopted through compassion and affection ; and then telling the story how he came into his ship unknown , or without his leave ; by the circumstances of time , place , and manner , found that it was she ; whereat , being transported with joy , he could scarce conceal his passion , but dissembled his knowledg as well as he could for the present , yet after that time sought an occasion to get her alone ; where he did usually go a birding , and did command travelia to carry his bags of shot after him ( who loved the service , though she feared the lord ) ; and when they were gone some distance from the rest of the company , and being in a shady wood , the prince feigned himself weary ; and setting down to rest , commanded him to do the like ; and at last discovered to him how he came to know her . she finding her self discovered , turned as pale as death ; and in that passion of fear , prayed him to kill her , or otherwise she should find a way to do it her self . but the prince told her , he would satisfie himself first , unless she would consent to live with him as his wife , in that island , wherein ( said he ) we may live free and secure , without any disturbance . she musing with her self what to do , believing he was not grown the chaster , with living amongst rude and barbarous people , thought it best to dissemble , and give a seeming-consent . whereat the prince's thoughts being more elevated , than if he had been master of the whole world , they return'd to the rest of the company ; the one with an over-joyed mind , the other sad , and full of perplexed thoughts . but when she came to a place where she might be alone , sitting down in a melancholy posture , without uttering words , or shedding tears ; for grief and amazement had congealed the one , and stopt the other : yet at last her smuthered sorrow broke out into complaint . you gods ( said she ) ! who will offer sacrifice to your deities , since you give innocency no protection , nor let chastity live undefiled ? cruel fates ! to spin my thread of life , to make me up a web of misery ! accurst fortune , that brake not that thread with an untimely death ! and you unjust powers , to torment poor virtue , making it a sin to free it self : for , bad i leave to dye , i would not live in shame : for to dwell bere , committing acts dishonourable , although i am forced , yet shall i seem a party guilty ; and though no outward accusers , yet my conscience will condemn me . but , o you gods of light ! since you regard me not , nor will not hear me ; you powers of darkness , hearken unto me , and wrap me up in your dark mantles of perpetual night , that no eye may see me ; and cast me into black oblivion , where no remembrance is . the old man her father ( who was come from the water-side , where he had been for the directing and ordering the building of a new ship ) came to her in the midst of her complaints , and asked her , what she lacked ? or , if she were sick ? i would i were , said she ; then might i hope death would reprieve me : but i am worse ; for i am miserable , having torment ( like to those of hell ) within my mind : my thoughts are vultures , eating on my carrion-infamy ; or like the restless stone , that cannot get up to the hill of peace , but rolleth back with fear and sad remembrance . then she told him what she was , which he did never know before ; and what had pass'd since the first of her misfortunes , to that present ; and how he had ignorantly discovered her . which , when he heard , he cursed his tongue for telling how , and where he found her . father , said she , what is past , cannot be recalled ; wherefore , i must strive to help my self in what 's to come : and since i have been dutiful , and you so loving and kind , as to save me from the jaws of death ; help me now to protect my honour ; convey me hence ; let me not live here to please his appetite , but cast me to some unknown place , where ( like an anchoret ) i may live from all the world , and never more to see the face of man ; for , in that name , all horror strikes my senses , and makes my soul like to some furious thing ; so much affrighted it hath been . her father said , heaven give you quiet , and me aid to help your designs . but you must ( said he ) dissemble , to compass them : wherefore rise , and put on a smooth and pleasant face , and let your discourse be so compliant , that you may have a free liberty ; for if a doubt should cross his thoughts , you may chance to be restrained and kept by force , which will break that assistance i may give you . whilst they were thus discoursing , the prince came to them ( who had not patience to be long from her ; for her absence was his hell , and her presence his heaven ) , flattering the old man : my father , said he , ( for so i may call you now ) let me entreat you i may be your son , and she your daughter ; since she , you thought a boy , is proved a girl : and since fortune hath brought us so happily to meet , let us not despise her favours , but make the best use of them , to our advantage . then telling the old man , how that island might be made a paradice , and in what felicity they might live there , if their peevish humours did not overthrow . their pleasures . the old man seemed to approve of all the prince said ; whereupon the prince took him to be his dear friend , and secret councellor : for the old man did not omit to give him counsel concerning the setling and advancing of his new and small monarchy ; because he thought , in doing so , he might the better work out his own design , by taking away those suspitions that otherwise he thought might be had of him . then the prince bid the old man to have a care , and to order his maritime affairs , in over-seeing his ships and boats built ( for , said he , our chief maintenance will be from the sea ) ; the whilst i will perswade these men i have here , to make this place the staple and port of their prizes , and dwelling . then taking travelia along with him ( the old man and he parted for that time ) , and going to the rest of the company , he perswaded so well with his rhetorick , that they resolved to stay , and build them houses there to live , and also ware-houses to lay their prizes in , and from thence to traffick with them into safe and free places . whereupon every one put himself in order thereunto ; some cut down wood , others digg'd up stones ; some carried burthens , and some builded . thus , like bees , some gathered the honey and wax , whilst others made and wrought the combs . the mean time the old man made himself busie , at the coast side , about ships and boats , as being the chief master employed in that work. but oft-times he would go out a fishing in a fisher-boat all alone , bringing several draughts of fish ; and when he thought he should be least mistrusted , conveyed victuals therein , and then gave travelia notice to steal to the water-side ; who , watching her opportunity when the prince was busie in surveying , and in drawing the platforms of the city he would have built , stole away ; and as soon as she came , her old father went as if he meant to go a fishing , carrying his nets ( and the like ) with him to the boat , his supposed son busie in helping him ; and so both being put out to sea , and not gone very far , were taken by the sympathetical merchants , who trafficking into the kingdom of amity , sold them there to other merchants ; who carrying them to the chief city , the queen of that countrey ( who was an absolute princess in the rule and government thereof ) seeing travelia , who was brought to her as a rarity , took such a liking to him , that she received him into her family , as also to attend near her person ; wherein he behaved himself so well , that he became her favourite , and the old man was treated very well for his son's sake . in the mean time , the prince was in a sad condition for the loss of his mistress , who searched about all the island for her ; but could hear nothing of her , until he sent to the sea-side for the old man , to enquire for her ; and had answer back , that the old man and the youth went out a fishing , but were not as yet returned . which he no sooner heard , but guesled a-right that they were fled away . whereupon he grew so enraged , that he lost all patience ; swearing , tearing , stamping , as if he had been distracted . but when his fury was abated , his melancholy encreased , walking solitary , accompanied only with his sad thoughts , casting about which way to leave that hated place ( for all places seemed so to him where his mistress was not ) : yet he knew not very well what to do , because he had perswaded the rest of the company to abide there , and make it their home ; and in order thereunto he knew they had taken great pains : besides , he thought they might despise him , as seeming unconstant ; yet stay he could not : wherefore calling them together he spake in this manner : my friends , said he , we have here a pleasant island , altogether unhabited , but what is possest by our selves ; and certainly , we might become a famous people , had we women to get posterity , and make a commonwealth : but as we are all men , we can only build us houses to live and dye in , but not have children to survive us . wherefore my counsel is , that some of us that are most employed , may take the new ship , and go a pyracing for women , making some adventure on the next kingdom , which may be done by a sudden surprisal ; which prizes , if we get any , will bring us more comfort , pleasure , and profit , than any other goods : for , what contentment can riches bring us , if we have not posterity to leave it to ? they all applauded so well of his advice , that they were impatient of stay , striving who should go along with him ; and so pleased they were with the imagination of the female sex , that those whose lot was to stay ( who seldom or never pray'd before ) prayed for the others good success . but the prince's intention was , only to find that female he lost ; caring not to seek for those he never saw . but setting out with great expedition , and hopes of a good return , sailed with a fair wind three or four days , at last saw land , part of the kingdom of amity . no sooner landed , but they were beset with multitudes of countrey-people , who flocked together , being affrighted with the arrival of strangers ; and being more in numbers than they were , over-power'd them , and took them prisoners . they were examined , for what they came ? they answered , for fresh water . but they believed them not : for , said they , it is not likely you would come in a troop so armed , for fresh water . so they bound them , and sent them to the king , to examine them farther : and being carried to the chief city , where the king was , who was advertised of all ; sent for them into his presence to view them : and being brought unto them , the prince , who was of a comely and graceful presence , and a handsome man , bowing his head down low , in a submissive stile thus spake : great king , we poor watry-pilgrims , travelling through the vast ocean to search the curiosities of nature , that we may offer our prayers of admiration , on her altar of new discoveries ; have met with cruel fortune , who always strives to persecute , and hath forced us to your coast for the relief of fresh water : for we came not here to rob , nor to surprise ; but to relieve our feeble strength , that was almost lost with thirst ; not that we were afraid to dye , but loath to live in pain : nor would we willingly yeeld up our lives , unless great honour lay at stake : but if the fates decree our death , what way soever it comes , with patience we will submit . but if , great king , your generosity dares trust our faiths , so far as to employ us in your service , we may prove such by our courage , that our acts may beg a pardon for those necessitated faults we have committed ; and if we dye in warrs , we dye like gallant men ; but to dye shackled prisoners , we dye like slaves , which all noble natures abhor . the king , when he had heard him speak , thus answered the prince ( as their accustomed manner was ) in verse : your faith i 'le trust , and courages will try : then let us see how bravely you dare dye . the prince poetically answered again , as he perceived it an usual custom to speak : our lives , said he , wee 'l quit , before we yeeld : wee 'l win your battels , or dye in the field . for the king , at that time , was newly entred into a warr with the queen of amity ; the chief cause was , for denying him marriage , he being a batchelor , and she a maid , and their kingdoms joining both together ; but he nearer to her by his affection , being much in love with her : but she was averse and deaf to his suit ; and besides , her people was loath , for fear of being made a subordinate kingdom . wherefore , he sought to get her by force . and the king , liking the prince's demeanour , demanded who he was , and from whence he came . the prince told him truly , who he was , from whence he came ; how he was taken by the pyrates ; and how long he had lived with them ( concealing the cause of his journey ) : but by his discourse and behaviour , he insinuated himself so far into the king's favour , and got such affections in his court , that he became very powerful , insomuch as he was chosen the chief commander to lead out the army ; believing him ( as he was ) nobly born , and observing him to be honourably bred ; and they ( being a people given to ease , and delighting in effeminate pleasures ) shunned the warrs , sending out only the most vulgar people , who were rather slaves than subjects : all meeting together , produced the chusing of the prince , who ordered and directed their setting out , so well , and prudently , as gave them great hopes of a good success . in the mean while , the queen was not ignorant of their intentions , nor slack in her preparations , sending forth an army to meet them : but the queen her self had a warr in her mind , as great as that in the field ; where love , as the general , lead her thoughts ; but fear and doubt of times , made great disorder , and especially at that time ; for travelia , on whom she doted , was then sick ; in which sickness , she took more care to recover him , than to guard her self and kingdom . but the army she sent out , was led by one of her chief noble men , who marched on until he had a view of the other army ; and , being both met , they set their armies in battel-array . when they were ready to fight , the prince thus spake in the most general language : noble friends , you being all strangers to me , makes me ignorant both of your natures and customs ; and i , being a stranger to you , may cause a mistrust both of my fidelity and conduct . as for my experience , i am not altogether ignorant of the discipline of warr , having been a commander in my own countrey . neither need you doubt of my zeal and loyalty to your king's service , by reason i owe my life to him ; for it was in his power to have taken it away : neither can i have more honour bestowed on me from any nation , than from this , were i never so ambitious , or basely covetous , to bribe out my fidelity : wherefore , if i lose ( as i am perswaded i shall win the day ) , yet it will not be out of my neglect , falshood , or want of skill ; but either it must be through fortune's displeasure , or by your distracted fears ; which i cannot believe will possess any spirit here , being so full of alacrity , chearfulness , and readiness to meet the enemy ; and may the thoughts of honour maintain that heat and fire , not only until it hath consumed this army you see , but all that shall ever oppose you . after he had thus spoke to them , they began the onset : long was the dispute ; but at last , by the prince's courage , which animated the rest by his example , and by his wise conduct and diligent care in rectifying the disordered ranks , and supplying their broken files by fresh men , he got the day , and put the enemy to a rout , killing many , and taking store of prisoners . the prince , when he saw that fortune was his friend at that time , though at other times she had frown'd ; yet now he thought to make his advantage whilst she was in a good humour : wherefore he called to the soldiers to follow their pursuit ; but they were so busie in the dividing of the spoils , as they were deaf to all commands or entreaties , giving their enemies leave to rally their scattered forces , and so to march away ; and by that means they got so far before them , as they had time to get up their spirits , and strengthen their towns by fortification ; to man their forts , and to entrench themselves ; whereas , if they had followed their victory , they might have taken a great part of the countrey : for , all towns , forts , and the like , seldom stand out , but yeeld to a victorious army ; yet it must be whilst the terror and fright of their losses , hath wholly possest their minds , leaving no place for hope . but when the prince thought they had lost their opportunity , through the covetousness of the soldiers , he sent a messenger to the king , of the victory , and with the reasons why he could not follow the same ; but , if his majesty would give permission , he would march on , and try out his fortune . in the mean time , the queen hearing of the loss of her army , was much perplexed ; then musing with her self what way she were best to take , she straight went to travelia , who was indifferently well recovered ; to him she related the sad news ; then asked his counsel what she were best to do . he told her , his opinion was for her to call a council of the gravest and noblest of her subjects , and those whose age had brought experience : for , if worldly wisdom dwells any where , it is in aged brains , which have been ploughed by various accidents , and sowed with the seed of observation , which time hath ripened to a perfection ; these are most likely , said he , to produce a plentiful and good crop of advice ; but young brains , said he , want both manuring and maturity , which makes their counsels green and unwholsome . whereupon they called a council ; where , after they had disputed long , at last they all agree in one consent , that the best was , for her to go her self in person , to animate her soldiers , and to give a new life to their dejected spirits . whereat she was much troubled , by reason travelia was not so well as to travel with her ; and to leave him , seemed worse to her than death . but after her council was broken up , she returned to him , and told him what her council had decreed . and this ( said she angerly to him ) was by your advice : for , had i not called a council , but had sent a general of my own choice , it would not have been put to a vote for me to have gone in person . but had you had that love for me , as i have for you , i should have had better advice ; and with that wept . heaven knows , said she , the greatest blow fortune can give me , is to go and leave you behind me . he seeing her weep , thus spake : beauty of your sex , and nature's rarest piece ; why should you cast your love so low upon a slave so poor as i , when kings hazzard their kingdoms for your sake ? and if your people knew , or did suspect your love to me , they would rebel , and turn unto your enemy ; and besides , conquerors are feared and followed ; whereas losing is a way to be despised , and trod into the earth with scorn . alas ! i am a creature mean and poor , not worthy such a queen as you ; and 't were not wise to hazzard all for me . wherefore , go on great queen ; and may you shine as glorious in your victories , as the brightest starrs in heaven : may pallas be your guide , and mars the god of warr fight your battels out : may cupid give you ease , and venus give delight . may hymen give such nuptials as best befits your dignity . may fortune always smile , and peace dwell in your kingdom . and in each heart such loyal love may grow : no disobedience may this kingdom know : age crown your life , and honour close your days : fame's trumpet loud may blow about your praise . she , weeping , said : no sound will pierce my ear , or please my mind , like to those words you utter , when they 're kind . but at last by his perswasions , more than by her councellor's advice , she consented to go , upon that condion he would take upon him the government of her kingdom , until such time as she returned again ; and , said she , if i dye , be you heir to my crown , and ruler of my people . and may the gods keep you from all opposers . the people knowing her commands and pleasure by her proclamation , fell a murmuring , not only in that she left a stranger , but a poor slave , who was taken prisoner and sold , and a person who was of no higher birth than a ship-master's son , to govern the kingdom , and rule the people . whereupon they began to design his death , which was thought best to be put in execution when she was gone . but he behaved himself with such an affable demeanour , accompanied with such smooth , civil , and pleasing words , expressing also the sweetness of his nature by his actions of clemency ; distributing justice with such even weights ; ordering every thing with that prudence ; governing with that wisdom , that it begot such love in every heart , that their mouths ran over with praises , ringing out the sound with the clappers of their tongues , into every ear ; and by their obedience shewed their duty and zeal to all his commands , or rather to his perswasions , so gently did he govern . thus whilst he ruled in peace at home , the armies met abroad ; and being set ready to fight , the trumpets sounded to charge , and every one prepared to encounter his enemy , striving for the honour of reputation , which is got by the ruin of one side : so equally hath nature distributed her gifts , that every one would have a just proportion , did not fortune disorder and misplace her works by its several accidents . but the terror of the former blow was not quite extinguished in the queen's army , nor the insulting spirits of the other army laid , but rather a new courage added to their old victory , which did help them now to win that day , and with such victorious fortune , that they took the queen a prisoner , and did destroy the whole army . the prince thinking the kingdom won , in having the queen's person , made him divide his army into two parts ; the one half he sent to take possession of the towns , castles , and forts ; the other part he led himself to conduct the queen , being much pleased that he had such a gift to present to the king ; which present he knew his royal master would prize above all the world , which made him chuse to go with it : for had the spoils been less , he had sent them with some messengers ; but being so rich , he durst trust none to guard it but himself . the king hearing of their coming , made all the preparations of state that could be , sending the prince a triumphant chariot , and his own robes to wear ; which chariot coming as they were ready to enter the city , the prince sets the queen thereon , and walks on foot by the chariot-side , as being mistress to the king his master . and the king , being attended by all his nobles of the kingdom , met the queen , and with great respect led her to his palace ; where , when she came , the king kissed her hand , and smiling , said , the gods had brought her thither : for certainly , said he , the gods by their fates have decreed and destin'd you to be my queen ; in which gift the gods have made me like themselves , to enjoy all felicity . she with a face clothed in a sad countenance , answered , fortune was his goddess ; and if he were like her , he might prove unconstant ; and then , said she , you may change from love to dislike ; if so , i may chance to have liberty , either by death , or to be sent into my own kingdom again . if you will accept of me , said he , you shall not only have your own kingdom , but mine , wherein you shall be adored and worshipped as the only she in the world. she answered , i had rather have what i adore , than to be adored my self . then was she conducted to a strong and safe , but a pleasant place , to be kept in , where the king visited her often , treated her civilly , courted her earnestly , loving her with an extraordinary passion . the prince , in the mean time , was in high favour with the king , who asked and took his counsel in every thing : and sending for him one day , when he came , hung about his neck , as was his custom so to do ; saying to him , o my friend ! ( for that was his usual name he gave him ) my cruel prisoner ( said he ) you brought me , despises my affection , slights my addresses , condemns my suit , scorns my proffers , hates my person : what shall i do to gain her love ? alas ! said the prince , i have had so ill success in love , that what i doted on most , did hate me worst ; which is the cause i have left my countrey , friends , and estate , and lost the peace of mind , the joy of mirth , the sweets of pleasures , the comfort of life , hating my self because she doth not like nor love me : jealous i am of light , darkness , heat , cold , because they come so near as to touch her . i wish her dead , because none should enjoy her but my self : yet i cannot live without her , and loath i am to dye and leave her here behind . thus hang i on a tortur'd life , and bear my hell about me . whilst they were thus lamenting their hard fortunes in love , a messenger brought news that their forces were beaten that were sent into amity . how can that be , said the prince ? most of the nobles being here , and none but peasants left behind , who have no skill in warrs , and only fight like beasts ? but the alarms came so thick one after another , to tell that they had not only beat their forces , but were entred into their kingdom . with that the king in haste dispatched the prince with a fresh supply added to those forces he brought the queen with , so march'd out to meet the enemy . for travelia hearing the queen was taken prisoner , was highly enraged ; which choler begot a masculine and couragious spirit in her : for though she could not have those affections in her for the queen , as a man ; yet she admired her heroick virtues , and loved her as a kind and gracious princess to her ; which obligations made her impatient of revenge : then calling all the chief of the kingdom together , thus spake unto them : honourable , and most noble , you have heard the sad news of the queen's being taken prisoner , which cannot chuse but strike your hearts through your ears , and make them burn in flames of high revenge ; and may those flames be never quenched , until you fetch her back , and set her in her throne again . she went to keep you safe ; and nothing can be more ungrateful , than to let her live amongst her enemies . nor can you here be free , whilst she is made a slave ; your wives and children will be bought and sold , and you be forced to do their servile work : what goods you now possess , your enemies will enjoy . then let your hands and strength redeem your countrey 's loss ; or sacrifice your lives in the service . after she had spoke , they proclaimed her with one voice general ; raising new forces , making vows they would never forsake their queen ; but dye , or be conquerors . then sitting themselves in order thereunto , travelia ( as their general and chief governour ) caused a solemn fast and procession , sacrificing to the gods for good success . after that , she took a view of her arms and ammunition , selecting out the ablest and youngest men to fight , making the better sort commanders , that envy might not breed disobedience : the aged she chose for her councellors , her old father being made one ; the most mechanicks , as smiths , farriers , pioneers , cannoneers , sumpter-men , wagoners , cooks , women , and the like , went with the bag and baggage . neither did she omit to take good chyrurgeons , doctors , apothecaries , and druggists , to help the sick and wounded . at the army 's going out , she caused a proclamation to be read , that all the women and children , and infirm persons , which were left behind , not being fit to go , should pray incessantly to the gods for victory and safe return : for , said she , women and children , and the infirm , are the best advocates , even to the gods themselves , being the most shiftless creatures they have made , wherefore the most aptest to move compassion . thus setling the kingdom in a devout and orderly posture , they marched on , re-taking their towns , forts , and castles , lost ; beating the enemy out of every place ; insomuch as they did not only clear their own kingdom of their enemies , but entred into theirs : and being gone some days journey , their scouts brought them word there was an army coming to meet them ; and , after a short time , the armies were in view of each other : whereupon she drew up her forces ; the right and left wings she gave to be commanded by two of the valiantest and experienced commanders ; the rear unto another ; the van she led her self ; the reserve she gave her old father in charge to bring in , as he saw occasion ; praying him he would not stand with it so far off , but that he might come soon enough to their aid ; nor yet to stand so near , as to be annoy'd with their present fight : father , said she , i give you this part to command , because i dare trust your faith , as well as your judgment , courage , and skill . then she commanded every captain of a company should place himself in the midst of their second ranks ; for if the chief commander ( said she ) in a company , be kill'd , the spirits of the common soldiers soon dye , and their nerves grow slack with fear ; and all their strength will fail , unless it be to run away . the lieutenants , she ordered them to place themselves in their last ranks , to keep the soldiers from flying : for , said she , shame will cause obedience , to submit to authority : wherefore , his eyes will be as a fort , and his breast as a bulwark , to keep them in . then she gave order , that every squadorn should be but five ranks deep , and fifty on a breast ; which number , said she , is enough to knit into a proportionable body ; more makes it unweildy , and is like a man over-grown with fat , whose bulk makes him unactive either to assault , or to defend himself : and rands of ten deep , said she , are not only unuseful and troublesome , but so many men are lost as to employment ; for the hindermost ranks come seldom or never to the charge . in every troop of horse she placed some foot , both pikes and muskets , to gall and hurt their enemy's horse when they came to encounter : for , if once the horse fails , the man is down . after that , she commanded her army to marchin such a slow pace , as not to break or loosen their ranks , but commanded them to join so close , as if there were no vacuum in their troops , and so to move as one entire body or piece . lastly , she commanded all the cuirasiers should stand in the fore-front , to bear the shock , or break the ranks . and thus she set the battalia in order , form , and figure , as the ground and places would permit to their best advantage . the prince ordered his battalia as he was used to do , making it thick , as believing it to be the stronger ; which is questionless the best way , if it were only to stand still for a defence , but not to assault : for in action , the half of those thick bodies serve only as cyphers without a figure ; but never help to multiply the numeration of blows . but the armies , being both ready to joyn , the young general thus spake to his soldiers : noble friends , brave soldiers , and wise councellors , who knows but this our meeting may produce good and great effects , and bring peace to your countrey , which is molested with warrs , and ruin to your enemies , that have almost ruined you ; comfort to your sad friends we have left behind , liberty to your imprisoned friends ? we fight for fame hereafter , for honour and profit now presently : but if we let our enemies become our masters , they will give us restless fears , unreasonable taxes , unconscionable oaths , whereby we shall lose the peace of our mind , the conversation of our friends , the traffick with our neighbours , the plenty of our land , the form of our customs , the order of our ceremonies , the liberty of the subjects , the royalty of your government , and the company and rule of our gracious , vertuous , and beautiful queen . and shall they have courage to spoil , and we none to right our wrongs ? shall they live by our hard labour ? and shall we live by their hard laws ? all noble spirits hate bondage , and will rather dye than endure slavery . wherefore , my friends , be you constant to your just resolutions , circumspect in your ways , patient in your labours , heroick in your actions : for , what man can remember such injuries , and let their courages be cold ? wherefore , for your own sakes , your countrey 's sake , your royal queen's sake , go on with valiant hearts , and active strengths ; and may apollo be your friend , shooting his darts , dazling your enemies eyes . may mars , the god of warr , direct you in your fight . may fortune give you aid , and pallas give you victory . after she had thus spoke , the trumpets sounded to charge , and the young general sent some flying horse to give the onset , and then seem to run away ; which the other army seeing , thought it was out of fear , and followed them as in pursuit , which disordered and broke all their ranks : but the queen's army marched in good order to meet them ; at which the enemy , viewing their unexpected posture , was so daunted , as they neither had spirits to fight , nor power to run away ; and so a great number being killed and taken prisoners , the queen's army became absolute masters of the field . the prince with much difficulty retreated back about a days march , with some few , but with the prime of his horse ; where he heard of a fresh army coming to assist them : for the king , fearing they were not strong enough , being forced suddenly away , caused new men to be raised to follow them . the news of this army rejoiced the prince much , being at that time very melancholy for the great loss he received , and for the disgrace , as he thought , by reason he despised the enemies to the king ; and to be overcome by those he scorned , did wrack his soul. but taking up fresh hopes with his new-come army , returned back to the queen's army again ; who , when they heard of a new supply , were much amazed and dejected , by reason they were weary and tired with three fights , and disordered with gathering up , and carrying away their spoils . but the young general , perceiving them to hang down their heads , thus spake : noble friends , i perceive such a sadness in your faces , as if fear had taken possession of your hearts ; which if it hath , except courage beats it out , it will betray your lives unto your enemies ; and to be taken by a timorous thought , before your strength hath grapled with your foes , were base ; and if right and truth be on your side , as sure it is ; and reason rules your judgment , as i hope it doth ; you have no cause to doubt : but if you fear the conduct of my youth , as wanting experience to judg or direct the best , then here are aged men who with ulysses and nestor may compare ; their counsel is your aid . let no vain suspition therefore quench your hopes , but courage set your spirits on fire , and with their heat consume your enemies to ashes . with that they all aloud did say , go on , we will dye or conquer . in the mean while the prince was encouraging his new-come army , who was struck with the news of the last battel , hearing nothing of it until they met the prince ; the sudden report ( like thunder ) shook their spirits ; which to appease , the prince thus spake : noble friends , you that have humility to obey , love to unite , charity to redress , have hopes to obtain : for , hope is the ground on which courage is built . let not the enemy of mistrust , vanquish your faith ; but perform your loyalty through your industry : for obedient thoughts are not sufficient , without obedient actions . wherefore take courage to fight . let not your enemies kill your spirits . weep not , nor condole at our losses ; but let us regain our honours either by victory , or death . and they that are sloathful or cowardly in this army , may they neither enjoy the lawrel , olive , or cypress ; but go to the grave unregarded , or forgotten ; or live in shame , despised . but those that are industrious and valiant , may they sit high in honour's throne ; and fame blow their praises so loud , and far , that no time can stop the sound . then the two armies being set in battel-array , the prince ( to save the effusion of blood ) finding his army not full of alacrity , sent the young geral a challenge ; who , although he knew himself unfit for a single duel , accepted it , being afraid of the dishonour of denying it : but the two armies would not consent to look on whilst they fought ; for , in the encounter , both armies joined in cruel fight . but she having no skill in the art and use of the sword , nor strength either to assault or resist , was wounded ; and her wound bled so fast , that she fainted and fell down to the ground . but the prince , who was of a noble nature , perceiving by her shape that she was but a stripling , run to unty her head-piece ; and viewing her face , straight knew her ; and was so astonished thereat , that he had not power to stir for the present ; but stopping the wound as well as he could , brought life again ; yet so faint she was , that she could not speak ; neither had he power to go away , but sate by until he was found in that posture . in the mean time , the army being left to chance , having not their general to direct them , fortune play'd a part of civility and courtship , giving victory to the ladies ; so the queen's army had the day ; and some of the common soldiers , seeking for spoil , found them , he sitting by , holding her in his arms ; from whence they took her , and put her in a litter , and he also in the same , as a prisoner , to carry them to the body of the army ; and as she went , having recovered her spirits again , thus complaining , she said : i have heard of pleasure , ne're could it obtain ; for what we pleasure call , still lives in pain : then life is pain , and pain is only life , which is a motion , motion all is strife ; as forward , backward , up or down , or so side-ways , or in a circle round doth go . then who would live , or would not wish to dye , since in the grave there is no misery ? o let me dye , strive not my life to save ; death happy is , and peace lies in the grave . the prince told her , she preached to her self a false doctrine : for , said he , life is a blessing which the gods do give ; and nothing shews them gods , but that they live : they 're the original of life , the spring ; life the beginning is of every thing : and motion is from all eternity ; eternal motions make the gods to be . to wish no life , we wish no gods , and then no resurrection to the souls of men : in resurrection we as gods become ; to be — none would refuse a martyrdome : the very being pleaseth nature well , were she to live always in pains of hell. nature , nothing is more horrid to her than annibilation , that quite undoes her . thus gods and nature , you do wish to spoil , because a little pain endures a while . devils had rather devils be , than nought at all ; but you like angels that did never fall . thus they discoursed as they went ; but he strove to conceal himself from her knowledg , until such time as he thought he might make his peace with her , for fear she should run away again out of hate and dislike to him . but the army , when they miss'd their young general , grew so sad , that they took no pleasure in their victory : for they were all as one dumb man , no noise was heard , all eyes were full of tears . but when they saw the litter , as supposing she was dead , they raised a cry that rent the air , and made the thicker clouds to move . which when she heard , and saw them running to her , she shook her hand to shew them she did live . then sent they shouts of joy to heaven high ; and ev'ry countenance sad , look'd merrily . but when they came so near as to view her face , and saw her pale and weak , they grew into such a rage , that they would have killed the prince , hearing he wounded her : but she entreated for his life , and begg'd him for her prisoner : no sooner ask'd , but granted ; and she gave the charge of him to her father . being brought into her tent , the army watch'd by turns whilst she was under the chirurgeons hands for cure : nor would they take any of the spoils , but what she did divide unto them ; nor any direction but what she gave : nor would they stir until her health permitted her to travel : but , being indifferently well , she gave order to march on . but the king had raised another army in the time of her sickness , and sent it out to meet them . she , although weak , went about to order and encourage her soldiers , who loved her better than their life ; which affections made them fight so well , that they overcame their enemies ; and before the king could raise another army , they got unto the city . where , as soon as she came near , she gave order to her soldiers to entrench about it , and to cast at every corner of the city a mount of earth , on which she placed her cannon to batter down the walls : then she did build forts about , to place her men to shoot and cast granadoes in ; and by their several assaults they battered the city , and killed many of their men by sundry and sudden assaults : at last she resolved to storm it . but the king , perceiving his weakness , and that he could not hold out long , sent to the young general , desiring a treaty , and withall a cessation of arms. in the mean time , the queen , being weary of her imprisonment , longing for the coming of her beloved , in a melancholy humour thus spake : o what a hell is it to love , and not be loved again ! nay , not only to love , but to love a slave , and he regards me not : do i say , slave ? no , he is none , that hath no slavish passion : then he is free , and i am only bound to slavery , first to my passions , then to his tyranny . what shall i do , you gods above ? you punish me , and yet you make me love . do you delight still in a tortur'd mind ? make you no sympathy in human kind ? must all your works consist in contradiction ? or do we all enjoy nothing but fiction ? the mind is nothing but meer apprehension ; 't is not a thing , unless it hath dimension . but o you powerful gods ! by your decree , you can of nothing , something make to be : then make me something , grant me my delight ; give me my lover , or destroy me quite . thus leaving her in a melancholy posture and humour , we return to the armies . the cessation being near expired , the young general called a council , and thus spake to them : right noble and valiant heroes , the king hath sent to treat of peace ; but in my opinion there can be no honourable agreement ( next to the setting the queen at liberty ) but the resigning of his crown , and so his kingdom , to her . first , for raising hostility , and disturbing the sweet peace and happy condition of a kingdom that never molested them . then , for the dishonour , in taking the queen prisoner , the ruin and spoil of your countrey , the death of your friends , and the loss of your gallant men , killed in this dissention , making many widows and fatherless children . besides , who can rely upon the faith of an unjust prince , who made warr upon his neighbours without a just offence , but only through an ambitious attempt upon your queen and kingdom ? have we not victory ? and yet shall we return with loss ? shall we despise the gift of the gods , in making no use of what they give us ? and shall the trumpet of loud fame report the queen was taken prisoner , and resigned upon a low agreement ? no , let fame divulge unto the world , her release came with the ruin of his kingdom . after the general had spoken , one of the council , who was like nestor for years and experience , thus spake : our general hath spoke a speech so full of courage and honour , as shews him to be of so true an heroick spirit , that he hath left no room for policy to play a part . but states cannot subsist with valiant hands alone , unless they have a politick head , which is the guide to great designs ; it burns more cities than granadoes do ; it undermines strong towns , pulls down great works , wins forts , sets battels , takes prisoners , makes slaves , and conquers kings and kingdoms ; and what we call policy in a publick state , is called discretion in a private family ; and it is not , as the vulgar think it , a cheat , or meer deceit , but a wise prudence , to prevent the worst of ills , and to keep peace , or get tranquillity . 't is true , valour is a daring spirit , but policy is the trusty friend , and covers with skill all those faults it cannot mend ; it guides the bark in which man's life swims , and keeps them from the shipwrack of the world , pulls down the ambitious sails when blown too full with pride , lest it should overturn the ship of safety , to be drowned in seas of miseries : but policy will rather chuse the oars of patience , and take the tides of time , than venture where the doubts are more than hopes , or hazzards more than gains . then let us try to make a prudent peace , not trusting to fortune's favour , unless she were more constant : for in the warrs such unknown chance may fall , instead of victory , we may be ruin'd all . i speak not this to cross my general ; for i shall be as ready to obey all his commands , be they never so dangerous , as i have freely delivered my opinion . after he had spoke , the general rose up , and said , these counsels are too solid to be contradicted by rash youth . whereupon they all agreed to treat with the king , giving his ambassadors audience . the king's ambassadors coming into their assembly , thus spake : you great victorious amitenians , my master should not need to seek for peace , before it sought for him , had not the god of love proved his enemy , perswading mars to be his foe : for those that are cross'd in love , have seldom victory ; for mars doth take the part of venus , cupid's mother . thus our great king and master is by love undone . but since 't is the gods that work his fate , he humbly doth submit : wherefore he sends these proffers unto you : first , he will build your broken forts again , and raise those walls his soldiers have pulled down . secondly , he will repay your charges and expences in this warr , although his own is great , and his loss is more . thirdly , he will restore his prisoners , if you will do the like to those you have taken : but for the queen , she is no prisoner : for our master is her captive , and her thrall , both to command him , and his kingdoms all . after the amitenians had consulted , they told the king's ambassadors , that words were not acts ; wherefore , they could conclude of nothing until the queen was in her army to make her atonement for her self ; and if she were no prisoner , they desired to wait on her out of the city ; if not , they must use force . whereupon the ambassadors went back to their king to declare their answer . but to return to the captive prince , who was more fetter'd in his mind , than in his body ; for the old father treated him civilly , and used him kindly : but , perceiving him to be very melancholy , thought it might proceed from the overthrow he received ; which he strove to moderate , telling him , nothing was more subject to chance , than warr ; and that the valiantest and wisest men , might fall by fortune's hand : for , said he , she on wheels , not on firm ground doth stand . she seeks not worth and merit to advance ; her scepter , which she governs by , is chance . then said the prince , o fortune , most unkind ! i would she were as powerless as blind . as he was speaking , in comes the young general ; whom when he saw , love's passion shook his manly strength , and made his visage pale . but she , being of an affable and sweet disposition , wish'd all content of mind to every person , although she had little her self . noble sir , said she , it was not for want of respect , i have not visited you ; but my engagements have so busily employed me , that till the cessation of arms , i have not had so much time as to examine your welfare . but i know my father hath not omitted any service he could help you in ; neither do believe , you ( being a commander ) can be so ignorant , but to know , that camps can afford but a rude entertainment , having therein no necessary accommodations ; and since my wishes cannot make it better , you will be pleased to accept of it as it is . worthy sir ( answered the prince ) , i am only a prisoner to your favours , but am free by your noble entertainments . so , after some discourse , telling him of the agreement which was like to be , left him , or rather carried him with her ; for his soul went after her , although his person stay'd behind . but , to follow the ambassadors , who were got to the king , and told him , the demands of the amitenian army was , to have their queen , before they would treat any farther . the king being very much troubled thereat ; for to keep her he durst not , knowing his own weakness , and their strength ; and to let her go , he could not ; for his passion of love would not give him leave : neither would he call a council , knowing they would be for the departure of the queen , for their own securities : then did he wish for his friend and servant , the prince : but at last , being resolved , went to the queen his mistress , and taking the crown from off his head , laid it at her feet : madam , said he , here i deliver you my crown , and with it my kingdom ; and yeeld my self your prisoner , dispose of it and me as you please : for it never shall be said , i make conditions with her i do adore ; for since my soul is yours , there is nothing i can own that is not so . and since you must and will go from this place , let me go with you , to set your triumphs out ; and lead me as your slave . sir , answered she , i have not been so ill treated , nor am i so ungrateful to go away , and leave no thanks behind me : wherefore i will stay until there is such a peace made , as you may receive as much profit , and as little losses thereby , as i. wherefore , in order thereunto , i desire , that the general of my forces , and some of my council , may come hither , and so confer both with my self and you . the king gave order , that the gates of the city might be set open : but the queen sent a messenger to the army , that none of the forces should enter into it , but keep themselves where they were , without ; only the general and the council , and some of the chiefest commanders , to come unto her . but when they were ready to wait upon the queen , the old man fell very sick , and sent to his son ( the young general ) to come unto him to take his leave of him before he dyed ; who went with a sorrowful heart , and sad countenance ; and when he came close to his bed , the old man spake : son , said he , my lease of life is expired ; and death , the landlord of my body , knocks at my old and ruinated cottage , sending out my soul to seek another habitation ; which soul intends to travel through the airy skies , unto the mansion of the gods , where it shall pray for your success and happy days on earth . o father , said travelia , must you go , and leave me here behind ? why will the gods so cruelly oppress an innocent youth , to leave it in distress ? you were my good angel , to guard me from those evils that fortune sets about me ; you were my guide , which did direct my simple youth to just and honest ways : what will become of me when you are gone ? or who will rescue me from those that seek my ruin ? the old man said , the gods , the gods , my son , they will reward your virtue . farewel , farewell ; then turned his head , and dyed . after he had lamented and mourned over his lifeless corps , he sent to the queen to give him leave to interr his father's ashes . the king hearing thereof , sent to the general , inviting him to bring his father's body into the city , and there to be interr'd in his chief temple ; which honour he accepted . whereupon all the army brought the hearse unto the gates , and then returned unto their trenches . but the chief commanders did bear it unto the grave ; the young general came into the temple , being clad all in mourning , only his face seen ( which appeared like the sun when it breaks through a dark and spungy cloud , whose beams did shine on those watry drops that fell upon her cheeks , as banks where roses and lillies grow ) and standing on a mounted pillar , he said : i come not here to flatter or be-lye the dead , but to speak the truth as far as my knowledg is informed : he was aged in years , not old ; for those are only old , whose memories and understanding are grown defective by the length of time . he was wise by experience , not led with self-opinion . he was learned in the art of navigation , and not ignorant of land-service , or command ; although few that dwell on seas , and profess that art , know more of land , than the ports where they take harbour to shelter themselves from furious storms , or to take fresh victuals in , or to be deboist with wine and women . but he was most temperate , not only in moderating his passions , but also his appetites , with reason , honour , and religion . in his behaviour he was affable and free , not formal nor constrain'd , by vain and self-conceit . his disposition gentle , sweet , and kind . he was in his nature compassionate to all that were in distress . he was industrious to all good effects , and had a nimble and ingenious wit , and 〈◊〉 a superfluity of courage , as did not only banish fear in himself , but begot spirit in others . he was bred in the schools of honour , where he had learnt vertuous principles , and heroick actions . he had all the ingredients that goeth to the making of an honest and gallant man. and he was not only morally honest , but most pious and devout . he offered not sacrifice to the gods for worldly prosperity , but out of pure love and adoration to the gods. he was a pattern for all others to take example by . his soul was as the breath of the gods ; and his animal part as the best of nature's extraction . but nature makes nothing to last in one form long ; for what she creates , she dissolves again . with that her tears fell so fast from her eyes , as stopt her mouth for a time : but at last , she sighing , said : although my tears are useless to him , since it is not in their power to alter the decrees of fate , nor can perswade the gods to give perpetual life here in this world ; yet natural affections are forced through my eyes . then bowing down her head over the corps , which was placed underneath , said : these , as satisfaction , may asswage my grief , to think my new-born fears , the issues of my love , shall be buried and lye intombed with his cold ashes ; which is the only way to mingle souls , when death hath parted bodies . but if fate had had the power to twist the thread of of my life with his , then death had struck me too , and so eased my grief . but since it is not so , his memory shall lye entombed in my heart until i dye . after he had spoke this funeral-speech , he descended from the pillar ; and helping to lay the corps upon the funeral-pile , did with a flaming-torch set the fuel on fire ; and gathering up the ashes , put them in the urn , and placed it in a tomb. having thus executed those ceremonies belonging to the dead , he changed his mourning-robes , and clothed himself fit for the court or camp again . then he and the council , and the chief commanders , went unto the palace of the king ; where , after some discourse , he was brought to the queen , who joyed more to see her travelia , than for the victories they had won : and after she had condoled with him for the loss of his father , she congratulated with him for the good success he had in the warrs ; aud withal told him , she must set at liberty his prisoner the prince , for she had given him back unto the king. whereupon he presently gave order for the prince to repair to the court ; and after she had heard the relations of all their several actions and accidents , and pleased her self with the variety of other discourses ; she told them , she would sit in council to consider what was to be done as concerning the peace ; and so dismist them for that time : only she stayed travelia , loving his company so well , she could not so easily part with him . but the king perceiving her affections , as being never pleased but when travelia was with her , he grew so jealous , that had not honour forbid him , having past his word unto her , they should all there be safe , he should not have let him live to have been his rival . in the mean time , the messenger had caused the prince to repair to the court ; who was much troubled how to behave himself : for , said he in his thoughts , if i should make my self known unto my mistress , she will straight convey away her self either by death , or stealth ; and if i go disguised , although i may make the reason known unto the king , yet the court will talk , and think it is for some ill design against the state , so bring an aspersion upon my loyalty . thus musing a long time with himself , at last he thought it best for to take counsel of the king ; and being come to him , the king with great joy embraced him , saying , o my friend ! thy company is a kingdom to me . he humbly kissing his hand , said , he thought fortune was so much his enemy , as that she had shut him out of his royal favour . but sir , said he , it was none of my fault i did not win ; for the gods , jupiter , mars , and the rest , are such lovers of the fair mortal-females , that they will never be against them ; for wheresoever they are , victory is there also . the king , thinking he meant it of the queen , told him how unkindly she used him , and how he perceived she loved the young general even to a dotage ; and withall , asking his counsels what he should do , he smiling , yet sighing , said : o sir , said he , there is no cause to fear ; for that person you do suspect , is a woman , which i believe the queen knows not . then he told him all the story of his love , and all the several accidents thereupon , and ask'd his advice what he should do ? the king was overjoyed at his relations , discovering she was a woman ; and his joy gave so many several advices , that the number confused the counsel , and confounded the choice . but while they were thus talking , a messenger came to the prince , which brought him letters from his own countrey , by merchants that were lately come in , that his wife was dead ( for although they knew not where he was , yet they sent letters into several countreys , in hope some might light into his hands ) : which when he heard , his doubts were turned into hopes . with that , the king and he embraced with joy , making no question now but cupid was turned their friend , and that he would shoot two golden arrows into their mistresses hearts from the forts of their affections . the time being come when the king and queen , and the councellors of both , should meet about the peace , they being all set ready to treat , the king entreated the queen she would give him leave , that the prince might be one of his council ; which ( said he ) without your own consent , he shall not be , since he hath been your prisoner . she told the king , he was not bound to her , since she had given him a release ; and your councellors are to be chosen by your self , and not by me . after her answer , he sent for him ; who came , being not disguised , but as he was himself ; and travelia looking upon his face as he was coming in , and seeing the man she most did fear , she fell into a swound : at which accident the queen being extreamly afflicted , thinking it was done by some design wrought from the jealousie of the king , broke up the juncto for that time , taking all the care she could for his recovery . but travelia being recovered out of her swound , was still sick in mind , though not in body ; and kept her bed as if she had been very ill . whereupon the queen's suspition was more encreased , and fear'd some poyson had been given him ; and with that conceit could not endure to see the king. the king being much troubled that the queen was more severe to him than she was used to be , and perceiving that it was travelia that was the cause , complained unto the prince , and ( with seeminganger ) said merrily , dispose of your mistress some way ; for i am jealous , said he , although she be a woman . sir , said the prince , i have as much reason to be jealous of the queen , as you have of my mistress , setting her masculine habit aside . at last they did agree to discover her to the queen . whereupon the prince went to the queen , and desired her ( by a messenger ) to grant him half an hours conference . she desired to be excused . he sent her word , it was something concerning his own affairs . whereupon she gave him admittance . when the prince came to her , he said : madam , i should not press thus rudely on your thoughts , but that i think i am part of the cause that makes them melancholy . sir , said she , you take upon you to know much ; for it is hard to know the mind or thoughts of our selves , much less of others . madam , said he , i will be so presumptuous to guess at them , if you will give me leave . take it , said she . then , madam , said he , i must tell you , you are in love ; and the person you love , although most excellent , yet cannot return such love as you desire ; for you have placed your affection upon a woman , who hath concealed her sex , in taking the habit of a man ; and hath more confirm'd your mistake , by the actions of a soldier . i know not , said the prince , how kind you have found her ; but i have found her cruel . then told her the story from the first time he saw her , until that present . when the queen had heard his relation , her colour came and went , moved by her mix'd passions , anger and love ; angry that she was deceived , yet still did love , and wish'd she had been a man. then the prince began to move unto her the suit of the king. but she was so impatient and troubled in her mind , being crost in her love , that she would hear nothing concerning love more at that time . which he perceiving , took his leave for the present . but as soon as he was gone , tears from her eyes flow'd out , as if they meant to make her there a watry monument . and her oppressed heart such sighs sent forth , like gusts of wind that blow from south or north. after this furious storm , a calm did rise , her spirits , like a still smooth water , lyes . then laying down her gentle head to rest , thus to the god of love her prayers addrest . thou powerful god of love , that shoots from high , one leadden arrow in my breast let flye , to quench that scorching heat thou mad'st to burn , unless a woman to a man can turn . with that the god of love did pity take , quench'd out the first , and did a new fire make ; yet was it weak , as being made but new ; but being kindled , it much hotter grew . at last the flame got hold upon the king , which did much joy unto each kingdom bring . after a sweet and refreshing sleep , she rose , and went to travelia's chamber , and told her how she was discovered . then chiding her gently for not making her self known unto her , said , that she had caused her many unquiet rests . but travelia begged her pardon ; telling her , it was the cause of her misfortunes that concealed her , and not out of any evil design she had to deceive her . then desired her assistance and help to secure her . whilst they were thus talking , the king and the prince came to see the sick person ; to whom the queen with a smiling-countenance said , she was courting her hard-hearted lover . the king answered , that he hoped she would take pity on him , by what she had felt her self . the queen told him , she was likelier to love him now , than if she had never been a lover before : for , said she , there is something pleasing in lovers thoughts , be their fortunes never so adverse ; and i believe , said she , the prince will say as much . madam , said he , it is a pleasing-pain , as being mix'd with hopes and fears ; but if our hopes do cease , all pleasure is gone , and nothing doth remain but pains of hell. then , said the queen , your mistress should be in a sad condition , if she loved you as you seem to love her , you being a married-man . no , said the prince , i am now a widower ; but i doubt ( said he ) that doth not advantage me in my mistress's affection . but when travelia heard he was a widower , her heart did beat , like a feverish pulse , being moved with several passions , fearing it was not so , hoping it was so , joying if it were so , grieving that she ought not to wish it so . but the queen asked the prince , how that he came to know of it . whereupon he told her . she said , i have promised your mistress to protect her against your outragious assaults : but since your suit is just , and your treaty civil , i will yeeld her to you , upon that condition you carry her not out of my kingdom : for , since i cannot marry her , and so make her my husband , i will keep her , if i can , and so make her my friend . with that , travelia rises up in her bed , and bowed her self with a pleased countenance , giving the queen thanks . the prince said , you have given me as much as the gods could give , which is , felicity . madam , said the king , you have given me nothing . the queen , with blushes , answered , that if her council would agree , she would give him her self . the king , for joy , kneeled down , and kiss'd her hand : now , said he , i am like to the gods , they can but have their wish . thus passing that day in pleasing-discourses , the next day they caused their councils to meet , where they concluded the marriage of the king and queen ; and that the queen should live with their king in the kingdom of amours ; and that her first son should be heir to the crown , and her second should be heir to the kingdom of amity : but in case there were no sons , or but one , then daughters should inherit . in the mean time , the prince , and his princess that was to be , should be vice-roy ; or rather , that she should rule , who was so beloved of the people , as if she had not only been a native born , but as if she had been born from the royal stock . but they thought it fit she should make her self known unto the army by word of mouth , that she was a woman , otherwise they might think she was made away by a violent death ; and that the report of being a woman , was only a trick to deceive them ; and from thence arise such a mutiny as might bring a ruin to both kingdoms . when all was agreed , they prepared for the marriages . in the mean time , travelia goeth to the army , attended by the prince ; where the king and queen came soon after , that the soldiers might see they were there , as witnesses of what she told them . and , being all in a circle round about her , she being upon a place raised for that purpose , thus spake : noble friends , and valiant soldiers , i am come here , at this present , to declare i am a woman , although i am habited like a man ; and perchance you may think it immodesty : but they that will judg charitably , will enquire the reason , before they give their censure : for upright judges never give sentence before they examine . wherefore i believe you will not condemn me because necessity did enforce me to conceal my sex , to protect my honour : for , as the love of soul and body is inseparable , so should the love of chastity , and the feminine sex ; and who can love , and not share in danger ? and since no danger ought to be avoided , nor life considered , in respect of their honours ; and to guard that safe from enemies , no habit is to be denied : for it is not the outward garment that can corrupt the honest mind ; for modesty may clothe the soul of a naked body ; and a sword becomes a woman when it is used against the enemies of her honour : for though her strength be weak , yet she ought to shew her good will ; and to dye in the defence of honour , is to live with noble fame : and therefore neither camp , nor court , nor city , nor countrey , nor danger , nor habit , nor any worldly felicity , must separate the love of chastity , and our sex : for , as love is the sweetest , so it is the strongest of all passions ; and true love proceeds from virtue , not from vice : wherefore it is to be followed by life , and to be maintained till death : and if i have served my queen honestly , condemn not my modesty . then she bowed her head down low , first to the king and queen , then to the army . whereupon the army gave a shout , and cryed out , heaven bless you , of what sex soever you be . after she had spoke this speech , she went into her tent , and drest her self in her woman's robes , and came out again ; and standing in the same place , thus spake : noble friends , thus with my masculine clothes i have laid by my masculine spirit ; yet not so , but i shall take it up again , if it be to serve the queen and kingdom , to whom i owe my life for many obligations . first , to my queen , who bought me as a slave , yet used me as a friend ; and loved me with that affection , as if nature had linked us in one line ; for which , heaven reward her with glory and renown . besides , her love did bestow upon me great honour , made me protector of her kingdom in her absence ; and you her subjects ( out of loyalty ) obeyed all my commands , although i am young and unexperienced . and 't is not only what your loyalty enforces ; but i have found your affections of love to be such , as it shewed they came freely from your souts , expressing it self in grieving for my sickness , taking care for my health , joying in my company , mourning for my absence , glorying in my fame ; in so much , as you would lessen your own , to give it me . what shall i do to shew my gratitude ? alas ! my life is too poor a sacrifice : had i the mansion of the gods , i would resign it for your felicity . but these are only words , not acts , to shew you my thanks . yet here i do offer all that the gods or nature gave me , life , health , or beauty ; peace , pleasure , or plenty ; and these shall stand upon the altar of a thankful heart , ready to be sacrificed to your service . whereupon all the army cryed out , an angel , an angel , the gods had sent unto them ! then was there a declaration read in the army , of the agreement of peace : and when it was read , that the prince should be vice-roy in the kingdom of amity , all the soldiers ( as if they had but one voice ) cryed out , travelia shall be vice-regent ; which was granted to pacifie them . whereupon there were great acclamations of joy. but the prince told his mistress , she should also govern him . she answered , that he should govern her , and she would govern the kingdom . then went the king and queen , the prince and travelia , the nobles and the chief commanders , to celebrate their nuptials ; and on the wedding-day , though the queen was adorned with a crown of diamonds , hung about with rich jewels ; yet her beauty did dim their luster . but travelia was only drest in a white silk garment , which hung loosly about her ; and yet her face did seem like to a glory bright , where gods and goddesses did take delight : and in her eyes , new worlds you there might see , love-flying cupids there as angels be : and on her lips venus enthroned is , inviting duller lovers there to kiss : wing'd mercury upon her tongue did sit , strewing out flow'rs of rhetorick and wit : pallas did circle-in each temple round , which she with wisdom , as a lawrel , crown'd : and in her cheeks sweet flowers for love's posies , there fates spun tbreads of lillies and of roses : and every loving smile , as if each were a palace for the graces to dwell there : and chast diana on her snow-white breast there lean'd her head , with most pure thoughts to rest : when view'd her neck great jove turn'd all to wonder , in love's soft showers melting without thunder . the lesser gods on her white hands did lie , thinking each vein to be their azure skie . her charming circling arms , made mars to cease all his fierce battels , for a love 's soft peace ; and on our world's globe sate triumphing high , heav'd there by atlas up unto the skie : and sweet-breath'd zephyrus did blow her name into the glorious trumpet of good fame . after they were married , to set out their triumphs , they had masques , playes , balls , pageants , shews , processions , and the like . and when they had kept the festivals some days in the city , the prince and princess desired they might go and revel for some days with the army that was without the city . the queen being well pleased therewith , thither they went ; where they had tiltings , running at the ring , fencing , wrastling , vaulting , jumping , running races of horse and foot , baiting of beasts , and many the like warlike pastimes ; and such hospitality , that every common soldier was feasted : and after they were well satisfied with sports and good cheer , the prince and princess returned to the court again : where , after they had remained some time , the king and queen sent them with the army into the kingdom of amity ; and the soldiers returned home not only with all the spoils they got in the warr , but the king did present all the chief commanders with presents ; and the two kingdoms lived in peace and tranquillity during the life of the king and queen ; and , for ought i can hear , do so to this day . the tale of a traveller . a gentleman and his wife being married some years , and having none but daughters ; at last was born unto them a son , of whom they were very fond , and did strive to give him the best breeding they could . in the first place , he was to learn the horn-book , from that his primmer , and so the bible , by his mother's chamber-maid . but after he came to ten years old , or thereabouts , he was sent to a free-school , where the noise of each scholar's reading aloud , did drown the sense of what they read , burying the knowledg and understanding in the consusion of many words , and several languages , yet were whipt ( for not learning ) by their tutors , whose ill teaching broke and weakned their memories with over-heavy burthens ; and striving to thrust in more learning than could be digested , or kept in the brain , dulled their senses , and opprest their understanding ; for , being afraid of whipping , they got their lessions by rote , without understanding the sense . but this youth , being ingenious by nature , learnt more by his own capacity , than by his tutor's dull rules . after some time , he was sent to the university ; where continuing from the years of fourteen , to the years of eighteen , did at last consider with himself , that he was buried to the world and its delights , conversing more with the dead , than with the living , in reading old authors ; for that little company he had , was only at prayers and meat ; the time of the one being taken up in devotion , the other in eating , or rather fasting ; for their prayers were so long , and their commons so short , that it seemed rather an humiliation and fasting , than an eating and a thanksgiving . but their conversation was yet a greater penance then their spare diet ; for their disputations ( which are fed by contradictions ) did more wrack the brain , than the other did gripe the belly ; the one with filling the head with vain opinions , and false imaginations , for want of the light of truth ; as the other with wind and crude humours , for want of sufficient nourishment . upon which considerations , he left the university , and fitted himself to travel into forreign countreys , to see their varieties and curiosities , and to learn the customs and laws thereof , going into all places and companies of note and recourse : but when he had travelled some few years , he began to sum up his journeys , that he might know what advantagious experiences he had gained by his observations . whereupon he recounted the several forms and fashions in architecture , both in churches and palaces , cities , towns , and villages ; their longitudes and latitudes , their height and thickness ; their forms , as round , square , triangular , and the like ; their materials , as stones , and what sorts of them , wood , brick , tiles , slat , or the like : what pillars and pillasters of all fashions , cuts , and carvings ; the doors and frontispieces , which are for grace and ornament , as bellviews ; or for conveniency , to avoid the sharp winds , shunning the northern or southern points : and so for windows ; placing them obliquely from the sun , to avoid the extremity of heat . then likewise granishing ; as gilding , fretting , and their paintings , where the proportion of their figures were made according to the distance of the eyes . then what piles had been so built upon the least compass of ground , that none was lost , but every foot employed , making no vacant corners , or useless places . then their situation and accommodations for water , and fuel , and healthsome air. what cities had navigable rivers , or conveniency of ports and havens for traffick and commerce . what fortifications or forts for its defence . after he had recounted this to himself , and what those sights had advantaged him ; if i were able , said he , i would pick out all the curiosities of these several buildings , by imitation , and create me a palace . but , upon reflecting-thoughts , he said , building was very chargeable ; for the very building of a mean house , will wasten an indifferent good estate : so that i may build a house after mine own humour , but i shall be so poor , as not be able to live in it when it is finished . no , said he , i will live in those house my ancestors left me , who built by degrees , according as they were able , every generation adding something ; and leave great , curious , and rare buildings , to great princes and monarches , who build with their subjects puises ; or to the clergy , who build with charity , raising great colledges and churches out of weak consciences ; or to unjust magistrates , who create palaces from brides . then what good hath these observations done me , said he , unless i meanto to be a surveyor ? and then i would not study any other thing , because then i would make it my living , and so learn the curiosity of it for my trade . but , since i cannot build for my humour , fancy , nor fame ; i will not trouble my self for the pleasure of others . he recounted also to himself the several courts of judicature he had seen , and how causes were determind ; where he observed , that riches and power decides all causes ; and those that have neither , lose their suits . afterward he considered what places of societies he had frequented , and what he had gained by conversations at ordinaries , where all strangers and travellers meet ; and that their discourses were most commonly of news , many times false , being of what designs one prince hath against another ; and of their peace and agreements , their warrs , their victories , and overthrows ; the disadvantages and advantages of their polities , governments , and tyrannies ; their favourites , their luxuries , and vanities ; but seldom in praise of their wisdom or justice . and what advantages , said he , do i gain by this ? their losses hurt not me ; i gain nothing by their victory : their luxury draws nothing out of my purse ; nor doth their clemency nor their bounty extend so far as my miseries or necessities : god send me health , said he , and fortune give me good luck , and let forreign kingdoms do what they will ; for i cannot settle them when they are in disorder ; mutinous factions will not hear me ; nor will tyrant princes take my counsel : why should i then fill my head with their actions , or busie my thoughts with their quarrels or agreements ? besides , the reports are most commonly , or at least half of them , lyes . then he took notice of his recreations and pastimes , as playing at cards and dice , mistresses , and the like : by this , said he , i do not only lose and waste time , idly sitting still , and only exercising my self in shuffling and throwing ; but i lose my money : for , if i win once , i lose twice ; and the box eats up all the gains : which doth so torment my mind , that it is never at rest : for , when i have won , i long to be at play again , to win more , with the hopes that i shall grow rich with it , and so fill my head with such vain imaginations , build such castles in the air , do such wonders with my imaginary wealth , as caesar and alexander never did the like : and if i lose , i am never quiet until i am at play again , out of hopes to get what i have lost ; and am as sullen all the while , as a hare that is got in restraint ; my countenance so dejected and sad , as if i had newly buried my father ; and my humour so cross , that i contradict all discourse , let it be never so rational ; and am so cholerick , that i am ready to beat all i meet . thus i disturb my sleep , torment my thoughts , vex my mind , impair my health in sitting up late , and all to no purpose . if not at play , then i go to a bawdy-house , and there for a short pleasure i get a lasting disease : for the pox is seldom got out of the bones ; and when it is cured at the best , it leaves pains and aches to their dying-day . well , said he , by these courses i find i am absolutely a loser ; and therefore i leave them to whores , bawds , cheats , and pick-pockets . and as for those exercises and qualities ( said he ) which we call virtuous , i could never get them by travelling about to see sights and rarities , as they are accounted : so that vaulting , riding , fencing , which should maintain honour , and defend my life , is lost in the search of novelties , which whirls a man about as dust in a whirlwind ; and his thoughts are so scattered about ; that his reason and consideration can settle in no judicious place . well , said he , i will turn courtier , and see what preferment i can get at court. whereupon he made himself fine clothes , taking many pages , lacqueys , and grooms , giving fantastical liveries : and thus being accoutred for a great prince his court , he addressed himself there to ushering the ladies , kissing their hands , admiring their beauties , cringing and congying , creeping and crouching to the favourites ; waiting and attending in the privy-chamber for the presence of the king and queen ; and if he could at any time get a word from the king or queen ( although it were but to call such a one , or to speak to have a back-door ready opened to go into the garden , or to take coach privately ) , he thought himself raised from a mole-hill to a mountain . but after he found his money was spent , and no preferment was like to come , he considered with himself what advantages he had got , or rather lost . here , said he , i waste my time in hopes of preferment , which comes by favour , not by merit ; and , many times , those that deserve least , have the greatest honours cast upon them . here i spend my estate to grace the court , and my self to flatter authority , to maintain knavery ; siding in factions , to rail against honest men , to bely my conscience ; and to what purpose is this ? for when i am a bankrupt , i shall be despised and scorned , or be their anvil to knock jests upon . no , said he , i will spend my estate where i shall have something for my money , and be flattered by them that shall live upon my bounty or vain-glory . besides , said he , this is an idle and cowardly life ; i will go to the warrs , and there get me honour and reputation . so he fitted himself with arms , horses , tents , wagons , and the like ; and after he had been received by the general very kindly , and with great civility , he marched with the rest of the cavalry ; and having past two summers in marching , besiedging , fighting , wintering , quartering , and purloining , he began to consider the course of life he lived in . here , said he , i adventure my life , running through great dangers , endure great miseries by colds and heats , and extream hunger and thirst , breaking my natural rest , lying upon the cold and hard ground , killing those that never did me harm , and offering my self to be killed by those that never did me good ; and this i do to get an honourable fame ; whenas , ten thousand to one , i am cast into the grave of oblivion , amongst the common soldiers : for alas , fame hath not many puny-clarks to record every several action done by every particular person in a great and numerous army . besides , all the honour of a victory redounds to the general , and the losses reflect upon the common-soldier and under-commanders ; besides , fortune gives the triumph , and not merit . and what have i gained by all my travels and experience ? nay , what have i not lost ? have i not spent a great sum of money , endangered my life both by sea and land , wasted my youth , wearied my limbs , exhausted my spirits with tedious journeys , my senses almost choaked with dust , or drowned with wet , lying in lowsie inns , eating stinking meat ; and suffered all the inconveniences that go along with travellers ; and when they return to their own countrey , they are no wiser than when they went out ; but oft-times become more compleat and absolute fools , bringing vain fashions , fantastical garbs , lying reports , infectious diseases , rotten bodies , atheistical opinions , feared consciences , and spotted souls . well , said he , i will now return to my native soil , leaving the flattering and dissembling courts , the deboist cities , the cruel warrs , and never take up arms more , but when my king and country calls me to it ; nor will i travel more , but when my king and countrey sends me forth . but i will lead a countrey-life , study husbandry , follow my plows , sell my cattel and corn , my butter and cheese , at markets and fayres , kiss the countrey wenches , and carry my neighbour's wife to a tavern when market is done ; live thriftily , and grow rich . then taking his leave of the general , he returned to his own countrey , where after he had visited his friends , who were joyed to see him , and did welcome him home ; he put himself into one of his farm-houses , stocking his grounds , taking men-servants and maid-servants to follow his business ; and he himself ( clothed in a frieze jerkin , and a pair of frieze breeches , a frieze pair of mittins , and a frieze mountier-cap , to keep out sharp-cold in winter-mornings , when the breath freezes between the teeth ) would over-see and direct ; and was industrious to call up his servants before day-light , and the last a-bed when their vvork was done ; for in the summer-time he would be up with the lark , to mow down his hay , to reap down his harvest , and to see his carts loaded , riding from cart to cart ; and at noon would sit down on his sheafs of corn or hay-cocks , eating bread and cheese , and young onions , with his regiment of work-men , tossing the black-leather bottle , drinking the healths of the countrey-lasses and good-wives that dwelt thereabout ; and after his harvest was brought into his barns , and his sheep-shearing-time done , make merry ( as the custom of the countrey was ) with good cheer , although countrey-fare ; with goose-pyes , pudding-pyes , furmity , custards , apples , and march-beer ; dancing to the horn-pipe with the lusty lasses , and merry good-wives , who were drest in all their bravery , in their stammel petticoats , and their gray cloath-wastcoats , or white wrought wastcoats , with black woolstead , and green aprons ; and the men with cloath breeches , and leather doublets with pewter buttons . these and the like recreations the countrey-people hath mix'd with their hard labours : when their stomacks were full , and their legs weary with dancing , or rather with running and leaping ( for their dances have no nice and difficult measures to tread ) , they disperse every one to their several houses , which are thatch'd , and only holes cut for windows ; unless it be the rich farmers , and they most commonly have a chief room , which is glazed ; yet the poorer sort are seldom without bacon , cheese , and butter , to entertain a friend at any time . then giving thanks to the gentleman for their good cheer , and he shaking them every one by the hand , they took their leaves ; and the next day every one followed their own labours , as they used to do ; nor did the gentleman omit any pains , care , and industry in his affairs , but plyed the markets , selling his corn , straw , hay , cattle , cheese , butter , honey , &c. and after he had followed this way of husbandry two or three years , casting up his accounts , he found that he was rather behind than before-hand in his estate , and that his husbandry did not amount so high as the rents he had from his tenants , when he did let them . alas , said he , have i taken all this pains , rising early , following my business hard all day , making my self a slave to the muck of the earth , to become poorer than i was ! it 's hard , when those that take my lands , pay me great rents , and not only live themselves and their families thereon , but grow rich into the bargain ; and i cannot make so much as my rent , when i take as much pains , and am as industrious as they are . then being in a cholerick humour ( as they are most commonly that thrive not ) , and vexing at the servants round his house for their carelesness and idleness , in a melancholy humour he would walk out into his fields ; and going once by a neighbour's cottage , where only lived an old man , and his old wife ; he saw her standing at the door , fanning some corn in a little basket : by your leave , good-wife , said he ; you are fanning your gleanings ? god bless you , my good master , said she , and all that belongs to you : truly , said she , i am sifting a little corn from the husks , to boil for my good man's supper and mine , who will come home weary and hungry from his day's labour : we are old , master , said she , and labour goeth hard with us now ; but in our younger days it was like a recreation , when our bodies were young and strong , and our spirits lively : but now , our bodies being weak , and our spirits faint , it is a toil and an affliction to us : but we must work whilst we live , for we have nothing but our labours to feed us , and clothe us , god help us , said she . well , said he , i will be charitable , and see if that will make me thrive ; and told her , he would allow her a weekly-stipend . why , the blessing of god ( said she ) rain down plentifully on your life , and eternal joys in heaven , after you are dead . but i wonder , said he , you could not get so much by your labour in your younger days , to serve to maintain you when you were old . o master , said she , some have too little to thrive on , and some have too much ; but those that have nothing but from hand to mouth , can never lay up , because they eat up what they get ; and there can be no store without some savings : they that have more than they can manage themselves , are destroyed by those that help them ; for many mouths eat them up , and many hands work them out : besides , they are ever cozened and cheated in every office ; their reapers steal sheaves of corn ; for whilst the masters watch one end of the field , there are sheaves flung over the hedg at the other end ; and their sons , daughters , servants , friends , or partners , that help to share , convey it away ; and if they miss it in the field , they will have it when it goeth home in the cart ; for whilst the master goeth home with one cart , the other that goeth before , or cometh behind , is purloined : when he is in the barn , they rob him in the field ; when he is in the field , they rob him in the barn : besides , their threshers carry home corn in their bottles and bags , or hide it in some out-corner until they go home . they are cozened in their garners : for though they do keep the keys themselves , yet when it is fann'd , sifted , and turned , they must watch as a cat doth a mouse , or else they will lose it ; and if they grind their corn , the miller steals his share , and when they go to sow the seed in the ploughed up ground , if the master doth not follow the plough and harrow , and watch the hand that flings in the corn , they will throw handfuls in heaps , to gather it up when he is gone home ; and for their kine and sheep , their maids will sell their milk in the fields ; and when their masters and mistresses are gone to bed , although they saw them go before , they will rise in the middle of the night when they are asleep , and skim their bowls of the first cream . in their meadows and pastures , the neighbours will put their cattel to feed on their grass in the night , and take them out before the day . besides , the servants they send to markets , will drink out the gains , and then complain to their masters , that provisions came so thick , and buyers so few , that they were forced to sell at under-rates ; and , that plenty destroyed the market ; so that robbin and dick , jone and gill , make merry with what their master loses : and so the like in all other commodities . the shepherd steals the twin-lambs ; the swineherd the tenth pig ; the net-herd will mix strange steers in amongst his master 's to grass , knowing his master cannot have so much time as to count his own every day : and when the barns , and the ploughs , and the carts want mending , and repairing , his baylie cuts down two trees , or more , when less than one will serve the turn ; and the carpenter makes more and greater chips than he needs to do ; or carries pieces of wood home amongst his tools : likewise , his carters steal his oats , and makes his horses fast , and flings down more trusses of hay from the lost , than they need to use : the butchers steal the tallow out of the oxe's , the sheep's , and swine's belly , whilst they rip them up , unless they be watch'd : wherefore he that husbands much , had need have argus eyes , to watch in every corner , and to spy into every action ; and briareus hands , to help at every turn ; and more than one pair of legs , to walk into every place , or else he shall never thrive . but he that hath no more ground than he can ride about every day , nor more servants than what his two eyes can observe , nor more labourers than what he can diligently follow , nor more cattel than what he can easily count , nor more mouths than business ; this man shall thrive so , as to be able to pay his landlord's rent , to maintaintain his family , and have money in his purse to lay out upon a good bargain , when many a good worshipful gentleman is fain to borrow , and find more wants in his abundance , than the other in his hired farm ; and those are the happiest masters ( said she ) that have not many nor high desires , and can be content with a little , and whose wants are not above their means . the gentleman said , i have travelled far , and have seen and heard much ; yet i have learnt more experience from you , than i have done in all my tedious and expensive travels : wherefore ( said he ) i find we go far about to seek for that which is at home ; and for your learned discourse ( said he ) here is a crown to make your husband welcome when he comes home . heaven send you a good wife , said she ; and may you live together as old as methuselah , and as loving as isaac and rebecca . so home he went , and by the way he considered what the old woman had told him . i find , said he , her words true ; for i have taken more business upon me than i can manage : wherefore i will sell off my stock , and lett my lands again , only keep so much as shall serve me for provision for my private expence ; and i will get me a wife , who shall not be so handsome as to be proud of her beauty , seeking ways to shew it to the world ; and whilst she strives to shew her self , out of a desire to have all eyes gaze at her , and to incaptivate all hearts , she may chance to be catch'd in love's net her self with some flattering youth , or ignorant coxcomb , who are only crafty to lay lime-twigs to catch simple women . neither will i have one with a great portion , for she will so presume upon what she brought , and be so extravagant in her expences and vanities , ( which are like hydra's heads , where if one be struck off , two will rise in the room ) and will not be contented to spend her own , but my estate also . nor will i have one that is poor , for then her beggarly kinred will lye upon my estate like so many caterpillars , and never leave until they have destroyed the fruit , tree , and all . but i will have one that is right worshipful , born honorably , bred chast , and of a good reputation , has a competent portion , is young , and indifferently handsom ; and one that is cleanly , thrifty , and patient , with a sober behaviour , and a modest countenance , has so much wit as to understand my discourse , and so much discourse as to answer pertinently to my questions , is without self-conceit , and of so much ingenuity as to learn the rules of my will ; then i will live to my self , seeking all moderate delights for my senses , and not be as a property to serve others , cramming a company of idle people , as they do capons , with the fat of my estate , and i their host to provide their meat and drink , and their servant to place their dishes before them , and their drudg to make my house clean after they are gone ; and have nothing for my labour but their satyrical reports , saying i am vain-glorious and prodigal : and when my kind heart and courteous civility hath made me bankrupt , they will laugh at my person , condemn my actions , scorn my poverty , shun my miseries , and will blot me out of their remembrance : for ingratitude , or any other vice or wickedness , seldom hath , and hates returning-thoughts . neither will i spend my time in deciding my neighbours foolish quarrels ; for time is precious , being short , though it measures the full life of man ; and i shall have in recompence , only the honourable name of justice of peace in quorum , which is nothing but a sound , and no real and substantial thing ; neither would i have the trouble for all the poultry in the countrey : wherefore , i will have nothing to do in court , city , or countrey ; but obey the laws , though not to execute them as a subordinate magistrate ; i will submit to authority , but not sit in authority . at last , with these contemplations and discourses to himself , he arrived to his own house : so after supper , with musing thoughts , he went to bed. the next day he sent to an intimate friend to come to dine with him ; and after dinner he told him his intent of discharging himself of the trouble and loss of husbandry : withall , he told him a design he had to marry , and desired him to seek him out a good wife ; relating what manner of woman he would have her to be . his friend said , i will do my best to search out such a one as may sympathize with your humour . but i do wonder , said he , you should think of marriage now ; for you should have wedded a wife when you were in the prime and strength of your age , about the years of four or five and twenty , and not stay until you are eight or nine and forty , when weakness and sickness is ready to seize on you . he answered and said , that young men , wanting the experience of time , chose by fancy , and not with judgment : besides , they knew not how to prize chastity , nor honour the virtues of their wives , having no experience of the falshood and inconstancy which dwells in that sex , or rather that was created with women , as being the essence of their natural dispositions ; so that chastity is to be accounted as supernatural ; and if my wife had been inclined to honesty , yet the vanities and debaucheries of my fantastical youth , might have misled her youth , and have corrupted her pure mind , and innocent life , by my ill example . besides , if i had married whilst i was young , it is likely i should have been weary of my wife before she had been old ; and my children might have been weary of me before i had been old : but now i am old enough to govern a young wife by my sober example , and my solid instructions , and gentle perswasions ; and to prize her chastity so , as to trust her without a jealous spye , and to honour her virtue , to love her person , to maintain her honour , to provide for her and her family , to chuse her delights , and to direct her life : thus i may be happy in my age , by not marrying when i was young . well , said his friend , i will travel all the countrey over to chuse you a fit wife . pray , said he , let me give you some certain rules along with you . first , i would not have her a meer countrey-gentlewoman ; for she seldom seeing any other men but her father's steward , butler , or carters , with their frieze jerkins , and leather breeches ; if she should come to see a flanting young gallant bedaub'd with gold and silver lace ( or say it were copper ) she will be so ravish'd in admiration , that she will yeeld upon the meanest condition he can make ; nay , a gentleman-usher , with a pair of silk stockins , will beset her hard . wherefore , let me have one that dwells in the countrey , that hath seen the city , that hath seen the court , plays , and masques ; but not so well acquainted with them , as to know their enticing-vanities , or tempting-vices . then , i would have her such a one , whose parents have bred her rather to a superfluity , than in pinching-necessity ; for necessity teaches youth to dissemble and shark ; and when they come to command plenty , they have no stay of their prodigality and luxury ; but just like those that are almost starved for want of meat and drink , throw so much into the stomach , that many times it causeth a sudden death , or else a dangerous sickness . but those whose breedings have known no want , have no mean nor base desires ; for plenty opens the door to generosity , and raises the mind to high and noble speculations , which produceth honourable actions , despiseth unnecessary vanities , loves magnanimity , and hates crouching flattery , or base dissembling actions , which plenty seldom knows , having no use thereof . another thing , you must observe her humour , and have a care she be not of a peevish disposition , for they are pleased at no time , but fall out with every thing , even with themselves ; and not only make their own unhappiness , but of all those that live near them ; they will cross all discourse , be it never so rational ; oppose all actions , be they never so just ; delight in no place to live in , be it never so convenient ; but all their life is made up with crosses , and their mind is insnared with unnecessary troubles . truly , said his friend , your rules by which i am to measure a wife , are so strait , as all my industry will never fit you . so his friend left him to court his contemplations , whilst he went to search for a fruition . after a short time , he sent him word in a letter , thus : sir , i have found a young lady , who has the reputation of being virtuous ; born from an ancient stock , and honoured race ; carefully bred , and well qualified ; her portion is small , her friends are not poor ; she has enough beauty to delight a temperate mind ; she seems to be of a cheerful disposition , and makes me believe she can love an ancient man , if ( says she ) his merit equals his years : but ( said she ) i will be wooed before i am wed . wherefore , if you will marry , you must visit the lady ; and as you do both like , you may agree : howsoever , i durst not strike up the bargain before you see her , for fear you should dislike my market , being the first commodity of this kind , and of this nature , i ever cheapned . so good fortune direct you . after he had received this letter , he put himself into a wooing-equipage ; and so compleat he was in apparel and attendants , that the same eyes that had seen him when he followed his husbandry , and should view him now , would forswear they had ever seen him before . such alterations fine clothes and many followers make . the young lady , who expects his company , makes her self fine to entertain him ; the whilst her friends trim up the house , direct their servants how to wait , and provide good cheer to bid him welcome . at last a servant comes running in , to give notice the noble gentleman was come ; which as soon as the young lady heard , the report gave her the palpitation of the heart , which caused a trembling over the whole body , and fear and bashfulness made her colour to rise and fall : but hemming up those spirits that fear had depress'd , setling her countenance to the best advantage for her face , she stood with as much resolution as her weak confidence would give her leave , to receive his addresses ; whom he no sooner saw , but loved ; liking her by report , before he came . after he had saluted her , he thus spake : lady , i come not to woo you as a wanton lover ; for neither my years , nor your modesty , will allow it : neither do i come a suiter to your beauty , but your virtue ; and i wish i were such a one as might merit your affection : but since i cannot promise you to be such as i wish to be ; you will do a meritorious action , to take me out of charity , since i love you devoutly . sir , answered she , i wish i were worth a valuable affection , such as i prize yours to be : i am not yet acquainted with your merit by experience , but by report : and though the ears are the doors that let in the truest affections , yet i will not bar my eyes , but they shall stand as open , as free , though not the only passage to my heart . and i wish reason may rule the objects of my affections , that are gathered together : for it is not safe to love a man for one good quality ; but as many several causes produce but one effect ; so , many several good qualities , produce one entire affection . when they had discoursed themselves ( after this manner ) out of breath , the gentleman was directed to his chamber , where he laid by his riding-cloak , shifted his boots , brush'd his hat , comb'd his hair , and set himself in order , waited on by an old servant , who was busie about him , and one that had been with him in all his travels , and was his favourite . what think you , jack , ( said he ) of a young mistress to your old master ? in troth , answered he , i think my master thinks well of a young mistress . the master saith , the young lady hath a modest countenance , which is a sign she wil make a good wife . so is a bush , said the man , hung out of a tavern , a sign of good wine , but it often deceives the customers . but in troth , said he , i am like one that 's dry , with seeing another drink thirstily ; for i have a mind to a wife , now i perceive your worship resolves to marry . why , jack , ( said he ) you may woo the chamber-maid . he answered : but , sir , the question is , whether the chamber-maid is as discreet as her mistress , to marry a man in years ; for i am as old as your worship : besides , if she be not young , i shall not like her ; for i would imitate your worship in every thing : but the best of it is , if she be old , she will not like me ; for an old woman desires to marry a young man ; and when their teeth are fallen out of their head with age , yet they will snicker upon a beardless boy . thus , whilst the master was trimming himself up , his man and he discoursed . in the mean while , the young lady was gone into her chamber ; and called her maid to bring her the glass , and to view if the curls of her hair were in order . o lord , said she , joan , how red my face is ! i seem as if i were drunk , my cheeks burn like fire ; you told me the other day , i was in the green-sickness ; you cannot think so now . she answered , by my troth , mistress , the gentleman's discourse hath painted your cheeks ; pray mistress , saith she , doth he talk finely ? he talks rationally , answered her mistress ? is he a handsome man , said she ? the mistress said , he has a manly garb , and a wise countenance , and then he cannot be ill-favoured . i pray mistress , said she , how doth he seem to like you ? truly , joan , said she , i cannot tell ; he did not frown ; he seemed well pleased : yet i believe i behaved my self simply , for i was extreamly out of countenance ; and shame-fac'dness restrains the words , and disorders the behaviour , and many times makes one fall into such ridiculous errors , that it is hard to get out of them . o mistress , said she , youth can commit no errors to be condemned , for all their follies are cast on their few years , and their simplicity are graces in the eyes of their lovers . in the time while they were discoursing , her servant had found out the way to her chamber ; whom when she saw him , she flung away her glass . he told her , she did ill to lay aside that which did present her the best object , her self . she answered , his civility might prove bribes to self-conceit , and perswade her eyes to be impartial judges : but , said she , if i can make my mind fair , i care not how my face appears . but , after a short time , growing more acquainted , they left their complemental wooing , and discours'd more seriously concerning the course of life they did intend to settle in . he said , i have heard by the writing of wise solomon , that the only happiness in this life , is , to eat , and drink , and sleep in peace ; and that all things else are wearisomness and vexation of spirit : and truly , said he , that little experience i have , though i have travelled a great way , and into many places , proves if so to me : but , finding a good wife must be added to compleat the happiness , i resolved to marry : but the danger is , if the wife proves not according to the man's desire , then his life is closed up in misery ; yet i cannot believe my fate so ill , since i saw you . she said , i can only say this for my self , i shall be a very honest woman : but for all other good qualities , which are the ingredients to make up a good wife , i cannot promise ; but what errors my ignorant simplicity may be apt to commit , it may be rectified by your wise admonitions . then he told her , the quicker they did dispatch their marriage , the sooner they should be happy ; but , said he , i find your friends desire a publick vvedding , great store of company , musick , and good cheer . i must confess , company and musick fits the years of youth ; but they are not seemly companions for the gravity of age : and to see a man in years dance , is as if his head and his heels were mis-match'd , the one is too light for the other ; and it is seldom known , that a wise brain is propt with dancing-legs ; and if i put my self where such pastimes are exercised , i must run the hazzard of being rude , in denying those that offer to take me out ; or render my self ridiculous , which i would not willingly do , especially before you . besides , it is more comely , noble , and majestical , for youth to follow the strict and severe rules of age , than for age to follow the leight measures , fantastical garbs , and vain rules of youth . sir , said she , as i chuse age for the best to lead my life withall , so i shall chuse aged counsellors to direct all my actions ; and though i am young , i do not approve of the ways of youth ; neither do i find any solid mirth , or lasting contentment , in their recreations or pastimes . he said , you speak according to my own soul , and i hope nature did create us for one another , and destiny will link our affections so fast , that neither change of time nor fortune can alter them ; and that our loves will live in the grave , when our bodies be dead . so in two or three days all contracts were confirmed , and the match was concluded with the approbation of all friends of either side ; married they were , and in a short time after he carried her to his house , there made her mistress of his estate ; and whilst he governed his outward affairs , she governed the family at home , where they lived plentifully , pleasantly , and peaceably ; not extravagantly , vain-gloriously , and luxuriously ; they lived neat and cleanly , they loved passionately , thrived moderately ; and happily they lived , and piously dyed . the she-anchoret . there was a widower who had but one child , and she a daughter ; which daughter he bred with pious devotions , moral instructions , and wise advertisements ; but he falling sick to death , called his daugher unto him , and thus spake to her : farewell my dearest child , for dye i must ; my soul must flye , my body turn to dust : my only care is , that i leave thee young , to wander in the world , mankind among ; few of them charitable are , or kind ; nor bear they in their breast a noble mind , to help the fatherless , or pity youth , protect the innocent , maintain the truth : but all their time 's spent with laborious toil , for to pervert , to ruin , and to spoil . flatter thy beauty , and thy youth betray , to give thy heart , and virgin-flower away . they will profess love , vow to be thy friend , marriage will promise ; yet they will pretend their friends will angry be , or else they 'l say , their land 's engag'd , they first their debts must pay ; or else that they during some time of life , have made a vow , not yet to take a wife : and twenty such excuses they will find for to deceive the simple female-kind . and if you marry , troubles you will find , pains , griefs , and cares , to vex a quiet mind . but here i charge you ( lying in death's arms ) that you do stop your ears against their charms : live chast and holy , serve the gods above , they will protect thee for thy zealous love. daughter . i will obey whatever you command : although you dye , your will shall fixed stand . father . next , i do charge thee , not to grieve nor mourn , since no redress will from the grave return . daughter . o do not so , said she ; but give grief leave to flow out of my eyes ; for if it be supprest , the body dyes : whilst now you live , great wrong y'uld think you have , if i should sit and laugh upon your grave ; or with neglect should i your grave pass by , and ne're take notice where your ashes lye . father . you cannot hinder destiny's decree . daughter . o no! but nature , nature still will be : nature created love within the mind ; the object dead , the passion still is kind . had i as many lives as nature make , i 'de lay them on death's altar for your sake . that single one i have , o heavens me hear ! exchange it for my father's life so dear : but when her father found that death drew on , he bid her lay her hand his eyes upon . father . close up my eyes , said he , and then receive upon thy lips my last breath , let me breathe . when he was dead , sh' amaz'd , long time sate still ; at last bethought her of her father's will : then up she rose , his body did entomb ; and how she spent her life , rehearse i 'le soon . the description of her life in prose . after she had interred her father's corps , although she had rich , honourable , and importunate suiters ; yet she resolved to live like a kind of an anchoret's life , living encloistered by her self alone , vowing chastity , and a single-life ; but gave leave for any to speak to her through a grate . when she went first into her solitary habitation , she thus spake : virtues are several pathes which lead to heaven ; and they which tread these pathes , have graces given : repentant tears allay the dust of pride ; and pious sighs doth blow vain thoughts aside : sorrow and grief , which in the heart doth lye , doth cloud the mind , as thunder doth the skie : but when in thundring-groans it breaketh out , the mind grows clear , the sun of joy peeps out . this pious life i now resolve to lead , will in my soul both joy and comfort breed . she had not been long enclosed , but she grew as famous as diogenes in his tub ; all sorts of people resorted to her , to hear her speak ; and not only to hear her speak , but to get knowledg , and to learn wisdom : for she argued rationally , instructed judiciously , admonished prudently , and perswaded piously ; applying and directing her discourse according to the several studies , professions , grandeurs , ages , and humours of her auditory . the first that came to her , were natural philosophers ; who asked her opinion of man's soul : of which she discoursed in this manner : she said , man hath three different natures or faculties ; a sensitive body , animal spirits , and a soul : this soul is a kind of deity in it self , to direct and guide those things that are far above it , and to create by invention ; and though it hath not an absolute power over it self , yet it is an harmonious and absolute thing in it self : and though the sensitive body hath a relation to it , yet no other ways than jove's mansion hath unto jove ; for the body is only the residing-place , and the animal spirits are as the angels of the soul , which are messengers and intelligencers : all animal creatures have not this soul , but only man ; for beasts have none ; nor every man : for most men are beasts , and have only a sensitive body , and animal spirits , as beasts have : but none know when this soul is out or in the body , but the gods : and not only other bodies and spirits cannot know ; but the body where it resides , and the attending-spirits , are ignorant thereof : for this soul is as invisible to the body and the animal spirits , as the gods to men ; for , though this kind of soul knows , and hath intelligence by the senses , and by the animal spirits ; yet the senses nor animal spirits have none from the soul : for , as gods know men , but men know not gods ; so this soul knows the senses and animal spirits , but the senses nor animal spirits know not this soul. then they asked her , whether souls were immortal ? she answered , that only the life was immortal , from whence all souls are derived . then they asked her , what deities she thought there were ? she answered , she thought but one , which was the father of all creatures , and nature the mother ; he being the life , and nature the only matter ; which life and matter produceth motion ; and figure , various successions , creations , and dissolutions . then they asked her , what she thought time was ? she said , time was only the variation and alteration of nature ; for time is only in respect to creations , alterations , and dissolutions . then they asked her , what eternal was ? she answered , an endless succession . then they asked her , what infinite was ? she said , a numberless succession : but , said she , eternal is in respect to infinite , as infinite to eternal . then they asked her , whether she thought there were fixt decrees , or all were governed by chance ? she answered , that doubtless there were fixt decrees , as light , darkness , growth , decay ; as youth , age , pain , pleasure , life , death , and so in every thing else , for ought my reason can perceive . for , said she , as nature creates by dissolution , and dissolves by creation ; so the diattical life ( says she ) decrees rules , and ruleth by decrees . then they asked her , what was chance and fortune ? chances ( said she ) are visible effects from hidden causes ; and fortune , a conjunction of many sufficient causes to produce such an effect ; since that effect could not be produced , did there want any one of those causes , by reason all of them together were but sufficient to produce ; but that one effect , many times , produces many effects upon several subjects ; and that one effect , like the sun , streams out into several rays , darting upon several subjects : and again , as the sun scorches and burns some things , and warms and comforts others ; so this effect advances some , and casts down others ; cures some , and kills others ; and when the causes vary , and the effects alter , it is called change of fortune . then they asked her , whether she thought faith could naturally produce any effect ? she answered , that in her opinion it might : for , said she , why may not faith , which is an undoubted belief , joined to such a subject , produce or beget an effect , as well as a seed sown or set in the earth , produceth a flower , a tree , or the like ; or as one creature begets another ; especially if the faith , and subject whereon it is placed , have a sympathy ; but by reason ( said she ) faith is not so customary a way of producing , as other ways are , it causeth many doubts , which doubts are like cold northern winds , or sharp biting frosts , which nip and kill the buds of faith , which seldom or never lets the effects come to perfection . then they asked , vvhat the sun was ? she answered , a body of fire . then they askedher , vvhat light was ? she answered , light was enflamed air. they said , that if light was enflamed air , it would burn all things , and so consume the world. she answered , that in thin bodies fire had but little power to burn ; for the thinness of the matter weakens the power of the strength , which causeth flame ( said she ) to be of no great heat : for , the hot flames do rather sindg than burn ; and the thinner the substance is that is set on fire , the purer the flame is ; and the purer the flame is , the less heat it gives ; as the flame of aqua-vitae , that may be eaten with sops . then they asked her , what air was ? she answered , that air was the smoak produced from heat and moisture : for air , said she , is a thin oyl , which is set on fire by the fiery sun ; or is like a fiery substance , and fiery motions , whose flame is light . then they asked her what darkness was ? she answered , darkness was the absence of light. and then they asked , why it was dark immediately , when the passage of light was stopped , and that if it were inflamed air , it would burn and give light , as long as that inflamed air lasted . she answered , that when the fiery rays that issued from the sun were cut off , the flame went out ; for said she , it is not the air , that feeds the flame , but the fire that is in the flame , and when that fire is spent or taken away , the flame dyes ; this is the reason , said she , that as soon as the rays of the fire is cut off , or shut out , or taken away , it is dark ; and when they are eclipsed , the light is dull and dim : but , as i said before , light is only air , set on flame by the fiery sun ; and the blewest sky , is the thinnest flame , being the purest air ; and just as if we should carry a candle away , we carry the light also , which is the flame ; so doth the sun : and as we bring a candle , or the like , into a room , we bring in the light ; so doth the sun : where the fire is , there is the greatest light ; and when a screen is set before it , the light is eclipsed : and when kindled fire ( as a candle , or the like ) is carried quite from the place , it leaves as great a darkness as if it were put out : just so doth the sun , ( which is the world's candle ) when it goeth down , draweth away the light , which is the flame ; and as it riseth , it bringeth in the fire , which causeth the flame ; and when it is high-noon , then is the brightest light , as casting no shadows , if nought eclipses it ; and when clouds get before it , it is eclipsed , as with a screen ; and when it is quite removed to another part of the world , it doth as if it went into another room or chamber , leaving no light behind it : for twi-light is caused from the rays of the sun : for , though the body of the sun is gone from off such a part of the earth , yet the rays ( which are the spreading-part of fire ) are not quite drawn away as soon as the sun ; for as those rays usher the sun-rising , so they follow the sun-setting : and though these rays of fire ( which are the beams of the sun ) enflame the air ; yet not so bright as the body of the sun doth : and where the sun is gone so far as the beams cannot reach , that part of it becomes dark . it is not the gross clouds ( as some think ) make twi-light ; for we see a cloudy day makes the twi-light seem shorter , though it be not ; and it is by reason they eclipse the enflamed air ; for clouds are rather vapour than air : and though vapour and air have some relation , the like hath vapour and water ; and vapour , when it is gathered into the clouds , doth rather eclipse than prolong light . they said , that if the light was flame , the vapoury clouds might quench it out . she answered , that although vapour could eclipse the light , it could not put out the light of the sun : 't is true , said she , it may and doth often allay the fiery heat in the rays ; for some days will be cooler than other days , although the sun be higher ; and some will be cooler than others , although in the same degree of the sun , by reason of low marish grounds , or near great rivers , from whence vapours arise . but though the vapour may abate the heat in the rays , as the enflamed air , and eclipse the light either of mists or fogs , or when they are gathered into clouds , yet they can neither put out the light , nor quench out the heat of the sun , which is the fountain of both , no more than a drop of water can quench a house on fire . the sun is a world of bright shining fire , from which other worlds receive both light and heat . 't is true , if there could be such a quantity of water as could equal the sun's power , it might quench the sun , unless the sun be an eternal fire . but as for vapour , were there a greater quantity than what arises from the earth , it could not change the natural property of the sun : besides , vapour is of a middle nature , as betwixt water and air ; for by the rarifaction it is not so gross nor so wet as water ; nor rarified so much as to be as thin and dry as air. then they asked her , what she thought of those that were of the opinion , that under the line it was uninhabitable , through an extream heat . she said , she thought they were like those that were blind of one eye , which saw perfectly on the one side , but not on the other : for their reason discovered there was a great heat , but it did not discover the refreshing-winds and moistning-dews which are constantly in that place ; which winds and dews quench the fiery heat , which makes it temperate ; for , heat and cold make an equal temper , when they are equal in degrees : and because there is twelve hours night , and twelve day ; there is as much cold as heat ; for the dews and the winds join'd with the night , makes it temperate ; but if it were not for the equal hours , and those dews and winds , it would be , as they thought it was , insufferably hot ; but they wanted information concerning the dews and the wind , and did not throughly consider when they miss'd the night . then they asked her the reason of the light of clow-worms tails ? she answered , that it was probable the purest , thinnest , and oilest extracted parts of the body , were in the tail , which the radical fire enflamed , which flame was light ; and ( said she ) the worm having no solid bones , tough sinews , firm flesh , gross blood , or thick skin in that part , to obstruct or eclipse the light , it visibly shines in the night when the sun is gone , whose greatest light drowns all other lesser lights : and the reason it shines some times , and not others , may be some outward cause that eclipses it from our sight , as a little cloud will do the sun ; whereas a much smaller vapour , or the like cause , will serve to obscure the light of the glow-worms tail : and certainly , said she , if we could see through the bodies of animals , and likewise throught their skull , as easily as the glow-worms tail , we should see ( said she ) a much brighter flame in the heart and the brain ; which flame is the light of knowledg ; and the several objects that the senses bring in , are there visibly perceived ; these lights sickness eclipses , and death puts out . then they asked her , what the moon was ? she answered , a body of water ; and the several changes ( said she ) is the ebbing and flowing thereof , which makes it fuller sometimes in one part of the circle , than in the other ; and when it is high-tide , we say it is full moon ; and when it is low-tide , it is in the wane ; and as it encreases , or decreases , we say it is in the first , second , or third quarter . then they asked her , what made it give light ? she said , the sun's reflexion thereon : for you may observe ( said she ) , that as the water shines with the reflexions or beams of the sun , so doth the moon , as we say , with a watrish light ; and ( said she ) it is more or less light , as that side next to the sun is swelled fuller , or ebbed lower . then they asked her of the rest of the planets ? she said , she believed that venus starr was a body of water , as the moon was ; but for the other planets ( said she ) i take them to be earthly bodies ; but not such as our globe is , but much finer , and of as great a difference ( said she ) as between porceline and clay ; which makes them shine so bright , the substance being so pure , that it is as it were transparent . then they asked , what the fix'd starrs were ? she answered , suns . then they asked her , what was the reason that the breath was hot and cold all at one time , as it were ? for when a man breathed upon his hand , it would feel hot ; and when he blows upon it , it would feel cold . she said , there was a reason for that : for , ( said she ) a dilatation causeth heat , and a contraction causeth cold ; and ( said she ) if one breathes on the hand , they open the mouth and lips wide , by which the breath dilatates like a steam , or a vapour , which is hot ; and when one blows upon the hand , then the mouth and lips are drawn into a narrow compass , and that contracts the breath into a cold wind . these several motions make one and the same thing , from one and same manner or passages , to work two several effects ; and surely those winds that are coldest , from whence soever they issue out , their passage is narrow ; and those winds that feel warm , as many times winds will do , their passage is wider , and are rather a breathing vapour , than a perfect wind. there is nothing shews that vvind is made cold by contraction , so much as to blow upon the hand ; which shews , that vvind is contracted air. then they asked her , vvhat was the reason wind could blow out flame , and in a flame it could kindle , and put out fire ? she said , that wind did strive to dissipate all things it did encounter ; and where it hath not so much power to dissipate , it only dilatates ; and when fire is set to any combustible matter , as wood , or the like ; the wind having not a forcible power to dissipate it into dust or ashes , it beats the heat of the fire into it ; and fire having a nature to catch hold , and to dilatate , and so to feed it self upon all things , or at least upon most , when the matter is too hard for the siery-points to enter , or at least to enter suddenly ; the wind , like a hammer , strikes them in , and so lends the fire force ; and helping the fire to extend , by its dissipating-power , dilatates the heat into the smoak or vapour of the matter , and so into a flame : but when it puts out fire or flame , it is when it hath so much force , as to dissipate the matter the fire works on ; and if the wind destroys or disperses the matter , it must needs put out the fire , having nothing to work on ; for fire dyes when it hath no fuel to work or feed on . this is the reason a man with his breath can blow out the flame of a candle , and with his breath blow the flame in again , if the snuff of the candle be full , and throughly fired , or else he cannot ; but if it be full , and throughly fired , he may blow so hard as to dissipate the flame , yet not so hard as to dissipate the fiery snuff , or wieck of the candle ; so that the flame , by the dissipating , goeth out , being dilatated to a dissipation ; and when the flame is out , and the fire remaining , with a gentle wind he may dilatate the fire into a flame again , and so many times , as long as the body of fire remains ; but if they should blow so hard or strongly , as to dissipate the body of fire , they put out both fire and flame . then they asked her , vvhat snow , hail , ice , and frost , was ? she answered , that snow was curded vvater , like curded milk : for , saith she , cold doth curdle water as sower vinegar doth milk ; and as curded parts will lye in clods , so vvater in flakes of snow . hail ( said she ) is broken water , or rather crumbbled water : for as a hand which nips a piece of bread , crumbles it by rubbing it between their fingers ; so doth some sort of cold motions break and crumble water into a number of small parts ; and as many crumbs ' of bread will stick together , through the moist clamminess , lying in little lumps ; so doth the broken parts of water , which is hail-stones : and though the body is divided into abundance of little parts ; yet every part is more compact , as being closer contracted , with being crusht and nipt together . as for frost , said she , that is candyed or crusted vapour , which is rarified water : for as some sorts of hot motions candy sugar , so some sorts of cold motions candy's vapour . likewise , said she , as milk changes not the nature from being milk , with curding ; nor bread , with crumbling ; nor sugar , with candying ; so water changes not the nature with contractions or dividings into snow , hail , ice , and frost . as for ice , it is made by such a kind of cold motion , as hot motions make glass : for , as fire in a hot furnace calcines some sorts of earth , and the purest to glass : so doth the strongest of such sorts of cold motions congeal water into ice . and as some hot motions strive to convert earth into water ( as we may see , by making earth into glass ) ; so some sorts of cold motions do turn water into earth , as by condensing into ice , hail , snow , and frost : and as snow and ice is nothing but condensed water ; so glass is nothing but calcined or rarified earth : for , that fine earth which makes glass , is so rarified by the hot fire in a furnace , which blows and spreads it as thin , and clarified it as clear as water ; only it makes it not liquid and fluid ; yet whilst it is in the fire , it is in a degree of being fluid , for it is soft and clammy . thus fire makes earth so near like water , as it is transparent , shining , and smooth , and brings it into the mid-way ; but it wants the liquid , wet , and fluid motions , which some will call parts , to make it perfect water . and i suppose , that crystals , diamonds , and the like , are only the purest part of earth , turn'd ( by the heat in the earth , or in the sun ) to a glassy substance , but stronger , as being wrought by a natural heat , and not by an artificial heat , or fire ; but as glass is a rarified earth , so air is a rarified water , and smoak a rarified oyl , and oyl is a fluid sulphur , and flame is a fluid fire , and quick-silver is a fluid metal . then they asked her , whether there were natural elements , not subject to be metamorphosed ? she answered , yes . they asked , how she would prove it ? she said , she would prove there was a natural fire , by the sun , which never changes his heat , or ●●ffens his light , nor alters his natural properties of attracting , contracting , and the like ; and to prove a metamorphosed fire , is lightning , meteors , fevours , and the like ; and to prove a natural water , is the sea ; and to prove a metamorphosed water , is vapour ; and to prove a natural air , is the serene ; and to prove a metamorphosed air , is wind : and ( said she ) the difference of natural elements , and those that are called metamorphosed , is , that the natural elements cannot lose their properties , as those that are metamorphosed do , by changing from one thing to another : for say the natural elements be mixed , yet they quit not their natural properties ; as for example , mix wine , or aqua-vitae , or the like , and vvater ; and though they are mixt , yet they lose not their natural properties , as the vvater to cool , and vvine to heat ; for put a drop of wine to a pint of water , or to an ocean , and it will be so much more hotter , as the quantity of a drop can heat ; and so for a drop of water to so much wine , and it is so much colder , as the quantity of a drop can cool ; for though they mix , yet they lose not their properties , neither doth their mixture take from their pure nature . then they asked her , if a natural or metamorphosed element , might not corrupt a pure element ? she said , no , being not subject to change , more than a gross and malignant vapour can corrupt the sun : but ( said she ) natural elements can and do often-times purifie corruption , if they be not obstructed ; for though they cannot be changed , they may be obstructed ; as we see dark clouds will obstruct the natural light of the sun , and many times the natural heat ; yet they can neither quench out the one , nor put out the other : the like is the continuance of the natural elements . but perchance you will say , that you talk of an element , and i speak of a planet : i say that for example : but though the sun is a planet , yet it is an elementary fire ; and though earth may be called a planet , yet it is an elementary earth ; and for all we can know , the moon may be an elementary vvater : but howsoever , there may be a natural fire , which is an unalterable fire , which you may call the elementary fire , as the sun , and so the rest of the elements , for any thing that reason can prove against it . then they asked her , if nature did work always exactly ? she answered , no : for , nature doth seldom work so exactly , as to bring often to perfection , not the bodies of all animals , especially mankind , either in the body or mind ; much less to make them both exactly answerable , or answerably exact . as for their bodies , for the most part they are neither in proportion nor lineaments answerable to each other : for , some have well-shap'd hands , legs , and feet , and ill-shap'd bodies : others well-shap'd bodies , and ill-featured faces , and ill-shap'd legs and feet : also , some have one feature in the face excellent , and all the rest ill-favour'd . the like is the mind : for , some have good capacities and understandings to some things ; and to others , are as dull , as sensless blocks : some are witty upon some subjects , and are meer fools to others ; so some will be good-natured to some things , and bad or cruel to others , without cause . likewise , nature seldom makes a body and mind answerable ; for some have an ill-favoured body but a noble soul , and rational understanding : others , most beautiful bodies , but base souls , and depraved understandings : which shews , as if nature took so much pains and care in making the one , as she became weary before she began the other : and sometimes she seems lazy in the beginning of her work , and sometimes as if she were idle in the midst of her work , and sometimes as if she were quite tired at the finishing of her work ; as when she makes ill-favoured and weak bodies , imperfect senses , and ill or foolish minds , then she is lazy at the beginning ; and when she makes some parts exact , and some defective , then she is idle , working by halfs ; and when she makes all exact , but some little defect , then she is tired out before she hath quite made an end : but ( said she ) the most probable reason that i can give , why nature ( for the most part ) works so imperfectly , is , she hath so much work to do , as we may say , that she hath not leisure to be exact ; for the insinite matter takes up the infinite time , so as she cannot stay about the curiosity of her works ; and so we may say , that what was , or is wrought extraordinary , is rather done by chance , than intended by nature ; for it were a kind of miracle , if any thing should be so exact , as somewhat might not be mended , either in property , quality , quantity , formality , symmetry , or the like . then they asked her , if a man could have an idea of jove ? she said , she thought not : for ( said she ) if it were an image printed or fixt to the essence or soul of man , all mankind would have one and the same idea , which we find they have not : for , some have thought him a corporeal substance ; others , an incorporeal thing : which shews his idea was not created with man ; neither can we have an idea from the works of jove , because we neither know the matter he works on , nor the motions he works with , nor to what end he works for . besides , the various figures are not to be drawn , nor his subtil ways to be traced , nor to be guess'd at : we may have various thoughts ( said she ) concerning the various works of jove , but never draw his idea therefrom , or thereby . then they asked her , what was an idea ? she said , a shadow : for , as all shadows were eclipsed-lights , so all idea's were eclipsed-thoughts ; for thoughts are the light of knowledg , and knowledg is the sun of the animal world , which receives aliment from outward objects . then they asked her , why iron doth not move to iron , being more like ; than iron to a load-stone , being less like ? because ( said she ) there is a sympathy in contrarieties , and not always like unto like : for we see , those that are cold , seek heat ; and what is hot , seeks cold : so what is cold , is nourished by heat ; and what is hot , is refreshed by cold . the same sympathy hath iron to the load-stone , and the load-stone to iron . then they asked her , why in nature there are certain principles of different kinds ? because ( said she ) there is but one principal matter , from whence all principles are derived ; and the variety is only made by motion , not matter ; but the principle keeps in the matter , which is not subject to change from such principles . then they asked her opinion of the world ? she said , the world is like a clock that is woun'd up to such a time as ten , twenty , or a hundred thousand years ; and the planets , as its wheels , go their natural course , turning round . his grace the duke of newcastle's opinion , whether a cat seeth in the night , or no ? some say , cats do not see in the night , but only do hunt mice by the smell , as dogs do deer : but i dare say , if dogs were stark blind , they would hardly kill any deer , or any thing else ; and how is it possible that a cat ( by the smell ) should lay her foot so exactly upon a mouse in the dark , and at the very first time , did she not see in the dark ? we will wave unnecessary disputes , and fall to the truth , without the vexation of our readers . first , vve are to take into consideration what things ( besides fire ) shine , or give light in the darkest night : rotten vvood shines in the night , and the more if it be a little greenish and mouldy : so doth fish-bones that are a little greenish . but that which shines the most of all in the night , is a glow-worm , and especially the tail of it , which is a kind of a sea-water-green . now let us take into consideration the eyes of all cats , which being of what colour sover ( for my curiosity in this point made me observe it with care ) , i find are thus : that which we call the black of the eye , which indeed is a round hole in most animals , covered with a double glass , which they call the crystalline humour , is convex , to draw all the lines to a point , and the glass double : for a single one would make every thing in appearance to us , to go upon their heads ; and a double glass sets them all on their feet again , because the lines cut cross in the hole of the eye ; and because the line that comes from the head , cuts at the bottom of the hole ; and the lines that come from the feet , cut at the top of the hole ; so that all the species in a dark chamber , coming in at a little hole , upon a white sheet of paper , go on their heads : but put another glass over your former glass , and then all the species are set right upon their legs again , because the lines are cut again cross in the hole , which sets them up right , though the species are weakned by their double journey . and this is the reason that the crystalline humour is double in all other animals , but cats ; which have white about the black of the eye . now you must understand , that the eyes of all cats are just as i have told you of other animals , saving the round black , which in a cat is a slit downward , which she can contract and dilatate at her pleasure ; and that slit being extended to its uttermost , is a mighty circle . then you must conceive again , that the white that is about our eyes , is a sea-water-green about all cats eyes : so that in the day a cat doth stretch and extend the narrow slits of her eyes , which are dilatated to a mighty circle , hiding her sea-water green that is about them , almost all over . but in the night she contracts her eyes to a very narrow long slit , which very much enlarges the sea-water-green all about them ; which sea-water-green gives the light . and thus she lights her torches , or flamboes , in the night , and carries them along with her to see by , as one doth a candle in the hand ; and puts out her candles in the day , as having no use of them . that this is probable , remember the several greens that i told you of before , that do shine and give light in the night ; and besides , i have heard by a great many several credible witnesses , that have seen the eyes of cats shine just like candles in the dark night ; which is so often and commonly seen , that it suffers no dispute . but if you will put a cat in some dark place , and she is not pleased to light her torches , because she would not have you find her , do not rashly condemn the opinion for that ; for i do assure you , very many confirm it as no strange thing , or miraculous , and that never dream't of philosophy . if you do not like these reasons , give better , or else pardon the meanness of the subject , since the times give me leave to study the nature of all things , even from the mouse to the elephant . the second sort that were to visit her , were physicians . and after a short time , they asked her what made a good physician ? she answered , practise and observation . then they asked her , what made the difference between pain and sickness ? she said , pain was caused by cross perturbed motions ; and sickness by distempered matter , and the overflow of humours . then they asked her , whether the mind could be in pain , or be sick ? she answered , no ; but ( said she ) the mind is like the fire , it can put the body to pain , but can feel none it self : likewise , the motion is like fire ; for the more matter it hath to work on , the quicker it moves ; and when the mind is ( as it were ) empty , it grows dull , and the head is filled with nothing but smoaky vapours . then they asked her , what difference there is between the soul and the mind ? she answered , as much difference as there is betwixt flame , and the grosser part of fire : for , said she , the soul is only the pure part of the mind . then they asked her the difference ( if any was ) betwixt the soul , the mind , and the thoughts ? she answered , as the mind was the fire , the soul the flame ; so the thoughts were as the smoak that issues from the several subjects that the mind works on : and as smoak , so the several thoughts many times vanish away , and are no more remembred ; and sometimes they gather together as clouds do ; and as one cloud lies above another , so the thoughts many times lye in rows one above another , as from the first , to the second and third region . then they asked her , what was the best medicine to prolong life ? she answered , temperance and good diet. then they asked her , what diet ? as for diet , said she , to healthful bodies , meats must be well and wisely matched : but to diseased bodies , such diets must be prescribed as are proper to cure each several disease . as for the mixing and matching meats , said she , they must be after this description following : all flesh-meats are apt to breed salt rheums ; and being roast , breeds cholerick humours ; which salt rheums , and cholerick humours , causeth ( many times ) hectick fevers , enflaming the arterial blood , and vital spirits , and drinking out the radical moisture ; and salt rheums penetrating into the vital parts , cause excoriations and ulcerations . as for white meats , as milk-meats , and the like , they are apt to breed sharp humours : also , the gross parts cause many times obstructions of the noble parts ; and the sharpness is apt to corrode , especially the uretaries , guts and stomack ; producing bloody-waters from the one , and cholicks in the other . also sharp humours cause cankers , fistula's , and the like , eating through several parts of the body , making several holes , passages , or wounds , to pass through ; and obstructions cause ill digestion , ill digestion causes corruptions , corruptions cause several diseases , as feavers , small-pox , imposthumes , boils , scabs , and leprosies , if the corruption is salt or sowr . as for fish , and also all sorts of pults , they breed slime ; and slime in hot bodies causeth the stone , and gout in cold bodies ; and all sorts of white swellings , as the kings-evil , wens , and the like ; also the brains , feet , or any sinewy part of any meat , doth the like , as also sweet-meats . as for all sorts of fruits , roots , herbs , they breed thin , crude humours , which causes wind ; wind causes cholicks , cramps , and convulsions , by griping and twisting the guts , nerves , and veins ; as also , all swimming and dizzy diseases in the head ; likewise , head-akes , caused by a vapour arising from the crude and raw humours ; also , in hot bodies it causeth the sciatica , the heat over-rarifying the sharp humours , caused by fruit , makes it so subtil and searching , that it doth not only extend to the outmost parts of the body , as betwixt the skin and flesh ; but gets into the small thread-veins . as for all sweet-meats , and comfits , they are in some bodies very obstructive , and in all bodies they breed both sharp and hot rheums ; and i have heard , said she , that sugar makes the most sharp and acid vitriol . as for the matching of several meats : fish-meats do well agree with roots , herbs , and fruits , if they be stewed , roasted , boiled , baked , or the like ; otherwise the rawness hinders the concoction of the meat : but if they be drest as aforesaid , they temper the saltness , and quench out the heat which the over-nourishing strength doth produce . also , fish may be mix'd with flesh-meat , although all physicians are against it : for certainly , the natural freshness and coldness of fish , doth temper and allay the natural heat and saltness that is in flesh-meat , mixing it into a good chyle , and tempering it into a juicy-gravy , which encreases the radical moisture , and nourisheth the radical heat : also , it supplies the arteries , fills the veins , plumps the flesh , smooths the skin : whenas strong drinks mix'd with strong meats , over-heats the body , enflames the spirits , evaporates the radical moisture , burns the radical heat , scorches the arteries , drinks up the blood , sears the veins , shrinks up the nerves , dries the flesh , and shrivels the skin . white meats and pults agree best , as being of one and the same degree ( as it were ) of heat : for all strong meats curdle all sorts of milk , which causes obstructions and corruptions , and turns it sowr , being of a nature so to do ; which makes such sharpness in the blood and body , as causes tertians , quartans , quotidians , and the like diseases . pults , and all sorts of milk-meat , being of a spungy substance , digest ( as it were ) together ; when meats that are solid , mix'd with meats that are more porous and spungy , do hinder each other . small drink is best with white meat ; but when pults is eaten without milk , it may agree better with stronger liquor . roots and milk-meats agree , as being both easily dissolv'd from the first forms , into chyle . nor do fruits and pults disagree ; for the sharpness of the fruits , doth divide the clamming of the pults ; and the sliminess of the pults doth temper the sharpness of the fruits : but fruits and milk-meats are enemies , which when they meet , they do exasperate one another . so that fruits and pults , and milk and roots , do best together ; roots having no sharpness in them : but there is of all sorts of flesh , fish , milk , roots , and herbs ; some being hotter than others , and grosser ; as , the most watrish fruits are the hottest , as having most spirits in their acute juices . likewise , all roots or herbs that bite , as it were , the tongue , or are bitter to the tast , are hot , although druggists , herbalists , and physicians , are many times of the other opinion : but certainly all that is sharp , salt , or bitter , proceeds from a hot nature , and most commonly produces hot effects , having a fiery figure and motion : but because they find many things that are sharp or bitter , to qualifie feavers , or the like hot diseases , they think it is the natural temper of the drugs , herbs , roots , fruits , or the like ; but a hot cause may produce a cold effect : as for example , obstructions cause heat in the body ; but sharp things do divide and dissolve those gross and tough humours , and open obstructions . likewise , those that are salt and bitter , do purifie and cleanse the corruption in the body ; and when the cause of the disease is taken or removed away , the body becomes equally temper'd ; for as the disease doth waste , the body doth cool . thus it is the sharpness , saltness , and bitterness , that cures the disease , and not a cold nature in the simples ; for when the disease , as i said , is gone , the body is well-temper'd and cooled . then they asked her , which was the best way to make the best temperament for health . she said , that way that was best towards mediocrity , as neither to eat too gross meats , nor too watrish ; nor to drink too strong drink , nor such as was very small ; that is , neither too hot , nor too cold , either virtually , or actually . as for gross meats , they fill the body with too much melancholy humours , and the head with malignant vapours . very fine and tender meat , makes the stomack weak , by reason the substance is not sufficiently solid : for , as very gross meat over-powers the stomack , by the laborious working thereon ; so very fine and tender meat makes it lazy and weak for want of exercise . very small drinks , being very watrish , quench the natural heat ; and those that are very strong , burn it out : but , said she , meats and drinks must be wisely match'd ; and not only meats and drinks , but the nourishment , and the nourished : for , although ( in general ) hot constitutions should use cooling drinks and meats for their diets ; and cold , hot diets ; and moist , dry diets ; and dry , moist diets : yet , if the body be any ways diseased or distempered , they must order such a body according to the cause , and not to the effects of their disease : as for example , to all hydropical bodies , must not be applied drying medicines nor diets : for if the dropsie proceeds from a dry cause , dry diets or medicines are as bad as poyson ; for though the effect be watrish in such diseases , yet the cause was dry : so for heat or cold . and this example may serve for all other diseases : wherefore physicians must search out , and know the original cause , before they can cure the disease : for , those that prescribe according to the effect , may cure by chance , but kill with ignorance . then they asked her , if the spirits were always affected with the distemper of the body , or the body with the distemper of the spirits ? she answered , not always : for sometimes the spirits will be ill-affected , and the body in health : other times the body sick , and the spirits lively and well-temper'd : but ( said she ) this is to be observed , that the body may be cold , and the spirits enflamed ; and the body heated , and the spirits quenchched or stupified ; for the spirits are the thinnest and subtillest substances of the creature : now this thinnest and subtillest substance in the creature , may be enflamed , when the solid'st is be-numb'd with cold : for a cold melancholy body may have enflamed and distracted spirits . likewise , a cold diseased body may have hectick spirits : and thus both the animal and vital spirits may be hot , and the more solid parts or humours of the body cold . also , the heat of the spirits may be quenched , and the body burning-hot ; as the stomack , liver , or other parts , may be parched with heat , when both the animal and vital spirits have not a sufficient heat to give them lively motions . and it is to be observed , said she , that the animal and vital spirits , as they are the thinnest and subtilest part of a creature , so they are nourished by the thinnest substances or parts of food , which dilate to the spirits : for , though the spirits can and do work upon the solid'st parts of the body , or nourishment ; yet they only receive benefit by the thinnest . as also , the great annoyance : for it is the vapour of meats and drinks that feeds the spirits , and not the substance : for , vapour will choak , smuther , burn , or quench them out : but the vapours from liquors work more suddenly upon the spirits ( either to good effect , or bad ) , than vapours from a solid substance , by reason all liquors have a dilatating nature , which spreads it self amongst the spirits with more facility . also , the vapour of liquid bodies is more facil than the vapour of solid bodies : and , said she , some burn their stomacks with drugs , and some quench their spirits with julips ; others burn their spirits with cordials , and flat or dead the stomack with meats virtually cold : for it is to be observed , that there is a general error amongst mankind , about rules concerning health ; some practising with a belief , that drinks virtually cooling , temper hot meats ; and virtually cooling meats , hot drinks . in which they are deceived : for , though they may mix so , and temper ; yet , for the most part , it is only as water and meal makes dough ; or as earth and water makes mud ; or as sugar and water makes syrrup ; but doth not temper that virtual heat or cold that works upon the substantial or the spiritual parts ; for that which works upon the spirits , hath a more sudden operation than that which works upon the solid parts of the body ; and that from the solider parts has a flower operation : so that the stomack may be parched , and the heat of the spirits quenched , and the spirits burnt , and the stomack weak by a heavy or dull coldness . but those bodies that are in health , have not such defects as to fear such a sudden operation ; for as defects are easily inveterated , so health is not suddenly annoyed : wherefore they may temper their meat and drink by cooling and heating , yet not to a high degree ; for all extreams are naught . then they asked her , what was the reason that all creatures look fuller and fatter in summer than in winter ? she answered , the reason was , because then the blood extends to the extream parts , which swells out the flesh , and puffs out the skin ; and in the winter the blood falls back , as the sap of plants doth to the roots , which causeth the flesh and skin to look withered and dry , as branches and leaves do , sear'd , faded , wither'd , and dry . the like reason is , when men have pimples , scabs , swellings , pocks , and the like , which is the fruit of corrupted blood . then they asked her opinion of mineral waters ; what virtues and vices they have , being drunk ? she answered , that all mineral-waters were of a kind of a brine , but not so much a salt brine , as a sharp brine ( if i may call that which is sharp , brine , said she ) ; but whether it hath the effects upon the body , as brine hath upon dead flesh , as to preserve or keep it from putrefaction , i cannot say ; but certainly it drinks up the natural moisture in healthful bodies , more often than it purifies the corrupted humours in diseased bodies . the effects of sharp and salt , are oft-times alike , as a sharp pickle will preserve from putrefaction , as well as brine . but howsoever the mineral-waters have much salt in them , the effects are hot and dry , and have a corroding quality ; their corroding quality is caused by the sharpness ; and their heat , by their corroding ; and their driness , by their insipid nature : and though they are actually cold , they are virtually hot ; their virtues are only on cold and moist bodies , or diseases ; as those that have obstructions caused by raw cold flegm ; or swellings caused by cold clammy humours ; or ulcers caused by cold corrupted humours ; or rheums , or dropsies , caused by too many cold moist humours ; or the like diseases , caused by cold humours ; and in my opinion , said she , they would be excellently good for all outward ulcers , or old sores or wounds , being washed and bathed therewith , by reason they have a cleansing , drying faculty , not only inwardly taken , but outwardly applied . also , they may temper the inflamations that most commonly attend all ulcers , sores , or wounds , not only by cleansing and drying up the putrefactions , but being actually cold , especially outwardly applied : for , though they are virtually hot , being inwardly taken , and digested into the blood ; or as i may say , the mineral rubbed or wrought into the body ; yet they are actually cold , that is , cold to touch . but to return to the interior maladies : all those diseases that are produced from hot , dry , and sharp causes , are as bad as poysons . they are so : for such obstructions that proceed from hard-baked , dry humours , or dropsies caused by hot dry livers , spleens , or other parts ; or consumptions that proceed from salt sharp rheums , or hot dry lungs , livers , spleens , or the like parts : or all swellings caused by hot , dry , or sharp humours ; or interior ulcers , caused by hot , dry , or sharp humours ; or apoplexies , caused by hard crusted flegm , or dry black melancholy , or burnt dry thick blood , which stops the natural passages of the spirits ; or epilepsies , or convulsions , caused by sharp humours , which shrivel and knit up the nerves or veins , or joints of the body ; or hot winds , which work and foam , and ( as i may say ) yeest the natural humours in the body , distempering the body therewith . likewise , it is an enemy to all melancholy bodies , being full of sharp humours , like aqua-fortis , which are bred in the body ; or as a sharp green humour , which is a poisonous verdigrease bred in the body ; which humour is the cause most commonly of the disease called epilepsis , or falling-sickness ; and oft-times is the cause of convulsions : but this humour is a certain cause of the stomack-cholick , that is to say , a wind in the stomack and sides . also , they are enemies to the gout , by reason that the gout proceeds from a hot-baked , dry , salt , or sharp humour . it is a bitter or sulphureous humour , or a limy chalky humour , that causeth the gout ; and indeed , it is a calcined humour , which makes it incurable . for the stone , they may work good effects , although my reason cannot perceive , but that the minerals may contract and confirm humours into stone , as well as dissolve stone : for , thought their acuteness is penetrating , and so may dissolve ; yet their driness is contracting , uniting , combining ; and they are not only dry , by the insipidness of their nature , but by their sharpness ; for all sharpness is drying , more or less : and though sharpness is actually dissolving by corroding ; yet it is virtually drying , by heating : for corroding is the cause of heat . for whatsoever is rubb'd , or grated hard or swiftly , grows hot ; even stones , or any metal , which is the hardest matter we know ; but looser matter , as wood , will be set on fire . wherefore if wood , stone , and metal , will become actually hot , by rubbing or grating actually thereon ; well may soft flesh , especially the inward parts , that are most tender . and as it is the nature of sharpness to corrode , and the nature of corroding or rubbing , to heat : so it is the nature of heat to drink up moisture , and make all things dry . and as sharp things may cleanse ulcers , by eating the filth therein ; or may be good to take off superfluous flesh , call'd proud-flesh , in sores ; or may dissolve some hard humours , moderately taken or applied : so they may make ulcers , sores , and wounds , and contract and confirm humours , if immoderately or unnecessarily , or wrongfully applied . but , as i said , the mineral-waters may as well cause the stone in the kidneys or bladder , as dissolve it ; and may also ulcerate as soon as cleanse : but the mineral-waters do rather make a passage , and send forth gravel , by the quantity that is drunk , and passes through the uretories , which like a stream doth wash and carry all loose matter before it , and not so much by the virtue of dissolving . but to conclude , concerning mineral-waters ( said she ) ; i cannot perceive but they may breed more diseases than they cure ; and those bodies they are most proper for , must be purged and empty before they take them , lest the weight and quantity of the waters , should carry obstructions to the parts open and free , by carrying too suddenly or forcibly , or pressing or thrusting too hard . then they asked her about the nature of purging-drugs ? she said , all purging-drugs were full of spirits , which was the cause they were so active and quick in operation : for , said she , whatsoever hath most spirits , is most active ; which shews , saith she , that birds have more spirits ( which is innated matter ) than any other sort of animal-kind ; for they are always hopping and flying about ; also chirping , whistling , and singing ; which shews them not only to be more active , as having more vital or sensitive spirits ; but also more rational , as being fuller of animal spirits . but to return to drugs ( said she ) ; they seem to have more of the sensitive spirits ( vulgarly called vital spirits ) , which work upon the grossest substance , than the rational spirits ( which are vulgarly called animal spirits ) do ; with which spirits cordials seem to be full , as working upon the finer parts ; for cordials do cheer , and do revive the soul or mind , making the thoughts more cheerful and pleasing ; which alacrity doth help to abate and qualifie the disorders in the body . then they asked her , what was the best study for such as would practise physick ? she said , natural philosophy : for , said she , those can never be good physicians , that are not good natural philosophers ; and if they would study natural philosophy more than they do , there would be more frequent cures : for if they do not study nature that makes the body , they shall never know remedies to cure the body ; for those that do not understand the works of nature , cannot mend a fault , or prevent a danger to come : but they must study nature's creations , dissolutions , sympathies , antipathies , in matter , motion , and figure : but , said she , it is a difficult study , and requires a subtil , moving-brain to find out the several motions , although they be the plainest , vulgar , and grossest , much more the subtil and intricate ones . and had aristotle , said she , studied the motions in nature , or natural motions , as he did the parts of nature , or natural parts , he would have been a far more learned man than he was ; but his study was easie : for it is no great matter to conceive what the senses present ; but it is difficult to present to the senses what the brain conceives , making the senses the servants or scouts , to seek and search , by industry and experiments , and to find the truth of a rational opinion : but ( said she ) the studies of many physicians in these later times , are mixt , as partly of one science , and partly of another ; which makes them learned in neither . as , if a physician should study theology , he will neither be a subtil divine , or an eloquent preacher , nor a knowing physician ; one study confounding the other : for , though natural philosophy proves a god , yet it proves no particular religion . then they asked , what was that which was called the sensitive and rational spirits ? she said , they were the highest extracts of nature , which are the quintessence and essence of nature , and the innated parts of nature , which in the knowledg and life , are nature ; which are the soul and actions of nature . then they asked her , whether those spirits had several figures or small bodies ? and , whether they were from all eternity ? she answered , that their degrees and innated motions ; and their figurings , acuteness , and subtilties , were from all eternity . as for the rational innated parts , said she , they change and re-change into any figures or forms , having no particular figure or form inherent , but the form of that degree of matter it is of : but as it can put its self into parts , so it can unite its self ; and as it can divide and unite its self , so it can dilate and contract its self , and all by a self-motion , as moving innatedly , like quick-silver , from an united body , into numbers of parts ; and from parts , to an united body again . the sensitive innated part moves , said she , after another manner , as aqua-fortis , or the like , on metal ; for it moves , not figuring it self , but as it figures other parts of matter that hath no innateness inherent therein , but ( only as a dull lump ) lies to be moved by the moving-part , which is the innated part , as metal doth by fire or water , by cold or heat . thus this different way of moving , was from eternity , as their degree was from eternity ; for the rational innated matter , is a degree above the sensitive innated matter : and though they move not always after one manner , yet they move always after one nature . many , said they , could not conceive what those spirits were ; some imagining them little creatures . no , said she , they are not creatures , but creators , which creating-brains may easily understand ; and those that cannot conceive , have a scarcity thereof . but , said she , because the philosophy is new , therefore they do obstruct it with idle questions , ignorant objections : but ( said she ) the philosophy is good , in despight of their ignorance . i desire very much to know ( said she ) how the learned describe that which they name vital and animal spirits ? whether they think them little creatures , or no ? to which they made no answer . then they asked her , what caused sleep in animal figures ? she said , the tiredness or weariness of the sensitive innated matter , called the sensitive spirits ; which weariness causeth them to retire from the outward parts of animal figures : for , though the sensitive spirits do not desist from moving in any part , as to the consistence or dissolution of the figure ; yet all the sensitive spirits do not work one and the same way , or after the same manner ; nor the same part of innated matter , or sensitive spirits , work not always one and the same way , or after the same manner , nor in the same parts : but , as some of that innated matter , or spirits , work in several parts of a figure , on the dull part of matter , to the consistence or dissolution of the figure ; so others , and sometimes one and the same degree , work to the use , convenience , or necessity of the figure ; and those that work to the use of the figure in the several senses , although they do not desist from moving , as being against nature , being a perpetual motion ; yet they often desist from labouring ( as i may say ) : for it is a greater labour to take patterns ( as they do ) from outward objects , than to work by roat , or as they please ( which they do ) , in sleep : but it is not always their labour , as being over-pow'rd with work ; but sometimes their want of work ; as many will sleep through idleness , having no outward objects presented to them , to print or paint : other times it is their appetite to freedom and liberty from those outward labours or employments : for , though they may , and are oft-times as active when they work , as in sleep ; yet it is easier , being voluntary : for the spirits work more easie , at least more freely , when they are not taskt , than when they are like apprentices or journey-men ; and will be many times more active when they take or have liberty to play , or to follow their own appetites , than when they work ( as i said ) by constraint , and for necessity ; but many times the sensitive spirits retire , when they work , not to sleep , as being perswaded or disswaded then from either , by the rational innated matter , which is called the rational spirits in the figure ; or by the rational spirits in another figure , to desist from the outward labour , as one would perswade another to rest ; and to retire , and shut up the shop-windows and doors of the sensitive houses : for the eyes , ears , nostrils , mouth , or the pores of the skin , are but the working-houses or rooms of the sensitive spirits . to prove it : doth not our mind ( which is the rational part ) perswade the body ( which is the sensitive part , and that wherein works the sensitive matter or spirits ) to lye , to rest , or to withdraw from outward employments , because it would not be disturbed with the labour of the sensitive spirits ? for the rational , which is the mind ( said she ) , are not only the servants , to view and take notice of all the works and workings of the sensitive ; but are oftentimes , in many things , the directors , advisers , and sometimes rulers and opposers ; as when the mind forces the body to danger or trouble . but this rational part , or the rational spirits , are ( for the most part ) busily employed in figuring themselves by the sensitive prints , which is the knowledg they take of the works and workings ; being the more busie and exact , when the sensitive spirits work outward works . i will not say , they move always after the sensitive prints , which is to view them ; for sometimes they move after their own inventions : for many times the mind views not what the body doth ; and many times they move partly after their own invention , and partly after the sensitive prints . but when the sensitive spirits do retire , or when the rational spirits perswade them to retire , then the rational spirits move after their own appetites or inventions , which are conceptions , imaginations , opinions , fancies , or the like : but ( said she ) it is to be taken notice , that as the rational spirits , for the most part , move after the sensitive prints , which is , to put their own matter into such figures as the sensitive spirits print upon the dull and unmoving parts of matter : so many times the sensitive spirits do print or engrave those conceptions , imaginations , fancies , or the like , upon the dull part of matter , as patterns of the rational figures : for , as i said , the rational spirits do cast , work , or move their own part of matter , into figures ; and the sensitive spirits do figure and print upon other parts of matter , as that which is called the dull and unmoving part : but when the rational matter perswades , or causes the sensitive matter to work and print from their figurings ; or that the sensitive spirits do it of their own free choice , they work ( for the most part ) irregularly ; i will not say , always ; for when the rational spirits move to invention , the sensitive spirits work those inventions regularly , if not at first , yet with a little practice ; but when the rational spirits move to any passion , especially violent passions , the sensitive spirits are apt to work irregularly , and to discompose the animal figure with irregularities ; for oft-times , not only the irregular motions of the rational spirits , but the violence of their motions , although regular , doth disorder the sensitive spirits , causing them to work irregularly ; but violence is not always irregular or perturbed : also , the regularity of the sensitive spirits , will cause a disorder amongst the rational spirits ; as we shall see the mind will distemper the body , as the body will disorder the mind ; but where the rational innated matter , or spirits , move so irregularly , as to make unusual imaginations , or imaginary fears , and other conceptions and passions , which are irregular ; as much as violence causeth the sensitive spirits also to work both irregularly and violently ; whereby they print strange figures in the animal senses , as we may prove by those that are affrighted , or have imaginary fears , who see strange and unusual objects , which men call devils , hobgoblins , spirits , and the like ; and without question , they do see such things as are strange and unusual to them ; for such strange and unusual figures , are printed by the irregularity of the sensitive spirits , upon the optick nerve . and so for hearing , scent , touch , and the like : for , when men have such imaginary fears , they will say , they saw strange things , and that they heard strange noises , and smelt strange scents , and that they were pinched and beaten black and blew , and that they were carried out of their way , and cast into ditches , or the like ; and it is not to be doubted , but that they did see such sights , hear such sounds , smell such scents , and feel such pains ; for many times the black-and-blew marks will be seen in the flesh , and the flesh will be sore ; and how should it be otherwise , when the sensitive innated matter , or spirits , by moving in such motions , work in each sense those objects , sounds , scents , touches , and the like ? and i see no reason , but the whole body may be carried violently from place to place by the strength of the sensitive spirits : for certainly , the innated matter , in every animal figure , doth not commonly use its full strength : for , the body will be more actually strong at some times , than at other times ; and upon some occasion , more than when they have no occasion to use strength : for , though the several degrees of innated matter cannot work beyond the strength of their degree , yet they can work in their strength , and not always work to their full power ; and as we may observe , the power of strength is seldom used in animal figures ; but certainly it is amongst the sensitive and rational spirits , in every animal creature , as it is with the governours or citizens of every kingdom ; they know not their own power and strength , until they be put to it : for , every particular part , knoweth not the strength of the whole , until they join together as one part. this is the reason , man , or any other creature , is ignorant , not only each of other , but of themselves : for , how is it possible , man should know himself , since nature cannot know her self , being divided into several parts and degrees ? but to return to the strength of the united-spirits of mankind ; which united-spirits , working irregularly , carry the body forcibly into unnecessary or dangerous places : for , the violence and irregularity , doth disorder the rational spirits ( if they were not disordered before ) so much , that they cannot direct prudently , nor order methodically , not advise subtilly ; but are all , as i may say , in a hurly-burly : for the rational spirits , making imaginary fears , do as those that begin an uproar : so the rational spirits are not only afraid of the tumult amongst the sensitive spirits , but are discomposed and hurried about themselves ; and their society , which is their own matter , is dispersed abroad ; that is , dis-united and disordered in their regular motions : so as the rational innated matter , or spirits , although they were the first cause of the extravagant commotions amongst the sensitive spirits , yet they are discomposed therewith , by reflexion , their own disorders returning in double lines of strength from the sensitive body . then they asked her , why the animal figure did not always dream in sleep , since the sensitive and rational spirits , or innated matter , did never desist from moving . she said , that although the innated matter did never desist from moving , yet they did not always figure or print , for they dissolve as well as create . besides , said she , they may work to the preservation or consistence of the figure , and of every particular sense , and yet not always make use of the senses . besides , said she , the rational matter doth not always figure it self by the sensitive print ; and for proof , many times those that are in a serious discourse , studious contemplations , or violent passions , will take no notice of the sensitive motions : for , in a violent passion , many will receive a deadly wound , and never take notice of the touch ; and , many times , those in serious discourse receive a pinch on their arm , or finger , or any other part , and yet they at that time never take knowledg thereof ; and yet when their violent passion or discourse is ended , then their rational knowledg takes notice that their finger , arm , or other parts , ake ; or their wounds smart ; which shews the sense of touch was sometimes in their finger , or in that part wounded , before the rational knowledg took notice of it . so in a deep contemplation , when they view objects , hear sounds , smell scents , tast and touch , the rational knowledg takes no notice of it , because the rational spirits move not to the sensitive works ; so that only the eye sees , or the ear hears , or the nose smells , or the tongue tasts , or any particular part feels , but the rational takes no notice thereof : so that these are but particular knowledges in every particular sense , or part of the figure , and not a general knowledg : for the sensitive knowledg , which are the sensitive spirits , are bound to parts ; but the rational knowledg , which are the rational spirits , is free to all , as being free to it self , the other bound to the dull part of matter . but to return to dreams ; how shall we remember figurative dreams , since memory is not made by the rational motions ? for , though the sensitive innated matter might print such figures ; yet the rational innated matter hath not figured those prints ; and then we say , we did not dream . then they asked , why some animal creatures were almost dissolved for want of sleep ? she said , want of sleep was caused by distemper ; which distemper was a disorder and irregularity amongst the innated matter , sometimes from the sensitive spirits , sometimes from the rational spirits , and sometimes from both . the irregularity of the sensitive spirits , was , when the body was pained , or sick , or over-power'd : the irregularity amongst the rational was , when the mind was troubled : these disorders hinder the sensitive spirits from shutting up shop orderly ; and when they sleep by halves , or unsoundly , those irregularities cause their windows and doors ( which are the senses ) to open and shut unnecessarily and untimely , as i may say ; and , many times , lack of sleep is caused , when the spirits are so tired , that they cannot use a sufficient force to shut up shop , at least , not to lock or barr the windows and doors close . sometimes the sensitive spirits are so earnest and ( as i may say ) greedy in working , that they labour both night and day , either for curiosity , or encrease , or pleasure : but , most commonly , the rational spirits join or go halves with the sensitive spirits , when they work for curiosity or pleasure , because they make a delight thereby . then they asked her , what was the reason that some sorts of cordials or drugs caused sleep ? she said , that that part of innated matter that was taken in cordials , or such drugs , did either help the innated matter in the animal body or figure ( by adding strength to them ) , to shut up their shops and windows ; or else helped to rectifie their disorders and irregularities . but ( said she ) as some drugs or cordials do sympathize to the irregular part of innated matter in the figure ; so other drugs and cordials do work antipathetically to their regularity , and sympathetically to their irregularities ; and then the working to sleep is more hindred then helped . then they asked her , whether one kind of motion could give a perfect form at one instant ? she said , no , unless the creature formed be without the varieties of parts ; for every different part requires a different motion to the creating of each part , and a distance of time to form each part in ; for some parts require more work and labour than others . then they asked her , if all creatures were created by degrees ? she said , all creatures that were composed of various parts , are : for , as there are degrees of innated matter , which innated matter is the creator of all figures ; so there are degrees of , and in creation : for our senses ( said she ) shew us , that there is a season , a time , and a working in time , by degrees : and if we allow there be degrees of encreasing , as strengthning and enlarging , why should we think there are none in creating every particular figure , and different parts in one and the same creature ? for as we see , seed must be first sown , and then remain in the earth for some time , before those seeds sprout up and encrease ; so there is time and degrees in forming of the formed : for if there be degrees that we call time , why not in the working of each part of each figure in time ? for in reason we cannot think , that the root , the blade , the stalk , the ears , the seed in the ears of corn , are produced from one motion , made by the seed sown , and the earth , and so each different part to be created at one instant , into one created from or figure . and as in vegetables , so questionless in animals , there are degrees in their creations : for it is against reason and sense , to think an animal is formed at one instant , although the figure at first created , was no bigger than a hair , if the figure hath variety of parts , which require not only various motions , but degrees of motions , and distance of time to move in . and thus as vegetable require degrees and distance of time to create one figure ; so in animals there is not only space in time , and degrees of motions , and several mixtures of temperaments , to enlarge and strengthen that figure ; but degrees in creating every particular part in one and the same figure , which is not formed at once : for common sense ( said she ) shews us , that there is nothing done but by degrees ; and whosoever thinks otherwise , their thoughts move irregularly , and against sense and reason : for nature works by degrees , and in order , and orders her works by degrees . then they asked her , whether a creature might not be created by the effects of motion , without partaking of the substance of the parents . she said , no : for , said she , the earth , and the seed sown ( which are the parents that produce an off-spring ) , cannot produce any thing of its own nature , unless some part of the producers goeth to the creating of the produced : for it is not only such a motion made between the producers , that creates the produced ; but part of their innated matter ( which are the sensitive and rational spirits ) , which goeth to the forming and creating of the produced : for that innated matter or spirits that goeth from the producers , meeting and intermixing together , creates or lays the foundation of the produced , on which other innated matter or spirits ( brought by the way of nourishment ) do build : so that the foundation of every creature , is of the creator . but , said she , one and the same matter doth not move always after one and the same manner ; for it is not meerly such a motion , but such kind of motions , that create ; and the variousness of the motions , or creators , although of one and the same matter , causeth a difference in the created , in semblances , constitutions , humours , dispositions , qualities , faculties , and the like : for , though the producers be the same , and not only the produced of the same kind , but of the same natures , as coming from such producers ; yet the produced are not always alike , but some vary more than others , not only the produced , but those produced from their producers . but , said she , to shew that the produced partake of the producers , of each party , more or less , not only in effects , but in substance , is , that such a creature or creatures could not be created , but by the same creators ; otherwise the same motions , made by such a kind of matter , would produce the same creature : which cannot be ; for the same kind or degree of innated matter which creates , hath the same kind of motions in general ; but every particular part is of it self : for that which is of one part , is not of another part , although it be of one and the same kind , and hath one and the same property . but the rational spirits ( said she ) go to the creation of the mind or soul , the sensitive to the body . but , said she , opinion creates one way , and nature another way ; which opinions , except there be sense and reason in them , are the false conceptions in nature . but the learned students study so much the parts , that they never consider the parties that work therein . the authoress of these opinions of the rational and sensitive spirits , says , she brings sense and reason to dispute for their truth , which no other opinions do ; and they that will not believe sense and reason , will believe nothing ; but express , by their incredulity , that they have but a small quantity of that innated matter in their brains . whatsoever treats of innated matter , as the sensitive and rational spirits , is to be compared to my philosophical opinions . then they asked her , whether she thought there could be repetitions in nature ? she said , yes : for , said she , if anything in nature cannot be so dissolved , as to be annihilated , it may be repeated . for if the same matter and same motions are in being , the same figures may be repeated ; and if there can be in creations , said she , a repetition , it is probable there are repetitions of one and the same creature ; only the time , and changes of time , makes a difference and obscurity ; in which obscurity the creature is ignorant of it self , and its former being ; whereby one and the same creature may come to envy his own renown , which was kept alive by records from age to age ; as if homer should be created again , and envy his own works , or at least strive to out-work them ; or that alexander and caesar should be created again , and should envy their own actions , victories , and powers , or ( at least ) grieve and repine they cannot do the like : for if they were created again , they might miss of the same occasions , opportunities or powers , birth or fortunes : for though the body and soul may be the same , as also the appetites and the desires ; yet the outward concurrence may not be the same that was in the former being ; for though the concurrents ( as well as the creature ) may be repeated , yet perchance not repeated in one and the same age or time : but if they should fall out to be repeated in one age , the same actions would fall out to be as caesar's or alexander's were , to conquer the world again , as they did before ; and there would be the same warr betwixt the grecians and trojans , if the same occasions were ; but homer would not write the same poems , if they were on record : for , though it be an honour to conquer what was conquered ( although after the same manner ) ; yet it is no honour to wit to write what was writ before upon the same subject , nor indeed upon any other subject : for , both the wit and the subject must be new ; at least the wit , to gain as great and lasting renown . then they asked her , what fire was ? she said , that fire was not only the quickest motion , but it is a perpetual quick motion , that hath no intermission , by which it hath a strange power over every thing ; so that it hath a stronger power by the continuance , than by the quickness . the third sort that visited her , were moral philosophers . the moral philosophers asked her , if it were possible to alter or abate the passions ? no , said she ; you may pacifie or imprison them , and enforce them to conceal themselves in the heart , not only from outward appearance , but from the very understanding in the head ; but never alter or change their natures , to weaken their natural strength , or abate their natural vigour : for passions ( said she ) are like the sun ; they may be eclipsed , or clouded , but never can be alter'd : and as the sun ( saith she ) draws forth vapour from the earth ; so do the imaginations draw forth passions from the heart ; and as a bucket draws up water from the bottom of a well , so do outward objects draw up passions from the heart . then they asked , what was the difference betwixt the passions and the appetites ? she said , the appetites were the passions of the body ; and the passions , the appetites of the mind ; and the mind is as apt to surfeit of the one , as the body of the other . likewise , saith she , the mind is as seldom pleased , as the body is seldom at ease ; being both restless , and never satisfied : for the height of sensitive pleasure , is the beginning of pain ; and the height of passion , is the beginning of desire ; and desire hath no period , no pleasure , no center . then they asked her , what sort of love was the perfectest ? she said , that love that descended : for love that descends , is more solid than that which ascends ; and draws more towards perfection , as being most contracted : for that which ascends , is airy , and disperses soon , like smoak : but that which descends , is like falling showers of rain , that join into a river or sea of love , running with force to perfection . this is the reason parents love their children better than children can love their parents . this is the reason nature loves her creatures better than the creatures can love nature . this is the reason , the gods love mankind better , and more perfectly , than mankind loves the gods. thus the perfectest love is from the gods to men ; for the greater the descent is , the more force there is . the like ( said she ) is hate : for , that hate which descends , is more inveterate and malignant than that which ascends ; for we are easily perswaded to pardon the injuries or wrongs we receive from our superiors ; but seldom are pacified , without a high revenge , for the wrongs we have received from inferiors ; i mean , not only the inferiors of birth , or fortunes , but merit . this is the reason noah could not forgive his son cham for the disgrace which he received ; for no hate is like to that of dishonour . this is the reason that heaven hates hell more than hell can hate heaven . then they asked her , why the passions forced the body to weep , to sigh , to groan , to laugh , to sing , to complain , to rail , to curse , to commend , to extoll , to implore , to profess , to protest , to look pale , to look red , to shake , to tremble , to strike , to embrace ? she said , that the causes , in the mind , did work their effects upon the bodies , as the causes , in jove , did work their effects upon nature . or , in a lower comparison , said she , the mind is as the sun , and the body like the earth ; the sun having several faculties , as the mind several passions ; it gives life and light , strength and growth ; it comforts and warms , it weakens , corrupts , withers , and decays ; it burns and destroys , it dilatates and contracts ; it doth digest and expel ; it sucks , it draws , and confirms : so doth the mind ; it gives the light of knowledg , and the life of understanding ; it comforteth and warmeth by invention ; it strengthens by judicious advice ; it encreases by temperance ; it weakens , withers and decayes by unsatiable intemperance ; it drys and parches it by grief ; inflames it by anger ; burns it by rage ; confirms it by melancholy ; destroys it by desperate fury , as self-murther . likewise , as the sun doth not only contract and dilatate it self , but contracts and dilatates the several creatures on and in the earth ; the same doth the mind the several parts of the body ; it dilatates the body into several actions , postures , and behaviours ; to strike , to kick , to stretch out the body , to spread out the arms , to fling out the legs ; to stare , to call , or cry out ; to hoop , to hollow ; and it will contract the body into a silent musing , close the lips , shut up the eyes , fold in the arms , bow or bend in the legs , and ( as it were ) wind up the body by fear , grief , anger , melancholy , joy , wonder , admiration , and the like : and as the sun doth suck and draw from the earth , and dissolve and expel the creatures therein ; so do the passions , the humours of the body : for , as some sun-beams suck moisture from the several springs that rise in the earth ; so divers passions suck out moisture from the several veins that run in the body ; or as such beams which pierce the earth , make the face thereof wither and pale ; so will some sorts of passions : and as some other sorts of sunny-beams ( for all work not the like effect ) draw sulphureous vapours from the bowels of the earth , towards the middle-region , which flash out in lightning ; so do the passions draw from the heart a flushing-colour to the face , which flushes in hot blushes . and as the sun-beams draw salt vapours from the sea , which fall in pouring showers ; so do the passions draw salt vapours from the bowels , which fall in trickling tears : for the passions are the beams of the mind , and have as great an influence and power over the body , as the sun-beams have upon the earth ; and as the sun 's bright rays cause the elements to appear clear and light ; so doth the mind's tranquility cause the countenance to look cheerful and fair . then they asked her of the four cardinal virtues ? she said , that prudence and temperance were two virtues , which belonged more to the wise , than the heroick men : for prudence barrs generosity and magnanimity ; and doth not only forewarn dangers , but restrains from dangerous actions : when heroick honour is got in danger , more than safety ; and courage is made known thereby : likewise , temperance forbids magnificence ; but fortitude and justice belongs most to heroick men. then they asked her , if she thought beasts had a rational soul ? she answered , that if there could be no sense without some reason , nor reason without the sense , beasts were as rational as men ; unless , said she , reason be a particular gift , either from nature , or the god of nature , to man , and not to other creatures : if so , said she , nature , or the god of nature , would prove partial or finite . as for nature in her self , she seems unconfined ; and for the god of nature , he can have no biass , he ruling every thing by the straight line of justice ; and what justice , nay what injustice would it not be , for mankind to be supream over all other animal-kind ; or some animal-kind over any other kind ? then they asked her , why no creature was so shiftless at his birth , as man ? she answered , there were other creatures as shiftless as man ; as for example , birds are as shiftless before their wings are fledged . for , as infants want strength in arms to feed themselves , and legs to go ; so birds want strength of bills to feed themselves , and feathers in wings to flye . then they asked her , whether she thought there were a heaven and a hell ? she answered , that in nature there was a hell and a heaven , a god and a devil , good angels and bad , salvation and damnation ; for , said she , pain and trouble is a hell , the one to torment the body , the other the mind . likewise , said she , health and pleasure is a heaven , which gives the body rest , and the mind tranquility ; also , said she , the natural god is truth ; the natural devil , falshood ; the one seeks to save , the other to deceive ; the good angels are peace and plenty ; the evil are warrs , and famine ; light is the beatifical vision , darkness the natural dungeon , death is the damnation , life the salvation ; and moral virtue is the natural religion , and moral philosophers are nature's priests , which preach , and seem to practise a good life . then they asked , what government for a commonwealth was best ? she answered , monarchical . for , as one sun is sufficient to give light and heat to all the several creatures in the world ; so one governour is sufficient to give laws and rules to the several members of a commonwealth . besides , said she , no good government can be without union ; and union is in singularity , not in plurality ; for union is drawn to a point , when numbers make division , extraction , substraction ; which often-times brings distraction ; and distraction , confusions . then they asked her , whether she was of that opinion , that those that had good understandings , had weak imaginations ? she said , she was not of that opinion ; for , said she , from the pureness and cleerness of the understanding , proceeds the subtilty and the variety of their imaginations ; and the understanding is the foundation of imagination : for , as faith is built upon reason , so is imagination upon understanding . then they asked her , if the faculties of the mind or soul had their uses , or proceeded from the temper of the brain and heart ? she answered , that the uses and faculties of the mind , proceeded from the motions of the vital and animal spirits , which i call ( said she ) the sensitive and rational spirits , which is the life and soul ; and from the regular motions , and full quantity thereof , proceeds a perfect memory , a clear understanding , and a sound judgment : from the quick motions proceed a ready wit ; and from the various and regular motions , proceed probable imaginations or opinions : from the scarcity , proceeds dulness and stupidity , or insensibility ; from the irregularity , proceeds extravagancies or madness ; and where the scarcity and irregularity meets , it produceth a stupid , dull madness . the fourth sort that visited her , were scholars , that studied theology ; and they asked her , whether she was of opinion that man hath free will ? she answered , that she was not so proud , nor so presumptuous , as to think that man had free-will : for , said she , if jove had given men free-will , he had given the use of one of his attributes to man , as free power ; which , said she , jove cannot do ; for that were to lessen himself , to let any creature have free power to do what he will : for , free-will is an absolute power , although of the narrowest limits ; and to have an absolute power , is to be a god ; and to think man had it only , and no other creature , were to think jove partial ; but , said she , man's ambition hath bred this , and the like opinions . but , said they , jove might permit man , or suffer man to do some things . she said , that was as ill , or a worse opinion : for , to think jove permits man to cross his will , and let him do that which he would not have him do , were to make jove less than a god , as if his decrees were to be alter'd by man's humour and will ; or , said she , to think that jove requires of man such things as his nature suffers him not to do ; and so , as it were , to force him to disobey him : or to think jove suffers man to do evil , when he could prevent it ; or to think jove permits man to provoke his justice , or to damn man , when it is in jove's power to save him , were to think jove unjust and cruel ; or to think jove made man , yet knew he would be damned ; and might have saved him , in not making him ; were make a malignity in the nature of jove : for to make , and take delight to punish , is to be malicious ; which cannot be , said she ; for jove is a god in goodness , as well as a god in power ; and a god in justice , as well as a god of wisdom : for justice and knowledg is the basis of wisdom ; but , said she , the opinions men have of jove , are according to their own natures , and not according to the nature of jove , which makes such various religions , and such rigorous judgment in every religion , as to condemn all but their own opinion ; which opinions are so many and different , as scarce any two agree ; and every opinion judges all damned but their own : and most opinions are , that the smallest fault is able to damn ; but the most vertuous life , and innocent thoughts , not sufficient to save them . then they asked her , if she did believe predestination ? she said , she believed that jove did order all things by his wisdom ; and that his wisdom knew how to dispose to the best ; as also , that jove's will was the only fixt decree ; and that his power establishes all that his will decrees . then they asked her , what she thought jove required from man ? she answered , she thought jove required nothing from man , but what he required from nature ; as love , praises , admiration , adoration , and worship ; to love his goodness , praise his justice , admire his wisdom , adore his power , and to worship all his attributes ; and jove ( said she ) requires not only this in man , but of all the creatures in nature ; for , said she , it were a sinful opinion to think none but man did love , praise , admire , adore , and worship jove . then they asked her , if there were no evil ? she said , there was ; but , said she , all evil lives in nature , as all good in jove ; for in nature , said she , is discord , in jove concord ; by nature confusion , by jove method : and though , said she , jove's goodness and power will not suffer nature to run into a confusion ; yet nature , faith she , struggles and strives , like an untoward jade that would break loose to run wildly about ; and her skittish tricks , said she , are the sins against jove ; but ( said she ) all things in nature are guilty , as much as man , in one kind or other . then they asked her , what were the sins in nature against jove ? she said , many : but the greatest sins the creatures in nature commit against jove , are , not to believe he is above nature ; or to think it is the nature of nature , and not the knowledg and power of jove , that governs so wisely , that orders so prudently , that produceth so orderly , that composes so harmoniously ; and all with a free will , a pure goodness , and infinite bounty : likewise , as not to believe that jove hath an infinite generosity to forgive and pardon all the evils and defects in nature : also , to dislike or murmur at the government of jove . and the submission in nature , is , to repent , to be humble , to agree , to be content , and to think all that cannot be avoided , is for the best : and as nature is apt ( said she ) to commit sins against jove , so nature is apt to disorder , cross , and vex it self , by excess , mischief , and cruelty ; as , to strive to destroy to no use , to obstruct to no purpose , to hinder the creations , to displace creations , to oppose right , to defend falshood , to conceal truth , to obstruct knowledg , to delude ignorance , to wrong innocency , to hurt the helpless , to destroy the hurtless : likewise , to overcharge the appetite , to exasperate the passions , to deceive the affections to abuse time , to be unnecessarily busie , or lazy , or idle . and thus all the creatures of every kind , that are made in nature , do , in one manner or other : but the goodness and power of jove ( said she ) doth still hinder nature from running into confusions , and rectifies the disorders therein : for warr lives in nature , said she , and peace in jove . then they asked her , what natural evils there were ? she said , nature was an infinite lump of evil ; but the natural evils to animals ( said she ) are , pain , sickness , sorrow , fear , famine , warrs , darkness , and infamy . then they asked her , if there were no natural good ? she said , none in nature : for all that is good , said she , is caused by jove's wise ordering and composing harmoniously : for , said she , health is an harmonious composition ; pleasure and delight is an harmonious composition ; rest , an harmonious composition ; peace , an harmonious unity : as for life , said she , it is an evil , were it not ordered wisely by jove ; and would be a perpetual torment , did not jove by his wisdom order nature so , as to ease it with that we call death ; which is only as a change of notes in musick , or harmonious measures : and the several measures life danceth , are several transmigrations , which jove orders as it moves ; and the notes are the several creatures that are made , which jove's wisdom sets ; and health is the cords that jove's wisdom tunes ; and the several pleasures are the several lessons that jove's wisdom causeth nature to play ; and peace is the harmony that jove's wisdom makes . so that all that is thought good in nature , is but good as it is ordered by jove ; jove measures the matter , marks out the figures , and appoints the motions what work to do . likewise , jove's goodness and wisdom qualifies and tempers , by several mixtures and temperaments , the vicious malignant evil of nature , or natural evil. thus , said she , there would be a perpetual warr in nature , if jove's wisdom , power , and goodness , did not order nature . then they asked her , if there were not punishments and rewards ordained by jove ? she answered , yes : for , said she , jove hath ordained , virtue shall be a reward to it self , and vice a punishment . the fifth sort that visited her , were the fathers of the church ; who desired her to speak : which she did as follows : you holy fathers ( said she ) , you will pardon me for what i shall speak , since it is your desire i should speak . the preachers for heaven , said she , ought not to preach factions , nor to shew their learning , nor to express their wit ; but to teach their flock to pray rightly : for hard it is to know , whether we pray , or prate ; since none can tell the purity of their own heart , or number the follies thereof , or cleanse out the muddy passions that by nature are bred therein , or root out the vices the world has sown thereon : for , if we do not leave out the world , the flesh , and the devil , in our humble petitions , and earnest desires , we offer to heaven , it may be said , we rather talk than pray : for , it is not bended knees , or a sad countenance , can make our prayers authentical or effectual ; nor words , nor groans , nor sighs , nor tears , that can pierce heaven ; but a zealous flame , raised from a holy fire , kindled by a spark of grace in a devout heart , which fills the soul with admiration and astonishment at jove's incomprehensible deity : for , nothing can enter heaven , but purity and truth ; all the gross and drossie parts fall back with greater force upon our lives , and , instead of blessings , prove curses to us ; and the ignorant , not conceiving the difference , may be lost for want of instruction therein , being most commonly taught the varieties of opinions , the sayings and sentences of the fathers of the church ; or exclaimed against natural imperfections , or threatned for slight vanities ; and many , by giving warning against vices , raises those that have been dead and buried with former ages , unaccustomed , and utterly unknown to the present auditory . but one good prayer that is directly sent to heaven , buries a multitude of errors and imperfections , and blots out many a sin. i speak not this to tax any one here ; for i believe you are all holy men , and reverend and grave fathers of the church , who are blessed messengers and eloquent orators for heaven , the true guides to souls , and the example of a good life . then they asked , how they ought to pray ? whereupon , in a zealous passion , thus she said : o gods ! o gods ! mankind is much too blame ; he commits faults when be but names his name : this name , saith she , that deity hath none ; his works sussicient are to make him known . his wondrous glory is so great , how dare man similize , but to himself compare ? or , how durst men their tongues or lips to move in argument , his mighty power to prove ? as if men's words his power could circle in , or trace his ways , from whence he did begin his mighty works to make , or to what end ; as proudly placing man to be his friend : yet poor , proud , ign'rant man , knows not the cause of any creature made , much less his laws : man's knowledg so obscure , not so much light as to perceive the glimmering of his might . strive not this deity to comprehend ; he no beginning had , nor can have end : nor can mankind his will or pleasure know , it strives to draw him to expression low . let words desist , let 's strive our souls to raise : let our astonishments be glory's praise : let trembling thoughts of fear , as prayers , be sent ; and not leight words , which are by men invent : let tongues be silent , adoration pray : and love and justice lead us the right way . the sixth sort that visited her , were judges ; who asked her about justice . i will divide justice , said she , into three parts , human , moral , and natural . these three into six : punishing , deciding , distributing ; censuring , trafficking , and suffering . in punishing justice , there is divine piety , and human pity ; and if a judg leave out those two , it is no more justice , but cruelty : for , temporal judges ought to have as great a care of the soul of the accused , as of executing justice on the body . for if a judg threaten terribly a timorous nature , or cruelly torture a tender body ; the fear of pain may make them be lye , forswear , or falsly accuse themselves ; which endangers the soul , not only by their oaths , lyes , and false accusations , but by self-murther : for those that falsly accuse themselves , commit wilful-murther . as for the punishing of the body , they ought not to be condemned before they can positively prove them criminals : for probabilities , although they appear plain , yet are often-times deceitful . the second is , dividual justice , or common justice , in deciding of causes , and what is right and truth : as , put the case two men claim equal right to one piece of ground , which piece of ground but one can have right to : the judg , not knowing how to distinguish the truth from the falshood , divides the ground , giving one half to the one , and the other half to the other ; which is unjust : for he that hath right to all , hath as much injustice done unto him in that part that is given from him , as if he had lost all the whole : nay , one grain of dust wrongfully taken , or given away , makes the injustice the same ; for it is not the weight of the cause makes justice more or less , but the truth of the cause . but judges will say , it is not to be helped , by reason truth lyes many times so obscure , that neither industry , ingenuity , subtilty , long experience , nor solid judgment , can find it out . so they think , that by dividing they do cut off some branches of injustice , although the root will lye obscurely , do what they can . but i say , injustice hath no branches , but is all root . the last act of justice , is , in distributing reward according to worth or merit ; wherein there may be as much injustice to deal beyond or above worth or merit , as to fall short of worth and merit : and though the actions are the visible objects of merit ; yet merit is often-times buried for want of opportunity ; and many times good fortune is mistaken , and taken for merit . now it is as great injustice to give rewards to fortune , as unfortunate for merit not to be made known by some act : for , though merit dwells in the actions , yet it was born in the soul , and bred in the thoughts . the fourth is , censuring-justice , which lives meerly in opinion : for , who knows the heart of another , since no man can give a true or a right account of his own ? and though misdemeanors ought to be punished in a commonwealth , lest they should cause the ruin thereof ; yet , to judg the heart , and condemn it for faults , by the actions , words , or countenance , were very unjust : for many evil actions are done through a good intention ; for the design might be honest , though the effect prove evil ; nay , the design or intention may not only be morally honest , but divinely pious , yet the effect prove wicked . likewise , many evil actions are produced by chance or misfortune ; and it were an injustice to accuse the heart of dishonesty for fortune's malice , and chance's carelesness . again , there are many evil actions produced from some infirmity of nature , or from the ignorance of practice , or want of experience ; not from a dishonest nature ; and though infirmities ought to be corrected by admonitions , and ignorance rectified by instruction ; yet it were an injustice to condemn honesty for infirmities , faults , or ignorant errors . also for words ; although there is an old saying , the mouth speaketh what the heart thinketh ; yet antiquity cannot verifie it for a truth : but , most commonly , the tongue runs by rote and custom , without the consent of the heart , or knowledg of the thoughts : for , the tongue doth oft-times like the legs , which most commonly walk without the guidance of the sight , or the directions of the knowledg ; for few measure each stride , or count or look at every several step they take , nor think they how they go , nor ( many times ) where they go ; and the mind , many times , is so deep in contemplations , that the thoughts are so fix'd upon some particular object , or so busily employed on some invention , or so delightfully taken with some fantasm , that although the legs walk themselves weary , yet the mind and thoughts do not consider or think whether the body hath legs or no. how many , through extream fear , run into that they should shun , not considering whither they go ? and if the legs move so often without the mind's knowledg , or heart's consent , well may the tongue , which is the agilest member of the body . and to judg by the countenance , were more unjust : for , a man may have a knavish face , and an honest heart ; a spightful eye , yet a generous nature ; a frowning brow , yet a quiet spirit ; a dull cloudy countenance , but a bright clear mind . the fifth is , a chaffering or trafficking justice : for , though it is justice for a man to buy and to fell in a commonwealth , where all is not in common ; yet there may be great injustice in buying and selling . as for example : a man hath a horse which he esteems , and hath a love or ( as it were ) an affection to ; which horse he is forced to sell , either for want , or otherwise ; for which he asks a price according to his affection , not according as he is really worth : now this man doth not cozen nor cheat , because he prizes him as he thinks he is worth ; yet he is unjust through his partiality , not judging the horse uprightly , nor weighing the scales of justice evenly , between his affection , and the horse's worth . the sixth , suffering . as for buying , it comes into self-justice : for example ; a man through perswasion buys a house , which house is no way convenient for him ; or stands unhealthy , being in an ill air ; or unpleasantly , as in a dirty place ; or in some place where many travellers pass , which puts the dweller to great charges through entertainments . now this man is unjust to himself through his facil nature , or courteous or kind disposition , in buying such a house as will impair his health or estate , or necessitate him through incommodiousness . or for a man to keep a servant that is no way ingenious or useful in his offices ; the master may be said to be a bountiful or charitable man to his servant , but unjust to himself , to be ill served when he may be better served . likewise , for to be bound or engaged for a man unto whom he is no ways obliged , or hopes to be so , is an injustice to himself , but to hazzard , if he doth never suffer imprisonment for the engagment , not being able to make a satisfaction for which he gives up his liberty ; this injustice is caused by a foolish pity . also , although it is justice for a man to adventure , offer , or lay down his life for one that he knows by good proofs would do the like for him ; yet for a man to offer or give up his life for a man condemned , or otherwise , from whom he never received such favours as to deserve or merit his life , or had proof of his friendship ; although this person was never so worthy , i say , it were a heroick act , and a huge generosity , but a great injustice to himself , unless he had self-ends , in thinking he should get a fame thereby : for , though there is a human justice , as well as a grateful justice , for mankind to help and assist each other ; yet surely it is justice for a man to love himself best , next to his creator , producer , preserver , and protector ; as his god , his parents , his countrey , and his friend ; and he ought to offer up his goods , life , liberty , and fame , to him from whom he received them ; for it is an injustice not to return ( if need require ) as much as he received . thus it is justice to prefer a man's own fortunes , life , and fame , before all others but those before-mentioned ; and an injustice if he do otherwise . thus , noble hearers , said she , you may observe and take notice , that although all dishonesty is injustice , yet all injustice is not dishonest , because the intent is not evil . likewise , although justice is honest , yet honesty is not always just ; by reason , many times , the knowledg is not perfect , or the understanding clear , or the truth visible , or the will free , or the power strong enough to do justice , or justly . the seventh sort that visited her , were barresters and orators ; to whom she thus spake . the root of oratory is logick , the branches are rhetorick , and the fruit is magick , which charms the senses , and inchants the soul : wherefore it ought to be banished from the barr of justice , lest it should incircle justice-seat , excluding right and truth that comes to plead . for oratory chiefly is employ'd for to prefer the wrong , and falshood hide . they asked her , whether an orator or a poet had most power over the passions ? she answered , an orator had power to betray the passions , but could not make an absolute conquest of them . as for poetry , saith she , it hath a double power ; for all poetry hath oratory , but all oratory hath not poetry . wherefore , said she , poetry hath an absolute power over the passions ; for poetry is like a powerful monarch , can raise , rally , and imbattel them at his command ; and , like a skilful musician , can set , tune , and play upon them as he pleases . poetry is nature's landskip , and life's prospect ; it is a spring , where noblest souls do bathe themselves : their thoughts , like wanton boys , dabble therein . but those that are to make orations , said she , either at the barr , in pulpits , upon theaters , or in the field , must first consider the ground and matter whereon and whereof they would speak , and to what end they would drive their speech ; for when they have laid the ground , and have well considered the subject of their discourse , words will follow easily and freely , without meditating thereupon ; but those that consider only words , and in what phrases they shall speak , shall never speak well ; but be out at every turn , because the foundation is not laid whereupon their discourse should be built : for the materials ( which are words ) will serve them in small stead , or to little purpose , when they want the ground , or mistake the ground whereon they should work . but a learned orator's head , said she , is like a garden , wherein are set divers sorts of flowers , fetch'd from several soils both far and near ; as some from demosthenes , thucydides , tully , seneca , tacitus , and the like ; and many slips from more modern orators , and seeds from so many several authors , which they strain about in their orations , as is sans nombre . or , said she , a learned orator is like a crab tree-stock , whereon are grafted several sorts of sweet fruits , but bears nothing of its own fruit ; and if it doth ( said she ) , they will be but sowr crabs : so their speech would sound harsh to the ear , as such sowr fruit would be sharp to the tast. whereas a natural orator , said she , bears , nor brings forth any other fruit but his own , which is sweet and pleasent , without pains-taking or ingrafting : but all things grow as nature sets them , without the help of art. but i have observed , said she , that in matches of orations , the last hath ever the victory ( or for the most part ) although not so wise or eloquent as the first ; which shews , that the digesting part of the brain ( which is judgment and nutriment , and is truth , which nourisheth the rational understanding ) is not like the stomack , the digestingplace for food , that is to nourish the sensitive body ; for when the stomack is full , the tast dis-relishes all meat presented thereunto , be it never so delicious ; it heaves against it , as being over-charged ; neither doth variety tempt it . whereas the head , although it be stuft , or over-gorged , as i may say , still covets more ; and the ears suck and draw in with an eager appetite , so it be variety ; otherwise it grows dull , flat , and drowsie : for , the brain will feed on gross matter , or unwholsome trash , with more pleasure , and a greater gust , than on that which is fine or wholsome , if once received before . also , said she , i perceive all those that make orations in the field to their soldiers , repeat their victories from the first descent , of the foundation of their cities , kingdoms , and commonwealths , and the renown of their ancestors ; but never their losses , their treacheries , or their follies ; they strive to bury them in oblivion : for , though it be a good policy , yet it is not a clear honesty , to present a half-faced glass for a whole . but this is not so great a fault , but it may be excused , when it is to a good end , as to defend what is rightly their own , or to gain back what unjustly they lost , or to revenge an unpardonable wrong , or to punish a wicked crime , or to take the part of the helpless innocent ; otherwise it is a dishonesty not excusable , when it is used for treason , rapine , or the like . but you orators ( said she ) are like those that are skilful in playing on a flute , or cornet ; where the ears of the auditors are the holes ; and your tongues , or words , as the fingers , do make the stops ; your breath gives the sound , and your wit and your learning , are the ayres and musical ditties that move their passions , or rather their passion : for indeed , there is but one passion in nature , or at least in an animal figure ; which passion changes into several forms , according to the several subjects or objects it is placed upon ; for upon some subjects , it is love , upon others it is hate , upon others it is fear , upon others anger ; and so the like of all the rest of those they call several passions , which is but one natural faculty , property , quality , or what you will name it , which is the heart . that these severally alter and ( camelion-like ) change , and sometimes seem all one colour , and sometimes of divers colours ; or as a triangular-glass , which makes a million of various colours from one light ; so doth the triangular-heart ( from the light of life ) seem to have many passions : but ( said she ) lest orators should be the cause of unlawful passions , there ought to be a law , that the publick assemblies that are drawn about an oracle , either such as are to declare the command of the gods , or for any other instruction ; informations or exhortations , either in the church , or on theaters , should not be mixed of several sexes ; but either the assembly should be all men , or all women ; otherwise a consecrated place may be polluted with wanton eyes , and enticing countenances ; self-whisperings , and secret agreements to dangerous meetings ; evil intentions , and wicked actions ; by which a church would become a bawdy-house , and the priests the pimps or procurers to draw them together . and all orations concerning the commonwealth , or for any important matter , would be lost ; for the ears of the assembly would be stopt by their eyes ; at least , the hearing of the auditors would be imperfect , and their understanding confounded , and their memory dazled with the splendor of light glances and fair faces of each sex. the eighth sort of visiters were states-men , who ask'd her , what government was best ? she answered , monarchy : for ( said she ) a good king is the center of a commonwealth , as god is the center of nature , who orders and disposes all to the best , and unites and composes all differences , which otherwise would run into a confusion : and unity , said she , is sooner found , and easier made by one , than by more , or many : neither , said she , can one man make so many faults , as more or many may . besides , said she , there is less justice , and more injustice in a multitude , than in one . then they asked her , whether it were lawful for a king to lay down his scepter and crown ? she answered , that princes that voluntarily lay down their royal dignity , do either express some infirmity in power , or weakness of understanding , or imperfect health of body , or effeminacy of spirits , or doting affection , or vain-glory : for religion requires it not ; nay , said she , it seems rather an impiety for jove's annointed , being his chief deputy on earth , to leave , or be weary in governing the people , by which , and in which he serves jove . and it was accounted ( said she ) a blessing as well as an honour , in the ancient writ , to go out and in before the people , most being inspired by jove to that dignity of prophesying ; and for the great , gallant , heroick heroes , as alexander and caesar , they left not their crowns , nor parted with their power , until death uncrowned and divested them . neither ( said she ) were there any that voluntarily laid down or yeelded up a crown , but have had more condemners and dispraisers , than commenders or admirers . thus , said she , neither the laws of honour or religion allow it ; nor can i perceive morality approves it . then they asked her , if a foolish king might not bring a commonwealth to ruin sooner , than a council of many ? she said , no : for , said she , the plurality breeds faction ; which faction causeth more evil than one foolish head can make or bring about . then they asked , if a tyrant-king were not worse than a factious assembly ? she said , no : for , said she , a tyrant-king may make good laws , and keep peace , and maintain supreme power and authority ; but a factious assembly ( said she ) will break all laws , do no justice , keep no peace , obstruct authority , and overthrow supreme power ; and , said she , that kingdom is happiest that lives under a tyrant-prince ; for when the people are afraid of their prince , there is peace ; but where the prince is afraid of the people , there is warr ; and there is no misery like a civil-warr : nor is there a greater sign that a king is afraid of his people , than when he advances those that are , or seem to be his enemies . thus subjects in general live happiest under a tyrant , but not particular courtiers , or busie prating fools , or factious knaves : and a facil king causeth more trouble , distraction , and ruin , by his soft easie nature , than a cruel tyrant with executions , severe laws , or heavy taxes : for the greatest tyrant that ever was , will not destroy all his subjects , or take away all substance , for his own sake ; for if he did , he would destroy his power , and ruin his monarchy . then they asked her , what men made the best privy councellors ? she said , those that had most experience , such as had seen the several changes of fortune , and observed the several humours of men. likewise , those that are rich ; for those will be cautious in their counsel , and careful for the commonwealth for their own sakes ; not daring to adventure their estates in a factious party , or a rash advice . but , said she , princes should not have more councellors than business , for fear they should make troubles to have employments . likewise , a state should not have too many magistrates : for , many magistrates in a common-wealth , are like many masters in family : nor too great a number of officers , lest the many officers should over-charge the state , spending more in ordering and commanding , than they would lose by some disorders and disobedience . then they asked her , what was apt to make rebellion ? she answered , poor nobility and rich citizens or burgers , being both factious , and apt to raise rebellion through covetousness and ambition : for , the poor nobility would have wealth to maintain their honour ; and rich burgers and yeomantry would have honour to dignifie their wealth . then they asked her , why those kings that had favourites , were most commonly unfortunate ? she said , one cause was , that the subjects ( in general ) take it for a weakness in a prince to beruled or perswaded by one particular man. secondly , they hate that particular person , as an usurper , ingrossing wholly the king's favour ; which makes them think their prince unjust , to give to one man that which ought to be distributed according to merit and worth. thirdly , the favourite's crimes are thought the king's cruelty or facility . fourthly , the favourite's vanity is thought to be their taxes ; all which , makes them apt to murmur and rebel : but they never fail to rebel , when the king interposes himself as a buckler betwixt the people and his favourite ; by which he endangers himself , but helps not the favourite . but a king who would reign long and peaceably , if he will have a favourite , must have a favourite to be a buckler between him and the rest of his subjects : for he must not take his favourite's faults upon him , but lay his faults on the favourite ; for when a people judg their king to have faults , they will withdraw their reverences ; for princes must be thought as gods that cannot err . but favourites , said she , are very dangerous and insinuating parasites : for , those princes must needs be ignorant , that are much flattered ; for every flattering tongue is as a muffler , to blind the eyes of the understanding ; and self-conceit is the mouth , that sucks the milk of vain-glory , which putrifies the reasori , and breeds a corrupted judgment ; which causeth crudities and ulcers in the stomack of the commonwealth , and makes the heart of the kingdom sick ; which distempers the whole body , and brings the plague of rebellion , every member being infected therewith ; which is a certain and sudden death to monarchical government . then they asked her , how great monarchs should use petty princes ? great monarchs or princes should always keep lesser princes in awe , lest in time they should go cheek-by-jowl , and may chance to thrust them out of their power , either by land , or sea. indeed , they should be kept like spaniels , to crouch ; and not like mastiffs , to bite ; otherwise they may chance to leap at their throat , and tear out the life of their supremacy . also , said she , lesser princes ought not to be suffered to encroach upon the ceremonies of great monarchs : for , if ceremonies deifie , those ceremonies ought to be kept sacred . nor upon their orders or dignifyings , as to make nobility , or to give their orders , or such as are like to them , as the george , the s. esprit , or golden fleece , which elective princes are apt to do , if they be not kept in awe by the hereditary kings ; and those hereditary kings that give way to them to do it , ought to lose their magnisicency . then they asked her , how kings and monarchs should use their officers of state , and commanders of warr ? she said , kindly , whilst they were in employments : for , their employments either in the civil magistracy , or martial discipline , give them power ; and a small power ( said she ) oft-times ruin a greater , especially when malice and opportunity are joined together : for though ambition , said she , perswades ; yet it is opportunity and malice which betrays and sets open the gates to rebellion ; for many powerful princes , and potent monarchs , have been unthrnned , and kingdoms ruined , by mean subjects , and small beginnings . wherefore , said she , princes and states should have a care of lessening the power of their officers , and to remove them from a better office , or higher degree , to a worse office , or lower degree ; but if they will remove them , or must ( as being most convenient ) , then let them put them out of all power and authority , or advance them , either in authority of office or honour , by which they will qualifie their spleens , or prevent their malice , or destroy their abilities from doing any harm . then they asked her , if it were seemly or fit , that kings should suffer any subjects to be familiar in their discourse or actions , either to themselves privately , or in the presence of a publick assembly ? she said , no : for , said she , a familiarity makes a parity , for it advances a subject to a greater respect ; and draws down a king to a less esteem ; but said she , kings should be like gods , obeyed with fear , and loved for mercy . then they asked her , what kings should do to such subjects or servants ? she said , they shnuld be check'd with frowns , and banished from their presence ; for , that king that doth not keep strict orders , and rules severely , shall neither be obeyed nor loved , as being either fearful , that dares not check offenders , and cut off criminals ; or facil , to suffer boldness in his sight ; or hated , as being thought partial : and if you will observe ( said she ) , you shall find the more stern a master , the better he shall be served : for , although his servants complain , yet they dare not disobey : so a king , the more tyrannical he is , the better he shall be obeyed ; when a gentle master , and a facil king , shall lose his power and authority . then they asked her , whether it were wise for a king to discover the secrets of his heart to a chief favourite councellor ? she said , the king that made known the secrets of his heart , or would but make known his ordinary intentions , until they were to be put in execution , although but to the most trusty of his council , was fitter to be ruled , than to rule : but , said she , it is an ordinary policy in favourite-councellors , to perswade their prince to keep nothing of moment from their knowledg , or any advice that others give ; for if they do , they cannot counsel as they should , because they know but part of the king's affairs ; which credulous princes believe , and so betray themselves . but wise princes , said she , hear others , but counsel themselves ; and foolish princes , said she , will hear nothing from any , but those they will entrust ; but if they do , they straight tell their favourites ( as children do their nurses ) all that they hear or know . the ninth sort were trades-men , or citizens ; and they asked her , how they should grow rich ? she said , not to have their pride above their calling : for , they that think themselves too good , or too worthy , or too highly born for their trade , will never thrive thereby ; for they neglect it through scorn , and so grow poor with pride . likewise , said she , not to take too many apprentices ; for , out of a covetousness of a little present money they get when they are bound , they are forced for seven years to maintain a company of idle boys , that can gain them nothing , by reason they must learn before they can work ; and by that time they come to be shop-men , or workmen , and skilful in their trade , their time is out ; so that the masters lose the time in teaching them , spends money in maintaining them , and receives no profit by them . likewise , not to have more journey-men than trafficque : for journey-men have great wages ; and when they have more servants than employments , they spend more than they can get , giving more wages out , than they have profit coming in . likewise , not to set too great prizes on their ware ; for those that sell deer , will have but few customers . likewise , not to neglect their shops ; for when there is no body to sell their ware , it must needs lye unbought . also , not to neglect their customers ; for there are few will stay and pray for what they must deerly pay . likewise , not to break their promises , or day of payments ; for that will make all afraid to trust them . likewise , not to trust much , especially such as have not visible estates ; for they that sell out their wares for bonds , may chance to break by their customers : for , though bonds may imprison their persons , yet not always get their money ; for , as the old saying is , where there is nothing to be had , the king must lose his right . likewise , to shun all law-suits : for , whilst they follow their suit , they are forced to neglect their trade , leaving all to their servants , who are as idle and as careless in their shops , as the master is busie in law. and whilst the lawyers pick their purse of their gains , their servants cozen and rob their shops of their wares , or lose their customers by their carelesness , or lazily neglect their work. also not to be drunkards , for drink drowns all industry ; and though it swells the body , it shrinks the purse ; and as it disorders the brains , so it causes disorders in a family , by abusing their wives , children , and servants ; disturbing their neighbours with their quarrels and unhandsome demeanours : besides , by their drunken humours , sometimes they spoil and destroy their goods ; so that what with their spending more , or at least as much as they get , and spoiling what they have , and neglecting what they should have , a drunkard is never rich , but on the contrary very poor . lastly , to marry wives that are approved for good huswifry , rather than for riches : for an idle gossip will spend more than she brings ; and will be maintained finer than her husband's quality , and above his trade or calling . then they asked her , what it was to be a good citizen ? she said , not to look after their particular profit more than the publike good ; and never to neglect their duty in discharging their commissions or offices of authority . likewise , not to prefer their own private interest before the publick , by ingrossing trading , or heightning the prizes . also , not to be factious , murmuring at authority , or repining through envy . likewise , to defend their countrey with courage , wealth , and love , against any assault made against it . likewise , to observe the laws punctually , to perform the customs and ceremonies strictly , to submit to magistrates willingly , to dwell by their neighbours peaceably , to govern their family orderly , to breed their children civilly , and to live honestly . the tenth sort that visited her , were house-keepers , and masters of families . they asked her , what was the greatest ruin to an estate ? she answered , great estates were ruinated with gluttonous hospitality , unnecessary servants , negligences of stewards , unprofitable horses , drunken cellars , careless masters , and vain-glory. as for the first , said she , a man is only praised so long as the meat is tastable in their mouths ; but when their bellies are full , and their stomacks sick , by being over-charged , they will curse not only the meat they eat , and the cook that drest it ; but the master that gave it , when it is digested , is forgotten . as for unnecessary servants , said she , when there are more servants than work , they grow lazy and proud , thinking themselves masters by their little employment , forgetting at whose cost they live ; besides the factions idleness brings , by hearkning after tales , and reporting them worse than they were meant ; so they rather serve to eat , than to work ; to command , than to obey . then they asked her , whether it were not against hospitality to quarrel with a stranger in his house ? she said , yes . then they asked her , if it were not lawful to defend his honour against a stranger in his own house ? she said , they might defend their life in their own house ; but not assault the life of their guest or stranger . likewise , said she , they may defend their honour by reasoning , clearing , and telling the truth ' and by declaring the right ; but not to revenge their quarrel in their own house ; but when they are departed from their house , they might do their pleasure . then they asked her , if a house-keeper might not in honour deny strangers entertainment ? she said , yes , when it was inconvenient to the owner , and not very serviceable to the guests . then they asked her , if an impertinent troublesome guest might not be put out of one's house , if he would not go civilly of himself ? she said , yes ; for , said she , every man's dwelling-house is , or ought to be his earthly paradice ; and if there be a serpent , he ought to be banished out ; or evil angel , to be thrown out . then they asked her , if it were against the laws of hospitality , if they should entertain their guests only with a sufficiency , without a superfluity ? she said , honour did not bind or require any man to ruin himself : wherefore , said she , every man may , nay ought to entertain according to his estate ? then they asked her , if they ought not to make a difference of persons in their entertainment ? she said , yes , if their estates would allow it , or else not ; for every man , said she , must entertain according to the ability of his fortunes , not according to the quality of his guests . then they asked her , what was the reason the man looks finer in the master 's old clothes , than the master did when he left them off . she answered , the reason was , because the master seemed too noble for his old clothes ; but when the man had them on , the clothes seemed too noble for him . the eleventh sort that visited her , were married-men and their wives . the men asked her , what was the best course to keep their wives honest ? she said , tender regard , civil respects , wise instructions , honourable examples , and virtuous employments . for , said she , idleness breeds vain thoughts , wild passions , and extravagant appetites ; and vain thoughts and wild passions have a sympathy to each other ; and as thoughts lye in the brain , so passions dwell in the heart , and various thoughts raise up several passions : but reason , said she , should govern as king in the brain ; and temperance , as queen in the heart ; and when this king and queen are contracted into a matrimonial bond , the life lives orderly , the mind peaceably , and the body healthfully . wherefore , said she , women ought to be wisely employed ; for business to the mind , is as necessary as exercise to the body ; and instructions to the mind are as necessary as food to the body ; and let me warn you , said she , of idleness ; for it is the great bawd of the world. then the men asked her , if husbands might not in honour correct their wives ? yes , said she , with timely admonitions , seasonable reproofs , and loving perswasions ; but not with cruel blows : for a husband is a wife's guardian and protector from all harms ; wherefore he ought not to hurt her , but to cherish and defend her : but , said she , a husband may restrain a wife , although not beat her ; for if she be an unsufferable scold , or a vixen , he may bind her hands with kind embraces , and stop her mouth with kisses . if she be indiscreet , he may restrain her from going abroad , lest she should disgrace him with her follies . if she be a slut , he must keep servants that are cleanly , if he be able ; if not , he must do his work himself , or visit his wife but seldom : but if he cannot do his work himself , through publick employments , and yet he must be at home ; he must strive to make her better by perswasions and directions : for they that will not mend with good counsel , will grow worse and worse , and more perverse with blows . if she be wanton , she must be kept to a spare dry diet ; she must be purged much , and eat little ; she must study much , and sleep little ; and she must have moral lectures preached to her very often : likewise , she must be maintained thriftily , not vainly ; she must not be suffered to be superfluous or costly , but only to be allowed necessaries or conveniences , which will keep her from wandring or gadding abroad , having no vanities to shew her neighbours : as for a man to lock up his wife , it is no secure remedy ; for women will find a thousand inventions to get liberty . wherefore , if the cure cannot be wrought upon the body and mind , they may despair : for restraint of liberty will do them small good . but the only way in this condition , is for a man to part from his wife ; for then the world may only pity him as being a cuckold , but cannot scorn him as being a wittal . then they asked her , if a husband might not be lawfully complemental to other women in their wives company ? she answered , it was unworthy for any man rudely to neglect a civility to any woman ; and he was no ways worthy the name of a gentleman , that used not respect to the meanest of that sex : but , said she , a husband ought to have respect to his wife , and to do no action , nor speak no words that may justly offend or disgrace her , or to put her out of countenance : for , though men ought to be civil to that sex , yet a husband ought not to make courthsips to any , neither in jest or earnest ; for foolish toying , though harmless meaning and honest intentions , may cause great discontent bet wixt a married pair , and breed such quarrels as cannot be reconciled . then they asked her , how they should breed their children , especially sons ? she said , children should be bred according to their condition of birth or fortune : yet , said she , there is a general breeding , as well as a particular breeding ; that is , to be bred on honest grounds , and honourable principles : to do as they would be done by , that is justice ; to suffer an evil patiently , when they cannot avoid , that is fortitude ; to be industrious to prevent evils that may come , is prudence ; to abstain from tempting-evils , that is temperance ; and to instruct them of the benefit that will accrew thereby , shewing them that it is the greatest wisdom for a man's self , to be honest ; and to have honourable principles , is to do good when they have power to do hurt ; to prefer their neighbour's good before their own pleasure ; to maintain right , to defend the truth , to assist the helpless , to incite them to noble endeavors , and civil demeanours . for particular breeding : if they be nobly born , they should be respectfully bred ; their tutors should instruct them submissively and humbly , and not commandingly ; they should rather be perswaded by reason , than forced to learn by terrifying ; otherwise a noble person may have a slavish spirit : their learning must be , to know men and manners ; to be instructed of times past ; to be advertised of the times present . likewise , they must be bred to handle the pen more than the pencil , the sword more than the pen , the horse's bridle more than the fiddle-string , the cannot-bullet more than the racket-ball , the valuting-horse more than dancing ; to encounter strengths , more than running lengths ; to wrastle , more than shuffle cards ; and throwing the barr , more than throwing the dice : the actions of cards are too soft and effeminate for masculine spirits . also , they must rather be taught to speak well , than sing well . likewise , they must rather study fortification than logick ; to defend towns , rather than dispute arguments ; to decide quarrels , rather than to make quarrels . likewise , they must study how to return obligations gratefully , to reward merit nobly , to supply necessity generously . likewise , they should be bred more with the muses , than the sciences : for the poetick flame doth fire the spirits with a noble ambition . likewise , they must be bred to know the laws , customs , and priviledges of their native countrey , lest their ignorance should commit faults in breaking the laws , or commit errors in omitting the customs , or do themselves wrong in not claiming their priviledges . also , they should have some insight of the laws of other nations , that they may know how to behave themselves , if they should be sent embassadors ; or to advise , if they should be called to councils . also , they should be instructed in the maps of their own nation , as also of forreign nations ; that they may know how to order their commands , to take their advantages , and to avoid dangers , in case they should be employed as commanders and officers of warr for their king and countrey . in short , they must be instructed by truth , advised by honour , and encouraged by fame . as for the breeding them in common schools , i do utterly disapprove , although some say it gives them confidence , and quickens their courage ; but my opinion is , it rather makes them rudely bold , than manly confident . it learns them rather to quarrel , than to fight : for a company of boys make a wrangling-noise , and scolding-quarrels ; but seldom fight or cuff with alacrity . it makes them factious and unconstant ; for having not experience to understand truly , and judg rightly , they one while take this boy 's part , another while another boys part ; and there is a faction between the little boys and the great boys , and amongst the lesser boys too . a free-school is apt to make lyars , sharks , and thieves ; for boys will not only be apt to lye to save their breech , denying the truth of a fault ; but to get a point , or rather for fear to lose a point or a farthing at play . they learn to shark , being necessitous , either by the thriftiness of their parents , or tutor , or both ; or being cozened by other boys , whose parents have not much to give them ; and they , rather than want , will do any base thing to get : and boys , being active and stirring , young and strong , causeth sharp appetites , and quick stomacks , which quick stomacks and short commons do not agree ; and their hunger out-running their meat , makes their wit out-run their honesty ; for they will be strangely subtil , and most ingenious to cozen or get from those boys that have more than the rest : it learns them to flatter and dissemble , to get it by fair means ; or to quarrel and lye , to get it by force ; or to watch or design , to get it by theft ; and when they cannot compass their designs , they will make other boys sharers , to help them to steal , or at least to cheat . it makes them envious at the praises of those that are most apt to learn ; also malicious , by being whipt ; and makes them ill-natured , to wish , or be glad when any other boys are whipt , because they shall not be laughed at , or twitted , for being whipt . it makes them base informers , and many times false accusers ; for rather than they will suffer the disgrace ( as they take it ) to be whipt alone , they will betray , be-lye , or accuse any , that they may make them have the same punishment . besides , in common schools much beastly wickedness is learnt : but it were a wonder if vices should not be catch'd in a common school , being so many boys in a company , of several natures and dispositions , qualities , births , and fortunes ; and vicious qualities , being malignant , like the plague ; for one sick body is able to infect a whole town , when the best cordial-counsels and advices cannot save life . a company of boys are like a company of colts before they are back't , which kick , and fling , and run about ; and are so impatient at the bridle , spurr , and rod , that they strive with all their strength , and use all their skittish tricks to fling their rider off , striking all that come near them ; so do boys their tutors : and unless a tutor be a discreet man , and a wise governour , his scholars grow resty , and become unuseful , stubborn , malicious , and ill-natur'd . but by reason it is proved , that common schools breed confidence , or rather boldness , it is good for the breeding of such youth whose parents intend them for lawyers and divines , embassadors , and the like , who are to present themselves , and to speak in a full assembly , where bashfulness may perchance disturb and obstruct their oratory . and it is the best breeding to get experience , and to be acquainted with the nature of mankind : for in youth the nature lies open and plain to the view ; and the rest of the senses are not arrived to the art of concealing them under counterfeit veils , or disguising them in various dresses , which time learns men to do . likewise , these common schools may be good for physician , s and chirurgeons , and soldiers : for chirurgeons , because it makes them bold and adventurous : for soldiers , because it makes them hardy , venturous , and resolute : for physicians , because it gives them experience of several appetites , diets , and constitutions : for prints strike deeper in youth than age ; and men in age remember best the observations of their youth ; and youth observe more than age doth ; and like a jack-an-apes , imitate what they observe . as for the particular breeding of the common-sort , they are to be bred according to the profession their parents intend them to practice : as , clerks must be bred to the use of the pen , and to learn several hand-writings . all merchants , either trading , trafficking , or adventuring , must learn arithmetick , and to keep accounts . apothecaries must learn the difference and properties of simples . doctors , to apply them . lawyers must learn the laws , customs , and priviledges of the kingdom ; also , the records , fees , and offices of several courts ; likewise , all sorts of warrants , grants , leases , and wills. heralds must be good antiquaries , and learned in the fashious , ceremonies , and orders of dignities . surveyors , architectors , and musicians , must be learned in the mathematicks and geometry . picture-drawers , in history and geography ; as also in the mathematicks , by reason of symmetry . as for handicrafts-trades , practice makes them masters ; and trades-men of all sorts , the lesser speculative learning they have , the better work-men they most commonly be , busying their heads with nothing but their trade . as for secretaries of state , they must be bred to several languages , and to understand the laws , customs , humours , and potencies of forreign nations , for which they should be bred with several embassadors , whose employments are travelling-schools , and experienced-tutors . as for states-men , they must be bred to a general learning , but no particular study ; they must learn the humours of men , as well as the laws of the kingdom ; they must learn the discipline of warr , as well as the rules of peace ; they must learn the weakness and strength , the infirmities and advantages of the kingdom , as well as the traffick and commerce . they must learn morality as well as rhetorick ; they must learn to do well , as well as to speak well : for he will be but a corrupt states-man , who hath more eloquence than justice , more policy than honesty . but in youth , saith she , the understanding is like their age and bodies , little and young ; their eyes must first be fed with action , their ears with relation ; without which objects and subjects , the understanding would become lean or starved : for several objects and discourses , put to the sight and hearing , pass through the eyes and ears , into the head , to feed the brain , which maintains the life of the understanding ; as several sorts of meats put by the hands into the mouth , pass through the throat into the stomack , to feed the body , to maintain the life thereof ; and the natural capacities digest those several objects and subjects into knowledg and understanding , as the natural heat into flesh and blood. and the brain is like the body , sometimes more strong , and sometimes more weak ; which makes the understanding sometimes more sick , and sometimes more healthy : and sometimes also the brain will be stuft with fancy , as the body with humours . but some brains are like an unhealthy body , that will never thrive ; and others , like stomacks that are nourish'd but with some particular sort of meat , when variety will corrupt , but never digest . and others are like stomacks , that the more varieties are received , the better concoction , where particulars would cause a surfeit . likewise , said she , young brains are like tender slips , not grown to bear fruit ; but length of time brings them to maturity . and some brains are like barren grounds , that will not bring seed or fruit forth , unless it be well manured with the wit which is rak'd from other writers or speakers . others are like unplowed ground ; for the senses , which are as the husband-man , either neglect through laziness , or are so poor that they have not a sufficient stock of objects or subjects , or matter or form , to work with , or sow in the brain . others are like foolish husband-men , that either sow or reap too soon or too late ; that know not how to sett and graft , to prune or to cherish ; which makes the brain unprofitable . others , like ill husbands , run wandring about unconstantly , and never regard their affairs , but let the brain run to weeds , which with good husbandry might bear fruitful corps . and some are so rich and fertil , that if they be not plowed nor sett , yet they will be fat meadows , and rich pasture , wherein grow wild cowslips , prim-roses , violets , dazies , and sweet thyme , marjoram , succory , and the like . then they asked her , how they should govern their servants ? she answered , with employment : for , said she , idle servants , like idle subjects , grow factious , and so rebellious , for want of good employments to busie their heads with . then they asked her , how masters ought to use servants ? she answered , as good princes do their subjects , with a fatherly care for their well-being , well-doing , and subsisting : they must have a protector 's regard , for their safety ; be just judges , for their rights and priviledges , for their condemnations and punishments ; honest friends , to advise them ; wise tutors , to instruct them ; prudent governours , to order them ; powerful generals , to command them ; bountiful gods , to reward their painful labours , their dutiful obediences , their honest services , their faithful trust , and their constant fidelity . then the wives asked her , if it might not be as lawful for wives to receive and entertain love's courtships , as for husbands to make love-courtships ? she said , no : for , said she , unconstant women are the ruin of a commonwealth . for first , it decays breed : for , though many be barren by nature , yet there are more become barren through wildness . secondly , it corrupts breed , mingling the issues of several men. thirdly , it decays industry : for , a man that doubts the children be none of his , will never take pains to provide for them , or at least not to enrich them . fourthly , it makes dangerous and deadly quarrels : for the cuckold and the cuckold-maker can never agree . then they asked her , what they should do in case their husbands did kiss their maids , or their neighbour's maids , daughters , or wives ? she said , to take as little notice of it as they could ; to give them as much liberty as they would have ; to praise their mistresses more than they deserved ; and to cause them to be as jealous of them as they could be . first ( said she ) , to take no notice , makes them to live quiet , and makes their husbands to be more shye , lest they should perceive it ; otherwise , said she , there will not only be quarrels , but she will receive often affronts and disgraces by himself and whores . secondly ( said she ) , to give them liberty , will glut their appetites , surfeit the humour , and quench their affections . thirdly ( said she ) , a superlative praise will abate the truth , and out-reach the admiration . lastly ( said she ) , to make them jealous by discoursing , that no woman is to be trusted or relied upon , for their constancies in love , when they have forsaken their own honour , their modest nature , their honest birth , their lawful rites , their civil customs , and their pious zeal to heaven : for jealousie , saith , she , turns love into hate . then they asked her , what they should do if their husbands whores did enslave them by being as mistresses to command , and they as drudges and slaves to obey , making them as bawds or witnesses to their lascivious acts ? she said , there was nothing for that , but parting : for , said she , a noble mind cannot play the bawd , nor live with impudent vices . but , said they , if the wife have children , how shall they part then ? 't is better , said she , to part with the goods of the body , than the goods of the soul ; wherefore it were better to part from children or life , than with honour and virtue : for , though virtue , said she , may wink at an infirmity , and honour may excuse a fault , yet not be made as a party , or brought to the publick view , or be made a slave thereto . then they asked her , what was the best way to keep their husband's love , and cause them to be constant ? she said , the best way to keep their husband's love , was , to be honestly modest , cleanly , patient , prudent , and discreet : but , said she , a man may love dearly and tenderly his wife , and yet desire to kiss his maid : wherefore , to keep him constant , said she , a wife must act the arts of a courtizan to him , which is very lawful , since it is to an honest end : for the arts honest and lawful , but the design and end is wicked : but , said she , to learn those arts , you must be instructed by such as have practised or seen them ; for i have not , nor cannot guess or devise arts. the twelfth sort were nurses with their nurse-children . and they asked her , how children should be ordered ? she said , young children should be handled gently , watched carefully , used kindly , and attended prudently . the gentle handling , said she , is most requisite : for children have rather grissles than bones , more jelly than flesh ; whereby the least oppression , or wrenching , or turning , may deform them , causing some members to be deformed , that otherwise would be in perfection ; and by reason nurses handle not children tenderly , there is so many lame and crooked as they are . likewise , nurses should give their limbs liberty , not swaddle nor tye them too hard , or to suffer their coats to be too little , or their shooes or stockings too short , nor to pin too many pins about them , lest they should prick them . likewise , not to toss nor tumble them , nor to dance nor rock them too violently ; for a weak motion may displace an unknit grissle-joint ; and what pains soever they feel , or hurts they get , they cannot complain or tell their grievance by their speech , having not learnt a language ; and though their tears supply their speech , yet nurses most commonly take their tears to be shed out of a froward passion , rather than a mournful complaining , or a craving redress ; which makes them only to sing , or prate , or whistle , or rattle to them , to please them ; but not to search about them , or observe them , to find out their malady , to ease them ; but rather , by the dancing and rocking them , they put them to more pain . secondly , to watch them carefully : for many children are killed , or cripled , or blinded , or scarified ( which is worse ) by the negligence of the nurses . and some are over-laid by the nurses in their sleep ; some choak't by giving them meat too hard , or too big to pass through their little tender throats . some fall into the fire and burn themselves , or put out their eyes , or disfigure their face ; some fall from tables , stools , beds , stairs , or the like , whereby they become oft-times cripples all their life-time ; and many the like accidents befall through the carelesness of the nurses : wherefore , children should rather lye and play upon the ground , laying some soft blanket under them , then be set upon tables , stools , or beds : besides , it is both healthful and strengthning , for children to lye stretching and rolling themselves ; for their weak strength cannot disorder their tender limbs , but rather gives them liberty to grow ; whereas to be carried much in arms , or to set much in chairs , or to lye much in cradles , cramps up their limbs , and doth ( as it were ) rivet their joints , causing them to grow , as we say , double-jointed . thirdly , to be fed sparingly , or rather discreetly : for there is nothing that destroys children , or causeth more diseases , than too full diet ; or nurses are of an opinion , that a child cannot live and be in health , unless they be always eating ; through which opinion the nurses feed them so long , as they puke it up again ; and the nurse is so desirous they should eat , that they will return the meat they spue up , into their mouths again , forcing them to eat against their appetite or stomack ; which must needs be very unwholesome : first , in over-charging their stomacks . next , in not giving their stomack time to digest . lastly , in giving a child milk and flesh-meat , which no ways agree ; for it curdles the one , and corrupts the other . thus an overcharged stomack causeth surfeits , which surfeits breed a superflous moisture , which causeth the rickets ; or else it breeds tough matter , which matter breeds obstructions , which obstructions causeth swellings . likewise , an ill digestion breeds crudities , which crudities cause the cholick and convulsions . also , milk and meat together , the corruption of the one doth cause burning-fevers , or scabs on their heads and faces ; and the sharpness of the other causes agues or sharp rheums , making sore eyes , or the like rheumatick diseases . and children being weak of nature , and sickly in breeding of teeth , which makes them more weak ; yet they feed them so much , that if a man at his full strength should eat as often , and as great a quantity for his growth , as children for theirs , he would become as weak as a child , and there would be as great a mortality of men , as there is most commonly of children ; for more dyes in infancy than in age ; and the reason is , that they are killed with over-feeding , although nurses and parents impute it to the teeth ; for a child , as i said , cannot tell its grievances , which makes them mistake , by reason they can only guess at the cause . wherefore , said she , children must be both orderly and temperately fed , have a breakfast , dinner , and supper , until such time as they are so strong as to run about , and then they may eat four times a day : for by reason a child is active , and always stirring , and likewise growing , they may eat the oftner , if they exercise much ; but whilst they are weak , having not strength to run about , they must be fed with leighter meat , and a less quantity : for , though some are of opinion , that a child's stomack is extraordinary hot , which heat they think causeth a quick digestion ; yet i am of opinion , that the heat is according to their years , which is like a new-kindled fire , which is rather a smuthering heat , than a hot dissolving heat ; and as heat is weak in a child , as being not throughly kindled ; so it becomes weak by age , as being burnt out : wherefore , infancy and old-age should feed most temperately , lest the quantity of the fuel should quench out the strength of the heat ; but howsoever , nurses feed children as if they had ostritch's stomacks , which is able to digest iron . lastly , children should be kindly used , and prudently bred : wherefore they must be humoured in all things that are not hurtful ; otherwise to be crossed , makes them of a froward and crossing nature ; for the ill custom of being crossed , makes them take the habit or custom of crossing , and to strike , or beat , or whip them , is worse ; for stripes create a spaniel's disposition ; and timorous spirits are hard and cruel natures . likewise , not to scold , rail , or to give children ill language , for that only teaches them the rudest part of language , and to be foul-mouthed , as we say . likewise , children must not be deceived with lyes , lest they learn to deceive with lying : also , they must not be frighted with telling them of hobgoblins , or the like ; for what is printed in infancy , doth not easily wear out with age ; and certainly the terrors of youth are a great cause of cowardly age : for surely , frighting-tales to children work the same effect on the mind , as unwholsome food on the body ; for as the body becomes weak , so the mind fearful . likewise , children should be taught the purest and perfectest parts of their language , and the most significant words and eloquent speech ; and the tongue get the habit of a good pronunciation , as well as the understanding the right and clear sense thereof ; otherwise they will be like those that have learned musick of an ill master , that though they can play a tune perfectly , and keep just time , and set a true note , yet they play not sweetly , but rough and rudely , making a jarring-scraping , or squeaking-noise . wherefore , children must hear truth , and not lyes ; be instructed with reason , not beaten with rods ; advised with kindness , not threatned with words ; presented with gifts , not crost in toys ; used with respect , not sleighted with neglect . likewise , they must be taught to speak perfectly , sensibly , and seasonably , not impertinently ; civilly , not rudely ; truly , not falsly . to conclude , those that attend children , should behave themselves well before them , lest they should give an ill example . wherefore the better sort , that have estates to maintain it , should have their children attended by none but such as are well fashioned , well spoken , and well qualified . the thirteenth sort were widowers and widows . the widowers asked her , if it were not allowable for a widower ( in the laws of honour ) to marry ? she said , yes , in six cases . the first was , if he had a good estate , and had no children to be heir to it ; or that there were none left of his family to keep alive the lovely memory of his ancestors . the second was , if he had many young children , and his employments or affairs required him often from home . thirdly , if he had many servants , and much houshold-employments . fourthly , if he were a melancholy man , and lived solitarily alone . fifthly , if he were infirm or sickly . and lastly , if he were consciously honest , or honestly amorous . yet , said she , he must be wise , in chusing such a woman as his affairs require , or his humour desires : for a man that marries for children , must chuse a woman well born , well bred , of a good reputation , and who comes from a fruitful stock ; likewise , she must be beautiful and well shap't , lest she gives his breed an ill dye , or an ill-favoured mark . secondly , if a man marry a wife to take care to bring up his children , he must chuse a discreet , sober , and well-natured woman , and one that is honourably born , and well bred ; for those that are honourably born and bred , have good natures , noble qualities , and sweet dispositions ; also , it breeds children to respect , it humbles them to obedience , it subjects them to corrections , and begets in them a love . thirdly , if a man marries a wife to follow his servants , and govern his houshold-affairs ; she must be such a one as hath been bred thriftily , and to good huswifry , and one that hath had some experience in the world : otherwise he may chance to have a busie wife , but not a prudent wife ; she may take pains , but he get but small gains . fourthly , if a man marries because he would not live solitarily , he must use his endeavour to get a cheerful wife , and of a pleasant humour , or rather a pleasing humour ; she must be conversible , and of a ready wit , and a good understanding : also of a healthful constitution : otherwise he will have a disease instead of a wife ; a trouble instead of a companion ; a grave instead of a bed. if a man marries a wife to attend and nurse him , she must be a neat , cleanly , ingenious , and handsome-handed woman ; also skilful in chirurgery and physick , and the applying of medicines : likewise , she must be careful , watchful , and industrious ; also patient , silent , chast , and good-natur'd ; otherwise his wife , instead of a nurse , may prove his plague , his hell , his tormenter ; his plague , with her sluttery ; his hell , with her dishonesty ; his tormenter , with her froward nature , and scolding tongue . and lastly , if a man marry out of a consciencious honesty , as being honestly amorous ; he must endeavour to get a chast , healthful , beautiful , cleanly woman . likewise , she must be of a free disposition , a merry humour , and a kind nature ; also , she must rather be modestly kind , than boldly wanton . for if she be dishonest , his jealousie will disturb his love. if sickly , his kindness will disturb her health . if ill-favoured , it will tempt his constancy . if sluttish , he will loathe her bed. if peevish or coy , it will cross his desires ; and if bold , it will surfeit his appetite . but , said she , equal matches and happy marriages , are not common ; by reason fortune , covetousness , or lust , makes more marriages , than prudent judgment of love ; and oft-times men and women are deceived in each other ; by reason the nature of man is so obscure , as it can hardly be found out : besides , woers do strive to conceal their faults , and veil their defects ; or pretend to be vertuous , because they would be gracious in the opinion of their mistresses , or the mistress in the opinion of the suitor ; whenas marriage will discover them to be but counterfeits , gilded with deceit ; which golden outside is rubbed off with acquaintance ; and then their base drossie nature appears , and repentance is dearly bought . then they asked her , if it were not lawful for a man to keep a mistress , in case he was unwilling to marry ? she said , the laws of nature and custom would allow it ; but not the laws of morality or divinity : wherefore if they could not live a chast single life , she said they ought to marry . besides , said she , although those men that have mistresses instead of a wife , have liberty to change their mistresses , which they cannot do their wives ; yet it is a far worse condition of life to keep a mistress , than marry a wife : for the best natur'd mistress is harder and more difficult to please , than the worst humour'd wife : for a mistress is a tyrant , prouder than a mean foolish favourite ; more commanding than a strict general ; more tyrannical than any tyrant ; more false than a traitor : proud , because sued to ; commanding , because served with obedience ; cruel , because jealous ; false , because unconstant . wherefore , she must be flattered , obeyed , observed , and watch'd . likewise , they will be more prodigal than a gamester ; for what they get by vice , they spend in vanity ; and yet more covetous than an usurer ; for if she lend her lover her person , she will have the interest of his estate . this ruins his family , and impoverishes his estate : also , she is more froward than a child , if she hath not what she desires ; or as melancholy as a stoick , when she hath so much she knows not what to desire ; more furious than a desperate mad-man , when she is crost . wherefore , she must be humour'd and pleas'd , to keep her quiet . likewise , when is merry , she is more mischievous than a jack-an-apes , more skittish than a colt , skips more than a frog , chatters more than a pye : when she is angry , she is more furious than a bull , and more fierce than a mastiff . when she hath designs , she is craftier than a fox , more subtil than a serpent ; when covetous , more ravenous than a vvolf ; when jealous , more cruel than a tiger ; when kind , they are worse than beasts ; for vvhores are seldom harmlesly merry , or vertuously melancholy , or honourably angry , or innocently wise , or prudently thrifty , or lovingly jealous , or modestly kind . the gifts of nature , youth , vvit , and beauty , they set as snares to intangle virtue , or to intrap vice ; youth fits , beauty draws , and vvit catches hold . to conclude , a vvhore and good fortune leaves a man at once ; and a vvhore many times makes the fortune ill ; when a chast vvife is constant to a man all her life , and many times makes an ill fortune good . then the women asked her , if it were not allow'd in honour's laws , for widows to marry ? she said , by no means : for widows do both cuckold their dead husbands , and their living husbands . the fourteenth sort were virgins . they asked her , how they ought to behave themselves ? she said , soberly , modestly , silently , civilly , temperately , and dutifully . soberly : behaving themselves with reservedness ; not to dance , skip , jump , or toy wildly about , or to wander or gad abroad without their parents or governesses . modestly : not to keep lewd or ill-famed company , or to entertain all sorts of visiters , or to suffer men to embrace , kiss , or whisper to them . silently : not to talk much , or loud ; or to laugh or sing much before company , unless they have excellent voices ; nor then , except they are civilly entreated ; and if they can sing , and are entreated thereto , not to be foolishly nice , nor confidently forward ; also , to leave the hearers with a relish or appetite , and not to sing so long as to tire them , or surfeit their ears . civilly : to give every one their due respect . temperately : not to drink too much wine , or eat too high or luxurious meats . dutifully : to obey their parents , governesses , tutors , or mistresses , with all humility , care , diligence , willingness , and love . then they asked her , if they might not lawfully entertain suiters ? she said , yes ; but so , as to have some friend by , as witness , that they may not give them cause to brag of their received-favours , or to challenge promises , or to receive disgrace by their inconstancies ; but to hear their suit with attention , to return them an answer with discretion ; to entertain modestly , or deny them civilly . then they asked her , what age was best to marry in ? she said , at the years of twenty : for at that age ( said she ) time doth both usher and follow you : and at those years a woman is like the sun at high-noon , being then in full strength , glory , and splendor , as being past the dawning-day of infancy , and hath enlightned the dark clouds of ignorance , and is fill'd with the sweet morning-dew of good education : and at this height you give a full light of beauty , without shadows ; a clear day of wit , without misty errors , or foggy follies ; a comfortable warmth , by an assured setled love ; a nourishing life , by a fruitful womb : for marriage , in childish years , is like unseasonable weather , wherein nothing is brought forth kindly : it dries the sap of youth , shrinks up the body of growth ; it nips the buds of beauty , blasts the blossoms of modesty , withers the leaves of pleasure , spoils the fruits of birth , and kills the root of love. if women marry before they come to full growth , their children are most commonly weak and infirm ; for when a young and tender slip bears fruit , the fruit is most commonly little , or insipid , or very watrish ; and those forward trees last not so long , nor are so strong nor large , nor flourish so much , as those that bear more late . likewise , when women marry before they are experienced in knowledg , or have solid judgment , they most commonly repent , having been deceived , and despising the acts of their youth , or condemning their childish affections , or rather fondness : for youth is rather fond , than truly loving , by reason they have not judgment to distinguish merit and worth from vanities and trifles ; for they will be catch'd with sweet banquets , perswaded with kind words , enticed with gay clothes , and won with pedling toys ; nay , many young maids will marry for no other reason , but to wear a wedding-ring ; for they never enquire after the birth , fortunes , breeding , or disposition of their suiters , but observe whether they be brave or no ; a silver and gold-laced suit they prize more than lands and livings ; gay ribbans , and flanting feathers , they esteem more than titles or birth ; to dance , and make a courtly congey , they account exact breeding ; their flattering courtship they believe is good nature , and gentle disposition : they think them very wise if they talk much , and very valiant if they swear or rant highly ; very noble if they brag ; very handsome if they be fine ; and very fine , if they be gay . three or four lacqueys they take to be most honourable attendance , and more than forty other servants ; and the master of a race-horse sooner wins a mistress , and with more facility , than the wager for which he runs . but let me warn you ( said she ) of bawds , for they are more crafty , and have more devices and policies to deceive young virgins , vvives , or vvidows , than machiavel , or the wisest states-men , to cozen the people . of which bawds there are four sorts : a procuring bawd , a protecting bawd , a conniving bawd , and a flattering bawd. a procuring bawd , is to make love-matches , and contrive love-meetings . a protecting bawd , is to help lovers in distress , as to entertain , or hide , or conceal lovers . a conniving bawd , is to wink , or to take no notice of lovers designs , hindring not their meetings , nor obstructing their desires , but leave them both to time and opportunity . a flattering bawd , is to palliate lovers faults , excuse lovers follies , to maintain lovers arguments , and to plead lovers freedoms . but many one , said she , are bawds to corrupt their own virtue ; and are as ingenious and industrious to cozen themselves , as those that get a fee or bribe to cozen another . wherefore , said she , women should guard their chastity with temperance and prudence , with courage and constancy , with innocence and modesty , with honour and piety . then they asked her , whether it was a disgrace and dishonour to live to be an old maid ? she said , no : for virginity , said she , may be compared to angels for purity and innocency ; and to be like angels , is no dishonour to any age , sex , or quality : but if a woman cannot be free from scandals , or safe from injuries , she ought to marry : for a husband is a tower , and a champion , to keep and defend a woman's chastity and reputation . then they asked her , why old maids were most commonly scorned and despised ? she answered , it was out of a corrupt nature in mankind , which strives to scandalize virtue ; and a spightful reproach from the masculine sex , that would corrupt all the female kind . besides , said she , the generality of mankind think it a disgrace to be ignorant in any thing in nature , although it be in vice ; for they had rather be criminals than ignorant . but virtue , said she , desires to know no more than for vertue 's use . the fifteenth sort were lovers . and they asked her , vvhat made love so painful ? she said , that a lover was as if he were tied to a post , his mind being firmly fixed upon one object : but when the mind is stretch'd , said she , with admiration , then is a lover nailed with thoughts , as it were , upon a cross ; for admiration is extension , and yet is fixed ; and when the mind , said she , is extendedly fixed , the spirits grow faint , the senses dull , the complexion pale , the body sick , the flesh withers , and the strength decays : whereas if the thoughts , said she , were loose , the mind would be at liberty , and free from love's tormenting-pains . then they asked her , vvhy lovers were apt to weep ? she said , that when the mind was crucified , it was a hundred to one but it would bleed : for , said she , tears are the blood of the mind , although they flow in the body ; for the head and the heart , said she , are the cisterns that are fill'd with this blood ; and the eyes are the veins or artery-pipes , through which it runs ; and when the mind is wounded , it bleeds ; which blood is dropping-tears , that fall upon the cheeks , and sometimes gush out in a full stream . then they asked her , vvhy they were apt to sigh ? she said , sighs were the minds pulse ; and when the mind was sick , the pulse beats strong , fast , and unevenly ; which made lovers sigh softly , smutheringly , and sometimes deeply and strongly . then they asked her , vvhat made lovers groan ? she said , groans were the mind's voice ; and when it felt pains , it complained , as finding no ease . then they asked her , vvhat made lovers extravagant ? she said , that extravagantness was a distemper in the mind ; which distemper was caused by the pain it felt . then they asked her , if there were no cure ? she said , yes ; time was a good physician ; and change , the only remedy : unless ( said she ) the object of love be unalterable , and then it is dangerous . but ( said she ) the mind would be well and free from such pains , if it were not for the appetites , which are never pleased , but are restless , run after excess , and hunt after variety ; for they are always in pain , either in desiring and not enjoying , or else with surfeiting of what they have fed upon : for the period of the appetites , is excess ; and excess is surfeit ; and surfeit is sickness ; and desire is travelling , and travelling is restless , and restlesness is wearisome , and wearisomness is painful ; insomuch as before we get to our desired end , we are tired or dead . seldom do lovers weep , sigh , groan , or tremble , but to make love , or rather to dissemble : for some can forge those passions by the dozen , and act them all , poor women for to cozen . the sixteenth sort of visiters , were poets . who asked her , why poets were most commonly poor ? she said , poets are employed with contemplations , that they have no time for fruition ; for poets , said she , had rather have fancies in their heads , than money in their purse ; and take more pleasure in expressing the one , than in spending the other ; which makes their imaginations their chiefest possessions ; being careless of fortune's goods , despising her service , regarding neither her frowns nor her favours ; being entertained by nature , whom they most industriously serve , and diligently attend . then they asked her , who were most in nature's favour , poets or philosophers ? she answered , there was no doubt to be made , but that she esteemed and loved poets the best : for ( said she ) natural philosophers tire nature with enquiries , trouble her with searching and seeking about , anger her with their erroneous opinions , tedious disputations , and sensless arguments , and make her outragious with their cruel extractions , substractions , and dissections . as for moral philosophers , said she , they restrain , enclose , and tye nature , as one that is mad , tormenting her beyond all reason : but sometimes , said she , with strugling and striving , she breaks out ; but cannot get so far , but they straight get hold of her again ; which makes them always at variance . but poets , saith she , never cross nor anger her , nor torment her ; they please her all they can , and humour her every way ; they sooth her passions , feed her appetites , delight her senses , praise her wit , admire her beauty , adorn her person , and advance her fame . then they asked her , what the muses were ? she said , that the muses were nature's dressers , and poet's mistresses ; to whom they made love , and several courtships . then they asked her , what poets were ? she said , poets were nature's painters , which drew her to the life ; yet some do flatter her , said she , and some do her wrong ; but those that flatter her , she favours most ( as all great ladies do ) . then they asked her , what was the ground of poetry ? she said , distinguishing and similizing , which is , said she , judgment and fancy : as for numbers , rhyme , and rhetorick , they are but the several accoutrements , but no part of the body of poetry . then they asked her , what was the effect of poetry ? she said , to move passions , to describe humours , to express actions , to correct errors , to condemn follies , to persecute vice , to crown virtue , to adorn the graces , to entertain time , to animate youth , to refresh age , to encourage noble endeavours , to quicken the spirits , to please the senses , to delight the mind , to recreate the thoughts , to encrease knowledg , to instruct the understanding , to preserve the memory , to refine language , to praise heaven , to enflame zeal , to register life , to in-urn death , to pencil nature , and raise fame . then the poets asked her , if wit might not be gotten by industry ? she said , yes : for , though it is nature's work to make a brain strong , and well-temper'd , or put it in tune ; yet it is learned practice and skill , that must play therewith ; like a lute , although it should be well strung , and justly tuned , yet if there were no hands , or other things , to set it in motion , it would become useless ; and unless it were tried , it would not be known whether it could sound or no ; and one that was not practised and learnt in the art of that instrument , might jangle , but hardly play a composed tune , or make any harmony therewith . so a brain becomes dull for want of use , stupid for want of subject , and barren for want of learning ; unless nature doth play on the instruments she makes , without the help of art : which she can do , and doth sometimes ; but so seldom , that it is a wonder . but although she doth not always make use of art , she never but doth make use of time ; for time is her chief instrument , with which she works , and produceth all things . i perceive , said she , that few profit by reading over or repeating of their own wit ; for it is like the breath of water-divers , who have two bags , one filled with air , the other to put in breath that issues out ; and that breath that goes out , can never be drawn back for use ; for the life of the body must be fed with fresh air , or else it is smuthered out : so the life of wit must be fed with new subjects ; or else it becomes idle , or ( panting ) dyes . the seventh sort that visited her , were aged persons . they asked her , what made age so dull ? she said , that most commonly aged bodies had melancholy minds ; their thoughts , as their bodies , were always travelling towards death ; unless ( said she ) it be the irrational sort , who live only to their appetites , and dye like beasts : for although old father time preches death to them every minute , they sensually ( or being accustomed to his doctrine ) regard him not , but follow their senses as long as they can , until they become as insensible , as before irrational . then they asked her , what made mankind afraid to dye ? she said , pain , and oblivion : but , said she , all creatures are afraid of the one ; but none but mankind are afraid of the other . then they asked her , what age endured the most violent pangs of death ? she said , middle-age , and perfect growth , as being strongest bodies : for perfect growth , with middle-age , is like a well-built house , throughly seasoned , and strongly setled ; which makes death take the greater pains to pull it down . but infacy and age , said she , are like to houses newly wrought , or rotten with long time , which the least puff of wind lays level with the ground . then they asked her , what course of life was best for age to live ? she said , piously , temperately , soberly , easily , peaceably , pleasantly , and sagely : to be pious in serving the gods duly ; and to be compassionate and charitable : for the aged many times seem as if they were tired in the service of the gods , making their age a lazy excuse for their omissions . and age having the experience of the changes of fortune , the accidents of chance , the miseries and cruelties in nature , and the havocks and spoils death makes , grow hard-hearted : for , as time hardens a tender plant with the growth ; so custom hardens a tender heart with frequency . as also , having observed the false natures , the malicious dispositions , the subtil designs , the self-ends , the cruel actions in the generality of mankind , they are apt to censure , mistrust , and condemn all ; which makes their charity cold , and assistance slow . they should be bountiful ; for age seeing the many miserie 's that poverty brings , and the power that riches hath , become oft-times so covetous , and so sparing , that they become miserable , making their stores their prisons , their gold their shackles , lashing themselves with the rods of scarcity and inconveniency ; and though their blood streams not through a porous skin , yet are their veins shrunk up , and dry within ; they feed on thoughts , as lovers do ; and their gold is their mistress , admiring it as the fairest of nature's works , worship it as a deity , believe all happiness lives therein , and good is produced thereby . but those that have a generous soul by nature , and have been accustomed to relieve by practice , encrease in humanity , compassion , charity , and liberality , as in years : also , their love and piety is fuller of fervencies ; and though the lamp of their life is blinking , yet the flames of their zeal are more clear ; for as their oil of life wasts , their oil of devotions encreases continually , pouring in glory , praises , and thanksgiving . likewise , said she , age should live soberly and temperately : as for temperance , said she , age is a distemper in it self ; and therefore they should have a greater care in ordering themselves ; but some are so far from patching the ruins of time , or propping , or upholding a sagging , sinking life , that they make the rents greater , and pull down the building sooner than nature intended , disturbing their bodily rest , and peaceable mind , by their unseasonable hours , and unnecessary cares ; as also , by their unwholsome diets , and disordered appetites , which weakens nature , and disturbs health , more than otherwise they would be . but those that are prudently wise , survey themselves , and industriously maintain life in as good repairations as they can , placing shelters before it , or laying covers upon it , to defend and keep it from boisterous storms , and nipping colds . likewise , they repair it with nourishing food , comfortable cordials , and quiet rest ; which makes them appear like a famous monument , or an ancient palace , whose stately structure cannot be buried in the ruins . they should also live soberly , gravely , and reservedly : for an aged body , with a vain mind , fantastical humours , extravagant actions , apish behaviours , and idle discourses , suit not well together ; they appear both uncomely , undecently , and unnaturally . for , can there be any thing vainer , than for age to rant and swagger , brag and boast , or to be vain-glorious ? or , can there be any thing more phantastical , than for age to be inconstant and various , pining and spightful , gossipping and thwarting , amorous and wanton ? and can there be more phantasticalness , than for age to be fooling and toying , sporting and playing , dancing and singing , flanting and revelling , posting and travelling , searching and seeking , sharking and fawning , crouching and creeping ? or , can there be more apishness , than to see age full of imitation , as to affect a dancing , jetting , strutting , stragling gait ; a pruning , jointing , wreathing , rowling posture ; a simpring , fleering , jeering , mopping , mewing countenance ; or leering , fleering , winking , gloting eyes ? and what can be idler , than to hear age talk lasciviously , buffoonly , impertinently , falsly , amorously , vain-gloriously , maliciously , factiously , and wickedly ? but sober age hath a setled mind , quiet thoughts , well governed passions , temperate appetites , noble resolutions , honest designs , prudent actions , rational discourses , and majestical behaviours . for an easie life , said she , age should shun all troublesome offices , painful employments , tedious travellings , long speeches , impertinent talkers , hard couches , uneasie garments , sharp colds , burning heats ; also surfeits , or unpleasant or loathsome meats or drinks ; for it were better to dye , than live in pain ; and the infirmities of age is pain enough , without any addition to encrease them . likewise , age should strive to live a peaceable life , as neither to hear quarrels , or make quarrels , or be a party in quarrels , or quarrelsome business ; should abate all turbulent passions , restless cares , endless desires , vexing thoughts . it should also avoid all clamours or mournful noises ; cruel , dreadful , or pitiful objects : they should forgive injuries freely , suffer injuries patiently , submit to power willingly , or at least readily : for life is a torment when peace is banished ; and to have an unquiet life , a troubled mind , joined with a weak body , would be as bad as hell's torments . the last is , to have a pleasant life : for age being apt to be melancholy , it ought to please it self , to divert its saddest thoughts , and raise its drooping spirits . besides , age hath most reason to please it self , having by nature the shortest while to live ; and they are most unwise , that make not the best use , or take not the most profit of time. but some may say , that age cannot take pleasure , by reason that pleasure lives in the senses ; and the senses , which are the strings , organs , or pipes of pleasure , are broke , or out of tune ; and the mind , they will say , is subject to ruinous time , as much as the body and senses : for knowledg , which is the foundation thereof ; and understanding , the building thereon ; and memory , the doors thereto ; and remembrance , the windows therein , is apt to decay ; which forceth the inhabitant , which is delight , to forsake its mansion : but i speak not to those that are so old , or so infirm , as to be past thinking , as it were ; for those are but breathing-carcasses , not living-men : but i speak to such , whose knowledg is more , and understanding clearet , by time's experience : for , though the body hath a fixt time to arrive to a perfect growth and perfection , yet the mind hath not ; for the mind can never know nor understand so much , that it might not know and understand more ; neither hath time such a tyrannical power over the mind , as over the body . wherefore , said she , the mind may have delight when the body is past pleasures ; and the thoughts , which are the children of the mind , may have more various pastimes and recreations to delight them , than the senses can have varieties of substance to work pleasures out of ; for they can create delight in themselves , which the senses cannot ; for they become dull , and grow as dead , when they have nothing to work on . when the thoughts are like spiders , or silk-worms , that can spin out of their own bowels , which is the mind ; for the mind is the bowels or womb of thoughts : and though some think the mind would be like an empty house , if it were not furnished by the senses , and outward objects ; yet some minds are so largely , curiously , and sumptuously built by nature , and with such excellent , rich , and strong materials , that they need not the senses . the several objects that the senses bring in , do but incumber it , and lumber it , hiding the curious architecture , and shadowing the light thereof ; but howsoever , to please or delight the mind by the senses , age must hear sweet charming musick , view delightful objects , smell comfortable scents , taste savoury meats , drink delicious drinks , be lapt in soft silks , or warm furr . likewise , they must converse with and pleasant company , and so recreate themselves in what they most delight : for wise and noble age cannot delight in any thing but what is honourable , allowable , and commendable ; and whosoever lives temperately , prudently , soberly , easily , peaceably , and pleasantly , lives sagely ; but , said she , wise age majestick seems , like gods above ; their countenance is mercy join'd with love : their silver hairs are like to glorious rays ; their eyes , like monarch's scepter , power sways . their life is justice seat , where judgment 's set ; their tongue is the sharp sword , which truth doth whet . their grave behaviour the balance , which poise the scales of thoughts and actions , without noise : merit 's the grains , which makes them even weight ; honesty the steddy hand that holds them streight . the eighteenth sort were soldiers . and they asked , what sort of men were fit to be generals ? she said , those that could command themselves , were wise enough to command others . then they asked her , what sort of men were best for other commanders and military officers ? she said , those that had learnt to obey ; for from their obedience they could well command . then they asked her , of what age men should be chosen for soldiers ? she said , that men of twenty were desperate , and men of thirty were couragious , and from thirty they were valiant : for courage ( said she ) is not so furious as desperateness ; nor valour so rash as courage : and beasts ( said she ) are furious and couragious ; but none but men are valiant : but ( said she ) of necessity there must be men of all ages , that are able to bear arms ; or else there will not be men enough to make up a number : for , though ( said she ) fury is soon spent by violent force , and courage is weaker by rash follies ; yet if none should be chosen but those that are rightly valiant , there would not be a troop where there should be an army : for true valour ( said she ) is such an equal temper and mixture of capacities , qualities , and virtues compounded , as justice , prudence , temperance , patience , judgment , understanding , resolution , audacity , circumspection , and the like , to make valour , that there are few valiant men to be found ; whenas of men of courage , whole armies are full : for , courage is only a passion , without any mixture of fear ; or rather , it is an appetite to adventures . then they asked her , what assaulting-arms were best ? she said , the sword : for , said she , cannons , muskets , carbines , pistols , or the like , are fitter to fight with walls , than men : besides , said she , there is no assaulting-arms that stands at a distance , but seem cowardly , as bows , slings , pistols , guns , and the like ; which make men seem as if they were afraid to meet and encounter body to body , when a sword , or the like weapon , seems ( as it is ) heroick and manly . then they asked her , whether an army were better to intrench , or lye in garrison towns ? she said , to intrench : for , said she , the soldiers will be careful to defend their walls of mudd , which are trenches ; but when they lye in garrisons , they become negligent , as thinking the walls of stone should defend them . then they asked her , how they should begin the onset of a battel ? she said , closely , coldly , and temperately , lest their force should waste in their fury , and disorders should grow by the violence thereof . then they asked her , how they should behave themselves in a victory ? she said , humbly and mercifully . then they asked her , how they should behave themselves when they lost ? she said , patiently and cheerfully ; to shew their spirits were not dejected with their ill fortune . the last sort that visited her , were historians . they asked her , whether it were worth the taking pains , to write an history ? she said , there was no pains worth the taking , but for the cause of truth , for right sake , and for the advancement of good. as for an history , said she , it cannot be exactly true , because there are so many several intentions interwoven with several accidents ; and several actions divided into so many several parties and several places ; and so many several reporters of several opinions , partialities , understandings , judgments , and memorials , which give such various relations of one and the same action , that an historian ( being but one man ) cannot possibly know the truth ; which makes them write so falsly , whereby right is injured and degraded of that honour which is due unto its merit ; or else that honour is given where there is not merits to deserve it . neither doth history add good to an human life , or peace to a disordered state , or zeal to a pious soul : for it instructs the present life with the vices , follies , and ambitions , rapines , cruelties , craft , subtilties , and factions , of former ages ; which makes the present age more bold to do the like , and desirous to follow their fore-fathers steps ; which rather inflames the distempers , than gives peace to a commonwealth ; indeed it distempers a peaceable commonwealth , and oft-times brings it to ruin , over-heating the youth , and hardning the aged : neither doth it add zeal ; for reading in history the several religions , and many gods , that wise men held and prayed to , in every age , weakens their faith with doubt of the right , not knowing what to chuse . also historians are , for the most part , detractors ; for they oftner blurr men's reputations , than glorifie them ; and the world is apt to believe the worst part : for , one pen may blurr a reputation , but one pen will hardly glorifie a reputation ; for glory requireth many pens , many witnesses , or else the world will not believe it ; when one accusing-pen shall serve to condem the most noble persons , and heroick actions ; so unjust the world is . they are also contrary one to another , writing according to their opinions , judgment , and belief , not often to the truth ; for some praise those men and actions that others dispraise ; causing doubts to the readers , who know not which to believe : besides , they are so partial to sides and factions , that to the adverse party they note things to their disadvantage ; or aggravate their errors or imperfections , and leave out some things that are of high worth , and worthy the remembrance ; or else lessen them in their relations . but to those they adhere to , they do the contrary ; they either obscure or excuse their errors , imperfections , and crimes ; and illustrate , with false lights , their dim virtues ; or give them such praises they never deserved . wherefore , no history should be esteemed , but what was written by the authors themselves ; as , such as write the history of their own lives , actions , and fortunes , and the several accidents that befell in their time , and to their knowledg : yet , ( said she ) i wish i might out-live the historians of these times , that i might write a history of the historians , there to describe their birth and breeding , their life , their actions , their fortunes , their interest ; and let the world judg , whether they writ truth , and without partiality . but to draw towards an end of my tale : all sorts of people resorting to hear her speak , she became so famous , as that a great monarch ( whose kingdom was neighbouring to the countrey she was born , bred , and lived in ) had a great curiosity to see and hear her ; for the fame of her beauty was equal to the fame of her wit ; and putting himself into a disguise , left his kingdom and wife , to visit this lady ; whom when he saw , and had heard speak , her wit , beauty , and graceful behaviour did so ravish him , that he became a deseperate lover : whereupon he secretly revealed himself unto her , perswading ( all he could ) to leave that inclosed life , proffering her to be divorced from his wife , and to marry her : but she refused his offers , despised his love , forbid his suit , and absented her person ; which caused him to return in a rage and fury , sending ambassadors to proclaim warrs , unless the state would deliver the lady into his power . but they absolutely denied to deliver her , thinking it both a wicked and dishonourable disgrace to their countrey , although they perceived an utter ruin was like to fall upon them , by reason the kingdom was in a weak condition , caused by former warrs . but it came no sooner to her hearing , but she desired to meet the ambassadors in a publike audience , which they granted ; where multitudes of people came thronging to see her ; and when they were met , she thus spake : i come not here to make eloquent orations to divulge my wit , or to present my beauty to the view of many eyes : for , though i may thank nature for her bounteous gifts , yet i have not that vanity or pride , for to allure or draw from virtue 's side . but i come to answer these threatning-ambassadors ; for i cannot call them noble , or honourable , since they come upon a base design , and to an unjust end : but let me tell them , that the gods would hate me , should i break my holy vow . next , i should grieve my father's sleeping-ashes , should i disobey his dyingcommand . thirdly , i should be a dishonour to my birth and sex , should i live incontinently . lastly , i should curse my birth , hate my life , blast my fame , should i be the cause of my countrey 's ruin ; and my countrey had cause to do the same , should it beruined for me : but since it will prove a mischief , sin , and shame , to live ; honour , prudence , love , and justice , bids me dye : wherefore i have sacrificed my life for my countrey 's peace and safety ; my unspotted chastity , holy vows , and dutiful obedience , and to quench the raging lust of a wicked tyrant . and growing very sick , she became so weak , that she could stand no longer ; but gently sinking to the ground , she fell : whereupon all that could get near , run unto her to help her : but she told them it was in vain ; for poyson ( saith she ) hath been the engine that hath broken open the gate of life , to let death in ; and so immediately dyed . which the people no sooner understood , but made such outcries , lamentations , and mournings , as if there had been an utter desolation of the whole world. then after some time of preparations , they buried her with great solemnity , and intombed her costly ; the state setting up her statue of brass , for her courage and love to her countrey : the church deified her a saint , for her virtue and piety ; and the clergy raised altars , where all the kingdom twice a year did offer unto her solemn sacrifices : and the poets built several pyramides of praise of her beauty , wit , virtue , and sweet graces ; which pyramides reach'd to fame's highest tower : and the historians writ her life and death in golden letters , and recorded them in fame's brazen tower , that all the world might know and follow the example of her heroick spirit , generous soul , chast body , pious life , and voluntary death . heaven's library , which is fame's palace , purged from errors and vices . jove , and some of the other gods , being set in council , pallas being one , rose up , and bowing to jove , thus spake : great jove , said she , i ought in duty and love to inform you , not only of the vices and errors , which are numerous in the world , and in time may bring it to confusion ; but of those errors and vices which are crept into your great library ( fame's palace ) , and if order be not taken to destroy them , they will devour all your best and noblest records . jove answers , that vices were as serpents , and errors as worms , bred in the bowels of nature , of which she could never be cured , for the gods had no medicine strong enough to purge them out ; and by reason they were from all eternity , they could not be destroyed : for , if any thing could be destroyed that is from all eternity , then we our selves might be destroy'd : but , said jove , we can cast them out of our own mansions , though we cannot cast them out of nature's bowels ; also , we can hinder them from coming in : wherefore fame is to be reproved for suffering the library to be so foul , and full of filthy vermin . whereupon mercury was sent to call fame to appear before jove and his council ; so when fame came , jove told her , that gods and goddesses ought to be just and upright , and to have their palaces pure , and full of truth ; which ( said he ) you nor your palace hath not been ; for you are partial , and your court full of faction , and my library ( your palace ) foul , and full of wormy errors ; which if it had been kept pure and clean , they would never have entred ; or if they had entred , you might have caused them to have been swept out by old father time . fame answered , that it was not her fault ; for mars , venus , and fortune , had sent them in ; and it is not for me to oppose so great a god as mars , or so great a goddess as venus ; or to sit as judg , to determine what was best to be flung out , or what to be placed therein ; for none is fit to judg those causes , but you ( great jove ) and your council . jove approving what fame said , told his council , that after they had taken some repast , they would sit in council again , and their only business should be , to purge and cleanse their library . so after they had feasted with ambrosia and nectar , they returned to council ; where they did first decree : that all those records that were to be cast forth , should be heapt up together , and then they would decree how to dispose of them . after that , they did decree , that all those records that were of usurpers and invaders , should be cast forth . next , all fabulous and profitless records . thirdly , all wanton and amorous records . fourthly , all records of useless laws , and inhuman sacrifices . fifthly , all records of tedious speeches , or vain or factious oratory . sixthly , all obstructive controversie , as being destructive to truth , should be cast out : also , tedious disputes and sophistry . but mars , cupid , and mercury , opposed it as much as they could , saying , that if all these records should be cast forth , the famous library would be very empty . jove said , it was an infamous library 〈◊〉 they were kept therein ; and that no records ought to be in fame's library , but of such acts as suppress'd vice , and advanc'd virtue , and were prositable for the life of man ; and those of necessary inventions ; but chiefly , those that glorified the gods , and sung their praises , declaring their power , wisdom , justice , and love ; whose authors ought to have their memory recorded to everlasting time . as for the works of the poets by nature , said jove , the fates have decreed them several places in the library ; wherefore it is not in our power to remove them : but those that are like false coyn , that have only got , by unjust means , the stamp of the true figure , and not the worth of the metal ; such as are dross , or basely mixt , not pure and perfect pieces , we shall find out by their trial . after they had decreed the generalities , they fate in council on the particularities ; as , which were unworthy to be kept , or worthy to be cast out . first , they began with moral and natural philsophers , physicians , and chymists ; where jove said , all but some few ought to be cast forth ; for , to what purpose should we stuff the library with the repetitions and false commentaries , of which all modern records are ( for the most part ) full , being only alter'd in language . as for the philosophers , the first shall be plato , and his works shall be all kept , but his commonwealth ; and that shall be put out , by reason it was so strict it could never be put in use , nor come into practise : the rest that were nam'd , were pythagoras , epicurus , socrates , and aristotle . as for physicians , only hippocrates , and galen ; and paracelsus for his medicines ; and reymund lully for the philosoper's-stone : for although their records be lost in the rubbish of the library , yet old father time shall be employed to find them out , and other records that are buried in the dust , which are worthy of perspicuous places . also aristotle's logick and rhetorick was kept ; and for gramar , lilly. the next they came to consider , were mathematical records ; whereof none was to be kept but archimedes and euclid . as for the records of invention , all that are either necessary , profitable , or pleasant , shall be inrolled : but all such invention as is hurtful , distrustful , obstructful , vain and useless , shall be cast forth . then said one of the gods , archimedes must be cast out , for he invented many engines of warr. 't is true , said jove ; but by reason it was in the defence of the city he lived in , and was a native thereof , he shall be spared . the next were astronomers ; whereof four were kept ; copernicus , tichobrache , ptolomy , and gallileo . the next sort were orators and law-makers : as for law-makers , there were moses , licurgus , and solon kept : for orators , only thucydides and demosthenes : as for tully , he was a vain boasting fellow , and seneca a meer pedant , and a dissembling , pretending philosopher ; and therefore they shall out . for politicks , only achitophel and machiavel . then they came to heroick records . jove said , that all the records that were of the actions of those they call the heroes , ought most of them to be cast out , being violaters of peace , and destroyers of righteous laws , and divine ceremony ; prophaners of our temples , breaking down our altars and images , robbing us of our treasures , to maintain their ill-gotten power therein ; or to get that power they have no right to ; having no justice but strength to make their titles good : besides , they are the greatest troublers of mankind , robbers , and thieves , disposing the right of ancient possessions , and defacing the truth of ancient times . with that mars rose up , and bowing to jove , said , may it please your great god-head , there are priests of yours that have made it good by divine laws , and many lawyers that justifie it by the laws of every kingdom , and by the laws of nations ; and will you cast down that which your priests and lawyers preach and plead up ? with that pallas rose up , and spoke : great jove , said she , wisdom knows , that force makes the gown stoop ; and mercury knows , that orators tongues are as often brib'd for fear , as reward ; and those two professions plead always for the stronger side , and falsifies your text for interest , and turns right to wrong , and makes the text and laws a nose of wax , which will take any print ; or else , how should various disputes arise in that we hold sacred , as divinity ; and every cause disputed pro and con , in all courts , by opposite counsels ? wherefore ( all-seeing jove ) your power will rectifie it , and it will be justice to throw them out . wherefore , let all the records of all those of the heroick acts and heroes both of greeks and romans , that were invaders or usurpers , with their heroes ( as alexander , hannibal , scipio , caesar ) , and all the rest ; and all other records and heroes , of what nation soever , which is of that in jurious , turbulent , ambitious , and vain-glorious nature , whereof there be thousands , which ought to be cast into hell's dungeon , the place of infamy , there let their actions be recorded ; and not usurp heaven's great and glorious library , as they did earth's . then ( said mars ) you must cast all the heroick actions and worthies , in homer's works , into that dungeon . that must not be , said jove : for homer was heaven's chronologer ; and the records of the gods of heaven must not be cast into hell. besides , there was a just pretence for that warr ; for the grecians had received a palpable injury , and the trojans did but defend themselves ; and though the injury done , and the wrong received , were but by two single men ; and the quarrel but for a leight inconstant woman ; yet it was a riot : and the more faulty , and less pardonable , because it was a riot of our deputies on earth . for kings are the gods deputies and vicegerents , and therefore sacred , and ought not to be injured ; but when they are , their injuries are to be severely punished ; and heaven forbid we should be so unjust , as to cast out all heroick actions , and warring heroes ; no , we cast out only those that make warr unjustly , vain-gloriously , or covetously . then mars ask'd , if tamberlain should be cast out ? jove said , yes ; for he had no right to the turks empire . then he ask'd , if scanderbeg should be thrown out ? jove said , no : for it is lawful for any to get their own , and to maintain their right by what force soever : and that scanderbeg had reason to fight for , and to maintain by force his own inheritance . then he asked , if the records of the jews heroes , and their heroick actions in the land of canaan , should be cast out ? jove said , no : for that land was given them by the gods. then they came to romances ; where jove said , all romances should be cast out , but don quixot , by reason he hath wittily abused all other romances ; wherefore he shall be kept , and also have his books writ in golden letters . then cupid spoke in their behalf , and entreated jove , that they might not be cast out : for , said cupid , romances work as great effects upon the hearts of mortals , as my arrows ( tipt with gold ) do : besides , they are my mother venus looking-glasses . jove said , they did corrupt mortals thoughts , and made them neglect their divine worship , causing them to spend their time vainly , idly , and sinfully . then cupid desired jove to spare amadis de gaul . but jove said , that should be the first that should be cast out , by reason it was the original of all the rest . likewise , said jove , all fables shall be cast out , but esop's fables , which profit mankind by his morals . also , lucian and rabelais shall be kept , both for their huge wit and judgment , rectifying scholars understandings ; and though some that are spiteful at their wit , call them scoffers , yet they are not so , but teachers of truth in a pleasant stile ; and those that say they are prophane , judg presumptuously and maliciously of them . at this sentence mercury joyed . at last they came to judg of poets ; where homer , pindar , and anacreus , were preferr'd as the three first . then one of the gods , named virgil as the fourth . jove said , it was a question whether virgil was a true poet by nature , or no , by reason he was rather an imitator of homer , than of nature ; and his praise was more for his language , than either for fancy or natural description : wherefore , said jove , he might be questioned for a true-born poet ; and since it may be doubted he is of a bastard-kind , i will prefer horace before him , who certainly is a true-begotten poetical son of nature . another of the gods said , i should judg ovid to be plac'd before either of them both , for the sweetness of his verse , and fineness of his fancy ; the curious intermixing , and the subtil interweaving of his several discourses , theams , arguments , or his transitions . jove said , for his part he was no friend to ovid for divulging his several amours ; and if it were in my power ( said jove ) to alter the decrees of fate , i would cast him forth ; but by reason he is a right poet by nature , i cannot ; but yet i can place him in heaven's library as i will ; and therefore he shall not be before either horace or virgil , but he shall stand in the sixth place ; and in the seventh place shall stand martial . cupid said , your god-head hath forgot tibullus and his son. no , said jove ; they ought to be put out , because their verses were wanton . cupid said , your god-head cannot put them out , because they are poets by nature . then let them ( said jove ) be placed in some out-corner of the library . at which sentence cupid srown'd , knowing his mother venus would grieve to have them dis-respected . after them were placed the comedians , terence and plautus ; and the tragedian , seneca . and having given their judgments of all the ancient poets , which were more than could be numbred in this place ; they tried the moderns , whereof they could not find one true poet by nature , amongst five hundred : for though there is an infinite company of them , yet hardly one true one amongst them all ; for most of the moderns have been like a company of ravens , that live upon dead carkasses , so they upon old authors ; and some have been like maggots , that have been bred in their dead flesh , which is the living works of dead authors ; and some like hornets , and some like bees : but very few rightly begotten from nature ; indeed so few , as i am loath to set them down : so most of the moderns were cast out . then after they had divided the records , what to be put out , and what to be kept in , there rose a great dispute amongst the gods , how those that were cast out should be disposed of ? at last jove decided the case : those that were wicked , mischievous , and base , should be put into hell ; and those that were idle , vain , useless , and foolish , should be drown'd in the river of styx ; but they were forc'd to make new boats to waft some to hell , and to drown others in the river ; for there was such an infinite company , that charon had not leisure , neither could one boat serve their turn . but then there rose another dispute about those that go to hell ; for , said some of the gods , the records must not be in paper , nor parchment , nor in metal , nor stone , by reason there is a continual and eternal fire in hell , which will burn the one , and melt and moulder away the other . whereupon jove ordered , that those that were to go into hell , should be recorded in salamander-stone , on which the fire hath no force ; for the more it is burnt , the more it is purified . after they had decreed this , all the records of tyrants , usurpers , invaders , murderers , thieves , ravishers , extortioners , detractors , licentious mutiniers , factious , prophane , and rebellious records , with evil inventions , were cast into hell , a room being provided as a library , and one of the furies with a fiery trumpet to sound out their reproach : and all those records that were vain , useless , idle , amorous , and wanton ; with all those that were full of sophistry , tedious , obscure , pedantical ; and those that were only repetitions and false commentaries ; also , those of useless inventions , and that were meer rhymers , were cast into the river of styx , and so drown'd in oblivion . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * phaeton , solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, the method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, the method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding / by j.s. sergeant, john, - . [ ], [i.e. ], [ ] p. printed for roger clavil ... abel roper ... and thomas metcalf ..., london : . reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. philosophy, modern -- th century. enlightenment. knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jennifer kietzman sampled and proofread - jennifer kietzman text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion solid philosophy asserted , against the fancies of the ideists : or , the method to science farther illustrated . with reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning human understanding . by j. s. london , printed for roger clavil at the peacock , abel roper at the black boy , both in fleetstreet , and thomas metcalf , over against earl's - court in drury-lane , . to the right honourable robert , lord viscount dunbar . my lord , had i thought that this piece i here dedicate to your lordship , was not above your , or any man's , patronage , i had shewn less respects to you in making you so mean a present . were you monarch of the universe , truth ( which it defends ) could receive no protection from your grandeur . her genius is so sublime , and her self so nobly-born , that , like him from whom she descends , she is beneficial to all , and incapable of receiving advantage from any . all extrinsecal supports , in stead of honouring her , debase her . her well-compacted and indissoluble fabrick is altogether divine : contrary to our material structures , it is built from the top ; and , its foundation laid as high as heaven it self . the god of truth has imprinted all natural truths in created beings , as in the footsteps of his infinite wisdom ; from whence , by the vehicles of our senses , they are copy'd and transcrib'd into our mind ; where , without our labour , they beget all our natural notions ; and , as speculation , and even experience , assures us , they do also , at the same time , give us some knowledge of the things themselves ; which steadily and distinctly reflected on , breed in us that best natural perfection of our understanding , science ; of which those notions are , as it were , the seeds . thus was mankind put into a plain road-way of gaining clear intellectual light , by the common providence of our good creatour . to improve in which , and to keep our thoughts from wandring into errour , the same goodness of our maker endowed us with a faculty of reflecting on the operations of our own minds ; and , on all the guilded train of our spiritual conceptions , and of the several natures and manners of them ; by which means those who were addicted to attentive reflexion , or speculation , invented a way , and setled artificial rules , how to manage their notions , judgments and discourses . which rules laid orderly together , and found by reason to be agreeable to the natures of things according to the being they had in the mind , and , therefore , solid ; did , in time , compose that excellent and most useful science call'd logick . but , my lord , the crooked byass of men's wills perverted their reason , and made them disregard this well-grounded and regular method , given them so freely by the author of nature . the heathen philosophers of old , whose god was vanity , affected to set up several sects , to pride themselves with the empty honour of being esteemed their heads . the christian schools succeeded ; who , at first , discours'd gravely on those subjects which were of a higher nature ; but , whether the circumstances did not bend their thoughts that way , or from what other reason , they settled no scientifical method to attain philosophical knowledges . yet , those who follow'd aristotle's principles , ( as the great aquinas constantly endeavoured ) did generally discourse even in such subjects , when they had occasion , very solidly . but , afterwards , when school-disputes grew to be the only fashionable learning , the multitudes of combatants increas'd , and the contests were maintain'd by several great bodies ; each of which thought it creditable to their party to set up and follow some eminent man of their own . hence this nature-taught method came to be much neglected ; and he was thought to win the prize who was the subtilest and acutest disputant , and not he who could most solidly demonstrate truth . hence , no exact and rational logick being settled and agreed on , they were apt to take up oftentimes wrong principles ; and the several conceptions of our mind were mistaken to be so many several things . demonstration was rather talk'd of for form's sake , than pursu'd and practis'd ; and , the the use of general maxims , which should establish our discourses , was scarce once thought on ; without which , demonstration was impossible . new questions in philosophy , of little or no use , were started ; and bandy'd to and fro by terms and words not well understood ; nor their sense agreed on , by the contending parties . the heat of opposition fix'd men in their own opinions . innumerable quaint and nice , and sometimes impertinent , distinctions were invented , to escape their being entangled by the arguments of their adversary . every man affected to be a proteus , and took more care to elude opposition , than to settle and establish truth on immovable grounds . the true sense of aristotle's doctrine , not being taken from himself or his first interpreters , but from some modern mis-understanders , was lost ; and his text drawn into several meanings , to abet contradictory tenets . in a word , nothing was decisively concl●●ed , nor likely to be so , by this way of school-term-learning , as things were manag'd by unmethodiz'd disputation . thus stood the affair of philosophy at the beginning of this present century ; which having been fertile of many excellent wits , two of the chiefest of them , cartesius in france , and our ingenious countryman mr. locke , having taken scandal at these miscarriages , and an aversion against that miracle of nature , aristotle , whose doctrine schoolmen had ill represented ; and being withal men of strong brains , enabling them to carry their conceptions through , and to make them coherent ; they did , out of their zeal for truth , undertake to set up new systems of philosophy ; tho' cartesius in some sort , furbish'd up , improv'd , and refin'd upon the old corpuscularian way of democritus and epicurus ; which i have fully confuted in the appendix to my method ; and , i hope , beyond all possibility of reply . but , these two gentlemen , being better vers'd in the mathematicks than in metaphysicks ; and , thence , not apprehending how corporeal natures could get into the mind , or be there ; nor , reflecting that a spiritual nature , being incomparably superiour in the rank of beings to that of corporeal things , must , consequently , have naturally and ncessarily a power to comprehend , after its manner , ( or by way of knowledge ) that inferiour one ; they were forc'd , thro' their want of higher principles , to build all knowledge , not upon the things themselves in their knowing power , but upon ideas or similitudes of them ; tho' neither of them set themselves to make out or demonstrate how we could possibly have our notions , or first notices of the things by them . now , these spiritual ideas being , most evidently , neither the things known , nor any mode or accident of those objects ; and , consequently , nothing at all of the thing in any sort , were manifestly convinced not to be the productions of creative wisdom , in which he had imprinted all natural truths , but meer fancies , coin'd by their imagination . these ideas or fancies then , and only these , they contemplated , and grounded all natural truths , ( which could have no foundation but only in the things which the first truth had made ) upon these fantastick resemblances : and , thence , they put all formal truths to consist in the agreement of those empty similitudes ; till at length ( as fancy let loose to fly at its full random , and driven forward with a quick wit , does naturally and genuinly lead ) they had introduced a kind of fanaticism into philosophy ; built , in the main , or in great part , on a pretended inward light by means of those imaginary and visionary ideas . from this introversion upon these unsolid aiery bubbles , and thence their neglecting the things themselves , and our solid natural notions , mr. locke was brought to confound corporeal and spiritual natures ; and consequently , ( these two being the adequate object of all philosophy ) all philosophical knowledge was rendred impossible . and cartesius left us no means to know whether man is one thing made up of soul and body , or two things , tack'd together by virtue of some accident ; which well consisted with their substantial distinction . hence also it came , that god was brought in at every hard pinch , to act contrary to what the natures of things requir'd ; without which , they could not lay their principles , or make their scheme cohere ; that is , they would needs make god , as he is the author and orderer of nature , to work either preternaturally or else supernaturally ; which is a plain contradiction . nay , mr. locke finding no fancy in his imaginative power that suits with our notion of [ thing , ] would perswade the world that no man living knows what a thing or substance is ; that is , that none knows what the word thing means ; which is so evident to our natural thoughts , that it is impossible for the rudest person in the world to be ignorant of it . in a word , their fancy so inveigled their reason , that they came to deny self-evident truths ; and held many other propositions , which were absolutely impossible and contradictory . wherefore , seeing philosophy reduced to this lamentable condition ; and , that solid rationality , and all truth in natural objects , were thus in imminent danger to be over-run and born down by imaginary conceits ; and apprehending that god's providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great mischiefs ; i thought it became me to re-instate reason in her soveraignty over fancy ; and , to assert to her the rightful dominion nature had given her over all our judgments and discourses . i resolved therefore to disintricate truth , ( which lay too deep for superficial fancy to fathom ) from all those labyrinths of errour . i observ'd that philosophy labour'd and languish'd under many complicated distempers , ( all springing from this way of ideas ) and that they were grown epidemical ; nor could they be cur'd by the application of remedies to this or that particular part , or by confuting this or that particular errour . hereupon , having found out the true cause of all these maladies of human understanding , i saw it was necessary to stub up by the roots that way it self ; and , by clos● and solid reasons , ( the most decisive weapons in tru●●● armory , ) to break in pieces the brittle glassy essences of those fantastick apparitions ; which , if a right way of reasoning be settled , and understood , will disappear , and vanish out of the world , as their elder sisters , the fairies , have done in this last half century . i know , my lord , reformation made by a single man , tho' but in philosophy , seldom gains credit to him who attempts it . and , it must be confess'd , that , to pretend to reform where there is no necessity , has an ill name ; and is justly held to spring from policy , interest , pride , or some such other sinister motive . but i am very confident , that whoever peruses this treatise , nay , but even the preface , will see , that the occasion of this undertaking was not only expedient , but cogent . nor can any man justly tax him of arrogance , or of usurping a dictature over other men's judgments , tho' he opposes great multitudes of speculaters , who offers his reasons to convince theirs . to this necessity , now laid open , of reforming philosophy , i shall add another , of a much more weighty concern ; and which may also rectifie some zealons well-meaning friends ; who , judging of things by their own short reach , think that the advancing truth in philosophy is little better than time and labour lost ; whereas , i , on the contrary , do really think , that the supplying what the world most wants , is the greatest , and most universal good i can possibly do . this other necessity then , of my rectifying our modern philosophy , ( which will make others see , how great a good it is , ) is this : those truths which are of a higher , and more sacred nature , can never be rightly explicated , nor consequently ( such men not valuing authority ) be duly recommended to those who dissent from them , unless true principles of philosophy be settled , and unsound ones confuted . for , since no explication of faith can be made by faith it self ; all of them must necessarily be made by our reason , shewing the conformity they have to our natural notions , or to such knowledges as we had from the things in nature ; especially , since dissenters draw their chief objections from the repugnancy of those points to our natural principles . 't is a known truth , that as every definition must be the self-same notion with what is defin'd , so must every right explication too ; it being , in reality , nothing but the unfolding what was before wrapt up closer . whence follows , that , when he who has the ill luck to have taken up false principles , comes to explicate the trinity , the incarnation , the resurrection , or any high point of reveal'd faith ; his explication must always be contrary to true principles of nature , and perhaps may have twenty real contradictions in it ; and , so , common reason ( as was said ) telling all sensible men , that the explication must be the same sense with the point which it explicates ; the tenet of faith will suffer in the opinion of witty men , by such an untoward and senseless explication ; be ridiculous to adversaries ; and be held perfect nonsense and contradiction . whereas , if the philosophy , by which those tenets are explicated , be true and solid ; then , since both natural and reveal'd truths are children of the same father , ( the god and author of all truth , ) who cannot contradict himself , and therefore those two sorts of truths cannot but agree ; it will follow , that the explication of all reveal'd points , made according to true philosophy , must needs appear to intelligent men to be most rational ; and most consonant , and not contradictory , to true natural principles : which will comfort faith in those who believe already ; recommend it to all ingenuous and indifferent seekers ; help to convert to christianity those , whose reason was formerly dissatisfy'd upon such sinister misconceits ; and , lastly , confound adversaries , by putting them past opposing it by any principles of true philosophy , and leave nothing for them to object against it , but idle and ill-grounded fancies , whose weak attempts are easily defeated . whence , i could heartily wish , that , were true philosophy in fashion , all sects ( so the state thought fit ) might have free liberty to print the best reasons they can muster up against christianity ; resting confident , that ( in that happy state of science , or true learning ) nothing in the world could gain to truth a greater advantage . till that desirable time comes , all i can do , is , to declare here publickly , that i shall take it for a great favour , if any learned socinian , deist , or atheist , would please to send me those reasons they , or their leaders , judge of most weight , why they cannot embrace the doctrine of the trinity , or christianity ; which they may do privately , and unnam'd , to the stationer who publishes this treatise ; and i do hereby promise them , i will give their objections their full force , and publish an answer to them : onely , i will expect , that their arguments shall be intrinsecal ones , or drawn from the opposition such reveal'd articles , as they mislike , are conceiv'd by them to have to some principles of logick , physicks , or metaphysicks , which are either self-evident , or which they will undertake to reduce to evidence : these onely being such objections as becomes a christian philosopher to speak to . for , if they be extrinsecal ones , and built on histories , or on groundless fancies ; or , if they consist in glossing words , in whose sense we are not agreed ; it belongs to a critick , or a historian , and is not the proper employment of a philosopher . i would not be thought , by what is said lately , to cast any reflexions on cartesius or mr. locke , ( whom i join here equally , and indifferently , ) as intending any diskindness to christianity by their new methods of philosophy : it appears both by their writings , and by their particular manner of handling their subjects , that they meant ingenuously and sincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be true. onely i must say of both of them , that , if their way of philosophizing , and , therefore , their philosophy it self , be shewn to be far from true and solid ; then , in case any chief christian tenet should come to be explicated by their ways , those sacred points themselves must necessarily , for the reason now given , receive some taint and blemish by such ill-grounded explications : and the same , for the same reason , i must say of school-philosophy too , if it proceeds upon principles that are not well-grounded , or solid . it remains , my lord , to give my reasons why this common duty i here perform to the learned part of mankind who are candidates of science , comes to be particularly address'd to your self : which , in short , are these . i was much in debt ; and it was an honest man's part to endeavour to discharge it . i ow'd much to your lordship's father , of honourable and pious memory , who both encourag'd my first endeavours , and favour'd me with a particular friendship and correspondence to his dying-day : and , i make account , such kind obligements , writ in a grateful heart , ought to be as lasting , and as binding , as those obligations drawn on paper ; and , withal , ought to devolve , by a hereditary right , to his immediate descendent , your self . i ow'd very much to your lordship 's own person , for the kind respect with which you have been pleas'd to honour me . i ow'd much to all your lordship 's nearest and noblest relations , both in the direct , and in all the collateral lines . and , lastly , since every man who writes for truth , naturally loves to be understood , i ow'd it to my self , to present this treatise particularly to your lordship ; than whom , i know none of our english nobility more acutely intelligent . it is of such a nature , by its laying the foundation of philosophy from the deepest bottom-principles , that , to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly , there was requir'd a judgment both solid , and pointed ; both which perfections meet in your lordship's great genius , in a high perfection . the diligent printer has overtaken my lazy pen , and stays for this hasty scribble ; which forces me , with an unmannerly abruptness , to write my self , my lord , your lordship 's most sincere honourer , and most humbly devoted servant , j. s. the preface , directed to those learned men of both our universities who have a due regard for truth , and a sincere desire of knowledge . gentlemen , . after i had publish'd my method to science , which i dedicated to your selves , i came to receive certain information that very many students in both the universities , and not a few of those also who were to instruct others , did apply themselves to the way of ideas , in hopes to arrive by that means at philosophical knowledge . my best judgment , grounded on very evident reasons , assur'd me , that that method was far from solid , and utterly unable to give you the true knowledge of any thing in nature ; being it self altogether groundless , and meerly superficial . i saw clearly , that to addict your thoughts to study similitudes and resemblances , ( which , as will be most evidently demonstrated , could not possibly give you any true or certain light to know the things themselves , ) was no better than ( as it is in the fable ) vitreum vas lambere , pultem non attingere . it struck me with a very sensible trouble , that the precious time and pains of such great numbers of men , who were the flower of our nation , who were hereafter to be guides to others , and whose very profession , and state of life , had addicted them wholly to the pursuit of knowledge , should be imbued with such principles as render'd the attainment of it absosolutely impossible . i look'd upon my self as one who , having spent near half a century in speculative studies , was capable to avert and redress so great a harm ; and , thence , i esteem'd my self bound in duty to make you aware of the way you have either chosen , or light into for want of a better ; that you might consider seriously whether you ought not to retrieve your steps ere you had wander'd too far in a path which could never bring you to the end you aim'd at . this consideration oblig'd me to strike at the root , and to overthrow the whole way of proceeding upon ideas , by whomsoever advanced ; and to demonstrate by many clear , and , i hope , unanswerable arguments , and multitudes of instances , that it was superficial , fruitless , insignificant , and meerly phantastical . . when i had near finish'd my method , i gave a cursory look over mr. locke's essay concerning humane understanding ; and i hap'd to light on some places , which gave me a high esteem for it ; insomuch that i began to conceive some hopes that his ingenious thoughts might , with some few alterations , be reconcil'd to true philosophy : for , i was at that time far from intending to make any reflexions upon it , but highly extoll'd it where-ever i came : judging of the whole , by the scantlings i had seen of it ( as it were ) accidentally . but , the last september , setting my self to take a nearer and fuller view of the whole book , i quite lost the hopes , i had gladly entertain'd formerly , of according it with philosophical principles ; and became much concern'd , that so excellent a wit should be half lost to the commonwealth of learning , by lighting unfortunately into such an unaccountable method . for , i saw evidently , that ( besides the oddness of the way he took ) his fancy , the vivacity of which was very extraordinary , had , in very many particulars , got such an ascendent over his reason , that , as he was sceptical in divers things which were clearest truths ; so he seem'd in very many others to be positive , the contrary to which was plainly demonstrable , and in a manner self-evident . i was heartily sorry , i say , to see so considerable a writer , whose comprehensive genius , and clear expression , would have made truth irresistible , had he taken her part , mis-led so strangely as to take fancies for realities ; and to think that philosophy , which is the knowledge of things , consisted in a perpetual contemplation of empty ideas , or resemblances . . this wrought up my thoughts higher , and made me conceive a greater indignation against this new way of philosophizing ; and that , very particularly , for his sake ; tho' i saw the cartesians as much wanted rectifying in their grounds , as he , or rather more . wherefore , to gain such a powerful assistant over to truth 's side , ( of which , his sincere professions of ingenuity would not let me despair , ) i resolv'd to lay open those blemishes of errours i had observ'd in his essay , retaining still a due esteem for the many beauties it contain'd : for , i do assure him , my nature leads me , as willingly to acknowledge and give their just elogiums to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as to discover the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , he may have fallen into at unawares , as i doubt not but my readers will see ; and , that ( tho' i declare open war against the way it self ) i rather incline to excuse , than to aggravate his faults or mistakes . indeed , the duty i ow'd to truth oblig'd me to note those latter with such a distinction , as i conceiv'd they did more or less injure that sacred concern . and , i was the more willing to enter the lists against such a champion ; because , if i hop'd to gain any advantage over him , ( i had rather say , if i had the good fortune to win him , ) 't is impossible truth should ever obtain a more clear victory ; for , no man , who takes the just dimensions of mr. locke 's great wit , can think , that any thing but the invincible force of truth can soil him . . i have good reason to fear , that this declaring against whole bodies of ideists , at once , will be interpreted by some to savour of singularity : it will be deem'd by others , a high imprudence to make such a bold breach with a world of acute speculaters ; with whole sects of modern philosophers , both in two neighbouring nations , and in our own universities ; and , in many things , with most of the school-men too . others will think , that i do very unwisely provoke opposition ; and , by such a brisk attack , in a manner challenge all those great men who are of a contrary sentiment . but , what is all this to his purpose , who has devoted himself wholly to promote and defend truth ; and , is sure he does , upon solid reasons , judge that to be true which he maintains ? this objection seems grounded on this false maxim , which some men have set up very politickly , to establish their own reputation with the vulgar , as sacred and inviolable ; viz. that [ the opinion of a multitude has the force of a kind of authority , to bridle the understandings of private men from setting up a contrary doctrine . ] now , whatever some men may think of this position , i must declare my sentiment of it , that it is the most pernicious maxim that could be invented , to hinder the progress of rational nature in that which should most perfect it ; that it puts a stop to the farther use of their reason in all future mankind ; that it makes all improvement in knowledge impossible , and utterly obstructs the advancement of science . no reasoners , how many , or of how great name soever they be , have any authority at all but by virtue of the reasons they produce ; whence , that single man , whoever he be , that brings better reasons , for the tenet he advances , than all the former world has done for theirs , ought to have more of this ( miscall'd ) authority , than that whole world of opposers . . but , this postponing the consideration of the multitude of dissenting speculaters to evident reason , is ten times more justifiable , in case that opposing party does not so much as pretend to , much less produce self-evident principles , nor demonstration , to ground , or conclude their tenets ; but builds on voluntary suppositions , and makes use of wit , good language , and other meerly plausible ways , to recommend their conclusions to the approbation of their readers . those who do not so much as pretend to demonstration and clear principles , being unable to offer any thing that is certain , ought not ( in my opinion ) meddle at all with philosophy ; nor appear before learned men with an expectation their doctrine should be embraced ; nor can they , in reason , assert any thing , but only propose . . but the main consideration which takes off all invidiousness from my carriage in this particular , is , that in this whole contest between the ideists and me , there is nothing at all that is personal . 't is not the parts or abilities of the contenders , but their method which is in dispute . the slowest and lamest traveller , who can but creep forward in a right path , shall sooner arrive at his journey 's end , than another whose legs are nimble , and his pace swift , if he takes a wrong way at his first setting out . rather his greater strength and agility do , in such a ease , enable him only to run more widely astray ; as the strongest bow shoots farthest from the mark , if the shast be wrong levell'd . let the talent of wit in the ideists be incomparable , ( as doubtless that of cartesius was , to whom i may , with justice , join mr. locke ) if the methods they take be not proper to attain true science , their errours , when they mistake , ( as i am sure they do in their principles , and , consequently , in most of their conclusions ) must be to the same degree more enormous , as their fancies are more ingenious . 't is their method then , or their way of proceeding and building upon ideas , which i most blame and oppose . or rather i deplore the detriment accruing hence to the learned part of the world , that men , endowed with such an excellent genius , did unluckily light into such an indirect and perplex'd path ; seeing what vast advances science might have made , had such men taken up right principles , hit upon the right way at first , and apply'd their strong brains to pursue it . 't is not then their endowments which come into competition , to which i deferr as much as is possible : for , i much more admire the skill of such architects as can build a castle in the air , and make it hang there by geometry ( as it were ) than all those common sort of artists , who can raise such a structure upon firm ground . . what our several methods are , the title of my book tells my reader in short , viz. that , ( as i have hinted in my dedicatory ) theirs is to ground all their discourses on ideas ; that is , ( as themselves express it , and as the word [ idea ] declares , ) on similitudes or resemblances ; which similitudes , ( as is abundantly demonstrated in my three first preliminaries , ) are meer fancies : mine is to build them solely and entirely on the things themselves , in which , as the footsteps or effects of his essential verity , the creative wisdom of the god of truth , has planted and imprinted all created truths whatever . this method i observe so exactly throughout my whole method , and this present treatise , that i disown and renounce any discourse in either of these books , which is not built either upon the things as they are in nature , or according to the being they naturally have in the understanding : and , i shall owe much to that man , who will show me that i do any where decline from this solid and well-grounded method . as for formal truths , found in our judgments or discourses , i build them on most evident principles , or strive to reduce them thither ; and on the connexion of the terms found in propositions , by which only truth can be express'd ; keeping still an attentive regard to the things themselves . and i desire that the differences between the ideists and me may be decided by the impartial umpirage of rigorous logick . a test , which , as i am sure their cause cannot bear , so i am confident they will never accept of or stand to . for , it may easily be discern'd by any serious reflecter , that their procedure and manner of discoursing is not by way of laying principles , and drawing a close and well-knit train of consequences , as i do in all the main points of my method , and in this present treatise on occasion ; but , by unproved suppositions , and loose discourses made up of well-express'd wit , ingenious remarks , quaint novelties , plausible explications , and such other superficial ways ; which , tho' they take with vulgar readers , are ( to speak plainly ) more fit for flashy rhetorical declamation , than for manly and solid philosophy . nor do i think it did ever so much as once enter into the thoughts of the ideists , much less their hope , that their discourse could be reduced to self-evidence , or to that artificial form of close discourse call'd a demonstrative syllogism ; which is the touchstone to distinguish what ratiocinations are truly conclusive , what inconclusive or fallacious . without which , what do we know ? . i am very well aware what prejudice i bring upon my self , by addressing you in this confident manner at the very first dash of my pen ; and some well-meaning friends have advertis'd me , that this carriage of mine has been reflected on , especially by some meer school-men ; who , tho' they in reality know nothing , are more proud of their probabilities , than the most scientifical man living is of his demonstrations ; tho' their utmost performances amount to no more than that of the ridiculous fortune-tellers of old , — aut erit , aut non ; divinare etenim magnus mihi donat apollo . whence i do fully expect , that the humour of our modern speculaters will judge this assuredness of mine to be a high presumption of my own performances ; nay , some will think it a proud disregard of others even to talk of demonstration . indeed , i must own i have a high opinion of my principles and my method , which nature and god's good providence have laid and establish'd . but , as for my conclusions and deductions , as i will not justifie them all with the same firmness as i did the others ; so , i must declare , that did i not really judge them demonstrative when i call them so , i should not think i ought to propose them as such ; nor at all to the learned . the world has been sufficiently pester'd already with books of philosophy , nay , volumes , blown up to a vast bulk with windy and frathy probabilities , and petty inconclusive topicks ; which , like rank weeds , have over-run that rich soil where science ought to have been sown ; and i esteem it too poor and mean a vanity to plant briar-fields to enlarge a wilderness . if i overween in calling my proofs , demonstrations , i am willing to take the shame to my self , if it deserves shame ; tho' perhaps i had been more blame-worthy , if , really judging them demonstrative , i had minced the truth , and out of an affected modesty , or a diffidence for which i saw no ground , i had diminish'd their force in the esteem of my readers ; and so hinder'd the profit , which , startled at the uncouth sound of demonstration , they might otherwise have reap'd by looking into them . for , demonstrations are strange rarities in this sceptical age ; and when those who are to show them do proclame to the world where they are to be seen , curious people will run in flocks to view the monster . . he that knows what demonstration is , and verily judges his argument is such , and yet , out of niaiserie and shamefastness says at every turn , [ i think , or , perhaps this is true , or may be true ] should , if i might advise him , wear a mask ; for he does as good as tell his readers , [ gentlemen , i offer you an argument , but i fear 't is not worth your acceptance . ] a strange complement from one philosopher to another ! it was not out of my natural humour and inclination , but perfectly out of deliberate design to win my readers to attentive examination , and invite those who were dissatisfy'd to opposition , ( which is the best means to clear truth ) that i deliver'd my self with that bold assurance . and i did really intend that sceptical men should ask , — quid profert dignum tanto promissor hiatu ? that , setting themselves thence to sift the nature of my method , and the force of my arguments more narrowly , they might better sink into their understandings ; as i am confident they will , if ever they have perused my method to science ; and , by that or any other means , do solidly know what is requisite to a true demonstration . . another reason why i put on this vizard of confidence , so little suting with my natural complexion , was this . the want of true science , and the despair of finding any , had brought such a luke-warm and indifferent humour into the world , ( and i wish it were not too common ) that , tho' all men affect to talk of truth , and seem in ordinary discourse to value and magnifie her ; yet , when it comes to the point , scarce one man dares heartily profess himself her champion , and declare he will defend her cause with evident reason , against all opposers . for , alas ! how few men are there , who will profess to demonstrate in philosophy , or to reduce their discourses to evidence ? without doing which , and abiding by the tryal , perhaps there is not one word of truth in all philosophy , nor any thing but learned romance in all the universities of europe . many men , indeed , do make a profession of knowledge , because 't is honourable ; and every scholar is engag'd to do so , or he will quite lose his credit . but , when it should come to performance , not one man in ten thousand shews that zeal for the advancement of truth as answers to the profession he made to love and esteem it ; but , tho' he sees errour and ignorance , and probable talking overspread the face of philosophy , and stifle truth and knowledge both , he sits still unconcern'd . now and then indeed there is a writer who attempts to confute this or that particular errour ; some casual circumstance addicting him to that employment : but , what man sets himself to lay the ax at the root , or writes against uncertain methods and groundless babbling ? what man goes about to make mankind aware of the mischief that comes to rational nature by the sophisticate ways of talking prettily , neatly , and wittily ; tho' , perhaps , not a word groundedly and solidly ? nay , what man is not well-appay'd and pleased with a well-penn'd piece ; tho' , were the reason in it sifted to the bottom , perhaps there is not one evident ttuth in it to build that discourse on ; that is , not one word of sense in it ; but only such a way of plausible discourse or language-learning , as may serve equally and indifferently to maintain either side of the contradiction ? . lastly , ( which is the chief point , ) who is there that applies himself to find out a certain method to arrive at truth , and attain knowledge , without which all our studies are to no purpose ? logick is the proper art to give us this method ; and i see students do generally make use of any logician , so he but talks d●yly of the operations of the understanding ; of propositions , syllogisms , and demonstration ; tho' , perhaps , he gives not one word of reason for his unprov'd sayings , to enlighten the understanding of the learner , or inform him , ( ex natura rei , ) whence and why this and the other rudiment , or rule , must be so : such an author may indeed enable a learner to say as he says , and talk after him in imitation , as it were ; but he can never instruct him to understand what 's true , and why it is true , or to demonstrate himself ; which was the main design of my method . . but my greatest complaint against others , and my best excuse for putting my self forwards with such a confident ayr , is , that i see not that any learned men do endeavour to make head against scepticism ; which , thro' this universal connivence , or rather civil and kind toleration , and ( in some sort ) encouragement , creeps by insensible degrees into even the most learned societies , infects the best wits of our nation , threatens to bear down all true philosophy , to extinguish the natural light of men's understandings , and drown their best faculty [ reason ] in a deluge of profound ignorance . for , if this vogue should obtain still in the world to look upon any loose discourse for brave sense , so it be but sprucely dress'd up in neat language , and sauc'd with a little piquancy of brisk wit ; and let it pass current for true learning and knowledge ; scepticism will not only insinuate it self slily into all sorts of men , but be recommended to the world by such an universal approbation of well-clad gentile ignorance . nor does this mischievous inundation stop its career in bereaving us of natural truths ; but , having once darken'd in us the knowledge of nature , it disposes men to doubt of , and too often to deny the existence of the author of nature himself ; who is best made known to mankind by science , or the exact knowledge of his creatures ; from which we glean all the notions , and , consequently , all the knowledge , we , by ordinary means , have , or ought to have . all these mischiefs , ( i may add , and all immorality too , ) are owing to the insensible growth of this lethargy of our understanding , scepticism ; which benums and chills our intellectual faculties with a cold despair of ever attaining evident knowledge of any thing ; for which , as its natural perfection , our soul was fitted and ordain'd . i saw this gloomy evening overcasting the clear sky of science , and drawing on the cimmerian night of dark ignorance , and black infidelity ; and thence it was , that , to awaken men's souls out of this drowzy sleep and torpor of their mind , i did so often , boldly and fearlessly ( tho' as i judg'd , truly , ) declare and proclaim aloud , that demonstration in philosophy might be had , and that i had actually demonstrated in such and such particulars . . lastly , 't is for this reason , and to rescue all sincere lovers of truth from this spreading contagion of scepticism , that with an unusual boldness , i did ( as was said before ) attempt to write a demonstrative logick ; to comprehend which , whoever shall bestow half that pains as men usually do who study the mathematicks , ( for such connected discourses are not to be perused , with hopes of profiting by them , with a cursory application , ) will , i am sure , be able to set all his natural notions in a right and distinct order ; know how to connect two of them with one another in a solid judgment ; and both of them with a third to frame a conclusive discourse ; and not only have the true nature of demonstration knowingly fix'd in his mind , by comprehending the reason of it ; but , by having it there , he himself will be enabled to work according to that nature , or to demonstrate himself ; without ability to know or do which , none ought to pretend to be a philosopher . lastly , to carry this good work forward as far as was possible , i have here , as a supplement to my method , and an introduction to my reflexions , added five preliminary discourses ; shewing the true and solid bottom-ground on which all exact knowledge , or philosophy , is built ; and , that the things themselves , and not ideas , resemblances , or fancies , ( which can never make us know the things , ) are and must be the only firm foundation of truth , and of our knowledge of all truths whatsoever . . i must not pass over another complaint made of me by some of the cartesian school ; viz. that in the preface to my method , i so deeply censure malbranche as a phanatick in philosophy ; nay , the whole way it self as disposing to enthusiasm . to the first part of my charge , i reply , that i cited that author 's own words ; which are such strong proofs of a fanatick genius , that i cannot believe any arguments of mine can add weight to the full evidence and force they carry'd with them , to manifest that his philosophy is built upon inspiration ; or , as himself expresses it , comes to him by revelation . and , for my pretending that the whole cartesian way of philosophizing is of the same leven , i can need no other compurgatour than that french author , who with much exactness wrote the life of cartesius , and was his good friend and follower . the book is now made english ; where in the th page he tells us , that to get rid of all his prejudices , ( that is , to unlearn , amongst other things , all that the clear light of nature had taught him ) cartesius did undergo no less than to unman himself . a pretty self-denying beginning ! and pag. , . that he wearied out his mind to that degree in his enquiry after this happy means , ( viz. that his imagination should represent to him his understanding quite naked ) that his brain took fire , and he fell into a spice of enthusiasm ; which dispos'd his mind , already quite spent , in such a manner , that it was fit to receive impressions of dreams and visions . where we see it confess'd , that his method of unknowing all that nature had taught him , brought him to enthusiasm , and enthusiasm to visions and revelations ; so that malbranche did but follow his masters example , and copy'd his method . the author proceeds . he ( cartesius ) acquaints us , that on the th of november , . laying himself down brimful of enthusiasm , ( which is little better than stark mad ) and wholly possess'd with the thoughts of having found that day the foundation of that wonderful science , he had three dreams presently one after another ; yet , so extraordinary , as to make him fancy they were sent him from above . he supposed he discern'd thro' their shadows , the tracks of the paths god had chalk'd out to him , in his enquiry after truth . and is it not a powerful motive to make all wits , ( especially , if they be of a melancholy temper ) who are enclin'd to embrace his doctrine , which was first sent from heaven , to gape after revelations too , as well as malbranche did ? he goes on . but the divine spiritual air which he took a pride to give to those dreams , was so near a-kin to that enthusiasm wherewith he believ'd himself to be warmed , that a man would have believ'd he had been a little crack'd-brain'd . and , lest any should wrong the original of his doctrine , or degrade it from the honour of being given him by divine inspiration , this author takes off any unfavourable conjecture of ours , that might make it spring from any sublunary cause , in these words : one would have believ'd he had drunk a cup too much that evening before he went to bed ; but he assur'd us he had been very sober all that day , and that evening too , and had not drunk a drop of wine three weeks together . this looks as if cartesius himself , who so cautiously inform'd him of this afterwards , was fond to have it thought that his doctrine , and especially his method , ( which was the minerva of which his brain was then in labour , ) had been given him from above , by supernatural means . . now , gentlemen , i beseech you , tell me , in good sober sadness ; can you think god ever intended that the onely method for men to get knowledge , should be to lose their wits first in looking after it ? that , to unman our selves , so as to seem crack'd-brain'd , or drunk , is the way to become soberly rational ? that , to reduce our selves to perfect ignorance of all that the goodness of nature has taught us , ( which is , in plain terms , to make an ass of one's self , ) is the onely certain way to become a philosopher ? certainly , unless we be all infatuated with enthusiastick dreams and visions , made up of ideas , we should rather think that it is a far more solid , and more natural way , to begin our quest of truth from those knowledges which are evident , and such grounds as are magis nota , and thence proceed by our reason to minùs nota , than it is to take our rise from affected ignorance , and unknowing again all those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or common notions , which right nature had given us to ground all other knowledges on . no wonder then , this freakish method , taken up by whimsical fancy , had for its genuin effect , fantastick dreams , visionary madness , and enthusiastick folly ; which this writer of his life ( who , doubtless , was himself a zealous cartesian ) calls here a happy means , the foundation of that wonderful science , the path chalk'd out by god ; and the descanting on them , to be done by a divine spiritual air ; tho' he confesses , at the same time , they were dreams , visions , and fits of enthusiasm : and that they made him that had them seem crack'd-brain'd , or drunk . all these wild caprichio's of cartesius , sprung naturally from a lively and heighten'd fancy , screw'd up by frequent sollicitous and melancholy thoughtfulness ; and were the effects of his introversion upon his ideas ; which is quite opposite to his regarding the things in nature , that are without us . nor do i doubt , but that all his followers , did they ( as they ought ) imitate their master , and follow his example , in laying aside first all their former natural knowledges , would also ( as any man must who takes that unnatural method ) fall into fits of enthusiasm , dreams , and visions , and run mad for company . for , ideas , which , being similitudes , are no more but fancies , appearances , and representations , are , consequently , far more proper materials for dreams and visions , and such roving flights , than they are for science , or solid philosophy . . tho' i forestall what comes hereafter , i am tempted to annex here , to this character of the cartesian manner of spirit in philosophy , a short passage mention'd by mr. locke , book . chap. . § . . viz. that he has discours'd with very rational men , who have actually deny'd they were men. now , certainly , this is something beyond enthusiasm , and extravagant even to madness , that any man should deny himself to be what he is : but , 't is prodigious , that mr. locke should give such men the elogium of being very rational . whence , since he cannot but sincerely judge , that the way he proposes and maintains in his essay , is the most rational of any other ; we are to conclude , that those very rational men did follow this way of his , and were great ideists ; or else , that mr. locke judges that those men who actually deny'd themselves to be men , might , for all that , according to his way of ideas , be very rational notwithstanding . 't is worth our while to observe the consonant effect of the ideal way , in the followers of cartesius and mr. locke , and ( in some sort ) in both the authors of those philosophical sects themselves : the one unmans himself ; and the others deny themselves to be men , and yet are character'd by mr. l. to be , notwithstanding , very rational : which are so perfectly parallel , that i am at a great loss which to prefer . and , now , do you think , gentlemen , that , ( besides the regard we owe to truth , ) out of the common love we ought to bear to mankind , and to rational nature , that it is not high time to look to our wits , and to make head against this way of ideas ; when we find two such great men as cartesius , and mr. locke , thro' this fantastick method they had chosen , fall into such incredible extravagancies , as either ( in a manner ) to abdicate , by unmanning one's self ; or , to commend the abdication of their own natures ; at least , to think them very rational that do so ? . far be it from me to judge , that all , or most of the performances of those two admirably-ingenious men , are of this extravagant nature . 't is my sincere judgment , that few men write like them ; and , none , better , where their ill-grounded methods do not intermingle , and pervert their reason . and , i freely acknowledge , that mr. locke 's essay , on which i make so many reflexions , contains many excellent and uncommon truths in it : tho' i do not think he owes any of them to his way of ideas ; but , that he proceeded in such occasions , upon his natural notions , in the same manner the aristotelians do ; and , thence , made right judgments and reflexions upon them by his own acute wit. this unfortunate choice of their method did , as i conceive , proceed hence , that such active and quick fancies do not patiently brook the rains of logick and metaphysicks ; the former of which ( much against the grain ) restrains them from taking their wild carreer , by the discipline of its artificial rules ; the other keeps them from roving , by the self-evident maxims it sorces their understanding to accept of . whence , if these two do not bridle and keep them in , it is not to be expected in nature that such high-mettl'd fancies should be held within strict bounds , or kept to the slow and sober pace of solid reason ; but , that they will take their vagaries , and run over hedge and ditch , whithersoever the swift career of that nimble faculty hurries them . this discourse i make the more willingly , that those students who read this , may clearly discern , that all their application to gain knowledge will be purely lost labour , and time thrown away , if their first and chief care be not to take a wise and solid method at the beginning . having thus finish'd my long address , for which i beg your pardon , i shall now apply my self to make some few discourses , relating to my following book . . man being one thing , compounded of a corporeal and a spiritual nature , and every thing acting as it is , it follows , that both those natures must concurr to every operation that flows from him , as he is man ; and , consequently , be produced by some faculty belonging properly to each of those respective natures : nor can it be doubted , but that , as those faculties , or powers , which are peculiar to both those natures , are as different as are the natures themselves ; so the immediate objects peculiar to those different faculties , must likewise be as widely different from one another , as are those powers to which they belong ; and , consequently , be as vastly opposite , as the natures of body and spirit can distance them . it being then agreed to by all parties , that the faculties or powers which join in our production of knowledge , are those we call the imagination and the mind , or the fancy and the understanding , i cannot doubt but it may be demonstratively concluded , from the known nature and constitution of this thing called man , that , to every thought or act of knowledge we have , ( those being such operations as properly and formally belong to us as we are men , ) there must two sorts of interiour objects concurr ; whereof , the one is of a corporeal , the other of a spiritual nature ; and that , otherwise , those acts could not be said to be humane acts , or the acts of that suppositum , or compound thing , called man ; but of one of those natures onely , a-parted from the other as to its operation , and consequently , as to its being . which supposition is directly contradictory to the natural constitution of man ; as he is distinguish'd , on one side , from a brute , who has nothing but material phantasms , or ideas ; on the other , from an angel , or intelligence ; in whom there is nothing of matter or fancy , but all in it is purely spiritual . . the distinction of these two objects of the fancy and of the understanding being granted , in some manner , by all sides , i cannot but wonder how it hapt to escape the thoughts of all the philosophers both ancient and modern , to explicate fully and clearly the exact difference between those two objects of the fancy and of the understanding ; there being scarcely any one point in philosophy of half that importance for the attaining of truth , and avoiding of errour : for both these being truly in us , whenever we have an act of knowledge ; and withall , being as far removed from one another in their natures as body and spirit are ; if speculative men , either thro' mistake , or thro' inadvertence of this vast difference between them , or out of loathness to take pains to look deep into the intrinsecal natures of things , imprinted in their minds when they have notions of them , shall happen to mistake what they find uppermost or most superficial , and therefore is easiest to their fancy , ( as phantasms or material representations are ) for notions ; which , being of a spiritual nature , do not make so obvious and familiar an appearance as those gay florid pictures did , but are to be gather'd by reason , or made understood by reflexion and study ; such speculaters , i say , will be at the same loss , and not much wiser than those birds were that peck'd at xeuxis 's grapes to seed themselves ; mistaking the outward pourtraiture or idea for the inward nature of the thing : for , no knowledge of the things could ever be expected from ideas , taken ( as themselves take them ) for similitudes ; since those terms or words , which we use , and must use , when we speak or discourse of any thing whatever , were intended , by the agreement of mankind , to signifie the things themselves about which we are discoursing , and not to signifie meer likenesses or similitudes of them . however this has been neglected by others , i see 't is my duty to say something of this distinction of phantasms from notions . i have in my th reflexion , § § , and . endeavour'd to show it . to which i have here thought fit to annex some few 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or distinguishing marks to know one from the other . . my first criterion shall be the sensibleness of the former , and insensibleness of the other . when we shut our eyes , or walk in the dark , we experience we have ideas or images of our way , or of other things we have seen , in our fancy ; and this , without the least labour of ours , or any reflexion : and there is also beyond that , something else in the mind , which tells us of what nature , or what things those are , which appear'd superficially to our fancy ; which costs us labour and reflexion to bring it into the view of the understanding , so that we cannot get perfect acquaintance with it , unless we define it . nor is this sensible , as the other was , but only intelligible : not superficial or uppermost ; but hidden , retruse , and ( as we may say ) stands behind the curtain of the fancy : nor easie to comprehend at the first direct sight of our inward eye , but costs us some reflexion , or some pains , to know it expressly and distinctly . which latter sort , in each of these regards , are those we call simple apprehensions , conceptions , or notions . . the next criterion shall be this : we find we have in us meanings ; now the meanings of words , or ( which is the same , taking that word objectively , what 's meant by those words , ) are most evidently the same spiritual objects as are our notions , and 't is impossible those meanings should be the same with ideas or similitudes , but of a quite different nature . let it be as like the thing as 't is possible , 't is not the likeness of it which we aim at in our language : for we do not intend or mean when we speak of any thing , to talk or discourse of what 's like that thing , but of what 's the same with it , or rather what that thing it self is ; which the meer similitude of a thing cannot possibly be . for a similitude being related to the thing , is so far from being that thing , or the same as it is , that it is relatively opposite to it ; that is , quite distinct from it . now , that what 's essentially and formally distinct from a thing , nay opposite to it , should of it self , and by it self alone , give us the first knowledge of it , ( as they put their ideas to do ; ) or that the meaning of the one should be the meaning of the other , is utterly unintelligible , and against common sense . wherefore the meaning , which is the immediate and proper object of the mind , and which gives us , or rather is the first notice of the thing , must be of a quite different nature from an idea or likeness of it ; and since there can be no middle between like and the same ; nor any nearer approach or step , proceeding from likeness , towards unity with the thing , but it falls into identity , it must necessarily be more than like it ; that is , the same with it ; which an idea or likeness cannot possibly be , as was proved lately . . the third criterion which confirms the other , shall be this : none denies but brutes have ideas or similitudes in their fancy ; but they can have no meanings , because they have no spiritual part or mind , only which can mean. hence , all the sounds or noises they make , express only passion , or some corporeal easiness or uneasiness which they feel , and not their thoughts or meaning : as appears by this ; that they can never come to know what the words we use do mean or signifie ; nor can those of them that can speak , adapt the words they pronunce to our meaning , nor answer us pertinently ; which reflexion serves to shew us farther the vast difference between ideas and meanings , or between phantasms and notions . . my third criterion is taken from the evident difference between an idea or similitude of a thing , and its definition ; of which see method to science , book . less . . § . towards the end. . my fourth criterion is , that we are as certain we have general notions , as that we have particular ones ; nay , we can conceive them as general ; that is , we can conceive their generality . if then we have an idea or likeness of universality , or generality , what is it like ? it must either be like the thing , or must be like nothing , and so is no idea or likeness at all . but it cannot be like the thing in any respect , because in the thing there is nothing that is general or universal ; but all that is there is particular and determin'd ; which is quite unlike , nay , opposite to universality or generality . 't is evident then , that we have no idea or likeness of an universal in our meaning or notion , when we use or hear the words that signifie it . on the other side , we have a notion of homo , animal , and ens ; and still a clearer one according as they are more general . wherefore , 't is likewise evident , that our notions are of a quite different nature from ideas or similitudes . . i shall leave the pursuing this point any farther , and give the reader some taste before-hand of what ( perhaps ) he will be cloy'd with in the following book ; especially it will be proper to season his understanding with some few notions concerning the main question between the ideists and me , viz. whether our knowledge is made by the things being in our mind when we know it , or an idea or similitude of it only . in order to which i ask the ideists , whether the modes or accidents are distinct entities from the substance or thing ? to which i am sure mr. locke will say , they are not . hence i argue , therefore , if the modes or accidents be not distinct really from the substance , the substance or thing is not really , ( or in re , ) distinguish'd from the modes or accidents : therefore they are ( as they are in nature , or in re ) the same thing , or identify'd . therefore they are only distinguish'd by the understanding conceiving the same thing diversly ; therefore 't is onely the conceptions of our understandings which are distinct. therefore taking the word [ conception ] objectively ; that is , for the thing conceiv'd ; all we conceive is still the thing . therefore all our notions , both of the substance and of its accidents or modes , that is , all the notions we can have , ( they being the same with our conceptions , ) are nothing but the thing conceiv'd diversly . therefore , if that thing be a body , all our notions of it are meerly that thing call'd body diversly conceiv'd . therefore the putting space , succession , &c. where there neither is nor can be any body , is to put body where there is no body ; and , is a meer fancy , and contradictory . therefore those philosophers who proceed upon our grounds , do still conceive , judge and discourse of the thing . therefore the knowledge they gain by such notions is the knowledge of the thing ; the judgments they make by connecting those notions , are connexions of the thusdistinguish'd parts ( as it were ) of the thing ; and the discourses they make , discourses concerning the very thing . therefore the philosophy of such men is truly and entirely the knowledge of the things , or true philosophy . wherefore those who have only in their minds similitudes or ideas , and do only connect or discourse of them , which ideas are not the thing , nor conceiv'd to be it either in whole , or in part , are convinced to build their discourses ( thus grounded ) upon nothing . therefore they have no solid knowledge of any thing . therefore , in proper speech , they know nothing . therefore all their philosophy ( thus built ) is purely fantastick . i infer farther , that , since this distinction of the thing into substance ( precisely consider'd ) and its modes or accidents , is perform'd only by the understanding ; therefore it is made within the understanding . therefore since this act , that thus distinguishes them , is not transitive to the thing which is out of it , the thing must be in the understanding to be there distinguish'd ; otherwise we should distinguish we know not what ; which ( it being done by a knowing power ) is impossible , and a perfect contradiction . therefore the thing it self must forcibly be intellectually in the mind : therefore , there can need no ideas or similitudes to make us know it ; for to be in a knowing power is to be known , without more ado . 't is incredibly strange , and even monstrous , that mr. locke 's thoughts and mine , like antipodes , should move diametrically opposit to one another in this point . he tells us , b. . ch. . in his margin , that there is no abstract idea of substance ; nor can we ( as he there says ) by the sensible qualities have any idea of the substance of body , more than if we knew nothing at all . and , the essences or entities of particular substances ( as clearest reason demonstrates , ) are incomparably harder to be known , than substance in the abstract ; whence we must , consequently , know less than nothing of them , if we know nothing at all of the other : it being impossible to know what this thing or this man is , if we be ignorant what thing or man is . nor have we any innate ideas ( as he confesses ) to make [ substance ] known . if , then neither innate nor acquir'd ideas can make us know any thing at all of it , and we can know nothing but by ideas ; 't is plain , we cannot know thing or substance at all , and so we must rest contented with knowing nothing . for , substance being unknown , 't is impossible to know any mode or accident ; they being essentially certain manners how a thing is ; and , so , including substance and thing in their definition . again , mr. l. holds we can frame no idea of substance , or at most but a most blindly obscure one ; and i hold that the notion of it is most clear , nay , the clearest of any but that of existence , exprest by the word [ is . ] he thinks that the nature of accidents is known by themselves , tho' the substance ly in the dark from us : and i judge it demonstrable that , as they have no entity of their own , but by means of the thing , ens or substance , so they can have no intelligibility ( which is a property of ens ) of their own , but meerly by virtue of the substance or thing with which they are identify'd . in a word , he thinks substance is most unknown , and i say , 't is self-evidently known . he says it cannot be known clearly ; and i say it not only can , but must be known clearly ; nay , that nothing else can be known but it , or by being it. by this discourse it appears , that this point being ( of its own nature ) of universal concern ; and , therefore , drawing great and most important consequences after it , which , acting here as a philosopher , i do not mention ; either he or i must be in a most dangerous errour . wherefore , being perfectly assured that the method i take will not permit me to erre enormously ; and , very certain that i follow very faithfully that method ; i humbly beg of mr. locke , by that candour and ingenuity , of which ( i doubt not , sincerely too ) he has made so frequent professions , that he would please to apply his thoughts anew ( for if second thoughts be better , the last may be best of all ) to review his way of ideas ; and , comparing it with what i have propos'd and prov'd in my method to science , my preliminaries , and my several reflexions on his essay , he would unbyassedly consider , whether ( since he cannot suspect his own excellent parts ) this new way of philosophizing be not the sole cause of all his mistakes , and misleads him into all these great errours ; to entertain which this phantastick method has inveigled his good reason . i have no more to preface , but to beg pardon for oftentimes repeating the same thing over and over in the ensuing book , mr. locke civilly apologizes for doing the same ; and my chief excuse is , that , being to trace and follow his discourses , i could not well avoid it ; hoping withall , at the same time , to clear the point better ; either by some new thought , which then occurr'd , or by giving a better turn to my former arguments . besides , i must confess , that i did now and then affect these repetitions , to make some particulars which were of most weight sink better into the judgment of my readers , by re-minding them often of such important truths . i am forced to use the word [ idea ] often , because mr. locke ( with whom i am discoursing ) does so always ; tho' generally i join notions to it . but , this one note will keep my true sentiment from being misunderstood ; that i allow ideas or resemblances in the fancy or imagination ; but , i absolutely deny there are any spiritual ideas or similitudes in the mind on which we ground any truth , or which are the materials of knowledge ; but notions only , or the things abstractedly or inadequately conceiv'd by the understanding . your well-wishing friend and faithful servant , j. s. solid philosophy asserted . preliminary discourses . preliminary first . of the impropriety and equivocalness of of the word [ idea . ] . the author of the essay concerning human understanding , having sincerely levelled the aim of his endeavours at the attainment of truth in philosophy , which can only be had by clearing the way to science ; hence , this being the sole end we have , both of us , prefixt to our selves , the best method ( in common ) which i can take in my reflexions on that learned treatise is , to keep my eye still directed to that end , and to take my measures from the order and rapport which our respective positions , or discourses , may be conceived to bear to that best design . . this premis'd , my first preliminary reflexion shall be upon his making use , throughout his whole work , of the word ( ideas ) as the chief , or rather only materials , of which , according to him , we are to frame immediately all our knowledges . which being so , it follows that , if the sense of that word be not it self clear , but equivocal ; and if , as taken in one sense , it be manifestly nothing at all to science , nor can be any material of it ; and , as taken in the other , it may and must conduce to it , nay , be the sole imediate ground and origin of all science ; i cannot but think , that the promiscuous usage of that word in such disparate senses , ( it being of so general concern , and running through that whole book ) must necessarily encumber and perplex in a high measure the way to scientifical knowledge . . one of his secondary designes was ( as he expresses himself in his epistle to the reader ) to remove the rubbish in order to the building up science , and to beat down the vanity and ignorance of those who have reduced philosophy , which is nothing but the knowledge of things , to insignificant school-terms . this is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable design ; it being evident to all ingenuous lovers of truth , that never was there more need of a reformation , than there has been of philosophy in these last centuries ; to second him in which i have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours . yet , notwithstanding i do not think we ought , without great and necessary occasion , alter those words which have been accepted and used by the learned world ( such as it was ) hitherto : especially such words as are proper and univocal , such i take the word [ notion ] to be ; much less to substitute another , which i must think is less proper , and withall highly equivocal , or ambiguous , i mean the word ( idea . ) i know this ingenuous author apologizes for his frequent using it ; and i am apt to think he did this out of civility towards our modern philosophers , who have brought it into fashion : for , he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word ( notion ; ) which , importing a part of cognition , does most certainly better suit with a treatise about human understanding . . as for the sense in which he takes the word ( idea ) he professes that he uses it to express whatever is meant by phantasm , notion , species , or whatever it is that the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . which manifests that he uses that word very equivocally : for a phantasm , and a notion , differ as widely , as body and spirit ; the one being a corporeal , the other a spiritual resemblance ; or rather , the one being a resemblance , or a kind of image , or picture ; the other the thing resembled , as will be seen hereafter . again , 't is agreed to by all the world , that brutes have phantasms , but they can have no notions ; for these are the elements , or materialls , whose agreeable connexion furnishes our mind with science ; of which beasts , which have no mind , are incapable ; and therefore it were both unnatural , and to no purpose , to put notions ( which are the primary affections of the mind ) in those meer animals . i am more at a loss to find , that , in the last page but one in his epistle to the reader , he seems to contradistinguish notions to ideas ; which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word ( idea ) here to signify notions , i cannot at all comprehend . . i must confess , it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a word , which is nothing but a sound , or a character , were but the determinate meaning of it told us by the user of it : let it be a , or b , or what he pleases , provided the distinct sense of it be clearly manifested by the writer , or speaker , it were , in that case , logomachy , and impertinent cavil , to except against it . but , when the author 's own explication of it does , ( contrary to the nature of explications ) declare it is used ambiguously , it laies a force on me to remark it ; lest it may lead the reader , ( as it infallibly must ) into great errors , unless it 's double sense be warily distinguisht in the ensuing discourse ; which i have not observed to be done any where by this otherwise accurate author . . from this undistinguish'd ambiguity of the word ( idea ) it follows naturally , that even his own excellent judgment , and consequently , his reader 's , must necessarily sometimes deviate ; and , tho' his general intention was only to pursue the knowledge of things , yet he must needs be sometimes mis●ed at unawares to entertain fancies for real knowledges ; as will occasionally be shown hereafter . for the present i cannot omit one particular , it being of such main importance . . the author believes all sorts of animals to have , in some degree , perception . now perception ( as i conceive ) signifies knowledge ; for , under what sort of material action to rank it , i confess my self at a loss : but , let it be only the first step and degree towards knowledge , and the in-let of all the materials of it , still he says , the dulness of the faculties of some brutes , makes them remote from that knowledge which is to be found in some men : so that it seems in other men there may possibly be no more knowledge ( at least in some things ) than in brutes ; nor does he any more than probably conjecture , that beasts have not the power of comparing , which may be observed in m●n , belonging to general ideas , and useful to abstract reasonings . now , this so jumbles together spiritual natures with those which are meerly corporeal , that , if this be so , we shall be at some loss to know our own kind , to define what man is , or to distinguish our selves from our younger brothers in knowledge , brutes , or our souls from theirs : for , if by ideas there be meant notions , ( as his expressions leave it indifferent ) and that a man's knowledge consists in having these ideas in him , and brutes have also such ideas ; and , that , moreover , they may possibly have also , in some sort , a power to compare those notions , and both * judging and discoursing most evidently consist in comparing our notions , i see no operations peculiar to a man , but what brutes may perform in a lower degree ; and since degrees do not vary the species ( for otherwise dull men would be of another species from those who have more wit ) we could , consequently , never know what mankind meant ; or who is a man , who not , unless in outward appearance ; nor , lastly , how our souls , or minds , do differ from their fancies , or imaginations . again , m. l. affirms , b. . ch. . § . . that it seems as evident to him that beasts do reason , as that they have sense ; than which , certainly , nothing in the world can be more evident , or undeniable . now , if this be so , all those who hold that ( a rational animal ) is a proper and adequate definition of ( man ) ought to hold brutes to be men. mr. l. will say , that brutes can only reason in particulars , having no general ideas , because they cannot abstract ; nor do we see they make use of any general signes to express universal ideas : indeed , they have no such signes as words , to notify they have any such ideas ; but , if we may conclude from their outward actions ( on which only mr. l. seems to ground his good opinion of them that they have reason , ) we may as well gather from the same ground that they have general ideas too . for example , when a horse sees a man a far off , he can only have an idea that it is something ; for the object cannot , at that distance , imprint a more particular idea of it self , but that most general one , and therefore 't is evident the horse must either have a general idea of it , or none at all ; whereas yet he must have some idea of it , because he sees it , though confusedly . coming nearer , the object imprints a more distinct idea of a man ; yet not so distinct , as to represent this man in particular . at length coming very near , the same object is apt to imprint an idea of this particular man ; which shews plainly , that all those ideas the object gave him before were general ones : to proceed , we may observe , that while it appear'd only to be something , which was a very abstract idea , the horse carry'd it abstractedly too , and remain'd unconcern'd . when it appear'd to be a man , it began to be a little concern'd , having to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either good or harm ; and therefore it stares at it ( a common carriage in sheep especially ) as if it study'd , or consider'd , what to make of it , in order to its own interest , or self-preservation . but , when the object imprints an idea of this particular man , who either us'd to bring him provender , or come to catch him to make him work , he either comes towards him , or runs away ; which different behaviour of theirs ( if outward actions were , in this case , worth building on ) is as good a sign that brutes have general ideas , as we can expect from dumb animals . besides , when a cat , or dog is hungry , and hunts about for meat , how can mr. l. imagin they long only for one particular sort of meat , and not any sort of meat in common that is agreeable to their nature ? i am sure their indifferency to any such food ( in case they know at all ) gives us as good ground to think they have a general idea of such a sort , kind , or species of food , as it does for any knowledge they have of particulars . hence is shown , that mr. l's criterion , or distinctive mark to know them from men , ( viz. the having general idea's ) quite failing , we ought to esteem horses , and other cattle , to be four-footed men , or else men must be two-legg'd beasts . moreover , since he grants here § . . they can compare those ideas they have , tho' imperfectly , and but in some circumstances ; and all judging , and discoursing must , by his doctrine , consist in the comparing ideas ; he must think there are some of them who are very judicious gentlemen , and use natural logick , and , tho' not very artificially , make syllogisms too . in a word , if we have no pecular faculties intrinsecal to our nature , nor any primary operation belonging to it , and it only , to distinguish us from brutes but extrinsecal shape only , all beasts might be men , and men beasts : and then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our carriage towards our dear brethren in nature , brutes ; which will bring in the turkish charity to dogs , and twenty other fooleries : and , 't is an excellent argument to prove the identity of our natures , that mr. l. brings of some gentlemen he was acquainted with , who deny'd themselves to be men ; and i wonder he would civilly give them the lye , by passing upon them the complement that they were notwithstanding very rational men ; for , were it possible any man could be a beast , 't is most certain these men were such . but i wonder not all at such extravagant conceits ; for as reason , grounded on our natural notions of the thing , is reduced , if pursued home , to first and self-evident principles ; so fancy , if follow'd close , advances at length to pure folly , and ends finally in perfect madness . . as for us men , we can certainly affirm , that we do truly perceive , or know , because we know certainly , by experience , or rather by reflexion , that we do know ; but we do not thus know that brutes know ; and whoever thinks he can gather it by reason , ought , i conceive , er'e he goes about it , to study exactly two previous points . first , he ought to consider very attentively , how , or upon what grounds he can imagin particles of matter , tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together , can be capable of perception , or knowledge , or how this suits with the nature of meer body . we can only gather this from local motions proceeding from brutes , with some kind of regularity : now an exact watch ( in proportion to its few parts ) does , by vertue of a spring within , which is part of its self , afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance . for , it shews us , and regularly too , the minutes , quarters , half-hours , hours , days of the month , and tells us the time aloud by striking the bell : nay , a repeating-clock does , without missing , or mistake , answer the question ( as it were ) which by pulling the string you ask it ; and , tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often , yet it still answers truth , with more steady exactness than banks his horse could , by seeing the motion of his masters eye . yet , if any man had drawn thence a conclusion that those engins had perciev'd , or known , we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken . an italian here had an engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise , and also strike fire , and light his candle for him ; which i believe is more than the most docil brute could ever be taught to perform . the case had been still more difficult , had this watch , or engine , which seemed self moving , been put into all these motions by subtil and indiscernable agents ; as iron is by the effluuiums of a loadstone , or as memnons musical statue was by the rayes of the sun ; for in that case the vulgar , discerning no material cause that set it on work , would presently have had recourse to some knowing power in the engine ; in the same manner as when they hear noises in a house , and cannot find out what caused them , they imediately conclude 't is a spright . whence results this plain rule , that er'e we can with reason conclude , or think any thing , except our selves , has perception , or knowledge , by our seeing it perform any outward action , we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the operations of bodies , and all the several combinations and contrivances of them ; and that we see that those actions are impossible to be performed by bodily parts , laid together by an infinitely wise artificer ; before we fall to imagin that any meerly animal body is more than a natural engin ; or that it does any more perceive , think , or know , than does a watch or clock . . the second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think brutes have any knowledge , is , to consider exactly the incredible variety of the several organical parts , found in the bodies of animals ; which , with the peculiar uses of each , and the contexture of them with the other parts , do swell so many books of anatomy already , without any hopes or prospect of reaching them all : and , besides , it is necessary also to weigh attentively the chymical parts ( if i may be allowed to call them so ) of an animal , consisting of blood , the humours in it , and especially the spirits ; which last are apt to be moved , upon every occasion , by the least touch of all the bodies about it , nay , by the most minute particles of them , lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh ; and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient vehicles throughout the whole , to set on motion those parts which are more solid : when he has done this , let him consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the all-wise contriver of nature , in order to the animal's pursuing what 's agreeable to its nature , and avoiding what 's disagreeable to it : when , i say , all these particulars are well weigh'd , and duely reflected on , i believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward notion with such wise contextures , and the complexion of such innumerable material causes may not naturally produce . . to give some ease to our fancy , startled at the strangeness of many actions we see done by brutes , let us reflect on what happens to men , walking in their sleep , when the passages to our knowing power are intercepted ; and our wonderment will to a great degree , cease . how regularly do the phantasms at that time , move our brutal part , the body : many authentick examples of which i could recount worthy our highest admiration ; they being such as , were we awake , and had our rational fears about us , we neither durst attempt , nor could possibly perform , without extream hazard . but , not to insist on these , let us reflect on our selves , even when perfectly awake , and we shall discover that , however we are set on work by motives , or reasons , yet we know not at all how the outward parts of our body ( only which we experience in brutes , and ground the conceit of their having knowledge upon them ) do perform any of their operations . what man living , though supposed the wisest ( much less the generality ) knows how , or by what passages he is to send animal spirits into the muscles ( whence all our motion proceeds ) or into what muscles , or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an outward action ? what feats of activity does a rope-dancer show us ? how many ways does he distort , wind , turn , poize , stretch , and ply the parts of his body ? to do which , the animal spirits are to be sent now into this , now into that muscle , to move this or this or that limb , or joint ; sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement , or quick motion ; sometimes fewer , to move them more moderately ; sometimes none at all into any of them , when he has a mind to surcease all motion , and sit still . yet he knows , no more than a brute , or a stone does , how he is to do any of this , nor can give the least account how it is done . all this is transacted by the wise contrivance of the body ; which is so framed as to be subservient to the design the man , as he is knowing and rational , had projected . and the same is done in brutes , when either actual impressions are made upon them from the objects ; or those former impressions are again excited in the brain ; which done , all the frisking motions of pursuance and avoidance which they perform , do follow by a course of natural or material causes ; and , withal , according to those measures and degrees as are proportioned to the efficacy of the first impellent cause , the object in their imagination ; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of which , to the nature of the animal is that which sets all the engine on work at first . . nor can the objection bear any force that some actions of brutes resemble reason , even though it seems more then is found in men ; since we experience that a watch , which is the work of an artificer , performs the operations proper to it , and tells us the time of the day with more exactness , than the best reason we have can do without such helps . so that the watches acting according to reason , demonstrates indeed there was reason in the framer of it , but argues none at all in the engine it self : wherefore , however the actions of some brutes may bear a show of reason , this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a rational , or wise maker ; but , not that themselves acted knowingly , or rationally , while they did these actions : for my self , i must declare , that i have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the action of a young vine , exerting and twisting its little fingers about other things near it , to support it self as it grew up , as ( all the forementioned circumstances weighed and abated ) at any operation of a brute ; and i doubt not but a campanella ( who maintained that every thing in nature had perception ) or some such other man of fancy , would discourse , and descant on it thus : " the poor week limber vine knew , and was well aware , that , not being able to support it self , it would , when it increast in length , fall down flat on the ground , and so be exposed to be trampled under foot , and hurt ; and , therefore , did very prudently cling about other vegetables , or poles near it , to sustain it self , and avoid that inconvenience . " and , i dare affirm that we lose the best part of our natural contemplation , by putting brutes to have knowledge ; for , what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing power in them should know , or , who admires it in a man ? whereas , it justly raises our mind to high admiration and adoration of the divine artificer , to see things which are made of meer matter , act with as much wisdom and prudence for their own preservation , as the wisest knower can by his best wit , of which he is so proud , and sometimes with much more . no doubt but the growth and operations of dull vegetables , do administer to devout reflecters occasions of very high contemplation ; and shall the operations of sensitive beings , which are incomparably more excellent , and more admirable , as being the top and master-piece of this material world , afford little , or none at all ? now , if their nature be to have knowledge in them , and it be a thing common to all creatures , and expected that god should give to every thing what is its nature , there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment . god has given brutes a knowing power , and that power makes them know , and there 's an end of our admiration , and consequently of our contemplation , and of that devout admiration , to which our astonishment at the several actions of those natural automata would otherwise raise us . . i beg pardon for this long digression ; i thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point ; both because it is a very concerning and useful preliminary ; as also to manifest how the using the word ( idea ) hand over head ( as we may say ) and taking it equivocally and indifferently for phantasms and notions , leads this great man ( as it must needs have done every man ) into great mistakes . for phantasms beasts may indeed have , they being no more but effluuiums emitted from other bodies , and received by the portalls of the senses into the brain ; where the animal spirits stand readily waiting to move the brute , according as those tinctures are agreeable , or disagreeable , to the compound : but notions , or ( which is the same ) meanings , or apprehensions , they cannot have ; for these being made by direct impressions upon our spiritual part , the mind , ( only which can mean , or apprehend ) to judge they have any such , would conclude they had a spiritual , and consequently an immortal part in them , which i am sure we shall both of us deny . besides , had they meanings , or were capable of any , they would be capable of the meanings of our words ; at least those amongst them which are most docil , and could speak , would not fail , if well taught , and educated , to know much of our language , and answer , in some few occasions , pertinently ; which none of them ever did designedly , and , if they hap to do so by accident , none thinks they meant as they spoke , but all mankind laughs at the odd chance , as at a pleasant jest. those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their names , as nurses do to little infants ; and why might not beasts learn them , as well as children ; at least learn as much in many years , as they do in two , or three ? indeed , some words and sounds , which are very often used to come into their brain , accompanied with some pleasing or harmful phantasm , do , by vertue of that concomitant phantasm , affect them , and make them act ; not from their knowing what these words , or interjections mean , but by vertue of the phantasms , or effluviums , that came along with them , and moves them ; or , because they being lodged together in the brain , that word or sound , or some other vehement motion of ours , excites again the same phantasm which puts them upon acting . nor can we draw any parallel from some wild and savage men , seeming as rude as brutes ; the question is of their nature , not of their circumstances . could it be well proved that those brutish savages , tho' instructed afterwards , could never be brought to perfom any actions more rationally than brutes do , nor could ever be taught any language to a tolerable degree , so as to answer at all pertinently or intelligently , the difficulty would be greater ? but this i never heard , or read , asserted by any . or , conld it be well attested , that brutes could fancy , or make choise of a female for being more beautiful , or were taken with the harmony of musick , or did comport themselves accordingly , i must confess i should much wonder . i remember that about the year . visiting my noble friend sir kenelm digby , he told me he was much surprized , and uneasy at a relation made him by a gentleman , whom he could not suspect guilty of that vanity , as to tell an untruth to make his story admired ; which was , that he saw apes dance the ropes at southwark fair ( which was then held ) and that they framed their gestures and motions exactly according to the musick . for ( says he ) this , if true , shows they know proportion , which argues reason , and will oblige us to seek for new principles . at his earnest intreaty i went to examine the business , and found it thus . a fellow stood below on the ground with a string ( which was put about the ape 's neck ) in one hand , and a switch in the other ; who , understanding the musick , made a little twitch with the string , or a menace with the switch , when he would have the ape retire , or advance , to keep time with the fiddles : nay , far were those mock-men , the poor apes , from being guilty of any thing that resembled reason , that , when they made them dance with a lighted wax-candle in their hand , neither their tutor's instructions , nor their own docility could teach them to hold the lighted end of the candle upwards , though they often felt the inconvenience : for , the melted wax scalded their legs , and made them , in the middle of their dance , steal now and then a little scratch where it burnt them ▪ which they did with such a serious and innocent grace , that it gave much divertisement to the spectators . this story i relate the more willingly , to warn others not to give easy credit to particular men's narrations , whether travellers , or others ; much less to suspect their own principles upon such sleight advertisements . i returned to my friend , and eased him of his quandary ; for which he was very thankful ; and blamed himself much for giving credit to a tale , to the prejudice of evident reason . . to proceed , and pursue my theme more closely , i would be glad to know , at least in common , what kind of things , in this author's opinion , those [ ideas ] are . are they corporeal , or are they spiritual , or under what head shall we rank them ? if corporeal , they cannot be in the mind ; as accidents , or modes of it ; the mind being of a spiritual nature . if they be spiritual , brutes , which have not a spiritual nature , can have no ideas . perhaps it will be answer'd they are not things , but certain modes of things : but this satisfies not ; for modes are affections of the thing , or certain manners how it is ; wherefore they must be sutable to the nature of the thing of which they are modes ; for a thing cannot be such as it cannot bee : and so the question returns , what that thing is of which those ideas are the modes : is it corporeal , or is it spiritual ? if it be spiritual , then again brutes can have no ideas , because they have no spiritual natures in them , and so they can have no spiritual modes : if corporeal , then our mind , which is spiritual , can have no ideas in it ; corporeal ideas being improper modes for a spiritual nature . i do chiefly insist upon this objection , to shew more manifestly that the word idea , should have been distinguish'd at first , and counterposed to phantasm , and not confounded with it : besides , my genius leads me when i discourse about any thing , even tho' i oppose it , to know distinctly what that thing is , least i oppose i know not what ; and i must declare that i can make no conception of the word idea by what our moderns , and particularly this learned author , has given me concerning it . for , he abstracts from affording his reader a distinct and clear view of it ; without which his book , which runs wholly upon that word , cannot be perfectly intelligible ; nor , oftentimes , his main discourses inferr any determinate conclusions . . it may perhaps be replied , that every man experiences he has those ideas ; as also that he comes to know , by having them in his mind ; and therefore it is a folly to enquire so scrupulously about such things as are , in some sort , self-known ; and that it is enough to say they are resemblances of things , made in us by the object without us . to which i reply , that we indeed experience the an est of something in our mind ( and , by the way , of something of another nature in our fancy too ) by which we know things ; but , whether it ought to be called an [ idea ] or suits with the proper meaning of this word ; or , after it is called so , the quid est of that [ idea ] or what it is ( at least as to the common notion or genus of it ) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this author , or any other i have had the good fortune to see , i must profess i am not able to discern . all the knowledge i have of it from him , besides that given above which confounds me , is this , that he calls it frequently a resemblance , portraiture , image , appearanc , and such like ; which still leave me more dissatisfied than ever : for , who can have the first knowledge of a thing by a picture , or resemblance of it ? let any man see the picture of a tree , or an apple , who had never seen those things themselves , nor ever should see them any other ways ; and what knowledge could it give him , but only of things of a far different nature from a tree , or apple , viz. a cloth , board , or paper , thus figured and colour'd ? or , how can any man know that such things are , or have any being in nature , by a bare similitude of them . i may see the picture of such a shap'd man , but whether that man is , or ever was , the picture cannot inform me ; so that it might be some fancy of the painter , for ought i know by the picture . indeed , had i known such things formerly , then a resemblance of them might , in that case , revive , and call into my mind the knowledge of them ; but , how it should beget the first knowledge of them , as our late philosophers put those resemblances to do , is altogether impossible and inexplicable . . again , since mr. l. affirms that we know nothing , either by direct or reflex knowledges , but by having ideas of it ; it must follow , that when by a reflex act i know my first idea got by a direct impression , i must have an idea of that direct idea , and another idea when i know that reflex one , of it ; and still another of that ; and so still on , all the time while i go on reflecting upon my former knowledges . now , what sense can we make of an idea of an idea , or what means a similitude of a similitude , or an image of an image ? each succeeding knowledge must be different from the former , because it has still a different object to represent , and that object cannot be known without its proper idea ; and , it is not only the immediately preceeding act which must be thus different , but the immediately-preceding idea too , which is the object of each succeeding act ; and , in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive ideas to consist ? it may perhaps be said , that plain reason tells us it must be so , though we know not the particular manner how it is done . i answer , the same reason tells us far more plainly , that it looks very untowardly , and aukwardly , it should be so ; or that there should be a resemblance of a resemblance : and my advancing this objection does oblige me to show , in due place , how both our direct and reflex knowledges may be performed after a connatural manner , without straining either good sense , or the nature of things . were it a material resemblance , it might , by rebounding from one place to another , cause a resemblance of its self ; but here 't is quite otherwise ; for the first ( idea ) it coming by a direct impression from the corporeal object without me , must resemble it ; and the idea of that idea ( or else of my first direct act ) which is the object of my first reflex act , must be a similitude of an idea that came from the object in nature , and is like it ; and the second reflex idea must resemble an idea , which was like an idea that represented a thing of a quite different , or of a corporeal nature ; and so endwayes ; which would put all our reflex ideas into confusion , as involving still others in them . . 't is yet as great a difficulty , if not greater , how the soul should have a power in its self ( as mr. l. conceives ) to reflect upon its own actions , that is , to form ideas of its former ideas ; it being ( as i verily judge ) metaphysically demonstrable , that an indivisible nature cannot work upon it self , or produce in its self a new act , or a new idea by its own single power ; or , by it self , move the body at pleasure , as we seem to experience in those motions we call voluntary ; or so much as have any succession of acts , but by means of the body ; only which ( and not the soul ) is quantitative , and , consequently , of it self , capable of succession . the farther explicating and elucidating which points , are reserved to their proper places . . many other arguments against these ideas , will , i believe , occurr hereafter , which i at present omit , because i would not fore-stall . but , e're i leave this point , i must do the right to this ingenuous author to d●clare , that it was besides his intention in his treatise to discourse particularly about the nature of his ideas , and therefore i cannot be said properly to confute , or over-throw , what he never went about to advance , or establish : though i cannot but judge , that it had been far more satisfactory to his acute readers , and most highly important to science , to have done so ; and most necessary for his book , since without distinguishing his ideas from phantasms , and letting us know distinctly what his ideas are , his whole essay is unintelligible , and all his discourses built on the ambiguous word [ idea ] are inconclusive . and , had his penetrating wit set it self to that study , i doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his own thoughts , and to have enlightned others . i desire then it may be understood , that it is not in order to him only i have enlarged on this point , but to meet with the mistakes of others also , who do customarily use the word [ idea , ] and yet , as i have good reason to fear , do not perfectly understand their own meanings . lastly , i thought it fit to dilate first on this point , that i might prepare the way to my next discourse , to which it naturally leads . corollary . from this whole discourse collected into a summary , i deduce this corollary , that , since the word idea , according to this author , signifies a resemblance , similitude , or image , and , consequently is indifferent to corporeal and spiritual resemblances , that is , to what 's in the mind , and what 's only in the fancy ; and that , only that which is in the mind can be the proper material of all our knowledges ; hence that word is most improper to be used in philosophy , which is the study of knowledge . also , that as taken thus undistinguisht , it does in another regard highly prejudice all true knowledge of things , or science ; in regard it confounds corporeal and spiritual natures , which contain the two general objects of all our knowledges ; and are , besides , most vastly disparate . preliminary second . that the elements , or materials , of all our knowledges are properly to be called . notinos ; and what those notions are . . but , if the word [ idea ] be equivocal and improper to be used in philosophy , as being unfit to signify the first conceptions of our mind , ( which are , as mr. l. says well , the materials of science ) and consequently , are apt to make us entertain erroneous fancies for real knowledges ; it will be be ask'd what other word we can invent which is univocal , proper , and not liable to signify a superficial resemblance , nor dangerous to seduce us by taking fantastical appearances for the true knowledge of the things ; but is , of its own nature , fit to express distinctly those solid materials , by the composition of which the structure of science is to be raised ? i reply , the word [ notions ] is such , and answers all these intentions ; and therefore this is the only word to be made use of by philosophers , who seriously and sincerely pursue the knowledge of things , and not their own witty conceits , or imaginations . 't is univocal and unambiguous , because men of art , or philosophers , who are the best reflecters on the operations of our mind , and have the truest right to express those thoughts their art has given them , have constantly used it hitherto to signify our simple apprehensions , or the first operation of our understanding ; and never to signify material resemblances , or phantasms : whence also it claims to be proper . and , indeed , it has title to be such even from its very origin and derivation : for , none can doubt , or ever question'd , but that the compound word [ cognition ] does properly signify true [ knowledge , ] and therefore the simple word [ notion ] must most properly signify those simple parts , elements , or materials ; the orderly putting together of which in a knowing power does compound , or make ( cognition , ) whereas the particular sense or meaning of the word [ idea ] which denotes a resemblance , or similitude , does not , in its immediate and proper sense , in the least intimate any order to knowledge at all ; nor any material , part , or peculiar object of it . nor , lastly , does the word [ notion ] signify a bare similitude , or resemblance , which can be , and usually is , in the fancy ; but ( as will be seen shortly ) the very thing it self existing in our mind ; which is most undoubtedly a solid material , or firm ground to build the knowledge of things , or science upon it . . i hope i shall have candid readers , and therefore i am not apprehensive that any will be so captious as to object , that i do here use an equivocal word , as well as others , by taking [ cognition ] which signifies an act of knowledge , for the object of that act. 't is a fate , to which all words are obnoxious , to have some ambiguity , or double sense one way or other . thus we call in our common speech a parchment by which we hold our estates [ a writing , ] and a sentence of seneca , his , [ saying ] ; and so take those words for the thing written , or said ; tho' they may also signifiy the acts of writing , or saying . but , this is not such an equivocalness as breaks squares between me and the ideists , or that on which my exception proceeds . the univocalness which i assert to the word [ cognition ] and [ notion ] is such a one as is taken from their radix , [ nosco ] which , notwithstanding little gramatical variations , does still import some knowledge , or an order to it ; and the genuin signification of those words , thus varied or declined , is still kept within that same line . quite otherwise than is found in the word [ idea ] which is indeterminate to those vastly different lines of corporeal and spiritual , ( which makes it highly equivocal ; ) besides that it has no rapport at all to the line of knowledge from its radix , or original sense . to clear then the meaning of the word [ notion , ] as 't is used here from this sleight , and ( in our case ) unconcerning ambiguity , i declare , that , there being two considerations in knowledge , viz. the act of my knowing power , and the object of that act , which , as a kind of form , actuates and determins the indifferency of my power , and thence specifies my act ; i do not here take the word [ notion ] for my act of simply apprehending ; but for that object in my mind which informs my understanding power , and about which that power is employed ; in which objective meaning i perceive mr. locke does also generally take the word [ idea . ] . since i have formerly blamed the ambiguous explication of the word [ idea , ] 't is but just it should be required of me to give a more determinate and distinct one of the word [ notion , ] which i shall do in blunt terms thus ; [ a notion is the very thing it self existing in my understanding . ] i expect at the first hearing such a monstrous position , which seems to the antiperipateticks something above paradox , and as mysterious as a supernatural point of revealed faith , it will be entertained by some of them with a kind of amazement , by others with a smile . on the other side , i am so little concerned how any receive it , that i must resolutely declare that , unless this thesis be as true as it is strange , it is impossible any man living should know any thing at all . by which the reader will see that the credits of the aristotelians , and their adversaries , as to their being held solid philosophers , does entirely lie at stake upon the decision of this main point . which therefore must crave the attention , and soberest consideration of those persons , who take themselves to be concerned in the affair of science , or in the search after truth . . er'e i address my self to prove my position , i must bespeak my reader 's consideration , that , in a question of this nature , which depends upon our reflexion on what is , or is not in our spiritual part , the the soul , he must lay aside his pleasing phantasms , and all the imagery , which with such a fine raree-show uses to entertain and delight his fancy . the point is of a higher nature than to managed by such familiar appearances . the ideas of figure , colour , nay , of quantity it self must sit out as bunglers , when such a game is to be played , in which they have no skill . this contest must be carried on by means as spiritual , as is the subject of it ; that is , by exact reason , or severe connexion of terms . and , to think to draw intrinsecal arguments ; or to frame pertinent answers to them , from what we find in material imaginations , when the question belongs to that part of metaphysicks which treats of spiritual natures , and their operations , is as absurd , as 't is to contend that the knowledge of a man is great , or little , because his body is bigg , or dwarfish ; or to fancy that science is to be measured by yards , or inches . and , tho' i cannot fear any such rational kind of attacque as close connexion of terms , for the negative , yet i grant my self obliged to produce no less than clearest evidence for the affirmative ; provided we rate evidence , not from what seems easiest to fancy , but from the said connexion of terms ; only which can establish our judgments . . i am to note first , that , as the moderns grant we know nothing without having [ ideas ] of them within our minds ; so i willingly acknowledge , that we cannot know any thing that is without us , but by having in our understanding notions of those things . now , say i , those notions must be the very things themselves ( as far as they are known ) in our soul ; which they deny , as incredible and monstrous . i note , secondly , that in my thesis , i take the word [ thing ] in the largest signification , as it comprehends not only substances , which only are properly things ; but also all the modes , or accidents of substance , which are improperly such . these notes premised , i come to my proof : . first argument . when i simply apprehend the thing , or any mode or accident of it , this operation of my understanding is within my mind , and compleated there ; therefore the thing apprehended , which is the object of that operation , must be there likewife : for , otherwise , this operation of my mind , it being immanent , and not transient , or passing out of my mind to the thing without me , cannot be employed about that thing , contrary to the supposition . nor could the thing be truly said to be apprehended , unless this operation , called my apprehension , had the thing for its object ; and this within my understanding , it being an internal operation . but , that which is within me when i know it , is the notion of it : therefore the notion of it ( taken , as is declar'd above , objectively ) is the thing it self in my understanding . . second argument . i know the very thing ; therefore the very thing is in my act of knowledge : but my act of knowledge is in my understanding ; therefore the thing which is in my knowledge , is also in my understanding . . tho' i will not allow it to be any way an an answer to these arguments , to alledge , that 't is sufficient that the [ idea ] or resemblance of the thing be in my mind , because it does not in the least shock the connexion of its terms , or shew them incoherent ; but is a mere shuffling pretence , thrown in to avoid their force : yet i shall condescend to shew it impertinent , and i argue against it thus . . third argument . that only is known , which i have in my knowledge , or in my understanding ; for , to know what i have not in my knowledge , is a contradiction : therefore , if i have only the idea , and not the thing , in my knowledge or understanding , i can only know the idea , and not the thing ; and , by consequence , i know nothing without me , or nothing in nature . again , . fourth argument . philosophy is the knowledge of things : but if i have nothing but the ideas of things in my mind , i can have knowledge of nothing but of those ideas . wherefore , either those ideas are the things themselves , as i put notions to be , and then i have gain'd my point ; or else they are not the things , and then we do not know the things at all ; and so adieu to the knowledge of things , or to philosophy . . i expect not any direct answer to these reasons , yet i doubt not but wit and fancy will furnish a prejudiced person with evasions ; and the next will , possibly , be this , that we know the things that are without us , by means of the ideas or resemblances of them which are within us . to overthrow which pretence , i argue thus : . fifth argument . we cannot have the first knowledge of any thing by a picture , or resemblance , as was shewn , preliminary . § . . wherefore , notions , or simple apprehensions being the first notifications of the things to our mind , we cannot know the thing by their means , as is pretended , were they not more than resemblances ; that is , were they not the very thing . to overthrow this pretence utterly , and withall , to uphold and fortifie this last argument , i advance this : . sixth argument . we cannot possibly know at all the things themselves by the ideas , unless we know certainly those ideas are right resemblances of them . but we can never know ( by the principles of the ideists ) that their ideas are right resemblances of the things ; therefore we cannot possibly know at all the things by their ideas . the minor is proved thus ; we cannot know any idea to be a right resemblance of a thing , ( nor , indeed , that any thing whatever resembles another rightly , ) unless they be both of them in our comparing power ; that is , in our understanding or reason , and there view'd and compar'd together , that we may see whether the one does rightly resemble the other , or no. but , this necessitates that the thing it self , as well as the idea , must be in the understanding , which is directly contrary to their principles ; therefore by the principles of the ideists , we cannot possibly know that their ideas are right resemblances of the thing . now , if the thing it self be in the understanding , there needs no idea of it ; for to be there , or to be in a knowing power , is to be known . again , . seventh argument . no relation can be known without knowing both the correlates : therefore no idea , which being a resemblance of the thing must necessarily be related to it , can be known without knowing also the thing to which 't is related as that which is resembled by it . therefore the thing resembled must be known , not only besides the idea , but by other means than by it ; which can be no way but by the thing it self existing , in the understanding . which argument is enforced by this consideration , that when the one of the two things that are related , or alike , is the prototype , the other taken from it , or ( as it were ) drawn by it ; the prototype must be first known ere we can judge that the other is like it . but the prototype in our case is the thing without us , therefore the thing without us must first be in our mind er'e we can judge of the other 's resembling it . . ninth argument . notions are the meanings , or ( to speak more properly ) what is meant by the words we use : but what 's meant by the words is the thing it self ; therefore the thing it self is in the meaning ; and consequently in the mind ; only which can mean. . it may be perhaps replied , that the ideas are only meant by the words ; because when we speak , we intend to signify our thoughts . i answer , that , however it may be pretended that what is meant immediately by the words , is our thoughts , when our own thoughts or judgments about any matter , are the things desir'd to be known ; yet , when the things are the objects enquired after , as , when a master teaches a scholler natural philosophy , or any other truth , the intention of the speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify the things or truths themselves ; and not our thoughts concerning them ; and , therefore , the things themselves are in the intention and mind , or are the meanings of the speakers , or discoursers . and this passes generally in all other occasions , except only when the knowledge of our interiour thoughts is ultimately aymed at . thus , when a gentleman bids his servant fetch him a pint of wine ; he does not mean to bid him fetch the idea of wine in his own head , but the wine it self which is in the cellar ; and the same holds in all our commerce and conversation about things without us . . eleventh argument . our words are ad placitum , and have no natural connexion with the things they signifie , but are order'd to express them by the agreement of mankind : therefore what 's signified by them , must be fore-known to that agreement . but the ideas , or resemblances we have , cannot be foreknown to this agreement , since they could not be at all known , ( being in the mind , ) but by the words ; which , not being yet agreed on , can make known , or signifie nothing . therefore the things which we had naturally fore-knowledge of , and not the ideas , are that which is signified by words . on the other side , since 't is no less certain that the words do signifie what 's in the mind of the speaker , or his notions , they must signifie the thing in the mind ; and , consequently , also the very things which are without us , and which were known to us before the agreement about the words , were in our mind , when we went about to name them : and , were not this so , words could signifie nothing , which is a contradiction . corollary i. hence that great contest in the schools , whether our words do immediately signifie our conceptions , or the things in re , ( as they phrase it , ) is put past all dispute . for , if the objective part of our conceptions , which are our notions of the thing , be the self-same with the thing in re , neither the one , nor the other , is immediately signified ; because there is no one , and other , but the same . and if the question be put of the thing as in re , and as in the understanding ; 't is answer'd , this question takes in those several manners of existing , which enters not into the objective notion , nor prejudices the identity of the thing under either state ; and so the question is again frivolous . . twelfth argument . the same is evinced from the verification of our words ; as , when i say [ the glass is in the window , ] the word [ the glass ] must mean the very substance of that glass existent without us , and not the idea of that glass ; for it would be false to say , the idea of the glass is in the window . therefore the very glass it self which is in the window , must be also in my mind . . thirteenth argument . but , because resemblances and likenesses please them so well , we will try what proofs may be drawn from those very words which themselves do most affect . they hold , the idea , or likeness of the thing is in the mind . let us consider then the likeness of a man in the understanding ; or rather , because we both agree that we have no compleat ideas or notions of any suppositum , let us take one of mr. locke's simple ideas , v. g. extension . i ask , is the idea of extension , as to its representation , in all respects like that mode as it is in the thing ; or is it not ? if not , then we can never know that mode ( at least , not clearly and fully ) by that idea ; which yet we must do , ere we can discourse of it as a simple idea . and , if it is perfectly , or in all respects , like it ; then 't is in no respect unlike it ; and , by consequence , in no respect different from it , ( for that difference would be an unlikeness ; ) and , if it be in no respect different , it follows , out of the very terms , that it is the very same , in the mind , and out of the mind , which is so much boggled at in our notions : so that , at unawares , the explicaters of ideas by resemblances , must be forced to come over to our position , even while they would avoid it . . fourteenth argument . to make this yet clearer , and to set it above all possible confute , let us take the word , [ existence , ] or actual being . they know what that word means , and consequently , they they have an idea of it in their understanding ; for 't is this which they say words signifie . this idea then must either be in all respects like to existence , or in some respects ; that is , in part only : not in part ; for existence has no imaginable parts in it , nor any divers respects or considerations ; no , not even those parts made by the nicest metaphysical abstraction of our mind , called act and power ; but 't is one , most simple , indivisible , and most absolute act ; and thence 't is called by the schools an actuality , as if it were the very nature of act it self , without the least alloy of the more imperfect notion of potentiality , or power . wherefore the idea of existence must either be in all respects like existence , or not at all like it ; if not at all like it , then , having no idea or resemblance of it , we can never know what the word existence means : if it be in all respects like it , then , by our former discourse , 't is in no respect unlike it ; and therefore , in no respect different from it ; and therefore 't is the very same with it . . fifteenth argument . it may , perhaps , look like an amusement , or surprize , to pretend the thing is the same , when 't is perfectly like ; for i do not expect that every reader will speculate so deep , as to see that all likeness is unity of form as far as the likeness reaches . wherefore , to put them out of this mis-conceit , we will endeavour to convince them that this position is not a trick of art , but plain honest nature : it has been still my usual method to shew , that the highest speculations i advance , are abetted by the natural notions , sentiments , and sayings of mankind ; nor will i decline to bring my present position to be tried by the same test. let us take then two quantities , ( yards for example ; ) in case we find them perfectly alike under the notion or respect of quantity , we make account we can in true speech say they are the same quantity . or , take two pieces of cloth , of such a colour ; and , if they be exactly alike in that respect , unprejudiced nature obliges us to say they are of the same colour ; and the same holds in all substances and modes whatever . since then the ideists must grant that their ideas are perfectly like that which they know by them , ( as they must be , as far as the thing is known by them , because the thing is known only by their resembling , or being like it , ) it follows from the consent of mankind , that those ideas must , consequently , be the same with the things out of the mind which are known by them ; which is what we put our notions to be . wherefore , the notion we have of the thing , must be the self-same with the thing known . . it may be replied , that the notion of a thing ( a stone , for example ) has a spiritual manner of being in the mind ; whereas the thing , or stone , out of the mind has a corporeal manner of being , and therefore 't is in some respect different from the thing ; and , consequently , not perfectly the same with it ; and so can only be barely like it , or resemble it . i answer , 't is granted that it is unlike it , and so different from it , and therefore not the same with it , as to the manner of existing ; but i deny that either its existing , or manner of existing do enter into the notion , ( except in the notion of god , to whom existence is essential , ) or do at all belong to it , or the thing either ; but that the notion is the thing , precisely according to what is common to it both in the understanding , and out of it , abstractedly from both those manners of existing . to explicate which , we may consider , . that no created thing , nor consequently , mode or accident of it , has , of its own nature , any title to be at all , ( much less to be after such or such a manner ; ) for then being would be essential to them , and not the gift of their creator ; whose prerogative of self-being , or essential being , is incommunicable to his creatures . . hence the things , and consequently their modes , do perfectly abstract from being , and not being , much more from all manners of being . . this appears evidently by those words which signifie them , the meaning of which words is the same with our notions . for example , take gabriel , peter , bucephalus , an oak , a stone , a yard , whiteness , or what other thing , or mode of thing we please ; 't is evident that the sense of them ( which is the same with our notion of them ) does not at all include , hint , or intimate existence , or non-existence . wherefore , 't is set above all farther dispute , and ( as far as i can fore-see ) beyond all imaginable objection , that our notion of the thing is the self-same with the thing in nature which is conceived by us . q. e. d. . now , if our soul , when it knows any thing has the very nature of that thing in it , and therefore is intellectually that thing ( for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the nature of such a thing in it ) it follows that , considering her precisely as knowing a stone , a tree , fire , &c. she is that stone , tree and fire intellectually , whence we may discover how rational , and how necessary and important a truth that saying of aristotle is , that anima intelligendo fit omnia . in a word , 't is due to the nature of our soul , as it is spiritual , and to the eminency of her essence , to comprehend after her manner the whole inferiour nature of bodies , ( and much more ) or to be an intellectual world , as soon as she is her self , and depur'd from her dull material compart , as is shown in my * method . nor can this making the soul to know so much ( nay , much more ) be deemed an extravagant conceit , or too high a privilege for her , by any well instructed christian , who reflects , ( as is also clearly demonstrable in metaphysicks ) that she is made for , or is capable of a knowledge infinitely higher , viz. the beatifying sight of god ; in comparison of which the knowing the whole universality of creatures is but a meer trifle . . i much fear that such readers , who are not raised above fancy , and have not well reflected how all truths , and all our judgments and discourses that are rightly made , do consist in the connexion of terms , will look upon all efforts of close reason , as chimerical , and think them to be only a kind of chiquaning , and little tricks of logick . wherefore , to comfort the uneasy fancies of such weak speculaters , i desire them to consider how all things were in the divine understanding before they were created , and are still there ; and how their ideas , that is , their essences , had there another , ( and that a more incomparable manner of being ) then they had in themselves afterwards . from which divine archetypes they were copied into nature , and thence transcribed , by impressions on our senses , into human understandings . this reflexion will ( i hope ) let them see how it is not impossible , but consonant to reason , that the self-same thing may have both a natural , and an intellectual manner of existing . i note by the way , that , whereas i have insisted so much on the impropriety and novelty of the word [ idea , ] our modern ideists will alledge that plato did make use of that word before them , and that they do but eccho him , while they use it after him . but , i believe they will find upon examination , that plato meant by that word the essences , or natures of things ; and , in likelihood , those very essences in the divine understanding ; however some thought he misapplied it to universal ideas , or essences , subsisting alone , and not in the individuals . now , did our moderns take it in the same sense he did , that is , for essences , and not for resemblances only , i should not except against them as to that particular ; but , to use his word , and affix another sense to it , is , as i conceive , to abuse it . . corollary ii. from this whole discourse , and the many several arguments in it , it appears evidently , that unless the word [ idea ] be taken as we take the word [ notion , ] that is , unless ideas , or notions , or whatever else we please to call them , be the very things in our understanding , and not meer resemblances of them , they can never reach or engage the thing it self , or give us knowledge of it ; that is , they can never make us know any thing ; any more than a picture can make us know a man we never saw , nor ever shall or can see but by means of that picture ; that is , not at all . and therefore , as i cannot but judge what i here advance to be true , and withall most necessary to be told , so i am obliged , without asking leave of any , to do that right to truth as to declare that those many schems of doctrine , woven upon such ideas as their groundwork , tho' they be never so ingenious and coherent within themselves , and may be of some use in logick to distinguish our notions , are both meerly superficial , and perfectly useless in philosophy , which is the knowledge of things ; and can only serve to please the daedalean fancies of the ingenious contrivers and witty descanters upon them ; but can never bring us to the solid knowledge of any one thing in nature , nor verify any one predication , or judgment we make ; nor enable us in our speculative , or even common , discourses about any thing , to speak one word of good sense . not that i think that mr. locke does still take the word [ idea ] in that unaccountable meaning ; but , that the acuteness of his natural genius does generally carry him ( perhaps unreflectingly ) to mean by that word the same i mean by notion ; tho' , to say the truth , he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point . . corollary iii. hence also we may gain some light what knowledge is . for , it has been demonstrated that our notions , on which all our knowledges are grounded , and of which they are compounded , are the very natures of the thing known ; and , consequently , that our soul , considered precisely as knowing those natures , or having them in her , as in their subject , is , as such , those very things which are constituted by those natures . wherefore , our knowing that those things are , or are such or such ( which is compleat knowledge ) is the having those things and their predicates of existent , or of their being affected with such or such accidents , so in the judging power as they are in the things without ; that is , the things within her must be as the things in nature are . wherefore , when the soul knows any thing in nature she must be that thing as it is another thing distinct from her ; so that in a word , to know is esse aliud ut aliud ; to be another thing , as it is another . for example ; to know the bell is in the steeple , she must not only have the bell existent in the steeple within her , but also that the bell in the steeple is without her ; or is in her as another thing , which is neither her , nor any thing or mode belonging to her . to explicate which hard point we may reflect , that all the essential notions of a thing ( were it possible to comprehend them all ) of a body for example , are intrinsecal to it ; as also all those modes or accidents of it , the complexion of which does constitute the essence of that body ; and even taking them singly , as meer accidents , they depend for their being on that body as on their substance ; but it is not so with the natures of those bodies , or their modes or accidents , as they are in the soul. for , they are no determinations or modes suitable or belonging to her nature as 't is spiritual , nor depend solely on her as on their subject for their existence , as all modes in their natural subjects do . whence follows , that when she knows them , they are purely in her as extrinsecall to her , or as other things ; and as having their genuin existence elsewhere , or out of the mind . and , in this consists the excellency of a spiritual nature , ( from which we may demonstrate her immateriality , and , by consequence , her immortality ) that by reason of the superlative nobleness of her essence she can comprehend the whole nature of bodies ( tho' she may know other higher natures also ) all its accidents , its existence without us , and whatever can belong to it ; and yet so as to stand a-loof from it , and preserve her distance and height above it ; and is withall through the amplitude of her nature , able to engraft on her infinitely capacious stock of being all other things ; and give them , besides their own , ( if they be inferiour natures or bodies ) a far nobler existence in her self . this definition of knowing will , i doubt not , look like gibberish to short-sighted speculaters , who have not reflected steadily on the souls spiritual operations , and on what manner things are in the mind : but , if each step to it be ( as i cannot doubt but it is ) demonstrable , the evidence of the premisses , and the necessity of the consequence ought to obtain of every learned man not be startled at the strangeness of the conclusion , because fancy is dissatisfyed . that inferiour faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow sphere ; and forbid to meddle with spiritual subjects which are beyond its reach and skill ; and are only manageable by reason grounding it self on such notions as are above matter . and , if it appears by this rigorous test that our notions are the very things as distinct from us , all the rest of it will follow of course by a natural and necessary consequence . preliminary third . that all our science is grounded on the things themselves ; and how this is performed . . but how can the things be in our understanding ? since the [ thing , ] in its first and proper signification , being an individual substance , is the subject of innumerable modes , or accidents , which we can never reach , or comprehend ; and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly , as mr. locke has very elaborately demonstrated at large ; and , as my self have also proved in my * method . this being so clear and confess'd a truth , it seems to follow hence against us both , that neither the ideists have any idea of it resembling it fully , nor we any notion of it , which is truly and entirely the same with it intellectually ; and so neither of us can , properly speaking , pretend to know any thing as we ought . . to clear this important difficulty , on which the whole affair of science , and the confutation of scepticism , seems mainly to depend , it is to be noted . . first , that the notion of the individuum , thing or suppositum , can never , for the reason now given , be distinct and compleat , but confused and imperfect . for , let us take any individual thing , v. g. a stone , we shall find that it has in it what answers to the notion of a thing , ( or what has being ) as also of extended , dense , hard , opacous , dinted , &c. it is divisible into innumerable particles ; its peculiar mixture consists of many diverse-natured parts , with such an order or position amongst them , &c. of all which our senses , with their best assistances , can not afford us clear knowledge ; nor , consequently , imprint any clear notion of that whole thing in our mind . . secondly , that , since to know a thing , is to have the notion of it in our mind , our knowledge must be such as the notion is : if the notion be clear , intire and distinct , our knowledge too is such ; and , if the notion be obscure , partial and confused , our knowledge must be obscure , partial , and confused likewise . . thirdly , we can have such a notion of every individual thing , if it be not ( as the smallest atoms are ) too little to be perceptible by our sense , as ( tho' it be confused as to it self ) may serve to distinguish it from all other things , and to make us know it exists separately from all others , and independently on them ; moreover , that it is the suppositum , or subject , which has its own nature or essence in it , and also all the modes or accidents belonging to it . thus , when we see a bag of sand , or wheat , poured out , our senses acquaint our mind , pre-imbued by some common notions , that each grain can exist separate ; and has , sustains , or gives being to its own accidents , without the assistance of any of its fellow-grains . . fourthly , this confused knowledge of the thing , in gross , is sufficient for such a degree of science of it , as we can have in this state. for tho' we cannot have a distinct knowledge of it all , taken in the lump , and therefore do not pretend to have science of it thus considered , nor of each considerability in it taken by detail ; yet , we know that confusedly it contains in it self what answers to all the many distinct conceptions we make of it , which are the ground of all the science we have ; they being all stored up and amassed in the thing , and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our abstractive considerations of it . . lastly , that our distinct knowledge ( or science ) is built on our distinct notions of the thing fram'd in our minds by impressions on the senses , which are many , and the manners of their affecting us also manifold . hence our soul , in this state , can have no distinct or clear knowledge of the thing , but by piece-meal , or by distinct , different , partial , inadequate , or ( as they are generally and properly called ) abstract notions ; as mr. locke has frequently and judiciously exemplify'd in the several conceptions or notions we have of gold ; which we may consider , as yellow , heavy , solid , malleable , dissolvable in aqua regia , &c. whence , tho' it be , perhaps , impossible for us to reach all the considerabilities that may be found in it , which ground our different notions ; yet each notion we have of it , being distinct from all the rest , and being truly the thing , as far as 't is thus consider'd ; hence we can have science of the thing , tho' confusedly of the whole , yet distinctly of it in part , by such a notion , as far as it is conceived by that notion ; notwithstanding our ignorance of other considerations of it ; those abstract notions being in our mind , ( unless they hap to be subordinate , as general and particular ones are , ) perfectly distinct from , and exclusive of one another . thus we can have abstract notions of length , breadth and thickness in bodies ; or ( which is the same ) we can conceive bodies precisely as they are long , broad and thick ; and mathematicians can frame many sciences of bodies , as thus conceived ; and discourse orderly and clearly of each of those distinct notions , that is , of the thing , as precisely such ; without meddling with rarity , density , solidity , fluidity , heat , cold , moisture , dryness , or any other physical consideration found in the same body : tho' each of these last also may , for the same reason , ( viz. their clear distinction from all the rest , ) be discours'd of with equally clear evidence ; and ground as many several subordinate sciences in physick , as the other did in mathematicks . . by what 's said , it appears , that all science , or all philosophy , being grounded on these abstract or distinct notions of the thing , it can be truly said to be the knowledge of things ; and that unless this be so , there can be no philosophy . this position mr. locke has ingenuously asserted : whether he holds to it exactly , or no , will be seen shortly . tho' , in case he should be found to deviate from it , 't is not peculiar to him , but a far more common errour in our modern school-philosophers ; and , i fear , in all the ideists : for these gentlemen , as soon as they have got such ideas into their heads , and express'd them by abstract words , as rationality , extension , roundness , length , &c. they , finding this abstract conception in their minds , and experiencing that they can discourse about it scientifically , do presently begin to imagine that those ideas have got rid of the thing , and hover in the air ( as it were ) a-loof from it , as a little sort of shining entities ; and thence have of themselves a title to be a competent ground-work to build science on . they character them to be resemblances , which is a conceit easie to fancy ; and so they set themselves to contemplate them , and employ their wits to descant on them . they discourse of them , and them only ; for they do not endeavour to shew clearly how those ideas do engage the solid nature of the thing . whence it must needs happen , that in case those ideas chance to be meer material resemblances , or phantasms , the knowledge built on them is purely superficial and imaginary ; nor can have any more truth in it , than a looking-glass , which represents to us a well-proportioned edifice ; or a dream , which ( as it sometimes lights ) is composed of fancies pretty well coherent with one another . lastly , which is worst of all , they make truth , which can have no foundation , but in the things which creative wisdom or essential truth has made and establish'd , to consist in the meer agreement of those ideas . whereas they ought to make it consist in this , that those abstracted conceptions , or notions of ours , are the thing it self thus partially consider'd ; and also , that our judgments or discourses of them , and all truths whatever , do wholly consist in this , that those partial conceptions of ours are found to be identify'd in the thing we judge or discourse of . 't is the thing we divide , ( as it were , ) or take in pieces by those abstract or partial notions of it ; and , therefore , 't is the parts ( as it were ) of the same thing we put together again , and identify when we compound propositions or judgments . . in a word , they make the abstractedness of those ideas to be exclusive of the subject or thing ; whereas i make it only exclusive of other notions , but to include and signifie the thing or subject , according to some consideration , or ( as it were ) part of it ; in the same manner ( to use a grosser example ) as the hand or foot signifie the man or thing to which they belong , according to his power of handling , or walking . hence i hold , that whiteness , breadth or hardness in the wall , do signifie and import the wall it self , precisely quatenus , or as it is white , broad and hard. whence i affirm , that all science , which consists of those abstract and mutually-distinct notions , as of its materials , is truly a solid ( tho' inadequate ) knowledge of those very things ; and not of notions , or ideas , aparted from them really , or as distinct kinds of beings existing separately from it : which if they were , we should be never a jot the wiser for knowing all the ideas in the world , nor ever arrive at true philosophy , it being the knowledge of things , and not of resemblances : especially , since ( as was demonstrated in my former section ) those resemblances can never give us knowledge of the things themselves . we may draw farther arguments to prove our position , that all our most abstract notions do include or connotate the thing or subject , from all our abstract notions or ideas , whether they be essential , or accidental . to begin with the former . . arg. . 't is impossible to conceive humanity , for example , without connotating homo its suppositum ; therefore that abstract idea , [ humanity , ] must signifie the thing , or [ homo , ] according to what 's his essential constitutive . the antecedent is prov'd . the notion or idea of the definition is the very notion or idea of the thing defined ; but the definition of humanity , viz. the compleat essence of a man , includes man in its notion ; therefore [ humanity , ] which is the thing defined , does also include the thing , or [ man , ] in its notion . wherefore [ humanity , ] tho' express'd abstractedly , because 't is but one part , as it were , of the entire suppositum , ( though it be the principal part of it , ) does signifie the thing , or man , according to his compleat essential form or constitutive . the same argument may be made of any other essential idea . let us examine next the ideas or notions of the modes or accidents of things , and try whether they exclude the thing , or include it . . arg. . the idea or notion of [ modes , ] is , that they are the manners how a thing is ; and of [ accidents , ] that they are those which do advene to the thing , or ( if i may be permitted to strain a word , to express properly and fully my meaning ) accidents are unessential conceptions of the thing . wherefore , the idea of both of them do include the thing in their explications , and consequently in their notions , and not exclude it . or thus , there can be no modes of a nothing ; therefore the notion or idea of a mode involves essentially the thing of which it is a mode , and to which , as such , it relates . wherefore , the material part of it is the thing , the formal part [ as thus modify'd ] or [ as existing thus ] or ( which is the same ) as thus conceiv'd . . arg. . this is confirm'd , because modes are justly conceiv'd to have no being of their own , but to exist by the existence of their subject : but , when we have a notion of any mode in nature , we conceive it as some way or other existing ; therefore their notion must connotate the subject or thing by whose existence only they do exist . . it would not be hard to multiply arguments to prove this nice point , fetch'd both from metaphysicks , and also from logick , and the verification of all propositions , did i conceive it to be needful . but , i see plainly , that all the arguments in my former preliminary do conspire with their united force , to make good this fundamental position . for , if this truth be once firmly establish'd , that our notions are the things themselves , as far as they are conceiv'd by us , it must follow , that all our science being built on those notions , has for its solid basis the very thing it self , and not any other things or nothings , distinct from the thing known ; such as are their pretty spiritual looking-glasses , those unaccountable , inexplicable , unnecessary , and useless things , called ideas . and , i hope i may rest confident that those proofs of mine will abide the shock of the most strenous opposition ; since , unless that grand leading truth be certain , 't is demonstrable that no man living can know any thing at all . for , 't is confess'd , that nothing can be known , but by the means of those ideas or representations of it : and those arguments evince , that unless the thing it self be in our mind first , those ideas , or resemblances cannot possibly give us any notice , or knowledge of it . . note first . on this occasion we may reflect on the sagacity of that great speculater and observer of nature , aristotle ; and may gather , at the same time , his true sentiments in this particular ; that , when he came to range all our natural notions into his ten common heads , he did not express the modes or accidents by abstract words , but concrete ones ; lest his scholars should hap to think they were certain kinds of entities distinct from the subject : whereas they were nothing but the subject or substance it self , considered as thus affected , or thus modify'd : for , he does not call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quantitas , qualitas , as we do ; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quantum , quale ; nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relatic , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , relata ; or more simply , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ad aliquid : which last is abetted by our common language ; as , when we ask , [ what is he to me ? ] the answer is , [ your friend , ] your father , &c. where the words [ to me , ] express formally what we call relation ; and the words [ is he , ] both signifie that the relation is a mode or accident intrinsecal to the subject , however it be consider'd in order to another ; and withall , that it has no being , but that of the thing or subject signify'd by the pronoun [ he : ] which amounts to this , that what we call in an abstract word [ relation , ] is nothing in reality , but the thing considered thus , or in order to another individuum , which we call to be thus modified , or conceived to be according to such a manner related . the same is observable in the rest , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , agere , pati , habere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quando , ubi , which have the force of concretes ; for 't is only the subject that can be conceived or said to act , suffer , be in such a place or time , or have such a kind of habiliment : whereas , were it not for that reason , he could have express'd them in abstract terms , ( perhaps more handsomly ; ) as , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , tempus , lecus , actio , habitus , had it not been his intention to avoid abstract terms , lest the manner of expression should represent it as a kind of thing , distinct really from the subject , and so lead men to take a fancy for a reality , as it happens in the mis-acception of the word [ space , ] which breeds the conceit of vacuum . and , he was less sollicitous to do this in the first predicament , call'd by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because there was no danger men should take the essence of the thing to be a distinct thing from the thing it self , as there might be in the others ▪ so that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd , as a most certain and most fundamental maxim by all who pretend to true philosophy , that whatever conception of ours has not the thing , or res , ( either consider'd in part , or in whole , ) in its notion , has no reality in it , and is a meer fancy . note second , hence we may gather the proper manner of signifying , found in abstract and concrete words , as such , viz. that the concrete word ( album for example ) signifies directly the subject , and indirectly the form or mode conceived to be in it : and the abstract word albedo signifies directly the form or mode , and indirectly the subject ; which indirect manner of signifying is properly called connotating . . this uncommon doctrine might , perhaps , sink better into the reader 's consideration , if it were illustrated by an instance . we will take then mr. locke's position of an infinite imaginary space , or vacuum . to make good which tenent , he imagins that vacuum signifies a space without body : which , to my judgment , is as much as to say , it signifies a contradiction , or chimera . for , i positively deny we can have any notion of space , without including body , however we may have a fancy of it : and i as positively affirm , that space can signifie nothing but body , according to such a mode called space , or quantity . for ( to wave my former proofs ) i ask him whence he had first the notion or idea of space ? he is too acute to hold innate ideas : it was acquir'd then , or wrought in him ; and by what , but by the thing , that is , by the body ? it was the body then which he saw ; it was the body thus modify'd , that imprinted it self thus on his senses , and caused such a manner of idea in his mind . wherefore , to conceit that we can have an idea of space without body , whereas he never had an impression or idea of space , but what was in body , and a mode of it ; and so identify'd with it , is to relinquish our solid natural conceptions , and run to fancies ; to abandon the firm ground of all our knowledge , the thing , and to pursue instead of it an aiery nothing ; ( for modes or manners , without the thing of which they are modes , signifie a meer nothing , and can be nothing else ; ) or , ( which is the same ) 't is to discard our well-grounded notions , and to entertain in their room meer phantastick resemblances . the notion of space then being an impression of and from the thing , is the thing or the body conceived according to that abstracted respect or mode , called space ? wherefore , to put space beyond all bodies , or where there is no body , is a plain trucking our natural notions , for appearances that are groundless , and coined by our imagination . perhaps he will say , we can clearly abstract the idea of space from that of body ; which is so far true , that our precise and formal notion of the body , as it is precisely a thing , or capable of existing , is not the notion of space , which is a mode of the thing . but , why must it therefore be nothing of body , when 't is evidently one kind of conception or consideration of it ; that is , when 't is nothing but body , as grounding the notion of space ? in a word , since space is not of it self a thing , or res , it must and can only be modus rei ; and therefore , to fancy an idea of it , which excludes body , is to make it a mode of nothing , and consequently no mode ; which is to destroy the notion of space , while he goes about to refine it . this for the present , till we come to reflect farther upon that tenet in its proper place . preliminary fourth . of the particular manner how all sorts of notions are bred in us ; and by what way those elements of knowledge do first come into the soul. . the former grounds being laid , shewing what knowledge is , and in what it consists ; the next thing that comes to be consider'd is , to shew , in particular , the manner how we come to know at first ; or , by what connatural steps , the things , or ( which is the same ) our notions of them , which are the materials of knowledge , are introduced into our minds . and , let it be noted , that it is not my intention here to shew , what compleat knowledges , or judgments , are in our soul before others in priority of nature ; which i have already done in my method , book . lesson . what i aim at here is , to acquaint the reader very particularly with my thoughts how our mind comes first to be imbu'd with both direct and reflex notions , which are the elements or materials , of which our compleat knowledges or judgments are compounded . . the difficulty of conceiving how corporeal things that are without us , could get into our soul which is spiritual , and affect it , was so puzzling to the greatest philosophers hitherto , that it has made them rack their best wits to invent some congruous way how this could be performed . aristotle , who ought to have done this , since he advanced that position above-mentioned which required it should be done , gives us no particular account of it ; but being resolved , it seems , to follow the sullen principle he had taken up , viz. acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editae , left it to posterity to find it out . which affected humour of his , whether it proceeded from envy of knowledge to the world ( an unpardonable fault in a professor of knowledge ) or from vanity , or out of policy to bring more scholars to his walking school , has certainly brought much disparagement to his doctrine , hindred its currency , and help'd forward by the schools , ( who undertook to explicate him , and did it untowardly ) has pester'd the world with diverse schemes of philosophy , either newly invented or furbish'd up afresh . whether he did explain after what manner we come to know , to his scholars , i know not ; only it may seem wonderful , if he had done it , that none of them should have deliver'd it down to us . but , letting aristotle alone with his faults , which blemish'd his other great vertues , and come to the other philosophers since his time . . these learned men saw clearly , that all corporeal agents work by local motion , and that no operation of theirs could be transacted without such motion , at least accompanying all their actions , they being all of them successive or quantitative ; and they could not conceive how local motion should be received or wrought in a soul , whose nature , ( it being spiritual ) is incapable of it . for , it must ( as the very notion of it imports ) be made first in one part of the subject , afterwards in another ; which can with no sense be apply'd to the soul , which ( it being indivisible ) has no parts at all . they were not so well skill'd in metaphysicks , as to reflect , that it was very congruous to reason to affirm , that the notion or nature of things ( speaking of created beings ) did abstract from all existence ; and therefore , that the same thing might have different manners of existing , and be in our soul spiritually , tho' out of it corporeally : and , those few who did apprehend the thing might thus exist in the soul when in it , were still at a nonplus how it could get into it . perhaps the difficulty of explaining this , might be one reason , why cartesius , not knowing how to give an account of this , thought fit rather to study , how he might avoid giving any account at all of it , and thence recurr'd to the position of innate ideas . at least , this is the best excuse i can make in his behalf , for embracing a tenet so totally praeternatural ; in case ( as his words give us just occasion to think ) it were really his doctrine . . the schoolmen , whose way it is , when they are at a plunge how to find out a reason for any difficult point , to create some entity which god and nature never made , and then to alledge 't was that entity which did the business ; invented their species intentionales ; which , if they were not the same with our notions , or the things in our knowledge , were meer resemblances coined by fancy , as our modern ideas generally are . but this raised a new difficulty , instead of laying the old one : for , besides that those species were such unaccountable things , that none knew what to make of them , or under what head to rank them , they could do the question no service at all : for , if they were corporeal , they could only affect the soul by way of local motion ; of which , being spiritual , she is not capable . and , if they were spiritual , it will be ask'd , how they came to be such , being caused by a corporeal agent ; as also , how , being sent from a body , they could get into the soul , or by what vehicle ? being thus at a loss , they invented another entity , called intellectus agens ; whose office it was to depure the phantasms from their dross of materiality , that they might become fit , thus refined , to be receiv'd in the soul. but this still multiply'd more difficulties , and solv'd none . for , first , what other reason had they from nature to put such a power in the soul ? or what other thing was it good for , but to purifie the species ? if it had no other office , nor served for any thing but to do this job , 't is manifest 't was invented gratis , to get rid of the difficulty that stunn'd them , and taken up for an asylum ignorantiae , when they were hard put to it , and wanted something else to say . secondly , were those phantasms , before they were spiritualiz'd , in the soul , or intellectus , or out of it ? if in it , the old question returns , how got they thither ? if out of it , how could the soul's acts of understanding , which are immanent acts , become transitive , and affect a thing which is without her ? thirdly , since the understanding , or this intellectus agens , can only work by knowledge , how could it have this power to alter the natures of things , or turn them from corporeal into spiritual , when as yet it had no knowledge at all in it , as before those species were refined and fitted to be received in it , it had none ? lastly , are those species they put , when purify'd , perfectly like the thing , or imperfectly ? if perfectly like , then they are the same with it , as our notions are ; and so , the thing it self is in the soul , and then those species of theirs are to no purpose ; for the thing being there in person ( as it were , ) there can need no proxy of species to stand for it ; nor can it bear any sense to call the thing a species of it self . if they be imperfectly like the thing , they are no more but resemblances of it ; and then , 't is already abundantly demonstrated , that the thing can never be known by them : so that they could make nothing cohere how our first rudiments or materials of knowledge could get into the soul , or how the thing could come to be known by them . . the ideists , on this occasion ; have taken two ways , and both of them very short ones ; which is to skip over all those difficulties at one leap. the cartesians tell us in one word , that god gave the soul her ideas ( or , as some of them say , some of them ) at the same time he gave her her being ; and that , by having those ideas in her , she comes to know ; and , so , by making this quick work , the question is at an end. this is soon said , but not so easily proved . some rubs i have put in the way of this pretence , to hinder its currency , in the preface to my method , and in the book it self , as occasion presented ; and shall add many more , in case their opposition shall invite me to it . but ; what needs any more , since mr. locke has already confuted that position beyond possibility of any rational reply ? other ideists there are , who think it their best play to abstract totally from that hard question ; and , finding , by experience , that they have ideas and resemblances in their head when they know , they content themselves with that , without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are , or how they bring us to the knowledge of the things in nature . these men do certainly act more prudently than the former ; for , 't is much more wise and safe , in order to the common good of learning , to wave an obscure point totally ; than , by advancing false positions , in a matter of universal concern in philosophy , to affirm what cannot be maintain'd . tho' i must declare , that i cannot see but that such a fundamental point , which influences the whole body of science , ought not to be pretermitted . for which reason i have thought fit to lay the grounds for it in the two first lessons of my method , reserving a more particular account of it till further occasion should be presented ; which seems to offer it self at present . . yet i do not judge this opportunity so pressing or proper , as to oblige me to treat such a large point fully , or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every step i take in this untrodden and rugged way . this of right belongs to that part of metaphysicks that treats of the nature of the soul ; and , particularly , as it is the form of such an animal body ; which may not improperly be called physicks ; or animasticks . besides , it were too great a boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse point quite thorough with evident demonstration . yet i think i may promise my readers , that the positions i shall lay down orderly to clear it , will have that coherence amongst themselves , and be so agreeable to the natures of things , and to the maxims of divers other sciences ; that it will be hard , in just reason , to find any considerable flaw in it . i take my rise from the remotest principles that can concern that point , and these are my thoughts . . it belongs to the divine wisdom to carry on the ordinary course of his world by causes and effects ; and , on the matter 's side , by dispositions to further productions . thus wood is heated by degrees , e're it becomes fire , and breaks out into a flame ; and , in the generation of every thing in nature , there are are many previous alterations of the matter , ere it acquires another form , or becomes another thing . . wherefore it belongs also to the same wisdom and goodness of god , as he is the first cause , that if , in the ordinary course of the world , the subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the power of second causes , to step in to nature's assistance , and help her immediately by his own hand . thus , when the individuality is compleated , that is , when the potentiality of the matter is ultimately determin'd and particulariz'd by second causes , so that it is become distinct from all other entities , or apt to be this , and so fitted for existence ; which existence , second causes cannot give : god , whose generous bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his creatures all the good they are capable of , does give them existence immediately by himself . . therefore , if there can be such a disposition in the brain of an embryo , that ( grown riper ) it is apt , as far as is on the matters side , to act comparatively , which is the disposition for rationality : and that this cannot be done , but by having a form in it of a superior or spiritual nature , which second causes cannot produce ; it is certain , god will , by himself , assist it , by infusing such a form. . there can be such a disposition in the brain of an embryo to work comparatively , that is , to judge and discourse ; since we experience that we do this actually now , in part , by the means of the brain , or something that 's near it , or belongs to it . . wherefore , since this cannot be done without having those materials in us , of which , compounded or compared , we are to judge and discourse , which we call simple apprehensions , or notions ; it follows that there must be such a disposition in some bodily part , as to convey into the soul such notions . . wherefore , since bodies , in their whole quantity , or bulk , cannot be convey'd by the senses into the brain , the author of nature has order'd that all bodies , upon the least motion of natural causes , internal or external , ( which is never wanting ) should send out effluviums , or most minute and imperceptible particles ; which may pass through the pores of those peruious organs , called the senses ; and so , be carried to the brain . . this natural compound , called [ man , ] is truly one thing , and not aggregated of more things actually distinct ; since the form , called the soul , did ( tho' not so naturally , yet ) as necessarily follow out of the disposition of the matter , ( taking it as seconded , and its exigency and deficiency supply'd by the first cause , ) as the form of fire , or of any other body in nature , does out of the dispositions properly previous to that form : and , therefore , does as truly ( by informing that matter ) make or constitute the man one thing , as any other corporeal form does any body in nature . . therefore there must be some chief corporeal part in man , which is immediately united with the soul , as the matter with its form , and , therefore , is primarily corporeo-spiritual , and includes both natures . whence , when that part is affected , after its peculiar nature , corporeally ; the soul is affected after its nature , that is , spiritually , or knowingly ; which part cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or glandula pinealis . . therefore the manner how , and the reason why those corporeal effluviums do come to affect the soul , and cause in her spiritual notions of the thing , is because of the immediate identification of the matter and form , in that part ; whence follows , that the one cannot be affected , but the other must be affected too after its different manner , proper to its distinct nature . in the same manner ( abating the diversity peculiar to each of those natures ) as , when the matter of wood is wrought upon , the form of it , or the complexion of accidents , ( making up one thing with it , ) does also suffer change. whence , by the way , is seen the reason of that received maxim , that actiones & passiones sunt suppositorum : so that 't is the whole thing which acts or suffers , tho' according to this or that part of it ; and hence it is that the whole thing is conceiv'd , tho' by an inadequate notion we conceive but but one part of it ( as it were ) distinctly . . this part immediately inform'd by the soul as 't is spiritual , ( which we will call the seat of knowledge , ) must , whatever it is , be of a temper the most indifferent to all bodies , and to their several modes as can be conceived ; and ( as far as matter can bear ) abstract from them all ; both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the different effluviums by which their several natures are to be understood ; as also more fit to beget in the soul universal notions , such as are those of ens , or being ; by which all the negotiation of our interiour acts of judging and discoursing is managed . tho' i am apt to judge that those general notions are also caus'd when the impression is confused or indistinct , as those of ens or being are ; and the same is to be said of the rest in proportion . thus , when we see a thing a-far off , and have but a confused view of it , it only appears to us to be something , we know not , particularly what , or a thing ; without making us know in the least , what kind of thing or body it is . afterwards , coming nearer , we discern it moves it self ; whence we gain the notion of a living thing : then , approaching still nearer , we , by a more distinct impression , know 't is a horse . and , lastly , when it is within convenient distance to give us a perfectly distinct view of it , we know 't is such a particular horse of our own . . that part , called the seat of knowledge , must , moreover , be the most sensible , and the most tender that can be imagin'd , that ( as was said ) the least effluviums may affect it : and yet it must not be of a glutinous nature , so as to entangle them , and make them stick there ; but that , reverberated thence , they may light in some near adjacent place , to serve , by their renewed impulses afterwards , for the use of memory , and to excite again former knowledges ; as also , ( as will be shewn , ) to cause reflex acts. that it must not be in the least glutinous , appears hence evidently , that , did the effluviums stick there , we should , whether we would or no , perpetually contemplate or think of those objects ; which would also hinder our perception of others , by mingling the former effluviums with those which supervene . . the orderly disposure of the world , by gradual steps arising from less perfect natures to those which are more noble , and more perfect , does evince that this part call'd the seat of knowledge , is the most supremely noble production of material things , and nearest ally'd ( as it were ) to spiritual nature that can be imagin'd ; so that all the best perfections that are to be found in corporeal things , are center'd in it . whence , tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned physician , that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is a baser part of man's body than the intestinum rectum ; yet i cannot approve of cartesius his conceit , that it is a glandule ; which is one of the ignoblest parts we have ; but judge it has a peculiar temperature of its own ; not only specifically distinct from other parts , but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it . . whether amongst its other special qualities it partakes of the nature of those bodies which in the dark do reflect light ; and that the glossy and lively appearances and resemblances , which we call fancies , or phantasms , do spring thence , i leave to others to determin . i think it is the interest of those who make the septum lucidum to be the seat of knowledge , to embrace that opinion . . those effluviums sent out from bodies , have the very natures of those bodies in them , or rather are themselves lesser bodies of the self-same nature , ( as the smallest imperceptible parts of bread and flesh , are truly bread and flesh ) which are cut off by natural agents from the great lump ; and , therefore , by application of themselves , they imprint the very body it self , or a body of that nature , on that material part which is the seat of knowledge . whence the soul being , at the same time , affected after her manner ( or knowingly ) as that part was affected , she has also the very nature of that body ( as far as the sense exhibits it ) put in her by that conformable impression , when she has a notion of it . . therefore those effluviums striking the seat of knowledge , and immediately ( as has been said ) falling off from it , do affect it as a thing distinct from the m●n . for they are not there as belonging at all to the intrinsecal constitution of the body , but as meer strangers to it : whence the soul has the nature of that body in her ( and consequently is that body ) as 't is another thing from her , which illustrates the explication of knowing given formerly ; and that 't is to be another thing as it is another . . the reason why those effluviums , containing the essence or nature of the bodies whence they flow , do not breed a notion in the soul of their whole essences is , because they are convey'd to that part by many different conduits the senses ; which being diverse , and each of them ( according to their circumstances ) apt to be affected diversely , do therefore receive and imprint them after a different manner . for example , those which , by the smart motion of the ayr , do come in thro' the drum of the ear ; and consequently by the auditory nerve which is joined to it , and immediately conveys them to the seat of knowledge ; do affect it with a kind of vibration , or ( as we may say ) soundingly . those which come in by the eye , affect it luminously , or as accompany'd with light , and so of all the rest ; whence are caused in our soul all our distinct , or abstracted notions of the thing , or ( which is the same ) of the nature of the thing , in part , or according to such a consideration of it ; on which , because of the distinctness , and consequently clearness of those impressions , all the science we have of the thing is grounded . . there is , moreover on the soul's side , which is the subject that receives those impressions , another thing highly conducing to make our notions yet more clear and perfectly distinct , which deserves our best reflexion . 't is this , that , the nature of our soul being indivisible , it gives an indivisibility to all those notions , or natures in her ; which , as they existed without her , and were convey'd into her by effluviums , being corporeal , were divisible , and therefore something indistinct and confus'd : this appears clearly in most of the objects about which the soul is conversant , perhaps , in all ; viz. in figures , points , lines , superficies , instants , measures , comparisons , predications , respects , negations , denominations , relations , &c. for example , there is not , perhaps , in all nature any body perfectly , or mathematically , flat , sphaerical or triangular ; or just a yard , nor any duration mark't out to be just an hour ; but , by reason that bodies are affected with quantity , which is perpetually variable by a world of agents of diverse figures assaulting it ; as also because of the divisibility of quantity in infinitum , it is warpt from those exact figures , or deviates from those just measures : whereas , on the contrary , those things , as they exist in the soul , are adjusted and stinted even to an indivisible ; so that the very least imaginable consideration , added or detracted , quite alters the notion to another species , now , nothing can be so concisely distinct from another , or more impossible to be confounded with it , than what is so comprized within its own bounds , as to be this and no other , or so much and no more , even to an indivisible . whence 't is demonstrable that the thing , as in our soul , or as standing under our notion , or conception , is a most proper ground for that distinct and clear knowledge called science . this is evidently seen throughout the whole body of the mathematicks ; and the same will be found by reflexion in all other sciences whatever . i note here on the by , that this power or faculty of the soul , which is so proper and so natural to her , of reducing all things in her from the indistinctness found in them , as they stand in nature , or from divisibility to indivisibility , does ground most evident demonstrations of her immateriality , and consequently , of her immortality , were it pursu'd home .. but this is not my business at present . . that part , called the seat of knowledge , can be affected with many coherent impressions at once , which cause in the soul complex , or compounded notions . this is too evident to need any dilating on it , i call those impressions coherent , which are caused by effluviums making singly different impressions either from the same thing , or the same sort of thing . but , it is on this occasion to be well noted , that , lest our knowledges or discourses be lost in a croud , or run astray in a pathless wood of notions disorderly aggregated , the art of logick is absolutely necessary , to range and distinguish our notions into common heads , and to descend from those general heads all along by intrinsecal differences * ; that is , to divide them by more and less of the common notion , so to keep them still within that line or head ; without which they must needs interfere and breed confusion . this method of distinguishing and keeping distinct our notions , is as necessary for scientifical discourses , as 't is for an army to be marshalled in rank or file ; without which 't is but a medly or confused multitude . whence , those who slight this methodizing their notions , must necessarily , in rigorous reason , talk ramblingly ; tho' perhaps ingeniously , according to such a sort of wit as men use when they would maintain paradoxes ; or , as erasmus us'd to praise folly. . it being demonstrable in metaphysicks , that whatever is only in power to have a new act , cannot of it self produce that act in it self , unless it be wrought upon first by some other agent which is in act ; and much less can such a power do this , as is of an indivisible or spiritual nature , in regard it has no parts , one whereof being in act it self , may produce an act in the rest ; as it happens in the wheels of a watch , or in our bodies , when one part of them moves another : it follows hence , that our soul can produce no new act , either of memory , or of reflexion upon her own former acts , nor of thinking or willing , &c. without being first affected by some object without her , or anew by some part or particle within the man ; which , being in act it self , may cause those new acts of knowledge in her . . the effluviums , which , by affecting the seat of knowledge , gave her to know at first , are the properest agents to produce connaturally these new acts of reflexion or memory ; in case it can be found that they are duely qualify'd for such an efficiency . . those effluviums ( as was prov'd above ) not sticking on that part which is the seat of knowledge , do consequently fall off from it , and are lodged near it ; whence 't is consonant , that that part also having its effluviums when thus sollicited by the impulse of those atomes sent from without ; and therefore ( all natural action causing reaction ; ) when they rebound thence , they carry away some minute particles of the said part. wherefore these outward effluviums , thus imbu'd , and qualify'd with some tang of the seat of knowledge , when they come to be excited again by some exteriour or interiour causes , must affect it afterwards accordingly ; and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a notion of it as fore-known , which we call , to reflect upon it , or remember it . by which we see how reflexion and reminiscence are caused by the new impulse of those former atoms to the seat of knowledge , tinctur'd with some particles of that part it self . for which reason , the oftner this is done , the memory of it is more easie and lively . whence is seen , that there is no need of multiplying succeeding ideas , to know the preceding ones , when we have acts of reflexion ; a new impression of the effluviums or phantasms , thus qualify'd , repeating still the same former notion with the connotate of foreknown . . memory and remembrance are inexplicable , without putting those first-imprinted atoms to reside still in the brain , and to be excited there anew . for , were this put to be perform'd by a meer motion upon the nerve ( as most of our modern philosophers think , ) the object being gone , that motion would quickly cease . nor could the same motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same object , which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember , as experience shows us . much less could the remembrance of sounds or tunes , in man or birds , be possibly explicated , unless those repell'd atoms , lying in order , and striking afresh the auditory organ , did repeat the same impression they had formerly . for , to put millions of motions to continue perpetually playing in the fancy , and ( as they needs must ) interfering with one another , would destroy all harmony , and breed a strange jarring confusion . note , that reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our reason , gathering or recollecting former notions by others that orderly succeeded them ; in the same manner as we investigate causes from their effects : whereas in brutes it is performed meerly by a new appulse of the former atoms to that part in which the imagination consists ; which being the most supreme in the animal , has a power to agitate the animal spirits , and move the body agreeably to those impressions ; as is found also in man. . the same excitation of those particles thus imbu'd , causes also reflex knowledge of our former operations . and indeed reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as remembrance of them ; for we can neither reflect on a thing without remembring it , nor remember it without reflecting on it . but this reflexion , for the reason lately given , must proceed from some object or cause extraneous to the soul ; that is from effluviums in the memory thus reexcited . for it is to be noted that as divines ( or rather christian faith ) tell us , that christ having two distinct natures in the same suppositum , all his operations proper to him as such , were therefore theanthropicae , or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the divine and humane natures : so man , consisting of both a corporeal and spiritual nature , and thence being a corporeo-spiritual thing , all his operations , for the same reason , must be corporeo-spiritual . whence he has no act purely spiritual , or uncompounded with the co-operation of that corporeal part , which receives those effluviums ( call'd by us fancy ) or without it's concurrence . which gives us farther light , to see how our soul cannot reflect on her own operations , but the fancy must go along ; and , by what 's said , it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the operation must begin anew , viz. from that part from which it did begin at first . hence came that saying of the schools , that the soul has notions , or knows , speculando phantasmata : which are pretty fanciful words ; and , tho' they may perhaps have a good meaning , yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd : for it makes the soul to speculate , which ( if it have any sense at all ) signifies to know the phantasms or ideas in the imagination , when as yet she has no knowledge in her at all . all her notions , which are the first elements of knowledge , being caus'd in her by those effluviums , previously to her knowing either them , or any thing else . . from what 's said above , 't is seen that those direct notions , which are thus naturally imprinted , are common to all mankind in the main , ( however they may in each man differ in some degree ) and consequently , the words we agree on to express those natural notions are , for the same reason , proper words ; whereas those notions made by meer reflexion , as are those of spiritual natures , are therefore improper , as having no proper phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the mind : whence also the words that express them , are such as are taken or translated from natural objects ; and therefore they are improper or metaphorical . . from this exact distinctness of our notions , even to an indivisible , or from this , that one of them is not another , our mind has an appendage of a negation tack'd to every notion , so that it becomes very familiar to her : whence she can have a negative notion of every thing she conceives , while the considers it as limited , or reaching thus far , and no farther ; or being this , and no other . of which nature are all the modes of ens , they being limited conceptions of it ; no notion being perfectly positive but that of ens or being . . hence the soul can have also the notions of indivisibility , immortality , immensity , and innumerable such like . but , it is very specially to be remark'd , that we can have no notions of those negatives as taken abstractedly from the thing or subject ; for , otherwise , non entities ( formally as such ) might be the object of the understanding ; which is impossible ; for [ nothing ] formally as such ( i add , nor vacuum ) can have no effluviums sent from it to the brain , nor consequently any intelligibility ; nor can any possible notion be fram'd of it . wherefore baldness signifies the head , quatenus having no hair on it ; blindness , the eye , quatenus having no sight ; immensity , the thing , quatenus not capable to be measured , &c. hence . the notion we have of [ nothing ] or non ens , is only that of ens in it's whole latitude , with a negation annexed to it ; in the same manner as in particular entities , [ incorporeal ] signifies [ non corpus ] or as [ indivisible ] signifies [ non-quantum ] &c. . hence it is that we come to conceive , and sometimes express non ens as an ens ; as grammarians do when they define a noun to be the name of a thing , and yet make nihil ( which signifies nothing ) a noun subjective , and put adjectives to it . whence philosophers must take very great care , lest , seduced by our manner of conceiving non-ens as a thing , they come to fancy , or judge it to be formally something ; as do the asserters of vacuum , and too many others in like occasions . for then ( i beg their pardon for my plainness ) their discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those ingenious verses , made to shew how rare a thing nothing is ; nor , indeed , so wise : for those poets did this ludicrously , to shew their wit ; but these do it seriously , and make account , that , in doing so , they shew their skill and wisdom ; which i must think is meer folly. . the notions of genus , species , subject , predicate , and generally of all terms of art which are not fantastick , but wisely conducing to clear and range our notions in order , to gain science , are nothing but several abstract notions of the thing , precisely considered according to some manner of being it has in our understanding . for animal and homo are evidently abstract or inadequate notions of peter , taking him as he exists in nature : but , when we call animal a genus , or , homo a species ; or , when , in this proposition , [ petrus est homo , ] we say petrus is the subject , and homo the predicate , we speak of them precisely , as they exist in the understanding ; for , in nature , or out of the understanding , there can be no universals , but only individuals , none else being determin'd to be this or that ens , or capable of existing : nor can propositions be any where , but in the mind . whereas , in the understanding , the notion of [ animal ] is really larger , and that of [ homo ] narrower ; which artists call genus and species . and , in the foresaid proposition , petrus and homo , which are its parts , are as truly in our mind the subject and predicate , as that proposition it self is there ; or as the thing , as existing in nature , is white or black. . this then is the test to try all the speculations made by logicians , and other reflecters or artists , viz. to examin whether they suit with , and are built on the natures of the things themselves , as they exist in our mind ; that they conduce to order our notions so , as may clear the way to science ; and that they be not meerly impertinent and shallow grounded fancies , as they too frequently are ; particularly , the * entia rationis , which make such a noise in the schools . corollary ii. whence , upon the main , is clearly discovered , how all true philosophy is nothing but the knowledge of things ; either as they have their being in nature , which is done by direct acts ; or else in the understanding only , which are known by reflex ones . . besides those impressions which cause our direct and reflex acts , there are others which breed meer whimsies coin'd by the fancy , and are purely chimerical . for our fancy having innumerable effluviums , or atomes in it , of many sorts , which are oft-times agitated disorderly ; hence it comes , that it conjoins and imprints incoherent phantasms on the seat of knowledge , and so makes apprehensions of them in our minds ; such as are those of a golden earth , a hircoceruus , an elephant supporting the world , a chimera , and such like . this most commonly happens in dreams , conceited prophesies , and enthusiastick revelations ; especially those caused by the spleen . nor is groundless speculation , exempt from this enormity . generally this happens when our thoughts are unattentive to the things in nature , whose direct impressions keep our fancy orderly , and firm. now , there is little harm in our apprehending those extravagant connexions ; the danger is , lest speculaters , seduced by imagination , do come to judge that the things are so in nature as they fancy them ; which must necessarily fill their minds with caprichio's , and frantick conceits . the ways to avoid these inconveniences , are , first , to attend heedfully to the direct impressions from the things without us ; and to examine whether the connexion of those fancies be agreeable to their natures , or no. secondly , to make right and strong judgments concerning those common notions we had from nature , which keep our thoughts and discourses steady and solid ; especially , to keep an attentive consideration , that , as all these notions came from the thing , so they are still the thing , conceiv'd according to somewhat that is in it ; and to take care we do not make them forget their original , nor disown the thing , from whence only , as being modes meerly depending on it , they had any kind of being at all ; nor , consequently , intelligibility . thirdly , to observe the methodical rules and maxims of true logick , which teach us how to distinguish our notions exactly , and to keep them distinct , lest we blunder in our discourses ; and which do withall shew us what are the ways how to frame true connexions , or right judgments and discourses . but , the last and best means to keep us from being mis-led by fancy , or following its vagaries , is , the study of metaphysicks ; which , being built on the highest , steadiest and clearest principles , abstract from all fancy , and will scarce ever permit those who who are well vers'd in it , to fall into errour . and , let it be observ'd , that nothing in the world more perverts all true science , than does the admitting those disorder'd fancies because , being cleanly express'd , they have sometimes a lively appearance , for solid truths ; nay , laying them often for grounds , and self-evident principles . this , this , i say , is the main source of all hypothetical philosophy , and of all erroneous schemes of doctrine , not grounded on the natures of the things ; which , therefore , must needs be , at best , shallow , and superficial ; and , if pursu'd home to their principles , plain nonsence , the usual and proper effect of ungovern'd fancy . . of those things that do not come in by our senses , as bodies do , but are of a different or opposite nature ; of which therefore we can have no notion but by joining a negation to the notion of body , ( such as are indivisible , incorporeal , immaterial , immortal , and , in general , all spiritual things , and their proper modes , ) we can have no proper effluviums , or phantasms , as is evident . wherefore also , the notions we have of them , and , consequently , the words by which we express them , are all improper , or metaphorical ; which , if not reflected on , will breed innumerable errours . the best notion we can frame of them , is that of thing , with a negation of body , and of all the modes of body joined to it ; which does not so much tell us what it is , as what it is not ; or rather , it gives us a blind , but certain knowledge of what kind of nature it must be , because it tells us of what kind of nature it cannot be ; the differences which constitute that nature , and its opposite , being contradictory , which forces it to be either of the one or of the other . yet this hinders not , but we may discourse consequently , or scientifically , of those things that connotate the negation of body , full as well as of the bodies themselves : for , as we can conclude evidently from the notion of body , that it is divisible , changeable , placeable , moveable , thus or thus qualify'd , &c. so we may conclude , with equal evidence , from the notion of a thing which is not a body , that it is not divisible , not extended , not moveable , not placeable , not affected with any physical qualities , &c. . lastly , as for the notion we have of god , however the an est of such a supreme being be many ways evident and demonstrable ; yet the notion of the quid est of such a being is the most obscure that can be imagin'd . for , first , since he must have innumerable perfections in his nature , and the notion we have of every ordinary suppositum in nature is therefore confused , and obscure , because it grounds many notions which we cannot clearly conceive at once , or have a distinct apprehension of them ; it follows , that much less can the divine nature be clearly conceived by us in this state , which comprehends all the best perfections found in the whole universality of creatures , and infinitely more . secondly , 't is yet harder to frame a notion of a being , in which those innumerable perfections are not found single , but are all of them center'd in one most simple , and most uncompounded formality ; which contains in it self eminently all the excellencies that can possibly be conceived in creatures , and millions of times greater , and more . thirdly , as we can have no notion of a created spiritual nature , but by a negation of what 's proper to body ; so we can have no notion of the divine nature , but by denying of him all that belongs properly to the natures of such a body and spirit both ; and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling , or even shadowing him . lastly , we have no notion , or expression , that can sute with him ; no , not even the most metaphysical ones . ens includes potentiality to existence ; and , all potentiality signifying imperfection , must be utterly denied of him . existence seems to come nearer ; yet , because it signifies a formality supervening to ens , as 't is existent ; and so is , as it were , a kind of compart , it cannot be proper for his infinitely - simple being . and even self-existence signifies a kind of form or mode of the subject that self-exists . so that we have no kind of notion or expression , that can perfectly agree to god's infinite essence ; but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes one attribute , sometimes another , that signifies some perfection , with [ infinite ] annex'd to it , which is not found in creatures , or which is denied of them , or is incommunicable to them . whence comes that maxim of the mysticks , that god is better known by negations , or by affirming he is none of those positive perfections we find in creatures , than by applying any of our positive notions to him . and this is all we can do in this state , till grace raising us up to glory , we come to know his divine essence , as it is in its self ; ( or , as we phrase it , see him face to face ; ) in contemplating which , consists our eternal happiness . . thus much of our notions , which we call the first operations of our understanding , and how they are caused in our soul. how our judging and discoursing ( which are the other two ) are made in it , is shewn at large in the second and third books of my method to science . . if any learned man is dis-satisfied with this discourse , or has a mind to oppose it , i think i have right to require of him two things : first , that he would not object his own fancies or dis-like of it , or think that this is sufficient to invalidate it ; but , that he would go to work like a man of reason , and shew that this or that part of it does contradict such and such a principle in logick , physicks , or metaphysicks . this is the only solid way of objecting , all other being but empty talk , and idle cavil . next , i think i have right to demand , ( since it is fundamentally necessary to philosophy that this point be clear'd , ) that he would set himself to frame some orderly and coherent discourse of his own , built upon evident principles , how , or by what particular means , the first knowledge of the things without us , comes into our soul. in doing which , he will oblige the world very highly , and my self very particularly : and , unless he does this , he will be convinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend : which will manifest that he either wants true knowledge , or ( which is a far greater defect ) ingenuity . preliminary fifth . of the proper and genuine signification of those words which are of most use in philosophy . . the main hindrance of science , viz. the mistake of fancies for realities , or of meer similitudes for notions , being provided against ; the other grand impediment to true knowledge , which is the taking words , us'd in philosophy , in an ambiguous or wrong sense , is to be our next care. the inconveniences which arise hence , and the ways how to detect and avoid equivocation , are in my * method discours'd of in common ; and i have here in my second preliminary clear'd also in common the signification of all abstract words , and shewn , that they mean the thing it self , quatenus such or such ; or , according to such or such a consideration of it as is express'd by that word . my present business , to which my circumstances oblige me , is to clear , in particular , the notion or meaning of those most important words , which being made use of by learned men , and taken by them often-times in different senses , do so distract them in their sentiments ; and , by drawing their intellectual eye , now to one side , now to the other , make them so frequently miss the mark while they aim at true science . not that my intention in this preliminary is , to pursue the mistakes of others , but only to settle the true and genuine sense of such words , to be applied afterwards to the mis-accepters of them , as occasion requires ; tho' i may hint now and then some abuses of them , that so i may the better clear their proper signification . . i begin with [ existence ] express'd by the word [ is ] which is the notion of the thing , precisely consider'd as it is actually being . this is the most simple of all our notions , or rather indeed the * only simple notion we have , all the rest being but respects to it . for , it has no kind of composition in it , not even that metaphysical one , of grounding divers conceptions or considerations of it , as all others have . whence all notions being , by their abstraction , distinct and clear ; this most abstracted notion is so perfectly clear and self-evident , that , as it cannot need , so it cannot admit any explication . they who go about to explain it , show themselves bunglers , while they strive to approve themselves artists . for , by telling us , that 't is esse contra causas , they put [ esse , ] which is the notion defin'd , in the definition ; which is most absurd , and against all art and common sense : nay , they make it more obscure than it was before , by adding [ extra causas ] to it , which are less clear than it self was . by the word [ causes , ] i suppose , they mean natural ones ; and so , tho' it gives no clearness to the signification of the word [ esse , ] yet it may at least consist with good sense ; and may mean , that the thing was , before , or while it was not yet produced , within the power of those causes , or in the state of potentiality ; and that existence is that formality , or most formal conception , by which the thing is put out of that imperfect state , of having only a power to be , and is reduced to the perfecter state of actuality , or actual being . . as it is impossible to misconceive this self-evident notion , so 't is equally impossible to mistake the meaning of the word [ existence ] which properly expresses that notion ; for , if they take the word [ is ] to have any meaning , relating any way to the line of [ ens , ] or any signification at all that is , of its nature , purely potential , they quite destroy it's notion : and , if they take it , in any sense , for an actuality not belonging to the line of ens , they must necessarily take it to mean [ is not , ] there being no third or other such notion to take it for ; in the same manner , as if one takes not ens to mean a thing , he must take it to mean nothing . now , tho' the goodness of humane nature , which abhors contradiction , reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural depravation of common sense , as to take [ is , ] while thus express'd , for [ is not ; ] yet , taking the meaning of the word [ existence ] as it is disguised by another word , which is , by consequence , equivalent to it ; those deserters of humane nature , the scepticks , do take occasion from the altering the expression , to misapprehend even what is self-evident . for 't is the same sense , ( when we speak affirmatively ) to say a thing is true or certain , as to say it is ; since nothing can be true or certain that is not ; and , therefore , when these men talk of moral and probable truth , and probable or moral certainty , which mincing expressions mean [ possible not to be so ] they in effect say , that [ what is , may , whilst it is , possibly not be ; ] which manners of expression , tho' they may seem to some but a meer unconcerning school-speculation ; and unreflecting men may think it deserves no other note , but that of being ridiculous ; yet , i judge my self obliged to declare , that it is moreover most enormously mischievous ; and that it quite perverts and destroys ( by a very immediate consequence ) the nature and notion of all certainty and truth whatsoever , and of being too ; and quite overthrows all possibility of knowing any thing at all . had they said [ i think it true or certain ] none would blame them ; rather 't is a credit for such men even to think heartily there is any truth or certainty at all in philosophy ; but to joyn ( as they do ) moral or probable , to truth and certainty , as a kind of mode affecting them , is to clap these most unconsociable things , light and darkness , into one dusky compound , to abet nonsense , and palliate ignorance . . the notion immediately next in order to existence , as that which has the very least potentiality that can be in the line of being , is that of ens , or thing . wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [ capable to be ] for , no created thing has actual being , or existence , in its essential-notion , but of its own nature may be or not be ; as , besides what 's proved in my * method , is seen in the very notion of creature ; which signifies that which has its being from another ; which , therefore , can , of its self , be only capable of being . that the notion of ens is distinct from that of existence is demonstrated * elsewhere , and is farther evident hence , that the notion of what has existence must be different from what 's had by it , or from existence it self . all mankind has this notion of thing in them ; for they experience that every thing can exist , by seeing it does so ; and they know also they are not of themselves , whether they hold a first being , or no ; because they do generally see that causes produced them . wherefore all that can be said , or thought of the word [ ens ] is , that it signifies the thing precisely , as 't is capable of being . . whence follows , that the abstract terms , [ entity ] or [ essence ] do properly signify [ a capacity of being , ] which is the abstract term of [ capable of being . ] tho' entity is often us'd as a concrete for the thing it self . moreover , essence is the total form of ens its suppositum , or subject , which adequately and intirely constitutes it such ; as humanitas is the total form of homo . i call it the total form , to distinguish it from the partial form of body ; which , with the matter , its compart , do compound the entire notion , or total form of corporeity . . to understand which more clearly we are to note that the notion and signification of the word [ matter ] signifies the thing , or body precisely , as it is a power to be a thing ; and form signifies the same thing , according to that in it which determins it to be a thing actually . we are to reflect too , that power and act , considered in the line of being , are the same as matter and form ; only the former words are purely metaphysical , because they express the parts of ens as ens ; in regard no other conceptions in the line of being can possibly be framed of a body , but as it is determinable , or determinative , which are the very notions of power and act ; whereas matter and form , tho' in bodies they signify the same as the former , seem rather to incline to the parts of such an ens , or body , physically consider'd . . to show literally what 's meant by this saying , that matter and form constitute the compleat ens , or make the subject capable of existing , i discourse thus . nothing as 't is indeterminate or common to more can be ultimately capable to be : v. g , neither a man in common , nor a horse in common , can possibly exist , but this man , or this horse : whatever therefore does determin the potentiality , or indifferency of the subject as it is matter , or , which is the same , a power to be of such or such a nature , ( which is what we call to have such a form in it ) does make it this or that , and , consequently , disposes it for existence . wherefore since the particular complexion of the several modes and accidents do determin the power or matter , so as to make it distinct from all others , it does by consequence determin it to be this , and , so , makes it capable of existing ; that is , an ens or thing . i enlarge not upon this point , because i have treated it so amply in the appendix to my method to science . . hence is seen what is , or can , with good sense , be meant by that metaphysical , or entitative part called by the schools , the substantial or essential form ; which they say , does , with the matter , make up that compound ens , call'd body ; and that , in literal truth , it can be nothing else but that complexion of the modes , or accidents , which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial constitution of every body , at the first instant of its being thus ultimately determin'd to be this. for , this original temperature of the mixt or animal , being once settled by the steady concurrence of its causes ; whatever particles or effluviums , or how many soever , which are agreeable to it , do afterwards accrue to it , are so digested into , or assimilated , to its nature , that they conserve , nourish and dilate , and not destroy it . whereas , if they be of an opposit nature , they alter it from its own temperature , and in time quite destroy and corrupt it . to explicate which more fully , let us consider how the causes in nature , which are many times of a different , sometimes of a contrary temper to the compound , do work upon a body ; and how they make ( as they needs must ) preternatural dispositions in it ; till , when those disagreeable alterations arrive to such a pitch , as quite to pervert the former complexion of accidents , which we call its form ; a new form , or new complexion succeeds , determining the matter to be another thing ; till it self also , wrought upon in the same manner , comes to be corrupted , and so makes way for a new off-spring . to which , in the very instant it is ultimately determined to be this , the first being , whose overflowing goodness stands ever ready to give his creatures all that they are disposed or capable to have , does , with a steady emanation of being , give his peculiar effect , existence . corollary . the reason why our moderns do so oppose substantial or essential forms , are reduced to two heads : first , because they conceited the form was a kind of distinct thing , or at least a part of a thing supervening to the marter , its compart , and compounding the ens , after that gross manner as two things in nature do compound a third : whereas , in reality , they are nothing but divers notions or considerations of the thing , formally , as it is a thing . wherefore , to say , a body is compounded of matter and form , is no more , in literal truth , than to say that there can be no more considerations of a body , taken formally , as it is a thing ; or taking it in the line of ens precisely , but of a power to become such a thing ; and of the act or form , determining that power : however the thing may have in it what grounds the notions of many modes or accidents ; which are also the thing materially , tho' not formally according to the notion of ens. nor let any object , that this is to maintain that things are compounded of notions , as some may mis-understand us ; for , let it be remember'd ( as is demonstrated above , ) that the notion is the very thing , as it is in our understanding , according , or as far as it is conceiv'd by us ; that is , 't is the very thing , partially consider'd . the other reason which the moderns had for this mis-conceit , was , because the schools generally explain'd themselves very ill , by making a new entity of every different conception ; not comprehending well the difference between metaphysical composition and divisibility , and physical , or rather artificial ones ; such as apothecaries use when they put many ingredients into a pill ; or carpenters , when of many divers materials they compound a house ; which is the applying , outwardly or inwardly , more things ( properly so called ) together : whereas metaphysical divisibility is never reduced to act , but by our understanding framing distinct or abstract notions of one and the same thing . and metaphysical composition is no more , but that there is found in the thing ( though physically and entitatively one , and uncompounded ) what grounds those distinct notions ; which being but divers respects or considerations , it follows , that the thing in nature may , without any contradiction , ( or possibly , ) be chang'd according to one of them , and not according to another . . hence , lastly , is clearly seen what is the principle of individuation , about which there have been such warm disputes , viz. that 't is nothing but that comploxion of modes or accidents , which make up the peculiar constitution of a body at the first instant of its being such an ens or this , as is explicated at large , § . by which 't is , consequently , fitted for such a particular operation in nature . . ens or thing has many other names , tho' all of them less proper . as , first , [ substance , ] which , coming from the verb [ substare , ] respects only its modes and accidents , and not what concerns its self , or its own order or capacity to existence . wherefore , 't is very improper ; and , unless the common usage of it make some amends for the impropriety of the expression , certainly it is most highly unfit . aristotle calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which coming from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , keeps it within the line of being . as i remember boetius was the first who render'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by substantia . the schools either us'd it in imitation of him , or else they took it up when they were to treat of the ten predicaments ; and , nature instructing them that the last nine had no order to being in their signification ; and so , as taken in their peculiar notions , could not exist alone , without needing a kind of support ( as it were : ) hence they call'd this support , by a name suitable enough to their thoughts , substance ; and the others , that had not being in their notion , and so had no title to being by their own merits , or to uphold themselves in being , accidents ; of the impropriety of which word more hereafter . i wish there were no worse in it ; and that , they did not fancy all those abstract notions , which are only the thing in part , to have in them the notion of things too , or to be so many intire things ; tho' they were feebler and the other stronger . however it were , they went to work illogically : for , they should have considered , that all of them ( taking them as they were distinct from the notion of thing ) could be nothing but several conceptions of ours , or ( which is the same ) the thing as diversly considered ; and then they might have easily reflected , that we could not ( in general ) have more conceptions than those of res and modus rei ; that is , of the thing , and of the several manners how a thing is ; which would have clear'd this truth to them , that the manner or the how a thing is , is nothing without the thing , as is deduced formerly . however , the word [ substantia ] with a sound explication , may pass , since use will have it so ; and will do little harm , so it be but rightly understood to mean what we properly call ens , res , or thing . . on this occasion , 't is my opinion , that both mr. locke and my self should not be too severe against the modern school-men , for using the words [ substantia ] and [ inhaerentia ; ] or , as he ingeniously ridicules it , [ sticking-on and underpropping . ] the manner how the thing and its modes do relate to one another ; being only found in our mind , and according to the being they have there ( for out of it there is no distinction at all of the thing from its modes ) is spiritual ; and so , can no other way be express'd , but metaphorically ; and our selves do and must , in such a case , frequently use such metaphors to express our conceptions ; which a critick might banter sufficiently , by taking them literally . indeed , if those school-men did understand them in that crude literal sense , ( as i fear many of them did ) from which apprehension , i believe , his zeal against them proceeded , they deserve to be the sport and laughter of all men of sense ; for i know nothing else they are good for . now the truth is , there is a kind of natural order in our notions , tho' taken from the same thing ; so that we have the notion of res or thing antecedently ( in priority of nature ) to modus rei , or the accidents ; and we conceive the mode or manner to presuppose the notion of the thing , and to have no being but as it is in it and affects it . whence , being conceiv'd to be in it , and to have no being by any other means , we may , by a metaphor not much strain'd , say it does , as it were , inhere in it ; and that the thing supports its modes in their being . nor will it do us any harm loqui cum vulgo , to speak as vulgar philosophers use ; provided we do sentire cum doctis , or make wiser judgments of the literal sense of those words , than they perhaps ever meant . . the word [ suppositum ] is another name of ens or thing , in a manner , ( tho' not altogether ) the same with substance . for [ substance ] is , i conceive , meant for the essential notion of the thing , as it is contradistinguisht from accidental , or unessential ones ; and suppositum does , over and above , relate also to the very nature of the thing , ( or to the complexion of accidents which constitutes its essence ) and not only to the modes , as each of them singly is a meer accident , and had being by it or in it . whence the notion of suppositum is the most confused of any other ; and signifies that which has all the forms in it whatever , whether they be essential ones or accidental ; and not only those modes ( or accidents ) which naturally belong'd to it at first as properties , ( or inseparable accidents ) but those also which accru'd to it since , and are meerly accidental to it . . hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word [ suppositality ] which is the abstract of the suppositum : for , it signifies manifestly the thing according to the precise notion of the suppositum , or of what has all the aforesaid forms in it : how agreeable this discourse is to christian language and principles , will easily appear to solid divines . . the word [ individuum ] which is another name of ens , us'd by the learned , and , as is seen in those usual words [ the same individual thing , ] is got into our vulgar language , is a logical expression ; distinguishing the notion of a particular , ( only which is properly a thing ) from the generical and specifical notions ; in regard both these latter do bear a division of their notions into more inferiour ones ; and so , that each of the inferior ones contains the whole superiour natures in it which the others do signify ; as the whole definiton , notion or nature of an [ animal ] or of [ a sensitive living thing ] is found in man , and also in brutes ; and the whole definition or notion of man , is found in socrates and plato . but , the particular natures of socrates and plato ( which are signify'd by those words ) and their definitions , could they bear any , cannot be divided into more which have the particular natures of socrates and plato in them : and , therefore they are called individuums ; that is , such as cannot be divided into more , which have the natures signified by those words in them , as could the generical and specifical notions of animal and homo ; whence individuums are the lowest and narrowest notion that can possibly be in the line of ens. . the individuum , is call'd by the latin schools [ substantia prima ] and the superiour notions in the line of ens. [ substantiae secundae ] which signifies that only individuums are in propriety of speech entia or capable of existing ; for , since , ( as was shown above ) nothing that is common or undetermined can exist , none of the others can have any actual being at all but in the individuum , as a kind of metaphysical part of its intire notion ; and a part ( in what sense soever that word be taken ) can not possibly be but in the whole . if this then be their meaning , as i believe it is , nothing can be more true and solid . only i must note that it is less properly and less logically exprest ; and that aristotle speaks more exactly when he calls the former 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or primò substantia , and the latter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or secundò substantia ; which words denote , that the former is ens in its primary and proper signification of that word , and the latter only analogically , that is in a secondary and improper sense ; which prima and secunda substantia do not express : for , both these may be properly entia still , for any thing those words tell us , tho' one of them may have an order of priority to the other as prima and secunda ; in some such sense as we call god the primum ens , considering him in order to creatures . . from words used by philosophers which belong to the line of ens , we come to those which are made use of to express the modes or manners how a thing is ; which , in a generall appellation , the schools have call'd accidents . this word is , certainly , very improper : for , who can think that quantity or ( as they will needs call it ) extension , is accidental to body , or ( as some may take that equivocal word ) that 't is but by chance , or by accident , that bodies have any bigness in them at all ? the best sense i can give it , in pursuance to my own grounds , is this , that [ accidental , ] which is the denominative from [ accident , ] may mean such notions as are not essential ; or ( which is the same ) they may mean the thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any order to being , nor expresses any such order by the word which signifies its notion . and , were this sense universally accepted , and attributed to the word [ accidents , ] it would be a true and solid one : for , 't is evident , that none of the words that signifie any of those accidents , does in the least import in its signification either being , or any respect or order to it , as does ens , and all those words which do formally and properly express it , or belong to it . whence the notions signify'd by such words , are not essential ones , or relating properly and precisely to the essence ; but modish , ( as we may term it , ) or expressing some manner [ how ] the thing is ; which is a quite different notion from that of ens , or thing , or of what formally is found in that line . i do believe that divers of the wisest , and most learned school-men did take the word [ accidents ] in this sense , tho' the propriety of that word , fetch'd from its radix , did not invite , much less oblige them to do so . i doubt also , that the usage of that word in that warrantable sense i have now assign'd , was not so common , and universally current , even among the school-men , as to force it to bear that sense ; as appears by their thinking that accidents were certain kinds of little adventitious entities ; much less among the modern ideists ; who ( through their shortness in logick and metaphysicks ) do make quantity , or extension , the essential form of body ; which is , to put bigness in the line of being ; or , to make bigness and being , or the mode and the thing , to be in the same line of notions , and intrinsecal to one another : whereas , a thing must first be conceiv'd to be , e'er it can be after such a mode , or manner . . for the reason lately given , i cannot but judge , that the word [ mode , ] or ( as some call it ) [ modification , ] is far more proper than the word [ accidents , ] to signifie those last nine common heads of our natural notions , which impartiality of mine , on this , and other occasions , giving some advantage to the cartesians , and other moderns , over other philosophers , who call themselves aristotelians , will , i hope , obtain their good opinion of me , that i do sincerely follow my best reason , and not pique or prejudice , while i oppose them in other things : and i am sure , 't is my own reason i ought to follow , till clearer reasons of theirs shew mine to be none ; which i have no reason to fear ; for , i hope , it will appear to every acute and ingenuous examiner , that no writer ever distinguish'd his notions more exactly and clearly , or connected them more closely and immediately . . the primary mode of all those things we converse with , or bodies , is call'd quantity . this word is very proper , and fully significant ; for , all the bodies in nature have some quantity or bigness in them , more or less : nay , even the least atome , or effluvium , that can be conceiv'd , has bigness in it , as well as the greatest body , nay , as the whole world ; tho' not so much , or so great a degree of it . wherefore , this word [ quantity ] is comprehensive ; and so , fit to signifie the commonest affection of body : but , this is not enough ; 't is withal , very simple , or uncompounded : moreover , the word it self has , on its side , no kind of equivocalness , taking it as it is applied to body in common ; which requisites are not found in any other word used by us , to express that mode . only we are to note , that bigness , or bulk , is only proper to body , as it has in it all the three dimensions ; whereas , quantity reaches to how long , or how broad , as well as how thick : and therefore quantity is absolutely the properest word to express this primary mode : however , it is much neglected by our moderns , who are grown strangely fond of extension . . the word [ extension ] is very improper to signifie it : for , extension properly denotes the action of extending ; to which is directly opposit , in our usual speech , that action , call'd contraction . or , if it be taken for the being extended , still its proper signification must be a passion caus'd by the action of extending ; which cannot sute with that simple and primary mode we call quantity ; which is naturally antecedent to , and independent of those subsequent modes called action , and passion . again , all intrinsecal modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of forms affecting body , as their subject ; and forms are very ill express'd by a substantive deriv'd from a verb ; and by such an one especially , as must necessarily ( at least ) connotate action or passion , if it does not rather directly , or most properly signifie them . moreover , let them take extension , stretching out , or exporrection how they will , still common sense teaches us , that we may take contraction or straitning in the same manner as they do it : whence follows , that if extension means or implies impenetrability of parts , contraction must mean penetrability of parts ▪ which notion none of us will admit to have any ground in nature , tho' the maxim tells us , that [ contraries are employ'd about the same subject . ] now , the word [ quantity ] is not entangled with any of these inconveniences , but freed from them all , as will appear to any sober reflecter . and , on this occasion , i beg leve of our ideists , to tell them , that it is not safe , nor prudent , to leave off an old and us'd word , till they are sure they have found another which is better , or more proper . cartesius made choice of [ extension ] wittily , that he might thus more cleaverly bring all physicks to mathematicks ; and others ( perhaps , ut est natura hominis , fond of a novelty ) follow'd him unadvisedly ; tho' they were not guilty of any such design of their own , or aware of his . and i am sorry mr. l. affects only the improper word [ extension , ] and quite neglects that more proper word [ quantity . ] . many other names , at least attributes , are given to quantity ; such as are divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability ; the former of which signifies it in order to natural action and passion , and respects properly the parts into which it may be divided ; or , which is the same , its potential parts ; in which , perhaps , the nature of quantity would be found to consist , were i here to treat of the nature of those modes , and not only of the names us'd in philosophy . impenetrability properly signifies such an order or ( as it were ) situation of those parts , as that one of them is without , and not within another ; which grounds that secondary notion , which some do improperly call extension ; and extension or quantity , if of any considerable largeness in respect of the body it contains , is call'd space ; which differs from the notion of place in this , that place ( if properly such ) is just as much quantity as contains the thing placed , and has a respect to some determinate and known points : whereas space has not in its notion to be adjusted to the body that is in it , not restrain'd to any set distance . so that space is place at large , and place is space restrain'd . measurability grounds the reckoning or computing how many of such a standard of quantity as we had design'd in our thoughts , would , if repeated , equal the whole of which we intend to take a survey . . now , quantity being the most common of all corporeal modes , and which antecedes and grounds all the others , it cannot , for that very reason , be properly defin'd ; so that ( as mr. locke acutely observ'd ) we know such things before we are ask'd , better than we do after ; for the asking puzzles our natural thoughts , which were clear enough before of themselves ; and reflexion , which , when there is occasion , is wise , and enlightens us , does but serve to blunder us when there is no need or occasion for it . notwithstanding , i have , in my method , endeavour'd to give it some kind of explication , by differencing it from all other intrinsecal modes , ( which are its genus , as it were , or rather , a transcendent notion to all such accidents , ) in this , that it tells how the thing is , according to some common consideration , in which all things we converse with do agree . by which 't is distinguish'd from quality , which acquaints us how a thing is as to what respects its own peculiar nature ; and from relation , which expresses how one individuum respects another individuum . but this ( as was said ) is out of my present business in this preliminary , which is only to shew what names are proper , or improper ; and not to treat of the particular nature of each mode , of which i have , in their due places , sufficiently discours'd in my method . . these , as far as occurrs to my memory , are the chiefest words used by philosophers , whose proper or improper acception has most influence upon the advancement or hindrance of science . notwithstanding , there are others far more equivocal than any of the rest , called transcendents , or words applicable to all , or many of the common heads of our natural notions ; which are hardest of all to explicate , as wanting any common genus , or any thing like it , to explicate them by . i intended once to dilate upon them in this preliminary , as being a subject very worthy of our reflexion , and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve : but , seeing , upon review , how prolix i have been already in my preliminaries , i am forced to content my self with noting them in short ; leaving it to others to enlarge upon them . they are these , distributed into their several ranks . . first , ens , taken , in its whole latitude , for the thing , and its modes . secondly , the properties of ens , taken in that large signification ; such as are unum , verum , bonum , and their opposites , non-unum , or divisum , falsum , and malum . for , the notions of all the modes being improperly entia , have , by consequence , only improper essences , or entities of their own ; and , consequently , properties of those improper essences . thirdly , idem , diversum , and , in general , relatum ; taking this last word in the largest sense , for all kinds of respects whatsoever . in which signification , all things , or properly called entia , do relate to existence ; and all their modes or accidents do respect them diversly , as certain manners how they are . of which nature also are the aforesaid common words , [ mode , ] and [ accident , ] which are transcendents in respect of the nine last predicaments . fourthly , completum , incompletum , partial and total , generical and specifical , superior and inferior , simple and compound , and such like . most of which kind of transcendents seem rather to respect the manner of being which things have in our understanding , than the manner of being they have out of it . of the last sort are , which , what , that which , something , somewhat , &c. which are the most confused words imaginable , and signifie any notion , but that of meer nothing . by these we make a bastard or illegitimate definition of ens ; and say , that a thing is [ that which is capable of existing , &c. ] i call it an illegitimate or improper definition , because the notion of the genus ( which is one part of a proper one ) has a determinate sense : whereas [ that which , ] which , for want of a better , supplies the place of the genus , has none . for , 't is to be noted , that in all transcendents , ( unless ▪ perhaps , some of those of the fifth sort , which have a kind of blind , confused sense , ) the name only is common or applicable to more , and not the notion ; for , having no one notion that is common to all those common heads , they have none till it be determin'd ; since no notion can exist in the mind , unless it be this , or that , or one , any more than a thing can exist in nature , unless it be determin'd to be such a particular or individual thing . much less has any of them proper differences , dividing them by more and less of the common notion , as every notion that is truly common to more , may , and must have . . whence extreme care must be taken , how students in philosophy do use these transcendent words ; and that they do distinguish their sense most exactly , when they have occasion to make use of them . for , they having an indifferency to many senses , and those as vastly disparate as the common heads themselves are ; that is , ( as the schools properly phrase it ) senses differing toto genere , ( i may add , generalissimo ) it must follow , that every time they do use them confusedly , or with a conceit that they are univocal , their discourse must needs straggle widely , now one way , now another , and thence confound all our commonest notions , which , of all others , ought to be kept distinct ; the want of doing which , hinders all coherence or connexion of terms , in which only science consists , and breeds innumerable , and most enormous errours . it would be tedious , i doubt , to my readers , tho' perhaps not hard for me , to show what prodigious inconveniences do arise from the mis-acceptions of one of those many different senses such words may bear , for another , i will only bring one instance ; hoping that by this , as by a sea-mark , my readers may avoid the shoals and rocks of errors in other like occasions . . the word [ compounded ] may either mean the composition of matter with its essential form ; or , that of the essence with its suppositum , which is conceived to have the essence in it : or , of the superiour notions of ens with the individuum ; all which are compositions belonging to the line of ens. coming next to the modes or accidents , the whole ens or suppositum may be considered as compounded with its primary mode called quantity ; or with some quality , or relation . or , with some action or passion , time , place , situation , or habit. whence accrues to the subject the denominations of agent , patient , living , or being at such a time , or in such a place , sitting , armed , &c. all which nine last compositions are modifying or accidental ones , and not essential , or such as concern directly and precisely the notion of thing or being , as did those of the first sort . now come cartesius and his followers , who , loath to say the body and soul are two suppositums ; and , wanting skill in metaphysicks to comprehend what the union of entitative parts is , or how made , ( which are points too hard for mathematicians , and of which de la forge , tho' he talks prettily , can make nothing at all ) they would have the soul and body compound one thing , because they act together , or assist one another mutually to produce some sorts of actions . whereas action being only a mode , and so presupposing the res , or thing , which it modifies , can only determin and denominate its subject to be acting ; and therefore joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the soul and body co-acters ; which is a vastly disparate notion from the constituting and denominating them one thing , as common sense informs us . we will put an instance : my hand and my pen do both of them concur to the action of writing , and so compound one joint-acter ; nay , they depend mutually on one another as to the producing this action : for the hand cannot write without the pen , nor the pen without the hand : besides , they are in some sort fitted to one another , in order to perform this action ; for , the fingers are so fram'd , as to hold and guide the pen very commodiously ; and the pen ( taking in its handle and the nib-end too ) is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my hand , so as to draw the letters such as they ought to be . lastly , which is much more , and a parallel very agreeable to the co-action of soul and body , they both of them do modifie each other's action . for , the best scrivener writes but scurvily with a bad pen , and the best pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful hand . and yet the hand and the pen are not one jot the nearer being one thing , notwithstanding their concurrence to this joint-action ; tho' it be qualify'd with mutuality , fitness of the co-agents , and the modification which the action receives from both of them jointly , and each of them severally . besides , they put the cart before the horse , while they pretend that the acting as one thing is to make them one-thing . for since the res is , in priority of nature and reason , before modus rei ; and being before acting ; and that nothing can act otherwise than it is ; 't is evident from plainest principles , and even from the very terms , that they must first be one thing , e'er they can act as one thing , or be such a compound , before they can act as such a compound . and so , the point sticks where it was , viz. how the soul and body come to be thus compounded into one ens ; of which i have given some account , preliminary . § , , , . . on this occasion i cannot but reflect , that the cartesians were very unadvised to meddle with such a point , as puts them quite past their mathematicks ; as likewise , that tho' they have fram'd a logick or method suitable to explicate their mathematical philosophy , yet they are but very bad distinguishers of our natural notions into common heads , which is one principal part of true logick ; as appears by their rambling so irregularly from one to the other , as has been shewn elsewhere , in their making extension or quantity , which is a mode , the form which is essential to their first matter ; and here , in putting composition according to the notion of action , to be composition according to the notion of ens. and whoever impartially examins the distribution of their notions into heads , will find it not to be such as reason naturally forced , ( as ours is , ) but such as design voluntarily and ingeniously invented . reflexions on mr. locke's essay concerning humane understanding . reflexion first , on the first book . . this book gives me little occasion to make any reflexions , but such as i must be forced to make through his whole essay ; which is , on the penetrative and clear wit , and happy expression of its author , in his pursuing the design which he had prefix'd to himself . i could wish , indeed , that he had thought fit to take his rise higher , or ( to speak more properly ) had laid his grounds deeper . but , it is to be expected , that every author should write according to those thoughts or principles with which the casual circumstances of his fore-past life had imbu'd him , or as his natural genius leads him . his steering such an impartial mean between scepticism and dogmatizing , does certainly argue a very even temper of judgment , and a sincere love of truth . and , i shall hope , that , whoever peruses attentively my method , ( b. . less . . from § . . to § . . ) will discern that i have so exactly measur'd out the pitch of knowledge attainable by us in this state , that i am as little a friend to over-weening , as i profess my self a declar'd enemy to scepticism . . i am a little apprehensive , from some words in his introduction , expressing his dis-like that men let loose their thoughts into the vast ocean of being ; and his conceit that this brings men to doubts and scepticism , that he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks ; whose proper object is , those notions of the thing which abstract from matter and motion , and concern being only . were i assur'd that i did not mistake him , i would , for his sake , enlarge on that point , and display fully the excellency of that most solid , most clear , and most incomparable science ; which i shall only touch upon at present , by giving my reader a summary of its principal objects . . it treats of the formal or essential parts of physical entities , or bodies , in common , and in specie ; of the essential unity and distinction of them , and whence 't is taken ; particularly , of the essential constituents of elements , mixts , vegetables and animals ; and when , and how , they come to be essentially , or individually chang'd : thence , advancing to the chief animal , man , he treats of his form , the soul , and of its proper action : of the superior part of it , the mind ; and , of its progress towards its last end , or its declension from it . thus far demonstrated , it proceeds to treat of the separation of the soul from the body ; and , to shew evidently its immateriality , and , consequently , its immortality . of the science of a soul separated , and the eminency of her acts in that state , above what she had in the body ; and , lastly , of the felicity and infelicity connaturally following out of her actions here , and the good or bad dispositions found in her at her separation ; as also , of the immutability of her condition afterwards . it treats of the notion or nature of existence , and how 't is accidental or unessential to the natures of every created being ; and thence demonstrates a first being , or a god , to whom 't is essential to be ; that is , whose nature is self-existence . whence follows , by necessary consequence , that his nature is infinitely pure or simple , eternal , infinitely perfect and immutable , all-knowing , willing ever what 's most wise , and therefore most free in all his actions ; and that the divine essence is unconceivable by any notion we can frame or have of it ; and unexpressible by any name we can give it which is proper , and not most highly metaphorical . lastly , it demonstrates , there are pure spiritual beings , which have no matter or potentiality in them , call'd intelligences , or angels ; and likewise , ( in common , ) of their number , distinction , and subordination ; as also , of their proper operations , both internal and external . . these , and such as these , are the objects proper to that supream science , metaphysicks ; which any man of sense would think ought to make it deserve the esteem of the best , and most elevated portion of mankind ; and not to be ridicul'd by drollish fops , who turn all they understand not into buffoonery . all these high subjects it treats of , i say , if possible , ( as i believe it is , ) with more close , more necessary , and more immediate connexion , than the mathematicks can pretend to ; since the evidence and certainty of the principles of this science ( as also of logick ) do depend on , are subordinate to , and are borrow'd from the principles of the other ; which is the sovereign and mistress of all other sciences whatever . . it will , i doubt not , be apprehended , that such high knowledges are above our reach , and impossible to be attain'd by us , in this state. they are , indeed , above fancy ; and , i believe , this objection is made by fancy , or by men attending to the resemblances of fancy , which fall short of representing to us such sublime objects . but , why they should be above our reason , i cannot imagin ; or , why they should be deem'd so mysterious , as not to be knowable without a divine revelation . it is manifest , that we can have abstract notions of existence , thing , immaterial , incorporeal , knowledge , will , operation , &c. that is , we can consider the common subject [ thing ] as existent , capable of being , and ( if it be a spirit ) as immaterial , incorporeal , knowing , willing , and operating , &c. as well as mathematicians can a body , as extended , round , or triangular , &c. and , then , i would know why we cannot , by attentive consideration , and due reflexion on those things , as thus conceiv'd by us , frame a science grounded on the things thus apprehended , as well as mathematicians can upon a body consider'd as grounding their proper objects ; or , as grounding their notions of such and such modes of quantity ; such as are the degrees , proportions , or figures of it . let us not blaspheme in our thoughts the bounty of infinite goodness . it was the devil's first calumny against god , that he envy'd manking knowledge : let not us carry it on , by entertaining such an unworthy conceit of essential goodness ; but , dispose our selves by seeking a right method to knowledge , and pursuing it with industrious study , and we may be certain of success . while i was writing my method to science , the attempt to shew the reason all along , for such notions as were taken from the thing , according to the manner of being it had in my understanding , and , therefore , was to be carried through with perpetual reflexion on the things there , did appear so discouraging , that i was sometimes half sorry i had undertaken it : but i saw the world needed it , and knew all truths were connected , and therefore was confident of god's assistance in such a necessary and useful occasion . indeed , providence has left us no means to know what is done in the moon , or other stars , ( tho' , perhaps , they are as busie there , as we are in this sublunary planet , the earth , ) because it is not to our purpose to know such things . but , whoever considers those metaphysical objects , will , at first sight , discover how useful the knowledge of them is , both in regard of their influence upon all inferior sciences , and to raise us to contemplation ; as also , to explicate , establish , defend and comfort christian faith. for , there is a gradation of truths , as well as a connexion of one truth with another . the natural are foundation-stones , to bear the supernatural ones ; which , tho' they to heaven's top aspire , 't is the same ground , rais'd stories higher . bless'd soul ! which , to the throne divine , winds it self up by its own line ! all these high encomiums of metaphysicks , if it shall please god to protract my span of life some few inches longer , i doubt not but to shew , are no more but its just due ; and , amongst the rest , its clearest demonstrative evidence and certainty : particularly , that the study of that science is so far from increasing doubts , or leading to scepticism , ( as , perhaps , mr. l. may apprehend , ) that , on the contrary , the knowledge of it is the most effectual means imaginable to settle all doubtfulness , and to convert or confound the greatest scepticks . . mr. locke's tenet of no innate notions , nor , consequently , innate principles , does perfectly agree with my sentiments ; both as to the thesis it self , and the reason for it ; which is , that god has laid connatural causes , to give us our notions ; and , therefore , it did not become his sovereign wisdom to do such a needless action , as to ingraft them by his own hand immediately . besides which , that judicious author accumulates so many other pregnant and solid reasons , to fix that position of ours in an immoveable certainty , that i see not but it may , for the future , deserve the repute of an establish'd and leading maxim in philosophy . reflexions on the second book . reflexion second , on the first chapter . . i agree perfectly with this learned author , that our observation employ'd either about external sensible objects , or about the internal operations of our minds , perceived and reflected on by our selves , is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking . as also , that a man first thinks when he begins to have any sensations . that the impressions made on the senses are the originals of all knowledge . that the mind is of its own nature fitted to receive those impressions . that in receiving ideas or notions at first the mind is passive . that 't is all one to say , the soul and the man thinks . and , lastly , that men do not always think ; which last thesis he confutes here very elaborately : but , i cannot at all agree to some positions he makes use of to oppose this last tenet , and , indeed , needlesly ; for he produces good store of solid arguments sufficient to confute it . . for first , he makes the having ideas and perception to be the same thing . i apprehend he means , that when we have ideas , we must perceive we have them ; because he says afterwards , that the soul must necessarily be conscious of its own perception . indeed had he said the having ideas , when he is awake , and attentively reflects on those ideas , it had been a certain and evident truth : otherwise , 't is manifest that we retain or have our ideas or notions in our mind when we are soundly asleep , ( it being a strange and extravagant paradox to say , that we get them all again as soon as ever our eyes are open ; ) and yet we do not then know them ; and , to say we do , is to come over to his adversary , and grant the thesis he is impugning : for , if a man does think when he is sound asleep , 't is without question that he may think always . . next , i must utterly deny his position , that we cannot think without being sensible or conscious of it . to disprove which i alledge , that when a man is quite absorpt in a serious thought , or ( as we say ) in a brown study , his mind is so totally taken up with the object of his present contemplation ( which perhaps is something without him ) that he can have no thought , at that very instant , of his own internal operation , or that he is thinking , or any thing like it . i have been call'd sometimes from my study to dinner , and answered , i am coming . upon my delay , they call'd me again , and ask'd , why i came not , having promis'd it ? i deny'd i heard , or saw , or answered them ; yet , upon recollection , i remember'd afterwards that i did . i knew then that they call'd me , since i understood their words , and answered pertinently ; yet , it is most manifest , that i did not at the time of the first call understand that i understood it , or know that i knew it , since it came only into my mind afterwards by reminiscence or reflexion ; which argues i had the knowledge of it before by a direct impression , otherwise i could not have remember'd it . . tho' this thesis of mr. locke's is mention'd hereafter , it were not amiss to speak my sense of it where i first meet it . he judges , that we know our own thoughts , ( which are spiritual ) by experience ; and i deny we have any experience but by direct impressions from sensible objects , either coming from them at first , or re-excited . he thinks it impossible to know , but we must at the same time be conscious , or ( which is the same ) know we know : and , i judge it impossible we should know we know at the same time we have that act only , till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a new act ; which is to know it , not by experience , but by reflexion . my reason why i am so positive in my assertion , is this : nothing can be known by any act of knowledge but the object of that act : for the object of knowing , and the thing known , are the same almost in the very terms , and perfectly the same in sense . put case then i know by a direct impression what we call extension ; in this case extension is the sole object of that act of knowledge , and not my act of knowledge it self ; therefore i am not conscious i know ; that is , i do not know i know when i have the act of knowing extension : for , were it so , extension would not be the sole object of that act , but the complex made up of extension , and the act it self by which i know extension : which objects being of disparate natures , ought to be the objects of different acts. besides , this would hinder any external object , or corporeal mode to be known distinctly ; for the idea of it would be confounded and mingled with a kind of spiritual compart , viz. my very act it self ; for this act being known ( according to him ) at the same time with extension , must needs make up part of the object of this act. lastly , if we know our own act experientially , we should confound direct knowledges with keflex ones . for ( if i understand mr. locke rightly ) he with good reason makes the internal operations of the mind to be the proper objects of the reflex acts ; and , that the genuin difference of those two sorts of acts does consist in this ; that by direct ones , we know the objects which are in nature , or without us ; and by reflex ones , what 's in the soul , or her operations ; and not the things in nature , otherwise than as they are in that act : but if i be conscious , or know that i know when i know the object without me , i must by the same act know what 's within me and what 's without me both at once ; and so my act of direct knowledge would be reflex ; or rather , that one act would be both direct and reflex , which makes it chimerical . . the same argument demonstrates , that we cannot be conscious of our reflex acts at the very time we produce them . for , my first reflex act has for its sole object that operation of the mind , which i had immediately before by a direct one ; and my second reflex act has for its object the first ; and in the same manner , each succeeding reflexion has for its object that act which immediately preceded . wherefore , if the first reflex act had for its object , at the same time , both the direct and it self too ; that is , did we , when we first reflected , know by that very act it self that we did thus reflect , then the second reflex act would be forestall'd , and have no proper object left for it . to clear this better , let us assign one reflexion to be the last : it were not the last reflexion , unless the object of it were that reflexion which was the last but one . wherefore , unless that reflexion that went last before was known by that act , and the last of all remain'd unknown , the last would have two objects , viz. the preceding reflexion and its self too . this seems to me as plain reason as plain can be ; and , i believe , mr. locke's different thoughts proceeded , from not adverting with what incredible celerity our reflex thoughts do generally succeed the direct ones , and one another . whence it comes , that , not aware of the imperceptible time between them , we are apt to conceit , that the reflex act is experientially known by the very act it self . since then , nothing can be known by any act but the object of that act , and , ( as might easily be shown ) it would confound our natural notions strangely , to say , the act is its own object ; it follows , that it cannot be known by its self , but must be known ( if at all ) by the next reflexion . whence results this certain and evident corollary , that , it is impossible we should ever come to know our last reflexion . . these are my reasons why i recede from mr. locke in his opinion , that a man cannot think without being conscious of it . but , the consequence he seems to draw thence , that therefore consciousness is that which causes individuation , i must absolutely deny ; and cannot but judge , that it draws after it a train of farther consequences , which are altogether extravagant . of which more , when we come to examin his principle of individuation . as for the position , [ that men do always think ] which he impugns , and , in my judgment , quite overthrows , i cannot but wonder what the asserters of it mean. they grant the soul has modes and affections peculiar to her own nature ; and , consequently , of which she is properly the subject : why she may not therefore retain them in her habitually ( as it were ) without exerting or exercising them , as well as the body may those proper to its nature , is altogether unconceivable . indeed , were the soul , in this condition she has here , a pure act , as angels are , it would consist with good reason ; but being here in a potential state , ( as appears by her being capable still of new knowledges , and her being but a part of that one actual thing call'd man , and depending on the material compart in her operations ) i cannot see on what principle , either physical or metaphysical , they can pretend to ground such a paradox . this makes me fear , that this tenet savours strongly of that odd opinion , that the soul here is a pure act as the angels are , or a distinct thing from the body ; that is , a forma assistens , and not informans ; tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly , but shift it off with witty explications of their own doctrine ; which , when brought to the test of close reason , vanish into air ; at which ingenious ways of evasion it must be confess'd they are very great artists . reflexion third . on the second , third , and fourth , chapters . . i must except against his making , or naming the objects of our senses , simple ideas , having already prov'd that the only absolutely simple idea or notion , is that of existence : to which are respective ( which argues some complexion or composition ) one way or other , all our other notions of the thing which we have , or can have ; as is shown in my method , b. . less . d . from § . to § . i could wish he had taken the distinction and order of his notions from nature ; which teaches us that the notion of [ res ] is before [ modus rei ; ] and that the consideration or notion of [ thing ] is more knowable than that of any mode ; and the mode of quantity is that which naturally antecedes , and grounds , all the other modes that can be conceiv'd belonging to body . nor will it excuse this deviation from nature , that we have no exact notions of individuals ; since we can abstract the notion of entity or capacity of being from the thing , as well as we can its solidity , or any of the rest . and certainly , that notion which expresses reality , or an order to being , should claim a right to be consider'd in the first place : i cannot but judge that the methodizing of his ideas on this manner , would certainly have made his ensuing discourses more orderly , and consequently more clear. but , every man is master of his own thoughts , and of his own method . nor did mr. locke intend to write an exact logick , which is what i aym'd at ; and therefore took that way that best suted with his own ingenious conception ; which was , that , as all our notions ( as we both of us hold ) come into our mind by our senses , so he apprehended it the properest way to treat of them as they are the objects of this or that , or many different sensations . . his th . chapter of solidity gives me occasion of making some few reflexions ; which i shall touch on slightly , or omit , because they recurr hereafter . first , his using the word [ solidity ] in his new sense seems very improper . for , all our words do either signify our natural notions , which are common to all mankind , whose meaning therefore is to be taken from the usage of the vulgar ; or else artificial ones , invented by artists to express the notions they are conversant about : whereas the word [ solidity ] taken as it is here , seems to agree to neither . i do not remember it is ever us'd in an artificial sense but by mathematicians , who signify by it the triple dimension of quantity ; which is quite different from his sense of it : and the vulgar understand and use the word [ solid ] as opposit to [ fluid ; ] and say that the earth is solid , or firm , and the water fluid , or apt to be diffus'd ; both which senses are vastly different from impenetrability of the potential parts of quantity ; which is the meaning he gives it : so that , as far as i have read , no man ever used the word [ solidity ] in his sense but himself ; and it is not at all allowable to him , me , or any man , to give a new sense to any word not given it before . for , this discourse of mine shows it can have no proper sense at all ; and on the other side he does not take it in a metaphorical sense , as we use to do when we transferr it to spiritual things , and call a notion or a discourse solid . all words are indeed ad placitum ; but 't is mankind that must please to agree in their signification ; nor must they be at the beneplacitum of particular men , or private authors . . he declines , with some reason , the word [ impenetrability ] because it is negative : but why might not then extension have serv'd , which bears the same sense ? for that , whose notion or nature it is to have its parts without one another , cannot bear the having them within one another , or their being penetrated within themselves ; which is his notion of the word [ solidity . ] he conceives his solidity to be most intimately connected with , and essential to body , and no where to be found or imagin'd but only in matter , but why his solidity should be deem'd essential to body at all , he gives no reason , and i am well assur'd no man living can give any ; for it confounds the line of substance or ens , with that of quality ; which jumbles all our commonest notions together , by making the thing and its mode to be the same essential notion . nor is it solidity only that is necessarily found in matter ; for neither can extension , divisibility , measurability , space , impenetrability , &c. be found any where but in things made of matter , but , what i most wonder at , is , why [ quantity ] should be totally wav'd and neglected , that word having been used by all the learned world , till of late , is ( as has been shown , preliminary th . § . . ) most proper ; and , either directly , or by immediate consequence , involves all the rest in its signification . for , if a body have bigness or quantity in it , it must be extended , and cannot be contracted into a point , line or surface . it must be divisible , or one in the notion of quantity . and , if it must be extended and cannot be crampt into an indivisible , its parts cannot be penetrated within one another ; however it may be pierced or divided by another body , by shoving its potential parts towards either side . lastly , it must be measurable , or proportionable to a body of the same quantity . so that i see not what imaginable priviledge can accrue to solidity above the rest : and , it seems to me a new and groundless assertion , that impenetrability ( tho' we abate the negative manner of expression ) is essential at all to body , more than any of the rest ; that is , not at all . . this acute writer , in pursuance of his doctrine about solidity , proceeds to prove there may be pure space , or vacuum ; because we can have an idea of space left by a body without the idea of another solid thing , or a body , coming in its room . i answer , we may indeed have a fancy of such a thing , as we may of many other contradictions , so they be not exprest in directly opposit terms , v. g. of a golden animal , or a chimera , &c. but , i utterly deny that we can have a true and solid notion of it , taken from the thing it self ; as all ideas must be , that are not phantastick . he thinks there is no necessity , one body should follow another that is moved from such a space ; and that the maintainers of it do build their assertion on the supposition that the world is full . what other men hold of the world 's being full , i know not , nor what they mean by it ; but i will candidly deliver my sentiment , and the demonstration for it a priori , which is this : i take my notion of quantity from the thing , or body ; and , i have shewn above , that that notion is the nature of the thing , as 't is quantitative , or affected with such a mode . here is my firm ground , and here i fix my foot. . proceeding hence , and reflecting on this nature of quantity in my mind ; i discourse it thus : i am to find out in what its ( analogical ) essence or entity consists ; and i discover , it must be in that which expresses its proper unity : seeing then divisibility best expresses its unity , ( for , what is divisible , or capable to be more , is , eo ipso , one , ) i have found out the essential notion or nature of quantity ; and , since what is divisible , or not yet divided , is continued ; and what is continued as to its quantity , is not discontinued or divided according to its quantity ; therefore continuity is its proper unity ; which consists in being indivisum in se , or within its own notion , and formally constitutes its subject such . wherefore , since the essence of quantity is the commonest affection of body , taken in its whole latitude , as including all bodies , it follows , that continuity , which is its unity , must be found in them all likewise ; that is , all bodies , or the whole nature of body , that is , the entire bulk of body , must be continued . and therefore , 't is as great a contradiction , that some bodies , or some parts of body , should not be continued , ( or , which is the same , that there should be a vacuum , ) as that triangularity should be in some one body , and yet it should not be triangular ; that whiteness should be in a wall , and yet it should not be white ; or unity in a thing , and yet it self should not be unum . this is my way of demonstrating against vacuum within the world , to prove , and not suppose , the world full , or continued ; which i draw out of the abstract notion of quantity , or of body consider'd as quantitative ; and out of those notions , most intimately and essentially connected with it . which , why it should not be as evident as any demonstration in mathematicks ; or why we cannot draw as clear a demonstration from the nature of quantity in common , as we can from the nature of such a quantity , i desire any man , who is so wise as to know that all science and demonstration do consist in the connexion of terms , to inform me . i say , any such man ; for , if he knows not this , it is impossible he should know any thing at all in philosophy , or even in logick ; and so he is not worth discoursing with . . hence is seen , that it is impossible that a sucker in a pump may draw up water , and yet the next body not follow . we may fancy it if we please ; but our fancy cannot change the natures of things : it cannot make continuity not to be continuity ; quantitative unity , not to be such an unity ; nor quantity , not to be quantity ; any more than his solidity can be non-solidity , or the parts of body penetrate one another . had mr. locke had a notion of space , taken indifferently from body , and something that 's not body , as we have of sensitiveness from man and brute ; he might , in that case , have fram'd an abstract notion of it , common and indifferent to body and vacuum ; for , then , it had been grounded on the thing , and had been a solid and true notion ; but , since he had the idea , or notion of space from body only , and therefore ( as was largely prov'd above ) it could be of nothing else , but of body thus modified , it must be confin'd to body , with which ( as all modes are ) it is identified ; and therefore , the idea , or notion of it , can never be applicable to what is not a body . reflexion fourth , on the seventh and eighth chapters . . having * already shewn , that our only simple notion is that of existence , i have no occasion to make any remarks on his th chapter , but that 't is highly commendable in the author , to reduce his speculations to piety and contemplation : this being not only our duty , but that best end , to which all solid speculation naturally leads us . . as for his th chapter , i grant , that all the ideas , or notions , we have , are positive in the understanding , ( at least , in part ; ) but the reason of it is , because they do , all of them , include the thing , as 't is thus consider'd ; without which , we could have no ideas of privations or negations at all : for , non-ens , formally as such , or as totally excluding ens , can have no intelligibility , nor , consequently , any notion , by which we can understand it : and privations differ from negations only in this , that they include in their notion a capacity of the subjects having such or such a mode , annex'd to its not having it ; which capacity clearly connotates the thing , since there cannot be a capacity , without some thing that is capable , or has that capacity . add , that i see not how , ideas being resemblances , an idea , consider'd by us as a positive real being , can ever resemble or represent privations , they being of ( at least ) subcontrary natures . what i hold , is , that , when we conceive a thing , as having some privation in it , the idea of it is partly positive , partly privative ; and the material part of it is the thing ; the formal , as privative , or , as thus modify'd . for , ideas , i mean , notions of privations , without including the thing , are unconceivable , and impossible ; as whoever looks into their * definition , will discern clearly . of this nature ( in common ) are all the notions we have of the modes , or accidents ; no notion being truly or perfectly positive , but that of ens , or thing . i cannot grant that our ideas , or notions , ( or even phantasms , ) are caus'd in us by meer motions , continued from our senses , to the brain , or the seat of sensation ; but must judge , for the reasons alledg'd * above , that this is perform'd by those imperceptible bodies there spoken of , or by the effluviums themselves convey'd thither , and afterwards lodged there . in embracing which opinion , of our knowledge being wrought by meer motions made by the objects , his excellent wit suffers it self to be led astray by our moderns . his reason ( which i conceive is also theirs ) is , because it is not more impossible to conceive , that god should annex such ideas to such motions , than pain to a piece of steel dividing the body , with which that idea has no resemblance . how unlike a reason this is , appears at first fight ; and , i am sure this parallel has no resemblance at all with the thing it is brought for . i know of no annexing the idea of pain to a piece of steel ; but , must think 't is a most highly extravagant conceit . the business passes thus in nature . a piece of steel being denser , and withall sharp , is a proper cause of dividing the body ; the dividing of it , is a proper cause of its being disorder'd , and render'd unable to assist the soul , or the man , in his necessary operations : this breeds naturally a conception in the soul , or the man , that he is hurt ; which naturally produces in the knower , who is highly concern'd in it , grief or pain : so that all is here carry'd on by a train of proper causes , to proper effects ; and needs no annexing by god , more than to conserve the order of second causes which himself has establish'd . on the other side , there is no natural resemblance of such a motion to such an idea , as is confess'd ; nor is the former a proper cause of the other ; which puts them to have recourse to this voluntary annexion to them by god. add , that it is an odd kind of argument , to alledge , that it is not impossible to conceive that god may do this , or that , without proving he has done it : nor is it at all allowable in philosophy , to bring in a deus è machinâ at every turn , when our selves are at a loss to give a reason for our thesis . nor is it to be expected , that god will alter the nature of things , for the interest of any man's tenet ; but , since his wisdom , in his ordinary government of the world , carries on the course of it according to the nature of second causes , it must first be prov'd , that what we maintain , is agreeable to the course of natural causes , e'er we ought to think or imagin that god will have any hand in it : and , if we can prove this , we need no immediate or particular recourse to god's favouring us , by doing this , or that , to make good our argument . . i must deny too , consequently to my former doctrine , that sensible qualities are nothing in the objects , but powers to produce various sensations in us ; unless it be meant , that they have powers to send out such effluviums into the brain , by the senses , as imprint their very natures in our mind ; and not barely to produce motions in our nerves . nor can i conceive why the ideas of the secondary qualities should have nothing like them , existing in the bodies themselves ; nor be resemblances of them . if this be true , why are they call'd [ ideas , ] which either signifies resemblances , or nothing ? again , since the bodies are put to cause them , how can we think they are nothing like them ? can any man think the effect is nothing like the cause , when every effect can be nothing but a participation of the cause , or something coming into the subject from the efficient , which was in it some way or other before ? lastly , if these secondary qualities be compounded of the primary ones , ( viz. of solidity , extension , figure and mobility ) in our understanding , why should not those primary qualities in re , as well compound those secondary ones in the thing , or out of our understanding ? and , if they do , ( as 't is evident they must , since they are all there , ) then , why are not those secondary ideas full as like those secondary or compounded qualities found in the thing , as the primary ideas were like the primary qualities in the same thing ; and , consequently , resemble them , as well as the others did their proper originals ? i much doubt , that the author rather consulted his fancy in this particular , than his good reason : and , because those effluviums , or the figures of parts , which cause our sensations , are too subtile and indiscernable to cause distinct phantasms of themselves , as the primary ones did , but are of a confus'd uniformness in appearance , he judges hence , they are nothing like the others : whereas , reason will inform reflecters , that , since colour is nothing but the surface of a body , as 't is apt to reflect light ; the manner of reflexion found in the surface of a white thing , which is apt to reflect much light , is , to our reason , and in our notion , such as it was in the thing imprinting it ; and , consequently , ( every thing acting as it is , ) such as came from it . whence , those who , by reflex thoughts , and using their reason , do go about to explain or define the nature or notion of whiteness , do make it consist in such a reflexion of light , bringing effluviums with it from a surface so advantagiously figur'd : and so , the notion of whiteness is the same in the thing , and in the understanding ; viz. those effluviums thus figur'd , or modified , however , the appearance of it in the fancy reaches not the true nature of the thing , as 't is white ; which , indeed , fancy never does . . the reason why the pain , which we feel , is not in the thing that caus'd it , and sensible qualities are so , is , because these last are proper , univocal , and immediate effects of bodies sending out effluviums of their own natures ; but pain , being an affection of the soul , springing from a perception that its dear compart is hurt , and disorder'd , is an improper , remoter , and equivocal production . the altering , disordering , or spoiling the temperature or continuity of the bodily parts due to their nature , is , ( as was shewn , ) the immediate and proper effect of those offensive agents ; but 't is accidental to their manner of operating , that they cause pain , or pleasure , even remotely ; and , it lights only , that sometimes they do this , because the subject , or the body , in which they produce these their proper effects , haps to be identified with a knowing nature , only which is properly capable to grieve , or be delighted when a harmful or pleasing impression is made on the body , which is part of the man , and , in some sort , himself . the like is to be said of manna , and other such instances . the alterations or disorder made in the guts and stomach , are natural , proper , and immediate effects of it ; but the pain ensuing thence , which is a spiritual disposition of the mind , is a remote , accidental , and improper effect of it . . by this time mr. locke sees that i agree with him , that the bodies in nature have a power in them to cause our several sensations ; and , that this power is that which we call such a quality of it . but i disagree with him , that they are only powers to cause such a motion ; and affirm , it is a power , when duly circumstanced with other requisites , ( as , with light , to convey visible qualities ; moisture , gustable ones , &c. ) to send out effluviums , of their own nature , to the brain ; ( which , therefore , are inherent in , and proper parts of those objects , ) whether they cause actual sensation , or no. the sun sends out his beams , which , scatter'd thinly , at this remote distance from the fountain , are therefore one of mr. locke's secondary qualities , which we call light ; yet , contracted by a burning-glass , they perform the proper effect of fire , burning ; whence we ought to conclude , they are of the nature of fire . can we then deny , or doubt , but that the body of the sun , which communicates , or sends them out , is it self fire ; or , that , being such , those rays , and the sun , have no similitude with one another ? or , that , when they strike the eye , they stop there , and are not carry'd into the brain ? hippocrates tells us , that omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles ; meaning , that they are pervious to the humours ; which are gross things , in comparison of the sun-beams . how can it then be doubted , but that they reach the fancy ; and thence , the soul ; and imprint their notions or natures there : and , tho' some may deny they are the same in the mind , as they are in nature ; yet can it , with any shew of reason , be deny'd they are at all like the cause that produced them ? the like discourse holds in all other sensible qualities , to what sense soever they belong . . to close this discourse , i am apt to think , that mr. locke intended to oppose those who hold , that the sensible qualities are a little kind of distinct entities . next , i declare , that , tho' the thing has accidentally a power in it , to make it self perceiv'd ; yet , taking the thing as an object , ( as he does , ) it is but improperly called a power ; and not properly , as are our powers , or faculties , of seeing , hearing , knowing , &c. are : for , the act being the end for which the power was given , the faculties , or powers , are better'd , and perfected , by being reduced to act ; and so there is a real ground for their being related to the object : whereas , neither the object , or thing , nor any sensible quality in it , is a jot the better , or any way alter'd , by being perceiv'd , or known ; any more than a cart rolling through the street , is the better , or otherwise than it had been , because the effluviums it sends out do make a representation of it in a shop full of looking-glasses , as it passes by . whence logicians say , that there is no real relation of the object to the sense , or intellect ; because there is no real ground for such a relation , nor any dependence of the object on those powers , in any kind ; * as is shewn in my method . reflexion fifth , on the tenth chapter . passing over this ninth chapter about perception , i confess my self at a great loss how to understand divers passages in his tenth , which treats of retention , or how to make him coherent with himself . for , first , he tells us our ideas are nothing but actual perceptions of the mind . by which words he seems to make no kind of distinction between the act of perception and the object of it ; whereas the act is the exercise of our power of perceiving , actuated by the object about which it is then employ'd ; which object determins the indifferency of the power to this or that act in particular ; which the schools call specifying the act : but the object is the thing known by the act ; and 't is a strange paradox to say , that the act of knowledge and the object or thing known are the same ; especially , if the thing known be something without us : next , i cannot reconcile his making our ideas to be nothing but actual perceptions , with his making our ideas , quite through his book , to be the object of our thoughts , and expresly stating them to be such in the beginning of it , chap. . § . secondly , he says , that those ideas cease to be any thing , when there is no perception of them . if so , why does he put us to have memory or retention , if , after the act is past , there be nothing to keep in memory or retain . thirdly , in consequence of this his ground , he affirms , that this laying up ideas in the repository of his memory , signifies no more , but that the mind has in many cases a power to revive perceptions , with a connotate annext , of having had them before . certainly , this signification of the word [ memory ] is peculiar to himself , and contrary to the sentiments of all mankind ; who , were they examined by the poll , would , i believe , unanimously declare , that by laying up a thing in memory , they meant , ( as the words naturally import ) the retaining something which has its being yet within us , and may be brought into play again upon occasion . can the memory be said to retain what is not ? or can there be a repository of nothing ? is reviving the notion of retaining , they being rather of a contrary sense to one another ? or can remembring be conceived to be the same notion with reproduction ? these seem to me such monstrous abuses of words , that i would willingly think my self mistaken , rather than to father them on so learned an author , did not my eyes assure me i do not dream or oversee . nor can the same individual act ever be reviv'd ; it depending on many circumstances , determinable to such a time or place ; the former of which can never recur , or be reproduced . lastly , what means this power in the mind to revive perceptions ? the man , indeed , has a power , when re-excited by outward objects like the former , or by passion , disease , or by some other casual circumstances , to rummage the ideas lodged in the brain ; and , so , by their new impression on the seat of knowledge , to cause such an act , as by it to know the same thing again ; as also to know it was foreknown , as was explicated * above : but to put the soul to revive ideas , or even to act , so that the action shall begin from her peculiar nature , is praeternatural to her condition , to her manner of existing , and consequently , to her manner of operating here ; which , as it must be ever with the bodily part or the fancy , so it must begin still from it , as it did at first ; with this only difference , that in the first impressions made on the sense , and thence on the seat of knowledge , the man ( and particularly as to his soul ) is perfectly passive ; whereas afterwards by vertue of those phantasms , and their former impression , which have already affected the said seat of knowledge , ( which is part of himself ) and have been re-affected by it , the man is partly passive , partly active in remembring ; as mr. locke does , i think , also acknowledge ; tho' he explicates it otherwise than i do , viz. by the mind's setting it self on work , which i judge , and have shewn to be impossible , prelimin . . § , , . . i must not omit here to remark , that when mr. locke says , that ideas fade in the memory ; or , ( as he ingeniously expresses it ) that [ the pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours ] he most evidently discovers , that by ideas here he means material representations or phantasms , and not those spiritual objects of our understandings , notions . for , there is no doubt but that phantasms , they being only imperceptible particles , of the same nature with the corporeal agents whence they are sent , do follow , ( and that very easily ) the fate of their originals ; and are liable to be defaced , alter'd or corrupted , as these are : whereas it is impossible , that ideas or notions , which have a spiritual being in our mind , should be liable to any such decay , corruption or mutation . if any thing could prejudice , destroy or efface them , it must in all reason be thought that their contraries would do it : whereas clear reflexion tells us , that contraries in the mind are so far from expelling , blurring , or altering one another there , that they not only very friendly dwell together , but moreover that , by their co-habitation there , they make one another magis elucescere , and establish one anothers natures . hot and cold , moist and dry , which are perpetually fighting , and make such bustles and turmoils in the material world , are very consistent , and agree amicably in the soul. the corporeal instruments which brought our notions thither may perish ; but when they are once in her , they are as immutable and immortal as her self . so that the pictures in our minds are so far from being drawn in fading colours , that they should rather be said ( if we would use a metaphor to express their durableness ) to be engraved in brass , marble , or adamant ; being as lasting as eternity . which tenet , were i writing metaphysicks , i should not doubt but to demonstrate ; and withal to show how useful it is to explicate christian faith : particularly those points of laying open the book of conscience at the last day ; when , as the sybil sings , [ cunctaque cunctorum cunctis arcana patebunt . ] and how infants are connaturally saved by virtue of baptism . reflexion sixth . on the eleventh and twelfth chapters . . the th . chapter gives me no occasion to make any reflexions , but only on his attributing knowledge to brutes ; about which i have been too large already . he denies indeed that they have the power of abstracting , or of having general ideas . but , if they have true knowledge , or any more than king david meant , when he says , the sun knows his going down , i see no reason why they may not have general notions , and abstract , and compare too . for , if they have any degree of reason , as he grants they have , they may do all this ; and i am sure , and have already shown , their outward actions do as much countenance their having reason , as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot abstract , or have general ideas ; since general ideas ( as every good reflecter may observe ) are nothing but imperfect ideas of the thing ; and in a thousand occasions , the object or thing affords them no more , but imperfect or general ideas , and therefore they must have them . i am much pleased with his distinction between wit and judgment ; and i could wish that our men of fancy , who affect to bring religion , and all they understand not , to drollery , would apply it to themselves . . the author discourses very acutely , how our reason and judgment are misguided by our not distinguishing our notions exactly ; whence we may inferr , that that part of logick which teaches us how to distinguish them accurately , and to keep them distinct , is of exceeding great use ; and that the study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all pretenders to science ; especially by new beginners : of which , i hope , i have elaborately treated in the first book of my method . . in order to the th . chapter ; there is no doubt but that we can unite several simpler ideas or notions into one , and signify them by one name ; but i deny that , if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are , or may be , united in external objects , or in the thing , we can have any complex notions , tho' we may have a fancy , of them , or a kind of imitation of some thing which once affected our senses . for , since i cannot but think i have demonstrated that our notion is the thing as conceiv'd by us , or the thing existing in the understanding ; if i have any complexion of more simple notions in my mind , not found to be united in the thing ; the idea in my mind is not conformable to the thing it self , nor is it , as i have prov'd it to be , that thing ; and then to what end should i have such an idea , as if i come to predicate it of the thing , the proposition would be false , which consequently would fill our mind with falshoods . next , as has been often prov'd formerly , i deny the soul can unite or act of her self , or by her peculiar power ( tho' the man may ) but is oblig'd to take what 's given her by impressions on the seat of knowledge . in which case , what the thing or object , by a genuin impression , gives her , is orderly , solid , and a seed of true knowledge or science ; but that which the fancy gives her , otherwise than as the thing did directly imprint it , is disorderly , superficial , and a ground of errour . indeed , she is forc'd to apprehend , whenever the phantasms strike the seat of knowledge , tho' their motions and complexions be never so disorderly , or even monstrous . now , whenever this is done , judicious men direct their eye to the thing , and examine whether the conjunction of such or such ideas , is truly found in re ; or is agreeable to those direct impressions it had received thence ; which if it be , the soul entertains it , after examination , and lets it sink into her ; it being the true nature of the thing , and so a ground to truth , to see which her essence was made ; if it be not , she rejects it ; for it grounds a contradiction to the nature of the thing , which is the only ground of truth ; and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is not ; and it is directly against her nature to admit contradictory judgments . now , what judicious men , by their recourse to the thing , thus reject , those unskilful thinkers , who are led by fancy , do admit ; and by this means their souls become full of phantastick conceits which never can be brought to any coherence or connexion of terms . for no terms can cohere , unless the notions meant by each of them be really in the thing it self ; and those coherences made in the mind by any other way , or of any other materials , are far from solid or true , as we experience in people that are splenetick or enthusiaistck . . wherefore , whenever the ideas are connected otherwise than they are or may be in re , the object of that act can have no metaphysical verity , unity , nor consequently entity in it ; the two former of which , being properties of ens , cannot be where ens or thing is not . whence the objects of those fantastick acts is some non-ens taken for an ens ; which , if pursu'd home by a good logician , must end in a contradiction . for example , i can have notions of hircus and ceruus aparted from one another ; but , if i will unite them in my mind otherwise than nature exhibited them , and take them conjoyntly , ( as fancy may ) and frame a a complex idea of a hirco-ceruus , or goat-stag , it must needs be perfectly fantastical and chimerical . this will farther appear , if we take one of mr. l's complex ideas , viz. beauty , consisting of a certain composition of figure and colour . now , if such figure and colour had not been found , or might not be found united by nature in the same thing , the idea of it could not have been conformable to what 's in nature , or the idea of any reality , but purely fantastical and counterfeit . the same may be said of his idea of lead , with its proper qualities ; or of the ordinary idea of a man , describ'd here to be a substance or thing with motion , thought and reasoning join'd to it : which qualities , were they not join'd in the thing they belong to , or identify'd with it , the complex ideas of them would be nothing but meer groundless fancies . this point is so important , that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible : i shall therefore allow it a more elaborate explanation , tho' i spend less pains and time in my other reflexions . when i consider an individual thing in nature , ( v. g. a man ) according to the notion of being , i have two notions of him , viz. that he is capable of existing , and that he actually exists ; the former of which he has by means of second causes , which , by determining the matter , gives him his determinate nature or essence . the other he has immediately from the first being ; and i have a complex notion of him accordingly . next , considering the same thing precisely as a body , or such an ens as we call by that name ; i find in it somewhat by which it is corruptible , or changeable into another , and somewhat by which it is determin'd to be this sort of thing , or body , or to be what it is : and , i conceive and call body according to the former of these considerations power or matter ; and , according to the later , act or form ; and i frame a complex idea of it , as 't is a body accordingly . hitherto i treat of the thing as a metaphysician , and regard it only according to some order it has to being . proceeding further on , and dividing still the common line of ens , or ( what i am now arriv'd at ) [ body ] by intrinsecal differences , or by more and less of the generical notion , of which quantity or divisibility is the primary affection , or that of which all the other modes are made ; i find that some bodies must be more divisible or rare , other less divisible or dense ; and by this means we approach something nearer to natural or physical considerations of that thing as 't is call'd body ; and the science that treats of it , as being immediately under metaphysicks , and immediately above physicks , may not unfitly be called archi-physical ; as giving the immediate principles to physicks ! this way of considering body grounds the notions of simple bodies , called elements ; which differ in nothing but rarity and density ; and also , the notions of compound bodies made up of those simple ones . so that now my former complex notions of capable to be and actual being ; and , of having determinate and indeterminate respects to that ens as it is body , call'd form and matter , has annext to it in the thing many secondary qualities , made up of those primary ones ; such as are , heat and cold , moisture and driness , &c. and so we are come to that science call'd physicks or natural philosophy ; and my former complex notion of such an individuum , takes in these second qualities , over and above what it contain'd before . advancing farther , we come to consider this thing or body with its parts so diversify'd by those first and second qualities , or so organiz'd , that one part ( the common causes of the world suppos'd ) is able to work on another ; which kind of thing we call self-moving or living . and , still proceeding on by a f●rther complexion of such parts , we come to a thing that is sensitive , or moving it self by the least effluviums affecting those tender organs call'd the senses . all which give so many new additions to my former notion of that individuum , and make it more complex . moreover , we can find in this sensitive thing , or this animal now spoken of , both as to its peculiar matter and form , a disposition to work comparatively ; that is to judge , and reason or discourse ; and , consequently , to have in it a knowing power , which is to be a man : and , lastly , such a peculiar degree of this power of comparing , which restrains the specifick notion of man to be this individual man. so that , by this time , such a vast assembly of modes or accidents ( the croud of which make that most complex notion , call'd the suppositum , so blindly confused ) do meet in my complex idea of this individual man , that , tho' i see he is a thing ; and a distinct thing , because i see he exists and operates independently of all other things ; yet , i can have no distinct and clear notion of his essence , but by taking it in pieces , ( as it were , ) both as to those several considerations belonging to him , according to the line of being , as was now explain'd ; and also , as to those conceptions i make of him , according to all the physical modes or accidents which are in him : which modes , so to gain an exacter knowledge of him , as affected with those modes , ( and the same may be said of all other things , ) we divide , and sub-divide , as we see agreeable to their distinct natures or notions . this discourse may , if well weigh'd , be , perhaps useful for many ends. but , to apply it to our present purpose : all this multitude of less complex , or more simple ideas , belonging to the line of substance , are found connected in this individuum ; and , did we add the least of them by our mind , which was not found conjoin'd in the thing , my notion or idea of him would , so far , be fantastick , and false ; because there was nothing found in the thing that answers to such a complexion , ( only which can make it real , ) but only in my fancy , counterfeiting such a complexion , and mis-informing my understanding ; as it happens in the illusive representations , made in those who are troubled with the spleen , melancholy , or phrenzy ; as likewise , in timerous people , when they think they see sprights ; or in horses , when they boggle . add , that the mind cannot , of its self , begin to act , ( as was proved formerly : ) but all new acts , or excitation of former notions in her , are the acts of the whole man , and must naturally arise first from the bodily part , or the fancy ; either imprinting phantasms , which it receives from the objects , orderly and genuinly , on the seat of knowledge ; or disorderly , as its irregular and extravagant motions happen to conjoyn them . whence we say that a man who does not correct such incoherent connexions by judgment , is led by fancy , or caprichious . . while we are discoursing about the manner how we come by all our ideas whether simple or complex , it would not perhaps be improper to set before the reader 's view , what is my tenet , the cartesians and mr. lockes , and how we differ . the cartesians do not own themselves at all beholding to outward objects for their ideas ( as least , as some of them say , for the chiefest ones ) but they say they are innate , or imprinted on the soul by gods immediate hand ; tho' some of them ( which makes the matter much worse ) chose rather to say they are elicited or produced by the soul it self , upon such a motion from without ; as also , that they are re-excited by such motions ; in which last tenet mr. locke seems to agree with them . but this learned author denies all innate ideas ; and holds that the simple ones ( at least ) are caused by the objects , whether they be internal or external ; but , that the complex ideas are framed by the mind , which he conceives to have a virtue of compounding them as she pleases . whereas , my principles force me to oppose them both , and to hold that all ideas , whether simple , or complex ( provided that by ideas be meant notions , and not imaginations ) are to be taken intirely from the objects or things in nature ; as also that , when we excite them a new , something that is in act it self must cause that action ; because a meer power to do any thing , ( whether in the soul or out of it ) cannot determin it self to any action in particular . and , if i may freely and impartially pass my verdict between them , i should frankly declare , that mr. locke's way has far more of nature in it , and consequently is more solid than the cartesian ; in regard he holds all our ideas are originally taken from the outward objects , either emmediately , as to his simple ideas ; or mediately , as to those which are compounded of them by the soul : whereas the cartesians cannot pretend to know any thing in nature , unless they can solidly prove these three previous points : first , that their ideas are innate , or else produced by the soul ; neither of which i am certain they can ever prove . secondly , what those ideas are , or that they are not meer fancies . thirdly , if they put them to be meer representations , and not the thing , or object it self , how we can be certain that we must by them know the things without vs , notwithstanding all that i have alledg'd to demonstrate the contrary in my second and third preliminaries . if these points , which are the main hinges that open us the way into philosophy , or the knowledge of things , be not first firmly establish'd , all their discourses , tho' they be never so ingenious , must be hollow and superficial for want of solid ground . these three points , i say , they must either show to be self-evident , or they must make them evident by demonstrating them ; or else , i am sure , 't is most evident , that all their superstructures are ruinous for want of a firm foundation . i would not misunderstand them , when they explain to us what their ideas are ; and yet they have such a peculiar talent of speaking ambiguous sense in seemingly plain words , that i cannot for my heart comprehend their meaning . they tell us sometimes they hold the idea , consider'd objectively , to be the res or thing itself ; but when they add , that it is the res or thing [ quatenus representata ] they seem to deny it again ; for the words [ quatenus representata ] signifie , in true logick , the bare representation of the thing ; as [ paries quatenus albus , ] means [ albedo ; ] the restrictive word [ quatenus ] cutting off the precise notion to which it is annex'd , from all others . and how odd a piece of chiquanery it is to say , that the picture or resemblance of caesar , is caesar himself , quatenus representatus , i leave it to others to judge . besides , if the thing it self be really there , or in the knowing power , it may be known without more ado , or without needing those little spiritual epicycles , ( if i may so call them ) those useless ideas . mr. locke , i must confess , began at first to build solidly on the things ; but , he is so very acutely and speculatively attentive to the ideas in his own thoughts , and so wholly taken up with contemplation of them , that he seems sometimes to over-run his own principles , ( which only at first he intended to pursue ) and quite to lose sight of the things . whereas i bend my whole endeavour to keep my eye steadily upon them through the whole course of my doctrine , without intermingling any gratuitous suppositions , or suffering my self to be led astray from the natures of the things by any ill-grounded fancies of my own , which would court and debauch my reason , tho' they seem never so ingenious . reflexion seventh . on the thirteenth chapter . . if , as mr. locke says , we get the simple idea of space by our sight and touch , then nature gives us no idea of a space , which is not visible and tangible ; whence follows , that the idea of such a space as vacuum , which is neither the object of one of those senses , nor of the other , is unnatural and fantastical . the notion of distance is well explain'd ; but i cannot discern why length , breadth and thickness should be called capacity : for , these three modes ( as all modes do ) express the manner how they intrinsecally affect their subject , body ; whereas , capacity signifies the respect to something extrinsecal to the body thus affected , or a power to contain another thing . much less can extension be character'd a capacity of space , with something between the extremities , which is solid , moveable and tangible ; for , tho' matter were suppos'd to have no extremities at all , but to be infinite , it would not be less extended , but more : and were the air supposed to be neither solid , moveable or tangible , yet still it might be conceiv'd to be extended . again , what means it , that extension is a capacity of space , whereas space is rather a capacity of what is extended . i wish i knew from what rule or ground mr. locke takes the proper meaning of the words he uses ; for it seems evident to me , that this explication of extension is meerly voluntary and preternatural ; and seems ( tho' perfectly groundless it self ) to be laid as a ground for vacuum ; and , therefore , his consequences drawn thence , want premisses . nor need we take such pains by repeating our ideas , to gain the notion of immensity ; it is but putting a negative to the plain notion of [ measurable , ] and the deed is done . rather , 't is perfectly demonstrable , that the adding or repeating our ideas , cannot possibly give us the notion of immensity ; for , we have no ideas , but of finite quantities ; and the number of the times we can repeat them , can be but finite ; which the very terms tell us , can never give us a notion of an infinite quantity , or of immensity . when he says , the mind can repeat , double , or join ideas , i must deny it , as impossible , unless , by the word [ mind , ] he means the man. the mind has no distinct shop of her own , to work in a-part ; nor can she work without her tools , or her conjoin'd instrument , the body , as is prov'd above . . nothing can be more solid , ingenious , or better express'd , than are his discourses here about place : in which , he , in great part , observes the sayings , and common language of the vulgar ; which is the most natural way to explain those notions which are vulgar ones , and common to all mankind . whence , when we will needs affix significations , to the words which are generally used to express those notions , by our own conceits , it will most certainly lead us into very great errours . he only seems not to reflect upon the common saying of the vulgar , that [ things are in such or such a place ; ] which shews , that their notion of place is to be a container , and consequently , extended ; the body contain'd , to which it is adjusted , being such . . he argues well ad hominem , against those who make body and extension the same thing : i suppose , he and they both mean , the same idea ; for , the latter is not a thing distinct from the substance in which it is ; and the ideas do most evidently differ , toto genere . those men's way of arguing from ideas including one another , is purely fantastical , unless those ideas be notions , or the thing , as thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , like a kind of parts , are in the whole ens , and so may be said to be in it , or predicated of it . . i have already prov'd , that space is ( materially ) nothing else but body , consider'd according to its quantity ; and those preliminary discourses , which pretend to demonstrate it , must either be confuted , or else it must follow , that ( whatever we may fancy ) the parts of space are both separable , moveable , and do resist motion . farther , to imagine space , that is not extended , is a perfect contradiction , tho' not in the very terms , yet by an easie and immediate consequence . for , putting a body to be in such a space , it must be commensurate to such a part of it ; otherwise , that body might take up all space ; and must do so , were it not commensurate to some part of it only : and to fancy a thing commensurate to the parts of what is extended , and it self not to be extended likewise , is a most extravagant conceit , and a plain contradiction . again , if a body take up but one part of space , and not another part of it , ( v. g. that part which is next it , or in which it is , ) space must not only have parts , but also one part without another ; which is the very notion of extension . lastly , since imaginary space is put to be vast , and even infinite , it cannot consist in an indivisible ; wherefore , it must necessarily be divisible and diffused , that is , extended : whence follows , that , to fancy body to be put in such a space , or place , ( for he grants here , § . . that these two ideas differ but in a certain respect , ) and yet not shove aside or remove those extended parts out of that space , is to make the extended parts of that space , and of the body in it , to be within one another , or penetrated ; which implies a contradiction . now , if they be not penetrated , one of them must necessarily drive the other out of the space it occupates ; and therefore , the parts of that space must be separable , moveable , and resistent , as those of body are ; they being , in very deed , the self-same . . hence is seen , that in all this discourse about pure space , or vacuum , mr. locke consulted his fancy , and not his good reason attending to the things as they are in nature . that which mis-led him seems to be this , because he finds not in his idea of space , formally consider'd , the notion of divisibility , separability , nor resistance ; but that it abstracts from them all , as to the formal part of its conception , by which 't is distinguish'd from those others . but , this is not peculiar to space ; nor bears it any shew of being a solid ground for the existence of space separately from body . for , figure has not , in its formal notion , quantity ; and yet 't is nothing but quantity thus terminated . how many notions have we of quantity , and several other modes , formally distinct , which yet are nothing else , really and materially , but quantity it self . take divisibility , extension , measurability , proportionability , impenetrability , space , place , &c. they have , all of them , some nice formality , or different respect , which distinguishes them ; and makes the ideas or notions of them , as such , to be formally exclusive of one another . divisibility speaks the unity of the potential parts of quantity : measurability , the respect they have to some determinate quantity stated by our mind : proportionability , such a degree of equality or inequality to another thing , or to their own parts : impenetrability and extension , the order or situation of the same potential parts : space , the same quantity , precisely and formally , as it is a capacity or power to contain a multitude of things , without any determination or adjustment of the space , to the things contain'd in it ; so that the notion of space is the self-same as that of room : and place signifies the same quantity , as having a power to contain them limitedly , and determinately : yet , notwithstanding , none ever conceited , that , because they were apprehended as formally distinct , they could therefore exist separately , without quantity , or without one another , ( as he puts space to exist without body and extension , ) tho' all their ideas are thus formally distinct : nor , consequently , can space , for the same reason , exist without extension and body ; which seems to be his ground , built on the distinct formal idea he has of space , why he thinks there may be a vacuum : or else , his ground is only a roving imagination of a vast nothing beyond the universality of things , fancy'd by him to be a thing he knows not what , nor of what sort or kind . but , enough of this formerly . . the notion of extension stands in his way , and therefore he endeavours to make it unintelligible , and inexplicable . he objects , that , to say that to be extended is to have partes extra partes , is the same as to say extension is extension . first , if it were the same in sense , where 's the harm ? so it be only meant , that it is the same in re ; or in the formal notion , as long as the expression is different , and not formally identical . at this rate we may ridicule all definitions : for , to say , [ homo est animal rationale , ] is the same in reality , as to say , homo est homo . next , i deny they are formally the same : divisibility , which is the notion of quantity , expresses only , that the body it affects , has potential parts ; and extension expresses the manner how it has those parts ; viz. not penetrated , or one within another , but without one another ; which adds a new formality to the bare notion of quantity : and this is a fair explication for such a most common and general notion ; which having no proper genus , but a transcendent , can bear no exact definition . . to our objection , that if pure space or vacuum be not really a body , it not being pretended to be a spirit , it must be a meer nothing , and so cannot exist ; he replies , ( if i understand him , ) that there may be a thing that is neither spirit , nor body ; and he asks who told us there may not be such a third thing ? i answer , our evident reason told it us , by dividing ens into divisible and indivisible ; which dividing members , being contradictory , allow no third thing which is neither the one , nor the other . since then he must not say , that such a vast expansion as vacuum beyond all bodies is indivisible , either mathematically , as a point is , or physically , as those things are which are insuparably hard ; it must be divisible , and consequently extended , separable , &c. as a body is . but this also he denies it to be ; and therefore 't is evidently concluded , that 't is a meer nothing . . nor will he acquaint us with his thoughts , whether vacuum be a substance , or accident , till we shew him a distinct idea of substance : which seems to me a witty avoiding the question , rather than a pertinent answer . indeed , we have no distinct and compleat notion of a suppositum , or individual substance , because it involves many distinct notions or considerabilities in it , as their ground . but , of substance it self , or , which is the same , of what is meant by the word [ thing , ] 't is scarce possible to be ignorant , or to want a distinct idea of it : for , there is nothing from which we need or can distinguish the notion of substance , or ens , and so to gain a distinct conception of it , but either non-ens , or modus entis ; from both which , honest nature , if we attend to it , and not to preter-natural fancies , teaches us to distinguish it . i should put the argument thus : vacuum , if any thing , must be either res , or modus rei ; for we have no other notions : but vacuum is neither ; therefore it is pure nothing . i believe mr. locke had the worst of the late school-men in his eye , when he gave this answer ; who , talking metaphorically of standing under , and inhering , left their readers in the dark , as to what they meant literally . how god is metaphorically called a substance ; and how all our notions and words fall infinitely short of conceiving him as he is in himself , or of expressing him literally , i have discoursed * above . . 't is almost insuperably hard for those who are more vers'd in mathematicks than in metaphysicks , to get above fancy , especially in this particular of vacuum , or imaginary space ; because , tho' plain reason tells them that all created things are limited , both in their own natures , and consequently in their modes or accidents ; yet , because they can fancy something beyond bodies , they will needs conceit there is some ultra-mundane kind of thing existent out of the world , tho' it costs them that highest absurdity of putting non-ens to be ens , or nothing to be something . and the same fancy furnishes them with plausible apprehensions , which serve them for arguments . so , mr. locke asks , if god should place a man at the extremity of corporeal beings , whether he could not stretch out his hand beyond his body ? i answer , that , in all probability , he could neither stretch out his hand , nor so much as live in a region so remote from the habitation of mortals : nor , did he live , how knows he but the outmost surface of the world is insuperably solid and hard ; as 't is likely it is , so to keep the world compacted , close and tight ? next , to put god ; at every turn , ( with all reverence to his divine majesty be it spoken , ) to shew tricks , meerly for the interest of their tenet , ( as our moderns use , ) is very unphilosophical . he will say , it is only a supposition ; which , even , tho' impossible , is sometimes allowable to put , that we may clear a farther point . nor do i look upon it to be any other but a supposition ; only , i judge it to be a very extravagant one , and contrary to the natures of things . god's infinite wisdom has so contriv'd the world , ( * omnia in sapientia fecisti domine , ) that created things should be the ground of truth ; therefore , whatever supposition or position draws after it a contradiction , is as impossible , as that two and three should not make five ; or that a thing can be and not be at once . and , as it has been demonstrated , that when the sucker in a pump is drawn up , the water must needs follow ; because , otherwise , it would violate the natures or essences of things : and therefore , vacuum , within the world , is impossible ; so no force in nature can make any protuberancy in the world's surface , because it would induce a formal effect , viz. distance , and yet nothing to make that distance formally . a position as contradictory , as 't is to say a thing is round , and yet no mode or accident of roundness is in it , which is the formal cause of it as 't is round . 't is his opinion , that they who deny vacuum , must hold body to be infinite : whereas , i hold it demonstrable that there is no vacuum , nor infinity of the world neither ; nor can i see any dependence one of those tenets has upon the other . . he conceives , that no man can , in his thoughts , set any bounds to space , more than to duration . i ask , whether , by his thought , he means his judgment ? for , 't is evident , that he that can demonstrate , that the mode or accident cannot exist , where the body or thing , of which it is a mode , is not ; or , that both the extent of the world has , and its duration will have an end ; can , and must , in his judgment , set bounds to both of them ; however his fancy rambles and roves beyond his judgment . or , if he means , he cannot have a notion of any thing so great , but a greater may be still conceiv'd ; then i answer , first , that our conception cannot make or prove that to be , which is not . secondly , that none can , indeed , possibly have such a notion ( by his way ) of either of them ; but by our way very easily ; for , by adding a negation to finite , as 't is manifest we may , we may have a notion of infinite , which sets bounds to all imaginable quantities , since none can pretend to imagine any thing beyond infinity . the same way gives us the plain notion of immensity , by joining a negation to measurableness . indeed , the notion of eternity can be explicated neither way ; neither by repeating or adding ideas , nor by a negation of finite time , compounding an infinite time , to which it may be conceiv'd commensurable : for , to endure , is to be ; and , tho' our duration , which is accompany'd with perpetual alterations and changes , is therefore subject to time , and commensurable to such and such portions of it ; yet god's duration is of a far more sovereign nature . let us reflect , when we say , god was from all eternity , what those words can mean. infinite time neither was , nor can be ; and therefore , to explicate eternity by what neither was , nor can be , is to explicate it by an impossibility , which is to make it inexplicable . time was not before the world , in re ; nor in our understanding , for we were not yet ; nor in god's , for he , being truth it self , cannot know any thing to be actually , when as yet it was not . wherefore , since eternity cannot be explicated by any regard to possible time , it is left that it must be explicated by what the word [ duration ] imports , viz. by being ; and so it must consist in the highest impossibility of not being , which naturally follows from the notion of self-existence . tho' i doubt not but those who are not got above fancy , are as hard put to it , not to imagine a long flux of time before the world ; as they are , not to imagine a vast expansion of empty space beyond the world. and so it must happen , till connexion of terms ( in which only , and not in the fancy , truth is to be found ) comes to govern men's thoughts , and establish their judgments . . but , to leave these little sallies and inroads into metaphysicks , and return to to our business : the next argument is drawn from god's power to annihilate a part of matter , and keep the next bodies from closing ; in which case , a vacuum between them is unavoidable . in answer ; first , i ask how he knows god would keep the next bodies , in that case , from closing ? if it be against the nature of things , he will not do it : and if it be a plain contradiction , as we contend it is , mr. l. himself will not say he can do it . secondly , i fear it would look like a wild paradox , and little less than blasphemy , if i should deny that god can annihilate ; and yet , out of the profound and dutiful reverence i bear to his wisdom , goodness and power , i must declare , it is my tenet , that he cannot ; any more than he can witness a falshood , or be liable to any other imperfection . it will be thought this limits , and consequently takes away his omnipotency : and i , on the contrary , think i have far more reason to judge , that the other opinion argues impotency , and ours settles his omnipotency . common sense seems to tell us , that omnipotency is a power of doing all things , and not of doing nothing . to act , is to do something ; and therefore , to do nothing , or make a nothing , ( which the sense of annihilation , ) is , not to do : and , 't is a strange notion of omnipotency , which puts it to consist ( in such an occasion ) in not doing . i wonder what conceit such discoursers make of the divinity . what i am forc'd to conceive of him , as essential to him , is , that he is a pure actuality of being , ( as far as is on his part , ) actually , and ever exercised ; that he has no power in him undetermin'd to act , as we have ; which argues some potentiality , or imperfection in us . that , actual existence being essential to him , his peculiar effect is , to give existence , or to create things ; and to conserve them in being , which is a perpetual creation , or creation continued ; and , therefore , that 't is more diametrically opposite to his nature , to cause not being , than it is for light to cause darkness . whence follows , that whatever his creatures are naturally disposed for , he is actually bestowing it upon them . since then the essences of all creatures are capacities of being , the same goodness that makes the sun shine on the just and unjust , must give them continually to be actually . the place is not proper to prove this point at large ; but , were i writing metaphysicks , and were oblig'd to handle it throughly , i should not doubt , but to demonstrate from the natures of action , effect , causality , the specification of action , from the natures of creatures , and almost each of god's infinite attributes , that annihilation is both impossible , and also most unworthy the divine nature . some witty men think that annihilation does best sute with god's justice ; and thence conceit , that eternal damnation is nothing else but to be annihilated . whereas , indeed , this tenet violates that attribute in the highest degree : for , to punish a sinner without inflicting something upon him that is penal , is nonsense : and , what pain can a sinner feel when he is nothing , or is not ? . indeed , mr. locke , § . . argues strongly , and ( as far as i can judge ) unanswerably , against the cartesians ; who make the innumerable particles of their aether , tho' jumbled together confusedly , still light so exactly , as to fill every little interstice . did they put them to be fluid , and of a very rare nature , and so , easily pliable , they might make some sense of it : but they make them solid , dry , and of a firm consistency ; for , otherwise , the particles of their elements could not be made by attrition of other parts of their matter ; of which , one of them is ( as it were ) the dust. nor can it avail them to say , those particles are less and less indeterminately ; for , every thing ( and mode too ) in nature ( especially if consistent ) is determin'd to be particularly what it is , and as it is . nor can there be any thing of an indeterminate quantity , any more than there can be a man in common , who is indeterminate and indifferent to be this or that man. . as for his alledging that men have an idea , of vacuum , distinct from the idea of plenum , 't is true , indeed ; and it means the same as non corpus , and consequently non quantum , non quale , &c. and is of the same nature as is chimaera , which means non ens. but , how does it follow hence , that it does or can exist , or that ( as he phrases it ) there is an incomprehensible inane ; unless , with the vulgar schools , we will make every distinct nice conception of ours to be a particular entity , and capable of existing a-part ; which i do not think mr. locke's good judgment will allow of . reflexion eighth , on the fourteenth chapter . this chapter affords much matter for reflexion , which to do as briefly as i can , i will put my respective negatives to mr. locke's affirmatives , giving my reasons for them , and invalidating his . i deny , that the notion of time is so abstruse as he conceives it . the word is used commonly by the vulgar to express what they mean by it , and their usual meaning is the notion or nature of it . no clown can be ignorant of it , if he ever read an almanack , or saw a sun-dial ; unless some witty man comes to puzzle him with doubts and questions ; which he may even in things the vulgar , and all men living , know very perfectly . he knows , tho' not to a mathematical exactness , ( which is not requisite to our time , or our use of it ) that the year begins on new-years day , and that the sun 's diurnal motion , till he returns to the same line or point , makes what we call a day , and that a day is divided into hours . he knows how many days make a month , how many months a year , &c. he esteems all these , however he divides them into lesser , or by addition augments them into greater , to be parts of time ; and , consequently , parts of the sun's motion , as well as he knew that a day was such . if then they know that all particular parts of the sun's motion are particular parts of time , let us abstract from all these particulars , and the motion of the sun , in common , is the common notion of time it self in reality ; however the formal notion of time consists in this , that it be known and regular , ( as the sun's motion is , as far as they can discern , ) so that they can measure and adjust all their actions by it , which 't is evident they may . and this formality of time they do know too ; as appears by using or applying hours , days , months , &c. to measure and adjust all their motions or actions by them . so that this whole discourse of mine , answering the niceties objected , which escap'd the observation of the vulgar , seems to be built on that solid maxim , that the true signification or sense of the words is to be taken from the common usage of them . if mr. locke pleases ( as i think he will not ) to coin another idea of it , and call it time , he may if he pleases ; but it will not be the notion of time which men have had hitherto ; nor will his new notion sute with the sense of mankind ; nor is it possible the signification he imposes upon that word can ever obtain acceptation in the world , unless some supreme authority , which commands all the world , should enjoin , under great penalties , that such a word be taken in that new sense , and no other ; and even that will never be ; for all mankind will never be under any such authority . . i deny that duration ought to be call'd succession , unless restrain'd to corporeal duration , which is the least worthy that name . for to endure is to be , which has steadiness and permanency in its notion ; whereas succession is essentially change , and so rather opposit to duration or being . nor is any thing said to endure because it succeeds , but because it is all the while other things succeed ; or rather , while it self undergoes some accidental change. whence our being is not commensurate to succession as it is being , but as it is changeable one way or other ; which changes being accompany'd with motion , must consequently be successive as it is . angels and pure spirits have duration , tho' they are unchangeable , and therefore unsuccessive ; having no parts or vicissitudes in their natures or operations , as material and quantitative things , or bodies , have . moreover , the notion of meer being is indivisible , whereas the notion of suceession is essentially divisible ; whence they can have no commensuration to one another . for which reason , before ( as we apprehend it ) motion or succession begun , or after it is ended , the things afford us no ground to conceive any thing like before or after , but only one ever-standing or unchangeable and indivisible instant ; which better expresses our eternity , or constantly being ever , than any correspondence to succession or motion can ; whose natures are finite in duration , and so can never reach infinite duration , or that ever-constant being call'd eternity . . i deny absolutely , that the notion of succession ought to be taken from the train of ideas running in our heads , but from the things in nature ; and mr. locke , ( chap. . ) makes motion , which is the same with succession , one of his simple ideas which comes into the mind by divers senses from outward objects . which how to reconcile with his doctrine here , i am at a loss : nor can i see why the rowling of a cart-wheel in the street , or the flying of a bird in the air , should not more naturally and more solidly give us the idea of succession , than our observing the gliding of ideas in our fancy , or mind . . i deny that his argument , drawn from our not perceiving duration when we sleep , does conclude that this successive train of ideas gives us , or is the notion of our duration . for , none can think he endures not , whether he perceives it or no ; or that our duration ceases , or is interrupted , tho' he thinks not of it ; or that its being longer or shorter depends on our having attention to those ideas , but on its correspondence to more or less of the sun's motion : nor , had we endur'd more or less , or been a jot more or less old , whether we had wak'd or slept all our life-time . nor , is this peculiar to the idea of duration , that we have no perception of it in our sleep ; but common to extension , and all other modes whatever ; which , nevertheless , are , or continue in being , after their manner , whether we perceive them or not . wherefore his notion of duration taken from our co-existence to such a train of ideas , is ill-grounded , as not having any the least foundation in solid nature , but in witty fancy . . i deny also , that the idea or notion of succession comes by reflexion on our train of ideas : because experience tells us it comes naturally by a direct impression from outward objects , which we see move or succeed . . i deny absolutely , that , tho' all that 's said be wav'd , a train of our ideas can either be a proper cause of the notion of succession , or represent it : for succession or motion has , of it self , no distinguishable , much less actually distinct parts , any more than permanent quantity , or extension has any nicks or notches to butt , bound , determin or distinguish it here and there ; but they both proceed in one even , confus'd and undistinguishable tenour ; whereas in the train of ideas , each idea is actually distinct from the other . whence the notion of such a succession ought to be one continued idea , or the idea of a continuance , or else it resembles not the thing as it is in nature ; nor consequently , is it a similitude or idea of the thing , or outward object ; that is , 't is no idea at all , nor so much as a good phantasm ; much less is it a notion , or the thing so in the understanding , as it is out of it . whence i must utterly deny what he says here , § . . that motion produces in the mind an idea of succession , any otherwise , than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas . for , distinction can never represent that which is essentially indistinct , as succession is : or , if he means the interval's between the appearances of one idea , and another are indistinct and confused , it will be ask't by what idea this indistinct interval is made known to us ; and why the same idea may not as connaturally be imprinted by the motion of bodies in nature ; the succession of which our eyes , ears , and touch , do testify ? . i must deny too that duration ( as he takes it ) and succession cannot one of them be a measure to the other . for , all that can be conceiv'd of the notion of duration ( besides being ) fitting it to be a measure , is some designed part of motion or succession : and , when two things move , that which moves more regularly ( provided it be evidently knowable , and its quantity some way or other determin'd ) is in all points fitted to be the measure of the others motion . nor is it more difficult to measure the less regular motion by the more regular one , if the other requisites be not wanting , than 't is to measure the extended quantity of a permanent body , v. g. a yard of cloth ( which as found in the piece is undetermin'd ) by a yard-wand , whose quantity is stated and determin'd . for example , when i write or walk an hour , the motion of sand in an hour-glass , which is more known and determinate , measures the motions of my pen or legs , whose successive quantity or motion is less certainly known or determinate than the other is . and , as that determinate motion measures the other , so the motion of the sun , which is knowable to all mankind ( which the glass was not ) and , to their apprehension , regular , brought to proportionate and determinate parts by help of our understanding , is apt to measure all our motions whatever ; which measure we call time , as i think , mr. l. grants . whence i deny that time is measur'd by the motion of the sun ( as mr. l. objects , and justly wonders at ) for it is that very motion , fitted , as is now said , to be a common measure to all others . he mentions many other signes or marks of periods supposed equidistant , as the returning of birds at such seasons , the ripening of fruit , or fire lighted up at the same distance of time , increast in heat , &c. but what must measure the distance between those periods ? or , what 's this to our time as it is now . st. austin was puzzled to know , whether , if rota figuli moveretur , and all things else stood still , there would in that case be time or no. but all these extravagant suppositions are frivolous . mankind takes their notions from things as they are , and as they work upon their senses ; which , in our case , is the regular and known motion of the sun ; and they take the notions of its parts , from the designation , division and multiplication , made by our understanding ; and not from wild suppositions , which neither come home to the point , nor are , ever were , or shall be ; nor are , or could be so regular and knowable to all mankind , as this motion of the sun is . . i must absolutely deny , and moreover think it a most extraordinary position , to affirm that we must not judge that the periods of duration are equal , by the motion of the sun , but by the train of ideas that passed in men's minds in the intervals ; which , i conceive , is the sense of his § . . and § . . and of the tenour of his discourse in divers places . for , first , how does it appear that the motion of the train of those ideas is it self equal , or near equal , in any one or the same man at all times ; without which we cannot know by their equal succession that the periods which they are to measure are equal , when a man is in a stupid humour , his thoughts play very little and slowly ; when he is sound a-sleep , not at all ; when awake and brisk , or agitated by some great passion , they move very swiftly ; when sedate and compos'd , more moderately ; so that 't is impossible to fix the succession of those ideas in any regularity . next , how can we know that those ideas move regularly , and not rather very differently , in diverse men ? contemplative , melancholly and dull men use to fix their mind long upon one thought ; and , consequently , upon one object of their thought , or one idea : whereas those who are endow'd with gayity of wit , ( which is defin'd c●ler motus intellectûs ) and those who are possest with phrenzy or madness have their ideas succeeding one another very swiftly : when we judge , we fix our thought ; when we invent , we muster up whole armies of them on a sudden . ly , let any man consult his own interiour , and examin with the most exact reflexion , whether his ideas have mov'd swiftly , or slowly , the last hour , he will find himself at a loss to give any good account of them ; much more to assure himself , or ascertain others that they moved regularly : wherefore the train of ideas ( and the same may be said of his other imaginary measures , § . . ) are quite destitute of that chief property of a measure , viz. that it self be regular ; and , if it concerns all mankind , most notorious to all who need it . for want of which , and for the reasons lately given , perhaps no two men in the world could agree , or come to a right understanding with one another , about the time of their actions , which would put all the world in confusion about their common affairs . lastly , mr. l. assignes no reason to evince the regular succession of his ideas in his § . . which seems the proper place to assert that principal point upon which all his discourse depends ; and he only says , that he guesses that the appearance of the ideas vary not very much in a waking man ; and that they seem to have certain bounds in their quickness and slowness . and the reason he gives afterwards , § . . for this ( as he calls it ) odd conjecture , is easy to be solv'd by our principles : for , there is no doubt but that some short time must be allow'd for the coming of impressions from without , for the ferrying them over the medium , and the re-exciting them in the fancy , by which notions are bred in our mind ; which a very quick motion of the outward object may prevent , as in a brand whirl'd round , &c. and there must be also some marks to make us observe too slow motions ; yet , between those two extremes , there are so many degrees , and such variety intervene , that the succession of those ideas may nevertheless be very uneven and irregular . rather , i may with better reason , affirm that it is impossible it should be any way regular at all ; since their succession depends on the fancy ( the most irregular and unconstant faculty we have ) applying the material ideas or phantasms a-new to the seat of knowledge ; which application thousands of causes may retard , or accelerate . his objections against the regularity of the sun's motion not being mathematically such , is of no force . 't is sufficient that it be so regular as serves our use to measure , and adjust our actions by it ; and the same may be objected against one measuring cloth by a yard-wand , whose length is never mathematically exact . . wherefore , notwithstanding the respect i have for mr. l. i cannot but think that such quivering grounds as these can never support his most unaccountable opinion , § . . that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man , are , as it were , the measure and standard of all other successions . his own good judgment saw well the weakness of his grounds ; wherefore his clear sincerity , and usual modesty would not suffer him to deliver assertively , and assuredly , what he saw was uncertain ; and therefore he propos'd it rather as a paradox , or ( he calls it ) an odd conjecture , than maintain'd it as a position ; however , the conception being so new , he was tempted not to pretermit it wholly : in doing which too , i believe , he not so much gratify'd himself , as the humor of most late philosophers ; who are far more addicted to value what 's quaint than what 's solid . reflexion ninth , on the fifteenth chapter , of duration and expansion consider'd together . . i have already said enough of imaginary space , imaginary time , and of the true notion of eternity . philosophers must speak of things as they are , if they mean to speak truth ; and , therefore , the applying our idea of duration , which is a mode of ens , to imaginary time before the creation , when as yet there was no such ens as was capable of such a mode , is evidently against the first principles of our understanding ; and the same illusion of fancy that induced mr. l. to put space ( which is a mode of that ens called body , and neither has , or ever had any being but its , nor power to beget any idea at all in the mind , but by being it ) beyond the world , that is , beyond the universality of things ; where there can only be pure nothing . when we relinquish the things on which only truths are grounded , all the ideas we pursue and substitute in their rooms must necessarily be meer fancies , and inevitably plunge us into contradictions and absurdities . wherefore , i have no occasion to make any further reflexions upon the grounds of this present discourse , the foundation of it being , i hope , overthrown in my preliminaries , and divers other places ; yet , upon his manner of his carrying it on , i must a little reflect . as , . first , that they who endeavour to introduce opinions inconsistent with our natural notions , must be forced to change the common signification of words , lest they cross them in their discourses , and in the explication of their tenet . hence ( as i have noted above ) mr. l. alter'd the signification of the word [ solidity , ] to make way for an unsolid being , or an empty space , as also , the meaning of the word [ extension , ] which he would confine to material beings ; and chose to make use of the word [ space , ] because it seem'd less to connotate the notion of body , than extension did . and , here , he rather chuses to make use of the word [ expansion , ] as if it were better , that is , different from extension . the word is proper enough , for which i do not much blame him : only , i must affirm , that no wit , nor even fancy of man , can conceive or imagine any thing , existing any where but in the imagination , ( or , even scarcely there , ) to be expanded , but it must also be really extended ; nor to be extended , but it must be divisible ; and , therefore , its parts separable by the intervening body , ( which he denies of his inane , ) unless we put them to be insuperably hard , solid , or infractil , as epicurus did his atoms ; or that , if they be thus extended , and yet the parts of the inane do not separate , and give way to a new-come body , there must not inevitably follow a penetration of extended parts ; that is , those parts that must be without one another , must be at the same time within one another ; which is a direct contradiction . . secondly , i cannot but specially remark , to what incredible extravagancies fancy , if not check'd by reason , transports men , tho' otherwise of the greatest parts ; even so far as to conceit that god's immensity consists in a kind of quantitative diffusion of his essence , or in the commensuration of it to an infinite expansion . for , what else can his argument here , § . . for his infinitely expanded inane mean , couch'd in these words , [ unless he ( viz. the denier of such a vacuity ) will confine god within the limits of matter . ] what , i say , can this mean , but that he apprehends god's unconfin'd or infinite being , would be confin'd , finite , and consequently lost , unless there were an infinite quantity of imaginary space answerable to it in extent or expansion . a conceit certainly most unworthy the divinity , whose essence was equally immense ere any creatures were made : nor can any of his essential attributes be taken in order to them ; for , this would give his essence some kind of dependence on his creatures . this is something like ( but much worse than ) the opinion of those ancients , who thought god to be the soul of the world. — penitúsque infusa per artus mens agitat molem , & magno se corpore miscet . which whimsy making god a kind of compart with matter , is long since exploded out of the schools by the solid principles of christian faith. god is not in his creatures by any co-extension to them , or any other way than by giving them being ; and his immensity , which is essential to him , consists in this , that , did an infinity of creatures exist , he would be intrinsecally , and of himself , able to give , or rather , actually giving being to them all . or else , [ existence ] being the least improper notion we can attribute to god , he is said to be immense , because his existence is illimited , or infinite . . thirdly , i much wonder what those words should mean , [ and he , i think , very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding , who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts farther than god exists , or imagine any expansion where he is not . ] for , first , i deny any understanding can conceive or have any notion of a vacuum , tho' he may have a fancy of it ; the notion being the thing it self in our understanding , imprinted by outward objects , by means of the senses ; whereas , his inane never made , nor can make any impression upon the senses at all . next , for the same reason , i deny our thoughts are extended to imaginary space , if by thoughts he means notions , or judgments built on them . lastly , i see not why our fancy may not extend it self farther than god exists ; that is , ( as is lately explicated , ) gives being to creatures ; as well as fancy can extend it self farther than god's omnipotency can act . splenetick or maniacal men can fancy they are made of glass ; that , if they make water , they shall drown all the world ; that , tho' standing on the ground , they touch the moon ; that their nose , tho' but an inch and an half long , touches and feels the opposite wall , tho' perhaps a furlong distant : the quaker fancy'd he was a grain of wheat ; and , when any pidgeons flew over his head ; fell down in a marvellous fright , lest they should peck him up , and fly away with him , &c. now , none of these are a possible object of the divine omnipotence , which is employ'd in making things , which are the ground of truth ; and not in making nothings , or undoing the natures of things , ( as fancy does , ) and so laying a ground for falshood and contradiction . . fourthly , i remark , that the texts of holy writ , which speak humano more , or in accommodation to our low fancies and conceptions , are the worst sort of arguments imaginable , and most unfit to be alledg'd for such by a philosopher ; being apt to lead us into a thousand enormous errours . for , if they be taken in a literal rigour , ( as philosophical arguments ought , ) they would make god no better than his poor changeable creatures . they would make him , at every turn , angry , sorry , repentant , subject to all , or most passions ; moving from this place to that ; and liable to innumerable imperfections . all which are opposite to the unchangeable nature of the divinity ; and therefore ought to be remov'd from him , as far as our thoughts can distance them . . the divine nature is essentially actual being ; and he goes below his soveraign excellency who conceives any thing of it by any other notion , or speaks of it by any word that is in the least potential , or comes not up to actual and essential existence . all his attributes , as metaphysicks demonstrate , do flow or follow from that infinit source of all perfection , self-existence ; or rather , are nothing but it diversly conceived by us ; and , therefore , cannot , according to literal truth , be any other way rightly explicated but by being . much more then are all the modes of ens , founded in creatures , especially those belonging to the basest of all other entities , corporeal things , ( such as are diffusion , or commensuration to space or quantity ) most highly derogatory to that most simple and all-comprehending mind , which eminently and actually contains them all , and concenters in its self all possible being . creatures are no more but [ rags of being , torn into thin formalities ; ] whereas the divinity is the inexhausted source of existence or being it self in the most full , compleat , and intire latitude its vast notion can bear . . i should think my self very happy , if i could correct this influence of fancy over men's thoughts , when they speak of spiritual natures , without making long excursions into metaphysicks ; and , perhaps , this plain discourse may help much towards it ; it being fetch'd from our most natural notions , and known to us ( as it were ) by a kind of experience . let us take then any spiritual mode or accident , a virtue for example , and let it be that of temperance ; which done , let us ask our natural thoughts , how long , broad , or thick that virtue is ? is it as little as a barly-corn , or as big as a house ? is it a yard in length , or but an inch ? is it as thick as a wall , or as thin as a wafer ? &c. and , honest nature would answer for us , that 't is nonsense to ask such a question ; its nature being perfectly of another kind , and utterly disagreeable to any of these accidents . again , let us ask what colour or figure it is of ? is it blew , green , or yellow ? is it round , four-square , or triangular ? is it rare or dense , hot , cold , moist , or dry ? and we shall discover that the asker , if serious , would be look'd upon by all mankind as a fool or a mad-man ; such qualities as these being as much disparate from the subject we are enquiring about , as knowledge is to a beetle , or science to a mushrom . and yet , it would not be wonder'd at , that such questions as these should be ask'd of any body whatever . and what does this amount to , but that nature assures us , by her free and sober acknowledgment of it , that this spiritual mode , call'd virtue or temperance , is quite different from the whole nature of body , and from any corporeal thing that by our senses ever enter'd into our fancy . since then this spiritual mode or accident has nothing at all to do with body or its modes , it is clearly evinced by the ingenuous confession of unprejudiced nature , that the subject of it , which we call a spirit , is so vastly removed from all we can say of body ( being only excepted ) that 't is perfect nonsense to attribute any thing to it which we find in corporeal natures . since then we can truly say of corporeal natures , that they are long , short , diffus'd , extended , commensurate to one another in their bulk , motion , duration , &c. we must be forced to deny all those of spirits ; and to judge that they have nothing to do with any of these , nor can bear the having such modes apply'd to them , or said of them , under penalty of forfeiting our plainest reason , and contradicting common sense . and , if it be such an absurdity to apply them to created spirits , how much more absurd must it be to explicate god's eternity , infinity , or immensity by such gross resemblances , or an imaginary order to the short and fleeting natures of corporeal creatures ? . lastly , to sum up all , i deny that the notion of motion is taken from the continu'd train of distinguishable ideas ; and i affirm that it is imprinted by the object without me , and is one continually successive and undistinguish'd mode there as it is in the thing . i deny too , that duration is motion or succession , but only being ; tho' our being ( it being unconstant and fleeting ) is accompany'd with succession , and subject to motion and time ; and commensurate to them , only ( not as 't is being , but ) as 't is fleeting , or perpetually changing some way or other . i deny it also , as the most prodigious enormity a rational soul could be liable to , thro' its giving up the reins of reason to wild fancy , to say , that our measure of time is applicable to duration before time. for mr. locke makes duration inconceivable without succession , and there could be no succession before the world , when there was only one unchangeable god , in whom is no shadow of vicissitude or succession . does not the plainest sense tell us , that we cannot apply one thing to another , but there must be one and another ; and where 's that other duration or succession before time , or before the world , whenas 't is confess'd there was none . can any man apply a mode of thing to nothing , which yet must be avowed by this author ; for before the world there was nothing but god ; to whom it could not be apply'd , and therefore there was nothing for mr. l. to apply it to . but this is parallel to that seducing fancy that inveigled his reason to hold a vacuum ; he took the notion of space from body , and then apply'd it to what was neither spirit nor body , but meer nothing ; and , here , he took his notion of duration , or succession from bodies moving ; and when he has done , he would apply it to what 's not body ( nor spirit neither ) nor motion , nor like it , but contrary to it ; that is , he would apply it to meer nothing . i desire he would please to consider , that the thing to which another is apply'd must exist as well as that which is apply'd to it ; and this antecedently to his application of one to the other . wherefore both space and duration being both modes or accidents , he must first prove , there is something beyond the world to which he can apply the mode of space ; or something before the world , to which he can apply the mode of successive duration , or it is perfect nonsense even to talk of applying one to the other . but this he has not done , and his way of attempting to do it seems to be this ; first , he fancies he can apply those modes to something there , and then ; and thence concludes , there must be things there to which they may be apply'd ; as if his fancy could create entities at pleasure , or to please her humour . nor matters it that we can apply stated measures of duration , and thence imagin duration where nothing does really endure or exist , or by this means imagin to morrow , next year , or seven years hence ; for we cannot apply them by our reason , but only upon supposition that they will exist , and then there will be also some thing or subject supposed fit for them to be apply'd to ; whereas an imaginary space beyond the world , or imaginary time or succession before or after the world , neither is now , nor can there ever be any possible subject to which they can be apply'd ; and so the application of them can bear no manner of sense . i must confess the word [ imagin ] which mr. l. uses , cap. . § . is very fit for his purpose , and gives the greatest semblance of truth to his discourse . but , by his leave , our imagination cannot create entities , nor make things , to which he is to apply his ideas , to exist when they do not , nor ever will exist ; and , unless it can do this , his application is no application ; for to apply a thing , or mode of thing , to nothing , is no application at all . both space and successive duration are modes proper to body , whence only we had them ; and , a mode without the thing of which 't is a mode ( modes having no entity of their own ) is a meer nothing . let him prove then first , that there are beyond or before the world any thing to which they can be apply'd ; otherwise he will be convinced to ground all his discourse on this principle , [ whatever we can imagin , is . ] which maxim being utterly deny'd , he must make it evident by proof . which if he does , it will do his book more service , than any principles taken from all the sciences in the world ; for all these are as much opposite to him , as he is to them. reflexion tenth , on the th and th chapters . . i have little to except against his th chapter , of number . nothing , certainly , could have been deliver'd more solidly , or more ingeniously . i only reflect on the last words in it ; viz. that the endless addition of numbers , so apparent to the mind , is that , i think , which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity . for , since it is granted that all we do actually conceive , how much soever it be , is finite ; and all our ideas are of what we do actually conceive ; i cannot comprehend how that which is finite can give us the idea of infinite . it may be said , that our reflecting that we can still add more endlesly , is that which gives us the notion of infinity . i reply , that , were this addition of numbers taken from the objects side , so that we saw that by such an addition , number might at length arrive to be truly or actually infinite ; then , indeed , that object ( viz. number ) thus consider'd , or reflected on , might beget in us the idea or notion of infinite : but , 't is taken only from our side , who are the adders , or multipliers ; and so , means only that we can never come to take so much of it , but more may by us be still taken ; whence , since all we can possibly take of it ( our term of life , and consequently , our additions being stinted and limited ) must still be finite ; this may , indeed , furnish us with an idea or notion of a very great number , and by us incomputable ; which notwithstanding , for any thing we can thence gather , may be of it self finite , tho' our additions can never de facto reach its by-us-innumerable total . now , how a finite number , a finite number of times repeated , tho' we called in algebraical multiplication to our assistance , can give us the notion of infinite , which is contradictory to it , surpasses all imagination . and , instead of shewing how it does so , mr. locke tells us here , that we must suppose an inexaustible remainder beyond the finite idea , and that infinity consists in a supposed endless progression ; which is , in a manner , to suppose or beg the whole question : for , if this inexhaustible remainder be still actually finite , ( especially , if held by us to be such , ) it can never give us the idea of infinite actually , which only is the true idea of infinite ; a potential infinity , or a meer power to be infinite , rather signifying not to be infinite ; for , nothing is , what it is only a power to be , especially such a power as is never reducible to act : wherefore , this inexhaustible remainder must be supposed more than potentially , that is , actually infinite ; which is the thing in question . or , if he says , this remainder is only a power to be still greater , but is impossible ever to be actually infinite , then how can it ever , possibly , beget in us an idea of true or actual infinity ? . i have explicated above , by how plain and easie a method we come to have our notion of infinity ; which is , * by joining the sense of the adverb [ non ] to that of [ finis : ] and mr. locke , ch. . § . . seems to come over to my thoughts ; where he says , that the idea of infinity seems to be pretty clear , when we consider nothing in it but the negation of an end. whereas , on the other side , he grants , that the idea of an infinite space or duration is very obscure and confused . now , if the clearness of an idea be the greatest perfection it can have , it follows , even from his own concession , that the idea of infinity ought rather to be taken from the negation of finiteness , than from this confus'd way of adding and repeating more and more of space or duration . add , that ( as was said ) this way can only give us the idea of a potential infinity ; nor that neither well , unless that power to be infinite could ever be reduc'd to act , which is impossible it should : now , the negation of finiteness fully reaches an actual and absolute infinity ; and is applicable , and truly to be predicated of god himself , and all his intrinsecal attributes , as being , duration , power , wisdom , &c. without needing any recourse to the transitory and limited natures or modes of creatures to explicate it . whereas , mr. locke's idea of infinite cannot be predicated of god , or his attributes , at all : nor can we say that god is infinite , in his sense of that word ; in regard he says , that our idea of infinity is ( as he thinks ) an endless growing idea ; for , the infinity of god , and of all that can be conceiv'd to belong to him , is incapable of growth , degrees , or additions ; but is one indivisible being , without any possibility of our conceiving more or less in it , if we conceive it as we ought . . on the other side ; how facil and natural is my way of our gaining an idea or notion of infinite ? we see most things we converse with to be limited , or finite ; wherefore , the notion of the thing as 't is limited , or ( which is the same ) the notion of limitation or end , is very familiar and obvious to our thoughts . since then experience teaches us that we can very easily join a negation to finiteness or end when-ever we please , as well as we can to any other notion ; and , thence , have a kind of complex notion of infinite , as well as we can of immortal , immense , immaterial , incorporeal , indivisible , &c. we have the notion of infinity given to our hands , without more ado ; or without perplexing our selves with making use of those ●ame helps of adding or repeating those stinted measures of corporeal modes or accidents , whose very natures ( besides the finite number of times we can only repeat them ) do make them utterly incapable ever to reach actual , that is , true infinity . . as for the question he introduces here , viz. whether the idea of infinite be positive , or negative , or includes something of both ; my firm opinion is , that , however the gramatical way of expressing that conception seems to be negative , yet the notion it self meant by that word , is altogether positive . my reason is , because the idea or notion of finis or limit ( in what kind soever it be ) does formally signifie [ no farther in that kind , ] which is perfectly negative : wherefore , the negation added to finite , in the word [ infinite , ] quite taking off that negative sense which did before belong to the word [ finite , ] gives the word [ infinite ] a sense purely positive . again , we can have no direct impression from the thing ; nor , consequently , direct notion of [ infinite , ] nor , consequently , any reflex notion of it ; for , all reflex notions have for their proper object , the direct ones which are already in our minds : wherefore , if the notion of [ infinity ] can be had any other way than by adding [ non ] to [ finite , ] it must come from our reason finding out by discourse , that there is a first and self-existent being , whose essence and attributes are beyond all limits , or actually infinite . whence follows , that , since clear reason demonstrates , that all created entities , and consequently , all the modes belonging to them , are finite , and only god is infinite in his essence , and in all his intrinsecal attributes : and reason also tells us , that all which is in god , ( to whom only the notion of infinite can belong , ) is most highly positive ; the same reason teaches us to correct in our thoughts the grammatical negativeness of the word [ infinite , ] which can only be apply'd to him ; and to look upon it , and esteem it , as most perfectly positive . . i cannot pass by , unreflected on , a passage , § . . in which mr. locke's fancy imposes strangely upon his reason : he says , that nothing is more unconceivable to him , than duration , without succession . what thinks he of the duration of god , in * whom is no vicissitude , or shadow of change ; ( which text , i believe , no man , at least , no christian , but holds to be plain , and literally true ; ) whereas , succession is essentially perpetual change ? let him please to reflect , that [ to endure so long , ] is nothing else but [ to be so long ; ] which done , by cutting off [ so long ] in both those sayings , he will sind , that [ to endure , ] is neither more , nor less , but simply [ to be . ] whence his conceit is so far from being true , that nothing more wrongs duration , or being , than does succession , or motion . and , therefore , our duration here , which is unsteady , unconstant , and transitory , is justly reputed to be the worst sort of duration , or being ; and the next to not-being , or not-enduring at all . again , common sense tells us , that nothing moves meerly for motion's sake ; and , therefore , that all motion is , to attain something which is not-motion , but the end of it , that is , rest. wherefore , eternal rest , or that duration called eternity , is the end of all the motion of the whole world ; conformably to what the holy scripture , speaking of the state of eternity , tells us , that , * tempus non erit amplius ; time ( nor , consequently , succession ) shall be no more . wherefore , since , taking away motion and succession , 't is impossible to imagin any thing in duration , but only being ; and eternity is an infinitely better duration , or state of being , than this transitory one , which is successive ; it follows , that eternal rest , in which we have all we can have , or could acquire by motion , at once , is the only true duration , and our duration here only the way to it . so far is duration from being unconceivable without succession , if we guide our thoughts by principles , and not by meer fancy . reflexion eleventh . on the eighteenth , nineteenth , and twentieth chapters . . the three next chapters of simple modes , are very suitable to mr. locke's doctrine delivered formerly , and almost all of them agreeable to nature ; particularly the th , which gives us more genuin definitions of the several passions ; and more aptly , in my judgment , expresses them than mr. hobbes has done ; tho' he is justly held to have a great talent in delivering his conceptions . but , i must deny that the perception or thought , made by impressions on the body , by outward objects , is to be called sensation . for if thoughts be sensations , then the sense can think ; which being the proper act of the mind , i believe none will say if he reflects that our soul is of a spiritual nature . nor are the modes of thinking at all proper to the senses . the truth is , that man having two natures in one suppositum , all the impressions upon him as he is an animal , do also at the same time ( i may say the same instant ) affect him also as he is spiritual ; whence they are to be called sensations , as they are receiv'd in that material part called the seat of knowledge ; and the same direct impressions , as they proceed farther , and affect his soul , are call'd notions , or simple apprehensions . wherefore , as the two natures in man are distinct , and have their distinct properties and modes ; so the words , that are to express what 's peculiar to each of those natures , are to be distinguish'd too , and kept to their proper signification ; which cannot be , if thought , which is peculiar to the mind , be confounded with sensation , which properly belongs to the corporeal part . but i suspect the printer may be here in the fault , and not the author ; the sense in this place being something imperfect . . to the question proposed , ( cap. . § . ) whether it be not probable , that thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul ? i answer , that 't is more than probable ; for 't is demonstrable , that 't is only the action , and not the essence of it . for , in such natures as are potential , or apt to receive impressions from other things , ( as the soul is in this state ; ) and therefore their essence does not consist in being pure acts ( as angels are , ) being must necessarily be presuppos'd to operating ; especially , when their first operation ( as thinking is to the soul ) is a meer passion , caus'd by impressions from another thing ; which are therefore purely accidental to the subject that receives them . and i wonder mr. locke would even propose this as a question to be yet decided , or think it but probable ; since he has formerly maintain'd assertively , that men do not always think : for if it be not certain that thinking is not the essence of the soul , it follows necessarily , that men must always think ; since the soul can never be without her essence , or what 's essential to her . . his position , that things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain , however it may hap to be misunderstood by some well-meaning bigots , is a most solid truth ; and is exceedingly useful to explicate christian principles , and to shew god's wisdom and goodness in governing mankind connaturally . he proposes to him fulness of joy , and pleasures for evermore ; and such as , being spiritual and most agreeable to the nature of the soul , are pure , durable , and filling the whole capacity of its boundless desire ; not transitory , mean , and base ; which , tho' they cloy , never satisfie . heaven would not be heaven , if it were not infinitely pleasant and delightful ; nor would hell be hell , if it were not penal . and in case that explication of epicurus his tenet , which is given it by some of his followers , be truly his , which makes man's summum bonum consist in pleasure at large , and chiefly in the best pleasures of the mind , it would not misbecome a christian philosopher . whence results this corollary , that the whole body of christian morality depends , as on its practical principle , upon our making a wise choice of the pleasures we pursue here . for , the object of our will , and consequently , of its acts of love , is an appearing good , and the lively appearance of that good is that which makes the will prompt to act effectually ; whence , since that which breeds pleasure in us , must needs appear lively to be a good to us , there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most pleasant , or most agreeable to our true nature , reason ; ( such as the best spiritual goods are ; ) and we may be sure by such a well-made choice to arrive at that best , greatest , and purest pleasure , eternal glory . reflexion twelfth . on the th . chapter . . in this chapter of power , i find more to admire than confute . the author always ingenious , even when he errs , has here much out done his former self . particularly , his explication of freewill , is ( generally speaking ) both solid and acute ; and his doctrine that liberty is consistent with a perfect determination to goodness , and virtue is both learned and pious . yet i am forced to disagree with him in some particulars : in giving my thoughts of which i will imitate mr. locke's laudable method ; in making my discourses subservient , and in shewing them to be agreeable , to christian principles . . 't is an excellent thought , that the clearest idea of active power is had from spirit . for bodies can act no otherwise , than as they are acted on themselves ; nor can the first mov'd body that moves the rest , push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not body , or by some spiritual agent ; which therefore has the truest notion of agency in it , without any mixture of patiency ; because the body mov'd cannot react upon it . tho' therefore we may have by our senses the idea of action and passion , from the effects we see daily wrought by natural causes on fit subjects ; yet the clearest idea of action , is given us by our reason , finding out that the beginner of corporeal action is a separated spirit , or pure act ; and therefore not at all passive from any other creature , nor from the body it operates on , by reaction , as is found in corporeal agents . and , our reason gives us this idea , ( as it does many other reflex ones ) by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be processus in infinitum amongst corporeal agents ; nor can they , of themselves alone , begin to move themselves , nor move one another circularly ; and therefore the first corporeal motion must necessarily be originiz'd from some pure spirit or angel. now , mr. locke conceives that the soul , according to her faculty call'd [ will ] moving the body , gives him this clearest idea of active power ; which tenet i have in diverse places disprov'd * formerly ; and shown that the soul , by reason of her potential state here , cannot principiate any bodily action ; nor the man neither , unless wrought upon by some external or internal agent , which is in act it self . . he judges with good reason , that the vulgar mistake of philosophers , in making every faculty or power a distinct entity , has caus'd much obscurity and uncertainty in philosophy ; which humour of multiplying entities , i am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand , in making the understanding and will to be one and the same power , and affirming that they only differ , formally , in degree . he shows clearly how , in proper speech , the will is not free but the man ; unless it be signified with a reduplication , that by the word [ will ] is meant man , according to that power in him call'd the will. for powers ( as he discourses well ) belong only to agents , and are attributes only of substances , and not of the powers themselves . perhaps this reason of his will abet my position , that the understanding and will are the same power . those who make them two , do this because they find in the notion of [ will ] only a power of acting , and not of knowing ; and in the notion of [ understanding ] only a power of knowing , and not of acting : but the same men make the understanding direct the will , which they call a blind power ; by which they make one of those powers , formally as such , to work upon the other , as if the former were an agent , and the latter a patient . i add , moreover , that they do this with the worst grace that is possible ; for what avails it the will , to be directed by the understanding , if it does not know how the understanding directs it ? and to make the will to know , is to make it a knowing power , which is to make the will ( tho' they never meant it ) to be the understanding . not reflecting in the mean time when our understanding is full of any apparent good , the man pursues it , and so becomes , or has in him a principle or power of acting ; which is what we call will. . perhaps a philosophical discourse , beginning from the principles in this affair , if exprest literally , and pursu'd home by immediate consequences , may set this whole business in a clearer light ; and show us very evidently how man determins himself to action ; and therefore is free ; as also how he is predetermin'd to determin himself , than any particular reflexions on our own interiour : which , tho' they may oftentimes have some truth in them , yet , not beginning from the bottom-truths that concern the point in hand , they can never be steady , but are now and then liable to some errours . . beginning then with the animal part in man , and considering him barely as an animal , and wrought upon as other animals are , i discourse thus . particles , agreeable to the nature of the animal , being by the senses convey'd into the brain , do , if they be but few , lightly affect it ; and work no other effect but a kind of small liking of it ; if more , they make it ( as we say ) begin to fancy it : but , if they be very many , and sent from an object very agreeable or good to such a nature ; they will in proportion to their multitude and strength , cause naturally a tendency towards it , and powerfully excite the spirits , so as to make the animal pursue it ; that is , they will become such a principle of action ; which in meer animals we call appetite . to which action that meer animal is not carry'd thro' choice , or freely , but is naturally and necessarily determin'd to act for the attainment of that good , in the same manner as iron follows the load-stone . but , if we consider this animal , as having now a rational and knowing compart join'd to it , things will be order'd after another manner : for , those impressions are carry'd farther than the region of the brain , even into the soul it self , which is endow'd with a faculty of reflecting upon those her notions , whence she gains exacter knowledge of those bodies that imprinted them . nor only so , but she can reflect upon her own operations too , and know that she knows them ; by which means she comes acquainted with her own nature , and comes to see that knowledge and reason is that nature of hers ; which she finds is a nobler part of the man , than is the body ; because by it she excels and governs beasts ; and , in great part , under god , manages corporeal nature . moreover , she can discourse her thoughts , compare the objects , or the goods they propose , and gather the preference some ought to have above others . . things standing thus with the man , it is evident that he has now not only that nature called the body , to provide for ; but another , and that a spiritual , and much better nature , to look to , and to procure for it all the good he can , and such goods as are agreeable to it . he finds evidently , that no corporeal things can be its proper good , taking it as 't is distinct from the body . he may easily discern , that its distinct nature being knowing , or rational , nothing can perfect it but what is according to reason , or improves knowledge ; and that the acquisition of science does perfect it in the latter regard , and virtue in the former ; virtue being nothing but a disposition to act according to right reason in such and such matters , or in such and such occasions . reason therefore is the ground of all true morality ; and , to act according to reason , is to act virtuously : wherefore , to act virtuously would be most natural to man , if his true nature be not depraved ; which it cannot , without impiety , be thought to be , if we consider it as it came immediately from god's hand . wherefore , if it be not so now , but be blinded and mis-led from reason and virtue , by passion and vice , ( as we experience it is , ) it is demonstrable hence , a posteriori , that it has been some way or other perverted since its creation ; which christianity tells us , has happen'd thro' original sin , transfus'd from adam . moreover , as the sense of corporeal or sensible pleasure or pain invites the man to pursue what is for the good of the body , and makes him tend towards what 's agreeable , and eschew what 's harmful to it ; so , in man , as he is rational , there is , or ought to be , answerable to those , a spiritual pleasure and pain , viz. the satisfaction and dis-satisfaction of mind , which we call conscience , or the law of nature , annex'd to all our actions ; our thoughts ( as st. paul says ) accusing or excusing one another ; so to keep us from unreasonableness , or vice , and make us more pliable to follow reason or virtue . for , as grief or pain is caus'd in us by our knowing that our bodies , for which we have a great concern , is disorder'd ; so the stings of conscience ( as far as they proceed from nature ) come from our knowing that our better part , our soul , for which we ought to have an incomparably higher concern , is wounded or disorder'd in her rationality , which is her essence . . hence is seen , that man is apt to be wrought upon by two several sorts of motives , viz. those which are sutable to the good of the body , and those which are agreeable to the good of the soul. now , were not humane nature ( as was said ) perverted , these two could not clash ; nor would there be any inclination in the man to do any thing which could prejudice his superior part , reason ; to which the inferior , the body , is naturally subservient . but , man's nature being poison'd in the spring-head , the motives of the first kind did hazard quite to over-bear the motives of the second sort ; and so mankind became liable to act , in a manner , perpetually against reason , or , ( to express it in christian language , ) all his actions might have been sinful , and himself a slave to sin. wherefore , to obviate the violent impulses of passion , and to strengthen our reason against its assaults , god's wisdom , goodness and mercy took care to give us a doctrine full of supernatural motives , and those the most powerful ones that could be conceiv'd ; taught us by a divine master , and ascertain'd after the best manner ; so to make the appearance of the eternal goods it proposed ( if reflected on ) lively ; which might keep us upright , and move us effectually to follow our true nature , reason ; and so pursue our true last end , by the practice of virtue . . now , there can be no question but that , both in the state of pure and uncorrupted nature , as also in the corrupted state of it , thus powerfully assisted , the innate propension of the will tending strongly to good or happiness ; and [ good ] and [ motive ] being in our case the same , eternal goods would most strongly carry the will , and prevail over temporal ones ; as certainly as heat ut octo would prevail over heat ut duo , were there the same application of one as of the other to the same object equally well dispos'd ; in case the proposal or appearance of both these goods were but equal . . both these motives , natural and supernatural , have their several species or phantasms beating upon the seat of knowledge ; with this difference , that the natural phantasms , being directly imprinted , are proper ones ; but those reflex ones , being of spiritual natures ( as the words and language they are express'd in do testifie ) are metaphorical and improper . as then , when in a meer animal a sensation is made by a small number of agreeable effluviums they make only a slight fancy , imagination or representation of it ; but when an impression is made by a great multitude of them , the animal is naturally ripe for action , and is enabled , or has a power to act , which power , thus prompt to act , we call appetite : so ( as was said above ) in a rational or knowing animal , a small quantity of reflex notions may serve to give it a speculative knowledge of the object proposed : but , when those reflex impressions are many , and of such objects as , being very agreeable or good to our true nature , are therefore highly concerning us to have them ; the appearance of them is so lively , and the strength of their motive force is so great , that the man becomes fit to act for them ; which principle of action we call will. so that knowledge and will differ but in degree , as did fancy and appetite in a meer animal . by which explication are avoided all the incoherent positions about this subject ; such as are , that the understanding directs the will ; that the will knows ; that one power works upon another , &c. whence is seen , . first , that the way to conquer in our spiritual warfare , is , to strive to multiply and strengthen those reflex thoughts , especially those given us by supernatural motives ; and to make their appearance lively in the soul ; that so it may be able to beat down and overcome the opposite band of impressions from corporeal objects which assault it : which i conceive to be what is literally meant by a lively faith working in us that best virtue , charity . next , in order to the same end , we must endeavour , by a cautious and prudent avoidance , to lessen and weaken the impressions from corporeal objects ; which is done by that virtue which we call temperance , or ( when 't is to some high degree ) mortification ; and , by that means to dim the appearance those objects would otherwise make ; lest , if it be too lively , they should overcome the motive force of those objects which are spiritual . but , it is to be noted , that the multiplying , or frequently repeating those reflex impressions , are not so necessary to every person , nor always the best . for , a wise , judicious christian , who , out of a clear sight of spiritual motives , has ( by a thorow-penetration of their excellency and preferribleness ) his speculative thoughts so lively , that they fix his interior practical judgment to work steadily for the attainment of eternal happiness , is a far more manly and strong christian , than those who arrive at a high pitch by the frequent dints of praying , or other good exercises , almost hourly continued : for , those well-knit thoughts , and rational judgments , are ( as it were ) an impenetrable phalanx ; and being connatural to our reason , no assault can shock or break their ranks . yet , even in those firmest souls , christian discipline and vigilance must be observ'd ; lest , not having those strong thoughts or judgments still in readiness , they be surprized by their ghostly enemy ; which i take to have been king david's case , when he first sinn'd . . secondly , it is seen hence , that man determines himself to action , or is free. for , 't is evident , both to reason and experience , that all those thoughts , discourses , judgments and affections , he had in him before , naturally , or supernaturally , are the causes of the determination of his will. wherefore , all these being modes or accidents belonging to him , and modes not being distinct entities from the thing to which they belong , but the thing it self , ( or , the man thus modify'd ; ) it follows , that man determines himself to action ; or , is a free agent . . thirdly , since man has neither his being , his powers , his actions , nor consequently , the circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good thoughts ( from whence he has the proposals of his true good , and of those incomparable motives to pursue it ) from himself ; but had all these from the maker and orderer of the world : and , since this series of internal and external causes ( called , in christian language , god's grace ) did produce this determination of himself , 't is manifest , that he was predetermin'd by god , the first cause , thus to determine himself , as far as there was entity or goodness in his action . . fourthly , since all our powers are , by the intent of nature , ordain'd to perfect us , and that power , called freedom , does not perfect any man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to eternal misery ; it follows , that the more he is determin'd to virtue and true goodness , the more free he is . again , since a man is free when he acts according to the true inclination of his nature ; and the true natural inclination of a man is to act according to right reason , that is , virtuously ; it follows , that freedom is then most truly such , and the man most truly free , when he is determin'd to virtuous actions . whence irrationality , or sin , is by the holy ghost called slavery , which is opposite to freedom . from which slavery , the mercy of god , meerly and solely through the merits of his son , our redeemer , has freed us . . fifthly , we experience , that the lively proposal of temporal and eternal goods , when it arrives to that pitch , that there is hic & nunc , such a plenitude ( ex parte subjecti ) of such objects or motives , that it hinders the co-appearance , co-existence , and much more the competition of the contrary motives , does always carry the will , or the man , along with it . for , the object of the will being an appearing good , and no other good , in that juncture , ( at least , considerably , ) appearing , because the mind is full of the other ; it follows , that the inclination of the will to good in common , which man is naturally determin'd to , must needs carry the soul ; no other ( as was said ) then appearing . whence , mr. locke's position , that uneasiness alone is present ; and his deduction thence , that therefore nothing but uneasiness determines the will to act , is shewn to be groundless : for , an appearing good cannot but be always present to the soul ; otherwise , it could not appear , or be an appearing good. . sixthly , hence wrong judgments arise , either thro' want of information , as , when men are not imbu'd with sufficient knowledge of eternal goods ; or else , thro' want of consideration ; whence , by not perfectly weighing and comparing both , they come to prefer temporal goods before eternal ones . . lastly , 't is to be noted , that sin does not always spring from false speculative judgments , but from their being disproportionate . for , 't is a truth that temporal goods are in some sort agreeable to us ; nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd , provided we did but love eternal goods as much as they deserve to be loved too . sin therefore is hence occasion'd , that thro' too close and frequent a converse with them , we too much conceit , and make vast judgments of these temporal goods in proportion of what we make of eternal ones . and , were not this so , no sin would remain in a bad soul when separate , or in a devil ; nor , consequently , the proper punishment of sin , damnation , because they know all truths speculatively . wherefore , their inordinate practical judgments ( in which sin consists ) springs hence , that they do not conceit , or ( as we say ) lay to heart the goodness of true felicity , because they over-conceit or make too-great judgments of the goodness found in some false last end , which they had chosen . yet these disproportionate judgments , tho' speculatively true , are apt to beget wrong practical judgments , and wrong discourses or paralogisms in the soul of a sinner , to the prejudice of his reason ; as has been shown in my method , book , less . . § . . . mr. locke's discourse about uneasiness , lies so cross to some part of this doctrine , that it obliges me to examin it . he endeavours to shew that uneasiness alone and not good or the greater good , determines the will to act. his position , tho' new , and paradoxical , is very plausible ; and , taking it in one sense , ( viz. that there is always some uneasiness when the will is alter'd in order to action , ) has much truth in it ; and it seems to have much weight also , by his pursuing it so ingeniously : yet there is something wanting to render his discourse conclusive . for , . first , if we look into grounds and principles , they will tell us , that 't is the object of any power , which actuates , or determines it ; and the object of the will cannot be uneasiness : all uneasiness being evidently a consequence , following either from the not yet attaining the good we desire , and hope for ; or from the fear of losing it . and , if we should ask whether uneasiness does affect the will , otherwise than sub ratione mali , or , because it is a harm to the man ; and ease otherwise affect it , than sub ratione boni , ( that is , because it is good to him ; ) i believe it is impossible , with any shew of reason , to deny it . now , if this be so , it will follow , that 't is good only which is the formal motive of the will ; and ease , no otherwise than as it is good. . secondly , all that we naturally affect being only to be happy , or to be well ; it follows , that good only is that which our rational appetite , the will , strives to attain ; or pursues , and acts for . . thirdly , appearing good being held by all , to be the object of the will , ( for none hold , that good will move it , unless it appears such ; ) and the greater appearance of it having a greater , and sometimes the greatest power to move it , i observe , that tho' mr. locke does now and then touch slightly at the appearance of the good proposed to the understanding ; yet , he no where gives the full weight to the influence the several degrees of this appearance have over the understanding , to make the man will it ; but only denies that good , or the greater good , in it self , determines the will. whereas , even the greatest good , ●dimly appearing such , may not , perhaps , out-weigh the least good , if it be very lively represented , or apply'd close to our view , by a full appearance of it . hence , his argument , that [ everlasting unspeakable goods do not hold the will ; whereas , very great uneasiness does , ] has not the least force ; because he still leaves out the degree of their appearing such to us . for , since ( especially in our case ) eadem est ratio non entium , & non apparentium ; and no cause works its effect , but as it is apply'd ; he should either have put an equal appearance of the two contesting motives , or nothing will follow . . fourthly , this equal appearance put , his argument is not conclusive , but opposes himself . for , the prodigious torments inflicted by the heathen persecuters , upon the primitive martyrs , were , doubtlesly , the greatest present uneasiness flesh and blood could undergo ; yet the lively appearance of their eternal happiness , ( tho' distant , and absent , ) which their well-grounded faith , and erected hope assur'd them of , after those short , tho' most penal sufferings ; overcame all that inconceivable uneasiness they suffer'd at present . . lastly , how can it be thought , that the getting rid of uneasiness , or ( which is the same ) the obtaining of ease , can be the formal and proper object of the will. powers are ordain'd to perfect the subject to which they belong ; and , the better the object is which they are employ'd about , so much , in proportion , the man is the perfecter , who applies that power to attain it . it cannot then be doubted , but true happiness being the ultimate perfection man can aim or arrive at , which is only attainable by acts of his will ; that power was naturally ordain'd to bring man to his highest state of perfection by such an acquisition ; or , by loving above all things , and pursuing that object ; and , consequently , since this consists in obtaining his summum bonum , 't is the goodness of the object , apprehended and conceited such , which determines the will ; and , therefore , the straining after greater , and even the greatest goods , and being determin'd to them , is what , by the design of nature , his will was given him for . now , who can think , that meerly to be at ease , is this greatest good ; or the motive , object , end , or determiner of the will ? ease , without any farther prospect , seems rather to be the object of an idle drone , who cares not for perfecting himself at all ; but sits still , satisfy'd with his dull and stupid indolency . it seems to destroy the acquisition of all virtue ; which is arduous , and not perform'd but by contrasting with ease , and present satisfactions . it quite takes away the very notion of the heroick virtue of fortitude ; whose very object is the overcoming ease , and attempting such things as are difficult , and inconsistent with it . i expect , mr. locke will say , that all these candidates of virtue had not acted , had they not , according to their present thoughts , found it uneasie not to act as they did . but i reply , that uneasiness was not their sole motive of acting , nor the only , or formal determiner of their will : for , in that case , if meerly to be rid of uneasiness had mov'd them to act , meer ease had satisfy'd them . whereas , 't is evident , they aim'd at a greater good than meerly to be at ease . in a word ; ease bears in its notion , a sluggish , unactive , and most imperfect disposition : it seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or insensibility of a stoick . pleasure and joy have some briskness in their signification : desire is active , and implies a tendency to some good we affect : but the meer being at ease denotes no more but a stupid indisturbance ; which noble souls hate , as mean , and are weary of it : and , if ease be the proper motive and determiner of the will ; and the greatest good the will can have , or wish , is eternal glory ; it would follow , that the glory of the saints and angels in heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at ease ; which is far from elevating the soul to the highest degree of perfection , as glory , or the beatifying sight of god does ; and only signifies , she is , when in heaven , securely out of harm's way , or free from being disturb'd ever after : by which , no great good accrues to her , but only a kind of neutral state , in which she shall receive no hurt . . the true point then seems to me to stand thus ; the object of the will , an appearing good , works many effects immediately consequent to one another . first , when the appearance is but slight , it begets a liking of it ; when lively , a love of it , which determines the will to it ; to which , if great , follows an effectual tendency towards it , called desire of it . desire not satisfy'd , troubles us , or makes us uneasie : uneasiness makes us strive to change our condition , to get ease . this makes us to cast about , and consider how to find means to do it : means found , we make use of them , and actually go about to rid our selves of what was uneasie to us . now , tho' some of these are nearer to our outward action than others , yet the appearing good in the object is the common cause which produces all those orderly dispositions ; in virtue of which , as the first motive , they do all act , assist and concurr to determine our will to go about the outward action with vigour . . ere i part with this chapter of power , i am to observe , that mr. locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the power to be a thing ; tho' nature gives us as clear a notion of it , as of any other power whatever . for , as oft as we see one thing made of another , which we know is not created anew , so often our natural reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former thing could be made another thing ; and this , as evidently as when we see a thing act , which did not act before , we must acknowledge it had antecedently a power to act ; and thence we frame an idea or notion of such a power accordingly . but of this power , called matter , and of its metaphysical compart , the form or act , i have treated largely already in my appendix to my method , to which i refer my reader ; as also here , preliminary . § . , . i note , by this omission of the notion of metaphysical power , or matter , that mr. l. holds so rigorously to his first ground , that all our notions are got by sensation and reflexion , that he seems to make account , that , by working upon these , we do not gain other notions by using our reason ; in which sense , i must deny that ground of his . or else , he omits this , and other notions , ( especially metaphysical ones , ) because he finds no proper or formal similitudes for them in his fancy ; which makes it still more evident that he too much consults his imaginative faculty , to the prejudice of his reason ; and , too frequently , means by his ideas , meer fancies . which also is the reason why he blunders so about the notion of substance . reflexion thirteenth , on the twenty second and twenty third chapters . . i find nothing in chap. th , [ of mixed modes ] to reflect on , but what has been spoke to already . the author pursues with much accuracy his own method of shewing how his ideas of mixt modes are made up of simple ones . which , in a manner , falls into the same , as does our way of ranging all our notions into the common head of substance and its . modes , and then compounding them as use and occasion invites us , or rather as nature forces us . nor do i see how the name ties ( as mr. locke fancies ) the several ideas together , more than barely by signifying the combination of them made before-hand in our minds . the different method in this point , taken by mr. locke and us , seems to be this . that we , by distributing our ideas or notions into ten common heads , do know at first view in which box to look for them ; and , this discover'd , we find also all our particular notions , that are within the precincts of each head , by dividing the head it self by intrinsecal differences , or more and less of it ; which done , the mixture of that compounded notion is close and compacted ; each part of it , if in the same branch of that division , being essential to the other . and , if some part of the compound notion be taken from other heads , we , by looking into their notions , and comparing them by our reason , know how much , and what share of that notion is borrow'd from others , and belongs or not belongs to it ; and in what manner it belongs to it : which teaches us how to predicate diversly ; and instructs us how the terms of our propositions are connected , and whether they be connected at all . which exceedingly conduces to science , and ( as we conceive ) is hardly performable by his way , but rather is inconsistent with it . again , while we divide those common heads , in case our division be rightly made , we , with the same labour , frame genuin and proper definitions of each notion under each respective head. whereas , we conceive , his way of mixing his ideas wants the beauty of placing their parts orderly , which the process from superiour to inferiour notions has ; and his mixt ideas , if he goes about to explain and compound them , have so ragged , shatter'd , and dishevell'd an appearance , that 't is hard to determin which of his simple ideas that makes this mixture , ( much more which of his compounded ones ) is to be the first , second , third , &c. so that the definitions of his ideas do more resemble a confused heap than a regular building ; as will be observ'd by any man who reflects on those definitions and explications of his ideas he now and then gives us . in which , however it may be pretended , that his materials are oft-times proper , and the same with ours , yet it will be impossible to shew , that his way of laying those materials together is regular , artificial , or handsome . he speaks of the combinations , compositions , and mixtures of his ideas ; but i do not remember he ever tells us , much less maintains , their regularity , or the order in which his several ideas , or the words which express them , are to be placed ; which must necessarily leave his reader 's thoughts in much confusion . indeed , it seems not to have been his intention in this treatise to observe the rules of art , but only to give us our materials ; wherefore , as i do not object , or much impute this deficiency , so i thought it not amiss to note it . . while i perused mr. locke's th chapter , of the idea of substance , i was heartily grieved to see the greatest wits , for want of true logick , and thro' their not lighting on the right way of philosophizing , lay grounds for scepticism , to the utter subversion of all science ; and this , not designedly , but with a good intention , and out of their sincerity and care not to affirm more than they know . he fancies that the knowledge of substance and extension are absolutely unattainable . now , if we be altogether ignorant what substance or thing means , we must bid adieu to all philosophy , which is the knowledge of things , and confess that we talk all the while of we know not what : and , if we be invincibly ignorant of what extension is , farewell to all the mathematical sciences ; which , ( those that treat of number , or arithmetick , excepted ) do all of them presuppose our knowledge of extension , and are wholly grounded on that knowledge . wherefore , that i may perform the duty i owe to science and truth , i judge my self obliged first to establish the literal truth in this point ; and , next , to satisfie his scruples and difficulties . in order to which i discourse thus . . we can have no knowledge of a nothing , formally as such ; therefore all our knowledge must be of things one way or other ; that is , all our knowledge must either be of the res or the modus rei ; or , ( as the schools express it ) of substance or accidents ; for , other notions we cannot have . again , since mr. locke grants the accidents or modes are not distinct entities from the thing ; they can only differ from it notionally ; or , as divers notions , considerations , respects , or abstracted conceptions , which our limited understanding ( not able to comprehend at once the whole thing , and all that belongs to it , in the bulk ) has of the thing , which grounds them all . hence all our knowledge of quantity , ( under what name , or in whatever formality we take it ) is of the thing as 't is big , divisible , or extended : our knowledge of quality , is of the thing consider'd according to what renders its particular nature perfect or imperfect . relation is still the thing , according to that in it which grounds our comparing it to others . now , as we can consider the thing according to its modes or accidents , so we can have another notion or consideration of the thing as to its own self ▪ abstracting from all these former considerations ; or a notion of the thing , ( not according to any mode it has , but ) precisely according to its thingship ( as we may say ) or reality ; that is , in order to being ; or ( which is the same ) we can consider it precisely and formally as an ens , res , substance or thing ; and all we can say of it , thus consider'd , is , that 't is capable to be actually . for , since we see created things have actual being , yet so that they can cease to be ; all that we can say of them , ( thus consider'd ) is , that they are capable to be . besides , since we see they have being , were this actual being or existence essential to them , they would be of themselves , and so could not but be ; and , consequently , must always be ; which our common reason and experience contradicts ; in regard we know them to have been made ; and we see many of them daily produced , and others corrupted . this discourse is built on this principle , that all our ideas or notions ( and amongst them the notion of substance or thing ) are but so many conceptions of the thing ; or which ( taking the word [ conception ] objectively ) is the same , the thing thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , besides what 's said here , is prov'd at large in my second and third preliminaries . . now , according to this explication , which when we are distinguishing the notion of thing or substance from its modes ( as both of us are here ) is evidently true ; it is so far from being impossible to know , even distinctly , what the word [ substance ] or , which is the same [ thing ] means , or what substance is , that it is impossible to be ignorant of it . for , every one must needs know what it is to be ; since without knowing this , we could not understand any thing another says , nor what our selves think ; for all this is perform'd by affirming or denying , express'd by [ is ] or [ is not , ] which speak actual being , or not being . and 't is in a manner equally impossible not to know what [ capacity ] or [ power ] means ; which are the only ingredients of [ capable to be , ] which is the very formal conception of ens , as 't is precisely ens ; or , of the thing according to the meer notion of substance , taking that word in a logical sense , as 't is distinguish'd from accidents ; and not in a grammatical one ( as it were ) for a supporter of the accidents ; for , this is a secondary sense of [ thing , ] and does not signifie what it is in it self , or according to its primary and precise notion , as is noted above ; but , according to what respect or consideration it bears to others , or other notions . . thus far concerning the idea or notion of substance in common , or taken as abstracted from its modes or accidents . descending thence to such and such sorts of substances , and keeping still in that line , 't is plain that there goes more to their composition , than there did to constitute the bare notion of substance it self ; and therefore the modes or accidents must be taken in ( for there is nothing else in nature imaginable ) to constitute them such and such : wherefore , the complexion of those accidents which constitutes them of such or such a nature , and nothing else , is ( as the schools phrase it ) their substantial or essential form. and , if we go yet lower , there will need still a greater complexion , or a decomposition of accidents for the same reason ; and so still more , till we come to an individual thing ; or , as they call it , the substanstantia prima ; which , only , is in proper speech , a thing , because it only is capable of existing . but , when we are got to this lowest step in the climax of substance , i mean to the individuum or suppositum , which includes in it all the modes that constituted the superiour and inferiour natures above it , and those innumerable accidents over and above , which distinguish it from all other individuums of its own kind , and by which it is perfectly determin'd to be this in particular , and no other ; then , 't is no wonder our bewilder'd thoughts are lost in a wood ; it being impossible for us to conceive , find out , much less to know distinctly the confused medley of those numberless accidents or modifications found in the suppositum , which do compleatly constitute its individual essence . . and hence arises mr. locke's first difficulty , and his apprehension that we can make nothing of the idea of substance . but , he may please to reflect , that we ought to distinguish between the notion of a thing or substance taken as involving all the modes aforesaid ; and the notion of thing , as excluding , abstracting from , and contradistinguish'd to to them all ; in which later sense i take it here , and himself too , as appears by his considering it as a supporter to the accidents . which done , i am confident his difficulty will be at an end : for this is as easie to be done , as 't is to see the difference between the meer notion of thing , ( or what 's capable to be ) and such a thing , or capable to be of such or such a nature . next , he thinks that all we can make of the idea of substance is , that it is a substratum , or supporter of the accidents . to whch i answer , that if we consider substance in reference to its modes , we do indeed make such a metaphorical conception of it ; but not , if we do ( as we ought when we consider it singly ) conceive it as 't is in its self , or as to its own precise notion , or idea . 't is partly the impropriety and unfitness of the word [ substance ] ( as i have noted preliminary . § , . ) and partly the blundering explication of the common school-men , which breeds all this perplexity . and , indeed , 't is no wonder , if , when we take metaphorical words literally , we find our selves at a loss , and that our thoughts ramble into extravagancies . the literal truth of the whole business is this in short , which who ever does not well reflect on , and carry along with him , ( the distinction of our notions depending on it , ) i dare confidently affirm must necessarily discourse confusedly , and incoherently . . the thing , or individuum , as it stands in nature , does ( as was said ) contain in its self what grounds , corresponds to , and verifies thousands of different notions or conceptions which we may make of it . we cannot , as experience teaches us , weild or manage all or more of those notions at once ; and , therefore , our knowledge of it ( taken as it is in nature , or in the bulk ) is so confused , that we know not distinctly what it is , more than to see and experience that it is , and is distinguish'd from all others . the only way then to gain a clear and distinct knowledge of it , is to take it in pices ( as it were ) by our various considerations of it , and frame many partial , inadequate or abstracted notions of it . all these notions , how many soever they be , are either of res , or of modus rei ; that is , either they must be the notions or natures of thing , or of such a thing ; and both the first of them , and also all the rest , are nothing but the thing diversly consider'd . the conceptions , or notions of the modes or accidents are innumerable ; but there is only one which is the conception of thing it self , which we find to be this , that 't is capable to be or exist ; and , this notion , or ( which is the same ) the object thus consider'd , we call ens , res , substance or thing . the other notions we have of it , such as are big , qualify'd , related , &c. have neither being , nor any order to being in their signification , or peculiar notion , as had the other . wherefore , since nature tells us that we must first conceive the thing to be , ere we can conceive it to be after such and such a manner ; nor can the mode or manner be apprehended to be of its single self capable to be , otherwise than as it is annext to what 's capable to be by its self , or by its own peculiar nature , that is , as it is identify'd with it ; therefore no mode or accident can exist by virtue of its own idea or notion , but in virtue of the notion of thing or substance ; with which , therefore , tho' formally different , they are all materially identify'd . or thus , more briefly : had not the thing somewhat in it which grounds this true conception of it , that 't is capable to be ; none of the accidents ( they all wanting in their notion any order to being ) could be conceiv'd to be at all . and this , in literal truth , is the great mystery of those positions , about which disputants in the schools , blinded with their own ill-understood metaphors , have so long , like andabatae , fought in the dark about such questions as these , viz. whether the essence of the accidents is their inexistence , or inherence in the substance ; whether the substance supports them in being : is their substratum , or the subject , in which , those accidental forms , do inhere ? then , in pursuance of their fanciful metaphor , some of them begin to cast about how those forms are united to the subject or substance , or come to be received in it ; in order to which , and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly , they coyn a new connecting little entity , call'd an union , to soder them together , and so , instead of making it one entity , they very wisely make three . all which conceits , if we look narrowly into them , have at the bottom this mistake , that all our several conceptions have so many distinct entities in the thing corresponding to them . which vast errour both perverts all true philosophy , and is against a first principle in metaphysicks , by making unum to be divisum in se , or one entity to be many . now , if these modes be things , or ( to speak more properly ) if the notion of every manner of a thing be the formal notion of the thing it self , or of what 's capable of existing ; first , the nature of modes is destroy'd ; for they will be no longer the [ how , ] but the [ what ; ] and the nature or notion of substance , or ens , is lost too ; for , if all the modes are distinct entities , or capable of existing , they must all be substances ; which blends all the notions mankind has , or can have , ( on the perfect distinction of which , all science is grounded , ) in a perfect confusion ; and , consequently , reduces all our knowledge to a chaos of ignorance . but i wonder most , how this learned man can think none knows what extension is . we cannot open our eyes , but they inform us , that the air , and other bodies which which we see , are not cramp'd into an indivisible , but are vastly expanded , or ( which is the same ) extended . may we not as well say we may see light , and yet have no notion of it ? and , does not himself make extension to be one of his simple ideas , the knowledge of which goes along with all the knowledges we have of bodies ; and , withall , resembles the thing ; for what , thinks he , serves an idea , but to make men know by it what it represents ; or , consequently , an idea of extension , but to make us know extension ? perhaps he may think we cannot know it , because we cannot define or explicate it , but in words equivalent to it . but , first , this objection has no ground ; because all definitions and explications in the world are the same sense with the notion they define and explicate ; and , were it not so , they would be no definitions nor explications of that notion ; for they do no more but give us all the parts of the entire notion , and all the parts are the same as the whole . next , how does it follow , that , because we cannot explicate it , we do not know it ? whereas , the direct contrary follows in our present case : for , the commonest notions can the worst be defin'd . because they least need it , being self-known , or self-evident . not all the wit of man can define and explicate what it is to be ; and , yet , all mankind knows it perfectly , or else it is impossible they , not knowing what the copula means , should know the truth or falshood of any proposition whatever . thirdly , he seems to think that ( as some of the school-men do imagin ) contradictory positions may follow out of the notion of extension ; else , why should he imagin the difficulties concerning it are inextricable : which i must declare against , as the the worst piece of scepticism , next to the denying all first principles . for , if contradictory positions may follow out of any notion taken from the thing , then that notion , and consequently the thing it self , would not have any metaphysical verity in it , but be purely chimerical . add , that the learned thomas albius , in his excellent preface before the latin edition of sir kenelm digby's treatise of bodies , has clearly solv'd those imaginary contradictions . . to shew the difficulty of knowing extension , he objects , that no reason can be given for the cohesion of the parts of extended matter . if he means , that we can give no. physical reason for it , or such an one as fetch'd from the qualities or operations of bodies , i grant it ; for all those qualities and operations are subsequent to the notion of extension , and grounded on it : but , if he thinks there cannot be a far better and clearer reason given from the supream science , metaphysicks , i deny it . i explain my self ; all positions that concern the essences of things , or modes either , do belong to the object of metaphysicks ; so that , whoever makes the natures or essences of any of these [ not to be what they are , ] is most clearly convinced , by his violating that metaphysical first principle , [ a thing is what it is , ] to maintain a clear contradiction . if then divisibility be the essence of quantity , and divisibility signifies unity of the potential parts of quantity ; and continuity ( as making those parts formally indivisas in se ) be evidently the unity proper to those parts ; it follows , that quantity being the common affection of body , does formally , and as necessarily , make its whole subject , that is , all its parts , continued , or coherent ; as duality does make a stone and a tree formally two ; or rotundity in a body makes it round ; or any other formal cause is engag'd by its very essence to put its formal effect , which would induce a clear contradiction if it should not . . 't is not in this occasion only , but in many others too , that great scholars puzzle their wits to find out natural causes for divers effects , the true reason for which is only owing to trans-natural ones , or from these altissimae causae , which only metaphysicks give us ; and it happens also , not seldom , that men beat their brains to find out efficients for that which depends only on formal causes ; whose most certain causality depends on no second causes , but only on the first cause , god's creative wisdom , which establish'd their essences to be what they are . let any one ask a naturalist , why rotundity does formally make a thing round , and you will see what a plunge he will be put to , not finding in all nature a proper reason for it . the same , in other terms , is the ground of mr. locke's perplexity how extended parts do cohere ; to which , the properest and most satisfactory answer is , because there is quantity in them , which is essentially continued ; and , so does formally give coherence of parts to body , its subject . by the same means we have a clear reason afforded us , why bodies impell one another ; which mr. locke thinks is inexplicable . for , putting one body to be thrust against another , the body that is passive must either be shov'd forwards , or there must necessarily be penetration of parts ; unless , perhaps , at first , the impulsive force be so slight and leisurely , that it is able to cause only some degree of condensation . every thing therefore acting as it is , if the body , or the quantity of it , be extended , or have one part without the other , and , therefore it be impossible its parts should be penetrated , or be one within the other , the motion of the passive body must necessarily ensue . . to proceed : mr. locke makes account we have as clear a knowledge of spirits , as we have of bodies ; and then argues , that we ought no more to deny the existence of those , than of these . which i should like well , did he maintain and prove first , that the nature of bodily substances is clearly intelligible : but , to make those notions which are most essential and proper to bodies , and most obvious of all others , viz. their entity or substance , and their extension , to be unintelligible , and then to tell us , that the idea of spiritual natures are as clear as that of bodily substance , which he takes such pains to shew is not clear at all , is , as i conceive , no great argument for their clearness , nor their existence neither ; but rather , a strong argument against both : the parallel amounting to this , that we know not what to make either of the one , or of the other . . as for the knowledge we have of spiritual natures , my principles oblige me to discourse it thus : we can have no proper or direct notions of spiritual natures , because they can make no impressions on our senses ; yet , ( as was shewn * above , ) our reflexion on the operations , and modes which are in our soul , make us acknowledge those modes are not corporeal ; and therefore , that the immediate subject of those modes ( our soul ) is not a body , but of another nature , vastly different , which we call spiritual . our reason assures us also , * by demonstrating that the first motion of bodies could neither proceed immediately from god , nor from our soul , ( which presupposes both that , and many other motions , to her being , ) that there must be another sort of spiritual nature , distinct from our soul , from which that motion proceeds ; which therefore being active , and so in act it self , is not a compart , but a whole , and subsistent alone ; which we call angels : their operations prove they have actual being , and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be , or things . whence we must correct our negative expressions of them by our reason ; and hold , they are positive things ; all notions of thing being positive . farther , we can as evidently discourse of those beings , or things , tho' negatively express'd , as we can of any body : v. g. if an angel be non-quantus , we can demonstrate it is non-extensus , non-locabilis , &c. and , from its having no matter , or power , which is the ground of all potentiality and change , 't is hence collected , that 't is a pure act ; and , therefore , that once determin'd , it is immutable , at least naturally . lastly , i affirm , that , this presupposed , we can discourse far more clearly of spirit , than of bodies : for , there are thousands of accidents belonging , intrinsecally or extrinsecally , to every individual body , whence all our confusion , and ignorance of it comes ; whereas , in a pure spirit , there are only three or four notions , viz. being , knowledge , will and operation , for us to reflect on , and manage ; and , therefore , the knowledge of them is ( as far as this consideration carries ) more clearly attainable , than is the knowledge of bodies . reflexion fourteenth , on the th , th , th , and th chapters . . the th chapter [ of the collective ideas of substance ] gives me no occasion to reflect . only when he lays ( as it were ) for his ground , that the mind has a power to compare , or collect many ideas into one , i am to suppose he means , that the mind does not this of her self alone , without the joint-acting of the body , as has been often prov'd above ; for , otherwise , the whole , or the man , cannot be said to be the author of that action . . the th chapter gives us the true notion of relation , and very clearly express'd ; which he seconds with divers other solid truths , viz. that some terms which seem absolute are relatives ; that relation can be only betwixt two things ; and that all things are capable of relation . what i reflect on is , that he gives us not the true difference between real and meerly verbal relations ; nor the true reason why some relative terms have , and others have not correlates he thinks the reasons why we call some of them extrinsecaldenominations ( which is the same with verbal relations ) proceed from defect in our language , or because we want a word to signifie them : whereas , this matters not a jot ; since we can have the idea or notion of relation in our minds , if we have good ground for it , whether we have a word to signifie it or no ; or rather , if we have a real ground for it , we shall quickly invent either some one word , or else some circumlocution to express it . let us see then what our principles in this affair say to us . . relation is not here taken for our act of relating , ( for then it would belong to another common head of notions , call'd action ) but for the thing as it is referred by our comparative power to another ; wherefore , there must be some ground in the thing for our thus referring in ; and , consequently , if the relation be new , or such a one as before was not , there must be some novelty in the thing it self to ground it . whence follows that , if there be such a real ground on the one side only , and no real ground on the other , there will be a real relation on the one side , and no real relation on the other , but only a verbal one , or an extrinsecal denominatien ; answering , or ( as it were ) chiming grammatically to the term which is really relative , v. g. our powers of seeing or understanding any thing , have a real relation to their proper objects ; both because such objects specifie the power , or make it such a power , that is , give it its peculiar or distinct essence ; as also , because the power is by the object actuated and determin'd to act ; that is , the power is intrinsecally chang'd , or otherwise than it was , by means of the object ; but the object suffers no kind of change , nor is it at all alter'd , or otherwise than it was by being known or seen . whence the intellective or visive powers are really related to the object ; but the objects , for want of a real ground , are not really related back to the powers ; however the words [ understood ] or [ seen , ] do verbally answer to the acts of understanding and seeing ; which is , therefore , call'd by the schools in their barbarous language [ relatio dedici ] or an extrinsecal denomination . for farther light in this very necessary particular , i refer my reader to my method , book . less . . where , if i flatter not my self , he will find the notion of relation treated of very fully and clearly . especially i recommend to his perusal the th , th , th , and th section , where i discourse of that unmutual relation of the measure to the thing measured ; the exact knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this subject ; however it lay out of mr. locke's road to take notice of such speculations as regard , or not regard , the thing as their ground . . reviewing his th chapter , ( of cause and effect , &c. ) i found that he acquaints us very exactly , how we gain the ideas of them by our senses ; but he proceeds not to show us , ( which yet he often does in other occasions ) in what the nature of causality consists , which is of the chiefest use in philosophy . for , what is the learned part of the world the better , for having those rudest draughts , or ( as mr. l. well calls them ) materials of knowledge , ideas or notions , or for knowing how we come by them , ( in which he very frequently terminates his enquiries , ) if we do not by reflexion and reason , polish and refine them , and thence attain to true knowledge of the things , from which we glean'd them ; or by what virtue they come to be causes of such effects ? what i conceive of causality is , that 't is the power of participating or communicating some thing , or some mode of thing , to the patient , which was before some way or other , in the thing that caus'd it : on which point i have no occasion to to dilate here particularly . only , which concerns our present purpose , i am to note , that that which is thus communicated is the real ground on which the real relation of the effect to its cause is founded . whence follows , that the cause also , when it has some real change , by being reduced from the imperfecter state of meer power , to the perfecter one of act , or ( as we say ) gets something by producing such an effect , will have a real ground , and consequently a real relation to the effect , and not otherwise . and hence it is that god , our creatour , has no real relation to his creatures , tho' they have many to him ; because he is no otherwise , nor better , in the least , by creating them , than he had been in case he had not created any thing at all ; and therefore there is no ground in him of a real correlation to them . . the th chapter ( of identity and diversity ) requires a deeper consideration . in order to which , i know no more compendious way to clear the point in dispute between us , than to fetch my discourse from those principles that concern it . the subject does , indeed , properly belong to metaphysicks ; but i will endeavour to do what i can , to avoid those abstracted mediums , which are made use of in that supreme science . and , first , as the ground work of my discourse , i am to settle the principle of individuation , or how a particular thing or substance , comes to be what it is ; for , this done , it will be easily seen whence we are to take our measures , to judge when it continues the same , and when it is to be another , or a different thing from its former self . i discourse thus ; nor will it be tedious i hope to repeat often , what is so useful to be remember'd , as being the sure ground of all our knowledge . . all our conceptions , by which only we can discourse of things , are either of res or modus rei ; that is , they are either the notions of substance or thing precisely ; or else , the notions of accidents . of these the word [ thing ] has a very abstracted notion , and is perfectly indifferent and indeterminate to all particulars : wherefore the notion of such a species or sort of thing , being ( as was said above ) more determinate , must have something superadded to it to determin it , and compound or constitute it of such a species ; which can be nothing but such a complexion of accidents or modes ; there being ( as was said ) nothing else imaginable that can be added to the notion of thing . now , philosophers agreeing to call that which determins the common notion of thing ; and so , constitutes such and such species or kinds of things [ a substantial or essential form ; ] hence , the substantial form of all the sorts , kinds , or species of natural bodies can be nothing else but such a complexion of accidents , as fit the thing for such a kind of operation in nature . and , hitherto , if i mistake not , mr. locke and i may agree in the main , however we may differ in the manner of explicating our selves . . descending then to the individuals , it is evident , that a greater complexion of accidents is necessary to determine and constitute the several individuums , than would serve to constitute the species ; for , the species or kinds of things are but few , but the individuums under those kinds are innumerable ; and , therefore , more goes to distinguish these from one another , than was needful to distinguish or determine the other : whence it comes , that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the suppositum , or individuum . wherefore , it being a certain maxim , that [ what distinguishes , does constitute , ] this medly of innumerable accidents , which differences or distinguishes each individuum from all the rest , does also intrinsecally constitute those individuums ; or , is the intrinsecal or formal principle of individuation . moreover , since nothing in common , or not ultimately determin'd to be this or that , is capable of existing ; nor , consequently , in proper speech , a thing ; it follows again , that that complexion of acccidents , which gave the thing its primigenial constitution in the very first instant it was thus ultimately determin'd to be this , ( or different from all others of the same kind , ) did truly and properly individuate it . note , that this discourse holds equally in elementary , mix'd , living , vegetable and animal individuums ; allowing only for the smaller or greater number of accidents , which goes to the constituting each of them respectively . why mr. locke , who allows the complexion of accidents to constitute the specifick nature , should not follow the same principle , in making a greater complexion of the modes intrinsecally distinguish the individuum from all others , and so constitute it , i cannot imagin ; it being so perfectly consonant , and necessarily consequent to his own doctrine , and agreeable to evident principles . . applying then this discourse to man : since it is the constant method of god's wisdom , as he is the author of nature , to carry on the course of it by dispositions on the matter 's side ; and , therefore , to adjust and fit that which supervenes to what pre-exists ; and , especially , to sute the form to the matter ; and , since 't is evident that the embrio pre-exists to the infusion of the soul , as the peculiar matter to its form ; it follows , that the soul is adjusted to the bodily or animal part ; and , according to the degree , that part of it , call'd the fancy , is better or worse fitted ( as far as is on its side ) to perform such actions , when it is ripe ; or , more or less fit to work comparatively , ( in which all judging and discoursing * consists , ) there will be infused a soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly , or less perfectly , according as the matter requires . and , were it otherwise , so that the soul were apt to work more perfectly than the body were able to go along with it ; first , that greater degree of rationality in the soul would be lost , and in vain ; and next , the man , god's workmanship , would be disproportion'd , and , in a manner , monstrous in his most essential parts . putting then those parts orderly fitted to one another , which can only be done ( as was shewn ) by suting the supervening part to that which pre-existed , it follows necessarily , that as the bodily or ( meerly ) animal matter of man , the embryo , was , in the instant before the soul was infused , ( and the man made , ) individually different from all of the same kind , or from all other embryo's ; and so , was , consequently , just to such a degree , fit , by the peculiar disposition of its brain , ( as it s conjoin'd instrument , ) to act with the soul comparatively ; so , it is impossible ( the soul being proportion'd to that matter , as its form ) that any two souls should be perfectly alike , or equal in rationality ; or rather , that any two men should have a capacity of knowing , or reasoning , to the self-same degree : for , were they equally rational , those two men would be but one and the same man essentially , or under the notion of such a species ; in regard that , tho' they might have many accidental differences , yet they would have nothing in the line of such a rational ens , or man , to distinguish them essentially , or make and constitute them formally two such entities , or things , as we call men , or rational animals . . this premis'd , i come to examin mr. l's discourses upon this subject . he imagins existence is the principle of individuation ; which can consist with no show of reason . for , since thing in common cannot exist , and therefore what 's ultimately determin'd to be this thing , or an individuum , can only be capable of actual being ; 't is evident that the individual thing must , ( in priority of nature or reason ) be first constituted such , ere it can be capable of existence . wherefore 't is impossible that existence , consider it how we will , can be in any manner the principle of individuation , the constitution of the individuum being presupposed to it . again , since , as has been shown above , the notion of a thing , or an individuum , ( speaking of creatures ) is [ capable to be ] 't is impossible that actual being , or existence , should constitute the potentiality or capacity of being , any more then the meer power of walking can constitute or denominate a man actually walking . besides , both logick and metaphysicks demonstrate that , existence , it being the immediate effect of the first cause , who is essentially an infinitly-pure actuality of being , is therefore the most actual of any notion we have , or can have . wherefore , since whatever does difference or distinguish another , must necessarily be more actual than the notion distinguish'd ; it follows , that existence is of its own nature a most perfectly uniform and undistinguishable effect , that is one and the same in all creatures whatsoever , as far as concerns its own precise nature or notion : for reflexion will inform us clearly , that whatever notion is distinguishable is potential ; and that the distinguishing notion is more actual than it . since then no notion can be more actual than is that of existence ; it follows , it cannot possibly be distinguish'd at all . whence follows this unexpected , tho' clear , consequence , that , if existence does constitute the individuality , all the individuums in the world , as having one and the self-same constituter , would be but one individuum . . next , mr. l. fancies , that the existing of a thing in the same time and place , constitutes the identity of a thing ; and the being in several times and places constitutes its diversity . by which 't is easy to discern , that he distinguishes not between the extrinsecal marks and signes by which we may know the distinction of individuals , and what intrinsecally and essentially constitutes or makes them differeut things . who sees not that time and place are meerly extrinsecal to the notion of substance , or rather toto genere different from it , as belonging to other common heads ? and therefore they are too superficial considerations for their identity and diversity ( which are relations grounded on their essence ) to consist in them . besides time and place are evidently no more , but circumstances of the thing ; wherefore , that very word ( circumstance ) shows plainly that they cannot be intrinsecal , much less essential to it ; and it evidences moreover that they suppose the thing already constituted , to which they are annext . tho' then practical men may have light thence to distinguish individuums ; yet , it is very improper for philosophers , or speculative reflecters , to make the entity of things , which grounds the relations of identity and diversity , to consist in these outward signes and circumstantial tokens . . this learned gentleman conceives there must be a different reason for the individual identity of man. to make way to which he premises , and would perswade us gratis , that it is one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third to be the same person . but , i must forestall all his subsequent discourses by denying this preliminary to them . for , speaking of one and the same individual man , as he does , i must affirm that 't is all one , nay , the same formal conception of him , to be the same substance , man and person , for example , 't is evident that socrates is one thing under the common head of substance , or ens , descending by the genus of animal , and species of homo ; whence this one thing or substance is not only necessarily , but formally one man , because he is formally a a thing , or substance , under the kind or species of man ; and 't is impossible he can be under any other . again [ man ] bearing in its essential notion that he is an intelligent being , he is essentially and formally one person too . nor can we separate , even by our thought , one of those considerations from another , unless we take the word [ substance ] or [ man ] in a generical , or specifical meaning for substance , and man in common ; which we are forbid to do by our very subject in hand , which is about the principle of individuation ; or else , unless he takes substance for parts of matter , with their quantity and figure acceding and deceding to the individuum ; which things are not essential to man , nor fit him for his primary operation ; which position follow'd home , would , perhaps , make the individuality of man , and of all things else , alter every moment . so that mr. locke , led by the different sound of words , makes three notions of one ; and then racks his wits to shew how this one notion , made into three , is distinguish'd ; which we may easily foretell must render his discourse very extravagant , as will be seen shortly . . perusing his th section , i much fear that his tenet , that brutes are knowing and rational , does influence his thoughts strangely on this occasion , and makes him dislike the definition of man , [ viz. a rational animal ; ] and he seems here not only to take the idea of individuation , but of his very nature and kind too from his make and shape ; and then he discants on what people would think of a thing in the shape of a man , which never used reason any more than a cat or parrot ; or , of a cat or parrot that could discourse or philosophize ? i answer , i will tell him my mind when it shall please god to do miracles to help out our want of principles ; and , in the mean time , that i think such extravagant suppositions , perverting the course of nature , should not be heard amongst philosophers ; much less be brought instead of , or to abett , arguments . it would be more to purpose , if he could convince men of sense by conclusive reasons , that it is possible that knowledge should be made by artificial laying together particles of matter ; or else , if it cannot , to prove that srutes have spiritual natures in them : for , one of these two must necessarily be first made good , ere we can with reason affirm , that ●●●●●s have , or can have knowledge . 't is principles and not fancies which must guide our thoughts in such concerning points . what i conceive sober men , and even the generality , would think of such irrational men and rational brutes is this : they would think the former , if they could never be made to understand , or answer pertinently in their whole lives , ( notwithstanding their make , ) to be no men ; and the later , i mean those philosophizing brutes to be either devils , or engins acted and animated by them : so far are such wild suppositions from giving us the notions of things . but the main point ( in which mr. locke frequently mistakes ) is , that it matters not at all what people think or judge . we are indeed to take the meanings of words which express our natural notions , or simple apprehensions , from the users of them , the populace ; but , the applying , or joining those words or notions to one another , in order to the framing thoughts or judgments of such connexions , we are to take only from the learned , or from the principles belonging to the sciences that treat of such subjects , and not at all from the vulgar ; which if we did , we must judge , as many of them doubtlesly do , that the moon is no bigger than a great cheshire cheese ; nor one of the fixed stars so big as a brands-end , or a beacon on fire . . the former distinction forelaid , he proceeds to make personal identity in man to consist in the consciousness that we are the same thinking thing in different times and places . he proves it , because consciousness is inseparable from thinking , and as it seems to him , essential to it . perhaps he may have had second thoughts since he writ his th chapter , where , § . he thought it probable that thinking is but the action and not the essence of the soul. his reason here is , because 't is impossible for any to perceive , without perceiving that he does perceive . which i have shewn * above to be so far from impossible , that the contrary is such . but , to speak to the point : consciousness of any action or other accident we have now , or have had , is nothing but our knowldge that it belong'd to us ; and , since we both agree that we have no innate knowledges , it follows , that all both actual and habitual knowledges which we have , are acquir'd or accidental to the subject or knower . wherefore the man , or that thing which is to be the knower , must have had individuality or personality from other principles , antecedently to this knowledge call'd consciousness ; and consequently , he will retain his identity , or continue the same man , or ( which is equivalent ) the same person , as long as he has those individuating principles . what those principles are which constituted this man , or this knowing individuum , i have shewn above , § § , . it being then most evident , that a man must be the same , ere he can know or be conscious that he is the same ; all his laborious descants , and extravagant consequences , which are built upon this suppositions , that consciousness individuates the person , can need no farther reflexion . . yet it is a great truth , that consciousness of its own actions is inseparable from a knowing individual substance , or person , and remains with it eternally ; and ( which will justifie the forensick consideration he mentions ) will acquit or condemn him when he appears before god's dread tribunal ; not because it constitutes its personality , but because nothing we once knew , or knowing , did , is possible to be ever blotted out of the soul. whence it comes , that a soul not only knows her self as soon as separated , ( or rather , is then her own first , and most immediate , and ever-most-present object , ) but also , because , she then knowing all the course of the world , and , consequently , all the actions of her past life , both good and bad , is disposed , by the knowledge of the former , and by the consequences of them , laid by god's mercy or justice , to erect her self by hope to an ardent and over-powering love of her true last end , which will save her ; or , by her knowledge , or the consciousness of the latter , to sink into despair , which will plunge her into a hell of endless misery . it is also true , that we are conscious here of any perceptible good or harm that happens to our person ; because we cannot but reflect on what concerns any part of our individuum , which is our self ; which , yet , is so far from proving that our personality consists in this consciousness , that it proves the direct contrary : for , it shews that our person , or individual self , affected thus agreeably , or disagreeably , is the object of that consciousness ; and objects must be antecedent and pre-supposed to the acts which are employ'd about them , because the objects are the cause of those acts. nor is there any farther mystery in the word [ self ; ] for it means no more but our own same intelligent individuum , with which we are well acquainted , partly by direct , partly by reflex knowledges . . it looks so very odly to say , that one of our own acts should constitute our own particular essence , ( which it must do , if our personal identity consists in our consciousness , ) that i am apt to think that mr. locke's great wit aim'd at some other truth , tho' he hap'd to mis-apply it . i can but guess at it ; and perhaps 't is this : 't is , without doubt , true , that the essence of subsistent spiritual natures , which ( as having no manner of potentiality in them ) are pure acts , ( i mean angels , ) consists in actual knowledge ; which act is first of themselves . and , if so , why may not this act of the soul , call'd consciousness , employ'd about her self , or her own actions constitute the soul , or the man's personality . but , the difference lies here , that those pure spirits having no matter or potentiality in them , annex'd to , much less identify'd with their natures , their essence is formally constituted by their being in act according to their natures ; that is , by being actually knowing : whereas , the soul , in this state , being immers'd in matter , and identify'd , or making one thing with her bodily compart , and needing to use it as her conjoin'd instrument ( as it were ) to attain knowledge , is therefore in a state of potentiality ; whence she has no innate notions , ( much less principles , ) but is meerly passive in acquiring those first rudiments of knowledge : however , after she is thus pre-inform'd , she ( or rather , the man , according to his spiritual part ) is , in part , active , when he improves those knowledges , or ripens them to perfection , by his reflexion and reason , as both of us hold . . i see no necessity of making any farther remarks upon this chapter , after i have noted some other ill-laid , and wrongly supposed grounds , which occasion'd his mistakes . as , first , that the soul of a man is indifferently alike to all matter . whereas , each soul not being an assistant , but an informing form ; and , withall , being but the form of one particular , and therefore fitted ( as was lately proved ) to the disposition of the particular pre-existent embryo ; it can be receiv'd in no matter , but that which is individually determin'd in it self , as to its animality ; and therefore it requires a form distinct from all others , or as the individual constitution of the embryo was . secondly , § . . he makes account , the specifick idea , if held to , will make clear the distinction of any thing into the same , and diverse : whereas , our subject ( as i suppose ) being about individual identity , and diversity ; how the holding to the specifical idea , in which all the individuums under it do agree , and which makes them one in nature , should clear the distinction of individuals , is altogether inexplicable . it must then be only the individual idea , or notion , as far as we can reach it , ( to which there go more modes , than to the specifical , ) and its intrinsecal composition , which can diversifie things really , or make them to be really the same , or divers : however , some outward circumstances can do it , quoad nos . i am not much surpriz'd , that mr. locke , led by the common doctrine , does think there are no essential notions under that which logicians call the species : whereas , all individuals being most properly distinct things , must have also ( essence being the formal constitutive of ens ) distinct essences , and so be essentially distinct. but of this , enough in my method , book . less . . § . . &c. his proof of it is very plausible : but the reader may observe , that while , § . . he uses the word [ that rational spirit , that vital union , ] he supposes it that ; that is , individually the same ; instead of telling us what makes it that . besides , that he throughout supposes existence to individuate ; which is already confuted . lastly , i observe , that , to make good his distinction of [ person , ] from the individual substance , and individual man , he alledges , that a hand cut off , the substance is vanish'd . by which 't is manifest , that he takes [ substance , ] not for the thing , called man , constituted by a soul , as its form ; but , for the quantity of the matter , or the figuration of some organiz'd part : whereas , taking the word [ substance , ] as he ought , for ens , or thing , no alteration or defalcation of matter , quantity , or figure , &c. makes it another substance , or another thing ; but such a complexion of accidents , or such a new form , as makes it unfit for its primary operation , to which it is ordain'd , as it is a distinct part in nature . nor can this argue in the least , that consciousness constitutes personality ; because this happens not only in men , or persons , but also in trees and dogs ; which , if they lose a branch , or a leg , are still the same substance , or thing ; that is , the same tree , and the same dog , as all the world acknowledges . reflexion fifteenth , on the th , th , th , th , and th chapters . . the th chapter [ of other relations ] is very ingenious , and consonant to his his own principles . it might ; indeed , shock a less attentive reader to see virtue and vice rated , or even so much as named so , from the respect they have to the lesbian rule of reputation or fashion , call'd in scripture consuetudo saeculi , which the more libertine part of the world would set up and establish as a kind of law. and this , i suppose , was the occasion that made that very learned and worthy person , mr. lowde , except against it . but the author has clear'd that point so perfectly in his preface , that none can now remain dissatisfy'd : for who can hinder men from fancying and naming things as they list . . i take leave to discourse it thus : the word [ virtue ] both from its etymology and true use , signifies manly , or becoming a man , taking him according to his genuin and undeprav'd nature given him by god ; that is , right reason . this reason , if we use it and attend to it , will give us the knowledge of a deity : in speculative men , by way of demonstration ; in others , by a kind of practical evidence , from their observing the regular and constant order of the world , especially of the celestial bodies ; as likewise by their scanning , according to their different pitch , the solid grounds of the christian religion reveal'd to us by god , viz. the certain testimony of the miracles , and other supernatural ways by which it was introduced and recommended . this right reason convinces us we are to adore this supreme being and great governour of the world , and to obey him in those things he has manifested to us to be his will. this assures us that he governs his creatures according to the natures he has given him ; and , therefore , that he governs mankind according to his true nature , right reason ; and consequently , that the rule of living , or the law he has given us , is absolutely the best for the universal good of the world , which right reason teaches us is be observ'd ahd preferr'd before the satisfaction of our own private humour or appetite ; and therefore this rule , call'd the decalogue , or ten commandments , is most rational . whence , from its being most agreeable to man's true nature , reason , 't is hence styled jus divinum naturale , or the law writ in men's hearts . this shews how compleat a summary of our comportment with all others of our own kind , that incomparable precept is , [ do the same to others as you would they should do to you ] and that a rule so short and plain in words , and so comprehensive and universally beneficial in sense , could only be dictated by a divine master . this assures us that , if this infinitely great and good governour does , to elevate and perfect souls , oblige them to believe any other and higher points , especially such as are uncouth to the course of the world , or to natural reason , he will , out of his wisdom and goodness , give us such convincing grounds for our belief of them , as shall overpower the repugnance of our fancies , and oblige us according to principles of right reason to assent to them as truths . this tells us also , thro' our reflexion on the goodness , piety and peaceableness of christian doctrine , that the principles of it ( that is , the doctrine it self ) are true and sacred ; and lets us see how infinitely we are bound to his favour , and merciful kindness , for enlightning us with so sacred a law , and so every way conformable to right reason . and , if any company or sort of men have , out of the depravedness of their nature , fram'd to themselves , and introduced any other rules of manners , grounded upon vain-glory , false reputation , or any other new-fangl'd conceits of their own invention ; v. g. if they would strive to legitimate , and make pass for current and unblameable morality , duelling , excessive drinking , swearing , whoring , cheating , &c. this tells us how unmanly , and far from right reason , those actions are ; and how the world could not long subsist , did men take their private revenge , besot their brains continually with excess ; blaspheme , or needlesly and carelesly ( that is , irrevently ) slubber over god's holy name , which alone gives majesty and authority to all those sacred laws ; or , did they live promiscuously with women , or take away all they could get from other men. this right reason , abetted by costly experience , shews us what pernicious consequences , and inconveniencies of many kinds , do attend the breach of those laws , instituted for the universal good of the world ; and , how all the course of our life is dis-jointed , and out of frame , when we once yield the conduct of it to passion and vice. lastly , 't is this light of true reason , which makes those who are conscious to themselves that they have deviated enormously from this rule , look upon themselves as debauchers and deserters of their reason , which is their nature ; as breakers and contemners of the law ( not of the land , but ) of the world , and disregarders of the law-giver himself ; as base , mean , corrupted , and rotten at the heart , degenerate from their own true nature ; and , therefore , ( unless they reform themselves , ) utterly uncapable of being promoted to that perfection and happiness , to which the ever ready generosity of their infinitely-bountiful god and maker , would otherwise advance them ; and , moreover , as liable to all those most dreadful punishments , which the anger of so great a majesty , justly provok'd , will certainly inflict on them . whence ensues interior heart-gnawing sorrow , and stings of conscience ; and , if they persist , despair and damnation . these things consider'd , and virtue being nothing but right reason ( man's true nature ) employ'd about fitting objects , in fitting occasions , i do not think we are to attend to what irrational men , libertines , or humourists call virtue or vice , and esteem laudable or blameable ; but to what right reason , the only establish'd and impartial standard in this case , teaches us to be truly such : and , i think it had been better , and more unexceptionable , to have called such good and bad dispositions [ reputed virtues and vices , ] than to join those qualities in an univocal appellation with those rational or irrational habits , which only , in proper speech , are truly such . . as to the th chapter , [ of distinct and confused ideas , ] i cannot think that the confusion of ideas , is in reference to their names ; but springs mostly from the reasons assign'd by himself , § . . for , what are names , but the words which signifie those ideas ? the idea , then , is in my mind , what it is , and such as it is , independently of those names ; as being there before i named it . and the same reason holds , for keeping up the distinction of those ideas ; for the notions will be still what they were , whether one name or another be imposed on them : and , i think mr. locke agrees with me , that they are like figures , which , the least detracted , or added , makes the idea be quite another . if one talks to me of a mufti , and i take that word to signifie a rat-catcher , my idea of a rat-catcher is the same as if the word [ rat-catcher ] had been used , tho' the reference of the idea to that name be as wrong as may be . or , if i speak of an individuum , called longinus , and another takes that word to signifie a yard ; my idea is confused , being of an individuum ; and his distinct , tho' the word be the same . so if the same person , rectify'd as to the meaning of any word , takes it now in a different sense than he did formerly , then he has another idea by it than he had ; but yet , both his former , and his new-got idea are still unalterably and perfectly distinct . but , i observe , that mr. locke attributes many things to words and names ; which , whether it be his over-acuteness , or my dulness , i can make nothing of . what i conceive of confus'd ideas , is this : in two cases chiefly they are confus'd , viz. when there is a confusion in the things themselves from which they are taken , and to which they correspond ; as , when too many considerabilities are blended together ( as it were ) in the same suppositum , or individuum ; or , that the object it self consists of many things ; as , a heap , an army , a sack of wheat , &c. or else , when the object is not well represented , either by defect of the organ , the distance of the object , or the ill disposition of the medium . to this latter sort belongs the imperfection of our understanding ; which , not able to comprehend the whole thing , is forced to make many inadequate ideas or notions of it ; which , not reaching to particularize the thing , must therefore be common , or general , as containing more under them indeterminately , that is , confusedly . in two cases also , names seem to cause in us confused ideas : one , when the word is perfectly equivocal , and signifies neither sense determinately . the other , when a multitude of words are huddled together inartificially , or stammer'd out unintelligibly ; to which we may add , our not understanding the language thorowly . in which cases , we have either no notion at all , or , if any , a very confused one . and these seem to me the only solid ways to breed confused ideas , as being taken from the nature of the things , and of their circumstances ; and from the nature of the words , as words ; that is , from their significativeness . as for the secret and unobserved references , the author speaks of , which the mind makes of its ideas to such names , i must confess , i know not what it means , more than that the understanding knows perfectly , or imperfectly , what the word stands for , or ( which is the same ) what is its true and proper meaning . concerning infinity , of all sorts whatever , i have said enough formerly , on divers occasions . . the th chapter needs no new reflexion . the th , [ of adequate and inadequate ideas , ] has in it much of true philosophy ; especially , where he makes the essences of things consist in the complexion of the modes or accidents . i grant , that whole complexion is not knowable by us in this state : but , why have not we as much knowledge of them as is necessary for us ? or , why must we think we know nothing of them , unless we have ( over and above our use ) all those superfiuous degrees of the knowledge of things , as may satisfie also our curiosity , or humour ? by those accidents of gold , which we know , we can discern gold , ordinarily , from other metals : or , if any cunning fellow would impose upon nature and us , and undermine that slighter knowledge of the generality , to cheat them ; god has furnish'd us ( especially those whose peculiar concern it is ) with means to countermine their sophisticating arts. i grant too , that our idea of individual substances is not adequate ; but , if an imperfect notion of them be sufficient for our purpose , and withall , most sutable to our imperfect understanding , why should we desire more . . moreover , there is another reason , of a higher nature , and most supreamly wise , grounded on what the metaphysicians term altissimae causae , which we call first principles , why this complexion of accidents should be so numerous , and millions of ways variable . it becomes the god of truth , so to order his world , that things should be a ground for truth . now , had there not been almost as infinite variety of those modes which constitute , and , consequently , distinguish , every individuum ; it might happen , there being such an innumerable multitude of those individual things , that some two of them , which , by being two , must be different , would yet differ in nothing , or in no respect , or mode ; and so , they would be one , and not one ; which is a contradiction . nay , not only divers things , but each discernable and divisible part of the same thing , however seemingly uniform , must have a various complexion of those modes , to distinguish them . for example ; let a s . piece of gold be divided into forty parts ; each part , after division , being now a whole , and a distinct thing from all the rest , must either have some distinct modes in it , to distinguish it from all the others , or it would be distinct , and yet not distinct , ( having nothing to distinguish it ; ) that is , it would be one thing , and yet not one thing ; or rather , the same part , and yet not the same part ; and this in the same respect , ( viz. under the notion of substance , thing , or part ; ) which is a perfect contradiction . wherefore , the god of nature , who is always essential truth , has so order'd it , that things , and each part of things , how minute soever , should have a ground in them of differing from one another , as whoever is used to microscopes , will easily discover . as for what concerns us , this inconceivable variety tasks our industry , employs our speculation , and raises our contemplation , by making us see that god's wisdom is infinitely exalted in the least of his creatures ; and by obliging us to break out into transports of admiration , * ecce , deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram . . since then we see and experience that things do exist , and therefore ( nothing being able to do what 't is not capable to do ) are capable of being actually , or existing ; since we know they existed not of themselves , or by virtue of their own essence ; and therefore , that to be meerly or purely capable of existing , is the very nature or notion of created things , considering them precisely according to the notion of thing or substance . since we know the last distinction , or individuation , of things thus consider'd , consists intrinsecally in the complexions of modes or accidents , which ultimately determins them to be this ; and since , withall , we have such outward marks and signs of their individuality , from their existing in the same time and place , and other such like circumstances , ( in which sense , and not in making them intrinsecally constitute the individuum , mr. locke's doctrin in this point is admitted . ) lastly , since there are the highest reasons imaginable , that this individual complexion of accidents should be impossible to be comprehended by us in this state ; let us content our selves with this sufficient knowledge which we have of them , without grasping foolishly at more than we are able to fathom . . in my judgment this acute author might have excused this th chapter , [ of true and false ideas . ] he grants they cannot properly be true or false in themselves ; and ideas or notions , being nothing but the nature of the thing ( as thus or thus conceiv'd ) in our minds , can have no consideration belonging to them , but what they are in themselves , or that they are what they are , which is called their metaphysical verity ; and therefore ( as he says well ) they can no more be true or false , than a single name can be said to be such . the improper truth or falshood which he seems willing to attribute to them , belongs ( as he also intimates ) to judgments ; that is , to the connexions of his ideas , and not to the ideas or notions themselves , which are the parts that are capable to be connected . but , if this truth or falshood ( which mr. locke would force his reason to shew , ) can any way belong to them , it will not be improperly but properly such ; for truth and falshood are most properly found in judgments , and only in them . wherefore , either no formal truth or falshood at all can belong to ideas , or it must be proper truth or falshood ; which is what the author denies , as contrary to his intention . reflexions on the third book . reflexion sixteenth , on the subject of this whole book . . in the th section of the first chapter , the grounds are well laid to shew how metaphorical and improper conceptions and names come ; and how they are translated from those notions which arise from impression on the senses . for , to have senses being common to all mankind ; and , withall , they being , ( with a very small difference ) apt to be affected by objects after the same manner , the notions thus imprinted are natural and common ; and , therefore , the words that men agree on , or by use establish , to signifie such notions , are proper ; the universal use of them , and the general consent that they should signifie those natural notions , making them current , and giving them this propriety . whereas , the notions we have of spiritual natures , and of the operations of our mind produced by it , not being imprinted naturally , but got by reflexion , have no words or names which mankind agrees to call them by . whence we are forced to make use of our natural notions and expressions , ( with some additions annex'd , to shew their difference ) to signifie our reflex ideas ; and , therefore , the conceptions we have of such natures , and consequently the names by which we signifie them , being transferr'd from the natural ones to them , are called metaphorical . . as for rules to know the right sense of words , as far as relates to philosophy , there can be but two in general , viz. that the sense of those words or names which express our natural notions , which are common to all mankind , is to be taken from the vulgar ; and , the sense of artificial words from the masters in those respective arts ; these two sorts of men being the framers and authors , as it were , of those two sorts of language ; and who , by their imposing , accepting , or using of them in such a sense , have stamp'd upon them their proper signification , and given it to be sterling and current ; in which , and not in etymologies or criticisms only , consists the propriety of words . nor can i see ( care being taken to avoid equivocalness ) what further inspection into the nature of words can be needful for a philosopher . i say , in this designation , agreement , and usage of the word , and only in this , consists all the connexion or tying the ideas to the words , and those secret references of the former to the other , of which mr. locke speaks so often in his second chapter , and other places ; nor can it consist in any thing else . . indeed those words which express artificial notions are most liable to be mistaken ; because artists have the prerogative of coining their own words , and of affixing to them what signification they please . whence , if their thoughts differ , the words that express them must needs be equivocal or double-sensed . for all art being nothing but reflexion on nature , polishing and perfecting those rude draughts given us by our mother-wit to an exactness , and reflexions being various in divers men , according to their degree of skill , and their talent of penetrating the nature of the object they are employ'd about ; the same univocalness of signification is not to be expected in those words that express our reflex thoughts , as in those by which we notifie our direct ones , in which all mankind ( as was shewn ) do agree . this chiefly happens in many logical words ; for the notions that art makes use of , being wholly built on the manner of existing the thing has in our understanding , which none but steady , solid and acute reflectcters can perfectly discern ; hence , those reflex notions , and consequently the names which are to signifie them , become liable to ambiguity ; which has , doubtless , been the occasion of many fruitless contests ; which end ( if they ever end at all ) in word-skirmishes . . yet , it will not be hard to prevent , or avoid , all mistake even in these , if we do but attend heedfully to the manners by which those things exist in our minds , and take the sense of those words from the ablest artists , or best reflecters . for nature ( if we do not relinquish it ) and familiar explications , will make them easy to be understood . for example , let it be told us by a logician , that the species is the lowest and narrowest sort of common notions , that have none under them but individuals ; and it will be presently seen that the conception we call [ man ] ( thus apprehended and exprest ) is a specifical notion . let it be told us again , that a genus is a larger notion which has divers species or sorts under it ; and , it will quickly appear that [ animal ] is a generical notion ; or , if a logician acquaints us , that a proposition is a speech which affirms or denies ; and that that part of it which is affirm'd ( or deny'd ) is call'd by men of art the predicate , and that part of which 't is affirm'd or deny'd , is the subject ; and that which expresses the affirmation or negation is the copula ; and there can be no difficulty to know that this speech ( a stone is hard ) is a proposition ; that [ stone ] is the subject , [ hard ] the predicate , and [ is ] the copula ; and so in all the rest , if a right reflecter have the management of them . but , care is to be taken that we do not pin our belief upon authors , who frame artificial notions out of their imagination , without regard to the thing as 't is conceived by our understanding , or according to the manner it is there ; for , then , we shall quite lose the solid grounds of nature , and let our wits loose to follow their butterfly fancies ; for , that thing call'd [ man , ] as thus conceived , is as truly a species , and [ animal ] a genus , considering it as it is in our understanding with such a degree of abstraction , as an individual man , as existing in re , or out of the understanding , is two-legg'd , or a horse four-footed . and , for the same reason , 't is as evident to true logicians , or right reflecters , that in the proposition now mentioned , there are as truly , really , necessarily and essentially those three parts lately spoken of , as 't is to a mathematician , that there are three corners in a triangle : the same reason , i say , holds for both ; for the soul is as really a thing , as the bodies in nature ; and her modes , or accidents , and their manners of existing , are as real , as those of any bodies are , or can be , perhaps more . whence 't is evident also that , in the proposition now mentioned , the thing diversly conceiv'd , or its modes , are truly and really subject , predicate and copula in the mind ; and that , tho' they be exprest in logical terms , they do not put off their natures , or notions , which were directly and naturally imprinted on the understanding ; but are only super-vested with an artificial dress , thrown over them by our reflexion : for , otherwise , we could not say the thing call'd [ a stone ] is hard , but we must withal mean and say [ the subject is the predicate ] in case not the natural notion of the thing , but only the logical notion were predicated ; nor could the former of these two propositions be true , the later , false , if the thing it self , or its modes were not the materials that compounded it . . wherefore , this is to be establisht as a certain maxim , and a necessary preliminary to all philosophy whatever , that 't is the thing in our mind that gives solidity and steadiness to all our judgments and discourses ; for all these are made up of notions , that is , of the very thing it self in our mind , inadequately and diversly conceiv'd : wherefore that is still the ground-work , however it be wrought upon , order'd and postur'd by reflexion and art. from default of this consideration springs all the wordishness , and empty disputes among trivial philosophers ; of which mr. l. does , with good reason , so often complain . i wish he could as well give us an account , that the ideas he and others speak of are the thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd by us , and not meer representations of it ; for , this done , we might hope for true philosophy from the principles of the ideists . which they cannot pretend to show , or to give us this hope , till a solid answer be given to what 's alledg'd against them in my second and third preliminaries ; where i undertake to demonstrate that 't is impossible . . i am not of mr. l's mind , that metaphysical words ( however logical ones may be ambiguous ) are so unintelligible , or in fault . for those words that signify being , or what nearly relates to it ( which are the chief objects of that queen of sciences ) are absolutely the clearest that mankind ever uses , or can use ; so that , whoever abuses or misaccepts them , must needs be a deserter of common sense . notwithstanding , in regard some pretended schollers have on divers occasions us'd philosophical , and even common words variously , i have thought fit to add a fifth preliminary , to show what sense the chief words us'd in philosophy must have ; and that they can signify no other . lastly , i have shown at large in my method , b. . less . th . how equivocalness springs , and how it may be detected and avoided . . this learned authour having most elaborately , largely and acutely prosecuted in his former book the distinction of his ideas , and the whole duty of words being to signify our thoughts to others , i cannot discern what need there could be to take such pains about those outward signes . many curious remarks do indeed embellish his discourses , which show that his exuberant wit , can make good work of the dryest subject , and raise elegant structures out of the sleightest materials : yet , notwithstanding , i see not how they conduce to promote the solid knowledge of things . the very essence , i say , and the nature of words being to signify our notions , or to impart the knowledge of the things in our mind to others ; their sense must either be suppos'd to be agreed on , and foreknown to the speakers and hearers , or they will scarce be allow'd worthy to be call'd words but rather empty and insignificant articulate sounds . wherefore , if the idea or notion of the speakers be clear , or obscure ; distinct , or confus'd ; adequate or inadequate , &c. the word must either express it accordingly , or it is not the name of such an idea or notion , nor a word ▪ sit for it , and much less for any thing else ; and therefore 't is good for nothing at all . this makes me wish mr. l. had rather thought fit to take particular notice of those words , which have been abus'd or misaccepted by trivial philosophers ; and had clear'd their ambiguity , rectify'd their impropriety , and substituted ( if need were ) others more proper in their stead ; which must certainly have had great influence upon the advancement of science . nor need he much wonder that dull or hasty men , who either are not capable of much sense , or will not take pains to reflect on their natural notions , or ( which is the same ) on the meanings of their words , do make use of them , and yet talk by rote all the while ; following the track of others whom they have heard speak them , or the jargon of their masters ; who breed their schollers to stick to their words , as unalterably as if they were principles ; tho' perhaps neither of them were so wise as to know , or so prudent as to regard much their determinate meaning . . things standing thus , and my intention , in this whole treatise , being only to carry on my method to science , and to reduce to solidity , those discourses which i conceive have too much of fancy in them , i have no more to do , as to this third book , but to note by the way some particulars that occurr , and which , as i judge , do by ass from true philosophy . . the author seems to dislike our way of defining by a genus and its difference , and to think it may be better perform'd by enumerating some certain ideas , which , put together , do make up the sense of the notion defin'd . to abett which doctrine , he gives us this definition of a man , viz. a solid extended substance , having life , sense , spontaneous motion , and the faculties of reasoning . i discourse thus : what best sutes with the vulgar is one thing , what becomes men of art , another . it will serve the common people well enough to declare their thoughts by huddling together many particular considerations ; nay , they will define even individuums ( if such as these may be call'd definitions ) by this method , as homer did thersites . but the point is , how art , which is to perfect and polish the rudeness of raw undisciplin'd nature , ought to behave it self . reflexion , the parent of all arts , teaches even housewives and lawyers , that 't is very convenient for the one to put such and such linnen into distinct drawers ; and , for the other to distribute all those writings that concern different businesses into distinct boxes : and the same faculty teaches logicians also to range all their notions ( the materials they are employ'd about ) into distinct common heads , so to gain a distinct knowledge of each ; which , they being innumerable , would otherwise lie mingled confusedly . this perform'd , what are they to do next ? must they hover still in these few common heads of notions ? no , certainly ; for , then , they would not have enow of such more-particular notions as are needful for discourse . they must descend therefore from those common notions to more-particular ones under each of them ; and this , as plain reason tells us , gradually : that is , they must divide those common heads by immediate distinctive notions , call'd differences : for , were they not different , the product of that division could not be more notions ; whereas division must ( at least ) make two of one. and , whence must we take those differences ? from other common heads ? no surely ; for this would confound all our notions again , which we had taken such care to distinguish into those heads , in case the more particular ones , or the respective species , were made up of one notion found in one line , and of another found in another . those differences then that divide each common head , must be found within the same head , or ( as we use to call them ) must be intrinsecal ; which ( * as is demonstrated in my method ) can be no other but more and less of the immediate superiour notions . the first two differences ( of ens , for example ) join'd with the common head it self , gives us the definitions of the two first subaltern genera ; and each of those two ( and of the inferiour ) genus's being for the same reason divided after the same manner , do still give us naturally ( as it were ) the definitions of the next two members immediately under them ; and so still endways , till we come at the individuums ; each of which being constituted by an innumerable multitude of accidents , we are , when we come there , lost in a pathless wood ; and can no longer define or give a clear and entire account of the intrinsecal dictinction of those particulars , but are forced to content our selves with some few notions belonging to them , which distinguish them from others ; or to describe them by outward signs and circumstances for our use and practice ; our speculation being here nonplust . . when mr. locke shall have leisurely consider'd each step of this short discourse , he will find that nature forces us upon this method of defining by a genus and a difference ; that art , ( which is nothing but nature well reflected on ) shews us it must be so ; and that his own definition of man will oblige him , even while he opposes this method , to have recourse to it for refuge . for , when he puts man to be a solid extended substance , should it be deny'd , because there is but one part of man ( his body ) that is solid and extended , and not his spiritual part , the soul ; his only defence can be this , that those words were meant only for the general notion , or what was common to man and all other bodies , ( for which reason , substance there is the highest genus ; ) and that which follows is meant to difference or distinguish him from them . next , it will be unanswerably objected , that man being a thing , or ( which is the same ) a substance , which signifies meerly what 's capable to be , and a definition telling us the essence of the notion defin'd , he deviates manifestly from the fundamental laws of art , by taking in such differences to distinguish substance , viz. solidity and extension , which are foreign to this common head of being or thing , and belong to other common heads , which are only modes of thing , viz. those of quantity and quality . add , that this seems also to contradict his own doctrin , ( b. . chap. . § , . and b. . chap . § . ) where he makes extension and body not to be the same . i suppose he means in part ; which , were extension a proper and intrinsecal difference of substance , constituting the essence of body , could not be said . now , as was lately shewn , all these rubs are avoided if we separate our notions into common heads ; and , by dividing those heads by intrinsecal differences , at the same time make our definitions of each inferior notion . nor can it be objected , that we also use extrinsecal differences , while we divide substance by divisible and indivisible , and yet make divisibility the notion of quantity ; for , all such exceptions are fore-stall'd in my method , b. . less . . and particularly , §§ . . and . . the like errour , and no less fundamental , is his assertion , chap. . l. . that generals and universals belong not to the real existence of things , but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding , made by it , for its own use , and concern only signs , whether words , or ideas . had he said , that universals belong not to the existence of things , as they are in nature ; or , that universals , as such , are not capable of existing there , i could understand him : but , if he means , they do not belong to the existence of things in the understanding , or , that they are designedly invented , or fram'd , or made use of by it , for its own convenience , i must utterly deny it . for , it is as evident that nature makes them in our mind , as it is that because we cannot here comprehend individuals , therefore nature , by imprinting objects diversly in us , and by different senses , forces the mind to have partial or inadequate notions of it . now , every inadequate notion , in what line soever , is an universal notion ; as will appear to any man who reflects upon the ideas or notions of ens , corpus , vivens , animal , homo ; all which are inadequate ( and withall , universal ) notions , in respect of the individuum . when i see a thing a-far off , so that i can yet make nothing of it , but that 't is something , or some body , 't is evident that i have only an universal notion of it , since i know not yet what it is in particular ; and , that this general notion is not invented or created by my mind , but given me by nature . the like happens when i hear one knock at the door , without knowing who it is in particular ; and in a hundred such like occasions . so that the mind , and it only , is indeed capable of universal notions ; but , 't is only nature , and not her self , which begets in her those notions . her only work is , to compare , or discern the identity or diversity of those notions ; but nature gives her those objects , or materials , on which she thus works . thus , when we see two or many things agree , 't is those natural objects , that have in them something agreeing to both , which causes in me a common notion , called animal , or homo ; and the mind lends nothing but her comparing nature , to make those common notions ; which artificial reflecters , designedly re-viewing , call them genus and species . let us hold to the things in nature . our mind ( as was often said ) is not here in an actual state , but in a potential one ; and , therefore , when we ascribe to her singly any activity , we make her do what she cannot do ; and , so , missing the true causes of such effects , we fall into great errours . . as for that catachresis of nominal essences , which answer to those few abstract notions we have actually of the things , when we name them , making a complex idea , i deny we have any such intention as he speaks of , in naming any thing : for , tho' at that time we do actually know but few of those accidents , whose complexion does , indeed , go to the whole essence ; yet , being pre-assur'd the thing has more modes in it than we know or think of , we do not nominate them precisely according to what we do then actually know , exclusively of all others , but including them confusedly . rather , otherwise , we cannot know the thing at all , because it involves confusedly all the modes that are in it , known or unknown , as their subject : for , tho' we should afterwards discover more particular accidents in gold than we did formerly , yet , we should not alter the name which signifies its substance , or essence ; nor would call it any thing but gold still ; however the newly discover'd mode gave us a new idea of it self , annex'd to that of substance . the essences are no otherwise ingenerable , but as they are from eternity in the divine ideas ; nor incorruptible , but as they are either there , or else in some humane or angelical understanding , out of which they can never be effaced . lastly , what have names or words , which are nothing but articulate air , or figur'd ink , ( excepting what is annexed to them by our minds , ) to do with the intrinsecal natures of things , that they should be one sort or kind of essences . . this learned author justly complains that we have so few definitions ; and my self have both resented it in my preface to my method , and have also excited and encourag'd learned men to make good that defect . but , till the best , and only proper way ( which i mention'd lately ) to make definitions be allow'd and taken , i am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that name ; and those few that are already made , will still be exposed to the baffling attacks of fancy . aristotle was , certainly , the best definer of any philosopher yet extant ; yet , his definitions are excepted against by witty men ; and ( which is worse ) for no other reason , but because they are too learned , that is , too good. mr. locke expresses here great dis-satisfaction at two of them ; which , to my best judgment , not all the wit of man can mend . the first is . of motion ; which aristotle defines to be actus entis in potentia , quatenus in potentia . now , i wonder not that mr. locke , who , in his large chapter of power , never so much as mention'd the idea of power to be a thing , nor the power to have such an accident , or mode ; nor , consequently , the idea of an act answering to such a power , should conceit this definition to be gibberish . however he came to pretermit them , it is most manifest that we have natural ideas or notions of both these . we cannot see a thing made actually of another , or alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was ; but nature obliges us to see , and say , that that thing , of which the new one was made , could , or had a power to be , it , or have another made of it . or , when we see 't is anew made hot , cold , round , white , moved , placed , &c. but that it could , or had a power to become such , ere it was actually such . these ideas then of act and power are so natural , that common sense forces us to acknowledge them , and common language must use them : and 't is a strange fastidiousness , not to allow those transcendent ( that is , most common , and most clear ) words in definitions , whose notions or meanings nature gives us ; and which words , or equivalent expressions , common discourse forces us to use . yet , in the uncouthness of these words to some men's fancies , consists all the difficulty which they so boggle at in this definition . the ens , or body , was only capable , or had a power to be moved ere motion came ; and , now , by motion it is actually moved . it is evident then that motion is the act , or ( which is the same ) the formal cause , which reduced that power into act , or formally denominated it moved actually . act then , was a proper genus , as far as those most common notions can have one . now comes the difference [ in potentia , ] which is , to determine what kind of act motion is . to understand which , we may reflect , that a body has many other acts or ( as we conceive and call them ) forms in it , such as are quantity , figure , and all qualities whatever ; as , roundness , length , breadth , health , &c. but they are not acts of that body , as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is , but as 't is actually such or such : for , they truly denominate it to be actually round , long , healthful , &c. whereas , motion , being formally a meer tendency to an effect not yet produced , constitutes and denominates a body to be only in power to be what by that motion it is to be afterwards . for , reflecting on all motions whatever , v. g. generation , alteration , augmentation , sanation , &c. none of them affect the subject , or body , in order to what it has already fixedly ; but in order to a newly generated , or rather , producible thing , quality , quantity , disposition , health , &c. which the matter or subject has only a power to have or acquire by means of those respective motions . the last words , [ quatenus in potentia , ] signifie , that the thing , as affected with motion , is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such , and not at all as actually so . matter has the notion of power to be another thing ; but in regard it is a kind of compart , constituting actually the stable and entire ens , the thing , or body , which has matter in it , cannot be said to be meerly in power to have matter which it has already . whereas , by having motion in it , which is only the way or means to attain what nature aims to produce , it must be thus meerly and formally in power to that to which it is tending . wherefore , this definition most appositely fits the notion of motion , by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other sorts of acts whatever ; without a tittle conceivable in it that is defective , superfluous , or disparate . yet , this is here character'd to be exquisite jargon , and a famous absurdity . i should be glad to see how one of our new philosophers would define motion : i doubt he would find it a puzzling task to explicate its formal and proper nature ; in regard that , besides its being very general , it is the blindest and * most imperfect notion we have , and most approaching to non-entity ; being neither the thing as it is in it self , nor as it is yet another , but hovering ( as it were ) between both . and i am certain , it is impossible to perform it , without varying the words used by aristotle , to others of the same sense ; or , even to give some tolerable explication of it , which can sute with its formal notion . . the other definition which mr. locke mislikes , is , that of light ; which he says aristotle defines , the act of a perspicuous thing , as it is perspicuous . now , tho' light be fire , were the particles of it contracted into one closer body , as it is by a burning-glass ; yet , the rays of it , thinly scatter'd , have , like all other effluviums , the notion of a quality or mode of the body they are receiv'd in ; and modes or accidents have their analogical essences from the manner they affect their subjects . the question then is , what is the proper subject of light ? mr. locke's principles deny the sun is the subject ; and put it to be onely the cause of it : nor can an opacous body be the subject of it ; for it affects not that body it self , but the surface which reflects it ; and then it has the notion of colour . 't is left then , that the proper subject of light must be a medium , which is perspicuous , or which has a power in it to let it pass through it , to our eyes ; and , therefore , onely light is , properly and formally , the act which informs or actuates that power ; which cannot possibly be express'd better than by these words , the act of a perspicuous body , as it is perspicuous . for , putting the air , or the water , to be that medium , those bodies may have many other acts or accidental forms in them ; as , rarity , fluidity , humidity , coldness , &c. yet , according to none of these , is light the proper act of either of them ; but as they are pellucid , or perspicuous ; because , whatever other qualities or powers they may have , if they had not that called perspicuousness , it could not affect those bodies at all . i observe by mr. locke's discourse here , that he makes account definitions are made for the vulgar : whereas , they are only fram'd by art , for men of art , or philosophers . but , surely he is pleasant , and cannot mean seriously , when he finds fault with this definition , as useless , and insignificant , because it will not make a blind man understand what the word [ light ] means . the meaning of the word , is the notion of it in our mind ; and our notions , or ideas , ( as both of us hold , ) come in by impressions from the object upon our senses . if , then , blind men could have no sensible impression of light , 't is impossible they should have any idea or notion of it , let the definition be never so good . definitions are the work of reflexion , and are to suppose our natural notions , which are the rough draughts of knowledge , common to us , and to the vulgar : art is to polish our notions , and bring them to exactness and concinnity , by defining them ; and not to imbue us with them , when nature never gave them : and 't is a hard case , if aristotle's definitions must be useless and insignificant , unless they work miracles . . i agree with him that the definition of motion , which he says is that of the cartesians , [ viz. that 't is the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another ] is faulty . whether it be theirs or no i know not , i think they give another : yet , i doubt not but mr. locke has his reasons why he dislikes it . mine is this ; because successive quantity and motion are the self-same formal notion ; and , so , the definitum is as plain as the definition which should explain it . besides that , [ application ] is one sort of motion , and therefore is harder to be understood than motion it self , which is the genus to it . all which absurdities , and others such , aristotle wisely avoids , by using the transcendent , or more common notions of act and power . . i pardon mr. locke's opinion , that nothing is essential to individuums ; because this error is common , or rather epidemical , amongst the modern schools ; and springs hence , that those authors do not distinguish between what serves for logical speculations , and what is the real constitution of things in nature : for , what can the word [ essentia ] of which essential is the denominative , possibly mean , but that formal notion quâ ens est ens. since then the notion of ens or thing is only proper to the individual substance , as being its first analogate ; it follows that , if they be divers entia or things , they must have divers formal constituents , or divers essences . nay more , it follows that [ ens ] being only properly spoken of substantia prima or the individuums , and improperly of substantiae secundae , and much more of the modes or accidents ; therefore , essence ( the formal constituent of ens ) can only be properly said of the essences of individuals , and improperly of any other essences : so that only divers individuals , in proper speech , do differ essentially , or have essential differences belonging to them . but , of this enough in my * method . i only remark how odd it is to say , that two men are two things , and yet do not differ under the notion of thing , but only accidentally ; or , according to the notion of some mode or accident ; which is perhaps as much as my self now do differ from my self a year ago , and yet i am the same thing now i was then . but , i have said enough above of what intrinsecally constitutes divers entities or individuums ; and how we sufficiently know them , tho' we comprehend not the whole complexion of accidents that constitutes their individual essences , on which a good part of this th chapter proceeds . . the two last chapters contain many various observations in them ; and such as may both delight , and in some sort profit inquisitive wits : yet they touch upon some difficult points , which are contrary to my sentiments , and cannot well be solv'd without first laying my grounds ; especially that about the unknowableness of real essences . to clear which farther , and withall to meet with other difficulties that may occur , it will be necessary to lay , or repeat , for the foundation of my future discourses , some few principles . i have , i hope , demonstrated in my preliminaries , that all our ideas , or notions , which are solid , and not fantastick , are nothing but several conceptions of the thing ; or , which is the same ( taking the word [ conception ] for the object , and not for the act of conceiving ) the thing diversly conceiv'd . hence all our conceptions , or notions , are inadequate , especially if they be distinct , and not confused . hence the most abstracted notion we have , or can have , let it be figure , colour , existence , or what other we please , even tho' signify'd by the most abstract term , is still the thing consider'd precisely as having those modes in it ; in regard that , as those modes , or accidents , have no entity of their own , but meerly that of the thing which they affect , so they can have no intelligibility , or knowableness , ( which is the property of entity ) but as they are conceiv'd to belong to the thing , or to be it : so that , ( hardness being that by which a thing is formally hard ) neither would hardness be hardness , nor would existence be existence , if they were the hardness or existence , of nothing ; for nothing can neither be hard , nor exist , nor have any other affections belonging to it . again , 't is evident we can have no distinct notion of the whole ens , or individuum ; nor consequently of the essence , ( properly such ) which is the form that constitutes the whole ens : for this contains in it what grounds or corresponds to great multitudes of inadequate , or partial notions , and contains them blended ( as it were ) in the thing as in their root ; and this so confusedly and inseparably , that only that most acute divider , call'd acies intellectus , can take them a sunder , or separate them . moreover , there are not only confus'd and distinct ideas , as mr. l. acknowledges , but also ( which i remember not he takes notice of , ) notions or ideas which are more and less confused or distinct ; or partly one , partly the other , and this with very great variety ; as is seen in his example of gold , of which ( and the same may be said of all other bodies , ) some men gain by degrees more distinct knowledges than others do . to proceed , 't is evident that , of all other notions , that of existence has the least composition in it that can be . whence all clearness of our notions coming from their distinctness , and their distinctness springing from their simplicity , the formal notion of existence is the most clear ; that is , self-evident , and therefore inexplicable ; all explications being of those notions that can need it . the notion of ens , which signifies capable to exist , has but a very little composition , and consequently , confusion in it , as consisting of actual being , and the power to it , for the same reason corpus has more of composition or confusion in it , than ens ; vivens than corpus ; animal than vivens ; homo than animal ; and socrates , or the individuum , most of all ; there going still ( as was shown above ) more notions to constitute and compound each inferiour notion than there does to constitute those above it ; whence , still as they are more compounded , they are proportionably more confus'd , that is , less distinct , or less clear. the ideas , or notions , of individuals therefore , or of particular things , are for the reason now given the most unintelligible ; meaning by that word , the most impossible to be comprehended all at once . this reflected on , and it being shown above , that both nature and art instruct us to divide our notions into common heads , and to proceed thus gradually to inferiour ones ; 't is most evident that the only proper and natural way of distinguishing our notions into simple and compounded , is to be taken ( not from our fancy , what ideas seem most clear to us ) but from this gradual progression from superiour to inferiour notions ; in regard there goes still more to compound the inferiour notions , than there does to compound the superiour . whence follows out of the very terms that those must be more compounded , or less clear , these more simple , and more clear. . the same rule holds , and for the same reason , in all the common heads of the modes or accidents . the notion or idea of the supreme genus has no composition but that noted above , which is common to them all , of connotating the subject . whence , it is the simplest or least compounded , as involving both that of the common head and that of the difference , superadded to it . hence neither the ideas of motion nor extension , if by this latter be meant ( as by distinguishing it from motion it should seem ) permanent quantity , are simple ideas ; but the idea of quantity is the simple one ; and they , being evidently such kinds of quantity , viz. permanent , and successive , are clearly compounded of quantity and of the two different ideas which make them those two several sorts of it . much less is the idea or notion of number or figure simple ones ; for the former is compounded of the idea of meer quantity and of [ discrete ; ] and the later of the idea of quantity , and of such or such a manner of terminating it . and , the same may be easily shown of all the rest of his simple ideas whatever , excepting only that of existence . from these principles i make the following reflexions . . first , that the ideas can never be in fault when we name things wrong , but our own heedlesness or disagreement about the meanings , for which such words stand . for , our common notions are wrought by natural causes upon the same-natur'd patients , the senses , and thence upon the soul. whence notions are what they are invariably , without their meddling or being concern'd with our signifying them , or applying them to these or these words . we have them from nature ; the signifying them by such and such words , comes from our voluntary designation ; and that is all can be said of them ; as mr. l. has shown b. . ch. . § . . secondly , confused ideas , they being all compounded , may have fewer or more distinct ideas annext to their subject , according as we gain a farther distinct knowledge of the object , as is exemplified in mr. l's frequent instance of gold. in which case , it is not a new specifical notion , nor so much as a new nominal essence , as mr. l. calls it : ( for , let us discover never so many new qualities in gold , every man will call that thing gold still ) but the additions or appendages of new distinct notions , tack't as it were to the confused one ; or new inadequate notions , approaching so many little steps nearer to the making it an adequate one . . thirdly , since we know before-hand , that every thing has a distinct nature or real essence peculiar to its self , we take those most remarkable accidents intrinsecally belonging to it , to be that essence ; especially if they do sufficiently distinguish it from all other natures ; and , when we find they do not , we acknowledge our judgment may be false , we strive to correct it , and suspend till we gain better light ; yet still our notions are inerrably what they are , and faultless , however it fares with our judgment . nor does our judgment exclude the yet-undiscover'd modes from the notion of the thing ; but , we include them all in the lump or confusedly . whence 't is the real essence of the thing which is known , tho' imperfectly and inadequately . thus we know a man and a horse to be two things of different species by divers manifest qualities which never agree to both of them , and therefore distinguish them ; and , tho' 't is the whole , or rather a greater complexion of accidents which does constitute the specifick difference ; yet even that is known truly , ( tho' imperfectly ) when we know it but in part , especially ( as was said ) when it is sufficient to distinguish one from the other : in the same manner as when i see but a man's hand or face , i am truly said to see the man , tho' [ man ] signifies the whole , which i see but in part . the solid reason of which is this great truth , that [ there are no actual parts in any compound whatever . ] whence follows , that every part is the whole in part , or according to such a part ; which is one of the chiefest principles that gives grounds to the science of physicks , and therefore is demonstrable by the superiour science , metaphysicks . . fourthly , our former discourse being well reflected on , which shews that the most solid and certain way of knowing which notions are simple , which compounded or complex , is not to be taken from the easie appearances to our fancy , or from seeming experience , but from their being more general or more particular ; we may farther learn what notions are clear and which obscure , and how or why they are so . for , 't is manifest that all confusion and obscurity springs from composition , or the involving many notions , as is evidently seen in particular or individual bodies ; and all distinctness or clearness in our notions from their involving few or none , as is found in the most general notions . add , that , if this rule be observ'd , the order in our complex notions will be more regular . whereas the other unmethodical way of making so many simple ideas , places those ideas at random , or hap-hazard . lastly , if our method be observ'd , complex ideas cannot be taken for simple ones , as has been shewn mr. locke does in most of his . . fifthly , that the distinction of simple and complex , clear and obscure notions , is not to be taken from appearances to our fancy , but from the solid grounds now spoken of , is seen farther by this instance , that many men are much distasted at the notions belonging to metaphysicks , such as are being , ens , essence , act , power , and such like . the reason of which is , that we do customarily reflect upon our notions , and endeavour to define or explain them . whence , in metaphysical ones , finding this to be very difficult , and in many of them impossible , hence men fancy them to be inconceivable and incomprehensible ; and thence they take a toy at metaphysicks , and pretend it insuperably hard and mysterious . now it passes with these reflecters , as it does with those that would look stedfastly on the sun at noon-day ; they find a kind of cloud hovering before their eyes , and seem bedarken'd with too much light. the test to stick to in such cases is , to set themselves to define or explicate their notions ; which done , if they find they can invent no notions more clear than those notions themselves are , they may be sure they are self-evident , and may safely look upon them as such ; and , if they find they can be defin'd or explain'd , they may be sure there will be found in their definition or explication more notions equivalent to that one ; and thence they may be assur'd also that the notion defin'd or explicated , has more parts , or composition in it ; and , therefore , is not simple nor perfectly clear , since it needs to be made clear by others , which therefore must be more simple and clearer than it. . sixthly , it appears from what is said , that 't is not to avoid different significations of words , that men suppose a real essence belonging to each species ; but because 't is impossible there should be any individual thing , but it must have superior notions , or ( which is the same ) it must be of some sort or other in nature ; and , the notion of this sort , or species , must be an essential and main part of the individual essence . for , 't is evident , that nature forces us to have both the one , and the other notion , without any form'd design of ours ; and words have nothing to do but to signifie them . . lastly , hence it appears , that words do not therefore become ambiguous , because they have no settled standards in nature ; as mr. locke apprehends in mix'd modes , especially in moral ones . for , all virtues and vices being nothing but dispositions to act according to right reason , or contrary to it , have as fixed standards in nature , as reason it self has ; taking [ nature ] for the reflexions we naturally have upon the operations of our soul , and for what is agreeable or disagreeable to its true nature ; as also , on the subjects and circumstances , about which , and in which it is employ'd . hence , the words which he instances in , viz. sham , wheedle , banter , are evidently deviations from right reason in our just and civil comportments with other men ; and all the notions that go to their definitions , are as much connected as any other genus and difference are in any other definition whatever . so likewise , his mixed modes , murther and sacrilege , are defin'd ; the killing a man lawlesly , and the taking to our selves lawlesly , or abusing holy things ; and have the same solid connexion , as any other notions ; which consists in this , that the one of them is common or determinable properly by the other , and the other is particular or determinative of it , which makes them cohere together in good sense . as for our soul 's connecting them at pleasure , it is quite otherwise : she has notions of each common head naturally ; and nature and art do both of them conspire to oblige us to divide those heads by intrinsecal notions , called differences ; and , it is not at her pleasure and choice , what differences shall be proper , what disparate . nature has settled the agreeableness of one of these notions to the other ; so that , should we put a difference to a generical notion , which is inconsistent with it , the notion thus defin'd would be nonsence , and chimerical ; and no wiser than green scarlet , or a four-square triangle . . let the obscurity and ambiguity of words spring from what causes mr. l. pleases , concerning which he is very acute in his th chapter , it is to me very evident , that the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of words , and , that this abuse of them must spring from one of these three heads , viz. ambiguity of single words , the ill contexture of them , and their mis-application . artificial words are , indeed , ( as was said , ) more liable to obscurity ; and , perhaps , logical ones most of all . but , since the users of those words do pretend to learning , let them define their terms of art , and it will quickly appear whether they agree in the notion of those terms , or no ; and , by declaring what the notion meant by that term is useful for , it will appear which of the definitions agrees truly to that notion , and which does not . . tho' then some men have the knowledge of more accidents in the same thing , or in the same essence , than another man has , yet it does not follow they agree in nothing but the name , or that they substitute the name for the thing ; for they do both of them acknowledge and agree that they speak of the same thing , or of the same essence , notwithstanding this more particular knowledge which one of them has of it above the other . in the same manner as divers persons may know , or discourse of the same individual man , socrates , ( tho' the complexion of accidents which constitute the individuum be far greater than that which constitutes the specifick notion ; ) notwithstanding that , one of them better knows his humour , temper , constitution , science , virtue , and his degree of rationality , ( which is most essential to him , as he is this man , ) than the other does . whence this position does not only make all philosophy , or knowledge of things ( which are not such , but by their real essence which formally makes them such ) to be impossible ; but , it makes even our ordinary communication amongst men unintelligible , because we should still speak of divers things , and not of the same : for , divers they must be , if they have divers essences , which formally constitutes them such . yet , i must declare , that i verily judge this learned author delivers this doctrine out of his sincerity , without intending to do any favour to the scepticks ; and that he is not aware how much this leans to that maxim of the pyrrhonians , viz. that [ nothing can be known , unless it be known perfectly ; ] which is sufficiently confuted by this evident reflexion , that our soul works by inadequate notions , and builds her knowledge on those partial notions ; that is , we can truly know that thing , though we know it but imperfectly , or in part . . and , where 's the harm to this acquir'd knowledge , called science , tho' we know the thing , or its essence , only imperfectly , by those partial notions ; since science has not for its object the whole thing in the bulk , nor its whole essence neither , but only abstracted conceptions of it ? cannot a mathematician discourse scientifically of wood , as 't is long , broad , or solid ; or a carpenter or carver know it to be wood really , or to have the real essence of wood , and such a sort of wood , by its colour , its degree of hardness , its aptness to be cut , or its being more easie to do so if one goes according to the grain , and such like ; unless he knows all those innumerable accidents found in its entire and exact composition ? or , cannot ( i may say , do not ) we all agree to call its real essence [ lignea , or woodish , ] without abusing the word ; because one of us penetrates the nature , or real essence of it , more than the other does ? i suppose , mr. locke's laudable zeal against some pretended philosophers , did , on this occasion , something byass his good reason , that he might better oppose them . and , certainly , it must be acknowledg'd , that , never were words more abusively used , to the prejudice of good sense , than those by which they express their essences , and their specifick and essential forms ; so that , for want of some determinate and literal intelligible meaning , which could give a philosopher any light what to make of them , they seem'd nothing but meer words , obtruded upon us for the only truths ; and so tended to reduce science to mysterious nonsence , and unintelligible cant. but , i could wish , notwithstanding , that mr. locke had not over-strain'd some points , to baffle their insignificant talk. i hope his discerning judgment will distinguish me , and all true aristotelians , from the abetters of their folly ; and let them answer , if they can , for themselves . . his last chapter is , about remedying the abuses of words . wherefore , since divers of those abuses are conceiv'd by him to spring from our names given to real essences , and 't is impossible , he says , to know fully what those real essences are ; i should be glad he would put us into a way to do an impossibility , and comprehend them fully ; otherwise , since name them we must , we shall , according to his discourse , be necessarily inforc'd to the abuses of words , without any possible remedy ; which is something too hard a case . . i am a little apprehensive , that i do not perfectly hit mr. locke's true meaning in some passages here , and elsewhere ; finding his discourse in other places sub-contrary to what i took to be his thoughts . for example ; speaking here , § . . of shewing and defining substances ; all which being entities , must have real essences in them ; he has these words : [ for , there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities , to which we suppose the other , which make up the complex idea of that species , annex'd ; we give the name to that quality or idea which is the most observable , and we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species . ] where , if , instead of the words [ to that quality , ] be put [ the subject of that quality , ] to which subject we suppose the rest of its proper complexion of accidents annex'd ; it will be perfectly co-incident with my thoughts as to this point . only , i wonder why he pitches upon some one quality ; as also , why he says not a word of the matter , which , ( in all bodily substances , ) determin'd by this complexion of accidents , makes up the thing . this manner of expression makes him seem to discourse all along as if this complexion of accidents , abstractedly consider'd , without any regard to the matter , did make the essence ; whereas , they cannot do this at all , unless by their determining the potentiality of the matter to be this , and as including that determination of it ; that is , as including the matter thus determin'd . of the equivocalness in words , the several sorts of it , how it comes , and of the way how to detect it ; as also , of the means how we may arrive at their true and proper signification in several subjects , i have treated in my method to science , book . less . . reflexions on the fourth book . reflexion seventeenth , on the first three chapters . . this learned author having , with much exactness , treated of all that can belong to his ideas , the being affected with which is called the first operation of our understanding , or simple apprehension ; he advances to the second [ judgment , ] which is express'd by a proposition . 't is by this that we have compleat knowledge or cognition ; which ( as the word it self imports ) is the putting together of notions in the understanding after its manner ; that is , in order to the seeing them connected , or knowing they are so . the first chapter is both comprehensive of his subject , and has much truth in it . whether it goes to the bottom , and does not require some deeper truths to explicate the point fully , is now to be examined . . he defines knowledge to be the perception of the connexion and agreement , or of the disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas . my exceptions against this definition are : . that [ perception ] being the act of a knowing power , can mean nothing but knowledge ; and , therefore , to define knowledge by knowledge seems inartificial and preternatural : for , it will still be ask'd , what this knowledge he calls perception is ? . mr. locke granting perception to brutes , he must necessarily allow them ideas , and that they can connect them too . wherefore his book being entituled , an essay concerning humane understanding , it is needful we know what kind of ideas we have , what brutes have ; and , ( not to speak of our or their perception ) whether they do connect them as we men do . for , this concession makes perception to be the genus in this definition ; and , therefore , to appropriate it to humane knowledge , the large signification of it ought to be restrain'd to such a perception as is peculiar to man. but , what i most dislike is the word [ ideas , ] in our perceiving the agreement or disagreement of which he puts knowledge to consist . philosophy is the knowledge of things ; wherefore , unless those ideas be the thing it self in our understanding ; or , if they be not , but similitudes only ( as the word imports ) unless it be well made out that those similitudes do give us the knowledge of the thing it self , ( which i have demonstrated in my preliminaries they cannot ) 't is impossible we should ever arrive at true philosophy , tho' we did perceive the connexion of all the ideas in the world. nay , unless they be the thing it self ( in part , ) no predication we make can be true. . to shew this more fully , i intreat mr. locke to consider , that this connexion of ideas he speaks as necessary to knowledge , is that which is signify'd by the word [ est ; ] which being so , in this proposition , [ sugar is sweet , ] the word [ est ] must according to him , if only ideas must be connected , naturally and genuinly affirm , that one of those ideas is the other idea , or that the idea of sugar is the idea of sweet ; which is evidently false . for those ideas differ toto genere ; the former belonging to the common head of substance , the other of quality ; and besides , 't is perfectly contradictory to mr. locke's avowed doctrine , that each idea has its peculiar metaphysical verity , or is what it self is , and is distinct from any other idea , and therefore is to be deny'd of it . whence follows , that it is not in seeing the connexion or disagreement of the ideas themselves that knowledge can consist ; for they are , as to themselves , always distinct , and therefore unconnected ; so that we can never say one of them is the other , which yet we do in all our affirmative propositions ; whence follows , that all our affirmative propositions would be false . it follows then , that it is the subject or thing inadequately conceiv'd by our understanding , which is said by the copula [ est ] to be identity'd really and materially with it self as conceiv'd by another inadequate notion ; and , that [ est ] speaks their being united in the same ens , or ingrafted on the same stock of being . and , certainly , it appears , at first sight , to be an odd explication of knowledge and philosophy , to maintain , that they consist in seeing the connexion or disagreement of similitudes . . wherefore , i should rather think , that , as notions are defin'd , the thing in the understanding inadequately conceiving it , ( which has been abundantly prov'd , ) so knowledge ought to be defin'd , the inadequate notions of the thing , existing in the understanding , so connected there , as they are in the thing in nature . to make good my definition , i discourse thus : first , it has been prov'd by many arguments , that all our notions are partial conceptions of the thing ; or , which is the same , ( if we take the word [ conception ] for the object , and not for the act of conceiving , ) they are the thing inadequately conceived . and , i dare be confident , those arguments are unanswerable ; and that no true reason , or connexion of terms , can ever shock them : however , i may expect much repugnance of fancy , ere that point be admitted . secondly , all our distinct notions being inadequate , and consequently , ( as it were , ) parts of the thing , as 't is knowable by us ; it follows , that ( according to our doctrine ) the immediate object of all our knowledge , being somewhat of the thing , is wholly built on the thing it self , and therefore solid . thirdly , those several notions , however inadequate taking them abstractedly , yet they do connotate the whole thing ; since no part can be conceiv'd , but in reference to the whole , or as in it , it being impossible the former can be apprehended to be a distinct thing from the latter ; because , if it were of it self a distinct thing , it would be of it self a whole , and not a part. fourthly , the copula [ est ] speaks the identity of those parts with the whole ; for , they can onely be identify'd , as they are one with the whole thing materially ; since formally , as parts , they are contradistinguish'd from one another . and , were it not so , few propositions ( as was lately prov'd ) could be true. whence , let us take any proposition , v. g. [ socrates is wise ; ] the true sense of it is , that the individual substance , called socrates , is the same thing , materially , or really , with that which is wise ; or , that , what answers to socrates , and to wise , are found in the same thing . fifthly , in regard parts , as such , are distinguish'd formally from one another ; therefore , we cannot say that any partial notion , express'd formally as a part , is another . whence we cannot say [ petreitas est sapientia , ] tho' we can say [ petrus est sapiens ; ] in regard those abstract words do formally signifie such a partial notion of the whole thing , or a kind of part of it . and , tho' each of them does connotate the whole thing , yet , with a quatenus , ( to which that abstract manner of expression is equivalent , ) they cut off such a precise considerability , or notion of it , from all others ; and therefore , such words can onely signifie that precise notion , or ( as it were ) part , and no other . lastly , hence it is , that we cannot predicate a concrete of an abstract , nor an abstract of a concrete ; because the abstract signifies , distinctly and formally , only a part , and the concrete the whole , ( tho' confusedly , ) and not any distinct part of it . but i expatiate too much into the subject of predication , and shall pursue it no farther at present . . to come closer to the business in hand ; it appears by what is here said , that it is not enough for knowledge , nor answers the true notion of philosophy , that ideas be predicated of other ideas , or similitudes of similitudes ; nor ( which is the same ) that we see they agree or disagree with one another ; but it is necessary , that the ground of our knowledge , and of our predications , be taken from the thing it self , as is express'd in our definition . i produce not here the definition of knowing which i gave in my preliminaries , because it is not yet granted by those with whom i am discoursing , that our notions are the things in our understanding ; tho' ( one consideration , which is brought there , being added ) these two definitions are co-incident : but i accommodate my self to mr. locke's words , as far as they will bear , that the difference between us may be made more apparent . . hence , whereas mr. locke makes four sorts of connexions of our ideas , in which knowledge is found , viz. . of identity , or diversity : . of relation : . co-existence : . real existence ; i must , in pursuance to the grounds now laid , affirm , and maintain , that there is but one sort of intellectual connexion of our notions , viz. that of the co-existence of what is meant by the two terms in the same thing ; and , that ( there being but one copula [ est , ] all the other sorts of connexion are co-incident with this one . for , the first consisting in this , that each idea , or notion , is its self , and not another , signifies no more but what we express by this identical proposition , [ the thing as thus conceiv'd , is the thing as thus conceiv'd ; or , not as otherwise conceiv'd . ] whence it is self-evident , because the terms being every way the self-same notion , are as closely connected as perfect identity can express them ; whence they can admit no middle term to come between them , and make the proposition evident , or prove it : but their evidence is entirely grounded on this first metaphysical principle , [ every thing ( whether substance or accident ) is what it is ; or , is indivisum in se , and divisum a quolibet alio ; ] that is , in plain terms , one. the second , [ relation ; ] taking it not for the act of our mind , comparing or connecting it to another ; but for the ground of it in the thing , which obliges our comparing power , when it is in it , to refer it actually ; is still the thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd to be connected with , or agreeing to the same thing in part , as is explicated above . v. g. master and scholar are grounded on the actions and passions of teaching , and being taught , which are inadequate conceptions , co-existing in those two persons , and identify'd materially with those subjects : and the same is found in all others , which are thus connected . and the last , of real existence ; as , when we say , [ peter is , ] clearly imports , that what is meant by peter , the subject ; and by existent , which is the predicate , ( imply'd there in the word [ is , ] ) are co-existent ; or , are found in the same thing . but , more of this when we come to consider his th chapter , of the reality of our knowledge . . his second chapter , of the degrees of our knowledge , distinguishing it into intuitive , demonstrative , and sensitive , is admirably solid , clear , and rational throughout . the first of these is proper to principles , the second to proofs , the last to the knowledge of particular things or modes by the way of experiments . indeed , intuitive knowledge is proper to pure spirits , call'd intelligences or angels ; which , because they do not glean their knowledge from various impressions on the senses , consequently they do not divide the thing into parts , by inadequate notions , when they come to know it ; nor compound those notions again into propositions , as we do ; but , at one direct and full view , call'd intuition , they comprehend the whole thing , and all that belongs to it , at once . whence it seems not so proper to attribute intuition to us mortals , who are but poor retailers of our imperfect and short notions ; which we spell ( as it were ) and put together as children do letters , when they are , otherwise , not able to read whole words currently . but this is very pardonable in mr. locke ; for , to say true , 't is very hard to find another word which fits our knowledge of first principles much better ; tho' i think [ self-evidence ] might serve . my self have long ago had such a thought , tho' i express'd it warily in these words : " there is nothing in all our knowledges , that , in the manner of it , comes so near the angelical intuition as does our knowledge of self-evident principles , express'd by identical propositions . it divides as little as is possible for us in this state ; for it predicates the same of the same ; nay , the whole of the whole ; and , for the same reason , it as little compounds again . whence , it resembles it not a little in its absolute evidence and immovable firmness ; and is the nearest approach possible to simple intuition . that so , as the order of the world requires , the supremum infimi may immediately confine upon the infimum supremi . " . i was much pleased to see mr. locke declare , that upon this intuition depends all the certainty and evidence we have of our knowledge , and particularly , that , in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge , ( that is , in every consequence we deduce ) there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the next intermediate idea . i add , upon which agreement all the force of consequenee , that is , all our reasonings are grounded . the evident proof he gives for it here , is worthy the attentive consideration of his learned readers . 't is not in this occasion only , but in divers others , tho' i have not always noted them , that mr. locke and my self have , without design'd confederacy , agreed in positions of great moment ; which , i know not how , have escap'd the thoughts of all other authors i have seen . the reader may please to review my method to science , b. . less . . § . . where i discourse thus : " wherefore , since , if the consequence , in which consists the essence , and all the force and nerves of discourse , be not clear and evident , there could be no certainty or evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded ; and so our faculty of exact reasoning would have been given us to no purpose ; hence , 't is manifest , that however one proposition may be made known by other propositions that are connected and consequential to one another ; yet the consequence it self cannot be proved by another consequence . for , the question would still return how , and in virtue of what , that consequence which made the other evident , is evident it self , and so in infinitum . whence it follows , that the evidence of all consequences whatever , must be built on something in a higher manner evident than any consequence or proof can otherwise make it ; that is , on a self-evident proposition . ] " the certain knowledge of which kind of propositions , as mr. locke holds , is to be had by intuition . . i have been larger upon this point , and do most especially recommend it to the best reflexion of our readers ; because it is not only the deepest and firmest ground , but also the very best test of all argumentation ; and therefore the main hinge on which all science turns . i must confess , for all that , i cannot see why , since all self-evident truths can only be express'd by identical propositions , this learned gentleman is so shy to use those words , since the sense he brings on this occasion , is clearly equivalent to those identical forms of speech ; nor , if put into propositions , can be express'd by any other . i think we should not be asham'd of them , or think them trifling , because some men of fancy , who never set their thoughts to trace evidence and truth to their originals , are pleased to make themselves sport with them ; nor because their terms are too closely connected ; for , they must be so ; and , were they not so , they would be unworthy the name of first principles , nor do us any good when we come to reduce other truths into them ; which is the best way of demonstrating . . the extent of humane knowledge , of which he treats in his d chapter , is a very excellent subject . science has two capital enemies , scepticism , and dogmatism : the one will allow very little , or nothing at all , to be known ; the other pretends to know too much . the former , by breeding a perfect despair of knowledge , discourages the industry of the best wits ; and makes them , since truth cannot be found , to addict themselves only to wordish talk and declamation : to which contributes not a little , that many who have incomparable fancies , have oftentimes the worst judgments ; especially , if they have let their wits loose to raillery , and drollery : for , such persons , proud of their joking talent , do think they answer a demonstration , if they can but break a jest upon it . and , besides , they have the faculty of cutting capers beyond the moon , and raising objections at random . the latter does , perhaps , as much harm , by presuming to demonstrate every thing : and the over-weening of these men is the more pernicious , because they make a shew of a great friendship and zeal for science ; and yet , by falling short of their extravagant pretensions , they throw a scandal upon her ; and make weak distinguishers apprehend there is no science at all . the one deviates from zeal for truth , in excess ; the other , in defect : and the judicious decision of this point , [ of the extent of our knowledge , ] settles the golden mean between both . i have endeavour'd , in my method , b. . less . . to § . . to establish from clear grounds , the just pitch of our knowledge in this state : mr. locke does , with his usual candour , attempt to do the same in his way ; concerning which , i am to give him my thoughts ; which are these . . there is no doubt but we have less knowledge than we might have had , through our want of some notions ; as also , for want of discerning the agreement or disagreement of them in the same thing . no doubt too , but intuitive knowledge , which is only of self-evident truths , cannot reach to all that belongs to our notions , or ideas ; and , that we too often want proper mediums to connect those notions , in order to demonstration : as also , that our sensitive knowledge ( i suppose he means that which is had by experiments ) does not reach very far ; otherwise , our senses giving us ( as we do both of us hold ) all the first natural notions we have , i believe it cannot be deny'd , but that they give us withall the ground of all our knowledge . whence i cannot see , why he limits sensitive knowledge to the notion of existence onely ; or , that our senses do make us know onely that a thing is : for , certainly , our senses do as well tell us the wall is white , as that the wall is ; tho' , in proper speech , it does neither , but by means of our mind , comparing the notions of the two terms , given us by the object , in order to the seeing their co-existence in the thing . all they do , is , to give us our notions ; which the soul ( that is , the man , according to his spiritual part ) compounds into a proposition ; and so frames a judgment of the said co-existence ( or inconsistency ) of those terms , or ( which is the same ) of what is signify'd by them , in the same thing . nor do i think mr. locke will much deny any of this , however we may express our selves diversly . . 't is very true that our experience gives us some light to know what qualities do belong to such substances ; yet , i cannot think it impossible to know this very often a priori , by demonstrative reason , tho' we do not know the constitution of the minute parts , on which those qualities do depend ; much less do i judge , that , tho' we did not know them , yet we could not discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities ; he means , those qualities which are the objects of our senses . nor do i wonder mr. locke thinks thus , because he does , all along , pitch his thoughts on the corpuscularian hypothesis , as on that which , in some men's opinion , goes farthest in an intelligible explication of the qualities of body . now , my judgment is , that 't is demonstrable , that the principles of the corpuscularians cannot possibly give account of the constitution either of the minute parts , or of the least atom , nor , consequently , of any body in nature ; or ( which is the proper work of a philosopher ) refund any quality into its proper causes ; i mean , such causes as they can prove to be such , or must be such ; however , they may fancy them to be such , by allowing to themselves voluntary suppositions for principles . i have shewn in my appendix to my method , that the most celebrated of the corpuscularian philosophers , the cartesians , cannot know the constitution of the most minute part of any of their elements , since they can never tell us by their grounds , the primary qualities of their first matter , of which their three elements , and , consequently , all natural bodies are made . to shew we can , i will give a short summary of the aristotelian doctrine in this particular , truly represented , and cleared from the mis-conceits of some late school-men . . 't is confess'd , and evident , that quantity is the primary affection of body ; of which , re-modify'd , ( as i may say , ) all qualities are made . we can shew , that by it body is divisible ; and , therefore , quantity ( for that , and and many other reasons ) is divisibility , especially , taking it as consider'd physically : however , taking it as capable to be measur'd , proportion'd , and figur'd , ( as mathematicians do , ) it may not very unfitly be called extension . but , take it , ( as i said , ) as affecting bodies , in order to natural action and passion , in which the course of nature consists , ( as a natural philosopher ought to consider it , ) and 't is divisibility , or a capacity to be divided by those causes . nor can the greatest cartesian deny this , since he grants , that the first operation in nature , is , the making their three elements , by grinding ( as it were ) or dividing their first matter . proceeding by immediate steps , we are to seek out the first sorts of this divisibility ; and this must be done by finding the most simple intrinsecal differences of that , or any other notion , which can only be more and less of the common notion . now , more and less of divisibility consider'd , in order to natural agents , is the same as to be * more easily , and less easily divisible by by those agents , which we call to be rare , and dense . rarity therefore , and density do constitute the simplest sorts or kinds of bodies . and , since it is inconceivable that matter should be divided at all by second causes , but the divider must be more dense , or more able to divide , than the matter that is to be divided by it ; it follows , that rare and dense bodies were originally such ; or , that there were created at first some sorts of bodies that are more , and others that were less divisible ; as is clearly express'd in the two first verses of genesis . and reason abets it ; for , otherwise , the course of nature , consisting in motion , could never have been connaturally made ; because , had all the parts of matter been equally divisible , there could be no reason why one part of the matter should be the divider , rather than the other ; and so there could have been no motion , nor , consequently , any course of nature at all . . by the division of rare bodies by dense ones , and the division of their first compounds , the number of parts increasing , there naturally follow'd the various size , and the grossness and minuteness of those parts ; as also , their various figures , situations , &c. all which contribute to compound the species and individuums . of these , variously mingled and remingled , all the rest are made . from simple division , two things are made of one ; whence follows the individual diversity of bodies , according to the notion of substance , or ens. more accidents are ( as was said before ) still taken in , to make the subaltern genera and species , even to the lowest sort , or kind ; and innumerably more of them , to distinguish and constitute individual bodies . . to come a little nearer our main point : unless those qualities , rarity and density , which are the primary ones , be admitted , the world could never have been form'd connaturally ; nor the course of nature carried on ; because , ( as was now shewn , ) in that supposition , there would have been no motion . for , motion of material entities is perform'd by the intervening of the parts of the one between the parts of the other , and , so , dividing it ; which is impossible , unless the one had been rarer , or more yielding ; the other denser , or less yielding . but , this once settled , 't is evident from the very terms , that there are proper causes , both on the agent 's and patient's side , for the one's dividing , and the other's being divided . for , the rare being more divisible than the dense , 't is demonstrable , that the dense being impell'd against the rare by motion , ( which comes from a superior agent , ) the rare being more divisible , will give way , and be divided by the dense ; which is clearly impossible in the corpuscularian hypothesis ; which puts all parts of their matter to be equally rare , or dense ; or rather , ( as the cartesians do , ) neither rare , nor dense ; all qualities , according to them , being made by mingling their three elements ; which elements are themselves made by , and presuppose , the motion of their first matter . whereas , yet , it is impossible to conceive , but those parts of that matter must be either rare , or else dense , at least to some degree . and , as denying the rarity and density in the first bodies does , by making motion impossible , put the course of nature out of frame , both in its beginning and progress ; so it utterly destroys all demonstration in physicks , which is grounded on mediums from proper causes , and proper effects . . passing over many immediate steps , which shew how those four principal qualities , heat , cold , moisture , and driness , are made of rarity and density , acted upon by the common causes in nature ; we come to shew how these two primary qualities do constitute many secondary ones ; and how these last are refunded into the other , as their proper causes ; and , therefore , are demonstrable by them , as by their proper mediums . a few instances may serve , as hints , to explicate others . that great pellucidity in the air is necessarily , and properly refunded into its extream divisibility , or rarity ; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its parts , by those spicula ignea , the rays of the sun ; and opacity , for the same reason , is the proper effect of density ; which hinders its subject from being penetrated , or divided by them ; whence also it is a proper cause of repelling , or reflecting them . again ; who sees not that liquidity , which makes its subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly , as we see in ponds ; or driven to run into cavities , by the common motion of gravitation , is a proper effect of rarity , as consistency is of density ? spissitude is a constipation of dense parts , or the want of pores to admit the ingress of other bodies . grossitude is clearly nothing but density , in a bigger quantity of its parts . friability is refunded into great dense parts , and very large rare ones : whence , those rare parts , which , were they less , would better cement those parts together , being now very large , and , withal , very divisible , are easily divided ; and , consequently , the body is soon shatter'd : as we find in dry clods , out of which , ( while they were yet wet dirt , ) those parts which were watry , being drawn by heat , large cavities are left , which the air now possesses . on the other side , ductility and malleability are the effects of the very smallest rare parts , finely compacted with the minutest dense ones . those small dense parts , so closely woven , and , in a manner , contiguous , keep the rare from evaporating ; and the rare , by being such , and interwoven with the dense all over , make the compound yield to expansion , without breaking ; being very small , are not easily separable ; and yet , tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest agent , fire , they render it fusible . . were these principles which i rawly and briefly touch on here , pursu'd by learned men with immediate consequences , which , true logick assisting , is far from impossible ; the nature of those first-mixt qualities , and by their means of many others , would not be very hard to explicate . but , if men are resolv'd to neglect all natural principles , and the intrinsecal constitution of the first bodies in nature , and will needs run upon nothing but mathematical notions , which pre-suppose those principles ; nor could be found in nature , unless the other be first admitted , or division made possible ; ( for neither parts , nor consequently figures of parts , could be made without division , nor division unless some bodies were naturally apt to divide , others to be divided , that is , unless some were rare , others dense ) or , if , instead of demonstrating their natural principles by the superiour science , they will needs have recourse to voluntary suppositions ; and violate the nature of causality , and of the deity it self , by making him whose proper effect ( he being essentially self-existence ) is to give existence , or create , to be the proper and immediate cause of motion ; and go about to prove ignotum per ignotissimum , by supposing ( as they sometimes do ) that god wills this or that , which is for the interest of their tenet , and too hard to prove : if , i say , men are resolv'd to follow such untoward methods , 't is no wonder science does not advance , but the world is detain'd in ignorance of many things , which otherwise it might know . did learned men set themselves to carry forwards the grounds of nature in euclides physicus ( where they will find demonstrations enow ) to farther conclusions , with the same zeal as they do the mathematicks ; i doubt not but the evident truths , which would by degrees disclose themselves , would both encourage , and enable them , to make a farther progress in knowledge ; nor would the science of second qualities , ( about which physical demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd ) be held so desperate . but to leave these discourses , and apply my self to mr. l. i cannot but wonder , that amongst all his ideas of qualities , he not so much as once mentions ( as far as i remember ) those two chiefest ones of rarity and density ; tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole course of nature than these are . which , with many other reasons , makes me think he had not seen , or at least well weigh'd the true aristotelian system , ( which he might have seen in sir kenelm digby's treatise of bodies , and its latin preface ; as also in institutiones peripateticae ; ) but took it as represented by the modern schools . for my self , i must declare i verily judge , that the grounds i here insist on , are the only true ones that a natural philosopher can have ; that they are demonstrable ; and i do offer my self to maintain them to be such , if it shall please any learned objector to attempt to show these principles faulty ; or that we build on any supposition at all , and not on what 's either self-evident , or easily and immediately reducible to self-evidence . which , i believe , no other sect of philosophers did ever so much as pretend to . . to come to those qualities , which are the formal object of our senses , called by mr. locke secondary qualities , i have shewn already that divers of them are intelligible and explicable by rarity and density ; only certain little respects are added to them , which too lie in our ken : nor do i doubt but most of the others may be clearly and distinctly known by the same grounds . indeed , divers of them depend on the figure and texture of parts ; which , tho' we can never know with a mathematical exactness , yet i see not why we may not demonstrate the natures or kinds of each quality , so far as to distinguish them from others , and refund them into their proper causes ; which is enough for our purpose , and most proportionable to our state. for example , light brings from the wall into the eye , and so into our knowing power , the notion of whiteness , and of other colours from other objects . it cannot be doubted then , ( since light of its self is uniform ) but that there is some disposition in the surface of the object , or the figure of its outmost parts , which reflects light after a different manner , and affects the seer accordingly . nor is it hard to conceive , but very evident , that a very smooth surface , as having fewest pores in it , will reflect more light , and so make it more visible ; especially if those outmost parts be roundish , which reflect light every way , or towards all sides . it is manifest then that , that quality which is most visible of all others being that which we call whiteness , the proper causes of that quality may be found out . which will further appear hence , that if , on the contrary , the surface have small-pointed parts and large pores , much of the light will be lost in those shady grotts , and scarce any beam of it reflected ; which therefore is the proper cause of that lightless appearance call'd blackness ; which is the reason why , when there is no light at all to be reflected , all things seem black. if we hold a thousand needles points towards our eye , they appear black , because of the vastness of the interstices or cavities in proportion to the extant parts which should have reflected the light : whereas , were the object a polish'd plate of steel , the interstices or pores being less , it appears more luminous and whitish ; which may give us some faint , but sure , light , how this colour is made . the intermediate colours are made by the mixture and demixture of those extreams ; whence , out of the degrees of their partaking those , contrary or subcontrary qualities are framed , as blue , green , yellow , and all other colours . nor is this degree , constituting each of those species , unknowable . a picture-drawer can tell us what proportion of his paint of such a colour he adds to that of another colour , to make what third colour he pleases . we see then , that the secondary quality of colour , may come within the compass of our knowledge . nor do i see why the rest of them may not become equally intelligible , did we seriously set our reflex thoughts on work to study them ; especially experimental knowledge assisting , by hinting to us such matters of fact as give light to our reason , ( when furnish'd with , and attentive to , true natural principles ) how it may reduce those qualities unto their proper causes , which is the only work of science . reflexion eighteenth , on the th and th chapters . . i come now to a nearer view of the th chapter , of the reality of knowledge , the main point in which the whole doctrine of the ideists is concern'd . to state it rightly , i do not doubt ( as i have exprest my self formerly ) but that the ideists have many true notions of the things ; that is , the things themselves in their minds , after a natural manner , as well as their opposers have , notwithstanding their ill speculation ; and thence oftentimes discourse right ; for the same reason that , tho' some philosophers held that the eye sees per emissionem , others per receptionem radiorum , yet they naturally saw both a like , however their speculative thoughts , disfer'd about the manner how seeing was made . wherefore the true state of the question is , whether they can have any real knowledge of the things in nature , according to the principles of the ideists ; or , by their puting our notions , which are the ground and materials of our knowledge , to be onely likenesses , appearances , similitudes , resemblances , pourtraitures , or pictures of the things , ( which are the names they give them ) and not the things themselves in our minds : for , if they can have no real knowledge , or knowledge of the thing , by such meerly representing ideas , then it must be said that those ideas , being confessedly the first and onely materials of their knowledge , the ideists will become oftentimes liable to deviate from nature , and fall into errour by adhering to such groundless principles , as is the substituting very often empty resemblances , or fancies , for the things themselves ; nor can they ever be able to give a solid account by their principles , that they know any thing . . now , it seems to me ( tho' i should wave those many pregnant arguments brought against them , in my three first preliminaries ) that the very position of the ideists , does decide the question , and confute themselves . for , if we may trust their words , they agree that we know the things as well as the ideas , and onely differ in the manner how : of which mr. l. tell us here § . 't is evident the mind knows not things immediately , but onely by the intervention of the ideas it has of them . whence i much fear that by ideas he means phantasms , or material pictures in the imagination ; by whose intervention 't is indeed confest we know . for , otherwise , it is far from evident , that we know them by means of those spiritual conceptions , we call notions ; since we bring many close arguments , fetcht from the nature of the thing , to prove that there is perfect evidence of the contrary : for , those ideas or notions being held and shown by us , to be the things in our mind , their very being there , or in a knowing power , is to be known : nor can they be held by us to be the means to know themselves ; for , so the same would be the means and end both , which is a contradiction . but , let us consider his words . the mind , he says , knows the things by the intervention of ideas . the question then is what the idea does , and what the word [ intervention ] means . does the mind see the thing without , by sending out her rayes of knowledge to it ? this cannot be said , in regard all the acts of knowledge which the mind has , are immanent ones , and are receiv'd in that which produced them , as in their onely subject . does then the thing that is without , send its beams by the ideas , as by a kind of spiritual optick-glass , to which the mind lays her intellectual eye ? neither can this be said , for the mind could see or know the thing it self were it in it , else how could it know the ideas ? rather , were the thing in the understanding , it could not but be known , whether there were any similitude , besides , in it , or no. it may be said that the mind knows the thing by the idea because it is a picture or similitude that represents it . but i way walk in a gallery , and see a hundred pictures in it of men , and many other things in nature ; and yet not know one jot the better , any one of the things represented , unless i had know them formerly , tho' apelles himself had drawn them . i may remember them again , indeed , if i had known them before ; which cannot be said in our case , because those ideas of theirs are to give them the first knowledge of the thing . . being thus at a loss to explicate [ intervention ] or to know what it , or the idea or representation serves for , we will reflect next upon the word [ know ] which mr. locke applies ( tho' not so immediately , yet ) indifferently , to the thing and to the idea . now , if this be so , and that to to be known agrees to them both ; then , as the idea is in the mind when it is known , so the thing , when known , should be in the mind too , which is our very position , thought by the ideists so paradoxical , and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves . and , if neither the idea brings the thing into the knowing power , or ( which is the same ) into the mind ; nor the mind , or knowing power goes out of the soul to it , i know not how they can pretend to show how the knowing power , and the thing known , can ever come to meet , as they must when ever an act of knowledge is made . 't is to no purpose then , to alledge that the thing comes into the mind , or is brought thither by means of the idea ; for , if it comes or is brought thither , let it be by what means it will , 't is most incontestably evident that , after it is come or brought thither , it is there . nor can all the wit of man avoid this consequence , unless plain words must lose their signification . wherefore mr. l. in pursuance of his own principles should not have said that the mind does not know things immediately , but by means of the ideas ; but , that it does not know them at all , neither mediately nor immediately ; for if the thing be in the knowledge at all , they must be in the mind , where onely the knowledge is ; which comes over ( thus far ) to our position . . it must be confess'd , that mr. locke has here , § . . put the objection against the ideists as strongly , and home , as it is possible : but i must still persist , and avow , that neither his own excellent wit , ( which , had he light on right principles , could reach to any thing that is within the compass of possibility , ) nor all the world joining in his assistance , can clear that objection , so as to satisfie any intelligent man , who is true to his reason guiding it self ( as it ought ) by connexion of terms , and not by fancy ; nor shew , that by his ideas any knowledge at all of the thing can be possibly had . first , he alledges the agreement or conformity of the things with his simple ideas . and i reply , that he cannot , by the principles of the ideists , sh●w that the things do agree or disagree with his simple ideas at all . to demonstrate which , i argue thus : ere he can know that the representation and the thing represented do agree , common sense tells us , he must have both the idea and the thing in his comparing power , that is , in his mind ; that so he may take a view of both of them , and consider them in order to one another ; and , by doing this , see whether the one does truly resemble the other , or no. but , this is directly against the principles of the ideists , who do not allow that the thing can be in the mind , but the idea only . next , he alledges , that his complex ideas are archetypes ; and not conformable to the things , as the others were , but to themselves only ; and , therefore , he says , they cannot lead us into errour , because they cannot but represent themselves . i pass by the oddness of the position , that the idea , which is a picture , should be a picture of it self , or represent it self : i only note , that this allegation which should clear the point , quite loses it , and gives it up . for , the question is , whether his ideas do give us the knowledge of the things in nature ; and 't is evident , and confess'd they cannot give us this knowledge of them , but by representing them : now , he tells us , that his complex ideas are not copies of the things , nor represent them , but themselves only . whence is evidently concluded , that we are never the nearer to the knowing of things by them ; no , not obliquely , and at second hand , or by the intervention of those ideas , or similitudes representing them , as was pretended formerly . whence , for any thing he has produced , we may justly doubt whether such ideas are not whimsical fancies , without any reality at all ; since he will not allow them even that slightest relation to the things , of so much as representing them . but , which is much worse , he affirms , § . . that those ideas themselves are consider'd as the archetypes ; and the things no otherwise regarded , but as they are conformable to them . now , this seems to me a strange way of proving the reality of our knowledge , by ideas , to affirm , that we are not to regard the things , but as conformable to our ideas . is not this to make philosophy not the knowledge of things , but of ideas only ; and to pretend , that the thing must only be held true , if it be conformable to our ideas ? he might as well have said fancies ; for , he expresly says , these complex ideas are made by the mind , and not taken from the thing , nor like it : and , whatever is neither the res , nor so much as like it , can neither have reality , nor shew of reality ; and therefore , must be a meer fancy . now , these complex ideas reach much farther than all the others do ; viz. to modes , substances and relations ; as is seen , book . chap. . so that this discourse of his destroys the reality of our knowledge in almost all the things we are to know . he will , perhaps , say , those complex ideas are the effects of certain powers to cause them , found in the thing ; and , by this means they bring the things , as being their causes , into their mind . but the argument returns still with the same force ; for , if they bring the thing into the mind , then the thing is in the mind when it is brought thither . add , that this makes them resemblances of the thing , which he denies ; for , the effect , being a participation of the cause , must necessarily resemble it ; especially , if it be a natural effect . nor can he say they make us know the thing , because they are made up of simple ones : for , as the simple ideas only made us know the thing by representing it , so these other not representing it , have lost the power of making us know it at all . so that , let them turn which way they will , either the thing is never brought into the knowledge , or the mind ; and then it can never be known : or , it is brought thither , and then it must be there ; which is our position , and deny'd by the ideists . . i have shewn above , that all mathematical knowledges , tho' they are never so abstractedly express'd , are grounded on the thing , or on body ; and moral ones , ( which two he here mentions , ) on the nature of man , or reason ; which , i suppose , none will say are nothings ; and , therefore , they are , both of them , true knowledge of the thing , consider'd in part , or inadequately . . in his th section , he defends himself for having so little regard ( as it may seem ) to the real existence of things . i discourse thus : we have more real notions of the thing , than barely existence ; for , every notion that belongs to the line of thing or substance , whether inferior or superior ; nay , every mode or accident that does belong , or ever did belong to the thing , either intrinsecally or extrinsecally , are all of them real ; so that he needs not be sollicitous any should object , that his ideas have no reality in them , because he regards not their existence onely . and , were such an objection made , or had it any force , he might also reply , that in every part of his discourse , he does regard existence , and cannot do otherwise ; unless any objecter should be so weak as to alledge , that what exists in the mind , does not exist at all . for , if he had once his notions from the thing , they would be still the thing in the mind , and real , tho' the individual objects , whence they were taken , be perish'd . nay , more ; those things would have a better , a more durable , and more noble existence in the mind , than they had in nature . i say , [ those things ; ] not fearing that any should object , that thing signifies the whole ; which may seem contrary to my former doctrine , that the thing is only in the mind by inadequate notions , or in part . for , tho' the formal conception be onely of some quality of it , expresly and distinctly , yet it implies or connotates the knowledge of the whole thing confusedly ; it being most clearly demonstrable in metaphysicks , that there are no actual parts in any compound whatever : so that 't is still the whole thing that is known , tho' onely a part ( as it were ) of it be known distinctly . upon this evident principle , that there are no actual parts , is grounded that solid and most approved maxim , that actions and passions are of the suppositum , or individual thing . thus , when the hand strikes or wounds a man , 't is truly said , that the man ( which signifies the whole thing ) did it , and is answerable for it ; and , if he kills the person he struck , the whole man will be hang'd for it , tho' the hand onely , and not the legs , head , neck , &c. gave the blow . now , this could neither be said with truth , nor that punishment be inflicted by justice , if the word [ hand ] did not signifie , and truly were the whole man , according to his faculty of handling or striking , or according to that part which immediately did that action . the self-same is to be said , and for the self-same reason , of our inadequate notions ; and , that each of them implies , or connotates ( that is , materially and entitatively is ) the whole thing , tho' formally or precisely but a part of it , as it were ; or the thing according to such a particular considerability , found in it , or identify'd with it . whoever shall weigh attentively the force and coherence of this discourse , will clearly discern how entirely all our philosophy is built on the things , and is the knowledge of them ; and how far the ideists fall short of having that solid ground for the basis of their discourses : but , especially , this tenet , which puts their complex ideas not onely not to be the thing , ( which it must be some way , or to some degree or other , if it be not a meer fancy , ) but , not to be so much as a copy or resemblance of it , which ( as was said ) is the slightest and least relation it can possibly have to it . . i would have none think , that , by this discourse i deny complex notions , or ideas . the ten common heads are the simpler ones ; which when we divide by differences , each inferior genus and species , ( they being made up of the superior notions , and those differences , ) are complex notions , as their very definitions tell us . whence mr. locke's complex idea of murther , sacrilege , or whatever else they be , are given us by the same method . and , the difference between him and me in this point , is this ; that we complicate our ideas regularly , and according to the exact rules of art ; and he seems to make his voluntarily , or else by reflexion on his own interiour , and what he experiences in himself ; which i take to be a very fallacious way , because very few can distinguish well between a phantasm in the imagination , which is a material faculty in us ; and a notion , which is spiritual , tho' they be both of them interiour , or within us . to shew the difference between which , i have given a short hint in my method , book . less . . § . . and much more here , in my preface . . it is very hard , when two writers go upon different principles , not to mistake now and then one the others meaning ; and i would be loath to wrong so ingenuous an author . sometimes he seems to mean no more by his complex ideas , but either those compound notions which are made up of the simpler notions of the genus and difference , as we descend downwards in the same line ; or else , of those in divers lines ; and , i am sure , let him discourse them as he will , they can be compounded of nothing else ; those common heads comprizing all the natural notions we can have . it is no less certain too , that we can put together ( as he says ) simple notions as we please , which we have not observ'd thus put together in things that actually exist . but then we must be wary , while we do this , that our reason joins them by seeing them consistent and compossible : for , our fancy will put together ideas which are utterly repugnant to one another , and are altogether chimerical . now , if the notions , thus join'd by us , be consistent , the nature or thing suppos'd to be the ground of those notions is possible to be ; which being the notion of ens , hence they are conceiv'd as a kind of intellectual entity , created ( as it were ) by the mind , and thence have an intelligibility , which is a property of ens ( non-entities and chimaeras being unintelligible ) and we can have a kind of counterfeit , or artificial , notion of them as entities , tho' such a thing never existed in the world that we know of ; tho' , i believe , ' tit hard to conceive , that we can frame a complex notion of a nature that is capable to be , but it exists somewhere in the universality of creatures , here , or elsewhere . how the mind , using the fancy , can do this , cannot , i think , be better elucidated , than by reflecting on what those , who write of the excellency of poesie and poets , use to say in commendation of those daedalean artists . they tell us that a poet has that name from the greek noun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a maker . the reason they give for this appellation is , that whereas other artists have their materials given to their hands to work upon , by shaping it into an artificial form ; the poet alone is the maker as well of his matter , as the contriver of its form. so that the ideas he has in his head of his heroes , his lovers , his ladies , and of virtuous persons , are indeed ( as mr. locke calls his ) archetypes , and regard not whether such incomparable patterns he has invented did ever exist in nature , or no ; nor is it to his purpose . yet still ( as mr. locke says well ) that his complex ideas are made of simple ones , so ( by the leave of those self-magnifiers ) the poet could never have had those excellent ideas of his heroes , or their great actions , had he not been pre-imbu'd with natural notions ; which he joins together ingeniously , and exalts them to a high pitch , so to make them exemplars for others to imitate . rather , he only adds superlative or extraordinary degrees to what he finds in nature . whence 't is manifest , he regards not what is , but what should be ; quite contrary to the duty of a philosopher , who is to take his complex notions from things , just as he finds them complicated in nature , and then discourse upon them by his reason ; and not to stand coining new complex ideas which nature never gave him . what therefore i most dislike here in mr. locke is , that he seems not to reflect on what it is which makes some ideas or notions more simple than others , viz. their being more abstracted or universal ; for this frees them from the partnership of more-compounded differences , and the complexion of multitudes of accidents ; ( which , still , as they descend lower , are requisit to distinguish the kinds of things ; ) by which means they become more simple or less compounded ; whence , the supreme heads of the ten predicaments are the simplest notions of all others , except that of existence . did mr. locke rate the simplicity and complexion of his ideas from this certain and well-grounded rule , there might an easie accomodation be made between his doctrin and mine as to this particular . but his zeal against the cobweb schemes some modern school-men had woven , transported him to ravel that excellent frame of notions , which both nature and art had given us ; and , ( as cartesius and others have done ) to model all philosophy upon a new , tho' less solid , or rather far from solid , foundation . . that i may say as much as i can in behalf of the ideists , it may be alledg'd , that they find by experience things are as their ideas do represent them , and that they succeed as we by means of our ideas do forecast them : therefore real knowledge may be had by means of ideas . i answer , first , that this agreement they have between what 's in the mind and out of it , would equally , nay better , be explicated , were the things themselves in the mind , and not the ideas ; and , therefore , it can be no argument for the reality of their knowledge by ideas only . besides , i deny that when their ideas are not true natural notions but fancies , they experience them , or any effect of them ; as in vacuum , or duration before or after the world. secondly , i answer , that experience only helps them by giving them knowledge ; and knowledge , according to them , can only be had by means of ideas ; wherefore they must either prove , by other grounds , that similitudes can give us knowledge of the things , or they do petere principium , beg the question , and prove idem per idem . for , if meer representations can give us no true knowledge , experience , which only assists us by giving us ideas , is quite thrown out of doors , and may all be fantastical . all is wrong and falls short , if the first ground of our knowledge be incompetent and insignificant . besides , experience gives us both phantasms , which are material representations ; and our notions too , which are spiritual ; but experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the one , and which is the other ; tho' this be of the highest concern in our case : all it can do is to inform us , that we are affected by some agent working on our senses . nay , of the two , it more inclines us to embrace phantasms for notions ; for those do make upon us the more sensible impression , and cause a more lively representation . to distinguish perfectly between this false and true ground of knowledge , is of the most weighty importance of all other points of philosophy whatsoever ; and yet i must complain , that not the least care ( as far as i have observ'd ) is taken any where in this treatise to distinguish them ; and particularly , not in this chapter , which had been the proper place to treat of that subject : but , on the contrary , ( as i have shewn above ) they are carelesly confounded . and i must declare , that without settling this point well , we can never have any certainty what knowledge is real , what fantastick : or , when we do truly know , when onely seem to know : but , there is not a word here to that purpose . . as for the monsters and changelings here spoken of , i think philosophers should have nothing to do with lusus naturae , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which are besides the ordinary course of nature ; but with the common course of causes , or nature it self . my judgment is , too , that people should be very wary in killing any monsters that approach to humane shape ; and , that it were fitter there should be hospitalls to breed them , till perfect observations were made concerning them . the novelty of the sight , would invite spectators , and bear their charges : unless perhaps there may be danger , lest the imaginations of the apprehensive sex , who see such uncouth shapes , or hear frequent talk of them , should , by that occasion , breed more of them . what concerns us is to look to our principles , and not to be misled from them , by reflecting on such odd preternatural productions ; as i must think mr. locke is , when he thinks changelings to be something between a man and a beast . the division of animal into rational and irrational is made by such differences as are perfectly contradictory to one another ; between which there can no more be any third or middle , than there can be a medium between is and is not . if then that odd birth be rational , let the shape be as distorted as it will , it is truly a man ; if it be not , let it look never so like a man , 't is a brute . when 't is the one , when the other , may hap in some odd cases to be doubtful ; and then it belongs to the prudence of intelligent men to decide it ; or , if they cannot , it becomes us in christian prudence to act warily . indeed , if the definition of man , viz. rational animal , be questionable , we shall ( as i said above ) be at a great loss to know our own kind ; which would be but a melancholy business . and , if we forego our principles , distinguishing between corporeal and spiritual natures , we may perhaps grow in time no wiser than the common people amongst the portugueses in brazil , who conceit the apes and monkies there have as much wit as themselves have , and could speak well enough too if they would ; but that , out of a deep reach of policy , they counterfeit themselves dumb , and not to understand the language , lest they should be forced to work . corollary i. from this discourse , and the evident grounds of it , all possibility of vacuum is clearly confuted . for , if the idea or notion of space be only an inadequate conception of body , whence 't is evidently taken , or body conceived according to such a mode of it ; then to put space without body , or where there is no body , is a perfect contradiction . corallery ii. hence also , tho' the cartesians could demonstrate there are innate ideas , ( which i judge impossible ) yet , unless they declare and prove , by their principles , that those ideas are the things themselves in our understanding , and not resemblances onely , the same arguments i have used against others will have equal , or rather a far greater force against them ; and conclude , that they cannot , by their principles , have knowledge of any thing , but that they know nothing . and , how they should pretend they are the things themselves , if they do not so much as allow them to be taken from the things , is altogether inconceivable . . concerning truth in general , of which mr. locke treats in his th chapter , no more can be said ( speaking of natural truths ) but that it is , the things existing such in our minds as they exist in themselves . for , this put , our minds will be conformable to the things , whose metaphysical verity fixes them to be what they are , or ( if we speak of them as affected with any mode ) as they are : whence our judgments concerning them , being thus grounded , cannot but be true. what mr. l.'s joining or separating of signs , &c. has to do with truth , is beyond my skill to comprehend ; for signs are no more truth , than the bush at the door is the wine in the cellar . i have demonstrated over and over , that ideas , which he makes here one sort of signs , and are meer similitudes , can never give us knowledge of things ; much less can truth , which is the object of knowledge , consist in conjoining or separating them ; and , least of all , can truth consist in the joining or separating the other sorts of signs , viz. of words without the ideas or notions ; for , thus consider'd , they are no more but sounds or characters . to discourse this point from its fundamental ground , and declare it literally : the metaphysical verity of the thing , which , put into a proposition , predicates the whole thing ( or mode ) of it self , and affirms that the thing is what it is , gives us our first truths , or first principles . and all other truths consists in this , that inadequate , or partial notions or conceptions of the thing , either as to what is intrinsecal or extrinsecal to it , are predicated either of the thing as in it self , that is , according to the line of substance , which are call'd essential predicates ; as , when we say , petrus est animal ; or , as it is affected with some mode consistent in the same subject ; as when we say , petrus est albus , pater , locatus , galeatus , album est dulce , &c. and it is impossible there can be any more sorts of formal truths but these two : for all predication is made by some kind of identification , as is plainly signify'd by the copula [ is , ] and there cannot possibly be any other sorts of identification , but either in the whole , or not in the whole ; that is , in part , or according to partial conceptions of the same thing ; nor can there be any identification at all of ideas ; mr. locke confessing , that each of them is what it self is , and no other . . i take it to be a strange kind of catechresis to make two sorts of truth , montal and verbal , and we may with as good sense say , that a tavern has two sorts of wine ; one in the cellar , the other in the bush at the door ; for words are good for nothing in the world but meerly and purely to signifie : so that when we say a man speaks true , the sense of those words can be only this , that the proposition he speaks does signifie such a thought or judgment in his mind as is really conformable to the thing he thought or spoke of : and i wonder this great man can imagin that , in our more complex ideas , we put the name for the idea it self ; for then that name would signifie nothing at all , if neither the thing nor the idea be signified by it , as he seems to hold . again , words differ from meer sounds in this , that they have some sense or meaning in them , and meanings are the very notions we have in our minds : wherefore the parts of this distinction of his would be coincident , because all verbal truths ( were the expression proper ) would necessarily be mental ones ; and mr. locke seems to say the same , § . where he makes those truths which are barely nominal to be chimerical . i grant too , that truths may be distinguish'd , according to their several subjects , into moral , physical , metaphysical , &c. but i must severely reflect on his describing moral truths , § . to be the speaking things according to the perswasion of our own minds , tho' the proposition we speak does not agree to the reality of things : for , since it is most evidently known , that the perswasions of men's minds not onely may , but do frequently contradict one another ; by this definition of moral truth both sides of the contradiction may be true ; which destroys truth by confounding it with falshood ; and makes the art of distinguishing ridiculous , by making truth a genus to some sort of falshood , or not-truth to be one kind of truth . 't is a very dangerous thing in philosophy to bring distinctions , unless each member of the notion divided includes the notion of the genus . they were invented for clearing truth ; but , if ill made , or ill-manag'd , nothing in the world breeds greater error and confusion . corruptio optimi pessima . reflexion nineteenth , on the th , th , and th chapters . . by what has been deliver'd in my foregoing reflexion , my notes upon his th chapter [ of universal propositions , their truth and certainty ] will be easily understood . but , i am to premise , first , that the question is not here , what proves the truth of such propositions , which is the work of logick ; but , whether there can be any truth in them , or certainty of them at all , or no. secondly , that the formal truth of propositions can onely be in the mind ; or , that mental propositions onely are capable of truth or falslhood ; tho' words be needful to signify them : and , therefore , i must deny that the consideration of words is a necessary part of the treatise of knowledge ; meaning by that word , philosophical knowledge , as our circumstance determin us . let logicians but take care that the words be univocal , and not equivocal , or double sensed , and all else that can be consider'd to belong to truth , is to be look'd for in the mind , and can be no where else . hence , i cannot admit his distinction of certainty of truth , and certainty of knowledge in any other sense than that knowledge is the act , and truth the onely object of that act ; since nothing can be known to be what is not ; nor known to be true , which is not true. the generical notion [ certainty , ] should first have been explicated , ere those two sorts of it had been defin'd ; otherwise both those definitions must necessarily remain unintelligible . i shall presume that i have in my method shown from its grounds what certainty is , viz. the determination of our understanding , or judging power by the object 's actuating it , or being actually in it as it is in its self . with which , what his putting together of words in verbal propositions has to do , surpasses my understanding . and , 't is as hard to conceive , that general truths can never be well made known , and are very seldom apprehended , but as conceiv'd and express'd in words . that general truths cannot be made known to others without words , is in a manner , as evident as 't is that we cannot see one anothers thoughts ; nor is this peculiar to general truths , for scarcely can particular ones be made known any other way : but , that they cannot be known or apprehended by our selves ( which seems here to be his meaning ) but as conceiv'd and express'd in words , is so far from evident , that the contrary is such ; for , it is impossible to express them in words , unless we do first apprehend and conceive them in our thoughts ; and were not this so , all the while we use words in speaking of general truths , we should do nothing but talk of we know not what : for , our thoughts and apprehensions are ex natura rei , presupposed to the words by which we express them ; and , to do otherwise is to let our tongue run before our wit. whence we account them silly and senseless people , and perverters of nature , who make use of words before they know their meaning . . i have shown above , that it is not necessary to our being certain of any proposition that we know the precise bounds and extent of the species it stands for ; but that 't is sufficient to know it in part distinctly ; and the rest of it , or the whole , confusedly ; provided that part of it , which we know is sufficient to distinguish it from all other species : and , were not this so , it would follow that we never could know the truth of any universal proposition whatever ; especially when we discourse of the species infima , which requires a complexion of very many accidents , whose precise number and bounds are utterly unknowable by us . a position which makes logick useless ; scarce any conclusion being deducible from premisses , unless one of them be an universal ; and quite destroyes all science which is employ'd about universal or general truths . he instances in man and gold , and judges that , for want of knowing the extent of their species , it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational , or all gold yellow . we cannot indeed know this by considering every individual man by the poll : but , if by the word [ man ] we mean no more but a rational animal , it is so far from impossible to know , and affirm that all men are rational , that 't is impossible not to know it . and , were it a proper place to make good that definition here , i could demonstrate that it does agree to man , and can agree to nothing else ; and therefore that definition is true and adequate : nor can the contrary be sustaind any other way , but by unacquainting us with our selves and our own kind ; and by jumbling together these species , which are distinguisht by contradictory differences , and confounding the vastly-distinct natures and properties , of corporeal and spiritual beings . as for the species of gold , yellowness ( which he instances in ) is not essential to it , as rationality is to man ; as being but one of those accidents , by which we distinguish it from other species of minerals ; and i have hinted some other formerly , which are more intrinsecal and essential to it than its colour . again , we are moreover certain by manifest and daily experience , and by the constant and common practise of the world , that mankind is acquainted with enow of those accidents to distinguish it . one bespeaks a golden cup , and the goldsmith makes it for him : nor was it ever heard that any of this trade , did hope to cozen a sensible man , by obtruding upon the buyer brass , or any other mettal , for gold ; or , if he did , that goldsmith's-hall could not distinguish it : nay , if it be but a little alloyd , there are ways to find it out ; which shows that mankind is furnisht with means enow , to distinguish gold from other mettals , and for the same reason other things also ; tho' the extent of all the species , and their precise bounds , be not exactly known to those speculaters , who will needs forgo their natural knowledge of things to pursue scrupulous fancies : which , let loose to fly at rovers , are too hard for their reason unestablish'd by principles . . hence an answer is given to mr. locke's acute difficulty , viz. that 't is impossible for us to know that this or that quality , or idea , has a necessary connexion with a real essence , of which we have no idea at all ; that is , ( according to his principles , ) no knowledge . for , since a real essence is that which constitutes such a kind of ens , or species ; and what distinguishes an entity or species from all others , does also make it this , or that species ; that is , does constitute it ; it follows , that , since , by my discourse here , we have such a degree of knowledge of that kind of ens called gold , as to distinguish it from all others , we have a sufficient and true ( tho' not an adequate and distinct ) knowledge of its essence too , that constitutes it such a kind of ens. indeed , if nothing will content us but superfluous knowledge , for curiosity sake , of each particular mode that belongs to that essence , 't is no wonder if we labour in vain ; and , by over-straining to go beyond our selves in this state , fall short of our aim . i must confess , that it would concern us much , as we are , to know whether there be any quality , which we do not yet know in the thing , inconsistent with those we do know ; for , this would blunder our notion of it , and make it chimerical . but , as it is impossible creative wisdom should lay grounds for contradiction ; so , in case those qualities be all consistent , where is the harm not to know them ? and , since consistency implies some kind of agreement or connectedness of the one with the others , who knows how far their connexion and dependence may be known in time , if right principles were taken , and pursu'd ? 't is a strange dis-satisfy'd humour in us , to complain we know not all , when we know enough : i know no man is more free from this fault than mr. locke , or declares more against it formerly . what i dislike in him in this point is , that , by his too much introversion , he forsakes nature ; and , by his too nice speculation of his ideas , hazards to breed a conceit in his readers , that they know less than they really do ; and , that we are not able to attain half that knowledge we , in reality , may arrive to ; which , tho' contrary to his intention , must needs incline men to be scepticks as to essences and substances . . the th chapter , [ of maxims , ] is admirably clear , and , in the greatest part of it , very solid ; abating his proceeding upon ideas , and applying his discourses to his former hypothesis ; to which mr. locke was oblig'd , that all the parts of his work might be woven of the same piece , and consonant to one another . he explicates very well , how they are self-evident : yet , tho' they be such , he has three exceptions against them ; . as not being first known ; . as , in a manner , useless ; and . dangerous . he proves the first , because particulars are known before universals . i understand him not . knowledge may be either consider'd , as instill'd by insensible degrees , into infants , or the ruder sort ; or , as reducible to the clearest grounds , by men of art. now , i cannot think that mr. locke imagins , that we , or any man , hold that maxims were meant for infants , or the vulgar ; or , that either of them ought to be taught general principles at first , and by them attain to particular knowledges ; or , that the users of maxims ever intended them for that end . wherefore , all his discourses to prove them not to be first-known , may be allow'd to have their full force , and yet hurt no body , being wronglevell'd . the point then is , how they may avail artists , or speculators : and this leads to his second exception , their pretended uselesness ; which he endeavours to shew , by alledging , that 't is as evident as any maxim whatever , that the same idea , is the same idea , and no other ; v. g. that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow , and not of blue ; and , therefore , that maxims serve to little purpose , and are also innumerable . now , i grant , indeed , that all such particular propositions may be self-evident , and truths ; as also , that truths of this kind , which express the metaphysical verity and unity of every thing , and of every mode of thing , are innumerable . but , i do not think that any man living thought those to have the usefulness of maxims or principles , which are always general , or universal : for , the notion of [ principles ] super-adds to their being truths , and self-evident , that they influence many other truths that are ( as it were ) under them ; which cannot be said , or thought , of those particular propositions . for example ; should any one go about to refund the verity of this truth , yellow is yellow , and not blue , into this , because white is white , and not black , it would look more like a similitude , than a reason ; and be ridiculous to alledge the one to be the cause of the other ; because yellow is not white ; nor has the notion of the one any influence upon , nor any thing to do with the notion of the other ; in regard both of them stand upon the same bottom , or on the same level . but , should any sceptick ask why the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow ? tho' 't is foolish to ask it , yet , it would not look so extravagant to answer , because every thing is what it is : and , i believe , nature would force mr. locke , or any other to give this for his reason . in like manner , should he ask why a man is a man ? it would look preter-natural to answer , because a tree is a tree , whereas , it would look very natural to answer , because every thing is it self , or , is what it is . which shews to an acute reflecter , that this universal has some kind of influence upon the others , which their fellow-particulars had not . and , the reason is , because universals do engage for all the particulars under them ; whereas , one particular owes not this duty to another particular , to which it has no such real relation as the notion of an universal has in the mind to its particulars . and , who sees not , that , from this proposition , every man is rational , it follows , that peter , john , and each particular man , is rational ? but , from this , that peter , and a few other particulars , are rational , it does not follow , that every man is rational : wnich shews , that ( as was now said ) the truth of the universal engages for the truth of all particulars , and not vice-versâ ; nor one of them for another . . another reason for the usefulness of universal maxims , and , why artists use to reduce the truth of particulars to them , is , because they are more self-evident than the particular identicals are . this position looks something odd ; for , since self-evidence is the highest evidence that can be , to put degrees of self-evidence , is to say , there can be something higher than the highest ; which looks like a bull. to clear this point , i discourse thus : in all self-evident propositions whatever , the terms are so closely connected , ( being , indeed , the same , ) that no middle term can come between them , so to prove them connected , or make them evident ; wherefore , they must either not be evident at all , ( which were shameless to say , ) or they must be evident of themselves ; that is , self-evident . and , in this regard , or in the closest connexion or identity of their terms , all self-evident propositions are equally such . but , there is another kind of evidence arising out of the greater clearness of the terms themselves . now , it has been shewn formerly , that all clearness of our notions springs out of their simplicity , and uncompoundedness ; and all obscurity out of their composition , which breeds confusion : as also , that all general notions are more simple , and consequently , more clear than the particulars are . whence follows , that the proposition , which has more-general terms in it , ( such as all general maxims are , ) do gain hence a greater degree of evidence , and are more undeniable . for example ; let mr. locke tell a sceptick , that yellow is yellow , and not blue ; he may answer , that he will yield to neither proposition ; because , yellow and blue are species of colour , and ( according to mr. locke's grounds ) he knows not the distinct bounds , or precise extent of neither of them ; and therefore , should he grant it , he must assent to he knows not what . tell him , mr. locke speaks of the ideas of those colours ; he will ask what an idea is , and , doubtless , pick new quarrels at the definition ; especially , these being the ideas of secondary qualities , which himself says , have nothing like them in the thing . but , tell him , it cannot be deny'd , but that they are something , and not meerly nothing , in regard we experience we have them ; and , that every thing must necessarily be what it is , ( which is one of the maxims excepted against ; ) he will be put to a stand , and nonpluss'd : for , what can he say ? the identity of the thing with it self , whether it be a substance , or an accident , cannot be deny'd ; nor can he deny , that the same is the same with it self , ( which is another maxim ; ) for , the word thing , signifies , a supream generical notion ; and , the word same , is a transcendent ; which are both of them clear , because the latter has no kind of composition in it , the other as little as is possible . so that he cannot begin to shuffle here , or press to know the meaning of the terms , as he did when they were particulars ; the universal terms being far clearer than those particulars are . . hence another usefulness of self-evident maxims is discover'd ; which is , not to deduce conclusions from them , as from premisses , as mr. l. seems to apprehend ; but , to reduce inferior truths , which are less clear to them . that this can be done , and how it is done , i have shewn in my * method . and , mr. locke's concession here , § . that they are of great use in disputes , to stop the mouths of wranglers , abets and confirms my late ▪ discourses : for , whence could they have this strange virtue to stop the mouths of such unreasonable men , but because their evidence is greater than any others , or than particular self-evident propositions are ? otherwise , why could not these do it as well as general maxims ? now , if this be so , why cannot they satisfie and instruct rational men , and conduce to quiet and fix their judgment , as well as to nonplus wranglers ? 't is the nature of evidence , to enlighten and instruct men of sense ; and more proper to it , than to amuse and surprize sophisters . let any learned man reflect on all the maxims in euclid's elements , in euclides physicus and metaphysicus , or any other author who pretends to reasoning with exact closeness ; and he will easily see for what they are useful , and how. nay , even mr. l.'s identicals , [ yellow is yellow , and not blue , ] are useful in their kind . tho' mr. locke does omit to shew they are so : and this identical yellow is yellow , tho' it do not influence other particulars , as general maxims do ; ( for which reason , it does not absolutely deserve the name of a principle ; ) yet , both it , ( and such other particular identicals , ) is a kind of principle to all that is , or can be , discoursed about that particular colour : for , if any part of that discourse makes yellow not to be yellow , or ( which is all one ) violates that proposition , [ yellow is yellow , ] 't is concluded to be most evidently false ; or , if it agrees with it , to be true. he seems to mislike the procedure by praecognita and praeconcessa ; whereas , his acute wit will find , upon reflexion , that it is impossible we can make an ordinary , much less any speculative , discourse , but the discoursers must agree in something that is either foreknown , or ( at least ) foregranted ; for , if the two disputants disagree in all their principles and grounds , and one of them still denies all the other affirms , 't is impossible they should discourse together at all . . but , passing by all that is said , i alledge farther , that ( not to speak of others ) these two maxims so much excepted against , [ what it is ] and [ 't is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once , are of such most necessary and universal usefulness , that , without them , we could neither judge , discourse , nor act . indeed , these maxims lie retruse in the most inmost recesses of our judging or intellective power , and make not their appearance in formal propositions , but only when we have occasion to produce them ; tho' they are still there all the while , and guide all our thoughts steadily , nay , all our actions too . in the same manner as when a musician plays a careless voluntary upon a harpsichord , he guides himself all along by the rules of musick lodg'd in his mind ; tho' , they being now familiar to him , he is not so sensible of those rules as he was when he first learn'd them . to apprehend more clearly the usefulness of these two principles , let us suppose a man quite devested of them , and to have neither of them in his judgment , and then reflect what he is good for . all our judgments being made by the copula [ is , ] in case he have not this first principle in his understanding , he might take [ is ] for [ is not ; ] or else indifferently for one , and the other too : which , besides the perverting his judgment quite , would make him utterly unfit for the conversation of mankind again , 't is impossible such a man should have any truth at all in his mind , which is the natural perfection of human understanding ; but , wanting a steady ground to fix his judgment , he might think all things to be chimerical , embrace every fancy , and adhere to any contradiction . . to come to the usefulness of other general maxims , we may reflect how mankind do naturally guide their actions by them . a country butcher loses his knife , and looks all about for it ; in which case 't is usual for such fellows to say , as the motive of his continuing to seek it , [ i am sure it must be somewhere or other . ] by which rude saying 'tis evident , that he guides himself all the while by this foreknown general maxim , [ every particular body in the world must be in some place . ] for , had he not had the knowledge of this maxim before-hand , that is , did he think it were possible it should be no where , or in no place , he would never have taken such pains to look for it . we may observe hundreds of such natural maxims as this in the vulgar , guiding their actions and sayings ; and perhaps , it would not be unworthy speculaters to observe their behaviour and words which proceed from uncorrupted nature , and retrieve the genuin principles and maxims that naturally produced them . to apply this : the same we may gather from our speculative thoughts ; and that the same passes in us naturally as does in the vulgar . our first principles lie habitually laid up in the closet of our minds , and govern all our thoughts as occasion presents ; and , tho' we do not put them into formal propositions , till the circumstance invites ; yet they influence all we do , or say , or think ; as was instanced lately in the unshaken and unalterable sense of the copula [ is , ] which verifies all our propositions . . in a word , it were easie to shew , that this unadvised degrading of general maxims , making them in a manner useless for knowledge , does destroy all grounds ; which either are such maxims , or , at least , have no force but by virtue of those maxims , express'd or imply'd ; unless we will pretend those are grounds in any science that want proof there ; which makes them conclusions , and no grounds . whence , it does also destroy all science it self , which consists in universal knowledges , as experience does in particular ones ; for such universal truths cannot be had , if general maxims be disallow'd , as logick demonstrates . this ingenious author thinks the need of such maxims might be supply'd by having clear and distinct ideas . which , rightly understood , comes over to us ; for art and nature both inform us , that the clearness of our notions consists in their being more general ; and as they approach nearer to the highest genus , they are still clearer . now , the metaphysical verity of a general idea or notion , if put into a proposition , is perfectly identical , and a general maxim. hence appears , that it is a most fundamental errour in the ideists , that they rate the clearness of their ideas from the fresh , fair and lively appearances they make to the fancy . whereas only the definition , by explicating the true essence of a thing , shews us distinctly the true spiritual notion of it . the former of these is obvious and sensible . and ( as i may say ) lies and appears uppermost ; and , therefore , is superficial , and a material representation made in the fancy . the later is more retruse , it requires more reflexion and labour to attain it , it is intelligible not sensible ; but , once gain'd , it is solid , durable , and ( being indeed the very nature of the thing , ) it is the ground of all our discourses about it , and of those several knowledges concerning it . hence the followers of fancy become liable to take similitudes for notions , and representations for things ; which makes their productions very plausible to other men's fancies , ( for as they were the productions of fancy , so they sute best with men of fancy ) but they fall short of instructing their judgments . to give an instance of this distinction of notions from phantasms : they think that the idea of a quadrate ( for example ) or circle , is very clear and distinct ; and that the idea of quantity is very obscure and confused : whereas , to the notion of the two former , there goes the notion both of quantity , of the termination of quantity , ( or figure ; ) and , moreover , of such a figure ; all which being essentially involv'd in the notion of a quadrate or circle , must needs make their notions less intelligible and less clear than is that of quantity only : however , the fair pictures of the former , on paper , or in the fancy , enveigles them to think otherwise . let us but reflect how many truths are deduced by geometricians out of the notions of a quadrate or a circle , and what large treatises of trigonometry are drawn out of the notion or nature of a triangle ; and we shall discover how compounded and confused those notions are in reality , however we seem , while we mind only the pictures of them , to have very clear conceptions of them , and to comprehend them distinctly and fully . now , all these truths are involv'd confusedly in the notion or nature of these figures : for all discourses concerning any notion whatever , are nothing but running division ( as we may say ) upon the nature of that object as their ground ; and all descants upon it are meerly that very notion unfolded and explicated at large , and consider'd on all sides , and throughly : which , comprising them all in its bowels , is therefore not so clear and distinct as fancy makes us imagin . whence is seen evidently , that fancy , and the first and obvious appearance , is not to be the judge or test of the clearness or confusedness of our notions ; but reason , reflecting well on the simplicity or compoundedness of those notions themselves , and on the reasons why they are so . . lastly , 't is objected , that such maxims are dangerous ; because , if our notions be wrong , loose , or unsteady , general maxims will serve to confirm us in our mistakes , and to prove contradictions . now , tho' our judgments may be such , yet i cannot conceive how our notions can be wrong , loose , or unsteady . they are what they are ; and being the things in our understanding , their existence is fix'd there , and as unalterable as our soul it self , their subject , is , notions are the same as our meanings of the words ; and , tho' we may mistake what the word signifies to others , or to the generality ; yet , if i , mistaking , or not mistaking , have such a meaning of it in my mind , ( which only can mean or apprehend , ) that meaning is truly in me : nor , tho' i be rectify'd as to the common use of that word , and put another name to it ; yet my meaning , whether properly or improperly signify'd , is still indivisibly and unalterably the same . but , suppose this so ; why must general maxims be held dangerous and faulty , when the fault confessedly lies in other things ? mr. locke grants general maxims to be true , and self-evident ; and 't is extravagantly odd , to think , that propositions so qualify'd , can be guilty of leading men into errour . if , then , he only means , that the mis-application or abuse of them does great harm , he magnifies general maxims , while he intended to disparage them : for , it is generally noted , that those are the best things , that , mis-us'd , do the greatest harm . by this argument , we must lay aside all religion , as well as general maxims ; since , not all the things in the world , put together , have done so great mischief , as mis-us'd religion : tantum religio potuit suadere malorum . . to show general maxims , or self-evident propositions , may demonstrate contradictory positions , he instances in cartestus's making body to be nothing but extension ; and in his own tenet making body to be extension and solidity together : whence , by this maxim [ what is , is ] the former may demonstrate there can be no vacuum , the latter that there may . and , i must , in behalf of truth , take leave to tell them both , that neither extension alone , nor extension and solidity together , are any more the notion of body , than a horse-shoe is a pancake . for , body signifies a thing , and their extension and solidity are onely modes or accidents of that thing ; and , therefore , the notions of them do differ toto genere ; which is a greater and wider mistake , than to say a man is a horse , or an apple is an oyster ; these being all comprehended under the same common genus . if , out of aversion to metaphysicks , and disregard to true logick , which teaches us to distinguish our notions exactly , learned men will not be brought to consider what the word [ thing , ] and [ body ] which is such a thing , mean , they must necessarily fall into fundamental errours ; and , so , stumble every step they take . the notion of [ thing ] evidently relates to being , one way or other : but , it does not formally signify actual being , as existence does ; therefore it can onely consist in this , that is , a power to be , or is capable of being actually . and this thing call'd body , since we experience it is alterable and changeable substantially , or into another thing , must necessarily have a power in it to be alter'd , or become another thing ; which power we call [ matter ; ] our common speech and common sense telling us , that when a new thing is made , 't is not created or made of nothing , but of the matter that pre-existed in the former compound . but , this matter alone , since it is a meer power to be another thing , being , of its own notion , utterly indeterminate , ( which is the true sense of aristotle's description of it , ) is not capable of existing , or a thing ; for , nothing in common can exist , but what is determinately this : therefore , this matter , or power , needs another compart , conceiv'd to determin it , ( which the schools call the form ; ) by which it is made capable to be , or a thing ; and without which , it cannot be such . it being evident then , that every single mode or accident does something distinguish bodies , therefore such a complexion of them as so distinguishes matter , that it makes it differ from all other bodies , it does consequently determin it to be this , and no other ; and therefore constitutes it such a thing , or constitutes it capable to exist ; which is , to make it this thing , or an individuum . now , if we leave all consideration of matter out of the notion of body , and make it consist of modes , or accidents only , as he seems to tell us that himself and cartesius do , we must put those modes to have no possible subject , but to hover in the air , none knows how ; and , therefore , we must needs discourse incoherently , and be too hard for our selves , by raising , at every turn , puzzling difficulties we cannot solve . all our grounds must fail us , when we do not distinguish between the mode or manner how a thing is , and the thing it self . nor do i think cartesius holds body to be extension , but extended matter . how mr. locke comes not to treat of matter in his whole book , i know not ; but i fear it is , because his fancy cannot frame an idea or similitude of it : by which it seems to me evident , that very many of his ideas are meer fancies , coin'd by his imagination : for , 't is evident he must have a notion of it , since he very well knows the meaning of those words , [ a power to be a thing , or matter ; ] which meaning is the same with our notion of it . as for vacuum , which he again mentions here , my demonstration against it , is , in short , this ; waving many others mention'd above : all our natural notions are taken from body ; and , amongst them , that of space ; therefore they are nothing but body inadequately consider'd ; and either body , or some mode of body : therefore , whatever our fancy may suggest , it is impossible there should be space , where there is no body ; since the mode , having no distinct entity of its own , cannot be where the thing , which gives it being , is not : therefore , to put space where there is no body , or a vacuum , is a direct contradiction . each part of which discourse has been made good in its proper place . . in his second instance of man , he seems again , not to distinguish between the fancy and the notion of a man ; which i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . next , he seems not to reflect , that an imperfect conception of the thing , is of the whole thing confusedly . thirdly , 't is evident , that men do only err , or discourse wrong , by imperfectly conceiving , thro' this reason ; because they are not so wise as to consider that there may be more modes wrap'd up in the thing , than we yet distinctly discover : in which case , they may err by mis-applying their general maxims ; for which they must blame themselves , and not the maxim it self . but , i absolutely deny that any man can possibly have the true and distinct notion of man , unless he conceives him to be rational . as for what he tells us , he has discours'd with very rational men , who have actually deny'd they are men ; i can only say , i wonder how they escap'd bedlam ; where , i dare say , there are many men , who are more rational than they : and , my opinion is , that those very rational men were very high-flown ideists : for , such men , by deserting their natural notions taken from the things , and the conduct of true logick , and poring perpetually on their own interiour ; and being withall unable to see the difference between those ideas they find there , or to distinguish betwixt fancies and spiritual conceptions ; are ( unless they be otherwise masters of an excellent genius ) connaturally disposed by their principles to be fanaticks in philosophy ; and to entertain as wild fancies , as the deepest enthusiasts . witness cartesius his mad fit of enthusiasm , which lasted some days , when he was laying his principles , ( as is writ in his life ; ) and those self-strangers , now spoken of , who actually deny'd they were men : whom , ( to requite mr. locke with a parallel story ) i cannot liken so well to any thing , as to a famous humourist , one john band , who serv'd my lady wootton , in kent : this fellow , in the heat of summer , going out in a cart , drawn by two horses , fell asleep in the cart : the horses not hearing any cry gee , ho , to urge them forwards , took their opportunity to rest themselves , and stood still : a companion of his coming by , and seeing how matters stood , under-propp'd the cart , took out the horses ; and ; having set them up , return'd , and lay behind the hedge , to observe how john would behave himself when he miss'd his horses : who awaking , got up , rub'd his eyes , and , in the dawning of his reason , broke out , ( to himself , ) in these words , either now i am john band , or i am not john band : if i am john band , i have e'en lost two horses ; but , if i am not john band , i have found a cart. so that all john's hopes were , that he was not himself ; for then he had been on the better hand . i much doubt , that both he , and mr. locke's rational men , wanted the help of an identical proposition ; which ( tho' mr. locke holds , they are not in the least instructive ) would have made them all so wise , as to know that every thing is what it is . . but , to be serious ; i cannot but admire that this ingenious author should , in his th chapter , so ridicule identical propositions , or esteem them trifling . he told us in his d chapter , that that knowledge he calls intuitive , is of self-evident propositions ; and identical ones are such . he assures us , that in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge , there is an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas ; consonantly to which , i have demonstrated in my method , book . liss . . § . . that all the force of consequence , which gives the nerves to all our discourse , must be an identical proposition . moreover , he says , chap. . that we know each idea to be it self , and not another ; and , that no abstract idea can be the same with any other , but with it self ; which are perfectly identical speeches , and equivalent to these , the same is the same with it self ; or , every thing is what it is ; nay , and general maxims too , against which he shew'd himself much offended in that chapter . nor , do i doubt , but that he judges , his knowledge by ideas is refunded into those identicals , as its ground ; as will be shewn shortly . now , after all this , to rally identical propositions after such a rate , is to me unintelligible . but , i shall be briefer here upon this subject , having demonstrated in my method , book . less . , and . by many arguments , which , i am very confident , are unanswerable , that all first principles must be identical propositions : whence , either those arguments must be shewn invalid , or it must be forcibly deny'd by him that there are any first principles at all ; which all mankind , unless they be perfect scepticks , do grant , and common sense forces us to acknowledge . for , if there be no supream or first principles , 't is impossible there should be any inferior or subordinate ones ; and so , mankind must talk ramblingly , and at random , all their lives , without any principles or grounds at all . but , waving all the other aforesaid proofs , i would beg of him to consider this one argument : we may speak of , or ( which is the same ) put into propositions , all other considerations or notions of the thing , whether they be in the same line , or be the divers modes of it ; we can say , without danger of being reproach'd , that socrates is a man , an animal , a yard high , white , a father , writing , &c. and 't is a hard case if we may not be allow'd to say something of the metaphysical verity of the thing , this being that on which all truth is built ; and without which , all we could say would be false ; and all the world , a chaos of chimoera's . and , if we may say any thing of it , i defie all mankind to shew me , that that saying can be any other but an identical proposition . this being so , i alledge farther , that as all truths are fundamentally built on the metaphysical verity of things ; so all formal truths , or true propositions , must be grounded on such propositions as express or signifie that metaphysical verity , or , say that a thing is what it is ; and , consequently , such propositions , and onely such , can be first principles . now , if first principles , and that which grounds all the force of consequence , may be called trifling , i desire to be inform'd what can be called solid , serious and useful . . i perceive , by mr. locke's managing his discourse here , that his dislike of identical propositions springs from his mistake of our manner of using them . he seems to imagin that we would place them in capite libri , ( as it were , ) and thence deduce conclusions from them ; or else , that we consider them in their bare selves , without relation to any thing else : whence he , with good reason , affirms , they do not instruct us , or teach us any thing , that there is no real knowledge got by them , &c. but the business is quite otherwise : they are the first , and most evident truths , fix'd and rivetted by rational nature , in our understanding ; at the bottom of which they lie , perhaps unseen , and and unreflected on ; yet so , that they give the perfect light to guide all our thoughts and discourses . whence it comes , that speculaters do by art , what the * vulgar do by nature ; and make them the ultimate ressort of all their persuasions , and endeavour to reduce and resolve all their other knowledges into them : this will appear evident to any man who reflects , that , if those be false , or we be not pre-imbu'd with them , we could have no truth , nor any knowledge at all . they are such deep-laid foundations , that all science is rais'd upon them , tho' they make no formal appearance in the symmetry or beauty of that structure : nay , even those who rally them as dry , and useless , must be forc'd , for their own interest , to have recourse to them : for , unless mr. locke does first know , that each idea he has , is it self , and not another , which is an identical proposition , he must confess he could have no distinct ideas ; at least , no knowledge that they are distinct ; whence , the fabrick of his whole book would fall to the ground . after which kindness and support from them , in requital , to call them trifling , is not so gentile a return . hence is seen , that we make no other use of them , than himself does , and must do , or neither of us can possibly speak one word of sense ; for , neither could he , without them , ( suppos'd and held , at least , in his mind , if not express'd , ) be certain of any idea ; nor we , of any notion we have ; nor , consequently , could either of us build any discourse upon them . mr. locke acknowledges , book . chap. . that the metaphysical truth of his ideas do contain a tacit proposition : which being so , what blame can we deserve for speaking out , or writing what is tacitly in our minds ? the chief reason why we put those tacit propositions into formal ones , is for the scepticks sakes ; who , having an utter aversion against metaphysicks , would not heed the metaphysical verity of things , unless it were produced , and forced upon them , by putting it into such an undeniable form of speech as all mankind uses , and must grant . whence , as mr. locke confesses that they are very useful to stop the mouths of wranglers ; so , experience teaches us , they are of no less use to convert or confute scepticks : nay , absolutely necessary for that end ; because scepticks will not admit any thing to be true , but identical propositions onely . for which reason , i have attempted , in my method , to give some hints how to reduce all others to them . i once thought to have written a particular treatise on that subject ; but , i hope those short hints i gave there , may excite some other speculaters to perfect what , having a large field of matter to pass thorow , i did there but briefly touch upon . all this while , i am well aware that mr. locke , book . chap. . mentions other self-evident propositions , which are not identical ; but then , he acknowledges withall , that unless those ideas , which make the two terms of those propositions , be fix'd in their own natures to be such , or to be themselves onely , and therefore not to be another , none of those propositions could be evident at all . so that nothing can be known to be true , or be evident , but by having recourse , finally , to identical propositions . . another sort of trifling propositions , he says , is when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole ; that is , the genus or difference of the species . i answer ; what have we to do with ideas when we predicate ? for predicating is the saying something of another which we call the subject : if then the thing it self be not predicated , then ( to predicate being to say ) we do not talk or speak of it , but perhaps of our own fancies ; especially since mr. locke has declared , b. . chap. . § . that he takes idea indifferently for what is meant by phantasm or by notion . secondly , what means [ predicated of the name of the whole . ] for , if the name of the subject have not some idea , or notion , or some thing for its signification , 't is insignificant , and a meer useless sound : and , if it have , then the notion of the species or genus is that which is predicated , and not the name onely . if things , ( of which onely , as philosophers , we ought to speak ) are turn'd into ideas , realities into spiritual resemblances , and those empty resemblances into emptier names , philosophy will be brought to a strange pass . thirdly , none ever intended to instruct men by this proposition [ homo est animal ; ] because every man knows it already , who knows what the word [ man ] means ; without knowing which , 't is impossible to know any thing by any word whatever ; nor are such propositions as that , which frequently occur in logicians , meant for any thing but meerly for examples of such and such predications : but yet , nature tells us how instructive it is on all occasions , to know what sort or kind ( whether general or specifical ) every thing is , and how it differs from others of the same kind . now , mr. locke , contrary to his equity in other occasions , will neither allow us to predicate the whole definition of the thing defin'd ( as was seen above in the definition of extension ) because 't is the same notion with that which is defin'd ; nor part of the definition , because 't is part of the same ; and yet common reason assures us no predication is true , unless the subject and predicate be , in part or wholly the same ; as the sense of the copula [ est ] tells us . i wish mr. locke would put mankind into a wiser method ; for they have , it seems , done nothing , but perpetually trifled hitherto . . upon the main , he would have nothing that is essential predicated of man , or any other species , ( because the word signifies that already ) but only what 's accidental to him ; and he thinks that then a proposition is instructive , when it tells us something not contain'd in the idea of man. he instances in this ; [ in whatever thing , sense , motion , reason , and laughter are united , that thing has actually a notion of god. ] now this he conceives , does tell us more than barely what the word [ man ] means ; and therefore has somewhat of instruction in it . i much approve his design of bringing disparate notions to close and connect : but yet i must say , that all he can say of man , or any other thing , must either be taken from the intrinsecal nature of the thing it self , or it can never be instructive , solid , or capable of demonstration . v. g. it is essential to man to have natural notions , and to connect those notions orderly by his reason , and by doing this he may attain to the knowledge there is a god. now , all this is contain'd in the notion of man ; only it requires a deeper inspection into that nature , and a more particular reflexion upon what the word [ man ] signifies . for ( quite contrary to his sentiment ) 't is the nature of the thing , signified by its name , which only can instruct us solidly ; and it instructs us by our attention to it , and our frequent and penetrative reflexion on it . whence i cannot commend his instance , nor see how the predicate [ has the notion of god ] can ever be connected with the subject he puts , by virtue of any thing found in the subject it self as he exhibits it . sense belongs to man as he is an animal , motion as he is a living thing ; from neither of which considerations such a connexion of the terms are likely to follow . reason is the most likely ; but since mr. locke holds , that brutes too have some reason , and yet can have no notion of god , it cannot be deduced out of the common word [ reason , ] that man has any such notion . laughter there should seem , according to him , to be the most peculiar to mankind ; for brutes do not laugh at all ; but this is less likely than the others to be that precise consideration , by virtue of which man comes to have the notion of god. again , in his discourse against innate principles , he declar'd his opinion , that there were some men who had actually no notion of a god at all ; tho' , no doubt , they had sense , motion , reason , and laughter too . so that if this proposition be instructive , it can ( even according to himself ) instruct us in nothing but an errour . lastly , what needs this circumlocution ? if sense , motion , &c. huddled together , be signified by the word [ man , ] why could it not as well be said , [ every man has a notion of god ] without more ado ? since by his discourse to predicate what the word [ man ] signifies , is not instructive . or , if they be not signify'd by the word [ man , ] how is the proposition true ? or what means it to say , he intends [ man ] by those many words , and yet would not have it thought so ? or that no intrinsecal predicate instructs , but only what is extrinsecal to any nature ? or , if this be meant for an instructive definition , as it must , ( for the subject in that proposition agrees to nothing but to man ) why are the parts of it so disparate , and so many ? or rather if so many , why no more ? if we may gain the knowledge of more accidents in every species by degrees , as 't is granted we may ; and that we ought to define those species , not by the old beaten way of genus and difference , but by this new one , of cluttering together confusedly the multitudes of accidents we find in them , we may come in time , by finding still more and more , to have definitions so large , that the whole side of a leaf cannot hold them , nor man's memory retain them ; and then what do they serve for ? . indeed , when words are taken in divers significations , if men contentiously adhere to the different senses themselves give them , it is , as mr. locke says well , meer trifling . but i cannot grant that all predications of abstract words are only verbal and trifling . he says , they amount to nothing but significations of terms . and is not this enough ? i wish he would consider his own words . by [ signification of terms ] he means , i suppose , the sense or meaning of them : now the meanings of words being the same with our notions , which as has been demonstrated , are the things themselves , how can those abstract terms be meerly verbal ? since they as much signifie the thing as any other terms whatever ; only they signifie it with a restriction to such a precise respect or considerability found in that whole ens or substance . reflexion twentieth , on the th , th , th , and th chapters . . this excellent author discourses very solidly , when he says , that universal propositions , of which we can have certain knowledge , do not concern existence . i add , nor our notions neither , of which those propositions do consist , ( and much less propositions that are uncertain . ) for , taking the notion alone , or according to the direct signification of the terms , objectively consider'd , they abstract from ( that is , are indifferent to ) all kinds of existence , whether in the mind or in nature . but , when he says that such propositions do not concern existence , he means ( i suppose ) existence in nature , or out of the mind ; ( or else not at all ; ) and the copula [ est ] must necessarily signifie some kind of existence , as well as identifie the two terms in every proposition ; or otherwise it would be a sound or no word . but this discourse is perhaps needless , being , as i think , in great part granted here . all i intend by it , is to clear the notion of existence in the title , and that it means existence out of the mind , by which things or individuums are in themselves , whether we think of them or no. i grant too , that we have so certain a knowledge of our own existence , that it can need no proof ; but i deny we have it by intuition ; and i affirm we got it , and have it , by plain sensation or experience , in the same manner as we know the existence of other bodies ; as will be shewn , when we come to reflect on the th chapter . . his demonstration of a deity , chap. th , is very acute , nor does he here affect recourse to his ideas , or build on them expressly , or ( as he too often does in other places ) take phantasms for notions ; which takes off the force of his reasons . particularly , he argues so strongly that a cogitative being can never be made of meer-matter , that i do judge it unanswerable : and , withall , that it necessarily concludes that brutes can have no knowledge , without having something in them that is spiritual ; which i am sure he will not say . i could wish mr. l. had been steady to this distinction of those two natures , of spiritual and corporeal , which adequately divide ens : which , i think he was not , when he said b. . ch. . § . that he sees no contradiction in it that god should , if he pleas'd , give to certain systems of created senseless matter , put together as he thinks fit , some degrees of sense , perception and thought . for , if the nature of meer matter , by being commodiously put together , can bear the having thoughtfulness ; it is but compounding it more artificially , and it may be as cogitative as the wisest man living ; and so farewell to all spirituality of our soul , nay , to all spiritual nature whatever : for , to what end should god create the distinct nature of spirits , if matter wisely orderd could perform all their operations ? if once we yield that matter , conveniently contrived , can be capable of any degree of knowledge , it is but contriving it better and better , ( and who can stint gods omnipotency in this , more than in other things ? ) and it may be capable of the highest degree of science ; and , consequently , to create spiritual nature at all , would be needless , and to no purpose . besides , if men and brutes differ onely in the degrees of knowledge , they ought to be of the same species ; since magis et minus non variant specïem : for , otherwise , every single man would make a distinct species , which is a plain contradiction . against this position of the possibility of matters being cogitative , he argues here very vigorously § . and shows clearly that incogitative matter , and motion , whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk , could never produce thought . he will say that , tho' it could not do this of it self , yet god could make it do it . but if god cannot contradict himself , or do unwisely , then , since his creative wisdom has establisht each kind of nature to be it self and no other ; then , to put in god a power to confound those natures again , ( which he does if he should confound the primary and proper operation of spirits , which is thought , knowledge or reason by giving it to bodies , ) is to put a power in god to do contradictions , that is , to do impossibilities ; for whatever is against the essence or nature of any thing , makes that thing not to be it self ; which is against an identical and self evident proposition , and a direct contradiction . . the clear distinction of corporeal and spiritual natures , is of that vast importance ; that ( tho' it may seem a little unseasonable ) i cannot but take this occasion to reflect , once more upon mr. l's doctrine in this point , apprehending i may not meet with a fitter opportunity hereafter . i have reason to think , that he does not exclude materiality out of the idea of spirit , or at least of the soul , which all christian philosophers and most heathens too , hold to be of a spiritual nature . on the other side he attributes reason and knowledge ( in some degree at least ) to brutes . now , out of these two positions it follows demonstratively . . that the corporeal and spiritual natures are not clearly distinguisht , which utterly destroys all possibility of truth in philosophy , and seems to do no small prejudice to truths of a higher concern ; which are left inexplicable to men of sense , if those inferiour truths , which relate to the clear distinction of those two natures , be violated and render'd uncertain . for , corporeal and spiritual natures , comprizing , or dividing between themselves , the objects of all the sciences a philosopher can treat of , whether they be physicks , ethicks or metaphysicks , all which must necessarily build their discourses , and draw their conclusions from such notions as are taken from , and do of right belong to those two distinct natures ; it follows that , if these two natures be confounded and jumbled together , and be not clearly distinguisht , it is impossible any clear conclusion can be drawn from either of them , or any rational discourse made concerning them . . that mr. l's way of philosophizing by ideas , which leads him into such strange errours , or at least affords him no certain light to distingush those natures , is good for nothing at all . for , if it cannot furnish him with means , to put a clear distinction between natures so widely distant , and different from one another ; much less can it assist him to show clearly what modes , accidents or properties belong to one nature , what to the other ; or to distinguish those natures , which are infericur to those two general ones ; and therefore differ far less from one another than they did . it remains then to show that mr. l's doctrine by way of ideas , does not put a clear distinction between the aforesaid natures , but confounds them together . he holds it not to be certain that immateriality , is not included in the notion of our spiritual part the soul ; it may , therefore , be material , or have matter in it , for any thing his way of ideas tells him ; and therefore since matter cannot be crampt into an indivisible , it may be divisihle or extended ; and , so , may be divided or shatter'd , that is ( its unity being thus lost , and , consequently , its entity , ) it may cease to bee , or be corrupted . again , if it be divisible , it must be to some degree , or either more or less , divisible ; that is , rare , or else dense . if rare , then ( since passivenes is essential to the notion of matter ) it may by the operation of other material causes , which never wants , be condens'd ; and consequently , become opacous or visible ; or , it may by the same causes become rarer , and be turn'd into fire . also being divisible , it may have parts of which one must be without the other , that is , it must be impenetrable as to its own parts , and thence be able to protrude another material being , and be solid too ( in his sense of that word ) which is the same with impenetrable . moreover , since it must be divisible , it must be quantitative or extended , and this not infinitely but finitely ; that is , it must be terminated ; wherefore , termination of quantity , being the notion of figure , it may have figure too . in a word , if it may possibly be material , there is no property of body , but may agree to the soul ; and therefore , the soul , tho' spiritual , may be corporeal ; and so the nature of body and spirit may be one and the same . but what needs more than meerly his ascribing materiality to it , at least , permitting it to belong to it ? our notion of [ matter ] is taken from body , and from nothing else , and therefore can be nothing but body , consider'd as ( not what it actually is , but ) as 't is alterable , changeable , or apt to be another thing , that is , as 't is corruptible ; which , i am sure , mr. l. will not say or think of our soul. perhaps he may say , that he only means that it may have matter annex'd to its spirituality . but then he must grant , that since this materiality did not , as an accident , accrue to the soul afterwards , she had it from her nature ; and therefore it must be intrinsecal to her , and help to constitute her peculiar nature ; and , if this be so , then , when this material kind of compart is dissolv'd or corrupted ( for if material , it may be alter'd , wrought upon , and corrupted as other material compounds may ) the complex or compound it self is dissolv'd , and so no longer the same , but perish'd . besides , what should the soul do with two material comparts ; one , organical ; the other , inorganical ? especially , since there are as subtil parts in this visible body of ours , with which , as the form of the body , she is united , ( viz. the spirits ) as any , perhaps , mr. locke can conceive to be annex'd to her . . to proceed , he does but think it possible , for any thing he knows , that the soul may have some materiality ; but he positively judges , that brutes have reason ; nay , that 't is as evident to him as that they have sense . now , if they have reason , they must know how to draw consequences , this being essential to the notion of reason , or rather the same thing in other words . again , if they can reason , they can compare what 's meant by our terms , and have the sense of those sayings we call propositions in their knowing power . and , since that reason is not given them for nothing , but for their preservation , they can compare agreeable and disagreeable objects , and pursue , out of that reason , that which is most agreeable ; that is , they can will , chuse , and act freely , which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their reason what is better or worse for them , and thence determining themselves to it accordingly : i say , themselves ; for , if they have reason , then reason is part of themselves , and not a distinct thing from them . out of which two things follow : one , that the nature of man and brute are confounded ; since all those chief operations proper to man , are communicable to brutes . secondly , that mr. locke will be at a loss to get an idea of the spirituality of his soul , or of other spiritual beings , by reflecting on the operations of his mind ; since the same may possibly be found in such beings as are meerly corporeal . wherefore , to conclude this discourse , all our natural notions of body and spirit , and of all their operations , must be jumbled together in a kind of indifferency to either ; and therefore those two natures must be confounded , if either the soul , which is spiritual , may have materiality annex'd to her ; or brutes , which are material entities , may have thought , knowledge , and reason annex'd to them . and since mr. locke affirms very rationally , that one of his ideas is not another , i cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the natures of those two things , liquidly and precisely , how those two natures are distinguish'd ; or else his way of ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly phantastick and unphilosophical ; being most unlike the ideas in the divine understanding , the original ground of all truth , which do not confound natures , but establish them in a most perfect distinction to be what they are , and no other . i press not here how no discourse at all in philosophy can be conclusive , unless the nature of body and spirit be perfectly and clearly contradistinguish'd ; nor repeat what i have shewn , reflex . . § . . that our natural notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between body and spirit , which his ideas do not , but confound them , and thence deprave our natural knowledge of things . i know he says , but proves not , that the having general ideas , puts a perfect difference between brutes and us ; to which i have spoken formerly . i add , that 't is a thousand times easier to have general ideas , they being but imperfect perceptions of the thing , than to have reason ; as is easie to be demonstrated , and has been manifested above . . as for making something out of nothing , or creating ; after we have prov'd that existence is essential to god , and not accidental to him , which mr. l. clearly demonstrates ; it follows thence , and out of the commonest notion of causality , that it is not a matter of wonderment , or hard to believe that he should create , but that if he pleases to operate ad extra , this is his peculiar action ; since nothing is more evident than that every thing acts as it is . whence , if god's essence , and his very nature be existence or actual being , 't is demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause actual being or create , as it is for fire to heat , or light to enlighten ; but , moreover , that this is the onely effect that can immediately or without the intervention of second causes , proceed from him . . i much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true argument for the possibility of creation , to bring the instance of our thought moving our body ; whence he concludes that gods power to do a thing is not to be deny'd because we cannot comprehend its operation . for , . mr. locke thinks he experiences this , viz. that the soul moves the body ; whereas we do not experience that god created any thing . . as mr. locke has shown very ingeniously , that onely the man is free : so i affirm 't is the man that , wrought upon himself , moves his body , and not his thought onely . and , that , as when we gaind our first notions , the man was acted upon , both according to his corporeal and spiritual part ; so , every new act he had afterwards , that proceeded from him as he was man , is perform'd by the concurrence of both those parts . whence , in every act of his soul , he must be re-excited by some object that is out of the soul , either striking on his senses ; or else , by the repeated strokes of the material phantasms , lodg'd within , upon the seat of knowledge . these propose a-fresh the motives , and continue those impressions all the while he deliberates , compares , discourses , and determins ; and , when the man , according to that part call'd the fancy , is full ( as it were ) of those agreeable phantasms ; and , consequently , the soul ( hic est nunc ) is full too of those notions or apprehensions of their agreeableness , the whole man acts for them , and moves to attain them . in which case , what is purely material in those actions , or belonging meerly to corporeal motion , is refunded into the stupendious contrivance of the body , whose motions follow connaturally from the phantasms , in the same way as it does in brutes ; which is equally wonderful , we knowing no more than they , ( that is , not at all ) how it is done : but , the manner of the action , as to its design , direction , wise ordering of it , and its proceeding from knowledge , freedom and reason , ( all which we know it does , ) springs peculiarly from the soul , or from man , according to his spiritual part. now , the fundamental ground of my position is this , man is not two things ; nor ( which is the same ) made up of soul and body , as two actual parts ; but one thing , of which , consequently , those two are potential parts onely . wherefore , neither of those parts is actually , but the whole ; and therefore , neither of them alone can act , because neither of them exists alone ; * the existence of the thing being that in which its virtue of operating consists . but , in truth , his argument proceeds as well from this topick , as it does from that of meer thought moving the body ; for , we can comprehend as little , how man , tho' acting with his phantasms and thoughts too , does move the body , and all its distinct parts , so variously , as how the thought alone can do it . nor , were there some flaw in this particular , does it prejudice his main demonstration of a deity , they being distinct questions . add , that if we may conjecture from some expressions of his in other places , he may perhaps be of my opinion in this point , and , by the word [ mind , ] mean the man ; tho' in many places he speaks very ambiguously ; or rather , seems too plainly to maintain the contrary position . . i take leave on this occasion , to recommend it to speculative men , to endeavour to draw all their demonstrations from the nature of the thing , ( this being the onely solid way , ) and not from foreign topicks . after we have prov'd a deity , let us next demonstrate that god is self-existent ; or , that his essence , or nature , is existence ; and then , all that concerns the deity , or his immediate operations , nay , even the rational explication of the trinity it self , will ( if right logick and reflexion be not wanting ) follow more solidly , and more clearly , than the clearest mathematical conclusions ; if we rate clearness and evidence , ( as we ought , ) not from the figures on paper , which make it easie to our fancy ; but from the greater simplicity and clearness of the notions , and their terms , and of their equally-evident connexion ; which , coming nearest to first , and self-evident principles , do most firmly establish the judgment . . the th chapter treats of our knowledge of the existence of other things ; by which words he means , other things than our selves . he seems to ground his discourse on this position , that no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when , by actually operating upon him , it makes it self perceiv'd by him ; which he calls the way of sensation , or experience . now , if , by the words , [ any other being , ] he means bodies , nothing can be more solid , or worthy a philosopher . but , why we may not gather by our reason , the existence of spiritual beings , or angels , ( tho' they do not operate upon us actually , ) from some operation on other things in nature that can onely proceed from them , i cannot discern : rather , i hope i have demonstrated we can , in my method , book . less . . thesis . indeed , the notions of angelical natures are not proper ones , as our natural notions , which are imprinted by sensation , are ; which makes our conceptions , and consequently , the words which we use when we discourse of them metaphorical . nor matters it , that our expressions concerning them are oft-times negative , or signifie that they are not such beings as bodies are , but immaterial , unextended , indivisible , and , consequently , their operations unsuccessive ; in regard we intend all the while to signifie by those words , a positive being , tho' our low natural conceptions cannot reach its particular nature , as in it self : and , if we intend this , then this is the meaning of those words , or our notion of them ; meaning and intention being all one . yet , these predicates , tho' negative , or metaphorical , are , notwithstanding , truly said of them ; and , therefore , we can argue and discourse as consequently from them , as we can from the most positive or proper notions we have . indeed , as mr. locke says well , § . . we cannot know they exist , by the ideas we have of them in our minds ; and the reason is , because those ideas , or notions , taking them as ●●stinct , are but inadequate conceptions of the thing ; and , consider'd distinctly , are formally but a part of that complexion of accidents that constitute the individuum , which only is capable of existing , or the whole ; because parts cannot exist out of the whole : but he is much mistaken if he thinks we can no more know they are capable of existing by the notions we have of them , than we can that centaurs are : for , the idea or fancy of centaurs involves inconsistent notions in its very nature , ( or rather , no-nature ; ) which the notion of a subsistent spirit , called an angel , does not . add , that knowing , willing , and operating , which we attribute to such beings , are all positive notions ; and consistent , or capable to meet in a spiritual thing . . whereas mr. locke says we can onely know the existence of any other thing when it operates upon us , and therefore we know it is actually by sensation , i cannot see the least reason why we should not know our own being by sensation too , as well as that of other bodies , without having recourse to intuition ; which , apply'd to that case , 't is hard to understand ; or , to know how it differs from the direct knowledge had by sensation or experience . we can hear , see , feel and smell some parts of our own body , as well as we can those of others . indeed , now , when we are ripe for more express knowledges , those impressions made by one of our own parts upon others , do not cause in us the notion of existence , ( tho' , perhaps , they may tacitly repeat it , ) because we know already , and before-hand , that we do exist : but , put case we did not , would not these impressions make us know by sensation our own existence , as well as that of any other body whatever ? i doubt not but mr. locke will grant they would . since then the embryo in the womb lies in a roundish posture , why may not one part of it , by touching another , or operating upon it , cause in us , as soon as the soul ( which has a capacity of receiving notions ) is in it , a notion of our own existence , by way of sensation ? especially , since operation is nothing but the existence of the agent body , press'd or imprinted ( as it were ) upon another , by motion . certainly , it becomes us who deny innate ideas , to shew how all our first notions do come into us by impressions on the senses ; and , not to say rawly , that some of them come by intuition ; which is the way of knowing proper to angels , whose knowledges are all innate , and none of them acquir'd , either by sense , or discourse , for they have neither . this , i say , is certainly best for the interest of our tenet ; of which , intuition gives but a slender account . i believe mr. locke proceeds upon this , that he finds he not only does , but must as firmly assent to the proposition ego sum , as he does to the most evident proposition whatever ; nor can he at all doubt of it , nor can it need proof . but , my judgment is , that this introversion , and studying our own interiour , is a very fallacious guide , and will often lead us astray , if we keep not a steady eye , attentively bent to our principles ; which he seems here to neglect . for , many positions need no proof , and force our assent , and yet their certainty may depend on different causes . . the th chapter treats of the improvement of our knowledge , which mr. locke says , does not depend on maxims . but , first , he mistakes the use of general maxims : they are not made for the vulgar , or beginners , to gather knowledge by them ; tho' it may be observ'd , that men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose ; nay , sometimes make proverbs of them . nor was this maxim , [ a whole is bigger than a part , ] ever intended for boys , or to teach them that their hand is bigger than their little finger , or such like ; but , being premised to the ensuing proofs , they are occasionally made use of by learned men , in the process of their discourse , to clinch the truth of the point , when it needs it , by their self-evidence . in the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to metaphysical principles , and made use of them , in my preliminaries and reflexions , as occasion presented , to make my discourses evident ; and , to rivet the truths i advance , in the minds of my readers ; as any attentive peruser of them may easily observe . he speaks against our receiving principles without examination , and of principles that are not certain ; that is , against such sayings , as are no principles ; for , if they can either need , or admit of examination , or , if they be not certain , none but meer fops will let them pass for prinples . yet , tho' mr. locke does thus oppose maxims and principles , 't is , notwithstanding , very evident , that himself must make use of some maxims and principles all the while he disputes aganst their usefulness ; otherwise , he cannot discourse at all ; or , his discourse can have no force : in the same manner as he that wrastles with another , must either fix his foot on some firm ground , or he will fall himself , instead of overthrowing his adversary . let us then examin his principles . he alledges , that the knowledge of the certainty of principles depends only upon the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas . this , then , is one of his principles ; both because it runs through good part of his d and th books , as also because 't is equivalent to this universal , [ all certainty of principles depends , &c. ] now , this is so far from self-evident , that it needs examination enough ; and is one of those i judge not certain ; and , therefore , can be no ground or principle at all : nor is it possible it should , unless the word [ idea ] be cleared to mean spiritual notions in our mind , and not meer resemblances , or material representations in our fancy ; to clear which , ( tho' the whole treatise needs it , ) no provision is made ; but , on the contrary , those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded ; as is shewn in my first preliminary . another principle seems to be this , [ none ought , with a blind and implicit faith , to receive and swallow principles . ] this is of universal influence , and self-evident ; and , therefore , in all points well qualify'd for a principle . for , principles were not principles , if they needed either faith , or deductions of reason , to make them go down , since they ought to be evident by their own light. but , what good can this do to any , but to such as have renounc'd common sense , even to ridiculousness ? and , perhaps mr. locke had some such weak writers in his eye , when he advanc'd this cautious position , as a warning to learners . . now , the general maxims and principles , on which the learned part of the world has hitherto proceeded , can onely be overthrown ( if they must needs be so ) by other principles , more evident than themselves are ; or else it will be but a drawn match ; and so they may hope still to stand ( as the lawyers phrase it ) in their full force , effect , and vertue . we are to consider then , what principle mr. locke has substituted in their room , when they are discarded ; for , 't is a very ill case to be left without any principles at all . 't is this , [ all knowledge of the certainty of principles , and consequently , the way to improve our knowledge , is , to get , and fix in our minds , clear , distinct and compleat ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them proper and constant names . ] now , if the ideas must be clear , the terms must be very simple , and consequently ( as was shewn above ) general ones ; and this will force us back upon general maxims , which it was intended we should avoid , as good for little . to be distinct , if we go to work like artists , we must distinguish those general and common notions ; which will bring us back into the old road of those ten common heads , called predicaments ; and , consequently , of genus , species and differences , which was lately dislik'd ; i suppose , because it was too much travell'd in , and beaten ; tho' , i think , such a common path should not be left , because some may have here and there laid a block or briar in the way . lastly , compleat ideas ( as he grants ) are not to be had of the species , much less of the individuums . and , as for names ; 't is not we that are to annex them , but the common usage of the vulgar , or of the generality of learned men , ( in case they be artificial ones ; ) for , these are they who gave them their constant and proper signification . whence is seen , that so many difficulties are involv'd in this one thesis , or principle , ( besides what is said above , of the word [ ideas , ] ) that we can build no degree of certainty , nor improvement of knowledge upon it ; especially , since mr. locke himself ( according to his usual candour and modesty ) declares here , he does but think it true . but , which is the hardest case of all , to embrace this principle , we must be oblig'd to quit all our self-evident maxims , as of little use , upon which our selves , and all the learned part of the world , have proceeded hitherto . . 't is a great truth , that it is a right method of advancing knowledge , to consider our abstract notions : but , if these be not the things , nor ( as mr. locke's complex ideas are ) so much as like them , i see not but that , let us consider them as much as we will , we shall be never the nearer attaining any real knowledge by such a consideration . i add , that it is also as necessary to find out middle terms , that are proper ; without which , no science can be had of any new conclusion ; nor , consequently , can we , without this , advance one step in exact knowledge . 't is a certain truth also , that morality is capable of demonstration ; tho' i do not remember that any author , but mr. locke , and my self , have been so bold , as openly to profess it . the current of slight speculaters having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of maxim , that [ there is no perfect certainty to be had , but only in lines and numbers : ] whereas , the principles of morality are as evident , and the notions belonging to such subjects as clear , as those in natural philosophy , perhaps clearer ; as this worthy author has shewn most manifestly . 't is also true , that knowledge may be better'd by experience . but , if he means scientifical knowledge , which is the effect of demonstration , i must deny it , unless common principles of nature do guide experience , and give it light of the true and proper causes of what experience inform'd our senses ; for , without their assistance , ( as i have shewn in the preface to my my method , ) experimental knowledge can never produce any one scientifical conclusion . i add , that true science would be a thousand times more advanc'd , did learned men bend their endeavours to begin with the primary affections of body , and thence proceed gradually to secondary , or more compounded ones : for , this method would furnish studious men with good store of proper middle terms , to deduce their demonstrations . lastly , 't is true , that we must beware of hypotheses , and wrong principles : but , where shall we find any sect. of philosophers , who , for want of exact skill in logick and metaphysicks , are not forc'd to build upon hypotheses , ( and those generally false ones too ; ) but our anti-ideists , whom i take to be true followers of aristotle , in his main principles , and the only true understanders of his doctrine . it being , indeed , scarce possible , that those who are not well qualify'd with those two sciences , should be capable to comprehend his true sense . . mr. locke judges , that a man may pore long enough on those maxims us'd by euclid , without seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths . self-evident truths need not be por'd upon at all ; nor were they ever meant for the attaining new knowledges by poring on those propositions , singly consider'd : yet , these maxims must be pre-supposed to be true , and admitted , or the arguments would very often want their best cement , that gives them an evident and necessary coherence . they are prefix'd by euclid at first , both because they may often come in play afterwards ; as also , because it would throw off the tenour of the discourse , to mention them still expresly every time there needs recourse to them : whence it was judg'd fit by him , and others like him , to premise them at first , and then refer to them . let men but observe how , and in what occasions , euclid makes use of them , and it will then be best seen what they are good for : but , if they are good for nothing at all , i am sure it must be concluded , that both euclid himself , and such writers and users of maxims , were , all of them , a company of vain , idle fops , to amuse their readers by proposing so solemnly such ridiculous trifles ; and dubbing those insignificant baubles with the honourable titles of maxims and principles . to fix which dis-repute upon him , and his imitaters , will , i doubt , much scandalize every true member of the commonwealth of learning . reflexion th . on the fourteenth , fifteenth , and sixteenth chapters . . i am sorry i must declare , that in mr. locke's th chapter , which treats [ of judgment ] there is scarce one line that i can yield to . i discourse thus : judgment does most evidently import the fixure of our understanding in its assent to the truth or falshood of any proposition . for to say , i judge a thing to be so ; is the same as to say , [ i am fully and firmly persuaded it is so . ] now , this fixure of the mind may arise from two causes ; reason and passion . under the word [ reason , ] taken at large , i comprehend all kind of evident knowledge whatever , that can belong to a rational creature . to passion belongs all precipitancy of assent , from what motive or cause soever it springs . the former makes us adhere to what we judge , upon such motives , as by their evidence do determine the understanding to assent , and fix it in that assent ; which motives , therefore , can be only such as are purely intellectual ; or such as , by our proceeding upon them , we see clearly the thing must be so , or not so , as we apprehend . the later springs from the will , corrupted and byassed by some interest or pleasure , which inveigles our understanding to adhere to it as a truth , because the will would have it so . again , there are two sorts of objects man , as having two natures in him , may be employ'd about , viz. outward action and inward assent . the former does ( generally ) concern the external conveniences or necessities of our temporal life here ; the later , the interiour and natural perfection of our soul ; which is the adhering to truth , and rejecting of errour . in the former of these we can have no clear evidence , or very seldom ; both because outward actions are employ'd about particulars , of which we can have no science ; as also , because those particulars about which we are to act , are surrounded with almost innumerable circumstances which we cannot comprehend , and way-laid by the undiscoverable ambushes of fortune ; so that we can seldom or never , with absolute certainty , know whether they may , or may not prove successful . notwithstanding which dangers , when there is necessity or great conveniency to act outwardly , we may , without disparaging our reason , fall to acting upon a probability ; the necessity obliging us to do so , and the impossibility of perfect assurance acquitting us of imprudence . but , of assenting , or of judging inwardly , that a proposition is true or false , there can be no necessity , unless evidence forces us to it ; in regard god's goodness has furnish'd us with a faculty of suspending our judgment in such cases , lest we run into errour ; which is always prejudicial to our nature ; and , if the errour does concern matters of high moment , pernicious to our souls eternal welfare . this i take to be plain reason , nor do i doubt but that each branch of this discourse may be reduced to perfect evidence . we come to examin now what mr. locke delivers in this most important point . . first , he confounds outward action , of which there is necessity , and can be no evidence of success ; with interiour judging and assenting , of which there can be no necessity , if there can be no evidence ; and of which evident knowledge may oftentimes be had ; as also concerning whose truth or falshood , till evidence appear , we may safely and honourably suspend our judgment ; nay , if , in such a case , we do not , we hazard to do our selves an injury when we need not . that he thus confounds those two vastly different , or rather contrary considerations , appears hence ; that , § . he shews the unreasonableness of not eating , and of not going about our business , till we have a demonstration that the meat will nourish us , and the business will succeed ; which instances evidently relate to outward action ; but in § . he speaks in the same tenour of taking the proposition to be true or false ; which clearly relates to inward assent . secondly , god 's wisdom has indeed given us , generally , no more but probability for our outward actions doing us good , or succeeding ; but to think our all-wise maker has given us no better grounds to make us assent ; or rather , that he intended we should assent upon probabilities , which are still liable to be false ; and , if they be but probabilities , may all be false , is to think that god meant to expose our souls to innumerable errours ; nay , allows and designs we should embrace errours . for , if ( as mr. l. says ) god has given as a faculty to judge that to be true , which , the reasons for their truth being but probable , may not be true ; then , since god has most certainly intended we should make use of the faculty he has given us , it must follow that god has exposed us to errour , or design'd we should err ; and that , ( this faculty , as he says , not being knowledge ) very frequently . which is hardly consistent with the reverence we do both of us owe to our creatour , who governs his creatures according to the nature he has given them ; which , is to avoid errour , and never ( as will shortly be seen this does ) to admit a contradiction . . what therefore i extremely admire , is , that mr. locke should say in express terms , that judgment is that faculty , whereby the mind takes any proposition to be true or false , without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs ; and that this faculty is given man by god to enlighten him . for , first , judgment does not enlighten us at all ; as appears evidently , because false judgments are errours ; which are so far from enlightning the mind , that they manifestly darken it . all that judgment does , is to fix the mind in the perswasion it has , whether that persuasion springs from clear reason or dark passion ; and mr. locke seems to make good my words , while he contradistinguishes judgment to knowledge ; which later , and onely which , is our intellectual light. secondly , the words [ taking propositions to be true or false ] must mean assenting to them as such ; for every judgment is not only an assent , but a full and firm assent . now , that no probability can , with reason , cause assent , ( and certainly god , who gave us our reason , has not given us a faculty to use it against our reason ) will be seen hereafter . thirdly , which is yet worse , by contradistinguishing judgment and clear knowledge , he makes those assents which spring out of clear knowledge to be no judgments at all ; whereas these are the onely judgments that we can be sure will do us good , and are according to our true nature , reason . he tells us indeed , in the close , that when we judge as things really are , they are right judgments . but , how does this agree with his contradistinguishing formerly [ judgment , ] according to its whole latitude , or in its general notion , from knowledge ; unless we should say , that we only do right when we judge at hap-hazard , or judge right by chance . qui quod aequum est statuit parte inauditâ alterâ , aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus est tamen : by which rule , we are ill men , even tho' we judge right ; because we precipitate and hazard to embrace errour when we need not . besides , things are so really to us as we know them to be : and , if we do not know them to be such , we cannot with reason say or judge them to be such ; and , if we do , we act against our true nature ; to do which god has given us no faculty . fourthly , amongst the causes mention'd here that make us judge , necessity is reckon'd as one , when certain knowledge is not to be had : but , this can be no cause at all to make us judge . for , there can be no possible necessity , forcing us to judge , but clear evidence . this , indeed , obliges us to interiour assent , and compels us to judge that the thing is so as we see it to be . but , if no evidence can be had , what necessity is there at all of judging one way or other ? cannot we suspend our judgment till evidence appears ; or whether it does ever appear , or not ? why are we in such hast to hazard falling into error ? or who bids us judge at all till we see a good ( or conclusive ) reason why ? i am sure , whatever many men may do out of weakness , neither god nor nature ever impos'd upon any such an absurd duty . lastly , what means his making it then to be judgment , when we have no demonstrative evidence ? may we not judge a conclusion that is demonstrated to be true , because it is demonstrated ? or that an identical proposition is true , because 't is self-evident ? or , rather , ought we not to judge all such propositions to be true for this very reason , because we know evidently they are so . so far then is certain knowledge from being contradistinguish'd from judgment , that they are in some manner the same , as i have shewn in my method , b. . less . . § . where , i hope , i have set the nature of judgment in a clear light ; as i have that of assent , suspense , and certainty , b. . § . . i should be glad to think my self mistaken in mr. locke's meaning , if his express words , the tenour of his discourse , and his next chapter [ of probability , ] which runs in the same strain , would give me leave . perhaps , he thinks that , since none can embrace christianity without judging it to be true , and few know it to be so , we should exclude the generality from the way to salvation , if we do not allow such a faculty given us by god , as judging without knowing . i answer , . those gifts that come from above , from the father of lights , are all perfect , as being the endowments of his infinitely-bountiful hand ; and , that men act imperfectly and foolishly , springs from the limitedness of creatures . scarce a faculty they have but has its weakness when we come to act , as well as our reason . when then any one is reduc'd to christianity upon weak motives , what 's good or sincere in that action is refunded into god the author of all good ; what 's defective ( as all inconclusive reasonings are ) is to be refunded into the imperfection of creatures . indeed , it belongs to god to lay and establish such motives to embrace high and concerning truths , as are of their own nature apt to convince , not only people of all sorts , but even the most speculative wit living ; but it does not belong to him to provide , that every weak man shall , untaught , penetrate them throughly ; nor every careless man make use of them . rude and imperfect motives are sufficient to move rude and imperfect understandings . . this notwithstanding , god has furnish'd even the rudest , who cannot speculate at all , with a power to understand such motives , after some fashion , called practical evidence ; which teaches them , by a common converse with natural things , and with mankind , to know ( dully at least ) the force of witnessing authority attesting the miracles that abetted christianity , and the books that deliver'd it . but , what i chiefly insist upon is , that it teaches all men , that the nature of its precepts , and of its morality , is most agreeable to our reason ; that it curbs passion , which breeds such turmoils in the world ; and that , ( if settled in men's lives , ) it would establish all the world in peace and concord ; especially , since they cannot but see what inconveniencies and ill consequences do ensue the breach of the commandments . and this gives an entire satisfaction to every man who is capable of knowing common morality , ( as , who is not ? ) and assures them , that the doctrine it self is true ; since they experience that errour puts all into confusion and disorder . but , this on the by. in a word , he must be a mean speculater , who does not observe that god has laid motives , and solid knowable ones too , for every man to embrace christian faith , of what degree soever he be , if he be but so wise as to doubt , and require a reason : if those motives be not apply'd to all , 't is either the fault of those that do not care to be instructed ; or of those who should inculcate and explicate to them those motives , and shew how solid and clear they are . let them then bear the blame ; god's providence is justify'd , and his wisdom and goodness magnify'd , by his making ample provision for such negligent and unworthy persons . see method to science , book . less . . §§ . , . . hence , i have little to say to his th chapter , which treats of probability ; * having shewn from the ground of all consequence , ( the connexion of the middle term with the two extreams , ) that , when the medium is proper or immediate , it causes demonstration , and begets science ; when common or remote , it makes the thing onely probable , and begets opinion ; when unconcerning , it causes improbability ; when clearly repugnant , it breeds dissent . i am therefore onely to reflect on those expressions of mr. locke that seem to say we may assent , or judge the thing is so upon probable reasons ; or , as mr. locke expresses it , assent as firmly as tho' the thing were infallibly demonstrated , tho' it do but border near upon certainty . i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . that no truly wise man does assent or judge upon motives , tho' very highly probable ; nor can do so , tho' they be never so probable and likely , if he sees it but likely , or probable : for , all reasons or motives that are but probable , permit that the thing may not be so , or may not be ; and to assent , or judge the thing true , is to say in our mind , that the thing is : whence , to assent the thing is , upon a probability , is , equivalently , to hold , that , it is possible the thing may be , and may not be , at once : it may be , because it is ; and , it may not be at the same time , because the onely grounds for its being so , are but probable . which , therefore , being against a first , and self-evident principle , is the greatest depravation that a humane understanding can be liable to , and ( if put in clear terms ) absolutely impossible ; both because contradictions being repugnant to the nature of ens , or thing , are unintelligible ; as also , because it would make our mind , which is essentially intellectual , to be not intellectual , that is , chimerical . for , 't is impossible it should be intellectual , if it denies first principles . . this ground laid , 't is obvious to discern what is to be said to his th chapter , [ of the degrees of assent . ] for , . i must deny that any assent at all that the thing is so , can be built upon the sandy foundation of probability , without a most prodigious perversion of humane understanding . . hence i reflect upon the very subject or title of this chapter ; and i object against it , that it is an absolute impossibility there should be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . to assent to any truth , ( as was lately shewn , ) is to say interiourly , the thing [ is ; ] and to dissent , is to say the thing [ is not . ] these two notions then are evidently the objects of those two acts , which give those acts to be what they are , or ( as the schools express it ) do specifie them . wherefore , each of those two acts consists in an indivisible , as their objects do ; and , consequently , there can be no more any degrees of assent , than there can be any middle between is , and is not ; which is neither the one nor the other ; or , in part the one , in part the other ; whereas , being both of them indivisible , neither of them can have any parts at all . the degrees then which can possibly be put in this case , and which i would be willing to think mr. locke meant , are the degrees of bending or inclining , more or less , towards assent or dissent ; that is , greater or lesser opinions of the things being , or not being . assent then , and dissent , or is and is not , in the judging power , are the two fixed butts and bounds of that large field , in which innumerable swarms of opinions , probabilities , likelihoods , doubts , deemings , and uncertainties reside ; driven perpetually up and down , in a wild-goose chase , by those unsteady guides , probabilities ; now nearer , now farther off from those immoveable barriers . but , it is to be noted , that the degrees of probability and likelihood may sometimes be so very great , that they may seem , even to the wisest men , while they regard them heedlesly , to counterfeit assent , till they come to take a narrower and stricter re-view of the grounds on which they are built ; as i have shewn in my method , book . less . . § . . mr. locke enumerates here many probable topicks , grounding opinion ; and i have done the same , in the place now quoted , § . . all which do agree in this , that they are common or remote mediums : whence they are , in true reason , inconclusive ; and therefore , utterly unable to cause assent in a being that is rational ; there wanting in them that visible and certain connexion , in which all the force of consequence consists , and which mr. locke puts to be onely known by intuition . there may , indeed , be degrees of assent taken from the subject's side , by which the understanding assents more or less firmly ; according as the medium is more or less evident . whence , metaphysical mediums , which approach nearest to self-evidence , cause a firmer assent , than those which are taken from inferiour notions , which depend on the other for their certainty : and , that medium taken from the divine authority , does rationally beget the firmest assent of all : yet , still , the object of the assent or dissent is [ is , ] or [ is not . ] but this cannot be mr. locke's meaning here ; because the least of these assents is built upon clear evidence ; which is impossible to be found , where the medium is but probable . . i am very apprehensive that this discourse , and others such like will seem very uncouth , and be very displeasing to those short-sighted speculaters , who , either out of disadvantagious education , or out of diffidence that there can be any certain method to science , are sceptically inclin'd : especially to those of our modern schoolmen ; who , not being accustom'd to demonstrate themselves , think it a disgrace to them , and incredible to boot , that any else should do it . one of whom , a worthy friend of mine , of an acute understanding , and very ingenious , but not yet wean'd from insignificant school-terms , nor aware of their trifling way of distinguishing ; uponmy discoursing with him about this point , did imagin it might all be answered , and over thrown by an easy distinction of assent , into absolute and probable . alledging that absolute assent had indeed [ is ] for its object , and so consisted in an indivisible ; but that probable assent did not so ; by which means the imputation of holding a contradiction is avoyded . thus he reply'd : wherefore , it were not amiss for his sake , and others of the same pitch , to lay open the frivolousness of this insignificant distinction ; that , by reflecting on this , they may correct their carriage in all other like occasions . first then , he seems to join the epithet of [ probable ] to the act of assenting ; which is perfect nonsense . for , since every accident or mode has its metaphysical verity , by which it is what it is , as well as any substance ; it is equally against the first principle [ every thing is what it is ] to apply that distinction to any accident ( of which assent is one , ) as it would be to apply it to any substance . put case then we were discoursing concerning the nature of a stone , or of any other substance or body ; and were disputing whether its nature were such or such ; and he should go about to elude the whole force of this discourse , by distinguishing [ stone ] into a probable stone , and an absolute stone , would it not be highly ridiculous : for the same reason it would be equally ridiculous to apply [ probable ] to the act of assenting ; since that act is as absolutely it self , as a stone is a stone , or any other body is what it is . but , that i may not be too severe , let us imagin he meant to apply [ probable , ] to the object of the act or some proposition , as standing under motives onely probable ; whence , 't is equivalent to this proposition , [ this tenet is probable : ] then , in case the proof of that tenet were onely a probable medium , that proposition is a plain truth , for what is inferr'd by a probable medium , is beyond all question , probable ; and therefore the assent to that proposition , ought to be call'd absolute , and not probable , which quite spoiles the distinction by making the two branches of it to be one and the same . . hence , this contradistinguishing probable and absolute , is faulty in another regard , because the two parts of it are not ( some way ) opposit ; as they ought to be ; because the defendent in the schools uses to say , that according to one of them , he grants the proposition , and according to the other denies it . now , absolute and probable , are not at all proper opposites : [ absolute ] signifies consummate or perfect in its kind , and relates to the minds perfectly yeilding or assenting that the thing is true ; whereas , [ probable ] must relate to the motives , or the common medium under which the proposition stands , or else ( as was lately shewn ) it is meer nonsense , and ridiculous . the proper opposite to probable , is improbable ; and , what has improbable to do with absolute ? lastly , granting he speaks of the object or thesis proposed to our assent , it will appear evidently that my assertion will stand good , and that the formal object of assent is what is express'd by the copula [ is , ] or the connexion of the two terms , in which truth ( which onely is to be assented to ) consists . for example ; when we say that [ a thesis prov'd onely by a common medium , is probable ; ] the truth , even of this proposition , is onely express'd by the copula [ is , ] and consists in an indivisible ; so that you no sooner step out of [ is probable , ] but you must run into its contradictory , [ is not probable . ] . this instance will give us occasion to note the vanity and folly of innumerable distinctions , which pass current amongst disputants ; in which , if examin'd strictly , sometimes the two parts of them are not opposit , but onely oddly disparate ; sometimes coincident ; sometimes they are applied to such terms as are incapable to admit them , without palpable nonsense ; very often when all is done , they are impertinent : and , frequently , whereas the distinction should divide the notion of the genus , and include it , one of the members will perfectly contradict the whole generical notion , and pretend to pass for one sort of it , when it is point blank opposit to it , and to every part of it : for example , i remember an eminent school divine , when ( honest nature putting a scruple into me , when i was young ) i askt him how a man could say he had done such a thing when he had not done it ; he answerd very soberly , that he had done it intentionaliter , tho' not realiter : now , to do it ( as he call'd it ) intentionaliter , is onely to have an intention to do it , which signifies not to have done it . so that [ doing ] is , by virtue of a distinction , divided into doing and not doing ; and not doing is made one sort of doing . and i do assure my friend his probable assent is not a jot wiser ; but has more faults in it than had the other , 't is not enough then , nor at all satisfactory , to give an answer fork'd with a distinction ; but care must be had that the distinction be pertinent , and well qualify'd , as is hinted above . see other distinctions of the same leaven with the former , laid open , method to science . b. . less . . § § . . . i heartily joyn with mr. locke in his discourse about preserving mutual charity , and forbearance . tho' the demonstrations of learned men do much good , yet i am sure the want of charity does more harm . 't is in the highest manner preternatural that rational souls should be forced , or dealt with any other way than by reason ; unless they come to wrong common morality , or the peace of the common wealth in which they live ; both which are so evidently against the law of nature , that their reason must needs see and acknowledge it , unless most wickedly blinded with passion and vice. alas ! what silly reasons do good weak people take for certain , and are convinced by them as perfectly as we are by the clearest demonstration ! and , ( which more obliges us to pity them ) if we propose to them strong reasons , they are too weighty for their weak strength to wield ; and their own ridiculous ones do sute better with their size and pitch of wit. . i am clearly of mr. l's judgment , concerning the degrees of probability in several matters ; as also that in traditional truths , each remove weakens the force of the proof , if it descends meerly ( as he expresses it ) by the way of the hearsay of a hearsay . the bare narative must either be supported by a consonant , frequent , open and obligatory practise , and be strengthen'd by the acknowledged high concern of perpetuating the matter of fact attested , or it may in time dwindle away into a feeble tittle-tattle . and , i very much esteem his remark , as both very acute , and very solid , that no probability in historical relation can arise higher than its first original ; unless that first original were afterwards abetted and corroborated by other motives . his allowance of the validity of the testimony for miracles , is wise , and pious ; and his making divine revelation to be the highest certainty , is well becoming a christian philosopher : for , all our knowledge whatever is taken from things , made and establish'd by god , as the first cause ; and , therefore , if it be certain that god's revelation or testimony stands engag'd for any point , the truth of that point is prov'd by a nobler , stronger and higher medium than can be drawn from physicks , or even metaphysicks ; that is , from the soveraign cause of all those objects , whence those respective mediums are taken ; and , by whom onely they they have any truth at all in them ; no , not so much as their metaphysical verity it self . . it would not be impertinent on this occasion , to present mr. locke with a short story . a very judicious cantabrigian desir'd to know of me , whether we ought not to assent to a point of christian faith , supposing it was evidently reveal'd , more firmly than to any scientifical conclusion ? i answer'd , that we ought . he ask'd , why ? alledging , that , since there could not be any greater certainty that it was reveal'd than demonstration , the assent to the conclusion could not , in true reason , be more firm than that which a demonstration produces , or than the conclusion of any science : for , let the syllogism be this , [ whatever god said , is true : but , god said there will be a resurrection of our bodies ; therefore , there will be such a resurrection : ] none can pretend ( said he ) any greater certainty than that of science , for the certainty of the authority that gave us the minor ; therefore , since conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem , the assent to the conclusion can be , in true reason , no greater than that of science . i reply'd , that that saying of the logicians was meant of the particularity or negativeness found in the premisses , and not of the force of the medium . i alledg'd , that the major had the greater influence upon the conclusion , ( whence that proposition so called , had its appellation , ) than the minor ; which was onely an applier of the force of the major to some particular , or some other notion , in order to conclude concerning it ; and therefore , the certainty of the conclusion was chiefly to be rated from the force of the major : whence , those enthymems , which have the major for their antecedent , are more natural than those which have the minor. i insisted , that the divine authority being alledg'd for the onely medium or motive for all revealed points whatever , our assent to the verity of all such points , was onely to be refunded into it ; and , that it lost not its force by its being apply'd by a weaker medium to some particular , provided that supream authority's standing engag'd for that particular , were closely apply'd to our mind ; which is done by absolute certainty and evidence . to illustrate which , i brought this instance . let there be two agents , whereof the one is calidum ut octo , the other calidum ut duo , and both of them apply'd to the same patient equally ; it will not follow from this equal application , that they will have an equal effect ; but the heat produced by the one , will be more intense than that which was caused by the other . so , supposing two syllogisms , the minors of which are both known by science ; but of the majors , one is known onely by science , the other by an infinitely higher evidence , viz. by the essential veracity of the divine authority ; it will not follow , from the equal application of it , by the respective minors , to this or that particular , subsum'd under them , that the assent to the two conclusions , which is the effect they are to produce in our minds , will be equal ; but they will operate according to their several forces , provided the force of both be but closely apply'd to our minds , so to make it work its full effect ; which is done by seeing both the minors to be absolutely certain and evident . i have not time to dilate on this high point as it deserves , but leave it to the sober reflexion of all judicious lovers of truth , who seriously desire that christian principles may approve themselves to be , in all respects , perfectly rational . and 't is a duty we all owe to our selves , and to the world , to shew that christian faith does not pervert or impair , but perfect and exalt our reason . reflexion th . on the th , th , th , and last chapters . . this learned author states reason very right in all its parts ; but , i believe , he mistakes the right end , intention and use of syllogisms ; and that , while he opposes them , he takes his measures from the modern school-way of syllogistick arguing , and the little fruit it has yielded . such forms of reasoning were , certainly , never intended for the vulgar , as by his discourse he seems to apprehend ; nor for men of good mother-wits , to attain ordinary knowledge , by casting their thoughts in those exact molds . for , mankind could use their reason , and improve in it too ; nay , could draw their consequences ( generally ) very well , before syllogistick reasoning came in fashion ; tho' they could not so well make it out to themselves or others , why the consequence must follow , nor refund it into its causes , and so set it above contest , by reducing it to evidence . their own natural genius taught them to discourse right , very often unreflectingly ; as it does also the vulgar in things within their ken. in process of time , reflecters upon nature , finding ( as it were ) by experience , that some discourses were evidently consequent , some not , they began to cast about and find out by what virtue some discourses came to be so evidently conclusive above others . and , to this end ( art , if truly such , being nothing but a deep inspection into nature ) they set themselves to anatomize and dissect a rational discourse , that so they might discover the hidden nerves and ligaments that gave force and connexion to the whole . they found that such a discourse did consist of three main parts , call'd propositions ; and each of these again , of three lesser parts , called by them subject , copula , and predicate ; all which had distinct natures and offices in the discourse . they discover'd that the connexion of the two terms in the conclusion , in which consists the truth of it , depended on their connexion with a third or middle term in the premisses ; and that , if they be not connected with it or immediate , but remote from it , as all common mediums are , which beget probabilities ; nothing is concluded , and so the conclusion may , ( for any thing we know ) be false . they observ'd hence , that there could be but three terms in such a discourse ; and that , were they more , it caused a blunder and inconsequence . hence they took care those three terms should be so placed , as would render the connexion of the other two with the medium most clear at first sight . this done , they treated of each of those greater and lesser parts , that is , of propositions and notions singly and apart ; adding such rules as they saw convenient for each . from these observations , laid orderly together , sprung the art of logick , and all the rudiments belonging to it . all which have their force from nature ; nor ought any thing be esteemed art , but what has honest downright nature for its ground : and , i hope , that in every tittle of my whole method , i have not one argument in those many trains of consequences i have drawn there throughout it , that is not taken from the nature of the thing in hand . now , things standing thus , who can think logick , or syllogism ( the main end of it , ) are to be slighted as of little or no use ? can any man think that art and reflexion do add no advantage to untaught nature ? or that our rude , natural , and common reason may not be cultivated and improv'd , as well as our natural voice , walking and handling , may be better'd , by being taught to sing , dance , or play on the lute artificially . . i am very apt to think , that at first the inventers of logick and syllogisms did never intend to use them perpetually themselves , nor to instruct others in any science by using constantly that method . since neither aristotle , nor any other author i ever read , ancient or modern , ever went about to deliver a scheme of doctrine in a syllogistick way : but that , after they had by study and reflexion , found out in what their evidence lay , they made use of them as exemplars or tests , by which they might try whether their loose and dishevell'd discourses had an evident and necessary connexion of terms at the bottom ; or else , in some signal occasions , to confute and convince an acute or obstinate adversary ; especially , if the auditory and judges of the dispute were men of learning . for which reason that way is still continued in learned assemblies : such as the schools often are , and always should be . but , when at length that way grew too common , and that sophisters and bunglers would needs constantly use it , and it only , in their extempore disputes ; which could be manag'd right , and as they ought , by none but those who were exact masters of logick ; it came at length to degenerate into insipid artless wrangle and talking at random . for , the multitude of ill-understood and barbarous school-terms encreased , frivolous distinctions ( as i lately instanced ) grew rife ; principles were either neglected , or else supplied by their masters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the natures of things , and the ways dictated by nature , were left off ; and hence it came , that no progress was made in science ; nor any point decisively concluded . . in divers parts of this discourse i doubt not but mr. locke agrees with me : what i disagree with him in is : . i deny that in learned and philosophical discourses , ( for which syllogisms were intended ) the mind can perceive the connexion of the proofs where it really is , as easily , nay perhaps better , without them . certainly , the seeing the middle term placed in the middle , as it ought , will make a reflecting man see better the connexion of the terms ; whence , besides its own aptness to connect , it comes , even by vertue of its place , to be seen to be immediate to each of the extremes ; and , so , more apt to connect them . again , in a syllogism there is no necessary word left out , nor one unnecessary word put in ; whereas in loose discourses this last is always wanting : and , can we think it adds no degree of clearness to the discourse to keep it from being pester'd with many unnecessary words , in many of which there will not want ambiguity ? nor is this all , for in loose discourses , the fine language and plausible tricks of rhetorick do too often dazle the eye of the mind ; and make that seem excellent reason , which , brought the test of a syllogism , will be seen to be plain foolery and ridiculous nonsense . lastly , good logicians , who are skill'd in the solid reasons why the conclusion follows , do , while they discourse syllogistically , guide their thoughts all along by steady and ( generally ) self-evident rules ; and see a priori , and this , by the highest causes , why , and by what means the conclusion must follow ; which conduces in a high measure to demonstration and science : whereas , those that have only the assistance of their uncultivated natural reason , do both want this knowing satisfaction to themselves , and are utterly unable to give it to others . i grant then , that the untaught vulgar in common conversation and obvious affairs can need no syllogisms ; and that the gentlewoman he speaks of , may have wit enough to avoid catching cold , tho' neither her self , nor any for her , do put the reason of it into a syllogism ; and so does a milk-maid , without the help of mathematicks , know certainly that the diameter of her pail is shorter than the circumference of it ; nay , both of them would be blunder'd , and know those truths worse , were the true reasons for them put into the uncouth garb of a syllogism ; for art is not their talent : but to think that learned men and disputants gain little or no advantage by them above the vulgar , is to maintain , that art , tho' never so solidly grounded , is good for nothing . . secondly , to say that syllogism helps little in demonstration , is , i am sure , against reason and experience both . he might as well have said in one word , they are good for nothing at all . for it cannot be thought they are good to know principles , they being self-evident ; and , it is manifest they cannot help us in probabilities ; for a syllogism that does not conclude is not worth a straw ; and no medium that is meerly probable ( it being a remote one ) can be connected with the extremes , nor consequently can it conclude . 't is left then , that if they help little in demonstration , they do not help us much in any thing . we need then very strong arguments to make us yield to such a paradox . mr. locke confesses syllogism is sometimes good to discover fallacies : i take leave to say they are always good for that end : and does this help us little in demonstration ? all argumentations are either conclusive or inconclusive ; conclusive ones have a middle term immediately connected with the extremes ; inconclusive ones either are aim'd to deceive us , by bringing a bad medium , or by using a bad form ; and those are the worst sort of fallacies , or of such syllogisms as lead us into errour ; most of those fallacies noted in common logick-books , being but trifles . if then the syllogistick way discovers fallacies , it cannot be deny'd but it exceedingly helps conclusive argumentation , or demonstration . he grants too , that it sets the absent proposition ( and , so , the whole argument ) before the view in a clear light. i infer ; therefore without it , we should not have had so clear a knowledge of the proof , nor consequently of the conclusion ; and is this nothing ? but he thinks this good is over ballanced by this , that it engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure , equivocal and fallacious terms . let us blame then those logicians , who multiply terms and needless crotchets , ( which i have endeavour'd in my method , to lop off as superfluous ) and those authors who do not define those terms they use ; and not syllogism nor artificial logick , which tells them they ought to do it . i know no more , properly and peculiarly belonging to syllogism , but a middle term rightly placed ; as is usually done in the first figure , and according to the first four moods . nor do i see any thing in these that in my method is not reduced to clear evidence . 't is confest too that it is adapted to the attaining victory in disputes . now , if this be so , then the champion of truth , by means of syllogism , will make truth victorious ; and then , how it can be deny'd ( as mr. locke does ) that it confirms truth in fair enquiries , is to me unintelligible ; unless by fair enquiries he means loose discourses , which are not syllogistical , nor reducible to that form ; which i think is an improper and lukewarm expression ; for , a philosopher ought to esteem no discourse fair , which is not clear and conclusive . . indeed mr. locke says very well , that syllogism is of no use at all in probabilities . and there is very good reason why . for syllogism shows an infallibly-certain way of concluding ; whence nothing can bear that test but what does conclude ; whereas probabilities being grounded on common mediums , do not conclude at all ; and therefore it would do probability a great disservice to bring it to the touchstone of all true or conclusive reasoning , a syllogistick form. this would quickly lay open the incoherence of the terms , and consequently , show those men to be less rational who do assent , or say interiourly , the terms do cohere , or the thing is true , upon a probable argument , in which they do not cohere . 't is then by sagacious prudence , and not by syllogisms , that the degrees of probability are to be weighed and try'd . he grants also that syllogism serves to fence : and so it does , tho' not in mr. lock 's sense of that word . for , as an expert fencer easily wounds , and overthrows an enemy , who is not skilful in that art : so a man who is skilful in syllogism , which is the art of concluding evidently , will quickly confound and overthrow an adversary of truth . but why he should think it does not serve to increase knowledge , is a strange riddle ; the whole design of artificial , or syllogistick , reasoning being to deduce conclusions not yet known , from premisses which are either perfectly foreknown , or at least better known . . mr. locke has then good reason to say , that other helps should be sought : but , if syllogism be discarded , where any other help can be found to make the force and clearness of the consequence better appear , or upon more evident and more certain grounds , not the wit of mankind can imagin : and i defy any man to bring me any reason , that is a good one , or conclusive , but i will show him that it is equivalently a syllogism ; and i will undertake to reduce it to that form ; and manifest that it has all its strength and evidence from the same principles which give a syllogism to be clearly conclusive . i know not what authors mr. locke may have met with , who say we cannot reason about particulars , or , that no syllogistick reasoning can be right and conclusive , but what has at least one general proposition in it : i am sure i have shown the contrary in my method . b. . l. . § . indeed i show § . and § . that such syllogisms are not instrumental to science , as are those which have one or more , universal premisses : for , all science is of inadequate or abstracted notions , which are universal ones , and not particulars ; for who can pretend to have science of the whole complexion of accidents , which constitute any particulars ? and , to let my reader farther see , that the knowledge of particular conclusions cannot reach science , i desire him to reflect , that if a physician knew onely that this particular individual herb is good for such a disease , and not that all of that sort or kind is so , he could not pretend to have science of the nature of herbs ; or , if a mathematician knew onely that this individual triangle , which he is describing in paper , has three angles equal to two right ones , but knew not that any other , or all , had so , none would much praise him for his science in mathematicks . the so much neglected and abus'd aristotle , who had too much , and too well-grounded sense to be rightly understood by those who did not much regard grounds , nor the highest causes of things , told us that singularia non perficiunt intellectum ; the knowledge of singulars does not perfect the understanding . since then science is a perfection of our soul , it must be employ'd about the understanding universals : plain reason abetting his saying , as i have shown ibid. § . . i cannot let this chapter pass , without reflecting particularly on mr. l's saying , that inferences or consequences in words , are a great part of reason , tho' the agreement , or disagreement of ideas be the principal . now , it is evident by those expressions that he speaks of words abstractedly or contradistinctly , from the ideas signify'd by them ; that is , from their sense ; taking words in which sense they are no more but meer sounds . whence i see not but black-smiths striking orderly and regularly upon their anvil , may make as good consequences , as those he speaks of , and puts them to be a great part of our reason . i have observ'd that this acute author fancies unintelligible mysteries in the annexing words to his ideas ; nay , ( as appears here ) in words taken without ideas , or the sense of them ; that is in senseless sounds or characters . whereas my weak speculation , tho' i bend my sight never so strongly , cannot discern any annexion other than this , that men have agreed that such words , shall signify such and such things or notions ; all other annexion being unaccountable . nor , can i see how in such sayings as this , mr. locke does ( as philosophers ought ) guide himself by the natures of the things in hand , viz. words , and reason . for words , abstracted from his ideas . which he puts to be signify'd by them , are meer articulate sounds , and out of the mind ; whereas reason and all its acts ▪ are compleated in the mind , and sense . how then the consequence of words ( thus understood ) should be a great part of reason which is sense ; or what reason , which is an internal and spiritual power , has to do with those external and material sounds or motions of the ayr , more than to know their signification , and to take care they be not ambiguous , quite surpasses my understanding . the complexion of ideas , he speaks of , which the words are to signify , is confessedly made first by the understanding ; and , the memory can retain our notions as well , or better than it can sounds ; and tho' such sounds , thro' the use of the words are apt to re-excite the memory , yet all this amounts to no more but their aptness , thro' use , to signify our notions , let them be what they will : which is plain sense and easily understood ; whereas the consequence of sounds , abstracted from our notions , is very amusing , and utterly unintelligible . . the th chapter [ of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces ] is admirably clear , and in great part very solid . i grant no new simple ideas , that are proper ones , can he convey'd by traditional revelation . the author of nature gave us our natural notions ; and the author of grace , ( who is the same person , ) brought no unheard-of objects of our senses to increase the stock , already sufficient for all our knowledge ; yet , if the points thus convey'd are spiritual ones , as most points of the revealed faith are , there will be convey'd new metaphorical notions , translated from our natural ones which are proper . i grant too , that revelation cannot be admitted against clear evidence of reason . i wish , that instead of the word [ revelation ] he had rather said [ pretence of revelation ] for , otherwise , some readers may hap to take his words in a dis-edifying sense ; as if it were a possible case , that revelation it self may be supposed to be opposit to clear evidence of reason ; and ( which is worse , ) in case they hap to contract , must truckle and submit to it . my judgment in the point is this , that supposing the revelation is grounded on the means laid by god to assure us he has reveal'd such and such points , ( which therefore cannot but be certain to us , or evident , at least to those who are guides to others ) the case imply'd here is impossible ; because it is impossible that god , who gave us our nature , should ( as mr. l. well expresses it ) will us to admit any thing for true , in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of our understanding . i add , not to admit it as true , if the motives be but probable , or ( which is the same ) if the thing may be false . what i am here to note , is that , two cautions are necessary in this occasion . the one , that since god does nothing needlessly , therefore the points reveal'd by god are such as humane reason could not other ways attain to ; whence they being such as those mr. locke holds to be above reason , hence they must oft look very oddly to those low conceptions which the course of nature affords us : whereas the motives laid by god for mankind , to embrace christian faith , do , for that very regard , lie level to our natural reason . wherefore , in our enquiry what we are to embrace , what not ; we ought not to begin our quest , by scanning the points propos'd to us as reveal'd ; but , by examining whether the motives to judge they are reveal'd , be certain or no. otherwise , we shall neglect to employ our reason , in such things as are suitable to her capacity , and in which she can have evidence ; and task it to consider what 's perhaps above her reach , and of which , consequently , she can have no evidence ; which way of proceeding is clearly irrational . how many are there in the world who are reputed for learned men , and yet have no principles which are not taken from fancy ? let then such short speculaters loose , to judge of the verity of points ( perhaps ) incomprehensible to our natural reason , they will be apt to fancy twenty contradictions in the trinity , the incarnation , a virgins conceiving , the resurrection , and in many other main points of christian faith : and , were it allowable for any to begin his search after truth on this preposterous manner , the persons must be highly qualify'd to decide what is a contradiction , what not , ere their sentiments can be thought to have any kind of weight . they must be excellent logicians to know the force of a consequence , and how many things go to make a contradiction . they must be acute metaphysicians to know all the many several respects belonging to things ; without which it will be hard to determin certainly what notions are in all respects contradictory , which not : and , if they be not thus qualify'd , their skill is incompetent for such a performance . again , if the point do concern the nature of body , they must be able to comprehend the nature of that subject . and , in a word , unless they can demonstrate their own opposit tenet , plain terms give it that they can never show the other side to be a contradiction : for , since both sides of a contradiction cannot be true , they must demonstrate their tenet to be true , or they cannot demonstrate the other to be false and contradictory ; for 't is one labour to do both . . the other necessary caution is , that men do not take the bad explications of some weak divines for the point of faith it self . for , such men , as mr. l. well notes , being very forward to stop the mouths of all opponents by crying out such a position is of faith ; and , withall , having a high opinion of their own sentiments , and miscall'd authority ; are apt to fancy that all is of faith which belongs to their own explication of it , or seems to them consequent from it , or connected with it ; which is no better , in effect , than to obtrude their own skill in drawing consequences upon men for divine revelation . now , if the explicater be not truly learned and candid , then in stead of showing the point of faith , conformable to nature , as a solid divine ought ; he may hap to represent every point of faith so untowardly , that it may have twenty contradictions in it . 't is therefore the duty of every ingenuous man , to distinguish such explications from the point it self ; and not to pronounce too hastily of it , till it appears it cannot possibly bear any other rational explication , and such a one as is agreeable and not contradictory to the true principles of reason and nature . which i the rather note , because i have observed that scarce any one point of faith that is controverted has escap'd this misfortune ; nay more , that metaphorical expressions have often ( i may say , generally ) been mistaken for literal ones : in a word , let but the grounds for god's revealing christian faith be held and shown absolutely certain ( and the motives lay'd by god to that end , cannot but be such ) and the divine authority , thus evidently engaged , and closely apply'd to our mind , ought to subdue our understanding to assent , notwithstanding our seeming-rational dissatisfactions . i say , seeming ; for , to put the grounds and motives we have to know god revealed it to be thus certain , and yet that there is clear evidence against the point reveal'd , is to put a perfect contradiction , or impossibility . which makes me something apprehensive that those authors , who put such a case ( however their meaning may be good and pious , and they see not the consequence of it ) do deem that the grounds we christians have for god's revealing our faith , are not altogether certain , but probable onely ; which leaves all our faith in a possibility of being false for any thing any man living knows ; that is , of being perhaps not true. . hence i think 't is but a very sleight deference to divine revelation to affirm , that in matters where reason cannot judge , or but probably , revelation is to be hearken'd to : but that in matters where reason can afford certain knowledge , reason is to be hearken'd to . for , tho' it were so that reason can do this , yet experience tells us that reason does not actually , ( and this very often ) what it can do , or all that lies within the compass of that power ; but that we may often presume we have certain knowledge when we have none . especially since of the two it is far more likely our reason may discourse wrong of the points that are reveal'd , than of the motives which god has lay'd for mankind to know they are so ; the later being within its sphere , the other oft-times not . . the th chapter treats of wrong assent , or errour . this learned author seems here not to speak constantly of the same point . to assent to any proposition , is to say interiourly , [ it is true ; ] or , that the thing is so as the proposition exhibits it . now , these propositions may be of two sorts : the one is express'd thus , [ the thing is so , or is true : ] the other thus , [ the thing is probable . ] hitherto , and in some places here , he speaks of the former , or of assenting to the truth of the thing ; or , of taking the probable proposition to be true : in other places here , he seems to speak of the latter ; as , when , § . . he complains that probable doctrines are not always receiv'd with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability : which clearly makes the object of assent to be the probability of the thing , or as it stands under such motives as make it to a higher degree probable ; or , ( which is perfectly equivalent , ) that propositions to such a degree probable , are to be assented to , as to such a degree probable . now , this is an evident proposition ; and the assent to it , most rational . for , since we call that probable that stands under probable motives , it is as perfect a truth , and as firmly to be assented to , as 't is to assent , that what 's probable , is probable ; or , what 's probable to such a degree , is probable to such a degree : both which propositions being evident , nay , the terms of it as closely connected as they are in this proposition , [ what is , is , ] we not onely may , but are forced to assent to them , as being both of them self-evident . but , i much fear this is not mr. locke's meaning ; but , that he means , we must assent to a thing as true , or that the thing is , upon a proof which , of its own peculiar nature , and as it is distinguish'd from evidence , is so far from concluding it is , that it permits and allows it may not be , or be false . in which case , to assent , is both against clearest reason , and even ( as was shewn above ) against a first principle of our understanding . . what confirms me in this apprehension , is , his making way to his ensuing discourse with these words ; [ if assent be grounded on likelihood , and if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability , &c. ] now , both those hypothetical ifs i must categorically declare against ; and positively affirm and maintain , that likely motives can onely , in true reason , make us assent the thing is likely ; and that motives but probable cannot , without highly wronging our reason , cause us to assent the thing is more than probable : lastly , that [ may be , or may not be , ] cannot be a good argument that the thing is . i affirm farther , that this position of mine is clearly demonstrable : for , all motives or proofs affecting the conclusion , and our assent to it , according to their different nature and force ; therefore , as evident motives make the thing evident , so likely motives can onely prove the thing to be likely ; and probable motives can onely prove the thing to be probable ; and that , the proof being the cause of the conclusion , and those proofs being proper , and adjusted to those respective effects , 't is as perfect a demonstration , drawn from the proper cause to its proper effect , that they can make the conclusion no more than probable ; and , consequently , our assent to it ( if rational ) no more than that it is onely probable ; as it is that an agent which is hot but to such a degree , can onely cause heat to such a degree ; and this is as evident , as that no cause can act beyond its power to act , or can do what it cannot do ; which is an identical proposition , and self-evident . . 't is in vain then to start this question , how men come to give their assent contrary to probability , till this question be first satisfy'd , why men should assent at all upon meer probability ? but , this being supposed without any proof ; and , it being allow'd by me , that men may assent contrary to probability all the ways he assigns , i am not to pursue that point any farther , because it is quite besides my aim ; which is , to concern my self onely with what promotes true science ; with which , probability , as being both uncertain , and inevident , has nothing at all to do , but to injure it , ( if it meets with rash concluders , ) by ill-grounded assents . but , casting my eye on the title of this chapter , which is , [ of wrong assent , or errour , ] i observe , that he has not so much as touch'd upon one main cause of errour , which has an unhappy influence even upon some wise and good men , and oft proves prejudicial to their best concerns ; i mean , the assenting absolutely upon very high probabilities ; or , ( as mr. locke expresses it , ) as firmly , as if they were infallibly demonstrated . we are , indeed , more often deceiv'd by assenting on slight probabilities ; but , we are far more grosly deceiv'd , when a very high , and very likely probability fails us : whence , in such occasions , men use to say , [ who could ever have thought or imagin'd it ? ] or , [ i was never so abominably deceiv'd in my life . ] i will explain my self by one signal instance , shewing how dangerous it is to yield up our reason , by assenting absolutely upon very great likelihoods , and even the highest probabilities . which discourse may , i hope , edifie some , and thence convince others , that such an assent is irrational . . a man who is at this instant in perfect health , is apt to assent absolutely , that he shall not die suddenly of an apoplexy before morning ; that a tile shall not fall from a house , and kill him when he walks the streets ; that his house shall not fall on his head , and crush him ; that a drunken or quarrelsom ruffian shall not , without provocation , run him thorow ; that a bit of meat , a crum , or a bone , shall not choak him ; or any such sudden disaster befall him that day ; and 't is very highly probable they will not . now , the greatest concern we can have in this world , is , to die well prepared for the other . put case then , a man of a loose life , ( such men being most apt to presume , and lull themselves in a blind security , ) assents firmly and absolutely , upon such a high probability that he shall not be taken off suddenly , but shall have time to die penitent , haps to be surpriz'd by some such unlucky accident , without having any leisure to repent ; the case of his soul is very desperate . now , 't is evident , that that this eternal loss of happiness lights to such men thro' their acting contrary to their reason ; and their assenting , and relying firmly upon the frail assurance of a probability : for , had they used their reason right , it would have naturally suggested to them these thoughts : i can see no bottom nor foundation for assenting so fully that i shall not die very shortly , or suddenly . how many men , who thought themselves as secure as i do now , have , notwithstanding , been taken away in an instant ! every man living is liable to these , and a thousand other unforeknowable mischances : nor have i any kind of privilege above others ; nor know i any reason why those sinister chances that happen'd to other men , may not as well be my lot. this plain and obvious discourse , join'd with the infinite concern of the thing , might have conduced to make those carelesly secure men rectifie their wanderings , and endeavour to keep a good conscience , lest they should be suddenly arrested by death , with their debts uncancell'd : which good thoughts and motives they had wanted , had they assented upon a high probability that they should not die suddenly , as firmly as tho' the thing were infallibly demonstrated . this infallible and irrational security , i say , would , in all likelihood , have made such weak souls run on in sin , defer the amendments of their lives , and put it off with a dangerous presuming on death-bed repentance . hence i infer two things ; one , that our position , that we ought not to assent upon a high probability , but to retain some degree of suspence , is a great and very important truth , since it has so great an influence ( not to speak of our many other concerns ) upon the best and most important part of christian morality . errour does not use to be so favourable to goodness and piety , no more than ignorance is the mother of devotion ; whereas truth reduced to practice , is ever the genuin parent of virtue . the other , that to judge or assent without knowledge , springs from our weakness , or else from passion ; and that judgment taken in this sense , is not ( as mr. locke affirms ) the gift of god. . he proceeds to the reasons why men take wrong measures of probability , and so come to assent wrong or err. but , it appears evidently from what 's said , or rather indeed , it is evident out of the very terms , that all errour or wrong assent , does onely spring from assenting at all upon probable motives . for , did they assent onely upon evidence , it is impossible they should ever erre ; since evidence for an errour is in it self impossible . or , did they suspend their assent , or not assent when the thing is but probable , 't is again impossible they should err ; for , it is impossible they should err , or assent wrong , when they do not assent at all . whence follows , that ( excepting invincible ignorance , which concerns not our point in hand ) all wrong assent , or errour , springs from our assenting upon probability . the reasons he assigns , why men take wrong measures of probabilities , serve better to shew why men do not assent upon evidence ; viz. doubtful and false principles , receiv'd hypotheses , predominant passions , and authority ; by which last , i suppose , he means , such authority as may deceive us . all these are so many remora's to the advancement of science , and motes in our intellectual eye , hindring it from seeing evident truth . yet , none of them , but has some kind of probability , ( as the world goes ; ) or , at least , will furnish men with probable arguments : for , a very slight thing serves to make a thing probable . so that the upshot is , that the chief , and most effectual way for men to avoid wrong assents , or errours , is to instruct them in the way how to conclude evidently ; which is the sole end and aim of my method to science ; and , particularly , of that part of it which treats of the self-evident conclusiveness of syllogisms , in which no man can possibly be deceiv'd . for , this shews , that the inference or consequence of the conclusion , when the medium is proper , is as certain as self-evidence can make it ; and , that common mediums , ( such as all probable ones are , ) can never conclude ; and , therefore , such conclusions cannot be assented to , or held true , without wronging our reason . whence follows , that the way to avoid wrong assent , is , to exclude probability from having any title at all to our assent ; it being highly and manifestly irrational for any to judge , a proposition not at all demonstrated or shewn to be true , should be assented to as firmly as if it were infallibly demonstrated : for , this is directly to judge a thing to be such as it is not ; which is a manifest errour , or untruth . nor , matters it what most people do out of weakness : man's true nature , which is rational , is to be rated according to the conformity we ought to conceive it had from the idea of it in the divine understanding , its true essence ; where none can doubt but it was perfect , till it came to be slubber'd and sully'd by the tampering of second causes , and their never-uniform circumstances . the natural perfection , then , of a rational creature being to arrive certainly , or without missing , at knowledge and truth , which cannot be had without evidence ; hence , 't is his true nature to be guided in his way to acquire those interiour perfections of his mind , onely by evidence ; without which , he is liable to fall , every step he takes , into the precipice of errour . nay , 't is so clear a truth , that man 's true nature is onely to be guided in his interiour assents by evidence ; that , even in our outward actions , which do not directly concern the perfecting our soul , and in which we can have no evidence of their success , or of the good they will certainly do us ; yet , still we must ( unless we will incurr the note of folly ) have evidence that it is better to act , or better to venture ; otherwise , we shall clearly act with some precipitancy , and against our true nature , reason . . besides , it is extream hard to take right measures of probability . every measure is a certain standard ; whereas , probabilities are not capable of any ; but , like desultory ignes-fatui , whiffle now to this side , now to that ; doubling , and re-doubling ; so that none can take their just dimension , or proportion . they vary every day , oft-times every hour ; and , what 's more probable , this minute , may , by some new circumstance lately come to our knowledge , become less probable ; the next , perhaps , improbable . even the highest probabilities are not exempt from this frailty , and fickleness . i may think my house will certainly stand ; nor do i see any reason to make the least doubt of it : a prudent neighbour , whom i take to be more judicious than my self in such things , spies a flaw , or crack , near the foundation , which he thinks weakens it ; which makes it now improbable it will stand , and probable it will fall . hereupon , i send for an expert master-builder , who has ten times the skill of the other ; and he assures me , that late formidable crack is nothing at all to the firmness of the foundation , and therefore it will certainly stand : which said , the motive shifts faces again , and it becomes very probable it will not fall . amongst school-men , some hold , that the opinion of three doctors makes a point probable ; some think , the opinion of two is sufficient ; some say , one , who has maturely weigh'd the point , will serve ; and , in the mean time , perhaps it is scarce probable , at most but probable , that any of these say true. but then , these later say , that it is certain that what seven learned men agree in , is probable : let then these seven learned men agree that what some one very learned man , whom they nominate , says , makes the thing probable ; that one man has the virtue of all the seven center'd in him ; and , therefore , that one single learned man's opinion makes it probable enough in all conscience . where then shall we fix the bounds , or whence take any certain measures of greater and lesser probabilities ? whoever peruses , and considers well the several sorts of probable motives , enumerated in my method , b. . l. . § . . and by mr. locke here , in his th and th chapters , will see , ( tho' we have not reckon'd up half of them , ) by reflecting on their variety , and their crossness to one another , ( abating the several degrees of each , ) how insuperable a task it is to settle any fix'd limits by which we can be constantly assur'd , which sort of probability is greater , or lesser . 't is a thousand times easier to establish absolutely certain rules of demonstration , were men but as zealous to pursue truth , as they love to talk at random ; either because they think that noblest quest not worth their pains ; or , perhaps , because palliated scepticks inveigle them into a conceit , that science is unattainable . to obviate which calumny , has , these fifty years , been the butt of my endeavours . . as for authority , this one maxim , pursu'd home , secures us from being deceiv'd by relying on it ; viz. [ no authority deserves assent , farther than reason gives it to deserve . ] so that all the certainty of authority is to be refunded into intrinsecal arguments , taken from the nature of mankind , the attesters ; and the nature ( i mean , the notoreity and concern ) of the things attested ; and , thence ascertaining the attesters knowledge , and veracity : which , if they can be demonstrated , or put beyond probability , ( for , till then , none who are able to raise doubts , and see the medium is inconclusive , can be bound in reason to assent upon any testimony , ) even the wisest men may rationally assent to what they attest ; otherwise , not ; tho' weaker arguments ( as i hinted above ) may suffice for the vulgar , and for our outward actions . . to close my reflexions on this chapter , i am apt to think that this learned author is here drawn aside from using his excellent reason to his best advantage , by apprehending some things to be onely probable , which ( or the certainty of the authority for them ) are perfectly demonstrable ; as , in particular , that of the existence of julius caesar. the same i judge of these , viz. that alexander the great conquer'd asia ; that there are such cities as rome , or paris ; that the same chances cannot light often upon a hundred dice ; that i shall not think over again , in order , the same thoughts next year , as i did this ; and a thousand such like . which , perhaps , many will take to be but highly probable ; whereas i , upon good reason , cannot but judge they are all of them demonstrable . but i am weary , and hasten to an end. . the last chapter bears for its title , [ of the division of sciences . ] the two first general branches of this division are , in my opinion , co-incident ; as will be seen hereafter . however , the learned world is much oblig'd to the author , for putting ethicks to be capable of demonstration , and a true science . but , as to his third branch , which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the doctrine of signs , i must confess , i do not well know what to make of it : for , to make the doctrine of words to be a science , or part of philosophy , is to make philosophy wordish . he defin'd philosophy , in his preface , to be the knowledge of things ; and here he seems to make the knowledge of words a part of science , or philosophy , taken distinctly from the knowledge of things ; which is his first branch . all science is connected sense , and both sense and science are in our minds . the common agreement of men gives words to be signs ; common usage shews this agreement ; grammar helps them with congruity ; critick gathers from authors , or derivations , the genuine signification of such words as are not so much worn by common use , but mostly used by the learned : for , when they are thus common , critick is useless . logick , which is to direct our reason , and define our notions , so to keep our thoughts or discourses steady , takes care they be not ambiguous ; or , if they be , gives rules to detect their double sense , lest the ill-understood signs lead us astray from the point . but , all begins and ends in this , that we be sure our words do signifie our notions , rightly , and sincerely . sometimes we have simple notions ; and then we use such words as signifie them : sometimes we join many simpler notions in a complex one ; and then we make use of such a word as signifies that complex idea , or notion : sometimes we connect divers notions affirmatively , and frame judgments , or mental propositions ; and then , verbal propositions signifie that verbum mentis , or interiour saying . we may fancy that words do ty together many simple ideas in a complex one ; ( for , there is nothing which men of wit , by much bending their thoughts , cannot fancy ; ) but 't is we who ty our notions together in our mind ; nor can meer articulate sounds any more connect simple ideas , than they can connect or identifie our notions which are the terms of a proposition : nor can they do this , any more than they can frame a judgment ; that is , judge , or know. we may fancy too , that they record our thoughts , which otherwise would be lost : 't is true , that after we have agreed such words should signifie such things in our mind , they have an order to one another , and do ordinarily come together into our thoughts ; and so the word infers the thing ; but so does the thing infer the word too , to which we , by our agreement of its signification , do relate it ; and , of the two , the word is sooner lost out of the memory , and more needs a recorder , than the notion does ; especially , when our memory is of connected sense . how often do we remember very well the sense of an author we have read , and yet cannot at all call to mind his words ! my self , when i was young , had words , and great variety of them , at my tongue 's end ; my expression was copious , and florid , and now i am old and past my autumn , my stile is dry ; and the flowers and leaves fall off , when the fruit is ripe ; and tho' i still retain and increase my stock of thoughts , i have lost that multiplicity and choice of words i had formerly . but , i must complain that it is a great injury to that excellent and most useful science , [ logick ] which treats of the operations of our understanding , and of the way how to manage them , to make it nothing but the doctrine of signes , or words ; and to pretend it has its name thence . as if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not signify ratio , and uerbum mentis , as properly as it does vox ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 far more often [ rationalis , ] than it does sermone utens . but , above all , i am sure , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is never found to signify the art or doctrine of words , but the art of discoursing or reasoning . . i cannot but think that the subordination of sciences , is as useful and necessary to be known , as their division or distinction , in philosophy ; they being the exact knowledge of things , taking this last word in its largest sense , as it comprehends rem and modum rei . also every notion being the thing inadequately conceiv'd , and having a kind of distinct nature peculiar to it self in our minds ; and all sciences ( they being distinct and not confused knowledges , ) having , consequently , for their object , the thing as thus distinctly or inadequately consider'd , ( by which objects they are specify'd and distinguisht ; ) it follows , that there may be as many sciences as we have such distinct notions of the thing ; and that each of them is got by looking more penetratively into those distinct natures in our mind , or distinct notions : science being in reality nothing but descants ( as it were ) on those notions , and grounded entirely on their metaphysical verity . whence follows likewise that the subordination of sciences is grounded on this , that those notions ( their objects ) are subordinate ; or that one of them is more universal or general , others more particular . to instance ; the highest science in the line of that general notion we call substance , is that which treats of the supreme genus , or of ens as ens , and of what belongs to it as such ; and this we call metaphysicks or trans-natural knowledge . the imediate notion under ens is corpus ; and this is the object of natural philosophy , or physicks . next under that is vivens ; which ( as its object ) constitutes the science or knowledge of living things , and what belongs to them as such . under that is animal , which is the object of the science that treats of sensitive things , as they are sensitive , and of what appertains to them , as they are such . the lowest of our notions in that line , which are in any degree common or general , is that of homo ; which treats of humane nature , of its operations proper to man , as man ; and chiefly of his primary operation reasoning ; and then , the science which shows how to order those operations right that belong to his understanding , is logick ; as that science which shows how to order those operations right that belong to his will , is call'd ethicks . lower than this , science proceeds not ; individuals , by reason of the complexion of innumerable accidents that constitutes them , not being knowable to us , as such , so as to give us exact knowledge of their singularities . corollary i. from what 's said it appears ; that mr. locke's two first branches fall into one . for his first branch being [ the knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings , their constitutions , properties and operations ] and his second , viz. ethicks , having for its object the operations of mans will ; and logick , the operations of his understanding , which proceed from him as man , ( all outward actions that proceed not from his interiour knowledge and will , being meerly animal ; ) it follows that ethicks , which is his second branch , is coincident with his first . for man is a thing , and has a proper being of his own , and his understanding and will are his properties ; and their operations are his operations . corollary ii. each of the subordinant sciences deduces conclusions about its proper object : which , tho' conclusions there , are the principles to the immediately inferiour or subordinate science : so that none can know exactly what homo is , who is such an animal , if he be ignorant what animal is ; nor what animal , which is such a living body , is , if he knows not what living body is : nor what living body , which is such a body , is , if he knows not what body is ; nor , what body , which is such an ens , is , if he knows not what ens or thing is . corollaay iii. hence is seen evidently , how necessary , and according to nature it is , that those notions which are most universal , should be most knowable or clear ; in regard the inferiour ones cannot be known but by them ; and that being most clear , they must ( as was often shown above ) be also most simple . corollary , iv. hence is seen also how all sciences conversant about our gradual notions in the line of substance ( and the same holds in all the other lines ) come to be connaturally subordinate to those which have a superiour notion for their object ; and how perfect knowledge or skill in the inferiour science , is unattainable without knowledge or skill in the superiour . corollary v. hence is demonstrated , that metaphysicks is absolutely the highest science ; and that , without knowledge or skill in it , none can perfectly understand the inferiour sciences , so as to resolve them into their first , and most evident principles . corollary vi. and , since the greater clearness of that notion , which is the object of any science , gives a greater clearness and evidence to the science it self ; and the greater clearness of any notion arises from its being more simple ; and the more general they are , the more simple they are ; and the notion of ens is evidently more general than all the rest : it follows demonstratively that the science of metaphysicks , which treats of ens as ens , is the most clear of any others ; and , in the highest degree , evident ; and that they who think otherwise do guide themselves by fancy , to which such very abstract notions are unsuitable . corollary vii . and , since evidence determins our understanding to assent , and therefore certainty which is the determination of our judging power , follows evidence as its proper cause ; it follows , that , as no inferiour science can be evident without knowledge in metaphysicks , so neither can our knowledge of any of them be perfectly , ( or in the highest degree , ) certain , but by virtue of it , or of such maxims , or first principles , as belong to it. corollary , viii . the same discourse that is made here of objects found in the line of ens , and their proper sciences ; may be made and have equal force in the objects belonging to all the lines of accidents , and the sciences proper to them . corollary last . hence the doctrine of words is no part of philosophy , taking them as aparted from our notions ; because it has neither for its object , rem nor modum rei ; nor any thing found in nature , or belonging to it ; since words are meerly signes , appointed by our voluntary designation , to assist us in communicating our conceptions to others , which can be no part of the knowledge of things or true philosophy ; words being neither simple nor complex , adequate or inadequate notions , nor in any manner taken from the things themselves . finis . the contents . preliminary first . § . introduction . § . the using the word [ idea ] in disparate senses obstructs the way to science . . philosophical words generally used , not to be laid aside without great necessity ; much less changed for others less proper . . mr. l.'s acception of the word [ idea ] very ambiguous . . the ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . . the putting brutes to have knowledge associates them with mankind . . the first consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that brutes know . . the second consideration pre-requir'd . . that our selves both asleep and awake , do , without knowledg , perform as strange operations as brutes do . . the resemblance of reason in some actions of brutes , no argument of their knowledge . . brutes have phantasms , but no notions or meanings . § . ideas , if not spiritual notions , inexplicable . . experience that we have ideas gives no distinct account what they are . nor the saying , they are resemblances . . to have ideas of our own ideas inexplicable . . no operation , external or internal , begins from the soul alone . . mr. l. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this discourse . . to ground all knowledge on ideas not distinguish'd from phantasms , makes science impossible . preliminary second . § . that the elements or materials of our knowledge are properly to be called notions . . the word notion and cognition are taken here objectively . . what notions are . . fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about spiritual conceptions . . the question about notions stated . . a notion is the thing it self in our understanding . proof . because knowing is an immanent act. . proof . because the thing known must be in our knowing power . . proof . because a resemblance is not the object of our knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . . otherwise ideas only could be said to be known . . proof . because otherwise all philosophy would be destroy'd . . proof . because similitudes cannot possibly give us the first knowledge of things . § . as was prov'd formerly . . proof . because ere we can know the idea resembles the thing right , both of them must be in the mind , to be there compar'd . . proof . because both the correlates must be in the understanding . proof . because the prototype must be first known . . proof . because the notions are what 's meant by words . . proof . because , when the thing it self is intended to be made known , the thing it self is the first meaning , or what 's first meant by the words . . proof . because the ideas cannot be foreknown to our agreement what the words are to signifie , but the things only . hence the question , whether the things or our notions , are immediately signified by vvords , is frivolous . . proof . from the verification of propositions . . proof . because what 's perfectly like is the same . . proof . this last reason maintain'd by the instance of the notion of existence . . proof . the same reason abetted by the natural sayings of mankind . . the difference in the manner of existing prejudices not the identity of the notion and the thing . . the eminency of the spiritual nature of the soul gives her a power to be all things intellectually . § . shewn that things may have two different manners of existing . . no solid philosophy can be built on ideas . . what knowledge is . preliminary third . § . an objection against the possibility of the whole thing being in our mind . . some notes premis'd to clear this objection . . our knowledge is such as our notions are . . we can have such a notion of a thing ( or essence ) as distinguishes it from all other things . . confused notions suffice for a remote ground of science . . only distinct or abstracted notions are the immediate ground of distinct knowledge , or science . . science thus grounded , is truly called the knowledge of the thing . . abstracted ideas , tho' exclusive of one another , do include or connotate the thing . . this point farther explicated and enforc'd . . arg. . prov'd , because abstracted notions , if essential , do evidently include the thing . . arg. . prov'd , because all modes do the same . . arg. . as having no being of their own . . this makes , or shews philosophy to be the knowledge of things . . hence aristotle expresses the modes or accidents by concrete vvords . this point elucidated by abstract and concrete words . . hence space without body , or vacuum , is a contradiction . preliminary fourth . § . the state of the question . . aristotle neglects to shew particularly how knowledge is made . . later philosophers were at a great puzzle about it . . how the schools explicated this point . . how the ideists behaved themselves as to this point . . how far the author engages to clear this difficulty . . the first cause carries on the course of second causes by immediate dispositions . . and , therefore , he affists nature , if dispos'd , when it cannot reach . . therefore , if the matter can be dispos'd for a rational soul , god will give it . . there can be such a disposition in matter . . therefore , some material part , by which immediately the soul has notions from the objects . . therefore effluviums are sent from bodies to that part. . therefore man is truly one thing , which is corporeo-spiritual . . therefore some chief part in him which is primarily corporeo-spiritual , or has both those natures in it . . vvhich is affected according to both those natures , because of their identification in that part . . the peculiar temper of that part consists in indifferency . . that part very tender and sensible , yet not tenacious . § . that part the most noble of all material nature . . perhaps 't is reflexive of light , or lucid. . the effluviums have in them the nature of the bodies whence they are sent . . they affect that part , as things distinct from the man. . vvhy they imprint abstract notions . . the peculiar nature of our soul renders those notions perfectly distinct , and indivisible . . vvhence complex notions come . . the soul cannot , alone , produce any new act in her self ; . but by the phantasms exciting her a-new . . how reminiscence is made . . memory and reminiscence inexplicable , unless phantasms remain in the brain . the manner how reminiscence is made in brutes . . how reflexion is connaturally made . . direct notions are common to all mankind , and their words proper ; reflex ones , improper ; and their words metaphorical . . whence we come to have negative notions . . but those negative notions do not abstract from the subject . . how we come to have a notion of [ nothing . ] . hence great care to be had , lest we take non-entities , or nothings , for things . . logical notions are real ones . . the test to try artificial notions . hence all philosophy is real knowledge . . how our soul comes to have phantastick notions , or ( as we call them ) fancies . how to avoid being deluded by them . . how we may discourse evidently of those natures of which we have no proper notions . § . we can have no proper notion of god 's essence . . the author speaks not here of comparing notions , or of judgments . . the author's apology for this discourse ; and , what can be the onely way to go about to confute it . preliminary fifth . § . the design of the author here . § . the meaning of the word [ existence . ] . the extream danger of misconceiving it . . the meaning of [ ens , ] or [ thing . ] . the meaning of [ entity , ] or [ essence . ] . the meaning of [ matter ] and [ form ; ] or , of [ power ] and [ act. ] . what is meant literally by the common saying , that matter and form compound body . . the literal meaning of substantial or essential forms . the reason why some moderns oppose substantial or essential forms . the meaning of metaphysical composition and divisibility . . what is the principle of individuation . . the meaning of the word [ substance . ] the word improper . . that the word [ supporting , ] and [ inhering , ] taken metaphorically , may be allow'd ; and ought not to be ridicul'd . . the meaning of [ suppositum , ] or [ hypostasis . ] . the meaning of [ suppositality . ] . the meaning of the word [ individuum . ] . the meaning of [ substantia prima , ] and [ substantia secunda . ] . the word [ accidents ] is improper . § . the word [ modes ] more proper . . the word [ quantity ] is very proper . . the word [ extension ] very improper . . the meaning of divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability . . a short explication , what quantity , quality , and relation are . . what transcendents are . . the five sorts of transcendents . . great care to be had , that transcendent words be not held univocal . . what great errours spring thence , shewn in the univocal acception of the transcendent word [ compounded . ] . the cartesians unadvised in going ultra crepidam . reflexion first . § . the excellent wit , and unbyass'd ingenuity of the author of the essay acknowledg'd . . 't is probable he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks . . the incomparable excellency of the science of metaphysicks , shewn from the objects it treats of . . and from the manner , by which it handles them . . the knowledge of these high objects attainable by natural reason . . mr. locke's tenet of no innate ideas , solidly grounded , and unanswerable . reflexion second . § . in what the author agrees , and disagrees , with mr. locke . . we may have notions , without perceiving we have them . § . vve may think , without being conscious that we think . . 't is impossible to be conscious , or know we know , without a new act of reflexion . . 't is impossible to be conscious of , or know , our present reflex act , but by a new reflex one . hence , we can never come to know our last reflexion . . 't is utterly deny'd that consciousness causes individuation . the unreasonableness of the opinion , that men do always think . reflexion third . § . no notion simple , but that of [ existence . ] the order of our notions is to be taken from nature . . the word [ solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by mr. locke . . his solidity not at all essential to body . . space without body , or vacuum , is a meer groundless fancy . . the contrary to that tenet demonstrated . . therefore 't is impossible there should be any true experiment to prove a vacuum . reflexion fourth . § . mr. locke's first chapter commendable . § . privative notions connotate the subject . . meer motions made upon the senses , insufficient to give us knowledge of the objects . . sensible qualities are the same in the objects , as in the mind . § . the pretence of god's voluntary annexing improper causes to effects , is unphilosophical . . the power in the object to cause sensation and knowledge , is improperly such . reflexion fifth . § . ideas or notions are not actual perceptions , but the object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . it destroys the nature of memory , to make it consist in the reviving ideas . the mind cannot revive perceptions . . ideas in the fancy may fade ; but notions are never blotted out of the soul. reflexion sixth . § . if brutes can know , they may have general notions , and abstract and compare too . . the distinguishing our notions guides our reason and judgment right . . all complex ideas or notions must consist of simpler ones , united in the thing . . otherwise , they are groundless fancies . . the manner how all complex ideas or notions are made , elaborately explain'd . . how the doctrine of cartesius , mr. locke , and j. s. differ , as to this point . reflection seventh . § . extension , not well explicated . immensity , worse . . place , well explicated . . body and extension , not the same notion . § . space cannot be without extension . . extension and space differ onely formally , or in some nice respect . . the common explication of extension defended . . ens adequately divided into body and spirit . . vacuum must either be res , or modus rei ; otherwise , we can have no notion of it . . the extravagant arguments for vacuum refuted . . vve can set bounds to space , time , and to all durations but god's . . annihilation implies a contradiction ; and is not an act of omnipotency , but of impotency . . the cartesians can hardly avoid vacuum . . the having an idea of vacuum , distinct from that of plenum , no argument to prove it . reflexion eighth . § . the plain sense of the vulgar gives us the true notion of time. . duration is not succession , but rather opposite to it . . 't is a strange paradox to say , the notion of succession or duration is to be taken from the train of ideas in our mind . . our not perceiving duration when we sleep , no argument for it . . this tenet is against experience . . and , against the nature of things , and of resemblances too . . one motion , if known and regular , may , and must be a measure to another . . there is no shew of reason , that the equality of the periods of duration can possibly be taken from the train of our ideas . . this odd tenet not positively asserted by mr. locke . reflexion ninth . § . imaginary time before the vvorld , a meer illusion of fancy . . they who advance tenets against nature , must alter the meaning of those vvords that express our natural notions . . god's immensity not commensurate to an infinitely expanded space . . vve can have no notion of a vacuum , but a fancy onely . . scripture-texts the worst sort of arguments for philosophers , unless they be most plain , and literally meant . . onely self-existence , and what flows from that notion , is peculiar to god. . our natural notions assure us , that 't is meer fancy to explicate god's attributes by respect to corporeal natures . reflexion tenth . § . endless addition of numbers can never give us the notion of infinity . . how we come to have that notion . . and with what ease . . the notion of [ infinite ] is most perfectly positive . . duration easily conceivable without succession . reflexion eleventh . § . thoughts are not to be called sensations . § . thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul. § . mr. locke's position , that things are good or evil onely in reference to pleasure or pain , is true and solid . reflexion twelfth . § . the due commendation of mr. locke's doctrine , in this chapter of power . . that some spiritual agent is the first mover of bodies . the vvill cannot move our bodies . . the understanding and vvill not distinct powers . . man's freedom , or self-determination , deduced from principles . . the difference between men and brutes , in their determination to action . . man naturally pursues what is according to reason , or virtuous . therefore his nature has been perverted since his creation . . therefore supernatural motives are added , to strengthen man's weaken'd nature , or reason . . supernatural motives being the stronger , would always prevail , were they duely apply'd to a subject disposed . . why the understanding and vvill must be the same power substantially . . how to conquer in our spiritual warfare . . 't is evident that man determins himself to action : . yet , as pre-determin'd by god. . determination to virtuous action does perfect , and not destroy freedom . . good , if evidently appearing such , does certainly determin the vvill. . how wrong judgments come . § . sin generally springs from true , but disproportionate judgments . . of uneasiness ; and mr. locke's discourse concerning it . . good is the onely determiner of the will ; and not uneasiness . . prov'd from our natural defire of happiness . . the appearance of good is of greatest weight ; but , in a manner , disregarded by mr. locke . . putting this appearance , his reasons do not conclude . . prov'd , because ease is not the perfection of a soul. . the truth of this point stated . . mr. locke omits here the idea of power to be a thing , tho' nature suggests and forces it . reflexion thirteenth . § . our mixture of our notions is regular ; mr. locke's , irregular , and disorderly . . without knowing what substance or thing is , we cannot pretend to philosophy . . all our notions , and , amongst them , that of substance , or res , is taken from the thing . . we cannot be ignorant of the notion of substance , or thing . . we know the more inferiour notions of things less perfectly . and , individual essence , the least of all . . to gain a distinct notion of substance , or thing , we must consider it abstractedly from its modes , singly consider'd . . the literal truth , how substance and its accidents , or the thing and its modes , are exactly known . § . 't is impossible not to know extension , it being in a manner , self-evident . . the cohesion of extended parts is above physical proofs , and can onely be known by metaphysicks . . whence , 't is in vain to seek for natural efficient causes for those effects that depend on formal causes . . we may have clear knowledge of spiritual natures by reflexion . . the reason why , and the manner how . reflexion fourteenth . § . the mind alone does not collect notions , or compare them . . verbal relations come not from defect in our language , but for want of a real ground . . what causality is , and what grounds the relations of cause and effect . . the knowing the principle of individuation must antecede the knowledge of identity and diversity . . what gives the ground to specifie all notions . . what gives the ground to our notions of the individuum . . how individual men are constituted . . existence cannot possibly be the principle of individuation . . the outward circumstances of time and place cannot conduce to constitute the individual essence . . an individual man is formally an individual thing of that kind , and an individual person too . § . the essence of things not to be taken from the judgment of the vulgar , nor from extravagant suppositions . . consciousness cannot constitute personal identity . . that consciousness is inseparable from every individual man. . yet angels , who are pure acts , are constituted in part , by the act of knowing themselves . . no soul is indifferent to any matter . the notion of the individuum is essential . the substance is the same , tho' some quantity of the matter does come and go . reflexion fifteenth . § . that is onely true virtue , which is according to right reason . . how we come to have confus'd ideas , or notions . . the vvhole thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . . the metaphysical reason why this complexion of accidents , which constitutes individuums , should be almost infinitely various . . vve can sufficiently know things without comprehending fully this complexion . . no formal truth or falshood in ideas or notions . reflexion sixteenth . § . whence proper and metaphorical notions and vvords have their origin . . the general rules to know the right sense of vvords . § . words of art most liable to be mistaken . . the way how to avoid being mistahen in words of art. . even in terms of art , the thing is chiefly signify'd . . metaphysical vvords not unintelligible , but most clear. . this third book concerning words seems unnecessary . . vvhence j. s. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . . nature teaches us to define by a genus , and a difference . . those who oppose this method , must be forced to use it . . the mind does not frame universal notions designedly ; but is forced to it by nature . . nominal essences groundless and catachrestical . . aristotle's definition of motion defended . . aristotle's definition of light most proper . . the cartesian definition of motion faulty . . individuums under the same species differ essentially . . whence we must take our measures of simple and compound notions . . the same rule holds in accidents as well as in substance . . the idea or notion can never be in fault when we name things wrong . . confused notions may have more distinct ones annex'd to their subject . . coofused notions do not exclude but include those distinct ones which are yet undiscover'd . . we must not judge which notions are simple , which compounded , from clear or obscure appearances they make to our fancy , but from the rule given above , § , . § . shewn hence , because those men conceit that metaphysical notions are obscure , whereas they are evidently the clearest . . not the design of avoiding different significations of words , but plain nature forces us to put real essences . . vvords are not ambiguous for want of settled standards in nature . . the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of vvords ; but their ambiguity , ill contexture or misapplication . . imperfect knowers agree in the thing and not in the name only . . the knowing things by abstract notions promotes and not hinders science . . by mr. locke's principles , there is no way to remedy the abuses of vvords . . mr. locke's sentiment , after all , ambiguous . reflexion seventeenth . § . of the second operation of our understanding . . mr. locke's definition of knowledge in many respects faulty . . knowledge cannot consist in the connexion or disagreement of ideas . . the true definition of knowledge . . our definition of knowledge farther maintain'd . . hence , there is but one sort of connexion , in which knowledge consists ; viz. that of co-existence . . the degrees of our knowledge assign'd by mr. locke , very solid . § . every step we take in demonstrative knowledge , or every consequence , must be grounded on self-evidence . . the great usefulness of this last position . . scepticism and dogmatism are , both of them , highly prejudicial to science . . vve have sensitive knowledge of other notions besides existence . . onely principles and demonstration , and not experiments , can give us any intelligible explication of natural qualities . . short hints of the true aristotelian grounds . . how all secondary qualities come to be made . . the course of nature is fundamentally built on on the admission of rarity and density . . that by these grounds , the nature of secondary qualities is demonstrable . . the true reason why some men think them inexplicable . . the possibility of demonstrating them shewn by the instance of colour . reflexion eighteenth . § . the state of the question . § . how we know the things by means of ideas , inexplicable . . the ideists must be forc'd to grant , that the thing known is in the mind . . the necessity of the things being in our mind , farther enforced . . mathematical and moral knowledges are grounded on the thing in the mind . . all essential predicates , and accidental ones too , are truly the thing , and the whole thing imply'd confusedly . § . that our complex notions are regular , and well-grounded ; mr. locke's not so . . in what manner we compound such notions . . all pleas fail the ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish phantasms from notions . . odd miscarriages of nature ought not to shock natural principles . the cartesians are concluded against by j. s. as well as other ideists , or rather more . . all truth consists in joining or separating partial conceptions of the things ; and not in joining or separating ideas . . the distinction of truth into mental and verbal , extravagant ; and the parts of it co-incident . reflexion nineteenth . § . universal propositions in the mind are easily knowahle , antecedently to vvords . . 't is not necessary to know the precise bounds and extent of the species . . unnecessary knowledge not to be coveted , nor the vvant of it complain'd of . . the nature and use of general maxims mistaken by mr. locke . . the terms of general maxims clearer than those of particular propositions . . such general maxims are never used to deduce conclusions from them , but to reduce inferiour truths to them . . the absolute necessity of first principles asserted . . how other general maxims do govern all our actions and sayings . . the discarding general maxims destroys all science . this errour springs from men's taking wrong measures , in judging what notions are clear , and what confused . § . that not general maxims , but their abuse , breeds danger to science . . his instance , that general maxims are fit to prove contradictions , shews he quite mistakes the notion of body . . ideism is the genuin parent of enthusiasm in philosophy . . identical propositions not to be ridicul'd . . the right way how to use them ; and that mr. locke himself does , and must rely upon them . . neither ideas nor names can be predicate , or subject ; but the thing it self , as conceiv'd by us , in whole , or in part . . mr. locke's new instructive way is utterly insignificant . . that the signification of words is the meaning of them ; their meaning is our notion ; and our notion is the thing . reflexion twensieth . § . universals must relate to the existence they have in the mind . . to put any knowledge in brutes , is against the nature of things , and implicatory . . mr. locke confounds material and spiritual natures . . mr. locke's principles confound humane and brutal natures . . to create , is the peculiar effect of self-existence . . the thought cannot move the body ; and why . § . the notion or nature of the deity being once setled to be self-existence , all that can be said of it follows demonstratively . . we can know there are angels , tho they do not operate 〈◊〉 us . . we know at first our own existence , in the same manner as we know the existence of other things ; i. e. by sensation , and not by intuition . . no improvement of science , without some general principles . mr. locke's principles examin'd . . mr. locke's main principle ; which is to ascertain all other principles , inevident . . what things hinder the advancement of science . . euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying principles , or general maxims . reflexion twenty first . § . the point stated . § . mr. locke confounds outward action , to which we may proceed upon a probability ; with inward assent , to which we may not . . a strange character of our judging faculty . . that god has provided due motives of enjoin'd assent to all mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . . to assent upon a probability , is against the commonest light of reason . . there cannot be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . . probable assent is nonsense , or impertinent . . what kinds of distinctions are disallowable in disputation . § : charity to sincere and weak mis-understanders is a christian duty . . tradition built on meer hear-say , has little or no force . . a more firm assent is due to points certainly known to be reveal'd , than to scientifical conclusions . reflexion twenty second . § . how syllogisms came to be invented at first . § . the true use and abuse of them . . objections against syllogistick arguing clear'd . . syllogisms are useful for demonstration . . syllogisms are of no use in probable discourses . . other mistakes about syllogisms clear'd . . inferences and consequences of words abstracting from their sense , is strangely against all reason , and preposterous . . what is due to reason , what to divine revelation . the first caution to be observ'd , in order to this point . . the second caution to be used in this point . . reason not to be rely'd on in things beyond its sphere . . the notion of [ is true , ] must be distinguish'd from the notion of [ may be true , or may not be true. ] . therefore , that no assent ought to be built upon probable mediums , is demonstrable . . all errour comes by assenting upon probabilities . . the tenet that we ought to assent upon probability , is highly prejudicial to piety , and to best christian morality . § . to apply our selves to the right method to find out truth and science , is the onely antidote against errour . . no possible way , or certain standard , to take the just measure of probabilities . . the certain rule not to be mis-led by authority . . mr. locke seems to take some things for onely probable , which ( or the authority for them ) are demonstrable . . the members of mr. locke's division of sciences , are , partly co-incident , partly not belonging to science at all . . the connatural way how sciences are to be divided , and subordinate . some very useful corollaries concerning that subject . finis . errata . page . line . which last . l. . notion , which . p. . l. ult . poor weak . p. . l. . so far . p. . l. . to be . p. . l. . extra causas . p. . l. ult . words do . p. . l. . definition . p. . l. . it treats . p. . l. , . at least . p. . l. . insuperably . p. . l. . god at . p. . l. . no otherwise . p. . l. . found in . p. . l. penult . to be so . p. . l. . as is fetch'd . p. . l. . the referring it . p. . l . supposition . p . l. . given them . p. . l. . may walk . p. . l. . t is hard . p. . l. . l. . or other . p. . l. . brought to . p. . l. . enquiries . p. . contrast . p. . l. , . probable the next ; perhaps improbable . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the using the word [ idea ] in disparate senses , obstructs the way to science . philosophical words generally used , not to be laid a side without great necessity . much less chang'd for others less proper . mr. l's acception of the word [ idea ] very ambiguous . the ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . the putting brutes to have knowledge , associates them with mankind . * method to science , b. . less . §. . the first consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that brutes know . the second consideration prerequir'd . that our selves both asleep and awake , do , without knowledge , perform as strange operations as brutes do . the resemblance of reason in some actions of brutes , no argument of their knowledge brutes have phantasms , but no notions or meanings . ideas , if not spiritual notions , inexplicable . experience that we have ideas , gives no distinct account what they are . n●r to say , they are resemblances . to have ideas of our own ideas , inexplicable . no operation internal or external begins from the soul alone . mr. l. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this discourse . to ground all knowledge on ideas not distinguish'd from phantasms , makes science impossible . that the elements or materials of our knowledges are properly to be called [ notions . ] the word [ notion ] and [ cognition ] are taken here objectively . what notions are . fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about spiritual conceptions . the question about notions stated . a notion is the thing it self in our understanding ; proof . because knowing is an immanent act. proof . because the thing known must be in our knowing power . proof . because a resemblance is not the object of knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . otherwise , ideas only could be said to be known . proof . because , otherwise , all philosophy would be destroy'd . proof . because similitudes cannot possibly give us the first knowledge of things . as was prov'd formerly . proof . because , ere we can know the idea resembles the thing right , both of them must be in the mind , to be there compar'd . proof . because both the correlates must be in the understanding . proof . because the prototype , must be first known . proof . because notions are what 's meant by words . proof th . because when the thing it self is intended to be made known , the thing it self is the first meaning , or what is first meant by the words . proof . because the ideas cannot be fore-known to our agreement what vvords are to signifie , but the things only . hence the question , vvhether the things , or our notions , are immediately signified by vvords , is frivolous . proof . from the verification of propositions . proof . because what 's perfectly like , is the same . proof . this last reason maintain'd by the instance of the notion of existence proof . the same reason ab●tted by the natural sayings of mankind . the difference in the manner of existing prejudices not the identity of the notion and the thing . the eminency of the the spiritual nature of the soul , gives her a power to be all things intellectually . * b. . l. . §. . shown that things may have two different manners of existing . no solid philosophy can be built on ideas . . vvhat knowledge is . an objection against the possibility of the whole thing being in one mind , cleared . * b. . l. . § . some notes premis'd to clear this objection . our knowledge is such as our notions are . we can have such a notion of a thing ( or essence ) as distinguishes it from all other things . confused notions suffice for a remote ground of science . only distinct or abstracted notions are the immediate ground of distinct knowledge or science . science thus grounded , is truly called , the knowledge of the thing . abstracted ideas , tho' exclusive of one another , do include or connocate the thing . this point farther explicated , and enforced . prov'd , because abstract notions , if essential , do evidently include the thing . prov'd , because all modes do the same . as having no being of their own . this makes or shews philosophy to be the knowledge of things . hence aristotle expresses the modes or accidents , by concrete words the point elucidated by abstract and concrete words . hence space without body , or vacuum , is a contradiction . the state of the question . aristotle neglects to shew particularly how knowledge was made . later philosophers were at a great puzzle about it . how the schools explicated this point . how the ideists behav'd themselves as to this point . how far the author engages to clear this difficulty . the first cause carries on the course of second causes by immediate dispositions . and therefore he assists nature , if dispos'd , when it cannot reach . therefore , if the matter can be dispos'd for a rational soul , god will give it . there can be such a disposition in matter . therefore , some material part , by which immediately the soul has notions from the object . therefore effluviums are sent from bodies , to that part. therefore man is truly one thing , which is corporeo-spiritual . therefore some chief part in him which is primarily corporeo-spiritual , or has both those natures in it . which is affected according to both those natures , because of their identification in that part. the peculiar temper of that part consists in indifferency . that part very tender and sensible , yet not tenacious . that part the most noble of all material nature . perhaps 't is reflexive of light , or lucid. the effluviums have in them the naturee of the bodies whence they are sent . they affect that part , as things distinct from the man. why they imprint abstract notions . the peculiar nature of our soul , renders those notions perfectly distinct and indivisible . whence complex notions come . * method to science , book . less . . § . the soul cannot alone produce any new act in her self , but by the phantasms exciting her anew . how reminiscence is made . memory and reminiscence , inexplicable , unless phantasms remain in the brain the manner how reminiscence is made in brutes how reflexion is connaturally made . direct notions , common to all mankind , and their words proper ; reflex ones improper , and their words metaphorical . whence we come to have negative notions . but negative notions , as they are negative , do not abstract from the subject . how we come to have a notion of [ nothing . ] hence great care is to be had , lest we take non-entities , or nothings , for things . logical notions are real ones . the test to try artificial notions . * see method to science , b. . l. . §. , . hence all philosophy is real knowledge . how our soul comes to have phantastick notions , or ( as we call them ) fancies . how to avoid being deluded by them . how we may discourse evidently of those natures , of which we have no proper notions . we can have no proper notion of god's essence . the author speaks not here of comparing notions , or of judgments . the author's apology for this discourse ; and what can be the only way to go about to confute it . the design of the author here . * book . less . . the meaning of the word [ existence . ] * method . . b. . l. . § . the extreme danger of misconceiving it . the meaning of [ ens ] or [ thing . ] * b. . l. . * ibid. the meaning of [ entity ] or [ essence . ] the meaning of [ matter ] and [ form ; ] or of [ power ] and [ act. ] what 's meant literally by the common saying , that matter and form compound body . the literal meaning of substantial or essential forms . the reason why some moderns oppose substantial or essential forms . the meaning of metaphysical composition and divisibility . what is the principle of individuation . the meaning of the word [ substance . ] the word improper . that the words [ supporting ] and [ inhering ] taken metaphorically , may be allow'd , and ought not to be ridicul'd . the meaning of suppositum or hypostasis . the meaning of [ suppositality . ] the meaning of the word [ individuum . the meaning of [ substantia prima ] and [ substantiasecunda ] the vvord [ accidents ] is improper . the word [ mode ] more proper . the vvord [ quantity ] is very proper . the vvord [ extension ] very improper . the meaning of divisibility , impenetrability , space , and measurability . a short explication , what quantity , quality , and relation are . vvhat [ transcendents ] are . the five sorts of transcendents . great care to be had , that transcendent vvords be not held univocal . vvhat great errors spring thence shown in the univocal acception of the transcendent word [ compounded . ] the cartesians unadvis'd , in going ultra crepidam notes for div a -e the excellent wit , and unbyassed ingenuity of the author of the essay acknowledged . 't is probable he has taken a prejudice against metaphysicks . the incomparable excellency of the science of metaphysicks , shewn from the objects it treats of . and from the manner by which it handles them . the knowledge of these high objects attainable by natural reason . mr. locke's tenet of no innate ideas , solidly grounded , and unanswerable . notes for div a -e in what the author agrees and disagrees with mr. locke . we may have notions , without perceiving we have them . we may think , without being conscious that we think . 't is impossible to be conscious , or know we know , without a new act of reflexion . 't is impossible to be conscious of , or know our present reflex act , but by a new reflex one . hence , we can never come to know our last reflexion . 't is utterly deny'd that consciousness causes individuation . the unreasonableness of the opinion , that men do always think no notion simple but that of existence . the order of our notions is to be taken from nature . the word [ solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by m. l. his solidity not at all essential to body . space without body , or vacuum , is a meer groundless fancy . the contrary to that tenet demonstrated . therefore 't is impossible there should be any true experiment to prove a vacuum . * method to science , b. . l. . §. . mr. locke's first chapter commendable . privative notions must connotate the subject . * see prelim. . §. , , . meer motions made upon the senses , insufficient to give us knowledge of the objects . * prelim. . §. , , , &c. sensible qualities are the same in the objects , as in the mind . the pretence of god's voluntary annexing improper causes to effects , is unphilosophical . the power in the object to cause sensation and knowledge , is improperly such . * b. . l. . §. , , . ideas or notions are not actual perceptions , but the object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . it destroys the nature of memory , to make it consist in the reviving ideas . the mind cannot revive perceptions . * prelim. . § , , . ideas in the fancy may fade , but notions are never blotted out of the soul. if brutes can know , they may have general notions , and abstract , and compare too . the distinguishing our notions guides our reason and judgment right . all complex ideas , or notions , must consist of simpler ones , united in the thing . otherwise they are groundless fancies . the manner how all complex ideas or notions are made , elaborately explain'd . how the doctrine of cartesius , mr. locke , and j. s. differ , as to this point . extension not well explicated . immensity worse . place well explicated . body and extension not the same notion . space cannot be without extension . extension and space differ only formally , or in some nice respect . the common explication of extension defended . ens adequately divided into body and spirit . vacuum must either be res , or modus rei ; otherwise , we can have no notion of it . * preliminary . §. . the extravagant arguments for vacuum refuted . psal. . v. . we can set bounds to space , time , and to all duration but god's . annihilation implies a contradiction , and is not an act of omnipotency , but of impotency . the cartesians can hardly avoid vacuum . the having an idea of vacuum , distinct from that of plenum , no argument to prove it . the plain sense of the vulgar gives us the true notion of time. duration is not succession , but rather opposit to it . 't is a strange paradox to say , the notion of succession or duration is to be taken from the train of ideas in our head. our not perceiving duration when we sleep no argument for it . this tenet is against experience . and against the nature of things , and of resemblances too . one motion , if known and regular , may and must be a measure to another . there is no shew of reason that the equality of the periods of duration can possibly be taken from the train of our ideas . this odd tenet not positively asserted by mr. l. imaginarytime before the world , a meer illusion of fancy . they who advance tenets against nature , must alter the meaning of those words that express our natural notions . god's immensity not commensurate to an infinitely expanded space . we can have no notion of a vacuum , but a fancy only . scripture-texts the worst sort of arguments for philosophers , unless they be most plain , and literally meant . only self existence , and what flows from that notion , is peculiar to god. our natural notions assure us , that 't is meer fancy to explicate god's attributes by respect to corporeal natures . endless addition of numbers can never give us the notion of infinity . how we come to have that notion , * prelim. . § , . and with what ease . the notion of [ infinite ] is most perfectly positive . duration easily conceivable , without succession . * james . . * apocal. cap. . v. . thoughts are not to be call'd sensations . thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul. mr. l.'s position , that things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain , is true and solid . the due commendation of mr. l's doctrine in this chapter of power . that some spiritual agent is the first mover of bodies . the will cannot move our bodies . * preliminary . §. . . refl . . §. . the understanding and will , not distinct powers . man's freedom , or self determination , deduced from principles . the difference between man and brutes in their determination to action . man naturally pursues what is according to reason , or virtuous . therefore his nature has been perverted since his creation . therefore supernatural motives are added , to strengthen man's weaken'd nature , or reason . supernatural motives being the stronger , would always prevail , were they duly apply'd to a subject dispos'd . why the understanding and will must be the same power substantially . how to conquer in our spiritual warfare . 't is evident , that man determines himself to action , yet , as predetermin'd by god. determination to virtuous action does perfect , and not destroy freedom . good , if evidently appearing such , does certainly determine the will. how wrong judgments come . sin generally springs from true but disproportionate judgments . of uneasiness , and mr. l's discourse concerning it . good is the only determiner of the will ; and not uneasiness . prov'd from our natural desire of happiness . the appearance of the good is of greatest weight , but , in a manner , disregarded by mr. locke . putting this appearance , his reasons do not conclude . prov'd , because ease is not the perfection of a soul. the truth of this point stated . mr. l. omits here the idea of power to be a thing , tho' nature suggests i● our mixture of our notions is regular , mr. l.'s irregular and disorderly . without knowing what substance or thing is , we cannos pretend to philosophy . all our notions , and , amongst them , that of substance or res is taken from the thing . we cannot be ignorant of the notion of substance or thing . we know the more inferiour notions of things less perfectly ; and the individual essence least of all . to gain a distinct notion of substance or thing , me must consider it abstractedly from its modes , singly consider'd . the literal truth how substance and its accidents , or the thing and its modes are distinctly known . 't is impossible not to know extension , is being , in a manner , self-evident . the cohesion of extended parts is above physical proofs , and can only be known by metaphysicks . whence 't is in vain to seek for natural efficient causes for those effects that depend on formal causes . we may have clear knowledge of spiritual natures by reflexion . the reason why ; and the manner how. * reflex . . §. . * see method to science , b. . c. . §. . the mind alone does not collect notions , or compare them . verbal relations come not from defect in our language , but for want of a real ground . what causality is , and what grounds the relations of cause and effect . the knowing the principle of individuation , must anteceede the knowledge of identity and diversity . what gives the ground to specify all notions . what gives the ground to our notions of the individuum . how individual men are constituted . * method to science , b. . l. . §. . existence cannot possibly be the principle of individuation . the outward circumstances of time and place cannot conduce to constitute the individual essences . an individual man is formally an individual thing of that kind , and an individual person too . the essence of things not to be taken from the judgment of the vulgar , nor from extravagant suppositions . consciousness cannot constitute personal identity . * reflex . . § , , , . that consciousnes is inseparable from every individual man. yet angels , who are pure acts , are constituted , in part , by the act of knowing themselves . no soul is indifferent to any matter . the notion of the individuum is essential . the substance is the same , tho' some quantity of the matter does come and go . that is only true virtue , which is according to right reason . how we come to have confused ideas , or notions . the whole thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . the metaphysical reason why this complexion of accidents which constitutes individuums , should be almost infinitely various . * job . . we can sufficiently know things without comprehending fully this c●mplexion . no formal truth or falshood in ideas or notions . notes for div a -e whence proper and metaphorical notions and words have their origin . the general rules to know the right sense of words . words of art most liable to be mistaken . the way how to avoid being mistaken in words of art. even in terms of art the thing is chiefly signify'd . metaphysical words not unintelligible , but most clear. this third book concerning words seems unnecessary . whence j. s. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . nature teaches us to define by a genus and a difference . * b. . l. . § . those who oppose this method must be forced to use it . the mind does not frame universal notions designedly ; but as forced to it by nature . nominal essences groundless , and catachrestical . aristotle's definition of motion defended . * see method to science , b. . l. . §. . aristotle's definition of light , most proper . the cartesian definition of motion , faulty . individuums under the same species differ essentially . * b. . l. . § . whence we must take our measure of simple and compound notions . the same rule holds in accidents as well as substance . the idea or notion can never be in fault when we name things wrong . confused notions may have more distinct ones annext to their subject . confused notions do not exclude , but include those distinct ones which are yet undiscover'd . we must not judge which notions are simple , which compounded , from the clear or obscure appearances they make to our fancy , but from the r●le given above , § , . shown hence , because th●se men conceit that metaphysical notions , are obscure , whereas they are evidently the clearest . not the design of avoiding different signification of words , but plain nature , forces us to ●put real essences . words are not ambiguous for want of setled standards in nature . the thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the abuse of words ; but their ambiguity , ill contexture , or mis-application . imperfect knowers agree in the thing , and not in the name only . the knowing things by abstract notions promotes , and not hinders science . by mr. locke's principles , there is no way to remedy the abuse of words . mr. locke's sentiments , after all , ambiguous . notes for div a -e of the second operation of our understanding . mr. l.'s definition of knowledge in many respects faulty . knowledge cannot consist in the connexion or disagreement of ideas . the true definition of knowledge . our definition of knowledge farther maintain'd . hence , there is but one sort of connexion , in which knowledge consists : viz. that of co-existence . the degrees of our knowledge assign'd by mr. l. very solid . every step we take in demonstrative knowledge , or every consequence , must be grounded on self-evidence the great usefulness of this last position . scepticism and dogmatism are , both of them , highly prejudicial to science . we have sensitive knowledge of other notions , besides existence . onely principles and demonstration and not experiments , can give us any intelligible explication of natural qualities . short hints of the true aristotelian grounds . * see method to science , b. . l. . § §. , . how all secondary qualities come to be made . the course of nature is fundamentally built on the admission of ratity and density . that by these grounds , the nature of secondary qualities is demonstrable . the true reason why some men think them inexplicable . the possibility of demonstrating them shewn by the instance of colour . the state of the question . how we know the things by means of ideas , inexplicable . the ideists must be forced to grant that the thing known is in the mind . the necessity of the thing 's being in our mind , farther inforced . mathematical and moral knowledges are grounded on the thing in the mind . all essential predicates , and accidental ones too , are truly the thing , and the whole thing , imply'd consusedly . that our complex notions are regular , and well grounded ; mr. l's , not so . in what manner we compound such notions . all pleas fail the ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish phantasms from notions . odd miscarriages of nature ought not to shock natural principles . hence , no vacuum . the cartesians are concluded against by j. s. as well as other ideists , or rather more . all truth consists in joining or separating partial conceptions of the things ; and not in joining or separating ideas . the distinction of truth into mental and verbal extravagant , and the parts of it coincident . universal propositions in the mind are easily knowable antecedently to words . 't is not necessary to know the precise bounds and extent of the species . unnecessary knowledge not to be coveted , nor the want of it complain'd of . the nature and use of general maxims , mistaken by mr. locke . the terms of general maxims clearer than those of particular propositions . such general maxims are never used to deduce conclusions from them , but to reduce inferiour truths to them . * book . less . . the absolute necessity of first principles asserted . how other general maxims do govern all our actions and sayings . the discarding general maxims destroys all science . this errour springs from men's taking wrong measures in judging what notions are clear , what confused . that not general maxims , but their abuse , breeds danger to science . his instance that general maxims are fit to prove contradictions , shows he quite mistakes the notion of body . ideism is the genuin parent of enthusiasm in philosophy . identical propositions not to be ridicul'd . the right way how to use them , and that mr. locke himself does and must rely upon them . see meth. to science , b. a. l. . § neither ideas nor names can be predicate or subject ; but the thing it self , as conceived by us , in whole or in part . mr. l.'s new instructive way is utterly insignificant . that the signification of words is the meaning of them ; their meaning is our notion ; and our notion is the thing . universals mnst relate to the existence they have in the mind . to put any knowledge in brutes is against the nature of the thing , and implicatory . mr. l. confound ; material and spiritual natures . mr. l's principles confound human and brutal natures . to create is the peculiar effect of self-existence . the thought cannot move the body , and why . see method to science , book . less . . §. . the notion or nature of the deity being once settled to be self-existence , all that can be said of it follows demonstratively . we can know there are angels , tho' they do not operate'on us . we know at first our own existence , in the same manner as we know the existence of other things ; i. e. by sensation , and not by intuition . see method to science , book . less . . §. . no improvement of science , without fome general principle . mr. locke's principles examin'd . mr. locke's main principle ; which is to ascertain all other principles , inevident . what things hinder the advancement of science . euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying principles , or general maxims . the point stated . mr. l. confounds outward action , to which we may proceed upon a probability , with inward assent , to which we may not . a strange character of our judging faculty . that god has provided due motives of enjoin'd assent to all mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . * see method to science , b. . l. . to assent upon a probability , is against the commonest light of reason . there cannot be , in proper speech , any degrees of assent . probable assent is nonsense , or impertinent . what kinds of distinctions are disallowable in disputation . charity to sincere and weak misunderstanders is a christian duty . tradition built on meer hearsay , has little or no force . a more firm assent is due to points certainly known to be reveal'd , than to scientifical conclusions . how syllogisms came to be invented at first . the true use and abuse of them . objections against syllogistick arguing clear'd . syllogisms are useful for demonstration . syllogisms are of no use in probable discourses . other mistakes about syllogism clear'd . inferences and consequences of words , abstracting from their sense , is strangely against all reason , and preposterous . what is due to reason , what to divine revelation . the first caution to be observ'd , in order to this point . the second caution to be used in this point . reason is not to be rely'd on in things beyond its sphere . the notion of [ is true , ] must be distinguish'd from the notion of [ may be true , or may not be true . ] therefore , that no assent ought to be built on probable mediums , is demonstrable . all errour comes by assenting upon probability . the tenet , that we ought to assent upon probability , is highly prejudicial to piety , and to best christian morality . to apply our selves to the right method to find out truth and science is the onely antidote against errour . no possible way , or certain standard , to take the just measures of probabilities . the certain rule , not to be mis-led by authority . mr. locke seems to take somethings for onely probable , which ( or the authority for them ) are demonstrable . the members of mr. locke's division of sciences are partly co-incident , partly not belonging to science at all . the connatural way how sciences are to be divided , and subordinated . some very useful corollaries concerning that subject . academia scientiarum, or, the academy of sciences being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences, with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science : in english and latine / by d. abercromby ... abercromby, david, d. or . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) academia scientiarum, or, the academy of sciences being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences, with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science : in english and latine / by d. abercromby ... abercromby, david, d. or . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by h.c. for j. taylor, l. meredith, t. bennet, r. wilde ..., london : . english and latin on opposite pages. first ed. cf. wing. reproduction of original in british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng knowledge, theory of. philosophy -- early works to . science -- early works to . intellectual life. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jonathan blaney sampled and proofread - jonathan blaney text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licens'd , feb. . . r. midgley . academia scientiarum : or the academy of sciences . being a short and easie introduction to the knowledge of the liberal arts and sciences . with the names of those famous authors that have written on every particular science . in english and latine . by d. abercromby , m. d. london , printed by h. c. for j. taylor , l. meredith , t. bennet , r. wilde , booksellers in st. paul's church-yard , amen-corner , and ludgate-hill , . to alex. campbell , of calder the younger , eldest son to sir hugh campbell , knight baronet , and baron of calder . sir , being of a temper quite contrary to the flatering genius of this age , i shall not follow the example of most writers of dedicatory epistles , and try your patience with long encomiums either of yourself , or of your family , since the histories , and publick records of the kingdom of scotland , have given the publick so clear , and so full an account of its antiquity ; as likewise of the vertue , generosity , great atchievements , and unshaken loyalty of your illustrious ancestors yet i hope i shall not offend your modesty , if i say , 't is the general opinion of all your acquaintances , both at home and abroad , that as you follow in your greener years so closely their footsteps through the temple of vertue , to that of honour and glory , so you may perhaps , impove ( if possible ) to a higher pitch , those very great and heroick qualities they first excell'd in . may not i then b● allowed to say , without the least suspicio● of flattery , that you are not only th● la●ful successor of the most ancient , mo● noble , and loyal family of the thai● of calder , and of their estate and for ▪ tune , but also , that you are already possess'd of these good and great endowments both of body and mind , which made them capable of the great employments they were intrusted with , and enabled them on all occasions to render the kings of scotland and great britain such signal services , as can never be forgotten . but not intending a panegyrick , which i know would be uneasie to you , who hates the least appearance of flattery , i shall not insist on this subject ; i must only tell you , that this small treatise , since 't is the academy of sciences , could not but claim a peculiar right to your patronage , since you have given so singular and convincing proofs of your being thoroughly acquainted with the subject it treats of ; for having seen by a lucky chance , before i had any acquaintance with yourself , your very learned and accurate book , i found it to contain in short , almost all kind of useful learning , the systems both of the new and old philosophy , the choicest flowers of rhetorick ; as likewise evident marks of a not ordinary piety and loyalty , especially when you conclude the whole with your father's , as well as your own dutiful asserting and declaring for his sacred majesty , who now reigns , ( then duke , ) his undoubted right of succession , in expressions full of affection and zeal to his person and service , and that at a time when loyalty and duty of subjects to the royal family , were not only seasonable , but seem'd to be necessary ; and you being hardly past the sixteenth year of your age , i could not but be surprised , instead of promising buds , to find so early fruits both of vertue and loyalty . while this directed me whither i should send this small present , it rais'd my thoughts in revising of it with a paulo majora canamus , to reform it so as to make it suitable to your character , and give it the better pretence to your acceptance . only i hope , that as travellers find some pleasure when settled at home , to review in a small map , those vast and pleasant countries they have visited abroad , so it may perhaps , prove some diversion in your spare hours , to consider now and then those very many arts and sciences , which both at home and abroad you have practised , and so successfull studied in larger volumes . though i treat nothing a fond , as the french speak , or thoroughly and to the bottom , yet besides some not despicable hints of the material principles of most arts and sciences , i do point every where at the famed authors , and greatest masters of every art and science , that they may supply you with what my design'd brevity , and the scope of this treatise , would not allow me to enlarge upon ; and so this not unpleasant method , whatever you think of the performance , may perhaps reconcile you to my design , of adding , though but little , to your greater improvements , while at the same time i shew to the world with what zeal i am , sir , your truly affectionate friend , and humble servant , d. abercromby . nobilissimo , clarissimoque domino . d. alex. campbell , a calder juniori , d. hugonis campbell , equitis baronetti , & baronis calderae , filio natu maximo . nobilissime domine , cum proclivem adeo in adulationem hujus saeculi genium omnino oderim praeter orum fere omnium morem qui mecaeati suo opusculum quodpiam inscri●nt , neque in tuas ipsius , neque in familiae tuae laudes multis excurram , cum praesertim historia ipsa publicaque regni scotiae instrumenta , non antiquissima solum ejusdem stemmata , sed & virtutem , fortitudinem , ingentia sacta , inconcussamque semper in reges nostros illustrium majorum tuorum fidem nec semel , nec paucis divulgarint . nihil tamen , spero , proferam quod prae modestia aegrius ferre debeas , si dixero cum omnibus sive britannis , sive exteris quibus non de facie tantum notus es , eorum te vestigia quamvis adhuc tantum aerate florentem per templum virtutis ad templum honoris & gloriae , tam presso pede insequi , ut quibus illi aliquando dotibus claruere , has rerum a te gerendarum splendore illustriores forte aliquando fore , nec immerito , nec solus conjiciam . quidni igitur hoc loco absque ulla adulationis suspicione liceat mihi profiteri te non modo conspicuum antiquissimae , nobilissimae , fidissimaeque regibus nostris familiae , ac thannorum calderae , opumque , quibus potiuuntur , legitimum haeredem , sed videri etiam donatum a natura iis sive corporis sive animi ornamentis , quae ipsis ad sublimia quaeque regni munera additum aperuerunt , quibus ii recte administrandis insignia regibus tum scotiae , tum magniae britanniae obsequia nulla proinde oblivione delenda pro re nata praestitere . sed cum nullam hic panegyrim mihi proposuerim , utpote quae tibi vel levissimam adulationis speciem refugienti ingrata foret , huic argumento pluribus non immorabor ; hic tantum dicam tractulum hunc , cum academia scientiarum sit , vel eo nomine tuo deberi patrocinio quod illius argumentum intime te , penitusque nosse indiciis haud obscuris non ita pridem demonstraveris , cum enim propitio mihi casu in librum a te sane perquam docte eleganterque conscriptum prius quam mihi notus fores , incidissem statim eo paucis , compendioque animadverti contineri non veteris modo novaeque philosophiae systemata , sed & omnem fere utilorem & alicujus momenti doctrinam , flosculosque etiam eloquentiae selectiores , nec non conspicua pietatis in deum , fideique in regem ubique indicia , ibi praesertim ubi sub finem operis , tuo ipsius patrisque tui nomine , regis nunc regantis ( tum ducis eboracensis ) certissimum avitum ad diadema jus , spirantibus ubique tuum in ipsum amorem verbis pro officio declaras , eoque tempore quo debitae regiae familiae fidei , obedientiaeque declaratio non opportuna tantum , sed & necessaria omnino videbatur ; cumque annum jam sextum supra decimum vix implevisses non potui non mirari maturos adeo tuo in hortulo solidae virtutis fructus , e quo teneriores tantum adhuc flosculi habita aetatis ratione expectari poterant . dam haec me impellerent ut tuo tractatulum hunc nomini inscriberem novam mihi provinciam imposuerunt ut eum scilicet ad limam denuo revocarem , quo jam tuo dignior aspectu quantumvis tibi semper impar , faciliorem ad te aditum inveniret . illud tantum sperare mihi liceat , ut qui longinquas regiones peragrarunt , domum reduces non absque voluptate aliqua exigua eas in mappa revisunt , ita futurum tibi negotiis magis seriis libero non injucundum contemplari varias illas scientias artesque quas tanto successu grandioribuse voluminibus conquisitas , domi ●orisque foeliciter exercuisti . caeterum licet nihil hic penitius attingam , praeter non contemnenda artium plerarumque , ac scientiarum principia , celebriores ubique authores indico , ut ea tibi pluribus subministrent , quae paucis tantum proposita mihi brevitas ipseque tractatuli hujusce scopus a me exigebant ; hac itaque non injucunda scribendi methodo , quicquid de opere ipso censeas , forte fiet ut & concilium meum probes , & propositam mihi metam ; eo enim hoc opusculo collimavi , ut quidpiam quamvis modicum praeclaris animi tui ornamentis adderem , dum interim palam profiteor quam non ficte haberi velim tibi , tuoque ubi res feret , obsequio addictissimus . david abercromby . the preface . because of the shortness of humane life , and the little leisure of most men to read large volumes , an accurate and easie method for attaining to a general , and yet in some measure , sufficient knowledge of most arts and sciences , has been long wish'd for , but never , for ought i know , undertaken , or at least , so compendiously , and so usefully performed , by any perhaps , either at home or abroad . for , . i have set down in these papers , a part of what i judg'd most material in every science ; as likewise fittest for every common capacity , that so this treatise may prove of a more general use . . i have called it the academy of sciences , because here , as in an academy , you may learn most of the noblest arts and sciences , especially if you peruse often what is offered to you in these few sheets : but if you desire to know more , though perhaps most gentlemen will think this enough , i have supplied you with good authors , who will give you a further , instruction , if you are at leisuure to consult them . . the virtuosi are concern'd in this treatise , because it contains an abridgment of what they have already learn'd , together with the names of the famed authors that have treated of the subject ; which is no inconsiderable advantage , the learned as well others , being sometimes at a loss when they write books , what authors treat of this or that subject ; wherein by having this treatise at hand , they may be soon satisfied . i have written it both in english and latine , to gratifie such as understand but one of the said tongues . . for methods sake , in the order of the sciences set down here , i have followed the alphabet as far as conveniently i could , beginning with those whose first letter of their names is a , and then with those whose first letter is b , &c. which engag'd me to keep the greek and latine names , as the most known , and the fittest for this purpose . i need not now tell you , that this treatise is of singular use to all sorts of persons , of what condition soever , and not to scholars only , but likewise to masters , who have here in a few lines , what they may teach such as are committed to their trust ; yea , the very ladies themselves , by the perusal of this treatise , and a little help , may be furnish'd with such a variety of knowledge , as may supply their not being bred in universities . praefatio . cum per humanae vitae brevitatem , otiumque ingentia evolvere volumina plerisque hominum non liceat , accuratam , facilemque methodum qua generalem quis , & tamen quae aliquatenus sufficiat , artium praecipuarum scientiarumque notitiam assequeretur , diu multumque plurimi exoptarunt , quam tamen indigenarum nemo , quod sciam , aut etiam alienigenarum scribendam adhuc suscepit , aut eo saltem , quo hic tradita est , compendio , fructuque forte hactenus conscripsit : primo enim quicquid praecipui quavis in scientia momenti , & quicquid communem ad captum magis appositum judicavi , idcirco adduxi in medium ut eo pluribus tractatulus hic usui foret . . academiam scientiarum inscripsi ; hic enim velut in academia artes plerasque , scientiasque nobiliores discere poteris si praesertim saepius relegas quae breve hoc scriptum tibi proponit : at si penitius omnia , pluraque scire volueris , quamquam nobilium plerique sat multa haec forte existimaturi sint , probatos tibi suggessi authores , qui te plura docebunt si quidem per otium eos consulere tibi liceat . . jam eos quoque qui ingenuis artibus ingenium excoluere opusculum hoc spectat , utpote eorum compendium quae jam didicere , complexum , celebriorumque propofito super argumento nomina authorum : quod non exiguae quid utilitatis est cum etiam docti aliquando , perinde atque alii nesciant , dum libros scribunt , quis de hac , illave re egerit ; quod seposito hujuscemodi ad usum hoc libello cito discent . caeterum tum anglico eum , tum latino idiomate eo consilio scripsi , ut ●is inservirem qui alteram linguarum ●llarum non intelligerent . . methodi gratia in serie scientiarum hic exhibita , alphabeti ordinem , quantum commode potui secutus sum , initio ab iis ducto quarum homina littera a , tum ab iis quarum homina littera b inchoat , &c. unde factum est ut voces graecas & latinas , utpote maxime notas , huncque in scopum magis idoneas retinuerim . frustra jam hic subjungerem tractatulum hunc summe utilem fore omni hominum generi , aetati , conditioni , neque discipulis tantum , sed & magistris quae hic perpaucis habent quae suae commissos curae docere queant : quin etiam ipsae faeminae hujus tractatuli lectione exiguaque docentis opera eam cognitionis varietatem compare sibi poterunt , quae educationis , qua carent , academicae , supplementum quoddam videri possit . some books printed for , and sold by john taylor , at the ship in st. paul's church-yard . a free enquiry into the vulgarly receiv'd notion of nature , made in an essay , address'd to a friend . in english and latine , for the benefit of forreiners . by r. b. fellow of the royal society . the declimations of quintilian , being and exercitation or praxis upon his twelve books , concerning the institution of an orator . translated ( from the oxford theater edition ) into english , by a learned and ingenious hand , with the approbation of several eminent schoolmasters in the city of london . the happy ascetick , or the best exercise ; with a letter to a person of quality , concerning the lives of the primitive christians . by anthony horneck , d. d. preacher at the savoy . the academy of sciences . academia scientiarum . section i. algebra . algebra , or the analytical doctrine , is the art of finding an unknown magnitude , taking it as if it were known , and finding the equality between it and the given magnitudes : it implieth then a dissolving of what is suppos'd to be compounded , which is meant by the greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or resolution : this name may upon this account be given to the common operations of arithmetick ; as for instance , to what we call substraction , division , extraction of roots , &c. for substraction is nothing else but a dissolution or resolution of what is suppos'd to be compounded , or made up by addition ; and division a resolution of what is suppos'd to be made up by multiplication ; as likewise extraction of the square root , is a resolution of what is supposed to be made up by squaring : but such resolutions being easie , are not called algebra , for the resolution of things , whereof the composition is more intricate , is more properly understood by this harsh word . the arabs call it algibr walmokabala , from the first of these two words we call it algebra , which taken together , imply the art of restitution and resolution . lucas de burgo , the most ancient european algebrist , calls it the rule of restauration and opposition . and indeed , this is its chief work ; a quantity unknown , which they commonly call root , is supposed by additions , substractions , multiplications , divisions , and other like operations , to be so chang'd , as to be made equal to a known quantity compared with it , or set over against it ; which comparing is commonly called equation , and by resolving such an equation , the root so changed , transformed or luxated , is in a manner put into joynt again , and its true value made known , for the word giabara , from which the word algebra is derived , does signifie , to restore or set a broken bone or joynt . theo says , that algebra was invented by plato ; however the chief writers of algebra are those whose names i have set down here , to gratifie such as would learn this noble art. lucas pacciolus , or lucas of burgo , a minorita fryer , wrote an italian treatise of algebra , in venice , . a little after the invention of the art of printing ; there he mentions pisanus , and several others that had written on the same subject before him , but their works are not extant . harriot , oughtred , descartes , huddenius , gelleus , billius , and lately the fam'd dr. wallis has written a large volume on this subject . sectio prima . algebra . algebra sive doctrina analytica est ars inveniendi magnitudinem incognitam eam accipiendo quasi cognita foret , inveniendoque aequalitatem eam inter , datasque magnitudines . sonat itaque resolutionem ejus quod compositum supponitur , hicque graecae vocis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sensus est : hoc proinde nomen tribui poterit communibus arithmeticae operationibus , puta substractioni , divisioni , extractioni radicum quadratarum , &c. substractio enim nihil aliud est quam resolutio ejus quod ex additione supponitur emersisse , compositi , divisio quid ? nisi resolutio ejus quod ex multiplicatione supponitur emersisse , compositi , extractioque radicis quadratae nil aliud est quam resolutio ejus quod ex quadratione supponitur emersisse , compositi : sed hujuscemodi resolutiones utpote faciliores algebrae nomine intelligendae non veniunt , difficilium enim compositionum resolutio barbara hac voce , & magis proprie intelligitur . arabibus dicitur algiabr walmokabala , a priore voce nos algebram dici mus , geminae eae voces simul sumptae artem restitutionis , ac resolutionis sonant . lucas burgensis antiquissimus inter europaeos algebrista algebram restaurationis & oppositionis regulam vocat . et reipsa praecipuum hoc ejus opus est , quantitas adhuc incognita quam vulgo radicem dicunt , quibusdam additionibus , subductionibus , multiplicationibus , divisionibus , aliisque ●d genus operationibus ita supponitur mutata , ut tandem aequalis fiat quantitati notae eidem comparatae , aut e regione ejusdem collocatae , quae comparatio aequatio dici solet : hujus autem aequationis resolutione radix hunc in modum mutata , aut quasi luxata , priori rursus , ut ita dicam , situi restituitur , verusque ejus valor innotescit , vox enim giabara unde algiabr desumitur , fracti ossis restaurationem sonat . inventam asserit a platone algebram theo ; ut ut sit praecipui algebrae scriptores hi sunt quorum nomina hic appono in eorum gratiam qui nobilem hanc artem discere voluerint . lucas pacciolus , aut burgensis , italicum de algebra tractatum scripsit venetiis anno nonagesimo quarto supra millesimum quadringentesimum ●aulo post inventam typographiam ; ●bi commemorat pisanum , aliosque ●on paucos qui de eodem argumento ●rius scripserant , at eorum opera jam ●on extant . harriotus , oughtredus , cartesius , huddenius , gelleus , billius , ●c nuperrime celeberrimus vallisius ●oc super argumento amplum volu●en edidit . sect. ii. arithmetick . arithmetick is the art of numbering ; 't is either practical or speculative ; the speculative arithmetick contains some general truths relating to numbers : as for instance , unity is the beginning of every number ; a number is a multitude compounded of unites . an even part of a number is that which by multiplication produceth that number . as is an even part of , because multiplied by , give . an uneven part of a number is that which by multiplication produceth not that number . thus is an uneven part of , because however multiplied , it shall never produce this number . the proportion of numbers is either according to their excess , defect , or equality , for that thing has some proportion to another that is either less , greater , or equal . a perfect number is that which is equal to all its even parts : the first perfect number is , for all its even parts are , , , which together give . the next perfect number is , for all its even parts are , , , , , which by addition give . these ensuing notions likewise may be referr'd to the speculative part of arithmetick , to multiply one number by another , as by , is to take the multiplicand as many times as the unity may be taken in the multiplicator , and so being multiplied by , the product must be . to divide one number by another ; as for instance , by , is to find out how many times are contained in . a plain number is the product of two numbers multiplied the one by the other ; then is a plain number , because it is the product of multiplied by . a solid number is the product of three numbers multiplied , such is , because 't is the product of those three numbers multiplied , , , for multiplying by i have , and by i have . a square number is the product of two equal numbers muitiplied by one another , or of the same number multiplied by itself . is a square number , as being the product of multiplied by , and is called the square root . a cube is the product of three equal numbers , or of the same number thrice taken ; for if you multiply by , you have ; and if you multiply by ● again , you have , and is called th● cube root . that part of arithmetick that relate● to the practice , contains , first addition , which is the gathering of man● numbers into one sum ; as if i add ● to , the whole is . secondly substraction , as if i take from , ther● remains ▪ thirdly , multiplication as if i enquire how many are four time● six , and i find . fourthly , division , as if i enquire how many times ● are contained in , and i find the● to be contain'd four times in . fifthly , the fractions . sixthly , th● decimal fractions , invented to supply broken numbers , very troublesome to practitioners . seventhly , the extraction of roots , cubic and square ▪ eighthly , the four rules of proportion , of society , alligation , falshood , the doctrine of progressions . we may reckon the ensuing authors among the best arithmeticians . simon stevinius invented the decimal fractions ; neper supplies troublesome and intricate divisions by his rabdologick plates , and his logarithms ; and tacquet has given us both the theory , and the practice of arithmetick ; euclid in the , , , and of his elements of geometry ; jordanus , nemorantius , francis maurolycus , barlaamon , &c. sectio secunda . arithmetica . arithmetica est ars numerandi ; est autem practica aut speculativa ; haec manifeste vera quaedam , & generalia de numeris pronunciata complectitur : cujuscemodi ea sunt quae sequuntur . omnis numeri principium est unitas ; numerus est multitudo ex unitatibus composita . pars aliquota numeriea est quae numerum metitur . ita numerus hic est pars ●iquota numeri hujus , quinquies ●im sunt . pars aliquanta numeri est ea quae ●umerum non metitur . ita numerus ●ic est pars aliquanta numeri hujus ●o ; ter enim sumptus dat , & qua●er dat . proportio numerorum est nume●orum consideratio juxta excessum , defectum aut aequalitatem : illud ●nim ad aliud proportionem habet , quod aut minus , aut majus , aut aequale est . perfectus numerus dicitur qui omnibus suis partibus paribus aequalis est . primus perfectus est , illius enim omnes partes pares seu aliquotae sunt , , , quae simul additae dant . secundus est ; nam illius omnes partes aliquotae seu pares sunt , , , , , quae simul additae producunt . subsequentes pariter notiones ad arithmeticam speculativam referri poterunt . unum numerum per alium ●ultiplicare seu in alium ducere ut ●n est toties sumere multiplicandum ● quoties sumi potest in multiplicatore ● unitas : quare si ducas in , summa ●utura est . unum numerum divi●ere per alium ut per nihil aliud est quam invenire quoties conti●eantur in . numerus planus a duo●us numeris in se invicem ductis producitur , igitur est numerus planus quia producitur a numero in ducto . solidus numerus a tribus numeris multiplicatis oritur : ejusmodi est , ex tribus enim hisce numeris multiplicatis emergit , , ; si enim duco in habeo , & si duxero in , ha●eo . numerus quadratus producitur a duobus aequalibus numeris inse invicem ductis , cujusmodi est : oritur enim a numero in ducto , qui radix quadrata dicitur . cubus oritur ex multiplicatione trium numerorum aequalium , aut ejusdem numeri ter assumpti ita cubus primus ex multiplicatione numeri ter assumpti , producitur , si enim ducas in habes , & si rursus ducas in habes , & radix cubica dicitur . pars illa arithmeticae quae spectat praxim complectitur primo additionem quae est plurium numerorum in unam summam collectio , ut si addam huic numero summa integra futura est . secundo , substractionem ut si . subduco e numero , supersunt . tertio , multiplicationem , ut si inquiram quot constituant quater , comperiam . quarto , divisionem ut si inquiram quoties contineantur in comperioque in quater contineri . quinto , fractiones . sexto , fractiones decimales ad supplementum fractionum practicis permolestarum excogitatas . septimo , extractionem radicum cubicarum , ac quadratarum . octavo , regulas proportionum , societatis : alligationis , falsi , & doctrinam progressionum . annumerare possumus sequentes authores primis arithmeticis . simo●em stevinium fractionum decemalium ●nventorem ; neperum scotum qui divisionis molestiam laminis suis rabdologicis , & logarithmis omnem sustu●it ; tacquetum qui arithmeticae , & theoriam , & praxim tradidit ; eucli●em , , , , elementorum , jor●anum , nemorantium , franciscum maurolicum , & barlaamontium , &c. sect. iii. judiciary astrology . judiciary astrology is that science , by the help of which men pretend to judge of things to come , and more especially of mens good and bad fortunes . the judiciary astrologers do ascribe considerable vertues to the different conjunctions amd aspects of the stars . they distinguish five kinds of mutual aspects among the planets : the first is called a sextile , when one planet is distant from another the sixth part of the circuit of the heavens , that is to say , degrees . the second is called a quartile , when the distance is but the fourth part of the circle or degrees . the third is called a trine , when the distance is but the third part of the circle , or degrees . the fourth is called an opposition , when the two planets are in the two opposite points of the circle , and distant from one another degrees . the fifth is called a conjunction , when the two planets are in the same sign of the zodiack . astrologers divide the heavens into twelve equal parts , which they call houses ; they say that every planet has eight dignities , viz. house , exaltation , triplicity , term , chariot or throne , person , joy , face . they say the stars were not only made to give light : hence 't is they take the station , direction and retrogradation ( as they speak ) of a planet to be a certain reeling , or spinning of fates and fortunes : they distinguish all the constellations into so many triangles or trigones : the first is the fiery trigone , comprehending aries , leo , sagittarius ; the second is the earthly , comprehending those ensuing constellations , taurus , virgo , capricornus ; the third is the aerial , comprehending gemini , libra , aquarius ; the fourth trigone is the watery , comprehending cancer , scorpius , pisces . if you desire to know more particularly the principles of this science , you may consult these following authors . vannius , butler , cardan , gadbury , albottazen , haly , julius firmicus , johannes jovianus pontanus , pezelius , &c. secttio tertia . astrologia judiciaria . astrologia judiciaria ea est scientia cujus ope de rebus futuris homines pronunciant , ac praesertim de faelici aut infaelici cujusque fato . astrologi judiciarii insignes ascribunt virtutes diversis conjunctionibus , aspectibusque planetarum . quinos distinguunt aspectus planetarum . primus dicitur sextilis cum distat planeta unus ab alio sexta parte circuli , hoc est gradibus . secundus vocatur quadratus cum distant invicem quarta parte ejusdem circuli , hoc est gradibus . tertius dicitur trigonus quando tertia tantum parte , seu gradibus . quar●us oppositionis cum uterque planeta sibi oppositi sunt , disjunctique gradibus . quintus est conjunctionis cum duo planetae sunt in eodem signo zodiaci . universum coeli ambitum secant astrologi in duodenas partes aequales , quas vocant domos seu domicilia . octonas planetarum dignitates numerant , quae sunt domus , exaltatio , trigonus , terminus , carpentum , persona , gaudium , facies . stellas dicunt non creatas tantum ad orbem illuminandum : unde aiunt stationem , directionem & retrocessum planetae esse nescio quam fatorum revolutionem , ac quasi netionem : constellationes omnes distinguunt tot in triangula seu trigona : primum trigonum igneum dicitur , complectiturque arietem , leonem , sagittarium ; secundum terrestre appellatur , continetque taurum , virginem , capricornum ; tertium aerium est complexum geminos , libram , aquarium ; quartum appellatione aqueum , continet cancrum , scorpium , pisces . si propius hujus scientiae principia intueri volueris , consulere poteris hos sequentes authores , vannium , butlerium , cardanum , gadburium , justinum , philippum melanctonum , origanum , ptolomaeum , albohazen , haly , julium firmicum , johannem jovianum pontanum , pezelium , &c. sect ▪ iv. astronomy . astronomy gives us an account of the motions of coelestial bodies , of of their distance , order , bulk , &c. the babylonians will have belus to have been the inventor of it , the aegyptians mercury , the moors atlas and hercules , the grecians jupiter , orpheus and atreus , the scythes prometheus . we may divide it into two parts , the one spherical , and the other we may call systematical the spherical is that part of astronomy which treateth of the sphere , whether artificial or natural ; the artificial sphere is made up of ten circles , whereof six are great ones , because they divide the whole sphere into two equal parts , such we reckon the horizon , the meridian , the equator , the two colures , and the zodiack . the little circles are those that divide the sphere into two unequal parts , as the two tropicks , and the two polar circles : every circle is divided into sixty parts , which they call first minutes ; and each minute likewise into sixty parts , which we call second minutes . the natural sphere , or the coelestial globe , besides the foregoing circles , offers to our view divers constellations : the antients reckon'd eight and forty , comprehending in this number all the stars to be seen in greece , and all the known parts of the world ; of those constellations are contain'd in the zodiack , are to be seen toward the north , and towards the south ; but of late there are twelve other constellations discovered towards the south . the systematical astronomy , which others call the theorical , is that part which by the help of some engines and orbs , offers to our view those coelestial motions which are not so obvious to every common understanding . this part of . astronomy comprehends several hypotheses , as that of anaxagoras and democritus , who allowed a free motion to the stars , but of no first mover , or primum mobile : neither did they admit any second motion towards ihe east , but a simple motion only towards the west ; so in their opinion , those stars only could be said to move toward the east , that moved more slowly towards the west . there is another hypothesis that considers the stars as tied to solid spheres ; and who hold this hypothesis , hold likewise the earth to rest in the centre of the world. copernicus allows motion to the earth ; he fixeth the sun in the centre of the world , though it turns round about its own axis within seven and twenty days , as 't is manifest by the motion of its spots . . in this system , the orb of the sixed stars is immoveable . . mercury turns round the sun in almost three months . . venus in four months and a half , and the earth itself in twelve months , and round the earth the moon tarneth every month . . mars's revolution round the sun is ended in almost two years , as jupiter's in twelve years , and saturn's in thirty . tycobrahe orders his system thus : first the firmament , or the sphere of the fixed stars , the earth being the centre of the world ; then the orbs of saturn , jupiter and mars ; venus and mercury turn round the sun , and the moon round the earth . the old system was ordered thus : the earth was the centre of the world , above it were plac'd the planets and heavens in this order ; the moon , mercury , venus , the sun , mars , jupiter , saturn , the two chrystalline heavens , and the primum mobile . authors . ptolomy , aratus , eudoxus , calippe , tycobrahe , gassendy , de billy , courcier , de sacrobosco , fracastorius , galilaeus . sectio quarta . astronomia . astronomia describit corporum coelestium motum , distantiam , ordinem , magnitudinem , &c. illius inventorem babylonii volunt esse belum , aegyptii mercurium , mauri atlantem & herculem , graeci jovem , orpheum & atreum , scythae prometheum . eam dividere possumus geminas in partes , alteram sphaericam , alteram appellare possumus systematicam . sphaerica est ea pars astronomiae quae agit de sphaera , sive arte facta , sive naturali : sphaera arte facta constat circulis quorum sunt majores quia dividunt sphaeram in duas partes aequales ; cujusmodi numeramus horizontem & meridianum aequatorem , colurosque duos aequinoctii , & solstitii , & zodiacum . minores circuli sunt ii qui sphaeram in duas partes inaequales dividunt : cujusmodi sunt duo tropici , totidemque polares : quivis circulus dividitur in gradus , & quivis gradus in particulas , quas prima minuta vocant ; & minutum primum in sexaginta partes quas secunda minuta dicimus . sphaera naturalis , seu globus coelestis praeter commemoratos circulos aspicientibus exhibet varias constellationes : antiqui octo supra quadraginta constellationes numerabant : quo numero comprehendebant omnes stellas in graecia conspicuas , atque in omnibus cognitis tum mundi partibus : constellationes continebat zodiacus , apparent ad boream , ad austrum , versus hanc partem duodecim nuper aliae detectae sunt . astronomia systematica quam alii theoricam vocant est ea astronomiae pars quae aspectui nostro exhibet ope quarundam machinarum orbiumque eos coelestes motus qui omnibus non aeque obvii sunt . haec astronomiae pars varias complectitur hypotheses cujusmodi est hypothesis anaxagorae ac democriti , qui motum astris liberum assignabant sed nullum admittebant primum mobile ; neque ulla proinde solidis sphaeris alligabant sydera : nec ullum secundum in ortum concedebant motum , sed simplicem tantum in occasum : ita juxta eorum sententiam ea tantum sydera moveri dicuntur in ortum , quae lentius moventur in occasum : alia quaedam est hypothesis quae sydera , ut solidis alligata sphaeris intuetur ; quique hanc hypothesim tenent terram in centro mundi quietam volunt . copernicus motum terrae attribuit ; solem constituit in centro mundi immotum , licet proprium circa axem moveatur spatio viginti septem dierum ut patet e motu ejusdem macularum in hoc systemate . . orbis fixarum immotus est . . mercurius spatio fere trium mensium circa solem vertitur . . venus intra quatuor menses , & semissem , terraque ipsa duodecim mensibus , circaque terram quolibet mense gyrat luna . . martis periodus circa solem absolvitur duobus fere annis , ut jovis duodecim , saturnique spatio triginta annorum . suum tycobrahe systema ita constituit . firmamentum , seu coelum fixarum primo loco statuit : mundi centrum terra est ; fixarum coelo succedit coelum saturni , tum jovis , & martis , venus & mercurius circa solem gyrant luna circa terram movetur . antiquum systema ita se habebat : terra mundi centrum occupabat ; supra illam erant aqua , aer , & ignis , succedebant planetae coelique hoc ordine , luna , mercurius , venus , sol , mars , jupiter , saturnus , firmamentum , duo coeli chrystallini primum mobile . authores . ptolomaeus , aratus , eudoxus , calippus , tycobrahe , gassendus , billius , courcierius , de sacrobosco , fracastorius , galilaeus . sect. v. military architecture . architectonica militaris , or military architecture , is the art of fortifying . this art teacheth us how to encline towards the angles of a poligone , that is , a figure of many angles , certaines lines upon which the fortress is to be built in such a manner , that the enemy by whatever side he makes his approach , may be beat back by the lesser number . every point of the circumference of the fortress must be defended by some other part of the same . according to the holland method of fortifying , the angle of the bastion , or the flanqued , and defended angle exceeds always by degrees the half of the angle of the polygone ; upon this account 't is that the angle of the bastion is never streight , or of degrees , unless in a place defended by bastions ; but in places defended by more than , it is always streight . according to tht french method , if the polygone be a triangle , the angle of the bastion contains degrees ; if it be a pentagone , or of five angles , it contains degrees ; if the polygone have more than five sides , the angle of the bastion is streight , or is open deg . authors . errard of barleduc , samuel marolois , adam fritach , stevin in italian , de lorini , del cavallero francisco tensimi , del cavallero alessandro barone , de groote , herigone . sectio quinta . architectonica militaris . architectonica militaris est ars muniendi , ars autem muniendi docet qui inclinare debeamus ad angulos polygoni hoc est figurae variis terminatae angulis lineas quasdam super quibus propugnaculum aedificandum est , ita ut hostis quacumque parte invadat , minoribus viribus repelli possit . omne punctum in procinctu munimenti debet defendi ab alia parte . juxta methodum muniendi hollandicam angulus propugnaculi , aut defensus excedit semper quindecim gradibus semissem polygoni , quamobrem angulus propugnaculi nunquam est rectus nisi locus duodecim propugnaculis defenditur , quoties autem locus pluribus , quam duodecim propugnaculis munitur , rectus semper est . juxta gallicam muniendi methodum si munitum polygonum triangulum fuerit , angulus polygoni est graduum , si pentagonum fuerit , angulus propugnaculi est gradibus ; si polygonum constet pluribus quam quinque lateribus , angulus propugnaculi est rectus , aut graduum . authores . errardus barneto-duceus , samuel marolois , adamus fritachius , stevinius italice , de lorini , franciscus tensimi , herigonius , &c. sect. vi. the military art. the military art of the greeks and the romans was on several accounts different from that of this age. of old an ordinary grecian army did contain , among whom we reckon not those that were upon the elephants , who were sometimes in greater numbers , sometimes in lesser . this army was divided into horse and foot : the foot was divided again into oplites and psiles , the oplites were those that wore a heavy armour , the psiles were slightly arm'd . the number of the oplites was always double of the number of the psiles , and the psiles double of the number of the cavalry . all the oplites of the phalange were put in one battalion , whereof the front contained men , and the wing . of all the psiles of the phalange , the grecians made two battalions , each having men on a breast , and in the slanks ; all the cavalry of the phalange was divided into squar'd turmes or troops , whereof each did contain men . in a grecian army made up of four phalanges , there were four battalions of oplites , of psiles , and troops of horse . in a roman legion there were four different sorts of men , not only as to age , riches , warlick science , but likewise on the account of their arms , and way of fighting ; for of the younger and poorer sort ( as polybius assures us ) they made their velites ; those that were somewhat above them upon the account of their age and riches , were halbardeers , or hasteries ; such as were richer , and in the full vigour of their age , were princes ; and the oldest and most experimented , were the triaries . the number of the soldiers of every one of those different sorts , was different in different times , according as the legion was less or more numerous . when the legion did amount to , as it did in polybius his time , there were triaries in the legion , and of every one of the three other sorts , to wit , of princes , hastaries , and velites . when the legion was more numerous , those three different sorts were likewise encreased , the triaries only excepted , who were always the same number . in the militia of this age , there is no such repartition observed , the armies being not always divided into parts made up of the samo numbers ; for some regiments have companies , others , others , &c. likewise the compapanies have not always the same number , some being a hundred men strong , others one hundred and twenty , others one hundred and fifty , &c. in this age an army is drawn up in battel , or three lines , and the french divide sometimes every line into several little bodies ; the turks give sometimes to their army the figure of a cer●sont . the camp , especially if the enemy be near , ought to be in some place where there is a great abundance of water , and provisions : and if the army is to make a long stay , 't is to be observed if the air be good . ye are not to encamp near a hill , which being taken by the enemy , might incommode your camp. authors . polybius , stevin , herigone . sectio secta . ars bellica . ars bellica , seu militaris tum graecorum , tum romanorum varie discrepabat ab hodierna recentiorum . communis graecorum exercitus numerabat , quibus non annumeramus qui elephantis insidebant qui non eundem semper numerum conflabant , sed interdum majorem , minorem interdum . hic exercitus dividebatur in equites , peditesque , pedites rursus in oplitas & psilos , oplitae erant gravis armaturae milites , psili levis armaturae . numerus oplitarum duplus erat numeri psilorum , & psili equitum numerum geminabant . omnes oplitae unius phalangis uno colligebantur in agmine cujus frons constabat , & ala . ex omnibus psilis phalangis constituebant graeci duo agmina , a fronte stabant viginti octo supra centum , a latere octo . omnes equites phalangis distribuebantur in turmas quadratas sedecim , quarum quaelibet quatuor supra sexaginta milites continebat . in exercitu graeco ex quadruplici phalange conflato quatuor erant agmina oplitarum , octo psilorum , & sexaginta quatuor turmae equitum . romana legio quatuor complectebatur hominum genera diversa non aetate tantum , divitiis , scientiaque bellica , sed & armis , modoque pugnandi : ex junioribus enim , pauperioribusque , ut testatur polybius seligebantur velites , ex proximis hastarii , ex aetate florentibus principes , senioresque , & magis experti seligebantur in triarios . numerus militum ex quibus diversi illi ordines constabant diversis temporibus diversus erat ; prout legio magis , minusque numerosa erat . cum legio constabat ducentis supra quatuor millia , ut temporibus polybii constabat ; sexcenti erant triarii in legione , ducenti supra mille in quovis ordinum reliquorum , scilicet principum , hastariorum , & velitum : at numerosiore jam legione tres varii ordines numerosiores omnes reddebantur , exceptis tantum modo triariis quorum numerus idem semper erat . in militia hujus saeculi nulla hujusmodi distributio observatur , cum exercitus non dividatur in partes eodem semper numero constantes : quaedam enim legiones constant cohortibus quaedam , quaedam , paucioribus aut pluribus ; cohortes pariter non semper eodem constant numero : quaedam enim constant militibus , aliae , aliae &c. hoc saeculo exercitus pugnaturus in tres ordines distribuitur ; galli unumquemque ordinem in varia agmina quandoque distribuunt , turcae exercitum interdum ordinant in formam lunae crescentis . castra , maxime si in propinquo fuerit hostis debent figi in loco tuto ubi magna adsit aquarum copia , commeatusque , & si diuturnior esse debeat exercitus mora , videndum an aura illic salubris sit . cavendum autem imprimis ne castra prope montem statuantur , qui ab hoste occupatus exercitui noxius esse posset . authores . polybius , stevinius , heregonius . sect. vii . cosmography . cosmography is a description of the world , and its chief parts .. the world is the highest heaven , and whatever it contains , it is divided into the sublunary region , and the coelestial : the sublunary region is obnoxious to divers changes , and is contained in the concave surface of the orb of the moon : it contains the four elements , the earth , the water , the air , the fire . the semi-diametre of the earth contains about italian miles . the ordinary depth of the sea is geometrical paces . the surface of the earth is almost equal to the surface of the sea , and somewhat higher , because we see that rivers from their first rise to the sea go always downwards . the divines think that the earth was entirely round , and surrounded with waters on all sides , but after god had commanded the waters to retreat , so many hills were made as there are concavities to receive the seas . the coelestial region is that part of the world which is extended from the concave surface of the heaven of the moon , to the convex surface of the highest heaven ; which space comprehends the heavens of all the stars . astronomers distinguish three sorts of spheres ; the first is streight , when the equator maketh streight angles with the horizon ; the second is oblique , when the intersection of the horizon and equator makes oblique angles ; the third is the parallel sphere , when the equator and the horizon are joyned together . astronomers conceive ten points , and ten chief circles in the concave superficies of the first mobile : the points are the two poles of the world , the two poles of the zodiack , the two equinoctial , and two solsticial points , zenith and nadir . the circles are the horizon , meridian , equator , zodiack , the colures of the equinox , and the colures of the solstice . the cancer and capricorne , the arctick and antarctick circles ; by zenith and nadir we understand two points , the first directly answering to our heads , and the second to our feet . astronomers fancy divers motions in the heavens : the primum mobile turns round with it all the other orbs in hours . they allow to the other heavens under the first mobile a motion of libration from the north to the south , and from the south to the north. the eclipse of the moon is a real privation of its light , by the interposition of the earth between it and the sun. the eclipse of the sun is not a real privation of light , because the sun eclips'd , is only hid from our eyes by the interposition of the moon . all the eclipses of the moon are universal , or seen by all such as see the moon ; all the eclipses of the sun are particular ones , or not seen by every one that sees the sun. there are five zones , one torrid , two temperate , and two cold ones . the torrid zone is comprehended between the two tropicks ; its breadth is degrees , if we reckon according to the common calcul ½ on each side of the equator ; the two temperate zones are contain'd between the tropicks and the polar circles , whereof one is south , and the other north ; the breadth of both is degrees . the cold zones are contain'd within the polar circles , distant from the poles of the world degrees ½ . authors . peter aerte his world , in five vol. herigone , garcy , adrianus metius . sectio septima . cosmographia . cosmographia est descriptio mundi , praecipuarumque ejusdem partium . mundus est caelum altissimum , & quicquid eo comprehenditur , dividitur in regionem sublunarem , & coelestem , regio sublunaris variis est obnoxia mutationibus , contineturque concava caeli lunaris superficie , quatuor complectitur elementa , terram , aquam , aerem , ignem . semi-diameter terrae quadringenta fere & triginta sex supra tria millia , milliaria ilalica complectitur . communis marium altitudo est passuum geometricorum quingentorum . - superficies terrae est fere aequalis superficiei maris , atque aliquanto altior , quia animadvertimus flumina ab ipsa origine ad mare descendere , seu deorsum tendere . putant theologi terram initio rotundam fuisse , atque aquis undique circumcinctam : sed postquam deus aquas recedere jussisset , tot erupere montes , quot sunt concavitates aquis marinis recipiendis idoneae . regio coelestis est ea pars mundi quae porrigitur a superficie concava coeli lunaris ad superficiem convexam altissimi coeli , quod spatium coelos omnium stellarum comprehendit . astronomi triplicem sphaeram distinguunt prima est sphaera recta quando aequator rectos cum horizonte angulos constituit ; secunda est obliqua cum intersectio aequatoris , & horizontis constituit obliquos , tertia est parallela cum aequator , & horizon sibi congruunt , aut conjunguntur . astronomi in concava primi mobilis superficie concipiunt puncta , totidemque primarios circulos : puncta sunt duo mundi poli , duo poli zodiaci , duo puncta aequinoctialia , duo puncta solsticialia , zenith & nadir . circuli sunt horizon , meridianus , aequator , zodiacus , colurus aequinoctiorum , colurus solstitiorum , tropicus cancri , & capricorni , duoque polares : his vocibus zenith & nadir intelligimus duo puncta ex diametro opposita , alterum , scilicet zenith vertici nostro imminens , alterum nempe nadir , pedibus oppositum . astronomi varios concipiunt in coelis motus . primum mobile reliquos secum coelos horarum spatio circumducit : reliquis sub primo mobili coelis addunt motum librationis a septentrione in austrum & ab austro in septentrionem . eclipsis lunae est vera luminis privatio interjectu terrae lunam inter & solem : eclipsis solis non est realis privatio luminis . sol enim deficiens tegitur tantum ab oculis nostris interpositu lunae . omnes eclipses lunae sunt universales aut conspicuae omnibus corpus lunare eo tempore intuentibus ; omnes eclipses solis sunt particulares , aut non conspicuae omnibus qui solem ipsum intueri possunt . quinque sunt zonae , una torrida , duae temperatae , duaeque frigidae , torrida zona comprehenditur duobus tropicis : ipsius latitudo est vulgari calculo graduum ; nempe ½ cis , ●ltraque aequatorem ; duae temperatae comprehenduntur tropicis , & polari●us circulis quorum alter meridiona●is alter borealis est , utriusque latitudo est graduum ; frigidae zonae comprehenduntur polaribus circulis dissi●is a mundi polis grad . ½ . authores . petrus de aerte , seu mundus ipsius ● voluminibus , herigonius , garcaeus , adrianus metius . sect. viii . catoptrick . catoptrick is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a looking-glass , because it treats of the rays , as being reflected by polish'd bodies . this science demonstrates these following propositions . . if a ray falling upon a glass , make equal angles , 't is reflected into itself . . rays reflected from plain and convex glasses , do neither come together , nor are equi-distant . . heights and depths seem to be overturned in convex glasses . . in convex glasses , what is on the left hand , appears to be on the right ; and what is on the right hand , appears to be on the left . . if the eye were in the centre of ● concave-glass , it would see nothing but itself . authors . euclid and peter herigone have written on this subject . sectio octava . catoptrica . catoptrica derivatur a graeca voce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , quod speculum sonat , quia agit de radio ut reflexo a laevigatis corporibus , sequentes propositiones demonstrat . . si radius in qualecumque speculum cadens aequales facit angulos ipse in seipsum reflectitur . . radii a planis , convexisque speculis reflexi neque mutuo concurrent , neque erunt paralleli . . altitudines & profunditates in convexis speculis inversae apparent . . in speculis convexis sinistra videntur dextra , & dextra sinistra . . si oculus ponatur in centro speculi concavi seipsum tantum cernet . authores . euclides , & petrus herigonius hoc super argumento scripserunt . sect. ix . chymistry . chymistry is the art of analysing , or resolving bodies by the operation of the fire into their compounding principles . the chymists do generally affirm mercury , salt , and sulphur to be the compounding principles of all compounded things ; which doctrine is learnedly and solidly confuted by the english philosopher , i mean the famous robert boyle in his sceptical chymist . yet it cannot be denied but that it is useful and necessary likewise to mankind , upon the account of those many excellent medicines it prepares to the great advantage of physicians , and ease of their patients , whereof these ensuing are some of the most considerable . . aurum fulminans , or thundering gold ; a very good sudorifick ; it may be taken in the measles from grains to in any convenient electuary ; it stops vomiting , and is a hindrance to the activity of mercury , or quick-silver . . vitriolus lunae taken inwardly , is prevalent against the dropsie , and the head-ach , of what sort soever ; you may take it from grains to in any specifick water ; it is likewise a moderate purger . . sal jovis , is a great drier . . magisterium bismuth , softeneth the skin , and is good against scabs and itch , if you mix a drachm of it with ounces of water , because it is a great destroyer of salts and acids , two general causes of most distempers . . sal saturni taken inwardly , prevaileth against the squinancy , the overflowing of the flowers , piles , dysentery ; you may take it from grains to in plantain-water . . oleum saturni cleanseth and drieth up ulcers . . spiritus ardens saturni resisteth powerfully putrefaction ; it is beneficial to such as are troubled with too much melancholy . you may take it from to drops , in any convenient liquor , a fortnight together . . crocus aperitivus martis has a a peculiar vertue against all distempers occasioned by obstructions ▪ you may take it from grains to scruples in lozenges or pills . . crocus martis astringens is of a peculiar vertue against the glitting of the yard , the overflowing of the monthly flowers and piles ; you may take it from grains to a drachm in lozenges or pills . . mars diaphoreticus cures effectually the most melancholy distempers , as likewise quartan-agues ; you may take it from to grains in pills , or any convenient liquor . . sublimatum corrosivum eats up superfluous flesh , and drieth up ulcers . . sublimatum dulce , or aquila alba , is very good against all venereal distempers ; 't is a great deobstruent , and killer of worms ; it may be taken in pills from grains to : 't is a mild purger . . praecipitatum rubrum drieth up wounds , and consumeth superfluous or proud flesh . . turbith minerale , or the yellow praecipitate , is a strong purger , and worketh both upwards and downwards ; 't is good against venereal distempers ; you may take it in pills from gr . to . . crudum antimonium is a sudorifick , but if you boyl it in any acid liquor , it will provoke you to vomit . . regulus antimonii purgeth upwards and downwards , if mixed with any cathartick or purger . . vitrum antimonii is the strongest vomitory that is made of antimony . . antimonium diaphoreticum resisteth powerfully poison , and is likewise good against contagious distempers , and against the measlles . . flores antimonii provoke to vomit ; and rubri flores antimonii as yet more ; you may take them both from gr . to , taking every quarter of an hour a spoonful of broth wherein you have boyl'd a competent quantity of the cream of tartar. . sulphur antimonii is prevalent against the distempers of the breast ; you may take grains of it in any appropriated liquor . authors . paracelsus , beguinus , helmontius , and the deservedly renowned robert boyle , &c. sectio nona . chymica . chymica est ars reducendi corpora vi ignis in ea ex quibus constant principia . fatentur chymicorum plerique , asseruntque mercurium , sal , sulphur , esse tria ut loquuntur , prima , seu constituentia omnium rerum compositarum principia : quam doctrinam erudite more suo , ingenioseque ac solidis argumentis confutat philosophus britannicus celeberrimus merito boylius in chymico suo sceptico . nemo tamen inficias ierit chymiam & utilem esse generi humano , & necessariam ob tot generosa quae parat medicamenta non mediocri medicorum emolumento , magnoque commissorum ipsis aegrorum levamine : quae hic subjunguntur , quaedam sunt ●e praecipuis . . aurum fulminans sudores provocat ; adhiberi potest adversus morbillos , minima dosis sit gr . maxima gr . sistit vomitum , obstatque activitati mercurii . . vitriolus lunae interius sumptus praevalet contra hydropem , & quemcumque capitis dolorem : dosis minima gr . maxima in quacumque aqua specifica ; leniter quoque purgat . . sal jovis valde desiccat . . magisterium bismuth , emollit carnem , valetque contra scabiem & pruriginem si illius drachmam quatuor unciis aquae commisceas , quia salia , & acida , geminas plerumque morborum causas destruit . . sal saturni , si sumatur interius praevalet contra anginam , immoderatum menstruorum fluxum , haemorrhoides , dysenteriam ; dosis minima gr . , summa , in aqua plantaginis . . oleum saturni purgat , exsiccatque ulcera . . spiritus ardens saturni potenter resistit putrefactioni ; nimia melancholia dejectis prodest : dosis , aut guttae in quovis conveniente liquore per quatuordecim dies . . crocus aperitivus martis peculiari virtute pollet adversus morbos ab obstructionibus ortos : dosis minima gr . summa scrupuli duo in trapeziis , aut pilulis . . crocus martis astringens peculiariter valet contra stillicidium penis , nimium menstruorum fluxum , & hoemorrhoides ; dosis ima gr . , summa , drachma in trapeziis , aut pilulis . . mars diaphoreticus reipsa curat plerosque morbos a melancholia ortos , atque febres etiam quartanas ; dosis aut gr . in pilulis , aut conveniente quopiam liquore . . sublimatum corrosivum exedit superfluam carnem , exsiccatque ulcera . . sublimatum dulce , aut aquila alba pollet adversus omnem veneream intemperiem : insigniter deobstruit , vermiumque excidium est ; si in pilulis sumitur ; minima dosis gr . summa gr . ; leniter purgat . . praecipitatum rubrum exsiccat vulnera , consumitque superfluam carnem . turbith menerale , aut praecipitatum flavum valide purgat superne & inferne , valet adversus morbos venereos ; dosis ima in pilulis gr . . summa gr . . . crudum antimonium est sudorificum , sed si illud in acido quopiam liquore concoquas , vomitum provocabit . regulus antimonii cathartico cuipiam immixtus superne , inferneque purgat . . nihil ex antimonio fit , quod po●entius vitro antimonii vomitum ex●itet . . antimonium diaphoreticum re●istit potenter veneno , valetque contra morbos contagiosos , & morbillos . . flores antimonii vomitum pro●ocant fortiusque , adhuc , rubri flores antimonii ; amborum dosis ima gr . ●umma , sume interim quovis qua●rante horae cochleare jusculi in quo ●remoris tartari sufficiens mensura ●octa fuerit . . sulphur antimonii pollet adversus omnes pectoris morbos ; dosis ●r . in quovis idoneo liquore . authores . paracelsus , helmontius , beguinus , meritoque celeberrimus ubique boy●ius . sect. x. dioptrick . dioptrick is that part of astrology that searcheth out by instruments the distance of the sun , moon , and other planets . if you take it more generally , its chief end is to shew the apparent changes of our sight , and of visible objects look'd into through prospective glasses . it treats of the broken or refracted rays of light , and this is its chief principle : when a ray passeth through a thin middle into a thicker , it breaks in the superficies of the thicker towards the perpendicular line ; and when it passeth through a thick middle , or medium , to a thinner it deviates from the perpendicular line , which this obvious experiment demonstrates . lay an image , or any other visible object , in the bottom of a vessel , and then go back till it vanish out of your sight ; now if you fill this vessel with water , it shall presently be visible again , because the ray coming from your eye , breaks downwards in the superficies of the water , as the same going streight up to the superficies of the water deviates from the perpendicular , because of the thinner air towards the eye , which renders the object visible again . this science treats likewise of convex and concave glasses , as they may work some change in the sight , and may help it . it gives ▪ an account of those whom aristotle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who see remote things distinctly , and nearer objects confusedly ; and why those whom we call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , see both the remote and nearer objects confusedly . it teacheth likewise amongst other things , . that those whom we call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 see distinctly some things that are represented by convex glasses in a streight situation . . that they see not distinctly through a convex glass any of those objects that are overturn'd . . it sheweth the influence of glasses applied one to another upon our sight . authors . kepler , maurolycus , euclide , &c. have written of this curious science . sectio decima . dioptrica . dioptrica ea astrologiae pars est quae instrumentis quibusdam distantiam solis & lunae , aliorumque planetarum indagat . eam in genere si spectes , praecipuus ejusdem scopus est indicare apparentes visus mutationes , objectorumque per vitra optica ut microscopia , megaloscopia inspectorum , agit de radio fracto ; hocque primarium hujus scientiae principium est : cum radius lucis progreditur a tenuiore medio ad dentius , frangitur versus perpendicularem in superficie spissioris ; cumque progreditur a medio spissiore ad tenuius , deviat a perpendiculari . quod obvio hoc experimento manifestum fit : imaginem aut quodvis aliud conspicuum objectum infundo vasis cujuspiam colloca : tum recede donec objectum non amplius appareat : jam si vas hoc aqua impleas , oculis se mox imago oggeret : quia radius lucis ab oculo ad fundum vasis porrectus frangitur deorsum in superficie aquae versus perpendicularem , ut idem ad superficiem ascendens ob tenuiorem aerem deviat a perpendiculari versus oculum , unde fit ut objectum rursus conspiciendum se praebeat . insuper haec scientia agit de convexis concavisque vitris , quatenus visum aut variare , aut juvare possunt . redditque pariter rationem cur ii quos aristoteles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vocat , remota distincte videant , propinqua confuse ; & cur ii quos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicimus tum remota , tum propinqua objecta confuse videant . inter alia pariter docet , . eos quos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicimus , quaedam videre distincte quae a vitris convexis recto in situ exhibentur . . minime eos videre distincte per vitra convexa ullùm eorum objectorum quae eversa sunt . . ostendit vitrorum sibi invicem junctorum in visum nostrum operationem . authores . keplerus , maurolycus , euclides , &c. de curiosa hac scientia scripsere . sect. xi . moral philosophy . ethica is that art which directs us how to act always conformably to right reason : it s chief principle is this , do as you would be done by . it teacheth us that god is our last end , because he only is bonum sufficiens , the sufficient good , nothing else being able to content us . it teacheth likewise that we can never love any thing but under the shew and appearance of good , whereof it offereth three sorts , honour profit and pleasure . god alone is our objective beatitude or happiness , ( as they speak in the schools , ) our formal beatitude is that operation of the mind by which we possess god , which is the intuitive vision or contemplation of god. this art sheweth that the internal principles of humane actions are either natural , as powers ; or acquired , as habits : that the understanding moves the will to act , and the will our understanding ; that a habit being generated by the repetition of acts , giveth the soul not the real power of acting , but only enables it to act more easily . authors . aristotle , seneca , plato , cicero , &c. sectio undecima . ethica seu moralis philosophia . haec ea est ars quae nos ad agendum in omnibus conformiter rectae rationi dirigit : primarium ipsius principium hoc est , quod tibi vis fieri , & alteri feceris . docet deum esse ultimum nostrum finem quia ille solus est bonum sufficiens , cum nihil aliud beatos nos efficere queat : docet pariter nihil nos amare posse nisi sub specie boni , cujus triplex genus proponit jucundum , utile honestum . beatitudo nostra objectiva , ut loquuntur scholae , solus deus est , formalis nostra beatitudo est ea mentis operatio qua deum possidemus , intuitiva scilicet dei visio . hic habitus docet principia interna actionum humanarum , aut esse nobis congenita , cujusmodi sunt potentiae ; aut acquisita , cujusmodi sunt habitus ; docet intellectum movere voluntatem ad agendum , & vice versa ; habitum actuum repititione productum , animae tribuere non ipsam quidem agendi facultatem , seu potentiam , sed majorem quamdam facilitatem . authores . aristoteles , seneca , plato , cicero , &c. sect. xii . geography . geography is the description of the earth , and its chief parts .. because geographers talk much of the longitude and latitude of a place , 't is of some use to know what is meant by these two words . the longitude then of a place , or its distance from the east , is an arch of the equator intercepted between the semicircle of the first meridian , and the meridian of the place , according to the order of the signs . the latitude of a place , or its distance from the equinoctial line , is the arch of the meridian , intercepted between the equator and the place proposed , being always equal to the elevation of the pole , which is the arch of the meridian intercepted between the conspicuous pole and the horizon , because the latitude of a place , as likwise the height of the pole , together with the arch of the meridian intercepted between the pole & the zenith , are equal to the fourth part of the meridian or the quadrant . the whole world is now divided into four parts , europe , asia , africa , and america : europe is bounded towards the north by the hyperborean sea , towards the west by the atlantick sea , and the herculean by the streights of gibraltar and by the ocean ; towards the east by the egean sea , the hellespont , propontis , bosphorus thracius , the streights of caffa , the meotide lake , the river tanais , &c. till you come to a little town called ●uria , from whence 't is bounded by a white line till you come to the white sea. the chief parts of europe are germany , spain , france , great britain , switzerland , the low countries , ireland , denmarck , norway , swedeland , poland , italy , croatia , sclavonia , dalmatia , albania , grecia , thracia , bulgaria , servia , bosnia , russia , hungaria , transylvania . asia is bounded towards the north by the scythian sea , towards the east by the sea called eoum , towards the south by the indian sea or the red sea , towards the west by the arabick sreights and the interne sea. africa is joyn'd to asia by an isthme , or a narrow piece of ground dividing two seas : 't is bounded by several seas , towards the east by the red sea , towards the south by the ethiopian sea , towards the west by the atlantick sea , towards the north by the interne sea. the chief parts of africa we reckon to be those following , barbary biledulgeride , sarra , the countrey of the negroes , egypt , ethiopia both superior and inferior , the kingdom of the abyssins . america was wholly unknown to the antients till about the year , it was discovered by christopher columbus , a genoese , in the name of ferdinand king of castile . 't is called america from americus vespucius , a florentine , who the first after columbus , in the year , under the auspices of the king of portugal , discover'd that part of it that lyes beyond the equinoctial line . america is divided into two parts , the one norrhern , and the other southern , or the peruane america ; they are both divided by an isthme . the northern america is called the mexican , from its chief city mexico . we know only those countreys that lye near the shore , as canada , the land of labrador , the adjacent islands , new france or norimbegra , virginia or apalchen , florida , new spain , new grenade , california , quivira , ananian , jucatan , guatimala , hondura , nicaragna . in the southern america you have castile , the golden peru , chili , chica , the countrey of the pantagons , brasilia , caribana , guiiana , biquiri or the countrey of the amazons , paguan , picoram , moxos , uram , charchas . authors . ptolomy , the great atlas , the english atlas , ortelius , strabo , solinus , pomponius mela , philipp cluvier , &c. sectio duodecima . geographia . geographia est descriptio terrae praecipuarumque ejus partium . quia geographi multum loquuntur de longitudine ac latitudine loci , utile fuerit scire quid reipsa sint . longitudo itaque loci , aut ipsius distantia ab ortu , est arcus aequatoris inter semicirculum primi meridiani , & meridianum loci secundum ordinem signorum interceptus . latitudo loci aut ejusdem distantia a linea aequinoctiali est arcus meridiani interceptus aequatorem inter , & locum propositum , estque semper aequalis elevationi poli , quae est arcus meridiani horizontem inter , & conspicuum polum interceptus , quod tam latitudo loci , quam elevatio poli cum arcu meridiani inter polum & zenith intercepto , aequent quadrantem meridiani . totus terrarum orbis nunc dividitur in quatuor partes , europam , asiam , africam , americam : europa terminos habet a septentrione mare hyperboreum , aut septentrionale , ab occidente mare atlanticum , fretum herculeum , & oceanum , ob ortu mare aegaeum , hellespontum , propontidem bosphorum thracium , bosphorum cimmerium , lacum maeotim , tanais fluenta usque ad oppidum tuia , inde lineam rectam ad sinum usque granduicum , seu mare album . praecipuae europae partes sunt , germania , hispania , gallia , magna britannia , helvetia , belgium , dania , suedia , polonia , italia , croatia , sclavonia , dalmatia , albania , graecia , thracia , bulgaria , servia , bosnia , russia , hungaria , transylvania . asia terminatur versus septentrionem mari scythico , versus ortum mari eoo , versus meridiem mari indico , aut rubro , versus occidentem sinu arabico & mari interno . africa isthmo jungitur asiae , terminos habet varias circum maria , ab ortu mare rubrum , a meridie aethiopicum , ab occasu atlanticum , a septentrione internum . praecipuas africae partes sequentes numeramus , barbariam , biledulgeridem , sarram , regionem nigritarum , aegyptum aethiopiam utramque superiorem & inferiorem , regnum abyssinorum . america antiquis prorsus incognita fuit , donec sub annum quadringentesimum nonagesimum secundum supra millesinum detecta fuit a christophoro columbo genuensi nomine ferdinandi regis castiliae . america dicitur ab americo vespucio florentino qui primus post columbum anno . sub auspiciis regis lusitaniae eam partem continentis detexit quae ultra lineam aequinoctialem jacet . america dividitur duas in partes alteram septentrionalem , meridionalem alteram aut peruanam ; utraque isthmo dividitur , septentrionalis america vocatur mexicana a praecipua ejusdem civitate mexico ▪ regiones tantum littoribus adjacentes novimus , nempe canadam , terram laboratoris , atque insulas adjacentes , novam franciam sive norimbregram , virginiam sive apalchen , floridam , novam hispaniam , novam granatam , californiam , quiviram , ananian , jucatan , guatimalam , honduram , nicaragnem . in meridionali america sunt castilio aurea , peruvia , chili , regio pentagonum , brasilia , caribana , guiiana , biquiri , paguam , picoram , moxos , uram , charchas . authores . ptolomaeus , magnus atlas , ortelius , strabo , solinus , pomponius mela , philippus cluverius . sect. xiii . geometry . this science teacheth us how to measure the earth , and to set limits to every mans lands ; 't is entirely contain'd in the fifteen books of euclid's elements : the first thirteen are acknowledg'd by all to be undoubtedly of this author ; the two last are ascrib'd by some to hipsicles of alexandria . euclid's elements may be divided into four parts ; the first part , contain'd in the first six books , treats of plains ; the second , consisting of the three other following books searcheth into the properties of numbers ; the third part of euclid's elements , consisting of the tenth book only , treats of commensurable and incommensurable lines ; and lastly , the fourth part comprehending the remaining books , treats of solids , or bodies . the first part of euclid's elements is again threefold ; the first four books treat of plains absolutely considered , of their equality and inequality ; the fifth treats of the proportion of magnitudes in general ; the sixth sheweth the proportion of plain figures . geometry may be divided into these three subordinate parts , altimetry , planimetry , and stereometry ; altimetry is the art of measuring streight lines , planimetry is the art of measuring surfaces , stereometry is the art of measuring solids or bodies . a line is measured by a line of a known magnitude , and a superficies or surface by a square of a known magnitude , and solids are measured by a cube of a known bulk . authors . euclid , hero mechanicus ▪ fournierius , malapertius , maginus , clavius , nicolaus tartalea in italian , adrianus metius , samuel marolois , simon stevin , and daniel sant bech . sectio decima tertia . geometria . haec scientia docet nos qui terram metiamur , atque unius cujusque praediis limites praescribamus : integra continetur quindecim libris elementorum euclidis : priores tredecim sine ulla controversia euclidi ascribuntur ab omnibus , posteriores vero duo , a quibusdam hypsicli alexandrino tribuuntur . elementa euclidis dividi possunt in quatuor partes ; quorum prima pars sex prioribus libris contenta , agit de planis ; secunda , quae ex tribus sequentibus conflatur , affectiones numerorum examinat ; tertia pars elementorum euclidis , quae solo libro decimo constat , de lineis commensurabilibus , ac incommensurabilibus agit ; quarta denique pars , quam residui libri constituunt de solidis , aut corporibus disserit . prima pars elementorum euclidis rursus triplex est ; priores enim qua●uor libri agunt de planis absolute spectatis , de eorum aequalitate , aut inaequalitate ; quintus disserit de proportionibus magnitudinum in genere ; sextus planarum figurarum proportiones exponit . geometria dividi potest in has tres partes subordinatas , in altimetriam , planimetriam , & stereometriam ; altimetria est ars dimetiendi lineas rectas , planimetria est ars dimetiendi superficies , stereometria est ars dimetiendi solida , sive corpora . lineas metiuntur lineae notae magnitudinis , superficiem metitur quadratum mensurae notae , solidaque metitur cubus notae molis . authores . euclides , hero mechanicus , fournierius , malapertius , maginus , clavius , nicolaus tartalea italice , adrianus metius , samuel marolois , simon stevinius , daniel sant bechius . sect. xiv . the art of dialling . gnomonica is the art of dialling , or of making sun-dials . of sun-dials there are two sorts , some are pendulums , and others are fix'd ones . the pendulums are those that being hung up , or held up , shew the hours by the height of the sun , as the astrolabe , the cylinder , the quadrants , the astronomical rings , and others of the same kind . the fixed-dials require a certain situation , to shew the hours by the motion of the sun from east to west , and upon this account they are more exact than the pendulums . the centre of the dial , is that point of the plane of the dial in which the axis of the world is cut by the plane . the perpendicular style is a streight line drawn from the centre of the earth to the plane of the dial : the centre then of the world , or of the earth in a dial , is the top of the style , which is perpendicular to the plain of the dial. the pole of the plane of the dial , is the pole of a great circle equi-distant from the plane of the dial. in all astronomical dials , that part of the style which by its shadow sheweth the hour , must be in the axis or axle-tree of the world. the italians reckon hours , beginning from the setting of the sun ; the babylonians reckon as many from the rising of the sun , to the going down of the same ; but in the old dials , the hours of the day , and of the night , are reckon'd separately , viz. from the rising of the sun , till the going down of the same ; and as many from the setting of the sun , till the rising of the same . authors . maurolycus , ptolomaeus , kircherus , &c. sectio decima quarta . gnomonica . gnomonica est ars construendi horologia solaria . horologia solaria dividuntur in pendula , & fixa : pendula sunt ea quae appensa , aut manu suspensa , horas indicant ope altitudinis solaris : cujusmodi sunt astrolabium , cylindrus , quadrans , annuli astronomici , aliaque ejusdem generis . horologia stabilia , seu fixa , requirunt situm quemdam ut ostendant horas ope motus solis ab ortu in occasum , ideoque accuratiora sunt pendulis . centrum horologii est punctum plani horologii , in quo axis mundi secatura plano . stylus perpendicularis est recta a centro terrae ad planum horologii ducta , unde centrum mundi , sive terrae in horologio est vertex styli plano horologii normalis . polus plani horologii , est polus magni circuli paralleli plano horologii . in omni horologio astronomico ea pars styli quae umbra horam ostendit , debet esse in axe mundi . itali numerant horas initio ducto ab occasu solis ; babylonii numerant totidem initio ducto ab ortu solis ; sed in antiquis horologiis horae diei , noctisque separatim enumerantur , duodecim scilicet enumerantur ab ortu solis ad occasum , totidemque ab occasu ad ortum . authores . maurolycus , ptolomaeus , kircherus , &c. sect. xv. grammar . grammar is the art of writing and speaking well ; it treats of words and the construction of words . this art considereth two things in words , the letters , and the syllables ; as likewise two sorts of letters for some sound alone , and are called vowels , as a , e , i , o , u , ; others sound not alone , but together with some other letter , and they are called upon this account consonants , as these following , b , c , d g k , p , q , t , which letters are called mutes , as f , l , m , n , r , s , x , z are called half vowels . a syllable that has a full sound is made up either of a vowel and a consonant , or of vowels and consonants . in words , grammar considereth their accent or tone , whether acute , or grave , or mean ; their derivation and etymology , their composition and simplicity ; their numbers ; if the word be a noun , plural , singular ; their cases , nominative , genitive , dative , accusative , vocative , ablative : if the word be a verb , it considereth the tenses , as present , imperfect , perfect , future or to come . it teacheth the art of construing words one with another , as the adjective with the substantive , in order to make a congruous speech ; either continued or interrupted : it distinguisheth the sentences by three notes , which we commonly call comma , semicolon , colon , or as the latins speak , punctum . the first is a short pause of respiration , which we express thus ( , ) the second is a longer pause , which we express thus ( ; ) the third is a full pause , and finisheth the sense , which we mark thus ( . ) chief authors . alvares and despauter . sectio decima quinta . grammatica . grammatica est ars recte loquendi , scribendique ; agit de vocibus , vocumque constructione . duo contemplatur in vocibus literas & syllabas , ut pariter duo genera literarum quaedam enim solitarie sonant , & vocales dicuntur , ut a e , i , o , u , ; quaedam solitarie non sonant , sed simul cum alia quapiam litera , & propterea consonantes dicuntur , cujusmodi sunt hae literae oppositae b , c , d , g , p , q , t , quae literae dicuntur mutae , ut f , l , m , n , r , s , x , z dicuntur semivocales . syllaba quae integrum habet sonum , constat vel unica vocali , vel vocali addita consonante , vel vocalibus simul & consonantibus . in vocibus grammatica considerat accentum , seu tonum , sive acutum , sive gravem , sive medium , earum derivationem , originem , atque etymologiam , compositionem , simplicitatem , numeros , si quaestio de nomine sit , singularem , pluralem ; casus , nominativum , genitivum , dativum , accusativum , vocativum , ablativum ; si quaestio de verbo sit , considerat tempora , ut praesens , imper●ectum , praeteritum , futurum . docet qui voces simul construere debeamus , ut adjectivum cum substantivo , ut fiat oratio congrua , continua , aut interrupta ; distinguit sententias tribus hisce notis , quas designamus appellationibus hisce comma , semicolon , colon , aut ut latini loquuntur , punctum . prima nota indicat brevem a respirando cessationem , quam exprimimus hunc in modum ( , ) secunda est diuturnior cessatio quam exprimimus hunc in modum ( ; ) postrema est plena cessatio , sensumque absolvit , quam ita notamus ( . ) authores primae notae . alvares , despauterius , &c. section xvi . hydrography . hydrography is a description of the waters , especially the seas . the sea is the general collection of waters , 't is divided into the ocean and mediterranean sea : the ocean is that sea which surrounds the whole earth , 't is divided into the great ocean , gulfs and streights . the ocean hath four different names , from the four opposite points of the world , from the east , 't is called the eastern sea ; from the south , the southern ; from the north , the northern ; 't is divided into three vast seas , indian , or red sea ; the atlantick sea , so called from atlas , a hill in mauritania ; and the pacifick sea. the indian sea reacheth from the islands of sumatra and java to the promontory of good hope , its chief gulfs are the ganget●ck gulf , or the gulf of bengala , whose longitude is deg . latitude deg . the persick gulf , or elcatif sea , whose longitude is deg . latitude ; the arabick gulph , or the red sea , commonly called mar di meca , whose longitude is deg . latitude ; the barbarick gulf , whose longitude is deg . latitude . these are the chief islands of the ocean , lerne , or madagascar , or the island of st. laurence , longit . deg . lat . discuriada , or zocotara , longit . deg . lat . . the maldives , longit . . lat . . nanigeris , commonly called zeilan , longit . . lat . . taprobana , sumatra , longit . . lat . java the great , longit . . lat . . we reckon among the chief islands of the atlantick sea , albion , or great britain , longit . . lat . . ireland , longit . . lat . . hesperides , or the islands of the cap vert , longit . . lat . . cuba , longit . . lat . . jamaica , . lat . . the pacifick , or southern sea , lies between asia , america , and the magellanick gulf ; its chief islands are japan , longit . . lat . . the molucs , longit . . lat . . salomon's islands , longit . . lat . . authors . herigone , ortelius , pomponius mela , joachim , vadiam , fournier . sectio decima sexta . hydrographia . hydrographia est descriptio aquarum , maxime marium . mare est generalis aquarum collectio , dividitur in oceanum , & mare mediterraneum : oceanus est mare quod universam terram ambit , dividitur in vastum , sinuosum , & fretum . oceanus quatuor sortitur appellationes a quatuor cardinalibus mundi partibus , ab oriente eous dicitur , ab occidente occiduus , a meridie australis , a septentrione septentrionalis ; dividitur in tria vasta maria indicum , sive rubrum , atlanticum a● atlante mauritaniae monte sic dictum , & in pacificum . oceanus indicus porrigitur ab insulis sumatra , & java usque ad caput bonae spei : ejus praecipui sinus sunt gangeticus , sive bengalensis , cujus longitudo graduum , latitudo graduum . sinus persicus , cujus longit . graduum , latitudo graduum . sinus arabicus , aut mare rubrum , vulgo mar di meca , cujus longit . . lat . . sinus barbaricus , sive mare asperum , cujus longit . . lat . . primariae oceani insulae sunt lerne , aut madagascar , seu insula sancti laurentii , cujus long . . lat . . discuriada aut zocotara , cujus long . . lat . . maldiviae , longit . . lat . . nanigeris , vulgo zeilan , cujus longit . . lat . . taprobana , sumatra , longit . . lat . . java major , longit . . lat . . praecipuae insulae maris atlantici sunt albion , sive magna britannia , ●ujus longit . . lat . hibernia , ●ujus longit . . lat . . hesperides , ●ut insulae promontorii viridis , longit . ●arum insularum . lat . . cuba , ●ujus longit . . lat . . jamaica , ●ujus longit . . lat . . mare pacificum , sive meridionale ●cet inter asiam , americamque , & ●retum magellanicum ; praecipuae ejus ●nsulae sunt japonia , cujus longit . . ●t . . molucae , longit . . lat . . ●nsulae salomonis longit . . lat . . authores . herigonius , ortelius , pomponius me● , joachimus , vadiamus , fournierius . sect. xvii . logick . logick is the art of disputing wel● the three operations of the min● make up its whole object , which are apprehension , judgement or affirmation and illation . it teacheth , that the truth of any of those three operations consist● in their confirmity to their objects : s● this compounded apprehension , go● almighty , is true , because i apprehen● god to be , what he really is , that i● almighty ; you may easily apply this t● the other two operations . it s two chief principles are these dictum de omni , and dictum de nullo : the first signifieth , that whatever 〈◊〉 generally affirmed of any thing , m●… likewise be affirm'd of whatever is contain'd under that thing , as if i s●… every animal is a living creature , th●… it follows , that a bird is a living cre●tur● ▪ the second signifieth , that what ever is generally denied of any thing is denied likewise of whatever is contain'd under that thing ; as if i say no animal is a stone , then i may , an cught likewise to say , no bird is stone , no man is a stone , &c. logick teacheth the art of making syllogism , which consisteth of three propositions , whereof the first two being granted , the conclusion must necessarily b● granted , because it was already implicitely admitted by him , who admitted of the premises : as 't is evident in this syllogism , every man is a living creature , peter is a man , ergo , peter is a living creature . logick is natural to all mankind , because 't is nothing else but the use of our reasoning faculty . artificial logick is made up of some rules and precepts that help our reasoning faculty . authors . aristotle , arriaga , ruvius , guilminot , &c. sectio decima septima . logica . logica est ars recte disserendi : ipsius objectum sunt tres mentis ●perationes ; apprehensio , judicium ●ut affirmatio , & illatio . docet ●eritatem illarum operationum in ea●um cum ipsis objectis conformitate esse positam ; ut composita haec apprehensio , deus omnipotens , est vera , ●uia apprehendo deum , ut reipsa est omnipotentem : quod reliquis operationibus applicari facile potest . duo praecipua logicae principia sunt ista , dictum de omni , & dictum ●e nullo : prius significat quicquid generaliter affirmatur de re quapiam , affirmari idem posse de omnibus sub eadem contentis , ut si dicam , omne animal est vivens , licebit dicere omnis volucris est vivens . posterius ●nnuit , quicquid generaliter negatur de quapiam re , negari posse idem de omnibus eadem comprehensis ; ut si dicam , nullum animal est lapis ; licebit etiam dicere , nulla volucris est lapis ; nullus homo est lapis , &c. logica docet artem conficiendi syllogismi , qui constat tribus propositionibus : quarum duae primae si semel admittantur , tertia necessario admitti debet , quia jam tacite admissa est ab eo qui duas primas admisit , ut patet in hoc syllogismo , omnis homo est animal , petrus est homo , ergo , petrus est animal . logica congenita est humano generi , cum nihil aliud sit quam facultatis nostrae rationalis exercitium . artificialis logica sunt praecepta quaedam hanc facultatem juvantia . authores . aristoteles , arriaga , ruvius , guilminotius , &c. sect. xviii . metaphysick . this science considers beings , as abstracted from all matter ; and is so called , because it treats of things somewhat besides , above , or beyond nature . it considereth two things in a being , . it s essence , which seems to have a real being , though it does not exist , as a rose in the midst of winter . . it s existence , which is actually in being , or by which a thing is actually in being , as the existence of a rose is that by which it now is . it considereth three properties of every being , its unity , goodness , and truth ; unity is that by which a thing is one , and not many . truth or verity , is the conformity of any thing to its real or consistent principles , as true gold consists in its conformity to the principles of this metal . the metaphysical goodness of things , is that essential perfection which is agreeable to them . this science treats likewise of powers , acts , principles , and causes , and proves , in opposition to aristotle , and other ancient philosophers , that the world was not eternal . authors . aristotle , vasques , suares , valentia , &c. sectio decima octava . metaphysica . haec scientia considerat entia , ut abstracta ab omni materia , nomenque hoc trahit inde quod agat de rebus aliquatenus praeter , vel supra , aut ultra naturam . duo in ente contemplatur , . essentiam , quae videtur esse verum ens licet non existat , ut rosa media hyeme . . existentiam quae actu in rerum natura est , aut vi cujus aliquid actu existit , ut existentia rosae est id vi cujus rosa nunc existit . contemplatur tres in quovis ente proprietates , unitatem , bonitatem , veritatem : unitas est id vi cujus quidpiam est unum , & non multa . veritas est conformitas unius cujusque rei cum principiis veris , & constituentibus , ut veritas auri , aut aurum verum est ejusdem conformitas cum constituentibus hujusce metalli principiis . metaphysica bonitas rerum est essentialis illa perfectio quae rebus congruit . haec scientia agit pariter de potentiis , actibus , principiis , causis , contraque aristotelem , aliosque antiquos philosophos , probat mundum non fuisse aeternum . authores . aristoteles , vasques , suares , valentia , &c. sect. xix . musick . musick is a science which teacheth us what belongs to the theory and practice of harmony . melody is that which has a certain order compounded of sounds and intervals . this science treats of these seven ensuing things , of sounds , of intervals , of genders , of constitutions or systems , of tunes , of changes , of the making of melody . the sound is a gentle falling of the voice upon the note . the interval is comprehended under two sounds , the one sharper than the other . authors . guido aretine , in the year , invented these six syllables , ut , re , mi , fal , sol , la , of which mi , fa , or fa , mi , imply a half tune , and the others following one another signifie a greater or lesser tune ; euclid , ptolomy , aristoxenus , faber stapulensis , boetius , john kepler , salinas , zarlins , and vincentius galilaeus in italian . sectio decima nona . musica . musica est scientia quae theoriam praximque harmoniae docet . concentus est id quod certum habet ordinem ex sonis & intervallis compositum . haec scientia de septem hisce sequentibus agit , de sonis , de intervallis , de generibus , de constitutionibus , de tonis , de mutatione , de melopaeia . sonus est concinnus vocis casus ad unam extensionem : intervallum est id quod continetur duobus sonis acumine , & gravitate differentibus . authores . guido aretinus , anno salutis , invenit has sex syllabas , ut , re , mi , fa , sol , la , quarum mi , fa , vel fa , mi , dimidium tonum significant , ac sequentes sese invicem aliae tonum absque discrimine majorem aut minorem ; euclides , ptolomaeus , aristoxenus , faber stapulensis , boetius , joannes keplerus , salinas , zarlinus , vincentius galilaeus italice . sect. xx. the mechanicks . this science considereth the quantity of moving forces , and of duration of the time in which the motion is performed . the gravity of a body , is a certain capacity of falling downwards ; the center of gravity , is that place or point from which if we conceive the body to be suspended , whatever situation you may give it , it shall retain the same . the center of magnitude , and of gravity , are not always the same , as 't is evident in a bowl half lead , half wood. the pendula diameter of gravity , or the handle , is a streight line drawn through the center of gravity perpendicularly to the horizon . no weight can rest , unless the pendula diameter of gravity , or handle , pass through the place upon which it leans , or from which the weight is suspended . in all planes , the center of the figure , is likewise the center of gravity . this art teacheth in general , how to find out the ponderousness of every thing , and how to move things with little strength . we must not forget in this place a sort of mecbanism , the knowledge whereof is of great concern for the good of mankind ; i mean that of trusses , and instruments fit for restoring by degrees , any part of the body to its natural place and situation . the burst peritonaeum sometimes gives way to the intestines , at other times to the caul . and not seldom , to both , to get out of their natural place , into the groins , or the scrotum , there causing a rupture , called enterocele , or hernia intestinalis ; if the bowels come out , an epiplocele , or hernia omentalis ; if the omentum or caul be out . the peritonaeum is made up of two strong , but soft membranes , which do so contain whatsoever is included in the belly , that , when sound , nothing can fall out . in women , the os pubis is its utmost limit . in men , its outermost membrane reacheth further , and constitutes the first proper coat of the testicles . in the groin , it comprehends the seminal vessels , as in a sheath , called processus , which being stretched or inlarged , or coming to burst , is the immediate cause of the lately mentioned ruptures . we must not nevertheless imagine , that the peritonaeum cannot be distended , and burst in other places , and therein to cause a rupture . the causes which make the peritonaeum to burst or dilate , are falling , leaping , beating , bearing of heavy burthens , strong vomitings or coughing , obstipation of the belly , winds pent in , and vehement motions of the body . but i can do no greater service to the publick , than to inform the world of two of the best artists i know of in this kind , both living together in black fryers , in london , i mean the famed robert smith , a scotch gentleman , and his son-in-law , thomas jewel , who give daily succesful proofs of their skill in this kind of mechanism , their trusses of what kind soever being so light , so easie , and so fitted to all the motions of the body , that they are not at all troublesome . they likewise cure effectually any deformity in humane bodies , occasioned by the preternatural bending outwards , inwards , or downwards , of any part thereof , and by such ingenuously contrived engines , as force nature gently into its first place and situation . authors . aristotle , henry monenthole , joseph blancan , guid ubald , stevin , hero , robert vulturius , cedren , john baptista porta , joseph boillot , ranelli , barbette , brown , &c. sectio vigesima . mechanica . mechanica est scientia quae quantitates virium moventium , & temporum in quibus fit motus considerat . gravitas corporis est quaedam potentia ad descensum . centrum gravitatis est punctum ex quo vel sola cogitatione suspensum corpus , quemcumque situm dederis retinet . centrum gravitatis , & centrum magnitudinis non sunt semper idem , ut patet in sphaera plumbo ▪ lignea . pendula gravitatis diameter , aut ansa est linea recta ducta per centrum gravitatis acta horizonti perpendicularis . nullum pondus quiescere potest nisi pendula gravitatis diameter , aut ansa transeat per locum cui innititur , aut e quo suspenditur corpus . in omni plano figurae centrum , centrum quoque gravitatis est . haec ars docet in genere modum reperiendae ponderationis , rerumque exiguis viribus movendarum methodum . non est praetermittendum hoc loco aliud genus mechanismi cujus notitia non parum humano generi profuerit ; de mechanismo loquor , fasciarum , instrumentorumque , aut machinarum quibus paulatim quaevis corporis pars ad debitum a natura situm reducatur . rupto peritonaeo interdum intestina , omentum interdum , saepe & intestina , & omentum loco naturali excidunt in inguina , aut scrotum , ibique hernia producitur , dicta enterocele , aut intestinalis , si prolabantur intestina , vel epiplocele , aut hernia omentalis si omentum excidat . peritonaeum gemina valida quidem sed molli constat membrana , quae ita concludit quicquid imo ventre comprehenditur , ut cum sanum corpus est nihil procidere possit . peritonaeum in mulieribus osse pubis terminatur : in viris tunica exterior ulterius procedit , ac testiculorum involucrum primum proprium constituit . in inguine vasa seminalia comprehendit , instar vaginae , processus dictae : processus hic laxatus , dilatatus aut ruptus est immediata herniarum mox commemoratarum causa : non est tamen existimandum peritonaeum non posse distendi , rumpique etiam aliis in locis ibique herniam producere . causae peritonaei rupti , aut dilatati hae fere sunt , lapsus , saltatio , percussio , gravium onerum gestatio , vomitus violentior , aut tussis , constipatio ventris , flatus reclusi , vehementiorque omnis corporis motus . sed nihil forte utilius rei publicae praestitero , quam si hic nominatim indica vero duos peritissimos quos quidem norim hujusmodi mechanismi artifices simul conviventes londini in ea regione urbis quae black fryers , dicitur ; sunt autem ii celebris robertus smith scotus , ejusque gener thomas jewel , qui quotidiana magnoque successu suae hoc in genere mechanismi peritiae experimenta exhibent : ipsorum enim fasciae cujuscumque generis , sive contra hernias intestinales , sive omentales , sive umbilicales , sive ventosas , aut contra aquosas , adeo leves sunt , gestatuque faciles , omnique corporis motui ita obsecundant , ut nihil omnino molestiae gestantibus secum afferant . reipsa quoque praenominati tollunt quamcumque humanorum corporum deformitatem a praeternaturali partis cujuspiam extrorsum , introrsum , aut deorsum distentione ortam , instrumentisque ac machinis ingenii ejusmodi quibus natura suaviter ad pristinum situm reducatur . authores . aristoteles , henricus monentholus , josephus blancanus , guidus ubaldus ' stevinus , hero , robertus vulturius , cedrenus , joannes baptista porta , josephus boillotus , augustus ranelli , paulus barbettus , johannes brownius , &c. sect. xxi . medica : or the art of conserving and curing humane bodies . hermes trismegistus , a fam'd physician in egypt , invented this necessary art : 't is either empirical , that is , grounded upon meer experience ; or dogmatical , that is , grounded both upon reason and experience : hippocrates and galenus were the chief masters of the dogmatical part . this art is either speculative or practical ; the former considereth , . the nature , and the outward causes of distempers , as the six things that are called not natural , because they are not the constituent parts of our bodies , such we reckon the air , meat , drink , sleep , watching , motion and rest , what we throw off , and what we retain , excreta & retenta ; our passions , plethora , or fulness , cacochymy , or an ill habit of our bloud . . it searcheth into the internal causes of our distempers , as wind , worms , acids . the practical part of this noble and useful art relates to the method of curing , which is either performed by alteration or evacuation . whether this evacuation be wrought by bleeding , vomiting , stool , urine , sweat , or insenble transpiration ; and upon this account , its true object is the whole materia medica , or whatever may be subservient to the physician 's intention in either of the three kingdoms , i mean , animal , vegitative , and mineral . the whole materia medica may be reduc'd to the ensuing heads . . the attenuating remedies , as elicampe roots , wormwood leaves , camomile flowers , the hot seeds , juniper , and lawrel berries , old tallow , and grease , especially that of a wolf , and of a bear , most oyls , as of bitter almonds , walnuts , &c. the plaisters of betony , diachylon , oxycroceum , &c. . the softening , as marsh mallow roots , briony roots , &c. . such as dissolve clots , as the roots of round birthwort . . the deterging , as the roots of gentian , and birthwort . the epicerasticks , that by a moderate moisture take off the sharpness of the humour , as mallow , and marsh-mallow roots . . alexipharmaca , that resist venome , as angelica root . . the thickening , as the roots of bugloss and plantain . . the cathartick , which either purge the bile , as cassia , manna , tamarinds , &c. or the phlegm , as carthamy , wild saffron , agarick , turbith , jalep , or the melancholy , as sena oake-fern , or the watery humours , as dwarf elder , elder-seed , bark , juice , mechoaca . . the vomitory , whether milder ones , as sarabacca leaves bruised in dill water , or stronger ones , as the spirit of tobacco , the infusion of tobacco , crocus metallorum , &c. . diureticks , as radish roots , parseley roots , &c. . the sudorificks , as harts horn , diascordium , angelica roots , &c. . the repelling remedies , as the sloe-tree roots , tormentil roots , &c. . the emplasticks that stop the passages of the body , as lilly roots , wild comphry roots , &c. . the absorbing remedies , which by a great faculty of drying , consume the moisture , as all cenders , vineger , brine , &c. . the blistering , which raise blisters , as the cantharides , mustard , garlick , water-cresses . . the suppurating , that generate matter , as marsh-mallow roots , white lilly roots . . the vulnerary , as tormentil roots , the roots of both comphreys . . the sarcoticks , that remove whatever may hinder the breeding of flesh , as the roots of birthwort , tragacanth , dragons bloud , sarcocolla , &c. . the epuloticks , that generate a callus , or scarr , as dragons bloud , myrtle leaves . . the anodines , as marsh-mallows , and lilly roots . . the narcoticks , which take away all feeling , as oyl of palm , laurel , turpentine , opium , &c. . the hypnoticks , that cause sleep , as requies nicolai , diascordium , laudanum opiatum , &c. . such as stop bleeding , as corals , the bolus , seal'd earth . . the cephalicks , as the roots of birthwort , betony leaves , galanga . . the errhina , that purge the brains and the breast , by bringing down the superfluous pituite lying about the meninges , as the juice of betony , the powder of white and black hellebore . . the ophthalmicks for the eyes , as eye-bright , and celadine water , and also their juices . . otica , that ease the pains of the ears , as laurel leaves , leeks , radishes . . the cardiacks , as the roots of zodoaria , great leopards bane , thistle , and balm water . . the bechick , that render the humours contained in the lungs and the breast , fit to be thrown up , as the syrup of ground ▪ ivy. . the aromaticks , as roots of cyperus . . splenica , such as cure the spleen , as the powder of style , valerian roots . , the nephritcks , that help the reins , as marsh-mallow roots , sal prunella , &c. . the lithontripticks , that break the stone , as elecampane roots , galanga , &c. . the hystericks , that cure hysterical fits , as purslain seed , the seed of agnus castus , the trochisques of myrrh , &c. . the arthriticks , that prevail against the gout , as elecampane roots , night-shade , plaintain , marsh-mallow leaves . authors . hippocrates , galen , trallian , actuarius , cornelius celsus , avicenna , sennertus , riverius , macasius , regius , willis , barbette , harvey the inventor of the circulation of the bloud . sectio vigesima prima . medica : sive ars conservandi & restaurandi humani corporis . hermes trismegistus celebris apud aegyptios medicus necessariae hujusce artis inventor dicitur : est autem aut empirica , hoc est quae mera experientia , aut dogmatica , quae ratione & experientia nititur : medicinae dogmaticae praecipui magistri extitere hippocrates & galenus . est aut speculativa aut practica ; prior considerat , . naturam , causasque externas morborum , ut sex res dictas non naturales quia non sunt partes corporis humani constituentes , cujusmodi censemus aerem , cibum , potum , somnum , vigilias , motum , & quietem , excreta , & retenta , animi pathemata , plethoram , sive plenitudinem , cacochymiam , sive pravum sanguinis habitum . . scrutatur internas morborum causas , puta flatus , vermes , acidum . practica pars nobilis hujus , utilisque artis methodum medendi spectat , quae posita est in evacuatione , & alteratione , quocumque demum modo evacuatio contingat , sive venae sectione , sive vomitu , dejectione , sudore , urina , aut insensibili transpiratione ; quocirca verum ipsius objectum est tota materia medica , aut quicquid in regno animali , vegetabili , & minerali , medici scopo inservire poterit . porro totam materiam medicam ad sequentia capita reducere fere possumus . . attenuantia , ut radices aenulae campanae , folia absinthii , flores camomillae , semina calida , baccae juniperi , lauri , axungiae vetustiores maxime vulpina , & ursina , olea pleraque , ut amygdalarum amararum , nucum , &c. emplastra de betonica , diachylon , oxycroceum , &c. . emollientia , ut radices altheae , bryoniae . . grumos dissolventia , ut radices aristolochiae rotundae . . detergentia , ut radices gentianae , aristolochiae . . epicerastica quae moderata humidate acrimoniam humorum obtundunt , ut radices malvae , & altheae . . alexipharmaca quae resistunt veneno , ut radix angelicae . . condensantia , ut radices buglossae , & plantaginis . . cathartica que vel purgant bilem , ut cassia , manna , tamarindi , &c. vel phlegma , ut carthamus , crocus sylvestris , turbith , jalap , vel melancholiam , ut sena , polypodium quercinum , vel humores aquosos , ut sambuci , & ebuli semen , cortex , succus , mechoaca . . vomitoria , sive mitiora , ut asari folia , aut validiora , ut spiritus nicotianae , infusio nicotianae , crocus metallorum . , &c. . diuretica . ut radices raphani , apii . . sudorifica , ut cornu cervi , diascordium , radices angelicae . . repellentia , ut radices pruni sylvestris , tormentillae , &c. . emplastica quae corporis meatus obstruunt , ut radices symphiti , & liliorum . . absorbentia , quae valida exsiccandi vi absumunt humorem , ut omnes cineres , acetum , muria . . vesicatoria , quae vesicas excitant , ut cantharides , sinapi , allium , nasturtium . . suppurantia , a quibus pus generatur , ut radices althaeae , liliorum alborum , &c. . vulneraria , ut radices tormentillae , consolidae utriusque . . sarcotica , quae removent quicquid carnis generationem prohibet , ut radices aristolochiae , tragacantha , sanguis draconis , sarcocolla . . epulotica , quae callum generant , aut cicatricem , ut sanguis draconis , folia myrthi . . anodina , ut radices althaeae , radices liliorum . . narcotica , quae omnem sensum tollunt , ut oleum palmae , lauri , terebinthinae , &c. . hypnotica , quae somnos conciliant , ut requies nicolai , diascordium , laudanum opiatum , &c. . sanguinem sistentia , ut coralliae , bolus , terra sigillata , &c. . cephalica , ut radices aristolochiae , galangae , folia betonicae . . errhina , quae cerebum purgant & thoracem , educta superflua circa meninges pituita , ut succus betonicae pulvis albi & nigri hellebori . . ophthalmica , ut aquae & succi euphrasiae , & chelidoniae . . otica , quae levant aurium dolorem , ut folia lauri , radices porri , raphani . . cardiaca , ut radices zedoariae , doronici , aquae cardui benedicti , & melissae . . bechica , quae humores in thorace , & pulmone conclusos ad faciliorem tussiendo ejectionem disponunt , ut sirupus & succus hederae terrestris . . aromatica , ut sirupi absinthii , & betonicae . . splenica , ut pulvis ex chalybe , radices valerianae . . nephritica , ut radices althaeae , sal prunellae . . lithontriptica , quae calculum frangunt , ut radices aenulae campanae , galangae . . hysterica , ut semen agni casti , portulacae , trochisci de myrrha . . arthritica , quae valent adversus podagram , & chiragram , ut radices aenulae campanae , folia solani , plantaginis , althaeae . authores . hippocrates , galenus , trallianus , actuarius , cornelius celsus , avicenna , sennertus , riverius , macasius , regius , willisius , barbetius , harveius circulationis sanguinis inventor , &c. sect. xxii . the art of sailing . ars nautica , or histiodromica , is that art which teacheth how to direct a ship through the seas , to the propos'd harbour . this art requireth the knowledge of the mariners compass , and the lead , of the sea-coasts , capes , rocks , promontories , harbours , of the distances of one place from another , of the ebbing and flowing of the sea , of the latitude and longitude of every place . it requireth likewise the knowledge of several instruments fit to take the latitude of a place , as of the cross-staff , of the quadrant , of the nocturnal , of the plane scale , of gunter's scale , &c. the mariners compass is a round plane , whose circumference is divided into equal parts , by streight lines , called rhombs , passing through the center . the height of the pole , of so great benefit to sailers , is found out thus : observe first the height of the sun at noon-day , with an astrolabe , or some other instrument of that kind ; then take the declination of the sun , from the height , if the sun declines from the equator towards the northern pole ; or add the declination of the sun , to the observed height , if the sun declines towards the southern pole ; the remaining number , or the sum made up by addition , gives you the height of the equator , whose complement to degrees ( as they speak ) is always the height of the pole. thus if the height of the equator above our horizon be deg . the height of the pole is deg . because added to , make up ; and if the pole be elevated but deg . the height of the equator is , because this number is the complement of that . if their could be an hour glass , or ● clock , so contriv'd , as to fall but very little short of the measure of time ▪ with the help of this clock , to the great advantage of sailers , the differences of the longitudes might be found after this manner : when the ship sets off , let the clock shew the hour in the place from whence you sail'd , without discontinuing : if then we would know the longitude of the place in which we now are , let us , by observation of the sun , find the hour in that place we chance to be in ; which if it be the same pointed at by the clock , or shewn by the glass , 't is certain we are in the same meridian we were in at our first setting out ; but if we find by observation , more hours than the clock pointeth at , we have made a progress towards the east ; if we find fewer hours , we are gone towards the west ; and the differences of the longitudes may easily be known , if the differences of the hours be converted into degrees , and minutes of degrees . authors . seller , everard , wright , &c. sectio vigesima secunda . ars nautica . ars nautica , sive histiodromica ea est quae docet qui dirigi debeat navis per maria ad propositum portum . haec ars requirit notitiam pyxidis nauticae , & bolidis , orae maritimae , promontoriorum , rupium , portuum distantiarum inter loca , aestuum maritimorum , latitudinis & longitudinis cujusque loci , instrumentorum pariter variorum ad investigandam syderum altitudinem , ut baculi decussati , quadrantis , nocturnalis , scalarum planarum , scalarum gunteri , &c. pyxis nautica est planum rotundum , cujus circumferentia in partes aequales dividitur rectis lineis per centrum transeuntibus quae rhombi dicuntur . altitudo poli navigantibus adeo utilis sic invenitur : observa primo meridianam solis altitudinem ope astrolabii , aut alterius cujuspiam instrumenti , tum substrahe declinationem solis ex altitudine jam inventa solis , ope instrumenti , si declinatio solis versus polum conspicuum sit , aut adde declinationem solis observatae altitudini si sol declinaverit versus polum meridionalem , residuum aut summa futura est altitudo aequatoris , cujus complementum est semper altitudo poli : itaque si altitudo aequatoris supra horizontem nostrum sit graduum sexaginta , altitudi poli futura est graduum triginta : quia si addas ipsis , summa futura est ; & si polus tantum supra horizontem gradibus extet , aequator supra eundem extabit , quia hic numerus est complementum illius . si posset construi clepsydra , aut horologium quod ab accurata mensura temporis parum aberraret : illius ope inveniri possent hoc modo longitudinum differentiae : aptetur horologium ita ut dum solvit navis ostendat horas loci unde discedimus , deinde inter navigandum nunquam cesset : cumque libuerit scire longitudinem loci in quo sumus , ex observatione coelesti inquiratur illius loci hora , quae si omnino convenerit cum hora quam horologium indicat , certum erit nos esse sub eo unde discessimus meridiano , si vero plures horas observatione invenimus , quam horologium indicet , progressi sumus versus ortum , si pauciores defleximus versus occidentem , dignosceturque differentia longitudinum , si reducantur differentiae horarum in gradus , & minuta graduum . authores . sellerius , everardus , wrightius , &c. sect. xxiii . opticks . the opticks , or optica , gives us an account of various appearances of objects . this science treats of the streight ray , as the catoptrick of the reflected , and the dioptrick of the refracted or broken ray. these following definitions belong to the opticks . the proper objects of sense , are those that can be known but by one sense ; and the common objects , such as may be known by more than one sense . light and colour , are the proper objects of our sight ; the light , upon its own account ; and the colour , by the help of light. these following things , are the common objects of our senses , bulk , figure , place , situation , distance , continuity , discontinuity , motion , and rest. the visuel rays , are the streight lines , by which the frame of the visible object is in a manner carried to the eye . we may reckon among the chief principles of this science , these following . the visible object radiates from all its least parts , to all the least parts of the medium , to which one may draw a streight line . that is seen , and that only , from which to the eye the visuel ray may be eztended . the more bodies there appear between the eye and the object , the more remote the objects appear to be . the convergent rays , are those that departing from the object , come together : such are , the rays of diverse parts of the object , which cut one another in the chrystalline humor . the divergent rays , departing from the object towards the eye , recede from one another : the rays of every point of the object , are divergent , till they come to the chrystalline humour , beyond which they come together again towards the retina . we may reckon these following propositoins amongst the most considerable of the opticks . no visible object is seen at first altogether , and perfectly . magnitudes being in the same streight line , the remoter seem to be the lesser . parallel intervals seem to be nearer one another , the farther they are from the eye . rectangle magnitudes being seen at a distance , seem to be round . equal magnitudes being under the eye , those that are farthest from the eye , seem to be highest . authors . you may reckon amongst the best masters of the opticks , euclid , aquilonius , scheiner , vitellio , alhazane , herigone , &c. sectio vigesima tertia . optica . optica variae objectorum apparentiae causas demonstrat . agit de radio recto , ut catoptrica de reflexo , & dioptrica de refracto . ad opticam spectant sequentes definitiones . propria objecta sunt ea quae ab uno tantum sensu percipi possunt . communia sunt ea quae a pluribus sensibus percipiuntur . lumen & color sunt propria visus nostri objecta , lumen quidem ratione sui , color ope lucis . communia visus objecta sunt ea quae sequuntur , quantitas , figura , locus , situs , distantia , continuitas , discontinuitas , motus , & quies . radii visorii rectae lineae sunt , quibus forma aspectabilis objecti ad visum porrigitur . inter praecipua hujus scientiae principia sequentia numerare licet . visibile radiat e quolibet sui puncto ad quodlibet punctum medii ad quod recta duci potest . id omne & solum videtur a quo ad oculum radius opticus extendi potest . quo plura corpora oculum inter , & objectum apparent , eo remotius existimatur objectum . convergentes radii sunt ii qui recedendo ab objecto simul coeunt . ejusmodi sunt radii variorum punctorum objecti qui se mutuo in humore chrystallino secant . divergentes radii progrediendo ab objecto versus oculum recedunt a se invicem donec ad humorem chrystallinum pervenerint ultra quem versus retinam coeunt . annumerare possumus praecipuis opticae ; propositiones sequentes . nullum visibile objectum simul totum , & perfecte videtur . magnitudinum in eadem recta quae remotiores videntur , minores apparent . parallela intervalla eo magis ad se invicem accedere videntur quo sunt remotoria ab oculo . rectangulae magnitudines procul visae apparent rotundae . aequalium magnitudinum sub oculo quae remotiores , videntur altiores . authores . inter praecipuos opticae doctores censere possumus euclidem , aquilonium , alhazenum , scheinerum , vitellionem herigonium , &c. sect. xxiv . perspective . perspective representeth every object seen in some diaphane , or transparent medium , through which the visual rays are terminated or bounded on the object ; and generally what ▪ is seen through something , as through the air , water , clouds , glass , and the like , may be said to be seen in perspective . the chief contents of this science , may be referred to these following heads . the ray is a streight line drawn from the eye to the glass perpendicularly . that point is called primary , on which falls a perpendicular line drawn from the eye to the glass . the projection of a line , is not a crooked line . the object being a point , there is but one visual ray drawn from the object to the center of the eye , and this ray is called the axis , or centrical , as being the most vivid , and the strongest of all . if the object be a streight line , the visual rays make a triangle . if the object be a surface , plane or spherical , the visual rays represent a pyramide . ichonography is the pourtraiture of the platform or plane upon which we would raise any thing . orthography is the pourtraiture of the fore part of the object . scenography representeth the object wholly elevated and perfect , with all its dimensions and umbrages on all sides . the horizontal line in perspective , is taken from the height of our eye : this is the chief piece of the picture , and which ought to be the rule of the dimensions and height of the figure . the point of perspective , or sight , is made by the centrical ray above the horizon . authors . amongst the chief writers of perspective , you have roger bacon , john baptist porta , stevin , marole , john cousin , daniel barbaro , vignola , serlio , du cereau , salomon de caus , guidus ubaldus , niceronius , &c. sectio vigesima quarta . perspectiva . perspectiva quodlibet objectum exhibet conspectum permedium quodpiam diaphanum , per quod radii visorii transeuntes terminantur ad objectum , & generaliter loquendo quicquid per aliud quidpiam videtur , ut per aerem , per aquam , per nubes , per vitrum , & quaecumque alia sunt ejusmodi , dici possunt videri in perspectiva . quae praecipui momenti haec scientia continet ad sequentia capita reduci queunt . radius primarius est recta ab oculo in vitrum ad angulos rectos ducta . primarium punctum dicitur id in quod cadit perpendicularis ab oculo in vitrum ducta . projectio lineae non est linea curva . cum objectum est punctum unicus tantum est radius visorius ab objecto ad centrum oculi ductus , hicque radius dicitur axis , aut radius centricus , estque omnium vivacissimus , ac fortissimus . si objectum recta sit linea , radii visiorii conflant triangulum . si objectum sit superficies plana , aut sphaerica , radii visiorii conficiunt pyramidem . ichonographia est delineatio plani super quod erigere quidpiam volumus . orthographia est delineatio anterio●is objecti partis . scenographia exhibet objectum omnino elevatum , perfectumque una cum omnibus ejusdem dimensionibus , um●risque undique . linea horizontalis in perspectiva ●ucitur ab altitudine oculi : haec prae●pui in pictura momenti est , regu●que esse debet dimensionum , altitu●numque figurae . punctum perspectivae , aut visus fit ●entrico supra horizontem radio . authores . inter praecipuos perspectivae scriptores hi censentur rogerius bacco , johannes baptista porta , stevinius , marolus , johannes cousinus , daniel barbaro , vignola , serlio , du cereau , salomon de caus , guidus ubaldus , niceronius , &c. sect. xxv . poetry . poetry is the art of making verse and poems : in order to this , 〈…〉 teacheth the quantity of syllables , whether they be short or long , doubtful 〈…〉 common , i mean , either short or long 〈…〉 pleasure . it teacheth what feet every verse compounded of , that feet are made syllables of different quantities , as spondee consists of two long syllables ; for instance , doctos , and pyrrichius ; of two short , as rota ; a dactyle consists of one long , and two short , as pectora . a poem implieth a fiction : upon this account , verses that contain no fiction , are not strictly considered ▪ a poem ; and he that gives a meer matter of fact , without any ingenious fiction adapted to the subject , is rather styl'd a versificator , than a poet. verses are either denominated from their inventors , as sapphick verses , from the greek poetress sappho , the first inventress ; as pindarick , from pindarus , or from the feet whereof they consist ; as iambick , from the iambick● of which they are compos'd , or from th● matter they express ; as heroick , from the praises of great men ; as elegiack from sad narratives , or from the number of feet , as hexameter , and pent● meter , the first having six , and the othe● five . the scansion of a verse , is the measuring of a verse by its feet . the cesure is the making of a short syllable long at the end of a foot . authors . aristotle , horace , alvares , despauter , waller , cowley , dryden , & . sectio vigesima quinta . poetica . poetica est ars pangendorum carminum quem in scopum docet quantitatem syllabarum an scilicet sint longae , breves , dubiae , aut communes , hoc est pro arbitrio , breves aut longae . docet ex quibus pedibus quilibet versus constet , pedesque constare ex syllabis variae quantitatis , spondaeum puta , duabus longis , ut doctos , pyrrichium ; ex duabus brevibus , ut rota ; dactylum ex una longa & duabus brevibus , ut pectora . poema fictionem necessario requirit : quare versus nullam fictionem complexi stricte loquendo poema dici nequeunt : qui rem absque ingenioso ullo commento , ut reipsa contigit , carmine describit , versificator potius quam poeta dicendus est . versus denominantur aut ab inventoribus , ut sapphici versus a puella graeca quae sappho dicebatur , prima inventrice , ut pindarici a pindaro ; aut a pedibus ex quibus constant , ut iambici ab iambis , ex quibus fiunt ; aut a materia quam exprimunt , ut heroici a laudibus heroum , elegiaci a maestis narrationibus ; aut a numero pedum , ut hexameter , & pentameter a numero pedum sex , & quinque . scansio versus est ejusdem ope pedum dimensio . caesuta est productio syllabae brevis sub finem pedis . authores . aristoteles , horatius , alvares , despauterius , &c. sect. xxvi . philosophy . philosophy , if we take it generally , is the love of wisdom ; if more particularly , the knowledge of natural bodies , or of the natural causes of things : the aristotelian philosophy acknowledgeth three principles of every thing , matter , form , and privation ; for we can conceive nothing to be generated without these three ; for if i conceive the generation of fire in wood , i must of necessity apprehend the wood as the matter , as likewise the privation of the fire in the wood , and also the form of fire taking place of that of wood. this philosophy resolveth all difficulties relating to bodies , by matter , privation , and form , occult qualities , and such like pretences to humane ignorance : so every mixt , according to aristotles principle , is compounded of matter and form : this matter , the peripateticks call the subject of all forms ; and this form , the act of matter ; and both together , the two compounding principles of all compounded things aristotles followers teach , that nature is such an enemy to a vacuum , that to shun it , she forceth heavy things upwards , and light things downwards . the new philosophy holds but two simple principles of all things , matter , and motion ; that , as the material cause ; this , as the efficient . the formal cause of things , which school-men call a substantial or accidental form , being nothing else , according to the modern philosophers , but a certain texture of the compounding particles ; and by the variety of textures every where obvious , or by the various modifications of matter , they give us a rational account of all the differences we observe among corporeal beings . authors of the school philosophy . aristotle , and all his commentators , as averroes , alexander aphrodisaeus , &c. authors of the new philosophy . descartes , verulam , the honourable robert boyle , who in not a few things , has out-done them both , and is deservedly styl'd abroad , the english philosopher ; he being indeed , the honour of his nation , as well as of his family . sectio vigesima sexta . philosophia . philosophia si latius sumatur , amorem sapientiae sonat , si propius & specialius , est corporum naturalium , aut naturalium causarum cognitio . philosophia aristotelica agnoscit tria rerum dum generantur principia , materiam , formam , & privationem . nihil enim generari concipimus nisi haec tria concipiamus : si enim concipio generationem ignis in ligno , necessario concipio lignum , ut materiam , & privationem pariter ipsius in ligno , formamque ignis formae ligni succedentem . haec philosophia omnes fere difficultates ad corpora spectantes ope materiae , privationis , & formae resolvit , atque occultarum qualitatum beneficio , aliisque humanae ignorantiae velamentis ; unumquodque igitur mixtum juxta aristotelica principia componitur ex materia , & forma : hanc materiam vocant peripatetici subjectum omnium formarum , & hanc formam actum materiae , componentiaque duo principia si simul sumantur , omnium rerum compositarum . aristotelis sectatores docent naturam vacuo adeo esse inimicam , ut illius vitandi gratia gravia sursum cogat , & levia deorsum . nova philosophia duo admittit simplicia omnium rerum principia materiam , & motum , illam ceu causam materialem hanc ut efficientem . formalis enim rerum causa , quam scholastici formam substantialem vocant , aut accidentalem , nihil aliud est juxta philosophos recentiores , quam textura quaedam partium componentium . hacque contextus varietate ubique obvia , aut variis materiae modificationibus , rationalem , facilem , obviamque nobis reddunt rationem omnium quae observamus , corporea inter entia discriminum . authores philosophiae scholasticae . aristoteles ejusque commentatores , ut averroes , alexander aphrodisaeus , &c. authores novae philosophiae . gassendus , cartesius , verulamius , illustrissimus robertus boylius , qui in multis his omnibus palmam praeripuit , meritoque philosophus britannicus cognominatur ; est que reipsa nationis suae , & nobilissimae familiae ornamentum & decus . sect. xxvii . rhetorick . rhetorick is the art of speaking well ; the duty of a rhetorician , is to speak pertinently to the subject , in order to perswade , and his chief scope must be to perswade by his discourse . rhetorick consists of four parts , invention , disposition , elocution , and pronounciation : invention is the contriving of an argument fit to perswade , and those arguments are always taken from some of these ensuing heads . . from the definition , when we declare what the thing is . . from the division , when we distribute a thing into all its parts . . from the etymology , when we shew its origine and signification . . from the species , when we frame an argument from that particular kind of thing the subject we treat of , belongs to . . from the genus , when we bring some proof from that general thing the subject we treat of , is contain'd under . . from the similitude . . from the dissimilitude . . from contraries . . from opposites , that can never concur together . . from comparison . . from the four causes , efficient , material , formal , and final . . from the antecedents and consequents of a thing . disposition is the orderly placing of the things invented : this orderly placing consists of five things ; exordium , by which the speaker prepares the minds of his auditors , to what he is to say . proposition , when the orator declares what he intends to make out . narration , when he relates the matter of fact , with all its circumstances . confirmation , when he proves his proposition . peroration , when the orator endeavours to move the affections of the hearers , by a fit elocution . elocution , made up of tropes , as they speak in the schools , by which words change their signification ; and of figures , which are an elegant , and not vulgar manner of speaking , is the ornament of speech . pronunciation relates to the voice , and the gesture ; by the first , we please the ear ; by the second , the sight . these forementioned things ( necessary to the compleating of an orator ) being seldom found together in any eminency , gave occasion to cicero to say , that we scarce find a good orator in a whole age. authors . aristole , cicero , suarez . sectio vigesima septima . rhetorica . rhetorica est ars bene dicendi ; officium rhetoris est loqui apposite ad scopum hoc est ad persuadendum ; praecipuus enim ipsius scopus est persuadere dictione . rhetorica quatuor constat partibus , inventione , dispositione , elocutione , pronunciatione : inventio est excogitatio argumenti ad persuadendum idonei ; haec autem argumenta ducuntur semper ab aliquo sequentium capitum . . a definitione , cum declaramus quid res sint . . a divisione , cum rem distribuimus in omnes partes . , ab etymologia , cum indicamus ejusdem originem & significationem . . a specie , cum argumentum quodpiam ducimus a particulari illa rerum specie , ad quam res , de qua agimus spectat . . a genere , cum probationem de sumimus a generali illa re , sub qua id quod sub litem cadit , continetur . . a similitudine . . a dissimilitudine . . a contrario . . ab oppositis , quae nunquam concurrere queunt . . a comparatione . . a quatuor causis , efficiente , materiali , formali , & finali . . ab antecedentibus & consequentibus . dispositio est ordinata rerum inventarum collocatio : haec ordinata collocatio his quinque constat , exordio , quo parat orator auditorum animos ad ea quae dicturus est . propositione , cum orator quid probaturus sit exponit . narratione , cum materiam facti omnibus vestitam appendicibus enarrat . confirmatione , cum propositionem suam probat . peroratione , qua conatur orator auditorum animos apta elocutione movere . elocutio , composita ex tropis , quibus voces ad alienam significationem traducuntur , & figuris quae sunt elegantes , & non vulgares loquendi formulae , est totius orationis ornamentum . pronunciatio spectat vocem , & gestum , ista recreamus aurem , hac oculum : praememorata haec quae in perfecto oratore requirimus cum vix uspiam simul summo in gradu concurrant , impulerunt ciceronem ut dicere● vix singulis aetatibus singulos tolerabiles oratores extisse . authores . aristoteles , cicero , suares . sect. xxviii . the doctrine of the sphere . sphaerica is a science which treats of the sphere , whether artificial or natural . the sphere is a solid figure comprehended under one surface , to which all the streight lines drawn from one of those points that are within the figure , are equal one to another . the center of the sphere , is the forementioned point . the axis of the sphere , is a streight line drawn through the center , and terminated on each side in the surface of the sphere ; about which the sphere turneth round . the poles of the sphere , are the two extreme points of the axis . this science demonstrates these following propositions . . the sphere toucheth but in one point the plane by which it is not cut . . in the sphere , great circles cut one another into equal parts ; and if they divide one another into equal parts , they are great circles . . in the sphere , the pole of a great circle is distant from the circumference of the same circle , a full quadrant , or a fourth part of the great circle . . in the sphere , parallel circles are about the same poles ; and circles that are about the same poles , are parallel . . in the sphere , there are no more than two circles , both equal-distant and equal . this science teacheth how to find the center , and the pole of any sphere , and sheweth likewise all the properties of the circles of the sphere . authors . theodosius , maurolycus , sacrobosco , clavius , mestlinus , blancanus . sectio vigesima octava . sphaerica . sphaerica est scientia quae agit de sphaera , sive arte facta , sive naturali . sphaerica est figura solida comprehensa una superficie , ad quam ab uno eorum punctorum quae intra figuram sunt , omnes rectae lineae ductae sunt aequales inter se. centrum sphaerae est punctum praememoratum . axis sphaerae est recta per centrum ducta & utrimque terminata in superficie sphaerae circa quam volvitur sphaera . poli sphaerae , sunt duo extrema puncta axis . haec scientia sequentes propositiones demonstrat . . sphaera planum a quo non secatur , non tangit in pluribus punctis uno . . in sphaera , maximi circuli sese mutuo bifariam secant , & qui sese mutuo bifariam secant , sunt maximi . . in sphaera , polus maximi circuli abest a circumferentia ejusdem circuli quadrante maximi circuli . . in sphaera , paralleli circuli circa eosdem polos sunt , & qui circa eosdem polos in sphaera sunt , sunt paralleli . . in sphaera non sunt plures circuli aequales , & paralleli quam duo . haec scientia praeterea docet qui centrum , polumque cujuscumque sphaerae invenire possimus , indicatque pariter proprietates circulorum sphaerae . authores . theodosius , maurolycus , sacrobosco , clavius , mestlinus , blancanus . sect. xxix . divinity . theology , or divity , is wholly directed to the glory of god , and salvation of mankind . the speculative part of it , proposeth to us things that we are to believe , as whatever concerns gods attributes and perfections , the immortality of our souls , and whatever is contain'd in the apostolick creed . the practical part , proposeth to us things that we are to do , viz. whatever is contain'd in the decalogue . the immediate object of divinity , as it relates to christians , we reckon whatever concerns christ , directly , or indirectly ; as in general , the old and new testament . and in particular , the prophecies relating to his coming , his miracles , his doctrine , and the conversion of the world by his apostles : if then , a man knew no other divinity , but that which gives an account of gods attributes , he is not upon this account a christian divine , but a philosopher , or deist . christian divinity , besides the aforesaid things , teacheth all kind of vertues , as charity , humility , patience , chastity , adoration , prayer to , and praise of god , faith , obedience , repentance , &c. it will have us moreover to pardon and love our very enemies ; which no other religion commands : it offers to us the fundamental points of christian religion , christs godhead , passion , death , resurrection , &c. and ( as i was saying ) whatever is contained in the creed . authors . the master of sentences , thomas aquinas , scotus , hammond , lightfoot , and several other doctors of the church of england . sectio vigesima nona . theologia . thologia ad dei gloriam , salutemque animarum tota dirigitur . speculativa pars proponit nobis credenda , ut quae spectant ad attributa divina , immortalitatem animae , quaeque in symbolo apostolorum continentur . pars practica facienda nobis proponit , quaecumque scilicet decalogus nobis exhibet . theologia prout spectat christianos , immediatum habet objectum quicquid refertur ad christum directe , aut indirecte ut in genere tum antiquum , tum novum testamentum ; & magis speciatim prophetias ad ipsius adventum spectantes , miracula , doctrinam , hominumque ab apostolis conversionem : quocirca si nullum quis aliam noverit theologiam quam quae divinorum attributorum reddit rationem non hoc nomine christianus theologus , sed philosophus potius , aut deista merus dici debet . theologia christiana praeter superius commemorata docet omnia virtutum genera , humilitatem , patientiam , castitatem , adorationem , orationem , laudem dei , fidem , obedientiam , paenitentiam , &c. vult insuper nos non tantum remittere injuriam , sed & diligere inimicos : quod nulla nisi christiana religio injungit . proponit nobis religionis christianae fundamenta , christi deitatem , passionem , mortem , resurrectionem , &c. atque ut superius dicebam quicquid in symbolo continetur . authores . majister sententiarum , thomas aquinas , johannes duns scotus a patria , hamm●ndius , lightfootius , aliique quam plurimi ecclesiae anglicanae doctores . sect. xxx . spherical trigonometry . spherical trigonometry teacheth us to measure spherical triangles , that is triangles in the surface of the sphere , made by the arches of great circles . those sides of a spherical triangle are of the same kind that both exceed , or both fall short of degrees ; but they are of a different sort , if the one exceed , and the other fall short of degrees . this science demonstrates these following propositions . . in all spherical triangles , any side whatsoever , is less than a semi-circle . . in all spherical triangles , any two sides , howsoever they be consider'd , are greater than the third . . of a spherical triangle equilateral , if each side be a quadrant , or of deg . all the angles are streight ; and if each side be less than the quadrant , all the angles are obtuse . . in all spherical triangles , when the angles are all acute , all the arches are less than the quadrant . . in all spherical triangles , the three angles are greater than two streight angles , and lesser than six . authors . kepler , afraganius , julius higinus , garcaeus , robert hues , adrianus metius . sectio trigesima . trigonometria sphaerica . trigonometria sphaerica docet nos modum dimetiendi triangula sphaerica , hoc est triangula ex tribus arcubus maximorum circulorum , in superficie sphaerae composita . latera ea trianguli sphaerici ejusdem sunt affectionis quae simul excedunt , aut deficiunt a quadrante , aut nonaginta gradibus , sed non sunt ejusdem generis si unum latus excedat , & alterum sit infra nonaginta gradus . haec scientia sequentes hasce propositiones demonstrat . . in omni triangulo sphaerico quodvis latus quomodocumque sumptum est minus semi-circulo . . in omni triangulo sphaerico duo latera reliquo sunt majora quomodocumque sumpta . . omne triangulum sphaericum aequilaterum , si singula latera sunt quadrantes , habet singulos angulos rectos , si vero quadrante minora , ob , tusos . . in omni triangulo sphaerico cujus omnes anguli sunt acuti arcus singuli quadrante minores sunt . omnis trianguli sphaerici tres anguli duobus quidem rectis sunt majores , sex vero rectis minores . authores . keplerus , afraganius , julius higinus , garcaeus , robertus hues , adrianus metius . sect. xxxi . the rectiline trigonometry . the rectiline trigonometry teacheth us how to measure triangles made of streight lines . a streight line , is the shortest way between two extremes . between two extremes , there can be but one streight line . two streight lines can not cut one another , but in one point . an angle is measured by degrees , so a streight angle is an angle of degrees , an acute angle is an angle of fewer than , as an obtuse angle contains more than degrees . a line falling even down upon another line , without inclining either to the one side , or to the other , is called a perpendicular line , and makes two streight angles . parallel lines , are those that are equidistant one from another . this science demonstrates this proposition , of great use in mathematicks , that the three angles of all rectiline triangles , are equal to two streight ones . all the angles of a triangle , may be acute , but there can be but one streight , or obtuse . if one of the three angles of a triangle be streight , the two others are equal to a streight angle . who knows the degrees of two angles , knows the degrees of the third , because all three make up degrees . all the angles of a triangle being equal , all the sides are likewise equal . authors . euclid , clavius , arnauld ; malapertius , fournier , &c. sectio trigesima prima . trigonometria rectilinea . trigonometria rectilinea docet qui triangula ex rectis lineis composita metiri oporteat . linea recta est brevissima duo inter extrema via . duo inter extrema unica tantum duci potest recta . duae rectae nequeunt se invicem nisi in puncto secare . angulum metiuntur gradus , angulus rectus est angulus graduum , acutus angulus graduum pauciorum , angulus obtusus plures nonaginta gradibus gradus continet . linea in aliam utrimque incidens ex aequo perpendicularis dicitur , duosque utrimque rectos angulos constituit . lineae parallelae , sunt lineae aequo a se invicem intervallo dissitae . haec scientia non exiguae mathematicis in disciplinis utilitatis hanc propositionem demonstrat , omnis trianguli rectilinei tres anguli duobus rectis sunt aequales . omnes anguli trianguli rectilinei possunt esse acuti , sed unus tantum rectus esse potest , aut obtusus . si unus trium angulorum trianguli sit rectus , duo reliqui recto aequales sunt . qui novit duorum angulorum gradus tertii anguli gradus novit , simul enim tres anguli conficiunt numerum . quoties omnes anguli trianguli sunt aequales , omnia latera quoque aequalia sunt . authores . euclides , cicero , clavius , arnauld , malapertius , fournierius , &c. an appendix , pointing at some of the chief authors of this , and the foregoing ages . by authors , here are meant , those that are really such , and the first inventors of any useful piece of knowledge . reader , thou mayest rest satisfied with this very short and imperfect account of some of the chief new inventions , either of this , or of the past ages , since i design , at more leisure , to write a larger treatise of this subject , as likewise to set down the particular times every thing was printed in , that so the unjust dealing both of domestick and foreign transcribers , who have so often stolen the greatest , or ( at least ) the best part of their writings from the honourable robert boyle , hook , descartes , gassendi , and others , may to their confusion , be discovered ; and to the great encouragement of all ingenious men , who shall the more willingly venture abroad their notions , and new contrivances , in what kind soever , if they ▪ are once secured from usurping authors . i shall begin with the deservedly famous robert boyle , though i may dispatch in one word , what relates to this noble author , if i say , as truly i may , that whatever he has publish'd , is in every respect new , both as to the subject it self , the arguments he proposeth , and the particular method : but because the curious reader will not be satisfied with this general account , i come to particulars , but shall speak but of a very few things , as designing , at greater conveniency , a more accurate history of this great author's new contrivances , whether notions , engines , or experiments . as likewise whatever the natives of this island have invented towards the promoting of useful learning . the famous air-pump was invented by the honourable robert boyle : he giveth a full account of it , in his discourse of physico mechanical experiments ; by the help whereof , he proves the elastick power and spring of the air , and several other wonderful phaenomena's relating to the nature , spring , expansion , pressure , weight of the air , &c. he contrived the experiment concerning the different parts and redintegration of salt-peter ; whence he concludes , that motion , figure , and disposition of parts , may suffice to produce all secondary affections of bodies , and so banisheth the substantial forms and qualities of the schools . but because i design a larger account in another treatise of this noble author's new inventions , i shall only tell you here , that his physiological and experimental essays , his sceptical chymist , his usefulness of experimental philosophy , his history of cold , his experimental history of colours , his hydrostatical paradoxes , his origine of forms and qualities , his free enquiry into the receiv'd notion of nature , his reconciliableness of specifick remedies to the new philosophy , his history of humane bloud , his discourse of final causes , not yet published ; as likewise all his other treatises contain as many new notions and exepriments almost as lines . i shall not forget in this place , what that very learned and ingenious gentleman , sir robert gordon , of gordistoun , has lately invented ; i mean , his famous water-pump , a piece of mechanism , far beyond the contrivances of all foregoing ages , in this kind , as i shall easily make out by the following account of this useful engine . this new pump draweth twice as much water as any other ; it is wrought with half the force , and costs half the price , and takes up but half the room . the experiment , performed at deptford the twenty second of march , in presence of my lord dartmouth , and the commissioners of the navy ; appointed to give account of it to the king , was as follows . in a sixth-rate frigat , this new pump did fill the gaged cistern of two tuns , in one minute and forty five seconds ; and the shippump did the same in six minutes and some more , each pump being wrought by four men . in a fourth-rate frigat , this pump being wrought by twelve men , did fill the cistern in thirty one seconds ; and the ship-pump , being wrought by six men , fill'd it in four minutes and some more . the chief authors of new discoveries in anatomy , we reckon to be these following : fabricius ab aqua pendente discover'd the valve of the veins , as the valve at the entrance of the great gut colon was found out by bauhinus ; the milky veins of the mesentery , by asellius ; the receptacle of the chyle , hy pequet ; the ductus virsungianus , by george virsung , of padua ; the lymphatick vessels , by dr. joliffe , bartholin , and olaus rudbeck ; the internal ductus salivaris in the maxillary glandule , by dr. wharton , and dr. glisson ; the glandules under the tongue , nose and palate ; the vessels in the nameless glandules of the eye ; the tear glandule , by nicolas steno ; a new artery , called arteria bronchialis , by frederick rusch ; the circulation of the bloud , by dr. harvey , though some , upon no very good grounds , ascribe it to paulus venetus , and others to prosper alpinus , and andreas caesalpinus . the act of making salt water fresh , was lately invented in england , whereof the deservedly famous r. boyle gave a very rational account , in a letter written upon this subject . arithmetick was either invented , or much promoted by pythagoras , by euclid , not the euclid that was contemporary to plato , and hearer of socrates , but the famed mathematician of that name , who was after aristotle , and at ninety years distance from the former ; by diaphantus , psellus , apuleius , cardan , gemma frisius , clavius , &c. neper invented the logarithms , by the help whereof we perform all the operations of arithmetick by addition and substraction . he invented likewise an easie , certain and compendious way of accounting by sticks , called rabdology , as also computation by neper's bones . the telescope was invented by james metius , of amsterdam , though commonly ascribed to galile , who indeed , improved it . torricellius found the barometer , whereby we weigh the air itself . printing , according to polidore vergile , was found by john cuttemberg , of ments , in germany , though others give the honour to one fust , of the same city ; and some , to lawrence , a burgher of harlem . the chineses knew this art before the europeans . flavius goia , of amalphis , in the kingdom of naples , is thought to be the inventor of the mariners-compass , three hundred years since . finis . appendix , quosdam e praecipuis hujus , superiorumque saeculorum authoribus indicans . hic nomine authorum intelliguntur ii , qui reipsa ejusmodi sunt , hoc est primi utilis cujuscumque scientiae , seu cognitionis inventores . aequi bonique consulet lector brevem hanc imperfectamque descriptionem eorum , quae sive hoc , sive praeterita saecula invenerunt ; cum enim per otium licebit , statui ampliorem hoc super argumento conscribere tractatum , ipsumque denotare tempus quo quidlibet e prelo in lucem prodiit , eo consilio ut transcriptores tum domestici , tum extranei qui toties ties illustrissimo boylio , hookio , cartesio , aliisque maximam aut praecipuam saltem lucubrationum suarum partem surripuere meritas ipso detecti furti pudore luant paenas : quo fiet ut ingeniosi quique quaecumque de novo excogitant , facilius in lucem emissuri sint si tutos se ab authoribus aliena usurpantibus noverint . initium ducam a roberto boylio jure merito jam ubique celeberrimo , quamvis quae hic nobilem hunc authorem spectant verbo absolvere queam , si dixero ut vere possum , quicquid ab ipso in lucem editum est esse omnino novum , sive argumentum ipsum spectes , sive rationes ab ipso propositas , sive denique peculiarem ipsius methodum : sed quia his in genere dictis lectoris curiositati factum satis non fuerit , propius quaedam attingam paucissima tantum commemoraturus , ut qui per otium accuratiorem scribere decreverim historiam tum eorum quae magnus hic author primus adinvenit puta notionem machinarum , experiment orum , &c. tum eorum quae indigenae hujus insulae ad utilium scientiarum propagationem excogitarunt . celeberrima antlia aeria ab illustrissimo roberto boylio excogitata fuit : plenam ejusdem descriptionem tradit ibi ubi de experimentis physico-mechanicis ; illius ope elasticam aeris virtutem , atque elaterem probat , variaque alia , quae merito miremur , phaenomena ad naturam , elaterem , expansionem , pressionem , gravitatemque aeris spectantia . primus ille author experimenti est de diversis partibus , & redintegratione salispetrae , unde concludit motu , figura , partiumque dispositione secundarias omnium corporum affectiones produci posse , proscribitque proinde substantiales scholarum formas , & qualitates . sed quia fusius alibi scribere statui de iis quae nobilis hic author primus invenit , hic tantum suggeram , physiologicis ipsius tent aminibus , atque experimentalibus , chymico sceptico , utilitate experimentalis philosophiae , historia frigoris , experimentali historia colorum , hydrostaticis paradoxis , origine formarum & qualitatum , libera in receptam naturae notionem disquisitione , concordia remediorum specificorum & novae philosophiae , historia humani sanguinis , dissertatione de causis finalibus , nondum edita ; variisque aliis ejusdem operibus , tot novas contineri notiones , experimentaque fere quot versus . non praetermittam hoc loco quod doctissimus , ingeniosissim usque rob. gordonius , a gordistoun eques , nuper● adinvenit ; notissimam scilicet jam ubique hauriendis aquis antliam , mechanismi quoddam genus , quod superiorum aetatum hoc in genere arte facta longe exsuperet , ut sequente utilis hujusce machinae descriptione facile demonstrabo . nova haec antlia duplo plus quavis alia aquarum trahit ; & dimidiis tantum viribus dimidioque solum constat pretio , & dimidium tantum modo implet locum . experimentum hoc deptfordii vigesimo secundo martii coram comite darmouthensi commissariisque classis regiae , ad rem ut reipsa erat regi referendam constitutis ita se habebat . imposita nova haec antlia navi bellicae sexti ordinis mensuratam duorum doliorum cisternam minuto uno , secundis quinque supra quadraginta implevit : notaque navis antlia idem sex minutis & aliqua parte septimi praestitit , utramque autem quatuor tantum operarii agebant . navi bellicae quarti ordinis imposita coopera●tibus interim duodecim operario cist●ruam secundis triginta , & uno implevit , navisque antlia ope sex nautarum cand●●● quatuor minutis , & aliqua parte quinti implevit . praecipuos rerum anatomicarum detectores sequentes numeramus , vid. fabricium ab aqua pendente , qui detexit valvulas venarum , ut valvula , sub introitum magni intestini quod colon dicunt inventa fuit a bauhino ; venae lacteae mesenterii ab asellio , receptaculum chyli a pequeto , ductus virsungianus a georgio virsung paduensi ; lymphatica vasa a doctore joliffeo , bartholino , & olao rudbeckio , internus ductus salivaris in glandula maxillari a doctore whartono , & doctore glissonio , glandulae sub lingua , naso , palato , vasa sub innominata glandula oculi , glandula lacrymalis a nicolao stenone ; nova arteria bronchialis dicta a frederico ruschio , circulatio sanguinis ab harvaeo ; quamvis alii quidam non sat probabiliter eam ascribant paulo veneto , ut nonnulli prospero alpino , & etiam andreae caesalpino . ars aquae salsae dulcorandae inventa nuper in anglia est , de qua celeberrimus merito boylius conformia omnino rationi in epistola quadam hoc super argumento scripsit . arithmeticam aut invenerunt , aut multum promoverunt sequentes authores , pythagoras , euclides , non is qui coaevus fuit pl●toni , auditorque socratis , sed celeberrimus mathematicus hujus nominis qui post aristotelem floruit , annis post priorem nonaginta ; diaephantus , psellius , apuleius , cardan●s , gemma frisius , clavius , &c. neperus invenit logarithmos quorum ope omnia arithmeticae praescripta exequimur sola additione , & substractione . invenit pariter facilem , certam , brevemque numerandi methodum ope baculorum , quam rabdologiam dicunt , aut computationem per ossa neperi . telescopium inventum fuit a jacobo metio , amstelodamensi licet vulgo galilaeo tribuatur , qui quidem perfectius illud multo reddidit . torricellius invenit barometrum quo instrumento aerem ipsum metimur . ars typographica teste polydoro vergilio inventa fuit a johanne cuttembergio , moguntiano , licet quidam hunc honorem tribuant cuidam fustio ex eadem civitate , & nonnulli laurentio civi harlemensi . sinenses hanc artem prius aeuropaeis noverant . flavius goia , ab amalphi , in regno neapolitano creditur jam trecentis abhinc annis pyxidem nauticam invenisse . finis . an essay concerning humane understanding microform essay concerning human understanding locke, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing l estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) an essay concerning humane understanding microform essay concerning human understanding locke, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. : port. printed by eliz. holt for thomas basset ..., london : . dedication signed: john locke. "the first issue of st ed., although widely described as the nd issue"--cf. nuc pre- . errata: p. [ ] at beginning. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion effigies iohannis locke ex archetypo , quod in musaeo alexandri geekie chirurgi adservatur evpressa . an essay concerning humane understanding . in four books . quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias , quam ista effutientem nauseare , atque ipsum sibi displicere ! cic. de natur. deor. l. . london : printed by eliz. holt , for thomas basset , at the george in fleetstreet , near st. dunstan's church . mdcxc . to the right honourable thomas earl of pembroke and montgomery . baron herbert of cardiff , &c. lord-lieutenant of the county of wilts , and one of their majesties most honourable privy council . my lord , this treatise , which is grown up under your lordship's eye , and has ventured into the world by your order , does now , by a natural kind of right , come to your lordship for that protection , which you several years since promised it . 't is not that i think any name , how great soever , set at the beginning of a book , will be able to cover the faults are to be found it . things in print must stand and fall by their own worth , or the reader 's fancy . but there being nothing more to be desired for truth , than a fair unprejudiced hearing , no body is more likely to procure me that , than your lordship , who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her , in her more retired recesses . your lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things , beyond the ordinary reach or common methods , that your allowance and approbation of the design of this treatise , will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading ; and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed , which might otherwise , perhaps , be thought to deserve no consideration , for being somewhat out of the common road . the imputation of novelty , is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads , as they do of their perukes , by the fashion ; and can allow none to be right , but the received doctrines . truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote any where , at its first appearance : new opinions are always suspected , and usually opposed , without any other reason , but because they are not already common . but truth , like gold , is not the less so , for being newly brought out of the mine . 't is trial and examination must give it price , and not any antick fashion : and though it be not yet current by the publick stamp ; yet it may , for all that , be as old as nature , and is certainly not the less genuine . your lordship can give great and convincing instances of this , whenever you please to oblige the publick with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries , you have made , of truths hitherto unknown , unless to some few , to whom your lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them . this alone were a sufficient reason , were there no other , why i should dedicate this piece to your lordship ; and its having some little correspondence with soms parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences , your lordship has made so new , exact , and instructive a draught of , i think it glory enough , if your lordship permit me to boast , that here and there i have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from yours . if your lordship think fit , that by your encouragement this should appear in the world , i hope it may be a reason , some time or other , to lead your lordship farther ; and you will allow me to say , that you here give the world an earnest of something , that , if they can bear with this , will be truly worth their expectation . this , my lord , shews what a present i here make to your lordship ; just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour , by whom the basket of flowers , or fruit , is not ill taken , though he has more plenty of his own growth , and in much greater perfection . worthless things receive a value , when they are made the offerings of respect , esteem , and gratitude : these you have given me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have in the highest degree for your lordship , that if they can add a price to what they go along with , proportionable to their own greatness , i can with confidence brag , i here make your lordship the richest present you ever received . this i am sure , i am under the greatest obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours i have received from your lordship ; favours , though great and important in themselves , yet made much more so by the forwardness , concern , and kindness , and other obliging circumstances , that never failed to accompany them . to all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest : you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem , and allow me a place in your good thoughts , i had almost said friendship . this , my lord , your words and actions so constantly shew on all occasions , even to others when i am absent , that it is not vanity in me to mention , what every body knows : but it would be want of manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of , and every day tell me , i am indebted to your lordship for . i wish they could as easily assist my gratitude , as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship . this i am sure , i should write of the vnderstanding without having any , if i were not 〈◊〉 sensible of them , and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testifie to the world , how much i am obliged to be , and how much i am , my lord , your lordships most humble , and most obedient servant , john locke . the epistle to the reader . reader , i here put into thy hands , what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours : if it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine , and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading , as i had in writing it , thou wilt as little think thy money , as i do my pains ill bestowed . mistake not this , ●or a commendation of my work ; nor conclude , because i was pleased with the doing of it , that therefore i am fondly taken with it now it is done . he that hawks at larks and sparrows , has no less sport , though a much less considerable quarry , than he that flies at nobler game : and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise , the understanding , who does not know , that as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul , so it is employed with a greater , and more constant delight than any of the other . its searches after truth , are a sort of hawking and hunting , wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure . every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge , makes discovery , which is not only new , but the best too , for the time at least . for the understanding , like the eye , judging of objects , only by its own sight , cannot but be pleased with what it discovers , having less regret for what has scaped it , because it is unknown . thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket , and not content to live lazily on scraps of begg'd opinions , sets his own thoughts on work , to find and follow truth , will ( whatever he lights on ) not miss the hunter's satisfaction ; every moment of his pursuit , will reward his pains with some delight ; and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent , even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition . this , reader , is the entertainment of those , who let loose their own thoughts , and follow them in writing ; which thou oughtest not to envy them , since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion , if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading . 't is to them , if they are thy own , that i refer my self : but if they are taken upon trust from others , 't is no great matter what they are , they not following truth , but some meaner consideration : and 't is not worth while to be concerned , what he says or thinks , who says or thinks only as he is directed by another . if thou judgest for thy self , i know thou wilt judge candidly ; and then i shall not be harmed or offended , whatever be thy censure . for though it be certain , that there is nothing in this treatise of whose truth i am not persuaded ; yet i consider my self as liable to mistakes , as i can think thee ; and know that this book must stand or fall with thee , not by any opinion i have of it , but thy own . if thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee , thou art not to blame me for it . it was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject , and made a through acquaintance with their own understandings ; but for my own information , and the satisfaction of a few friends , who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it . were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this essay , i should tell thee that five or six friends meeting at my chamber , and discoursing on a subject very remote from this , found themselves quickly at a stand , by the difficulties that rose on every side . after we had a while puzzled our selves , without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us , it came into my thoughts , that we took a wrong course ; and that before we set our selves upon enquiries of that nature , it was necessary to examine our own abilities , and see what objects our understandings were , or were not fitted to deal with . this i proposed to the company , who all readily assented ; and thereupon it was agreed , that this should be our first enquiry , some hasty and undigested thoughts , on a subject i had never before considered , which i set down against our next meeting , gave the first entrance into this discourse , which having been thus begun by chance , was continued by intreaty ; written by incoherent parcels ; and , after long intervals of neglect , resum'd again , as my humour or occasions permitted ; and at last , in a retirement , where an attendence on my health gave me leisure , it was brought into that order thou now seest it . this discontinued way of writing may have occasioned , besides others , two contrary faults , viz. that too little , and too much may be said in it . if thou findest any thing wanting , i shall be glad , that what i have writ , gives thee any desire that i should have gone farther : if it seems too much to thee , thou must blame the subject ; for when i first put pen to paper , i thought all i should have to say on this matter , would have been contained in one sheet of paper ; but the farther i went , the larger prospect i had : new discoveries led me still on , and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in . i will not deny , but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is ; and that some parts of it might be contracted : the way it has been writ in , by catches , and many long intervals of interruption , being apt to cause some repetitions . but to confess the truth , i am now too lazie , or too busie to make it shorter . i am not ignorant how little i herein consult my own reputation , when i knowingly let it go with a fault , so apt to disgust the most judicious , who are always the nicest readers . but they who know sloth is apt to content it self with any excuse , will pardon me , if mine has prevailed on me , where , i think , i have a very good one . i will not therefore alledge in my defence , that the same notion , having different respects , may be convenient or necessary , to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse ; and that so it has happened in many parts of this : but waving that , i shall frankly avow , that i have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument , and expressed it different ways , with a quite different design . i pretend not to publish this essay for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions ; to such masters of knowledge i profess my self a scholar , and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here , but what being spun out of my own course thoughts , is fitted to men of my own size , to whom , perhaps , it will not be unacceptable , that i have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths , which established prejudice , or the abstractness of the ideas themselves , might render difficult . some objects had need be turned on every side ; and when the notion is new , as i confess some of these are to me ; or out of the ordinary road , as i suspect they will appear to others , 't is not one simple view of it , that will gain it admittance into every understanding , or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression . there are few , i believe , who have not observed in themselves or others , that what in one way of proposing was very obscure , another way of expressing it , has made very clear and intelligible : though afterward the mind found little difference in the phrases , and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other . but every thing does not hit alike upon every man's imagination . we have our understandings no less different than our palats ; and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress , may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery : the meat may be the same , and the nourishment good , yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning ; and it must be dressed another way , if you will have it go down with some , even of strong constitutions . the truth is , those who advised me to publish it , advised me , for this reason , to publish it as it is : and since i have been brought to let it go abroad , i desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it . i have so little affectation to be in print , that if i were not flattered , this essay might be of some use to others , as i think , it has been to me , i should have confined it to the view of some friends , who gave the first occasion to it . my appearing therefore in print , being on purpose to be as useful as i may , i think it necessary to make what i have to say as easie and intelligible to all sorts of readers as i can . and i had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious , than that any one , not accustomed to abstract speculations , or prepossessed with different notions , should mistake , or not comprehend my meaning . it will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity , or insolence in me , to pretend to instruct this our knowing age , it amounting to little less , when i own that i publish it with hopes it may be useful to others . but if it may be permitted to speak freely of those , who with a seigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write , methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence , to publish a book for any other end ; and he fails very much of that respect he owes the publick , who prints , and consequently expects men should read that , wherein he intends not they should mee● with any thing of use to themselves or others : and should nothing else be found allowable in this treatise , yet my design will not cease to be so ; and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present . 't is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure , which i expect not to escape more than better writers . men's principles , notions , and relishes are so different , that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. i acknowledge the age we live in , is not the least knowing , and therefore not the most easie to be satisfied ; which if i have not the good luck to doe , no body yet ought to be offended with me . i plainly tell all my readers , except half a dozen , this treatise was not at first intended for them ; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number . but yet if any one thinks fit to be angry , and rail at it , he may do it securely : for i shall find some better way of spending my time , than in such kind of conversation . i shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness , though in one of the meanest ways . the commonwealth of learning , is not at this time without master-builders , whose mighty designs in advancing the sciences , will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity ; but every one must not hope to be a boyle , or a sydenham ; and in an age that produces such masters , as the great — huygenius , and the incomparable mr. newton , with some other of that strain ; 't is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little , and removing some of the rubbish , that lies in the way to knowledge ; which certainly had ●een very much more advanced in the world , if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbred with the learned but frivolus use of uncouth , affected , or unintelligible terms , introduced into the sciences , and there made an art of to that degree , that philosophy , which is nothing but the true knowledge of things , was thought unfit or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company , and polite conversation . vague and insignificant forms of speech , and abuse of language , have so long passed for mysteries of science : and hard or misapply'd words , with little or no meaning , have , by prescription , such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and heighth of speculation , that it will not be easie to persuade either those who speak , or those who hear them , that they are but the covers of ignorance , and hindrance of true knowledge . to break in upon this sanctuary of vanity and ignorance , will be , i suppose , some service to humane understanding : though so few are apt to think , they deceive , or are deceived in the use of words ; or that the language of the sect they are of , has any faults in it , which ought to be examined or corrected , that i hope i shall be pardon'd , if i have in the third book dwelt long on this subject ; and endeavoured to make it so plain , that neither the inverateness of the mischief , nor the prevalency of the fashion , shall be any excuse for those , who will not take care about the meaning of their own words , and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be enquired into . i have been told that a short epitome of this treatise , which was printed about two years since , was by some condemned without reading , because innate ideas were denied in it ; they too hastily concluding , that if innate ideas were not supposed , there would be little left , either of the notion or proof of spirits . if any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatise , i shall desire him to read it through : and then i hope he will be convinced , that the taking away false foundations is not to the prejudice , but advantage of truth ; which is never injur'd or endanger'd so much , as when mixed with , or built on falshood . one thing more i must advertise my reader of , and that is , that the summary of each section is printed in italick characters , whereby the reader may find the contents almost as well as if it had been printed in the margin by the side , if a little allowance be made for the grammatical construction , which in the text it self could not always be so ordered , as to make perfect propositions , which yet by the words printed in italick , may be easily guessed at . errata . in the dedication , pag. . l. . read found in it . pag. line . read. to what things and mens words whatsoever is , is ; springs sins were excluded ult were characters distinguished from them — notions . external less nor is concerned as any of those extension alone more impossible understanding , which — and vanish tune plaid seem — sight for those discernable chess man sense body understand it — abstruse — with the idea apply it in ; and — infinitum , and abstruse confusion the second six figures them discourse enlarging , it can — extension are apt clear an idea instances enough of all our simple accompanies motion belong not power to occasion , to idea , experience it , in — willing ; in that it is avoid , at perception thinking — evidence — equally power of action idea — thing : in both cases my beings at least are ult rightly particular species ideas so , which qualities in not , their use , stand names — names conceptions them , did other murther burg , from — no more — the name ings selves , to them in — which we — ult no distinct numbers others to their received them : but men idea to be — of mistaken pretenders communication , it is them . what of those observe several properties in this way of the world subtlety subtlety use them in diversity , in this way of — not ? — — know , what other qualities — so few cation always , and in thinking often , does not steadily or confines minds ? — triangle : and — more , did — wheels . the ideas we by reflexion — smell which we spirit , upon which is , in truth — which i think more to these and fully convinced signification ? — one , more , or waking man should answer him for man and proved in adapted at that end three , four , and place us in — were revelation silent else ; and that obscurity no room makes of humane understanding . book i. chap. i. introduction . § . . since it is the vnderstanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings , and gives him all the advantage and dominion , which he has over them ; it is certainly a subject , even for its nobleness , worth our labour to enquire into . the understanding , like the eye , whilst it makes us see , and perceive all other things , takes no notice of it self : and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance , and make it its own object : but whatever be the difficulties , that lie in the way of this enquiry ; whatever it be , that keeps us so much in the dark to our selves ; sure i am , that all the light we can let in upon our own minds ; all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings , will not only be very pleasant ; but bring us great advantage , in directing our thoughts in the search of other things . § . . this , therefore , being my purpose to enquire into the original , certainty , and extent of humane knowledge ; together , with the grounds and degrees of belief , opinion , and assent ; i shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind ; or trouble my self to examine , wherein its essence consists , or by what motions of our spirits , or alterations of our bodies , we come to have any sensation by our organs , or any idea's in our understandings ; and whether those idea's do in their formation , any , or all of them , depend on matter , or no. these are speculations , which , however curious and entertaining , i shall decline , as lying out of my way , in the design i am now upon . it shall suffice to my present purpose , to consider the discerning faculties of a man , as they are employ'd about the objects , which they have to do with : and i shall imagine i have not wholly misimploy'd my self in the thoughts i shall have on this occasion , if , in this historical plain method , i can give any account of the ways , whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have , and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge , or the grounds of those perswasions , which are to be found amongst men , so various , different , and wholly contradictory ; and yet asserted some where or other with such assurance , and confidence , that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind , observe their opposition , and at the same time , consider the fondness , and devotion wherewith they are embrac'd ; the resolution , and eagerness , wherewith they are maintain'd , may perhaps have reason to suspect , that either there is no such thing as truth at all ; or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it . § . . it is therefore worth while , to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge ; and examine by what measures , in things whereof we have no certain knowledge , we ought to regulate our assent , and moderate our perswasions . in order whereunto , i shall pursue this following method . first , i shall enquire into the original of those idea's , notions , or whatever else you please to call them , which a man observes , and is conscious to himself he has in his mind ; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them . secondly , i shall endeavour to shew , what knowledge the understanding hath by those idea's ; and the certainty , evidence , and extent of it . thirdly , i shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith , or opinion : whereby i mean that assent , which we give to any proposition as true , of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge : and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent . § . . if by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding , i can discover the powers thereof ; at how far they reach ; to which things they are in any degree proportionate ; and where they fail us , i suppose it may be of use , to prevail with the busie mind of man , to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension ; to stop , when it is at the utmost extent of its tether ; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things , which , upon examination , are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities . we should not then perhaps be so forward , out of an affectation of an universal knowledge , to raise questions , and perplex our selves and others with disputes about things , to which our understandings are not suited ; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions , or whereof ( as it has perhaps too often happen'd ) we have not any notions at all . if we can find out , how far the understanding can extend its view ; how far it has faculties to attain certainty ; and in what cases it can only judge and guess , we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this state. § . . for though the comprehension of our understandings , comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things ; yet , we shall have cause enough to magnifie the bountiful author of our being , for that portion , and degree of knowledge , he has bestowed on us , so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion . men have reason to be well satisfied with what god hath thought fit for them , since he has given them ( as st. peter says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life , and information of vertue ; and has put within the reach of their discovery the provisions , that may support , or sweeten this life , and the way that leads to a better . how short soever their knowledge may come of an universal , or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is , it yet secures their great concernments , that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker , and the discovery of their own duties . men may find matter sufficient to busie their heads , and employ their hands with variety , delight , and satisfaction ; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution , and throw away the blessings their hands are fill'd with , because they are not big enough to grasp every thing . we shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds , if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us ; for of that they are very capable : and it will be an unpardonable , as well as childish peevishness , if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge , and neglect to improve it to the ends for which is was given us , because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it . it will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant , who would not attend his business by candle-light , to plead that he had not broad sun-shine . the candle , that is set up in us , shines bright enough for all our purposes . the discoveries we can make with this , ought to satisfie us : and we shall then use our understandings right , when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion , that they are suited to our faculties ; and upon those grounds , they are capable of being propos'd to us ; and not peremptorily , or intemperately require demonstration , and demand certainty , where probability only is to be had , and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments . if we will disbelieve every thing , because we cannot certainly know all things ; we shall do much-what as wisely as he , who would not use his legs , but sit still and perish , because he had no wings to fly . § . . when we know our own strength , we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success : and when we have well survey'd the powers of our own minds , and made some estimate what we may expect from them , we shall not be inclined either to sit still , and not set our thoughts on work at all in despair of knowing any thing ; nor on the other side question every thing , and disclaim all knowledge , because some things are not to be understood . 't is of great use to the sallor to know the length of his line , though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean . 't is well he knows , that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places , as are necessary to direct his voyage , and caution him against running upon shoals , that may ruine him . our business here is not to know all things , but those which concern our conduct . if we can find out those measures , whereby a rational creature put in that state , which man is in , in this world , may , and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon , we need not be troubled , that some other things scape our knowledge . § . . this was that which gave the first rise to this essay concerning the understanding . for i thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries , the mind of man was very apt to run into , was , to take a survey of our own understandings , examine our own powers , and see to what things they were adapted . till that was done , i suspected we began at the wrong end , and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths , that most concern'd us , whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being , as if all that boundless extent , were the natural , and undoubted possession of our understandings , wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions , or that escaped its comprehension . thus men , extending their enquiries beyond their capacities , and letting their thoughts wander into those depths , where they can find no sure footing ; 't is no wonder , that they raise questions , and multiply disputes , which never coming to any clear resolution , are proper only to continue and increase their doubts , and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism . whereas were the capacities of our understandings well considered , the extent of our knowledge once discovered , and the horizon found , which sets the bounds between the enlightned and dark parts of things ; between what is , and what is not comprehensible by us , men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd ignorance of the one , and imploy their thoughts and discourse , with more advantage and satisfaction in the other . § . . thus much i thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this enquiry into humane understanding . but , before i proceed on to what i have thought on this subject , i must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader , for the frequent use of the word idea , which he will find in the following treatise . it being that term , which , i think , serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks , i have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm , notion , species , or whatever it is , which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking ; and i could not avoid frequently using it . i presume it will be easily granted me , that there are such idea's in men's minds ; every one is conscious of them in himself , and a man's words and actions will satisfie him , that they are in others . our first enquiry then shall be how they come into the mind . chap. ii. no innate principles in the mind . § . . it is an established opinion amongst some men , that there are in the understanding certain innate principles ; some primary notions , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , characters , as it were stamped upon the mind of man , which the soul receives in its very first being ; and brings into the world with it . it would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition , if i should only shew ( as i hope i shall in the following parts of this discourse ) how men , barely by the use of their natural faculties , may attain to all the knowledge they have , without the help of any innate impressions ; and may arrive at certainty , without any such original notions or principles . for i imagine any one will easily grant , that it would be impertinent to suppose the idea's of colours innate in a creature , to whom god hath given sight , and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects : and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters , when we may observe in our selves faculties , fit to attain as easie and certain knowledge of them , as if they were originally imprinted on the mind . but because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth , when they lead him ever so little out of the common road : i shall set down the reasons , that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion , as an excuse for my mistake , if i be in one , which i leave to be consider'd by those , who with me dispose themselves to embrace truth , where-ever they find it . § . . there is nothing more commonly taken for granted , than that there are certain principles both speculative and practical ( for they speak of both ) universally agreed upon by all mankind : which therefore they argue , must needs be the constant impressions , which the souls of men receive in their first beings , and which they bring into the world with them , as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties . § . . this argument , drawn from vniversal consent , has this misfortune in it , that if it were true in matter of fact , that there were certain truths , wherein all mankind agreed , it would not prove them innate , if there can be any other way shewn how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in ; which i presume may be done . § . . but , which is worse , this argument of universal consent , which is made use of to prove innate principles , seems to me a demonstration that there are none such : because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent . i shall begin with the speculative , and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration whatsoever it is ; and 't is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , which of all others i think have the most allow'd title to innate . these have so setled a reputation of maxims universally received , that 't will , no doubt , be thought strange if any one should seem to question it . but yet i take liberty to say , that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent , that there are a great part of mankind , to whom they are not so much as known . § . . for , first 't is evident that all children and ideots have not the least apprehension or thought of them : and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent , which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths : it seeming to me near a contradiction , to say , that there are truths imprinted on the soul , which it perceives or understands not ; imprinting , if it signifie any thing , being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived . for to imprint any thing on the mind without the mind 's perceiving it , seems to me hardly intelligible . if therefore children and ideots have souls , have minds , with those impressions upon them , they must unavoidably perceive them , and necessarily know and assent to these truths : which since they do not , it is evident that there are no such impressions . for if they are not notions naturally imprinted , how can they be innate ? and if they are notions imprinted , how can they be unknown ? to say a notion is imprinted on the mind , and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it , and never yet took notice of it , is to make this impression nothing . no proposition can be said to be in the mind , which it never yet knew , which it was never yet conscious of . for if any one may ; then , by the same reason , all propositions that are true , and the mind is capable ever of assenting to , may be said to be in the mind , and to be imprinted : since if any one can be said to be in the mind , which it never yet knew , it must be only because it is capable of knowing it ; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know . nay , thus truths may be imprinted on the mind , which it never did , nor ever shall know : for a man may live long , and die at last in ignorance of many truths , which his mind was capable of knowing , and that with certainty . so that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for , all the truths a man ever comes to know , will , by this account , be , every one of them , innate ; and this great point will amount to no more , but only to a very improper way of speaking ; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary , says nothing different from those , who deny innate principles . for no body , i think , ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths . the capacity , they say , is innate , the knowledge acquired . but then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims ? if truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived , i can see no difference there can be , between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original : they must all be innate , or all adventitious : in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them . he therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding , cannot ( if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths ) mean such truths to be in the understanding , as it never perceived , and is yet fully ignorant of . for if these words ( to be in the vnderstanding ) have any propriety , they signifie to be understood . so that , to be in the understanding , and , not to be understood ; to be in the mind , and , never to be perceived , is all one as to say , any thing is , and is not , in the mind or understanding . if therefore these two propositions , whatsoever is , is , and , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , are by nature imprinted , children cannot be ignorant of them : infants , and all that have souls must necessarily have them in their understandings , know the truth of them , and assent to it . § . . to avoid this , 't is usually answer'd , that all men know and assent to them , when they come to the use of reason , and this is enough to prove them innate . i answer , § . . doubtful expressions , that have scarce any signification , go for clear reasons to those , who being prepossessed , take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say . for to apply this answer with any tolerable sence to our present purpose , it must signifie one of these two things ; either , that as soon as men come to the use of reason , these supposed native inscriptions come to be known , and observed by them : or else , that the use and exercise of men's reasons assist them in the discovery of these principles , and certainly make them known to them . § . . if they mean that by the vse of reason men may discover these principles , and that this is sufficient to prove them innate ; their way of arguing will stand thus , ( viz. ) that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us , and make us firmly assent to , those are all naturally imprinted on the mind ; since that universal assent , which is made the mark of them , amounts to no more but this ; that by the use of reason , we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of , and assent to them ; and by this means there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians , and theorems they deduce from them : all must be equally allow'd innate , they being all discoveries made by the use of reason , and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know , if he apply his thoughts rightly that way . § . . but how can those men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate , when reason ( if we may believe them ) is nothing else , but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions , that are already known ? that certainly can never be thought innate , which we have need of reason to discover , unless as i have said , we will have all the certain truths , that reason ever teaches us , to be innate . we may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible-objects , as that there should be need of reason , or the exercise thereof to make the understanding see what is originally engraven in it , and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it . so that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted , is to say , that the use of reason discovers to a man , what he knew before ; and if men have these innate , impressed truths originally , and before the use of reason , and yet are always ignorant of them , till they come to the use of reason , 't is in effect to say , that men know , and know them not at the same time . § . . 't will here perhaps be said , that mathematical demonstrations , and other truths , that are not innate , are not assented to as soon as propos'd , wherein they are distinguish'd from these maxims , and other innate truths . i shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing , more particularly by and by : i shall here only , and that very readily , allow , that these maxims , and mathematical demonstrations are in this different ; that the one has need of reason , using of proofs , to make them out , and to gain our assent : but the other , as soon as understood , are , without any the least reasoning , embraced and assented to . but i withal beg leave to observe , that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge , which requires the vse of reason for the discovery of these general truths : since it must be confessed , that in their discovery , there is no use made of reasoning at all . and i think those who give this answer , will not be forward to affirm , that the knowledge of this maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , is a deduction of our reason . for this would be to destroy that bounty of nature , they seem so fond of , whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts . for all reasoning is search , and casting about , and requires pains and application . and how can it with any tolerable sence be suppos'd , that what was imprinted by nature , as the foundation and guide of our reason , should need the use of reason to discover it ? § . . those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding , will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths , depends not either on native inscription , nor the vse of reason ; but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them , as we shall see hereafter . reason therefore , having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims , if by saying , that men know and assent to them , when they come to the vse of reason , be meant , that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims , it is utterly false ; and were it true , would prove them not to be innate . § . . if by knowing and assenting to them , when we come to the use of reason be meant , that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind ; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason , they come also to know and assent to these maxims ; this also is false , and frivolous . first , it is false : because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason ; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsly assigned , as the time of their discovery . how many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ? and a great part of illiterate people , and savages , pass many years , even of their rational ages , without ever thinking on this , and the like general propositions . i grant men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths , which are thought innate till they come to the use of reason ; and i add , nor then neither . which is so , because till after they come to the use of reason , those general abstract idea's are not framed in the mind , about which those general maxims are , which are mistaken for innate principles , but are indeed discoveries made , and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way , and discovered by the same steps , as several other propositions , which no body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate . this i hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse . i allow therefore a necessity , that men should come to the use of reason , before they get the knowledge of those general truths : but deny , that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery . § . . in the mean time , it is observable , that this saying that men know , and assent to these maxims , when they come to the use of reason , amounts in reality of fact to no more but this , that they are never known , nor taken notice of before the use of reason , but may possibly be assented to sometime after during a man's life ; but when , is uncertain : and so may all other knowable truths as well as these , which therefore have no advantage , nor distinction from others by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason ; nor are thereby proved to be innate , but quite the contrary . § . . but secondly , were it true , that the precise time of their being known , and assented to , were , when men come to the vse of reason ; neither would that prove them innate . this way of arguing is as frivolous , as the supposition of it self is false . for by what kind of logick will it appear , that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution , because it comes first to be observed , and assented to , when a faculty of the mind , which has quite a distinct province , begins to exert it self ? and therefore , the coming to the use of speech , if it were supposed the time , that these maxims are first assented to ( which it may be with as much truth , as the time when men come to the use of reason ) would be as good a proof that they were innate , as to say they are innate because men assent to them , when they come to the use of reason . i agree then with these men of innate principles , that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind , till it comes to the exercise of reason : but i deny that the coming to the use of reason , is the precise time when they are first taken notice of ; and that if it were , that it would prove them innate . all that can with any truth be meant by this proposition , that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason , is no more but this , that the making of general abstract idea's , and the understanding of general names , being a concomitant of the rational faculty , and growing up with it , children commonly get not those general idea's , nor learn the names that stand for them , till having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular idea's , they are by their ordinary discourse and actions with others , acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation . if assenting to these maxims , when men come to the use of reason , can be true in any other sence , i desire it may be shewn ; or at least , how in this , or any other sence it proves them innate . § . . the senses at first let in particular idea's , and furnish the yet empty cabinet : and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them , they are lodged in the memory , and names got to them . afterwards the mind proceeding farther , abstracts them , and by degrees learns the use of general names . by this manner the mind comes to be furnish'd with idea's and language , the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty : and the use of reason becomes daily more visible , as these materials , that give it employment , increase . but though the having of general idea's , and the use of general words and reason usually grow together ; yet , i see not , how this any way proves them innate . the knowledge of some truths , i confess , is very early in the mind ; but in a way that shews them not to be innate . for , if we will observe , we shall find it still to be about idea's , not innate , but acquired : it being about those first , which are imprinted by external things , with which infants have earliest to do , and which make the most frequent impressions on their senses . in idea's , thus got , the mind discovers , that some agree , and others differ , probably as soon as it has any use of memory ; as soon as it is able , to retain and receive distinct idea's : but whether it be then , or no , this is certain , it does so , long before it has the use of words ; or comes to that , which we commonly call the use of reason . for a child knows as certainly , before it can speak , the difference between the idea's of sweet and bitter ( i. e. that sweet is not bitter ) as it knows afterwards ( when it comes to speak ) that worm-wood and sugar-plumbs , are not the same thing . § . . a child knows not that three and four are equal to seven , till he comes to be able to count to seven , and has got the name and idea of equality and then upon the explaining those words , he presently assents to , or rather perceives the truth of that proposition . but neither does he then readily assent , because it is an innate truth , nor was his assent wanting , till then , because he wanted the vse of reason ; but the truth of it appears to him , as soon as he has setled in his mind the clear and distinct idea's , that these names stand for : and then , he knows the truth of that proposition , upon the same grounds , and by the same means that he knew before , that a rod and cherry are not the same thing ; and upon the same grounds also , that he may come to know afterwards , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , as we shall more fully shew hereafter . so that the later it is before any one comes to have those general idea's , about which those maxims are ; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them ; or to put together in his mind , the idea's they stand for ; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims , whose terms , with the idea's they stand for , being no more innate than those of a cat or a weesel , he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them ; and then he will be in a capacity , to know the truth of these maxims , upon the first occasion , that shall make him put together those idea's in his mind , and observe whether they agree or disagree , according as is expressed in those propositions . and therefore it is , that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen , are equal to thirty seven by the same self-evidence , that he knows one and two to be equal to three : yet , a child knows that , not so soon as the other ; not for want of the use of reason ; but because the idea's the words eighteen , nineteen● and thirty seven stand for , are not so soon got , as those , which are signify'd by one , two , and three . § . . this evasion therefore of general assent , when men come to the use of reason , failing as it does , and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate , and other truths , that are afterwards acquired and learnt , men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims , by saying , they are generally assented to , as soon as proposed , and the terms they are propos'd in , understood : seeing all men , even children , as soon as they hear and understand the terms , assent to these propositions , they think it is sufficient to prove them innate . for since men never fail , after they have once understood the words , to acknowledge them for undoubted truths , they would inferr , that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding , which , without any teaching , the mind , at very first proposal , immediately closes with , and assents to , and after that never doubts again . § . . in answer to this , i demand whether ready assent , given to a proposition upon first hearing , and understanding the terms , be a certain mark of an innate principle ? if it be not , such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them : if it be said , that it is a mark of innate , they must then allow all such propositions to be innate , which are generally assented to as soon as heard , whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles . for upon the same ground ( viz. ) of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms , that men would have those maxims pass for innate , they must also admit several propositions about numbers , to be innate , that one and two are equal to three , that two and two are equal to four , and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers , that every body assents to , at first hearing , and understanding the terms must have a place amongst these innate axioms . nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone , and propositions made about several of them : but even natural philosophy , and all the other sciences afford propositions , which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood . that two bodies cannot be in the same place , is a truth that no body any more sticks at , than at that maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ; that white is not black , that a square is not a circle , that yellowness is not sweetness : these , and a million of other such propositions , as many at least , as we have distinct idea's , every man in his wits , at first hearing , and knowing what the names stand for , must necessarily assent to . if then these men will be true to their own rule , and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms , to be a mark of innate , they must allow , not only as many innate propositions , as men have distinct idea's ; but as many as men can make propositions , wherein different idea's are denied one of another . since every proposition , wherein one different idea is denied of another , will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms , as this general one , it is impossible for the same to be , and not to be ; or that which is the foundation of it , and is the easier understood of the two , the same is not different : by which account , they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort , without mentioning any other . but since no proposition can be innate , unless the idea's about which it is , be innate , this will be , to suppose all our idea's of colours , sounds , tastes , figures , &c. innate ; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to reason and experience . universal and ready assent , upon hearing and understanding the terms , is ( i grant ) a mark of self-evidence : but self-evidence , depending not on innate impressions , but on something else ( as we shall shew hereafter ) belongs to several propositions , which no body was yet so extravagant , as to pretend to be innate . § . . nor let it be said , that those more particular self-evident propositions , which are assented to at first hearing , as , that one and two are equal to three ; that green is not red , &c. are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions , which are look'd on as innate principles : since any one , who will but take the pains to observe , what passes in the understanding , will certainly find , that these , and the like less general propositions , are certainly known and firmly assented to , by those , who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims ; and so , being earlier in the mind than those ( as they are called ) first principles , cannot owe to them the assent , wherewith they are received at first hearing . § . . if it be said , that these propositions , viz. two and two are equal to four ; red is not blue , &c. are not general maxims , nor of any great use . i answer , that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent , upon hearing and understanding . for if that be the certain mark of innate , whatever proposition can be found , that receives general assent , as soon as heard and understood , that must be admitted for an innate proposition , as well as this maxim , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , they being upon this ground equal . and as to the difference of being more general , that makes this maxim more remote from being innate ; those general and abstract idea's , being more strangers to our first apprehensions , than those of more particular self-evident propositions ; and therefore , 't is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding . and as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims , that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived , when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered . § . . but we have not yet done with assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms ; 't is fit we first take notice , that this , instead of being a mark that they are innate , is a proof of the contrary : since it supposes , that several , who understand and know other things , are ignorant of these principles , till they are propos'd to them ; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths , till he hears them from others . for if they were innate , what need they be propos'd , in order to gaining assent ; when , by being in the understanding , by a natural and original impression ( if there were any such ) they could not but be known before ? or , doth the proposing them , print them clearer in the mind than nature did ? if so , then the consequence will be , that a man knows them better , after he has been thus taught them , than he did before . whence it will follow , that these principles may be made more evident to us by other's teaching , than nature has made them by impression : which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles , and give but little authority to them ; but on the contrary , makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge , as they are pretended to be . this cannot be deny'd , that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths , upon their being proposed : but it is clear , that whosoever does so , finds in himself , that he then begins to know a proposition , which he knew not before ; and which from thenceforth he never questions : not because it was innate ; but , because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words , would not suffer him to think otherwise , how , or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them . § . . if it be said , the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles , but not an explicit , before this first hearing , ( as they must , who will say , that they are in the understanding before they are known ) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly ; unless it be this , that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions . and thus all mathematical demonstrations , as well as first principles , must be received as native impressions on the mind : which , i fear they will scarce allow them to be , who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition , than assent to it , when demonstrated : and few mathematicians will be forward to believe , that all the diagrams they have drawn , were but copies of those innate characters , which nature had ingraven upon their minds . § . . there is i fear this farther weakness in the foregoing argument , which would perswade us , that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate , which men admit at first hearing , because they assent to propositions , which they are not taught , nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration , but a bare explication or understanding of the terms . under which , there seems to me to lie this fallacy ; that men and supposed not to be taught , nor to learn any thing de novo ; when in truth , they are taught and do learn something they were ignorant of before . for first it is evident , they have learned the terms and their signification : neither of which was born with them . but this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case : the idea's themselves , about which the proposition is , are not born with them , no more than their names , but got afterwards . so , that in all propositions that are assented to , at first hearing the terms of the proposition , their standing for such idea's , and the idea's themselves that they stand for , being neither of them innate , i would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate . for i would gladly have any one name that proposition , whose terms or idea's were either of them innate . we by degrees get idea's and names , and learn their appropriated connection one with another ; and then to propositions , made in such terms , whose signification we have learnt , and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our idea's , when put together , is expressed , we at first hearing assent ; though to other propositions , in themselves as certain and evident , but which are concerning idea's , not so soon nor easily got , we are at the same time no way capable of assenting . for though a child quickly assent to this proposition , that an apple is not fire ; when , by familiar acquaintance , he has got the idea's of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind , and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them : yet , it will be some years after , perhaps , before the same child will assent to this proposition , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . because , that though , perhaps , the words are as easie to be learnt : yet , the signification of them , being more large , comprehensive , and abstract , than of the names annexed to those sensible things , the child hath to do with , it is longer before he learns their precise meaning , and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general idea's , they stand for . till that be done , you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition , made up of such general terms : but as soon as ever he has got those idea's , and learn'd their names , he forwardly closes with the one , as well as the other of the forementioned propositions ; and with both for the same reason ; ( viz. ) because he finds the idea's he has in his mind , to agree or disagree , according as the words standing for them , are affirmed , or denied one of another in the proposition . but if propositions be brought to him in words , which stand for idea's he has not yet in his mind : to such propositions , however evidently true or false in themselves , he affords neither assent nor dissent , but is ignorant . for words , being but empty sounds , any farther than they are signs of our idea's , we cannot but assent to them , as they correspond to those idea's we have , but no farther than that . but the shewing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds , and the grounds of several degrees of assent , being the business of the following discourse , it may suffice to have only touched on it here , as one reason , that made me doubt of those innate principles . § . . to conclude this argument of universal consent , i agree with these defenders of innate principles ; that if they are innate , they must needs have universal assent . for that a truth should be innate , and yet not assented to , is to me as unintelligible , as for a man to know a truth , and be ignorant of it at the same time . but then , by these men's own confession , they cannot be innate ; since they are not assented to , by those who understand not the terms , nor by a great part of those who do understand them , but have yet never heard , nor thought of those propositions ; which i think , is at least one half of mankind . but were the number far less , it would be enough to destroy universal assent , and thereby shew these propositions not to be innate , if children alone were ignorant of them . § . . but that i may not be accused , to argue from the thoughts of infants , which are unknown to us , and to conclude , from what passes in their understandings , before they express it ; i say next , that these two general propositions are not the truths , that first possess the minds of children ; nor are antecedent to all acquired , and adventitious notions : which if they were innate , they must needs be . whether we can determine it or no , it matters not , there is certainly a time , when children begin to think , and their words and actions do assure us , that they do so . when therefore they are capable of thought , of knowledge , of assent , can it rationally be supposed , they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted , were there any such ? can it be imagin'd , with any appearance of reason , that they perceive the impressions from things without ; and be at the same time ignorant of those characters , which nature it self has taken care to stamp within ? can they receive and assent to adventitious notions , and be ignorant of those , which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being , and imprinted there in indelible characters , to be the foundation , and guide of all their acquired knowledge , and future reasonings ? this would be , to make nature take pains to no purpose ; or , at least , to write very ill ; since its characters could not be read by those eyes , which saw other things very well ; and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth , and the foundations of all our knowledge , which are not first known , and without which , the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had . the child certainly knows , that the nurse that feeds it , is neither the cat it plays with , nor the blackmoor it is afraid of ; that the wormseed or mustard it refuses , is not the apple or sugar it cries for : this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of : but will any one say , it is by virtue of this principle , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , that it so firmly assents to these , and other parts of its knowledge ? or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age , wherein yet 't is plain , it knows a great many other truths ? he that will say , children join these general abstract speculations with their sucking bottles , and their rattles , may , perhaps , with justice be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion ; but less sincerity and truth , than one of that age. § . . though therefore there be several general propositions , that meet with constant and ready assent , as soon as proposed to men grown up , who have attained the use of more general and abstract idea's , and names standing for them : yet they not being to be found in those of tender years , who nevertheless know other things , they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons , and so by no means can be supposed innate : it being impossible , that any truth which is innate ( if there were any such ) should be unknown , at least to any one , who knows any thing else . since , if they are innate truths , they must be innate thoughts : there being nothing a truth in the mind , that it has never thought on . whereby it is evident , if there be any innate truths , they must necessarily be the first of any thought on ; the first that appear there . § . . that the general maxims , we are discoursing of , are not known to children , ideots , and a great part of mankind , we have already sufficiently proved : whereby it is evident , they have not an universal assent , nor are general impressions . but there is this farther argument in it against their being innate : that these characters , if they were native and original impressions , should appear fairest and clearest in those persons , in whom yet we find no foot-steps of them : and 't is , in my opinion , a strong presumption , that they are not innate ; since they are least known to those , in whom , if they were innate , they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour . for children , ideots , savages , and illiterate people , being of all others the least corrupted by custom , or borrowed opinions ; learning , and education , having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds ; nor by super-inducing foreign and studied doctrines , confounded those fair characters nature had written there ; one might reasonably imagine , that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every ones view , as 't is certain the thoughts of children do . it might very well be expected , that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals ; which being stamped immediately on the soul ( as these men suppose ) can have no dependence on the constitutions , or organs of the body , the only confessed difference between them and others . one would think , according to these men's principles , that all the native beams of light ( were there any such ) should in those , who have no reserves , no arts of concealment , shine out in their full lustre , and leave us in no more doubt of their being there , than we are of their love of pleasure , and abhorrence of pain . but alas , amongst children , ideots , savages , and the grosly illiterate , what general maxims are to be found ? what universal principles of knowledge ? their notions are few and narrow , borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with , and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impression . a child knows his nurse and his cradle , and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age : and a young savage has , perhaps , his head fill'd with love and hunting , according to the fashion of his tribe . but he that from a child untaught , or a wild inhabitant of the woods , will expect these abstract maxims , or the principles of sciences , will i fear find himself mistaken . such kind of general propositions , are seldom mentioned in the huts of indians : much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children , or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals . they are the discourses of the schools , and academies of learned nations , accustomed to that sort of conversation , or learning , where disputes are frequent : these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation , and useful for conviction ; but not much conducing to the discovery of truth , or advancement of knowledge . but of their small use for the improvement of knowledge , i shall have occasion to speak more at large , l. . c. . § . . i know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration : and probably , it will hardly down with any body at first hearing . i must therefore beg you a little to lay by your prejudice , and suspend your censure , till you have heard me out in the sequel of this discourse , being very willing to submit to better judgments . and since i impartially search after truth , i shall not be sorry to be convinced , that i have been too fond of my own notions ; which i confess we are all apt to be , when application and study have warmed our heads with them . upon the whole matter , i cannot see any ground , to think these two famed speculative maxims innate : since they are not universally assented to ; since the assent they so generally find , is no other than what several propositions , not allowed to be innate , equally partake in with them ; and since the assent is given them , is produced another way , and comes not from natural inscription , as i doubt not but to make appear in the following discourse . and if these first principles of knowledge and science , are found not to be innate , no other speculative maxims can ( i suppose ) with better right pretend to be so . chap. iii. no innate practical principles . § . . if those speculative maxims , whereof we discoursed in the fore-going chapter , have not an actual universal assent from all mankind , as we there proved , it is much more visible concerning practical principles , that they come short of an universal reception : and i think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule , which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as , what is , is , or to be so manifest a truth as this , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . whereby it is evident , that they are farther removed from a title to be innate ; and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind , is stronger against these moral principles than the other . not that it brings their truth at all in question . they are equally true , though not equally evident . those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them : but moral principles require reasoning and discourse , and some exercise of the mind , to discover the certainty of their truth . they lie not open as natural characters ingraven on the mind ; which if any such were , they must needs be visible by themselves , and by their own light be certain and known to every body . but this is no derogation to their truth and certainty , no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones , because it is not so evident as the whole is bigger than a part ; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing . it may suffice , that these moral rules are capable of demonstration : and therefore it is our own faults , if we come not to a certain knowledge of them . but the ignorance wherein many men are of them , and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them , are manifest proofs that they are not innate , and such as offer themselves to their view without searching . § . . whether there be any such moral principles , wherein all men do agree , i appeal to any , who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind , and look'd abroad beyond the smoak of their own chimneys . where is that practical truth , that is universally received without doubt or question , as it must be if innate ? iustice , and keeping of contracts , is , that which most men seem to agree in . this is a principle , which is thought to extend it self to the dens of thieves , and the troops of robbers ; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off of humanity it self , keep faith and rules of justice one with another . i grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another : but 't is , without receiving these as the innate laws of nature . they practice them as rules of convenience within their own communities : but it is impossible to conceive , that he imbraces justice as a practical principle , who acts fairly with his fellow-high-way-men , and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with . justice and truth are the common ties of society ; and therefore , even outlaws and villains , who break with all the world besides , must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves , or else they cannot hold together . but will any one say , that those that live by fraud and rapine , have innate principles of truth and justice , which they allow and assent to ? § . . perhaps it will be urged , that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts . i answer , first , i have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts . but since it is certain , that most men's practice , and some men's open professions , have either questioned or denied these principles , it is impossible to establish an universal consent ( though we should look for it only amongst grown men ) without which , it is impossible to conclude them innate . secondly , 't is very strange and unreasonable , to suppose innate practical principles , that terminate only in contemplation . practical principles , derived from nature , are there for operation , and must produce conformity of action , not barely speculative assent to their truth , or else they are in vain destinguish'd from speculative maxims . nature , i confess , has put into man a desire of happiness , and an aversion to misery : these indeed are innate practical principles , which ( as practical principles ought ) do continue constantly , to operate and influence all our actions , without ceasing : these may be observed in all persons and all ages , steady and universal ; but these are inclinations of the will and appetite , not impressions and characters on the understanding . i deny not , that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men ; and that , from the very first instances of sense and perception , there are some things that are grateful , and others unwelcome to them ; some things that they incline to , and others that they fly : but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind , which are to be the principles of knowledge , regulating our practice . such natural impressions on the understanding , are so far from being confirmed hereby , that this is an argument against them ; since if there were certain characters , imprinted by nature on the understanding , as the principles of knowledge , we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us , and influence our knowledge , as we do those others on the will and appetite ; which never cease to be the constant spring and motives of all our actions , to which , we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us . § . . another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles , is , that i think , there cannot any one moral rule be propos'd , whereof a man may not justly demand a reason : which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd , if they were innate , or so much as self-evident ; which every innate principle must needs be , and not need any proof to ascertain its truth , nor want any reason to gain it approbation . he would be thought void of common sense , who asked on the one side , or on the other side went about to give a reason , why it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . it carries its own light and evidence with it , and needs no other proof : he that understands the terms , assents to it for its own sake , or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it . but should that most unshaken rule of morality , and foundation of all social virtue , that one should do as he would be done unto , be propos'd to one , who never heard it before , but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning ; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason , why ? and were not he that propos'd it , bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him ? which plainly shews it not to be innate ; for if it were , it could neither want nor receive any proof : but must needs ( at least , as soon as heard and understood ) be received and assented to , as an unquestionable truth , which a man can by no means doubt of . so that the truth of all these moral rules , plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them , and from which they must be deduced , which could not be , if either they were innate , or so much as self-evident . § . . that men should keep their compacts , is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality : but yet , if a christian , who has the view of happiness and misery in another life , be asked why a man must keep his word , he will give this as a reason : because god , who has the power o● eternal life and death , requires it of us . but if an hobbist be asked why ; he will answer : because the publick requires it , and the leviathan will punish you , if you do not . and if one of the old heathen philosophers had been asked , he would have answered : because it was dishonest , below the dignity of a man , and opposite to vertue , the highest perfection of humane nature . § . . hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions , concerning moral rules , which are to be found amongst men , according to the different sorts of happiness , they have a prospect of , or propose to themselves : which could not be , if practical principles were innate , and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of god. i grant the existence of god , is so many ways manifest , and the obedience we owe him , so congruous to the light of reason , that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature : but yet i think it must be allowed , that several moral rules , may receive , from mankind , a very general approbation , without either knowing , or admitting the true ground of morality ; which can only be the law of a god , who sees men in the dark , and has power enough to punish the proudest offender . for god , having , by an inseparable connection , joined vertue and publick happiness together ; and made the practice thereof , necessary to the preservation of society , and visibly beneficial to all , with whom the vertuous man has to do ; it is no wonder , that every one should , not only allow , but recommend , and magnifie those rules to others , from whose observance of them , he is sure to reap advantage to himself . he may , out of interest , as well as conviction , cry up that for sacred ; which if once trampled on , and prophaned , he himself cannot be safe nor secure . this , though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation , which these rules evidently have ; yet it shews , that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words , proves not that they are innate principles : nay , it proves not so much , as , that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds , as the inviolable rules of their own practice : since we find that self-interest and the conveniences of this life , make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them , whose actions sufficiently prove , that they very little consider the law-giver , that prescribed these rules ; nor , the hell he has ordain'd for the punishment of those that transgress them . § . . for , if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men , but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts ; we shall find , that they have no such internal veneration for these rules , nor so full a perswasion of their certainty and obligation . the great principle of morality , to do as one would be done to , is more commended , than practised . but the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice , than to teach others , that it is no moral rule , nor obligatory , would be thought madness , and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to , when they break it themselves . perhaps conscience will be urged as checking us for such breaches , and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved . § . . to which , i answer , that i doubt not , but without being written on their hearts , many men , may , by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things , come to assent to several moral rules , and be convinced of their obligation . others also may come to be of the same mind , from their education , company , and customs of their country ; which perswasion however got , will serve to set conscience on work , which is nothing else , but our own opinion of our own actions . and if conscience be a proof of innate principles , contraries may be innate principles : since some men , with the same bent of conscience , prosecute what others avoid . § . . but i cannot see how any men , should ever transgress those moral rules , with confidence , and serenity , were they innate , and stamped upon their minds . view but an army at the sacking of a town , and see what observations , or sense of moral principles , or what touch of conscience , for all the outrages they do . robberies , murders , rapes , are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure . have there not been whole nations , and those of the most civilized people , amongst whom , the exposing their children , and leaving them in the fields , to perish by want , or wild beasts , has been the practice , as little condemned or scrupled , as the begetting them ? do they not still , in some countries , put them into the same graves with their mothers , if they die in child-birth ; or dispatch them , if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars ? and are there not places , where at a certain age , they kill , or expose their parents without any remorse at all ? in a part of asia , the sick , when their case comes to be thought desperate , are carried out and laid on the earth , before they are dead , and left there , exposed to wind and weather , to perish without assistance or pity . (α) it is familiar amongst the mengrelians , a people professing christianity , to bury their children alive without scruple . (β) there are places where they eat their own children . (γ) the caribes were wont to geld their children , on purpose to fat and eat them . (δ) and garcilasso de la vega tells us of a people in peru , which were wont to fat and eat their children they got on their female captives , which they kept as concubines for that pupose . the virtues , whereby the tououpinambas believed they merited paradise , were , revenge , and eating abundance of their enemies . (ζ) they have not so much as a name for god , lery pag. . no acknowledgment of any god , no religion , no worship , pag. . the saints , who are canoniz'd amongst the turks , lead lives , which one cannot with modesty relate . a remarkable passage to this purpose , out of the voyage of baumgarten , which is a book , not every day to be met with , i shall set down at large , in the language it is published in . ibi ( sc. prope belbes in aegypto ) vidimus sanctum unum saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos , ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem . mos est , ut didicimus mahometistis , ut eos , qui amentes & sine ratione sunt , pro sanctis colant & venerentur . insuper & eos qui cumdiu vitam egerint inquinatissimam , voluntariam demum paenitentiam & paupertatem , sanctitate venerandos deputant . ejusmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effraenem habent , domos quas volunt intrandi , edendi , bibendi , & quod majus est , concumbendi ; ex quo concubitu , si proles secuta suerit , sancta similiter habetur . his ergo hominibus , dum vivunt , magnos exhibent honores ; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima , eosque contingere ac sepelire maximae fortunae ducunt loco . audivimus haec dicta & dicenda per interpretem à mucrelo nostro . insuper sanctum illum , quem eo loci vidimus , publicitus apprimè commendari , eum esse hominem sanctum , divinum ac integritate praecipuum ; eo● quod , nec faeminarum unquam esset nec puerorum , sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum . peregr . baumgarten , l. . c. . p. . where then are those innate principles , of justice , piety , gratitude , equity , chastity ? or , where is that universal consent , that assures us there are such inbred rules ? murders in duels , when fashion has made them honourable , are committed without remorse of conscience : nay , in many places , innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy . and if we will look abroad , to take a view of men , as they are , we shall find , that they have a remorse , in one place , for doing or omitting that , which others , in another place , think they merit by . § . . he that will carefully peruse the history of mankind , and look abroad into the several tribes of men , and with indifferency survey their actions , will be able to satisfie himself , that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named , or rule of vertue to be thought on ( those only excepted , that are absolutely necessary to hold society together , which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies ) which is not , somewhere or other , slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men , governed by practical opinions , and rules of living quite opposite to others . § . . here , perhaps , 't will be objected , that it is no argument , that the rule is not known , because it is broken . i grant the objection good , where men , though they transgress , yet disown not the law ; where fear of shame , censure , or punishment , carries the mark of some awe it has upon them . but it is impossible to conceive , that a whole nation of men should all publickly reject and renounce , what every one of them , certainly and infallibly , knew to be a law : for so they must , who have it naturally imprinted on their minds . 't is possible , men may sometimes own rules of morality , which , in their private thoughts , they do not believe to be true , only to keep themselves in reputation , and esteem amongst those , who are perswaded of their obligation . but 't is not to be imagin'd , that a whole society of men , should , publickly and professedly , disown , and cast off a rule , which they could not , in their own minds , but be infallibly certain , was a law ; nor be ignorant , that all men , they should have to do with , knew it to be such : and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others , all the contempt and abhorrence due to one , who professes himself void of humanity ; and one , who confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong , cannot but be look'd on , as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness . whatever practical principle is innate , cannot but be known to every one , to be just and good . it is therefore little less than a contradiction , to suppose , that whole nations of men should both in their professions , and practice unanimously and universally give the lye to , what , by the most invincible evidence , every one of them knew to be true , right , and good . this is enough to satisfie us , that no practical rule , which is any where universally , and with publick approbation , or allowance , transgressed , can be supposed innate . but i have something farther to add , in answer to this objection . § . . the breaking of a rule , say you , is no argument , that it is unknown . i grant it : but the generally allowed breach of it any where , i say , is a proof , that it is not innate . for example , let us take any of these rules ; which being the most obvious deductions of humane reason , and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men , fewest people have had the impudence to deny , or inconsideration to doubt of . if any can be thought to be naturally imprinted , none , i think , can have a fairer pretence to be innate , than this ; parents preserve and cherish your children . when therefore you say , that this is an innate rule , what do you mean ? either , that it is an innate principle ; which upon all occasions , excites and directs the actions of all men : or else , that it is a truth , which all men have imprinted on their minds , and which therefore they know , and assent to . but in neither of these sences is it innate . first , that it is not a principle , which influences all men's actions , is , what i have proved by the examples before cited : nor need we seek so far as mingrelia or peru , to find instances of such as neglect , abuse , nay and destroy their children ; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations , when we remember , that it was a familiar , and uncondemned practice amongst the greeks and romans , to expose , without pity or remorse , their innocent infants . secondly , that it is an innate truth , known to all men , is also false . for , parents preserve your children , is so far from an innate truth , that it is no truth at all ; it being a command , and not a proposition , and so not capable of truth or falshood . to make it capable of being assented to as true , it must be reduced to some such proposition as this : it is the duty of parents to preserve their children . but what duty is , cannot be understood without a law ; nor a law be known , or supposed without a law-maker , or without reward and punishment : so that it is impossible , that this , or any other practical principle should be innate ; i. e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty , without supposing the idea's of god , of law , of obligation , of punishment , of a life after this , innate . for that punishment follows not , in this life , the breach of this rule ; and consequently , that it has not the force of a law in countries , where the generally allow'd practice runs counter to it , is in it self evident . but these idea's ( which must be all of them innate , if any thing as a duty be so ) are so far from being innate , that 't is not every studious or thinking man , much less every one that is born , in whom they are to be found clear and distinct : and that one of them , which of all others seems most likely to be innate , is not so , ( i mean the idea of god ) i think , in the next chapter , will appear very evident to any considering man. § . . from what has been said , i think we may safely conclude , that , whatever practical rule is , in any place , generally , and with allowance , broken , cannot be supposed innate , it being impossible , that men should , without shame or fear , confidently and serenely break a rule , which they could not but evidently know , that god had set up , and would certainly punish the breach of ( which they must if it were innate ) to a degree to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor . without such a knowledge as this , a man can never be certain , that any thing is his duty . ignorance or doubt of the law ; hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker , or the like , may make men give way to a present appetite : but let any one see the fault , and the rod by it , and with the transgression , a fire ready to punish it ; a pleasure tempting , and the hand of the almighty visibly held up , and prepared to take vengeance ( for this must be the case , where any duty is imprinted on the mind ) and then tell me , whether it be possible , for people , with such a prospect , such a certain knowledge as this , wantonly , and without scruple , to offend against a law , which they carry about them in indelible characters , and that stares them in the face , whilst they are breaking it ? whether men , at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent law-maker , can , with assurance and gaity , slight and trample under foot his most sacred injunctions ? and lastly , whether it be possible , that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law , and supreme law-giver , all the by-standers ; yea even the governors and rulers of the people , full of the same sense , both of the law and law-maker , should silently connive , without testifying their dislike , or laying the least blame on it ? principles of actions indeed there are lodged in mens appetites , but these are so far from being innate moral principles , that if they were left to their full swing , they would carry men to the overturning of all morality . moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires , which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments , that will over-balance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the law. if therefore any thing be imprinted on the mind of all men as a law , all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge , that certain , and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it . for if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate , innate principles are insisted on , and urged to no purpose ; truth and certainty ( the things pretended ) are not at all secured by them : but men are in the same uncertain , floating estate with , as without them . an evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment , great enough to make the transgression very uneligible , must accompany an innate law : unless with an innate law , they can suppose an innate gospel too . i would not be here mistaken , as if , because i deny an innate law , i thought there were none but positive laws . there is a great deal of difference between an innate law , and a law of nature ; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original , and something that we may attain to the knowledge of , by our natural faculties from natural principles . and i think they equally forsake the truth , who running into the contrary extreams , either affirm an innate law , or deny that there is a law , knowable by the light of nature ; i. e. without the help of positive revelation . § . . the difference there is amongst men in their practical principles , is so evident , that , i think , i need say no more to evince , that it will be imposisible to find any innate moral rules , by this mark of general assent : and 't is enough to make one suspect , that the supposition of such innate principles , is but an opinion taken up at pleasure ; since those who talk so confidently of them , are so sparing to tell us , which they are . this might with justice be expected from those men , who lay stress upon this opinion : and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity , who declaring , that god has imprinted on the minds of men , the foundations of knowledge , and the rules of living , are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours , or the quiet of mankind , as not to point out to them , which they are , in the variety men are distracted with . but in truth , were there any such innate principles , there would be no need to teach them . did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds , they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths , that they afterwards learned , and deduced from them ; and there would be nothing more easie , than to know what , and how many they were . there could be no more doubt about their number , than there is about the number of our fingers ; and 't is like then , every system would be ready to give them us by tale . but since no body , that i know , has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them , they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles ; since even they who require men to believe , that there are such innate propositions , do not tell us what they are . 't is easie to foresee , that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles , they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses , and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches : a plain evidence , that there are no such innate truths . nay , a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves , that by denying freedom to mankind ; and thereby making men no other than bare machins , they take away not only innate , but all moral rules whatsoever , and leave not a possibility to believe any such , to those who cannot conceive , how any thing can be capable of a law , that is not a free agent : and upon that ground , they must necessarily reject all principles of vertue , who cannot put morality and mechanism together ; which are not very easie to be reconciled , or made consistent . § . . when i had writ this , being informed , that my lord herbert had in his books de veritate , assigned these innate principles , i presently consulted him , hoping to find , in a man of so great parts , something that might satisfie me in this point , and put an end to my enquiry . in his chapter de instinctu naturali , p. . edit . . i met with these six marks of his notitiae communes , . prioritas . . independentia . . vniversalitas . . certitudo . . necessitas , i. e. as he explains it , faciunt ad hominis conservationem . . modus conformationis , i. e. assensus nullâ interpositâ morâ . and at the latter end of his little treatise , de religione laici , he say this of these innate principles : adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates . sunt enim in ipsâ mente coelitùs descriptae nullisque traditionibus , sive scriptis , sive non scriptis , obnoxiae , p. . and veritates nostrae catholicae , quae tanquam indubia dei effata in foro interiori descripta . thus having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions , and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of god , he proceeds at last to set them down ; and they are these : . esse aliquod supremum numen . . numen illud coli debere . . virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultùs divini . . rescipiscendum esse à peccatis . . dari proemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam . these , though i allow them to be clear truths , and such as , if rightly explained , a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to : yet i think he is far from proving them innate impressions in foro interiori descriptae . for i must take leave to observe , § . . first , that these five propositions are either all , or more than all , those common notions writ on our minds by the finger of god , if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written . since there are other propositions , which even by his own rules , have as just a pretence to such an original , and may be as well admitted for innate principles , as , at least , some of these five he enumerates , viz. do as thou wouldst be done unto : and , perhaps , some hundreds of others , when well considered . § . . secondly , that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions , viz. his first , second , and third marks , agree perfectly to neither of them ; and the first , second , third , fourth , and sixth marks , agree but ill to his third , fourth , and fifth propositions . for besides that , we are assured from history , of many men , nay , whole nations who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them , i cannot see how the third , viz. that vertue joined with piety , is the best worship of god , can be an innate principle , when the name , or sound vertue , is so hard to be understood ; liable to so much uncertainty in its signification ; and the thing it stands for , so much contended about , and difficult to be known . and therefore this can be but a very uncertain rule of humane practice , and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives , and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle . § . . for let us consider this proposition as to its meaning , ( for it is the sence , and not sound , that is and must be the principle or common notion ) viz. vertue is the best worship of god ; i. e. is most acceptable to him ; which if vertue be taken , as most commonly it is , for those actions , which according to the different opinions of several countries , are accounted laudable , will be a proposition so far from being certain , that it will not be true . if vertue be taken for actions conformable to god's will , or to the rule prescribed by god , which is the true and only measure of vertue ; then this proposition , that vertue is the best worship of god , will be most true and certain , but of very little use in humane life : since it will amount to no more but this , viz. that god is pleased with the doing of what he commands ; which a man may certainly know to be true , without knowing what it is that god doth command ; and so be as far from any rule or principle of his actions , as he was before : and i think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this , viz. that god is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands , for an innate moral principle writ on the minds of all men , ( however true and certain it may be ) since it teaches so little . whosoever does so , will have reason to think hundreds of propositions , innate principles , since there are many who have as good a title as this to be received for such , which no body yet ever put into that rank of innate principles . § . . nor is the fourth proposition ( viz. ) men must repent of their sins , much more instructive , till what those actions are , that are meant by sins , be set down . for the word peccata , or sins , being put , as it usually is , to signifie in general ill actions , that will draw on punishment upon the doers ; what great principle of morality can that be , to tell us we should be sorry , and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us , without knowing what those particular actions are , that will do so ? indeed , this is a very true proposition , and fit to be inculcated on , and received by those , who are supposed , to have been taught , what actions in all kinds are sin ; but neither this , nor the former , can be imagined to be innate principles ; nor to be of any use , if they were innate , unless the particular measures and bounds of all vertues and vices , were engraven in mens minds , and were innate principles also , which i think is very much to be doubted . and therefore , i imagine , it will scarce seem possible , that god should engrave principles in mens minds , in words of uncertain signification , such as are vertues and sins ; which amongst different men , stand for different things : nay , it cannot be supposed to be in words at all , ( which being in most of these principles very general names ) cannot be understood , but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them . and in the practical instances , the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves , and the rules of them abstracted from words , and antecedent to the knowledge of names ; which rules a man must know , what language soever he chance to learn , whether english or japan , or if he should learn no language at all , or never should understand the use of words , as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men. when it shall be made out , that men ignorant of words , or untaught by the laws and customs of their country , that it is part of the worship of god , not to kill another man ; not to know more women than one ; not to procure abortion ; not to expose their children ; not to take from another what is his , though we want it our selves , but on the contrary , relieve and supply his wants : and whenever we have done the contrary , we ought to repent , be sorry , and resolve to do so no more . when , i say , all men shall be proved actually to know , and allow all these and a thousand other such rules , all which come under these two general words made use of above , viz. virtutes & peccata , vertues and sins , there will be more reason for admitting these , and the like , for common notions , and practical principles : yet after all , universal consent ( were there any in moral principles ) to truths , the knowledge whereof might be attained otherwise , would scarce prove them to be innate ; which is all i contend for . § . . nor will it be of much moment here , to offer that very ready , but not very material answer , ( viz. ) that the innate principles of morality , may , by education , and custom , and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse , be darkened , and at last quite worn out of the minds of men. which assertion of theirs , if true quite takes away the argument of universal consent , by which this opi●●on of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved : unless those men will think it reasonable , that their own private perswasions , or that of their party , should pass for universal consent ; a thing not unfrequently done , when men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason , cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind , as not worthy the reckoning . and then their argument stands thus : the principles which all mankind allow for true , are innate ; those that men of right reason admit , are the principles allowed by all mankind ; we and those of our mind , are men of right reason ; therefore we agreeing , our principles are innate ; which is a very pretty way of arguing , and a short cut to infallibility . for otherwise it will be very hard to understand , how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge , and agree in ; and yet there are none of those principles which are not by depraved custom and ill education blotted out of the minds of many men : which is to say , that all men admit , but yet many men do deny , and dissent from them . and indeed the ●upposition of such first principles , will serve us to very little purpose ; and we shall be as much at a loss with , as without them , if they may by any humane power , such as is the will of our teachers , or opinions of our companions , be altered or lost in us ; and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles , and innate light , we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty , as if there were no such thing at all . it being all one to have no rule , and one that will warp any way ; or amongst various and contrary rules , not to know which is the right . but concerning innate principles , i desire these men to say , whether they can , or cannot , by education and custom , be blurr'd and blotted out : if they cannot , we must find them in all mankind alike , and they must be clear in every body : and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions , we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous , nearest the fountain in children and illiterate people , who have received least impression from foreign opinions . let them take which side they please , they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact , and daily observation . § . . i easily grant , that there are great numbers of opinions , which , by men of different countries , educations , and tempers , are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles ; many whereof , both for their absurdity , as well as oppositions one to another , it is impossible should be true . but yet all those propositions , how remote soever from reason , are so sacred somewhere or other , that men , even of good understanding in other matters , will sooner part with their lives , and whatever is dearest to them , than suffer themselves to doubt , or others to question , the truth of them . § . . this , however strange it may seem , is that which every days experience confirms ; and will not , perhaps , appear so wonderful , if we consider the ways , and steps by which it is brought about ; and how really it may come to pass , that doctrines , that have been derived from no better original , than the superstition of a nurse , or the authority of an old woman , may , by length of time , and consent of neighbours , grow up to the dignity of principles in religion or morality . for such , who are careful ( as they call it ) to principle children well , ( and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them , which they believe in ) instill into the unwary , and , as yet , unprejudiced understanding , ( for white paper receives any characters ) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess . these being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension ; and still as they grow up , confirmed to them , either by the open profession , or tacit consent , of all they have to do with ; or at least by those , of whose wisdom , knowledge , and piety , they have an opinion , who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned , but as the basis and foundation , on which they build either their religion or manners , come by these means to have the reputation of unquestionable , self-evident , and innate truths . § . . to which we may add , that when men , so instructed , are grown up , and reflect on their own minds , they cannot find any thing more ancient there , than those opinions which were taught them , before their memory began to keep a register of their actions , or date the time when any new thing appeared to them ; and therefore make no scruple to conclude , that those propositions , of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original , were certainly the impress of god and nature upon their minds ; and not taught them by any one else . these they entertain and submit to , as many do to their parents , with veneration ; not because it is natural ; nor do children do it , where they are not so taught , but because , having been always so educated , and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect , they think it is natural . § . . this will appear very likely , and almost unavoidable to come to pass , if we consider the nature of mankind , and the constitution of humane affairs : wherein most men cannot live , without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings ; nor be at quiet in their minds , without some foundation or principles to rest their thoughts on . there is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his understanding , that hath not some reverenced propositions , which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings ; and by which he judgeth of truth and falshood , right and wrong ; which some , wanting skill and leisure , and others the inclination , and some being taught , they ought not to examine ; there are few to be found , who are not exposed by their ignorance , laziness , education , or precipitancy , to take them upon trust . § . . this is evidently the case of all children and young folk ; and custom , a greater power than nature , seldom failing to make them worship for divine , what she hath inured them to bow their minds , and submit their understandings to ; it is no wonder , that grown men , either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life , or hot in the pursuit of pleasures , should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets ; especially when one of their principles is , that principles ought not to be questioned . and had men leisure , parts , and will , who is there almost that dares to shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions , and endure to bring upon himself , the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error ? who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach , which is every where prepared for those , who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party ? and where is the man to be found , that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical , sceptical , or atheist , which he is sure to meet with , who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions ? and he will be much more afraid to question those principles , when he shall think them , as most men do , the standards set up by god in his mind , to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions . and what can hinder him from thinking them sacred , when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts , and the most reverenced by others ? § . . it is easie to imagine , how by these means it comes to pass , that men worship the idols have been set up in their minds ; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there ; and stamp the characters of divinity , upon absurdities and errors , become zealous votaries to bulls and munkies ; and contented too , fight , and die in defence of their opinions . dum solos credit habendos esse deos , quos ipse colit . for since the reasoning faculties of the soul , which are almost constantly , though not always warily nor wisely employ'd , would not know how to move for want of a foundation , and footing , in most men , who through laziness or avocation , do not ; or for want of time , or true helps , or other causes , cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge , and trace truth , to its fountain and original , 't is natural for them , and almost unavoidable , to take up with some borrowed principles ; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things , are thought not to need any other proof themselves . whoever shall receive any of these into their thoughts , without due examination , but believe them , because they are to be believed , may take up from his education , and the fashions of his country , any absurdity for innate principles ; and by long poring on the same objects , so dim his sight , as to take monsters lodged in his own brain , for the images of the deity , and the workmanship of his hands . § . . by this progress , how many there are , who arrive at principles , which they believe innate , may be easily observed , in the variety of opposite principles , held , and contended for , by all sorts and degrees of men. and he that shall deny this to be the method , wherein most men proceed , to the assurance they have of the unalterable truth and evidence of their principles , will , perhaps , find it a hard matter , any other way to account for the contrary tenets , which are firmly believed , confidently asserted , and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. and , indeed , if it be the privilege of innate principles , to be received upon their own authority , without examination , i know not what may not be believed , or how any ones principles can be questioned . if they may , and ought to be examined , and tried , i desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried ; or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters , whereby the genuine , innate principles , may be distinguished from others ; that so , amidst the great variety of pretenders , i may be kept from mistakes , in so material a point as this . when this is done , i shall be ready to embrace such welcome , and useful , propositions ; and till then i may with modesty doubt , since i fear universal consent , which is the only one produced , will scare prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice , and assure me of any innate principles . from what has been said , i think it is past doubt , that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree ; and therefore none innate . chap. iv. other considerations concerning innate principles , both speculative and practical . § . . had those , who would perswade us , that there are innate principles , not taken them together in gross ; but considered , separately , the parts out of which those propositions are made , they would not , perhaps , have been so forward to believe they were innate . since , if the idea's , which made up those truths , were not , it was impossible , that the propositions , made up of them , should be innate , or our knowledge of them be born with us . for if the idea's be not innate , there was a time , when the mind was without those principles ; and then , they will not be innate , but be derived from some other original . for , where the idea's themselves are not , there can be no knowledge , no assent , no mental , or verbal propositions about them . § . . if we will attently consider new born children , we shall have little reason , to think , that they bring many idea's into the world with them . for , bating , perhaps , some faint idea's , of hunger , and thirst , and warmth , and some pains , which they may have felt in the womb , there is not the least appearance of any setled idea's at all in them ; especially of idea's , answering the terms , which make up those universal propositions , that are esteemed innate principles . one may perceive how , by degrees , afterwards idea's come into their minds ; and that they get no more , nor no other , than what experience , and the observation of things , that come in their way , furnish them with ; which might be enough to satisfie us , that they are not original characters , stamped on the mind . § . . it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , is certainly ( if there be any such ) an innate principle . but can any one think , or will any one say , that impossibility and identity , are two innate idea's ? are they such as all mankind have , and bring into the world with them ? and are they those , that are the first in children , and antecedent to all acquired ones ? if they are innate , they must needs be so . hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity , before it has of white or black ; sweet or bitter ? and is it from the knowledge of this principle , that it concludes , that wormwood rubb'd on the nipple , is not the same taste , that it used to receive from thence ? is it the actual knowledge of impossibile est idem esse , & non esse , that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger ; or , that makes it fond of the one , and fly the other ? or does the mind regulate it self , and its assent by idea's , that it never yet had ? or the understanding draw conclusions from principles , which it never yet knew or understood ? the names impossibility and identity , stand for two idea's , so far from being innate , or born with us , that i think it requires great care and attention , to form them right in our understandings . they are so far from being brought into the world with us ; so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood , that , i believe , upon examination , it will be found , that many grown men want them . § . . if identity ( to instance in that alone ) be a native impression ; and consequently so clear and obvious to us , that we must needs know it even from our cradles ; i would gladly be resolved , by one of seven , or seventy , years old , whether a man , being a creature , consisting of soul and body , be the same man , when his body is changed ? whether euphorbus and pythagoras , having had the same soul , were the same man , tho' they lived several ages asunder ? nay , whether the cock too , which had the same soul , were not the same with both of them ? whereby , perhaps , it will appear , that our idea of sameness , is not so setled and clear , as to deserve to be thought innate in us . for if those innate idea's , are not clear and distinct , so as to be universally known , and naturally agreed on , they cannot be the subjects of universal , and undoubted truths ; but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty . for , i suppose , every ones idea of identity , will not be the same , that pythagoras , and thousands others of his followers , have : and which then shall be the true ? which innate ? or are there two different idea's of identity , both innate ? § . . nor let any one think , that the questions , i have here proposed , about the identity of man , are bare , empty speculations ; which if they were , would be enough to shew , that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity . he , that shall , with a little attention , reflect on the resurrection , and consider , that divine justice shall bring to judgment , at the last day , the very same persons , to be happy or miserable in the other , who did well or ill in this life , will find it , perhaps , not easie to resolve with himself , what makes the same man , or wherein identity consists : and will not be forward to think he , and every one , even children themselves , have naturally a clear idea of it . § . . let us examine that principle of mathematicks , viz. that the whole is bigger than a part . this , i take it , is reckon'd amongst innate principles . i am sure it has as good a title as any , to be thought so ; which yet , no body can think it to be , when he considers the idea's it comprehends in it , whole and part , are perfectly relative ; but the positive idea's , to which they properly and immediately belong , are extension and number , of which alone , whole and part , are , relations . so that if whole and part are innate idea's , extension and number must be so too , it being impossible to have an idea of a relation , without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs , and in which it is founded . now , whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the idea's of extension and number , i leave to be considered by those , who are the patrons of innate principles . § . . that god is to be worshipped , is , without doubt , as great a truth as any can enter into the mind of man , and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles . but yet , it can by no means be thought innate , unless the idea's of god , and worship , are innate . that the idea , the term worship stands for , is not in the understanding of children , and a character stamped on the mind in its first original , i think , will be easily granted , by any one , that considers how few there be , amongst grown men , who have a clear and distinct notion of it . and , i suppose , there cannot be any thing more ridiculous , than to say , that children have this practical principle innate , that god is to be worshipped ; and yet , that they know not what that worship of god is , which is their duty . but to pass by this . § . . if any idea can be imagin'd innate , the idea of god may , of all others , for many reasons , be thought so ; since it is hard to conceive , how there should be innate , moral principles , without an innate idea of a deity : without a notion of a law-maker , it is impossible to have a notion of a law , and an obligation to observe it . besides the atheists , taken notice of amongst the ancients , and left branded upon the records of history , hath not navigation discovered , in these latter ages , whole nations , at the bay of soldania , (α) in brasil , (β) and the caribee islands , &c. amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a god , nicolaus del techo in literis , ex paraquaria de caaiguarum conversione haec habet . reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere , quod deum , & hominis animam significet , nulla sacra habet , nulla idola . relatio triplex de rebus indicis caaiguarum ●● / . and , perhaps , if we should , with attention , mind the lives , and discourses of people not so far of , we should have too much reason to ●ear , that many , in more civilized countries , have no very strong , and clear impressions of a deity upon their minds ; and that the complaints of atheism , made from the pulpits , are not without reason . and though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now ; yet , perhaps , we should hear , more than we do , of it from others , did not the fear of the magistrate's sword , or their neighbour's censure , tie up peoples tongues ; which , were the apprehensions of punishment , or shame taken away , would as openly proclaim their atheism , as their lives do . § . . but had all mankind , every where , a notion of a god , ( whereof yet history tells us the contrary ) it would not from thence follow , that the idea of him was innate . for , though no nation were to be found without a name , and some few dark notions of him ; yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind , no more than the names of fire , or the sun , heat , or number , do prove the idea's they stand for , to be innate , because the names of those things , and the idea's of them , are so universally received , and known amongst mankind . nor , on the contrary , is the want of such a name , or the absence of such a notion out of men's minds , any argument against the being of a god , any more , than it would be a proof , that there was no load-stone in the world , because a great part of mankind , had neither a notion of any such thing , nor a name for it ; or be any shew of argument , to prove , that there are no distinct , and various species of angels , or intelligent beings above us , because we have no idea's of such distinct species . for men , being furnished with words , by the common language of their own countries , can scarce avoid having some kind of idea's of those things , whose names , those they converse with , have occasion frequently to mention to them : and if it carry with it the notion of excellency , greatness , or something extraordinary ; if apprehension and concernment accompany it ; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind , the idea is likely to sink deeper , and spread the farther ; especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason , and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge , as that of a god is . for the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power , appear so plainly in all the works of the creation , that a rational creature , who will but seriously reflect on them , cannot miss the discovery of a deity : and the influence , that the discovery of such a being must necessarily have on the minds of all , that have but once heard of it , is so great , and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it , that it seems stranger to me , that a whole nation of men should be any where found so brutish , as to want the notion of a god ; than that they should be without any notion of numbers , or fire . § . . the name of god being once mentioned in any part of the world , to express a superior , powerful , wise , invisible being , the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason , and the interest men will always have to mention it often , must necessarily spread it far and wide ; and continue it down to all generations : though yet the general reception of this name , and some imperfect and unsteady notions , conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind , prove not the idea to be innate ; but only that they , who made the discovery , had made a right use of their reason , thought maturely of the causes of things , and traced them to their original ; from whom other less considering people , having once received so important a notion , it could not easily be lost again . § . . this is all could be inferr'd from the notion of a god , were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind , and generally acknowledged , by men grown to maturity in all countries . for the generality of the acknowledging of a god , as i imagine , is extended no farther than that ; which if it be sufficient to prove the idea of god , innate , will as well prove the idea of fire , innate ; since , i think , it may truly be said , that there is not a person in the world , who has a notion of a god , who has not also the idea of fire . i doubt not , but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island , where no fire was , they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing , nor name for it , how generally soever it were received , and known in all the world besides ; and , perhaps too , their apprehensions , would be as far removed from any name , or notion of a god , till some one amongst them had imployed his thoughts , to enquire into the constitution and causes of things , which would easily lead him to the notion of a god ; which having once taught to others , reason , and the natural propensity of their own thoughts , would afterwards propagate , and continue amongst them . § . . indeed it is urged , that it is suitable to the goodness of god , to imprint upon the minds of men , characters and notions of himself , and not leave them in the dark , and doubt , in so grand a concernment ; and also by that means , to secure to himself the homage and veneration , due from so intelligent a creature as man ; and therefore he has done it . this argument , if it be of any force , will prove much more than those , who use it , in this case , expect from it . for if we may conclude , that god hath done for men , all that men shall judge is best for them , because it is suitable to his goodness so to do , it will prove , not only , that god has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself ; but that he hath plainly stamped there , in fair characters , all that men ought to know , or believe of him , all that they ought to do in obedience to his will ; and that he hath given them a will and affection conformable to it . this , no doubt , every one will think it better for men , than that they should , in the dark , grope after knowledge , as st. paul tells us all nations did after god , acts xvii . . than that their wills should clash with their understandings , and their appetites cross their duty . the romanists say , 't is best for men , and so , suitable to the goodness of god , that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth ; and therefore there is one : and i , by the same reason , say , 't is better for men , that every man himself should be infallible . i leave them to consider , whether by the force of this argument they shall think that every man is so . i think it a very good argument , to say , the infinitely wise god hath made it so : and therefore it is best . but it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom , to say , i think it best , and therefore god hath made it so ; and in the matter in hand , it will be in vain to argue from such a topick , that god hath done so , when certain experience shews us , that he hath not . but the goodness of god hath not been wanting to men without such original impressions of knowledge , or idea's stamped on the mind : since he hath furnished man with those faculties , which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being ; and i doubt not but to shew , that a man by the right use of his natural abilities , may , without any innate principles , attain the knowledge of a god , and other things that concern him . god having endued man with those faculties of knowing which he hath , was no more obliged by his goodness , to implant those innate notions in his mind , than that having given him reason , hands , and materials , he should build him bridges , or houses ; which some people in the world , however of good parts , do either totally want , or are but ill provided of , as well as others are wholly without idea's of god , and principles of morality ; or at least have but very ill ones . the reason in both cases being , that they never employ'd their parts , faculties , and powers , industriously that way , but contented themselve with the opinions , fashions , and things of their country , as they found them , without looking any farther . had you or i been born at the bay of soldania , possibly our thoughts , and notions , had not exceeded those bruitish ones of the hotentots that inhabit there : and had the verginia king apochancana , been educated in england , he had , perhaps , been as knowing a divine , and as good a mathematician , as any in it . the difference between him , and a more improved english-man , lying barely in this , that the exercise of his faculties , was bounded within the ways , modes , and notions of his own country , and never directed to any other , or farther enquiries : and if he had not any idea of a god , it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it . § . . i grant , that if there were any idea's to be found imprinted on the minds of men , we have reason to expect , it should be the notion of his maker , as a mark god set on his own workmanship , to mind man of his dependence and duty ; and that herein should appear the first instances of humane knowledge . but how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children ? and when we find it there , how much more does it resemble the opinion , and notion , of the teacher , than represent the true god ? he that shall observe in children , the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have , will think , that the objects they do first , and most familiarly converse with , are those that make the first impressions on their understandings : nor will he find the least footsteps of any other . it is easie to take notice , how their thoughts enlarge themselves , only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects , to retain the idea's of them in their memories ; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them , and several ways put them together . how by these means , they come to frame in their minds an idea of a deity , i shall hereafter shew . § . . can it be thought , that the idea's men have of god , are the characters , and marks of himself , engraven in their minds by his own finger , when we see , that in the same country , under one and the same name , men have far different , nay , often contrary and inconsistent idea's , and conceptions of him ? their agreeing in a name , or sound , will scarce prove an innate notion of him. § . . what true or tolerable notion of a deity , could they have , who acknowledged , and worshipped hundreds ? every deity that they owned above one , was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of him , and a proof that they had no true notion of god , where unity , infinity , and eternity , were always excluded . to which if we add their gross conceptions of corporiety , expressed in their images , and representations of their deities ; the amours , marriages , copulations , lusts , quarrels , and other mean qualities , attributed by them to their gods ; we shall have little reason to think , that the heathen world , i. e. the greatest part of mankind , had such idea's of god in their minds , as he himself , out of care , that they should not be mistaken about him , was author of . and this universality of consent , so much argued , if it prove any native impressions , 't will be only this : that god imprinted on the minds of all men , speaking the same language , a name for himself , but not any idea : since those people , who agreed in the name , had at the same time , far different apprehensions about the thing signified . if they say , that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world , were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that imcomprehensible being , or several parts of his providence : i answer , what they might be in their original , i will not here enquire ; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar , i think no body will affirm : and he that will consult the voyage of the bishop of beryte , c. . ( not to mention other testimonies ) will find , that the theology of the siamites , professedly owns plurality of gods : or , as the abbé de choisy more judiciously remarks , in his journal du voiage de syam , / , it consists properly in acknowledging no god at all . § . . if it be said , that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions , of the unity and infinity of the deity , i grant it . but then this , first , excludes universality of consent in any thing , but the name . for those wise men being very few , perhaps one of a thousand , this universality is very narrow . secondly , it seems to me plainly to prove , that the truest and best notions men had of god , were not imprinted , but acquired by thought and meditation , and a right use of their faculties : since the wise and considerate men of the world , by a right and careful employment of their thoughts , and reason , attained true notions in this , as well as other things ; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men , making the far greater number , took up their notions , by chance , from common tradition , and vulgar conceptions , without much beating their heads about them . and if it be a reason to think the notion of god innate , because all wise men had it , vertue must be thought innate ; for that also wise men have always had . § . . this was evidently the case of all gentilism : nor hath even amongst iews , christians , and mahometans , who acknowledge but one god , this doctrine , and the care is taken in those nations , to teach men to have true notions of a god , prevailed so far , as to make men to have the same , and true idea's of him. how many , even amongst us , will be found upon enquiry , to fansie him in the shape of a man , sitting in heaven ; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him ? christians , as well as turks , have had whole sects owning , and contending earnestly for it , that the deity was corporeal , and of humane shape : and though we find few now amongst us , who profess themselves anthropomorphites , ( though some i have met with that own it ) yet , i believe , he that will make it his business , may find amongst the ignorant , and uninstructed christians , many of that opinion . talk but with country-people , almost of any age ; or young people almost any where , and you shall find , that though the name of god be frequently in their mouths ; yet the notions they apply this name to , are so odd , low , and pitiful , that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational man ; much less , that they were the characters writ by the finger of god himself . nor do i see how it derogates more from the goodness of god , that he has given us minds unfurnished with these idea's of himself , than that he hath sent us into the world , with bodies uncloathed ; and that there is no art or skill born with us . for being fitted with faculties to attain these , it is want of industry , and consideration in us , and not of bounty in him , if we have them not . 't is as certain , that there is a god , as that the opposite angles , made by the intersection of two strait lines , are equal . there was never any rational creature , that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions , that could fail to assent to them : though yet it be past doubt , that there are many men , who having not applied their thoughts that way , are ignorant both of the one and the other . if any one think fit to call this ( which is the utmost of its extent ) universal consent , such an one i easily allow : but such an universal consent as this , proves not the idea of god , no more than it does the idea of such angles , innate . § . . since then though the knowledge of a god , be the most natural discovery of humane reason , yet the idea of him , is not innate , as , i think , is evident from what has been said ; i imagine there will be scarce any other idea found , that can pretend to it : since if god had left any natural impressions on the understanding of men , it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some characters of himself , as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object . but our minds being , at first , void of that idea , which we are most concerned to have , it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters . i must own , as far as i can observe , i can find none , and would be glad to be informed by any other . § . . i confess , there is another idea , which would be of general use for mankind to have , as it is of general talk as if they had it ; and that is the idea of substance , which we neither have , nor can have , by sensation or reflection . if nature took care to provide us any idea's , we might well expect it should be such , as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves : but we see on the contrary , that since by those ways , whereby other ideas are brought into our minds , this is not , we have no such clear idea at all , and therefore signifie nothing by the word substance , but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what ; i. e. of something whereof we have no idea , which we take to be the substratum , or support , of those idea's we do know . § . . whatever then we talk of innate , either speculative , or practical , principles , it may , with as much probability , be said , that a man hath a l. sterling in his pocket , and yet deny that he hath there either penny , shilling , crown , or any other coin , out of which the sum is to be made up ; as to think , that certain propositions are innate , when the idea's about which they are , can by no means be supposed to be so . the general reception and assent that is given , doth not at all prove , that the idea's expressed in them , are innate : for in many cases , however the idea's came there , the assent to words expressing the agreement , or disagreement , of such idea's , will necessarily follow . every one that hath a true idea of god , and worship , will assent to this proposition , that god is to be worshipped , when expressed in a language he understands : and every rational man , that hath not thought on it to day , may be ready to assent to this proposition to morrow ; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one , or both , of those idea's to day : for if we will allow savages , and most country-people , to have idea's of god and worship ( which conversation with them , will not make one forward to believe ) yet , i think , few children can be supposed to have those idea's , which therefore they must begin to have sometime or other ; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition , and make very little question of it ever after . but such an assent upon hearing , no more proves the ideas to be innate , than it does , that one born blind ( with cataracts , which will be couched to morrow ) had the innate ideas of the sun , or light , or saffron , or yellow ; because when his sight is cleared , he will certainly assent to this proposition , that the sun is lucid , or that saffron is yellow : and therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate , it can much less the propositions made up of those ideas . if they have any innate ideas , i would be glad to be told , what , and how many they are . § . . besides what i have already said , there is another reason , why i doubt , that neither these , nor any other principles are innate . i that am fully perswaded , that the infinitely wise god made all things in perfect wisdom , cannot satisfie my self , why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men , some universal principles ; whereof those that are pretended innate , and concern speculation , are of no great use ; and those that concern practice , not self-evident ; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths , not allowed to be innate . for to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind , by the finger of god , which are not clearer there , than those which are afterwards introduced , or cannot be distinguish'd from ? if any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions , which by their clearness and usefulness , are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind , and acquired , it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us , which they are ; and then every one will be a fit judge , whether they be so , or no. since if there be such innate idea's and impressions , plainly different from all our other perceptions and knowledge , every one will find it true in himself . of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims , i have spoken already ; of their usefulness , i shall have occasion to speak more hereafter . § . . to conclude , some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all mens understandings ; and some sorts of truths result from any ideas , as soon as the mind puts them into propositions : other truths require a train of ideas placed in order , a due comparing of them , and deductions made with attention , before they can be discovered , and assented to . some of the first sort , because of their general and easie reception , have been mistaken for innate : but the truth is , ideas and notions are no more born with us , than arts and sciences ; though some of them , indeed , offer themselves to our faculties , more readily than others ; and therefore are more generally received ; though that too , be according as the organs of our bodies , and powers of our minds , happen to be employ'd ; god having fitted men with faculties and means , to discover , observe , and retain truths , accordingly as they are employ'd . the great difference that is to be found in the notion of mankind , is , from the different use they put their faculties to , whilst some ( and those the most ) taking things upon trust , misemploy their power of assent , by lazily enslaving their minds , to the dictates and dominion of others , in doctrines , which it is their duty carefully to examine ; and not blindly , with an implicit saith , to swallow : others employing their thoughts only about some few things , grow acquainted sufficiently with them , attain great degrees of knowledge in them , and are ignorant of all other , having never let their thoughts loose , in the search of other enquiries . thus , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , is a truth , as certain as any thing can be ; and i think more evident , than many of those propositions that go for principles ; and yet there are millions , however expert in other things , know not this at all , because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles : and he that certainly knows this proposition , may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions , in mathematicks it self , which are as clear and evident as this ; because , in his search of those mathematical truths , he stopp'd his thoughts short , and went not so far . the same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity ; for though there be no truth , which a man may more evidently make out to himself , than the existence of a god , yet he that shall content himself with things , as he finds them , in this world , as they minister to his pleasures and passions , and not make enquiry a little farther into their causes , ends , and admirable contrivances , and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention , may live long without any notion of such a being : and if any person hath , by talk , put such a notion into his head , he may , perhaps , believe it : but if he hath never examined it , his knowledge of it will be no perfecter , than his , who having been told , that the three angles of a triangle , are equal to two right ones , takes it upon trust , without examining the demonstration ; and may yield his assent as to a probable opinion , but hath no knowledge of the truth of it ; which yet his faculties , if carefully employ'd , were able to make clear and evident to him . but this only by the by , to shew how much our knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us , and how little upon those innate principles , which are in vain supposed to be in all mankind , for their direction ; which all men could not but know , if thy were there , or else they would be there to no purpose . § . . what censure , doubting thus of innate principles , may deserve from men who will be apt to call it , pulling up the old foundation of knowledge and certainty , i cannot tell : i perswade my self , at least , that the way i have pursued , being conformable to truth , lays those foundations surer . this i am certain , i have not made it my business , either to quit , or follow , any authority in the ensuing discourse : truth has been my only aim ; and where-ever that has appeared to lead , my thoughts have impartially followed , without minding , whether the footsteps of any other lay that way , or no. not that i want a due respect to other mens opinions ; but after all , the greatest reverence is due to truth ; and , i hope , it will not be thought arrogance , to say , that , perhaps , we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge , if we sought it in the fountain , in the consideration of things themselves ; and made use rather of our own thoughts , than other mens to find it : for , i think , we may as rationally hope to see with other mens eyes , as to know by other mens understandings . so much as we our selves consider and comprehend of truth and reason , so much we possess of real and true knowledge . the floating of other mens opinions in our brains , makes us not one jot the more knowing , though they happen to be true . what in them was science , is in us but opiniatrity , whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names , and do not , as they did , employ our own reason to understand those truths , which gave them reputation . aristotle was certainly a knowing man , but no body ever thought him so , because he blindly embraced , and confidently vented the opinions of another . and if the taking up of another's principles , without examining them , made not him a philosopher , i suppose it can make no body else so . in the sciences , every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends : what he believes only , and takes upon trust , are but shreads ; which however well in the whole piece , make no considerable addition to his stock , who gathers them . such borrowed wealth , like fairy-money , though it were gold in the hand from which he received it , will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use . § . . when men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of , as soon as understood , it was , i know , a short and easie way to conclude them innate . this being once received , it eased the lazy from the pains of search , and stopp'd the enquiry of the doubtful , concerning all that was once stiled innate : and it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers , to make this the principle of principles , that principles must not be questioned : for having once established this tenet , that there are innate principles , it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such , which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment , and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust , without farther examination : in which posture of blind credulity , they might be more easily governed by , and made useful to some sort of men , who had the skill and office to principle and guide them . nor is it a small power it gives one man over another , to have the authority to be the dictator of principles , and teacher of unquestionable truths ; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle , which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them . whereas had they examined the ways , whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths , they would have found them to result in the minds of men , from the being of things themselves , when duely considered ; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties , that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them , when duely employ'd about them . § . . to shew how the vnderstanding proceeds herein , is the design of the following discourse ; which i shall proceed to , when i have first premised , that hitherto to clear my way to those foundations , which , i conceive are the only true ones , whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge , it hath been necessary for me to give you an account of the reasons i had to doubt of innate principles : and since the arguments which are against them , do , some of them , rise from common received opinions , i have been forced to take several things for granted , which is hardly avoidable to any one , whose task it is to shew the falshood , or improbability , of any tenet ; it happening in controversial discourses , as it does in assaulting of towns ; where , if the ground be but firm , whereon the batteries are erected , there is no farther enquiry of whom it is borrowed , nor whom it belongs to , so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose . but in the future part of this discourse , designing to raise an edifice uniform , and consistent with it self , as far as my own experience and observation will assist me , i hope , to lay the foundation so , that the rest will easily depend upon it : and i shall not need to shore it up with props and buttrices , leaning on borrowed or begg'd foundations : or at least , if mine prove a castle in the air , i will endeavour it shall be all of a piece , and hang together . wherein i tell you before-hand , you are not to expect undeniable , cogent demonstrations , unless you will suffer me , as others have done , to take my principles for granted ; and then , i doubt not , but i can demonstrate too . all that i shall say for the principles i proceed on , is , that i can only appeal to mens own unprejudiced experience , and observations , whether they be true , or no ; and this is enough for a man who professes no more , than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures , concerning a subject not very obvious , without any other design , than an unbiass'd enquiry after truth . book ii. chap. i. of ideas in general , and their original . § . . every man being conscious to himself , that he thinks , and that which his mind is employ'd about whilst thinking , being the ideas , that are there , 't is past doubt , than men have in their minds several ideas , such as are those expressed by the words , whiteness , hardness , sweetness , thinking , motion , man , elephant , army , drunkenness , and others : it is in the first place then to be enquired , how he comes by them ? i know it is a received doctrine , that men have native ideas , and original characters stamped upon their minds , in their very first being . this opinion i have at large examined already ; and , i suppose , what i have said in the fore-going book , will be much more easily admitted , when i have shewed , whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has , and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind ; for which i shall appeal to every one 's own observation and experience . § . . let us then suppose the mind to be , as we say , white paper , void of all characters , without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? whence comes it by that vast store , which the busie and boundless fancy of man has painted on it , with an almost endless variety ? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? to this i answer , in one word , from experience : in that , all our knowledge is founded ; and from that it ultimately derives it self . our observation employ'd either about external , sensible objects ; or about the internal operations of our minds , perceived and reflected on by our selves , is that , which supplies our vnderstandings with all the materials of thinking . these two are the fountains of knowledge , from whence all the ideas we have , or can naturally have , do spring . § . . first , our senses , conversant about particular , sensible objects , do convey into the mind , several distinct perceptions of things , according to those various ways , wherein those objects do affect them : and thus we come by those ideas , we have of yellow , white , heat , cold , soft , hard , bitter , sweet , and all those which we call sensible qualities . this great source , of most of the ideas we have , depending wholly upon our senses , and derived by them to our understanding , i call sensation . § . . secondly , the other fountain , from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas , is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us , as it is employ'd about the idea's it has got ; which operations , when the soul comes to reflect on , and consider , do furnish the understanding with another sett of ideas , which could not be had from things without ; and such are , perception , thinking , doubting , believing , reasoning , knowing , willing , and all the different actings of our own minds ; which we being conscious of , and observing in our selves , do from these receive into our understanding , as distinct ideas , as we do from bodies affecting our senses . this source of ideas , every man has wholly in himself : and though it be not sense , as having nothing to do with external objects ; yet it is very like it , and might properly enough be call'd internal sense . but as i call the other sensation , so i call this reflection , the ideas it affords being such only , as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within it self . by reflection then , in the following part of this discourse , i would be understood to mean , that notice which the mind takes of its own operations , and the manner of them , by reason whereof , there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding . these two , i say , viz. external , material things , as the objects of sensation ; and the operations of our own minds within , as the objects of reflection , are , to me , the only originals , from whence all our idea's take their beginnings . the term operations here , i use in a large sence , as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas , but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them , such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought . § . . the understanding seems to me , not to have the least glimmering of any ideas , which it doth not receive from one of these two : eternal objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities , which are all those different perceptions they produced in us : and the mind furnishes the vnderstanding with ideas of its own operations . these , when we have taken a full survey of them , and their several modes , and the compositions made out of them , we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas ; and that we have nothing in our minds , which did not come in , one of these two ways . let any one examine his own thoughts , and throughly search into his understanding , and then let him tell me , whether all the original ideas he has there , are any other than of the objects of his senses , or of the operations of his mind , considered as objects of his reflection : and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there , he will , upon taking a strict view , see that he has not any idea in his mind , but what one of those two have imprinted ; though , perhaps , with infinite variety compounded and enlarged , by the understanding , as we shall see hereafter . § . . he that attentively considers the state of a child , at his first coming into the world , will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas , that are to be the matter of his future knowledge . 't is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them : and though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities , imprint themselves , before the memory begins to keep a register of time and order , yet 't is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way , that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them : and if it were worth while , no doubt a child might be so ordered , as to have but a very few , even of the ordinary ideas , till he were grown up to a man. but being surrounded with bodies , that perpetually and diversly affect us , variety of idea's , whether care be taken about it , or no , are imprinted on the minds of children . light , and colours , are busie and at hand every-where , when the eye is but open ; sounds , and some tangible qualities , fail not to sollicite their proper senses , and force an entrance to the mind ; but yet , i think , it will be granted easily , that if a child were kept in a place , where he never saw any other but black and white , till he were a man , he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green , than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster , or a pine-apple , has of those particular relishes . § . . men then come to be furnished , with sewer or more simple ideas from without , according as the objects , they converse with afford greater or lesser variety ; and from the operation of their minds within , according as they more or less reflect on them . for , though he that contemplates the operations of his mind , cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them ; yet unless he turn his thoughts that way , and considers them attentively , he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind , and all that may be observed therein , than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape , or of the parts and motions of a clock , who will not turn his eyes to it , and with attention heed all the parts of it . the picture , or clock may be so placed , that they may come in his way every day ; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of , till he applies himself with attention , to consider them each in particular . § . . and hence we see the reason , why 't is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds ; and some have not any very clear , or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives . because , though they pass there continually ; yet like floating visions , they make not deep impressions enough , to leave in the mind clear and distinct , lasting ideas , till the understanding turn inwards upon its self , and reflect on its own operations , and make them the object of its own contemplation . whereas children at their first coming into the world , seek particularly after nothing , but what may ease their hunger , or other pain : but take all other objects as they come , are generally pleased with all new ones , that are not painful ; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations , seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them , till they come to be of riper years ; and some scarce ever at all . § . . to ask , at what time a man has first any ideas , is to ask , when he begins to perceive , having ideas and perception being the same thing . i know it is an opinion , that the soul always thinks , and that it has the actual perception of ideas in its self constantly , as long as it exists ; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul , as actual extension is from the body ; which if true , to enquire after the beginning of a man's idea's , is the same , as to enquire after the beginning of his soul. for by this account , soul and ideas , as body and extension , will begin to exist both at the same time . § . . but whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to , or coeval with , or some time after the first rudiments of organisation , or the beginnings of life in the body , i leave to be disputed by those , who have better thought of that matter . i confess my self , to have one of those dull souls , that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate its ideas , nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think , than for the body always to move : the perception of idea's , being ( as i conceive ) to the soul , what motion is to the body , not its essence , but operation : and therefore , though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul ; yet it is not necessary , to suppose , that it should be always thinking , always in action . that , perhaps , is the privilege of the infinite author and preserver of all things , who never slumbers nor sleeps ; but is not competent to any finite being , at least not to the soul of man. we know certainly by experience , that we sometimes think , and thence draw this infallible consequence , that there is something in us , that has a power to think : but whether that substance perpetually thinks , or no , we can be no farther assured , than experience informs us . for to say , that actual thinking is essential to the soul , and inseparable from it , is , to beg what is in question , and not to prove it by reasons ; which is necessary to be done , if it be not a self-evident proposition . but whether this , that the soul always thinks , be a self-evident proposition , that every body assents to at first hearing , i appeal to mankind . § . . i grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought , because it is the condition of being awake : but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man , mind as well as body , may be worth a waking man's consideration ; it being hard to conceive , that any thing should think , and not be conscious of it . if the soul doth think in a sleeping man , without being conscious of it , i ask , whether , during such thinking , it has any pleasure or pain , or be capable of happiness or misery ? i am sure the man is not , no more than the bed or earth he lies on . for to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it , seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible . or if it be possible , that the soul can , whilst the body is sleeping , have its thinking , enjoyments , and concerns ; its pleasure or pain apart , which the man is not conscious of , nor partakes in , it is certain , that socrates asleep , and socrates awake , is not the same person ; but his soul when he sleeps , and socrates the man consisting of body and soul when he is waking , are two persons : since waking socrates , has no knowledge of , or concernment for that happiness , or misery of his soul , which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps , without perceiving any thing of it , no more than he has for the happiness , or misery of a man in the indies , whom he knows not . for if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations , especially of pleasure and pain , and the concernment that accompanies it , it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity . § . . the soul , during sound sleep , thinks , say these men. whilst it thinks and perceives , it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble , as well as any other perceptions ; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions . but it has all this a part : the sleeping man , 't is plain , is conscious of nothing of all this . let us suppose then the soul of castor , whilst he is sleeping , retired from his body , which is no impossible supposition for the men i have here to do with , who so liberally allow life , without a thinking soul to all other animals . these men cannot then judge it is impossible , or a contradiction , that the body should live without the soul ; nor that the soul subsists and thinks , or has perception , even perception of happiness or misery , without the body . let us then , as i say , suppose the soul of castor separated , during his sleep , from his body , to think apart . let us suppose too , that it chooses for its scene of thinking , the body of another man , v. g. pollux , who is sleeping without a soul : for if castor's soul , can think whilst castor is asleep , what castor is never conscious of , 't is no matter what place it chooses to think in . we have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them , which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns ; and the soul still thinking in the waking man , whereof the sleeping man is never conscious , has never the least perception . i ask then , whether castor and pollux , thus , with only one soul between them , which thinks and perceives in one , what the other is never conscious of , nor is not concerned for , are not two as distinct persons , as castor and hercules ; or , as socrates , and plato were ? and whether one of them might not be very happy , and the other very miserable ? just by the same reason , they make the soul and the man two persons , who make the soul think apart , what the man is not conscious of . for , i suppose , no body will make identity of persons , to consist in the soul 's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter : for if that be necessary to identity , 't will be impossible , in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies , that any man should be the same person , two days , or two moments together . § . . thus , methinks , every drousie nod shakes their doctrine , who teach , that the soul is always thinking . those , at least , who do at any time sleep without dreaming , can never be convinced , that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busie without their knowing of it ; and if they are taken in the very act , waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation , can give no manner of account of it . § . . 't will perhaps be said , that the soul thinks , even in the soundest sleep , but the memory retains it not . that the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busie a thinking , and the next moment in a waking man , not remember , nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts , is very hard to be conceived , and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed . for who can without any more ado , but being barely told so , imagine , that the greatest part of men , do , during all their lives , for several hours every day , think of something , which if they were asked , even in the middle of these thoughts , they could remember nothing at all of ? most men , i think , pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming . i once knew a man , that was bred a scholar , and had no bad memory , who told me , he had never dream'd in his life , till he had that fever , he was then newly recovered of , which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. i suppose the world affords more such instances : at least every ones acquaintance , will furnish him with examples enough of such , as pass most of their nights without dreaming . § . . to think often , and never to retain it so much as one moment , is a very useless sort of thinking : and the soul in such a state of thinking , does very little , if at all , excel that of a looking-glass , which constantly receives variety of images , or ideas , but retains none ; they disappear and vanish , and there remain no footsteps of them ; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas , nor the soul for such thoughts . perhaps it will be said , that in a waking man , the materials of the body are employ'd , and made use of , in thinking ; and that the memory of thoughts , is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain , and the traces there left after such thinking ; but that in the thinking of the soul , which is not perceived in a sleeping man , there the soul thinks apart , and making no use of the organs of the body , leaves no impressions on it , and consequently no memory of such thoughts . not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons , which follows from this supposition , i answer farther , that whatever ideas the mind can receive , and contemplate without the help of the body , it is reasonable to conclude , it can retain without the help of the body too , or else the soul , or any separate spirit , will have but little advantage by thinking . if it has no memory of its own thoughts ; if it cannot record them for its use , and be able to recall them upon any occasion ; if it cannot reflect upon what is past , and make use of its former experiences , reasonings , and contemplations , to what purpose does it think ? they who make the soul a thinking thing , at this rate will not make it a much more noble being , than those do , whom they condemn for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of matter . characters drawn on dust , that the first breath of wind effaces ; or impressions made on a heap of atoms , or animal spirits , are altogether as useful , and render the subject as noble , as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking ; that once out of sight , are gone for ever , and leave no memory of themselves behind them . nature never makes excellent things , for mean or no uses : and it is hardly to be conceived , that our infinitely wise creator , should make so admirable a faculty , as the power of thinking , that faculty which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being , to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd , at least ¼ part of its time here , as to think constantly , without remembring any of those thoughts , without doing any good to its self or others , or being any way useful to any other part of the creation . if we will examine it , we shall not find , i suppose , the motion of dull and sensless matter , any where in the universe , made so little use of , and so wholly thrown away . § . . 't is true , we have sometimes instances of perception , whilst we are asleep , and retain the memory of those thoughts : but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are ; how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being , those who are acquainted with dreams , need not be told . this i would willingly be satisfied in , whether the soul , when it thinks thus apart , and as it were separate from the body , acts less rationally then , when conjointly with it , or no : if its separate thoughts be less rational , then these men must say , that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body : if it does not , 't is a wonder that our dreams should be , for the most part , so frivolous and irrational ; and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations . § . . those who so confidently tell us , that the soul always actually thinks , i would they would also tell us , what those ideas are , that are in the soul of a child , before , or just at the union with the body , before it hath received any by sensation . the dreams of sleeping men , are , as i take it , all made up of the waking man's ideas , though , for the most part , oddly put together . 't is strange , if the soul has ideas of its own , that it derived not from sensation or reflection , ( as it must have , if it thought before it received any impressions from the body ) that it should never , in its private thinking , ( so private , that the man himself perceives it not ) retain any of them , the very moment it wakes out of them , and then make the man glad with new discoveries . who can find it reason , that the soul should , in its retirement , during sleep , have so many hours thoughts , and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from sensation or reflection , or at least preserve the memory of none , but such , which being occasioned from the body , must needs be less natural to a spirit ? 't is strange , the soul should never once in a man's whole life , recal over any of its pure , native thoughts , and those ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the body ; never bring into the waking man's view , any other ideas , but what have a tangue of the cask , manifestly derive their original from that union . if it always thinks , and so had ideas before it was united , or before it received any from the body , 't is not to be supposed , but that during sleep , it recollects its native ideas , and during that retirement from communicating with the body , whilst it thinks by it self , the ideas it is busied about , should be sometimes , at least those more natural and congenial ones had in it self , underived from the body , or its own operations about them , which since the waking man never remembers , we must from this hypothesis conclude , that memory belongs only to ideas , derived from the body , and the operations of the mind about them , or else that the soul remembers something that the man does not . § . . i would be glad also to learn from these men , who so confidently pronounce , that the humane soul , or , which is all one , that a man always thinks , how they come to know it ; nay , how they come to know that they themselves think , when they themselves do not perceive it . this , i am afraid , is to be sure , without proofs ; and to know , without perceiving : 't is , i suspect , a confused notion , taken up to serve an hypothesis ; and none of those clear truths , that either their own evidence force us to admit , or common experience makes it impudence to deny . for the most that can be said of it , is , that 't is possible the soul may always think , but not always retain it in memory : and , i say , it is as possible , that the soul may not always think ; and much more probable , that it should sometimes not think , than that it should often think , and that a long while together , and not be conscious to it self the next moment after , that it had thought . § . . to suppose the soul to think , and the man not perceive it , is , as has been said , to make two persons in one man : and if one consider well these mens way of speaking , one shall be lead into a suspicion , that they do so . for they who tell us , that the soul always thinks , do never , that i remember , say , that a man always thinks . can the soul think , and not the man ? or a man think , and not be conscious of it ? this , perhaps , would be suspected of iargon in others . if they say , the man thinks always , but is not always conscious of it ; they may as well say , his body is extended , without having parts . for 't is altogether as intelligible to say , that any thing is extended without parts , as that any thing thinks , without being conscious of it ; without perceiving , that it does so . they who talk thus , may , with as much reason , if it be necessary to their hypothesis , say , that a man is always hungry , but that he does not always feel it : whereas hunger consists in that very sensation , as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks . if they say , that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking ; i ask , how they know it ? consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man 's own mind . can another man perceive , that i am conscious of any thing , when i perceive it not my self ? no man's knowledge here , can go beyond his experience . wake a man out of a sound sleep , and ask him , what he was that moment thinking on . if he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on , he must be a notable diviner of thoughts , that can assure him , that he was thinking : may he not with more reason assure him , he was not asleep ? this is something beyond philosophy ; and it cannot be less than revelation , that discovers to another , thoughts in my mind , when i can find none there my self : and they must needs have a penetrating sight , who can certainly see , that i think , when i cannot perceive it my self , and declare , that i do not ; and yet can see , that a dog , or an elephant , do not think , though they give all the demonstration of it imaginable , except only telling us , that they do so . this some may suspect to be a step beyond the rosecrucians ; it seeming easier to make ones self invisible to others , than to make another's thoughts visible to me , which are not visible to himself . but 't is but defining the soul to be a substance , that always thinks , and the business is done . if such a definition be of any authority , i know not what it can serve for , but to make many men suspect , that they have no souls at all , since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking . for no definitions , that i know , no suppositions of any sect , are of force enough to destroy constant experience ; and , perhaps , 't is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive , that makes so much useless dispute , and noise , in the world. § . . i see no reason therefore to believe , that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on ; and as those are increased , and retained ; so it comes , by exercise , to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it , as well as afterwards , by compounding those ideas , and reflecting on its own operations , it increases its stock as well as facility , in remembring , imagining , reasoning , and other modes of thinking . § . . he that will suffer himself , to be informed by observation and experience , and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature , will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born child , and much fewer of any reasoning at all . and yet it is hard to imagine , that the rational soul should think so much , and not reason at all . and he that will consider , that infants , newly come into the world , spend the greatest part of their time in sleep , and are seldom awake , but when either hunger calls for the teat , or some pain , ( the most importunate of all sensations ) or some other violent idea , forces the mind to perceive , and attend to it , he , i say , who considers this , will , perhaps , find reason to imagine , that a foetus in the mother's womb , differs not much from the state of a vegetable ; but passes the greatest part of its time without perception or thought , doing very little , but sleep in a place , where it needs not seek for food , and is surrounded with liquor , always equally soft , and near of the same temper ; where the eyes have no light , and the ears , so shut up , are not very susceptible of sounds ; and where there is little or no variety , or change of objects to move the senses . § . . follow a child from its birth , and observe the alterations that time makes ; and you shall find , as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas , it comes to be more and more awake ; thinks more , the more it has matter to think on . after some time , it begins to know the objects , which being most familiar with it , have made lasting impressions . thus it comes , by degrees , to know the persons it daily converses with , and distinguish them from strangers ; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it : and so we may observe , how the mind , by degrees , improves in these , and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging , compounding , and abstracting its ideas , and of reasoning about them , and reflecting upon all these , of which , i shall have occasion to speak more hereafter . § . . if it shall be demanded then , when a man begins to have any ideas ? i think , the true answer is , when he first has any sensation . for since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind , before the senses have conveyed any in , i conceive that ideas in the understanding , are coeval with sensation ; which is such an impression or motion , made in some part of the body , as makes it be taken notice of in the understanding . § . . the impressions then , that are made on our senses by outward objects , that are extrinsical to the mind , and its own operations , about these impressions reflected on by its self , as proper objects to be contemplated by it , are , i conceive , the original of all knowledge ; and the first capacity of humane intellect , is , that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it ; either , through the senses , by outward objects ; or by its own operations , when it reflects on them . this is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of any thing , and the ground-work , whereon to build all those notions , which ever he shall have naturally in this world. all those sublime thoughts , which towre above the clouds , and reach as high as heaven its self , take their rise and footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders , in those remote speculations , it may seem to be elevated with , it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas , which sense or reflection , have offered for its contemplation . § . . in this part , the vnderstanding is meerly passive ; and whether or no , it will have these beginnings , and as it were materials of knowledge , is not in its own power . for the objects of our senses , do , many of them , obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds , whether we will or no : and the operations of our minds , will not let us be without , at least some obscure notions of them . no man , can be wholly ignorant of what he does , when he thinks . these simple ideas , when offered to the mind , the vnderstanding can no more refuse to have , nor alter , when they are imprinted , nor blot them out , and make new ones in it self , than a mirror can refuse , alter , or obliterate the images or ideas , which the objects set before it do therein produce . as the bodies that surround us , do diversly affect our organs , the mind is forced to receive the impressions ; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas , that are annexed to them . chap. ii. of simple idea's . § . . the better to understand the nature , manner , and extent of our knowledge , one thing is carefully to be observed , concerning the ideas we have ; and that is , that some of them are simple , and some complex . though the qualities that affect our senses , are , in the things themselves , so united and blended , that there is no separation , no distance between them ; yet 't is plain , the ideas they produce in the mind , enter by the senses simple and unmixed . for though the sight and touch often take in from the same object , at the same time , different ideas ; as a man sees at once motion and colour ; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax : yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject , are as perfectly distinct , as those that come in by different senses . the coldness and hardness , which a man feels in a piece of ice , being as distinct ideas in the mind , as the smell and whiteness of a lily ; or as the taste of sugar , and smell of a rose : and there is nothing can be plainer to a man , than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas ; which being each in it self uncompounded , contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance , or conception in the mind , and is not distinguishable into different ideas . § . . these simple ideas , the materials of all our knowledge , are suggested and furnished to the mind , only by those two ways above mentioned , viz. sensation and reflection . when the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas , it has the power to repeat , compare , and unite them even to an almost infinite variety , and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas . but it is not in the power of the most exalted wit , or enlarged understanding , by any quickness or variety of thought , to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind , not taken in by the ways before mentioned : nor can any force of the understanding , destroy those that are there . the dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding , being much what the same , as it is in the great world of visible things ; wherein his power , however managed by art and skill , reaches no farther , than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand ; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter , or destroying one atome of what is already in being . the same inability , will every one find in himself , who shall go about to fashion in his understanding any simple idea , not received in by his senses , from external objects , or from the operations of his own mind about them . i would have any one try to phansie any taste , which had never affected his palate ; or frame the idea of a scent , he had never smelt : and when he can do this , i will also conclude , that a blind man hath ideas of colours , and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds . § . . this is the reason why , though we cannot believe it impossible to god , to make a creature with other organs , and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things , than those five , as they are usually counted , which he has given to man : yet i think , it is not possible , for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies , howsoever constituted , whereby they can be taken notice of , besides sounds , tastes , smells , visible and tangible qualities . and had mankind been made with but four senses , the qualities then , which are the object of the fifth sense , had been as far from our notice , imagination , and conception , as now any belonging to a sixth , seventh , or eighth sense , can possibly be ; which , whether yet some other creatures , in some other parts of this vast , and stupendious universe , may not have , will be a great presumption to deny . he that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things ; but will consider the immensity of this fabrick , and the great variety , that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it , which he has to do with , may be apt to think , that in other mansions of it , there may be other , and different intelligent beings , of whose faculties , he has as little knowledge or apprehension , as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet , hath of the senses or understanding of a man ; such variety and excellency , being suitable to the wisdom and power of the maker . i have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses ; though , perhaps , there may be justly counted more ; but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose . chap. iii. of ideas of one sense § . . the better to conceive the ideas , we receive from sensation , it may not be amiss for us to consider them , in reference to the different ways , whereby they make their approaches to our minds , and make themselves perceivable by us . first then , there are some , which come into our minds by one sense only . secondly , there are others , that convey themselves into the mind by more senses than one . thirdly , others that are had from reflection only . fourthly , there are some that make themselves way , and are suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection . we shall consider them apart under these several heads : first , there are some ideas , which have admittance only through one sense , which is peculiarly adapted to receive them . thus light and colours , as white , red , yellow , blue ; with their several degrees or shades , and mixtures , as green , scarlet , purple , sea-green , and the rest , come in only by the eyes : all kinds of noises , sounds , and tones only by the ears : the several tastes and smells , by the nose and palate . and if these organs , or the nerves which are the conduits , to convey them from without to their audience in the brain , the mind's presence-room ( as i may so call it ) are any of them so disordered , as not to perform their functions , they have no postern to be admitted by ; no other way to bring themselves into view , and be perceived by the understanding . the most considerable of those , belonging to the touch , are heat and cold , and solidity ; all the rest , consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration , as smooth and rough ; or else more , or less firm adhesion of the parts , as hard and soft , tough and brittle , are obvious enough . § . . i think , it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas , belonging to each sense : nor indeed is it possible , if we would , there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses , than we have names for . the variety of smells , which are as many almost , if not more than species of bodies in the world , do most of them want names . sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas , which in effect , is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing ; though the smell of a rose , and violet , both sweet , are certainly very distinct ideas . nor are the different tastes that are in nature , much better provided with names . sweet , bitter and sowre , harsh and salt , are almost all we have to denominate all the variety of relishes , which are to be found distinct , not only in almost every sort of creatures , but in the different parts of the same plant or animal . the same may be said of colour and sound . i shall therefore in the account of simple ideas , i am here giving , content my self to set down only such , as are most material to our present purpose , or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas , amongst which , i think , i may well account solidity ; which therefore i shall treat of in the next chapter . chap. iv. of solidity . § . . the idea of solidity , we receive by our touch ; and it arises from the resistance we find in body , to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses , till it has left it . there is no idea , which we receive more constantly from sensation , than solidity . whether we move , or rest , in what posture soever we are , we always feel something under us , that supports us , and hinders our farther sinking downwards ; and the bodies we daily handle , make us perceive that whilst they remain between them , they do by an insurmountable force , hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them . that which thus hinders the approach of two bodies , when they are moving one towards another , i call solidity . i will not dispute , whether this acceptation of the word solid be nearer to its original signification , than that which mathematicians use it in : it suffices , that i think , the common notion of solidity will allow , if not justifie , this use of it ; but if any one think it better to call it impenetrability , he has my consent . only i have thought the term solidity , the more proper to express this idea , not only because of its vulgar use in that sense ; but also , because it carries something more of positive in it , than impenetrability , which is negative ; and is , perhaps , more a consequence of solidity , than solidity it self . this of all other , seems the idea most intimately connected with , and essential to body , so as no where else to be found or imagin'd , but only in matter ; which though our senses take no notice of , but in masses of matter of a bulk , sufficient to cause a sensation in us : yet the mind , having once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies , traces it farther , and considers it as well as figure , in the minutest particle of matter , that can exist , and finds it inseparably inherent in body , where-ever , or however modified . § . . this is the idea belongs to body , whereby we conceive it to fill space . the idea of which filling of space , is , that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance , we conceive it so to possess it , that it excludes all other solid substances ; and , will for ever hinder any two other bodies , that move towards one another in a strait line , from coming to touch one another , unless it remove from between them in a line , not parallel to that they move in . this idea of it , the bodies we ordinarily handle sufficiently furnish us with . § . . this resistance , whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space it possesses , is so great , that no force , how great soever , can surmount it . all the bodies in the world , pressing a drop of water on all sides , will never be able to overcome the resistance it will make , as soft as it is , to their approaching one another , till it be removed out of their way : whereby our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space , which is capable neither of resistance nor motion , and the ordinary idea of hardness . for a man may conceive two bodies at a distance , so as they may approach one another , without touching or displacing any solid thing , till their superficies come to meet ; whereby , i think , we have the clear idea of space without solidity . for ( not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body ) i ask , whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone , without any other other succeeding immediately into its place ? which , i think , 't is evident he can ; the idea of motion in one body , no more including the idea of motion in another , than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another . i do not ask , whether bodies do so exist , that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another ? to determine this either way , is to beg the question for or against a vacuum . but my question is , whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved , whilst others are at rest ? and i think , this no one will deny● if so , then the place it deserted , gives us the idea of pure space without solidity , whereinto another body may enter , without either resistance or protrusion of any thing . when the sucker in a pump is drawn , the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same , whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or no ; nor does it imply a contradiction , that upon the motion of one body , another that is only contiguous to it , should not follow it . the necessity of such a motion , is built only on the supposition , that the world is full ; but not on the distinct ideas of space and solidity , which are as different , as resistance and not resistance , protrusion and not protrusion : and that men have ideas of space , without body , their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate , as is shewed in another place . § . . solidity is hereby also differenced from hardness , in that solidity consists in repletion , and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses : but hardness , in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter , making up masses of a sensible bulk ; so that the whole does not easily change its figure . and indeed , hard and soft , are , as apprehended by us , only relative terms , to the constitutions of our bodies ; that being generally call'd hard by us , which will put us to pain , sooner than change figure by the pressure of any part of our bodies ; and that on the contrary , soft , which changes the situation of its parts upon an easie and unpainful touch . but this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves , or of the figure of the whole , gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world , than to the softest ; nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water . for though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble , will more easily approach each other , between which there is nothing but water or air , than if there be an adamant between them : yet it is not , that the parts of the adamant are more solid than those of water , or resist more ; but because the parts of water , being more easily separable from each other , they will by a side motion be more easily removed , and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble : but if they could be kept from making place , by that side-motion , they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble , as much as the diamond ; and 't would be as impossible by any force , to surmount their resistance , as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond . the softest body in the world will as invin●ibly resist the coming together of any two other bodies , if it be not put out of the way , but remain between them , as the hardest that can be found or imagined . he that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water , will quickly find its resistance : and he that thinks , that nothing but bodies , that are hard , can keep his hands from approaching one another , may be pleased to make an experiment , with the air inclosed in a football . § . . by this idea of solidity , is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space . the extension of body , being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid , separable , moveable parts ; and the extension of space , the continuity of unsolid , inseparable , and immoveable parts . vpon the solidity of bodies also , depends their mutual impulse , resistance , and protrusion . of pure space then , and solidity , there are several ( amongst which , i confess my self one ) who persuade themselves , they have clear and distinct ideas ; and that they can think on space , without any thing in it , that resists , or is protruded by body ; whereof they think they have as clear an idea , as of the extension of body , the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies , being equally as clear without , as with the idea of any solid parts between ; and on the other side , that they have the idea of something that fills space , that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies , or resist their motion . if there be others , that have not these two ideas distinct , but confound them , and make but one of them , i know not , how men , who have the same idea , under different names , or different ideas , under the same name , can , in that case , talk with one another , any more than a man , who not being blind , or deaf , has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet , and the sound of a trumpet , could discourse concerning scarlet-colour with the blind man , i mention in another place , who phansied , that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet . § . . if any one ask me , what this solidity is , i send him to his senses to inform him : let him put a flint , or a foot-ball between his hands ; and then endeavour to join them , and he will know . if he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity , what it is , and wherein it consists ; i promise to tell him , what it is , and wherein it consists , when he tells me , what thinking is , or wherein it consists ; or explain to me , what extension or motion is , which , perhaps seems much easier . the simple ideas we have such , as experience teaches them us ; but if beyond that , we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind , we shall succeed no better , than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind , by talking ; and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours . the reason of this , i shall shew in another place . chap. v. of simple ideas of divers senses . the ideas we get by more than one sense , are of space , or extension , figure , rest , and motion : for these make perceivable impressions , both on the eyes and touch ; and we can receive and convey into our minds , the ideas of the extension , figure , motion , and rest of bodies , both by seeing and feeling . but having occasion to speak more at large of these , in another place , i here only enumerate them . chap. vi. of simple ideas of reflection . § . . the mind receiving the ideas , mentioned in the foregoing chapter , from without , when it turns its view inward upon its self , and observes its own actions about those ideas it has , takes from thence other ideas , which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation , as of any of those it received from foreign things . § . . the two great and principal actions of the mind , which are most frequently considered , and which are so frequent , that every one that pleases , may take notice of in himself , are these two : perception , or thinking ; and volition , or willing . the power in the mind of producing these actions we denominate faculties , and are called the vnderstanding , and the will. of some of the modes of these simple ideas of reflection , such as are remembrance , discerning , reasoning , iudging , knowledge , faith , &c. i shall have occasion to speak hereafter . chap. vii . of simple ideas of both sensation and reflection . § . . there be other simple ideas , which convey themselves into the mind , by all the ways of sensation and reflection , viz. pleasure , or delight , and its opposite . pain , or vneasiness . power . existence . vnity . § . . delight , or vneasiness , one or other of them join themselves to almost all our ideas , both of sensation and reflection : and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without , any retired thought of our mind within , which is not able to produce in us pleasure , or pain . by pleasure and pain , i would be understood to signifie , whatsoever delights or molests us ; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds , or any thing operating on our bodies . for whether we call it satisfaction , delight , pleasure , happiness , &c. on the one side ; or uneasiness , trouble , pain , torment , anguish , misery , &c. on the other , they are still but different degrees of the same thing , and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain , delight or uneasiness ; which are the names i shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas . § . . the infinitely wise author of our being , having given us the power over several parts of our bodies , to move or keep them at rest , as we think fit ; and also by the motion of them , to move our selves , and other contiguous bodies , in which consists all the actions of our body : he having also given a power to our minds , in several instances , to chuse amongst its ideas which it will think on , and to pursue the enquiry of this or that subject , with consideration and attention , to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capaple of , he has been pleased to join to several thoughts , and several sensations , a perception of delight . this if it were wholly separated from all our outward sensations , and inward thoughts , we should have no reason to preferr one thought or action , to another ; negligence , to attention ; or motion , to rest. and so we should neither stir our bodies , nor employ our minds , but let our thoughts ( if i may so call it ) run a drift without any direction or design , and suffer the ideas of our minds , like unregarded shadows , to make their appearances there , as it happen'd , without attending to them . in which state man , however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will , would be a very idle , unactive creature , and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick dream . it has therefore pleased our wise creator , to annex to several objects , and the ideas we receive from them , as also to several of our thoughts , a concomitant pleasure , and that in several objects , to several degrees , that those faculties he had endowed us with , might not remain wholly idle , and unemploy'd by us . § . . pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work , that pleasure has , we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that , as to pursue the other : only this is worth our consideration , that it is often produced by the same objects and ideas , that produce pleasure in us . this their near conjunction , which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure , gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our maker , who designing the preservation of our being , has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies , to warn us of the harm they will do , and as advices to withdraw from them . but he , not designing our preservation barely , but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection , hath , in many cases , annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us . thus heat , that is very agreeable to us in one degree , by a little greater increase of it , proves no ordinary torment : and the most pleasant of all sensible objects , light it self , if there be too much of it ; if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes , causes a very painful sensation . which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature , that when any object does , by the vehemence of its operation , disorder the instruments of sensation , whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate , we might by the pain , be warned to withdraw , before the organ be quite put out of order , and so be unfitted for its proper sunctions for the future . the consideration of those objects that produce it , may well perswade us , that this is the end or use of pain . for though great light be insufferable to our eyes , yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them : because that causing no disorderly motion in it , leaves that curious organ unharm'd , in its natural state . but yet excess of cold , as well as heat , pains us : because it is equally destructive to that temper , which is necessary to the preservation of life , and the exercise of the several functions of the body , which consists in a moderate degree of warmth ; or , if you please , a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies , confined within certain bounds . § . . beyond all this , we may find another reason why god hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain , in all the things that environ and affect us ; and blended them together , in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with ; that we finding imperfection , dissatisfaction , and want of compleat happiness , in all the enjoyments of the creatures can afford us , might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him , with whom there is fulness of joy , and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore . § . . though what i have here said , may not , perhaps , make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us , than our own experience does , which is the only way that we are capable of having them ; yet the consideration of the reason , why they are annexed to so many other ideas , serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the soveraign disposer of all things , may not be unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries : the knowledge and veneration of him , being the chief end of all our thoughts , and the proper business of all understandings . § . . existence and vnity , are two other ideas , that are suggested to the understanding , by every object without , and every idea within . when ideas are in our minds , we consider them as being actually there , as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is , that they exist , or have existence : and whatever we can consider as one thing , whether a real being , or idea , suggests to the understanding , the idea of vnity . § . . power also is another of those simple ideas , which we receive from sensation and reflection . for observing in our selves , that we do , and can think● and that we can , at pleasure , move several parts of our bodies which were at rest ; the effects also , that natural bodies are able to produce in one another , occuring every moment to our senses , we both these ways get the idea of power . § . . besides these , there is another idea , which though suggested by our senses , yet is more constantly offered us , by what passes in our own minds ; and that is the idea of succession . for if we will look immediately into ourselves , and reflect on what is observable there , we shall find our ideas always , whilst we are awake , or have any thought passing in train , one going , and another coming , without intermission . § . . these , if they are not all , are at least ( as i think ) the most considerable of those simple ideas which the mind has , and out of which are made all its other knowledge ; all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection . nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in , which takes its flight farther than the stars , and cannot be confined by the limits of the world ; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of matter , and makes excursions into that incomprehensible inane . i grant all this , but desire any one to assign any simple idea , which it received not from one of those inlets before-mentioned , or any complex idea not made out of those simple ones . nor will it be so strange , to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought , or largest capacity ; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge , and more various phansies and opinions of all mankind , if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of letters ; or if going one step farther , we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made , with barely one of these ideas , viz. number , whose stock is inexhaustible , and truly infinite● and what a large and immense field , doth excursion alone afford the mathematicians ? chap. viii . some farther considerations concerning our simple ideas . § . . concerning the simple ideas of sensation 't is to be considered , that whatsoever is so constituted in nature , as to be able , by affecting our senses , to cause any perception in the mind , doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea ; which , whatever be the external cause of it , when it comes to be taken notice of , by our discerning faculty , it is by the mind looked on and considered there , to be a real positive idea in the understanding , as much as any other whatsoever ; though , perhaps , the cause of it be but a privation in the subject . § . . thus the idea of heat and cold , light and darkness , white and black , motion and rest , are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind ; though , perhaps , some of the causes which produce them , are barely privations in those subjects , from whence our senses derive those ideas . these the understanding , in its view of them , considers all as distinct positive ideas , without taking notice of the causes that produce them : which is an enquiry not belonging to the idea , as it is in the understanding ; but to the nature of the things existing without us . these are two very different things , and carefully to be distinguished ; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black , and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be , and how ranged in the superficies to make any object appear white or black . § . . a painter , or dyer , who never enquired into their causes , hath the ideas of white and black , and other colours , as clearly , perfectly , and distinctly , in his understanding , and perhaps more distinctly than the philosopher , who hath busied himself in considering their natures , and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative ; and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind , than that of white , however the cause of that colour in the external object , may be only a privation . § . . if it were the design of my present undertaking , to enquire into the natural causes and manner of perception , i should offer this as a reason , why a privative cause might , in some cases at least , produce a positive idea , viz. that all sensation being produced in us , only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits , variously agitated by external objects , the abatement of any former motion , must as necessarily produce a new sensation , as the variation or increase of it ; and so introduce a new idea , which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ . § . . but whether this be so , or no , i will not here determine , but appeal to every one 's own experience , whether the shadow of a man , though it consists of nothing but the absence of light ( and the more the absence of light is , the more discernible is the shadow ) does not , when a man looks on it , cause as clear and positive an idea in his mind , as a man himself , though covered over with clear sunshine ? and the picture of a shadow , is a positive thing . indeed , we have negative names , to which there be no positive ideas ; but they consist wholly in negation of some certain ideas , as silence , invisible ; but these signifie not any ideas in the mind , but their absence . § . . and thus one may truly be said to see darkness . for supposing a hole perfectly dark , from whence no light is reflected , 't is certain one may see the figure of it , or it may be painted ; and whether the ink , i write with , make any other idea , is a question . the privative causes i have here assigned of positive ideas , are according to the common opinion ; but in truth it will be hard to determine , whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause , till it be determined , whether rest be any more a privation , than motion . § . . to discover the nature of our ideas the better , and to discourse of them intelligibly , it will be convenient to distinguish them , as they are ideas , or perceptions in our minds ; and as they are in the bodies , that cause such perceptions in us ; that sowe may not think ( as perhaps usually is done ) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject ; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us , than the names that stand for them , are the likeness of our ideas , which yet upon hearing , they are apt to excite in us . § . . whatsoever the mind perceives in it self , or is the immediate object of perception , thought , or understanding , that i call idea ; and the power to produce any idea in our mind , i call quality of the subject wherein that power is . thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white , cold , and round , the powers to produce those ideas in us , as they are in the snow-ball , i call qualities ; and as they are sensations , or perceptions , in our underwandings , i call them ideas : which ideas , if i speak of sometimes , as in the things themselves , i would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us . § . . concerning these qualities , we may , i think , observe these primary ones in bodies , that produce simple ideas in us , viz. solidity , extension , motion or rest , number and figure . § . . these , which i call original or primary qualities of body , are wholly inseparable from it ; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers , all the force can be used upon it , it constantly keeps ; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter , which has bulk enough to be perceived , and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter , though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our senses . v. g. take a grain of wheat , divide it into two parts , each part has still solidity , extension , figure , and mobility ; divide it again , and it retains still the same qualities ; and so divide it on , till the parts become insensible , they must retain still each of them all those qualities . for division ( which is all that a mill , or pestle , or any other body , does upon another , in reducing it to insensible parts ) can never take away either solidity , extension , figure , or mobility from any body , but only makes two distinct bodies , or more , of one , which altogether after division have their certain number . § . . the next thing to be considered , is , how bodies operate one upon another , and that is manifestly by impulse , and nothing else . it being impossible to conceive , that body should operate on what it does not touch , ( which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not ) or when it does touch , operate any other way than by motion . § . . if then bodies cannot operate at a distance ; if external objects be not united to our minds , when they produce ideas in it ; and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them , as singly fall under our senses , 't is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves , or animal spirits , by some parts of our bodies , to the brains , the seat of sensation , there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them . and since the extension , figure , number , and motion of bodies of an observable bigness , may be perceived at a distance by the sight , 't is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes , and thereby convey to the brain some motion , which produces these ideas we have of them in us . § . . after the same manner , that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us , we may conceive , that the ideas of secundary qualities are also produced , viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses . for it being manifest , that there are bodies , and good store of bodies , each whereof is so small , that we cannot , by any of our senses , discover either their bulk , figure , or motion , as is evident in the particles of the air and water , and other extreamly smaller than those , perhaps , as much less than the particles of air , or water , as the particles of air , or water , are smaller than pease or hail-stones . let us suppose at present , that the different motions and figures , bulk , and number of such particles , affecting the several organs of our senses , produce in us those different sensations , which we have from the colours and smells of bodies , v. g. a violet , by which impulse of those insensible particles of matter of different figures and bulks , and in a different degree and modification , we may have the ideas of the blue colour , and sweet scent of a violet produced in our minds . it being no more conceived impossible , to conceive , that god should annex such ideas to such motions , with which they have no similitude ; than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel , dividing our flesh , with which that idea hath no resemblance . § . . what i have said concerning colours and smells , may be understood also of tastes , and sounds , and other the like sensible qualities ; which , whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them , are in truth nothing in the objects themselves , but powers to produce various sensations in us , and depend on those primary qualities , viz. bulk , figure , texture , and motion of parts ; and therefore i call them secundary qualities . § . . from whence , i think , it is easie to draw this observation , that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies , are resemblances of them , and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves ; but the ideas , produced in us by these secundary qualities , have no resemblance of them at all . there is nothing like our ideas , existing in the bodies themselves . they are in the bodies , we denominate from them , only a power to produce those sensations in us : and what is sweet , blue , or warm in idea , is but the certain bulk , figure , and motion of the insensible parts , in the bodies themselves we call so . § . . flame is denominated , hot and ligh●● snow , white and cold ; and manna , white , and sweet , from the ideas th●● produce in us . which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies , that those ideas are in us , the one the perfect resemblance of the other , as they are in a mirror ; and it would by most men be judged very extravagant , if one should say otherwise . and yet he that will consider , that the same fire , that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth , does at a nearer approach , produce in us the far different sensation of pain , ought to bethink himself , what reason he has to say , that his idea of warmth , which was produced in him by the fire , is actually in the fire ; and his idea of pain , which the same fire produced in him the same way , is not in the fire . why is whiteness and coldness in snow , and pain not when it produces the one and the other idea in us ; and can do neither , but by the bulk , figure , number , and motion of its solid parts . § . . the particular bulk , number , figure , and motion of the parts of fire , or snow , are really in them , whether any ones senses perceive them or no : and therefore they may be called real qualities , they really exist in those bodies . but light , heat , whiteness , or coldness , are no more really in them , than sickness or pain is in manna . take away the sensation of them , let not the eyes see light , or colours , nor the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste , nor the nose smell , and all colours , tastes , odors , and sounds , as they are such particular ideas , vanish and cease , and are reduced to their causes , i. e. bulk , figure , and motion of parts ? § . . a piece of manna of a sensible bulk , is able to produce in us the ideas of a round or square figure ; and by being removed from one place to another , the idea of motion . this idea of motion represents it , as it really is in the manna moving : a circle or square are the same , whether in idea or existence ; in the mind , or in the manna : and this , both motion and figure are really in the manna , whether we take notice of them or no : this every body is ready to agree to . besides , manna by the bulk , figure , texture , and motion of its parts , has a power to produce the sensations of sickness , and sometimes of acute pains , or gripings in us . that these ideas of sickness and pain , are not in the manna , but effects of its operations on us , and are no where , when we feel them not : this also every one readily agrees to . and yet men are hardly to be brought to think , that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna ; which are but the effects of the operations of manna , by the motion , size , and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate , as the pain and sickness caused by manna , are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts , by the size , motion , and figure of its insensible parts ; ( for by nothing else can a body operate , as has been proved : ) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate , and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas , which in it self it has not , as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach , and thereby produce distinct ideas , which in it self it has not . these ideas being all effects of the operations of manna , on several parts of our bodies , by the size , figure , number , and motion of its parts , why those produced by the eyes and palate , should rather be thought to be really in the manna , than those produced by the stomach and guts ; or why the pain and sickness , ideas that are the effects of manna , should be thought to be no-where , when they are not felt ; and yet the sweetness and whiteness , effects of the same manna on other parts of the body , by ways equal as unknown , should be thought to exist in the manna , when they are not seen nor tasted , would need some reason to explain . § . . let us consider the red and white colours in porphyre : hinder light , but from striking on it , and its colours vanish ; it no longer produces any such ideas in us : upon the return of light , it produces these appearances on us again . can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyre , by the presence or absence of light ; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness , are really in porphyre in the light , when 't is plain it has no colour in the dark ? it has , indeed , such a configuration of particles , both night and day , as are apt , by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone , to produce in us the idea of redness , and from others the idea of whiteness : but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time , but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us . § . . pound an almond , and the clear white colour will be altered in to a dirty one , and the sweet tast into an oily one . what real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body , but an alteration of the texture of it ? § . . ideas being thus distinguished and understood , we may be able to give an account , how the same water , at the same time , may produce the idea of cold by one hand , and of heat by the other : whereas it is impossible , that the same water , if those ideas were really in it , should at the same time be both hot and cold. for if we imagine warmth , as it is in our hands , to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves , or animal spirits , we may understand , how it is possible , that the same water may at the same time produce the sensation of heat in one hand , and cold in the other ; which yet figure never does , that never producing the idea of a square by one hand , which has produced the idea of a globe by another . but if the sensation of heat and cold , be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies , caused by the corpuscles of any other body , it is easie to be understood , that if that motion be greater in one hand , than in the other ; if a body be applied to the two hands , which has in its minute particles a greater motion , than in those of one of the hands , and a less , than in those of the other , it will increase the motion of the one hand , and lessen it in the other , and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold , that depend thereon . § . . i have , in what just goes before , been engaged in physical enquiries a little farther than , perhaps , i intended . but it being necessary , to make the nature of sensation a little understood ; and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies , and the ideas produced by them in the mind , to be distinctly conceived , without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them : i hope , i shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy , it being necessary in our present enquiry , to distinguish the primary , and real qualities of bodies , which are always in them , ( viz. solidity , extension , figure , number , and motion , or rest , and are sometimes perceived by us , viz. when the bodies they are in , are big enough singly to be discerned ) from those secundary and imputed qualities , which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones , when they operate , without being distinctly discerned ; whereby we also may come to know what ideas are , and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies , we denominate from them . § . . the qualities then that are in in bodies rightly considered , are of three sorts : first , the bulk , figure , number , situation , and motion , or rest of their solid parts ; these are in them , whether we perceive them or no ; and when they are of that size , that we can discover them , we have by these an idea of the thing , as it is in it self , as is plain in artificial things . these i call primary qualities . secondly , the power that is in any body , by reason of its insensible primary qualities , to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses , and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours , sounds , smells , tasts , &c. these are usually called sensible qualities . thirdly , the power that is in any body , by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities , to make such a change in the bulk , figure , texture , and motion of another body , as to make it operate on our senses , differently from what it did before . thus the sun has a power to make wax white , and fire to make lead fluid . the first of these , as has been said , i think , may be properly called real , original , or primary qualities , because they are in the things themselves , whether they are perceived or no : and upon their different modifications it is , that the secundary qualities depend . the other two , are only powers to act differently upon other things , which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities . § . . but though these two later sorts of qualities , are powers barely , and nothing but powers , relating to several other bodies , and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities ; yet they are generally otherwise thought of . for the second sort , viz. the powers to produce several ideas in us by our senses , are looked upon as real qualities , in the things thus affecting us : but the third sort are call'd , and esteemed barely powers . v. g. the idea of heat , or light , which we receive by our eyes , or touch from the sun , are commonly thought real qualities , existing in the sun , and something more than barely powers in it but when we consider the sun , in reference to wax , which it melts , or blanches , we look upon the whiteness and softness produced in the wax , not as qualities in the sun , but effects produced by powers in it : whilst yet we look on light and warmth to be real qualities , something more than bare powers in the sun. whereas , if rightly considered , these qualities of light and warmth , which are perceptions in me , when i am warmed , or enlightned by the sun , are no otherwise in the sun , than the changes made in the wax , when it is blanched or melted , are in the sun. they are all of them equally powers in the sun , depending on its primary qualities ; whereby it is able in the one case , so to alter the bulk , figure , texture , or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes , or hands , as thereby to produce in me the ideas of light , or heat ; and in the other , it is able so to alter the bulk , figure , texture , or motion of the insensible parts of the wax , as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid . § . . the reason , why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities , and the other only for bare powers , seems to be , because the ideas we have of distinct colours , sounds , &c. containing nothing at all in them , of bulk , figure , or motion , we are not apt to think them the effect of these primary qualities , which appear not to our senses to operate in their production ; and with which , they have not any apparent congruity , or conceivable connexion . hence it is , that we are so forward to imagine , that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves : since sensation discovers nothing of bulk , figure , or motion of parts in their production ; nor can reason shew , how bodies by their bulk , figure , and motions , should produce in the mind the ideas of blue , or yellow , &c. but in the other case , in the operations of bodies , changing the qualities one of another , we plainly discover , that the quality produced , hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it ; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power . for though receiving the idea of heat , or light , from the sun , we are apt to think , 't is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun : yet when we see wax , or a fair face , receive change of colour from the sun , we cannot imagine that to be the reception , or resemblance of any thing in the sun , because we find not those different colours in the sun it self . for our senses , being able to observe a likeness , or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects , we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject , to be an effect of bare power , and not the communication of any quality , which was really in the efficient , when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it . but our senses , not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us , and the quality of the object producing it , we are apt to imagine , that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects , and not the effects of certain powers , placed in the modification of their primary qualities , with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance . § . . to conclude , beside those before mentioned primary qualities in bodies , viz. bulk , figure , extension , number , and motion of their solid parts , all the rest , whereby we take notice of bodies , and distinguish them one from another , are nothing else , but several powers in them , depending on those primary qualities ; whereby they are fitted , either by immediately operating on our bodies , to produce several different ideas in us ; or else by operating on other bodies , so to change their primary qualities , as to render them capable of producing ideas in us , different from what before they did . the former of these , i think , may be called secundary qualities , immediately perceivable : the later , secundary qualities , mediately perceivable . chap. ix . of perception . § . . perception , as it is the first faculty of the mind , exercised about our ideas ; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection , and is by some called thinking in general . though thinking , in the propriety of the english tongue , signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas , wherein the mind is active ; where it with some degree of voluntary attention , considers any thing . for in bare naked perception , the mind is , for the most part , only passive ; and what it perceives , it cannot avoid perceiving . § . . what perception is , every one will know better , by reflecting on what he does himself , when he sees , hears , feels , &c. or thinks , than by any discourse of mine . whoever reflects on what passes in himself in his own mind , cannot miss it : and if he does not reflect , all the words in the world , cannot make him have any notion of it . § . . this is certain , that whatever alterations are made in the body , if they reach not the mind ; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts , if they are not taken notice of within , there is no perception . fire may burn our bodies , with no other effect than it does a billet , unless the motion be continued to the brain ; and there the sense of heat , or idea of pain , be produced in the mind , wherein consists actual perception . § . . how often may a man observe in himself , that whilst his mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some objects ; and curiously surveying some ideas that are there , it takes no notice of impressions , of sounding bodies , which are brought in , though the same alteration be made upon the organ of hearing , that uses to be for the producing the idea of a sound ? a sufficient impulse there may be on the organ ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind , there follows no perception : and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound , be made in the ear , yet no sound is heard . want of sensation in this case , is not through any defect in the organ , or that his ears are less affected than at other times , when he does hear : but that which uses to produce the idea , though conveyed in by the usual organ , not being taken notice of in the understanding , there follows no sensation . so that where-ever there is sense , or perception , there some idea is actually produced , and present in the vnderstanding . § . . therefore i doubt not but children , by the exercise of their senses about objects , that affect them in the womb , receive some few ideas , before they are born , as the unavoidable effects , either of the bodies that environ them , or else of those wants or diseases they suffer ; amongst which , ( if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination ) i think , the ideas of hunger and warmth are two : which probably are some of the first that children have , and which they scarce ever part with again . § . . but though it be reasonable to imagine , that children receive some ideas before they come into the world , yet these simple ideas are far from those innate principles , which some contend for , and we above have rejected . these here mentioned , being the effects of sensation , are only from some affections of the body , which happen to them there , and so depend on something exterior to the mind ; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense , but only in the precedency of time : whereas those innate principles are supposed to be of quite another nature ; not coming into the mind by the accidental alterations in , or operations on the body ; but , as it were , original characters impressed upon it , in the very first moment of its being and constitution . § . . as there are some ideas , which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb , subservient to the necessity of their life , and being there : so after they are born , those ideas are the earliest imprinted , which happen to be the sensible qualities , which first occur to them ; amongst which , light is not the least considerable , nor of the weakest efficacy . and how covetous the mind is , to be furnished with all such ideas , as have no pain accompanying them , may be a little guess'd , by what is observable in children new-born , who always turn their eyes to that part , from whence the light comes , lay them how you please . but the ideas that are most familiar at first , being various , according to the divers circumstances of childrens first entertainment in the world , the order wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind , is very various , and uncertain also ; neither is it much material to know it . § . . we are farther to consider concerning perception , that the ideas we receive by sensation , are often in grown people alter'd by the iudgment , without our taking notice of it . when we set before our eyes a round globe , of any uniform colour , v. g. gold , alabaster , or jet , 't is certain , that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind , is of a flat circle variously shadow'd , with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes . but we having by use been accustomed to perceive , what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us ; what alterations are made in the reflexions of light , by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies , the judgment presently , by an habitual custom , alters the appearances into their causes : so that from that , which truly is variety of shadow or colour , collecting the figure , it makes it pass for a mark of figure , and frames to it self the perception of a convex figure , and an uniform colour ; when the idea we receive from thence , is only a plain variously colour'd , as is evident in painting . § . . but this is not , i think , usual in any of our ideas , but those received by sight : because sight , the most comprehensive of all our senses , conveying to our minds the far different ideas of light and colours , which are peculiar only to that sense ; and also of space , figure , and motion , the several varieties whereof , change the appearances of its proper objects , viz. light and colours , it accustoms it self by use , to judge of the one by the other . this in many cases , by a setled habit , in things whereof we have frequent experience , is performed so constantly , and so quick , that we take that for the perception of our sensation , which is but an idea formed by our judgment ; so that one , viz. that of sensation , serves only to excite the other , and is scarce taken notice of it self ; as a man who reads and hears with attention and understanding , takes little notice of the characters , or sounds , but of the ideas that are excited in him by them . § . . nor need we wonder , that this is done with so little notice , if we consider , how very quick the actions of the mind are performed : for as it self takes up no space , has no extension ; so its actions seem to require no time , but many of them seem to be crouded into an instant . i speak this in comparison to the actions of the body . any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts , who will take the pains to reflect on them . how , as it were in an instant , does our minds , with one glance , see all the parts of a demonstration , which may very well be called along one , if we consider the time it will require to put it into words , and step by step shew it another ? secondly , we shall not be so much surprized , that this is done in us with so little notice , if we consider , how the facility we get of doing things , by a custom of doing , makes them often pass in us , without our notice● habits , especially such as are begun very early , come , at last , to produce actions in us , which often scape our observation . how frequently do we , in a day , cover our eyes with our eye-lids , without perceiving that we are at all in the dark ? men , that by custom have got the use of a by-word , do almost in every sentence , pronounce sounds● which , though taken notice of by others , they themselves neither hear , nor observe . and therefore 't is not so strange , that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation , into that of its judgment , and make one serve only to excite the other , without our taking notice of it . § . . this faculty of perception , seems to me to be that , which puts the distinction betwixt the ●nimal kingdom , and ●he inferior parts of nature . for however vegetables have , many of them , some degrees of motion , and upon the different application of other 〈◊〉 it s to them do very briskly alter their figures and motions , and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants , from a motion , which has some resemblance to that , which in animals follows upon sensation● yet , i suppose , it is all bare mechanism ; and no otherwise produced , than the turning of a wild oat-beard , by the insinuation of the particles of moisture ; or the shortning of a rope , by the affusion of water . all which is done without any sensation in the subject , or the having or receiving any ideas . § . . perception , i believe , is , in some degree , in all sorts of animals ; though in some , possibly , the avenues provided for the reception of sensations , are so few by nature , and the perception , they are received with , so obscure and dull , that it comes extreamly short of the quickness and variety of sensations , which is in other animals ; but yet it is sufficient for , and wisely adapted to the state and condition of that sort of animals , who are thus constituted by nature : so that the wisdom and goodness of the maker , plainly appears in all the parts of this stupendious fabrick , and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it . § . . we may , i think , from the make of an oyster , or cockle , reasonably conclude , that it has not so many , nor so quick senses , as a man , or several other animals ; nor if it had , would it in that state and incapacity of transferring it self from one place to another , be better'd by them . what good would sight and hearing do to a creature , that cannot move it self to or from the objects , wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil ? and would not quickness of sensation , be an inconvenience to an animal , that must lie still , where chance has once placed it ; and there receives the afflux of colder or warmer , clean or foul water , as it happens to come to it ? § . . but yet , i cannot but think , there is some small dull perception , whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility . and that this may be so , we have plain instances , even in mankind it self . take one , in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge , and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with ; and has , by destroying his sight , hearing , and smell quite , and his taste to a great degree , stopp'd up almost all the passages for new ones to enter : or if there be some of the inlets yet half open , the impressions made are scarce perceived , or not at all retained , how far such an one ( notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles ) is in his knowledge , and intellectual faculties , above the condition of a cockle , or an oyster , i leave to be considered . and if a man had passed sixty years in such a state , as 't is possible he might , as well as three days , i wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual perfections , between him and the lowest degrees of animals . perception then being the first step and degree towards knowledge , and the inlet of all the materials of it , the fewer senses any man , as well as any other creature , hath ; and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them ; and the duller the faculties are , that are employed about them , the more remote are they from that knowledge , which is to be found in some men. but this being in great variety of degrees , ( as may be perceived amongst men , ) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals , much less in their particular individuals . it suffices me only to have remarked here , that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties , and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds . and i am apt too , to imagine , that it is perception in the lowest degree of it , which puts the boundaries between animals , and the inferior ranks of creatures . but this i mention only as my conjecture by the bye , it being indifferent to the matter in hand , which way the learned shall determine of it . chap. x. of retention . § . . the next faculty of the mind , whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge , is that i call retention ; or the keeping of those simple ideas , which from sensation or reflection it hath received , which is done two ways ; first , either by keeping the idea , which is brought into it , for some time actually in view , which is called contemplation . § . . the other , is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas ; which after imprinting have disappeared , or have been as it were laid aside out of sight : and thus we do , when we conceive heat or light , yellow or sweet , the object being removed ; and this is memory , which is as it were the store-house of our ideas . for the narrow mind of man , not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once , it was necessary to have a repository , to lay up those ideas ; which at another time it might have use of . and thus it is , by the assistance of the memory , that we are said to have all those ideas in our understanding ; which though we do not actually contemplate , yet we can bring in sight , and make appear again , and be the objects of our thoughts , without the help of those sensible qualities , which first imprinted them there . § . . attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in our memory : but those , which naturally at first make the deepest , and most lasting impression , are those , which are accompanied with pleasure or pain . the great business of the senses , being to make us take notice of what hurts , or advantages the body , it is wisely ordered by nature ( as has been shewn ) that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas ; which supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children ; and acting quicker than consideration in grown men , makes both the young and old avoid painful objects , with that haste , which is necessary for their preservation ; and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future . § . . but concerning the several degrees of lasting , wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory , we may observe , first , that some of them being produced in the understanding , either by the objects affecting the senses once barely , and no more , especially if the mind then otherwise imployed , took but little notice of it , and set not on the stamp deep into it self ; or else , when through the temper of the body , or otherwise , the memory is very weak , such ideas quickly fade , ad vanish quite out of the understanding , and leave it as clear without any foot-steps , or remaining characters , as shadows do flying over fields of corn ; and the mind is as void of them , as if they never had been there . § . . thus many of those ideas , which were produced in the minds of children , in the beginning of their sensation ( some of which , perhaps , as of some pleasures and pains were before they were born , and others in their infancy ) if in the future course of their lives , they are not repeated again , are quite lost , without the least glimpse remaining of them . this may be observed in those , who by some mischance have lost their sight , when they were very young ; in whom the ideas of colours , having been but slightly taken notice of , and ceasing to be repeated , do quite wear out ; so that some years after , there is no more notion , nor memory of colours left in their minds , than in those of people born blind . the memory in some men , 't is true , is very tenacious even , to a miracle : but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas , even those which are struck deepest , and in the minds the most retentive ; so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses , or reflection about those kind of objects , which at first occasioned them , the print wears out , and at last there remains nothing to be seen . thus the ideas , as well as children of our youth , often die before us : and our minds represent to us those tombs , to which we are approaching ; where though the brass and marble remain , yet the inscriptions are effaced by time , and the imagery moulders away . the pictures drawn in our minds , are laid in fading colours ; and if not sometimes refreshed , vanish and disappear . how much the constitution of our bodies are concerned in this ; and whether the temper of the spirits and brain make this difference , that some retain the characters drawn on it like marble , others like free stone , and others little better than sand , i shall not here enquire , though it may seem probable , that the constitution of the body , does sometimes influence the memory ; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas , and the flames of a fever in a few days , calcines all those images to dust and confusion , which seem'd to be as lasting , as if carved in marble . § . . but concerning the ideas themselves , it is easie to remark , that those that are oftenest refreshed ( amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one ) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them , fix themselves best in the memory , and remain clearest and longest there ; and therefore those which are of the original qualities of bodies , viz. solidity , extension , figure , motion , and rest , and those that almost constantly affect our bodies , as heat and cold ; and those which are the affections of all kind of beings , as existence , duration , and number , which almost every object that affects our senses , every thought which imploys our minds , bring along with them : these , i say , and the like ideas , are seldom quite lost , whilst the mind retains any ideas at all . § . . in this secundary perception , as i may so call it , or viewing again the ideas , that are lodg'd in the memory , the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive , the appearance of those dormant pictures , depending sometimes on the will. the mind very often sets it self on work in search of some hidden idea , and turns , as it were , the eye of the soul upon it ; though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord , and offer themselves to the understanding ; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark cells , into open day-light , by some turbulent and tempestuous passion , our affections bringing ideas to our memory , which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded . § . . memory , in an intellectual creature , is necessary in the next degree to perception . it is of so great moment , that where it is wanting , all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless : and we in our thoughts , reasonings , and knowledge , could not proceed beyond present objects , were it not for the assistance of our memories , wherein there may be two defects : first , that it loses the idea quite , and so far it produces perfect ignorance . for since we can know nothing farther , than we have the ideas of it , when they are gone , we are in perfect ignorance . secondly , that it moves slowly , and retrieves not the ideas , that it has , and are laid up in store , quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions . this , if it be to a great degree , is stupidity ; and he , who through this default in his memory , has not the ideas , that are really preserved there , ready at hand , when need and occasion calls for them , were almost as good be without them quite , since they serve him to little purpose . the dull man , who loses the opportunity , whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas , that should serve his turn , is not much more happy in his knowledge , than one that is perfectly ignorant . 't is the business therefore of the memory , to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas , which it has present occasion for , and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions consists , that which we call invention , fancy , and quickness of parts . § . . this faculty of laying up , and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind , several other animals seem to have , to a great degree , as well as man. for to pass by other instances , birds learning of tunes , and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right , put it past doubt with me , that they have perception , and retain ideas in their memories , and use them for patterns . for it seems to me impossible , that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes ( as 't is plain they do ) of which they had no ideas . for tho' i should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits , in the brains of those birds , whilst the tune is actually playing ; and that motion may be continued on to the muscles of the wings ; and so the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises , because this may tend to the birds preservation : yet that can never be supposed a reason , why it should cause mechanically , either whilst the tune was playing , much less after it has ceased , such a motion in the organs of the bird's voice , as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound , which imitation can be of no use to the birds preservation . but , which is more , it cannot with any appearance of reason , be suppos'd ( much less proved ) that birds without sense and memory , can approach their notes nearer and nearer , by degrees , to a tune play'd yesterday ; which if they have no idea of in their memory , is now no-where , nor can be a pattern for them to imitate , or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to . snce there is no reason why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains , which not at first , but by their after-endeavours should produce the like sounds ; and why the sounds they make themselves , should not make traces which they should follow , as well as those of the pipe , is impossible to conceive . chap. xi . of discerning , and other operations of the mind . § . . another faculty we may take notice of in our minds , is that of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has . it is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general . unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects , and their qualities , it would be capable of very little knowledge , though the bodies that affect us , were as busie about us , as they are now , and the mind were continually employ'd in thinking . on this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another , depends the evidence and certainty of several , even very general propositions , which have passed for innate truths ; because men over-looking the true cause , why those propositions find universal assent , impute it wholly to native uniform impressions ; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind , whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same , or different : but of this more hereafter . § . . how much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies , either in the dulness , or faults of the organs of sense ; or want of accuteness , exercise , or attention in the understanding ; or hastiness and precipitancy , natural to some tempers , i will not here examine : it suffices to take notice , that this is one of the operations , that the mind may reflect on , and observe in it self . it is of that consequence to its other knowledge , that so far as this faculty is in it self dull , or not rightly made use of , for the distinguishing one thing from another ; so far our notions are confused , and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled . if in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand , consists quickness of parts ; in this of having them unconfused , and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another , where there is but the least difference , consists , in a great measure , the exactness of judgment , and clearness of reason , which is to be observed in one man above another . and hence , perhaps , may be given some reason of that common observation , that men who have a great deal of wit , and prompt memories , have not always the clearest judgment , or deepest reason . for wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas , and putting those together with quickness and variety , wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity , thereby to make up pleasant pictures , and agreeable visions in the fancy : iudgment , on the contrary , lies quite on the other side , in separating carefully ideas one from another , wherein can be found the least difference , thereby to avoid being misled by similitude , and by affinity to take one thing for another . this is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion , wherein , for the most part , lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit , which strikes so lively on the fancy ; and therefore so accepable to all people , because its beauty appears at first sight , and there is required no labour of thought , to examine what truth or reason there is in it . the mind , without looking any farther , rests satisfied with the pleasantness of the picture , and the gayety of the fancy : and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it , by the severe rules of truth , and good reason ; whereby it appears , that it consists in something , that is not perfectly conformable to them . § . . to the well distinguishing our ideas , it chiefly contributes , that they be clear and determinate : and when they are so , it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them , though the senses should ( as sometimes they do ) convey them from the same object differently , on different occasions , and so seem to err . for though a man in a fever , should from sugar have a bitter taste , which at another time would produce a sweet one ; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind , would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet , as if he had tasted only gall. nor does it make any more confusion between the two ideas of sweet and bitter , that the same sort of body produces at one time one , and at another time another idea , by the taste , than it makes a confusion in the two ideas of white and sweet , or white and round , that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time . and the ideas of orange-colour and azure , that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of lignum nephriticum , are no less distinct ideas , than those of the same colours , taken from two very different bodies . § . . the comparing them one with another , in respect of extent , degrees , time , place , or any other circumstances , is another operation of the mind about its ideas , and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas , comprehended under relation ; which of how vast an extent it is , i shall have occasion to consider hereafter . § . . how far brutes partake in this faculty , is not easie to determine ; i imagine they have it not in any great degree ; for though they probably have several ideas distinct enough , yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of humane understanding , when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas , so as to perceive them to be perfectly different , and so consequently two , to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared . and therefore , i think , beasts compare not their ideas , farther than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves . the other power of comparing , which may be observed in men , belonging to general ideas , and useful only to abstract reasonings , we may probably conjecture beasts have not . § . . the next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas , is composition ; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection , and combines them into complex ones . under this of composition , may be reckon'd also that of enlarging ; wherein though the composition does not so much appear , as in more complex ones , yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together , though of the same kind . thus by adding several unites together , we make the idea of a dozen ; and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches , we frame that of a furlong . § . . in this also , i suppose , brutes come far short of man. for though they take in , and retain together several combinations of simple ideas , as possibly the shape , smell , and voice of his master , make up a complex idea a dog has of him , or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him ; yet , i do not think they do of themselves ever compound them , and make complex ideas : and perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas , 't is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things , which possibly they distinguish less by their sight , than we imagine . for i have been credibly infomed , that a bitch will nurse , play with , and be fond of young foxes , as much as , and in place of her puppies , if you can but get them once to suck her so long , that her milk may go through them . § . . when children have , by repeated sensations , got ideas fixed in their memories , they begin , by degrees , to learn the use of signs : and when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds , they begin to make use of words , to signifie their ideas to others ; which words they sometimes borrow from others , and sometimes make themselves , as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in their first use of language . § . . the use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas , and those ideas being taken from particular things , if every particular idea we take in , should have a distinct name , names must be endless . to prevent this , the mind makes the particular ideas , received from particular objects , to become general ; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances , separate from all other existencies , and the circumstances of real existence , as time , place , or any other concomitant ideas . this is called abstraction , whereby ideas taken from particular beings , become general representatives of all of the same kind ; and their names general names , applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas . such precise , naked appearances in the mind , without considering , how , whence , or with what others they came there , the understanding lays up ( with names commonly annexed to them ) as the standards to rank real existencies into sorts , as they agree with these patterns , and to denominate them accordingly . thus the same colour being observed to day in chalk or snow , which the mind yesterday received from milk , it considers that appearance alone , makes it a representative of all of that kind ; and having given in the name whiteness , it by that found signifies the same quali-wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with ; and thus universals , whether ideas or terms , are made . § . . if it may be doubted , whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way , to any degree : this , i think , i may be positive in , that the power of abstracting , is not at all in them ; and that the having of general ideas , is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt mand and brutes ; and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to . for it is evident , we observe no foot-steps in them , of making use of general signs for universal ideas ; from which we have reason to imagine , that they have not the faculty of abstracting , or making general ideas , since they have no use of words , or any other general signs . § . . nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs , to frame articulate sounds , that they have no use , or knowledge of general words ; since many of them , we find , can fashion such sounds , and pronounce words distinctly enough , but never with any such application . and , on the other side , men , who through some defect in the organs , want words , yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs , which serve them instead of general words , a faculty which we see beasts come short in . and therefore i think we may suppose , that 't is in this , that the species of brutes are discriminated from man ; and 't is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated , and which at last widens to so vast a distance . for if they have any ideas at all , and are not bare machins ( as some would have them ) we cannot deny them to have some reason . it seems as evident to me , that they do reason , as that they have sense ; but it is only in particular ideas , just as they receiv'd them from their senses . they are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds , and have not ( as i think ) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction . § . . how far idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any , or all of the foregoing faculties , an exact observation of their several ways of faltering , would no doubt discover . for those who either perceive but dully , or retain the ideas that come into their minds , but ill , who cannot readily excite or compound them , will have little matter to think on . those who cannot distinguish , compare , and abstract , would hardly be able to understand , and make use of language , or judge , or reason to any tolerable degree ; but only a little , and imperfectly , about things present , and very familiar to their senses . and indeed , any of the forementioned faculties , if wanting , or out of order , produce suitable defects in mens understandings and knowledge . § . . in fine , the defect in naturals , seems to proceed from want of quickness , activity , and motion , in the intellectual faculties , whereby they are deprived of reason : whereas mad men , on the other side , seem to suffer by the other extream . for they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning : but having joined together some ideas very wrongly , they mistake them for truths ; and they err as men do , that argue right from wrong principles . for by the violence of their imaginations , having taken their fansies for realities , they make right deduction from them . thus you shall find a distracted man phansying himself a king , with a right inference , requires suitable attendance , respect , and obedience : others who have thought themselves made of glass , have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies . hence it comes to pass , that a man , who is very sober , and of a right understanding in all other things , may in one particular , be as frantick as any in bedlam ; if either by any sudden very strong impression , or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts , incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully , as to remain united . but there are degrees of madness , as of folly ; the disorderly jumbling ideas together , is in some more , and some less . in short , herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and mad men , that mad men put wrong ideas together , and so make wrong propositions , but argue and reason right from them : but idiots make very few or no propositions , and reason scarce at all . § . . these , i think , are the first faculties and operations of the mind , which it makes use of in understanding ; which though they are exercised about all its ideas in general ; yet the instances , i have hitherto given , have been chiefly in simple ideas ; and i have subjoined the explication of these faculties of the mind , to that of simple ideas , before i come to what i have to say , concerning complex ones , for these following reasons : first , because several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas , we might , by following nature in its ordinary method , trace and discover them in their rise , progress , and gradual improvements . secondly , because observing the faculties of our mind , how they operate about simple ideas , which are usually in most mens minds , much more clear , precise , and distinct , than complex ones , we may the better examine and learn how the mind abstracts , denominates , compares , and exercises its other operations , about those which are complex , wherein we are much more liable to mistake . thirdly , because these very operations of the mind about ideas , receiv'd from sensation , are themselves , when reflected on , another sett of ideas , derived from that other source of our knowledge , which i call reflection ; and therefore fit to be considered in this place , after the simple ideas of sensation . of compounding , comparing , abstracting , &c. i have but just spoken , having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places . § . . and thus i have given a short , and , i think , true history of the first beginnings of humane knowledge ; whence the mind has its first objects , and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in , and storing up those ideas , out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of ; wherein i must appeal to experience and observation , whether i am in the right : the best way to come to truth , being to examine things as really they are , and not to conclude they are as we fansie of our selves , or have been taught to imagine by others . § . . to deal truly , this is the only way that i can discover , whereby the ideas of things are brought into the vnderstanding : if other men have either innate ideas , or in●used principles , they have reason to enjoy them ; and if they are sure of it , it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege they have above their neighbours . i can speak but of what i find in my self , and is agreeable to those notions ; which if we will examine the whole course of men in their several ages , countries , and educations , seems to depend on these foundations i have laid , and to correspond with this method in all the parts and degrees thereof . § . . i pretend not to teach , but to enquire ; and therefore cannot but confess here again , that external and internal sensation , are the only passages i can find of knowledge to the understanding . these alone , as far as i can discover , are the windows by which light is let into this dark room . for , methinks , the vnderstanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light , with only some little openings left , to let in external visible resemblances , or ideas of things without ; which would they but stay there , and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion , it would very much resemble the vnderstanding of a man , in reference to all objects of sights , and the ideas of them . these are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have , and retain simple ideas , and the modes of them , with some other operations about them . i proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas , and their modes a little more particularly . chap. xii . of complex ideas . § . . we have hitherto considered those ideas , in the reception whereof , the mind is only passive , which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before-mentioned , whereof the mind cannot make any one to it self , nor have any idea which does not wholy consist of them . but as these simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together ; so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together , as one idea ; and that not only as they are united in external objects , but as it self has joined them . ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together , i call complex ; such as are beauty , gratitude , a man , an army , the vniverse ; which though complicated of various simple ideas , or complex ideas , made up of simple ones , yet are , when the mind pleases , considered each by it self , as one entire thing , and signified by one name . § . . in this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas , the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts , infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with : but all this still confined to those simple ideas , which it received from those two sources , and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions . for these , they are all from things themselves ; and the mind can have no more , nor other simple ideas , than as they are suggested to it . it can have no other ideas of sensible qualities , than what come from without by the senses ; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance , than what it finds in it self : but when it has once got those simple ideas , it is not confined barely to observation , and what offers it self from without , it can , by its own power , put together those ideas it has , and make new complex ones , which it never received so united . § . . complex ideas , however compounded and decompounded , though their number be infinite , and the variety endless , wherewith they fill , and and entertain the thoughts of men ; yet , i think , they may be all reduced under these three heads : . modes . . substances . . relations . § . . first , modes i call such complex ideas , which however compounded , contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves , but are considered as dependences on , or affections of substances ; such are the ideas signified by the words triangle , gratitude , murther , &c. and if in this i use the word mode , in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification , i beg pardon ; it being unavoidable in discourses , differing from the ordinary received notions , either to make new words , or to use old words in somewhat a new signification ; which in our present case , is perhaps the more tolerable of the two . § . . of these modes , there are two sorts , which deserve distinct consideration . first , there are some which are only variations , or different combinations of the same simple idea , without the mixture of any other , as a dozen , or score ; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct unites added together , and these i call simple modes , as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea . secondly , there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds , put together to make one complex one ; v. g. beauty , consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure , causing delight in the beholder ; theft , which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing , without the consent of the proprietor , contains , as is visible , a combination of several ideas of several kinds ; and these i call mixed modes . § . . secondly , the ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas , as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves ; in which the supposed , or confused idea of substance , such as it is , is always the first and chief . thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour , with certain degrees of weight , hardness , ductility , and fusibility , we have the idea of lead ; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure , with the powers of motion , thought , and reasoning , joined to substance , make the ordinary idea of a man. now of substances also , there are two sorts of ideas ; one of single substances , as they exist separately , as of a man , or a sheep ; the other of several of those put together , as an army of men , or flock of sheep ; which collective ideas of several substances thus put together , are as much each of them one single idea , as that of a man , or an unite . § . . thirdly , the last sort of complex ideas , is that we call relation , which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another , of these several kinds , we shall treat in their order . § . . if we will trace the progress of our minds , and with attention observe how it repeats , adds together , and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection , it will lead us farther than at first , perhaps , we should have imagined . and , i believe , we shall find , if we warily observe the originals of our notions , that even the most abstruse ideas , how remote soever they may seem from sense , or any operation of our own minds , are yet only such as the understanding frames to it self , by repeating and joining together ideas , that it had either from objects of sense , or its own operations about them : so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation , or reflection , being no other than what the mind by the ordinary use of its own faculties , employ'd about ideas received from objects of sense , or the operations it observes in it self about them , may , and does attain unto . this i shall endeavour to shew in the ideas we have of space , time , and infinity , and some few other , that seem the most remote from those originals . chap. xiii . of simple modes ; and first , of the simple modes of space . § . . though in the foregoing part , i have often mentioned simple ideas , which are truly the materials of all our knowledge ; yet having treated of them there , rather in the way that they come into the mind , than as distinguished from others more compounded , it will not be , perhaps , amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration , and examine those different modifications of the same idea ; which the mind either finds in things existing , or is able to make within it self , without the help of any extrinsical object , or any foreign suggestion . those modifications of any one simple idea ( which as has been said , i call simple modes ) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind , as those of the greatest distance or contrariety . for the idea of two , is as distinct from three , as blueness from heat , or either of them from any number ; and yet they are made up only of that simple idea of an unite repeated ; and these repetitions joined together , make those distinct simple modes , of a dozen , a gross , a million . § . . i shall begin with the simple idea of space . i have shewed above , c. . that we get the idea of space , both by our sight , and touch ; which , i think , is so evident , that it would be as needless , to go to prove , that men perceive by their sight , a distance between bodies of different colours , or between the parts of the same body ; as that they see colours themselves : nor is it less obvious , that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch. § . . this space considered barely in length between any two beings , without considering any thing else between them , is called distance : if considered in length , breadth , and thickness , i think , it may be called capacity : when considered between the extremities of matter , which fills the capacity of space with something solid , tangible , and movable , it is properly called extension . and so extension is an idea belonging to body only ; but space may , as is evident , be considered without it . at least , i think it most intelligible , and the best way to avoid confusion , if we use the word extension for an affection of matter , or the distance of the extremities of particular solid bodies ; and space in the more general signification for distance , with or without solid matter possessing it . § . . each different distance is a different modification of space , and each idea of any different distance , or space , is a simple mode of this idea . men having by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of space , which they use for measuring of other distances , as a foot , a yard , or a fathom , a league , or diametre of the earth , made those ideas familiar to their thoughts , can in their minds repeat them as often as they will , without mixing or joining to them the idea of body , or any thing else ; and frame to themselves the ideas of long , square , or cubick , feet , yards , or fathoms , here amongst the bodies of the universe , or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies ; and by adding these still one to another , enlarge their idea of space as much as they please . this power of repeating , or doubling any idea we have of any distance , and adding it to the former as often as we will , without being ever able to come to any stop or stint , let us enlarge it as much as we will , is that which gives us the idea of immensity . § . . there is another modification of this idea of space , which is nothing but the relation of the parts of the termination of capacity , or extension amongst themselves . this the touch discovers in sensible bodies , whose extremities come within our reach ; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours , whose boundaries are within its view : where observing how the extremities terminate , either in streight lines , which meet at discernible angles ; or in crooked lines , wherein no angles can be perceived , by considering these as they relate to one another , in all parts of the extremities of any body or space , it has that idea we call figure , which affords to the mind infinite vatiety . for besides the vast number of different figures , that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter , the stock , that the mind has in its power , by varying the idea of space ; and thereby making still new compositions , by repeating its own ideas , and joining them as it pleases , is perfectly inexhaustible : and so it can multiply figures in infinitum . § . . for the mind , having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out , and join it to another in the same direction , which is to double the length of that streight line ; or else join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit , and so make what sort of angle it pleases : and being able also to shorten any line it imagines , by taking from it ½ or ¼ , or what part it pleases , without being able to come to an end of any such divisions , it can make an angle of any bigness : so also the lines that are its sides of what length it pleases , which joining again to other lines of different lengths , and at different angles , till it has wholly inclosed any space , it is evident that it can multiply figures both in their shape , and capacity , in infinitum , all which are but so many different simple modes of space . the same that it can do with streight lines , it can do also with crooked , or crooked and streight together ; and the same it can do in lines , it can also in superficies , by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures , that the mind has a power to make , and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space . § . . another idea coming under this head , and belonging to this tribe , is that we call place . as in simple space , we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies , or points ; so in our idea of place , we consider the relation of distance betwixt any thing , and any two or more points , which are considered , as keeping the same distance one with another , and so considered as at rest ; for when we find any thing at the same distance now , which it was yesterday from any two or more points , which have not since changed their distance one with another , and with which we then compared it , we say it hath kept the same place : but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points , we say it hath changed its place : though vulgarly speaking in the common notion of place , we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise points ; but larger portions of sensible objects , to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation , and its distance , from which we have some reason to observe . § . . thus a company of chess-men , standing on the same squares of the chess-board , where we left them , we say they are all in the same place , or unmoved ; though , perhaps , the chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another , because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board , which keep the same distance one with another . the chess-board , we also say , is in the same place it was , if it remain in the same part of the cabin , though , perhaps , the ship it is in , sails all the while : and the ship is said to be in the same place , supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land ; though , perhaps , the earth hath turned round ; and so both chess-men , and board , and ship , have every one changed place in respect of remoter bodies , which have kept the same distance one with another . but yet the distance from certain parts of the board , being that which determines the place of the chess-men ; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin ( with which we made the comparison ) being that which determined the place of the chess-board ; and the fixed parts of the earth , that by which we determined the place of the ship , these things may be said properly to be in the same place , in those respects : though their distance from some other things , which in this matter we did not consider , being varied , they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect ; and we our selves shall think so , when we have occasion to compare them with those other . § . . but this modification of distance , we call place , being made by men , for their common use , that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things , where they had occasion for such designation , men consider and determine of this place , by reference to those adjacent things , which best served to their present purpose , without considering other things , which to another purpose would better determine the place of the same thing . thus in the chess-board , the use of the designation of the place of each chess-men , being determined only within that chequer'd piece of wood , 't would cross that purpose , to measure it by any thing else : but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag , if any one should ask , where the black king is , it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room it was in , and not by the chess-board ; there being another use of designing the place it is now in , than when in play it was on the chess-board , and so must be determined by other bodies . so if any one should ask , in what place are the verses , which report the story of nisus and eurialus , 't would be very improper to determine this place , by saying , they were in such a part of the earth , or in bodley's library : but the right designation of the place , would be by the parts of virgil's works ; and the proper answer would be , that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his aeneides ; and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since virgil was printed : which is true , though the book it self hath moved a thousand times , the use of the idea of place here , being to know only , in what part of the book that story is ; that so upon occasion , we may know where to find it , and have recourse to it for our use . § . . that our idea of place , is nothing else , but such a relative position of any thing , as i have before mentioned , i think , is plain , and will be easily admitted , when we consider , that we can have no idea of the place of the universe , though we can of all the parts of it ; because beyond that , we have not the idea of any fixed , distinct , particular beings , in reference to which , we can imagine it to have any relation of distance ; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion , wherein the mind finds no variety , no marks . for to say that the world is somewhere , means no more , but that it does exist ; this though a phrase , borrowed from place , signifying only its existence , not location ; and when one can find out , and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the universe , he will be able to tell us , whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space ; tho' it be true , that the word place , has sometimes a more confused sense , and stands for that space , which any body takes up ; and so the universe is in a place § . . the idea therefore of place , we have by the same means , that we get the idea of space , ( whereof this is but a particular limited consideration , viz. by our sight and touch ; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance . § . . there are some that would persuade us , that body and extension are the same thing ; who either change the signification of words , which i would not suspect them of , they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others , because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning , or deceitful obscurity of doubtful , or insignificant terms . it therefore they mean by body and extension the same , that other people do , viz. by body something that is solid , and extended , whose parts are separable and movable different ways ; and by extension , only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts , and which is possessed by them , they confound very different ideas one with another . for i appeal to every man 's own thoughts , whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity , as it is from th● idea of scarlet-colour ? 't is true , solidity cannot exist without extension , neither can scarlet colour exist without extension ; but this hinders not , but that they are distinct ideas . many ideas require others , as necessary to their existence or conception , which yet are very distinct ideas . motion can neither be , nor be conceived without space ; and yet motion is not space , nor space motion ; space can exist without it , and they are very distinct ideas ; and so , i think , are those of space and solidity . solidity is so inseparable an idea from body , that upon that depends its filling of space , its contact , impulse , and communication of motion upon impulse . and if it be a reason to prove , that spirit is different from body , because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it ; the same reason will be as valid , i suppose , to prove , that space is not body , because it includes not the idea of solidity in it ; space and solidity being as distinct ideas , as thinking and extension , and as wholly separable in the mind one from another : body then and extension , 't is evident , are two distinct ideas ; for first , extension includes no solidity , nor resistence to the motion of body , as body does . secondly , the parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other ; so that the continuity cannot be separated , neither really , nor mentally . for i demand of any one , to remove any part of it from another , with which it is continued , even so much as in thought . to divide and separate actually is , as i think , by removing the parts one from another , to make two superficies , where before there was a continuity : and to divide mentally , is to make in the mind two superficies , where before there was a continuity , and consider them as removed one from the other ; which can only be done in things considered by the mind , as capable of being separated ; and by separation , of acquiring new distinct superficies , which they then have not , but are capable of : but neither of these ways of separation , whether real or mental , is , as i think , compatible to pure space . § . . 't is true , a man may consider so much of such a space , as is answerable or commensurate to a foot , without considering the rest ; which is indeed a partial consideration , but not so much as mental separation , or division ; since a man can no more mentally divide , without considering two superficies , separate one from the other , than he can actually divide , without making two superficies disjoin'd one from the other : but a partial consideration is not separating . a man may consider light in the sun , without its heat ; or mobility in body without its extension , without thinking of their separation . one is only a partial consideration , terminating in one alone ; and the other is a consideration of both , as existing separately . § . . thirdly , the parts of pure space , are immovable , which follows from their inseparability ; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things : but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable ; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another . thus the clear and distinct idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly , and sufficiently from body ; since its parts are inseparable , immovable , and without resistence to the motion of body . § . . if any one ask me , what this space , i speak of , is ? i will tell him , when he tells me what his extension is . for to say , as is usually done , that extension is to have partes extra partes , is to say only , that extension is extension : for what am i the better informed in the nature of extension , when i am told , that extension is to have parts that are extended , exterior to parts that are extended , i. e. extension consists of extended parts ? as if one asking , what a fibre was ; i should answer him , that it was a thing made up of several fibres : would he hereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was , better than he did before ? or rather , would he not have reason to think , that my design was to make sport with him , rather than seriously to instruct him ? § . . those who contend that space and body are the same , bring this dilemma : either this space is something or nothing ; if nothing be between two bodies , they must necessarily touch ; if it be allowed to be something , they ask , whether it be body or spirit ? to which i answer by another question , who told them , that there was , or could be nothing but solid beings which could not think , and thinking beings that were not extended ? which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit . § . . if it be demanded ( as usually it is ) whether this space void of body , be substance or accident , i shall readily answer , i know not ; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance , till they that ask , shew me a clear distinct idea of substance . § . . i endeavour , as much as i can , to deliver my self from those fallacies , which we are apt to put upon our selves , by taking words for things . it helps not our ignorance , to feign a knowledge , where we have none , by making a noise with sounds , without clear and distinct significations . names made at pleasure , neither alter the nature of things , nor make us understand them , but as they are signs of , and stand for clear and distinct ideas . and i desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables , substance , to consider , whether applying it , as they do , to the infinite incomprehensible god , to finite spirits , and to body , it be in the same sense ; and whether it stand for the same idea , when each of those three so different beings are called substances ? if so , whether it will not thence follow , that god , spirits , and body , agreeing in the same common nature of substance , differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that substance ; as a tree and a pebble , being in the same sense bodied , and agreeing in the common nature of body , differ only in a bare modification of that common matter ; which will be a very harsh doctrine . if they say , that they apply it to god , finite spirits , and matter , in three different significations , and that it stands for one idea , when god is said to be a substance ; for another , when the soul is called substance ; and for a third , when a body is called so . if the name substance , stands for three several distinct ideas , they would do well to make known those distinct ideas , or at least to give three distinct names to them , to prevent in so important a notion , the confusion and errors , that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term ; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct , that it has scarce one clear distinct signification : and if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance , what hinders why another may not make a fourth ? § . . they who first ran into the notion of accidents , as a sort of real beings , that needed something to inhere in , were forced to find out the word substance , to support them . had the poor indian philosopher ( who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up ) but thought of this word substance , he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it , and a tortoise to support his elephant : the word substance would have done it effectually . and he that enquired , might have taken it for as good an answer from an indian philosopher , that substance , without knowing what it is , is that which supports the earth , as we take it for a sufficient answer , and good doctrine , from our european philosophers , that substance without knowing what it is , is that which supports accidents . so that of substance , we have no idea of what it is , but only a confused obscure one of what it does . § . . whatever a learned man may do here , an intelligent american , who enquired into the nature of things , would scarce take it for a satisfactory account , if desiring to learn our architecture , he should be told , that a pillar was a thing supported by a basis , and a basis something that supported a pillar . would he not think himself mocked , instead of taught , with such an account as this ? and a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books , and the things they contained , if he should be told , that all learned books consisted of paper and letters , and that letters were things inhering in paper , and paper a thing that held forth letters ; a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper . but were the latin words inhoerentia and substantia , put into the plain english ones that answer them , and were called sticking-on , and vnder-propping , they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents , and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy . § . . but to return to our ideas of space . if body be not supposed infinite , which , i think , no one will affirm , i would ask , whether if god placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings , he could not stretch his hand beyond his body ? if he could , then he would put his arm , where there was before space without body ; and if there he spread his fingers , there would still be space between them without body : if he could not stretch out his hand , it must be because of some external hindrance ; ( for we suppose him alive , with such a power of moving the parts of his body , that he hath now , which is not in it self impossible , if god so pleased to have it ; ) or at least it is not impossible for god so to move him : and then i ask , whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards , be substance or accident , something or nothing ? and when they have resolved that , they will be able to resolve themselves , what that is , which is or may be between two bodies at a distance , that is not body , has no solidity . in the mean time , the argument is at least as good , that where nothing hinders , ( as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies , ) a body put into motion may move on , as where there is nothing between , there two bodies must necessarily touch . for pure space between , is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact ; but bare space in the way , is not sufficient to stop motion . the truth is , these men must either own , that they think body infinite , though they are loth to speak it out , or else affirm , that space is not body . for i would fain meet with that thinking man , that can , in his thoughts , set any bounds to space , more than he can to duration ; or by thinking , hope to arrive at the end of either : and therefore if his idea of eternity be infinite , so is his idea of immensity ; they are both finite or infinite alike . § . . farther , those who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter , must not only make body infinite , but must also deny a power in god to annihilate any part of matter . no one , i suppose , will deny , that god can put an end to all motion that is in matter , and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest , and continue them so as long as he pleases . whoever then will allow , that god can , during such a general rest , annihilate either this book , or the body of him that reads it , must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum . for it is evident , that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body , will still remain , and be a space without body . for the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest , are a wall of adamant , and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space . and indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter , into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed , is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude ; which will therefore need some better proof , than a supposed matter of fact , which experiment can never make out ; our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying us , that there is no necessary connexion between space and solidity , since we can conceive the one without the other . and those who dispute for or against a vacuum , do thereby confess , they have distinct ideas of vacuum and plenum , i. e. that they have an idea of extension void of solidity , though they deny its existence ; or else they dispute about nothing at all . for they who so much alter the signification of words , as to call extension body , and consequently make the whole essence of body , to be nothing but pure extension without solidity , must talk absurdly , whenever they speak of vacuum , since it is impossible for extension to be without extension . for vacuum , whether we affirm or deny its existence , signi●ies space without body , whose very existence no one can deny to be possible , who will not make matter infinite , and take from god a power to annihilate any particle of it . § . . but not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe , nor appeal to god's omnipotency to find a vacuum , the motion of bodies , that are in our view and neighbourhood , seem to me plain to evince it . for i desire any one so to devide a solid body of any dimension he pleases , as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way , within the bounds of that superficies , if there be not left in it a void space , as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body . and if where the least particle of the body divided , is as big as a mustard-seed , a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed , be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body , within the bounds of its superficies , where the particles of matter are , , less than a mustard-seed , there must also be a space void of solid matter , as big as , , part of a mustard-seed ; for if it hold in one , it will hold in the other , and so on in infinitum . and let this void space be as little as it will , it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude . for if there can be a space void of body , equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature , 't is still space without body ; and makes as great a difference between space and body , as if it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , a distance as wide as any in nature . and therefore if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion , equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter , but to / or / of it , the same consequence will always follow of space without matter . § . . but the question being here , whether the idea of space or extension , be the same with the idea of body , it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum , but the idea of it ; which 't is plain men have , when they enquire and dispute , whether there be a vacuum or no ? for if they had not the idea of space without body , they could not make a question about its existence : and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space , they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world ; and 't would be as absurd to demand , whether there were space without body , as whether there were space without space , or body without body , since these were but different names of the same idea . § . . 't is true , the idea of extension joins it self so inseparably with all visible , and most tangible qualities , that it suffers us to see no one , or feel very few external objects , without taking in impressions of extension too . this readiness of extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas , has been the occasion , i guess , that some have made the whole essence of body , to consist in extension ; which is not much to be wondred at , since some have had their minds , by their eyes and touch , ( the busiest of all our senses , ) so filled with the idea of extension , and as it were wholly possessed with it , that they allowed no existence to any thing , that had not extension . i shall not now argue with those men , who take the measure and possibility of all being , only from their narrow and gross imaginations : but having here to do only with those , who conclude the essence of body to be extension , because , they say , they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension , i shall desire them to consider , that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells , as much as on those of sight and touch ; nay , had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst , and several other pains , they would have found , that they included in them no idea of extension at all , which is but an affection of body , as well as the rest discoverable by our senses , which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essence of things . § . . if those ideas , which are constantly joined to all others , must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things , which have constantly those ideas joined to them , and are inseparable from them ; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing . for there is not any object of sensation or reflection , which does not carry with it the idea of one : but the weakness of this kind of argument , we have already shewn sufficiently . § . . to conclude , whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a vacuum , this is plain to me , that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity , as we have of solidity distinct from motion , or motion from space . we have not any two more distinct ideas , and we can as easily conceive space without solidity , as we can conceive body without motion , though it be never so certain , that neither body nor motion can exist without space . but whether any one will take space to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance ; or whether they will think the words of the most knowing king solomon , the heaven , and the heaven of heavens , cannot contain thee ; or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher st. paul , in him we live , move , and have our being , are to be understood in a literal sense , i leave every one to consider ; only our idea of space is , i think , such as i have mentioned , and distinct from that of body . for whether we consider in matter it self , the distance of its coherent solid parts , and call it , in respect of those solid parts , extension ; or whether considering it , as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions , we call it length , breadth , and thickness ; or else considering it as lying between any two bodies , or positive beings , without any consideration , whether there be any matter or no between , we call it distance . however named or considered , it is always the same uniform simple idea of space , taken from objects , about which our senses have been conversant , whereof having setled ideas in our minds , we can revive , repeat , and add them one to another as often as we will , and consider the space or distance so imagined , either as filled with solid parts , so that another body cannot come there , without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before ; or else as void of solidity , so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space , may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there . § . . the knowing precisely what our words stand for , would , i imagine , in this , as well as a great many other cases , quickly end the dispute . for i am apt to think , that men , when they come to examine them , find their simple ideas all generally to agree , though in discourse with one another , they perhaps confound one another with different names . imagine , that men who abstract their thoughts , and do well examine the ideas of their own minds , cannot much differ in thinking ; however , they may perplex themselves with words , according to the way of speaking of the several schools , or sects they have been bred up in : though amongst unthinking men , who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas , and strip them not from the marks men use for them , but confound them with words , there must be endless dispute , wrangling , and jargon ; especially if they be learned bookish men , devoted to some sect , and accustomed to the language of it , and have learned to talk after others . but if it should happen , that any two thinking men should really have different ideas , different notions , i do not see how they could discourse , or argue one with another . here i must not be mistaken , to think that every floating imagination in mens brains , is presently of that sort of ideas i speak of . 't is not easie for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom , inadvertency , and common conversation : it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas , till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones , out of which they are compounded ; and to see which , amongst its simple ones , have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another : till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things , he builds upon floating and uncertain principles , and will often find himself at a loss . chap. xiv . of duration , and its simple modes . § . . there is another sort of distance , or length , the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space , but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession . this we call duration , the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it , whereof we have distinct ideas , as hours , days , years , &c. time , and eternity . § . . the answer of a great man , to one who asked what time was ( si non rogas intelligo , which amounts to this ; the more i set my self to think of it , the less i understood it ; ) might perhaps perswade one , that time , which reveals all other things , is it self not to be discovered . duration , time , and eternity , are , not without reason , thought to have something very obstruse in their nature . but however remote this may seem from our comprehension , yet if we trace them right to their originals , i doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge , viz. sensation and reflection , will be able to furnish us with those ideas , as clear and distinct as many others , which are thought much less obscure ; and we shall find , that the idea of eternity it self , is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas . § . . to understand time and eternity aright , we ought w●th attention to consider what idea it is we have of duration , and how we came by it . 't is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind , that there is a train of ideas , which constantly succeed one another in his understanding , as long as he is awake . reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds , is that which furnishes us with idea of succession : and the distance between any parts of that succession , or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds , is that we call duration . for whilst we are thinking , or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds , we know that we do exist ; and so we call the existence , or the continuation of the existence of our selves , or any thing else , commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds , the duration of our selves , or any such other thing co-existing with our thinking . § . . that we have our notion of succession and duration from this original , viz. from reflection on the train of ideas , which we find to appear one after another in our own minds , seems plain to me , in that we have no perception of duration , but by considering the train of ideas , that take their turns in our understandings . when that succession of ideas ceases , our perception of duration ceases with it ; which every one clearly experiments in himself , whilst he sleeps soundly , whether an hour , or a day ; a month , or a year ; of which duration of things , whilst he sleeps , or thinks not , he has no perception at all , but it is quite lost to him ; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think , till the moment he begins to think again , seem to him to have no distance . and so i doubt not but it would be to a waking man , if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind , without variation , and the succession of others : and we see , that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing , so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind , whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation , le ts slip out of his account a good part of that duration , and thinks that time shorter than it is . but if sleep commonly unite the distant parts of duration , it is , because during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds . for if a man , during his sleep , dream , and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another , he hath then , during such dreaming , a sense of duration , and of the length of it . by which it is to me very clear , that men derive their ideas of duration , from their reflection on the train of the ideas , they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings , without which observation they can have no notion of duration , whatever may happen in the world. § . . indeed a man , having from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts , got the notion , or idea of duration , he can apply that notion to things , which exist whilst he does not think ; as he , that has got the idea of extension from bodies by his sight or touch , can apply it to distances , where no body is seen or felt . and therefore , though a man have no perception of the length of duration , which past whilst he slept , or thought not : yet having observed the revolution of days and nights , and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant , he can , upon the supposition , that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner , whilst he was asleep or thought not , as it used to do at other times , he can , i say , imagine and make allowance for the length of duration , whilst he slept . but if adam and eve ( when they were alone in the world ) instead of their ordinary nights sleep , had passed that , and the following hours in one continued sleep , the duration of that hours had been irrecoverably lost to them , and been for ever left out of their account of time . § . . thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas , one after another in our vnderstandings , we get the notion of succession ; which if any one should think , we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses , he will , perhaps , be of my mind , when he considers , that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession , no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas . for a man looking upon a body really moving , perceives yet no motion at all , unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas . v. g. a man becalmed at sea , out of sight of land , in a fair day , may look on the sun , or sea , or ship , a whole hour together , and perceive no motion at all in either ; though it be certain , that two , and perhaps all of them , have moved , during that time , a great way : but as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body , as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him , then he perceives , that there has been motion . but where-ever a man is , with all things at rest about him , without perceiving any motion at all ; if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking , he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind , appearing one after another , and thereby observe , and find succession , where he could observe no motion . § . . and this , i think , is the reason , why motions very slow , though they are constant , are not perceived by us ; because in their remove from one sensible part towards another , their change of distance is so slow , that it causes no new ideas in us , but a good while one after another : and so not causing a constant train of new ideas , to follow one another immediately in our minds , we have no perception of motion ; which consisting in a constant succession , we cannot perceive that succession , without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it . § . . on the contrary , things that move so swift , as not to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their motion , and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind , are not also perceived . for any thing , that moves round about in a circle , in less time than our ideas are w●nt to succeed one another in our minds , is not perceived to move ; but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter , or colour , and not a part of a circle in motion . § . . hence i leave it to others to judge , whether it be not probable that our ideas do , whilst we are awake , succeed one another in our minds at certain distances , not much unlike the images in the inside of a lanthorn , turned round by the heat of a candle . this appearance of theirs in train , though , perhaps , it may be sometimes faster , and sometimes slower ; yet , i guess , varies not very much in a waking man : there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds , beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten . § . . the reason i have for this odd conjecture is , from observing that in the impressions made upon any of our senses , we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession ; which if exceeding quick , the sense of succession is lost , even in cases where it is evident , that there is a real succession . let a cannon-bullet pass through a room , and in its way take with it any limb , or fleshy parts of a man ; 't is as clear as any demonstration can be , that it must strike successively the two sides of the room : 't is also evident , that it must touch one part of the flesh first , and another after ; and so in succession : and yet i believe , no body , who ever felt the pain of such a shot , or heard the blow against the two distant walls , could perceive any succession , either in the pain , or sound of so swift a stroke . such a part of duration as this , wherein we perceive no succession , is that which we may call an instant ; and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds , without the succession of another , wherein therefore we perceive no succession at all . § . . this also happens , where the motion is so slow , as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses , as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it ; and so other ideas of our own thoughts , having room to come into our minds , between those offered to our senses by the moving body , there the sense of motion is lost ; and the body , though it really move , yet not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies , as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train , the thing seems to stand still , as is evident in the hands of clocks , and shadows of sun-dials , and other constant , but slow motions , where though after certain intervals , we perceive by the change of distance , that it hath moved , yet the motion it self we perceive not . § . . so that to me it seems , that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man , are , as it were , the measure and standard of all other succession , which if it either exceeds their pace , as where two sounds or pains , &c. take up in their succession the duration of but one idea ; or else where any motion or succession is so slow , as that it keeps not pac● with the ideas in our minds , or the quickness , in which they take their turns , as when any one , or more ideas in their ordinary course come into our mind between those which are offered to the sight , by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion , or between sounds , or smells , following one another , there also the sense of a constant continued succession is lost , and we perceive it not , but with certain gaps of rest between . § . . if it be so , that the ideas of our minds , whilst we have any there , do constantly change , and shift in a continual succession , it would be impossible , may any one say , for a man to think long of any one thing : by which if it be meant , that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind , without any variation at all , i think , in matter of fact it is not possible , for which ( not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed , of what materials they are made , whence they have their light , and how they come to make their appearances , ) i can give no other reason but experience : and i would have any one try , whether he can keep one unvaried single idea in his mind without any other , for any considerable time together . § . . for trial , let him take any figure , any degree of light or whiteness , or what other he pleases ; and he will , i suppose , find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind : but that some , either of another kind , or various consideration of that idea ( each of which consideration is a new idea ) will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts , let him be as wary as he can . § . all that is in a man's power in this case , i think , is only to mind and observe what the ideas are , that take their turns in his understanding ; or else , to direct the sort , and call in such as he hath a desire or use of : but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones , i think he cannot , though he may commonly chuse , whether he will heedfully observe , and consider them . § . . whether these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions , i will not here dispute : but this i am sure , that they include no idea of motion in their appearance ; and if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise , i think , he would have none at all , which is enough to my present purpose ; and sufficiently shews , that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds , appearing there one after another , is that which gives us the idea of succession and duration , without which we should have no such ideas at all . 't is not then , motion , but the constant train of ideas in our minds , whilst we are waking , that furnishes us with the idea of duration , whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception , than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas , as i have before shewed : and we have as clear an idea of succession , and duration by the train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds , without the idea of any motion , as by the train of ideas of the uninterrupted change of distance between two bodies , which we have from motion ; and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration , were there no sense of motion at all . § . . having thus got the idea of duration , the next thing natural for the mind to do , is to get some measure of this common duration , whereby it might judge of its different lengths , and consider the distinct order , wherein several things exist , without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused , and a great part of history be rendered very useless . this consideration of duration● , as set out by certain periods , and marked by certain measures or epochs , is that , i think , which most properly we call time. § . . in the measuring of extension , there is nothing more required , but the application of the standard or measure we make use of , to the thing of whose extension we would be informed . but in the measuring of duration , this cannot be done , because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another : and nothing being a measure of duration , but duration ; as nothing is of extension , but extension , we cannot keep by us any standing unvarying measure of duration , which consists in a constant fleeting succession , as we can of certain lengths of extension , as inches , feet , yards , &c. marked out in permanent parts of matter . nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time , but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions , by constantly repeated periods : what portions of duration are not distinguished , or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods , come not so properly under the notion of time , as appears by such phrases as these , viz. before all time , and when time shall be no more . § . . the diurnal , and annual revolutions of the sun , as having been from the beginning of nature , constant , regular , and universally observable by all mankind , and supposed equal to one another , have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration . but the distinction of days and years , having depended on the motion of the sun , it has brought this mistake with it , that it has been thought , that motion and duration were the measure one of another . for men in the measuring of the length of time , having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes , hours , days , months , years , &c. which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on , all which portions of time , were measured out by the motion of the heavens , they were apt to confound time and motion ; or at least to think , that they had a necessary connexion one with another : whereas any constant periodical appearance , or alteration of ideas in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration , if constant and universally observable , would have as well distinguished the intervals of time , as those that have been made use of . for supposing the sun , which some have taken to be a fire , had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian , and then gone out again about twelve hours after , and that in the space of an annual revolution , it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat , and so decreased again ; would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it , as well without as with motion . for if the appearances were constant , universally observable , and in equidistant periods , they would serve mankind for measure of time as well , were the motion away . § . . for the freezing of water , or the blowing of a plant , returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth , would as well serve men to reckon their years by , as the motions of the sun ; and in effect , we see that some people in america counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons , and leaving them at others . for any idea returning constantly at equidistant periods , as a fit of an ague ; the sense of hunger , or thirst ; a smell , or a taste ; and making it self universally be taken notice of , would not fail to measure out the course of succession , and distinguish the distances of time. and we see that men born blind , count time well enough by years , whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions , that they perceive not . and i ask , whether a blind man , who distinguished his years , either by heat of summer , and cold of winter ; by the smell of any flower of the spring , or taste of any fruit of the autumn , would not have a better measure of time , than the romans had before the reformation of their calendar by iulius caesar , or many other people , whose years , notwithstanding the motion of the sun , which they pretend to make use of , are very irregular ; and it adds no small difficulty to chronology , that the exact lengths of the years that several nations counted by , are hard to be known , they differing very much one from another , and , i think , i may say all of them , from the precise motion of the sun ; and if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the equator , and so equally dispersed his light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth , in days all of the same length , without its annual variations to the tropicks , as a late ingenious author supposes , i do not think it very easie to imagine , that ( notwithstanding the motion of the sun ) men should in the antediluvian world , from the beginning count by years , or measure their time by periods that had no sensible marks very obvious to distinguish them by . § . . but , perhaps , it will be said without a regular motion , such as of the sun , or some other , how could it ever be known that such periods were equal ? to which i answer , the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known , or presumed to be so at first , which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas had passed in men's minds in the intervals , whereby they guessed them to be equal , which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure ; though since exacter search has discovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun , and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal . those yet by their presum'd and apparent equality , serve as well to reckon time by , though not to measure the parts of duration exactly , as if they could be proved to be exactly equal ; we must therefore carefully distinguish betwixt duration it self , and the measures we make use of to judge of its length . duration in it self is to be considered , as going on in one constant equal uniform course ; but none of the measures of it we make use of can be known to do so , nor can we be assured that their assigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another : for two successive lengths of duration however measured , can never be demonstrated to be equal . that which the world used so long , and so confidently for an exact measure of duration , the motion of the sun has , as i said , been found in its several parts unequal : and though men have of late made use of a pendulum , as a more steady and regular motion , than that of the sun or ( to speak more truly ) of the earth ; yet if any one should be asked , how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal , it would be very hard to satisfie himself , that they are infallibly so : since we cannot be sure , that the cause of that motion which is unknown to us , shall always operate equally ; and we are sure , that the medium in which the pendulum moves , is not constantly the same ; either of which varying , may alter the equality of such periods , and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion , as well as any other periods of other appearances , the notion of duration still remaining clear , though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact . since then no two portions of succession can be brought together , it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality . all that we can do for a measure of time , is to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods ; of which seeming equality , we have no other measure , but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories , with the concurrence of other probable reasons , to perswade us of their equality . § . . one thing seems strange to me , that whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world , time yet should be defined to be the measure of motion ; whereas 't is obvious to every one that reflects ever so little on it , that to measure motion , space is as necessary to be considered as time ; and those who look a little farther , will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be taken into the computation , by any one who will estimate or measure motion , so as to judge right of it . nor , indeed , does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration , than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas , in seeming equidistant periods . for if the motion of the sun , were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds , sometimes very slow , and at others , irregularly very swift ; or if being constantly equally swift , it yet was not circular , and produced not the same appearances , it would not at all help us to measure time , any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does . § . . minutes , hours , days , and years , are then no more necessary to time or duration , than inches , feet , yards , and miles , marked out in any matter , are to extension . for though we in this part of the universe , by the constant use of them , as periods set out by the revolutions of the sun , or known parts of them , have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds , which we apply to all parts of time , whose lengths we would consider ; yet there may be other parts of the universe , where they no more use those measures of ours , than in iapan they do our inches , feet , or miles : but yet something analagous to them , there must be . for without some regular periodical returns , we could not measure our selves , or signifie to others the length of any duration , though at the same time the world were as full of motion , as it is now ; but no part of it disposed into regular and apparent equidistant revolutions . but the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time , do not at all alter the notion of duration , which is the thing to be measured , no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension , to those , who make use of those different measures . § . . the mind having once got such a measure of time , as the annual revolution of the sun , can apply that measure to duration , wherein that measure it self did not exist , and with which in the reality of its being , it had nothing to do : for should one say , that abraham was born in the year of the iulian period , it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the world , though there were so far back no motion of the sun , nor any other motion at all . for though the iulian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days , nights , or years , marked out by any revolutions of the sun , yet we reckon as right , and thereby measure durations as well , as if really at that time the sun had existed , and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now . the idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun , is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration , where no sun nor motion was , as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here , can be applied in our thoughts to distances , beyond the confines of the world , where are no bodies at all . § . . for supposing it were miles , or millions of miles , from this place to the remotest body of the universe , ( for being finite , it must be at a certain distance , ) as we suppose it to be years , from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world , we can , in our thoughts , apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation , or beyond the duration of bodies or motion , as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies ; and by the one measure duration , where there was no motion , as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts , where there is no body . § . . if it be objected to me here , that in this way of explaining of time , i have beg'd what i should not , viz. that the world is neither eternal , nor infinite ; i answer , that to my present purpose , it is not needful , in this place , to make use of arguments , to evince the world to be finite , both in duration and extension : but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary , i have certainly the liberty to suppose it , as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary ; and i doubt not but that every one that will go about it● may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion , though not of all duration ; and so may come to a stop , and non ultra in his consideration of motion : so also in his thoughts he may set limits to body , and the extension belonging to it , but not to space where no body is , the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thoughts , as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind , and all for the same reason , as we shall see in another place . § . . by the same means therefore , and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time , we have also that idea which we call eternity , viz. having got the idea of succession and duration , by reflecting on the train of our own ideas , caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas , coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts , or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses ; and having from the revolutions of the sun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration , we can , in our thoughts , add such lengths of duration to one another , as often as we please , and apply them , so added , to durations past or to come : and this we can continue to do on , without bounds or limits , and proceed in infinitum , and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration , supposed before the sun 's , or any other motion had its being ; which is no more difficult or absurd , than to apply the notion i have of the moving of a shadow , one hour to day upon the sun-dial , to the duration of something last night ; v. g. the burning of a candle , which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion , and it is impossible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night , to co-exist with any motion that now is , or for ever shall be , as for any part of duration , that was before the beginning of the world to co-exist with the motion of the sun now . but yet this hinders not , but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial , between the marks of two hours , i can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle last night , as i can any thing that does now exist : and it is no more than to think , that had the sun shone then on the dial , and moved after the same rate it doth now , the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour-line to another , whilst that flame of the candle lasted . § . . the notion of an hour , day , or year , being only the idea i have of the length of certain periodical regular motions , neither of which motions do ever all at once exist , but only in the ideas i have of them in my memory derived from my senses or reflection , i can with the same ease , and for the same reason , apply in my thoughts to duration , antecedent to all manner of motion , as well as to any thing that is but a minute , or a day , antecedent to this present motion that at this very moment the sun is in . all things past are equally and perfectly at rest ; and to this way of consideration of them , are all one , whether they were before the beginning of the world , or but yesterday ; the measuring of any duration , by some motion , depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion , or any other periods of revolution , but the having a clear idea of the length of some periodical known motion , or other intervals of duration in my mind , and applying that to the duration of the thing i would measure . § . . hence we see , that some men imagine the duration of the world from its first existence , to this present year . to have been years , or equal to annual revolutions of the sun , and others a great deal more ; as the aegyptians of old , who in the time of alexander counted years , from the reign of the sun ; and the chineses now , who account the world , , years old , or more ; which longer duration of the world , according to their computation , though i should not believe to be true , yet i can equally imagine it with them , and as truly understand , and say one is longer than the other , as i understand that methusalem's life was longer than enoch's : and if the common reckoning of should be true , ( as it may be , as well as any other assigned , ) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean , when they make the world a years older , since every one may with the same facility imagine ( i do not say believe ) the world to be years old , as ; and may as well conceive the duration of years , as . whereby it appears , that to the measuring the duration of any thing by time , it is not requisite , that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by , or any other periodical revolution ; but it suffices to this purpose , that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances , which we can in our minds apply to duration , with which the motion or appearance never co-existed . . for as in the history of the creation delivered by moses , i can imagine that light existed three days before the sun was , or had any motion , barely by thinking , that the duration of light before the sun was created , was so long as ( if the sun had moved then , as it doth now , ) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions ; so by the same way i can have an idea of the chaos , or angels , being created before there was either light , or any continued motion , a minute , an hour , a day , a year , or years . for if i can but consider duration equal to one minute , before either the being or motion of any body , i can add one more minute till i come to . and by the same way of adding minutes , hours , or years , ( i. e. such or such parts of the sun's revolution , or any other period whereof i have the idea , ) proceed in infinitum . and suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as i can reckon , let me add whilst i will , which i think is the notion we have of eternity , of whose infinity we have no other notion , than we have of the infinity of number , to which we can add for ever without end . § . . and thus i think it is plain , that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned , ( viz. ) reflection and sensation , we get the ideas of duration , and the measures of it . for first , by observing what passes in our minds , how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish , and others begin to appear , we come by the idea of succession . secondly , by observing a distance in the parts of this succession , we get the idea of duration . thirdly , by sensation observing certain appearances , at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods , we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of duration , as minutes , hours , days , years , &c. fourthly , by being able to repeat those measures of time , or ideas of stated length of duration in our minds , as o●ten as we will , we can come to imagine duration , where nothing does really endure or exist ; and thus we imagine to morrow , next year , or seven years hence . fifthly , by being able to repeat any such idea of any length of time , as of a minute , a year , or an age , as often as we will in our own thoughts , and add them one to another , without ever coming to the end of such addition , any nearer than we can to the end of number , to which we can always add , we come by the idea of eternity , as the future eternal duration of our souls , as well as the eternity of that infinite being , which must necessarily have always existed . sixthly , by considering any part of infinite duration , as set out by periodical measures , we come by the idea of what we call time in general . chap. xv. of duration and expansion , considered together . § . . though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration ; yet they being ideas of general concernment , that have something very obstruse and peculiar in their nature , the comparing them one with another may , perhaps , be of use for their illustration ; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them , by taking a view of them together . distance or space , in its simple abstract conception , to avoid confusion , i call expansion , to distinguish it from extension , which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter , and so includes , or at least intimates the idea of body : whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing . i preferr also the word expansion to space , because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts , which never exist together , as well as to those which are permanent . in both these ( viz. ) expansion and duration , the mind has this common idea of continued lengths , capable of greater , or less quantities : for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour , and a day , as of an inch and a foot. § . . the mind , having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion , let it be a span , or a pace , or what length you will , can , as has been said , repeat that idea ; and so adding it to the former , enlarge its idea of length , and make it equal to two spans , or two paces , and so as often as it will , till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another , and increase thus , till it amounts to the distance of the sun , or remotest star. by such a progression as this , setting out from the place where it is , or any other place , it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths , and find nothing to stop its going on , either in , or without body . 't is true , we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension ; the extremity and bounds of all body , we have no difficulty to arrive at : but when the mind is there , it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion ; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end . nor let any one say , that beyond the bounds of body , there is nothing at all , unless he will confine god within the limits of matter . solomon , whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom , seems to have other thoughts , when he says , heaven , and the heaven of heavens , cannot contain thee : and he , i think , very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding , who persuades himself , that he can extend his thoughts farther than god exists , or imagine any expansion where he is not . § . . just so is it in duration . the mind having got the idea of any length of duration , can double , multiply , and enlarge it , not only beyond its own , but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings , and all the measures of time , taken from the great bodies of the world , and their motions . but yet every one easily admits , that though we make duration boundless , as certainly it is , we cannot yet extend it beyond all being . god , every one easily allows , fills eternity ; and 't is hard to find a reason , why any one should doubt , that he likewise fills immensity : his infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another ; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter , to say , where there is no body , there is nothing . § . . hence , i think , we may learn the reason , why every one familiarly , and without the least hesitation , speaks of , and supposes eternity , and sticks not to ascribe infinity to duration ; but 't is with more doubting and reserve , that many admit , or suppose the infinity of space . the reason whereof seems to me to be this , that duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings , we easily conceive in god infinite duration , and we cannot avoid doing so ; but not attributing to him extension , but only to matter , which is finite , we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without matter ; of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute : and therefore when men pursue their thoughts of space , they are apt to stop at the confines of body ; as if space were there at an end too , and reached no farther : or if their ideas upon consideration carry them farther , yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe , imaginary space ; as if it were nothing , because there is no body existing in it . whereas duration , antecedent to all body , and the motions it is measured by , they never term imaginary , because it is never supposed void of some other real existence . and if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of mens ideas , ( as i am apt to think they may very much , ) one may have occasion to think by the name duration , that the continuation of existence , with a kind of resistence to any destructive force , and the continuation of solidity , ( which is apt to be confounded with , and if we will look into the minute atomical parts of matter , is little different from hardness , ) were thought to have some analogy , and gave occasion to words , so near of kin as durare and durum esse . but be that as it will , this is certain , that whoever pursues his own thoughts , will find them sometimes lanch out beyond the extent of body , into the infinity of space or expansion : the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body , and all other things ; which may ( to those who please ) be a subject of farther meditation . § . . time in general is to duration , as place to expansion . they are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity , as is set out and distinguished from the rest , as it were by land-marks ; and so are made use of , to denote the position of ●inite real beings , in respect one to another , in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space . these rightly considered , are nothing but ideas of determinate distances , from certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible things , and supposed to keep the same distance one from another . from such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon , and from them we measure out portions of those infinite quantities ; which so considered , are that which we call time and place . for duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless , the order and position of things , without such known setled points , would be lost in them ; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable conf●●sion . § . . time and place taken thus , for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration , set out , or supposed to be distinguished from the rest , by marks , and known boundaries , have each of them a two-fold acceptation . first , time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration , as it measured out by , and co-exhistent with the existence , and motions of the great bodies of the universe , as far as we know any thing of them ; and in this sense , time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world , as in these phrases before mentioned , before all time , or when time shall be no more . place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space , which is possessed by , and comprehended within the material world ; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion ; though this may more properly be called extension , than place . within , these two are confined , and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined the particular time or duration , and the particular extension , and place of all corporeal beings . § . . secondly , sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense , and is applied to parts of that infinite duration , not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence , and periodical motions of bodies , that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs , and for seasons , and for days , and years , and are accordingly our measures of time ; but such other portions too of that infinite uniform duration , which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time ; and so consider them as bounded and determined . for if we should suppose the creation , or fall of the angels , was at the beginning of the iulian period , we should speak properly enough , and should be understood , if we said , 't is a longer time since the creation of angels , than the creation of the world , by years : whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration , as we suppose equal to , and would have admitted , annual revolutions of the sun , moving at the rate it now does . and thus likewise , we sometimes speak of place , distance , or bulk in the great inane , beyond the confines the world , when we consider so much of that space , as is equal to , or capable to receive a body of any assigned dimensions , as a cubick●foot ; or do suppose a point in it , at such a certain distance from any part of the universe . § . . where and when are questions belonging to all finite existences , and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world , and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it . without some such fixed parts or periods , the order of things would be lost , to our finite understandings , in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion ; which comprehend in them all finite beings , and in their full extent , belong only to the deity . and therefore we are not to wonder , that we comprehend them not , and do so often find our thoughts at a loss , when we would consider them , either abstractly in themselves , or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible being . but when applied to any particular finite beings , the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space , as the bulk of that body takes up . and place is the position of any body , when considered at a certain distance from some other . as the idea of the particular duration of any thing , is an idea of that portion of infinite duration , which passes during the existence of that thing , so the time when the thing existed , is the idea of that space of duration , which passed between some known and fixed period of duration , and the being of that thing . one shews the distance of the extremities of the bulk , or existence of the same thing , as that it is a foot square , or lasted two years ; the other shews the distance of it in place , or existence from other fixed points of duration or space ; as that it was in the middle of lincolns-inn-fields , or the first degree of taurus , and in the year of our lord , . or the year of the iulian period : all which distances , we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration , as inches , feet , miles , and degrees , and in the other minutes , days and years , &c. § . . there is one thing more , wherein space and duration have a great conformity , and that is , though they are justly reckoned amongst our simple ideas : yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition , it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts : but their parts being all of the same kind , and without the mixture of any other idea , hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas . could the mind , as in number , come to so small a part of extension or duration , as excluded divisibility , that would be , as it were , the indivisible unite , or idea ; by repetition of which , it would make its more inlarged ideas of extension and duration . but since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space , without parts ; instead thereof it makes use of the common measures , which by familiar use , in each country , have imprinted themselves on the memory ( as inches , and feet ; or cubits , and parasangs ; and so seconds , minutes , hours , days , and years in duration : ) the mind makes use , i say , of such ideas as these , as simple ones ; and these are the component parts of larger ideas , which the mind , upon occasion , makes by the addition of such known lengths , which it is acquainted with : on the other side , the ordinary smallest measure we have of either , look'd on as an unite in number , when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions . though on both sides , both in addition and division , either of space or duration , when the idea under consideration becomes very big , or very small , the idea of its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused ; and it is the number of its repeated additions , or divisions , that alone remains clear and distinct , as will easily appear to any one , who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space , or divisibility of matter . every part of duration is duration too ; and every part of extension is extension , both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum . but the least portions of either of them , whereof we have clear and distinct ideas , may , perhaps , be fittest to be considered by us , as the simple ideas of that kind , out of which our complex modes of space , extension , and duration , are made up , and into which they can again be distinctly resolved . such a small part in duration , may be called a moment , and is the time of one idea in our minds , in the train of their ordinary succession there . the other , wanting a proper name , i know not whether i may be allowed to call a sensible point , meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern , which is ordinarily about a second of a circle , whereof the eye is the centre . § . . expansion , and duration have this farther agreement , that though they are both considered by us as having parts ; yet their parts are not separable one from another , no not even in thought : though the parts of bodies , from whence we take our measure of the one ; and the parts of motion , or rather the succession of ideas in our minds , from whence we take the measure of the other , may be interrupted and seperated ; as the one is often by rest , and the other is by sleep , which we call rest too . § . . but yet there is this manifest difference between them , that the ideas of length , we have of expansion , are turned every way , and so make figure , and breadth , and thickness ; but duration is but as it were the length of one streight line , extended in infinitum , not capable of multiplicity , variation , or figure ; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever , wherein all things whilst they exist , equally partake . for this present moment is common to all things , that are now in being , and equally comprehends that part of their existence , as much as if they were all but one single being ; and we may truly say , they all exist in the same moment of time. whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this , in respect of expansion , is beyond my comprehension : and , perhaps , for us , who have understandings and comprehensions , suited to our own preservation , and the ends of our own being , but not to the reality and extent of all other beings , 't is near as hard to conceive any existence , or to have an idea of any real being , with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion ; as it is , to have the idea of any real existence , with a perfect negation of all manner of duration : and therefore what spirits have to do with space , or how they communicate in it , we know not . all that we know is , that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it , according to the extent of its solid parts ; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space , whilst it remains there . § . . duration and time , which is a part of it , is the idea we have of perishing distance , of which no two parts exist together , but follow each other in succession ; as expansion is the idea of lasting distance , all whose parts exist together , and are not capable of succession . and therefore though we cannot conceive any duration without succession , nor can put it together in our thoughts , that any being does now exist to morrow , or possess at once more than the present moment of duration ; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the almighty far different from that of man , or any other finite being . because man comprehends not in his knowledge , or power , all past and future things : his thoughts are but of yesterday , and he knows not what to morrow will bring forth . what is once passed , he can never recal ; and what is yet to come , he cannot make present . what i say of man , i say of all finite beings , who though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power , yet are no more than the meanest creature , in comparison with god himself . finite of any magnitude , holds not any proportion to infinite . god's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge , and infinite power , he sees all things past and to come ; and they are no more distant from his knowledge , no farther removed from his sight , than the present : they all lie under the same view : and there is nothing , which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases . for the existence of all things , depending upon his good pleasure ; all things exist every moment , that he thinks fit to have them exist . to conclude , expansion and duration do mutually imbrace , and comprehend each other ; every part of space , being in every part of duration ; and every part of duration , in every part of expansion . such a combination of two distinct ideas , is , i suppose , scarce to be found in all that great variety , we do or can can conceive , and may afford matter to farther speculation . chap. xvi . of number . § . . amongst all the ideas we have , as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways , so there is none more simple than that of vnity , or one , it has no shadow of variety nor composition in it : every object our senses are employed about ; every idea in our understandings ; every thought of our minds brings this idea along with it : and therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts , as well as it is in its agreement to all other things , the most universal idea we have : for number applies it self to men , angels , actions , thoughts , every thing , that either doth exist , or can be imagined . § . . by repeating this idea in our minds , and adding the repetitions together , we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it . thus by adding one to one , we have the complex idea of two ; by putting twelve unites together , we have the complex idea of a dozen ; and so of a score , or a milion , or any other number . § . . the simples modes of number are of all other the most distinct ; every the least variation , which is an unite , making each combination , as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it , as the most remote ; two being as distinct from one , as two hundred ; and the ideas of two , as distinct from the idea of three , as the magnitude of the whole earth , is from that of a mite . this is not so in other simple modes , in which it is not so easie , nor , perhaps , possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas , which yet are really different . for who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper , and that of the next degree to it ? or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension ? § . . the clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others , even those that approach nearest , makes me apt to think , that demonstrations in numbers , if they are not more evident and exact than in extension , yet they are more general in their use , and more determinate in their application . because the ideas of numbers are more precise , and distinguishable than in extension ; where every equality and excess are not so easie to be observed , or measured , because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go , as in an unite ; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered , which is clear otherwise in number , where , as has been said , is as distinguishable from , as from , though be the next immediate excess to . but it is not so in extension , where whatsoever is more than just a foot , or an inch , is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot , or an inch ; and in lines which appear of an equal length , one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts : nor can any one assign an angle , which shall be the next biggest to a right one . § . . by the repeating , as has been said , of the idea of an unite , and joining it to another unite , we make thereof one collective idea , marked by the name two. and whosoever can do this , and proceed on , still adding one more to the last collective idea he had of any number , and give a name to it , may count , or have ideas for several collections of unites distinguished one from another , as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers , and a memory to retain that series , with their several names : all numeration being but still the adding of one unite more , and giving to the whole together , as comprehended in one idea , a new or distinct name or sign , whereby to know it from those before and after , and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of unites : so that he that can add one to one , and so to two , and so go on with his tale , taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression ; and so again by subtracting an unite from each collection retreat and lessen them , is capable of all the ideas of numbers , within the compass of his language , or for which he hath names , though not , perhaps , of more . for the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of unites , which have no variety , nor are capable of any other difference , but more or less , names or marks for each distinct combination , seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas . for without such names or marks , we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning , especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of unites , which put together without a name or mark , to distinguish that precise collection , will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion . § . . this , i think , to be the reason why some americans i have spoken with , ( who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough , ) could not , as we do , by any means count to ; nor had any distinct idea of that number , though they could reckon very well to . because their language being scanty , and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple life , unacquainted either with trade or mathematicks , had no words in it to stand for ; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers , they would shew the hairs of their head , to express a great multitude which they could not number ; which inability , i suppose , proceeded from their want of names . the tououpinambos had no names for numbers above ; any number beyond that , they made out by shewing their fingers , and the fingers of others who were present : histoire d'un voiage fait en la terre du brasil , par iean de lery , c. . / . and i doubt not but we our selves might distinctly number in words , a great deal farther than we usually do , would we find out but some fit denominations to signifie them by ; whereas in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions , it is hard to go beyond eighteen , or at most four and twenty decimal progressions , without confusion . but to shew how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning , or having useful ideas of numbers , let us set all these following figures in one continued line , as the marks of one number : v. g. nevilions . octilions . septilions . sextilions . quintilions . quatrilions . trilions . bilions . milions . vnites . . . . . . . . . . . the ordinary way of naming this number in english , will be the often repeating of millions , of millions , of millions , of millions , of millions , of millions , of millions , of millions , ( which is the denomination of six second figures . ) in which way , it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number : but whether , by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination , these , and perhaps a great many more figures , in progression , might not easily be counted distinctly , and ideas of them both got more easily to our selves , and more plainly signified to others , i leave it to be considered . this i mention only to shew how necessary distinct names are to numbering , without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention . § . . thus children , either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers , or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones , and range them to a regular order , and so retain them in their memories , as is necessary to reckoning , do not begin to number very early , nor proceed in it very far or steadily , till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas ; and one may often observe them in discourse and reason pretty well , and have very clear conceptions of several other things , before they can tell . and some , through the default of their memories , who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers , with their names annexed in their distinct orders , and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions , and their relation one to another , are not able all their life-time , to reckon or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers . for he that will count twenty , or have any idea of that number , must know that nineteen went before , with the distinct name or sign of every one of them , as they stand marked in their order ; for where-ever this fails , a gap is made , the chain breaks , and the progress in numbering can go no farther . so that to reckon right , it is required , . that the mind distinguish carefully two ideas , which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of one unite . . that it retain in memory the names , or marks , of the several combinations from an unite to that number ; and that not confusedly , and at random , but in that exact order , that the numbers follow one another ; in either of which if it trips , the whole business of numbring will be disturbed , and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude , but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration , will not be attained to . § . . this farther is observable in number , that it is that which the mind makes use of , in measuring all things that by us are measurable , which principally are expansion and duration ; and our idea of infinity , even when applied to those , seems to be nothing but the infinity of number . for what else are our ideas of eternity and immensity , but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of space and expansion , or duration , with the infinity of number , in which we can come to no end of addition ? for such an inexhaustible stock , number , of all other our ideas , most clearly furnishes us with , as is obvious to every one : for let a man collect into one sum , as great a number as he pleases , this multitude , how great soever , lessens not one jot the power of adding to it , or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number , where still there remains as much to be added , as if none were taken out . and this endless addition of numbers , so apparent to the mind , is that , i think , which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity ; of which more in the following chapter . chap. xvii . of infinity . § . . he that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of infinity , cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed , and then how the mind comes to frame it . finite , and infinite , seem to me to be looked upon by the mind , as the modes of quantity , and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts , and are capable of increase or diminution , by the addition or subtraction of any the least part ; and such are the ideas of space , duration , and number , which we have considered in the foregoing chapters . 't is true , that we cannot but be assured , that the great god , of whom , and from whom are all things , is incomprehensibly infinite ; but yet , when we apply to that first and supream being , our idea of infinite in our weak and narrow thoughts , we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity ; and , i think , more figuratively to his power , wisdom , and goodness , and other attributes , which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible , &c. for when we call them infinite , we have no other idea of this infinity , but what carries with it some reflection on , and imitation of that number or extent of the acts or objects of god's power , wisdom , and goodness , which can never be supposed so great , or so many , which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed , let us multiply them in our thoughts with all the infinity of endless number . i do not pretend to say how these attributes are in god , who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities : they do without doubt contain in them all possible perfection ; but this , i say , is our way of conceiving them , and these our ideas of their infinity . § . . finite then , and infinite , being by the mind looked on as modifications of expansion and duration , the next thing to be considered is , how the mind comes by them . as for the idea of finite , there is no great difficulty ; the obvious portions of extension , that affect our senses , carry with them into the mind the idea of finite , and the ordinary periods of succession , whereby we measure time and duration ; as hours , days , and years , are bounded lengths : the difficulty is , how we come by those boundless ideas of eternity and immensity , since the objects we converse with , come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness . § . . every one that has any idea of any stated lengths of space , as a foot , finds that he can repeat that idea ; and joining it to the former , make the idea of two foot ; and by the addition of a third , three foot ; and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions , whether of the same idea of a foot , or if he please of doubling it , or any other idea he has of any length , as a mile , or diametre of the earth , or of the orbis magnus ; for which-ever of these he takes , and how often soever he doubles , or any otherwise multiplies it , he finds that after he has continued this doubling in his thoughts , and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases , he has no more reason to stop , nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition , than he was at first setting out ; the power of enlarging his idea of space by farther additions , remaining still the same , he hence takes the idea of infinite space . § . . this , i think , is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite space . 't is a quite different consideration to examine , whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing , since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things ; but yet since this comes here in our way , i suppose i may say , that we are apt to think , that space in it self is actually boundless , to which imagination , the idea of space or expansion of its self naturally leads us . for it being considered by us , either as the extension of body , or as existing by it self , without any solid matter taking it up , ( for of such a void space , we have not only the idea , but i have proved , as i think , from the motion of body , its necessary existence , ) it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it , or be stopp'd any where , in its progress in this space , how far soever it extends its thoughts . any bounds made with body , even adamantine walls , are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its farther progress in space and extension , that it rather facilitates and enlarges it : for so far as that body reaches , so far no one can doubt of extension ; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body , what is there that can there put a stop and satisfie the mind , that it is at the end of space , when it perceive it is not ; nay , when it is satisfied that body it self can move into it ? for if it be necessary for the motion of body , that there should be an empty space , though never so little here amongst bodies , and it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space ; nay , it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space , the same possibility of a bodies moving into a void space , beyond the utmost bounds of body , as well as into a void space interspersed amongst bodies , will always remain clear and evident , the idea of empty pure space , whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies , being exactly the same , differing not in nature , though in bulk ; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it : so that wherever the mind places it self by any thought , either amongst or remote from all bodies , it can in this uniform idea of space no-where find any bounds , any end ; and so must necessarily conclude it by the very nature and idea of each part of it to be actually infinite . § . . as by the power we find in our selves of repeating , as often as we will , any idea of space , we get the idea of immensity ; so by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds , with all the endless addition of number , we come by the idea of eternity . for we find in our selves we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas , than we can come to the end of number , which every one perceives he cannot . but here again 't is another question , quite different from our having an idea of eternity , to know whether there were any real being , whose duration has been eternal . he that considers something now existing , must necessarily come to something eternal , but having spoke of this in another place , i shall say here no more of it , but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity . § . . if it be so , that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in our selves , of repeating without end our own ideas ; it may be demanded , why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas , as well as those of space and duration ; since they may be as easily , and as often repeated in our minds as the other ; and yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness , or infinite whiteness , though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white , as frequently as those of a yard , or a day ? to which i answer , all the ideas that are considered as having parts , and are capable of increase by the addition of any equal or less parts , afford us by their repetition the idea of infinity ; because with this endless repetition , there is continued an enlargement , of which there can be no end . but in other ideas it is not so ; for to the largest idea of extension or duration that i at present have , the addition of any the least part makes an increase ; but to the perfectest idea i have of the whitest whiteness , if i add another of a less or equal whiteness , ( and of a whiter than i have , i cannot add the idea , ) it makes no increase , and enlarges not my idea at all ; and therefore the different ideas of whiteness , &c. are called degrees . for those ideas that consist of parts , are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part ; but if you take the idea of white , which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to our sight , and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to day , and put them together in your mind , they embody , as it were , and run into one , and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased ; and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater , we are so far from increasing , that we diminish it . those ideas that consist not of parts , cannot be augmented to what proportion men please , or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses ; but space , duration , and number , being capable of increase by repetition , leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more ; nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther addition or progression , and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity . § . . though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity , and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity , by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases ; yet i guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts , when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have , and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity as an infinite space , or an infinite duration : for our idea of infinity being , as i think , an endless growing idea , but the idea of any quantity the mind has , being at that time terminated in that idea , ( for be it as great as it will , it can be no greater than it is , ) to join infinity to it , is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk ; and therefore i think it is not an insignificant subtilty if i say , that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space , and the idea of a space infinite : the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind , over what repeated ideas of space it pleases ; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite , is to suppose the mind already passed over , and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space , which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it , which carries in it a plain contradiction . § . . this , perhaps , will be a little plainer , if we consider it in numbers . the infinity of numbers , to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach , easily appears to any one that reflects on it : but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be , there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number , whatsoever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space , duration , or number , let them be never so great , they are still finite ; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder , from which we remove all bounds , and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought , without ever compleating the idea , there we have our idea of infinity ; which though it seem to be pretty clear , when we consider nothing else in it , but the negation of an end , yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration , that idea is very obscure , and confused , because it is made up of two parts , very different , if not inconsistent . for let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number , as great as he will ; 't is plain , the mind rests and terminates in that idea , which is contrary to the idea of infinity , which consists in a supposed endless progression . and therefore , i think , it is , that we are so easily confounded , when we come to argue , and reason about infinite space or duration , &c. because the parts of such an idea , not being perceived to be , as they are , inconsistent , the one side or other always perplexes , whatever consequences we draw from the other , as an idea of motion not passing on , would perplex any one , who should argue from such an idea , which is not better than an idea of motion at rest ; and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space , or ( which is the same thing ) a number infinite , i. e. of a space or number , which the mind actually has , and so views , and terminates in ; and of a space or number , which in a constant and endless progression , and enlarging it , can in thought never attain to . for how large soever an idea of space i have in my mind , it is no larger than it is that instant that i have it , though i be capable the next instant to double it ; and so on in infinitum : for that alone is infinite , which has no bounds , and that the idea of infinity ; in which our thoughts can find none . § . . but of all other ideas , it is , number , as i have said , which , i think , furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of . for even in space and duration , when the mind pursues the idea of infinity , it there makes uses of the ideas and repetitions of numbers , as of millions of millions of miles , or years , which are as so many distinct ideas , kept best by number from running into a confused heap , wherein the mind loses it self ; and when it has added together as many millions , &c. as it pleases , of known lengths of space or duration , the clearest idea it can get of infinity , is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers , which affords no prospect of stop or boundary . § . . it will , perhaps , give us a little farther light into the idea we have of infinity , and discover to us , that it is nothing but the infinity of number applied to determinate par●s , of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas , if we consider that number is not generally thought by us infinite , whereas duration and extension is apt to be so ; which arises from hence , that in number we are at one end , as it were : for there being in number nothing less than an unite , we there stop , and are at an end ; but in addition , or increase of number , we can set no bounds : and so it is like a line , whereof one end terminating with us , the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive ; but in space and duration it is otherwise . for in duration , we consider it , as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceivable , undeterminate , and infinite length ; which is evident to any one , that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of eternity ; which , i suppose , he will find to be nothing else , but the turning this infinity of number both ways , à parte ante , and à parte post , as they speak . for when we would consider eternity , à parte ante , what do we but beginning from our selves , and the present time we are in , we repeat in our minds the ideas of years or ages , or any other assignable portion of duration past , with a prospect of proceeding in such addition , with all the infinity of number ; and when we would consider eternity , à parte post , we just after the same rate begin from our selves , and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come still , extending that line of number , as before ; and these two being put together , are that infinite duration we call eternity ; which every way we consider , appears infinite , because we still turn that way the infinite end of number , i. e. the power still of adding more . § . . the same happens also in space , wherein conceiving our selves to be as it were in the centre , we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number ; and reckoning any way from our selves , a yard , mile , diameter of the earth , or orbis magnus , by the infinity of number , we add others to them as often as we will ; and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas , than we have to set bounds to number , we have that indeterminable idea of immensity . § . . and since in any bulk of matter , our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility , therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that , which has the infinity also of number , but with this difference , that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration , we only use addition of numbers ; whereas this is like the division of an unite into its fractions , wherein the mind also can proceed in infinitum , as well as in the former additions , it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers : though in the addition of the one , we can have no more the positive idea of a space infinitely great , than in the division of the other , we can have the idea of a body infinitely little ; our idea of infinity being , as i may so say , a growing and fugitive idea , still in a boundless progression that can step no where . § . . though it be hard , i think , to find any one so absurd , as to say he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number ; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of unites to any former number , and that as long , and as much as one will ; the like also being in the infinity of space and duration , which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions ; yet there be those , who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space . it would , i think , be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite , to ask him that has it , whether he could add to it or no ; which would easily shew the mistake of such a positive idea . we can , i think , have no positive idea of any space or duration , which is not made up of , and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet or yards , or days and years , which are the common measures whereof we have the ideas in our minds , and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities . and therefore , since an idea of infinite space or duration must needs be made up of infinite parts , it can have no other infinity , than that of number capable still of farther addition ; but not an actual positive idea of a number infinite . for , i think , it is evident , that the addition of finite things together ( as are all lengths , whereof we have the positive ideas ) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite , than as number does ; which consisting of additions of finite unites one to another , suggests the idea of infinite , only by a power we find we have , of still increasing the sum , and adding more of the same kind , without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression . § . . they who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive , seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument , taken from the negation of an end ; which being negative , the negation of it is positive . he that considers that the end is in body , but the extremity or superficies of that body will not , perhaps , be forward to grant , that the end is a bare negative : and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white , will be apt to think , that the end is something more than a pure negation ; nor is it , when applied to duration , the bare negation of existence , but more properly the last moment of it . but if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence , i am sure they cannot deny , but that the beginning is the first instant of being , and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation ; and therefore by their own argument , the idea of eternal , à parte ante , or of a duration without a beginning , is but a negative idea . § . . the idea of infinite , has , i confess , something of positive in all those things we apply to it . when we would think of infinite space or duration , we at first step usually make some very large idea , as , perhaps , of millions of ages , or miles , which possibly we double and multiply several times . all that we thus amass together in our thoughts , is positive , and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration : but what still remains beyond this , we have no more a positive distinct notion of , than a mariner has of the depth of the sea ; where having let down a large portion of his sounding-line , he reaches no bottom , whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms , and more ; but how much that more is , he hath no distinct notion at all : and could he always supply new line , and find the plummet always sink without ever stopping , he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a compleat and positive idea of infinity ; in which case , let this line be , or fathoms long , it equally discovers what is beyond it , and gives only this confused and comparative idea , that this is not all , but one may yet go farther . so much as the mind comprehends of any space , it has a positive idea of ; but in this thought of infinity , it being always enlarging , always advancing , the idea is still imperfect and incompleat . so much space as the mind takes a view of , in its contemplation of greatness , is a clear picture , and positive in the understanding ; but infinite is still greater . . then the idea of so much is positive and clear . . the idea of greater is also clear , but it is but a comparative idea . . the idea of so much greater , as cannot be comprehended , and this is plain negative : not positive ; for he has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension , ( which is that sought for in the idea of infinite , ) that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it ; and such , no body , i think , pretends to , in what is infinte . for to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity , without knowing how great it is , is as reasonable as to say , he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea-shoar , who knows not how many they be ; but only that they are more than twenty : for just such a perfect and positive idea has he of infinity , when he applies it to space or duration , who says it is larger than the extent or duration of , , , or any other number of miles , or years , whereof he has , or can have , a positive idea ; which is all the idea , i think , we have of infinite . so that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity , lies in obscurity , and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea , wherein i know , i neither do nor can comprehend all i would , it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity : and that cannot but be very far from a positive compleat idea , wherein the greatest part of what i would comprehend , is left out , under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater . for to say , that having in any quantity measured so much , or gone so far , you are not yet at the end , is only to say , that that quantity is greater , so that the negation of an end in any quantity , is in other words only to say , that it is bigger ; and a total negation of an end , is but the carrying this bigger still with you , in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity ; and adding this idea of still greater , to all the ideas you have , or can be supposed to have of quantity ; and whether such an idea as that , be positive , i leave any one to consider . § . . i ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity , whether their idea of duration includes in it succession , or not ? if it do not , they ought to shew the difference of their notion of duration , when applied to an eternal being , and to a finite ; since , perhaps , there may be others , as well as i , who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point , and acknowledge , that the notions they have of duration , force them to conceive , that whatever has duration , is of a longer continuance to day , than it was yesterday . if to avoid succession in eternal existence , they recur to the punctum stans of the schools , i suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter , or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration , there being nothing more inconceivable to me , than duration without succession . besides , that punctum stans , if it signifie any thing , being not quantum , finite or infinite , cannot belong to it . but if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever , our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration , wherein any thing does exist ; and whether any one has , or can have , a positive idea of an actual infinite number , i leave him to consider , till his infinite number be so great , that he himself can add no more to it ; and as long as he can increase it , i doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it , a little too scanty for positive infinity . § . . i think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature , that will but examine his own , or any other existence , to have the notion of an eternal wise being , who had no beginning : and such an idea of infinite duration , i am sure i have ; but this negation of a beginning , being but the negation of a positive thing , scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity ; which whenever i endeavour to extend my thoughts to , i confess my self at a loss , and find i cannot attain any clear comprehension of it . § . . he that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space , will when he considers it , find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest , than he has of the least space : for in this latter , which seems the easier of the two , and more within our comprehension , we are capable only of a comparative idea of smalness , which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea ; for all our positive ideas of any quantity , whether great or little , have always bounds , though our comparative idea , whereby we can always add to the one , and take from the other , hath no bounds : for that which remains either great or little , not being comprehended in that positive idea we have , lies in obscurity ; and we have no other idea of it , but of the power of enlarging the one , and diminishing the other without ceasing . for a pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility , as the accutest thought of a mathematician : and a surveyor may as soon with his chain , measure out infinite space , as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it , or by thinking comprehend it , which is to have a positive idea of it . he that thinks on a cube of an inch diametre , has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind , and so can frame one of ½ a ¼ ⅛ , and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very very little , but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness , which division can produce . what remains of smalness , is as far from his thoughts , as when he first began ; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smalness , which is consequent to infinite divisibility . § . . every one that looks towards infinity , does , as i have said , at first glance make some very large idea of that he applies it to , let it be space , or duration ; and possibly wearies his thoughts , by multiplying in his mind that first large idea : but yet by that he comes no nearer , having a positive clear idea of what remains , to make up a positive infinite , than the country-fellow had of the water which was yet to come , and pass the channel of the river where he stood : rusticus expectat dum transeat amnis , at ille labitur , & labetur per omne volubilis aevum . § . . there are some i have met with , that put so much difference between infinite duration , and infinite space , that they persuade themselves , that they have a positive idea of eternity ; but that they have not , nor can have any idea of infinite space . the reason of which mistake , i suppose to be this , that finding by a due contemplation of causes and effects , that it is necessary to admit some eternal being , and so to consider the real existence of that being , as taking up , and commensurate to their idea of eternity . but on the other side , not finding it necessary , but on the contrary apparently absurd , that body should be infinite , they forwardly conclude they can have no idea of infinite space , because they can have no idea of infinite matter : which consequence , i conceive , is very ill collected , the existence of matter being no ways necessary to the existence of space , no more than the existence of motion , or the sun , is necessary to duration , though duration uses to be measured by it : and i doubt not but a man may have the idea of miles square , without any body so big , as well as the idea of years , without any body so old . it seems as easie to me to have the idea of space empty of body , as to think of the capacity of his bushel without corn , or the hollow of a nut-shell without a kernel in it ; it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid body infinitely extended , because we have any idea of the infinity of space , than it is necessary that the world should be eternal , because we have an idea of infinite duration : and why should we think our idea of infinite space , requires the real existence of matter to support it , when we find we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come , as we have of infinite duration past ? though , i suppose , no body thinks it conceivable , that any thing does or has existed in that future duration . nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration , with present or past existence , any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday , to day , and to morrow to be the same ; or bring ages past and future together , and make them contemporary . but if these men are of the mind , that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration , than of infinite space , because it is past doubt , that god has existed from all eternity , but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space ; yet those philosophers who are of opinion , that infinite space is possessed by god's infinite omnipresence , as well as infinite duration by his eternal existence , must be allowed to have as clear idea of infinite space , as of infinite duration ; though neither of them , i think , has any positive idea of infinity in either case . for whatsoever positive ideas a man has in his mind of any quantity , he can repeat it , and add it to the former , as easie as he can add together the ideas of two days , or two paces , which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind , and so on as long as he please ; whereby if a man had a positive idea of infinite , either duration or space , he could add two infinites together ; nay , make one infinite infinitely bigger than another , absurdities too gross to be con●uted . § . . but yet if after all this , there be men who persuade themselves , that they have clear positive comprehensive ideas of infinity , 't is fit they enjoy their privilege : and i should be very glad ( with some others that i know , who acknowledge they have none such , ) to be better informed by their communication ; for i have been hitherto apt to think , that the great and inextricable difficulties , which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity , whether of space , duration , or divisibility , have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity , and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities . for whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space or duration , as if they had as compleat and positive ideas of it , as they have of the name they use for it , or of a yard , or of an hour , or any other determinate quantity , it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of , or reason about , lead them into perplexities and contradictions , and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty , to be surveyed and managed by them . § . . if i have dwelt pretty long on the considerations of duration , space , and number ; and what arises from the contemplation of them , infinity , 't is possibly no more than the matter requires , there being few simple ideas , whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men , than these do . i pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude , it suffices to my design , to shew how the mind receives them , such as they are , from sensation and reflection : and how even the idea we have of infinity , how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense , or operation of our mind , has nevertheless , as all our other ideas , its original there . some mathematicians , perhaps , of advanced speculations , may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity : but this hinders not but that they themselves , as well as all other men , got the first ideas they had of infinity , from sensation and reflection , in the method we have here set down . chap. xviii . of other simple modes . § . . though i have in the foregoing chapters , shewn how from simple ideas taken in by sensation , the mind comes to extend its self even to infinity ; which however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception , yet at last hath nothing in it , but what is made out of simple ideas , received into the mind by the senses , and afterwards there put together , by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas . though , i say , these might be instances of enough simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation , and suffice to shew , how the mind comes by them ; yet i shall for methods sake , though briefly , give an account of ●ome few more , and then proceed to more complex ideas . § . . to slide , roll , tumble , walk , creep , run , dance , leap , skip , and abundance other that might be named , are words which are no sooner heard , but every one who understands english , has presently in his mind distinct ideas , which are all but the different modifications of motion . modes of motion answer those of extension ; swift and slow are two different ideas of motion , the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together , so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion . § . . the like variety have we in sounds . every articulate word is a different modification of sound ; by which we see , that from the sense of hearing by such modifications , the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas , to almost an infinite number . sounds also , besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts , are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together , which make that complex idea call'd a tune , which a musician may have in his mind , when he hears or makes no sound at all , by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds , so put together silently in his own fancy . § . . those of colours might also be very various ; some we take notice of as the different degrees , or as they are termed , shades of the same colour : but since we very seldom make assemblages of colours , either for use or delight , but figure is taken in also , and has its part in it , as in painting , weaving , needle-works , &c. those which are taken notice of , do most commonly belong to mixed modes , as being made up of ideas of divers kinds , viz. figure and colour , such as beauty , rain bow , &c. § . . all compounded tastes and smells , are also modes made up of these simple ideas of those senses ; but they being such as generally we have no names for , are less taken notice of , and cannot be set down in writing ; and therefore must be left without enumeration , to the thoughts and experience of my reader . § . . in general it may be observed , that those simple modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea ; though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas ; yet have ordinarily no distinct names , nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas , where the difference is but very small between them . whether men have neglected these modes , and given no names to them , as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them , or because when they were so distinguished , that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use , i leave it to the thoughts of others ; it is sufficient to my purpose to shew , that all these simple ideas , come to our minds only by sensation and reflection ; and that when the mind has them , it can variously repeat and compound them , and so make new complex ideas . but though white , red , or sweet , &c. have not been modified or made into complex ideas , by several combinations , so as to be named , and thereby ranked into species ; yet some others of the simple ideas , viz. those of unity , duration , motion , &c. above instanced in , as also power and thinking have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas , with names belonging to them . § . . the reason whereof , i suppose , has been this , that the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another , the knowledge of men , and their actions , and the signifying of them to one another , was most necessary ; and therefore they made ideas of actions very nicely modified , and gave those complex ideas names , that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in , without long ambages and circumlocutions ; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about , might be the easier and quicker understood . that this is so and that men in framing different complex ideas , and giving them names , have been much governed by the end of speech in general ( which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another ) is evident in the names , which in several arts have been found out , and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions , belonging to their several trades , for dispatch sake , in their direction or discourses about them : which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations ; and thence the words that stand for them , by the greatest part of men of the same language , are not understood ; v. g. coltsher , drilling , filtration , cohobation , are words standing for certain complex ideas ; which being not in the minds of every body , they having no use of them , those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths , and chimists ; who having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for , and having given names to them , or received them from others upon hearing of these names in communication , readily conceive those ideas in their minds ; as by cohobation all the simple ideas of distilling , and the pouring the liquor , distilled from any thing , back upon the remaining matter , and distilling it again . thus we see , that there are great varieties of simple ideas , as of tastes and smells , which have no names , and of modes many more ; which either not having been generally enough observed , or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men , they have not had names given to them , and so pass not for species , which we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large , when we come to speak of words . chap. xix . of the modes of thinking . § . . when the mind turns its view inwards upon its self , and contemplates its own actions , thinking is the first that occurrs ; wherein it observes a great variety of modifications , and thereof frames to it self distinct ideas . thus the perception , or thought , which actually accompany , and is annexed to any impression on the body , made by an external object , it frames a distinct idea of , which we call sensation ; which is , as it were , the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses . the same idea , when it again recurrs without the operation of the like object on the eternal sensory , is remembrance . if it be sought after by the mind , and with pain and endeavour found , and brought again in view , 't is recollection : if it be held there long under attentive consideration , 't is contemplation . when ideas float in our mind , without any reflection or regard of the understanding , it is that which the french call resvery ; our language has scarce a name for it . when the ideas that offer themselves , ( for as i have observed in another place , whilst we are awake , there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds , ) are taken notice of , and , as it were , registred in the memory , it is attention . when the mind with great earnestness , and of a choice , fixes its view on any idea , considers it on all sides , and will not be called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other ideas , it is that we call intention , or study . sleep , without dreaming , is rest from all these ; and dreaming it self , is the perception of ideas ( whilst the outward senses are stopp'd , so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness , ) in the mind , not suggested by any external objects , or known occasion ; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all ; and whether that which we call extasie , be not dreaming with the eyes open , i leave to be examined . § . . these are some few instances of those various modes of thinking , which the mind may observe in it self , and so frame as distinct ideas of , as it does of white and red , a square or a circle . i do not pretend to enumerate them all , nor to treat at large of this set of ideas , which are got from reflection , that would be to make a volume . it suffices to my present purpose , to have shewn here , by some few examples , of what sort those ideas are , and how the mind comes by them ; especially since i shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning , iudging , volition , and knowledge , which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind , and modes of thinking . § . . but , perhaps , it may not be an unpardonable digression , nor wholly impertinent to our present design , if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking ; which those instances of attention , resvery , and dreaming , &c. before mentioned naturally enough suggest . that there are ideas , some or other , always present in the mind of a waking man , every ones experience convinces him ; though the mind employs it self about them with several degrees of attention . sometimes the mind fixes it self with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects , that it turns their ideas on all sides ; remarks their relations and circumstances ; and views every part so nicely , and with such intention , that it shuts out all other thoughts , and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses , which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions : at other times , it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding , without directing and pursuing any of them : and at other times , it lets them pass almost quite unregarded , as faint shadows that make no impression . § . . this difference of intention , and remission of the mind in thinking , with a great variety of degrees , between earnest study , and very near minding nothing at all , every one , i think , has experimented in himself . trace it a litte farther , and you find the mind in sleep , retired as it were from the senses , and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense , which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas . i need not , for this , instance in those , who sleep out whole stormy nights , without hearing the thunder , or seeing the lightning , or feeling the shaking of the house , which are sensible enough to those who are waking . but in this retirement of the mind from the senses , it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking , which we call dreaming , and last of all sound sleep closes the scene quite , and puts an end to all appearances . this i think almost every one has experience of in himself , and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far . that which i would farther conclude from hence is , that since the mind can sensibly put on , at several times , several degrees of thinking ; and be sometimes even in a waking man so remiss , as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree , that they are very little removed from none at all ; and at last in the dark retirements of sound sleep , loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever : since , i say , this is evidently so in matter of fact , and constant experience , i ask whether it be not probable , that thinking is the action , and not the essence of the soul ? since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission ; but the essences of things , are not conceived capable of any such variation . but this by the bye . chap. xx. of modes of pleasure and pain . § . . amongst the simple ideas , which we receive both from sensation and reflection , pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones . for as in the body , there is sensation barely in its self , or accompanied with pain or pleasure : so the thought , or perception of the mind is simply so , or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain , delight or trouble , call it how you please . these like other simple ideas cannot be described , nor their names defined ; the way of knowing them is , as of the simple ideas of the senses , only by experience : for to define them by the presence of good or evil , is no otherwise to make them known to us , than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves , upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds , as they are differently applied to , or considered by us . . things then are good or evil , only in reference to pleasure or pain ; that we call good , which is apt to cause or increase pleasure , or diminish pain in us ; or else to procure , or preserve us the possession of any other good , or absence of any evil. and on the contrary we name that evil , which is apt to produce or increase any pain , or diminish any pleasure in us ; or else to procure us any evil , or deprive us of any good. by pleasure and pain , i must be understood to mean of body or mind , as they are commonly distinguished ; though in truth , they be only different constitutions of the mind , sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body , sometimes by thoughts of the mind . § . . pleasure and pain , and that which causes them , good and evil , are the hinges on which our passions turn : and if we reflect on our selves , how these under various considerations operate in us , what modifications or tempers of mind , what internal sensations , ( if i may so call them , ) they produce in us , we may thence form to our selves the ideas of our passions . § . . thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight , which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him , has the idea we call love. for when a man declares in autumn , when he is eating them ; or in spring , when there are none , that he loves grapes , it is no more , but that the taste of grapes delights him ; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste , and he then can be said to love grapes no longer . § . . on the contrary , the thought of the pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us , is what we call hatred . were it my business here to enquire any farther , than into the bare ideas of our passions , as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain , i should remark that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings , is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain we receive from their use and application any way to our senses , though with their destruction ; but love and hatred to beings capable of happiness or misery , is often the pain or delight we have in their very being or happiness . thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends , producing constant delight in him , he is said constantly to love them . but it suffices to note that our ideas of love and hatred , are but the dispositions of the mind , in respect of pleasure and pain in general however caused in us . § . . the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing , whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it , is that we call desire , which is greater or less , as that uneasiness is more or less vehement . § . . ioy is a delight of the mind , from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good ; and we are then possessed of any good , when we have it so in our power , that we can use it when we please . thus a man almost starved , has ioy at the arrival of relief , even before he has the pleasure of using it ; and a father , in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight , is always , as long as his children are in such an estate , in the possession of that good ; for he needs but to reflect on it to have that pleasure . § . . sorrow is uneasiness in the mind , upon the thought of a good lost , which might have been enjoy'd longer , or the sense of a present evil. § . . hope is that pleasure in the mind , which every one finds in himself , upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him . § . . fear is an uneasiness of the mind , upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us . § . . despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good , which works differently in mens minds , sometimes producing uneasiness or pain , sometimes rest and indolency . § . . anger , is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind , upon the receit of any injury , with a present purpose of revenge . § . . envy is an uneasiness of mind , caused by the consideration of a good we desire , obtained by one we think should not have had it before us . § . . these two last , envy and anger , not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves , but having in them some mixed considerations of our selves and others , are not therefore to be found in all men , because those other parts of valuing their merits , or intending revenge , is wanting in them ; but all the rest terminating purely in pain and pleasure , are , i think , to be found in all men : for we love , desire , rejoice , and hope only in respect of pleasure ; we hate and fear , and are sad only in respect of pain ultimately ; and these passions are moved by things only , as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain , and to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them . thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject , ( at least if a sensible or voluntary agent , ) which has produced pain in us , because the fear it leaves is a constant pain : but we do not so constantly love what has done us good ; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us , as pain ; and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again ; but this by the bye . § . . by pleasure and pain , delight and uneasiness , i must all along be understood , as i have above intimated , to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure , but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us , whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection . § . . 't is farther to be considered , that in reference to the passions , the removal or lessening of a pain is considered , and operates as a pleasure , and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure , as a pain . § . . the passions too have most of them in most persons operations on the body , and cause various changes in it ; which not being always sensible , do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion : for shame , which is an uneasiness of the mind , upon the thought of having done something which is indecent , or will lessen the esteem we value , has not always blushing accompanying it . § . . i would not be mistaken here , as if i meant this as a discourse of the passions ; they are many more than those i have here named : and those i have taken notice of , would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse . i have only mentioned these here , as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds , from various considerations of good and evil ; i might , perhaps , have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more simple than these , as the pain of hunger and thirst , and the pleasure of eating and drinking , when one is so : the pain of the head-ach , or pleasure of rational conversation with one's friend , or discovering of a speculative truth upon study . but the passions being of much more concernment to us , i rather made choice to instance in them , and shew how the ideas we have of them , are derived from sensation and reflection . chap. xxi . of power . § . . the mind being every day informed by the senses , of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without , and taking notice how one comes to an end , and ceases to be , and another begins to exist which was not before ; reflecting also on what passes within it self , and observing a constant change of its ideas , sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses , and sometimes by the determination of its own choice , and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been , that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things , by like agents , and by the like ways , considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed , and in another the possibility of making that change ; and so comes by that idea which we call power . thus we say , fire has a power to melt gold , i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts , and consequently its hardness , and make it fluid ; and gold has a power to be melted ; that the sun has a power to blanch wax , and wax a power to be blanched by the sun , whereby the yellowness is destroy'd , and whiteness made to exist in its room : in which , and the like cases , the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas . for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in , or operation upon any thing , but by the observable change of its sensible ideas ; nor conceive any alteration to be made , but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas . § . . power thus considered is twofold , viz. as able to make , or able to receive any change : the one may be called active , and the other passive power . whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power , as its author god is truly above all passive power ; and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power , may be worth consideration : i shall not now enter into that enquiry , my present business being not to search into the original of power , but how we come by the idea of it . but since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances , ( as we shall see hereafter , ) and i mention them as such according to common apprehension ; yet they being not , perhaps , so truly active powers , as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them , i judge it not amiss , by this intimation , to direct our minds to the consideration of god and spirits , for the clearest idea of active power . § . . i confess power includes in it some kind of relation , ( a relation to action or change , ) as indeed which of our ideas , of what kind soever , when attentively considered , does not ? for our ideas of extension , duration , and number , do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts ? figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly ; and sensible qualities , as colours and smells , &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies , in relation to our perception , &c. and if considered in the things themselves , do they not depend on the bulk , figure , texture , and motion of the parts ? all which include some kind of relation in them . our idea therefore of power , i think , may well have a place amongst other simple ideas , and be considered as one of them , being one of those that makes a principle ingredient in our complex ideas of substances , as we shall here after have occasion to shew . § . . of passive power , all sensible things abundantly furnish us with ideas ; whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in a continual flux , and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. nor have we of active power ( which is the more proper signification of the word power ) fewer instances : since whatever change is observed , the mind must collect a power somewhere , able to make that change , as well as a possibility in the thing it self to receive it . but yet if we will consider it attentively , bodies by our senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power , as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds . for all power relating to action , and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have any idea , viz. thinking and motion , let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions . . of thinking , body affords us no idea at all , it is only from reflection that we have that ; neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion . a body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move ; and when it is set in motion its self , that motion is rather a passion , than an action in it : for when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard-stick● it is not any action of the ball , but bare passion ; also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way , it only communicates the motion it had received from another , and loses in it self so much as the other received ; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body , whilst we observe it only to transferr , but not produce any motion . for it is but a very obscure idea of power , which reaches not the production of the action , but the continuation of the passion : for so is motion in a body impelled by another ; the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion , being little more an action , than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow is an action . the idea of the beginning of motion , we have only from reflection on what passes in our selves , where we find by experience , that barely by willing it , barely by a thought of the mind , we can move the parts of our bodies , which were before at rest : so that it seems to me , we have from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses , but a very imperfect obscure idea of active power , since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action , either motion or thought . but if from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another , any one thinks he has a clear idea of power , it serves as well to my purpose , sensation being one of those ways , whereby the mind comes by its ideas ; only i thought it worth while to consider here by the way , whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations , than it doth from any external sensation . § . . this at least i think evident , that we find in our selves a power to begin or forbear , continue or end several , thoughts of our minds , and motions of our bodies , barely by the choice or preference of our minds . this power the mind has to prefer the consideration of any idea , to the not considering it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body , to its rest , is that , i think , we call the will ; and the actual preferring one to another , is that we call volition , or willing . the power of perception , is that we call the vnderstanding : perception , which we make the act of the understanding , is of three sorts : . the perception of ideas in our minds . . the perception of the signification of signs . . the perceception of the agreement or disagreement of any distinct ideas . all these are attributed to the understanding , or perceptive power , though it be to the two latter , that in strictness of speech , the act of understanding is usually applied . § . . these powers of the mind , viz. of perceiving , and of preferring , are usually call'd by another name ; and the ordinary way of speaking is , that the understanding and will , are two faculties of the mind ; a word proper enough , if it be used as all words should be , so as not to breed any confusion in mens thoughts , by being supposed ( as i suspect it has been ) to stand for some real beings in the soul , that performed those actions of understanding and volition . for when we say the will is the commanding and superiour faculty of the soul ; that it is , or is not free ; that it determines the inferiour faculties ; that it follows the dictates of the understanding , &c. though these and the like expressions , by those that carefully attend to their own ideas , and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things , than the sound of words , may be understood in a clear and distinct sense ; yet i suspect , i say , that this way of speaking of faculties , has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us , which had their several provinces and authorities , and did command , obey , and perform several actions , as so many distinct beings ; which has been no small occasion of wrangling , obscurity , and uncertainty in questions relating to them . § . . every one , i think , finds in himself a power to begin or forbear , continue or put an end to several actions in himself . the power the mind has at any time to prefer any particular one of those actions to its forbearance , or vice versa , is that faculty which , as i have said , we call the will ; the actual exercise of that power we call volition ; and the forbearance or performance of that action , consequent to such a preference of the mind , is call'd voluntary . hence we have the ideas of liberty and necessity , which arise from the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions , not only of the mind , but the whole agent , the whole man. § . . all the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves , as has been said , to these two , viz. thinking and motion , so far as a man has a power to think , or not to think ; to move , or not to move , according to the preference of his own choice , so far is a man free. where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power ; wherever doing or not doing , will not equally follow upon the preference o● his mind , there he is not free , though perhaps the action may be voluntary . so that the idea of liberty , is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any action , according to the determination or thought of the mind , whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other ; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his preference , there is not liberty , that agent is under necessity . so that liberty cannot be , where there is no thought , no volition , no will ; but there may be thought , there may be will , there may be volition , where there is no liberty . a little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear . § . . a tennis-ball , whether in motion by the stroke of a racket , or lying still at rest , is not by any one taken to be a free agent . if we enquire into the reason , we shall find it is , because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think , and consequently not to have any volition , or preference of motion to rest , or vice versâ ; and therefore has not liberty , is not a free agent ; but all its both motion and rest , come under our idea of necessary , and are so call'd . likewise a man falling into the water , ( a bridge breaking under him , ) has not herein liberty , is not a free agent . for though he has volition , though he preferrs his not falling to falling ; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power , the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition ; and therefore therein he is not free . so a man striking himself , or his friend , by a convulsive motion of his arm , which is not in his power upon his preference or volition to forbear ; no body thinks he has in this liberty ; every one pities him , as acting by necessity and constraint . § . . again , suppose a man be carried , whilst fast asleep , into a room , where is a person he longs to see and speak with ; and be there locked fast in , beyond his power to get out : he awakes , and is glad to find himself in so desirable company , which he stays willingly in , i. e. preferrs his stay to going away ; i ask , is not this stay voluntary ? i think , no body will doubt it ; and yet being locked fast in , 't is evident he is not at liberty not to stay , he has not freedom to be gone . so that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition , or preferring ; but to the person having the power of doing , or forbearing to do , according as the mind shall chuse . our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power , and no farther . for whereever restraint comes to check that power , or compulsion , takes away that indifferency to act , or not to act ; there liberty , and our notion of it , presently ceases . § . . we have instances enough , and often more than enough in our own bodies . a man's heart beats , and the blood circulates , which 't is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop ; and therefore in respect of these motions , where rest depends not on his choice , nor would follow the determination of his mind , if it should prefer it , he is not a free agent . convulsive motions agitate his legs ; so that though he wills it never so much , he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion , ( as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti , ) but he is perpetually dancing : he is not at liberty in this action , but under as much necessity of moving , as a stone that falls , or a tennis-ball struck with a racket . on the other side , a palsie or stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind , if it would thereby transferr his body to another place . in all these there is want of freedom , though the sitting still even of a paralitick , whilst he preferrs it to removal , is truly voluntary : voluntary then is not opposed to necessary ; but to involuntary . for a man may prefer what he can do , to what he cannot do ; the state he is in , to its absence or change , though necessity has made it in it self unalterable . § . . as it is in the motions of the body , so it is in the thoughts of our minds ; where any one is such , that we have power to take it up , or lay it by , according to the preference of the mind , there we are at liberty . a waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind , is not at liberty to think , or not to think ; no more than he is at liberty , whether his body shall touch any other , or no : but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another , is many times in his choice ; and then he is in respect of his ideas , as much at liberty , as he is in respect of bodies he rests on : he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another . but yet some ideas to the mind , like some motions to the body , are such , as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid , nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use . a man on the rack , is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain , and entertain other contemplations ; and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts , as a hurricane does our bodies , without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things , which we would rather chuse : but as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue , begin or forbear any of these motions of the body without , or thoughts within , according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other , then we consider the man as a free agent again . § . . where-ever thought is wholly wanting , or the power to act or forbear , there necessity takes place . this in an agent capable of volition , when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind , is called compulsion ; when the hindring or stopping any action is contrary to his volition , it is called restraint . agents that have no thought , no volition at all , are in every thing necessary agents . § . . if this be so , ( as i imagine it is , ) i leave it to be considered , whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated , and , i think , unreasonable , because unintelligible , question , viz. whether man's will be free , or no. for if i mistake not , it follows from what i have said , that the question it self is altogether improper : and it is as insignificant to ask , whether man's will be free , as to ask , whether his sleep be swift , or his vertue square ; liberty being as little applicable to the will , as swiftness of motion is to sleep , or squareness to vertue . every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these , because it is obvious , that the modifications of motion being not to sleep , nor the difference of figure to vertue ; and when any one well considers it , i think he will as plainly perceive , that liberty , which is but a power , belongs only to agents , and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will , which is also but a power . § . . volition , 't is plain , is nothing but the actual choosing or prefering forbearance to the doing , or doing to the forbearance , of any particular action in our power , that we think on . and what is the will , but the faculty to do this ? and is that faculty any thing more in effect , than a power , the power of preferring any action to its forbearance , or vice versâ , as far as it appears to depend on us ? for can it be denied , that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions , and to preferr their doing or omission either to other , has that faculty call'd will. will then is nothing , but such a power ; liberty , on the other side , is the power a man has to do or forbear doing any particular action , according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind , which is the same thing as to say , according as he himself wills it . § . . 't is plain then , that the will is nothing but one power or ability , and freedom another power or ability : so that to ask , whether the will has freedom , is to ask , whether one power has another power , one ability another ability ; a question at first sight too grosly absurd to make a dispute , or need an answer . for who is it that sees not , that powers belong only to agents , and are attributes only of substances , and not of powers themselves ? so that this way of putting the question , viz. whether the will be free , is in effect to ask , whether the will be a substance , an agent , or at least to suppose it , since freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else . if freedom can with any propriety of speech be applied to power , it may be attributed to the power , is in a man , to produce , or forbear producing motion in parts of his body , by choice or preference ; which is that which denominates him free , and is freedom it self . but if any one should ask , whether freedom were free , he would be suspected not to understand well what he said ; and he would be thought to deserve midas's ears , who knowing that rich was a denomination from the possession of riches , should demand whether riches themselves were rich . § . . however the name faculty , which men have given to this power call'd the will , and so talked of it as acting , may by this appropriated term , seem a little to palliate the absurdity , yet the will in truth , signifies nothing but a power , or ability , to preferr or choose ; and when considered , as it is , barely as an ability to do something , it will easily discover the absurdity , in saying it is free , or not free . for if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties , as distinct beings , that can act , ( as we do , when we say the will orders , and the will is free , ) 't is fit that we should make a speaking faculty , and a walking faculty , and a dancing faculty , by which those actions are produced , which are but several modes of motion ; as well as we do the will and understanding to be faculties , by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced , which are but several modes of thinking ; and we may as properly say , that 't is the singing faculty sings , and the dancing faculty dances , as that the will chooses , or that the understanding conceives ; or , as is usual , that the will directs the understanding , or the understanding obeys , or obeys not the will. it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say , that the power of speaking directs the power of singing , or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking . § . . this way of talking , nevertheless , has prevailed , and , as i guess , produced great confusion ; for these being all different powers in the mind , or in the man , to do several actions , he exerts them as he thinks fit ; but the power to do one action , is not operated on by the power of doing another action . for the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing ; nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking , no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing , or the power of singing on the power of dancing , as any one may easily perceive , who will but consider ; and yet that is it which we say , when we thus speak , that the will operates on the vnderstanding , or the vnderstanding on the will. § . . i grant , that this or that actual thought , may be the occasion of volition , or exercising the power a man has to choose ; or the actual choice of the mind , the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing : as the actual singing of such a tune , may be the occasion of dancing such a dance , and the actual dancing of such a dance , the occasion of singing such a tune : but in all these , it is not one power that operates on another ; for powers are relations , not agents : but it is the mind , or the man , that operates , and exerts these powers ; that does the action , he has power , or is able to do . that which has the power , or not the power to operate , is that alone , which is , or is not free ; and not the power it self : for freedom , or not freedom , can belong to nothing , but what has , or has not a power to act . § . . the attributing to faculties , that which belonged not to them , has given occasion to this way of talking : but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind , with the name of faculties , a notion of their operating , has , i suppose , as little advanced our knowledge in that part of our selves ; as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties , in the operations of the body , has helped us in the knowledge of physick . not that i deny there are faculties both in the body and mind : they both of them have their powers of operating , else neither the one nor the other could operate : for nothing can operate , that is not able to operate ; and that is not able to operate , that has no power to operate . nor do i deny , that those words , and the like , are to have their place in the common use of languages , that have made them currant . it looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by : and philosophy it self , though it likes not a gaudy dress , yet when it appears in publick , must have so much complacency , as to be cloathed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country , so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity . but the fault has been , that faculties have been spoken of , and represented , as so many distinct agents : for it being asked , what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs ? it was a ready , and very satisfactory answer , to say , that it was the digestive faculty . what was it that made any thing come out of the body ? the expulsive faculty . what moved ? the motive faculty : and so in the mind the intellectual faculty , or the understanding , understood ; and the elective faculty , or the will , willed or commanded : which is in short to say , that the ability to digest , digested ; and the ability to move , moved ; and the ability to understand , understood . for faculty , ability , and power , i think , are but different names of the same things : which ways of speaking , when put into more intelligible words , will , i think , amount to thus much ; that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest ; motion by something able to move ; and understanding by something able to understand . and in truth it would be very strange if it should be otherwise ; as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free . § . . to return then to the enquiry about liberty , i think the question is not proper , whether the will be free , but whether a man be free . thus , i think , . that so far as any one can , by choice , or preference of the existence of any action , to the non-existence of that action , and , vice versâ , make it to exist , or not exist ; so far he is free : for if i can , by the preference of the motion of my finger to its rest , make it move , or vice versâ , 't is evident , that in respect of that , i am free : and if i can , by a like thought of my mind , preferring one to the other , produce either words , or silence , i am at liberty to speak , or hold my peace ; and as far as this power reaches , of acting , or not acting , by the determination of his own thought preferring either , so far is a man free . for how can we think any one freer than to have the power to do what he will ? and so far as any one can ( by preferring any action to it s not being ; or rest to any action ) produce that action or rest , so far can he do , what he will : for such a preferring of action to its absence , is the willing of it : and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer , than to be able to do what he will : so that in respect of actions , within the reach of such a power in him , a man seems as free , as 't is possible for freedom to make him . § . . but the inquisitive mind of man , willing to shift off from himself , as far as he can , all thoughts of guilt , though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity , is not content with this ; will have this to be no freedom , unless it reaches farther : but is ready to say , a man is not free at all , if he be not as free to will , as he is to act , what he wills . concerning a man's liberty there yet therefore is raised this farther question , whether a man be free to will ; which , i think , is that meant , when it is disputed , whether the will be free : and as to that , i imagine , § . . . that willing , or choosing being an action , and freedom consisting in a power of acting , or not acting , a man in respect of willing any action in his power once proposed to his thoughts , cannot be free . the reason whereof is very manifest : for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will , should exist , or not exist ; and its existence , or not existence , following perfectly the determination , and preference of his will , he cannot avoid willing the existence , or not existence , of that action ; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one , or the other , i. e. prefer the one to the other : since one of them must necessarily follow ; and that which does follow , follows by the choice and determinati●n of his mind ; that is , by his willing it : for if he did not will it , it would not be . so that in respect of the act of willing , a man is not free : liberty consisting in a power to act , or not to act , which , in regard of volition , a man has not : it being necessary , and unavoidable ( any action in his power being once thought on ) to prefer either its doing , or forbearance , upon which preference , the action , or its forbearance certainly follows , and is truly voluntary . so that to make a man free in this sense , there must be another antecedent will , to determine the acts of this will , and another to determine that , and so in infinitum : for where-ever one stops , the actions of the last will cannot be free : nor is any being , as far as i can comprehend beings above me , capable of such a freedom of will , that it can forbear to will , i. e. to preferr the being , or not being of any thing in its power , which it has one considered as such . § . . this then is evident , a man is not at liberty to will , or not to will any thing in his power , that he once considers of : liberty consisting in a power to act , or not to act , and in that only . for a man that sits still , is said yet to be at liberty , because he can walk if he wills it . a man that walks is at liberty in that respect : not because he walks , or moves ; but because he can stand still if he wills it . but if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself , he is not at liberty : nor a man falling down a precipice , though in motion , is not at liberty , because he cannot stop that motion if he would : but a man that is walking , to whom it is proposed to give off walking , is not at liberty , whether he will will , or no : he must necessarily prefer one , or t'other of them ; walking or not walking : and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power ; they being once proposed , the mind has not a power to act , or not to act , wherein consists liberty : it has not a power to forbear willing , it cannot avoid some determination concerning them , let the consideration be as short , the thought as quick as it will , it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking , or changes it : whereby it is manifest it prefers one to the other , and thereby either the continuation , or change becomes unavoidably voluntary . § . . since then it is plain , a man is not at liberty , whether he will will , or no ; ( for when a thing in his power is proposed to his thoughts , he cannot forbear volition , he must determine one way or other ; ) the next thing to be demanded is , whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases , motion or rest. this question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in it self , that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced , that liberty concerns not the will in any case . for to ask , whether a man be at liberty to will either motion , or rest ; speaking , or silence ; which he pleases , is to ask , whether a man can will , what he wills ; or be pleased with what he is pleased with . a question which , i think , needs no answer : and they , who can make a question of it , must suppose one will to determine the acts of another , and another to determinate that ; and so on in infinitum , an absurdity before taken notice of . § . . to avoid these , and the like absurdities , nothing can be of greater use , than to establish in our minds clear and steady notions of the things under consideration : if the ideas of liberty , and volition , were well fixed in our understandings , and carried along with us in our minds , as they ought , through all the questions are raised about them , i suppose , a great part of the difficulties , that perplex mens thoughts , and entangle their understandings , would be much easier resolved ; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms , or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity . § . . first then , it is carefully to be remembred , that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence , or not existence of any action , upon our volition of it , and not in the dependence of any action , or its contrary , on our preference . a man standing on a cliff , is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea ; not because he has a power to do the contrary action , which is to leap twenty yards upwards , for that he cannot do : but he is therefore free , because he has a power to leap , or not to leap . but if a greater force than his , either hold him fast , or tumble him down , he is no longer free in that case : because the doing , or forbearance , of that particular action , is no longer in his power . he that is a close prisoner , in a room twenty foot square , being at the north-side of his chamber , is at liberty to walk twenty foot southward , because he can walk , or not walk it : but is not , at the same time , at liberty , to do the contrary ; i. e. to walk twenty foot northward . in this then consists freedom ( viz. ) in our being able to act , or not to act , according as we shall choose , or will. § . . secondly , in the next place we must remember , that volition or willing , regarding only what is in our power , is nothing but the preferring the doing of any thing , to the not doing of it ; action to rest , & contra . well , but what is this preferring ? it is nothing but the being pleased more with the one , than the other . is then a man indifferent to be pleased , or not pleased , more with one thing than another ? is it in his choice , whether he will , or will not be better pleased with one thing than another ? and to this , i think , every one's experience is ready to make answer , no. from whence it follows , § . . thirdly , that the will , or preference , is determined by something without it self : let us see then what it is determined by . if willing be but the being better pleased , as has been shewn , it is easie to know what 't is determines the will , what 't is pleases best : every one knows 't is happiness , or that which makes any part of happiness , or contributes to it ; and that is it we call good. happiness and misery are the names of two extremes , the utmost bounds whereof we know not : 't is what eye hath not seen , ear hath not heard , nor hath entred into the heart of man to conceive . but of some degrees of both , we have very lively impressions made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side , and torment and sorrow on the other : which , for shortness sake , i shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain , there being pleasure and pain of the mind , as well as the body : with him is fulness of ioy , and pleasures for evermore : or to speak truly , they are all of the mind ; though some have their rise in the mind from thought , others in the body from motion . happiness then is the utmost pleasure we are capable of , and misery the utmost pain . now because pleasure and pain are produced in us , by the operation of certain objects , either on our minds , or our bodies ; and in different degrees : therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us , is that we labour for , and is that we call good ; and what is apt to produce pain in us , we avoid and call evil , for no other reason , but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us , wherein consists our happiness or misery . farther , because the degrees of pleasure and pain have also justly a preference ; though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure , be in it self good ; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain , be evil ; yet it often happens , that we do not call it so , when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort . so that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil , we shall find it lies much in comparison : for the cause of every less degree of pain , as well as every greater degree of pleasure , has the nature of good , and vice versâ , and is that which determines our choice , and challenges our preference . good then , the greater good is that alone which determines the will. § . . this is not an imperfection in man , it is the highest perfection of intellectual natures : it is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom , that it is the very improvement and benefit of it : 't is not an abrigdment , 't is the end and use of our liberty : and the farther we are removed from such a determination to good , the nearer we are to misery and slavery . a perfect indifferency in the will , or power of preferring , not determinable by the good or evil , that is thought to attend its choice , would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature , that it would be as great an imperfection , as the want of indifferency to act , or not to act , till determined by the will , would be an imperfection on the other side . a man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head , or let it rest quiet : he is perfectly indifferent to either ; and it would be an imperfection in him , if he wanted that power , if he were deprived of that indifferency . but it would be as great an imperfection , if he had the same indifferency , whether he would prefer the li●ting up his hand , or its remaining in rest , when it would ●ave his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming : 't is as much a perfection , that the power of preferring should be determined by good , as that the power of acting should be determined by the will ; and the certainer such determination is , the greater is the perfection . § . . if we look upon those superiour beings above us , who enjoy perfect happiness , we shall have reason to judge they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we : and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy , or less free , than we are . and if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are , to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do , i think we might say , that god himself cannot choose what is not good ; the fredom of the almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best . § . . but to consider this mistaken part of liberty right , would any one be a changeling , because he is less determined , by wise considerations , than a wise man ? is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool , and draw shame and misery upon a man's self ? if want of restraint to chuse , or to do the worse , be liberty , true liberty , mad men and fools are the only free-men : but yet , i think , no body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such liberty , but he that is mad already . § . . but though the preference of the mind be always determined by the appearance of good , greater good ; yet the person who has the power , in which alone consists liberty to act , or not to act according to such preference , is nevertheless free , such determination abridges not that power . he that has his chains knocked off , and the prison-doors set open to him , is perfectly at liberty , because he may either go or stay , as he best likes ; though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the night , or illness of the weather , or want of other lodging . he ceases not to be free ; though that which at that time appears to him the greater good absolutely determines his preference , and makes him stay in his prison . i have rather made use of the word preference than choice , to express the act of volition , because choice is of a more doubtful signification , and bordering more upon desire , and so is referred to things remote ; whereas volition , or the act of willing , signifies nothing properly , but the actual producing of something that is voluntary . § . . the next thing to be considered is , if our wills be determined by good , how it comes to pass that men's wills carry them so contrarily , and consequently some of them to what is evil ? and to this i say , that the various and contrary choices , that men make in the world , doe not argue , that they do not all chuse good ; but that the same thing is not good to every man. were all the concerns of man terminated in this life ; why one pursued study and knowledge , and another hawking and hunting ; why one chose luxury and debauchery , and another sobriety and riches , would not be , because every one of these did not pursue his own happiness ; but because their happiness lay in different things ; and therefore 't was a right answer of the physician to his patient , that had sore eyes . if you have more pleasure in the taste of wine , than in the use of your sight , wine is good for you : but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you , than that of drinking , wine is naught . § . . the mind has a different relish , as well as the palate ; and you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory , ( which yet some men place their happiness in , ) as you would to satisfie all men's hunger with cheese or lobsters ; which , though very agreeable and delicious fare to some , are to others extremely nauseous and offensive : and many people would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly , to those dishes , which are a feast to others . hence it was , i think , that the philosophers of old did in vain enquire , whether summum bonum consisted in riches , or bodily delights , or virtue , or contemplation : and they might have as reasonably disputed , whether the best relish were to be found in apples , plumbs , or nuts ; and have divided themselves into sects upon it . for as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves , but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate , wherein there is great variety : so the greatest happiness consists , in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure , and the absence of those which cause any disturbance , any pain , which to different men are very different things . if therefore men in this life only have hope ; if in this life they can only enjoy , 't is not strange , nor unreasonable , they should seek their happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here , and by preferring all that delight them ; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference . for if there be no prospect beyond the grave , the inference is certainly right , let us eat and drink , let us enjoy what we delight in , for to morrow we shall die . this , i think , may serve to shew us the reason , why , though all men's wills are determined by good , yet they are not determined by the same object . men may chuse different things , and yet all chuse right , supposing them only like a company of poor insects , whereof some are bees , delighted with flowers , and their sweetness ; others scarabes , delighted with other kind of viands ; which having enjoyed for a season , they should cease to be , and exist no more for ever . § . . this sufficiently discovers to us , why men in this world prefer different things , and pursue happiness by contrary courses : but yet since men are always determined by good , the greater good ; and are constant , and in earnest , in matter of happiness and misery , the question still remains , how men come often to prefer the worse to the better ; and to chuse that , which by their own confession has made them miserable ? § . . to this i answer , that as to present happiness , or misery ; present pleasure or pain , when that alone comes in consideration , a man never chuses amiss : he knows what best pleases him , and that , he actually prefers . things in their present enjoyment , are what they seem : the apparent and real good , are , in this case , always the same . for the pain or pleasure being just so great , and no greater , than it is felt , the present good or evil is really so much as it appears . and therefore were every action of ours concluded within it self , and drew no consequences after it , we should undoubtedly always will nothing but good ; always infallibly prefer the best . were the pains of honest industry , and of starving with hunger and cold set together before us , no body would be in doubt which to chuse : were the satisfaction of a lust , and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one 's present possession , he would not balance , or err in the choice , and determination of his will. but since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness , and misery , that depend on them , along with them in their present performance ; but are the precedent causes of good and evil , which they draw after them , and bring upon us , when they themselves are passed , and cease to be ; that which has the preference , and makes us will the doing or omitting any action in our power , is the greater good , appearing to result from that choice in all its consequences , as far as at present they are represented to our view . § . . so that , that which determines the choice of the will , and obtains the preference , is still good , the greater good : but it is also only good that appears ; that which carries with it the expectation of addition to our happiness , by the increase of our pleasures , either in degrees , sorts , or duration , or by the preventing , lessening , or shortning of pain . thus the temptation of a pleasant taste , brings a surfeit , a disease , and , perhaps , death too , on one , who looks no farther than that apparent good , than the present pleasure ; who sees not the remote and concealed evil : and the hopes of easing or preventing some greater pain , sweetens another man's draught , and makes that willingly be swallowed , which in it self is nauseous and unpleasant . both these men were moved to what they did by the appearance of good , though the one found ease and health , and the other a disease and destruction : and therefore to him that looks beyond this world , and is fully persuaded , that god the righteous judge , will render to every man according to his deeds ; to them who by patient continuance in well doing , seek for glory , and honour , and immortality , eternal life ; but unto every soul that doth evil , indignation and wrath , tribulation and anguish : to him , i say , who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness , or misery that attends all men after this life , depending on their behaviour here , the measures of good and evil , that govern his choice , are mightily changed . for since nothing of pleasure and pain in this life , can bear any proportion to endless happiness , or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter , actions in his power will have their preference , not according to the transient pleasure , or pain that accompanies , or follows them here ; but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter . § . . he then that will account for the misery , that men often bring on themselves , notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness , and always prefer the greater apparent good , must consider , how things come to be represented to our choice , under deceitful appearances : and that is , by the iudgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them . to see how far this reaches , and what are the causes of wrong judgment , we must remember , that things are judged good or bad in a double sense . first , that which is properly good or bad , is nothing but barely pleasure or pain . secondly , but because not only present pleasure and pain , but that also which is apt by its efficacy , or consequences , to bring it upon us at a distance , cannot but move the will , and determine the choice of a creature , that has soresight ; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain , are considered as good and evil. § . . the wrong iudgment that misleads us , and makes the will often fasten on the worse side , lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these . the wrong judgment i am here speaking of , is not what one man may think , of the determination of another ; but what every man himself must confess to be wrong . for since i lay it for a certain ground , that every intelligent being really seeks happiness , and would enjoy all the pleasures he could , and suffer no pain ; 't is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient , or leave out any thing in his power , that could add to its sweetness , but only by a wrong judgment . i shall not here speak of that mistake , which is the consequence of invincible error , which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment ; but of that wrong judgment , which every man himself must confess to be so . § . . i. therefore , as to present pleasure and pain , the mind as has been said , never mistakes that which is really good or evil : that which is the greater pleasure , or the greater pain , is really just , as it appears . but though present pleasure and pain , shew their difference and degrees so plainly , as not to leave room for mistake : yet when we compare present pleasure or pain with future , we often make wrong iudgments of them , taking our measures of them in different positions of distance . objects near our view , are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size , that are more remote : and so it is with pleasures and pains , the present is apt to carry it , and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison . thus most men , like spend-thrift heirs , are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come ; and so for small matters in possession , part with great ones in reversion : but that this is a wrong judgment every one must allow , let his pleasure consist in whatever it will : since that which is future , will certainly come to be present ; and then having the same advantage of nearness , will shew its self in its full dimensions , and discover his wilful mistake , who judged of it by unequal measures . were the pleasure of drinking accompanied , the very moment a man takes off his glass , with that sick stomach , and akeing head , which in some men are sure to follow not many hours after , i think no body , whatever pleasure he had in his cups , would , on these conditions , ever let wine touch his lips ; which yet he gaily swallows , and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time . but if pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal , how much more will it be so , by a farther distance , to a man , that will not ( by a due consideration , do , what time will , i. e. bring it home upon himself ) consider it as present , and there take its true dimensions ? this is the way we usually impose on our selves , in respect of bare pleasure and pain , or the true degrees of happiness or misery : the future loses its just proportion , and what is present , obtains the preference as the greater . i mention not here the wrong judgment , whereby the absent are not only lessened , but reduced to perfect nothing ; when men enjoy what they can in present , and make sure of that , concluding amiss , that no evil will thence follow : for that lies not in comparing the greatness of future good and evil , which is that we are here speaking of : but in another sort of wrong judgment , which is concerning good or evil , as it is considered , to be the cause and procurement of pleasure or pain , that will follow from it . § . . the cause of our judging amiss , when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future , seems to me to be the weak and narrow constitutions of our minds . we cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once , much less any pleasure almost , whilst pain possesses us . the present pleasure , if it be not very languid , and almost none at all , fills our narrow souls , and so takes up all our minds , that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent : or if many of our pleasures are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance ; yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain , that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures . a little bitter mingled in our cup , leaves no relish of the sweet : and hence it comes , that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present evil , which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal ; since while the pain remains , we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of happiness . hence we see the present pain , any one suffers , is always the worst ; and 't is with anguish they cry out , any other rather than this ; nothing can be so intolerable as what i now suffer . and therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil before all things , as the first necessary step towards happiness , let what will follow . nothing , as we passionately think , can exceed , or almost equal the pain we feel : and because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers it self , is a sort of pain ; nay , oftentimes a very great one , 't is no wonder , that that operates after the same manner pain does , and lessens in our thoughts what is future , and so forces us , as it were , blindfold into its embraces . thus much of the wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure and pain , when they are compared together ; and so the absent considered as future . § . . ii. as to things good or bad in their consequences , and by the aptness is in them to procure us good or evil in the future , we judge amiss several ways . . when we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them , as in truth there does . . when we judge , that though the consequence be of that moment , yet it is not of that certainty , but that it may otherwise fall out ; or else by some means be avoided , as by industry , address , change , repentance , &c. but that these are wrong ways of judging , were easie to shew in every particular , if i would examine them at large singly ; but i shall only mention this in general , viz. that it is a very wrong , and irrational way of proceeding , to venture a greater good and evil , for a less , upon uncertain guesses , and before due , and through examination , as far as a man's knowledge can , by any endeavours or assistance , attain . this , i think , every one must confess , especially if he considers the usual causes of this wrong iudgment , whereof these following are some . § . . i. ignorance : he that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable , cannot acquit himself of judging amiss . ii. inadvertency : when a man overlooks even that which he does know . this is an affected and present ignorance , which misleads our judgments , as much as the other . judging is , as it were , balancing an account , and determining on which side the odds lies . if therefore either side be hudled up in haste , and several of the summs , that should have gone into the reckoning , be overlook'd and left out , this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment , as if it were a perfect ignorance . that which most commonly causes this , is the prevalency of some present pleasure , heightned by our feeble passionate nature , most strongly wrought on by what is present . to check this precipitancy , our understanding and reason was given us , if we will make a right use of it , to search , and see , and then judge thereupon . how much sloth and negligence , heat and passion , the prevalency of fashion , or acquired indispositions , do severally contribute , on occasion to these wrong judgments , i shall not here farther enquire . § . . this , i think , is certain , that the choice of the will is every-where determined by the greater apparent good , however it may be wrong represented by the understanding ; and it would be impossible men should pursue so different courses as they do in the world , had they not different measures of good and evil. but yet morality , established upon its true foundations , cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider : and he that will not be so far a rational creature , as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery , must needs condemn himself , as not making that use of his understanding he should . the rewards and punishments of another life , which the almighty has established as the enforcements of his law , are of weight enough to determine the choice , against whatever pleasure or pain this life can shew , when the eternal state is considered in its bare possibility , which no body can deny . he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here , or the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one , must own himself to judge very much amiss , if he does not conclude , that a vertuous life , with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss , which may come , is to be preferred to a vicious one , with the fear of that dreadful state of misery , which 't is very possible may overtake the guilty ; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation . this is evidently so , though the vertuous life here had nothing but pain , and the vicious continual pleasure ; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise , and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of , even in their present possession ; nay , all things rightly considered , have , i think even the worse part here . but when infinite happiness is put in one scale , against infinite misery in the other ; if the worst , that comes to the pious man , if he mistake , be the best that the wicked can attain to , if he be in the right , who can without madness run the venture ? who in his wits would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite misery , which if he miss , there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard ? whereas on the other side , the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got , if his expectation comes to pass . if the good man be in the right , he is eternally happy : if he mistake , he is not miserable , he feels nothing . on the other side , if the wicked be in the right , he is not happy : if he mistake , he is infinitely miserable . must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment , that does not presently see , to which side , in this case , the preference is to be given . i have forborn to mention any thing of the certainty , or probability of a ●uture state , designing here to shew the wrong judgment , that any one must allow , he makes , upon his own principles laid how he pleases , who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration , whilst he knows , and cannot but be certain , that a future life is at least possible . § . . under this simple idea of power , i have taken occasion to explain our ideas of will , volition , liberty , and necessity ; which having a greater mixture in them , than belongs barely to simple modes , might perhaps , be better placed amongst the more complex . for will , for example , contains in it the idea of a power to prefer the doing , to the not doing any particular action ( & vice versa ) which it has thought on ; which preference is truly a mode of thinking , and so the idea which the word will stands for , is a complex and mixed one , made up of the simple ideas of power , and a certain mode of thinking : and the idea of liberty is yet more complex , being made up of the idea of a power to act , or not to act , in conformity to volition . but i hoped this transgression , against the method i have proposed to my self , will be forgiven me , if i have quitted it a little , to explain some ideas of great importance ; such as are those of the will , liberty , and necessity , in this place , where they , as it were , offered themselves , and sprang up from their proper roots . besides , having before largely enough instanced in several simple modes , to shew what i meant by them , and how the mind got them , ( for i intend not to enumerate all the particular ideas of each sort , ) those of will , liberty , and necessity , may serve as instances of mixed modes , which are that sort of ideas i purpose next to treat of . § . . and thus i have , in a short draught , given a view of our original ideas , from whence all the rest are derived , and of which they are made up ; which if i would consider , as a philosopher , and examine on what causes they depend , and of what they are made , i believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary , and original ones , viz. extension , solidity , mobility ; which by our senses we receive from body : thinking , and the power of moving ; which by reflection we receive from our minds ; to which if we add existence , duration , number ; which belong both to the one , and the other , we have , perhaps , all the original ideas on which the rest depend . for by these , i imagine , might be explained the nature of colours , sounds , tastes , smells , and all other ideas we have , if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions , and motions , of these minute bodies , which produce those several sensations in us . but my present purpose being to enquire only into the knowledge the mind has of things , by those ideas , and appearances god has fitted it to receive from them , and how the mind comes by that knowledge ; rather than into their causes , or manner of production , i shall not , contrary to the design of this essay , set my self to enquire philosophically into the peculiar constitution of bodies , and the configuration of parts , whereby they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities : i shall not enter any farther into that disquisition ; it sufficing to my purpose to observe , that gold , or saffron , has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow ; and snow , or milk , the idea of white ; which we can have only by our sight , without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies , or the particular figures , or motion of the particles , which rebound from them , to cause in us that particular sensation : though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds , and would enquire into their causes , we cannot conceive any thing else , to be in any sensible object , whereby it produces different ideas in us , but the different bulk , figure , number , texture , and motion of its insensible parts . chap. xxii . of mixed modes . § . . having treated of simple modes in the foregoing chapters , and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them , to shew what they are , and how we come by them ; we are now in the next place to consider those we call mixed modes , such are the complex ideas , we make by the names obligation , drunkenness , a lie , &c. which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of different kinds , i have called mixed modes , to distinguish them from the more simple modes , which consists only of simple ideas of the same kind . these mixed modes being also such combinations of simple ideas , as are not looked upon to be the characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence , but scattered and independent ideas , put together by the mind , are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances . § . . that the mind , in respect of its simple ideas , is wholly passive , and receives them all from the existence and operations of things , such as sensation or reflection offers them , without being able to make any one idea experience shews us . but if we attentively consider these ideas i call mixed modes , we are now speaking of , we shall find their original quite different . the mind here often exercises an active power in the making these several combinations : for it being once furnished with simple ideas , it can put them together in several compositions , and so make variety of complex ideas , without examining whether they exist so together in nature . and hence , i think , it is , that these sort of ideas are called notions ; as if they had their original , and constant existence more in the thoughts of men , than in the reality of things ; and to form such ideas , it sufficed , that the mind put the parts of them together , and that they were consistent in the understanding , without considering whether they had any real being . though i do not deny , but several of them might be taken from observation , and the existence of several simple ideas so combined , as they are put together in the understanding : for the man who first framed the idea of hypocrisie , might have either taken it at first from the observation of one , who made shew of good qualities which he had not ; or else have framed that idea in his mind , without having any such pattern to fashion it by . for it is evident , that in the beginning of languages , and societies of men , several of those complex ideas , which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them , must needs have been in the minds of men , before they existed any where else ; and that many names , that stood for such complex ideas , were in use , and so those ideas framed , before the combinations they stood for , ever existed . § . . indeed , now that languages are made , and abound with words standing for them , an usual way of getting these complex ideas , is by the explication of those terms that stand for them . for consisting of a company of simple ideas combined , they may by words , standing for those simple ideas , be represented to the mind of one who understands those words , though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things . thus a man may come to have the idea of sacrilege , or murther , by enumerating to him the simple ideas these words stand for , without ever seeing either of them committed . § . . every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas , it may be well enquired , whence it has its vnity ; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea , since that combination does not always exist together in nature : and this , it is plain , it has from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas together , and considering them as one complex one , consisting of those parts ; and the mark of this union , or that which is looked on generally to compleat it , is one name given to that combination . for 't is by their names , that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes , seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas , to make one complex one , but such collections as there be names for . thus , though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea , as the killing a man's father ; yet there being no name standing precisely for the one , as there is the name of parricide to mark the other , it is not taken for a particular complex idea , nor a distinct species of actions , from that of killing a young man , or any other man. § . . if we should enquire a little farther , to see what it is , that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct , and , as it were , setled modes , and neglect others , which in the nature of things themselves , have as much an aptness to be combined , and make distinct ideas , we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language ; which being to mark , or communicate mens thoughts to one another , with all the dispatch that may be , they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes , and affix names to them , as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation , leaving others , which they have but seldom an occasion to mention , loose and without names , that tye them together : they rather chusing to enumerate ( when they have need ) such ideas as make them up , by the particular names , that stand for them , than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them , which they shall seldom or never have any occasion to make use of . § . . this gives us the reason how it comes to pass , that there are in every language words which cannot be rendred by any words of another . for the several fashions , customs , and manners of one nation , making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one , which another people had never any occasion to make , or , perhaps , so much as take notice of , names come of course to be annexed to them , to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation ; and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds . thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst the greeks , and proscripto amongst the romans , stood for complex ideas , which were not in the minds of other people , nor had therefore any names in other languages that answered them . where there was no such custom , there was no notion of any such actions , no use of such combinations of ideas as were united , and , as it were , tied together by those terms ; and therefore in other countries there were no names for them . § . . hence also we may see the reason , why languages constantly change , take up new , and lay by old terms . because change of customs and opinions bringing with them new combinations of ideas , which it is necessary frequently to think on , and talk about , new names to avoid long descriptions are annexed to them ; and so they become new species of complex modes . what a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound , and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved , any one will see , who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas , that either reprieve or appeal stand for ; and instead of either of those names , use a periphrasis to make any one understand their meaning . § . . though i shall have occasion to consider this more at large , when i come to treat of words , and their use ; yet i could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed modes , which being fleeting , and transient combinations of simple ideas , which have but a short existence any where , but in the minds of men ; and there too have no longer any existence , than whilst they are thought on , have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence , as in their names ; which are therefore , in these sort of ideas , very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves . for if we should enquire where the idea of a triumph , or apetheosis exists , it is evident , they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things themselves , being actions that required time to their performance , and so could never all exist together : and as to the minds of men , where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged , they have there too a very uncertain existence ; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us . § . . there are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes . . by experience and observation of things themselves . thus by seeing two men wrastle , or fence , we get the idea of wrastling or fencing . by invention , or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds : so he that first invented printing , or etching , had an idea of it in his mind , before it ever existed . . which is the most usual way , by explaining the names of actions we never saw , or notions we cannot see ; and by enumerating , and thereby , as it were , setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up , and are the constituent parts of them . for having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas , and by use got the names , that stand for them , we can by those names represent to another any complex idea , we could have him conceive : so that it has in it no simple idea , but what he knows , and has , with us , the same name for . for all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas , of which they are compounded , and originally made up , though perhaps their immediate ingredients , as i may so say , are also complex ideas . thus the mixed mode , which the word lye stands for , is made of these simple ideas : . articulate sounds . . certain ideas in the mind of the speaker . . those words the signs of those ideas . . those signs put together by affirmation or negation , otherwise than the ideas they stand for , are in the mind of the speaker . i think i need not go any farther in the analysis of that complex idea , we call a lye : what i have said is enough to shew , that it is made up of simple ideas : and it could not but be an offensive tediousness to my reader , to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea , that goes to this complex one ; which , from what has been said , he cannot but be able to make out to himself . the same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever ; which however compounded , and decompounded , may at last be resolved into simple ideas , which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have or can have . nor shall we have reason to fear , that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas , if we consider , what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes , number , and figure alone affords us . how far then mixed modes , which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas , and their infinite modes , are from being few and scanty , we may easily imagine . so that before we have done , we shall see , that , no body need be afraid , he shall have scope , and compass enough for his thoughs to range in , though they be , as i pretend , confined only to simple ideas received from sensation or reflection , and their several combinations . § . . it is worth our observing which of all our simple ideas have been most modified , and had most mixed modes made out of them , with names given to them : and those have been these three ; thinking , and motion , ( which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action , ) and power , from whence these actions are conceived to flow . these simple ideas , i say , of thinking , motion , and power , have been those , which have been most modified ; and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes , with names to them . for action being the great business of mankind , and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant , it is no wonder , that the several modes of thinking and motion , should be taken notice of , the ideas of them observed and laid up in the memory , and have names assigned to them ; without which , laws could be but ill made , or vice and disorders repressed . nor could any communication be well had amongst men , without such complex ideas , with names to them ; and therefore men have setled names , and supposed setled ideas in their minds , of modes of actions distinguished by their causes , means , objects , ends , instruments , time , place , and other circumstances ; and also of their powers fitted for those actions ; v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do before others , without fear or disorder ; and the greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : which power or ability in man , of doing any thing , when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing , is , that the idea we name habit ; when it is forward , and ready upon every occasion , to break into action , we call it disposition : thus testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry . to conclude , let us examine any modes of action , v. g. consideration and assent , which are actions of the mind ; running and speaking , which are actions of the body ; revenge and murther , which are actions of both together , and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas , which together make up the complex ones signified by those names . § . . power being the source from whence all action proceeds . the substances wherein these powers are , when they exert this power into act , are called causes ; and the substances which thereupon are produced , or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power , are called effects . the efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced , is called , in the subject , exerting that power , action ; but in the subject , wherein any simple idea is changed on produced , it is called passion : which efficacy however various , and the effects almost infinite ; yet we can , i think , conceive it in intellectual agents , to be nothing else but modes of thinking , and willing , in corporeal agents , nothing else but modifications of motion . i say , i think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two : for whatever sort of action , besides these , produces any effects , i confess my self to have no notion , nor idea of ; and so they are quite remote from my thoughts , apprehensions , and knowledge ; and are as much in the dark to me , as five other senses , or the ideas of colours to a blind man : and therefore many words , which seem to express some action , signifie nothing of the action , or modus operandi at all , but barely the effect , with some circumstances of the subject wrought on , or cause operating ; v. g. creation , annihilation , contain in them no idea of the action or manner , whereby they are produced , but barely of the cause , and the thing done . and when a country man says , the cold freezes water , though the word freezing seem to import some action , yet truly it signifies nothing , but the effect , viz. that water , that was before fluid , is become hard and consistent , without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done . § . . i think i shall not need to remark here , that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes , marked by names , and familiar in the minds and mouths of men ; yet other simple ideas , and their several combinations , are not excluded ; much less , i think , will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes , which have been setled , with names to them : that would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity , ethicks , law , and politicks , and several other sciences . all that is requisite to my present design , is to shew , what sort of ideas those are , i call mixed modes ; how the mind comes by them ; and that they are compositions , made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection , which , i suppose , i have done . chap. xxiii . of our complex ideas of substances . § . . the mind being , as i have declared , furnished with a great number of the simple ideas , conveyed in by the senses , as they are found in exterior things , or by reflection on its own operations , takes notice also , that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together ; which being presumed to belong to one thing , and , words being suited to common apprehensions , and made use of for quick dispatch , are called so united in one subject , by one name ; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one single idea , which indeed is a complication of many ideas together : because , as i have said , not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves , we accustom our selves , to suppose some substratum , wherein they do subsist , and from which they do result , which therefore we call substance . § . . so that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general , he will find he has no other idea of it at all , but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities , which are capable of producing simple ideas in us ; which qualities are commonly called accidents : and if any one should be asked , what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres , he would have nothing to say , but the solid extended parts : and if he were demanded , what is it , that that solidity and extension inhere in , he would not be in a much better case , than the indian before mentioned ; who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant , was asked , what the elephant rested on ; to which his answer was , a great tortoise : but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back'd tortoise , replied , something , he knew not what . and thus here , as in all other cases , where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas , we talk like children ; who being questioned , what such a thing is , which they know not ; readily give this satisfactory answer , that is something ; which in truth signifies no more when so used , either by children or men , but that they knew not what ; and that the thing they pretend to know , and talk of , is what they have no distinct idea of at all , and so are perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark . the idea then we have , to which we give the general name substance , being nothing , but the supposed , but unknown support of those qualities we find existing , which we imagine cannot subsist , sine re substante , without something to support them , we call that support substantia ; which according to the true import of the word is , in plain english , standing under , or upholding . § . . an obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made , we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances , by collecting such combinations of simple ideas , as are by experience and observation of mens senses taken notice of to exist together , and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution , or unknown essence of that substance . thus we come to have the ideas of a man , horse , gold , water , &c. of which substances , whether any one has any other clear idea , farther than of certain simple ideas coexisting together , i appeal to every one 's own experience . 't is the ordinary qualities , observable in iron , or a diamond , put together , that make the true complex idea of those substances , which a smith , or a jeweller , commonly knows better than a philosopher ; who , whatever substantial forms he may talk of , has no other idea of those substances , than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas are to be found in them ; only we must take notice , that our complex ideas of substances , besides all these simple ideas they are made up of , have always the confused idea of something to which they belong , and in which they subsist : and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance , we say it is a thing having such or such qualities , as body is a thing that is extended , figured , and capable of motion ; a spirit a thing capable of thinking : and so hardness , friability , and power to draw iron , we say , are qualities to be found in a loadstone . these and , the like fashions of speaking intimate , that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension , figure , solidity , motion , thinking , or other observable ideas , though we know not what it is . § . . hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances , as horse , stone , &c. though the idea , we have of either of them , be put the complication , or collection , of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities , which we use to find united in the thing called horse , or stone , yet because we cannot conceive , how they should subsist alone , nor one in another , we suppose them to exist in , and supported by some common subject ; which support we denote by the name substance , though it be certain , we have no clear , or distinct idea of that thing , we suppose a support . § . . the same happens concerning the operations of the mind , viz. thinking , reasoning , fearing , &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves , nor apprehending how they can belong to body , or be produced by it , we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance , which we call spirit ; whereby yet it is evident , that having no other idea or notion , of matter , but something wherein those many sensible qualities , which affect our senses , do subsist ; by supposing a substance , wherein thinking , knowing , doubting , and a power of moving , &c. do subsist , we have as clear a notion of the nature , or substance of spirit , as we have of body ; the one being supposed to be ( without knowing what it is ) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without ; and the other supposed ( with a like ignorance of what it is ) to be the substratum to those operations , which we experiment in our selves within . 't is plain then , that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions , and apprehensions , as that of spiritual substance , or spirit : and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit , we can no more conclude its non-existence , than we can , for the same reason , deny the existence of body : it being as rational to affirm , there is no body , because we cannot know its essence , as 't is called , or have no idea of the substance of matter ; as to say , there is no spirit , because we know not its essence , or have no idea of a spiritual substance . § . . whatever therefore be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general , all the ideas we have of particular distinct substances , are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas , coexhisting in such , though unknown , cause of their union , as makes the whole subsist of it self . 't is by such combinations of simple ideas , and nothing else , that we represent particular substances to our selves ; such are the ideas we have of their several sorts in our minds ; and such only do we by their specifick names , signifie to others , v. g. man , horse , sun , water , iron , upon hearing which words , every one who understands the language , frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas , which he has usually observed , or fancied to exist together under that denomination ; all which he supposes to rest in , and be , as it were , adherent to that unknown common subject , which inheres not in any thing else : though in the mean time it be manifest , and every one , upon enquiry into his own thoughts , will find , that he has no other idea of any substance , v. g. let it be gold , horse , iron , man , vitriol , bread , but what he has barely of those sensible qualities , which he supposes to inhere with a supposition of such a substratum , as gives as it were a support to those qualities , or simple ideas , which he has observed to exist united together . thus the idea of sun , what is it , but an aggregate of these several simple ideas , bright , hot , roundish , having a constant regular motion , at a certain distance from us , and , perhaps , some other ? as he who thinks and discourses of the sun , has been more or less accurate , in observing those sensible qualities , ideas , or properties , which are in that thing , which he calls the sun. § . . for he has the perfectest idea of any particular substance , who has gathered , and put together , most of those simple ideas , which do exist in it , among which are to be reckoned its active powers , and passive capacities ; which though not strictly simple ideas , yet , in this respect , for brevities sake , may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them . thus the power of drawing iron , is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a load-stone , and a power to be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron ; which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects . because every substance , being as apt by the powers we observe in it , to change some sensible qualities in other subjects , as it is to produce in us those simple ideas , we receive immediately from it , does by those new sensible qualities , introduced into other subjects , discover to us those powers , which do thereby mediately affect our senses , as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately , v. g. we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and colour ; which are , if rightly considered , nothing but powers in it , to produce those ideas in us : we also by our senses perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal ; whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire , which it has to change the colour and consistency of wood : by the former fire immediately , by the later it mediately discovers to us these several powers ; which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire , and so make them a part of the complex ideas of it . for all those powers that we take cognizance of , terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities , in those subjects , on which they operate , and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas , therefore it is , that i have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas , which make the complex ones of the sorts of substances ; though these powers considered in themselves , are truly complex ideas . and in this looser sense , i crave leave to be understood , when i name any of these potentialities amongst the simple ideas , which we recollect in our minds , when we think of particular substances . for the powers that are severally in them , are necessary to be considered , if we will have true distinct notions of substances . § . . nor are we to wonder , that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances ; since their secondary qualities are those , which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another , and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them . for our senses failing us , in the discovery of the bulk , texture , and figure of the minute parts of bodies , on which their real constitutions and differences depend , we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities , as the characteristical notes and marks , whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds , and distinguish them one from another . all which secondary qualities , as has been shewn , are nothing but bare powers . for the colour and taste of opium , are , as well as its foporifick or anodyn virtues , meer powers depending on its primary qualities , whereby it is sitted to produce different operations , on different parts of our bodies . the ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances , are of these three sorts . first , the ideas of the primary qualities of things , which are discovered by our senses , and are in them even when we perceive them not , such are the bulk , figure , number , situation , and motion of the parts of bodies , which are really in them , whether we perceive them or no. secondly , the sensible secondary qualities , which depending on these , are nothing but the powers , those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses ; which ideas are not in the things themselves , otherwise than as any thing is in its cause . thirdly , the aptness we consider in any substance , to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities , as that the substance so altered , should produce in us different ideas from what it did before , these are called active and passive powers : all which powers , as far as we have any notice or notion of them , terminate only in sensible simple ideas ; for whatever alteration a load-stone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron , we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron , did not its sensible motion discover it ; and i doubt not but there are a thousand changes , that bodies we daily handle , have a power to cause in one another , which we never suspect , because they never appear in sensible effects . § . . powers therefore , justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances . he , that will examine his complex idea of gold , will find several of its ideas , that make it up , to be only powers , as the power of being melted , but of keeping its weight in the fire , of being dissolved in aq. regia , are ideas , as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold , as its colour and weight ; which if duly considered , are also nothing but different powers . for to speak truly , yellowness is not actually in gold ; but is a power in gold , to produce that idea in us by our eyes , when placed in a due light ; and the heat , which we cannot leave out of our idea of the sun , is no more really in the sun , than the white colour it introduces in wax . these are both equally powers in the sun , operating by the motion , and figure of its insensible parts ; so on a man , as to make him have the idea of heat ; and so on wax , as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white . § . . had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies , and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend , i doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us ; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold , would then disappear , and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure . this microscopes plainly discover to us ; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour , is by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses , discovered to be quite a different thing ; and the thus altering , as it were , the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight , produces different ideas from what it did before . thus sand , or pounded glass , which is opaque , and white to the naked eye , is pellucid in a microscope ; and a hair seen this way , looses its former colour , and is in a great measure pellucid , with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours , such as appear from the refraction of diamonds , and other pellucid bodies . blood to the naked eye appears all red ; but by a good microscope , wherein its lesser parts appear , shews only some few globules of red , swimming in a pellucid liquor ; and how these red globules would appear , if glasses could be found , that yet could magnifie them , or times more , is uncertain . § . . the infinitely wise contriver of us , and all things about us , hath fitted our senses , faculties , and organs , to the conveniences of life , and the business we have to do here we are able by our senses , to know , and distinguish things ; and to examine them so far , as to apply them to our uses , and several ways accommodate the exigences of this life . we have insight enough into their admirable contrivances , and wonderful effects , to admire , and magnifie the wisdom , power , and goodness of their author . such a knowledge as this , which is suited to our present condition , we want not faculties to attain . but it appears not , that god intended , we should have a perfect , clear , and adequate knowledge of them : that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being . we are furnished with faculties ( dull and weak as they are ) to discover enough in the creatures , to lead us to the knowledge of the creator , and the knowledge of our duty ; and we are fitted well enough with abilities , to provide for the conveniences of living . these are our business in this world : but were our senses altered , and made much quicker and acuter , the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us ; and i am apt to think , would be inconsistent with our being , or at least well-being in this part of the universe we inhabit . he that considers , how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air , not much higher than that we commonly breath in , will have reason to be satisfied , that in this globe of earth alotted for our mansion , the all-wise architect has suited our organs , and the bodies , that are to affect them one to another . if our sense of hearing were but times quicker than it is , how would a perpetual noise distract us ? and we should in the quietest retirement , be less able to sleep or meditate , than in the middle of a sea-fight . nay , if that most instructive of our senses , seeing , were in any man , or more acute than it is now by the best microscope , he would see things or less than he does now , and so come nearer the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things ; and in many of them , probably get ideas of their internal constitutions : but then he would be in a quite different world from other people : nothing would appear the same to him , and others : the visible ideas of every thing would be different . so that i doubt , whether he , and the rest of men , could discourse concerning the objects of sight ; or have any communication about colours , their appearances being so wholly different . and , perhaps , such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sun-shine , or so much as open day-light ; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once , and that too only at a very near distance . and if by the help of such microscopical eyes , ( if i may so call them , ) a man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret composition , and radical texture of bodies , he would not make any great advantage by the change , if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange ; if he could not see things , he was to avoid at a convenient distance ; nor distinguish things he had to do with , by those sensible qualities others do . he that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock , and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse , its elastick motion depends , would no doubt discover something very admirable : but if eyes so framed , could not view at once the hand , and the characters of the hour-plate , and thereby at a distance see what a-clock it was , their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness ; which whilst , it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machin , made him loose its use . § . . and here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine , viz. that since we have some reason , ( if there be any credit to be given to the report of things , that our philosophy cannot account for , ) to imagine , that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk , figure , and conformation of parts , whether one great advantage some of them have over us , may not lie in this , that they can so frame , and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception , as to suit them to their present design , and the circumstances of the object they would consider . for how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge , who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes , that one sense , as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision , which the assistence of glasses ( casually at at first light on ) has taught us to conceive ? what wonders would he discover , who could so fit his eye to all sorts of objects , as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood , and other juices of animals , as distinctly as he does at other times the shape and motion of the animals themselves . but to us in our present state , unalterable organs , so contrived , as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies , whereon depend those sensible qualities , we now observe in them , would , perhaps , be of no advantage . god has no doubt made us so , as is best for us in our present condition . he hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies , that surround us , and we have to do with : and though we cannot by the faculties we have , attain to a perfect knowledge of things ; yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned , which are our great concernment . i beg my reader 's pardon , for laying before him so wild a phansie , concerning the ways of conception in beings above us : but how extravagant soever it be , i doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels , but after this manner , some way or other , in proportion to what we find and observe in our selves . and tho' we cannot but allow , that the infinite power and wisdom of god , may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties , and ways of perceiving things without them , than what we have : yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own , so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection . the supposition at least , that angels do sometimes assume bodies , need not startle us , since some of the most ancient , and most learned fathers of the church , seemed to believe , that they had bodies : and this is certain , that their state and way of existence is unknown to us . § . . but to return to the matter in hand , the ideas we have of substances ; and the ways we come by them , i say our ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas , considered as united in one thing . these ideas of substances , though they are commonly called simple apprehensions , and the names of them simple terms ; yet in effect , are complex and compounded . thus the idea which an english-man signified by the name swan , is white colour , long neck , red beak , black legs , and whole feet , and all these of a certain size , with a power of swimming in the water , and making a certain kind of noise , and , perhaps , to a man , who has long observed those kind of birds , some other properties , which all terminate in sensible simple ideas . § . . besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances , of which i have last spoken , by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds , we experiment daily in our selves , as thinking , understanding , willing , knowing , and power of beginning motion , &c. coexisting in some substance , we are able to frame the complex idea of a spirit . and thus by putting together the ideas of thinking , perceiving , liberty , and power of moving themselves and other things , we have as clear a perception , and notion , of immaterial substances , as we have of material . for putting together the ideas of thinking and willing , or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion , joined to substance , of which we have no distinct idea , we have the idea of spirit ; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts , and a power of being moved , joined with substance , of which likewise we have no positive idea , we have the idea of matter . the one is as clear and distinct an idea , as the other : the idea of thinking , and moving a body , being as clear and distinct ideas , as the ideas of extension , solidity , and being moved . for our idea of substance , is equally obscure , or none at all , in both ; it is but a supposed , i know not what , to support those ideas , we call accidents . § . . by the complex idea of extended , figured , coloured , and all other sensible qualities , which is all that we know of it , we are as far from the idea of the substance of body , as if we knew nothing at all : nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity , which we imagine we have with matter , and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies , will it , perhaps , upon examination be found , that they have any more , or clearer , primary ideas belonging to body , than they have belonging to spirit . § . . the primary ideas we have peculiar to body , as contradistinguished to spirit , are the cohesion of solid , and consequently separable parts , and a power of communicating motion by impulse . these , i think , are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body : for figure is but the consequence of finite extension . § . . the ideas we have belonging , and peculiar to spirit , are thinking , and will , or a power of putting body into motion by thought , and , which is consequent to it , liberty . for as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse , to another body , which it meets with at rest ; so the mind can put bodies into motion , or forbear to do so , as it pleases . the ideas of existence , duration , and mobility , are common to them both . § . . there is no reason why it should be thought strange , that i make mobility belong to spirit : for having no other idea of motion , but change of distance , with other beings , that are considered as at rest ; and finding that spirits , as well as bodies , cannot operate , but where they are ; and that spirits do operate at several times , at several places , i cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits : ( for of the infinite spirit , i speak not here . ) for my soul being a real being , as well as my body , is certainly as capable of changing of distance with any other body , or being , as body it self ; and so is capable of motion . and if a mathematician can consider a certain distance , or a change of that distance between two points ; one may certainly conceive a distance , and a change of distance between two spirits ; and so conceive their motion , their approach , or removal , one from another . § . . every one finds in himself , that his soul can think , will , and operate on his body , in the place where that is ; but cannot operate on a body , or in place , an hundred miles distant from it . no body can imagine , that his soul can think , or move a body at oxford , whilst he is at london ; and cannot but know , that being united to his body , it constantly changes place all the whole journey , between oxford and london , as the coach , or horse , does that carries him ; and , i think , may be said to be truly all that while in motion : or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion , its being separated from the body in death , i think , will : for to consider it , to go out of the body , or leave it , and yet to have no idea of its motion , seems to me impossible . § . . if it be said by any one , that it cannot change place , because it hath none , for spirits are not in loco , but vbi ; i suppose that way of talking , will not now be of much weight to many , in an age that is not much disposed to admire , or suffer themselves to be deceived , by such unintelligible ways of speaking . but if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction , and applicable to our present purpose , i desire him to put it into intelligible english ; and then from thence draw a reason to shew , that spirits are not capable of motion . indeed , motion cannot be attributed to god , not because he is a spirit , but because he is an infinite spirit . § . . let us compare then our complex idea of spirit , with our complex idea of body , and see whether there be any more obscurity in one , than in the other , and in which most . our idea of body , as i think , is an extended solid substance , capable of communicating motion by impulse : and our idea of our souls , is of a substance that thinks , and has a power of exciting motion in body , by will , or thought . these , i think , are our complex ideas of soul and body , as contradistinguished : and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it , and difficulty to be apprehended . i know that people , whose thoughts are immersed in matter , and have so subjected their minds to their senses , that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them , are apt to say , they cannot comprehend a thinking thing , which , perhaps , is true : but i affirm , when they consider it well , they can no more comprehend an extended thing . § . . if any one says , he knows not what 't is thinks in him ; he means , he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing : no more , say i , knows he what the substance is of that solid thing . farther , if he says he knows not how he thinks ; i answer , neither knows he how he is extended ; how the solid parts of body are united , or cohere together to make extension . for though the pressure of the particles of air , may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter , that are grosser than the particles of air , and have pores less than the corpuscles of air ; yet the weight , or pressure , of the air , will not explain , nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves . and if the pressure of the aether , or any subtiler matter than the air , may unite , and hold fast together , the parts of a particle of air , as well as other bodies ; yet it cannot make bonds for it self , and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis . so that that hypothesis , how ingeniously soever explained , by shewing , that the parts of sensible bodies are held together , by the pressure of other external insensible bodies , reaches not the parts of the aether it self ; and by how much the more evident it proves , that the parts of other bodies are held together , by the external pressure of the aether ; and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union , by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the aether it self : which we can neither conceive without parts , they being bodies and divisible , nor yet how their parts cohere , they wanting that cause of cohesion , which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies . § . . but in truth , the pressure of any ambient fluid , how great soever , can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter . for though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies , one from another in a line perpendicular to them , as in the experiment of two polished marbles : yet it can never , in the least , hinder the separation by a motion , in a line parallel to these superficies . because the ambient fluid , having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space , diserted by a lateral motion , resists such a motion of bodies so joined , no more , than it would resist the motion of that body , were it on all sides environed by that fluid , and touched no other body : and therefore , if there were no other cause of cohesion , all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion . for if the pressure of the aether be the adequate cause of cohesion , where-ever that cause operates not , there can be no cohesion . and since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation , ( as has been shewed , ) therefore in every imaginary plain , intersecting any mass of matter , there could be no more cohesion , than of two polished superficies ; which will always , notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid , easily slide one from another : so that , perhaps , how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body , which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts , he that shall well consider it in his mind , may have reason to conclude , that 't is as easie for him to have a clear idea , how the soul thinks , as how body is extended . for since body is no farther , nor otherwise extended , than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts , we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body , without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts ; which seems to me as incomprehensible , as the manner of thinking , and how it is performed . § . . i allow , it is usual for most people to wonder , how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe . do we not see , will they be ready to say , the parts of bodies stick firmly together ? is there any thing more common ? and what doubt can there be made of it ? and the like , i say , concerning thinking , and voluntary motion : do we not every moment experiment it in our selves ; and therefore can it be doubted ? the matter of fact is clear , i confess ; but when we would a little nearer look into it , and consider how it is done , there , i think , we are at a loss , both in the one , and the other ; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere , as how we our selves perceive , or move . i would have any one intelligibly explain to me , how the parts of gold , or brass , ( that but now in fusion were as loose from one another , as the particles of water , or the sands of an hour-glass , ) come in a few moments to be so united , and adhere so strongly one to another , that the utmost force of mens arms cannot separate them : a considering man will , i suppose , be here at a loss , to satisfie his own , or another man's understanding . § . . the little bodies that compose that fluid , we call water , are so extreamly small , that i have never heard of any one , who by a microscope , ( and yet i have heard of some , that have magnified to ; nay , to much above , times , ) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk , figure , or motion : and the particles of water , are also so perfectly loose one from another , that the least force sensibly separates them . nay , if we consider their perpetual motion , we must allow them to have no cohesion , one with another : and y●t let but a sharp cold come , and they unite , they consolidate , these little atoms cohere , and are not , without great force , separable . he that could find the bonds , that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly ; he that could make known the cement , that makes them stick so fast one to another , would discover a great , and yet unknown secret : and yet when that was done , would he be far enough from making the extension of body ( which is the cohesion of its solid parts ) intelligible , till he could shew wherein consisted the union , or consolidation of the parts of those bonds , or of that cement , or of the least particle of matter that exists . whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body , will be found , when examined , to be as incomprehensible , as any thing belonging to our minds ; and a solid extended substance , as hard to be conceived , as a thining one , whatever difficulties some would raise against it . § . . for to extend our thoughts a little farther , that pressure , which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies , is as unintelligible , as the cohesion it self . for if matter be considered , as no doubt it is , finite , let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of universe , and there see what conceivable hoops , what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter , in so close a pressure together ; from whence steel has its firmness , and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility . if matter be finite , it must have its extreams ; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder . if to avoid this difficulty , any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter , let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body ; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible , by resolving it into a supposition , the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other : so far is our extension of body , ( which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts , ) from being clearer , or more distinct , when we would enquire into the nature , cause , or manner of it , than the idea of thinking . § . . another idea we have of body , is the power of communication of motion by impulse ; and of our souls , the power of exciting of motion by thought . these ideas , the one of body , the other of our minds , every days experience clearly furnishes us with : but if here again we enquire how this is done , we are equally in the dark . for in the communication of motion by impulse , wherein as much motion is lost to one body , as is got to the other ; which is the ordinariest case , we can have no other conception , but of the passing of motion out of one body into another ; which , i think , is as obscure and unconceivable , as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought ; which we every moment find they do . the increase of motion by impulse , which is observed or believed sometimes to happen , is yet harder to be understood . we have by daily experience clear evience of motion produced both by impulse , and by thought ; but the manner how , hardly comes within our comprehension ; we are qually at a loss in both . so that however we consider motion , and its communication either in body or spirit , the idea which belongs to spirit , is at least as clear , as that , that belongs to body . and if we consider the active power of moving , or , as i may call it , motivity , it is much clearer in spirit than body : since two bodies , placed by one another at rest , will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other , but by a borrowed motion : whereas the mind , every day , affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies ; and therefore it is worth our consideration , whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits , and passive power of matter . but be that as it will , i think , we have as many , and as clear ideas belonging to spirit , as we have belonging to body , the substance of each being equally unknown to us ; and the idea of thinking in spirit , as clear as of extension in body ; and the communication of motion by thought , which we attribute to spirit , is as evident , as that by impulse , which we ascribe to body . constant experience makes us sensible of both of these , though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither . for when the mind would look beyond these original ideas , we have from sensation , or reflection ; and penetrate into their causes , and manner of production , we find still , it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness . § . . to conclude , sensation convinces us , that there are solid extended substances ; and reflection , that there are thinking ones : experience assures us of the existence of such beings ; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse , the other by thought ; this we cannot doubt of . experience , i say , every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas , both of the one , and the other . but beyond these ideas , as received from their proper sources , our faculties will not reach . if we would enquire farther into their nature , causes , and manner , we perceive not the nature of extension , clearer than we do of thinking . if we would explain them any farther , one is as easie as the other : and there is no more difficulty , to conceive how a substance we know not , should by thought set body into motion , than how a substance we know not , should by impulse set body into motion . so that we are no more able to discover , wherein the ideas belonging to body consist , than those belonging to spirit , from whence it seems probable to me , that the simple ideas , we receive from sensation and reflection , are the boundaries of our thoughts : beyond which , the mind , whatever efforts it would make , is not able to advance one jot : nor can it make any discoveries , when it would prie into the nature , and hidden causes of those ideas . § . . so that , in short , the idea we have of spirit , compared with the idea we have of body , stands thus : the substance of spirit is unknown to us ; and so is the substance of body , equally unknown to us : two primary qualities , or properties of body , viz. solid coherent parts , and impulse , we have distinct clear ideas of : so likewise we know , and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities , or properties of spirit , viz. thinking , and a power● action ; i. e. a power of beginning , or stopping several thoughts , or motions . we have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies , and have the clear distinct ideas of them : which qualities , are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts , and their motion . we have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking , viz. believing , doubting , intending , fearing , hoping ; all which , are but the several modes of thinking . we have also the ideas of willing , and moving the body consequent to it , and with the body it self too ; for , as has been shewed , spirit is capable of motion . § . . lastly , if this notion of spirit , may have , perhaps , some difficulties in it , not easie to be explained , we have thereby no more reason to deny , or doubt the existence of spirits , than we have to deny , or doubt the existence of body : because the notion of body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard , and , perhaps , impossible to be explained , or understood by us . for i would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of spirit more perplexed , or nearer a contradiction , than the very notion of body includes in it ; the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension , involving us , whether we grant or deny it , in consequences impossible to be explicated , or made consistent ; consequences that carry greater difficulty , and more apparent absurdity , than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance . § . . which we are not at all to wonder at , since we having but some few superficial ideas of things , discovered to us only by the senses from without , or by the mind , reflecting on what it experiments in it self within , have no knowledge beyond that , much less of the internal constitution , and true nature of things , being destitute of faculties to attain it . and therefore experimenting and discovering in our selves knowledge , and the power of voluntary motion , as certainly as we experiment , or discover in things without us , the cohesion and separation of solid parts , which is the extension and motion of bodies ; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of spirit , as with our notion of body ; and the existence of the one , as well as the other . for it being no more a contradiction , that thinking should exist , separate , and independent from solidity ; than it is a contradiction , that solidity should exist separate , and independent from thinking , they being both but simple ideas , independent one from another ; and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking , as of solidity , i know not , why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity , i. e. imma●erial , to exist ; as a solid thing without thinking , i. e. matter , to exist ; especially since it is no harder to conceive , how thinking should exist without matter , than how matter should think . for whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas , we have from sensation and reflection , and dive farther into the nature of things , we fall presently into darkness and obscurity , perplexedness and difficulties ; and can discover nothing farther , but our own blindness and ignorance . but which ever of these complex ideas be clearest , that of body , or spirit , this is evident , that the simple ideas that make them up , are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection ; and so is it of all our other ideas of substances , even of god himself . § . . for if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible supreme being , we shall find , that we come by it the same way ; and that the complex ideas we have both of god , and separate spirits , are made up of the simple ideas , we receive from reflection ; v. g. having from what we experiment in our selves , got the ideas of existence and duration ; of knowledge , and power ; of pleasure , and happiness ; and of several other qualities and powers , which it is better to have , than to be without , when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the supreme being , we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity ; and so putting them together , make our complex idea of god. for that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas , received from sensation and reflection , has been already shewed . § . . if i find , that i know some few things ; and some of them , or all , perhaps , imperfectly , i can frame an idea of knowing twice as many ; which i can double again , as often as i can add to number , and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge , by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible : the same also i can do of knowing them more perfectly ; i. e. all their qualities , powers , causes , consequences , and relations , &c. till all be perfectly known , that is in them , or can any way relate to them , and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge : the same may also be done of power , till we come to that we call infinite ; and also of the duration of existence , without beginning or end ; and so frame the idea of an eternal being : the degrees or extent , wherein we ascribe existence , power , wisdom , and all other perfection , ( which we can have any ideas of ) to that sovereign being , which we call god , being all boundless and infinite , we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of ; all which is done , i say , by enlarging those simple ideas , we have taken from the operations of our own minds , by reflection ; or by our senses , from exterior things , to that vastness , to which infinity can extend them . § . . for it is infinity , which , joined to our ideas of existence , power , knowledge , &c. makes that complex idea , whereby we represent to our selves the best we can , the supreme being . for though in his own essence , ( which certainly we do not know , not knowing the real essence of a peble , or a fly , or of our own selves , ) god be simple and uncompounded ; yet , i think , i may say we have no other idea of him , but a complex one of existence , knowledge , power , happiness , &c. infinite , and eternal : which are all distinct ideas , and some of them being relative , are again compounded of others ; all which being , as has been shewn , originally got from sensation and reflection , go to make up the idea or notion we have of god. § . . this farther is to be observed , that there is no idea we attribute to god , bating infinity , which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits . because being capable of no other simple ideas , belonging to any thing but body , but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds , we can attribute to spirits no other , but what we receive from thence : and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits , is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge , power , duration , happiness , &c. for that in our ideas , as well of spirits , as of other things , we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection , is evident from hence , that in our ideas of spirits , how much soever advanced in perfection , beyond those of bodies , even to that of infinite , we cannot yet have any idea of the manner , wherein they discover their thoughts one to another : though we must necessarily conclude , that spirits , which are beings , that have perfecter knowledge , and greater happiness than we , must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts , than we have , who are fain to make use of corporeal signs , and particularly sounds , which are therefore of most general use , as being the best , and quickest we are capable of . but of immediate communication , having no experiment in our selves , and consequently , no notion of it at all , we have no idea , how spirits , which use not words , can with quickness , or much less , how spirits that have no bodies , can be masters of their own thoughts , and communicate , or conceal them at pleasure , though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power . § . . and thus we have seen , what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds , wherein they consist , and how we come by them . from whence , i think , it is very evident , first , that all our ideas of the several sorts of substances , are nothing but collections of simple ideas , with a supposition of something , to which they belong , and in which they subsist ; though of this supposed something , we have no clear distinct idea at all . secondly , that all the complex ideas we have of substances , are made up of no other simple ideas , but such , as we have received from sensation or reflection . so that even in those , which we think , we are most intimately acquainted with , and come nearest the comprehension of , our most enlarged conceptions , cannot reach beyond those simple ideas . and even in those , which seem most remote from all we have to do with , and do infinitely surpass any thing , we can perceive in our selves by reflection , or discover by sensation in other things , we can attain to nothing , but these simple ideas , which we originally received from sensation , or reflection , as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels , and particularly of god himself . thirdly , that most of the simple ideas , that make up our complex ideas of substances , when truly considered , are only powers , however we are apt to take them for positive qualities ; v. g. the greatest part of the ideas , that make our complex idea of gold , are yellowness , great weight , ductility , fusibility , and solubility , in aq. regia , &c. all united together in an unknown substratum ; all which ideas , are nothing else , but so many relations to other substances ; and are not really in the gold it self , though they depend on those real , and primary qualities of its internal constitution , whereby it has a fitness , differently to operate , and be operated on by several other substances . chap. xxiv . of collective ideas of substances . § . . besides these complex ideas of several single substances , as of man , horse , gold , violet , apple , &c. the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances ; which i so call , because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together , as united into one idea , and which so joined , are looked on as one ; v. g. the idea of such a collection of men as make an army , though consisting of a great number of distinct substances , is as much one idea , as the idea of a man : and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name world , is as much one idea , as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it ; it sufficing , to the unity of any idea , that it be considered as one representation , or picture , though made up of never so many particulars . § . . these collective ideas of substances , the mind makes by its power of composition , and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one , as it does , by the same faculty , make the complex ideas of particular substances , consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas , united in one substance : and as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity , makes the collective mode , or complex idea of any number , as a score , or a gross , &c. so by putting together several particular substances , it makes collective ideas of substances , as a troop , an army , a swarm , a city , a fleet ; each of which , every one finds , that he represents to his own mind , by one idea , in one view ; and so under that notion , considers the things themselves as perfectly one , as one ship , or one atom . nor is it harder to conceive , how an army of ten thousand men , should make one idea , than how a man should make one idea ; it being as easie to the mind , to unite into one , the idea of a great number of men , and consider it as one ; as it is to unite into one particular , all the distinct ideas , that make up the composition of a man , and consider them altogether as one § . . amongst such kind of collective ideas , are to be counted most part of artificial things , at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances : and , in truth , if we consider all these collective ideas aright , as army , constellation , vniverse , as they are united into so many single ideas , they are but the artificial draughts of the mind , bringing things very remote , and independent one from another , into one view , the better to contemplate , and discourse of them , united into one conception , and signified by one name . for there are no things so remote , nor so contrary , which the mind cannot , by this art of composition , bring into one idea , as is visible in that signified by the name vniverse . chap. xxv . of relation . § . . besides the ideas , whether simple or complex , that the mind has of things , as they are in themselves , there are others it gets from their comparison one with another . the understanding , in the consideration of any thing , is not confined to that precise object : it can carry any ideas , as it were , beyond it self , or , at least , look beyond it , to see how it stands in conformity to any other . when the mind so considers one thing , that it does , as it were , bring it to , and set it by another , and carry its view from one to t'other : this is , as the words import , relation and r●spect ; and the denominations given to positive things , ●ntimating that respect , and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject it self denominated , to something distinct from it , are what we call relatives ; and the things so brought together , related ● thus when the mind considers cajus , as such a positive being , it takes nothing into that idea , but what really exists in cajus ; v. g. when i consider him , as a man , i have nothing in my mind , but the complex idea of the species , man : so likewise , when i say● cajus is a white man , i have nothing but the bare consideration of man , who hath that white colour . but when i give cajus the name husband , i intimate some other person ; and when i give him the name whiter , i intimate some other thing in both cases : my thought is led to something beyond cajus , and there are two things brought into consideration . and since any idea , whether simple , or complex , may be the occasion , why the mind thus brings two things together , and , as it were , takes a view of them at once , though still considered as distinct : therefore any of our ideas , may be the foundation of relation , as in the above-mentioned instance , the contract , and ceremony of marriage with sempronia , is the occasion of the denomination , or relation of husband ; and the colour white , the occasion why he is said whiter than free-stone . § . . these , and the like relations , expressed by relative terms , that have others answering them , with a reciprocal intimation , as father , and son● bigger , and less ; cause , and effect , are very obvious to every one , and every body at first sight perceives the relation . for father , and son● husband , and wife , and such other correlative terms , seem so nearly to belong one to another , and , through custom , do so readily chime , and answer one another in peoples memories , that upon the naming of either of them , the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named ; and no body over-looks , or doubts of a relation , where it is so plainly intimated . but where languages have failed to give correlative names , there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of . concubine is , no doubt , a relative name , as well as wife ; but in languages where this , and the like words , have not a correlative term , there people are not so apt to take them to be so , as wanting that evident mark of relation , which is between correlatives , which seem to explain one another , and not to be able to exist but together . hence it is , that many of those names , which duly considered , do include evident relations , have been called external denominations : but all names , that are more than empty sounds , must signifie some idea , which is either in the thing to which the name is applied ; and then it is positive , and is looked on as united to , and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given● or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it , to something distinct from it , with which it considers it ; and then it includes a relation . § . . another sort of relative terms there is , which are not looked on to be either relative , or so much as external denominations ; which yet , under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject , do conceal a tacit , though less observable , relation ; such are the seemingly positive terms of old , great , imperfect , &c. whereof i shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters . § . . this farther may be observed , that the ideas of relation , may be the same in men , who have far different ideas of the things that are related , or that are thus compared ; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man , may yet agree in the notion of a father ; which is a notion superinduced to the substance , or man , and refers only to an act of that thing called man ; whereby it contributed to the generation of one of his own kind , let man be what it will. § . . the nature therefore of relation , consists in the referring , or comparing two things , one to another ; from which comparison , one or both comes to be denominated : and if either of those things be removed , or cease to be , the relation ceases , and the denomination consequent to it , though the other receive in it self no alteration at all ; v. g. cajus , whom i consider to day as a father , ceases to be so to morrow , only by the death of his son , without any alteration made in himself ; nay , barely by the mind 's changing the object , to which it compares any thing , the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time ; v. g. cajus , compared to several persons , may truly be said to be older , and younger ; stronger , and weaker , &c. § . . whatsoever doth , or can exist , or be considered as one thing , is positive ; and so not only simple ideas and substances , but modes also are positive beings ; though the parts , of which they consist , are very often relative one to another : but the whole together considered as one thing , and producing in us the complex idea of one thing ; which idea is in our minds , as one picture , though an aggregate of divers parts ; and under one name , it is a positive or absolute thing , or idea . thus a triangle , though the parts thereof , compared one to another , be relative , yet the idea of the whole , is a positive absolute idea . the same may be said of a family , a tune , &c. for there can be no relation , but betwixt two things , considered as two things . there must always be in relation two ideas , or things , either in themselves really separate , or considered as distinct , and then ground or occasion for their comparison . § . . concerning relation in general , these things may be considered : first , that there is no one thing , whether simple idea , substance , mode , or relation , or name of either of them , which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations , in reference to other things ; and therefore this makes no small part of mens thoughts and words ; v. g. one single man may at once be concerned in , and sustain all these following relations , and many more , viz. father , brother , son , grandfather , grandson , father-in-law , son-in-law , husband , friend , enemy , subject , general , judge , patron , client , professor , european , english-man , islanders , servant , master , possessor , captain , superiour , inferiour , bigger , less , older , younger , contemporary , like , unlike , &c. to an almost infinite number , he being capable of as many relations , as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things , with which he may agree , or disagree , or have any respect : for , as i said , relation is a way of comparing , or considering two things together ; and giving one , or both of them , some appellation from that comparison , and sometimes giving even the relation it self a name . § . . secondly , this farther may be considered concerning relation , that though it be not contained in the real existence of things , but something extraneous , and superinduced ; yet the ideas which relative words stand for , are often clearer , and more distinct , than of those substances to which they do belong . the notion we have of a father , or brother , is a great deal clearer , and more distinct , than that we have of a man : or , if you will , paternity is a thing whereof 't is easier to have a clear idea , than of humanity : and i can much easier conceive what a friend is , than what god. because the knowledge of one action , or one simple idea , is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation : but to the knowing of any substantial being , an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary . a man , if he compare two things together , can hardly be supposed not to know what it is , wherein he compares them : so that when he compares any things together , he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation . the ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds , than those of substances : because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas , which are really in any substance , but for the most part easie enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation i think on , or have a name for ; v. g. comparing two men , in reference to one common parent , it is very easie to frame the ideas of brothers , without having yet the perfect idea of a man. for significant relative words , as well as others , standing only for ideas ; and those being all either simple , or made up of simple ones , it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for , to have a clear conception of that , which is the foundation of the relation ; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to . thus having the notion , that one laid the egg , out of which the other was hatched , i have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick , between the two cassiowaries in st. iames's park ; though , perhaps , i have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves . § . . thirdly , though there be a great number of considerations , wherein things may be compared one with another , and so a multitude of relations , yet they all terminate in , and are concerned about tho●● simple ideas , either of sensation or reflection ; which i think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge . to clear this , i shall shew it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of , and some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection ; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence , and that the notions we have of them , are but certain simple ideas , and so originally derived from sense or reflection . § . . fourthly , that relation being the considering of one thing with another , which is extrinsical to it , it is evident , that all words , that necessarily infer , and lead the mind to any other ideas , than are supposed really to exist in that thing , to which the word is applied , are relative words ; v. g. a man black , merry , thoughtful , thirsty , angry , extended ; these , and the like , are all absolute , because they neither signifie nor intimate any thing , but what does , or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated : but father , brother , king , husband , blacker , merrier , &c. are words , which , together with the thing they denominate , imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing . § . . having laid down these premises concerning relation in general , i shall now proceed to shew , in some instances , how all the ideas we have of relation are made up , as the others are , only of simple ideas ; and that they all , how refined , or remote from sense soever they seem , terminate at last in simple ideas . i shall begin with the most comprehensive relation , wherein all things that do , or can exist , are concerned ; and that is the relation of cause and effect . the idea whereof , how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge , sensation and reflection , i shall in the next place consider . chap. xxvi . of cause and effect , and other relations . § . . in the notice , that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things , we cannot but observe , that several particular , both qualities , and substances begin to exist ; and that they receive this their existence , from the due application and operation of some other being . from this observation , we get our ideas of cause and effect . that which produces any simple or complex idea , we denote by the general name cause ; and that which is produced , effect . thus finding , that in that substance which we call wax , fluidity , which is a simple idea , that was not in it before , is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat , we call the simple idea of heat , in relation to fluidity in wax , the cause of it ; and fluidity the effect . so also finding that the substance , wood , which is a certain collection of simple ideas , so called , will by the application of fire , be turned into another substance , called ashes ; i. e. another complex idea , consisting of a collection of simple ideas , quite different from that complex idea , which we call wood ; we consider fire , in relation to ashes , as cause , and the ashes , as effect . so that whatever is considered by us , to conduce or operate , to the producing any particular simple idea , or collection of simple ideas , whether substance , or mode , which did not before exist , hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause , and so is denominated by us . § . . having thus , from what our senses are able to discover , in the operations of bodies on one another , got the notion of cause and effect ; viz. that a cause is that which makes any other thing , either simple idea , substance , or mode , begin to be ; and an effect is that , which had its beginning from some other thing , the mind finds no great difficulty , to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts : first , when the thing is wholly made new , so that no part thereof did ever exist before ; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist , in rerum natura , which had before no being ; and this we call creation . secondly , when a thing is made up of particles , which did all of them before exist , but that very thing , so constituted of pre-existing particles , which considered altogether make up such a collection of simple ideas , had not any existence before , as this man , this egg , rose , or cherry , &c. and this , when referred to a substance , produced in the ordinary course of nature , by an internal principle , but set on work by , and received from some external agent , or cause , and working by insensible ways , which we perceive not , we call generation ; when the cause is extrinsical , and the effect produced by a sensible separation , or juxta position of discernable parts , we call it making ; and such are all artificial things . when any simple idea is produced , which was not in that subject before , we call it alteration . thus a man is generated , a picture made , and either of them altered , when any new sensible quality , or simple idea , is produced in either of them , which was not there before ; and the things thus made to exist , which were not there before , are effects ; and those things , which operated to the existence , causes . in which , and all other cases , we may observe , that the notion of cause and effect , has its rise from ideas , received by sensation or reflection ; and that this relation , how comprehensive soever , terminates at last in them . for to have the idea of cause and effect , it suffices to consider any simple idea , or substance , as beginning to exist , by the operation of some other , without knowing the manner of that operation . § . . time and place , are also the foundations of very large relations , and all finite beings , at least are concerned in them . but having already shewn in another place , how we got these ideas , it may suffice here to intimate , that most of the denominations of things , received from time , are only relations ; thus , when any one says , that queen elizabeth lived sixty nine , and reigned forty five years ; these words import only the relation of that duration to some other , and means no more but this , that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty nine , and the duration of her government to forty five annual revolutions of the sun ; and so are all words , answering , how long . again , william the conqueror invaded england about the year . which means this ; that taking the duration from our saviour's time , till now , for one entire great length of time , it shews at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes : and so do all words of time , answering to the question when , which shew only the distance of any point of time , from the period of a longer duration , from which we measure , and to which we thereby consider it , as related . § . there are yet besides those , other words of time , that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas , which yet will , when considered , be found to be relative , such as are young , old , &c. which include , and intimate the relation any things has , to a certain length of duration , whereof we have the idea in our minds . thus having setled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years , when we say a man is young , we mean , that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to : and when we denominate him old , we mean , that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed . and so 't is but comparing the particular age , or duration of this or that man , to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds , as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals : which is plain , in the application of these names to other things ; for a man is called young at twenty years , and very young at seven years old : but yet a horse we call old at twenty , and a dog at seven years ; because in each of these , we compare their age to different ideas of duration which are setled in our minds , as belonging to these several sorts of animals , in the ordinary course of nature . but the sun , and stars , though they have outlasted several generations of men , we call not old , because we do not know what period god hath set to that ●ort of beings . this term belonging properly to those things , which we can observe in the ordinary course of things , by a natural decay to come to an end , in a certain period of time ; and so have in our minds , as it were , a standard , to which we can compare the several parts of their duration ; and by the relation they bear thereunto , call them young , or old ; which we cannot therefore do to a ruby , or a diamond , things whose usual periods we know not . § . . the relation also that things have to one another , in their places and distances , is very obvious to observe ; as above , below , a mile distant from charing-cross , in england , and in london . but as in duration , so in extension and bulk , there are some ideas that are relative , which we signifie by names , that are thought positive ; as great , and little , are truly relations . for here also having , by observation , setled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things , from those we have been most accustomed to , we make them , as it were , the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others . thus we call a great apple , such an one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to ; and a little horse , such an one as comes not up to the size of that idea , which we have in our minds , to belong ordinarily to horses : and that will be a great horse to a welsh-man , which is but a little one to a fleming ; they two having from the different breed of their countries , taken several siz'd ideas to which they compare , and in relation to which they denominate their great , and their little. § . . so likewise weak and strong , are but relative denominations of power , compared to some idea we have , at that time , of greater or less power . thus when we say a weak man , we mean one that has not so much strength , or power to move , as usually men have , or usually those of his size have ; which is a comparing his strength , to the idea we have of the usual strength of men , or men of such a size . the like when we say the creatures are all weak things ; weak , there , is but a relative term , signifying the disproportion there is in the power of god , and the creatures . and so abundance of words , in ordinary speech , stand only for relations , ( and , perhaps , the greatest part , ) which at first sight , seem to have no such signification : v. g. the ship has necessary stores : necessary , and stores , are both relative words ; one having a relation to the accomplishing the thing intended , and the other to future use . all which relations , how they are confined to , and terminate in ideas derived from sensation , or reflection , is too obvious to need any explication . chap. xxvii . of other relations . § . . besides the before-mentioned occasions of time , place , and causality of comparing , or referring things one to another , there are , as i have said , infinite others , some whereof i shall mention . first , the first i shall name , is some one simple idea ; which being capable of parts or degrees , affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another , in respect of that simple idea , v. g. whiter , sweeter , bigger , equal , more , &c. these relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea , in several subjects , may be called , if one will , proportional ; and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection , is so evident , that nothing need be said to evince it . § . . secondly , another occasion of comparing things together , or considering one thing , so as to include in that consideration some other thing , is the circumstances of their origine or beginning ; which being not afterwards to be altered , make the relations , depending thereon , as lasting as the subjects to which they belong ; v. g. father and son , brothers , cousin-germanes , &c. which have their relations by one community of bloud , wherein they partake in several degrees ; country-men , i. e. those who were born in the same country , or tract of ground ; and these i call natural relations : wherein me may observe , that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life , and not to the truth and extent of things . for 't is certain , that in reality , the relation is the same , betwixt the begetter , and the begotten , in the several races of other animals , as well as men : but yet 't is seldom said , this bull is the grandfather of such a calf ; or that two pigeons are counsin-germanes . it is very convenient , that by distinct names , these relations should be observed , and marked out in mankind , there being occasion , both in laws and other communications one with another , to mention and take notice of men , under these relations : from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men : whereas in brutes , men having very little or no cause to mind those relations , they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names . this , by the way , may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages , which being suited only to the convenience of communication , are proportioned to the notions men have , and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them ; and not to the reality or extent of things , nor to the various respects might be found among them ; or the different abstract considerations might be framed about them . where they had no philosophical notions , there they had no terms to express them : and 't is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of . from whence it is easie to imagine , why , as in some countries , they may not have so much as the name for an horse ; and in others , where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses , than of their own , that there they may have not only names for particular horses , but also of their several relations of kindred one to another . § . . thirdly , sometimes the foundation of considering things , with reference to one another , is some act whereby any one comes by a moral , right , power , or obligation to do something . thus a general is one that hath power to command an army ; and an army under a general , is a collection of armed men , obliged to obey one man. a citizen , or a burgher , is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place . all this sort depending upon mens wills , or agreement in society , i call instituted , or voluntary ; and may be distinguished from the natural , in that they are most , if not all of them , some way or other alterable , and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged , though neither of the substances , so related , be destroy'd . now though these are all reciprocal , as well as the rest ; and contain in them a reference of two things , one to the other : yet because one of the two things often wants a relative name , importing that reference , men usually take no notice of it , and the relation is commonly over-look'd , v. g. a patron and client , are easily allow'd to be relations : but a constable , or dictator , are not so readily , at first hearing , considered as such . because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator , or constable , expressing a relation to either of them ; though it be certain , that either of them hath a certain power over some others ; and so is so far related to them , as well as a patron is to his client , or general to his army . § . . fourthly , there is another fort of relation , which is the conformity , or disagreement , mens voluntary actions have to a rule , to which they are referred , and by which they are judged of ; which , i think , may be called moral relation ; as being that which denominates our moral actions , and deserves well to be examined , there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get clear and distinct ideas , and avoid , as much as may be , obscurity and confusion . humane actions , when with their various ends , objects , manners , and circumstances , they are framed into distinct complex ideas , they are , as has been shewed , so many mixed modes , a great part whereof have names annexed to them . thus supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received ; polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once : when we frame these notions thus in our minds , we have there so many clear and distinct ideas of mixed modes . but this is not all concerning our actions ; it is not enough to have clear and distinct ideas of them , and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas , as make up the complex idea belonging to such a name . we have a farther and greater concernment , and that is , to know whether such actions so made up , are morally good , or bad . § . . good and evil , as has been shewed in another place , are nothing but pleasure or pain , or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us . morally good and evil then , is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law , whereby good or evil is drawn on us , from the will and power of the law-maker ; which good and evil , pleasure or pain , attending our observance , or breach of the law , by the decree of the law-maker , is that we call reward and punishment . § . . of these moral rules , or laws , to which men generally refer , and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions , there seem to me to be three sorts , with their three different enforcements , or rewards and punishments . for since it would be utterly in vain , to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man , without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil , to determine his will , we must , where-ever we suppose a law , suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that rule . it would be in vain for one intelligent being , to set a rule to the actions of another , if he had it not in his power , to reward and punish the compliance with , or deviation from his rule , by some good and evil , that is not the natural product and consequence of the action it self . for that being a natural convenience , or inconvenience , would operate of it self without a law. this , if i mistake not , is the true nature of all law , properly so called . § . . the laws that men generally refer their actions to , to judge of their rectitude , or obliquity , seem to me to be these three . . the divine law. . the civil law. . the philosophical law , if i may so call it . by the relation they bear to the first of these , we judge whether our actions are sins , or duties ; by the second , whether they be criminal , or innocent ; and by the third , whether they by virtues or vices . § . . first , that god has given a law to mankind , i think , there is no body so brutish as to deny . he has a right to do it , we are his creatures : he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best : and he has power to enforce by reward and punishments , of infinite weight and duration , in another life : for no body can take us out of his hands . by comparing them to this law , it is , that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions ; that is , whether as duties , or sins , they are like to procure them happiness , or misery , from the hands of the almighty . § . . the civil law , the rule set by the commonwealth , to the actions of those who belong to it , is another rule , to which men refer their actions , to judge whether they be criminal , or no. this law no body over-looks : the rewards and punishments that enforce it , being ready at hand , and suitable to the power that makes it , which is the force of the commonwealth , which is engaged to protect the lives , liberties , and possessions , of those who live according to its laws , and has power to take away life , liberty , or goods , from him who disobeys ; which is the punishment of offences committed against this law. § . . thirdly , the third , which i call the philosophical law , not because philosophers make it , but because they have most busied themselves to enquire after it , and talk about it , is the law of vertue , and vice ; which though it be more talked of , possibly , than either of the other , yet how it comes to be established with such authority as it has , to distinguish and denominate the actions of men ; and what are the true measures of it , perhaps , is not so generally taken notice of . to comprehend this aright , we must consider , that men uniting into politick societies , though they have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their force ; so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizen , any farther than the law of their country directs : yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill ; approving or disapproving the actions of those they live amongst , and converse with . if therefore we examine it right , we shall find , that the measure of what is every-where called and esteemed vertue and vice , is this approbation or dislike , praise or blame , which , by a secret and tacit consent , establishes it self in the several societies , tribes , and clubs of men in the world : whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them , according to the judgment , maxims , or fashions of that place . § . . that this is the common measure of vertue and vice , will appear to any one , who considers , that though that passes for vice in one country , which is counted a vertue in another , yet every-where vertue and praise , vice and blame , go together . vertue is every-where that which is thought praise-worthy ; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem , is vertue . vertue and praise are so united , that they are called often by the same name . sunt sua proemia laudi , says virgil ; and so cicero , nihil habet natura praestantius , quam honestatem , quam laudem , quam dignitatem , quam decus , which he tells you , are all names for the same thing , tusc. l. . this is the language of the heathen philosophers , who well understood wherein their notions of vertue and vice consisted . and though , perhaps , by the different temper , education , fashion , maxims , or interest of different sorts of men it fell out , that what was thought praise-worthy in one place , escaped not censure in another ; and so in different societies , vertues and vices were changed : yet as to the main , they for the most part kept the same every where . for since nothing can be more natural , than to encourage with esteem and reputation , that wherein every one finds his advantage ; and to blame and discountenance the contrary : 't is no wonder , that esteem and discredit ; vertue and vice , should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong , which the law of god hath established ; there being nothing● that so directly , and visibly secures , and advances the general good of mankind in this world , as obedience to the laws he has set them , and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion , as the neglect of them . and therefore men , without renouncing all sense and reason , and their own interest , which they are so constantly true to , could not generally mistake , in placing their commendation and blame on that side , that really deserved it not . nay , even those men , whose practice was otherwise , failed not to give their approbation right , few being depraved to that degree , as not to condemn , at least in others , the faults they themselves were guilty of : whereby even in the corruption of manners , the true boundaries of the the law of nature , which ought to be the rule of vertue and vice , were pretty well preserved . so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers , have not feared to appeal to common repute . whatsoever is lovely , whatsoever is of good report , if there be any vertue , if there be any praise , &c. phil. . . § . . if any one shall imagine , that i have forgot my own notion of a law , when i make the law , whereby men judge of vertue and vice , to be nothing else , but the consent of private men , who have not authority enough to make a law : especially wanting that , which is so necessary , and essential to a law , a power to inforce it : i think , i may say , that he , who imagines commendation and disgrace , not to be strong motives on men , to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse , seems little skill'd in the nature , or history of mankind , the greatest part whereof , he shall find to govern themselves chiefly , if not solely , by this law of fashion ; and so they do that , which keeps them in reputation with their company , little regard the laws of god , or the magistrate . the penalties , that attend the breach of god's laws , some , nay , perhaps , most men seldom seriously reflect on : and amongst those that do , many whilst they break the law , entertain thoughts of future reconciliation , and making their peace for such breaches : and as to the punishments , due from the laws of the common-wealth , they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity . but no man scapes the punishment of their censure and dislike , who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps , and would recommend himself to . nor is there one of ten thousand , who is stiff and insensible enough , to hear up under the constant dislike , and condemnation of his own club. he must be of a strange , and unusual constitution , who can content himself , to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society . solitude many men have sought , and been reconciled to : but no body , that has the least thoughts , or sense of a man about him , can live in society , under the constant dislike , and ill opinion of his familiars , and those he converses with . this is a burthen too heavy for humane sufferance : and he must be made up of irreconcileable contradictions , who can take pleasure in company , and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions . § . . these three then , first , the law of god. secondly , the law of politick societies . thirdly , the law of fashion , or private censure , are those , to which men variously compare their actions : and 't is by their conformity to one of these laws , that they take their measures , when they would judge of their moral rectitude , and denominate their actions good or bad . § . . whether the rule , to which , as to a touch-stone , we bring our voluntary actions , to examine them by , and try their goodness , and accordingly to name them ; which is , as it were , the mark of the value we set upon them . whether , i say , we take that rule from the fashion of the country , or the will of a law-maker , the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it ; and to judge , whether the action agrees , or disagrees with the rule ; and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil , which is either conformity , or not conformity of any action to that rule : and therefore , is often called moral rectitude . this rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas , the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action , that the simple ideas , belonging to it , may correspond to those , which the law requires . and thus we see , how moral beings and notions , are founded on , and terminated in these simple ideas , we have received from sensation or reflection , besides which , we have nothing at all in our understandings , to employ our thoughts about . for example , let us consider the complex idea , we signifie by the word murther ; and when we have taken it asunder , and examined all the particulars , we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas , derived from reflection or sensation , viz. first , from reflection on the operations of our own minds , we have the ideas of willing , considering , purposing before hand , malice , or wishing ill to another ; and also of life , or perception , and self-motion . secondly , from sensation , we have the collection of the simple sensible ideas of a man , and of some action , whereby we put an end to that perception , and motion in the man ; all which simple ideas , are comprehended in the word murther . this collection of simple ideas , being found by me to agree or disagree , with the esteem of the country i have been bred in ; and to be held by most men there , worthy praise , or blame , i call the action vertuous or vitious : if i have the will of a supreme , invisible law-maker for my rule ; then , as i supposed the action commanded , or forbidden by god , i call it good or evil , sin or duty : and if i compare it to civil law , the rule made by the legislative of the country , i call it lawful , or unlawful , a crime , or no crime . so that whencesoever , we take the rule of moral actions ; or by what standard soever , we frame in our minds the ideas of vertues or vices , they consist only , and are made up of collections of simple ideas , which we originally received from sense or reflection ; and their rectitude or obliquity , consists in the agreement or disagreement , with those patterns prescribed by some law. § . . to conceive a right of moral actions , we must take notice of them , under this two-fold consideration . first , as they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas . thus drunkenness , or lying , signifie such or such a collection of simple ideas , which i call mixed modes ; and in this sense , they are as much positive absolute ideas , as the drinking of a horse , or speaking of a parrot . secondly , our actions are considered , as good , bad , or indifferent : and in this respect , they are relative , it being their conformity to , or disagreement with some rule , that makes them to be regular or irregular , good or bad ; and so , as far as they are compared with a rule , and thereupon denominated , they come under relation . thus the challenging , and fighting with a man , as it is a certain positive mode , or particular sort of action , by particular ideas , distinguished from all others , is called duelling ; which , when considered , in relation to the law of god , will deserve the name sin ; to the law of fashion , in some countries , valour and vertue ; and to the municipal laws of some governments , a capital crime . in this case , when the positive mode has one name , and another name as it stands in relation to the law , the distinction may as easily be observed , as it is in substances , where one name , v. g. man , is used to signifie the thing , another , v. g. father , to signifie the relation . § . . but because , very frequently the positive idea of the action , and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name , and the same word made use of , to express both the mode or action , and its moral rectitude or obliquity : therefore the relation it self is less taken notice of ; and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action , and the reference it has to rule . by which confusion , of these two distinct considerations , under one term , those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds , and are forward to take names for things , are often mis●ed in their judgment of actions . thus the taking from another what is his , without his knowledge or allowance , is properly called stealing : but that name , being commonly understood to signifie also the moral pravity of the action , and to denote its contrariety to the law , men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing , as an ill action , disagreeing with the rule of right . and yet the private taking away his sword from a mad-man , to prevent his doing mischief , though it be properly denominated stealing , as the name of such a mixed mode : yet when compared to the law of god ; when considered in its relation to that supreme rule , it is no sin , or transgression , though the name stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it . § . . and thus much for the relation of humane actions to a law , which therefore i call moral relations . 't would make a volume , to go over all sorts of relations : 't is not therefore to be expected , that i should here mention them all . it suffices to our present purpose , to shew by these , what the ideas are , we have of this comprehensive consideration , call'd relation , which is so various , and the occasions of it so many , ( as many as there can be of comparing things one to another , ) that it is not very easie to reduce it to rules , or under just heads . those i have mentioned , i think , are some of the most considerable , and such , as may serve to let us see , from whence we get our ideas of relations , and wherein they are founded . but before i quit this argument , from what has been said , give me leave to observe , § . . first , that it is evident , that all relation terminates in , and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas , we have got from sensation or reflection : so that all that we have in our thoughts our selves , ( if we think of any thing , or have any meaning , ) or would signifie to others , when we use words , standing for relations , is nothing but some simple ideas , or collections of simple ideas , compared one with another . this is so manifest in that sort called proportional , that nothing can be more . for when a man says , honey is sweeter than wax , it is plain , that his thoughts in this relation , terminate in this simple idea , sweetness , which is equally true of all the rest ; though , where they are compounded , or decompounded , the simple ideas they are made up of , are , perhaps , seldom taken notice of . v. g. when the word father is mentioned : first , there is meant that particular of species or collective idea , signified by the word man ; secondly , those sensible simple ideas , signified by the word generation ; and , thirdly , the effects of it , and all the simple ideas , signified by the word child . so the word friend , being taken for a man , who loves , and is ready to do good to another , has all those following ideas to the making of it up . first , all the simple ideas , comprehended in the word man , or intelligent being . secondly , the idea of love. thirdly , the idea of readiness , or disposition . fourthly , the idea of action , which is any kind of thought , or motion . fifthly , the idea of good , which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness ; and terminates at last , if examined , in particular simple ideas , of which the word good in general , signifies any one ; but if removed from all simple ideas quite , it signifies nothing at all : and thus also , all moral words terminate at last , though , perhaps , more remotely in a collection of simple ideas : the immediate signification of relative words , being very often other supposed known relations ; which , if traced one to another , still end in simple ideas . § . . secondly , that in relations , we have for the most part , if not always , as clear a notion of the relation , as we have of those simple ideas , wherein it is founded : agreement or disagreement , whereon relation depends , being things , whereof we have commonly as clear ideas , as of any other whatsoever : it being but the distinguishing simple ideas , or their degrees one from another , without which , we could have no distinct knowledge at all . for if i have a clear idea of sweetness , light , or extension , i have too , of equal or more , or less , of each of these : if i know what it is for one man to be born of a woman , viz. sempronia , i know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman , sempronia ; and so have as clear a notion of brothers , as of births , and , perhaps , clearer . for if i believed , that sempronia digged titus out of the parsley-bed , ( as they use to tell children , ) and thereby became his mother ; and that afterwards in the same manner , she digged cajus out of the parsley-bed , i had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them , as if i had all the skill of a midwife ; the notion that the same woman contributed , as mother , equally to their births , ( though i were ignorant , or mistaken in the manner of it , ) being that on which i grounded the relation ; and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth , let it be what it will. the comparing them then in their descent from the same person , without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent , is enough to found my notion of their having , or not having the relation of brothers . but though the ideas of particular relations , are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those , who will duly consider them , as those of mixed modes , and more determinate than those of substances ; yet the names belonging to relation , are often of as doubtful , and incertain signification , as those of substances , or mixed modes ; and much more than those of simple ideas . because relative words , being the marks of this comparison , which is made only by men's thoughts , and is an idea only in men's minds , men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things , according to their own imaginations , which do not always correspond with those of others using the same names . § . . thirdly , that in these i call moral relations , i have a true notion of relation , by comparing the action with the rule , whether the rule be true , or false . for if i measure any thing by a yard , i know , whether the thing i measure be longer , or shorter , than that supposed yard , though , perhaps , the yard i measure by ; be not exactly the standard : which , indeed , is another enquiry . for though the rule be erroneous , and i mistake in it : yet the agreement , or disagreement of that which i compare with it , is evidently known by me ; wherein consists my knowledge of relation . though measuring by a wrong rule , i shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude ; because i have tried it by that which is not the true rule : but am not mistaken in the relation that action bears to that rule i compare it to , which is agreement , or disagreement . chap. xxviii . of clear and obscure , distinct and confused ideas . § . . having shewed the original of our ideas , and considered the several sorts of them , as simple and complex ; and shewed the difference in complex ones , betwixt those of modes , relations , and substances , all which , i think , is necessary to be done by any one , who would acquaint himself throughly with the progress of the mind , in its apprehension and knowledge of things , it will , perhaps , be thought i have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas . i must , nevertheless , crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them . the first is , that some are clear , and others obscure ; some distinct , and others confused . § . . perception of the mind , being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight , we shall best understand what is meant by clear , and obscure in our ideas , by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight . light being that which discovers to us visible objects , we give the name of obscure , to that , which is not placed in a light , sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours , which are observable in it , and which , in a better light , would be discernable . thus our simple ideas are clear , when they are such as the objects themselves , from whence they were taken , did , in a well-ordered sensation or perception , present them . whilst the memory retains them thus , and can produce them so , to the mind , when-ever it has occasion to consider them , they are clear ideas . so far as they either want any thing of that original exactness , or have lost any of their first freshness , and are , as it were , faded or tarnished by time , so far are they obscure . complex ideas , as they are made up of simple ones : so they are clear , when the ideas , that go to their composition , are clear ; and the number and order of those simple ideas , that are the ingredients of any complex one , is determinate and certain . § . . the cause of obscurity in simple ideas , seems to be either dull organs ; or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects ; or else a weakness in the memory , not able to retain them as received . for to return again to visible objects , to help us to apprehend this matter . if the organs , or faculties of perception , like wax over-hardned with cold , will not receive the impression of the seal , from the usual impulse wont to imprint it ; or , like wax of a temper too soft , will not hold it well , when well imprinted ; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit , but the seal not applied with a sufficient force , to make a clear impression : in any of these cases , the print left by the seal , will be obscure . this i suppose , needs no application to make it plainer . § . . as a clear idea is that whereof the mind has a full and evident perception , so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other ; and a confused idea is such an one , as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another , from which it ought to be different . § . . if no idea be confused , but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another , from which it should be different , it will be hard , may any one say , to find anywhere a confused idea . for let any idea be as it will , it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be ; and that very perception , sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas , which cannot be other , i. e. different , without being perceived to be so . no idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another , from which it ought to be different , unless you would have it different from it self : for from all other , it is evidently different . § . . to remove this difficulty , and to help us to conceive aright , what it is , that makes the confusion , ideas are at any time chargeable with , we must consider , that things are supposed different enough to have different names , whereby to be marked , and discoursed of apart , upon any occasion : and there is nothing more evident , than that the greatest part of different names , are supposed to stand for different things . now every idea a man has , being visibly what it is , and distinct from all other ideas , but it self , that which makes it confused is , when it is such , that it may as well be called by another name , as that which it is expressed by : the difference which keep the things ( to be ranked under those two different names ) distinct , and makes them belong rather to the one , than the other of them , being left out ; and so the distinction , which was intended to be kept up by those different names , is quite lost . § . . the defaults which usually occasion this confusion , i think , are chiefly these following : first , when any complex idea ( for 't is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion ) is made up of small a number of simple ideas , and such only as are common to other things , whereby the differences , that make it deserve a different name , are left out . thus he , that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots , has but a confused idea of a leopard , it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx , and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted . so that such an idea , though it hath the peculiar name leopard , is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx , or panther , and may as well come under the name lynx , as leopard . how much the custom of defining of words by general terms , contributes to make the ideas we would express by them , confused and undetermined , i leave others to consider . this is evident , that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain , and take away the benefit of distinct names . when the ideas , for which we used different terms , have not a difference answerable to their distinct names , and so cannot be distinguished by them , there it is that they are truly confused . §. . secondly , another default , which makes our ideas confused , is , when though the particulars that make up any idea , are in number enough ; yet they are so jumbled together , that it is not easily discernable , whether it more belongs to the name that is given it , than to any other . there is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion , than a sort of pictures usually shewn , as surprizing pieces of art , wherein the colours , as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself , markout very odd and unusual figures , and have no discernable order in their position . this draught , thus made up of parts , wherein no symmetry nor order appears , is , in it self , no more a confused thing , than the picture of a cloudy sky ; wherein though there be as little order of colours , or figures to be found , yet no body thinks it a confused picture . what is it then , that makes it be thought confused , since the want of symmetry does not : as it is plain it does not ; for another draught made , barely in imitation of this , could not be called confused ? i answer , that which makes it be thought confused , is the applying it to some name , to which it does no more discernably belong , than to some other ; v. g. when it is said to be the picture of a man , or caesar , then any one with reason counts it confused : because it is not discernable , in that state , to belong more to the name man , or caesar , than to the name baboon , or pompey ; which are supposed to stand for different ideas , from those signified by man , or caesar. but when a cylindrical mirrour , placed right , hath reduced those irregular lines on the table , into their due order and proportion , then the confusion ceases , and the eye presently sees , that it is a man , or caesar ; i. e that it belongs to those names ; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon , or pompey ; i. e. from the ideas signified by those names . just thus it is with our ideas , which are , as it were , the pictures of things . no one of these mental draughts , however the parts are put together , can be called confused , ( for they are plainly discernible as they are , ) till it be ranked under some ordinary name , to which it cannot be discerned to belong , any more than it does to some other name , of an allowed different signification . § . . thirdly , a third defect that frequently gives the name of confused , to our ideas , is when any one of them is uncertain , and undetermined . thus we may observe men , who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language , till they have learn'd their precise signification , change the idea , they make this or that term stand for , almost as often as they use it . he that does this , out of uncertainty of what he should leave out , or put into his idea of church , or idolatry , every time he thinks of either , and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas , that makes it up , is said to have a confused idea of idolatry , or the church : though this be still for the same reason that the former , viz. because a mutable idea ( if we will allow it to be one idea ) cannot belong to one name , rather than another ; and so loses the distinction , that distinct names are designed for . § . . by what has been said , we may observe how much names , as supposed steady signs of things , and by their difference to stand for , and keep things distinct , that in themselves are different , are the occasion if denominating ideas distinct or confused , by a secret and unobserved reference , the mind makes of its ideas to such names . this , perhaps , will be fuller understood , after what i say of words , in the third book , has been read and considered . but without taking notice of such a reference of ideas to distinct names , as the signs of distinct things , it will be hard to say what a confused idea is . and therefore when a man design● , by any name , a sort of things , or any one particular thing , distinct from all others , the complex idea he annexes to that name , is the more distinct , the more particular the ideas are , and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is , whereof it is made up . for the more it has of these , the more has it still of the perceivable differences , whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas belonging to other names , even those that approach nearest to it , and thereby all confusion with them is avoided . § . . confusion , making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated , concerns always two ideas ; and those most , which most approach one another . whenever therefore we suspect any idea to be confused , we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with , or which it cannot easily be separated from , and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name , and so should be a different thing , from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct ; being either the same with it , or making a part of it , or , at least , as properly call'd by that name , as the other it is ranked under ; and so keeps not that difference from that other idea , which the different names import . § . . this , i think , is the confusion proper to ideas ; which still carries with it a secret reference to names . at least if there be any other confusion of ideas , this is that which most of all disorders mens thoughts and discourses : ideas , as ranked under names , being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves , and always those which they communicate about , with others . and therefore where there are supposed two different ideas , marked by two different names , which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them , there never fails to be confusion : and where any ideas are distinct , as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by , there can be between them no confusion . the way to prevent it , is to collect and unite into our complex idea , as precisely as is possible , all those ingredients , whereby it is differenced from others ; and to them so united in a determinate number , and order , apply steadily the same name . but this neither accommodating mens ease or vanity , or serving any design , but that of naked truth , which is not always the thing aimed at , such exactness , is rather to be wished , than hoped for . and since the loose application of names , to uncertain , and almost no ideas , serves both to cover our own ignorance , as well as to perplex and confound others , which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge , it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves , whilst they complain of it in others . though yet , i think , no small part of the confusion , to be found in the notions of men , might , by care and ingenuity , be avoided ; yet i am far from thinking it every-where wilful . some ideas are so complex , and made up of so many parts , that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas , under one name ; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it . from the first of these , follows confusion in a man 's own reasonings and opinions within himself ; from the latter , frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others . but having more at large treated of words , their defects and abuses in the following book , i shall here say no more of it . § . . our complex ideas being made up of collections , and so variety of simple ones , may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part , and very obscure and confused in another . in a man who speaks of a chiliaderon , or a body of a thousand sides , the idea of the figure may be very confused , though that of the number be very distinct : so that he being able to discourse , and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea , which depends upon the number of a thousand , he is apt to think , he , has a distinct idea of a chiliaëdron ; though it be plain , he has no precise idea of its figure , so as to distinguish it , by that , from one that has but sides : the not observing wherereof , causes no small error in men's thoughts , and confusion in their discourses . § . . he that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of a chiliaëdron , let him for trial's-sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter , viz. gold , or wax , of an equal bulk , and make it into a figure of sides . he will , i doubt not , be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another by the number of sides ; and reason , and argue distinctly about them , whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas , which is contained in their numbers ; as that the sides of the one , could be divided into two equal numbers ; and of the other , not , &c. but when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure , he will there be presently at a loss , and not be able , i think , to frame in his mind two ideas , one of them distinct from the other , by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold ; as he could , if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube , the other a figure of five sides . in which in compleat ideas , we are very apt to impose on our selves , and wrangle with others , especially where they have particular and familiar names . for being satisfied in that part of the idea , which we have clear ; and the name which is familiar to us , being applied to the whole , containing that part also , which is imperfect and obscure , we are apt to use it for that confused part , and draw deductions from it , in the obscure part of its signification , as confidently as we do from the other . § . . having frequently in our mouths the name eternity , we are apt to think , we have a positive comprehensive idea of it , which is as much as to say , that there is no part of that duration , which is not clearly contained in our idea . 't is true , that he that thinks so , may have a clear idea of duration ; he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration ; he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one , with still a greater : but it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration , let it be as great as it will , the whole extent together of a duration , where he supposes no end , that part of his idea , which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration , he represents to his own thoughts , is very obscure and undetermined . and hence it is , that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity , or any other infinite , we are very apt to blunder , and involve our selves in manifest absurdities . § . . in matter , we have no clear ideas of the smalness of parts , much beyond the smallest , that occurr to any of our senses : and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum , though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility , and have also clear ideas of parts , made out of a whole , by division ; yet we have but very obscure , and confused ideas of corpuscles , or minute bodies , so to be divided , when by former divisions , they are reduced to a smalness , much exceeding the perception of any of our senses : and so all that we have clear , and distinct ideas of , is of what division in general , or abstractly is , and the relation of totum and pars ; but of the bulk of the body , to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions , i think , we have no clear , nor distinct ideas at all . for i ask any one , whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw , he has any distinct idea , ( bating still the number which concerns not extension , ) betwixt the , , and the , part of it . or if he think he can refine his ideas to that degree , without losing sight of them , let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers ; for that will bring it no nearer the end of infinite division , than the first half does . i must confess for my part , i have no clear , distinct ideas of the different bulk , or extension of those bodies , having but a very obscure one of either of them . so that , i think , when we talk of division of bodies in infinitum , our idea of their distinct bulks or extension , which is the subject and foundation of divisions , comes to be confounded , and almost lost in obscurity . for that idea , which is to represent only bigness , must be very obscure and confused , which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big , but only by number : so that we have clear , distinct ideas , we may say of ten and one , but no distinct ideas of two such extensions . 't is plain from hence , that when we talk of infinite divisibility of body , or extension , our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers : but the clear , distinct ideas of extension , after some progress of division , is quite lost : and of such minute parts , we have no distinct ideas at all ; but it returns , as all our ideas of infinite do , at last to that of number always to be added ; but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual , infinite parts . we have , 't is true , a clear idea of division , as often as we will think of it : but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter , then we have a clear idea of an infinite number , by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned number we have : endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts , than endless addibility ( if i may so speak ) gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number : they both being only in a power still of increasing the number , be it already as great as it will. so that of what remains to be added , ( wherein consists the infinity , ) we have but an obscure , imperfect , and confused idea ; from or about which we can argue , or reason with no certainty or clearness , no more than we can in arithmetick , about a number of which we have no such distinct idea , as we have of or ; but only this relative obscure one , that compared to any other , it is still bigger : and we have no more a clear , positive idea of it , when we say or conceive it is bigger , or more than , , , than if we should say , it is bigger than , or : , , , having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition , or number , than . for he that adds only to , and so proceeds , shall as soon come to the end of all addition , as he that adds , , , to , , . and so likewise in eternity , he that has an idea of but four years , has as much a positive compleat idea of eternity , as he that has one of , , of years : for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years , is as clear to the one as the other ; i. e. neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all . for he that adds only years to , and so on , shall as soon reach eternity , as he that adds , , of years , and so on ; or if he please , doubles the increase as often as he will : the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions , as it is from the length of a day , or an hour . for nothing finite , bears any proportion to infinite ; and therefore our ideas , which are all finite , cannot bear any . thus it is also in our idea of extension , when we increase it by addition , as well as when we diminish it by division , and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space . after a few doublings of those ideas of extension , which are the largest we are accustomed to have , we lose the clear distinct idea of that space : it becomes a confusedly great one , with a surplus of still greater ; about which , when we would argue , or reason , we shall always find our selves at a loss ; confused ideas in our arguings , and deductions from them , always leading us into confusion . chap. xxix . of real and phantastical ideas . § . . besides what we have already mentioned , concerning ideas , other considerations belong to them , in reference to things from whence they are taken , or which they may be supposed to represent ; and thus , i think , they may come under a threefold distinction ; and are , first , either real , or phantastical . secondly , adequate , or inadequate . thirdly , true , or false . first , by real ideas , i mean such as have a foundation in nature ; such as have a conformity with the real being , and existence of things , or with their archetypes . phantastical or chymerical , i call such as have no foundation in nature , nor have any conformity with that reality of being , to which they are tacitly referr'd , as to their archetypes . if we examine the several sorts of ideas before-mentioned , we shall find , that , § . . first , our simple ideas are all real , all agree to the reality of things . not that they are all of them the images , or representations of what does exist , the contrary whereof , in all but the primary qualities of bodies , hath been already shewed . but though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow , than pain is ; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness , pain , &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us , ordained by our maker , to produce in us such sensations ; they are real ideas in us , whereby distinguish the qualities , that are really in things themselves . for these several appearances , being designed to be the marks , whereby we are to know , and distinguish things we have to do with ; our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose , and are as real distinguishing characters , whether they be only constant effects , or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves : the reality lying in that steady correspondence , they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings . but whether they answer to these constitutions , as to causes or patterns , it matters not ; it suffices , that they are constantly produced by them . and thus our simple ideas are all real and true , because they answer and agree to those powers of things , which produce them in our minds , that being all that is requisite to make them real , and not fictious at pleasure . for in simple ideas , ( as has been shewed , ) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it ; and can make to it self no simple idea , more than what it has received . § . . though the mind be wholly passive , in respect of its simple ideas : yet , i think , we may say , it is not so , in respect of its complex ideas : for those being combinations of simple ideas , put together , and united under one general name ; 't is plain , that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty , in forming those complex ideas . how else comes it to pass , that one man's idea of gold , or justice , is different from another's : but because he has put in , or left out of his , some simple idea , which the other has not . the question then is , which of these are real , and which barely imaginary combinations : what collections agree to the reality of things , and what not ? and to this i say , that § . . secondly , mixed modes and relations , having no other reality , but what they have in the minds of men , there is nothing more required to those kind of ideas , to make them real , but that they be so framed , that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them . these ideas , being themselves archetypes , cannot differ from their achetypes , and so cannot be chimerical , unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas . indeed , as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them , by which , he that has them in his mind , would signifie them to others , so barely possibility of existing is not enough ; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them , that they may not be thought phantastical : as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea , which common use calls liberality : but this phantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech , than reality of ideas . for a man to be undisturbed in danger , but sedately to consider what is fittest to be done , and to execute it steadily , is a mixed mode , or a complex idea of an action which may exist . but to be undisturbed in danger , without using ones reason or industry , is what is also possible to be ; and so is as real an idea as the other . though the first of these , having the name courage given to it , may , in respect of that name , be a right or wrong idea : but the other , whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it , is not capable of any rectitude or deformity , being made with no reference to any thing but its self . § . . thirdly , our complex ideas of substances , being made all of them in reference to things existing without us , and intended to be representations of substances , as they really are , are no farther real , than as they are such combinations of simple ideas , that are really united , and co-exist in things without us . on the contrary , those are phantastical , which are made up of such collections of simple ideas , as were really never united , never were found together in any substance ; v. g. a rational creature , consisting of a horse's head , joined to a body of humane shape , or such as the centaurs are described : or , a body , yellow , very malleable , fusible , and fixed ; but lighter than common water : or , an uniform , unorganized body , consisting as to sense , all of similar parts , with perception and voluntary motion joined to it . whether such substances , as these , can possibly exist , or no , 't is probable we do not know : but be that as it will , these ideas of substances , being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know ; and consisting of such collections of ideas , as no substance ever shewed us united together , they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary : but much more are those complex ideas , which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts . chap. xxx . of adequate and inadequate ideas . § . . of our real ideas , some are adequate , and some are inadequate . those i call adequate , which perfectly represent those archetypes , which the mind supposes them taken from ; which it intends them to stand for ; and to which it refers them . inadequate ideas are such , which are but a partial , or incompleat representation of those archetypes to which they are referred . upon which account it is plain , § . . first , that all our simple ideas are adequate . because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things , fitted and ordained by god , to produce such sensations in us , they cannot but be correspondent , and adequate to those powers : and we are sure they agree to the reality of things . for if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness , and sweetness , we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds , or else they could not have been produced . and so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses , the idea so produced , is a real idea , ( and not a fiction of the mind , ) which has no power to produce any simple idea ; and cannot but be adequate , since it ought only to answer that power : and so all simple ideas are adequate . 't is true , the things producing in us these simple ideas , are but few of them denominated by us , as if they were only the causes of them ; but as if those ideas were real beings in them . for though fire be call'd painful to the touch , whereby it signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain : yet it is denominated also light , and hot ; as if light , and heat , were really something in the fire , more than a power to excite these ideas in us ; and therefore are called qualities : in , or of the fire . but these being nothing , in truth , but powers to excite such ideas in us , i must , in that sense , be understood , when i speak of secundary qualities , as being in things ; or of their ideas , as being in the objects , that excite them in us . such ways of speaking , though accommodated to the vulgar notions , without which , one cannot be well understood ; yet truly signifie nothing , but those powers , which are in things , to excite certain sensations or ideas in us . since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch ; nor a mind joined to those organs , to receive the ideas of light and heat , by those impressions from the fire , or the sun , there would yet be no more light , or heat in the world , than there would be pain , if there were no sensible creature to feel it , though the sun should continue just as it is now , and mount aetna flame higher than ever it did . solidity , and extension , and the termination of it , figure , with motion and rest , whereof we have the ideas , would be really in the world as they are , whether there were any sensible being to perceive them , or no : and therefore those we have reason to look on , as the real modifications of matter ; and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies . but this being an enquiry not belonging to this place , i shall enter no farther into it , but proceed to shew what complex ideas are adequate , and what not . § . . secondly , our complex ideas of modes , being voluntary collections of simple ideas , which the mind puts together , without reference to any real archetypes , or standing patterns , existing any where , are , and cannot but be adequate ideas . because they not being intended for copies of things really existing , but for archetypes made by the mind , to rank and denominate things by , cannot want any thing ; they having each of them that combination of ideas , and thereby that perfection the mind intended they should : so that the mind acquiesces in them , and can find nothing wanting . thus by having the idea of a figure , with three sides , meeting at three angles , i have a compleat idea , wherein i require nothing else to make it perfect . that the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea , is plain , in that it doe ; not conceive , that any understanding hath , or can have a more compleat or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle , supposing it to exist , than it self has in that complex idea of three sides , and three angles : in which is contained all that i● , or can be essential to it , or necessary to compleat it , where-ever or howe-ever it exists . but in our ideas of substances , it is otherwise . for there desiring to copy things , as they really do exist ; and to represent to our selves that constitution , on which all their properties depend , we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend : we find they still want something we should be glad were in them ; and so are all inadequate . but mixed modes and relations , being archetypes without patterns , and so having nothing to represent but themselves , cannot but be adequate , every thing being so to it self . he that as first put together the idea of danger perceived , absence of disorder from fear , sedate consideration of what was justly to be done , and executing of that without disturbance , or being deterred by the danger of it , had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination : and intending it to be nothing else , but what it is ; nor to have in it any other simple ideas , but what it hath , it could not also but be an adequate idea : and laying this up in his memory , with the name courage annexed to it , to signifie it to others , and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it , had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by , as they agreed to it . this idea thus made , and laid up for a pattern , must necessarily be adequate , being referred to nothing else but it self , nor made by any other original , but the good-liking and will of him , that first made this combination . § . . indeed , another coming after , and in conversation learning from him the word courage , may make an idea , to which he gives that name courage , different from what the first author applied it to , and has in his mind , when he uses it . and in this case , if he designs , that h●s idea in thinking , should be conformable to the other's idea , as the name he uses in speaking , is conformable in sound to his , from whom he learned it , his idea may be very wrong , and inadequate . because in this case , making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking , as the other man's word , or sound , is the pattern of his in speaking , his idea is so far defective and inadequate , as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to , and intends to express and signifie by the name he uses for it : which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea , ( to which , in its proper use , it is primarily annexed , ) and of his own , as agreeing to it : to which if his own does not exactly correspond , it is faulty and inadequate . § . . therefore these complex ideas of modes , when they are referred by the mind , and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being , expressed by the names , we apply to them , they may be very deficient , wrong , and inadequate . because they agree not to that , which the mind designs to be their archetype , and pattern : in which respect only , any idea of modes can be wrong , imperfect , or inadequate . and on this account , our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other : but this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right . § . . thirdly , what ideas we have of substances , i have above shewed : now those ideas have in the mind a double reference : . sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things . . sometimes they are only design'd to be pictures and representations in the mind , of things that do exist , by ideas that are discoverable in them . in both which ways , these copies of their originals , and archetypes , are imperfect and inadequate . first , it is usual for men to make the names of substances , stand for things , as supposed to have certain real essences , whereby they are of this or that species : and names standing for nothing but the ideas , that are in men's minds , they must consequently refer their ideas to such real essences , as to their archetypes . that men ( especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world ) do suppose certain specifick essences of substances , which each individual in its several kind is made conformable to , and partakes of , is so far from needing proof , that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise . and thus they ordinarily apply the specifick names , they rank particular substances under , to things , as distinguished by such specifick real essences . who is there almost , who would not take it amiss , if it should be doubted , whether he call'd himself man , with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man ? and yet if you demand , what those real essences are , 't is plain men are ignorant , and know them not . from whence it follows , that the ideas they have in their minds , being referred to real essences as archetypes which are unknown , must be so far from being adequate , that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all . the complex ideas we have of substances , are , as has been shewed , certain collections of simple ideas , that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together . but such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance : for then the properties we discover in that body , would depend on that complex idea , and be deducible from it , and their necessary connexion with it be known ; as all properties of a triangle depend on , and , as far as they are discoverable , are deducible from the complex idea of three lines , including a space . but it is plain , that in our complex ideas of substances , are not contained such ideas , on which all the other qualities , that are to be found in them , do depend . the common idea men have of iron , is a body of a certain colour , weight , and hardness ; and a property that they look on as belonging to it , is malleableness . but yet this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea , nor any part of it : and there is no more reason to think , that malleableness depends on that colour , weight , and hardness , than that that colour , or that weight , depends on its malleableness . and yet , though we know nothing of these real essences , there is nothing more ordinary , than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences . the particular parcel of matter which makes the ring i have on my finger , is forwardly , by most men , supposed to have a real essence , whereby it is gold ; and from whence those qualities flow , which i find in it , viz. it s peculiar , colour , weight , hardness , fusibility , fixedness , and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury , &c. this essence , from which all these properties flow , when i enquire into it , and search after it , i plainly perceive i cannot discover : the farthest i can go , is only to presume , that it being nothing but body , its real essence , or internal constitution , on which these qualities depend , can be nothing but the figure , size , and connexion of its solid parts ; of neither of which , i having any distinct perception at all , i can have no idea of its real essence , which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness ; a greater weight than any thing i know of the same bulk ; and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver . if any one will say , that the real essence , and internal constitution , on which these properties depend , is not the figure , size , and arangement or connexion of its solid parts , but something else , call'd its particular form ; i am farther from having any idea of its real essence , than i was before . for i have an idea of figure , size , and situation of solid parts in general , though i have none of the particular figure , size , or putting together of parts , whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced ; which qualities i find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger , and not in another parcel of matter with which i cut the pen i write with . but when i am told , that something besides the figure , size , and posture of the solid parts of that body , is its essence , something called substantial form , of that , i confess , i have no idea at all , but only of the sound form : which is far enough from an idea of its real essence , or constitution . the like ignorance as i have of the real essence of this particular substance , i have also of the real essence of all other natural ones : of which essences , i confess , i have no distinct ideas at all ; and i am apt to suppose , others , when they examine their own knowledge , will find in themselves , in this one point , the same sort of ignorance . § . . now then , when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger , a general name already in use , and denominate it gold , do they not ordinarily , or are they not understood to give it that name , as belonging to a particular species of bodies , having a real internal essence ; by having of which essence , this particular substance comes to be of that species , and to be called by that name ? if it be so , as it is plain it is , the name by which things are marked , as having that essence , must be referred primarily to that essence ; and consequently the idea to which that name is given , must be referred also to that essence , and be intended to represent it : which essence , since they who so use the names , know not their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect , as not containing in them that real essence , which the mind intends they should . § . . secondly , those who , neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences , whereby they are distinguished , endeavour to copy the substances , that exist in the world , by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities , which are sound co-existing in them , though they come much nearer a likeness of them , than those who imagine they know not what real specifick essences : yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances , they would thus copy into their minds : nor do those copies , exactly and fully , contain all that is to be found in their archetypes . because those qualities , and powers , of substances , whereof we make their complex ideas , are so many and various , that no man's complex idea contains them all . that our abstract ideas of substances , do not contain in them all the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves , is evident , in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance , all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it . because endeavouring to make the signification of their specifick names , as clear , and as little cumbersome as they can , they make their specifick ideas of the sorts of substances , for the most part , of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them : but these having no original precedency , or right to be put in , and make the specifick idea , more than others that are left out , 't is plain that both these ways , our ideas of substances are deficient , and inadequate . the simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances , are all of them ( ba●ing only the figure and bulk of some sorts ) powers ; which being relations to other substances● we can never be sure we know all the powers that are in any one body , till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to , or receive from other substances , in their several ways of application : which being impossible to be tried upon any one body , much less upon all , it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance , made up of a collection of all its properties . § . . whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of substance , we denote by the word gold , could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump , to depend on its real essence ; on its internal constitution . therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body : but its peculiar colour , perhaps , and weight , were the first he abstracted from it , to make the complex idea of that species . which both● are but powers ; the one to affect our eyes , after such a manner , and to produce in us that idea we call yellow ; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk , they being put into a pair of equal scales , one against another . another , perhaps , added to these , the ideas of fusibility and fixedness , two other passive powers , in relation to the operation of fire upon it : another , its ductility and solubility in aq. regia , two other powers , relating to the operation of other bodies , in changing its outward figure , or separation of it , into sensible parts . these , or part of these , put together , usually make the complex idea in mens minds , of that sort of body we call gold. § . . but no one , who hath considered the properties of bodies in general , or this sort in particular , can doubt that this , call'd gold , has infinite other properties , not contained in that complex idea : some , who have examined this species more accurately , could , i believe , enumerate ten times as many properties in gold ; all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution , as its colour , or weight : and 't is probable , if any one knew all the properties , that are by divers men known of this metal , there would an hundred times as many ideas , go to the complex idea of gold , as any one man yet has in his ; and yet that not , perhaps , be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it . the changes that that one body is apt to receive , and make in other bodies , upon a due application , exceeding far , not only what we know , but what we are apt to imagine . which will not appear so much a paradox to any one , who will but consider , how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one , no very compound figure , a triangle , though it be no small numbers that are already by mathematicians discovered of it . § . . so that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate : which would be so also in mathematical figures , if we were to have our complex ideas of them , only by collecting their properties , in reference to other figures . how uncertain , and imperfect , would our ideas be of an elypsis , if we had no other idea of it , but some few of its properties ? whereas having in our plain idea , the whole essence of that figure , we from thence discover those properties , and demonstratively see how they flow , and are inseparable from it . § . . thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas , or nominal essences : first , simple ideas , which are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or copies ; but yet certainly adequate . because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation , that sensation , when it is produced , cannot but be the effect of that power . so the paper i write on , having the power , in the light , ( i speak according to the common notion of light , ) to produce in me the sensation , which i call white , it cannot but be the effect of such a power , in something without the mind ; since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in its self , and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power , that simple idea is real and adequate : the sensation of white , in my mind , being the effect of that power , which is in the paper to produce it , is perfectly adequate to that power ; or else , that power would produce a different idea . secondly , the complex ideas of substances are ectypes , copies too ; but not perfect ones , not adequate : which is very evident to the mind , in that it plainly perceives , that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists , it cannot be sure , that it exactly answers all that are in that substance . since not having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it , and found all the alterations it would receive from , or cause in other substances , it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities ; and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing , and its relations , which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have . and , after all , if we could have , and actually had , in our complex idea , an exact collection of all the secundary qualities , or powers of any substance , we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing . for since the powers , or qualities , that are observable by us , are not the real essence of that substance , but depend on it , and flow from it , any collection whatsoever of these qualities , cannot be the real essence of that thing . whereby it is plain , that our ideas of substances are not adequate ; are not what the mind intends them to be . besides , a man has no idea of substance in general , nor knows what substance is in it self . § . . thirdly , complex ideas of modes and relations , are originals , and archetypes ; are not copies , nor made after the pattern of any real existence , to which the mind intends them to be conformable , and exactly to answer . these being such collections of simple ideas , that the mind it self puts together , and such collections , that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends it should , they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist : and so are designed only for , and belong only to such modes , as when they do exist , have an exact conformity with those complex ideas . the ideas therefore of modes and relations , cannot but be adequate . chap. xxxi . of true and false ideas . § . . though truth and falshood , belong , in propriety of speech , only to propositions ; yet ideas are oftentimes termed true or false ( as what words are there , that are not used with great latitude , and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations , ) though , i think , that when ideas themselves are termed true or false , there is still some secret or tacit proposition , which is the foundation of that denomination : as we shall see , if we examine the particular occasions , wherein they come to be called true or false . in all which , we shall find some kind of affirmation , or negation , which is the reason of that denomination . for our ideas , being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds , cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false , no more than a single name of any thing , can be said to be true or false . § . . indeed , both ideas and words , may be said to be true in a metaphysical sense of the word truth ; as all other things , that any way exist , are said to be true ; i. e. really to be such as they exist . though in things called true , even in that sense , there is , perhaps , a secret reference to our ideas , look'd upon as the standards of that truth , which amounts to a mental proposition , though it be usually not taken notice of . § . . but 't is not in that metaphysical sense of truth , which we enquire here , when we examine , whether our ideas are capable of being true or false ; but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words : and so i say , that the ideas in our minds , being only so many perceptions , or appearances there , none of them are false . the idea of a centaur , having no more falshood in it , when it appears in our minds ; than the name centaur has falshood in it , when it is pronounced by our mouths , or written on paper . for truth or falshood , lying always in some affirmation , or negation , mental or verbal , our ideas are not capable any of them of being false , till the mind passes some judgment on them ; that is , affirms or denies something of them . § . . when ever the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them , they are then capable to be called true or false . because the mind in such a reference , makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing : which supposition , as it happens to be true or false ; so the ideas themselves come to be denominated . the most usual cases wherein this happens , are these following : § . . first , when the mind supposes any idea it has , conformable to that in other men's minds called by the same common name ; v. g. when the mind intends , or judges its ideas of iustice , temperance , religion , to be the same , with what other men give those names to . secondly , when the mind supposes any idea it has in it self , to be conformable to some real existence . thus the two ideas , of a man , and a centaur , supposed to be the ideas of real substances , are the one true , and the other false ; the one having a conformity to what has really existed ; the other not . thirdly , when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution , and essence of any thing , whereon all its properties depend : and thus the greatest part , if not all our ideas of substances , are false . § . . these suppositions , the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas . but yet if we will examine it , we shall find it is chiefly , if not only concerning its abstract complex ideas . for the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge ; and finding if it should proceed by , and dwell upon only particular things , its progress would be very slow , and its work endless : therefore to shorten its way to knowledge , and make each perception the more comprehensive ; the first thing it does , as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge , either by contemplation of the things themselves , that it would know ; or conference with others about them , is to bind them into bundles , and rank them so into sorts , that what knowledge it gets of any of them , it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort ; and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business , knowledge . this , as i have elsewhere shewed , is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas , with names annexed to them into genera and species ; i. e. into kinds , and sorts . § . . if therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind , and observe what couse it usually takes in its way to knowledge , we shall , i think , find that the mind having got any idea , which it thinks it may have use of , either in contemplation or discourse ; the first thing it does , is to abstract it , and then get a name to it ; and so lay it up in its store-house , the memory , as containing the essence of a sort of things , of which that name is always to be the mark. hence it is , that we may often observe , that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not , he presently asks what it is , meaning by that enquiry nothing but the name . as if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species , or the essence of it ; whereof it is indeed used as the mark , and is generally supposed annexed to it . § . . but this abstract idea , being something in the mind between the thing that exists , and the name that is given to it , it is in our ideas , that both the rightness of our knowledge , and the propriety or intelligibleness of our speaking consists . and hence it is , that men are so forward to suppose , that the abstract ideas they have in their minds , are such as agree to the things existing without them , to which they are referr'd ; and are the same also , to which the names they give them , do by the use and propriety of that language belong : for without this double conformity of their ideas , they find , they should both think amiss of things in themselves , and talk of them unintelligibly to others . § . . first then , i say , that when the truth of our ideas is judged of , by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have , and commonly signifie by the same name , they may be any of them false . but yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken . because a man by his senses , and every day 's observation , may easily satisfie himself , what the simple ideas are , which their several names , that are in common use stand for , they being but few in number ; and such , as if he doubts , or mistakes in , he may easily rectifie by the objects they are to be found in . therefore it is seldom , that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas ; or applies the name red , to the idea of green ; or the name sweet , to the idea bitter : much less are men apt to confound the names , belonging to different senses ; and call a colour , by the name of a taste , &c. whereby it is evident , that the simple ideas , they call by any name , are commonly the same , that others have and mean , when they use the same names . § . . complex ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect ; and the complex ideas of mixed modes , much more than those of substances : because in substances , ( especially those , which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to , ) some remarkable sensible qualities , serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another , easily preserve those , who take any care in the use of their words , from applying them to sorts of substances , to which they do not at all belong . but in mixed modes , we are much more uncertain , it being not so easie to determine of several actions ; whether they are to be called iustice , or cruelty ; liberality , or prodigality . and so in referring our ideas to those of other men , call'd by the same name , ours may be false ; and our idea we call justice , may , perhaps , be that which ought to have another name , § . . but whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any sort , to be different from those of other men , which are marked by the same name : this at least is certain , that this sort of falshood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes , than to any other . when a man is thought to have a false idea of iustice , or gratitude , or glory , it is for no other reason , but that his agrees not with the ideas , which each of those names are the signs of in other men. the reason whereof seems to me to be this , that the abstract ideas of mixed modes , being men's voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas ; and so the essence of each species , being made by men alone , whereof we have no other sensible standard , existing any where , but the name it self , or the definition of that name : we have nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to as standards , to which we would conform them , but the ideas of those , who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations ; and so as our ideas conform , or differ from them , they pass for true or false . and thus much concerning the truth and falshood of our ideas , in reference to their names . § . . secondly , as to the truth and falshood of our ideas , in reference to the real existence of things , when that is made the standard of their truth , none of them can be termed false , but only our complex ideas of substances . § . . first , our simple ideas , being barely such perceptions , as god has fitted us to receive , and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws , and ways , suitable to his wisdom and goodness , though incomprehensible to us , their truth consists in nothing else , but in such appearances , as are produced in us , and must be suitable to those powers , he has placed in external objects , or else they could not be produced in us : and thus answering those powers , they are what they should be , true ideas . nor do they become liable to any imputation of falshood , if the mind ( as in most men i believe it does ) judges the ideas to be in these things themselves . for god in his wisdom , having set them as marks of distinction in things , whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another ; and so chuse any of them for our uses , as we have occasion : it alters not the nature of our simple idea , whether we think that the idea of blue , be in the violet it self , or in our mind only ; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts , reflecting the particles of light , after a certain manner , to be in the violet it self . for that texture in the object , operating regularly and constantly , producing the same idea of blue in us , it serves us to distinguish , by our eyes , that from any other thing , whether that distinguishing mark , as it is really in the violet , be only a peculiar texture of parts , or else that very colour , the idea whereof ( which is in us ) is the exact resemblance . and it is equally from that appearance , to be denominated blue , whether it be that real colour , or only a peculiar texture in it , that causes in us that idea : since the name blue notes properly nothing , but that mark of distinction , that is in a violet , discernable only by our eyes , whatever it consists in , that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know , and , perhaps , would be of less use to us , if we had faculties to discern . § . . neither would it carry any imputation of falshood to our simple ideas , if by the different structure of our organs , it were so ordered , that the same object should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time ; v. g. if the idea , that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes , were the same that a marigold produced in another man's , and vice versâ . for since this could never be known : because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body , to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs ; neither the ideas hereby , nor the names , would be at all confounded , or any falshood be in either . for all things that had the texture of a violet , producing constantly the idea , which he called blue ; and those which had the texture of a marigold , producing constantly the idea , which he as constantly called yellow , whatever those appearances were in his mind ; he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances , and understand , and signifie those distinctions , marked by the names blue and yellow , as if the appearances , or ideas in his mind , received from those two flowers , were exactly the same with the ideas in other men's minds . i am nevertheless very apt to think , that the sensible ideas , produced by any object in different men's minds , are most commonly very near and undiscernably alike . for which opinion , i think , there might be many reasons offered ; but that being besides my present business , i shall not trouble my reader with them ; but only mind him , that the contrary supposition , if it could be proved , is of little use , either for the improvement of our knowledge , or conveniency of life ; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it . § . . from what has been said concerning our simple ideas , i think , it evident , that our simple ideas can none of them be false , in respect of things existing without us . for the truth of these appearances , or perceptions in our minds , consisting , as has been said , only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects , to produce by our senses such appearances in us : and each of them being in the mind , such as it is , suitable to the power that produced it , and which alone it represents , it cannot upon that account , or as referr'd to such a pattern , be false . blue or yellow , bitter or sweet , can never be false ideas , these perceptions in the mind , are just such as they are there , answering the powers appointed by god to produce them ; and so are truly what they are , and are intended to be . indeed the names may be misapply'd ; but that in this respect , makes no falshood in the ideas : as if a man ignorant in the english tongue , should call purple , scarlet . § . . secondly , nether can our complex ideas of modes , in reference to the essence of any thing really existing , be false . because whatever complex idea i have of any mode , it hath no reference to any pattern existing , and made by nature : it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas , than what it hath ; nor to represent any thing , but such a complication of ideas , as it does . thus when i have the idea of such an action of a man , who forbears to afford himself such meat , drink , and cloathing , and other conveniencies of life , as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply , and his station requires , i have no false idea ; but such as represents an action , either as i find , or imagine it ; and so is capable of neither truth , or falshood . but when i give the name frugality , or vertue , to this action , then it may be called a false idea , if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea , to which , in propriety of speech , the name of frugality doth belong ; or to be conformable to that law , which is the standard of vertue and vice. § . . thirdly , our complex ideas of substances , being all referred to patterns in things themselves , may be false . that they are all false , when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things , is so evident , that there needs nothing to be said of it . i shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition , and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind , taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things , of which patterns , they are the supposed copies : and in this reference of them , to the existence of things , they are false ideas : . when they put together simple ideas , which in the real existence of things , have no union ; as when to the shape , and size , that exist together in a horse , is joined , in the same complex idea , the power of barking like a dog : which three ideas , however put together into one in the mind , were never united in nature ; and this therefore may be called a false idea of an horse . . ideas of substances are , in this respect , also false , when from any collection of simple ideas , that do always exist together , there is separated , by a direct negation , any other simple idea , which is constantly joined with them . thus if to extension , solidity , fusibility , the peculiar weightiness and yellow colour of gold , any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness , than is in lead , or copper ; he may be said to have a false complex idea , as well as when he joins to those other simple ones , the idea of perfect absolute fixedness : for either way , the complex idea of gold being made up of such simple ones , as have no union in nature , may be termed false . but if he leave out of this his complex idea , that of fixedness quite , without either actually joining to , or separating of it from the rest in his mind , it is , i think , to be looked on , as an inadequate and imperfect idea , rather than a false one : since though it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature , yet it puts none together , but what do really exist together . § . . though in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking , i have shewed in what sense , and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true , or false ; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter in all cases , where any idea is call'd true , or false , it is from some judgment that the mind makes , or is supposed to make , that is true , or false . for truth , or falshood , being never without some affirmation , or negation , express , or tacit , it is not to be found , but where signs are joined or separated , according to the agreement , or disagreement , of the things they stand for . the signs we chiefly use , are either ideas , or words ; wherewith we make either mental , or verbal propositions . truth lies in so joining , or separating these representatives , as the things they stand for , do , in themselves , agree , or disagree : and falshood in the contrary , as shall be more fully shewed hereafter . § . . any idea then we have in our minds , whether conformable , or not , to the existence of things , or to any ideas in the minds of other men , cannot properly for this alone be called false . for these representations , if they have nothing in them , but what is really existing in things without , cannot be thought false , being exact representations of something : nor yet if they have any thing in them , differing from the reality of things , can they properly be said to be false representations , or ideas of things , they do not represent . but the mistake and falshood is , § . . first , when the mind having any idea , it judges and concludes it the same , that is in other mens minds , signified by the same name ; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification , or definition of that word , when indeed it is not : which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes , though other ideas also are liable to it . § . secondly , when it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones , as nature never puts together , it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing ; as when it joins the weight of tin , to the colour , fusibility , and fixedness of gold. § . . thirdly , when in its complex idea , it has united a certain number of simple ideas , that do really exist together in some sorts of creatures , but has also left out others , as much inseparable , it judges this to be a perfect compleat idea , of a sort of things which really it is not ; v. g. having joined the ideas of substance , yellow , malleable , most heavy , and fusible , it takes that complex idea to be the compleat idea of gold , when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in aqua regia are as inseparable from those other ideas , or qualities of that body , as they are one from another . § . . fourthly , the mistake is yet greater , when i judge , that this complex idea , contains in it the real essence of any body existing ; when at least it contains but some few of those properties , which flow from its real essence and constitution . i say , only some few of those properties ; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers , it has , in reference to other things , all that are vulgarly known of any one body ; and of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made , are but a very few , in comparison of what a man , that has several ways tried and examined it , knows of that one sort of things ; and all that the most expert man knows , are but few , in comparison of what are really in that body , and depend on its internal or essential constitution . the essence of a triangle , lies in a very little compass , consists in a very few ideas ; three lines meeting at three angles , make up that essence : but the properties that flow from this essence , are more than can be easily known , or enumerated . so i imagine it is in substances their real essences lie , in a little compass ; though the properties flowing from that internal constitution , are endless . § . . to conclude , a man having no notion of any thing without him , but by the idea he has of it in his mind ; which idea , he has a power to call by what name he pleases , he may , indeed , make an idea neither answering the reality of things , nor agreeing to the ideas commonly signified by other peoples words ; but cannot make a wrong , or false idea of a thing , which is no otherwise known to him , but by the idea he has of it . v. g. when i frame an idea of the legs , arms , and body of a man , and join to this a horse's head and neck , i do not make a false idea of any thing ; because it represents nothing without me . but when i call it a man , or tartar , and imagine it either to represent some real being without me , or to be the same idea , that others call by the same name ; in either of these cases , i may err . and upon this account it is , that it comes to be termed a false idea ; though , indeed , the falshood lie not in the idea , but in that tacit mental proposition , wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it , which it has not . but yet , if having framed such an idea in my mind , without thinking , either that existence , or the name man , or tartar , belongs to it , i will call it man , or tartar , i may be justly thought phantastical in the naming ; but not erroneous in my judgment ; nor the idea any way false . § . . upon the whole matter , i think , that our ideas , as they are considered by the mind , either in reference to the proper signification of their names ; or in reference to the reality of things , may very fitly be called right , or wrong ideas , according as they agree , or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred . but if any one had rather call them true , or false , 't is fit he use a liberty , which every one has , to call things by those names he thinks best ; though in propriety of speech , truth , or falshood , will , i think , scarce agree to them , but as they , some way or other , virtually contain in them some mental proposition . the ideas that are in a man's mind , simply considered , cannot be wrong , unless complex ones , wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together . all other ideas are in themselves right ; and the knowledge about them , right and true knowledge : but when we come to refer them to any thing , as to their patterns and archetypes , then they are capable of being wrong , as far as they disagree with such archetypes . § . . having thus given an account of the original , sorts , and extent of our ideas , with several other considerations , about these ( i know not whether i may say ) instruments , or materials , of our knowledge , the method i at first proposed to my self , would now require , that i should immediately proceed to shew , what use the understanding makes of them , and what knowledge we have by them . this was that which in the first general view i had of this subject , was all that i thought i should have to do : but upon a nearer approach , i find , that there is so close a connexion between ideas and words ; and our abstract ideas , and general words , have so constant a relation one to another , that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge , which all consists in propositions , without considering , first , the nature , use , and signification of language ; which therefore must be the business of the next book . book iii. chap. i. of words or language in general . § . . god having designed man for a sociable creature , made him not only with an inclination , and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind ; but furnished him also with language , which was to be the great instrument , and common tye of society . man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned , as to be fit to frame articulate sounds , which we call words . but this was not enough to produce language ; for parrots , and several other birds , will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough , which yet , by no means , are capable of language . § . . besides articulate sounds therefore , it was farther necessary , that he should be able to use these sounds , as signs of internal conceptions ; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind , whereby they might be made known to others , and the thoughts of mens minds be conveyed from one to another . § . . but neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be . it is not enough for the perfection of language , that sounds can be made signs of ideas , unless those signs can be so made use of , as to comprehend several particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use , had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by . § . . words then are made to be signs of our ideas , and are general or particular , as the ideas they stand for are general or particular . but besides these names which stand for ideas , there be others which men have found and make use of , not to signifie any idea , but the want or absence of some ideas , simple or complex , or all ideas together ; such as are the latin words , nihil , and in english , ignorance and burrenness . all which negative or privative words , cannot be said properly to belong to , or signifie no ideas : for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds ; but they relate to positive ideas , and signifie their absence . § . . it may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge , if we remark , how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas ; and how those which are made use of , to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense , have their original , and are transferred from obvious sensible ideas ; v. g. to imagine , apprehend , comprehend , adhere , conceive , instill , disgust , disturbance , tranquillity , &c. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things , and applied to certain modes of thinking . spirit , in its primary signification , is breath ; angel , a messenger : and i doubt not , but if we could trace them to their originals , we should find , in all languages , the names , which stand for things that fall not under our senses , to have had their first rise from sensible ideas . by which we may give some kind of guess , what kind of notions they were , and whence derived , which filled their minds , who were the first beginners of languages ; and how nature , even in the naming of things , unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge : whilst , to give names , that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves , or any other ideas , that came not under their senses , they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of sensation , by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves , which made no outward sensible appearances ; and then when they had got known and agreed names , to signifie those internal operations of their own minds , they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words , all their other ideas ; since they could consist of nothing , but either of outward sensible perceptions , or of the inward operations of their minds about them ; we having , as has been proved , no ideas at all , but what originally come either from sensible objects without , or what we feel within our selves , from the inward workings of our own spirits , which we are conscious to our selves of within . § . . but to understand better the use and force of language , as subservient to instruction and knowledge , it will be convenient to consider , first , to what it is that names , in the use of language , are immediately applied . secondly , since all ( except proper ) names are general , and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing ; but for sorts and ranks of things , it will be necessary to consider , in the next place , what the sorts and kinds , or , if you rather like the latin names , what the species and genera of things are , wherein they consist , and how they come to be made . these being ( as they ought ) well looked into , we shall the better come to find the right use of words ; the natural advantages and defects of language ; and the remedies that ought to be used , to avoid the inconveniencies of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words : without which , it is impossible to discourse with any clearness , or order , concerning knowledge : which being conversant about propositions , and those most commonly universal ones , has greater connexion with words , than perhaps is suspected . these considerations therefore , shall be the matter of the following chapters . chap. ii. of the signification of words . § . . man , though he have great variety of thoughts , and such , from which others , as well as himself , might receive profit and delight ; yet they are all within his own breast , invisible , and hidden from others , nor can of themselves be made appear . the comfort therefore , and advantage of society , not being to be had without communication of thoughts , it was necessary , that man should find out some external sensible signs , whereby those invisible ideas , which possess his mind in so great variety , might be made known to others : for which purpose , nothing was so fit , either for plenty or quickness , as those articulate sounds , which with so much ease and variety , he found himself able to make . thus we may conceive how words , which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose , come to be made use of by men , as the signs of their ideas ; not by any natural connection , that there is between particular articulate sounds , and certain ideas , for then there would be but one language amongst all men ; but by a voluntary imposition , whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea . the use then of words , is to be sensible marks of ideas ; and the ideas they stand for , are their proper and immediate signification . § . . the use men have of these marks , being either to record their own ideas for the assistence of their own memory ; or as it were , to bring them out , and lay them before the view of others . words in their primary and immediate signification , stand for nothing , but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them , how imperfectly soever , or carelesly those ideas are collected from the things , which they are supposed to represent . when a man speaks to another , it is , that he may be understood ; and the end of the speech is , that those sounds , as marks , may make known his ideas to the hearer . that then which words are the marks of , are the ideas of the speaker : nor can any one apply them , as marks immediately to any thing else , but the ideas that he himself hath : for this would be to make them signs of his own conception , and yet apply them to other ideas ; which would be to make them signs , and not signs of his ideas at the same time ; and so in effect , to have no signification at all . words being voluntary signs , they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not . that would be to make them signs of nothing , sounds without signification . a man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things , or of conceptions in the mind of another , whereof he has none in his own . till he has some ideas of his own , he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man ; nor can he use any signs for them : for it would be the signs of he knows not what , which is in truth to be the sign of nothing . but when he represents to himself other men's ideas , by some of his own , if he consent to give them the same names , that other men do , 't is still to his own ideas ; to ideas that he has , and not to ideas that he has not . § . . this is so necessary in the use of language , that in this respect , the knowing , and the ignorant ; the learned , and unlearned , use the words they speak ( with any meaning ) all alike . they , in every man's mouth , stand for the ideas he has , and which he would express by them . a child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold , but the bright shining yellow-colour , he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour , and nothing else ; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail , gold. another that hath better observed , adds to shining yellow , great weight : and then the sound gold , when he uses it , stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow , and very weighty substance . another adds to those qualities , fusibility : and then the word gold to him signifies , a body , bright , yellow , fu●ible , and very heavy . another adds malleability . each of these uses equally the word gold , when they have occasion to express the idea , they have apply'd it to . but it is evident , that each can apply it only to his own idea ; nor can he make it stand , as a sign of such a complex idea , as he has not . § . . but though words , as they are used by men , can properly and immediately signifie nothing but the ideas , that are in their minds ; yet they in their thoughts , give them a secret reference to two other things . first , they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men , with whom they communicate : for else they should talk in vain , and could not be understood , if the sounds they applied to one idea , were such , as by the hearer , were apply'd to another , which is to speak two languages . but in this , men stand not usually to examine , whether the idea they , and he they discourse with , be the same : but think it enough , that they use the word , as they imagine , in the common acceptation of that language ; in which case , they suppose that the idea , they make it a sign of , is precisely the same , to which the understanding men of that country apply that name . § . . secondly , because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations , but of things as really they are ; therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things . but this relating more particularly to substances , and their names , as , perhaps , the former does to simple ideas and modes , we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large , when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes , and substances , in particular : though give me leave here to say , that it is a perverting the use of words , and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification , whenever we make them stand for any thing , but those ideas we have in our own minds . § . . concerning words also , this is farther to be considered . first , that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas ; and by that means , the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions , and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations , they have within their own breasts , there comes by constant use , to be such a connexion between certain sounds , and the ideas they stand for , that the names heard , almost as readily excite certain ideas ; as if the objects themselves , which are apt to produce them did actually affect the senses . which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities ; and in all substances , that frequently , and familiarly occurr to us . § . . secondly , that though the proper and immediate signification of words , are ideas in the mind of the speaker ; yet because by familiar use from our cradles , we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly , and have them readily on our tongues , and memories , but yet are not always careful to examine , or settle their significations perfectly , it often happens , that men , even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration , do set their thoughts more on words than things . nay , because words are many of them learn'd , before the ideas are known for which they stand : therefore some , not only children , but men , speak several words , no otherwise than parrots do , only because they have learn'd them , and have been accustomed to those sounds . but so far as words are of use and signification , so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea ; and a designation , that the one stand for the other : without which application of them , they are nothing , but so much insignificant noise . § . . words by long and familiar use , as has been said , come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily , that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them . but that they signifie only men's peculiar ideas , and that by a perfectly arbitrary imposition , is evident , in that they often fail to excite in others ( even that use the same language ) the same ideas we take them to be the signs of : and every man has so inviolable a liberty , to make words stand for what ideas he pleases , that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds , that he has , when they use the same words , that he does . and therefore the great augustus himself , in the possession of that power , which ruled the world , acknowledged he could not make a new latin word : which was as much as to say , that he could not arbitrarily appoint , what idea any sound should be a sign of , in the mouths and common language of his subjects . 't is true , common use , by a tacit consent , appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages ; which so far limits the signification of that sound , that unless a man applies it to the same idea , he cannot speak properly . and it is also true , that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer , which he makes them stand for in speaking , he cannot speak intelligibly . but whatever be the consequences of his use of any words , different either from the publick , or that person to whom he addresses them : this is certain , their signification in his use of them , is limited to his ideas , and they can be signs of nothing else . chap. iii. of general terms . § . . all things that exist , being particulars , it may , perhaps , be thought reasonable , that words , which ought to be conformed to things , should be so too , i mean in their signification : but yet we find the quite contrary . the far greatest part of words , that make all lauguages , are general terms : which has not been the effect of neglect , or chance , but of reason , and necessity . § . . first , it is impossible , that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name . for the signification and use of words , depending on that connection , which the mind makes between its ideas , and the sounds it uses , as signs of them , it is necessary in the application of names to things , that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things , and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one , with its peculiar appropriation to that idea . but it is beyond the power of humane capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with : every bird , and beast , men saw ; every tree , and plant that affected the senses , could not find a place in the most capacious understanding . if it be looked on , as an instance of a prodigious memory , that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army , by his proper name : we may easily find a reason , why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock , or crow that flies over their heads ; much less to call every leaf of plants , or grain of sand that came in their way , by a peculiar name . § . . secondly , if it were possible , it would yet be useless , because it would not serve to the chief end of language . men would in vain heap up names of particular things , that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts . men learn names , and use them in talk with others , only that they may be understood : which is then only done , when by use or consent , the sound i make by the organs of speech , excites in another man's mind , who hears it , the idea i apply it to in mine , when i speak it . this cannot be done by names , apply'd to particular things , whereof i alone having the ideas in my mind , the names of them could not be significant , or intelligible to another , who was not acquainted with all those very particular things , which had fallen under my notice . § . . thirdly , but yet granting this also fecible ; ( which i think is not , ) yet a distinct name for every particular thing , would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge : which though founded in particular things , enlarges it self by general views ; to which , things reduced into sorts under general names , are properly subservient . these , with the names belonging to them , come within some compass , and do not multiply every moment , beyond what , either the mind can contain , or use requires . and therefore in these , men have for the most part stopp'd : but yet not so , as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things , by appropriated names , where convenience demands it : and therefore in their own species , which they have most to do with , and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons ; there they make use of proper names , and distinct individuals have distinct denominations . § . . besides persons , countries also , cities , rivers , mountains , and other the like distinctions of place , have usually found peculiar names , and that for the same reason ; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly , and , as it were , set before others in their discourses with them . and i doubt not , but if we had reason to mention particular horses , as often as we have to mention particular men , we should have proper names for the one , as familiar as for the other ; and bucephalus would be a word as much in use , as alexander . and therefore we see that amongst jockeys , horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by , as commonly as their servants : because amongst them , there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse , when he is out of sight . § . . the next thing to be considered is , how general words come to be made . for since all things that exist , are only particulars , how come we by general terms , or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for ? words become general , by being made the signs of general ideas : and ideas become general , by separating from them the circumstances of time , or place , or any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence . by this way of abstraction , they are made capable of representing more individuals than one ; each of which , having in it a conformity to that abstract idea , is ( as we call it ) of that sort . § . . but to deduce this a little more distinctly , it will not , perhaps , be amiss , to trace our notions , and names , from their beginning , and observe by what degrees we proceed , and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy . there is nothing more evident , than that the ideas of the persons children converse with , ( to instance in them alone , ) are like the persons themselves , only particular . the ideas of the nurse , and the mother , are well framed in their minds ; and , like pictures of them there , represent only those individuals . the names they first give to them , are confined to these individuals ; and the names of nurse , and mamma , the child uses , determine themselves to those persons . afterwards , when time and a larger acquaintance , has made them observe , that there are a great many other things in the world , that in some common agreements of shape , and several other qualities , resemble their father and mother : and those persons they have been used to , they frame an idea , which they find those many particulars do partake in ; and to that they give , with others , the name man , for example . and thus they come to have a general name , and a general idea . wherein they make nothing new , but only leave out of the complex idea they had of pete● and iames , mary and iane , that which is peculiar to each , and retain only what is common to them all . § . . by the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man , they easily advance to more general names and notions . for observing , that several things that differ from their idea of man , and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name , have yet certain qualities , wherein they agree with man , by retaining only those qualities , and uniting them into one idea , they have again another and a more general idea ; to which having given a name , they make a term of a more comprehensive extension : which new idea , is made not by any new addition , but only , as before , by leaving out the shape , and some other properties signified by the name man , and retaining only a body , with life , sense , and spontaneous motion , comprehended under the name animal . § . . that this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas , and general names to them , i think , is so evident , that there needs no other proof of it , but the considering of a man's self , or others , and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge : and he that thinks general natures , or notions , are any thing else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones , taken at first from particular existences , will , i fear , be at a loss where to find them . for let any one reflect , wherein does his idea of a man , differ from that of peter , and paul ; or his idea of an horse , from that of bucephalus , but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual ; and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas , of several particular existences , as they are found to agree in . of the complex ideas , signified by the names man , and horse , leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ , and retaining only those wherein they agree , and of those , making a new distinct complex idea , and giving the name animal to it , one has a more general term , that comprehends , with man , several other creatures . leave out the idea of animal , sense , and spontaneous motion , and the remaining complex idea , made up of the remaining simple ones of body , life , and nourishment , becomes a more general one , under the more comprehensive term , vivens . and not to dwell longer upon this particular , so evident in it self , by the same way the mind proceeds to body , substance , and at last to being , thing , and such universal terms , which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever . to conclude , this whole mystery of genera and species , which make such a noise in the schools , and are , with justice , so little regarded out of them , is nothing else but abstract ideas , more or less comprehensive , with names annexed to them . in all which , this is constant and unvariable , that every more general term , stands for such an idea , as is but a part of any of those contained under it . § . . this may shew us the reason , why , in the defining of words , which is nothing but declaring their signification , we make use of the genus , or next general word that comprehends it . which is not out of necessity , but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas , which the next general word , or genus , stands for ; or , perhaps , sometimes the shame of not being able to do it . but though defining by genus and differentia , ( i crave leave to use these terms of art , though originally latin , since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to ; ) i say , though defining by the genus be the shortest way ; yet , i think , it may be doubted , whether it be the best . this i am sure , it is not the only , and so not absolutely necessary . for definition being nothing but making another understand by words , what idea the term defined● stands for , a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined : and if instead of such an enumeration , men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term , it has not been out of necessity , or for greater clearness ; but for quickness and dispatch sake . for , i think , that to one who desired to know what idea the word man stood for ; if it should be said , that a man was a solid extended substance , having life , sense , spontaneous motion , and the faculty of reasoning , i doubt not but the meaning of the term man , would be as well understood ; and the idea it stands for , be at least as clearly made known , as when it is defined to be a rational animal ; which by the several definitions of animal , vivens , and corpus , resolves it self into those enumerated ideas . i have in explaining the term man , followed here the ordinary definition of the schools : which though , perhaps , not the most exact , yet serves well enough to my present purpose . and one may in this instance , see what gave occasion to that rule that a definition must consist of its genus , and differentia : and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a rule , or advantage in the strict observing of it . for definitions , as has been said , being only the explaining of one word , by several others so , that the meaning , or idea it stands for , may be certainly known , languages are not always so made , according to the rules of logick , that every term can have its signification , exactly and clearly expressed by two others . experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary ; or else those who have made this rule , have done ill , that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it . but of definitions , more in the next chapter . § . . to return to general words , it is plain , by what has been said , that general and vniversal , belong not to the real existence of things ; but are the inventions and creatures of the vnderstanding , made by it for its own use , and concern only signs , whether words , or ideas . words are general , as has been said , when used , for signs of general ideas ; and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things : and ideas are general , when they are set up , as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves , which are all of them particular in their existence , even those words , and ideas , which in their signification , are general . when therefore we quit particulars , the generals that rest , are only creatures of our own making , their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding , of signifying or representing many particulars . for the signification they have , is nothing but a relation , that by the mind of man is added to them . § . . the next thing therefore to be considered is , what kind of signification it is , that general words have . for as it is evident , that they do not signifie barely one particular thing ; for then they would not be general terms , but proper names : so on the other side , ●is as evident , they do not signifie a plurality ; for man and men would then signifie the same ; and the distinction of numbers ( as grammarians call them ) would be superfluous and useless . that then which general words signifie , is a sort of things ; and that each of them does , by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind , to which idea , as things existing are found to agree , so they come to be ranked under that name ; or , which is all one , be of that sort . whereby it is evident , that the essences of the sorts , or ( if the latin word pleases better ) species of things , are nothing else but these abstract ideas . for the having the essence of any species , being that which makes any thing to be of that species , and the conformity to the idea , to which the name is annexed , being that which gives a right to that name , the having the essence , and the having that conformity , must needs be the same thing : since to be of any species , and to have a right to the name of that species , is all one . as for example , to be a man , or of the species man , and to have a right to the name man , is the same thing . again , to be a man , or of the species man , and have the essence of a man , is the same thing . now since nothing can be a man , or have a right to the name man , but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for ; nor any thing be a man , or have a right to be of the species man , but what has the essence of that species , it follows , that the abstract idea , for which the name stands , and the essence of the species , is one and the same . from whence it is easie to observe , that the essences of the sorts of things , and consequently the sorting of things , is the workmanship of the understanding , since it is the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas . § . . i would not here be thought to forget , much less to deny , that nature , in the production of things , makes several of them alike : there is nothing more obvious , especially in the races of animals , and all things propagated by seed . but yet , i think , we may say , the sorting of them under names , is the workmanship of the vnderstanding , taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them , to make abstract general ideas , and set them up in the mind , with names annexed to them , as patterns , or forms , ( for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification , ) to which , as particular things existing , are found to agree : so they come to be of that species , have that denomination , or are put into that classis . for when we say , this is a man , that a horse ; this iustice , that cruelty ; this a watch , that a iack ; what do we else but rank things under different specifick names , as agreeing to those abstract ideas , of which we have made those names the signs ? and what are the essences of those species , set out and marked by names , but these abstract ideas in the mind ; which are , as it were , the bonds between particular things that exist , and the names they are to be ranked under ? and when general names have any connexion with particular beings , these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them : so that the essences of species , as distinguished and denominated by us , neither are , nor can be any thing but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds . and therefore the supposed real essences of substances , if different from our abstract ideas , cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into . for two species may be one , as rationally , as two different essences , be the essence of one species : and i demand , what are the alterations may , or may not be made in a horse , or lead , without making either of them to be of another species ? by determining the species of things , by our abstract ideas , this is easie to resolve : but if any one will regulate himself herein , by supposed real essences , he will , i suppose , be at a loss : and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of an horse , or lead . § . . nor will any one wonder , that i say these essences , or abstract ideas , ( which are the measures of names , and the boundaries of species , ) are the workmanship of the vnderstanding , who considers , that at least the complex ones are often , in several men , different collections of simple ideas : and therefore that is covetousness to one man , which is not so to another . nay , even in substances , where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves , they are not constantly the same ; no not in that species , which is most familiar to us , and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance : it having been more than once doubted , whether the foetus born of a woman , were a man , even so far , as that it hath been debated , whether it were , or were not to be nourished and baptized : which could not be , if the abstract idea , or essence , to which the name man belonged , were of nature's making ; and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas , which the understanding puts together , and then abstracting it , affixed a name to it . so that in truth , every distinct abstract idea , is a distinct essence : and the names that stand for such distinct ideas , are the names of things essentially different . thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval , as a sheep from a goat : and rain is as essentially different from snow , as water from earth ; that abstract idea which is the essence of one , being impossible to be communicated to the other . and thus any two abstract ideas , that in any part vary one from another , with two distinct names annexed to them , constitute two distinct sorts , or , if you please , species , as essentially different , as any two the most remote , or opposite in the world. § . . but since the essences of things are thought , by some , ( and not without reason , ) to be wholly unknown ; it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word essence . first , essence may be taken for the very being of any thing , whereby it is , what it is . and thus the real internal , but generally in substances , unknown constitution of things , whereon their discoverable qualities depend , may be called their essence . this is the proper original signification of the word , as is evident from the formation of it ; essentia , in its primary notation signifying properly being . and in this sense it is still used , when we speak of the essence of particular things , without giving them any name . secondly , the learning and disputes of the schools , having been much busied about genus and species , the word essence has almost lost its primary signification ; and instead of the real constitution of things , has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species . 't is true , there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things ; and 't is past doubt , there must be some real constitution , on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing , must depend . but it being evident , that things are ranked under names into sorts of species , only as they agree to certain abstract ideas , to which we have annexed those names , the essence of each genus , or sort , comes to be nothing but that abstract idea , which the general , or sortal ( if i may have leave so to call it from sort , as i do general from genus , ) name stands for . and this we shall find to be that , which the word essence imports , in its most familiar use . these two sorts of essence , i suppose , may not unfitly be termed , the one the real , the other the nominal essence . § . . between the nominal essence , and the name , there is so near a connexion , that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being , but what has this essence , whereby it answers that abstract idea , whereof that name is the sign . § . . concerning the real essences of corporeal substances , ( to mention those only , ) there are , if i mistake not , two opinions . the one is of those , who using the word essence , for they know not what , suppose a certain number of those essences , according to which all natural things are made , and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake , and ●o become of this or that species . the other , and more rational opinion , is of those , who look on all natural things ●o have a real , but unknown constitution of their insensible parts , from which now those sensible qualities , which serve us to distinguish them one from another , according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts , under common denominations . the former of these opinions , which supposes these essences , as a certain number of forms or molds , wherein all natural things , that exist , are cast , and do equally partake , has , i imagine , very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things . the frequent productions of monsters , in all the species of animals , and of change●●●gs , and other strange ●ssues of humane birth , carry with them difficulties , not possible to consist with this hypothesis● since it is impossible , that two things , partaking exactly of the same real essence , should have different properties , as that two figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle , should have different properties . but were there no other ●eason against it , yet the supposition of essences , that cannot be known ; and yet the making them to be that , which distinguishes the species of things , is so wholly useless , and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge , that that alone were sufficient , to make us lay it by ; and content our selves with such essences of the sorts or species of things , as come within the reach of our knowledge : which , when seriously considered , will be found , as i have said , to be nothing else , but those abstract complex ideas , to which we have annexed distinct general names . § . . essences thus distinguished into nominal and real , we may observe , that in the species of simple ideas and modes , they are always the same : but in substances , always qu●te different . thus a figure including a space between three lines , is the real , as well as nominal essence of a triangle ; it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed , but the very essenti● , or being , of the thing it self , that foundation from which all its properties flow , and to which they are all inseparably annexed . but it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter , which makes the ring on my finger , wherein these two essences are apparently different . for it is the real constitution of its insensible parts , on which depend all those properties of colour , weight , fusibility , fixedness , &c. which are to be found in it . which constitution we know not ; and so having no particular idea of , have no name that is the sign of it . but yet it is its colour , weight , fusibility , and fixedness , &c. which makes it to be gold , or gives it a right to that name , which is therefore its nominal essence . since nothing can be call'd gold , but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex idea , to which that name is annexed . but this distinction of essences , belonging particularly to substances , we shall , when we come to consider their names , have an occasion to treat of more fully . § . . that such abstract ideas , with names to them , as we have been speaking of , are essences , may farther appear by what we are told concerning essences , viz. that they are all ingenerable , and incorruptible . which cannot be true of the real constitution of things , which begin and perish with them . all things , that exist in nature , besides their author , are all liable to change ; especially those things we are acquainted with , and have ranked into bands , under distinct names or ensigns . thus that , which was grass to day , is to mor●ow the flesh of a sheep ; and within few days after , becomes part of a man : in all which , and the like changes , 't is evident , their real essence , that constitution whereon the properties of these several things depended , is destroy'd , and perishes with them . but essences being taken for ideas , established in the mind , with names annexed to them , they are supposed to remain steadily the same , whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to . for whatever becomes of alexander and bucephalus , the ideas to which man and horse are annexed , are supposed nevertheless to remain the same ; and so the essences of those species are preserved undestroy'd , whatever changes happen to any , or all of the individuals of those species . by this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire , without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind . for were there now no circle existing any where in the world , ( as , perhaps , that figure exists not any where exactly marked out , ) yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is ; and to be as a pattern , to determine which of the particular figures we meet with , have , or have not a right to the name circle , and so by having that essence , were of that species . and though there neither were , nor had been in nature such a beast as an unicorn , nor such a fish as a mermaid ; yet supposing those names to stand for complex abstract ideas , that contained no inconsistency in them ; the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible , as that of a man ; and the idea of an unicorn , as certain , steady , and permanent , as that of an horse . from what has been said , it is evident , that the doctrine of the immutability of essences , proves them to be only abstract ideas ; and is founded on the relation , established between them , and certain sounds as signs of them ; and will always be true , as long as the same name can have the same signification . § . . to conclude , this is that , which in short i would say , ( viz. ) that all the great business of genera and species , and their essences , amounts to no more but this , that men making abstract ideas , and settling them in their minds , with names annexed to them , do thereby enable themselves to consider things , and discourse of them , as it were in bundles , for the easier and readier improvement , and communication of their knowledge , which would advance but slowly , were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars . chap. iv. of the names of simple ideas . § . . though all words , as i have shewed , signifie nothing immediately , but the ideas in the mind of the speaker ; yet upon a nearer survey , we shall find that the names of simple ideas , mixed modes , ( under which i comprise relations too , ) and natural substances , have each of them something peculiar , and different from the others . for example : § . . first , the names of simple ideas and substances , with the abstract ideas in the mind , which they immediately signifie , intimate also some real existence , from which was derived their original pattern . but the names of mixed modes , terminate in the idea that is in the mind , and lead not the thoughts any farther , as we shall see more at large in the following chapter . § . . secondly , the names of simple ideas and modes , signifie always the real , as well as nominal essence of their species . but the names of natural substances , signifie rarely , if ever , any thing but barely the nominal essences of those species , as we shall shew in the chapter , that treats of the names of substances in particular . § . . thirdly , the names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition ; the names of all complex ideas are . it has not , that i know , hitherto been taken notice of by any body , what words are , and what are not capable of being defined : the want whereof is ( as i am apt to think ) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling , and obscurity in men's discourses , whilst some demand definitions of terms , that cannot be defined ; and others think , they ought to rest satisfied , in an explication made by a more general word , and its restriction , ( or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference , ) when even after that regular definition , those who hear it , have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word , than they had before . this at least , i think , that the shewing what words are , and what are not capable of definitions , and wherein consists a good definition , is not wholly besides our present purpose ; and perhaps , will afford so much light to the nature of these signs , and our ideas , as to deserve a more particular consideration . § . . i will not here trouble my self , to prove that all terms are not definable from that progress , in infinitum , which it will visibly lead us into , if we should allow , that all names could be defined . for if the terms of one definition , were still to be defined by another , where at last should we stop ? but i shall from the nature of our ideas , and the signification of our words shew , why some names can , and others cannot be defined , and which they are . § . . i think , it is agreed , that a definition is nothing else , but the shewing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms . the meaning of words , being only the idea they are made to stand for by him that uses them ; the meaning of any term is then shewed , or the word is defined , when by other words , the idea it is annexed to , and made the sign of , in the mind of the speaker , is as it were represented , or set before the view of another ; and thus its signification ascertained : this is the only use and end of definitions ; and therefore the only measure of what is , or is not a good definition . § . . this being premised , i say , that the names of simple ideas , and those only , are incapable of being defined . the reason whereof is this , that the several terms of a definition , signifying several ideas , they can altogether by no means represent an idea , which hath no composition at all : and therefore a definition , which is properly nothing but the shewing the meaning of one word by several others , not signifying each the same thing , can in the names of simple ideas have no place . § . . the not observing this difference in our ideas , and their names , has produced that eminent trifling in the schools , which is so easie to be observed , in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas . for as to the greatest part of them , even those masters of definitions , were fain to leave them untouch'd , meerly by the impossibility they found in it . what more exquisite iargon could the wit of man invent , than this definition , the act of a being in power ; as far forth as in power , which would puzzle any rational man , to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity , to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of . if tully asking a dutchman what beweeginge was , should have received this explication in his own language , that it was actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia ; i ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word beweeginge signified , or have guessed what idea a dutchman ordinarily had in his mind , and would signifie to another● when he used that sound . § . . nor have the modern philosophers , who have endeavoured to throw off the iargon of the schools , and speak intelligibly , much better succeeded in defining simple ideas , whether by explaining their causes , or any otherwise . the atomists , who define motion to be a passage from one place to another , what do they more than put one synonymous word for another ? for what is passage other than motion ? and if they were asked what passage was , how would they better define it than by motion ? for is it not at least as proper and significant , to say , passage is a motion from one place to another , as to say , motion is a passage , &c. this is to translate , and not to define , when we change two words of the same signification one for another ; which when one is better understood than the other , may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for ; but is very far from a definition , unless we will say , every english word in the dictionary , is the definition of the latin word it answers , and that motion is a definition of motus . nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body , to those of another , which the cartesians give us , prove a much better definition of motion , when well examined . § . . the act of perspicuous , as far forth as perspicuous , is another peripatetick definition of a simple idea ; which though not more absurd than the former of motion , yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly , because experience will easily convince any one , that it cannot make the meaning of the word light ( which it pretends to define ) at all understood by a blind man : but the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless , because it scapes this way of trial. for this simple idea , entring by the touch as well as sight ; 't is impossible to shew an example of any one , who has no other way to get the idea of motion , but barely by the definition of that name . when the cartesians tell us , that light is a great number of little globules , striking briskly on the bottom of the eye , they speak a little more intelligibly than the schools : but yet these words never so well understood , would make the idea , the word light stands for , no more known to a man that understands it not before , than if one should tell him , that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls , which fairies all day long strook with rackets against some men's fore-heads , whilst they passed by others . for granting his explication of the thing to be true ; yet the idea of the cause of light , if we had it never so exact , would no more give us the idea of light it self , as it is such a particular perception in us , than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel , would give us the idea of that pain , which it is able to cause in us . for the cause of any sensation , and the sensation it self , in all the simple ideas of one sense , are two ideas ; and two ideas so different , and distant one from another , that no two can be more so . and therefore should des cartes's globules strike never so long on the reti●a of a man , who was blind by a guttâ serenâ , he would thereby never have any idea of light , or any thing approaching to it ; though he understood what little globules were , and what striking on another body was , never so well . § . . simple ideas , as has been shewed , are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds , by the proper inlets appointed to each sort . if they are not received this way , all the words in the world , made use of to explain , or define any of their names , will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for . for words being sounds , can produce in us no other simple ideas , than of those very sounds ; nor excite any in us , but by that voluntary connexion , which is known to be between them , and those simple ideas , which common use has made them signs of . he that thinks otherwise , let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine-apple , and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. so far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes , whereof he has the ideas already in his memory , imprinted there by sensible objects not strangers to his palate ; so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind . but this is not giving us that idea by a definition , but exciting in us other simple ideas , by their known names ; which will be still very different from the true tastes of that fruit it self . in light and colours , and all other simple ideas , it is the same thing : for the signification of sounds , is not natural , but only imposed and arbitrary . and no definition of light , or redness , is more fitted , or able to produce either of those ideas in us , than the sound light , or red , by it self . for to hope to produce an idea of light , or colour , by a sound , however formed , is to expect that sounds should be visible , or colours audible ; and to make the ears do the office of all other senses . which is all one as to say , that we might taste , smell , and see , by the ears : a sort of philosophy worthy only of sanco panca , who had the faculty to see dulcinea by hearsay . and therefore he that has not before received into his mind , by the proper inlet , the simple idea which any word stands for , can never come to know the signification of that word , by any other words , or sounds , whatsoever put together , according to any rules of definition . the only way is , by applying to his senses the proper object ; and so producing that idea in him , for which he has learn'd the name already . a studious blind man , who had mightily beat his head about visible objects , and made use of the explication of his books and friends , to understand those names of light , and colours , which often came in his way ; brugg'd one day , that he now understood what scarlet signified . upon which his friend demanding , what scarlet was ? the blind man answered , it was like the sound of a trumpet . just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have , who hopes to get it only from a definition , or other words made use of to explain it . § . . the case is quite otherwise in complex ideas ; which consisting of several simple ones , it is in the power of words , s●anding for the several ideas that make that composition , to imprint complex ideas in the mind , which were never there before ; and so make their names be understood . in such collections of ideas , passing under one name , definitions , or the teaching the signification of one word , by several others , has place , and may make us understand the names of things , which never came within the reach of our senses ; and frame ideas su●table to those in other mens minds , when they use those names : provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas , which he to whom the explication is made , has never yet had in his thoughts . thus the word statue may be explained to a blind man by other words , when picture cannot , his senses having given him the idea of figure , but not of colours , which therefore words cannot excite in him . this gain'd the prize to the painter , against the statuary ; each of which contending for the excellency of his art , and the statuary bragging , that his was to be preferred , because it reached farther , and even those who had lost their eyes , could yet perceive the excellency of it . the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man ; who being brought where there was a statue made by the one , and a picture drawn by the other ; he was first led to the statue , in which he traced , with his hands , all the lineaments of the face and body ; and with great admiration , applauded the skill of the workman : but being led to the picture , and having his hands laid upon it , was told , that now he touched the head , and then the forehead , eyes , nose , &c. as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth , without finding any the least distinction : whereupon he cried out , that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship , which could represent to them all those parts , where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing . § . . he that should use the word rainbow , to one who knew all those colours , but yet had never seen that phaenomenon , would , by enumerating the figure , largeness , position , and order of the colours , so well define that word , that it might be perfectly understood . but yet that definition , how exact and perfect soever , would never make a blind man understand it ; because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one , being such as he never received by sensation and experience , no words are able to excite them in his mind . § . . simple ideas , as has been shewed , can only be got by experience , from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions . when by this means we have our minds stored with them , and know the names for them , then we are in a condition to define , and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them . but when any term stands for a simple idea , that a man has never yet had in his mind , it is impossible , by any words , to make known its meaning to him : when any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with , but is ignorant , that that term is the sign of it , there another name , of the the same idea which he has been accustomed to , may make him understand its meaning . but in no case whatsoever , is any name , of any simple idea , capable of a definition . fourthly , but though the names of simple ideas , have not the help of definition to determine their signification ; yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain , than those of mixed modes and substances . because they standing only for one simple perception , men , for the most part , easily and perfectly agree in their signification , and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning . he that knows once , that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow , or milk , will not be apt to misapply that word , as long as he retains that idea ; which when he has quite lost , he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it , but perceives he understands it not . there is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together , which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes ; nor a supposed , but an unknown real essence , with properties depending thereon , the precise number whereof , are also unknown , which makes the difficulty in the names of substances . but on the contrary , in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once , and consists not of parts , whereof more or less being put in , the idea may be varied , and so the signification of its name , be obscure , or uncertain . § . . fifthly , this farther may be observed , concerning simple ideas , and their names , that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali , ( as they call it , ) from the lowest species , to the summum genus . the reason whereof is , that the lowest species being but one simple idea , nothing can be left out of it , that so the difference being taken away , it may agree with some other thing in one common to them both ; which having one name , is the genus of the other two : v. g. there is nothing can be le●t out of the idea of white and red , to make them agree in one common appearance , and so have one general name ; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man , makes it agree with brute , in the more general idea and name of animal . and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations , men would comprehend both white and red , and several other such simple ideas , under one general name , they have been fain to do it by a word , which denotes only the way they get into the mind . for when white , red , and yellow , are all comprehended under the genus or name colour , it signifies no more , but such ideas , as are produced in the mind only by the sight , and have entrance only through the eyes . and when they would frame yet a more general term , to comprehend both colours and sounds , and the like simple ideas , they do it by a word , that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense : and so the general term quality , in its ordinary acception , comprehends colours , sounds , tastes , smells , and tangible qualities , with distinction from extension , number , motion , pleasure , and pain , which make impressions on the mind , and introduce their ideas by more senses than one . § . . sixthly , the names of simple ideas , substances , and mixed modes , have also this difference ; that those of mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary : those of substances , are not perfectly so ; but refer to a pattern , though with some latitude : and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things , and are not arbitrary at all . which what difference it makes in the significations of their names , we shall see in the following chapters . the names of simple modes , differ little from those of simple ideas . chap. v. of the names of mixed modes and relations . § . . the names of mixed modes being general , they stand , as has been shewn , for sorts or species of things , each of which has its peculiar essence . the essences of these species also , as has been shewed , are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind , to which the name is annexed . thus far the names and essences of mixed modes , have nothing but what is common to them , with other ideas : but if we take a little nearer survey of them , we shall find , that they have something peculiar , which , perhaps , may deserve our attention . § . . the first particularity i shall observe in them is , that the abstract ideas , or , if you please , the essences of the several species of mixed modes are made by the vnderstanding , wherein they differ from those of simple ideas : in which sort , the mind has no power to make any one , but only receives such as are presented to it , by the real existence of things operating upon it . § . . in the next place , these essences of the species of mixed modes , are not only made by the mind , but made very arbitrarily , made without patterns , or reference to any real existence . wherein they differ from those of substances , which carry with them the supposition of some real being , from which they are taken , and to which they are conformable . but in its complex ideas of mixed modes , the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly . it unites and retains certain collections , as so many distinct specifick ideas , whilst others , that as often occur in nature , and are as plainly suggested by outward things , pass neglected without particular names or specifications . nor does the mind , in these of mixed modes , as in the complex ideas of substances , examine them by the real existence of things ; or verifie them by patterns , containing such peculiar compositions in nature . to know whether his idea of adultery , or incest , be right , will a man seek it any where amongst things existing ? or is it true , because any one has been witness to such an action ? no : but it suffices here , that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea , that makes the archetype , and specifick idea , whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura , or no. § . . to understand this aright , we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists ; and that it is not in the making any new idea , but putting together those which the mind had before . wherein the mind does these three things : first , it chuses a certain number . secondly , it gives them connexion , and makes them into one idea . thirdly , it ties them together by a name . if we examine how the mind proceeds in these , and what liberty it takes in them , we shall easily observe , how these essences of the species of mixed modes , are the workmanship of the mind ; and consequently , that the species themselves are of men's making . § . . no body can doubt , but that these ideas of mixed modes , are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind , independent from any original patterns in nature , who will but reflect , that this sort of complex ideas may be made , abstracted , and have names given them , and so a species be constituted , before any one individual of that species ever existed . who can doubt , but the ideas of sacrilege , or adultery , might be framed in the mind of men , and have names given them ; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted , before either of them was ever committed ; and might be as well discoursed of , and reasoned about , and as certain truths discovered of them , whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding , as well as now that they have but too frequently a real existence ? whereby it is plain , how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the vnderstanding , where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truths and knowledge , as when they really exist : and we cannot doubt , but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions , which were only the creatures of their own understanding ; beings that had no other existence , but in their own minds . and , i think , no body can deny , but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind , before it really existed . § . . to see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind , we need but take a view of almost any of them . a little looking into them , will satisfie us , that 't is the mind , that combines several scattered independent ideas , into one complex one ; and by the common name it gives them , makes them the essence of a certain species , without regulating it self by any connexion they have in nature . for what greater connexion in nature , has the idea of a man , than the idea of a sheep with killing , that this is made a particular species of action , signified by the word murder , and the other not ? or what union is there in nature , between the idea of the relation of a father , with killing , than that of a son , or neighbour ; that these are combined into one complex idea , and thereby made the essence of the distinct species parricide , whilst the others make no distinct species at all ? but though they have made killing a man's father , or mother , a distinct species from killing his son , or daughter ; yet in some other cases , son and daughter are taken in too , as well as father and mother ; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species , as in that of incest . thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas , such as it finds convenient ; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature , are left loose , and never combined into one idea , because they have no need of one name . 't is evident then , that the mind , by its free choice , gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas ; which in nature have no more union with one another , than others that it leaves out : why else is the part of the weapon , the beginning of the wound is made with , taken notice of , to make the distinct species call'd stabbing , and the figure and matter of the weapon left out ? i do not say , this is done without reason , as we shall see more by and by : but this i say , that it is done by the free choice of the mind , pursuing its own ends ; and that therefore these species of mixed modes , are the workmanship of the understanding : and there is nothing more evident , than that for the most part , in the framing these ideas , the mind searches not its patterns in nature , nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things ; but puts such together , as may best serve its own purposes , without tying it self to a precise intimation of any thing that really exists . § . . but though these complex ideas , or essences of mixed modes , depend on the mind , and are made by it with great liberty ; yet they are not made at random , and jumbled together without any reason at all . though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature , yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made : and though they be combinations made of ideas , that are loose enough , and have as little union in themselves , as several other , to which the mind gives a connexion that combines them into one idea ; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication , which is the chief end of language . the use of language is , by short sounds to signifie with ease and dispatch general conceptions ; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained , but also a great variety of independent ideas , collected into one complex one . in the making therefore of the species of mixed modes , men have had regard only to such combinations , as they had occasion to mention one to another . those they have combined into distinct complex ideas , and given names to ; whilst others , that in nature have as near an union , are left loose and unregarded . for to go no farther than humane actions themselves , if they would make distinct abstract ideas , of all the varieties might be observed in them , the number must be infinite , and the memory confounded with the plenty , as well as overcharged to little purpose . it suffices , that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes , as they find they have occasion to have names for , in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs . if they join to the idea of killing , the idea of father , or mother , and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son , or neighbour , it is because of the distinct punishment , the one deserves different from the other , murther ; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name , which is the end of making that distinct combination . but though the ideas of mother and daughter , are so differently treated , in reference to the idea of killing , that the one is joined with it , to make a distinct abstract idea with a name , and so a distinct species , and the other not ; yet in respect of carnal knowledge , they are both taken in under incest ; and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name , and reckoning of one species , such unclean mixtures , as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others ; and this to avoid circumlocutions , and tedious descriptions . § . . a moderate skill in different languages , will easily satisfie one of the truth of this , it being so obvious to observe great store of words in one language , which have not any that answer them in another . which plainly shews , that those of one country , by their customs and manner of life , have found occasion to make several complex ideas , and give names to them , which others never collected into specifick ideas . this could not have happened , if these species were the steady workmanship of nature ; and not collections made and abstracted by the mind , in order to naming , and for the convenience of communication . the terms of our law , which are not empty sounds , will hardly find words that answer them in the spanish , or italian , no scanty languages ; much less , i think , could any one translate them into the caribee , or westoe tongues : and the versura of the romans , or corban of the iews , have no words in other languages to answer them : the reason whereof is plain , from what has been said . nay , if we will look a little more nearly into this matter , and exactly compare different languages , we shall find , that though they have words , which in translations and dictionaries , are supposed to answer one another ; yet there is scarce one of ten , amongst the names of complex ideas , especially of mixed modes , that stands for the same precise idea , which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendred by . there are no ideas more common , and less compounded , than the measures of time , extension , and weight , and the latin names hora , pes , libra , are , without difficulty , rendred by the english names , hour , foot , and po●nd : but yet there is nothing more evident , than that the ideas a roman annexed to these latin names , were very far different from those which an english-man expresses by those english ones . and if either of these should make use of the measures , that those of the other language design'd by their names , he would be quite out in his account . these are too sensible proofs to be doubted ; and we shall find this much more so , in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas ; such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses : whose names , when men come curiously to compare , with those they are translated into , in other languages , they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations . § . . the reason why i take so particular notice of this , is , that we may not be mistaken about genera , and species , and essences , as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature , and had a real existence in things ; when they appear , upon a more wary survey , to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding , for the easier signifying such collections of ideas , as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term ; under which , divers particulars , as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea , might be comprehended . and if the doubtful signification of the word species , may make it sound harsh to some , that i say , that the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding ; yet , i think , it can by no body be denied , that 't is the mind makes those abstract complex ideas , to which specifick names are given . and if it be true , as it is , that the mind makes these patterns , for sorting and naming of things , i leave it to be considered , who makes the boundaries of the sort , or species ; since with me , species and sort have no other difference , than that of a latin and english idiom . § . . the near relation that there is between species , essences , and their general names , at least in mixed modes , will farther appear , when we consider , that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences , and give them their lasting duration . for the connexion between the loose parts of those complex ideas , being made by the mind , this union , which has no particular foundation in nature , would cease again , were there not something that did , as it were , hold it together , and keep the parts from scattering . though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection , 't is the name which is , as it were , the knot , that ties them fast together . what a vast variety of different ideas , does the word triumphus hold together , and deliver to us as one species ! had this name been never made , or quite lost , we might , no doubt , have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity : but yet , i think , that which holds those different parts together , in the unity of one complex idea , is that very word annexed to it : without which , the several parts of that , would no more be thought to make one thing , than any other shew , which having never been made but once , had never been united into one complex idea , under one denomination . how much therefore , in mixed modes , the unity necessary to any essence , depends on the mind ; and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity , depends on the name in common use annexed to it , i leave to be considered by those who look upon essences and species , as real established things in nature . § . . suitable to this , we find , that men speaking of mixed modes , seldom imagine or take any other for species of them , but such as are set out by names : because they being of man's making only , in order to naming , no such species are taken notice of , or supposed to be , unless a name be joined to it , as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several loose ones ; and by that name , giving a lasting union to the parts , which would otherwise cease to have any , as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea , and ceased actually to think on it . but when a name is once annexed to it , wherein the parts of that complex idea have a setled and permanent union ; then is the essence , as it were , established , and the species look'd on as compleat . for to what purpose should the memory charge it self with such compositions , unless it were by abstraction to make them general ? and to what purpose make them general , unless it were , that they might have general names , for the convenience of discourse , and communication ? thus we see , that killing a man with a sword , or a hatchet , are looked on as no distinct species of action : but if the point of the sword first enter the body , it passes for a distinct species , where it has a distinct name , as in england , in whose language it is called stabbing : but in another country , where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name , it passes not for a distinct species . but in the species of corporeal substances , though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence : yet since those ideas , which are combined in it , are supposed to have an union in nature , whether the mind joins them or no , therefore those are looked on as distinct species , without any operation of the mind , either abstracting , or giving a name to that complex idea . § . . conformable also to what has been said , concerning the essences of the species of mixed modes , that they are the creatures of the understanding , rather than the works of nature : conformable , i say , to this , we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind , and no farther . when we speak of iustice , or gratitude , we frame to our selves no imagination of any thing existing , which we would conceive ; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those vertues , and look not farther , as they do , when we speak of an horse , or iron , whose specifick ideas we consider not , as barely in the mind , but as in things themselves , which afford the original patterns of those ideas : but in mixed modes , at least the most considerable part of them , which are moral beings , we consider the original patterns , as being in the mind ; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names . and hence i think it is , that these essences of the species of mixed modes , are by a more particular name called notions ; as by a peculiar right , appertaining to the understanding . § . . this also shews us the reason , why the complex ideas of mixed modes , are commonly more compounded , and decompounded , than those of natural substances . because they being the workmanship of the understanding , pursuing only its own ends , and the conveniency of expressing in short , those ideas it would make known to another , does with great liberty unite often into one abstract idea , things that in their nature have no coherence ; and so under one term , bundle together a great variety of compounded , and decompounded ideas . thus the name of procession , what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons , habits , tapers , orders , motions , sounds , does it contain in that complex one , which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together , to express by that one name ? whereas the complex ideas of the sorts of substances , are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones ; and in the species of animals , those two , viz. shape and voice , commonly make the whole nominal essence . § . . another thing we may observe from what has been said , is , that the names of mixed modes always signifie ( when they have any distinct signification ) the real essences of their species . for these abstract ideas , being the workmanship of the mind , and not referred to the real existence of things , there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name , but barely that complex idea the mind it self has formed , which is all it would have express'd by it ; and is that , on which all the properties of the species depend , and from which alone they all flow : and so in these , the real and nominal essence is the same ; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truths , we shall see hereafter . § . . this also may shew us the reason , why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got , before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known . because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of , but what have names ; and those species , or rather their essences , being abstract complex ideas , made arbitrarily by the mind , it is convenient , if not necessary , to know the names , before one endeavour to frame these complex ideas : unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas , which others having no names for , he has nothing to do with , but to lay by , and forget again . i confess , that in the beginning of languages , it was necessary to have the idea , before one gave it the name : and so it is still , where making a new complex idea , one also by giving it a new name , makes a new word . but this concerns not languages made , which have generally pretty well provided for ideas , which men have frequent occasion to have , and communicate : and in such , i ask , whether it be not the ordinary method , that children learn the names of mixed modes , before they have their ideas ? what one of a thousand ever frames the abstract idea of glory or ambition , before he has heard the names of them . in simple ideas and substances , i confess it is otherwise ; which being such ideas , as have a real existence and union in nature , the ideas , or names , are gotten one before the other , as it happens . what has been said here of mixed modes , is with very little difference applicable also to relations ; which since every man himself may observe , i may spare my self the pains to enlarge on : especially , since what i have here said concerning words in this third book , will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a subject required . i allow , it might be brought into a narrower compass : but i was willing to stay my reader on an argument , that appears to me new , and a little out of the way , ( i am sure 't is one , i thought not of , when i began to write , ) that by searching it to the bottom , and turning it on every side , some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts , and give occasion to the most averse , or negligent , to reflect on a general miscarriage ; which , though of great consequence , is little taken notice of . when it is considered , what a pudder is made about essences , and how much all sorts of knowledge , discourse , and conversation , are pester'd , and disorder'd by the careless , and confused use and application of words , it will , perhaps , be thought worth while throughly to lay it open . and i shall be pardon'd , if i have dwelt long on an argument , which i think therefore needs to be inculcated ; because the faults , men are usually guilty of in this kind , are not only the greatest hinderances of true knowledge ; but are so well thought of , as to pass for it . men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth , or possibly none at all , is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swell'd with ; if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds , and observe what ideas are , or are not comprehended under those words , with which they are so armed at all points , and with which they so confidently lay about them . i shall imagine i have done some service to truth , peace , and learning , if , by any enlargement on this subject , i can make men reflect on their own use of language ; and give them reason to suspect , that since it is frequent for others , it may also be possible for them , to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths , and writings , with very uncertain , little , or no signification . and therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves , and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others . with this design therefore , i shall go on with what i have farther to say , concerning this matter . chap. vi. of the names of substances . § . . the common names of substances , as well as other general terms , stand for sorts : which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas , wherein several particular substances do , or might agree , by virtue of which , they are capable to be comprehended in one common conception , and be signified by one name . i say , do or might agree : for though there be but one sun existing in the world , yet the idea of it being abstracted , so as that more substances ( if there were several ) might each agree in it ; it is as much a sort , as if there were as many suns , as there are stars . they want not their reasons , who think there are , and that each fixed star , would answer the idea the name sun stands for , to one who were placed in a due distance . which , by the way , may shew us how much the sorts , or , if you please , genera and species of things ( for those latin terms signifie to me , no more than the english word sort ) depend on such collections of ideas , as men have made ; and not on the real nature of things : since 't is not impossible , but that in propriety of speech , that might be a sun to one , which is a star to another . § . . the measure and boundary of each sort , or species , whereby it is constituted that particular sort , and distinguished from others , is that we call its essence , which is nothing but that abstract idea , to which the name is annexed : so that every thing contained in that idea , is essential to that sort. this , though it be all the essence of natural substances , that we know , or by which we distinguish them into sorts ; yet i call it by a peculiar name , the nominal essence , to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances , upon which depends this nominal essence , and all the properties of that sort ; which therefore , as has been said , may be called the real essence : v. g. the nominal essence of gold , is that complex idea the word gold stands for , let it be , for instance , a body yellow , of a certain weight , malleable , fusible , and fixed . but the real essence , is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body , on which those qualities , and all the other properties of gold depend . how far these two are different , though they are both called essence , is obvious , at ●irst sight , to discover . § . . for though , perhaps , voluntary motion , with sense and reason , join'd to a body of a certain shape , be the complex idea , to which i , and others , annex the name man ; and so be the nominal essence of the species so called : yet no body will say , that that complex idea , is the real essence and source of all those operations , are to be found in any individual of that sort. the foundation of all those qualities , which are the ingredients of our complex idea , is something quite different : and had we such a knowledge , of that constitution of man , from which his faculties of moving , sensation , and reasoning , and other powers flow ; and on which his so regular shape depends , as 't is possible angels have , and 't is certain his maker has , we should have a quite other idea of his essence , than what now is contained in our definition of that species , be it what it will : and our idea of any individual man , would be as far different from what it now is , as is his , who knows all the springs and wheels , and other contrivances within , of the famous clock at strasburg , is from that which a gazing country-man has of it , who barely sees the motion of the hand , and hears the clock strike , and observes only some of the outward appearances . § . . how much essence , in the ordinary use of the word , relates to sorts , and that it is considered in particular beings , no farther than as they are ranked into sorts , appears from hence : that take but away the abstract ideas , by which we sort individuals , and rank them under common names , and then the thought of any thing essential to any of them , instantly vanishes : we have no notion of the one , without the other : which plainly shews their relation . 't is necessary for me to be as i am ; god and nature has made me so : but there is nothing i have , is essential to me . an accident , or disease , may very much alter my colour , or shape ; a fever , or fall , may take away my reason , or memory , or both ; and an apoplex leave neither sense , nor understanding , no nor life . other creatures of my shape , may be made with more , and better , or fewer , and worse faculties than i have : and others may have reason , and sense , in a shape and body very different from mine . none of these are essential to the one , or the other , or to any individual whatsoever , till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things ; and then presently , according to the abstract idea of that sort , something is found essential . let any one examine his own thoughts , and he will find , that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential , the consideration of some species , or the complex idea , signified by some general name , comes into his mind : and 't is in reference to that , that this or that quality is said to be essential ; so that if it be asked , whether it be essential to me , or any other particular corporeal being to have reason ? i say no ; nor more than it is essential to this white thing i write on , to have words in it . but if that particular being , be to be counted of the sort man , and to have that name man given it , then reason is essential to it , supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for : as it is essential to this thing i write on , to contain words , if i will give it the name treatise , and rank it under that species . so that essential , and not essential , relate only to our abstract ideas , and the names annexed to them ; which amounts to no more but this , that whatever particular thing , has not in it those qualities , which are contained in the abstract idea , which any general term stands for , cannot be ranked under that species , nor be called by that name , since that abstract idea is the very essence of the species . § . . thus if the idea of body , with some people , be bare extension , or space , then solidity is not essential to body : if others make the idea , to which they give the name body , to be solidity and extension , then solidity is essential also to body . that therefore , and that alone is considered as essential , which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for , without which , no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort , nor be entituled to that name . should there be found a parcel of matter , that had all the other qualities that are in iron , but wanted obedience to the loadstone ; and would neither be drawn by it , nor receive direction from it , would any one question , whether it wanted any thing essential ? it would be absurd to ask , whether a thing really existing , wanted any thing essential to it . or could it be demanded , whether this made an essential or specifick difference , or no ; since we have no other measure of essential , or specifick , but our abstract ideas ? and to talk of specifick differences in nature , without reference to general ideas and names , is to talk unintelligibly . for i would ask any one , what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature , between any two particular beings , without any regard had to some abstract idea , which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species ? all such patterns and standards , being quite laid aside , particular beings , considered barely in themselves , will be found to have all their qualities equally essential ; and every thing , in each individual , will be essential to it , or , which is more true , nothing at all . for though it may reasonably be asked , whether obeying the magnet , be essential to iron ? yet , i think , it is very improper and insignificant to ask , whether it be essential to that particular parcel of matter i cut my pen with , without considering it under the name iron , or as being of a certain species ? and if , as has been said , our abstract ideas , which have names annexed to them , are the boundaries of species , nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas . § . . 't is true , i have often mentioned a real essence , distinct in substances , from those abstract ideas of them , which i call their nominal essences . by this real essence , i mean , that real constitution of any thing , which is the foundation of all those properties , that are combined in , and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence ; that particular constitution , which every thing has within it self , without any relation to any thing without it . but essence , even in this sense , relates to a sort , and supposes a species : for being that real constitution , on which the properties depend , it necessarily supposes a sort of things , properties belonging only to species , and not to individuals : v. g. supposing the nominal essence of gold , to be a body of such a peculiar colour and weight , with malleability and fusibility , the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter , on which these qualities , and their union , depend ; and is also the foundation of its solubility in aq. regia , and other properties accompanying that complex idea . here are essences and properties , but all upon supposition of a sort , or general abstract idea , which is considered as immutable : but there is no individual parcel of matter , to which any of these qualities are so annexed , as to be essential to it , or inseparable from it . that which is essential , belongs to it as a condition , whereby it is of this or that sort : but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea , and there is nothing necessary to it , nothing inseparable from it . indeed , as to the real essences of substances , we only suppose their being , without precisely knowing what they are . but that which annexes them still to the species , is the nominal essence , of which they are the supposed foundation and cause . § . . the next thing to be considered is , by which of those essences it is , that substances are determined into sorts , or species ; and that 't is evident , is by the nominal essence . for 't is that alone , that the name , which is the mark of the sort , signifies . 't is impossible therefore , that any thing should determine the sorts of things , which we rank under general names , but that idea , which that name is design'd as a mark for ; which is that , as has been shewn , which we call the nominal essence . why do we say , this is an horse , and that a mule ; this is an animal , that an herb ? how comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort , but because it has that nominal essence ? or , which is all one , agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to ? and i desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts , when he hears or speaks any of those , or other names of substances , to know what sort of essences they stand for . § . . and that the species of things to us , are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names , according to the complex ideas in us ; and not according to precise , distinct , real essences in them , is plain from hence ; that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort , called by one common name , and so received as being of one species , have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions , as far different one from another , as from others , from which they are accounted to differ specifically . this , as it is easie to be observed by all , who have to do with natural bodies ; so chymists especially , are often , by sad experience , convinced of it , when they , sometimes in vain , seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur , antimony , or vitriol , which they have found in others . for though they are bodies of the same species , having the same nominal essence , under the same name ; yet do they often , upon severe ways of examination , betray qualities , so different one from another , as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chymists . but if things were distinguished into species , according to their real essences , it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species , as it is to find different properties in two circles , or two equilateral triangles . that is properly the essence to us , which determines every particular to this or that classis ; or , which is the same thing , to this or that general name : and what can that be else , but that abstract idea , to which that name is annexed ? and so has , in truth , a reference , not so much to the being of particular things , as to their general denominations . § . . nor indeed can we rank , and sort things , and consequently ( which is the end of sorting ) denominate them by their real essences , because we know them not . our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances , than a collection of those sensible ideas , which we observe in them : which however made with the greatest diligence , and exactness we are capable of ; yet our complex idea is more remote from the true internal constitution , from which those qualities flow , than , as i said , a countryman's idea is , from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at strasburg , whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions . there is not so contemptible a plant , or animal , that does not confound the most inlarged understanding . though the familiar use of things about us , take off our wonder ; yet it cures not our ignorance . when we come to examine the stones , we tread on ; or the iron , we daily handle , we presently find , we know not their make ; and can give no reason , of the different qualities we find in them . 't is evident the internal constitution , whereon their properties depend , is unknown to us . for to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them , what is that texture of parts ? that real essence , that makes lead , and antimony susible ; wood , and stones not ? what makes lead , and iron malleable ; antimony , and stones not ? and yet how infinitely these come short , of the fine contrivances , and unconceivable real essences of plants and animals , every one knows . the workmanship of the all-wise , and powerful god , in the great fabrick of the universe , and every part thereof , farther exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man ; than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man , doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures . therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts , and dispose them into certain classes , under names , by their real essences , that are so far from our comprehensions . a blind man may as soon sort things by their colours , and he that has lost his smell , as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odors , as by those internal constitutions he knows not . he that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences , that are unknown to him , may be pleased to try his skill in those species , called cassiwary , and querechinchio ; and by their internal real essences , determine the boundaries of those species , without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities , that each of those names stands for , in the countries where those animals are to be found . § . . those therefore who have been taught , that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms ; and that it was those forms , which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera , were led yet farther out of the way , by having their minds set upon fruitless enquiries after substantial forms , wholly unintelligible , and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure , or confused conception in general . § . . that our ranking , and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes , and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves , is farther evident from our ideas of spirits . for the mind getting , only by reflecting on its own operations , those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits , it hath , or can have no other notion of spirit , but by attributing all those operations , it finds in it self , to a sort of beings , without consideration of matter . and even the most advanced notion we have of god , is but attributing the same simple ideas we have got from reflection , on what we find in our selves ; and which we conceive to have more perfection in them , than would be in their absence , attributing , i say , those simple ideas to him in an unlimited degree . thus having got from reflecting on our selves , the idea of existence , knowledge , power , and pleasure , each of which we find it better to have than to want ; and the more we have of each , the better , joining all these together , with infinity to each of them , we have the complex idea of an eternal , omniscient , omnipotent , infinitely wise , and happy being . and though we are told , that there are different species of angels ; yet we know not how to frame distinct specifick ideas of them ; not out of any conceit , that the existence of more species than one of spirits , is impossible : but because having no more simple ideas ( nor being able to frame more ) applicable to such being , but only those few , taken from our selves , and from the actions of our own minds in thinking , and being delighted , and moving several parts of our bodies ; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits , one from another , but by attributing those operations and powers , we find in our selves to them , in a higher or lower degree ; and so have neither distinct specifick ideas of spirits , except only of god , to whom we attribute both duration , and all those other ideas with infinity ; to the other spirits , with limitation , amongst which , we make no distinction : nor do we , between god and them in our ideas , put any difference by any number of simple ideas , which we have of one , and not of the other , but only that of infinity . all the particular ideas of existence , knowledge , will , power , and motion , &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds , we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits , with the difference only of degrees , to the utmost we can imagine , even infinity , when we would frame , as well as we can , an idea of the first being ; who yet , 't is certain , is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature , from the highest and perfectest of all created beings , much more from what our narrow understandings can conceive of him , than the greatest man , nay , purest seraphim , is from the most contemptible part of matter . § . . it is not impossible to conceive , nor repugnant to reason , that there may be many species of spirits , as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties , whereof we have no ideas , as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another , by qualities , which we know , and observe in them . that there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us , than there are of sensible and material below us , is probable to me from hence ; that in all the visible corporeal world , we see no chasms , or gaps . all quite down from us , the descent is by easie steps , and a continued series of things , that in each remove , differ very little one from the other . there are fishes that have wings , and are not strangers to the airy region : and there are some birds , that are inhabitants of the water ; whose bloud is cold as fishes , and their flesh in taste so near akin , that the scrupulous are allow'd them on fish-days . there are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts , that they are in the middle between both : amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatique together ; seales live at land and at sea , and porpoises have the warm bloud and entrails of an hog , not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids , or sea-men . there are some brutes , that seem to have as much knowledge and reason , as some that are called men : and the animal and vegetable kingdoms , are so nearly join'd , that if you will take the lowest of one , and the highest of the other , there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them ; and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter , we shall find every-where , that the several species are linked together , and differ but in almost insensible degrees . and when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the maker , we have reason to think , that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe , and the great design and infinite goodness of the architect , that the species of creatures should also , by gentle degrees , ascend upward from us towards his infinite perfection , as we see they gradually descend from us downwards : which if it be probable , we have reason then to be perswaded , that there are far more species of creatures above us , than there are beneath ; we being , in degrees of perfection , much more remote from the infinite being of god , than we are from the lowest state of being , and that which approaches nearest to nothing . and yet of all those distinct species , for the reasons above-said , we have no di - ideas . § . . but to return to the species of corporeal substances . if i should ask any one , whether ice and water were two distinct species of things , i doubt not but i should be answered in the affirmative : and it cannot be denied , but he that says they are two distinct species , is in the right . but if an english-man , bred in iamaica , who , perhaps , had never seen nor heard of ice , coming into england in the winter , find the water he put in his bason at night , in a great part frozen in the morning ; and not knowing any peculiar name it had , should call it harden'd water ; i ask , whether this would be a new species to him , different from water ? and , i think , it would be answered here , it would not to him be a new species , no more than congealed gelly , when it is cold , is a distinct species , from the same gelly fluid and warm ; or than liquid gold , in the fornace , is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman . and if this be so , 't is plain , that our distinct species , are nothing but distinct complex ideas , with distinct names annexed to them . 't is true , every substance that exists , has its peculiar constitution , whereon depend those sensible qualities , and powers , we observe in it : but the ranking of things into species , which is nothing but sorting them under several titles , is done by us , according to the ideas that we have of them : which though sufficient to distinguish them by names ; so that we may be able to discourse of them , when we have them not present before us : yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions , and that things existing , are distinguished , by nature , into species by real essences , according as we distinguish them into species by names , we shall be liable to great mistakes . § . . to distinguish substantial beings into species , according to the usual supposition , that there are certain precise essences or forms of things , whereby all the individuals existing , are , by nature , distinguished into species , these things are necessary : § . . first , to be assured , that nature , in the production of things , always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences , which are to be the models of all things to be produced . this , in that crude sense , it is usually proposed , would need some better explication , before it can fully be assented to . § . . secondly , it would be necessary to know , whether nature always attains that essence , it designs in the production of things . the irregular and monstrous births , that in divers sorts of animals have been observed , will always give us reason to doubt of one , or both of these . § . . thirdly , it ought to be determined , whether those we call monsters , be really a distinct species , according to the scholastick notion of the word species ; since it is certain , that every thing that exists , has its particular constitution : and yet we find , that some of these monstrous productions , have few or none of those qualities , which are supposed to result from , and accompany the essence of that species , from whence they derive their originals , and to which , by their descent , they seem to belong . § . . fourthly , the real essences of those things , which we distinguish into species , and as so distinguished , we name , ought to be known ; i. e. we ought to have ideas of them . but since we are ignorant in these four points , the supposed real essences of things , stand us not in stead , for the distinguishing substances into species . § . . fifthly , the only imaginable help in this case , would be , that having framed perfect complex ideas , of the properties of things , flowing from their different real essences , we should thereby distinguish them into species . but neither can this be done : for being ignorant of the real essence it self , it is impossible to know all those properties , that flow from it , and are so annexed to it , that any one of them being away , we may certainly conclude , that that essence is not there , and so the thing is not of that species . we can never know what are the precise number of properties , depending on the real essence of gold , any one of which failing , the real essence of gold , and consequently gold , would not be there , unless we knew the real essence of gold it self , and by that determined that species . by the word gold here , i must be understood to design a particular piece of matter ; v. g. the last guinea that was coin'd . for if it should stand here in its ordinary signification for that complex idea , which i , or any one else calls gold ; i. e. for the nominal essence of gold , it would be iargon : so hard is it , to shew the various meaning and imperfection of words , when we have nothing else but words to do it by . § . . by all which it is clear , that our distinguishing substances into species by names , is not at all founded on their real essences ; nor can we pretend to range , and determine them exactly into species , according to internal essential differences . § . . but since , as is aforesaid , we have need of general words , tho' we know not the real essences of things ; all we can do , is to collect such a number of simple ideas , as by examination , we find to be united together in things existing , and thereof to make one complex idea ; which though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists , is yet the specifick essence , to which our name belongs , and is convertible with it ; by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences . for example , there be that say , that the essence of body is extension : if it be so , we can never mistake , in putting the essence of any thing for the thing it self . let us then in discourse , put extension for body ; and when we would say , that body moves , let us say , that extension moves , and see how it will look : and he that should say , that one extension , by impulse moves another extension , would , by the bare expression , sufficiently shew the absurdity of such a notion . the essence of any thing , in respect of us , is the whole complex idea , comprehended and marked by that name ; and in substances , besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up , the confused one of substance , or of an unknown support and cause of their union , is always a part : and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension , but an extended solid thing ; and so to say , an extended solid thing moves , or impels another , is all one , and as intelligible , as to say , body moves , or impels . likewise , to say , that a rational animal is capable of conversation , is all one , as to say , a man. but no one will say , that rationality is capable of conversation , because it makes not the whole essence , to which we give the name man. § . . there are creatures in the world , that have shapes like ours , but are hairy , and want language , and reason . there are naturals amongst us , that have perfectly our shape , but want reason , and some of them language too . there are creatures , as 't is said , ( sit fides penes authorem , but there appears no contradiction , that there should be such , ) that with language , and reason , and a shape in other things agreeing with ours , have hairy tails ; others where the males have no beards , and others where the females have . if it be asked , whether these be all men , or no , all of humane species ; 't is plain , the question refers only to the nominal essence : for those to whom the definition of the word man , or the complex idea , signified by that name , agrees , they are men , and the other not . but if the enquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence ; and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different , it is wholly impossible for us to answer , no part of that going into our specifick idea : only we have reason to think , that where the faculties , or outward frame so much differs , the internal constitution is not exactly the same : but what difference in the internal real constitution , makes a specifick difference , is in vain to enquire ; whilst our measures of species , be , as they are , only our abstract ideas , which we know ; and not that internal constitution , which makes no part of them . shall the difference of hair only on the skin , be a mark of a different internal specifick constitution between a changeling and a drill , when they agree in shape , and want of reason , and speech ? and shall not the want of reason and speech , be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species , between a changeling , and a reasonable man ? and so of the rest , if we pretend , that the distinction of species is fixedly established by the real frame , and secret constitutions of things . § . . nor let any one say , that the real species of animals , are distinguished by a power of propagation , by the mixture of male and female , and plants by seeds , for this would help us no farther , than in the distinction of the species of animals , and vegetables : what must we do for the rest ? nor is it sufficient in them : for if history lie not , women have conceived by drills , ; and what real species , by that measure , such a production will be in nature , will be a new question ; and we have reason to think this not impossible , since mules , and gimars , the one from the mixture of an horse , and an ass , the other from the mixture of a bull , and a mare , are so frequent in the world. i once saw a creature , that was the issue of a cat , and a rat , and had the plain marks of both about it ; wherein nature appear'd to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone , but to have jumbled them both together . § . . upon the whole matter , 't is evident , that 't is their own collections of sensible qualities , that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances ; and that their real internal structures , are not considered by the greatest part of men , in the sorting them ; much less any substantial forms were ever thought on by any , but those who have in this one part of the world , learned the language of the schools : and yet those ignorant men , who pretend not any insight into the real essences , nor trouble themselves about substantial forms , but are content with knowing things one from another , by their sensible qualities , are often better acquainted with their differences ; can more nicely distinguish them for their uses ; and better know what they may expect from each , than those learned quick-sighted men , who look so deep into them , and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential . § . . but supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable , by those , that would severely apply themselves to that enquiry ; yet we could not reasonably think , that the ranking of things under general names , was regulated by those internal real constitutions , or any thing else but their obvious appearances : since languages , in all countries , have been established long before sciences ; so that they have not been philosophers , or logicians , or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences , that have made the general names , that are in use amongst the severel nations of men : but those , more or less comprehensive terms , have , for the most part , in all languages , received their birth and signification , from ignorant and illiterate people ; who sorted and denominated things , by those sensible qualities they found in them , thereby to signifie them , when absent to others , whether they had an occasion to mention a sort , or a particular thing . § . . since then it is evident , that we sort and name substances by their nominal , and not by their real essences , the next thing to be considered is , how , and by whom these essences come to be made . as to the latter , 't is evident they are made by the mind , and not by nature : for were they nature's workmanship , they could not be so various and different in several men , as 't is evident they are . for if we will examine it , we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances , in all men the same ; no not of that , which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with . it could not possibly be , that the abstract idea , to which the name man is given , should be different in several men , if it were of nature's making ; and that to one it should be animal rationale , and to another animal implume bipes latis unguibus . he that annexes the name man , to a complex idea , made up of sense and spontaneous motion , join'd to a body of such a shape , has thereby one essence of the species man : and he that , upon farther examination , adds rationality , has another essence of the species he calls man : by which means , the same individual will be a true man to the one , which is not so to the other . i think , there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure , so well known , to be the essential difference of the species man ; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals , rather by their shape , than descent , is very visible ; since it has been more than once debated , whether several humane foetus should be preserved , or received to baptism , or no , only because of the difference of their outward configuration , from the ordinary make of children , without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason , as infants cast in another mold : some whereof , though of an approved shape , are never capable of as much appearance of reason , all their lives , as is to be found in an ape , or an elephant ; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. whereby it is evident , that the outward figure , which only was found wanting , and not the faculty of reason , which no body could know would be wanting in its due season , was made essential to the humane species . the learned divine and lawyer , must , on such occasions , renounce his sacred definition of animal rationale , and substitute some other essence of the humane species . § . . wherein then , would i gladly know , consists the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species ? 't is plain , if we examine , there is no such thing made by nature , and established by her amongst men. the real essence of that , or any other sort of substances , 't is evident we know not : and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences , which we make our selves , that if several men were to be asked , concerning some odly-shaped foetus , as soon as born , whether it were a man , or no ; 't is past doubt , one should meet with different answers : which could not happen , if the nominal essences , whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances , were not made by man , with some liberty ; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature , whereby it distinguish'd all substances into certain species . who would undertake to resolve , what species that monster was of , which is mentioned by licetus , lib. . c. . with a man's head , and hog's body ? or those other , which to the bodies of men , had the heads of beasts , as dogs , horses , &c. if any of these creatures had lived , and could have spoke , it would have increased the difficulty . had the upper part , to the middle , been of humane shape , and all below swine ; had it been murther to destroy it ? or must the bishop have been consulted , whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font , or no ? as i have been told it happen'd in france some years since , in somewhat a like case . so uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us , who have no other measures , than the complex ideas of our own collecting : and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is ; though , perhaps , it will be judged great ignorance , to make any doubt about it . and yet , i think , i may say , that the certain boundaries of that species , are so far from being determined , and the precise number of simple ideas , which make that nominal essence , so far from being setled , and perfectly known , that very material doubts may still arise about it : and i imagine , none of the definitions , of the word man , we yet have , nor descriptions of that sort of animal , so perfect and exact , as to satisfie a considerate inquisitive person ; much less to obtain a general consent , and to be that which men would everywhere stick by , in the decision of cases , and determining of life and death , baptism or no baptism , in productions that might happen . § . . but though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind , they are not yet made so arbitrarily , as those of mixed modes . to the making of any nominal essence , it is necessary , first , that the ideas whereof it consists , have such an union , as to make but one idea , how compounded soever . secondly , that the particular ideas so united , be exactly the same , neither more nor less . for if two abstract complex ideas , differ either in number , or sorts , of their component parts , they make two different , and not one and the same essence . in the first of these , the mind , in making its complex ideas of substances , only follows nature ; and puts none together , which are not supposed to have an union in nature . no body joins the voice of a sheep , with the shape of an horse ; nor the colour of lead , with the weight and fixedness of gold , to be the complex ideas of any real substances ; unless he has a mind to fill his head with chim●ra's , and his discourse with unintelligible words . men , observing certain qualities always join'd and existing together , therein copied nature ; and of ideas so united , made their complex ones of substances . for though men may make what complex ideas they please , and give what names to them they will ; yet if they will be understood , when they speak of things really existing , they must , in some degree , conform their ideas , to the things they would speak of : or else mens language will be like that of babel ; and every man's words , being intelligible only to himself , would no longer serve to conversation , and the ordinary affairs of life , if the ideas they stand for , be not some way answering the common appearances , and agreement of substances , as they really exist . § . . secondly , though the mind of man , in making its complex ideas of substances , never puts any together , that do not really , or are not supposed to co-exist ; and so it truly borrows that union from nature : yet the number it combines , depends upon the various care , industry , or fansie of him that makes it . men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities ; and often , if not always , leave out others as material , and as firmly united , as those that they take . of sensible substances , there are two sorts ; one of organiz'd bodies , which are propagated by seeds ; and in these , the shape is that , which to us is the leading quality , and most characteristical part , that determines the species : and therefore in vegetables and animals , an extended solid substance of such , a certain figure usually serves the turn . for however some men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale , yet should there a creature be found , that had language and reason , but partaked not of the usual shape of a man , i believe it would hardly pass for a man , how much soever it were animal rationale . and if baalam's ass had , all his life , discoursed as rationally , as he did once with his master , i doubt yet , whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man , or allow'd him to be of the same species with himself . as in vegetables and animals 't is the shape , so in most other bodies , not propagated by seed , 't is the colour we most fix on , and are most led by . thus where we find the colour of gold , we are apt to imagine all the other qualities , comprehended in our complex idea , to be there also : and we commonly take these two obvious qualities , viz. shape and colour , for so presumptive ideas of several species , that in a good picture , we readily say , this is a lion , and that a rose ; this is a gold , and that a silver goblet , only by the different figures and colours , represented to the eye by the pencil . § . . but though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions , and unaccurate ways of talking and thinking ; yet men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas , or qualities , belonging to any sort of things , signified by its name . nor is it a wonder , since it requires much time , pains , and skill , strict enquiry , and long examination , to find out what , and how many those simple ideas are , which are constantly and inseparably united in nature , and are always to be found together in the same subject . most men , wanting either time , inclination , or industry enough for this , even to some tolerable degree , content themselves with some few obvious , and outward appearances of things , thereby readily to distinguish , and sort them for the common affairs of life : and so , without farther examination , give them names , or take up the names already in use . which though in common conversation , they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing , are yet far enough from comprehending , in a setled signification , a precise number of simple ideas ; much less all those , which are united in nature . he that shall consider , after so much stir , about genus and species , and such a deal of talk of specifick differences , how few words we have yet setled definitions of , may , with reason , imagine , that those forms , there hath been so much noise made about , are only chimaeras , which give us no light into the specifick natures of things● and he that shall consider , how far the names of substances are from having significations , wherein all who use them do agree , will have reason to conclude , that though the nominal essences of substances , are all supposed to be copied from nature● yet they are all , or most of them , very imperfect . since the composition of those complex ideas , are , in seveveral men , very different : and therefore , that these boundaries of species , are as men , and not as nature makes them , if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds . 't is true , that many particular substances are so made by nature , that they have agreement and likeness one with another , and so afford a fundation of being ranked into sorts . but the sorting of things by us , or the making of determinate species , being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms , i cannot see how it can be properly said , that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things : or if it be so , our boundaries of species , are not exactly conformable to those in nature . for we , having need of general names for present use , stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities , which would best shew us their most material differences and agreements ; but we our selves divide them , by certain obvious appearances , into species , that we may the easier , under general names , communicate about them . for having no other knowledge of any substance , but of the simple ideas , that are united in it ; and observing several particular things , to agree with others , in several of those simple ideas , we make that collection our specifick idea , and give it a general name ; that in recording our own thoughts , and discourse with others , we may , in one short word , design all the individuals that agree in that complex idea , without enumerating the simple ideas , that make it up ; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions : which we see they are fain to do , who would discourse of any new sort of things , they have not yet a name for . § . . but however , these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation , it is plain enough , that this complex idea , wherein they observe several individuals to agree , is , by different men , made very differently ; by some more , and others less accurately . in some , this complex idea contains a greater , and in others a smaller number of qualities ; and so is apparently such as the mind makes it . the yellow shining colour , makes gold to children ; others add weight , malleableness , and fusibility ; and others yet other qualities , they find joined with that yellow colour , as constantly as its weight or fusibility . for in all these , and the like qualities , one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance , wherein they are all join'd , as another . and therefore different men leaving out , or putting in several simple ideas , which others do not , according to their various examination , skill , or observation of that subject , have different essences of gold ; which must therefore be of their own , and not of nature's making . § . . if the number of simple ideas , that make the nominal essence of the lowest species , or first sorting of individuals , depend on the mind of man , variously collecting them , it is much more evident , that they do so , in the more comprehensive classes , which ; by the masters of logick , are called genera , which are complex ideas designedly imperfect ; out of which , are purposely left out several of those qualities , that are to be found in the things themselves . for as the mind , to make general ideas , comprehending several particulars , leaves out those of time , and place , and such other , that make them incommunicable to more than one individual , so to make other yet more general ideas , that may comprehend different sorts , it leaves out those qualities , that distinguish them , and puts into its new collection , only such ideas , as are common to several sorts . the same convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter coming from guiny , and peru , under one name , sets them also upon making of one name , that may comprehend both gold , and silver , and some other bodies of different sorts , which it does by the same way of leaving out those qualities , which are peculiar to each sort ; and retaining a complex idea , made up of those , that are common to each species : to which the name metal being annexed , there is a genus constituted ; the essence whereof being that abstract idea , containing only malleableness and fusibility , with certain degrees of weight and fixedness , wherein bodies of several kinds agree , leaves out the colour , and other qualities peculiar to gold , and silver , and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal . whereby it is plain , that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature , when they make their general ideas of substances ; since there is no body to be found , which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it , without other qualities as inseparable as those . but men , in making their general ideas , seeking more the convenience of language , and quick dispatch , by short and comprehensive signs , than the true and precise nature of things , as they exist , have , in the framing their abstract ideas , chiefly pursued that end , which was to be furnished with store of general , and variously comprehensive names . so that in this whole business of genera and species , the genus , or more comprehensive , is but a partial conception of what is in the species , and the species , but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual . if therefore any one will think , that a man , and an horse , and an animal , and a plant , &c. are distinguished by real essences made by nature , he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences , making one for body , another for an animal , and another for an horse ; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon bucephalus . but if we would rightly consider what is done , in all these genera and species , or sorts , we should find , that there is no new thing made , but only more or less comprehensive signs ; whereby we may be enabled to express , in a few syllables , great number of particular things , as they agree in more or less general conceptions , which we have framed to that purpose . in all which , we may observe , that the more general term , is always the name of a less complex idea ; and that each genus , is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it . so that if these abstract general ideas , be thought to be complete , it can only be in respect of a certain established relation , between them and certain names , which are made use of to signifie them ; and not in respect of any thing existing , as made by nature . § . . this is adjusted to the true end of speech , which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions . for thus he , that would make and discourse of things , as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and solidity , needed but use the word body , to denote all such . he that , to these , would join others , signified by the words life , sense , and spontaneous motion , needed but use the word animal , to signifie all which partaked of those ideas : and he that had made a complex idea of a body , with life , sense , and motion , with the faculty of reasoning , and a certain shape joined to it , needed but use the short monosyllable man , to express all particulars that corresponded to that complex idea . this is the proper business of genus and species : and this men do , without any consideration of real essences , or substantial forms , which come not within the reach of our knowledge , when we think of those things ; nor within the signification of our words , when we discourse with others . § . . were i to talk with any one , of a sort of birds , i lately saw in st. iames's park , about three or four foot high , with a covering of something between feathers and hair , of a dark brown colour , without wings , but in the place thereof , two or three little branches , coming down like sprigs of spanish broom ; long great legs , with feet only of three claws , and without a tail ; i must make this description of it , and so may make others understand me : but when i am told , that the name of it is cassuaris , i may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea mentioned in that description ; though by that word , which is now become a specifick name , i know no more of the real essence , or constitution of that sort of animals , than i did before ; and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds , before i learn'd the name , as many english-men do of swans , or herons , which are specifick names , very well known of sorts of birds common in england . § . . from what has been said , 't is evident , that men make sorts of things . for it being different essences alone , that make different species , 't is plain , that they who make those abstract ideas , which are the nominal essences , do thereby make the species , or sort. should there be a body found , having all the other qualities of gold , except malleableness , 't would , no doubt , be made a question , whether it were gold , or no ; whether it were of that species . this could be determined only by that abstract idea , to which every one annexed the name gold : so that it would be true gold to him , and belong to that species , who included not malleableness in his nominal essence , signified by the sound gold ; and on the other side , it would not be true gold , or of that species to him , who included malleableness in his specifick idea . and who , i pray , is it , that makes these divers species , even under one and the same name , but men that make two different abstract ideas , consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities ? nor is it a mere supposition to imagine , that a body may exist , wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness ; since it is certain , that gold it self will be sometimes so eager , ( as artists call it , ) that it will as little endure the hammer , as glass it self . what we have said , of the putting in , or leaving out of malleableness out of the complex idea , the name gold is , by any one , annexed to , may be said of its peculiar weight , fixedness , and several other the like qualities : for whatever is left out , or put in , 't is still the complex idea , to which that name is annexed , that makes the species : and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea , so the name of the sort belongs truly to it ; and it is of that species . and thus any thing is true gold , perfect metal . all which determination of the species , 't is plain , depends on the understanding of man , making this or that complex idea . § . . this then , in short , is the case : nature makes many particular things , which do agree , one with another , in many sensible qualities , and probably too , in their internal frame● and constitution : but ●tis not this real essence , that distinguishes them into species ; 't is men , who , taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them , and wherein they observe often , several individuals to agree , range them into sorts , in order to their naming , for the convenience of comprehensive signs ; under which particular , individuals , according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea , come to be ranked , as under ensigns : so that this is of the blew , that the red regiment ; this is a man , that a drill : and in this , i think , consists the whole business of genus and species . § . . i do not deny , but nature , in the constant production of particular beings , makes them not always new and various , but very much alike and of kin one to another : but i think it is nevertheless true , that the boundaries of the species , whereby men sort them , are made by men ; since the essences of the species , distinguished by different names , are , as has been proved , of man's making , and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from . so that we may truly say , such a manner of sorting of things , is the workmanship of men. § . . one thing , i doubt not , but will seem very strange in this doctrine ; which is , that , from what has been said , it will follow , that each abstract idea , with a name to it , makes a distinct species . but who can help it , if truth will have it so ? for so it must remain , till some body can shew us the species of things , limitted and distinguished by something else ; and let us see , that general terms signifie not our abstract ideas , but something different from them . i would fain know , why a shock , and a hound , are not as distinct species , as a spaniel , and an elephant . we have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel , than we have of the different essence of a shock and an hound ; all the essential difference , whereby we know and distinguish them one from another , consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas , to which we have given those different names . § . . how much the making of species and genera is in order to general names , and how much general names are necessary , if not to the being , yet at least to the completing of a species , and making it pass for such , will appear , besides what has been said , above , concerning ice and water , in a very familiar example . a silent , and a striking watch , are but one species , to those who have but one name for them : but he that has the name watch for one , and clock for the other , and distinct complex ideas , to which those names belong , to him they are different species . but it will be said , the inward contrivance and constitution , is different between these two , which the watch-maker has a clear idea of : and yet , 't is plain , they are but one species to him , when he has but one name for them . for what is sufficient in the inward contrivance , to make a new species ? there are some watches , that are made with four wheels , others with five : is this a specifick difference to the workman ? some have strings and physies , and others none ; some have the balance loose , and others regulated by a spiral spring , and others by hogs bristles : are any , or all of these , enough to make a specifick difference to the workman , that knows each of these , and several other different contrivances , in the internal constitutions of watches ? 't is certain , each of these hath a real difference from the rest ; but whether it be an essential , a specifick difference , or no , relates only to the complex idea , to which the name watch is given : as long as they all agree in the idea that belongs to that name , which has no species under it , they are not essentially nor specifically different . but if any one will make minuter divisions from differences , that he knows in the internal frame of watches ; and to such precise complex ideas , give names , that shall prevail : they will then be new species to them , who have those ideas , with names to them ; and can , by those differences , distinguish watches into these several sorts , and then watches will be a generical name . but yet they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clock-work , and the inward contrivances of watches ; who had no other idea , but the outward shape and bulk , with the marking of the hours by the hand : for to them , all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea , and signifie no more , nor no other thing but a watch. just thus , i think , it is in natural things . no body will doubt , that the wheels , or springs ( if i may so say ) within , are different in a rational man , and a changeling , no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill , and a changeling . but whether one , or both these differences be essential , or specifical , is only to be known to us , by their agreement , or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for : for by that alone can it be determined , whether one , or both , or neither of those be a man , or no. § . . from what has been before said , we may see the reason , why , in the species of artificial things , there is generally less confusion and uncertainty , than in natural . because an artificial thing being a production of man , which the artificer design'd , and therefore well knows the idea of , the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea , nor to import any other essence , than what is certainly to be known , and easie enough to be apprehended . for the idea , or essence , of the several sorts of artificial things , consisting , for the most part , in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts ; and sometimes motion depending thereon , which the artificer fashions in matter , such as he finds for his turn , it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof ; and so settle the signification of the names , whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished , with less doubt , obscurity , and equivocation , than we can in things natural , whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances , beyond the reach of our discoveries . § . . i must be excused here , if i think , artificial things are of distinct species , as well as natural : since i find they are as plain , and orderly ranked into sorts , and have distinct complex ideas , to which we give general names , as much distinct one from another , as natural substances . for why should we not think a watch , and pistol , as distinct species one from another , as a horse , and a dog , they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas , and to others , by distinct appellations ? § . . this is farther to be observed concerning substances , that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas , have particular , or proper names , whereby one only particular thing is signified . because in simple ideas , modes , and relations , it seldom happens , that men have occasion to mention often this , or that particular , when it is absent . besides the greatest part of mixed modes , being actions , which perish in their birth , are not capable of a lasting duration , as substances , which are the actors ; and wherein the complex ideas , designed by that name , have a lasting union . § . . i must beg pardon of my reader , for having dwelt so long up● this subject , and perhaps , with some obscurity . but i desire , it may be considered , how difficult is is , to lead another by words into the thoughts of things , stripp'd of those specifical differences we give them : which things , if i name not , i say nothing ; and if i do name them , i thereby rank them into some sort , or other , and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species ; and so cross my purpose . for to talk of a man , and to lay by , at the same time , the ordinary signification of the name man , which is our complex idea , usually annexed to it ; and bid the reader consider man , as he is in himself , and whereby he is really distinguished from others , in his internal constitution , or real essence ; that is , by something , he knows not what , looks like trifling : and yet thus one must do , who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things , as thought to be made by nature , if it be but only to make it understood , that there is no such thing signified by the general names , substances are call'd by . but because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this , give me leave to endeavour by an example , to make the different consideration , the mind has of specifick names and ideas , a little more clear ; and to shew how the complex ideas of modes , are referr'd sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings ; or which is the same , to the signification annexed by others , to their receive names ; and sometimes , to no archetypes at all . give me leave also to shew how the mind always refers its ideas of substances , either to the substances themselves , or to the signification of their names , as to their archetypes ; and also to make plain the nature of species , or sorting of things , as apprehended , and made use of by us ; and of the essences belonging to those species , which is , perhaps , of more moment , to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge , than we at first imagine . § . . let us suppose adam in the state of a grown man , with a good understanding , but in a strange country , with all things new , and unknown about him ; and no other faculties , to attain the knowledge of them , but what one of this age has now . he observes lamech more melancholy than usual , and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife adah , whom he most ardently loved , that she had too much kindness for another man. adam discourses these his thoughts to eve , and desires her to take care that adah commit not folly : and in these discourses with eve , he makes use of these two new words , kinneah and niouph . in time , adam's mistake appears , for he finds lamech's trouble proceeded from having kill'd a man : but yet the two names , kinneah and niouph ; the one standing for suspicion in a husband , of his wive's disloyalty to him ; and the other , for the act of committing disloyalty . it is plain then , that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes , with names to them , two distinct species of actions essentially different , i ask wherein consist the essences of these two distinct species of actions , and 't is plain , it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas , different in one from the other . i ask , whether the complex idea in adam's mind , which he call'd kinneah , were adequate , or no ? and it is plain it was , for it being a combination of simple ideas , which he without regard to any archetype , without respect to any thing as a pattern , voluntarily put together , abstracted and gave the name kinneah to , to express in short to others , by that one sound , all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one , it must necessarily follow , that it was an adequate idea . his own choice having made that combination , it had all in it he intended it should , and so could not but be perfect , could not but be adequate , it being referr'd to no other archetype , which it was supposed to represent . § . . these words , kinneah and niouph , by degrees gr●w into common use ; and then the case was somewhat altered . adam's children had the same faculties , and thereby the same power , that he had , to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds ; to abstract them ; and make what sounds they pleased , the signs of them : but the use of names , being to make our ideas within us known to others , that cannot be done , but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two , who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together . those therefore of adam's children , that found these two words , kinneah and niouph , in familiar use , could not take them for insignificant sounds : but must needs conclude , they stood for something , for certain ideas , abstract ideas , they being general names , which abstract ideas were the essences of the species , distinguished by those names . if therefore they would use these words , as names of species , already establish'd and agreed on , they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds , signified by these names , to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds , and to conform their ideas to them , as to their patterns and archetypes ; and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes , were liable to be inadequate , as being very apt ( especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas ) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds , using the same names ; though for this , there be usually a remedy at hand , which is , to ask the meaning of any word we understand not , of him that uses it : it being as impossible , to know certainly , what the words jealousie and adultery ( which i think answer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) stand for in another man's mind , with whom i would discourse about them ; as it was impossible , in the beginning of language , to know what kinneah and niouph stood for in another man's mind , without explication , they being voluntary signs in every one . § . . let us now also consider after the same manner , the names of substances , in their first application . one of adam's children , roving in the mountains , lights on a glittering substance , which pleases his eyes ; home he carries it to adam , who upon consideration of it , finds it to be hard , to have a bright yellow colour , and an exceeding great weight . these , perhaps , at first , are all the qualities , he takes notice of in it , and abstracting this complex idea , consisting of a substance , having that peculiar bright yellowness , and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk , he gives it the name zahab , to denominate , and mark all substances , that have these sensible qualities in them . 't is evident now , that in this case , adam acts quite differently from what he did before , in forming those ideas of mixed modes , to which he gave the name kinneah and niouph ; for there he put ideas together , only by his own imagination , not taken from the existence of any thing ; and to them he gave names to denominate all things , that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas , without considering whether any such thing did exist , or no : the standard there was of his own making . but in the forming his idea of this new substance , he takes the quite contrary course , here he has a standard made by nature ; and therefore being to represent that to himself , by the idea he has of it , even when it is absent , he puts in no simple idea into his complex one , but what he has the perception of from the thing it self . he takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype , and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable . § . . this piece of matter , thus denominated zahab by adam , being quite different from any he had seen before , no body , i think , will deny to be a distinct species , and to have its peculiar essence ; and that the name zahab is the mark of the species , and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence . but here it is plain , the essence adam signified , and made the name zahab stand for , was nothing but a body hard , shining , yellow , and very heavy . but the inquisitive mind of man , not content with the knowledge of these , as i may say , superficial qualities , puts adam upon farther examination of this matter . he therefore knocks , and beats it with flints , to see what was discoverable in the inside : he finds it yield to blows , but not easily separate into pieces : he finds it will bend without breaking . is not now ductility to be added to his former idea , and the essence of the species that name zahab stands for ? farther trials discover fusibility , and fixedness , are not they also , by the same reason , that any of the others were , to be put into the complex idea , signified by the name zahab ? if not , what reason will there be shewed more for the one than the other ? if these must , then all the other properties , which any farther trials shall discover in this matter , ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea , which the name zahab stands for ; and so be the essence of the species , marked by that name ; which properties , because they are endless , it is plain , that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype , will be always inadequate . § . . but this is not all , it would also follow , that the names of substances would not only have , ( as in truth they have ) but would also be supposed to have different significations , as used by different men , which would very much cumber the use of language . for if every distinct quality , that were discovered in any matter by any one , were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea , signified by the common name given it , it must follow , that men must suppose the same word to signifie different things in different men : since they cannot doubt , but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination , which others know nothing of . § . . to avoid this therefore , they have supposed a real essence , belonging to every species , from which these properties all flow , and would have their name of the species stand for that : but they not having any idea of that real essence in substances , and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have , that which is done by this attempt , is only to put the name or sound , in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence , without knowing what that real essence is ; and this is that which men do , when they speak of species of things , as supposing them made by nature , and distinguished by real essences . § . . for let us consider , when we affirm , that all gold is fixed , either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition , part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for ; and so this affirmation , all gold is fixed , contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. or else it means , that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word gold , is a property of that substance it self : in which case , it is plain , that the word gold stands in the place of a substance , having the real essence of a species of things , made by nature ; in which way of substitution , it has so confused and uncertain a signification , that though this proposition , gold is fixed , be in that sense an affirmation of something real ; yet 't is a truth will always fail us in its particular application , and so is of no real use nor certainty . for let it be never so true , that all god , i. e. all that has the real essence of gold , is fixed , what serves this for , whilst we know not in this sense , what is or is not gold ? for if we know not the real essence of gold , 't is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence , and so whether it be true gold or no. § . . to conclude ; what liberty adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed modes , by no other pattern , but by his own thoughts , the same have all men ever since had . and the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him , as to archetypes made by nature , that adam was under , if he would not wilfully impose upon himself , the same are all men ever since under too . the same liberty also , that adam had of affixing any new name to any idea ; the same has any one still , ( especially the beginners of languages , if we can imagine any such , ) but only with this difference , that in places , where men in society have already established a language amongst them , the signification of words are very warily and sparingly to be alter'd : because men being furnished already with names for their ideas , and common use having appropriated known names to certain ideas , an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous . he that hath new notions , will , perhaps , venture sometimes on the coining new terms , to express them : men think it a boldness , and 't is uncertain , whether common use will ever make them pass for currant . but in communication with others , it is necessary , that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for , to their known proper significations , ( which i have explain'd at large already , ) or else to make known that new signification , we apply them to . chap. vii . of particles . § . . besides words , which are names of ideas in the mind , there are a great many others that are made use of , to signifie the connexion that the mind gives to ideas , or propositions , one with another . the mind , in communicating with others , does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it , but others also , to shew or intimate some particular action of its own , at that time , relating to those ideas . this it does several ways ; as , is , and is not , are the general marks of the mind , affirming or denying . but besides affirmation , or negation , without which , there is in words no truth or falshood , the mind does , in declaring its sentiments to others , connect , not only the parts of propositions , but whole sentences one to another , with their several relations and dependencies , to make a coherent discourse . § . . the words , whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several affirmations and negations , that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration , are generally call'd particles : and 't is in the right use of these , that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good stile . to think well , it is not enough , that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts , nor that he observes the agreement , or disagreement of some of them ; but he must think in train , and observe the dependency of his thoughts and reasonings , one upon another : and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts , he must have words to shew what connexion , restriction , distinction , opposition , emphasis , &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse . to mistake in any of these , is to puzzle , instead of informing his hearer : and therefore it is , that those words , which are not truly , by themselves , the names of any ideas , are of such constant and indispensible use in language , and do so much contribute to mens well expressing themselves . § . . this part of grammar has been , perhaps , as much neglected , as some others over-diligently cultivated . 't is easie for men to write , one after another , of cases and genders , moods and tenses , gerunds and supines : in these and the like , there has been great diligence used : and particles themselves , in some languages , have been , with great shew of exactness , ranked into their several orders . but though prepositions and conjunctions , &c. are names well known in grammar , and the particles contained under them , carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions ; yet he who would shew the right use of particles , and what significancy and force they have , must take a little more pains , enter into his own thoughts , and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing . § . . neither is it enough , for the explaining of these words , to render them , as is usually in dictionaries , by words of another tongue which came nearest to their signification : for what is meant by them , is commonly as hard to be understood in one , as another language . they are all marks of some action , or intimation of the mind ; and therefore to understand them rightly , the several views , postures , stands , turns , limitations , and exceptions , and several other thoughts of the mind , for which we have either none , or very deficient names , are diligently to be studied . of these , there are a great variety , much exceeding the number of particles , that most languages have to express them by : and therefore it is not to be wondred , that most of these particles have divers , and sometimes almost opposite significations . in the hebrew tongue , there is a particle consisting but of one single letter , of which there are reckoned up , as i remember , seventy , i am sure above fifty several significations . § . . bvt is a particle , none more familiar in our language : and he that says it is a discretive conjunction , and that it answers sed in latin , or mais in french , thinks he has sufficiently explained it . but yet it seems to me to intimate several relations , the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them , which it joins by this monosyllable , first , bvt to say no more : here it intimates a stop of the mind , in the course it was going , before it came to the end of it . secondly , i saw bvt two planets : here it shews , that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed , with a negation of all other . thirdly , you pray ; bvt it is not that god would bring you to the true religion , fourthly , bvt that he would confirm you in your own : the first of these bvts , intimates a supposition , in the mind , of something otherwise than it should be ; the latter shews , that the mind makes a direct opposition between that , and what goes before it . fifthly , all animals have sense ; bvt a dog is an animal : here it signifies little more , but that the latter proposition is joined to the former , as the minor of a syllogism . § . . to these , i doubt not , might be added a great many other significations of this particle , if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude , and consider it in all the places it is to be found : which if one should do , i doubt , whether in all those manners it is made use of , it would deserve the title of discretive , which grammarians give to it . but i intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs ; the instances i have given in this one , may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language , and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing , which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles , some whereof constantly , and others in certain constructions , have the sense of a whole sentence contain'd in them . chap. viii . of abstract and concrete terms . § . . the ordinary words of language , and our common use of them , would have given us light into the nature of our ideas , if they had been but considered with attention the mind , as has been shewn , has a power to abstract its ideas , and so they become essences , general essences , whereby the sorts of things are distinguished : now each abstract idea being distinct , so that the one can never be the other , the mind will , by its intuitive knowledge , perceive their difference ; and therefore in propositions , no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another . this we see in the common use of language , which permits not any two abstract words , or names of abstract ideas , to be affirmed one of another . for how near of kin soever they may seem to be , and how certain soever it is , that man is an animal , or rational , or white , yet every one , at first hearing , perceives the falshood of these propositions ; humanity is animality , or rationality , or whiteness : and this is as evident , as any of the most allow'd maxims . all our affirmations then are only in concrete , which is the affirming , not one abstract idea to be another , but one abstract idea be join'd to another ; which abstract ideas , in substances , may be of any sort ; in all the rest , are little else but of relations ; and in substances , the most frequent are of powers ; v. g. a man is white , signifies , that the thing that has the essence of a man , has also in it the essence of whiteness , which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one , whose eyes can discover ordinary objects ; or a man is rational , signifies , that the same thing that hath the essence of a man , hath also in it the essence of rationality , i. e. a power of reasoning . § . . this distinction of names , shews us also the difference of our ideas : for if we observe them , we shall find , that our simple ideas have all abstract , as well as concrete names : the one whereof is ( to speak the language of grammarians ) a substantive , the other an adjective ; as whiteness , white ; sweetness , sweet . the like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations ; as justice , just ; equality , equal ; only with this difference , that some of the concrete names of relations , amongst men chiefly , are substantives ; as paternitas , pater ; whereof it were easie to render a reason . but as to our ideas of substances , we have very few or no abstract names at all . for though the schools have introduced animalitas , humanitas , corporietas , and some others ; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances , to which they never were rediculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones : and those few that the schools forged , and put into the mouths of their scholars , could never yet get admittance into common use , or obtain the license of publick approbation . which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind , that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances , since they have not names for such ideas : which no doubt they would have had , had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them , kept them from so idle an attempt . and therefore though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone , and metal from wood ; yet they but timerously ventured on such terms , as aurietas and saxietas , metallietas and lignietas , or the like names , which should pretend to signifie the real essences of those substances , whereof they knew they had no idea . and indeed , it was only the doctrine of substantial forms , and the confidence of shameless pretenders to a knowledge that they had not , which first coined , and then introduced animalitas , and humanitas , and the like ; which yet went very little farther than their own schools , and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. indeed , humanitas was a word , familiar amongst the romans ; but in a far different sense , and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance ; but was the abstract name of a mode , and its concrete humanus , not homo . chap. ix . of the imperfection of words . § . . from what has been said in the foregoing chapters , it is easie to perceive , what imperfection there is in language , and how the very nature of words , makes it almost unavoidable , for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations . to examine the perfection , or imperfection of words , it is necessary , first , to consider their use and end : for as they are more or less fitted to attain that , so are they more or less perfect . we have , in the former part of this discourse , often , upon occasion , mentioned a double use of words : first , one for the recording of our own thoughts . secondly , the other for the communicating of our thoughts to others . § . . as to the first of these , for the recording our own thoughts , for the help of our own memories , whereby , as it were , we talk to our selves any words will serve the turn . for since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas , a man may use what words he please , to signifie his own ideas to himself : and there will be no imperfection in them , if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea : for then he connot fail of having his meaning understood , wherein consists the right use and perfection of language . § . . secondly , as to communication by words , that too has a double use : i. civil . ii. philosophical . first , by their civil vse , i mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words , as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce , about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of civil life in the societies of men , one amongst another . secondly , by the philosophical vse of words , i mean such an use of them , as may serve to convey the precise notions of things , and to express , in general propositions , certain and undoubted truths , which the mind may rest upon , and be satisfied with , in its search after true knowledge . these two uses are very distinct ; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one , than in the other , as we shall see in what follows . § . . the chief end of language in communication , being to be understood , words serve not well for that end , neither in civil , nor philosophical discourse , when any word does not excite in the hearer , the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker . now since sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas , but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men , the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification , which is the imperfection we here are speaking of , has its cause more in the ideas they stand for , than in any incapacity there is in one sound , more than in another , to signifie any idea : for in that regard , they are all equally perfect . that then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some words more than others , is the difference of ideas they stand for . § . . words having naturally no signification , the ideas which each stands for , must be learned and retained , by those who would exchange thoughts , and hold intelligible discourse with others , in any language . but this is hardest to be done , where , first , the ideas they stand for , are very complex , and made up of a great number of ideas put together . secondly , where the ideas they stand for , have no certain connexion in nature ; and so no setled standard , any where in nature existing , to rectifie and adjust them by . thirdly , where the signification of the word is referred to a standard , which standard is not easie to be known . fourthly , where the signification of the word , and the real essence of the thing , are not exactly the same . these are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible . those which are not intelligible at all , such as names standing for any simple ideas , which another has not organs or faculties to attain ; as the names of colours to a blind man , or sounds to a deaf man , need not here be mentioned . in all these cases , we shall find an imperfection in words ; which i shall more at large explain , in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas : for if we examine them , we shall find , that the names of mixed modes , are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection , for the two first of these reasons ; and the names of substances chiefly , for the two latter . § . . first , the names of mixed modes , are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification . i. because of that great composition , these complex ideas are often made up of . to make words serviceable to the end of communication is necessary , ( as has been said ) that they excite , in the hearer , exactly the same idea they stand for , in the mind of the speaker : without this , men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds ; but convey not thereby their thoughts , and lay not before one another their ideas , which is the end of discourse and language . but when a word stands for a very complex idea , that is compounded and decompounded , it is not easie for men to form and retain that idea so exactly , as to make the name in common use , stand for the same precise idea , without any the least variation . hence it comes to pass , that mens names , of very compound ideas , such as for the most part are moral words , have seldom , in two different men , the same precise signification ; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with anothers , and often differs from his own , from that which he had yesterday , or will have to morrow . § . . ii. because the names of mixed modes , for the most part , want standards in nature , whereby men may rectifie and adjust their significations ; therefore they are very various and doubtful . they are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind , pursuing its own ends of discourse , and suited to its own notions ; whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing , but to denominate and rank things , as they come to agree , with those archetypes or forms it has made . he that first brought the word sham , wheedle , or banter in use , put together , as he thought fit , those ideas he made it stand for : and as it is with any new names of modes , that are now brought into any language ; so was it with the old ones , when they were first made use of . names therefore , that stand for collections of ideas , which the mind makes at pleasure , must needs be of doubtful signification , when such collections are no-where to be found constantly united in nature , nor no patterns to be shewn whereby men may adjust them● what the word murther , or sacrilege , &c. signifie , can never be known from things themselves . there be many of the parts of those complex ideas , which are not visible in the action it self , the intention of the mind , or the relation of holy things , which make a part of murther , or sacrilege , have no necessary connexion with the outward and visible action of him that commits either : and the pulling the trigger of the gun , with which the murther is committed , and is all the action , that , perhaps , is visible , has no natural connexion with those other ideas , that make up the complex one , named murther ● they have their union and combination only from the understanding , ●hich unites them under one name : but uniting them without any rule , or pattern , it cannot be but that the signification of the name , that stands for such voluntary collections , should be often various in the minds of different men , who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves , and their notions of such arbitrary ideas by . § . . 't is true , common vse , that is the rule of propriety , may be supposed here to afford some aid , to settle the signification of language ; and it cannot be denied , but that in some measure it does . common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation ; but no body having an authority to establish the precise signification of words , nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them , common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses ; there being scarce any name , of any very complex idea , ( to say nothing of others , ) which , in common use , has not a great latitude , and which keeping within the bounds of propriety , may not be made the sign of far different ideas . besides , the rule and measure propriety of it self being no where established , it is often matter of dispute , whether this or that way of using a word , be propriety of speech , or no● from all which , it is evident , that the names of such kind of very complex ideas , are naturally liable to this imperfection , to be of doubtful and uncertain signification ; and even in men , that have a mind to understand one another , do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer . though the names glory and gratitude be the same in every man's mouth , through a whole country , yet the complex collective idea , which every one thinks on , or intends by that name , is apparently very different by men using the same language . § . . the way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned , does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification . for if we will observe how children learn languages , we shall find , that to make them understand what the names , of simple ideas , or substances , stand for , people ordinarily shew them the thing , whereof they would have them have the idea ; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it , as white , sweet , milk , sugar , cat , dog. but as for mixed modes , especially the most material of them moral words , the sounds are usually learn'd first , and then to know what complex ideas they stand for , they are either beholden to the explication of others , or ( which happens for the most part ) are lest to their own observation and industry ; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names , these moral words are , in most mens mouths , little more than bare sounds ; or when they have any , 't is for the most part but a very obscure and confused signification . and even those themselves , who have with more attention setled their notions , do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience , to have them stand for complex ideas , different from those which other , even intelligent and studious men , make them the signs of . where shall one find any , either controversial debate , or familiar discourse , concerning honour , faith , grace , religion , church , &c. wherein it is not easie to observe the different notions men have of them ; which is nothing but this , that they are not agreed in the signification of those words , have not the same complex ideas they make them stand for : and so all the contests that follow thereupon , are only about the meaning of a sound . and hence we see , that in the interpretation of laws , whether divine , or humane , there is no end ; comments beget comments , and explications make new matter for explications : and of limitting , distinguishing , varying the signification of these moral words , there is no end . these ideas of mens making , are , by men still having the same power , multiplied in infinitum . many a man , who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of scripture , or clause in the code , at first reading , has , by consulting commentators , quite lost the sense of it , and , by those elucidations , given rise or increase to his doubts , and drawn obscurity upon the place . i say not this , that i think commentaries needless ; but to shew how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are , even in the mouths of th●se , who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking , as clearly as language , was capable to express their thoughts . § . . what obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men , who have lived in remote ages , and different countries , it will be needless to take notice . since the numerous volumes of learned men , employing their thoughts that way , are proofs more than enough , to shew what attention , study , sagacity , and reasoning is required , to find out the true meaning of ancient authors . but there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very sollicitous about the meaning of , but those that contain either truths we are required to believe , or laws we are to obey , and draw inconveniencies on us , when we mistake or transgress , we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors ; who writing but their own opinions , we are under no greater necessity to know them , than they to know ours . our good or evil depending not on their decrees , we may safely be ignorant of their notions : and therefore in the reading of them , if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity , we may lay them aside , and without any injury done them , resolve thus with our selves , si non vis intelligi , debes negligi . § . . if the signification of the names of mixed modes are uncertain , because there be no real standards existing in nature , to which those ideas are referred , and by which they may be adjusted , the names of substances are of a doubtful signification , for a contrary reason , viz. because the ideas they stand for , are supposed conformable to the reality of things , and are referred to standards made by nature . in our ideas of substances , we have not the liberty as in mixed modes , to frame what combinations we think fit , to be the characteristical notes , to rank and denominate things by . in these we must follow nature , suit our complex ideas to real existences , and regulate the signification of their names , by the things themselves , if we will have our names to be the signs of them , and stand for them . here , 't is true , we have patterns to follow ; but patterns , that will make the signification of their names very uncertain : for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning , if the ideas they stand for , be referred to standards without us , that either cannot be known at all , or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly . § . . the names of substances have , as has been shewed , a double reference in their ordinary use . first , sometimes they are made to stand for , and so their signification is supposed to agree to , the real constitution of things , from which all their properties flow , and in which they all centre . but this real constitution , or ( as it is apt to be called ) essence , being utterly unknown to us , any sound that is put to stand for it , must be very uncertain in its application ; and it will be impossible to know what things are , or ought to be called an horse , or antimony , when those words are put for real essences , that we have no idea of at all . and therefore in this supposition , the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known , their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards . § . . secondly , the simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances , being that which their names immediately signifie , these , as united in the several sorts of things , are the proper standards to which their names are referred , and by which their significations may best be rectified . but neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose , as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations ; because these simple ideas that co-exist , and are united in the same subject , being very numerous , and having all an equal right to go into the complex specifick idea , which the specifick name is to stand for , men , though they purpose to themselves the very same subject to consider , yet frame very different ideas about it ; and so the name they use for it , unavoidably comes to have , in several men , very different significations . the simple qualities , which make up the complex ideas , being most of them powers , in relation to changes they are apt to make in , or receive from other bodies , are almost infinite . he that shall but observe , what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive , from the different application only of fire ; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist , by the application of other bodies , will not think it strange , that i count the properties of any sort of bodies not easie to be collected , and completely known by the ways of enquiry , which our faculties are capable of . they being therefore at least so many , that no man can know the precise and definite number , they are differently discovered by different men , according to their various skill , attention , and ways of handling ; who therefore cannot chuse but have different ideas of the same substance , and therefore make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain . for the complex ideas of substances , being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature , every one has a right to put into his complex idea , those qualities he has found to be united together . for though in the substance gold , one satisfies himself with colour and weight , yet another thinks solubility in aq. regia , as necessary to be join'd with that colour in his idea of gold , as any one does its fusibility ; solubility in aq . regia , being a quality as constantly join'd with its colour and weight , as fusibility , or any other ; others put in its ductility or fixedness , &c. as they have been taught by tradition , or experience . who of all these , has established the right signification of the word gold ? or who shall be the judge to determine ? each has his standard in nature , which he appeals to , and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea , signified by the word gold , those qualities , which upon trial he has found united ; as another , who has not so well examined , has to leave them out ; or a third , who has made other trials , has to put in others . for the union in nature of these qualities , being the true ground of their union , in one complex idea , who can say one of them has more reason to be put in , or left out than another ? from whence it will always unavoidably follow , that the complex ideas of substances , in men using the same name for them , will be very various ; and so the significations of those names , very uncertain . § . . besides , there is scarce any particular thing existing , which in some of its simple ideas , does not communicate with a greater , and in others with a less number of particular beings : who shall determine in this case , which are those that are to make up the precise collection , which is to be signified by the specifick name ; or can with any just authority prescribe which obvious or common qualities are to be left out ; or which more secret , or more particular , are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance ? all which together , seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances , which causes such uncertainty , disputes , or mistakes , when we come to a philosophical use of them . § . . 't is true , as to civil and common conversation , the general names of substances , regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities , ( as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation , and in other substances , for the most part by colour , join'd with some other sensible qualities , ) do well enough , to design the things they would be understood to speak of . and so men usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold , or apple , to distinguish the one from the other . but in philosophical enquiries and debates , where general truths are to be established , and consequences drawn from positions laid down , there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found , not only not to be well established , but also very hard to be so . for example , he that shall make malleability , or a certain degree of fixedness , a part of his complex idea of gold , may make propositions concerning gold , and draw consequences from them , that will truly and clearly follow from gold , taken in such a signification : but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit , nor be convinced of their truth , who makes not malleableness , or the same degree of fixedness , part of that complex idea , that the name gold , in his use of it , stands for . § . . this is a natural , and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances , in all languages whatsoever , which men will easily find , when once passing from confused or loose notions , they come to more strict and close enquiries . for then they will be convinced , how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification , which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined . i was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians , where by chance there arose a question , whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves ; the debate having been managed a good while , by variety of arguments on both sides , i ( who had been used to suspect , that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words , than a real difference in the conception of things ) desired , that before they went any farther on in this dispute , they would first examine , and establish amongst them , what the word liquor signified . they at first were a little surprized at the proposal ; and had they been persons less ingenious , they might , perhaps , have taken it for a very frivolous , or extravagant one : since there was no one there , that thought not himself to understand very perfectly , what the word liquor stood for ; which , i think too , none of the most perplexed names of substances . however , they were pleased to comply with my motion , and upon examination found , that the signification of that word , was not so settled and certain , as they had all imagined ; but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea . this made them perceive , that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term ; and that they differed very little in their opinions , concerning some fluid and subtile matter , passing through the conduits of the nerves ; though it was not so easie to agree , whether it was to be called liquor , or no ; a thing which when each considered , he thought it not worth the contending about . § . . how much this is the case of the greatest part of disputes , that men are engaged so hotly in , i shall , perhaps , have an occasion in another place to take notice . let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the word gold , and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification . almost all agree , that it should signifie a body of a certain yellow shining colour ; which being the idea to which children have annexed that name , the shining yellow part of a peacock's tail , is properly to them gold. others finding fusibility join'd with that yellow colour in gold , think the other which contain'd nothing but the idea of body with that colour not truly to represent gold , but to be an imperfect idea of that sort of substance : and therefore the word gold , as referr'd to that sort of substances , does of right signifie a body of that yellow colour , which by the fire will be reduced to fusion , and not to ashes . another by the same reason adds , the weight , which being a quality , as straitly join'd with that colour , as its fusibility , he thinks has the same reason to be join'd in its idea , and to be signified by its name : and therefore the other made up of body , of such a colour and fusibility , to be imperfect ; and so on of all the rest : wherein no one can shew a reason , why some of the inseparable qualities , that are always united in nature , should be put into the nominal essence , and others left out : or why the word gold , signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of , should determine that sort , rather by its colour , weight , and fusibility ; than by its colour , weight , and solubility in aq . regia : since the dissolving it by that liquor , is as inseparable from it , as the fusion by fire ; and they are both of them nothing , but the relation that substance has to two other bodies , which have a power to operate differently upon it . for by what right is it , that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence , signified by the word gold , and solubility but a property of it ? or why is its colour part of the essence , and its malleableness but a property ? that which i mean , is this , that these being all but properties , depending on its real constitution ; and nothing but powers , either active or passive , in reference to other bodies , no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold , ( as referr'd to such a body existing in nature , ) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body , than to another● whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain . since , as has been said , several people observe properties in the same substance ; and , i think , i may say no body all . and therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things , and words have very uncertain significations . § . . by what has been before said , it is easie to observe , that the names of simple ideas are , of all others the least liable to mistakes . first , because the ideas they stand for , are much easier got , and more clearly retain'd , than those of more complex ones , and therefore they are not liable to the uncertainty or inconvenience of those very compounded mixed modes ; and secondly , because they are never referr'd to any other essence , but barely that perception they immediately signifie : which reference is , that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed , and gives occasion to so many disputes . men that do not perversly use their words , or on purpose set themselves to cavil , seldom mistake in any language , they are acquainted with , the use and signification of the names of simple ideas , white and sweet , yellow and bitter , carry a very obvious meaning with them , which every one precisely comprehends , or easily perceives he is ignorant of , and seeks to be informed . but what precise collection of simple ideas , modesty or frugality stand for in another's use , is not so certainly known : and however we are apt to think , we well enough know , what is meant by gold or iron ; yet the precise complex idea , others make them the signs of , is not so certain : and i believe it is very seldom , that in speaker and hearer , they stand for exactly the same collection : which must needs produce mistakes and disputes , when they are made use of in discourses , wherein men have to do with universal propositions , and would settle in their minds universal truths , and consider the consequences that follow from them . § . . by the same rule , the names of simple modes are next to simple ideas , those that are least liable to doubt or vncertainty , especially those of figure and number , of which men have so clear and distinct ideas , and amongst them , those that are least compounded , and least removed from simple ones . who ever , that had a mind to understand them , mistook the ordinary meaning of seven , or a triangle ? § . . mixed modes also , that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas , have usually names of no very doubtful signification . but the names of mixed modes , which comprehend a great number of simple ideas , are commonly of a very doubtful , and undetermined signification , as has been shewed . the names of substances being annexed to ideas , that are neither the real essences , nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to , are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty , especially when we come to a philosophical use of them . § . . the great disorder that happens in our names of substances , proceeding for the most part from our want of knowledge , and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions , it may probably be wondered , why i charge this as an imperfection , rather upon our words than understandings . this exception , has so much appearance of justice , that i think my self obliged , to give a reason why i have followed this method . i must confess then , that when i first began this discourse of the understanding , and a good while after , i had not the least thought , that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it . but when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas , i began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge , i found it had so near a connexion with words , that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed , there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge : which being conversant about truth , had constantly to do with propositions : and though it terminated in things , yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words , that they seem'd scarce separable from our general knowledge . at least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings , and the truth , it would contemplate and apprehend , that like the medium through which visible objects pass , their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes , and impose upon our understandings . if we consider , in the fallacies men put upon themselves as well as others , and the mistakes in mens disputes and notions , how great a part is owing to words , and their uncertain or mistaken significations , we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge ; which , i conclude we are the more careful to be warned of , because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience , that the arts of improving it , have been made the business of mens study ; and attained the reputation of learning and subtilty , as we shall see in the following chapter . but i am apt to imagine , that were the imperfections of language , as the instrument of knowledge , more throughly weighed , a great many of the controversies , that make such a noise in the world , would of themselves cease ; and the way to knowledge , and , perhaps , peace too , lie a great deal opener than it does . § . . sure i am , that the signification of words , in all languages , depending very much on the thoughts , notions , and ideas of him that uses them , must unavoidably be of great uncertainty , to men of the same language and country . this is so evident in the greek authors , that he that shall peruse their writings , will find , in almost every one of them , a distinct language , though the same words . but when to this natural difficulty in every country , there shall be added different countries , and remote ages , wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions , tempers , customs , ornaments , and figures of speech , &c. every one of which , influenced the signification of their words then , though to us now , they are lost and unknown , it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings , which though of great concernment to us to be understood , are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech , which ( if we except the names of simple ideas , and some very obvious things ) is not capable , without a constant defining the terms , of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker , without any manner of doubt and uncertainty , to the hearer . and in discourses of religion , law , and morality , as they are matters of the highest concernment , so there will be the greatest difficulty . § . . the volumes of interpreters , and commentators on the old and new testament , are but too manifest proofs of this . though every thing said in the text be infallibly true , yet the reader may be , nay , cannot chuse but be very fallible in the understanding of it . nor is it to be wondred , that the will of god , when cloathed in words , should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty , which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance , when even his son , whilst cloathed in flesh , was subject to all the frailties and inconveniencies of humane nature , sin excepted . and we ought to magnifie his goodness , that he hath spread before all the world , such legible characters of his works and providence , and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason , that they to whom this written word never came , could not ( when-ever they set themselves to search ) either doubt of the being of a god , or of the obedience due to him. since then the precepts of natural religion are plain , and very intelligible to all mankind , and seldom come to be controverted ; and other revealed truths , which are conveyed to us by books and languages , are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words , methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former , and less magisterial , positive , and imperious , in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter . chap. x. of the abuse of words . § . . besides the imperfection that is naturally in language , and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words , there are several wilful faults and neglects , which men are guilty of , in th●● way of communication , whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification , than naturally they need to be . § . . first , in this kind , the first and most palpable abuse is , the using of words , without clear and distinct ideas ; or , which is worse , signs without any thing signified . of these there are two sorts : i. one may observe , in all languages , certain words , that if they be examined , will be found , in their first original , and their appropriated use , not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas . these , for the most part , the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced . for their authors , or promoters , either affecting something singular , and out of the way of common apprehensions , or to support some strange opinions , or cover some weakness of their hypothesis , seldom fail to coin new words , and such as , when they come to be examined , may justly be called insignificant terms . for having either had no determinable collection of ideas annexed to them , when they were first invented ; or at least such as , if well examined , will be found inconsistent , 't is no wonder if afterwards , in the vulgar use of the same party , they remain empty sounds , with little or no signification , amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths , as the distinguishing characters of their church , or school , without much troubling their heads to examine , what are the precise ideas they stand for . i shall not need here to heap up instances , every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him : or if he wants to be better stored , the great mint-masters of these kind of terms , i mean the schoolmen and metaphysicians , ( under which , i think , the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages , may be comprehended , ) have wherewithal abundantly to content him . § . . ii. others there be , who extend this abuse yet farther , who take so little care● to lay by words , which in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas they are annexed to , that by an unpardonable negligence , they familiarly use words , which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas , they use them , i say , without any distinct meaning at all . wisdom , glory , grace , &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth ; but if a great many of those who use them , should be asked , what they mean by them ? they would be at a stand , and not know what to answer : a plain proof , that though they have learned those sounds , and have them ready at their tongues ends , yet there are no clear and distinct ideas laid up in their minds , which are to be expressed to others by them . § . . men , having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words , which are easily got and retained , before they knew , or had framed the complex ideas , to which they were annexed , or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for , they usually continue to do so all their lives , and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds clear and distinct ideas , they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have , contenting themselves with the same words other people use ; as if their very sound , necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning . this though men make a shift with , in their ordinary occurrences of li●e , where they find it necessary to be understood , and there●ore they make signs till they are so : yet this insignificancy in their words , when they come to reason , concerning either their tenents or interest , manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon , especially in moral matters , where the words , for the most part , standing ●or arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas , not regularly and permanently united in nature , their bare sounds are often only thought on , or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them● men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours ; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for , use them confidently , without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning : whereby , besides the ease of it , they obtain this advantage , that as in such discourses they seldom are in the right , so they are as seldom to be convinced , that they are in the wrong ; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes , who have no setled notions , as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation , who has no setled abode : this i guess to be so ; and every one may observe in himself and others , whether it be , or no. § . . secondly , another great abuse of words is , inconstancy in the use of them . it is hard to find a discourse written of any subject , especially of controversie , wherein one shall not observe , if he read with attention , the same words ( and those commonly the most material in the discourse , and upon which the argument turns ) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas , and sometimes for another , which is a perfect abuse of language . words being intended for signs of my ideas , to make them known to others , not by any natural signification , but by a voluntary imposition , 't is plain cheat and abuse , when i make them stand sometimes for one thing , and sometimes for another ; the wilful doing whereof , can be imputed to nothing but great folly , or greater dishonesty . and a man , in his accompts with another , may , with as much fairness , make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one , and sometimes for another collection of unites : v. g. this character , stands sometimes for three , sometimes for four , and sometimes for eight ; as in his discourse , or reasoning , make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas . if men should do so in their reckonings , i wonder who would have to do with them ? one who should speak thus , in the affairs and business in the world , and call sometimes seven , sometimes nine , as best served his advantage , would presently have clapp'd upon him one of the two names men constantly are disgusted with ; and yet in arguings , and learned contests , the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for wit and learning : but yet , to me , it appears a greater dishonesty , than the misplacing of counters , in the casting up a debt , and the cheat the greater , by how much truth is of greater concernment and value , than money . § . . thirdly , another abuse of language is , an affected obscurity , by either applying old words , to new and unusual significations ; or introducing new and ambiguous terms , without defining either ; or else putting them so together , as may confound their ordinary meaning . though the peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way , yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it . there is scarce any of them , that are not cumbred with some difficulties , ( such is the imperfection of humane knowledge , ) which they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms , and to confound the signification of words , which , like a mist before peoples eyes , might hinder their weak parts from being discovered . that body and extension , in common use , stand for two distinct ideas , is plain to any one that will but reflect a little : for were their signification precisely the same , it would be as proper , and as intelligible to say , the body of an extension , as the extension of a body ; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their signification . to this abuse , and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words , logick , and the liberal sciences , as they have been handled in the schools , have given reputation ; and the admired art of disputing , hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages , whilst it has been made use of , and fitted to perplex the signification of words , more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things : and he that will look into that sort of learned writings , will find the words there much more obscure , uncertain , and undetermined in their meaning , than they are in ordinary conversation . § . . this is unavoidably to be so , where mens parts and learning , are estimated by their skill in disputing . and if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests , which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words , 't is no wonder if the wit of man so employ'd , should perplex , involve , and subtilize the signification of sounds , so as never to want something to say , in opposing or defending any question ; the victory being adjusted not to him who had truth on his side , but the last word in the dispute . § . . this , though a very useless skill , and that which i think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge , hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of subtility and acuteness , and has had the applause of the schools , and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world ; and no wonder , since the philosophers of old , ( the disputing and wrangling philosophers i mean , such as lucian wittily , and with reason taxes , ) and the schoolmen since , aiming at glory and esteem , for their great and universal knowledge , easier a great deal to be pretended to , than really acquired , found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance , with a curious and unexplicable web of perplexed words , and procure to themselves the admiration of others , by unintelligible terms ; the apter to produce wonder , because they could not be understood : whilst it appears in all history , that these profound doctors , were no wiser , nor more useful , than their neighbours ; and brought but small advantage to humane life , or the societies , wherein they lived● unless the coining of new words , where they produced no new things to apply them to , or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones● and so bringing all things into question and dispute , were a thing profitable to the life of man , or worthy commendation and reward . § . . for , notwithstanding these learned disputants , these all knowing doctors , it was to the unscholastick statesman , that the governments of the world owed their peace , defence , and liberties ; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanick , ( a name of disgrace , ) that they received the improvemnts of useful arts. nevertheless , this artificial ignorance , and learned gibberish , prevailed mightily in these last ages , by the interest and artifice of those , who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained , than by amusing the men of business , and ignorant , with hard words , or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes , about unintelligible terms , and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth . besides , there is no such way to gain admittance , or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines , as to guard them round about with legions of obscure , doubtful , and undefined words . which yet make these retreats , more like the dens of robbers , or holes of foxes , than the fortresses of fair warriours : which if it be hard to get them out of , it is not for the strength that is in them , but the briars and thorns , and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with . for untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man , there is no other defence left for absurdity , but obscurity . § . . thus learned ignorance , and this art of keeping , even inquisitive men , from true knowledge , hath been propagated in the world , and hath much perplexed , whilst it pretended to inform the understanding . for we see , that other well-meaning and wise men , whose education and parts had not attained that accuteness , could intelligibly express themselves to one another ; and in its plain use , make a benefit of language . but though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black , &c. and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words ; yet there were philosophers found , who had learning and subtilty enough to prove , that snow was black ; ( i. e. to prove , that white was black ; ) whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse , conversation , instruction , and society ; whilst with great art and subtility , they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words , and thereby render language less useful , than the real defects of it had made it , a gift , which the illiterate had not attained to . § . . these learned men did equally instruct mens understandings , and profit their lives , as he who should alter the signification of known characters , and , by a subtile device of learning , far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate , dull , and vulgar , should , in his writing , shew , that he could put a. for b. and d. for e. &c. to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader ; it being as sensless to put black , which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea , to put it , i say , for another , or the contrary idea , i. e. to call snow black , as to put this mark a. which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound , made by a certain motion of the organs of speech , for b. which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound , made by another certain motion of the organs of speech . § . . nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties , or curious empty speculations ; it hath invaded the great concernments of humane life and society ; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity ; brought confusion , disorder , and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind ; and if not destroyed , yet in great measure rendred useless , those two great rules , religion and justice . what have the greatest part of the comments and disputes , upon the laws of god and man served for , but to make the meaning more doubtful , and perplex the sense ? what have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions , and accute niceties , but obscurity and uncertainty , leaving the words more unintelligible , and the reader more at a loss ? how else comes it to pass , that princes , speaking or writing to their servants , in their ordinary commands , are easily understood ; speaking to their people , in their laws , are not so ? and , as i remarked before , doth it not often happen , that a man of an ordinary capacity , very well understands a text , or a law , that he reads , till he consults an expositor , or goes to council ; who by that time he hath done explaining them , makes the words signifie either nothing at all , or what he pleases . § . . whether any by interests of these professions have occasioned this , i will not here examine ; but i leave it to be considered , whether it would not be well for mankind , whose concernment it is to know things as they are , and to do what they ought ; and not to spend their lives in talking about them , or tossing words to and fro : whether it would not be well , i say , that the use of words were made plain , and direct ; and that language , which was given us for the improvement of knowledge , and bond of society , should not be employ'd to darken truth , and unsettle peoples rights ; to raise mists , and render unintelligible both morality and religion ? or that at least , if this will happen , it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so ? § . . fourthly , another great abuse of words is , the taking them for things . this , though it , in some degree , concerns all names in general ; yet more particularly affects those of substances : and to this abuse , these men are most subject , who confine their thoughts to any one system , and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis ; whereby they come to be persuaded , that the terms of that sect , are so suited to the nature of things , that they perfectly correspond with their real existence . who is there , that has been bred up in the peripatetick philosophy , who does not think the ten names , under which are ranked the ten predicaments , to be exactly conformable to the nature of things ? who is there , of that school , that is not persuaded , that substantial forms , vegetative souls , abhorrence of a vacuum , intentional species , &c. are something real ? these words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge , and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them ; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion , that they are conformable to nature , and are the representations of something that really exists . the platonists have their soul of the world , and the epicureans their endeavour towards motion , in their atoms , when at rest . there is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms , that others understand not . but yet this gibberish , which in the weakness of humane understanding , serves so well to palliate mens ignorance , and cover their errours , comes by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe , to seem the most important part of language , and of all others the terms the most significant : and should aërial and aetherial vehicles come once , by the prevalency of that doctrine , to be generally received any where , no doubt those terms would make impressions on mens minds , so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things , as much as that peripatetick forms have heretofore done . § . . how much names taken for things , are apt to mislead the vnderstanding , the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover ; and that , perhaps , in words little suspected of any such misuse . i shall instance in one only , and that a very familiar one . how many intricate disputes have there been about matter , as if there were some such thing really in nature , distinct from body , as 't is evident , the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body . for if the ideas these two terms stood for , were precisely the same , they might indifferently in all places be put one for the other : but we see , that tho' it be proper to say , there is one matter of all bodies , one cannot say , there is one body of all matters . we familiarly say , one body is bigger than another , but it sounds harsh ( and i think is never used ) to say , one matter is bigger than another . whence comes this then ? viz. from hence , that though matter and body be not really distinct ; but where-ever there is one , there is the other : yet matter and body , stand for two different conceptions , whereof the one is incomplete , and but a part of the other . for body stands for a solid extended figured substance , whereof matter is but a partial , and more confused conception , it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body , without taking in its extension and figure : and therefore it is that speaking of matter , we speak of it always as one , because in truth , it expresly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance , which is every where the same , every where uniform : and therefore we no more conceive , or speak of different matters in the world , than we do of different solidities ; though we both conceive , and speak of different bodies , because extension and figure are capable of variation . but since solidity cannot exist without extension , and figure , the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision , has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes , which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning materia prima ; which imperfection or abuse , how far it may concern a great many other general terms , i leave to be considered . this , i think , i may at least say , that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world , if words were taken for what they are , the signs of our ideas only , and not for things themselves . for when we argue about matter , or any the like term , we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound , whether that precise idea agree to any thing really existing in nature , or no. and if men would tell , what ideas they make their words stand for , there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling , in the search or support of truth , that there is . § . . but whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words , this , i am sure , that by constant and familiar use , they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things . 't would be a hard matter , to persuade any one , that the words which his father or school-master , the parson of the parish , or such a revend doctor used , signified nothing that really existed in nature : which , perhaps , is none of the least causes , that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes , even in opinions purely philosophical , and where they have no other interest but truth . for the words , they have a long time been used to , remaining firm in their minds , 't is no wonder , that the wrong notions annexed to them , should not be removed . § . . fifthly , another abuse of words , is the setting them in the place of things , which they do or can by no means signifie . we may observe , that in the general names of substances , whereof the nominal essences are only known to us , when we put them into propositions , and affirm or deny any thing about them , we do most commonly tacitly suppose , or intend , they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances . for when a man says gold is malleable , he means , and would insinuate something more than this , that what i call gold is malleable , ( though truly it amounts to no more , ) but would have this understood , viz. that gold ; i. e. what has the real essence of gold is malleable , which amounts to thus much , that malleableness depends on , and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. but a man , not knowing wherein that real essence consists , the connexion in his mind of malleableness , is not truly with an essence he knows not , but only with the sound gold he puts for it . thus when we say , that animal rationale is , and animal implume bibes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man ; 't is plain , we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a species , and would signifie , that a rational animal better described that real essence , than a two-leg'd animal with broad nails , and without feathers . for else , why might not plato as properly make the word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or man , stand for his complex idea , made up of the ideas of a body , distinguished from others , by a certain shape and other outward appearances , as aristotle , make the complex idea , to which he gave the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or man , of body , and the faculty of reasoning join'd together , unless the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or man , were supposed to stand for something else , than what it signifies , and the idea a man professes he would express by it ? § . . 't is true , the names of substances would be much more useful , and propositions made in them much more certain , were the real essences of substances , the ideas in our minds , which those words signified . and 't is for want of those real essences , that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them : and therefore the mind , to remove that imperfection as much as it can , makes them , by a secret supposition , to stand for a thing , having that real essence , as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it . for though the word man or gold , signifie nothing truly but a complex idea of properties , united together in one sort of substances : yet there is scarce any body in the use of these words , but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence , on which those properties depend ; which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words , that by a plain abuse , it adds to it : when we would make them stand for something , which not being in our complex idea , the name we use , can no ways be the sign of . § . . this shews us the reason , why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one , being left out , or changed , it is allowed to be another thing , i. e. to be of another species , as is plain in chance-medly , man-slaughter , murther , parricide , &c. the reason whereof is , because the complex idea signified by that name , is the real , as well as nominal essence ; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence , but that . but in substances , it is not so . for though in that called gold , one puts into his complex idea , what another leaves out ; and vice versâ : yet men do not usually think , that therefore the species is changed : because they secretly in their minds refer that name , and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing existing , on which those properties depend . he that adds to his complex idea of gold , that of fixedness , or solubility in aq . regia , which he put not in it before , is not thought to have changed the species ; but only to have a more perfect idea , by adding another , which is always in rerum natura , joined with those other , of which his former complex idea consisted . but this reference of the name , to a thing whereof we have not the idea , is so far from helping at all , that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties . for by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies , the word gold ( which by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas , serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse ) comes to have no signification at all , being put for somewhat whereof we have no idea at all ; and so can signifie nothing at all , when the body it self is away . for however it may be thought all one ; yet , if well considered , it will be found a quite different thing , to argue about gold in name , and about a parcel of the body it self , v. g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us ; though in discourse , we are fain to substitute the name for the thing . § . . that which , i think , very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of species , is the supposition before mentioned , that nature works regularly in the production of things , and sets the boundaries to each of those species , by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual , which we rank under one general name . whereas any one who observes their different qualities , can hardly doubt that many of the individuals , called by the same name , are in their internal constitution , as different one from another , as several of those which are ranked under different specifick names . this supposition , however that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specifick name , makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences , though indeed they signifie nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds , when they use them . so that , if i may so say , signifying one thing , and being supposed for , or put in the place of another , they cannot but , in such a kind of use , cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses ; especially in those who have throughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms , whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished . § . . but however preposterous and absurd it be , to make our names stand for ideas we have not , or ( which is all one ) essences that we know not , it being in effect , to make our words the signs of nothing ; yet t is evident to any one , whoever so little reflects on the use men make of their words , that there is nothing more familiar . when a man asks , whether this or that thing he sees , let it be a drill , or a monstrous foetus , be a man , or no ; 't is evident , the question is not , whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea , expressed by the name man : but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things , which he supposes his name man to stand for . in which way of using the names of substances , there are these false suppositions contained . first , that there are certain precise essences , according to which nature makes all particular things , and by which they are distinguished into species . that every thing has a real constitution , whereby it is what it is , and on which its sensible qualities depend , is past doubt : but i think it has been proved , that this makes not the distinction of species , as we rank them ; nor the boundaries of their names . secondly , this tacitly also insinuates , as if we had ideas of these proposed essences . for to what purpose else is it , to enquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species man , if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick essence known ? which yet is utterly false : and therefore such application of names , as would make them stand for ideas we have not , must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them , and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words . § . . sixthly , there remains yet another more general , though , perhaps , less observed abuse of words ; and that is , that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain ideas , they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion between the names and the signification they use in them , that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is : and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered , as if it were past doubt , that in the use of those common received sounds , the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas . whence presuming , that when they have in discourse used any term , they have thereby , as it were , set before others the very thing they talk of . and so likewise taking the words of others , as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to , they never trouble themselves to explain their own , or understand clearly others meaning . from whence commonly proceeds noise , and wrangling , without improvement or information ; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions , which in truth , are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas . and yet men think it strange , if in discourse , or ( where it is often absolutely necessary ) in dispute , one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms : though the arguings , one may every day observe in conversation , make it evident , that there are few names of complex ideas , which any two men use for the same just precise collection . 't is hard to name a word , which will not be a clear instance of this . life is a term , none more familiar . any one almost would take it for an affront , to be asked what he meant by it . and yet if it comes in question , whether a plant , that lies ready formed in the seed , have life ; whether the embrio in an egg before incubation , or a man in a swound without sense or motion , be alive or no , it is easie to perceive , that a c●ear distinct settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word , as that of life is . some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have , to which they apply the common words of their language , and that serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses and affairs : but this is not sufficient for philosophical enquiries . knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas . and though men will not not be so importunately dull , as not to understand what others say , without demanding an explication of their terms ; nor so troublesomely critical , as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them ; yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case , i know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words , whose sense seems dubious : or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance , in what sense another man uses his words , since he has no other way of certainly knowing it , but by being informed . this abuse of taking words upon trust , has no where spread so far , nor with so ill effects , as amongst men of letters . the multiplication and obstinacy of disputes , which has so laid waste the intellectual world , is owing to nothing more , than to this ill use of words . for though it be generally believed , that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies , the world is distracted with ; yet the most i can find , that the contending learned men of different parties do , in their arguings one with another , is , that they speak different languages . for i am apt to imagine , that when any of them quitting terms , think upon things , and know what they think , they think all the same . though perhaps , what they would have , be different . § . . to conclude this consideration of the imperfection , and abuse o● language ; the ends of language in our discourse with others , being chiefly these three : first , to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another . secondly , to do it with as much ease and quickness , as is possible ; and thirdly , thereby to convey the knowledge of things . language is either abused , or deficient , when it fails in any of these three . first , words fail in the first of these ends , and lay not open one man's ideas to anothers view . first , when men have names in their mouths without any clear and distinct ideas in their minds , whereof they are the signs● or secondly , when they apply the common received names of any language to ideas , to which the common use of that language does not apply them ; or thirdly , when they apply them very unsteadily , making them stand now for one , and by and by for another idea . § . . secondly , men fail of conveying their thoughts , with all the quickness and ease that may be , when they have complex ideas , without having distinct names for them . this is sometimes the fault of the language it self , which has not in it a sound yet apply'd to such a signification : and sometimes the fault of the man , who has not yet learn'd the name for the idea he would shew another . § . . thirdly , there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words , when their ideas agree not to the reality of things . though it be a defect , that has its original in our ideas , which are not so conformable to the nature of things , as attention , study , and application might make them ; yet it fails not to extend it self to our words too , when we use them as signs of real beings , which yet never had any reality or existence . § . first , he that hath words of any language , without distinct ideas in his mind , to which he applies them , does , so far as he uses them in discourse , only make a noise without any sense or signification ; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words , or learned terms , is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge , than he would be in learning , who had nothing in his study , but the bare titles of books , without possessing the contents of them . for all such words , however put into discourse , according to the right construction of grammatical rules , or the harmony of well turned periods , do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds , and nothing else . § . . secondly , he that has complex ideas , without particular names for them , would be in no better a case than a book-seller , who had in his ware-house volumes that lay there unbound , and without titles ; which he could therefore make known to others , only by shewing the loose sheets , and communicate them only by tale. this man is hindred in his discourse , for want of words to communicate his complex ideas , which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them ; and so is sain often to use twenty words , to express what another man signifies in one . § . . thirdly , he that uses not constantly the same sign for the same idea , but uses the same words sometimes in one , and sometimes in another signification , ought to pass in the schools and conversation , for as fair a man , as he does in the market and exchange , who sells several things under the same name . § . . fourthly , he that applies the words of any language to ideas , different from those , to which the common use of that country applies them , however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light , will not by such words be able to convey one jot of it to others , without defining . for however , the sounds are such as are familiarly known , and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them ; yet standing for other ideas than they usually make them the signs of , they cannot make known his thoughts who uses them . § . . fifthly , he that hath ideas of substances , which never existed , nor have any correspondence with the real nature of things , to which he gives setled and defined names , may fill his discourse , and , perhaps , another man's head , with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain , but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot , in real and true knowledge . § . . he that hath names without ideas , wants meaning in his words , and speaks only empty sounds . he that hath complex ideas without names for them , wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions , and is necessitated to use periphrases . he that uses his words loosly and unsteadily , will either be not minded , or not understood . he that applies his names to ideas , different from their common use , wants propriety in his language , and speaks gibberish : and he that hath ideas of substances , disagreeing with the real existence of things , so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding , and hath , instead thereof , chimaeras . § . . in our notions , concerning substances , we are liable to all the former inconveniencies ; v. g. . he that uses the word tarantula , without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for , pronounces a good word ; but so long means nothing at all by it . . he that , in a new-discovered country , shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables , unknown to him before , may have as true ideas of them , as of a horse , or a stag ; but can speak of them only by a description till he shall either take the name the natives call them by , or give them one himself . . he that uses the word body sometimes for pure extension , and sometimes for extension and solidity together , will talk very ●allaciously . . he that gives the name horse , to that idea which common usage calls mule , talks improperly , and will not be understood . . he that thinks the name centaur stands for some real being , imposes on himself , and mistakes words for things . § . . in modes and relations generally , we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniencies , ( viz. ) . i may have in my memory the names of modes , as gratitude , or charity , and yet not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names . . i may have ideas , and not know the names that belong to them ; v. g. i may have the idea of a man's drinking till his colour and humour be altered , till his tongue trips , and his eyes look red , and his feet fail him ; and yet not know , that it is to be called drunkenness . . i may have the ideas of vertues , or vices , and names also , but apply them amiss : v. g. when i apply the name frugality , to that idea which others call and signifie by this sound , covetousness . . i may use any of those names with inconstancy . . but in modes and relations , i cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things : for modes being complex ideas , made by the mind at pleasure ; and relation being but my way of considering , or comparing two things together , and so also an idea o● my own making , these ideas can scarce be sound to disagree with any thing existing ; since they are not in the mind , as the copies of things regularly made by nature , nor as properties inseparably slowing from the internal constitution or essence of any substance ; but , as it were , patterns lodg'd in my memory , with names annexed to them , to denominate actions and relations by , as they come to exist . but the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions ; and so using words in a different sense from other people , i am not understood , but am thought to have wrong ideas of them , when i give wrong names to them . only if i put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations , any inconsistent ideas together , i fill my head also with chimaeras ; since such ideas , if well examined , cannot so much as exist in the mind , much less any real being , be ever denominated from them . § . . since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world , than dry truth and real knowledge , figurative speeches , and allusion in language , will hardly be admitted , as an imperfection or abuse of it . i confess , in discourses , where we seek rather pleasure and delight , than information and improvement , such ornaments as are borrowed from them , can scarce pass for faults . but yet , if we would speak of things as they are , we must allow , that all the art of rhetorick , besides order and clearness , all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented , are for nothing else , but to insinuate wrong ideas , move the passions , and thereby mislead the judgment ; and so indeed are perfect cheat : and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses , they are certainly , in all discourses that pretend to inform and instruct , wholly to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are concerned , cannot but be thought a great fault , either of the language or person that makes use of them . what , and how various they are , i shall not trouble my self to take notice ; the books of rhetorick which abound in the world , will inform those who want to be informed : only i cannot but observe , how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge , is the care and concern of mankind ; since the arts of fallacy are endow'd and preferred ; and 't is plain how much men love to deceive , and be deceived , since the great art of deceit and errour , rhetorick i mean , has its established professors , is publickly taught , and has always been had in great reputation . and , i doubt not , but it will be thought great boldness , if not brutality in me , to have said thus much against it . eloquence , like the fair sex , has too prevailing beauties in it , to suffer it self ever to be spoken against : and 't is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving , wherein men find pleasure to be deceived . chap. xi . of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . § . . the natural and improved imperfections of language , we have seen above at large ; and speech being the great bond that holds society together , and the common conduit , whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man , and one generation to another , it would well deserve our most serious thoughts , to consider what remedies are to be found for these inconveniences above-mentioned . § . . i am not so vain to think , that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world , no not so much as that of his own country , without rendring himself ridiculous . to require that men should use their words , all in the same sense , and for clear , distinct , and uniform ideas , would be to think , that all men should have the same notions , and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of ; which is not to be expected by any one , who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men , to be very knowing , or very silent . and he must be little skill'd in the world , who thinks that a voluble tongue , shall accompany only a good understanding ; or that mens talking much or little , shall hold proportion only to their knowledge . § . . but though the market and exchange must be lest to their own ways of talking , and gossippings , not robb'd of their ancient privilege ; though the schools , and men of argument would , perhaps , take it amiss to have any thing offered to abate the length , or lessen the number of their disputes ; yet , methinks those who pretend seriously to search after , or maintain truth , should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity , doubtfulness , or equivocation , to which mens words are naturally liable , if care be not taken . § . . for he that shall well consider the errours and obscurity , the mistakes and confusion , that is spread in the world by an ill use of words , will find some reason to doubt , whether language , as it has been employ'd , has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind . how many are there , that when they would think on things , fix their thoughts only on words , especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters ? and who then can wonder , if the result of such contemplations and reasonings , about little more than sounds , whilst the ideas they annexed to them , are very confused , or very unsteady , or perhaps none at all ; who can wonder , i say , that such thoughts and reasonings , end in nothing but obscurity and mistake , without any clear judgment or knowledge ? § . . this inconvenience , in an ill use of words , men suffer in their own private meditations : but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it , in conversation , discourse , and arguings with others . for language being the great conduit , whereby men convey their discoveries , reasonings , and knowledge , from one to another , he that makes an ill use of it , though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge , which are in things themselves ; yet he does , as much as in him lies , break or stop the pipes , whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of mankind . he that uses words , without any clear and steady meaning , what does he but lead himself and others into errours ? and he that designedly does it , ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge . and yet , who can wonder , that all the sciences and parts of knowledge , have been so over-charged with obscure and equivocal terms , and insignificant and doubtful expressions , capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted , very little , or not at all the more knowing or orthodox ; since subtilty , in those who make profession to te●ch or defend truth , hath passed so much for a vertue : a vertue , indeed , which consisting , for the most part , in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms , is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance , and obstinate in their errours . § . . let us look into the books of controversies of any kind , there we shall see , that the effect of obscure , unsteady , or equivocal terms , is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds , without convincing or bettering a man's understanding . for if the idea be not agreed on , betwixt the speaker and hearer , for which the words stand , the argument is not about things , but names . as often as such a word , whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them , comes in use , their understandings have no other object wherein they agree , but barely the sound , the things that they think on at that time , as expressed by that word , being quite different . § . . whether a bat be a bird , or no , is not a question , whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is , or have other qualities than indeed it has , for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of : but the question is , . either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of those sorts of things , for which these names are supposed to stand ; and then it is a real enquiry , concerning the nature of a bird , or a bat , to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete , by examining , whether all the simple ideas , to which combined together , they both give the name bird , be all to be found in a bat : but this is a question only of enquirers , ( not disputers , ) who neither affirm , nor deny , but examine : or , . it is a question between disputants ; whereof the one affirms , and the other denies , that a bat is a bird : and then the question is barely about the signification of one , or both these words ; in that they not having both the same complex ideas , to which they give these two names , one holds , and t'other denies , that these two names may be affirmed one of another . were they agreed in the signification of these two names , it were impossible they should dispute about them : for they would presently and clearly see , ( were that adjusted between them , ) whether all the simple ideas , of the more general name bird , were found in the complex idea of a bat , or no ; and so there could be no doubt , whether a bat were a bird , or no. and here i desire it may be considered , and carefully examined , whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world , are not meerly verbal , and about the signification of words ; and that if the terms they are made in , were defined , and reduced in their signification ( as they must be , where they signifie any thing ) to the simple ideas they stand for , those disputes would not end of themselves , and immediately vanish . i leave it then to be considered , what the learning of disputation is , and how well they are imploy'd for the advantage of themselves , or others , whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds ; i. e. those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies . when i shall see any of those combatants , strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity , ( which every one may do , in the words he uses himself , as far as he has clear and distinct notions to which he applies them , ) i shall think him a champion for knowledge , truth , and peace , and not the slave of vain-glory , ambition , or a party . § . . to remedy the defects of speech before-mentioned , to some degree , and to prevent the inconveniencies that follow from them , i imagine , the observation of these following rules may be of use , till some body better able shall judge it worth his while , to think more maturely on this matter , and oblige the world with his thoughts on it . first , a man should take care to use no word without a signification , no name without an idea for which he makes it stand . this rule will not seem altogether needless , to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words ; as instinct , sympathy , and antipathy , &c. in the discourse of others , so made use of , as he might easily conclude , that those that used them , had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them ; but spoke them only as sounds , which usually served instead of reasons , on the like occasions . not but that these words , and the like , have and may be used , in very proper significations● but there being no natural connexions between any words , and any ideas , these , and any other , may be learn'd by rote , and pronounced or writ by men , who have no ideas in their minds , to which they have annexed them , and for which they make them stand ; which is necessary they should , if men should speak intelligibly , even to themselves alone . § . . secondly , 't is not enough a man uses his words , as signs of some ideas ; those ideas he annexes them to , must be clear and distinct : which in complex ideas , is the knowing the particular ones that make that composition , of which , if any one be again complex , 't is the knowing also the precise collection , that is united in each , and so till we come to simple ones . this is very necessary in names of modes , and especially moral words ; which having no setled objects in nature , from whence , their ideas are taken , as from their originals , are apt to be very confused . iustice is a word in every man's mouth , but most commonly with a very undetermined loose signification : which will always be so , unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of ; and if it be decompounded , must be able to resolve it still on , till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up : and unless this be done , a man makes an ill use of the word , let it be iustice , for example , or any other . i do not say , a man needs stand to recollect , and make this analysis at large , every time the word iustice comes in his way : but this , at least , is necessary , that he have so examined the signification of that name , and setled the idea of all its parts in his mind , that he can do it when he pleases . if one , who makes his complex idea of iustice , to be such a treatment of the person or goods of another , as is according to law , hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is , which makes a part of his complex idea of justice , 't is plain , his idea of justice it self , will be confused and imperfect . this exactness will , perhaps , be judged very troublesome ; and therefore most men will think , they may be excused from setling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds . but yet i must say , till this be done , it must not be wondred , they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds , and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with others . § . . in substances , something more is required , than the distinct ideas their names stand for , they must also be conformable to things , as they exist : but of this , i shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by . this exactness is absolutely necessary in enquiries , after philosophical knowledge and controversies about truth . and though it would be well too , if it extended it self to common conversation , and the ordinary affairs of life ; yet i think , that is scarce to be expected . vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses ; and both , though confused enough , yet serve pretty well the market , and the wake . merchants and lovers , cooks and taylors , have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs ; and so , i think , might philosophers and disputants too , if they had a mind to understand , and to be clearly understood . § . . thirdly . 't is not enough that men have ideas , clear and distinct ideas , for which they make these signs stand : but they must also take care to apply their words , as near as may be , to such ideas as common use has annexed them to . for words , especially of languages already framed , being no man 's private possession , but the common measure of commerce and communication , 't is not for any one , at pleasure , to change the stamp they are current in ; nor alter the ideas they are affixed to ; or at least when there is a necessity to do so , he is bound to give notice of it . men's intentions in speaking are , or at least should be , to be understood , which cannot be without the frequent explanations , demands , and other the like incommodious interruptions , where men do not follow common use. propriety of speech , is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds , with the greatest ease and advantage ; and therefore deserves some part of our care and study , especially in the names of moral words , whose proper use is to be learn'd from those , who in their writings and discourses , appear to have had the clearest notions , and apply'd to them their terms , with the best choice and clearness . this way of using a man's words , according to the propriety of the language , though it have not always the good fortune to be understood : yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him , who is so unskilful in the language he speaks , as not to understand it , when made use of , as it ought to be . § . . fourthly . but because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words , as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for : and because men in the improvement of their knowledge , come to have ideas different from the vulgar , and ordinary received ones , for which they must either make new words , ( which men seldom venture to do , for fear of being thought guilty of affectation , or novelty , ) or else must use old ones , in a new signification . therefore after the observation of the foregoing rules , it is sometimes necessary , for the ascertaining the signification of words , to declare their meaning ; where either common use , has left it uncertain and loose ; ( as it has in most names of very complex ideas ; ) or where a man uses them , in a sens● any way peculiar to himself ; or where the term being very material in the discourse , and that upon which it chie●ly turns , is liable to any doubtfulness , or mistake . § . . as the ideas , men's words stand for , are of different sorts ; so the way of making known the ideas , they stand for , when there is occasion , is also different . for though defining be thought the proper way , to make known the proper signification of words ; yet there be some words , that will not be defined , as there be others , whose precise meaning cannot be made known , but by definition : and , perhaps , a third , which partake somewhat of both the other , as we shall see in the names of simple ideas , modes , and substances . § . . first , when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea , which he perceives is not understood , or is in danger to be mistaken , he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity , and the end of speech , to declare its meaning , and make known what idea he makes it stand for . this as has been shewed , cannot be done by definition ; and therefore , when a synonymous word fails to do it , there is but one of these ways le●t . first , sometimes the naming the subject , wherein that simple idea is to be found , will make its name be understood by those , who are acquainted with that subject , and know it by that name . so to make a country-man understand what feuillemorte colour signifies , it may suffice to tell him , 't is the colour of wither'd leaves falling in autumn . secondly , but the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple idea , is by presenting to his senses that subject , which may produce it in his mind , and make him actually have the idea that word stands for . § . . secondly , mixed modes , especially those belonging to morality , being most of them such combinations of ideas , as the mind puts together of its own choice ; and whereof they are not always standing patterns to be found existing , the signification of their names cannot be made known , as those of simple ideas , by any shewing ; but in recompence thereof , may be perfectly and exactly defined . for they being combinations of several ideas , that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together , without reference to any archetypes , men may , if they please , exactly know the ideas , that go to each composition , and so both use these words , in a certain and undoubted signification , and perfectly declare when there is occasion , what they stand for . this , if well considered , would lay great blame on those , who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct . for since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes , or which is all one , the real essence of each species , is to be known , they being not of nature's , but man's making , it is a great negligence and perversness , to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity , which is much more pardonable , in treating of natural substances , where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided , for a quite contrary reason , as we shall see by and by . § . . upon this ground it is , that i am bold to think , that morality is capable of demonstration , as well as methematicks : since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for , may be perfectly known ; and so the congruity , or incongruity of the things themselves , be certainly discovered , in which consists perfect knowledge . nor let any one object , that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality , as well as those of modes , from which will arise obscurity . for as to substances , when concerned in moral discourses , their divers natures are not so much enquir'd into , as supposed ; v. g. when we say that man is subject to law : we mean nothing by man , but a corporeal rational creature : what the real essence , or other qualities of that creature are in this case , is no way considered : and therefore , whether a child or changeling , be a man in a physical sense , may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will , it concerns not at all the moral man , as i may call him , which is this immoveable unchangeable idea , a corporeal rational being . for were there a monkey , or any other creature to be found , that had the use of reason , to such a degree , as to be able to understand general signs , and to deduce consequences about general ideas , he would no doubt be subject to law , and , in that sense , be a man , how much soever he differ'd in shape from others of that name . the names of substances , if they be used in them , as they should , can no more disturb moral , than they do mathematical discourses : where , if the mathematicians speak of a cube or globe of gold , or any other body , he has his clear setled idea , which varies not , though it may , by mistake , be apply'd to a particular body , to which it belongs not . § . . this , i have here mentioned by the bye , to shew of what consequence it is for men , in their names of mixed modes , and consequently , in all their moral discourses , to define their words when there is occasion : since thereby moral knowledge may be brought , to so great clearness and certainty . and it must be great want of ingenuity , ( to say no worse of it , ) to refuse to do it : since a definition is the only way , whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known ; and yet a way , whereby their meaning may be known certainly , and without leaving any room for any contest about it . and therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind , cannot be excused , if their discourses in morality be not much more clear , than those in natural philosophy : since they are about ideas in the mind , which are none of them false , nor disproportionate ; they having no external beings for archetypes which they are referred to , and must correspond with . it is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea , which shall be the standard to which they will give the name iustice ; with which pattern so made , all actions that agree , shall pass under that denomination , than having seen aristides to frame an idea , that shall in all things be exactly like him , who is as he is , let men make what notion , or idea , they please of him . for the one , they need but know the ideas they frame within themselves : for the other , they must enquire into the whole nature , and abstruse hidden constitution , and qualities of a thing existing without them . § . . another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary , especially of moral words , is what i mentioned a little before ; and that is , that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty . for the ideas they stand for , being for the most part such , whose component parts no-where exist together , but scattered and mingled with others , it is the mind alone that collects them , and gives them the union of one idea : and it is only by words , enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united , that we can make known to others , what their names stand for ; and not by any application to the senses , as we can do in sensible simple ideas , and also to some degree in substances . § . . thirdly , for the explaining the signification of the names of substances as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species , both the fore-mentioned ways , viz. of shewing and defining , are requisite , in many cases , to be made use of . for there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities , to which we suppose the other , which makes up our complex idea of that species , annexed , we give the name to some quality , or idea , which is the most observable , and we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species . these leading , or characteristical ( as i may so call them ) ideas , in the sorts of animals and vegetables , is ( as has been before remarked ) mostly figure , and in inanimate bodies colour , and in some both together . now , § . . these leading sensible qualities are those , which make the chief ingredients of our specifick ideas , and consequently the best definitions of our specifick names , as attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge . for though the sound man , in its own nature , be as apt to signifie a complex idea , made up of animality and rationality , united in the same subject , as to signifie any other combination ; yet used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind , perhaps , the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex idea , signified by the word man , as any other we find in it . and therefore why plato's animal implume bipes latis unguibus , should not be as good a definition of the name man , standing for that sort of creatures , will not be easie to shew : for 't is the shape , as the leading quality , that seems more to determine that species , than a faculty of reasoning , which appears not at first , and in some never . and if this be not allow'd to be so , i do not know how they can be excused from murther , who kill monstrous births , ( as we call them , ) because of an unordinary shape , without knowing whether they have a rational soul , or no ; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed , than ill-shaped infant , as soon as born . and who is it has informed us , that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement , unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece , or can join it self to , and inform no sort of body , but one that is just of such an outward structure . § . . now these leading qualities , are best made known by shewing , and can hardly be made known otherwise . for the shape of an horse , or cassuary , will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words , the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better : and the idea of the particular colour of gold , is not to be got by any description of it , but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it ; as is evident in those who are used to this metal , who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit , pure from adulterate , by the sight , where others ( who have as good eyes , but yet , by use , have not got the precise nice idea of that peculiar yellow ) shall not perceive any difference . the like may be said of those other simple ideas , peculiar in their kind to any substance ; for which precise ideas , there are no peculiar names . the particular ringing sound there is in gold , distinct from the sound of other bodies , has no particular name annexed to it , no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal . § . . but because many of the simple ideas that make up our specifick ideas of substances , are powers , which lie not obvious to our senses in the things as they ordinarily appear ; therefore , in the signification of our names of substances , some part of the signification will be better made known , by enumerating those simple ideas , than in shewing the substance it self . for he that , to the yellow shining colour of gold got by sight , shall , from my enumerating them , have the ideas of great ductility , fusibility , fixedness , and solubility , in aq. regia , will have a perfecter idea of gold , than he can have by seeing a piece of gold , and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities . but if the formal constitution of this shining , heavy , ductil thing ( from whence all these its properties flow ) lay open to our senses , as the formal constitution , or essence of a triangle does , the signification of the word gold , might as easily be ascertained , as that of triangle . § . . hence we may take notice , how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things , lies in our senses . for how spirits , separate from bodies , ( whose knowledge and ideas of these things , is certainly much more perfect than ours , ) know them , we have no notion , no idea at all : the whole extent of our knowledge , or imagination , reaches not beyond our own ideas , limited to our ways of perception . though yet it be not to be doubted , that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh , may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances , as we have of a triangle , and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence : but the manner how they come by that knowledge , exceeds our conceptions . § . . but though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances , as they stand for our ideas ; yet they leave them not without great imperfection , as they stand for things . for our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas , but being made use of ultimately to represent things , and so are put in their place , their signification must agree with the truth of things , as well as with mens ideas : and therefore in substances , we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea , commonly received as the signification of that word , but to go a little farther , and enquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves , and thereby perfect , as much as we can , our ideas of their distinct species ; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things , and are experienced in them . for since 't is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas , as do really exist in things themselves , as well as for the complex idea in other mens minds , which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for : therefore to define their names right , natural history is to be enquired into ; and their properties are , with care and examination , to be found out . for it is not enough for the avoiding inconveniences in discourses and arguings about natural bodies , and substantial things , to have learned , from the propriety of the language , the common but confused , or very imperfect idea , to which each word is applied , and to keep them to that idea in our use of them : but we must , by acquainting our selves with the history of that sort of things , rectifie and setle our complex idea , belonging to each specifick name ; and in discourse with others , ( if we find them mistake us , ) we ought to tell what the complex idea is , that we make such a name stand for . this is the more necessary to be done , by all those who search after knowledge , and philosophical verity , in that children , being taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things , apply them at random , and without much thinking or framing clear distinct ideas ; which custom , ( it being easie , and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation , ) they are apt to continue , when they are men : and so begin at the wrong end , learning words first , and perfectly , but make the notions , to which they apply those words afterwards , very overtly . by this means it comes to pass , that men speaking the proper language of their country , i. e. according to grammar-rules of that language , do yet speak very improperly of things themselves ; and by their arguing one with another , make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths , and the knowledge of things , as they are to be found in themselves , and not in our imaginations ; and it matters not much , for the improvement of our knowledge , how they are call'd . § . . it were therefore to be wished , that men , versed in physical enquiries , and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies , would set down those simple ideas , wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree . this would remedy a great deal of that confusion , which comes from several persons , applying the same name to a collection of a smaller , or greater number of sensible qualities , proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with , or accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things , which come under one denomination . but a dictionary of this sort , containing , as it were , a natural history , requires too many hands , as well as too much time , cost , pains , and sagacity , ever to be hoped for ; and till that be done , we must content our selves with such definitions of the names of substances , as explain the sense men use them in . and 't would be well , where there is occasion , if they would afford us so much . this yet is not usually done ; but men talk to one another , and dispute in words , whose meaning is not agreed between them , out of a mistake , that the signification of common words , are certainly established , and the precise ideas , they stand for , perfectly known ; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them . both which suppositions are false ; no names of complex ideas having so setled determined significations , that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas . nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing , but by the necessary ways of attaining it ; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for , in another man's mind , without he declare it to me by some other way , than barely using that sound ; there being no other way , without such a declaration , certainly to know it . indeed , the necessity of communication by language , brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words , within some tolerable latitude , that may serve for ordinary conversation ; and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words , by common use , in a language familiar to him . but common use , being but a very uncertain rule , which reduces it self at last to the ideas of particular men , proves often but a very variable standard . but though such a dictionary , as i have above mentioned , will require too much time , cost , and pains , to be hoped for in this age ; yet , methinks , it is not unreasonable to propose , that words standing for things which are known , and distinguished by their outward shapes , should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them . a vocabulary made after this fashion , would , perhaps , with more ease , and in less time , teach the true signification of many terms , especially in languages of remote countries or ages , and setle truer ideas in mens minds , of several things , whereof we read the names in ancient authors , than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks . naturalists , that treat of plants and animals , have found the benefit of this way : and he that has had occasion to consult them , will have reason to confess , that he has a clearer idea of apium , or ibex , from a little print of that herb , or beast , than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them . and so , no doubt , he would have of strigil and sistrum , if instead of a curry-comb , and cymbal , which are the english names dictionaries render them by , he could see stamp'd in the margin , small pictures of these instruments , as they were in use amongst the ancients . toga , tunica , pallium , are words easily translated by gown , coat , and cloak ; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the romans , than we have of the faces of the taylors who made them . such things as these , which the eye distinguishes by their shapes , would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them , and more determine the signification of such words , than any other words set for them , or made use of to define them . but this only by the bye . § . . fifthly , if men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words , and definitions of their terms , are not to be had ; yet this is the least that can be expected , that in all discourses , wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another , he should use the same word constantly in the same sense , if this were done , ( which no body can refuse without great disingenuity , ) many of the books extant , might be spared ; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end ; several of those great volumes , swollen with ambiguous words , now used in one sense , and by and by in another , would shrink into a very narrow compass , and many of the philosophers , ( to mention no others , ) as well as poets works , might be contained in a nut-shell . § . . but after all , words are so scanty in respect of that infinite variety is in mens thoughts , that men , wanting terms to suit their precise notions , will , notwithstanding their utmost caution , be forced often to use the same word , in somewhat different senses : and though in the continuation of a discourse , or the pursuit of an argument , there be hardly room to digress into a particular definition , as often as a man varies the signification of any term ; yet the import of the discourse will , for the most part , if there be no designed fallacy , sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers , into the true meaning of it : but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader , there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning , and shew in what sense he there uses that term. book iv. chap. i. of knowledge in general . § . . since the mind , in all its thoughts and reasonings , hath no other immediate object but its own ideas , which it alone does or can contemplate , it is evident , that our knowledge is only conversant about them . § . . knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement , or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas . in this alone it consists . where this perception is , there is knowledge ; and where it is not , there , though we may fansie , guess , or believe , yet we always come short of knowledge . for when we know that white is not black , what do we else but perceive , that these two ideas do not agree ? when we possess our selves with the utmost security of the demonstration , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , what do we more but perceive , that equality to two right ones , does necessarily agree to , and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle ? § . . but to understand a little more distinctly , wherein this agreement of disagreement consists , i think we may reduce it all to these four sorts : . identity , or diversity . . relation . . co-existence , or necessary connexion . . real existence . § . . first , as to the first sort of agreement or disagreement , viz. identiy , or diversity . 't is the first act of the mind , when it has any sentiments , or ideas at all , to perceive its ideas , and so far as it perceives them , to know each what it is , and thereby also to perceive their difference , and that one is not another . this is so absolutely necessary , that without it there could be no knowledge , no reasoning , no imagination , no distinct thoughts at all . by this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with it self , and to be what it is ; and all distinct ideas to disagree , i. e. the one not to be the other : and this it does without any pains , labour , or deduction ; but at first view , by its natural power of perception and distinction . and though men of art have reduced this into those general rules , what is , is ; and it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , for ready application in all cases , wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it ; yet it is certain , that the first exercise of this faculty , is about particular ideas . a man infallibly knows , as soon as ever he has them in his mind , that the ideas he calls white and round , are the very ideas they are , and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or square . nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before , or without any such general rule . this then is the first agreement , or disagreement , which the mind perceives in its ideas ; which it always perceives at first sight : and if there ever happen any doubt about it , 't will always be found to be about the names , and not the ideas themselves , whose identity and diversity will always be perceived , as soon and as clearly , as the ideas themselves are , nor can it possibly be otherwise . § . . secondly , the next sort of agreement , or disagreement , the mind perceives in any of its ideas , may , i think , be called relative , and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas , of what kind soever , whether substances , modes , or any other . for since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same , and so be universally and constantly denied one of another , there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all , if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas , and find out the agreement or disagreement , they have one with another , in several ways the mind takes of comparing them . § . . thirdly , the third sort of agreement , or disagreement , to be found in our ideas , which the perception of the mind is employ'd about , is co-existence , or non-co-existence in the same subject ; and this belongs particularly to substances . thus when we pronounce concerning gold , that it is fixed , our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this , that fixedness , or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed , is an idea , that always accompanies , and is join'd with that particular sort of yellowness , weight , fusibility , malleableness , and solubility in aq. regia , which make our complex idea , signified by the word gold. § . . fourthly , the fourth and last sort is , that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea . within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement , is , i suppose contained all the knowledge we have , or are capable of : for all the enquiries that we can make , concerning any of our ideas , all that we know , or can affirm concerning any of them , is , that it is , or is not , the same with some other ; that it does , or does not always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject ; that it has this or that relation to some other idea ; or that it has a real existence without the mind . thus blue is not yellow , is of identity . two triangles upon equal basis , between two parallels , are equal , is of relation . iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions , is of co-existence . god is , is of real existence . though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations , yet they are so peculiar ways of agreement , or disagreement of our ideas , that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads , and not under relation in general ; since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation , as will easily appear to any one , who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this essay . i should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge , but that it is necessary first , to consider the different acceptations of the word knowledge . § . . there are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth , each of which is called knowledge . . there is actual knowledge , which is the present view the mind has of the agreement , or disagreement of any of its ideas , or of the relation they have one to another . . a man is said to know any proposition , which having been once laid before his thoughts , he evidently perceived the agreement , or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists ; and so lodg'd it in his memory , that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on , he , without doubt or hesitation , embraces the right side ; assents to , and is certain of the truth of it . this , i think , one may call habitual knowledge : and thus a man may be said to know all those truths , which are lodg'd in , his memory , by a foregoing clear and full perception , whereof the mind is assured past doubt , as often as it has occasion to reflect on them . for our finite understandings being able to think , clearly and distinctly , but on one thing at once , if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on , they would all be very ignorant : and he that knew most , would know but one truth , that being all he was able to think on at one time . § . . of habitual knowledge , there are also , vulgarly speaking , two degrees : first , the one is of such truths laid up in the memory , as whenever they occur to the mind , it actually perceives the relation is between those ideas . and this is in all those truths , whereof we have an intuitive knowledge , where the ideas themselves , by an immediate view , discover their agreement , or disagreement one with another . secondly , the other is of such truths , whereof the mind having been convinced , it retains the memory of the conviction , without the proofs . thus a man that remembers certainly , that he once perceived the demonstration , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , is commonly allow'd to know it , because he cannot doubt of the truth of it . but yet having forgot the demonstration , strictly speaking , he rather believes his memory , than knows the thing ; or rather it is something between opinion and knowledge , a sort of assurance that exceeds bare belief , which relies on the testimony of another , and yet comes short of perfect knowledge . for knowledge consisting in a clear perception of the relation of any two ideas , either by an immediate juxta-position , as in intuitive knowledge ; or by the intervention of other ideas , which do immediately discover their relation one to another , as in demonstration , the mind cannot , in strictness , be said to have so much as an habitual knowledge , where it has not an habitual view of the proofs ; where it has not such a memory of the demonstration , that it can , when that proposition is again recall'd to the mind , perceive the connexion of those ideas , by the intervention of such other ideas , whose immediate connexion , or relation one to another , shew the relation of the extremes . and hence it is , that demonstrative knowledge , is much more imperfect than intuitive , as we shall see in the following chapter . chap. ii. of the degrees of our knowledge . § . . all our knowledge consisting , as i have said , in the view the mind has of its own ideas , which is the utmost light and greatest certainty , we with our faculties , and in our way of knowledge are capable of , it may not be amiss , to consider a little the degrees of its evidence . the different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception , the mind has of the agreement , or disagreement of any of its ideas . for if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking , we shall find , that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves , without the intervention of any other : and this , i think , we may call intuitive knowledge . for in this , the mind is at no pains of proving or examining , but perceives the truth , as the eye doth light , only by being directed toward it . thus the mind perceives , that white is not black , that a circle is not a triangle , that three are more than two , and equal to one and two. such kind of truths , the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together , by bare intuition , without the intervention of any other idea ; and this kind of knowledge is the clearest , and most certain , that humane frailty is capable of . this part of knowledge is irresistible , and like the bright sun-shine , forces it self immediately to be perceived , as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way ; and leaves no room for hesitation , doubt , or examination , but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it . 't is on this intuition , that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge , which certainty every one finds to be so great , that he cannot imagine , and therefore not require a greater : for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty , than to know that any idea in his mind is such , as he perceives it to be ; and that two ideas , wherein he perceives a difference , are different , and not precisely the same . he that demands a greater certainty than this , demands he knows not what ; and shews only that he has a mind to be a sceptick , without being able to be so . certainty depends so wholly on this intuition , that in the next degree of knowledge , which i call demonstrative , this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas , without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty . § . . the next degree of knowledge is , where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas , but not immediately . though where-ever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas , there be certain knowledge : yet it does not always happen , that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement , which there is between them , even where it is discoverable ; and in that case , remains in ignorance , or at most , gets no farther than a probable conjecture . the reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is , because those ideas , concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made , cannot by the mind be so put together , as to shew it . in this case then , when the mind cannot so bring it's ideas together , as by their immediate comparison , and as it were juxta-position , or application one to another , to perceive their agreement or disagreement , it is fain , by the intervention of other ideas ( one or more , as it happens ) to discover the agreement or disagreement , which it searches ; and this is that which we call reasoning . thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness , between the three angles of a triangle , and two right ones , cannot by an immediate view and comparing them , do it : because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once , and be compared with any other one , or two angles ; and so of this the mind has no immediate , no intuitive knowledge . in this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles , to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality ; and finding those equal to two right ones , comes to know their equality to two right ones . § . . those intervening ideas , which serve to shew the agreement of any two others , are called proofs ; and where the agreement or disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived , it is called demonstration , it being shewn to the understanding , and the mind made see that it is so . a quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas , ( that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other , ) and to apply them right , is , i suppose , that which is called sagacity . § . . this knowledge by intervening proofs , though it be certain , yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright , nor the assent so ready , as in intuitive knowledge . for though in demonstration , the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers ; yet 't is not without pains and attention : there must be more than one transient view to find it . a steddy application and pursuit , is required to this discovery : and there must be a progression by steps and degrees , before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty , and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs , and the use of reason to shew it . § . . another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge , is , that though in the latter all doubt be removed , when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas , the agreement or disagreement is perceived ; yet before the demonstration there was a doubt , which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas , no more than it can be a doubt to the eye , ( that can distinctly see white and black , ) whether this ink , and this paper be all of a colour . if there be sight in the eyes , it will at first glimpse , without hesitation , perceive the words printed on this paper , different from the colour of the paper : and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception , it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge . if the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing , or the mind of perceiving , we in vain enquire after the quickness of sight in one , or clearness of perception in the other . § . . 't is true the perception , produced by demonstration , is also very clear ; but yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which i call intuitive ; like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another , where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object , it produces a knowledge ; but 't is still every reflection , with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness , which is in the first ; till in many removes it has a great mixture of dimness , and is not at first sight so knowable , especially to weak eyes . thus it is with knowledge , made out by a long train of proofs . § . . now , in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge , there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea , which it uses as a proof : for if it were not so , that yet would need a proof . since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement , there is no knowledge produced : if it be perceived by it self , it is intuitive knowledge : if it cannot be perceived by it self , there is need of some intervening idea , as a common measure to shew their agreement or disagreement , by which it is plain , that every step in reasoning , that produces knowledge , has intuitive certainty ; which when the mind perceives , there is no more required , but to remember it to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas , concerning which we enquire visible and certain . so that to make any thing a demonstration , it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas , whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination ( where the one is always the first , and the other the last in the account ) is found . this intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas , in each step and progression of the demonstration , must also be carried exactly in the mind , and a man must be sure that no part is left out ; which because in long deductions , and the use of many proofs , the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain : therefore it comes to pass , that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge , and men embrace often falshoods for demonstrations . § . . the necessity of this intuitive knowledge , in each step of scientifical or demonstrative reasoning , gave occasion , i imagine , to that mistaken axiom , that all reasoning was ex praecognitis & praeconcessis ; which how far it is a mistake , i shall have occasion to shew more at large , where i come to consider propositions , and particularly those propositions , which are called maxims ; and to shew that 't is by a mistake , that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings . § . . it is not only mathematicks , or the ideas alone of number , extension , and figure , that are capable of demonstration , no more than it is these ideas alone , and their modes , that are capable of intuition : for whatever ideas we have , wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them , there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge ; and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas , there the mind is capable of demonstration , which is not limited to ideas of extension , or figure , or number , or their modes . § . . the reason why it has been generally sought for , and supposed to be only in those , i imagine , has been not only the general usefulness of those sciences : but because , in comparing their equality or excess , the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable : and though in extension , every the least excess is not so perceptible ; yet the mind has found out ways , to examine and discover demonstratively the just equality of two angles , or extensions , or figures , and both these , i. e. numbers and figures , can be set down , by visible and lasting marks . § . . but in other simple ideas , whose modes and differences are made , and counted by degrees , and not quantity , we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences , as to perceive , or find ways to measure their just equality , or the least differences . for those other simple ideas , being appearances or sensations , produced in us by the size , figure , number , and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible , their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some , or all of those causes ; which since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter , whereof each is too subtile to be perceived , it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas . for supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness , be produced in us by a certain number of globules , which having a verticity about their own centres , strike upon the retina of the eye , with a certain degree of rotation , as well as progressive swiftness ; it will hence easily follow , that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered , as to reflect the greater number of globules of light , and to give them that proper rotation , which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us , the more white will that body appear , that , from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles , with that peculiar sort of motion . i do not say , that the nature of light consists in very small round globules , nor of whiteness , in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules , when it reflects them ; for i am not now treating physically of light , or colours : but this , i think , i may say , that i cannot ( and i would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did ) conceive how bodies without us , can any ways affect our senses , but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves , as in tasting and feeling , or the impulse of some insensible particles coming from them , as in seeing , hearing , and smelling ; by the different impulse of which parts , caused by their different size , figure , and motion , the variety of sensations is produced in us . § . . whether then they be globules , or no ; or whether they have a verticity about their own centres , that produce the idea of whiteness in us , this is certain , that the more particles of light are reflected from a body , fitted to give them that peculiar motion , which produces the sensation of whiteness in us ; and possibly too , the quicker the peculiar motion is , the whiter does the body appear , from which the greater number are reflected , as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sun-beams , in the shade , and in a dark hole ; in each of which , it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees . § . . not knowing therefore what number of particles , nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness , we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness , because we have no certain standard to measure them by , nor means to distinguish every the least real difference , the only help we have being from our senses , which in this point fail us . but where the difference is so great , as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas , whose differences can be perfectly retained , there these ideas of colours , as we see in different kinds , as blue and red , are as capable of demonstration , as ideas of number and extension . what i have here said of whiteness and colours , i think , holds true in all secundaries qualities and their modes . § . . these two , ( viz. ) intuition and demonstration , are the degrees of our knowledge ; whatever comes short of one of these , with what assurance soever embraced , is but faith , or opinion , but not knowledge , at least in all general truths . there is , indeed , another perception of the mind , employ'd about the particular existence of finite beings without us ; which going beyond bare probability , and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the fore-going degrees of certainty , passes under the name of knowledge . there can be nothing more certain , than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds ; this is intuitive knowledge . but whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds , whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us , which corresponds to that idea , is that whereof some men think there may be a question made , because men may have such ideas in their minds , when no such thing exists , no such object affects their senses . but yet here , i think , we are provided with an evidence , that puts us past doubting : for i ask any one , whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception , when he looks on the sun by day , and thinks on it by night ; when he actually tastes wormwood , or smells a rose , or only thinks on that savour , or odour ? we as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory , and actually coming into our minds by our senses , as we do between any two distinct ideas . if any one say , a dream may do the same thing , and all these ideas may be produced in us , without any external objects , he may please to dream , that i make him this answer , . that 't is no great matter , whether i remove his scruple , or no : where all is but dream , reasoning and arguments are of no use , truth and knowledge nothing . . that i believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in a fire , and being actually in it . but yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical , as to maintain , that what i call being actually in the fire , is nothing but a dream ; and that we cannot thereby certainly know , that any such thing as fire actually exists without us ; i answer , that we certainly finding , that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us , whose existence we perceive , or dream that we perceive , by our senses ; this certainty is as great as our happiness , or misery ; beyond which , we have no concernment to know , or to be . so that , i think , we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge , this also , of the existence of particular external objects , by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them , and allow these three degrees of knowledge , viz. intuitive , demonstrative , and sensitive : in each of which , there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty . § . . but since our knowledge is founded on , and employ'd about only our ideas , will it not follow from thence , that it is conformable to our ideas ; and that where our ideas are clear and distinct , or obscure and confused , our knowledge will be so too ? to which i answer , no : for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement , or disagreement of any two ideas , its clearness or obscurity , consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception , and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves : v. g. a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle , and of equality to two right ones , as any mathematician in the world , may yet have but a very obscure perception of their agreement , and so have but a very obscure knowledg of it . but obscure and confused ideas , can never produce any clear or distinct knowledge ; because as far as any ideas are confused , or obscure , so far the mind can never perceive clearly , whether they agree , or disagree . chap. iii. of the extent of humane knowledge . § . . knowledge , as has been said , lying in the perception of the agreement , or disagreement , of any of our ideas , it follows from hence , that , first , we can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas . § . . secondly , that we can have no knowledge farther , than we can have perception of that agreement , or disagreement : which perception being , . either by intuition , or the immediate comparing any two ideas ; or , . by reason , examining the agreement , or disagreement of two ideas , by the intervention of some others : or , . by sensation , perceiving the existence of particular things . hence it also follows , § . . thirdly , that we cannot have an intuitive knowledge , that shall extend it self to all our ideas , and all that we would know about them ; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another , by juxta-position , or an immediate comparison one with another . thus having the ideas of an obtuse , and an acute angled triangle , both drawn from equal bases , and between parallels , i can by intuitive knowledge , perceive the one not to be the other ; but cannot that way know , whether they be equal , or no ; because their agreement , or disagreement in equality , can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them : the difference of figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application ; and therefore there is need of some intervening quantities to measure them by , which is demonstration , or rational knowledge . § . fourthly , it follows also , from what is above observed , that our rational knowledge , cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas . because between two different ideas we would examine , we cannot always find such mediums , as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge , in all the parts of the deduction ; and where-ever that fails , we come short of knowledge and demonstration . § . . fifthly , sensitive knowledge reaching no farther than the existence of things actually present to our senses , is yet much narrower than either of the former . § . . from all which it is evident , that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things , but even of the extent of our own ideas . though our knowledge be limited to our ideas , and cannot exceed them either in extent , or perfection ; and though these be very narrow bounds , in respect of the extent of all-being , and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some , even created understandings , not tied down to the dull and narrow information , is to be received from some few , and not very acute ways of perception , such as are our senses ; yet it would be well with us , if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas , and there were not many doubts and enquiries concerning the ideas we have , whereof we are not , nor i believe ever shall be in this world , resolved . nevertheless , i do not yet question , but that humane knowledge , under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions , may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been , if men would sincerely , and with freedom of mind , employ all that industry and labour of thought , in improving the means of discovering truth , which they do for the colouring or support of falshood , to maintain a system , interest , or party , they are once engaged in . but yet after all , i think i may , without injury to humane perfection , be confident , that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have ; nor be able to surmount all the difficulties , and resolve all the questions might arise concerning any of them . we have the ideas of a square , a circle , and equality ; and yet , perhaps , shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square , and certainly know that it is so . we have the ideas of matter and thinking , but possibly shall never be able to know , whether matter thinks , or no ; it being impossible for us , by the contemplation of our own ideas , without revelation , to discover , whether omnipotency has given to matter fitly disposed , a power to perceive and think , or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed , a thinking immaterial substance : it being equally easie , in respect of our notions , to conceive , that god can , if he pleases , superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking , as that he should superadd to it another substance , with a faculty of thinking ; since we know not wherein thinking consists , nor to what sort of substances the almighty has been pleased to give that power , which cannot be in any created being , but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the creator . for what assurance of knowledge can any one have , that certain thoughts , such as , v. g. pleasure and pain , should not be in body it self , after a certain manner modified and moved , as well as that it should be in an immaterial substance , upon the motion of the parts of body : motion , according to the utmost reach of our ideas , being able to produce nothing but motion , so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain , or the idea of a colour , or sound , we are fain to quit our reason , go beyond our own ideas , and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our maker . for since we must allow he has annexed effects to motion , which we can no way conceive motion able to produce , what reason have we to conclude , that he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them , as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon ? i say not this , that i would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality : i am not here speaking of probability , but knowledge ; and i think not only , that it becomes the modesty of philosophy , not to pronounce magisterially , where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge ; but also , that it is of use to us , to discern how far our knowledge does reach ; for the state we are at present in , not being that of vision , we must , in many things , content our selves with faith and probability : and in the present question , about the immateriality of the soul , if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty , we need not think it strange . all the great ends of morality and religion , are well enough secured , without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality ; since it is evident , that he who made us at first begin to subsist here , sensible intelligent beings , and for several years continued us in such a state , can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world , and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men , according to their doings in this life . but to return to the argument in hand , our knowledge , i say , is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have , and which we employ it about , but even comes short of that too : but how far it reaches , let us now enquire . § . . the affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have , may , as i have before intimated in general , be reduced to these four sorts , viz. identity , co-existence , relation , and real existence . i shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these : § . . first , as to identity and diversity in this way , of the agreement , or disagreement of our ideas , our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves : and there can be no idea in the mind , which it does not presently , by an intuitive knowledge , perceive to be what it is , and to be different from any other . § . . secondly , as to the second sort , which is the agreement , or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence , in this our knowledge is very short , though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances . for our ideas of the species of substances , being , as i have shewed , nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject , and so co-existing together : v. g. our idea of flame , is a body hot , luminous , and moving upward ; of gold , a body heavy to a certain degree , yellow , malleable , and susible : for these , or some such complex ideas as these in mens minds , do these two names of different substances , flame and gold , stand for . when we would know any thing farther concerning these , or any other sort of substances , what do we enquire but what other qualities , or powers , these substances have , or have not ; which is nothing else but to know , whether simple ideas do , or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea . § . . this , how weighty and considerable a part soever of humane science , is yet very narrow , and scarce any at all . the reason whereof is , that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up , are , for the most part , such as carry with them , in their own nature , no visible necessary connexion , or inconsistency with any other simple ideas , whose co-existence with them , we would inform our selves about . § . . the ideas that our complex ones of substances , are made up of , and about which our knowledge , concerning substances , is most employ'd , are those of their secondary qualities ; which depending all ( as has been shewed ) upon the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts ; or if not upon them , upon something yet more remote from our comprehension 't is impossible we should know , which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another : for not knowing the root they spring from , not knowing what size , figure , and texture of parts they are , on which depend , and from which result those qualities which make our complex idea of gold , 't is impossible we should know what other qualities result from the same constitution of the insensible parts of gold ; and so consequently must always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it , or else are inconsistent with it . § . . besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies , on which depend all their secundary qualities , there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance , which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-existence , or inco-existence ( if i may so say ) of different ideas in the same subject ; and that is , that there is no discoverable connexion between any secundary quality , and those primary qualities that it depends on . § . . that the size , figure , and motion of one body , should cause a change in the size , figure , and motion of another body , is not beyond our conception ; the separation of the parts of one body , upon the intrusion of another ; and the change from rest to motion upon impulse ; these , and the like , seem to us to have some connexion one with another . and if we knew these primary qualities of bodies , we might have reason to hope , we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another : but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies , and the sensations that are produced in us by them , we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules , of the consequence or co-existence of any secundary qulities , though we could discover the size , figure , or motion of those insible parts , which immediately produce them . we are so far from knowing what figure , size , or motion of parts produce a yellow colour , a sweet taste , or a sharp sound , that we can by no means conceive how any size , figure , or motion of any particles , can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour , taste , or sound whatsoever , there is no conceivable connexion betwixt the one and the other . § . . in vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas , ( the only true way of certain and universal knowledge , ) what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance ; since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts , on which their qualities do depend ; nor , did we know them , could we discover any necessary connexion between them , and any of the secundary qualities ; which is necessary to be done , before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence . so that let our complex idea of any species of substances , be what it will , we can hardly , from the simple ideas contained in it , certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality whatsoever . our knowledge in all these enquiries , reaches very little farther than our experience . indeed , some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence , and visible connexion one with another , as figure necessarily supposes extension , receiving or communicating motion by impulse , supposes solidity . but though these , and perhaps some others of our ideas have ; yet there are some few of them , that have a visible connexion one with another , that we can by intuition or demonstration , discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities are to be found united in substances ; and we are left only to the assistence of our senses , to make known to us what qualities they contain . for all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject , without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another , we cannot know certainly to co-exist any farther , than experience , by our senses , informs us . thus though we see the yellow colour , and upon trial find the weight , malleableness , fusibility , and fixedness , that are united in a piece of gold ; yet because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence , or necessary connexion with the other , we cannot certainly know , that where any four of these are , the fifth will be there also , how highly probable soever it may be : because the highest probability , amounts not to certainty ; without which , there can be no true knowledge . for this co-existence can be no farther known , than it is perceived ; and it cannot be perceived , but either in particular subjects , by the observation of our senses , or in general , by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves . § . . as to incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence , we may know , that any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities , but one particular at once , v. g. each particular extension , figure , number of parts , motion , excludes all other of each kind . the like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense ; for whatever of each kind is present in any subject , excludes all other of that sort ; v. g. no one subject can have two smells , or two colours , at the same time . to this , perhaps , will be said , has not an opall , or the infusion of lignum nepbriticum , two colours at the same time ? to which , i answer , that these bodies , to eyes differently placed , may at the same time afford different colours : but i take liberty also to say , that to eyes differently placed , 't is different parts of the object , that reflect the particles of light : and therefore 't is not the same part of the object , and so not the very same subject , which at the same time appears both yellow and azure . for 't is as impossible , that the very same particle of any body , should at the same time differently modifie , or reflect the rays of light , as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time . § . . but as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies , which make a great part of our enquiries about them , and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge ; i doubt , as to these , whether our knowledge reaches much farther than our experience ; or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers , and be certain that they are in any subject by the connexion with any of those ideas , which to us make its essence . because the active and passive powers of bodies , and their ways of operating , consisting in a texture and motion of parts , which we cannot by any means come to discover : 't is but in very few cases , we can be able to perceive their dependence on , or repugnance to any of those ideas , which make our complex one of that sort of things . i have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis , as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies ; and i fear the weakness of humane understanding is scarce able to substitute another , which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion , and co-existence , of the powers , which are to be observed united in several sorts of them . this at least is certain , that which ever hypothesis be clearest and truest , ( for of that it is not my business to determine , ) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances , will be very little advanced by any of them , till we are made see what qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connexion or repugnancy one with another ; which in the present state of philosophy , i think , we know but to a very small degree ; and , i doubt , whether with those faculties we have , we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge ( i say not particular experience ) in this part much farther . § . . if we are at this loss in respect of the powers , and operations of bodies , i think it is easie to conclude , we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits , whereof we naturally have no ideas , but what we draw from that of our own ; by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us , as far as they can come within our observation . but how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various , and possibly innumerable , kinds of nobler beings ; and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubims , and seraphims , and infinite sorts of spirits above us , we have in another place made some reflection upon . § . . as to the third sort of our knowledge , viz. the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation : this , as it is the largest field of our knowledge , so it is hard to determine how far it may extend : because the advances that are to be made in this part of knowledge , depending on our sagacity , in finding intermediate ideas , that may shew the relations and habitudes of ideas , whose co-existence is not considered , 't is an hard matter to tell , when we are at an end of such discoveries ; and when reason has all the helps it is capable of , for the finding of proofs , and examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas . they that are ignorant of algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it ; and what farther improvements and helps , advantageous to other parts of knowledge , the sagacious mind of man may yet find out , 't is not easie to determine . this at least i believe , that the ideas of quantity are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge ; and that other , and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation , would afford us certainty , if vices , passions , and domineering interests did not oppose , or menace such endeavours . the idea of a supreme being , infinite in power and wisdom , whose workmanship we are , and on whom we depend ; and the idea of our selves , as understanding , rational creatures , being such as are clear in us , would , i suppose , if duly considered , and pursued , afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action , as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration ; wherein i doubt not , but from principles , as incontestable as those of the mathematicks , by necessary consequences , the measures of right and wrong might be made out , to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one , as he does to the other of these sciences . the relation of other modes may certainly be perceived , as well as those of number and extension ; and i cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration , if due methods were thought on to examine , or pursue their agreement or disagreement . where there is no propriety , there is no injustice , is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in euclid : for the idea of property , being a right to any thing ; and the idea to which the name injustice is given , being the invasion or violation of that right ; it is evident , that these ideas being thus established , and these names annexed to them , i can as certainly know this proposition to be true , as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones . again , no government allows absolute liberty , the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws , which require conformity to them ; and the idea of absolute liberty , being for any one to do whatever he pleases ; i am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition , as of any in mathematicks . § . . that which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity , and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration , is , first , that they can be set down , and represented by sensible marks , which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever . diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind , and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification . an angle , circle , or square , drawn in lines , lies open to the view , and cannot be mistaken : it remains unchangeably , and may at leisure be considered , and examined , and the demonstration be revised , and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once , without any danger of the least change in the ideas . this cannot be thus done in moral ideas , we have no sensible marks that resemble them , whereby we can set them down ; we have nothing but words to express them by ; which though , when written , they remain the same , yet the ideas they stand for , may change in the same man ; and 't is very seldom , that they are not different in different persons . secondly , another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethicks , is , that moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematicks : from whence these two inconveniences follow : first , that their names are of more uncertain signification , the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on , and so the sign that is used for them in communication , always , and in thinking , often , does not always carry with it the same idea . upon which the same disorder , confusion , and error follows , as would if a man , going to demonstrate something of an heptagon , should in the diagram he took to do it , leave out one of the angles , and by oversight make the figure with one angle less than the name ordinarily imported , or he intended it should , when at first he thought of his demonstration . this often happens , and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral ideas , where the same name being retained , one angle , i. e. one simple idea is left out or put in , in the complex one , ( still called by the same name , ) more at one time than another . secondly , from the complexedness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience , ( viz. ) that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations , so exactly and perfectly , as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondencies , agreements or disagreements , of several of them one with another ; especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions , and the intervention of several other complex ideas , to shew the agreement , or disagreement of two remote ones . the great help against this , which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures , which remain unalterable in their draughts , is very apparent , and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly , whilst the mind went over the parts of them , step by step , to examine their several correspondencies : and though in casting up a long summ , either in addition , multiplication , or division , every part be only a progression of the mind , taking a view of its own ideas , and considering their agreement or disagreement , and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole , made up of such paticulars , whereof the mind has a clear perception ; yet without setting down the several parts by marks , whose precise significations are known , and by marks , that last and remain in view , when the memory had let them go ; it would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in mind , without confounding , or letting slip some parts of the reckoning , and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless . in which case , the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two , or more numbers , their equalities or proportions . that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves . but the numerical characters are helps to the memory , to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made , whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge , in surveying several of the particulars , has proceeded ; that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown ; and , at last , have in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings . § . one part of these disadvantages , in moral ideas , which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration , may in a good measure be remedied by definitions , setting down that collection of simple ideas , which every term shall stand for ; and then using the terms stedily and constantly for that precise collection . and what methods algebra , or something of that kind , may hereafter suggest , to remove the other difficulties , is not easie to foretell . confident i am , that if men would in the same method , and with the same indifferency search after moral as they do mathematical truths , they would find them to have a stronger connexion one with another , and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas , and to come nearer perfect demonstration , than is commonly imagined . but much of this is not to be expected , whilst the desire of esteem , riches , or power , makes men espouse the well endowed opinions in fashion , and then seek arguments , either to make good their beauty , or varnish over , and cover their deformity : nothing being so beautiful to the eye , as truth is to the mind ; nothing so deformed and irreconcileable to the understanding , as a lye. for though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome wife in his bosom ; yet who is bold enough openly to avow that he has espoused a falshood , and received into his breast so ugly a thing as a lye ? whilst the parties of men , i say , cram their tenents down all men's throats , whom they can get into their power , without permitting them to examine their truth or falshood ; and will not let truth have fair play in the world , nor men the liberty to search after it ; what improvements can be expected of this kind ? what greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences ? the subject part of mankind , in most places , might , instead thereof , with egyptian bondage expect egyptian darkness , were not the candle of the lord set up by himself in men's minds , which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish . § . . as to the fourth sort of our knowledge , viz. of the real , actual existence of things without us , we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence ; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a god ; of the existence of any thing else , we have no other but a sensitive knowledge , which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses . § . . our knowledge being so narrow , as i have shew'd , it will , perhaps , give us some light into the present state of our minds , if we look a little into the dark side , and take a view of our ignorance ; which being infinitely larger than our knowledge , may serve much to the quieting of disputes , and improvement of useful knowledge ; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas , we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings , and lanch not out into that abyss of darkness , ( where we have not eyes to see , nor faculties to perceive any thing , ) out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension . but to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit , we need not go far . he that knows any thing , knows this in the first place , that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance . the meanest , and most obvious things that come in our way , have dark sides , that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into . the clearest , and most enlarged understandings of thinking men , find themselves puzled , and at a loss , in every particle of matter : which we shall the less wonder at , when we consider the causes of our ignorance ; which from what has been said , i suppose , will be found to be chiefly these three : first , want of ideas . secondly , want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have . thirdly , want of tracing , and examining our ideas . § . . first , there are some things , and those not a few , that we are ignorant of for want of ideas . first , all the simple ideas we have are confined ( as i have shewn ) to the observation of our senses , and the operations of our own minds , that we are conscious of in our selves . but how much these few and narrow ●nlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings , will not be hard to persuade those , who are not so foolish , as to think their span the measure of all things . what other simple ideas 't is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have , by the assistence of senses and faculties , more or perfecter than we have , or different from ours , 't is not for us to determine . but to say , or think there are no such , because we conceive nothing of them , is no better an argument , than if a blind man should be positive in it , that there was no such thing as sight and colours , because he had no manner of idea of any such thing , nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing . the ignorance , and darkness that is in us , no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others , than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quick sightedness of an eagle . he that will consider the infinite power , wisdom , and goodness of the creator of all things , will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable , mean , and impotent a creature , as he will find man to be ; who in all probability , is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings . what faculties therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature , and inmost constitutions of things ; what ideas they may receive of them , far different from ours , we know not . this we know , and certainly find , that we want several other views of them , besides those we have , to make discoveries of them more perfect . and we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties , are very disproportionate to things themselves , when a positive clear distinct one of substance it self , which is the foundation of all the rest , is concealed from us . but want of ideas of this kind , being a part , as well as cause of our ignorance , cannot be described . only this , i think , i may confidently say of it , that the intellectual and sensible world , are in this perfectly alike ; that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not ; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes , or our thoughts of either of them , is but a point , almost nothing , in comparison of the rest . § . . secondly , another great cause of ignorance , is the want of ideas we are capable of . as the want of ideas , which our faculties are not able to give us , shuts us wholly from those views of things , which 't is reasonable to think , other perfecter beings than we have , of which we know nothing ; so the want of ideas , i now speak of , keeps us in ignorance of things , we conceive capable of being known to us . bulk , figure , and motion , we have ideas of . but though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general ; yet not knowing what is the particular bulk , figure , and motion , of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe , we are ignorant of the several powers , efficacies , and ways of operation , whereby the effects we daily see , are produced . these are hid from us in some things , by being too remote ; and in others , by being too minute . when we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world , and the reasons we have to think , that what lies within our ken , is but a small part of the immense universe , we shall then discover an huge abyss of ignorance . what are the particular fabricks of the great masses of matter , which make up the whole stupendious frame of corporeal beings ; how far they are extended ; what is their motion , and how continued , or communicated ; and what influence they have one upon another , are contemplations , that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in . if we narrow our contemplation , and confine our thoughts to this little canton , i mean this system of our sun , and the grosser masses of matter , that visibly move about it , what several sorts of vegetables , animals , and intellectual corporeal beings , infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth , may probably be in the other planets ; to the knowledge of which , even of their outward figures and parts , we can no way attain , whilst we are confined to this earth , there being no natural means , either by sensation or reflection , to convey their certain ideas into our minds . they are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge ; and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them , we cannot so much as guess , much less have clear , and distinct ideas of them . § . . if a great , nay for the greatest , part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe , scape our notice by their remoteness , there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness . these insensible corpuscles , being the active parts of matter , and the great instruments of nature , on which depend not only all their secondary qualities , but also most of their natural operations ; our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities , keeps us in an uncureable ignorance of what we desire to know about them . i doubt not but if we could discover the figure , size , connexion , and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies , we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another , as we do now the properties of a square , or a triangle ; and we should be able to tell before hand , that rubarb would purge , hemlock kill , and opium make a man sleep ; as well as a watch-maker does that a little piece of paper , laid on the ballance , will keep the watch from going till it be removed ; or that some small part of it , being rubb'd by a file , the machin would quite lose its motion , and the watch go no more . did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rubarb , hemlock , opium , and a man , as a watch-maker does those of a watch , whereby it performs all its operations ; and of a file , which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels ; the dissolving of silver in aqua fortis , and gold in aq . regia , and not vice versa , would be then , perhaps , no more difficult to know , than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock , and not the turning of another . but whilst we are destitute of senses , acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies , and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections , we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation ; nor can we be assured about them any farther , than some few trials we make , are able to reach . but whether they will succeed again another time , we cannot be certain . this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths , concerning natural bodies . and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. § . . and therefore i am apt to doubt that , how far soever humane industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things , scientifical will still be out of our reach ; because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies , which are nearest to us , and most under our command . those which we have ranked into classes under names , and we think our selves best acquainted with , we have but very imperfect , and incompleat ideas of . distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies , that fall under the examination of our senses , perhaps , we may have ; but adequate ideas , i suspect , we have not of any one amongst them . and though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse ; yet whilst we want the latter , we are not capable of scientifical knowledge ; nor shall ever be able to discover general , instructive truths concerning them . certainty and demonstration , are things we must not , in these matters , pretend to . by the colour , figure , taste , and smell , and other sensible qualities , we have as clear , and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock , as we have of a circle and a triangle : but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants , nor of other bodies we would apply them to , we cannot tell what effects they will produce ; nor when we see those effects , can we so much as guess , much less know , their manner of production . thus having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies , that are within our view and reach , we are ignorant of their constitutions , powers , and operations ; and of bodies more remote , we are ignorant of their very outward shapes and beings . § . . this , at first sight , will shew us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings ; to which , if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be , and probably are , which are yet more remote from our knowledge , whereof we have no cognizance , nor can frame to our selves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts , we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us , in an impenetrable obscurity , almost the whole intellectual world ; a greater , certainly , and more beautiful world than the material . for , bating some very few , and those , if i may so call them , superficial ideas , which spirit , we , by reflection , get of our own and of the father of all spirits , the eternal , independent author of them and us , and all things , we have no certain information , so much as of their existence , but by revelation . angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery . and all those intelligences , whereof 't is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances , are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all . that there are minds , and thinking beings , in other men as well as himself , every man has a reason , from their words and actions , to be satisfied . but between us and the great god , we can have no certain knowledge of the existence of any spirits , but by revelation ; much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures , conditions , states , powers , and several constitutions , wherein they agree or differ from one another , and from us . and therefore in what concerns their different species and properties , we are under an absolute ignorance . § . . secondly , what a small part of the substantial beings that are in the universe , the want of ideas leave open to our knowledge , we have seen . in the next place , another cause of ignorance , of no less moment , is the want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have . for where-ever we want that , we are utterly uncapable of universal and certain knowledge ; and are , as in the former case , left only to observation and experiment ; which how narrow and confined it is , how far from general knowledge , we need not be told . i shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance , and so leave it . 't is evident that the bulk , figure , and motion of several bodies about us , produce in us several sensations as of colours , sounds , tastes , or smells , pleasure and pain , &c. those mechanical affections of bodies , having no affinity at all with these ideas they produce in us , there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body , and any perception of a colour , or smell , we find in our minds , we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience ; and can reason no otherwise about them , than as the effects or appointment of an infinitely wise agent , which perfectly surpass our comprehensions . as the ideas of sensible , secundary qualities we have in our minds , can , by us , be no way deduced from bodily causes , nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which ( experience shews us ) produce them in us ; so , on the other side , the opetions of our minds upon our bodies , is as unconceivable . how any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas , as how any body should produce any thought in the mind . that it is so , if experience did not convince us , the considerations of the things themselves would never be able , in the least , to discover to us . these , and the like , though they have a constant and regular connexion , in the ordinary course of things ; yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves , which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another , we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that all-wise agent , who has made them to be , and to operate as they do , in a way utterly above our weak understanding to conceive . § . . in some of our ideas there are certain relations , habitudes , and connexions , so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves , that we cannot conceive them separable from them , by any power whatsoever . and in these only , we are capable of certain and universal knowledge . thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones . nor can we conceive this relation , this connexion of these two ideas , to be possibly mutable , or depend on any arbitrary power , which of choice made it thus , or could make it otherwise . but the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter , the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds , &c. by impulse and motion ; nay , the original rules and communication of motion , being such wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have , we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect . i need not , i think , here mention the resurrection of our bodies , the future state of this globe of earth , and such other things , which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent . the things that , as far as our observation reaches , we constantly find to proceed regularly , we may conclude , do act by a law set them ; but yet a law that we know not ; whereby , though causes work steddily and effects constantly flow from them , yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas , we can have but an experimental knowledge of them . from all which , 't is easie to perceive what a darkness we are involved in , how little 't is of being , and the things that are , that we are capable to know . and therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge , when we modestly think with our selves , that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe , and all the things contained in it , that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us , and make a part of us : concerning their secundary qualities , powers , and operations , we can have no universal certainty . several effects come every day within the notice of our senses , of which we have so far sensitive knowledge ; but the causes , manner , and certainty of their production , for the two foregoing reasons , we must be content to be ignorant of . in these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact , and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are , upon other tryals , like to produce . but as to a perfect science of natural bodies , ( not to mention spiritual beings , ) we are , i think , so far from being capable of any such thing , that i conclude it lost labour to seek after it . § . . thirdly , where we have adequate ideas , and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them , yet we are often ignorant , for want of tracing those ideas we have , or may have , and finding out those intermediate ideas , which may shew us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another . and thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths , not out of any imperfection of their faculties , or uncertainty in the things themselves ; but for want of application in acqu●ring , examining , and by due ways comparing those ideas . that which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas , and finding out their relations , and agreements or disagreements one with another , has been , i suppose , the ill use of words . it is impossible that men should ever truly seek , or certainly discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves , whilst their thoughts flutter about , or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names , and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves , that they would consider , and not sounds instead of them , have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity , puddering , and confusion , which has so much hindred mens progress in other parts of knowledge ; who sticking in words of undetermined and uncertain signification , were unable to distinguish true from false , certain from probable , consistent from inconsistent , in their own opinions : whereby the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very little , in proportion to the schools , disputes , and writings , the world has been fill'd with ; whilst men , being lost in the great wood of words , knew not whereabout they were , how far their discoveries were advanced , or what was wanting in their own , or the general stock of knowledge . had men , in their discoveries of the material , done , as they have in those of the intellectual world , involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful terms and ways of talking , volumes writ of navigation and voyages , theories and stories of zones and tydes multiplied and disputed ; nay , ships built , and fleets set out , would never have taught us the way beyond the line ; and the antipodes would be still as much unknown , as when it was declared heresie to hold there were any . but having spoken sufficiently of words , and the ill or careless use , that is commonly made of them , i shall not say any thing more of it here . § . . hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge , in respect of the several sorts of beings that are . there is another extent of it , in respect of vniversality ; which will also deserve to be considered : and in this regard , our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas . if the ideas are abstract , whose agreement or disagreement we perceive , our knowledge is universal . for what is known of such general ideas , will be true of every particular thing , in whom that essence , i. e. that abstract idea is to be found ; and what is once known of such ideas , will be perpetually , and for ever true . so that as to all general knowledge , we must search and find it only in our own minds , and 't is only the examining of our own ideas , that furnisheth us with that . truths belonging to essences of things , ( that is , to abstract ideas ) are eternal , and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences ; as the existence of things is to be known only from experience . but having more to of this in the chapters , where i shall speak of general and real knowledge , this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general . chap. iv. of the reality of our knowledge . § . . i doubt not but my reader , by this time , may be apt to think , that i have been all this while only building a castle in the air ; and be ready to say to me , to what purpose all this stir ? knowledge , say you , is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas ; but who knows what those ideas may be ? is there any thing so extravagant , as the imaginations of men's brains ? where is the head that has no chimeras in it ? or if there be a sober and a wise man , what difference will there be , by your rules , between his knowledge , and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world ? they both have their ideas , and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another . if there be any difference between them , the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's side , as having the more ideas , and the more lively . and so , by your rules , he will be the more knowing . if it be true , that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas , the visions of an enthusiast , and the reasonings of a sober man , will be equally certain . 't is no matter how things are : so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations , and talk conformably ; it is all truth , all certainty . such castles in the air , will be as strong holds of truth , as the demonstrations of euclid . that an harpy is not a centaur , is by this way as certain knowledge , and as much a truth , as that a square is not a circle . but of what use is all this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations , to a man that enquires after the reality of things ? it matters not what men's fancies are , 't is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized : 't is this alone gives a value to our reasonings , and preference to one man's knowledge over another's , that it is of things as they really are , and not of dreams and fancies . § . . to which i answer , that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them , and reach no farther , where there is something farther intended , our most serious thoughts would be of little more use , than the resveries of a crazie brain ; and the truths built thereon of no more weight , than the discourses of a man , who sees things clearly in a dream , and with great assurance utters them . but , i hope , before i have done , to make it evident , that this way of certainty , by the knowledge of our own ideas , goes a little farther than bare imagination ; and , i believe , it will appear , that all the certainty of general truths a man has , lies in nothing else . § . . 't is evident , the mind knows not things immediately , but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them . our knowledge therefore is real , only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things . but what shall be here the criterion ? how shall the mind , when it perceives nothing but its own ideas , know that they agree with things themselves ? this , though it seem not to want difficulty , yet , i think , there be two sorts of ideas that , we may be assured , agree with things . § . . first , the first are simple ideas , which since the mind , as has been shewed , can by no means make to it self , must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way , and producing therein those perceptions , which by the wisdom and will of our maker , they are ordained and adapted to . from whence it follows , that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies , but the natural and regular productions of things without us , really operating upon us ; and so carry with them all the conformity our state requires , which is to represent things under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us ; whereby we may distinguish the substances they are in , and apply them to our uses . thus the idea of whiteness , or bitterness , as it is in the mind , exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there , has all the real conformity it can , or ought to have , with things without us . and this conformity between our simple ideas , and the existence of things , is sufficient for real knowledge . § . . secondly , all our complex ideas , except those of substances , being archetypes of the mind 's own making , not intended to be the copies of any thing , nor referred to the existence of any thing , as to their originals , cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge . for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self , can never be capable of a wrong representation , nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing , by its dislikeness to it ; and such , excepting those of substances , are all our complex ideas ; which , as i have shewed in another place , are combinations of ideas , which the mind , by its free choice , puts together , without considering any connexion they have in nature . and hence it is , that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes , and things no otherwise regarded , but as they are conformable to them . so that we cannot but be infallibly certain , that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real , and reaches things themselves : because in all our thoughts , reasonings , and discourses of this kind , we intend things no farther than as they are conformable to our ideas ; so that in these , we cannot miss of a certain undoubted reality . § . . i doubt not but it will be easily granted , that the knowledge we may have of mathematical truths , is not only certain , but real knowledge ; not idle chimeras of men's brains : and yet if we will consider , we shall find , that it is only of our own ideas . the mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle , or circle , only as they are in idea in his own mind ; for 't is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically , i. e. precisely true , in his life : but yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle , or any other mathematical figure , are nevertheless true and certain , even of real things existing : because real things are no farther concerned , nor intended to be meant by any such propositions , than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind . is it true of the idea of a triangle , that its three angles are equal to two right ones ? it is true also of a triangle , where-ever it really exists . what ever other figure exists , that is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind , is not at all concerned in that proposition . and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas , is real knowledge : because intending things no farther than they agree with those his ideas , he is sure what he knows concerning those figures , when they have barely an ideal existence in his mind , will hold true of them also , when they have a real existence in matter ; his consideration being barely of those figures , which are the same where-ever or however they exist . § . . and hence it follows , that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty , as mathematicks . for certainty being but the perception of the agreement , or disagreement of our ideas ; and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement , by the intervention of other ideas , or mediums , our moral ideas , as well as mathematical , being archetypes themselves , and so adequate , and compleat ideas , all the agreement , or disagreement we shall find in them , will produce real knowledge , as well as in mathematical figures . § . . that which is requisite to make our knowledge certain , is the clearness of our ideas ; and that which is required to make it re●l , is , that they answer their archetypes . nor let it be wondred , that i place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas , with so little care and regard ( as it may seem ) to the real existence of things : since most of those discourses , which take up the thoughts , and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to enquire after truth and certainty , will , i presume , upon examination be found to be general propositions , and notions in which existence is not at all concerned . all the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle , conick sections , or any other part of mathematicks , concern not the existence of any of those figures ; but their demonstrations which depend on their ideas are the same , whether there be any square or circle existing in the world , or no. in the same manner , the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men , and the existence of those vertues in the world , whereof they treat : nor is tully's offices less true , because there is no body in the world that exactly practices his rules , and lives up to that pattern of a vertuous man , which he has given us , and which existed no where when he writ but in idea . if it be true in speculation , i. e. in idea , that murther deserves death , it will also be true in reality of any action that exists comformable to that idea of murther . as for other actions , the truth of that proposition concerns them not . and thus it is of all other species of things , which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men. § . . but it will here be said , that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas , and those , as other modes , be of our own making , what strange notions will there be of iustice and temperance ? what confusion of vertues and vices , if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases ? no confusion nor disorder in the things themselves , nor the reasonings about them ; no more than ( in mathematicks ) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration , or a change in the properties of figures , and their relations one to another , if a man should make a triangle with four corners , or a trapezium with four right angles : that is , in plain english , change the names of the figures , and call that by one name , which mathematicians call'd ordinarily by another . for let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles , whereof one is a right one , and call it , if he please , equilaterum or trapezium , or any thing else , the properties of , and demonstrations about that idea , will be the same , as if he call'd it a rectangular-triangle . i confess , the change of the name , by the impropriety of speech , will at first disturb him , who knows not what idea it stands for ; but as soon as the figure is drawn , the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear . and just the same is it in moral knowledge , let a man have the idea of taking from others , without their consent , what their honest industry has possessed them of , and call this iustice , if he please . he that takes the name here without the idea put to it , will be mistaken , by joining another idea of his own to that name : but strip the idea of that name , or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind , and the same things will agree to it , as if you call'd it injustice . indeed , wrong names in moral discourses , breed usually more disorder , because they are not so easily rectified , as in mathematicks , where the figure once drawn and seen , makes the name useless , and of no force : for what need of a sign , when the thing signified is present and in view ? but in moral names , that cannot be so easily and shorty done , because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes . but yet for all this the miscalling of any of those ideas , contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language , hinders not ● but we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements , if we will carefully , as in mathematicks , keep to the same precise ideas , and trace them in their several relations one to another , without being led away by their names . if we but separate the idea under consideration , from the sign that stands for it , our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty , whatever sounds we make use of . § . . one thing more we are to take notice of , that where god , or any other law-maker , hath defined any moral names , there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs ; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise : but in other cases 't is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country . but yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge , which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nick-nam'd ideas . § . . thirdly , there is another sort of complex ideas , which being referred to archetypes without us , may differ from them , and so our knowledge about them , may come short of being real ; and these are our ideas of substances : which consisting of a collection of simple ideas , supposed taken from the works of nature , may yet vary from them , by having more or different ideas united in them , than are to be found united in the things themselves : from whence it comes to pass , ●hat they may , and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves . § . . i say then , that to have ideas of substances , which , by being conformable to things , may afford us real knowledge , it is not enough , as in modes , to put together such ideas as have no inconsistency , though they did never before so exist . v. g. the ideas of sacrilege or perjury , &c. were as real and true ideas before , as after the existence of any such fact . but our ideas of substances being supposed copies , and referred to archetypes without us , must still be taken from something that does or has existed ; they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts , without any real pattern they were taken from , though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination . the reason whereof is , because we knowing not what real constitution it is of substances , whereon our simple ideas depend , and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another , and the exclusion of others ; there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature , any farther than experience and sensible observation reaches . herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances , that all our complex ideas of them must be such , and such only as are made up of such simple ones , as have been discovered to co-exist in nature . and our ideas being thus true , though not , perhaps , very exact copies , are yet the subjects of real ( as far as we have any ) knowledge of them ; which ( as has been already shewed ) will not be found to reach very far : but so far as it does , it will still be real knowledge . whatever ideas we have , the agreement we find they have with others , will still be knowledge . if those ideas be abstract , it will be general knowledge . but to make it real concerning substances , the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things ; whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance , these we may with confidence join together again , and so make abstract ideas of substances . for whatever have once had an union in nature , may be united again . § . . this , if we rightly consider , and confine not our thoughts and abstract ideas to names , as if there were , or could be no other sorts of things , than what known names had already determined , and as it were set out , we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion , than perhaps we do . 't would possibly be thought a bold paradox , if not a very dangerous falshood , if i should say , that some changelings , who have lived forty years together , without any appearance of reason , are something between a man and a beast : which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition , that these two names , man and beast , stand for distinct species so set out by real essences , that there can come no other species between them : whereas if we will abstract from those names , and the supposition of such specifick essences made by nature , wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake ; if we would not fansie , that there were a certain number of these essences , wherein all things , as in molds , were cast and formed , we should find that the idea of the shape , motion , and life of a man without reason , is as much as distinct idea , and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast , as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason , would be different from either that of man or beast , and be a species of an animal between , or distinct from both . § . . here every body will be ready to ask , if changelings may be supposed something between man and beast ; 'pray what are they ? i answer , changelings ; which is as good a word to signifie something different from the signification of man or beast , as the names man and beast are to have significations different one from the other . this , well considered , would resolve this matter , and shew my meaning without any more ado . but i am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men , which enables them to spin consequences , and to see religion threatned whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of speaking , as not to foresee what names such a proposition as this is like to be charged with : and without doubt it will be asked , if changelings are something between man and beast , what will become of them in the other world ? to which i answer , . it concerns me not to know or enquire . to their own master they stand or fall : it will make their state neither better nor worse , whether we determine any thing of it , or no : they are in the hands of a faithful creator and a bountiful father , who disposes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions , nor distinguishes them according to names and species of our contrivance . and we that know so little of this present world we are in , may , i think , content our selves without being peremptory , in defining the different state creatures shall come into , when they go off this stage . it may suffice us , that he hath made known to all those , who are capable of instruction , discourse , and reasoning , that they shall come to an account , and receive according to what they have done in this body . § . . but , secondly , i answer , the force of these men's question , ( viz. will you deprive changelings of a future state ? ) is founded on one of two suppositions , which are both false . the first is , that all things that have the outward shape and appearance of a man , must necessarily be designed to an immortal future being , after this life . or , secondly , that whatever is of humane birth , must be so . take away these imaginations , and such questions will be groundless and ridiculous . i desire then those who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and changelings , the essence in both being exactly the same , to consider , whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward shape of the body ; the very proposing it , is , i suppose , enough to make them disown it . no one yet , that ever i heard of , how much soever immersed in matter , allow'd that excellency to any figure of the gross sensible outward parts , as to affirm eternal life due to it , or necessary consequence of it ; or that any mass of matter should , after its dissolution here , be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of sense , perception , and knowledge , only because it was molded into this or that figure , and had such a particular frame of its visible parts . such an opinion as this , placing immortality in a certain superficial figure , turns out of doors all consideration of soul or spirit ; and upon whose account alone , some corporeal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal , and others not . this is to attribute more to the outside , than inside of things ; to place the excellency of a man , more in the external shape of his body , than internal perfections of his soul ; which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of immortality and life everlasting , which he has above other material beings : to annex it , i say , to the cut of his beard , or the fashion of his coat ; for this or that outward make of our bodies , no more carries with it the hopes of an eternal duration , than the fashion of a man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out , or that it will make him immortal . 't will perhaps be said , that no body thinks that the shape makes any thing immortal , but 't is the shape is the sign of a rational soul within which is immortal . i wonder who made it the sign of any such thing ; for barely saying it , will not make it so . it would require some proofs to persuade one of it . no figure that i know speaks any such language . for it may as rationally be concluded , that the dead body of a man , wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life , than there is in a statue , has yet nevertheless a living soul in it , because of its shape ; as that there is a rational soul in a changeling , because he has the outside of a rational creature ; when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them , in the whole course of his life , than what are to be found in many a beast . § . . but 't is the issue of rational parents , and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul. i know not by what logick you must conclude so . i am sure this is a conclusion , that men no-where allow of : for if they did , they would not make bold , as every-where they do , to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions . ay , but these are monsters . let them be so ; what will your drivling , unintelligent , intractable changeling be ? shall a defect in the body make a monster ; a defect in the mind , ( the far more noble , and , in the common phrase , the far more essential part , not ? shall the want of a nose , or a neck , make a monster , and put such issue out of the rank of men ; the want of reason and understanding , ) not ? this is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now : this is to place all in the shape , and to take the measure of a man only by his out-side . to shew that according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter , people do lay the whole stress on the figure , and resolve the whole essence of the species of man , ( as they make it , ) into the outward shape , how unreasonable soever it be , and how much soever they disown it , we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little farther , and then it will plainly appear . the well-shaped changeling is a man , has a rational soul , though it appear not ; this is past doubt , say you . make the ears a little longer , and more pointed , and the nose a little flatter than ordinary , and then you begin to boggle : make the face yet narrower , flatter , and longer , and then you begin to doubt : add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it , and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal , then presently 't is a monster ; and 't is demonstration with you , that it hath no rational soul , and must be destroy'd . where now ( i ask ) shall be the just measure , which the utmost bounds of that shape , which carries with it a rational soul ? for since there has been humane foetus's produced , half beast , and half man ; and others three part one , and one part t'other : and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to one shape or the other , and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man , or a brute . i would gladly know what are those precise lineaments , which according to this hypothesis , are , or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them ? what sort of outside is the certain sign , that there is , or is not such an inhabitant within ? for till that be done , we talk at random of man ; and shall always , i fear , do so , as long as we give our selves up to certain sounds , and the imaginations of setled and fixed species in nature , we know not what . but after all , i desire it may be considered , that those who think they have answered the difficulty , by telling us , that a mis-shaped foetus is a monster , run into the same fault they are arguing against , by constituting a species between man and beast : for what else , i pray , is their monster in the case , ( if the word monster signifie any thing at all , ) but something neither man nor beast , but partaking somewhat of either ; and just so is the changeling before mentioned . so necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences , if we will truly look into the nature of things , and examine them , by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist , and not by groundless fancies have been taken up about them . § . . i have mentioned this here , because i think we cannot be too cautious , that words and species , in the ordinary notions we have been used to of them , impose not on us : for i am apt to think , therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge , especially in reference to substances ; and from thence has rose a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty . would we accustom our selves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words , we might , in a great measure , remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts ; but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others , as long as we retained the opinion , that species and their essences were any thing else but our abstract ideas , ( such as they are , ) with names annexed to them , to be the signs of them . § . . where ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas , there is certain knowledge ; and where ever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things , there is certain real knowledge . of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things , having here given the marks , i think i have shewn wherein it is that certainty , real certainty , consists ; which whatever it was to others , was , i confess , to me heretofore , one of those desiderata which i found great want of . chap. v. of truth in general . § . . vvhat is truth , was an enquiry many ages since ; and it being that which all mankind either do , or pretend to search after , it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists ; and so acquaint our selves with the nature of it , as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falshood . § . . truth then seems to me , in the proper import of the word , to signifie nothing but the joining or separating of signs , as the things signified by them , do agree or disagree one with another ; which way of joining or separating of signs , we call proposition . so that truth properly belongs only to propositions : whereof there are two sorts , viz. mental and verbal ; as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of , viz. ideas and words . § . . to form a clear notion of truth , it is very necessary to consider truth of thought , and truth of words , distinctly one from another : but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder . because it is unavoidable , in treating of mental propositions , to make use of words ; and then the instances given of mental propositions , cease immediately to be barely mental , and become verbal . for a mental proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas , as they are in our minds stripp'd of names , they lose the nature of purely mental propositions , as soon as they are put into words . § . . and that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately , is , that most men , if not all , in their thinking and reasonings within themselves , make use of words instead of ideas ; at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas . which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind , and may , if attentively made use of , serve for a mark to shew us , what are those things , we have clear and perfect established ideas of , and what not . for if we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning , we shall find , i suppose , that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts , about white or black , sweet or bitter , a triangle or a circle , we can , and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves , without reflecting on the names : but when we would consider , or make propositions about the more complex ideas , as of a man , vitriol , fortitude , glory , we usually put the name for the idea , because the ideas these names stand for , being for the most part imperfect , confused , and undetermined , we reflect on the names themselves , because they are more clear , certain , and distinct , and readier occurr to our thoughts , than the pure ideas , and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves , even when we would meditate and reason within our selves , and make tacit mental propositions . in substances , as has been already noted , this is occasioned by the imperfection of our ideas , we making the name stand for the real essence , of which we have no idea at all . in modes , it is occasioned by the great number of simple ideas , that go to the making them up . for many of them being very much compounded , the name occurrs much easier , than the complex idea it self , which requires time and attention to be recollected , and exactly represented to the mind , even in those men , who have formerly been at the pains to do it ; and is utterly impossible to be done by those , who though they have ready , in their memory , the greatest part of the common words of their language , yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives , to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for : some confused or obscure notions have served their turns ; and many who talk very much of religion and conscience , of church and faith , of power and right , of obstructions and humours , melancholy and choler , would , perhaps , have little left in their thoughts and meditations , if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves , and lay by those words , with which they so often confound others , and not seldom themselves also . § . . but to return to the consideration of truth . we must , i say , observe two sorts of propositions , that we are capable of making . first , mental , wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together , or separated by the mind , perceiving , or judging of their agreement , or disagreement . secondly , verbal propositions , which are words the signs of our ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences . by which way of affirming or denying , these signs , made by sounds , are as it were , put together or separated one from another . so that proposition consists in joining , or separating signs ; and truth consists in the putting together , or separating these signs , according as the things they stand for agree or disagree . § . . every one's experience will satisfie him , that the mind , either by perceiving or supposing the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas , does tacitly within it self put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative , which i have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating . but this action of the mind , which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man , is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us , when we reason , judge , or suppose , than to be explained by words . when a man has in his mind the idea of two lines , viz. the side and diagonal of a square , whereof the diagonal is an inch long , he may have the idea also of the division of that line , into a certain number of equal parts ; v. g. into five , ten , an hundred , a thousand , or any other number , and may have the idea of that inch-line , being divisible or not divisible , into such equal parts , as a certain number of them will be equal to the side-line . now whenever he perceives , believes , or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line , he , as it were , joins or separates those two ideas , viz. the idea of that line , and the idea of that kind of divisibility , and so makes a mental proposition , which is true or false , according as such a kind of divisibility , a divisibility into such aliquot parts , does really agree to that line , or no : and when ideas are so put together , or separated in the mind , as they or the things they stand for do agree , or not , that is , as i may call it , mental truth . but truth of words is something more , and that is the affirming or denying of words one of another , as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree : and this again is is twofold , either purely verbal , and trifling , which i shall speak of , chap. . or real and instructive ; which is the object of that real knowledge , which we have spoken of already . § . . but here again will be apt to occurr the same doubt about truth , that did about knowledge : and it will be objected , that if truth be nothing but the joining or separating of words in propositions , as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's mind , the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing , as it is taken to be ; nor worth the pains and time men imploy in the search of it : since by this account , it amounts to no more than the conformity of words , to the chimaeras of men's brains . who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are fill'd with , and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of ? but if we rest here , we know the truth of nothing by this rule , but of the visionary world in our own imaginations ; nor have other truth , but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs , as men and horses . for those , and the like , may be ideas in our heads , and have their agreement and disagreement there , as well as the ideas of real beings , and so have as true propositions made about them . and 't will be altogether as true a proposition , to say all centaurs are animals , as that all men are animals ; and the certainty of one , as great as the other . for in both the propositions , the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds : and the agreement of the idea of animal , with that of centaur , is as clear and visible to the mind , as the agreement of the idea of animal , with that of man ; and so these two propositions are equally true , equally certain . but of what use is all such truth to us ? § . . though what has been said in the fore-going chapter , to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge , might suffice here , in answer to this doubt , to distinguish real truth from chimerical , or ( if you please , ) barely nominal , they depending both on the same foundation ; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider , that though our words signifie nothing but our ideas , yet being designed by them to signifie things , the truth they contain , when put into propositions , will be only verbal , when they stand for ideas in the mind , that have not an agreement with the reality of things . and therefore truth , as well as knowledge , may well come under the distinction of verbal and real ; that being only verbal truth wherein terms are joined , according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for , without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have , or are capable of having an exstence in nature . but then it is they contain real truth , when these signs are joined as our ideas agree , and when our ideas are such , as we know are capable of having an existence in nature ; which in substances we cannot know , but by knowing that such have existed . § . . truth is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is . falshood is the marking down in words , the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is . and so far as these ideas , thus marked by sounds , agree to their archetypes , so far only is the truth real . the knowledge of this truth , consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for , and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas , according as it is marked by these words . § . . but because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge , and that in conveying and receiving of truth , and commonly in reasoning about it , we make use of words and propositions , i shall more at large enquire , wherein the certainty of real truths , contained in propositions , consists , and where it is to be had ; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth , or falshood . i shall begin with general propositions , as those which most employ our thoughts , and exercise our contemplation . general truths are most looked after by the mind , as those that most enlarge our knowledge ; and by their comprehensiveness , satisfying us at once of many particulars , enlarge our view , and shorten our way to knowledge . § . . besides truth taken in the strict sense before-mentioned , there are other sorts of truths ; as , . moral truth , which is speaking things according to the persuasion of our own minds , though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things . . metaphysical truth , which is nothing but the real existence of things , conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names . this , though it seems to consist in the very beings of things , yet when considered a little nearly , will appear to include a tacit proposition , whereby the mind joins that particular thing , to the idea it had before setled with a name to it . but these considerations of truth , either having been before taken notice of , or not being much to our present purpose , it may suffice here only to have mentioned them . chap. vi. of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . § . . though the examining and judging of ideas by themselves , their names being quite laid aside , be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge : yet through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas , i think it is very seldom practised ; and every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of , instead of the ideas themselves , even when men think and reason within their own breasts ; especially if the ideas be very complex , and made up of a great collection of simple ones . this makes the consideration of words and propositions , so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge , that 't is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one , without explaining the other . § . . all the knowledge we have , being only of particular or general truths , 't is evident , that whatever may be done in the former of these , the latter , which is that which with reason is most sought after , can never be well made known , and is very seldom apprehended , but as conceived and expressed in words . it is not therefore out of our way , in the examination of our knowledge , to enquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions . § . . but that we may not be mis-led in this case , by that which is the danger every-where , i mean by the doubtfulness of terms , 't is fit to observe , that certainty is twofold ; certainty of truth , and certainty of knowledge . certainty of truth is , when words are so put together in propositions , as exactly to express agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for , as really it is : certainty of knowledge , is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas , as expressed in any proposition . this we usually call knowing , or being certain of the truth of any proposition . § . . now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition , unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for , it is necessary we should know the essence of each species , which is that which constitutes and bounds it . this , in all simple ideas and modes , is not hard to do : for in these , the real and nominal essence being the same ; or , which is all one , the abstract idea , the general term stands for , being the sole essence and boundary , that is or can be supposed , of the species , there can be no doubt how far the species extends , or what things are comprehended under each term ; which , 't is evident , are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for , and no other . but in substances , where a real essence , distinct from the nominal , is supposed to constitute , determine , and bound the species , there the extent of the general word is very uncertain : because not knowing this real essence , we cannot know what is , or is not of that species , and consequently what may , or may not with certainty be affirmed of it . and thus speaking of a man , or gold , or any other species of natural substances , as supposed made by nature , and partaking of that real essence , which is supposed to constitute that species , we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it . for man , or gold , taken in this sense , and used for species of things , constituted by real essences , different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker , stand for we know not what ; and the extent of these species , with such boundaries , are so unknown and undetermined , that it is impossible , with any certainty , to affirm , that all men are rational , or that all gold is yellow . but where the nominal essence is kept to , as the boundary of each species , and men extend the application of any general term no farther than to the particular things , in which the complex idea it stands for , is to be found , there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species , or be in doubt , on this account , whether any proposition be true , or no. i have chose to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastick way , and have made use of the terms of essences and species , on purpose to shew the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them , as of any other sort of realities , than barely abstract ideas with names to them . to suppose , that the species of things are any thing but the sorting of them under general names , according as they agree to several abstract ideas , of which we make those names the signs , is to confound truth , and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions , that can be made about them . though therefore these things might , to people not possessed with scholastick learning , be perhaps treated of , in a better and clearer way ; yet those wrong notions of essences and species , having got root in most peoples minds , who have received any tincture from the learning , which has prevailed in this part of the world , are to be discovered and removed , to make way for that use of words , which should convey certainty with it . § . . the names of substances then , whe●ever made to stand for species , which are supposed to be constituted by real essences , which we know not , are not capable to convey certainty to the vnderstanding , of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms , we cannot be sure . § . . on the other side , the names of substances , when made use of , as they should be , for the ideas men have in their minds , though they carry a clear and determinate signification with them , will not yet serve us to make many universal proposition , of whose truth we can be certain . not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them , but because the complex ideas they stand for , are such combinations of simple ones , as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy , but with a very few other ideas . § . . the complex ideas , that our names of substances properly stand for , are collections of such qualities , as have been observed to co-exist : but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations , we cannot certainly know , unless we can discover their natural dependence ; which in their primary qualities , we can go but a very little way in ; and in all their secundary qualities , we can discover no connexion at all , for the reasons mentioned , chap. . viz. . because we know not the real constitutions of substances , on which each secundary quality particularly depends . . did we know that , it would serve us only for experimental ( not universal ) knowledge ; and reach with certainty no farther , than that bare instance : because our understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secundary quality , and any modification whatsoever , of any of the primary ones . and therefore there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances , which can carry with them undoubted certainty . § . . all gold is fixed , is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of , how universally soever it be believed . for if , according to the useless imagination of the schools , any one supposes the term gold to stand for a species of things set out by nature , by a real essence belonging to it , 't is evident he knows not what particular substances are of that species ; and so cannot , with certainty , affirm any thing universally of gold. but if he make gold stand for a species , determined by its nominal essence , let the nominal essence , for example , be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour , malleable , susible , and heavier than any other known ; in this proper use of the word gold , there is no difficulty to know what is , or is not gold : but yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold , but what hath a discoverable connexion , or inconsistency with that nominal essence . fixedness , for example , having no necessary connexion , that we can discover , with the colour , weight , or any other simple idea of our complex one , or with the whole combination together ; it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition , that all gold is fixed . § . . as there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness , and the colour , weight , and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold ● so if we make our complex idea of gold , a body yellow , fusible , ductile , weighty , and fixed , we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in aq. regia ; and for the same reason : since we can never , from consideration of the ideas themselves , with certainty affirm or deny , of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow , very weighty , ductile , fusible , and fixed , that it is soluble in aq. regia : and so on of the rest of its qualities . i would gladly meet with one general affirmation , concerning any quality of gold , that any one can certainly know is true . it will , no doubt , be presently objected , is not this an universal certain proposition , all gold is malleable● to which i answer , it is a very certain proposition , if malleableness be a part of the complex idea the word gold stands for . but then here is nothing affirmed of gold , but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained : and such a sort of truth and certainty as this , it is to say a centaur is four-footed . but if malleableness make not a part of the specifick essence the name gold stands for , 't is plain , all gold is malleable , is not a certain proposition : because let the complex idea of gold , be made up of whichsoever of its other qualities you please , malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea , nor follow from any simple one contained in it . the connexion that malleableness has ( if it has any ) with those other qualities , being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its insensible parts , which , since we know not , 't is impossible we should perceive that connexion , unless we could discover that which ties them together . § . . the more , indeed , of these co-existing qualities we unite into one complex idea , under one name , the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that word : but yet never make it more capable of universal certainty , in respect of other qualities , not contained in our complex idea ; since we perceive not their connexion , or dependence one on another , being ignorant both of that real constitution in which they are all founded ; and also how they flow from it . for the chief part of our knowledge concerning substances , is not as in other things , barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately ; but of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct ideas in the same subject , or of their repugnancy so to co-exist . could we begin at the other end , and discover what it was wherein that colour consisted , what made a body lighter or heavier , what texture of parts made it malleable , fusible , and fixed , and fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquor , and not in another ; if ( i say ) we had such an idea as this of bodies , and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consist , and how they are produced ; we might frame such abstract ideas of them , as would furnish us with matter of more general knowledge , and enable us to make universal propositions , that should carry general truth and certainty with them . but whilst our complex ideas of the sorts of substances , are so remote from that internal real constitution , on which their sensible qualities depend , and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discover , there can be very few general propositions concerning substances , of whose real truth we can be certainly assured ; since there are but few simple ideas , of whose connexion and necessary co-existence , we can have certain and undoubted knowledge . i imagine , amongst all the secundary qualities of substances , and the powers relating to them , there cannot any two be named , whose necessary co-existence , or repugnance to co-exist , can certainly be known , unless in those of the same sense , which necessarily exclude one another , as i have elsewhere shewed . no one , i think , by the colour that is in any body , can certainly know what smell , taste , sound , or tangible qualities it has , nor what alterations it is capable to make , or receive , on , or from other bodies : the same may be said of the sound , or taste , &c. our specifick names of substances , signifying any collections of such ideas , 't is not to be wondred , that we can , with them , make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty : but yet so far as any complex idea , of any sort of substances , contains in it any simple idea , whose necessary co-existence with any other may be discovered , so far universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it : v. g. could any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness , and the colour or weight of gold , or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name , he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect ; and the real truth of this proposition , that all gold is malleable , would be as certain as of this , the three angles of all right-lined triangles , are equal to two right ones . § . . had we such ideas of substances , as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them , and how those qualities flowed from thence , we could , by the specifick ideas of their real essences in our own minds , more certainly find out their properties , and discover what qualities they had , or had not , than we can now by our senses : and to know the properties of gold , it would be no more necessary , that gold should exist , and that we should make experiments upon it , than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle , that a triangle should exist in any matter , the idea in our minds would serve for the one , as well as the other . but we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature , that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them . for we are wont to consider the substances we meet with , each of them , as an entire thing by it self , having all its qualities in it self , and independent of other things ; overlooking , for the most part , the operations of those invisible fluids , they are encompassed with ; and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them , and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction , whereby we know and denominate them . put a piece of gold any where by it self , let no other body encompass it , it will immediately lose all its colour and weight , and perhaps malleableness too ; which , for ought i know , would be changed into a perfect friability . water , in which to us fluidity is an essential quality , left to it self , would cease to be fluid . but if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them , that they would not be what they appear to us , were those bodies that environ them removed , it is yet more so in vegetables , which are nourished , grow , and produce leaves , flowers , and seeds , in a constant succession . and if we look a little nearer into the state of animals , we shall find , that their dependence , as to life , motion , and the most considerable qualities to be observed in them , is so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies , that make no part of them , that they cannot subsist a moment without them : though yet those bodies on which they depend , are little taken notice of , and make no part of the complex ideas , we frame of those animals . take the air but a minute from the greatest part of living creatures , and they presently lose sense , life , and motion . this the necessity of breathing has forced into our knowledge : but how many other extrinsical , and possibly very remote bodies , do the springs of those admirable machines depend on , which are not vulgarly observed , or so much as thought on ; and how many are there , which the severest enquiry can never discover ? the inhabitants of this spot of the universe , though removed so many millions of miles from the sun , yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of particles coming from , or agitated by it , that were this earth removed , but a small part of that distance , out of its present situation , and placed a little farther or nearer that source of heat , 't is more than probable , that the greatest part of the animals in it , would immediately perish : since we find them so often destroy'd by an excess or defect of the sun's warmth , which an accidental position , in some parts of this our little globe , exposes them to . the qualities observed in a load-stone , must needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body : and the ravage made often on several sorts of animals , by invisible causes , the certain death ( as we are told ) of some of them , by barely passing the line , or , as 't is certain of others , by being removed into a neighbouring-country , evidently shew , that the concurrence and operation of several bodies , with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do , is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us , and to preserve those qualities we know , and distinguish them by . we are then quite out of the way , when we think , that things contain within themselves the qualities , that appear to us in them : and we in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly , or an elephant , upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them ; for which , perhaps , to understand them aright , we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere , but even beyond the sun , or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered : for how much the being and operation of particular substances in this our globe , depend on causes utterly beyond our view , is impossible for us to determine . we see and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things here about us ; but whence the streams come that keep all these curious machines in motion and repair , how conveyed and modified , is beyond our notice and apprehension ; and the great parts and wheels , as i may so say , of this stupendious structure of the universe , may , for ought we know , have such a connexion and dependence in their influences and operations one upon another , that , perhaps , things in this our mansion , would put on quite another face , and cease to be what they are , if some one of the stars , or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us , should cease to be , or move as it does . this is certain , things , however absolute and entire they seem in themselves , are but retainers to other parts of nature , for that which they are most taken notice of by us : their observable qualities , actions , and powers , are owing to something without them ; and there is not so complete and perfect a part , that we know , of nature , which does not owe the being it has , and the excellencies of it , to its neighbours ; and we must look a great deal farther than the surface of any body , to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it . § . . if this be so , it is not to be wondred , that we have very imperfect ideas of substances ; and that the real essences , on which depend their properties and operations , are unknown to us . we cannot discover so much as the size , figure , and texture of their minute and active parts , which is really in them ; much less the different motions and impulses made in and upon them by bodies from without , and the effects of them , upon which depend , and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we observe in them , and of which our complex ideas of them are made up . this consideration alone may set us at rest , as to all hopes of our having the ideas of their real essences ; which , whilst we want the nominal essences we make use of instead of them , will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge , or universal propositions capable of real certainty . § . . we are not therefore to wonder , if certainty be to be found in very few general propositions made concerning substances : our knowledge of their qualities and properties go very seldom farther than our senses reach and inform us . possibly inquisitive and observing men may , by strength of iudgment , penetrate farther , and on probabilities taken from wary observation , and hints well laid together , often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them . but this is but guessing still ; it amounts only to opinion , and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge : for all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts , and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas . wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them , there we have general knowledge ; and by putting the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions , can with certainty pronounce general truths . but because the abstract ideas of substances , for which their specifick names stand , whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification , have a discoverable connexion or inconsistency with a very few other ideas , the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances , is very narrow and scanty in that part , which is our principal enquiry concerning them : and there is scarce any of the names of substances , let the idea it is applied to be what it will , of which we can generally , and with certainty pronounce , that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging to it , and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea , where-ever it is to be found . § . . before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind , we must first know what changes the primary qualities of one body , do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another , and how . secondly , we must know what primary qualities of any body , produce certain sensations or ideas in us ; which , in truth , to know all the effects of matter , under its divers modifications of bulk , figure , cohesion of parts , motion , and rest ; which is , i think , every body will allow , is utterly impossible to be known by us , without revelation : nor if it were revealed to us , what sort of figure , bulk , and motion of corpuscles , would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour , and what sort of figure , bulk , and texture of parts in the superficies of any body , were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour , would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty , concerning the several sorts of them , unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the bulk , figure , texture , and motion of bodies in those minute parts by which they operate on our senses , and so could by those frame our abstract ideas of them . i have mentioned here only corporeal substances , whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings : for as to the operations of spirits , both their thinking and moving of bodies , we at first sight find our selves at a loss ; though perhaps , when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies , and their operations , and examined how far our notions , even in these , reach with any clearness , beyond sensible matter of fact , we shall be bound to confess , that even in these too , our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity . § . . this is evident , the abstract complex ideas of substances , for which their general names stand , not comprehending their real constitutions , can afford us but very little universal certainty ; they not being that on which those qualities we observe in them , and would inform our selves about , do depend , or with which they have any certain connexion . v. g. let the idea to which we give the name man , be , as it commonly is , a body of the ordinary shape , with sense , voluntary motion , and reason join'd to it . this being the abstract idea , and consequently the essence of our species man , we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning man , standing for such an idea . because not knowing the real constitution on which sensation , power of motion , and reasoning , with that peculiar shape , depend , and whereby they are united together in the same subject , there are very few other qualities , with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion : and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm , that all men sleep by intervals ; that no man can be nourished by wood or stones ; that all men will be poisoned by hemlock : because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man , with this abstract idea that name stands for . we must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular subjects , which can reach but a little way . we must content our selves with probability in the rest : but can have no general certainty , whilst our specifick idea of man , contains not that real constitution , which is the root , wherein all his inseparable qualities are united , and from whence they flow ; whilst our idea , the word man stands for , is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him , there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specifick idea , and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones , upon his constitution . there are animals that safely eat hemlock , and others that are nourished by wood and stones : but as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of animals , whereon these , and the like qualities and powers depend , we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them . those few ideas only , which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence , or any part of it , can afford us such propositions . but these are so few , and of so little moment , that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances , as almost none at all . § . . to conclude , general propositions , of what kind soever , are then only capable of certainty , when the terms used in them , stand for such ideas , whose agreement or disagreement , as there expressed , is capable to be discovered by us . and we are then certain of their truth or falshood , when we perceive the ideas they stand for , to agree or not agree , according as they are affirmed or denied one of another . whence we may take notice , that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas . whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiments , or observations without us , our knowledge goes not beyond particulars . 't is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas , that alone is able to afford us general knowledge . chap. vii . of maxims . § . . there are a sort of propositions , which under the name of maxims and axioms , have passed for principles of science : and because they are self-evident , have been supposed innate , without that any body ( that i know ) ever went about to shew the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency . it may however be worth while , to enquire into the reason of their evidence , and see whether it be peculiar to them alone ; and also examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge . § . . knowledge , as has been shewn , consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas : now where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by it self , without the intervention or help of any other , there our knowledge is self-evident . this will appear to be so to any one , who will but consider any of these propositions , which , without any proof , he assents to at first sight : for in all these he will find , that the reason of his assent , is from that agreement or disagreement the mind , by an immediate comparing them , finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition . § . . this being so , in the next place let us consider , whether this self-evident be peculiar only to these propositions , which are received for maxims , and have the dignity of axioms allowed them ; and here 't is plain , that several other truths , not allow'd to be axioms , partake equally with them in this self-evidence . this we shall see , if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas , which i have above mentioned , viz. identity , relation , co-existence , and real existence ; which will discover to us , that not only those few propositions , which have had the credit of maxims , are self-evident , but a great many , even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such . § . . for , first , the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity , being founded in the mind 's having distinct ideas , this affords us as many self-evident propositions , as we have distinct ideas . every one that has any knowledge at all , has , as the foundation of it , various and distinct ideas : and it is the first act of the mind , ( without which , it can never be capable of any knowledge , ) to know every one of its ideas by it self , and distinguish it from others . this is that which every one finds in himself , that the ideas he has knows ; he knows also when any one is in his understanding , and what it is : and when more than one are there , he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another : which always being so , ( it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives , ) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind , that it is there , and is that idea it is ; and that two distinct ideas , when they are in his mind , are there , and are not one and the same idea . so that all such affirmations , and negations , are made without any possibility of doubt , uncertainty , or hesitation , and must necessarily be assented to , as soon as understood ; that is , as soon as we have , in our minds , the ideas clear and distinct , which the terms in the proposition stand for . it is not therefore alone to these two general propositions , whatsoever is , is ; and , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , that this self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right . the perception of being , or not being , belongs no more no these vague ideas , signified by the terms whatsoever , and thing , than it does to any other ideas . the mind , without the help of any proof , perceives as clearly , and knows as certainly , that the idea of white , is the idea of white , and not the idea of blue ; and that the idea of white , when it is in the mind , is there , and is not absent ; and so a triangle , motion , a man , or any other ideas whatsoever . so that in respect of identity , our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas : and so we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions , as we have names for distinct ideas . and i appeal to ever one 's own mind , whether this proposition , a circle is a circle , be not as self-evident a proposition , as that consisting of more general terms , whatsoever is , is : and again , whether this proposition , blue is not red , be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of , as soon as it understands the words , than it does of that axiom , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ? and so of all the like . § . . secondly , as to co-existence , or such a necessary connexion between two ideas , that in the subject where one of them is supposed , there the other must necessarily be also : of such agreement , or disagreement as this , the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them . and therefore in this sort , we have but very little intuitive knowledge : nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident , though some there are ; v. g. the idea of filling of a place equal to the contents of its superficies , being annexed to our idea of body , i think it is a self-evident proposition , that two bodies cannot be in the same place . § . . thirdly , as to the relations of modes , mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality . as equals taken from equals , the remainder will be equals ; which , with the rest of that kind , however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians , and are unquestionable truths ; yet , i think , that any one who considers them , will not find , that they have a clearer self-evidence than these , that one and one , are equal to two ; that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two , and from the five fingers of the other hand two , the remaining number will be equal . these , and a thousand other such propositions , may be found in numbers , which , at very first hearing , force the assent , and carry with them an equal , if not greater clearness , than those mathematical axioms . § . . fourthly , as to real existence , since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas , but that of our selves , and of a first being , we have in that , concerning the real existence of all other beings , not so much as demonstrative , much less a self-evident knowledge : and therefore concerning those there are no maxims , § . . in the next place let us consider , what influence those received maxims have , upon the other parts of our knowledge . the rules established in the schools , that all reasonings are ex praecognitis , & prac incessis , seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge , in these maxims , and to suppose them to be praecognita ; whereby , i think , is meant these two things : first , that these axioms , are those truths that are first known to the mind ; and , secondly , that upon them , the other parts of our knowledge depend . § . . first , that they are not the truths first known to the mind , is evident to experience . who perceives not , that a child certainly knows , that a stranger is not its mother ; that its sucking-bottle is not the rod , long before he knows , that 't is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be● and how many truths are there about numbers , which it is obvious to observe , that the mind is perfectly acquainted with , and ully convinced of , before it ever thought on these general maxims , to which mathematicians , in their arguings , do sometimes refer them ? whereof the reason is very plain : for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions , being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement , or disagreement of its ideas , according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another , in words it understands ; and every idea being known to be what it is , and every two distinct ideas not to be same , it must necessarily follow , that such self-evident truths , must be first known , which consist of ideas that are first in the mind : and the ideas first in the mind , 't is evident , are those of particuliar things , from whence , by slow degrees , the understanding proceeds to some few general ones ; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense , are setled in the mind , with general names to them . thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished , and so knowledge got about them : and next to them , the less general , or specifick , which are next to particular . for abstract ideas are not so obvious or easie to children , or the yet unexercised mind , as particular ones . if they seem so to grown men , 't is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so : for when we necely reflect upon them , we shall find , that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind , that carry difficulty with them , and do not so easily offer themselves , as we are apt to imagine . for example , does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle , ( which is yet none of the most abstract , comprehensive , and difficult , ) for it must be neither oblique , nor rectangle , neither equilateral , equicrural , nor scalenon ; but all and none of these at once . in effect , it is something imperfect , that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together . 't is true , the mind in this imperfect state , has need of such ideas , and makes all the haste to them it can , for the conveniency of communication , and enlargement of knowledge ; to both which , it is naturally very much enclined . but yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection ; at least , this is enough to shew , that the most abstract and general ideas , are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with , nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about . § . . secondly , from what has been said , it plainly follows , that these magnified maxims , are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge . for if there be a great many other truths , which have as much self-evidence as they , and a great many that we know before them , it is impossible they should be the principles , from which we deduce all other truths . is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three , but by virtue of this , or some such axiom , viz. the whole is equal to all its parts taken together ? many a one knows that one and two are equal to three , without having heard , or thought on that , or any other axiom , by which it might be proved ; and knows it as certainly as any other man knows , that the whole is equal to all its parts , or any other maxim , and all from the same reason of self-evidence ; the equality of those ideas , being as visible and certain to him without that , or any other axiom , as with it , it needing no proof to make it perceived . nor after the knowledge , that the whole is equal to all its parts , does he know that one and two are equal to three , better , or more certainly than he did before . for if there be any odds in those ideas , the whole and parts are more obscure , or at least more difficult to be setled in the mind , than those of one , two , and three . and indeed , i think , i may ask these men , who will needs have all knowledge besides those general principles themselves , to depend on general , innate , and self-evident principles , what principle is requisite to prove , that one and one are two , that two and two are four , that three times two are six ? which being known without any proof , do evince , that either all knowledge does not depend on certain praecognita or general maxims , called principles ; or else that these are principles : and if these are to be counted principles , a great part of numeration will be so . to which if we add all the self-evident propositions , may be made about all our distinct ideas , principles will be almost infinite , at least innumerable , which men arrive to the knowledge of , at different ages ; and a great many of these innate principles , they never come to know all their lives . but whether they come in view of the mind , earlier or later , this is true of them , that they are all known by their native evidence , are wholly independent , receive no light , nor are capable of any proof one from another ; much less the more particular , from the more general ; or the more simple , from the more compounded : the more simple , and less abstract , being the most familiar , and the easier and earlier apprehended . but whichever be the clearest ideas , the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this , that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea , and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas . for when a man has in his understanding , the ideas of one and of two , the idea of yellow and the idea of blue , he cannot but certainly know , that the idea of one is the idea of one , and not the idea of two ; and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow , and not the idea of blue . for a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind , which he has distinct : that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time , which is a contradiction : and to have none distinct , is to have no use of our faculties , to have no knowledge at all . and therefore what idea soever is affirmed of it self ; or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another , the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition , as infallibly true , as soon as it understands the terms , without hesititation or need of proof , or regarding those made in more general terms , and called maxims . § . . what shall we then say , are these general maxims of no use ? yes , they are of great vse in disputes , to stop the mouths of wranglers ; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths , or to help the mind forwards , in its search after knowledge . for whoever began to build his knowledge on this general proposition , what is , is : or it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be ; and from either of these , as from a principle of science , deduced a system of useful knowledge ? wrong opinions , often involving contradictions , one of these maxims , as a touch-stone , may serve well to shew whither they lead : but yet , however fit , to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion , they are of very little use for enlightning the understanding : and it will not be found , that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge ; which would be neither less , nor less certain , were these two general propositions never thought on . 't is true , as i have said , they sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth , by shewing the absurdity of his opinion . but it is one thing , to shew a man that he is in an error ; and another , to put him in possession of truth : and i would fain know what truths these propositions are able to teach ; and by their influence make us know , which we did not know before , or could not know without them . let us reason from them , as well as we can , they are only about identical predications , and influence , if any at all , none but such . each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity , is as clearly and certainly known in it self , if attended to , as either of these general ones : and there is nothing more certain , than that by these maxims alone we cannot evidence to our selves the truth of any one thing really existing . as to other less general maxims , many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions , and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another . the whole is equal to all its parts , what real truth i beseech you does it teach us ? what more is contained in that maxim , than what the signification of the word totum , or the whole , does of it self import ? and he that knows that the word whole , stands for what is made up of all its parts , knows very little less , than that the whole is equal to all its parts . and upon the same ground , i think that this proposition , a hill is higher than a valley , and several the like , may also pass for maxims . but yet mathematicians do not without reason place this , and some other such , amongst their maxims , that their scholars , having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions , made in such general terms , may have them ready to apply to all particular cases : not that if they be equally weighed , they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm ; but that being more familiar to the mind , the very naming them is enough to satisfie the understanding . but this , i say , is more from our custom of using them , than the different evidence of the things . but before custom has setled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds , i am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise : and that the child , when a part of his apple is taken away , knows it better in that particular instance , than by that general proposition , the whole is equal to all its parts ; and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other , the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular , than the particular by the general . for in particulars , our knowledge begins , and so spreads it self , by degrees , to generals . though afterwards , the mind takes the quite contrary course , and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can , makes those familiar to its thoughts , and accustoms it self to have recourse to them , as to the standards of truth and falshood : by which familiar use of them , as rules to measure the truth of other propositions , it comes in time to be thought , that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones , which in discourse and argumentation , are so frequently urged , and constantly admitted . and this i think to be the reason why amongst so many self-evident propositions , the most general only have had the title of maxims . § . . one thing farther , i think , it may not be amiss to observe concerning these general maxims , that they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowledge , that if our notions be wrong , loose , or unsteady , and we resign up our thoughts rather to the sound of words , than to setled , clear , distinct ideas of things : i say , these general maxims , will serve to confirm us in mistakes ; and in such a way of use of words , which is most common , will serve to prove contradictions : v. g. he that , with cartes , shall frame in his mind an idea of what he calls body , to be nothing but extension , may easily demonstrate , that there is no vacuum ; i. e. no space void of body , by this maxim , what is , is . for the idea to which he annexes the name body , being bare extension , his knowledge , that space cannot be without body , is certain . for he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly , and knows that it is what it is , and not another idea , though it be called by these three names , extension , body , space ; which three words standing for one and the same idea , may , no doubt , with the same evidence and certainty , be affirmed one of another , as each of it self : and it is as certain , that whilst i use them all to stand for one and the same idea , this predication is as true and identical in its signification , that space is body , as this predication is true and identical , that body is body , both in signification and sound . § . . but if another shall come and make to himself another idea different from cartes , of the thing , which yet , with cartes , he calls by the same name body , and make his idea , which he expresses by the word body , to consist of extension and solidity together , he will as easily demonstrate , that there may be a vacuum , or space , without a body , as cartes demonstrated the contrary , because the idea to which he gives the name space , being bare extension , and the idea to which he gives the name body , being the complex idea of extension and resistibility , or solidity together ; these two ideas are not exactly one and the same , but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two , white and black , or as of corporeity and humanity , if i may use those barbarous terms : and therefore the predication of them in our minds , or in words standing for them is not identical , but the negation of them one of another , as certain and evident , as that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . § . . but yet though both these propositions ( as you see ) may be equally demonstrated , viz. that there may be a vacuum , and that there cannot be a vacuum , by these two certain principles , ( viz. ) what is , is ; and the same thing cannot be , and not be ; yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us that any , or what bodies do exist ; for that we are le●t to our senses to discover to us as far as they can : those universal and self-evident principles , being only our constant , clear , and distinct knowledge of our own ideas more general or comprehensive , can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind , their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by its self , and of its distinction from others ; about which , we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our minds , though we may , and often are mistaken , when we retain the names without the ideas ; or use them confusedly , sometimes for one , and sometimes for another idea . in which cases , the sorce of these axioms reaching only to the sound , and not the signfication of the words , serves only to lead us into confusion , mistake , and errour . § . . but let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions , they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances , as they are found and exist without us , any farther than grounded on experience . and though the consequence of these two propositions , called principles , be very clear , and their use not very dangerous , or hurtful , in the probation of such things , wherein there is no need at all of them for proof , but such as are clear by themselves without them , viz. where our ideas are clear and distinct , and known by the names that stand for them ; yet when these principles , viz. what is , is ; and , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , are made use of in the probation of propositions , wherein are words standing for complex ideas ; v. g man , horse , gold , vertue ; there they are of infinite danger , and most commonly make men receive and retain falshood for manifest truth , and uncertainty for demonstration ; upon which follows errour , obstinacy , and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning . the reason whereof is not , that these principles are less true in such propositions , consisting of words standing for complex ideas , than in those of simple ideas . but because men mistake generally , thinking such propositions to be about the reality of things , and not the bare signification of words , when indeed they are , for the most part , nothing else , as is clear in the demonstration of vacuum , where the word body , sometimes stands for one idea , and sometimes for another : but shall be yet made more manifest . § . . as for instance : let man be that , concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate any thing , and we shall see , that so far as demonstration is by these principles , it is only verbal , and gives us no certain universal true proposition , or knowledge of any being existing without us . first , a child having framed the idea of a man , it is probable , that his idea is just like that picture , which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together ; and such a complexion of ideas together in his understanding , makes up the single complex idea which he calls man , whereof white or flesh-colour in england being one , the child can demonstrate to you , that a negro is not a man , because white-colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man : and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , that a negro is not a man ; the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition , which , perhaps , he never heard nor thought of , but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white , which he cannot be persuaded to take , nor can ever mistake , one for another , whether he knows that maxim , or no : and to this child , or any one who hath such an idea which he calls man , can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul , because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it ? and therefore to him , the principle of what is , is , proves not this matter ; but it depends upon collection and observation , by which he is to make his complex idea called man. § . . secondly , another that hath gone farther in framing and collecting the idea he calls man , and to the outward shape adds laughter , and rational discourse , may demonstrate , that infants and changelings are no men , by this maxim , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be : and i have discoursed with very rational men , who have actually denied that they are men. § . . thirdly , perhaps , another makes us the complex idea which he calls man , only out of the ideas of body in general , and the powers of language and reason , and leaves out the shape wholly : this man is able to demonstrate , that a man may have no hands , but be quadrupes , neither of those being included in his idea of man ; and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason join'd , that was a man : because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea , it is certain , that what is , is . § . . so that , if rightly considered , i think we may say , that where our ideas are clear and distinct , and the names agreed on , that shall stand for each clear and distinct idea , there is little need , or no use at all of these maxims , to prove the agreement , or disagreement of any of them . he that cannot discern the truth or falshood of such propositions , without the help of these , and the like maxims , will not be helped by these maxims to do it : since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof , if he cannot know the truth of others without proof , which are as self-evident as these . and upon the very same grounds , intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof , one part of it more than another : he that will suppose it , does take away the foundation of all knowledge , and certainty : and he that needs any proof to make him certain , and give his assent to this proposition , that two is equal to two , will also have need of a proof to make him admit , that what is , is . he that needs a probation to convince him , that two is not three , that white is not black , that a triangle is not a circle , &c. or any other two clear distinct ideas are not one and the same , will need also a demonstration to convince him , that it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be . § . . and as these maxims are of little use , where we have clear and distinct ideas , so they are , as i have shewed , of dangerous use , where our ideas are not clear and distinct ; and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct ideas , but to such as are of a loose and wandering signification , sometimes standing for one , and sometimes for another idea ; from which follows mistake and errour , which these maxims ( brought as proofs to establish propositions , wherein the terms stand for confused or uncertain ideas ) do by their authority confirm and rivet . chap. viii . of trifling propositions . § . . whether the maxims treated of in the fore-going chapter , be of that use to real knowledge , as is generally supposed , i leave to be considered . this , i think , may confidently be affirmed , that there are universal propositions ; that though they be certainly true , yet they add no light to our understandings , bring no increase to our knowledge . such are , § . . first , all purely identical propositions . these obviously , and at first blush , appear to contain no instruction in them . for when we affirm the same term of it self , whether it be barely verbal , or whether it contains any clear and real idea , it shews us nothing , but what we must certainly know before , whether such a proposition be either made by , or proposed to us . indeed , that most general one , what is , is , may serve sometimes to shew a man the absurdity he is guilty of , when by circumlocution , or equivocal terms , he would , in particular instances , deny the same thing of it self ; because no body will so openly bid defiance to common sense , as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words : or if he does , a man is excused if he break off any farther discourse with him . but yet , i think , i may say , that neither that received maxim , nor any other identical proposition , teaches us any thing : and though in such kind of propositions , this great and magnified maxim , boasted to be the foundation of demonstration , may be , and often is made use of to confirm them , yet all it proves , amounts to no more than this , that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of it self , without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition ; and let me add also , without any real knowledge . § . . for at this rate , any very ignorant person , who can but make a proposition , and knows what he means when he says ay , or no , may make a million of propositions , of whose truth he may be infallibly certain , and yet not know one thing in the world thereby ; v. g. what is a soul , is a soul● or a soul , is a soul ; a spirit , is a spirit ; a fetiche , is a fetiche , &c. these all being equivalent to this proposition , viz. what is , is , i. e. what hath existence , hath existence ; or who hath a soul , hath a soul. what is this more than trifling with words ? it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other ; and had he had but words , might , no doubt , have said , oyster in right hand is subject , and oyster in left hand is predicate : and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster , i. e. oyster is oyster ; and yet , with all this , not have been one whit the wiser , or more knowing : and that way of handling the matter , would much at one have satisfied the monkey's hunger , or a man's understanding ; and they would have improved in knowledge and bulk together . § . . secondly , another sort of trifling propositions is , when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole ; a part of the definition of the word defined . such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species , or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms● for what information , what knowledge carries this preposition in it , viz. lead is a metal , to a man , who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for . all the simple ideas that go to the complex one , signified by the term metal , being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name lead . indeed , to a man that knows the signification of the word metal , and not of the word lead , it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead , by saying it is a metal , which at once expresses several of its simple ideas , than to enumerate them one by one , telling him it is a body very heavy , fusible , and malleable . § . alike trifling it is , to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined , or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one , of the name of the whole complex idea ; as all gold is fusible : for fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for , what can it be but playing with sounds , by affirming that of the name gold , which is comprehended in its received signification . 't would be thought little better than ridiculous , to affirm gravely as a truth of moment , that gold is yellow ; and i see not how it is any jot more material , to say , it is fusible , unless that quality be left out of the complex idea , of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech . what instruction can it carry with it , to tell one that , which he hath been told already , or he is supposed to know before : for i am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me , or else he is to tell me . and if i know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body , yellow , heavy , fusible , malleable , 't will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition , and gravely say , all gold is fusible . such propositions can only serve to shew the disingenuity of one , who will go from the definition of his own terms , by re-minding him sometimes of it ; but carry no knowledge with them , but of the signification of words , however certain they be . § . . every man is an animal , or living body , is as certain a proposition as can be ; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things , than to say a palfry is an ambling horse , or a neighing ambling animal , both being only about the signification of words , and make me know but this ; that body , sense , and motion , or power of sensation and moving , are three of those simple ideas that i always comprehend and signifie by the word man ; and where they are not to be found together , the name man belongs not to that thing : and so of the other , that body , sense , and motion , and a certain way of going , with a certain kind of voice , are some of those simple ideas which i always comprehend , and signifie by the word palfry ; and when they are not to be found together , the name palfry belongs not to that thing . 't is just the same , and to the same purpose , when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas , that altogether make up that complex idea which is called a man , is affirmed of the term man : v. g. suppose a roman , signified by the word homo : all these distinct ideas united in one subject , corporeitas , sensibilitas , potentia se movendi , rationalitas , risibilitas , he might , no doubt , with great certainty , universally affirm one more , or all of these together of the word homo , but did no more than say , that the word homo , in his country , comprehended in its signification , all these ideas . much like a romance knight , who by the word palfry , signified these ideas ; body of a certain figure , four-legg'd , with sense , motion , ambling , neighing , white , used to have a woman on his back , might , with the same certainty , universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfry , but did thereby teach no more , but that the word palfry , in his , or romance-language , stood for all these , and was not to be applied to any thing , where any of the●e was wanting . but he that shall tell me , that in whatever thing sense , motion , reason , and laughter , were united , that thing had actually a notion of god , or would be cast into a sleep by opium , made indeed an instructive proposition : because neither having the notion of god , nor being cast into sleep by opium , being contained in the idea signified by the word man , we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for : and therefore the knowledge contained in it , is more than verbal § . . before a man makes any proposition , he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it , or else he talks like a parrot , only making a noise by imitation , and framing certain sounds he has learnt of others ; but not , as a rational creature , using them for signs of ideas he has in his mind . the hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them , or else he talks jargon , and makes an untelligible noise . and therefore he tri●les with words , who makes such a proposition , which when it is made , contains no more than one of the terms does , and which a man was supposed to know before : v. g. a triangle hath three sides , or saffron is yellow . and this is no farther tolerable , than where a man goes to explain his terms , to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him : and then it teaches only the signification of that word , and the use of that sign . § . . we can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions , with perfect certainty ; the one is , of those trifling propositions , which have a certainty in them , but 't is but a verbal certainty , but not instructive . and , secondly , we can know the truth , and so may be certain in propositions , which affirm something of another , which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea , but not contained in it . as that the external angle of all triangles , is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles ; which relation of the cutward angle , to either of the opposite internal angles , making no part of the complex idea , signified by the name triangle , this is a real truth , and conveys with it instructive real knowledge . § . . we having no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas existing together in substances , but by our senses , we cannot make any universal certain propositions concerning them , any farther than our nominal essences lead us : which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths , in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions , the general propositions that are made about substances , if they are certain , are for the most part but trifling ; and if they are instructive , are uncertain , and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth , how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgments in guessing . hence it comes to pass , that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses , that amount yet to nothing . for 't is plain , that names of substantial beings , as well as others , having constant and setled significations affixed to them , may , with great truth , be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions , as their definitions make them fit to be so joined ; and propositions consisting of such terms● may , with the same clearness , be deduced one from another , as those that convey the most real truths ; and all this , without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us . by this method , one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words , and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things ; v. g. he that having learnt these following words , with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them ; v. g. substance , man , animal , form , soul , vegetative , sensitive , rational , may make several undoubted propositions about the soul , without knowing at all what the soul really is ; and of this sort , a man may find an infinite number of propositions , reasonings , and conclusions , in books of metaphysicks , school-divinity , and some sort of natural philosophy ; and after all , know as little of god , spirits , or bodies , as he did before he set out . § . . he that hath liberty to define , i. e. determine the signification of his names of substances , ( as certainly every ones does in effect , who makes them stand for his own ideas , ) and makes their significations at a venture , taking them from his own or other men's fansies , and not from an examination and enquiry into the nature of things themselves , may , with little trouble , demonstrate them one of another ; wherein , however things agree , or disagree , in their own nature , he need mind nothing but his own notions , with the names he hath bestowed upon them : but thereby no more increases his own knowledge , than he does his riches , who taking a bag of counters , calls one in a certain place a pound , another in another place , a shilling , and a third in a third place , a penny ; and so proceeding , may undoubtedly reckon right , and cast up a great summ , according to his counters so placed , and standing for more or less as he pleases , without being one jot the richer , or without even knowing how much a pound , shilling , or penny is , but only that one is contained in the other twenty times , and contains the other twelve ; which a man may also do in the signification of words , by making them in respect of one another , more , or less , or equally comprehensive . § . . though yet concerning most words used in discourses , especially argumentative and controversial , there is this more to be complained of , which is the worst sort of trifling , and which sets us yet farther from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them , or find in them , viz. that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things , that they use their words loosly and uncertainly , and do not , by using them constantly and steddily in the same signification , make plain and clear deductions of words one from another , and make their discourses coherent and clear , ( how little soever it were instructive , ) which were not difficult to do , did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy , under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms ; to which , perhaps , inadvertency , and ill custom does in many men much contribute . § . . to conclude , barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks : first , all propositions , wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another , are barely about the signification of sounds . for since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but its self , when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term , it can signifie no more but this , that it may , or ought to be called by that name ; or that these two names signifie the same idea . thus should any one say , that parsimony is frugality , that gratitude is justice ; that this or that action is , or ●s not temperance : however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem , yet when we come to press them , and examine nicely what they contain , we shall find , that it all amounts to nothing , but the signfication of those terms . § . . secondly , all propositions , wherein a part of the complex idea , which any term stands for , is predicated of that term , are only verbal , v. g. to say , that gold is a metal , or heavy . and thus all propositions , wherein more comprehensive words , called genera , are affirmed of subordinate , or less comprehensive , called species , or individuals , are barely verbal . when by these two rules , we have examined the propositions , that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with , both in and out of books , we shall , perhaps , find that a greater part of them , than is usually suspected , are purely about the signification of words , and contain nothing in them , but the use and application of these signs . this , i think , i may lay down for an infallible rule , that where-ever the distinct idea any words stand for , is not known and considered , and something not contained in that idea , is not affirmed , or denied of it , there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds , and are able to attain no real truth or falshoood . this , perhaps , if well heeded , might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute ; and very much shorten our trouble , and wandring in the search of real and true knowledge . chap. ix . of our knowledge of existence . § . . hitherto we have only considered the essences of things , which being only abstract ideas , and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence , ( that being the proper operation of the mind , in abstraction , to consider an idea under no other existence , but what it has in the understanding , ) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all . where by the way we take notice , that universal propositions , of whose truth or falshood we can have certain knowledge , concern not existence ; and farther , that all particular affirmations or negations , that would not be certain if they were made general , are only concerning existence ; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing , which in their abstract natures , have no known necessary union or repugnancy . § . . but leaving the nature of propositions , and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place , let us proceed now to enquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things , and how we come by it . i say then , that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition ; of the existence of god by demonstration● and of other things by sensation . § . . as for our own existence , we perceive it so plainly , and so certainly , that it neither needs , nor is capable of any proof . for nothing can be more evident to us , than our own existence . i think , i reason , i feel pleasure and pain ; can any of these be more evident to me , than my own existence ? if i doubt of all other things , that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence , and will not suffer me to doubt of that . for if i know i feel pain , it is evident , i have as certain a perception of my own existence , as of the existence of the pain i feel : or if i know i doubt , i have as certain a perception of the existence of the thing doubting , as of that thought , which i call doubt . experience then convinces us , that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence , and an internal infallible perception that we are . in every act of sensation , reasoning or thinking , we are conscious to our selves of our own being ; and in this matter , come not short of the highest degree of certainty . chap. x. of our knowledge of the existence of a god. § . . though god has given us no innate ideas of himself ; though he has stamped no original characters in our minds , wherein we may read his being : yet having furnished us with those faculties , our minds are endowed with , he hath not left himself without witness : since we have sense , perception , and reason , and cannot want a clear proof of him , as long as we carry our selves about us . nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point , since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover , and know him , so far as is necessary to the end of our being , and the great concernment of our happiness . but though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers ; and though its evidence be ( if i mistake not ) equal to mathematical certainty : yet it requires thought and attention ; and the mind must apply its self to a regular deduction of it from some unquestionable parts of our knowledge , or else we shall be as uncertain , and ignorant of this , as of other propositions , which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration . to shew therefore , that we are capable of knowing , certainly knowing that there is a god , and how we come by it , i think we need look no farther than our selves , and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence . § . . i think it is beyond question , that man has a clear perception of his own being ; he knows certainly , that he exists , and that he is something . he that can doubt , whether he be any thing , or no , i speak not to , no more than i would argue with pure nothing ; or endeavour to convince non-entity , that it were something . if any one pretend to be so sceptical , as to deny his own existence , ( for really to doubt of it , is manifes●ly impossible , ) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing , until hunger , or some other pain convince him of the contrary . this then , i think , i may take for a truth , which every ones certain knowledge assures him of , beyond the liberty of doubting , viz. that he is something that actually exists . § . . in the next place , man knows by an intuitive certainty , that bare nothing can no more produce any real being , than it can be equal to two right angles . if a man knows not that non-entity , or the absence of all being cannot be equal to two right angles , it is impossible he should know any demonstration in euclid . if therefore we know there is some real being , and that non-entity cannot produce any real being , it is an evident demonstration , that from eternity there has been something . since what was not from eternity , had a beginning ; and what had a beginning , must be produced by something else . § . . next , it is evident , that what had its being and beginning from another , must also have all that which is in , and belongs to its being from another too . all the powers it has , must be owing to , and received from the same source . this eternal source then of all being must also be the source and original of all power ; and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful . § . . again , a man finds in himself perception , and knowledge . we have then got one step farther ; and we are certain now , that there is not only some being , but some knowing intelligent being in the world. there was a time then , when there was no knowing being , and when knowledge began to be ; or else , there has been also a knowing being from eternity . if it be said , there was a time when no being had any knowledge , when that eternal being was void of all understanding . i reply , that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge . it being as impossible , that things wholly void of knowledge , and operating blindly , and without any perception , should produce a knowing being , as it is impossile , that a triangle should make it self three angles bigger than two right ones . for it is as repugnant to the idea of sensless matter , that it should put into it self sense , perception , and knowledge , as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle , that it should put into it self greater angles than two right ones . § . . thus from the consideration of our selves , and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions , our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth , that there is an eternal , most powerful , and most knowing being ; which whether any one will please to call god , it matters not . the thing is evident , and from this idea duly considered , will easily be deduced all those other attributes , we ought to ascribe to this eternal being . from what has been said , it is plain to me , we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a god , than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us . nay , i presume i may say , that we more certanly know that there is a god , than that there is any thing else without us when i say we know , i mean there is such a knowledge within our reach , which we cannot miss , if we will but apply our minds to that , as we do to several other enquiries . § . . how far the ideas of a most perfect being , which a man may frame in his mind , does , or does not prove the existence of a god , i will not here examine . for in the different make of men's tempers , and application of their thoughts , some arguments prevail more on one , and some on another , for the confirmation of the same truth . but yet , i think , this i may say , that it is an ill way of establishing this truth , and silencing atheists , to lay the whole stress of so important a point , as this , upon that sole foundation : and take some men's having that idea of god in their minds , ( for 't is evident , some men have none , and some worse than none , and the most very different , ) for the only proof of a deity ; and out of an over fondness of that darling invention , cashier , or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments , and forbid us to hearken to those proofs , as being weak , or fallacious , which our own existence , and the sensible parts of the universe , offer so clearly , and cogently to our thoughts , that i deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them . for i judge it as certain and clear a truth , as can any where be delivered , that the invisible things of god , are clearly seen from the creation of the world , being understood by the things that are made , even his eternal power , and god-head . though our own being furnishes us , as i have shewn , with an evident , and incontestable proof of a deity . and i beleive no body can avoid the cogency of it , who will but as carefully attend to it , as to any other demonstration of so many parts : yet this being so fundamental a truth , and of that consequence , that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon , i doubt not but i shall be forgiven by my reader , if i go over some parts of this argument again , and enlarge a little more upon them . § . . there is no truth more evident , than that something must be from eternity . i never yet heard of any one so unreasonable , or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction , as a time , wherein there was perfectly nothing . this being of all absurdities the greatest , to imagine that pure nothing , the perfect negation and absence of all beings , should ever produce any real existence . it being then unavoidable for all rational creatures , to conclude , that something has existed from eternity . let us next see what kind of thing that must be . § . . there are but two sorts of beings in the world , that man knows or conceives . first , such as are purely material , without sense , perception , or thought , as the clippings of our beards , and paring of our nails . secondly , sensible , thinking , perceiving beings , such as we find our selves to be , which if you please , we will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings ; which to our present purpose , if for nothing else , are , perhaps , better terms , than material and immaterial . § . . if then there must be something eternal , let us see what sort of being it must be . and to that , it is very obvious to reason , that it must necessarily be a cogitative being . for it is as impossible to conceive , that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being , as that nothing should of it self produce matter . let us suppose any part of matter eternal , great or small , we shall find it , in it self , able to produce nothing . for example ; let us suppose the matter of the next peble , we meet with , eternal , closely united , and the parts firmly at rest together , if there were no other being in the world , must it not eternally remain so , a dead inactive lump ? is it possible to conceive it can add motion to it self , being purely matter , or produce any thing ? matter then , by its own strength , cannot produce in it self so much as motion : the motion it has , must also be from eternity , or else be produced , and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter ; matter , as is evident , having no● power to produce motion in it self . but let us suppose motion eternal too ; yet matter , incogitative matter and motion , whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk , could never produce thought : knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce , as matter is beyond the power of nothing to produce . and i appeal to every one 's own thoughts , whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing , as thought to be produced by pure matter , when before there was no such thing as thought , or an intelligent being existing . divide matter into as minute parts as you will , ( which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing , or making a thinking thing of it , ) vary the figure and motion of it , as much as you please , a globe , cube , cone , prism , cylinder , &c. whos 's diametres are but th part of a gry (α) will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk , than those of an inch or foot diametre ; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense , thought , and knowledge , by putting together in a certain figure and motion gross particles of matter , as by those that are the very minutest , that do any where exist . they knock , impell , and resist one another , just as the greater do , and that is all they can do . so that if we will suppose nothing first , or eternal , matter can never begin to be : if we suppose bare matter , without motion , eternal , motion can never begin to be : if we suppose only matter and motion first , or eternal , thought can never begin to be . whatsoever therefore is eternal , must be a cogitative being , a spirit : whatsoever is first of all things , must necessarily contain in it , and actually have , at least , all the perfections that can ever after exist : nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not , either actually in it self , or at least in a higher degree . § . . if therefore it be evident , that something necessarily must exist from eternity , 't is also as evident , that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being : for it is as impossible , that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being , as that nothing , or the negation of all being , should produce a positive being , or matter . § . . though this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind , do sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of a god ; since it will hence follow , that all other knowing beings that have a beginning , must depend on him , and have no other ways of knowledge , or extent of power , than what he gives them : and therefore if he made those , he made also the less-excellent pieces of this universe , all inanimate beings , whereby his omniscience , power , and providence , will be established , and all his other attributes necessarily follow : yet to clear up this a little farther , we will see what doubts can be raised against it . § . . first , perhaps it will be said , that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it , that there must be an eternal being , and that being must also be knowing : yet i● does not follow , but that thinking being may also be material . let it be so ; it equally still follows , that there is a god. for if there be an eternal , omniscient , omnipotent being , it is certain , that there is a god , whether you imagine that being to be material , or no. but herein , i suppose , lies the danger and deceit of that supposition : there being no way to avoid the demonstration , that there is an eternal knowing being , men , devoted to matter , would willingly have it granted , that this knowing being is material ; and then letting slide out of their minds , or the discourse , the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing being was proved necessarily to exist , would argue all to be matter , and so deny a god , that is , an eternal cogitative being : whereby they are so far from establishing , that they destroy their own hypothesis . for if there can be , in their opinion , eternal matter , without an eternal cogitative being , they manifestly separate matter and thinking , and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other , and so establish the necessity of an eternal spirit , but not of matter ; since it has been proved already , that an eternal cogitative being , is unavoidably to be granted . now if thinking and matter may be separated , the eternal existence of matter , will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being , and they suppose it to no purpose . § . . but now let us see how they can satisfie themselves , or others , that this eternal thinking being is material . first , i would ask them , whether they imagine , that all matter , every particle of matter , thinks ? this , i suppose , they will scarce say ; since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings , as there are particles of matter , and so an infinity of gods. and yet if they will not allow matter as matter ; that is , every particle of matter to be as well cogitative , as extended , they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reason , cogitative being out of incogitative particles , as an extended being , out of unextended parts , if i may so speak . § . . secondly , if all matter do not think , i next ask , whether it be only one atom that does so ? this has as many absurdities as the other ; for then this atom of matter , must be alone eternal , or not . if this alone be eternal , then this alone , by its powerful thought , or will , made all the rest of matter . and so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought , which is that the materialists stick at . for if they suppose one single thinking atom , to have produced all the rest of matter , they cannot ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account , than that of its thinking , the only supposed difference . but allow it to be by some other way , which is above our conception , it must be still creation ; and these men must give up their great maxim , ex nihilo nil fit . if it be said , that all the rest of matter is equally eternal , as that thinking atom , it will be to say any thing at pleasure , though never so absurd : for to suppose all matter eternal , and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest , is without any the least appearance of reason to frame any hypothesis : every particle of matter , as matter , is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other ; and i challenge any one in his thoughts , to add any thing else to one above another . § . . thirdly , if then neither one peculiar atom alone , can be this eternal thinking being ; nor all matter , as matter ; i. e. every particle of matter can be it , it only remains , that it is some certain system of matter duly put together , that is this thinking eternal being . this is that which , i imagine , is that notion which men are aptest to have of god , who would have him a material being , as most readily suggested to them , by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves , and other men , which they take to be material thinking beings . but this imagination , however more natural , is no less absurd than the other : for to suppose the eternal thinking being , to be nothing else but a composition of particles of matter , each whereof is incogitative , is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal being , only to the juxta-position of parts ; than which , nothing can be more absurd . for unthinking particles of matter , however put together , can have nothing thereby added to them , but a new relation of position , which 't is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them . § . . but farther , this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest , or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists . if it be perfectly at rest , it is but one lump , and so can have no privileges above one atom . if it be the motion of its parts , on which its thinking depends , all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental , and limitted ; since all the particles that by motion cause thought , being each of them in it self without any thought , cannot regulate its own motions , much less be regulated by the thought of the whole ; since that thought is not the cause of motion , ( for then it must be antecedent to it , and so without it , ) but the consequence of it , whereby freedom , power , choice , and all rational and wise thinking or acting , will be quite taken away : so that such a thinking being , will be no better nor wiser , than pure blind matter ; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter , or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter , is the same thing ; not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge , that must depend on the motion of such parts . but there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis , ( however full of them it be , ) than that before-mentioned ; since let this thinking system be all , or a part of the matter of the universe , it is impossible that any one particle , should either know its own , or the motion of any other particle , or the whole know the motion of every particular ; and so regulate its own thoughts or motions , or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion . § . . others would have matter to be eternal , notwithstanding that they allow an eternal , cogitative , immaterial being . this , tho' it take not away the being of a god , yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship , the creation , let us consider it a little . matter must be allow'd eternal : why ? because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing , why do you not also think your self eternal ? you will answer , perhaps , because about twenty or forty years since , you began to be . but if i ask you , what that you is , which began to be , you can scarce tell me . the matter whereof you are made , began not then to be : for if it did , then it is not eternal : but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame , as makes up your body ; but yet that frame of particles , is not you , it makes not that thinking thing you are ; ( for i have now to do with one , who allows an eternal , immaterial , thinking being , but would have unthinking matter eternal too ; ) therefore when did that thinking thing begin to be ? if it did never begin to be , then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity ; the absurdity whereof i need not confute , till i meet with one who is so void of understanding , as to own it . if therefore you can allow a thinking thing , to be made out of nothing , ( as all things that are not eternal must be , ) why also can you not allow it possible , for a material being to be made out of nothing , by an equal power , but that you have the experience of the one in view , and not of the other ? though , when well considered , creation of one , as well as t'other , requires an equal power : and we have no more reason to boggle at the effect of that power in one , than in the other ; because the manner of it in both , is equally beyond our comprehension . for the creation , or beginning of any one thing out of nothing , being once admitted , the creation of every thing else , but the creator himself , may , with the same ease , be supposed . § . . but you will say , is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing , since we cannot possibly conceive it ? i answer , no : . because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being , because we cannot comprehend its operations . we do not deny other effects upon this ground , because we cannot possibly conceive their production , we cannot conceive how thought ( or any thing but motion in body ) can move body : and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible , against the constant experience we have of it in our selves , in all our voluntary motions which are produced in us , only by the free thoughts of our own minds ; and are not , nor cannot be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter , in or upon our bodies ; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it . for example : my right hand writes , whilst my left hand is still : what causes rest in one , and motion in the other ? nothing but my will , a thought of my mind ; my thought only changing , the right hand rests and the left hand moves . this is matter of fact , which cannot be denied : explain this , and make it intelligible , and then the next step will be to understand creation . in the mean time , 't is an overvaluing our selves , to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities ; and to conclude , all things impossible to be done , whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension . this is to make our comprehension infinite , or god finite , when what he can do , is limitted to what we can conceive of it . if you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind , that thinking thing within you , do not deem it strange , that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite mind , who made and governs all things , and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain . chap. xi . of our knowledge of the existence of other things . § . . the knowledge of our own being , we have by intuition . the existence of a god , reason clearly makes known to us , as has been shewn . the knowledge of the existence of any other thing , we can have only by sensation : for there being no necessary connexion of real existence , with any idea a man hath in his memory , nor of any other existence but that of god , with the existence of any particular man ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being , but only when by actual operating upon him , it makes it self perceived by him . for the having the idea of any thing in our mind , no more proves the existence of that thing , than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world , or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history . § . . 't is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without , that gives us notice of the existence of other things , and makes us know , that something doth exist at that time without us , which causes that idea in us , though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it : for it takes not from the certainty of our senses , and the ideas we receive by them , that we know not the manner wherein they are produced : v. g. whilst i write this , i have , by the paper affecting my eyes , that idea produced in my mind ; which whatever object causes , i call white ; by which i know , that that quality or accident ( i. e. whose appearance before my eyes , always causes that idea ) doth really exist , and hath a being without me . and of this , the greatest assurance i can possibly have , and to which my faculties , can attain , is the testimony of my eyes , which are the proper and sole judges of this thing , and whose testimony i have reason to rely on , as so certain , that i can no more doubt , whilst i write this , that i see white and black , and that something really exists , that causes that sensation in me , than that i write or move my hand ; which is a certainty as great , as humane nature is capable of , concerning the existence of any thing , but a man's self alone , and of god. § . . the notice we have by our senses , of the existing of things without us , though it be not altogether so certain , as our intuitive knowledge , or the deductions of our reason , employ'd about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds ; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge , if we persuade our selves , that our faculties act and inform us right , concerning the existence of those objests that affect them , it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence . for i think no body can , in earnest , be so sceptical , as to be uncertain of the existence of those things he sees and feels . at least , he that can doubt so far , ( whatever he may have with his own thoughts ) will never have any controversies with me ; since he can never be sure i say any thing contrary to his opinion . as to my self , i think god has given me assurance enough of th●●●istence of things without me : since by their different application , i ●an produce in my self both pleasure and pain , which is one great concernment of my present state . this is certain , the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us , is the greatest assurance we are capable of , concerning the existence of material beings . for we cannot act any thing , but by our faculties ; nor talk of knowledge it self , but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is . but besides the assurance our senses themselves give us , that they do not err in the information they give us , of the existence of things without us , when they are affected by them , we are farther confirmed in this assurance , by other concurrent reasons . § . first , 't is plain , those perceptions are produced in us , by exteriour causes affecting our senses : because those that want the organs of any sense , never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds . this is too evident to be doubted : and therefore we cannot but be assured , that they come in by the organs of that sense , and no other way . the organs themselves , 't is plain , do not produce them : for then the eyes of a man in the dark , would produce colours , and his nose smell roses in the winter : but we see no body gets the relish of a pine-apple , till he goes to the indies where it is , and tastes it . § . . secondly , because sometimes i find , that i cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind . for though when my eyes are shut , or windows fast , i can at pleasure re-call to my mind the ideas of light , or the sun , which former experience had lodg'd in my memory ; so i can at pleasure lay by that idea , and take into my view that of the smell of a rose , or taste of sugar . but if i turn my eyes at noon towards the sun , i cannot avoid the ideas , which the light , or sun , then produces in me . so that there is a manifest difference , between the ideas laid up in my memory ; ( over which , if they were there only , i should have constantly the same power to dispose of them , and lay them by at pleasure ) and those which force themselves upon me , and i cannot avoid having . and therefore it must needs be some exteriour cause , and the brisk acting of some objects without me , whose efficacy i cannot resist , that produces those ideas in my mind , whether i will , or no. besides , there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himself , between contemplating the sun , as he hath the idea of it in his memory . and actually looking upon it : of which two , his perception is so distinct , that sew of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another . and therefore he hath certain knowledge , that they are not both memory , or the actions of his mind , and fancies only within him ; but that actual seeing hath a cause without . § . . thirdly , add to this , that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain , which afterwards we remember without the least offence . thus the pain of heat or cold , when the idea of it is revived in our minds , gives us no disturbance ; which , when felt , was very troublesome , and is again , when actually repeated● which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies , when applied to it : and we remember the pain of hunger , thirst , or the head-ach , without any pain at all ; which would either never disturb us , or else constantly do it , as often as we thought of it , were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds , and appearances entertaining our fancies , without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad . and though mathematical demonstrations depend not upon sense , yet the examining them by diagrams , gives great credit to the evidence of our sight , and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that to the demonstration it self . for it would be very strange , that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth , that two angles of a figure , which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram , should be bigger one than the other ; and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles , which by looking on , he makes use of to measure that by . § . . fourthly , our senses , in many cases , bear witness to the truth of each other's report , concerning the existence of sensible things without us . he that sees a fire , may , if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare fancy , feel it too ; and be convinced , by putting his hand in it . which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain , by a bare idea or phantom , unless that the pain be a fancy too : which yet he cannot , when the burn is well , by raising the idea of it , bring upon himself again . thus i see , whilst i write this , i can change the appearance of the paper ; and by designing the letters , tell before-hand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment , barely by my drawing the pen over it : which will neither appear ( let me fansie as much as i will ) if my hand stand still ; or though i move my pen , if my eyes be shut : nor when those characters are once made on the paper , can i chuse afterwards but see them as they are ; that is , have the ideas of such letters as i have made . whence it is manifest , that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination , when i find , that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts , do not obey them ; nor yet cease to be , whenever i shall fansie it , but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly , according to the figures i made them . to which if we will add , that the sight of those shall , from another man , draw such sounds , as i before-hand design they shall stand for , there will be little reason left to doubt , that those words , i write , do really exist without me , when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears , which could not be the effect of my imagination , nor could my memory retain them in that order . § . . but yet if after all this , any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses , and to affirm , that all we see and hear , feel and taste , think and do , during our whole being , is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream , whereof there is no reality ; and therefore will question the existence of all things , or our knowledge of any thing : i must desire him to consider , that if all be a dream , then he doth but dream that he makes the question ; and so it is not much matter that a man should answer . but yet , if he please , he may dream that i make this answer , that the certainty of things existing in rerum naturâ , when we have the testimony of our senses for it , is not only as great as our frame can attain to , but as our condition needs . for our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being , nor to a perfect , clear , comprehensive knowledge of things , free from all doubt and scruple ; but to the preservation of us in , whom they are ; and accommodated to the use of life : they serve to our purpose well enough , if they will but give us certain notice of those things , which are convenient or inconvenient to us . for he that sees a candle burning , and hath experimented the force of its flame , by putting his finger in it , will little doubt , that this is something existing without him , which does him harm , and puts him to great pain ; which is assurance enough , when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by , than what is as certain as his actions themselves . and if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass fornace , be barely a wandring imagination in a drowsie man's f●ncy , by putting his hand into it , he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish , that it is something more than bare imagination● so that this evidence is as great as we can desire , being as certain to us , as our pleasure or pain ; i. e. happiness or misery ; beyond which , we have no concernment , either of knowing or being . such an assurance of the existence of things without us , is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good , and avoiding the evil which is caused by them , which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them . § . . in fine then , when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea , we are well assured that there doth something at that time really exist without us , which doth affect our senses , and by them give notice of its self to our apprehensive faculties , and actually produce that idea which we then perceive ; and we cannot so far distrust their testimony , as to doubt that such collections of simple ideas , as we have observed by our senses to be united together , do really exist together . but this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses , employ'd about particular objects that do then affect them , and no farther . for if i saw such a collection of simple ideas , as is wont to be called man , existing together one minute since , and am now alone , i cannot be sure that the same man exists now , since there is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since , with his existence now : by a thousand ways he may cease to be , since i had the testimony of my sen●es for his existence . and if i cannot be sure , that the man i saw last to day , is now in being , i can be less sure that he is so , who hath been longer removed from my senses , and i have not seen since yesterday , or since the last year , and much less can i be certain of the existence of men that i never saw . and therefore though it be highly probable , that millions of men do now exist , yet whilst i am alone writing of this , i have no unquestionable knowledge of it ; though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt , and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are men ( and men also of my acquaintance , with whom i have to do ) now in the world : but this is but probability , not knowledge . § . . whereby yet we may observe , how foolish and vain a thing it is , for a man of narrow knowledge , who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things , and to be sway'd accordingly ; how vain , i say , it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it ; and refuse assent to very rational propositions , and act contrary to very plain and clear truths , because they cannot be made out so evident , as to surmount every the least ( i will not say reason , but ) pretence of doubting . he that in ordinary affairs of life , would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration , would be sure of nothing in this world , but perishing quickly . the wholesomness of his meat or drink , would be scarce capable of certainty enough to give him reason to venture on it : and i would fain know what 't is he could do upon such grounds as were capable of no doubt , no objections . § . . as when our senses are actually employ'd about any object , we do know that it does exist ; so by our memory we may be assured , that heretofore things that affected our senses , have existed . and thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things , whereof our senses having informed us , our memories still retain the ideas ; and of this , we are past all doubt , so long as we remember well . but this knowledge also reaches no farther than our senses have formerly assured us . thus seeing water at this instant , 't is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist : and remembring that i saw it yesterday , it will also be always true ; and as long as my memory retains it , always an undoubted proposition to me , that water did exist th . iuly , . as it will also be equally true , that a certain number of very fine colours did exist , which at the same time i saw upon a bubble of that water : but being now quite out of the sight both of the water and bubles too , it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth exist , than that the bubbles or colours therein ; it being no more necessary that water should exist to day , because it existed yesterday , than that the colours or bubbles exist to day , because they existed yesterday , though it be exceedingly much more probable , because water hath been observed to continue long in existence , but bubbles , and the colours on them quickly cease to be . § . . what ideas we have of spirits , and how we come by them , i have already shewn : but though we have those ideas in our minds , and know we have them there , the having the ideas of spirits , does not make us know that any such things do exist without us , or that there are any finite spirits , or any other spiritual beings , but the eternal god. we have ground from revelation , and several other reasons , to believe with assurance , that there are such creatures ; but our senses not being able to discover them , we want the means of knowing their particular existences . for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing , by the idea we have of such beings in our minds , than by the ideas any one has of fairies , or centaurs , he can come to know , that things answering those ideas , do really exist . and therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits , as well as several other things , we must content our selves with the evidence of faith , but universal certain propositions concerning this matter , are beyond our reach . for however true it may be , v. g. that all the intelligent spirits that god ever created , do still exist ; yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge . these , and the like propositions , we may assent to , as highly probable , but are not , i fear , in this s●ate , capable of knowing . we are not then to put others upon demonstrating , nor our selves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters , wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge , but what our senses give us in this or that particular . § . . by which it appears , that there are two sorts of propositions ; one concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea : as having the idea of an elephant , phoenix , motion , or an angel , in my mind , the first and natural enquiry is , whether such a thing does any where exist ? and this knowledge is only of particulars . no existence of any thing without us , but only of god , can certainly be known farther than our senses inform us . there is another fort of propositions , wherein is expressed the agreement , or disagreement of our abstract ideas , and their dependence one on another ; and such propositions may be universal and certain : so having the idea of god and my self , of fear and obedience , i cannot but be sure that god is to be feared and obeyed by me : and this proposition will be certain , concerning man in general , if i have made an abstract idea of such a species , whereof i am one particular . but yet this proposition , how certain soever , that men ought to fear and obey , god proves not to me the existence of men in the world , but will be true of all such creatures , whenever they do exist : which certainty of such general propositions , depends on the agreement or disagreement is to be discovered in those abstract ideas . § . . in the former case , our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our senses● in the latter , knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds whatsoever they are , and produce general certain propositions , many whereof are called aeter●ae veritates ; and are indeed so , not from being written in the minds of all men , or that they were before the world : but wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is endowed with such faculties , and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have , we must conclude he must needs , when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas , know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement , or disagreement , he will perceive amongst them . for names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas ; and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another , propositions , concerning any abstract ideas that are on●e true , must needs be eternal verities . chap. xii . of the improvement of our knowledge . § . . it having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters , that maxims were the foundations of all knowledge ; and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain praecognita , from whence the understanding was to take its rise , and by which it was to conduct it self , in its enquiries into the matters belonging to that science , the beaten road of the schools , has been to lay down in the beginning , one or more general propositions , as foundations whereon to build the knowledge was to be had of that subject . these doctrines thus laid down for foundations of any science , were called principles , as the beginnings from which we must set out , and look no farther backwards in our enquiries , but take these for certain and unquestionable truths , and established principles . § . . that which gave occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences , was ( as i suppose ) the good success it seemed to have in mathematicks , wherein men , being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge , these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , learning , or things learn'd , throughly learn'd , as having of all other the greatest certainty , clearness , and evidence in them . § . . but if any one will consider , he will ( i guess ) find , that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge men arrived to in these sciences , was not owing to the influence of their principles , nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general maxims laid down in the beginning ; but from the clear , distinct , compleat ideas their thoughts were employ'd about , and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them , that they had an intuitive knowledge , and by that a way to discover it in others , and this without the help of those maxims . for i ask , is it not possible for a young lad to know , that his whole body is bigger than his little finger , but by virtue of this axiom , that the whole is bigger than a part ; nor be assured of it , till he has learned that maxim ? or cannot a country-wench know , that having received a shilling from one that owes her three , and a shilling also from another that owes her three , that the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal ; cannot she know this , i say , without she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim , that if you take equals from equals , the remainder will be equals ; a maxim which possibly the never heard or thought of ? i desire any one to consider which is known first and clearest by most people ; the particular instance , or the general rule ; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other . these general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas , which are the workmanship of the mind , made , and names given to them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings , and drawing into comprehensive terms , and short rules , its various and multiplied observations : but knowledge began in the mind , and was founded on particulars ; though afterwards , perhaps , no notice be taken thereof ; it being natural for the mind ( forward still to enlarge its knowledge ) most attentively to lay up those general notions , and make the proper use of them , which is to disburthen the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars . § . . but be it in the mathematicks as it will , whether it be clearer , that taking an inch from a black line of two inches , and an inch from a red line of two inches , the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal , or that if you take equals from equals , the remainder will be equals : which , i say , of these two is the clearer and first known , i leave to any one to determine , it not being material to my present occasion . that which i have here to do , is to enquire , whether if it be the readiest way to knowledge● to begin with general maxims , and build upon them , it be yet a safe way to take the principles , which are laid down in any other science , as unquestionable truths ; and so receive them without examination , and adhere to them , without suffering them to be doubted of , because mathematicians have been so happy , or so fair , to use none but self-evident and undeniable . if this be so , i know not what may not pass for truth in morality , what may not be introduced and improved in natural philosophy . let that principle of some of the old philosophers , that all is matter , and that there is nothing else , be received for certain and indubitable , and it will be easie to be seen by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days , what consequences it will lead us into . let any one , with polemo , take the world ; or , with the stoicks , the aether , or the sun ; or , with aneximenes , the air , to be god ; and what a divinity , religion , and worship must we needs have ! nothing can be so dangerous , as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination ; especially if they be such as concern morality , which influence men's lives , and give a biass to all their actions . who might not justly expect another kind of life in aristippus , who placed happiness in bodily pleasure ; and in antisthenes , who made vertue sufficient to felicity ? and he who , with plato , shall place beatitude in the knowledge of god , will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations , than those who look not beyond this spot of earth , and those perishing things are to be had in it . he that , with archelaus , shall lay it down as a principle , that right and wrong , honest and dishonest , are defined only by laws , and not by nature , will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity , than those who take it for granted , that we are under obligations antecedent to all humane constitutions . § . . if therefore those that pass for principles , are not certain , ( which we must have some way to know , that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful , ) but are only made so to us by our blind assent we are liable to be misled by them ; and instead of being guided into truth , we shall , by principles , be only confirmed in mistake and errour . § . . but since the knowledge of the certainty of principles , as well as of all other truths , depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement , or disagreement of our ideas , the way to improve our knowledge , is not , i am sure , blindly , and with an implicit faith to receive and swallow principles ; but is , i think , to get and fix in our minds clear , distinct , and compleat ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them proper and constant names . and thus , perhaps , without any other principles , but barely considering those perfect ideas , and by comparing them one with another , finding their agreement , and disagreement , and their several relations and habitudes ; we shall get more true and clear knowledge , by the conduct of this one rule , than by taking up principles , and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others . § . . we must therefore , if we will proceed as reason advises , adapt our methods of enquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine , and the truth we search after . general and certain truths , are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas . a sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts , for the finding out these relations , is the only way to discover all that can be put , with truth and certainty concerning them , into general propositions . by what steps we are to proceed , is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians , who from very plain and easie beginnings , by gentle degrees , and a continued chain of reasonings , proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths , that appear at first sight beyond humane capacity . the art of finding proofs , and the ideas that demonstratively shew the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities , is , i confess , of great help to them : but whether something like this , in respect of other ideas , as well as those of magnitude , may not in time be found out , i will not determine . this , i think , i may say , that if other ideas , that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species , were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians , they would carry our thoughts farther , and with greater evidence and clearness , than possibly we are apt to imagine . § . . this gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture , which i suggest , chap. . viz. that morality is capable of demonstration , as well as mathematicks . for the ideas that ethicks are conversant about , being all real essences , and such as i imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another ; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations , so far we shall be possessed of certain , real , and general truths : and i doubt not , but if a right method were taken , a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness , that could leave , to a considering man , no more reason to doubt , than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematicks which have been demonstrated to him . § . . in our search after the knowledge of substances , our want of ideas , that are suitable to such a way of proceeding , obliges us to a quite different method . we advance not here , as in the other , where our abstract ideas are real , as well as nominal essences , by contemplating our ideas , and considering their relations and correspondencies , that helps us very little , for the reasons that in another place we have at large shewed . by which , i think , it is evident , that substances afford matter of very little general knowledge ; and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas , will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty . what then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings ? here we are to take a quite contrary course , the want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts , from contemplating , and drawing consequences from our own ideas , to the things themselves as they exist : experience must teach me what reason cannot : and by trying , 't is alone that i can certainly know what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea , v. g. whether that yellow , heavy , fusible body , i call gold , be malleable , or no ; which experience ( which way ever it prove in that particular body i examine ) makes me not certain , that it is so , in all or any other yellow , heavy , fusible body , but that which i have tried . because it is no consequence one way or t' other from my complex idea , the necessity or inconsistence of malleability , hath no visible connection with the combination of that colour , weight , and fusibility in any body . what i have said here of the nominal essence of gold , supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour , weight , and fusibility , will hold true , if malleableness , fixedness , and solubility in aqua regia be added to it , our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those masses of matter , wherein all these are to be found . because the other properties of such bodies , depending not on these , but on that unknown real essence , on which these also depend , we cannot by them discover the rest ; we can go no farther than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us , which is very little beyond themselves ; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain , universal , and useful truths . for upon trial , having found that particular piece ( and all others of that colour , weight , and fusibility , that i ever tried ) malleable , that also makes now , perhaps , a part of my complex idea , part of my nominal essence of gold ; whereby though i make my complex idea , to which i affix the name gold , to consist to more simple ideas than before : yet still , it not containing the real . essence of any species of bodies , it helps me not certainly to know ( i say to know , perhaps , it may to conjecture ) the other remaining properties of that body , farther than they have a visible connection , with some or all of the simple ideas , that make up my nominal essence . for example , i cannot be certain from this complex idea , whether gold be fixed , or no : because as before , there is no necessary connection , or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex idea of a body , yellow , heavy , fusible , malleable , betwixt these , i say , and fixedness , so that i may certainly know , that in whatsoever body those are found , there fixedness is sure to be : here again for assurance , i must apply my self to experience , as far as that reaches , i may have certain knowledge , but no farther . § . . i deny not , but a man accustomed to rational and regular experiments , shall be able to see farther into the nature of bodies , and guess righter at their yet unknown properties , than one that is a stranger to them : but yet , as i have said , this is but judgment and opinion , not knowledge and certainty . this way of attaining , and improving our knowledge in substances , only by experience and history , to which the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity we are in , in this world , makes me suspect , that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science . we are able , i imagine , to reach very little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies , and their several properties , experiments and historical observations , we may have , from which we may draw advantages of ease and health , and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life ; but beyond this , our talents reach not , our faculties cannot attain . § . . from whence it is obvious to conclude , that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabrick and real essences of bodies ; but yet plainly discover to us the being of a god , and the knowledge of our selves , enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty , and great concernment , it will become us , as rational creatures , to employ our faculties about what they are most adopted to , and follow the direction of nature , where it seems to point us out the way . for 't is rational to conclude , that our proper imployment lies in those enquiries , and in that sort of knowledge , which is most suited to our natural capacities , and carries in it our greatest interest , i. e. the condition of our eternal estate : and therefore it is , i think , that morality is the proper science , and business of mankind in general , ( who are both concerned , and fitted to search out their summum bonum , ) as several arts conversant about several parts of nature , are the lot and private talent of particular men , for the common convenience of humane life , and their own particular subsistence in this world. of what consequence the discovery of one natural body , and its properties may be to humane life , the whole great continent of america is a convincing instance ; whose ignorance in useful arts , and want of the greatest part of the conveniencies of life , in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty , i think , may be attributed to their ignorance , of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable stone , i mean the mineral of iron . and whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part of the world , where knowledge and plenty seem to vie each with other ; yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it , i suppose , it will appear past doubt , that were the use of iron lost among us , we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage americans , whose natural endowments and provisions , come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite notions . so that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible mineral , may be truly styled the father of arts , and author of plenty . § . . i would not therefore be thought to dis-esteem , or dissuade the study of nature . i readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire , revere , and glorifie their author : and if rightly directed , may be of greater benefit to mankind , than the monuments of exemplary charity , that have at so great charge been raised , by the founders of hospitals and alms-houses . he that first invented printing ; discovered the use of the compass ; or made publick the virtue and right use of kin kina ; did more for the propagation of knowledge , for the acquisition of conveniencies of life ; and saved more from the grave , than those who built colleges , work-houses , and hospitals . all that i would say , is , that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion , or expectation of knowledge , where it is not to be had ; or by ways , that will not attain it : that we should not take doubtful systems , for compleat sciences ; nor unintelligible notions , for scientifical demonstrations . in the knowledge of bodies , we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments , since we cannot from a discovery of their real essences , grasp at a time whole sheaves ; and in bundles , comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together . where our enquiry is concerning co-existence , or repugnancy to co-exist ; which by contemplation of our ideas , we cannot discover , there experience observation , and natural history , must give us by our senses , and by retail , an insight into corporeal substances . the knowledge of bodies we must get by our senses , warily employed in taking notice of their qualities , and operations on one another ; and what we hope to know of separated spirits in this world , we must , i think , expect only from revelation . he that shall consider , how little general maxims , precarious principles , and hypotheses laid down at pleasure , have promoted true knowledge , or helped to satisfie the enquiries of rational men after real improvements . how little , i say , the setting out at the end , has for many ages together advanced men's progress towards the knowledge of natural philosophy , will think , we have reason to thank those men , who in this latter age have taken another course , and have trod out to us , though not an easier way to learned ignorance , yet a surer way to profitable knowledge . § . . not that we may not , to explain any phoenomena of nature , make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever : hypotheses , if they are well made , are at least great helps to the memory , and often direct us to new discoveries . but my meaning is , that we should not take up any one too hastily , ( which the mind , that would always penetrate into the causes of things , and have principles to rest on , is very apt to do , ) till we have very well examined particulars , and made several experiments , in that thing we would explain by our hypothesis , and see whether it will agree to them all ; whether our principles will carry us quite through , and not be as inconsistent with one phaenomenon of nature , as they seem to accommodate , and explain another . and at least , that we take care , that the name of principles deceive us not , nor impose on us , by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth , which is really , at best , but a very doubtful conjecture , such as are most ( i had almost said all ) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy . § . . but whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty , or no , the ways to enlarge our knowledge , as far as we are capable , seem to me , in short , to be these two : first , the first is to get , and settle in our minds , as far as we can , clear , distinct , and constant ideas of those things we would consider and know . for it being evident , that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas , where they are either imperfect , or obscure , we cannot expect to have certain , and perfect knowledge . secondly , the other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas , which may shew us the agreement , or repugnancy of other ideas , which cannot be immediately compared . § . . that these two ( and not the relying on maxims , and drawing consequences from some general propositions ) are the right method of improving our knowledge in other ideas of modes , the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us . where first we shall find , that he that has not a perfect , and clear idea of those angles , or figures of which he desires to know any thing , is utterly thereby uncapable of any knowledge about them . suppose but a man , not to have a perfect exact idea of a right angle , a scalenum , or trapezium ; and there is nothing more clear , that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them . and farther it is evident , that it was not the influence of those maxims , which are taken for principles in mathematicks , that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made . let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematicks never so perfectly , and contemplate their extent and and consequences , as much as he pleases , he will by their assistence , i suppose , scarce ever come to know that the square of the hypotieneuson in a right angled triangle , is equal to the squares of the two other sides . the knowledge , that the whole is equal to all its parts , and if you take equal from equal , the remainder will be equal , &c. helped him not , i presume , to this demonstration : and a man may , i think , pore long enough on those axioms , without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths . they have been discovered by the thoughts otherways applied : the mind had other objects , other views before it , far different from those maxims , when it first got the knowledge of such kind of truths in mathematicks , which men well enough acquainted with those received axioms , but ignorant of their method , who first made these demonstrations , can never sufficiently admire . and who knows what methods may hereafter be found out to enlarge our knowledge in other things , as well as that of algebra in mathematicks , which so readily finds out ideas of quantities to measure others by , whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly , or , perhaps , never come to know ? chap. xiii . some farther considerations concerning our knowledge . § . . ovr knowledge , as in other things , so in this , has a great conformity with our sight , that it is neither wholly necessary , nor wholly voluntary . if our knowledge were altogether necessary , all men's knowledge would not only be alike , but every man would know all that is knowable ; and if it were wholly voluntary , some men so little regard or value it , that they would have extreme little , or none at all . men that have senses , cannot chuse but receive some ideas by them ; and if they have memory , they cannot but retain some of them ; and if they have any distinguishing faculty , cannot but perceive the agreement , or disagreement of some of them one with another : as he that has eyes , if he will open them by day , cannot but see some objects , and perceive a difference in them . but though a man with his eyes open in the light , cannot but see : yet there be certain objects , which he may chuse whether he will turn his eyes to ; there may be in his reach a book containing pictures , and discourses , capable to delight , or instruct him , which yet he may never have the will to open , never take the pains to look into . § . . there is also another thing in a man's power , and that is , though he turn his eyes sometimes towards an object , yet he may chuse whether he will intently survey it , and with an accurate search , endeavour to observe all that is visible in it . but yet what he does see , he cannot see otherwise than he does : it depends not on his will to see that black , which appears yellow ; nor to persuade himself , that what actually scalds him , feels cold : the earth will not appear painted with flowers , nor the fields covered with verdure , whenever he has a mind to it ; in the cold winter , he cannot help seeing it white and hoary , if he will look abroad . just thus is it with our understanding , all that is voluntary in our knowledge , is the employing , or with-holding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects , and a more , or less accurate survey of them : but they being employed , our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other ; that is done only by the objects themselves , as far as they are clearly discovered . and therefore , as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects , the mind cannot but receive those ideas , which are presented by them , and be informed of the existence of things without : and so far as men's thoughts converse with their own clear and distinct ideas , they cannot but , in some measure , observe the agreement , and disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them , which is so far knowledge : and if they have names for those ideas , they have thus considered , they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions , which express that agreement , or disagreement they perceive in them , and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths . for what a man sees , he cannot but see ; and what he perceives , he cannot but know that he perceives . § . . thus he that has got the ideas of numbers , and hath taken the pains to compare one , two , and three , to six , cannot chuse but know that they are equal : he that hath got the idea of a triangle , and found the ways to measure its angles , and their magnitudes , is as certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones , as that it is impossible for the same to be , and not to be . he also that hath the idea of an intelligent , but frail and weak being , made by and depending on another , who is eternal , omnipotent , perfectly wise and good , will as certainly know that man is to honour , fear , and obey god , as that the sun shines when he sees it . for if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind , and will turn his thoughts that way , and consider them , he will as certainly find that the inferior , finite , and dependent , is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite , as he is certain to find , that three , five , and seven , are less than fifteen , if he will consider , and compute those numbers ; nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen , if he will but open his eyes , and turn them that way . but yet these truths , being never so certain , never so clear , he may be ignorant of either , or all of them , who will never take the pains to employ his faculties , as he should , to inform himself about them . chap. xiv . of iudgment . § . . the understanding faculties being given to man , not barely for speculation , but also for the conduct of his life , man would be at a great loss , if he had nothing to direct him , but what has the certainty of true knowledge : for that being very short and scanty , as we have seen , he would be often utterly in the dark , and in most of the actions of his life , perfectly at a stand , had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge . for he that will not eat , till he has demonstration that it will nourish him ; he that will not stir , till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed , will have little else to do , but sit still and perish . § . . therefore as god has set some things in broad day-light ; as he has given us some certain knowledge , though limited to a few things in comparison , probably , as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of , to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state : so in the greatest part of our concernment , he has afforded us only the twilight , as i may so say , of probability , suitable , i presume , to that state of mediocrity and probationership , he has been pleased to place in us here ; wherein we might not be over confident , and presume ; but might by every day's experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error ; which might be a constant admonition to us , to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care , in the search , and following of that way , which might lead us to a state of greater perfection . it being highly rational to think , even where revelation is silent in the case , that as men employ those talents , god has given them , here , they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day , when their sun shall set , and night shall put an end to their labours . § . . the faculty , which god has given man to enlighten him , next to clear and certain knowledge , is iudgment : whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree , or disagree ; or which is the same , any proposition to be true , or false , without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs . the mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity , where demonstrative proofs , and certain knowledge are not to be had ; and sometimes out of laziness , unskilfulness , or haste , even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had . men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , which they are desirous , or concerned to know ; but either incapable of such attention , as is requisite in a long train of gradations , or impatient of delay , lightly survey , or wholly pass over the proofs ; and so without making out the demonstration , determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas , as it were by a view of them , as they are at a distance , and take it to be the one or the other , as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey . this faculty of the mind , when it is exercised immediately about things , is called iudgment ; when about truths delivered in words , is most commonly called assent or dissent : which being the most usual way , wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty , i shall under these terms treat of it , as least liable in our language to equivocation § . . thus the mind has two faculties , conversant about truth and falshood . first , knowledge , whereby it certainly perceives , and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas . secondly , judgment , which is the putting ideas together , or separating them from one another in the mind , when their certain agreement , or disagreement is not perceived , but presumed to be so ; which is , as the word imports , taken to be so before it certainly appears . and if it so unites , or separates them , as in reality things are , it is right iudgment . chap. xv. of probability . § . . as demonstration is the shewing the agreement , or disagreement of two ideas , by the intervention of one or more proofs , which have a constant , immutable , and visible connexion one with another : so probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement , or disagreement , by the intervention of proofs , whose connexion is not constant and immutable , or at least is not perceived to be so , but is , or appears for the most part to be so , and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true , or false , rather than the contrary . for example : in the demonstration of it , a man perceives the certain immutable connexion there is of equality , between the three angles of a triangle , and those intermediate ones , which are made use of to shew their equality to two right ones ; and so by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement , or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress , the whole series is continued with an evidence , which clearly shews the agreement , or disagreement , of those three angles , in equality to two right ones : and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so . but another man who never took the pains to observe the demonstration , hearing a mathematician , a man of credit , affirm the three angles of a triangle , to be equal to two right ones , assents to it ; i. e. receives it for true : in which case , the foundation of his assent , is the probability of the thing , the proof being such as , for the most part , carries truth with it : the man on whose testimony he receives it , not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to , or besides his knowledge , especially in matters of this kind . so that that which causes his assent to this proposition , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones , that which makes him take these ideas to agree , without knowing them to do so , is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases , or his supposed veracity in this . § . . our knowledge , as has been shewn , being very narrow , and we not happy enough to find certain truth in every thing , we have occasion to consider , most of the propositions we think , reason , discourse , nay act upon , are such , as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth : yet some of them border so near upon certainty , that we make no doubt at all about them ; but assent to them as firmly , and act according to that assent as vigorously , as if they were infallibly demonstrated , and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain . but there being degrees herein , from the very neighbourhood of certainty and evidence , quite down to improbability and unlikeliness , even to the confines of impossibility ; and also degrees of assent from certain knowledge , and what is next it , full assurance and confidence , quite down to conjecture , doubt , distrust , and disbelief . i shall come now , as having ( as i think ) found out the bounds of humane knowledge and certainty , in the next place to consider the several degrees and grounds of probability , and assent or faith. § . . probability then is likeliness to be true , the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition , for which there be arguments or proofs , to make it pass or be received for true . the entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions , is called belief , assent , or opinion , which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true , upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true , without certain knowledge that it is so . and herein lies the difference between probability and certainty , faith and knowledge , that in all the parts of knowledge , there is intuition ; each immediate idea , each step has its visible and certain connexion ; in belief not so . that which makes me believe , is something extraneous to the thing i believe ; something not evidently joined on both sides to , and so not manifestly shewing the agreement , or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration . § . . probability then being to supply the defect of our knowledge , and to guide us where that fails , it is always conversant about things , whereof we have no certainty , but only some inducements to receive it for true . the grounds of it are , in short , these two following : first , the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge , observation , and experience . secondly , the testimony of others , vouching their observation and experience . in the testimony of others , is to be considered , . the number . . the integrity . . the skill of the witnesses . . the design of the author , where it is a testimony out of a book cited . . the consistency of the parts , and circumstances of the relation . . contrary testimonies . § . . now probability wanting that intuitive evidence , which infallibly determines the understanding , and produces certain knowledge , the mind , before it rationally assents or dissents to any probable proposition , ought to examine all the grounds of probability , and see how they make more or less for or against it , and upon a due balancing the whole , reject , or receive it , with a more or less firm assent , proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probabily on one side or the other . for example : if i my self see a man walk on the ice , it is past probability , 't is knowledge : but if another tells me he saw a man in england in the midst of a sharp winter , walk upon water harden'd with cold ; this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen , that i am disposed by the nature of the thing it self to assent to it , unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact . but if the same thing be told to one born between the tropicks , who never saw nor heard of any such thing before , there the whole probability relies on testimony : and as the relators are more in number , and of more credit , and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth ; so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief . though to a man , whose experience has been always quite contrary , and has never heard of any thing like it , the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief . as it happened to a dutch ambassadour , who entertaining the king of siam with the particularities of holland , which he was inquisitive after , amongst other things told him , that the water in his country , would sometimes , in cold weather , be so hard that men walked upon it , and that it would bear an elephant , if he were there . to which the king replied , hitherto i have believed the strange things you have told me , because i look upon you as a sober fair man , but now i am sure you lye . § . . upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition : and as the conformity of our knowledge , as the certainty of observations , as the frequency and constancy of experience , and the number and credibility of testimonies , do more or less agree , or disagree with it , so is any proposition in it self , more or less probable . there is another , i confess , which though by it self it be no true ground of probability , yet is often made use of for one , by which men most commonly regulate their assent , and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing else ; any , that is , the opinion of others ; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on , nor more likely to mislead one ; since there is much more falshood and errour amongst men , than truth and knowledge . and if the opinions and persuasions of others , whom we know and think well of , be a ground of assent , men have reason to be heathens in iapan , mahumetans in turkey , papists in spain , protestants in england , and lutherans in sueden . but of this wrong ground of assent , i shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place . chap. xvi . of the degrees of assent . § . . the grounds of probability , we have laid down in the foregoing chapter , as they are the foundations on which our assent is built ; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are , or ought to be regulated : only we are to take notice , that whatever grounds of probability there may be , they yet operate no farther on the mind , which searches after truth , and endeavours to judge right , than they appear ; at least in the first judgment or search that the mind makes . i confess , in the opinions men have , and firmly stick to , in the world , their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them : it being in many cases almost impossible , and in most very hard , even for those who have very admirable memories , to retain all the proofs , which , upon a due examination , made them embrace that side of the question . it suffices , that they have once with care and fairness , examined the matter as far as they could ; and that they have searched into all the particulars , that they could imagine to give any light to the question ; and with the best of their skill , cast up the account upon the whole evidence : and thus having once found on which side the probability appeared to them , after as full and exact an enquiry as they can make , they lay up the conclusion in their memories , as a truth they have discovered ; and for the future , they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories , that this is the opinion , that by the proofs they have once seen of it , deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it . § . . this is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing , in regulating their opinions and judgments ; unless a man will exact of them , either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth , and that too in the same order , and regular deduction of consequences , in which they have formerly placed or seen them ; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume upon one single question : or else they must require a man , for every opinion that he embraces , every day to examine the proofs : both which , are impossible . it is unavoidable therefore , that the memory be relied on in the case , and that men be persuaded of several opinions , whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts ; nay , which perhaps they are not able actually to re-call . without this , the greatest part of men must be either very scepticks , or change every moment , and yield themselves up to whoever , having lately studied the question , offers them arguments ; which for want of memory , they are not able presently to answer . § . . i cannot but own , that men's sticking to their past iudgment , and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made , is often the cause of great obstinacy in errour and mistake . but the fault is not that they rely on their memories , for what they have before well judged ; but because they judged before they had well examined . may we not find a great number ( not to say the greatest part ) of men , that think they have formed right judgments of several matters ; and that for no other reason , but because they never thought otherwise ? that imagine themselves to have judged right , only because they never questioned , never examined their own opinions ? which is indeed to think they judged right , because they never judged at all : and yet these of all men hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness ; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets , who have least examined them . what we once know , we are certain is so : and we may be secure , that there are no latent proofs undiscovered , which may overturn our knowledge , or bring it in doubt . but in matters of probability , 't is not in every case that we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us , that any way concern the question ; and that there is no evidence behind , and yet unseen , which may cast the probability on the other side , and out-weigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us . who almost is there , that hath the leisure , patience , and means , to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has , so as safely to conclude , that he hath a clear and full view , and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information ? and yet we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other . the conduct of our lives , and the management of our great concerns , will not bear delay : for those depend , for the most part , on the determination of our judgment in points , wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge , and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side , or the other . § . . since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men , if not all , to have several opinions , without certain and indubitable proofs of their truths ; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance , lightness , or folly , for men to quit and renounce their former tenets , presently upon the offer of an argument , which they cannot immediately answer , and shew the insufficiency of : it would , methinks , become all men to maintain peace , and the common offices of humanity , and friendship , in the diversity of opinions : since we cannot reasonably expect , that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion , and embrace ours , with a blind resignation to an authority , which the understanding of man acknowledges not . for however it may often mistake , it can own no other guide but reason , nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another . if he you would bring over to your sentiments be one that examines before he assents , you must give him leave , at his leisure , to go over the account again , and re-calling what is out of his mind , examine all the particulars , to see on which side the advantage lies : and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains , 't is but what we do often our selves in the like case ; and we should take it amiss , if others should prescribe to us what points we should study . and if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust , how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets , which time and custom have so setled in his mind , that he thinks them self-evident , and of an unquestionable certainty ; or which he takes to be impressions he has received from god himself , or from men sent by him ? how can we expect , i say , that opinions thus setled , should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger , or adversary ; especially if there be any suspicion of interest , or design , as there never fails to be , where men find themselves ill treated ? we should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance , and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information ; and not instantly treat others ill , as obstinate and perverse , because they will not renounce their own , and receive our opinions , or at least those we would force upon them , when 't is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing theirs . for where is the man that has uncontestible evidence of the truth of all that he holds , or of the falshood of all he condemns ; or can say , that he has examined , to the bottom , all his own or other men's opinions ? the necessity of believing , without knowledge , nay , often upon very slight grounds , in this fleeting slate of action and blindness we are in , should make us more busie and careful to inform our selves than constrain others . at least , those who have not throughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets , must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others ; and are unreasonable in imposing that as a truth on other men's belief , which they themselves have not searched into , nor weighed the arguments of probability , on which they should receive or reject it . those who have fairly and truly examined , and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess , and govern themselves by , would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them : but these are so few in number , and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions , that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them : and there is reason to think , that if men were better instructed themselves , they would be less imposing on others . § . . but to return to the grounds of assent , and the several degrees of it , we are to take notice , that the propositions we receive upon inducements of probability , are of two sorts ; either concerning some particular existence , or , as it is usually termed , matter of fact , which falling under our observation , is capable of humane testimony ; or else concerning things , which being beyond the discovery of our senses , are not capable of any such testimony . § . . concerning the first of these , viz. particular matter of fact , first , where any particular thing , consonant to the constant observation of our selves and others , in the like case , comes attested with the concurrent reports of all that mention it , we receive it as easily , and build as firmly upon it , as if it were certain knowledge ; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt , as if it were perfect demonstration . thus if all english-men , who have occasion to mention it , should affirm , that it froze in england the last winter , or that there were swallows seen there in the summer , i think a man could almost as little doubt of it , as that seven and four are eleven . the first therefore , and highest degree of probability , is , when the general consent of all men , in all ages , as far as it can be known , concurrs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases , to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses : such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies , and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature . this we call an argument from the nature of things themselves . for what our own and other men's constant observation , has found always to be after the same manner , that we with reason conclude to be the effects of steddy and regular causes , though they come not within the reach of our knowledge . thus , that fire warmed a man , made lead fluid , and changed the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal : that iron sunk in water , and swam in quicksilver : these and the like propositions about particular facts , being agreeable to our constant experience , as often as we have to do with these matters ; and being generally spoke of , ( when mentioned by others , ) as things found constantly to be so , and therefore not so much as controverted by any body , we are put past doubt , that a relation affirming any such thing to have been , or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner , is very true . these probabilities rise so near to certainty , that they govern our thoughts as absolutely , and influence all our actions as fully , as the most evident demonstration ; and in what concerns us , we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge . and our belief thus grounded , rises to assurance . § . . secondly , the next degree of probability is , when i find by my own experience , and the agreement of all others that mention it , a thing to be , for the most part , so ; and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses : v. g. history giving us such an account of men in all ages ; and my own experience , as far as i had an opportunity to observe , confirming it , that most men prefer their private advantage , to the publick . if all historians that write of tiberius , say that tiberius did so , it is extreamly probable . and in this case , our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise it self to a degree , which we may call confidence . § . . thirdly , in matters that happen indifferently , as that a bird should fly this or that way ; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand , &c. when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses , there our assent is also unavoidable . thus : that there is such a city in italy , as rome : that about years ago , there lived in it a man , called iulius caesar ; that he was a general , and that he won a battel again another called pompey . this , though in the nature of the thing , there be nothing for , nor against it ; yet , being related by historians of credit , and contradicted by no one writer , a man cannot avoid believing it , and can as little doubt of it , as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance , whereof he himself is a witness . § . . thus far the matter goes easie enough . probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it , that it naturally determines the judgment , and leaves us as little at liberty to believe , or disbelieve , as a demonstration does , whether we will know , or be ignorant . the difficulty is , when testimonies contradict common experience , and the report of history and witnesses clashes with the ordinary course of nature , or with one another ; there it is , where diligence , attention , and exactness is required , to form a right judgment , and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing ; which rises and falls , according as those two foundations of credibility , viz. common observation in like cases , and particular testimonies in that particular instance , favours or contradicts it . these are liable to so great variety of contrary observations , circumstances , reports , different qualifications , tempers , designs , over-sights , &c. of the reporters , that 't is impossible to reduce to precise rules , the various degrees wherein men give their assent . this only may be said in general , that as the arguments and proofs , pro and con , upon due examination , nicely weighing every particular circumstance , shall to any one appear , upon the whole matter , in a greater or less degree , to preponderate on either side , so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainment , as we call belief , conjecture , guess , doubt , wavering , distrust , disbelief , &c. § . . this is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use of ; concerning which , i think , it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of england ; which is , that though the attested copy of a record be good proof , yet the copy of a copy never so well attested , and by never so credible witnesses , will not be admitted as a proof in judicature . this is so generally approved as reasonable , and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our enquiry after material truths , that i never yet heard of any one that blamed it . this practice , if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong , carries this observation along with it , viz. that any testimony , the farther off it is from the original truth , the less force and proof it has . the being and existence of the thing it self , is what i call the original truth . a credible man vouching his knowledge of it , is a good proof : but if another equally credible , do witness it from his report , the testimony is weaker ; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay , is yet less considerable . so that in traditional truths , each remove weakens the force of the proof ; and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through , the less strength and evidence does it receive from them . this i thought necessary to be taken notice of : because i find amongst some men , the quite contrary commonly practised , who look on opinions to gain force by growing older ; and what a thousand year since would not , to a rational man , contemporary with the first voucher , have appeared at all probable , is now urged as certain beyond all question , only because several have since , from him , said it one after another . upon this ground propositions , evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning , come by an inverted rule of probability , to pass for authentick truths : and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors , are thought to grow venerable by age , and are urged as undeniable . § . . i would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history : 't is all the light we have in many cases ; and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have , with a convincing evidence . i think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity : i wish we had more of them , and more uncorrupted . but this , truth it self forces me to say , that no probability can arise higher than its first original . what has no other evidence than the single testimony of one onely witness , must stand or fall by his onely testimony , whether good , bad , or indifferent ; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others , one after another , is so far from receiving any strength thereby , that it is only the weaker . passion , interest , inadvertency , mistake of his meaning , and a thousand odd reasons , or caprichios , men's minds are acted by , ( impossible to be discovered , ) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong . he that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers , cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve , where the originals are wanting ; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on . this is certain , that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds , can never after come to be more valid in future ages , by being often repeated . but the farther still it is from the original , the less valid it is , and has always less force in the mouth , or writing of him that last made use of it , than in his from whom he received it . § . . the probabilities we have hitherto mentioned , are only such as concern matter of fact , and such things as are capable of observation and testimony : there remains that other sort , concerning which , men entertain opinions with variety of assent , though the things be such , that falling not under the reach of our senses , are not capable of testimony ; and such are , . the existence , nature , and operations of finite immaterial beings without us ; as spirits , angels , devils , &c. or the existence of material beings ; which either for their smalness in themselves , or remoteness from us , our senses cannot take notice of , as whether there be any plants animals , and intelligent inhabitants of the planets , and other mansions of the vast universe . . concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature ; wherein though we see the sensible effects , yet their causes are unknown , and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced . we see animals are generated , nourished , and move ; the load-stone draws iron ; and the parts of a candle successively melting , turn into flame , and give us both light and heat . these and the like effects we see and know : but the causes that operate , and the manner they are produced in , we can only guess , and probably conjecture . for these and the like coming not within the scrutiny of humane senses , cannot be examined by them , or be attested by any body , and therefore can appear more or less probable , only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds , and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation . analogy in these matters is the only help we have , and 't is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability . thus observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another , produces heat , and very often fire it self , we have reason to think , that what we call heat and fire , consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter● observing likewise , that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours ; and also that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies , as of velvet , watered silk , &c. does the like , we think it probable that the colour and shining of bodies , is in them nothing but the different arangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts . thus finding in all the parts of the creation , that fall under humane observation , that there is a gradual connexion of one with another , without any great or discernable gaps between , in all that great variety of things we see in the world , which are so closely linked together , that , in the several ranks of beings , it is not easie to discover the bounds betwixt them , we have reason to be persuaded , that in such gentle steps things in perfection ascend upwards . 't is an hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin , and where insensible and irrational end ; and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things , and which the first of those which have no life ? things , as far as we can observe lessen and augment , as the quantity does in a regular cone , where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diametre at remote distances : yet the difference between the upper and under , where they touch one another , is hardly discernable . the difference is exceeding great between some men , and some animals : but if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some men , and some brutes , we shall find so little difference , that 't will be hard to say , that that of the man is either clearer or larger : observing , i say , such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the creation , that are beneath man , the rule of analogy may make it probable , that it is so also in things above us , and our observation ; and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings , excelling us in several degrees of perfection , ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the creator , by gentle steps and differences , that are every one at no great distance from the next to it . this sort of probability , which is the best conduct of rational experiments , and the rise of hypothesis has also its use and influence : and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths , and useful productions , which would otherwise lie concealed . § . . though the common experience , and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men , to make them give or refuse credit to any thing proposed to their belief ; yet there is one case , wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it . for where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him , who has the power to change the course of nature , there , under such circumstances , they may be the fitter to procure . belief , by how much the more they are beyond , or contrary to ordinary observation . this is the proper case of miracles , which well attested , do not only find credit themselves ; but give it also to other truths , which need such confirmation . § . . besides those we have hitherto mentioned , there is one sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent , upon bare testimony , whether the thing proposed , agree or disagree with common experience , and the ordinary course of things , or no. the reason whereof is , because the testimony is of such an one , as cannot deceive , nor be deceived , and that is of god himself . this carries with it certainty beyond doubt , evidence beyond exception . this is called by a peculiar name , revelation , and our assent to it , faith : which has as much certainty as our knowledge it self ; and we may as well doubt of our own being , as we can , whether any revelation from god be true . so that faith is a setled and sure principle of assent and assurance , and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation : only we must be sure , that it be a divine revelation , and that we understand it right ; else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm , and all the error of wrong principles , if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation . and therefore in those cases , our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation , and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in . if the evidence of its being a revelation , or that this its true sense be only on probable proofs , our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or diffidence , arising from the more , or less apparent probability of the proofs . but of faith , and the precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion , i shall speak more hereafter , where i treat of it , as it is ordinarily placed , in contradistinction to reason : though in truth , it be nothing else but an assent founded on the highest reason . chap. xvii . of reason . § . . the word reason in the english language has different significations : sometimes it is taken for true , and clear principles : sometimes for clear , and fair deductions from those principles : and sometimes for the cause , and particularly the final cause : but the consideration i shall have of it here , is in a signification different from all these ; and that is , as it stands for a faculty in man , that faculty , whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts , and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them . § . . if general knowledge , as has been shewn , consists in a perception of the agreement , or disagreement of our own ideas ; and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us ( except only of god ) be had only by our senses ; what room then is there for the exercise of any other faculty , but outward sense and inward perception ? what need is there of reason ? very much ; both for the enlargement of our knowledge , and regulating our assent : for it hath to do , both in knowledge and opinion , and is necessary , and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties , and indeed contains two of them , viz. sagacity and illation : by the one , it finds out , and by the other , it so orders the intermediate ideas , as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain , whereby the extremes are held together ; and thereby , as it were , to draw into view the truth sought for , which is that we call illation or inference , and consists in nothing but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas , in each step of the deduction , whereby the mind comes to see , either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas , as in demonstration , in which it arrives at knowledge ; or their probable connexion , on which it gives or with-holds its assent , as in opinion . sense and intuition reach but a very little way ; the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas : and in those cases , where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge , and take propositions for true , without being certain they are so , we have need to find out , examine , and compare the grounds of their probability . in both these cases , the faculty which finds out the means , and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one , and probability in the other , is that which we call reason . for as reason perceives the necessary , and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another , in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge : so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another , in every step of a discourse , to which it will think assent due . this is the lowest degree of that , which can be truly called reason : for where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion ; where it does not discern , whether there be any such connexion , or no , there men's opinions are not the product of judgment , or the consequence of reason ; but the effects of chance and hazard , of a mind floating at all adventures , without choice , and without direction . § . . so that we may in reason consider these four degrees ; the first and highest , is the discovering , and finding out of proofs ; the second , the regular and methodical disposition of them , and laying them in a clear and fit order , to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived ; the third is the perceiving their connexion ; and the fourth , the making a right conclusion . these several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration : it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part , as the demonstration is made by another ; another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts ; a third to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly ones self , and something different from all these , to have first found out those intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made . § . . there is one thing more , which i shall desire to be considered concerning reason ; and that is , whether syllogism , as is generally thought , be the proper instrument of it , and the usefullest way of exercising this faculty . the causes i have to doubt , are these : first , because syllogism serves our reason , but in one only of the forementioned parts of it ; and that is , to shew the connexion of the proofs in any one instance , and no more : but in this , it is of no great use , since the mind can perceive such connexion where it really is , as easily , nay , perhaps , better without it . if we will observe the actings of our own minds , we shall find , that we reason best and clearest , when we only observe the connexion of the proofs , without reducing it to any rule of syllogism : and therefore we may take notice , that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly , who know not how to make a syllogism . he that will look into many parts of asia and america , will find men reason there , perhaps , as acutely as himself , who yet never heard of a syllogism , nor can reduce any one argument to those forms . indeed sometimes it may serve to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish , or cunningly wrapp'd up in a smooth period ; and stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit , and good language , shew it in its naked deformity : but the mind is not taught to reason by these rules , it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence , or incoherence of its ideas , and can range them right , without any such perplexing repetitions . tell a country gentlewoman , that the wind is south-west , and the weather louring , and like to rain , and she will easily understand , 't is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad , in such a day , after a fever : she clearly sees the probable connexion of all these , viz. south-west-wind , and clouds , rain , wetting , taking cold , relapse , and danger of death , without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms , that clog and hinder the mind , which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them ; and the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state , would be quite lost , if this argument were managed learnedly , and proposed in mode and figure . for it very often confounds the connexion : and , i think , every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations , that the knowledge gain'd thereby , comes shortest and clearest without syllogism . secondly , because though syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an argument , made use of in the usual way of discoursing , by supplying the absent proposition , and so setting it before the view in a clear light ; yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure , equivocal , and fallacious terms , wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds : it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in dispute , than the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair enquiries . § . . but however it be in knowledge , i think , i may truly say , it is of far less , or no use at all in probabilities : for the assent there , being to be determined by the preponderancy , after a due weighing of all the proofs , with all circumstances on both sides , nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that , as syllogism ; which running away with one assumed probability , or one topical argument , pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration ; and forcing it upon some remote difficulty , holds it fast there , intangled perhaps , and as it were , manacled in the chain of syllogisms , without allowing it the liberty , much less affording it the helps requisite to shew on which side , all things considered , is the greater probability . § . . but let it help us ( as , perhaps , may be said ) in convincing men of their errors or mistakes ; ( and yet i would fain see the man , that was forced out of his opinions by dint of syllogism ; ) yet still it fails our reason in that part , which if not its highest perfection , is yet certainly its hardest task , and that which we most need its help in ; and that is the finding out of proofs , and making new discoveries . the rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas , that may shew the connexion of remote ones . this way of reasoning discovers no new proofs , but is the art of marshalling , and ranging the old ones we have already . the th proposition of the first book of euclid is very true ; but the discovery of it , i think , not owing to any rules of common logick . a man knows first , and then he is able to prove syllogistically . so that syllogism comes after knowledge , and then a man has little or no need of it . but 't is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that shew the connexion of distant ones , that our stock of knowledge is increased , and that useful arts and sciences are advanced . syllogism , at best , is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have , without making any addition to it : and if a man should employ his reason all this way , he will not doe much otherwise than he , who having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth , should have it beaten up all into swords , and put it into his servants hands to fence with , and bang one another . had the king of spain imploy'd the hands of his people , and his spanish iron so , he had brought to light but little of that treasure , that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of america . and i am apt to think , that he who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms , will discover very little of that mass of knowledge , which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature ; and which i am apt to think , native rustick reason ( as it formerly has done ) is likelier to open a way to , and add to the common stock of mankind , rather than any scholastick proceeding by the strict rules of mode and figure . § . . i doubt not nevertheless , but there are ways to be found to assist our reason in this most useful part ; and this the judicious hooker encourages me to say , who in his eccl. pol. l. . § . . speaks thus : if there might be added the right helps of true art and learning , ( which helps i must plainly confess , this age of the world carrying the name of a learned age , doth neither much know , nor generally regard , ) there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of iudgment between men therewith inured , and that which now men are , as between men that are now , and innocents . i do not pretend to have found , or discovered here any of those right helps of art , this great man of deep thoughts mentions ; but this is plain , that syllogism , and the logick now in use , which were as well known in his days , can be none of those he means . it is sufficient for me , if by a discourse , perhaps , something out of the way , i am sure as to me wholly new , and unborrowed , i shall have given occasion to others , to cast about for new discoveries , and to seek in their own thoughts , for those right helps of art , which will scarce be found , i fear , by those who servilely confine themselves to the rules and dictates of others ; for beaten tracts lead these sort of cattel , ( as an observing roman calls them , ) whose thoughts reach only to imitation , non quo eundum est , sed quo itur . but i can be bold to say , that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment , and largeness of comprehension , that if they would employ their thoughts on this subject , could open new and undiscovered ways , to the advancement of knowledge . § . . having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general , and the use of it , in reasoning , and the improvement of our knowledge , 't is fit , before i leave this subject , to take notice of one manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism ; viz. that no syllogistical reasoning can be right , and conclusive , but what has , at least , one general proposition in it . as if we could not reason , and have knowledge about particulars ; whereas , in truth , the matter rightly considered , the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge , is nothing but particulars . every man 's reasoning and knowledge , is only about the ideas existing in his own mind , which are truly , every one of them , particular existences ; and our knowledge and reasoning about other things , is only as they correspond with those our particular ideas . so that the perception of the agreement , or disagreement of our particular ideas , is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge ; universality is but accidental to it , and consists only in this , that the particular ideas , about which it is , are such , as more than one particular thing can correspond with , and be represented by . but the perception of the agreement , or disagreement of any two ideas , and consequently , our knowledge , is equally clear and certain , whether either , or both , or neither of those ideas be capable of representing more real beings than one , or no. § . . reason , though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth , elevates our thoughts as high as the stars , and leads us through the vast spaces , and large rooms of this mighty fabrick , yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal being ; and there are many instances wherein it fails us : as , first , it perfectly fails us , where our ideas fail . it neither does , nor can extend it self farther than they do : and therefore , where-ever we have no ideas , our reasoning stops , and we are at an end of our reckoning : and if at any time we reason about words , which do not stand for any ideas , 't is only about those sounds , and nothing else . § . . secondly , our reason is often puzled , and at a loss , because of the scurity , confusion , or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about ; and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions . thus , not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter , nor of infinity , we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter ; but having perfect , clear , and distinct ideas of number , our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers , nor finds it self involved in any contradictions about them . thus , we having but imperfect ideas , of the operations of our minds upon our bodies or thoughts ; and of the beginning of either motion or thought in us ; and much imperfecter yet , of the operation of god , run into great difficulties about free , created agents , which reason cannot well extricate it self out of . § . . thirdly , our reason is often at a stand , because it perceives not those ideas , which could serve to shew the certain or probable agreement , or disagreement of any two other ideas ; and in this , some men's faculties far out-go others . till algebra , that great instrument and instance of humane sagacity , was discovered , men , with amazement , looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians , and could scarce forbear to think the finding some of those proofs , more than humane . § . . fourthly , reason is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties , brought into straits and contradictions , without knowing how to free it self , by proceeding upon false principles ; which , being followed , lead men into contradictions to themselves , and inconsistency in their own thoughts ; which their reason is so far from clearing , that if they will pursue it , it entangles them the more , and engages them deeper in perplexities . § . . fifthly , as obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason , so , upon the same ground , do dubious words , and uncertain signs , often , in discourses and arguings , when not warily attended to , puzzle men's reason , and bring them to a nonplus . but these two latter are our fault , and not the fault of reason : but yet , the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious ; and the perplexities , or errors , they fill men's minds with , is every where observable . § . . some of the ideas that are in the mind , are so there , that they can be , by themselves , immediately compared , one with another : and in these , the mind is able to perceive , that they agree , or disagree , as clearly , as that it has them . thus the mind perceives , that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle , as clearly as it does the idea of a circle : and this , therefore , as has been said , i call intuitive knowledge ; which is certain , beyond all doubt , and needs no probation , nor can have any ; this being the highest of all humane certainty . in this consists the evidence of all those aeternae veritates , which no body has any doubt about , but every man ( does not , as is said , only assent to , but ) knows to be true , as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding . in the discovery of , and assent to these truths , there is no use of the discursive faculty , no need of reason ; but they are known by a superior , and higher degree of evidence : and such , if i may guess at things unknown , i am apt to think , that angels have now , and the spirits of just men made perfect , shall have , in a future state , of thousands of things , which now , either wholly escape our apprehensions , or which , our short-sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of , we , in the dark , grope after . § . . but though we have , here and there , a little of this clear light , some sparks of bright knowledge ; yet the greatest part of our ideas are such , that we cannot discern their agreement , or disagreement , by an immediate comparing them : and in all these , we have need of our reason ; and must , by discourse and inference , make our discoveries . now of these , there are two sorts , which i shall take the liberty to mention here again . first , those whose agreement , or disagreement , though it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together , yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas , which can be compared with them ; wherein , if the agreement , or disagreement , be plainly discerned , of the intermediate ideas on both sides , with those we would compare , there it is demonstration ; and it produces certain knowledge , though not altogether so evident as the former : because there is in the former , bare intuition , but in these there is intuition indeed , but not altogether at once ; for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium , with that we compared it with before , when we compare it with the other : and where there be many mediums , there the danger of the mistake is the greater , and consequently it may be liable to the greater uncertainty . but yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another , and that with a third , and that with a fourth , &c. there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration , and produces certain knowledge , which may be called rational knowledge , as the other is intuitive . § . . secondly , there are other ideas , whose agreement , or disagreement , can no otherwise be judged of , but by the intervention of others , which have not a certain agreement with the extremes , but an usual or likely one : and in these it is , that the iudgment is properly exercised , which is the acquiescing of the mind , that any ideas do agree , by comparing them with such probable mediums . and this , though it never amounts to knowledge , no not to that which is the lowest degree of it ; yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together ; and the probability is so clear and strong , that assent as necessarily follows it , as knowledge does demonstration . the great excellency and use of the judgment , is to observe right , and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability ; and then casting them up all right together , chuse that side which has the over-balance . § . . intuitive knowledge , is the perception of the certain agreement , or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together . rational knowledge , is the perception of the certain agreement , or disagreement of any two ideas , by the intervention of one or more other ideas . iudgment , is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree , or disagree , by the intervention of one or more ideas , whose certain agreement , or disagreement with them , it does not perceive , but hath observed to be frequent and usual . § . . though the deducing one proposition from another , or making inferences in words , be a great part of reason , and that which it is usually employ'd about : yet the principal act of ratiocination is the finding the agreement , or disagreement of two ideas one with another , by the intervention of a third . as a man , by a yard , finds two houses to be of the same length , which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position . words have their consequences , as the signs of such ideas : and things , agree or disagree , as really they are ; but we observe it only by our ideas . § . . before we quit this subject , it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments , that men in their reasonings with others do ordinarily make use of , to prevail on their assent ; or at least so to awe them , as to silence their opposition . first , the first is , to alledge the opinions of men , whose parts , learning , eminency , power , or some other cause , has gained a reputation to , and setled in the common esteem with some kind of authority . when men are established in any kind of dignity , 't is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it , and question the authority of men who are in possession of it . this is apt to be censured , as carrying with it too much of pride , when a man does not readily vail to the opinions of approved authors , which have been received with respect and submission by others ; and 't is looked upon as insolence , for a man to set up , and adhere to his own opinion , against the current stream of antiquity , or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor , or otherwise approved writer . whoever backs his tenets with such authorities , thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause , and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them . this , i think , may be called argumentum ad verecundiam . secondly , § . . another way that men ordinarily use to drive others , and force them to submit their judgments , and receive the opinion in debate , is to require the adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof , or to assign a better . and this i call argumentum ad ignorantiam . § . . thirdly , a third way is , to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles , or concessions . this is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem . § . . fourthly , the fourth is , the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge , or probability this i call argumentum ad iudicium , this alone of all the four , brings true instruction with it , and advances us in our way to knowledge . for , . it argues not another man's opinion to be right , because i out of respect , or any other consideration , but that of conviction , will not contradict him . . it proves not another man to be in the right way , nor that i ought to take the same with him , because i know not a better . . nor does it follow , that another man is in the right way , because he has shewn me , that i am in the wrong . i may be modest , and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion : i may be ignorant , and not be able to produce a better : i may be in an errour , and another may shew me that i am so . this may dispose me , perhaps , for the reception of truth , but helps me not to it : that must come from proofs and arguments , and light arising from the nature of things themselves , and not from my shamefacedness , ignorance , or errour . § . . by what has been before said of reason , we may be able to make some guess at th● distinction of things , into those that are according to , above , and contrary to reason . . according to reason are such propositions , whose truth we can discover , by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflexion ; and by natural deduction , find to be true , or probable . . above reason are such propositions , whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles . . contrary to reason are such propositions , as are inconsistent with , or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct ideas . thus the existence of one god is according to reason ; the existence of more than one god , contrary to reason ; the resurrection of the body after death , above reason . above reason also may be taken in a double sense , viz. above probability , or above certainty ; and in that large sense also , contrary to reason , is , i suppose , sometimes taken . § . . there is another use of the word reason , wherein it is opposed to faith : which though it be in it self a very improper way of speaking , yet common use has so authorized it , that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it : only i think it may not be amiss to take notice , that however faith be opposed to reason , faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind ; which if it be regulated , as is our duty , cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason ; and so cannot be opposite to it . he that believes , without having any reason for believing , may be in love with his own fansies ; but neither seeks truth as he ought , nor pays the obedience due to his maker , who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him , to keep him out of mistake and errour . he that does not this to the best of his power , however he sometimes lights on truth , is in the right but by chance : and i know not whether the luckiness of the accident , will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding . this at least is certain , that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into : whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties god has given him , and seeks sincerely to discover truth , by those helps and abilities he has , may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature , that though he should miss truth , he will not miss the reward of it . for he governs his assent right , and places it as he should , who in any case or matter whatsoever , believes or disbelieves , according as reason directs him . he that does otherwise , transgresses against his own light , and misuses the faculties which were given him to no other end , but to search and follow the clearer evidence , and greater probability . but since reason and faith are by some men opposed , we will so consider them in the following chapter . chap. xviii . of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . § . . it has been above shewn , . that we are of necessity ignorant ; and want knowledge of all sorts , where we want ideas . . that we are ignorant , and want rational knowledge , where we want proofs . . that we want general knowledge and certainty , as far as we want clear and determined specifick ideas . . that we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own , nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon . from these things thus premised , i think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason ; the want whereof , may possibly have been the cause , if not of great disorders , yet at least of great disputes , and perhaps mistakes in the world. for till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason , and how far by faith , we shall in vain dispute , and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion . § . . i find every sect , as far as reason will help them , make use of it gladly ; and where it fails them , they cry out , 't is matter of faith , and above reason . and i do not see how they can ever be convinced by any , who makes use of the same plea , without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason ; which ought to be the first point established in all questions , where faith has any thing to do . reason therefore here , as contradistinguished to faith , i take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths , which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas , which it has got by the use of its natural faculties , viz. by sensation or reflexion . faith , on the other side , is the assent to any proposition , not thus made out by the deductions of reason , but upon the credit of the proposer , as coming immediately from god ; which we call revelation . § . . first , then , i say , that no man inspired by god , can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflexion . for whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of god , this revelation , if it be of new simple ideas , cannot be conveyed to another , either by words , or any other signs : because words , by their immediate operation on us , cause no other ideas , but of their natural sounds ; and 't is by the custom of using them for signs , that they excite , and revive in our minds latent ideas ; but yet only such ideas , as were there before . for words seen or heard , recall to our thoughts those ideas only , which to us they have been wont to be signs of : but cannot introduce any perfectly new simple ideas , which were never there before . the same holds in all other signs , which cannot signifie to us things , of which we have before never had any ideas at all . thus whatever things were discovered to st. paul , when he was rapp'd up into the third heaven ; whatever new ideas his mind there received , all the description he can make to others of that place , is only this , that there are such things , as eye hath not seen , nor ear heard , nor hath it entred into the heart of man to conceive . and , supposing god should discover to any one , supernaturally , a species of creatures inhabiting : for example , iupiter , or saturn ( for that it is possible there may be such , no body can deny ) which had six senses ; and imprint on his mind the ideas convey'd to theirs by that sixth sense , he could no more , by words , produce in the minds of other men those ideas , imprinted by that sixth sense ; than one of us could convey the idea of any colour , by the sound of words into a man , who having the other four senses perfect , had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing . for our simple ideas then , which are the foundation , and sole matter of all our notions , and knowledge , we must depend wholly on our reason , i mean , our natural faculties ; and can by no means receive them , or any of them from traditional revelation , i say , traditional revelation , in distinction to original revelation . by the one , i mean that first impression , which is made immediately by god , on the mind of any man , to which , i pretend not to set any bounds ; and by the other , those impressions delivered over to others in words , and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another . § . . secondly , i say , that the same truths may be discovered , and conveyed down from revelation , which are discoverable to us by reason , and those clear ideas we have . so god might , by revelation , discover the truth of any proposition in euclid , as well as men , by the natural use of their faculties , come to make the discovery themselves . in all things of this nature , there is little need or use of revelation , god having furnished us with natural , and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them . for whatsoever truth we come to the discovery of , from the knowledge and contemplation of our own clear ideas , will always be certainer to us , than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation : for the knowledge we have , that this revelation came at first from god , can never be so sure , as the knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct ideas . as if it were revealed some ages since , that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones , i might assent to the truth of that proposition , upon the credit of the tradition , that it was revealed : but that would never amount to so great a certainty , as the knowledge of it , upon the comparing and measuring my own clear ideas of two right angles , and the three angles of a triangle . the like holds in matter of fact , knowable by our senses ; v. g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings , which had their original from revelation : and yet no body , i think , will say , he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood , as noah that saw it ; or that he himself would have had , had he then been alive , and seen it . for he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses , that it is writ in the book supposed writ by moses : but he has not so great an assurance , that moses writ that book , as if he had seen moses write it ; so that the assurance of its being a revelation , is less still than the assurance of his senses . § . . in propositions then , whose certainty is built upon clear , and perfect ideas , and evident deductions of reason , we need not the assistence of revelation , as necessary to gain our assent , and introduce them into our minds . because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there , or had done it already , which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing , unless where god immediately reveals it to us : and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is , that it is a revelation from god. but yet nothing , i think , can under that title , shake or over-rule plain knowledge , nor rationally prevail with any man , to admit it for true , in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding . for since no evidence of our faculties , by which we receive such revelations , can exceed , if equal , the certainty of our intuitive knowledge , we can never receive for a truth , any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge ; v. g. the idea of one body , and one place , does so clearly agree ; and the mind has so evident a perception of it , that we can never assent to a proposition , that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once , however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation , since the evidence ; first , that we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to god , secondly , that we understand it right , can never be so great , as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge , whereby we discern it impossible , for the same body to be in two places at once . and therefore , no proposition can be received for divine revelation , or obtain the assent due to all such , if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge . since this would be to subvert the principles , and foundations of all knowledge , evidence , and assent whatsoever ; and leave no difference between truth and falshood ; no measures of credible and incredible in the world , if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident ; and what we certainly know , give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in . in propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear ideas , 't will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. they cannot move our assent under that , or any other title whatsoever . for faith can never convince us of any thing , that contradicts our knowledge . because though faith be founded on the testimony of god , ( revealing any proposition to us , ) who cannot lie ; yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation , greater than our own knowledge : since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge , that god revealed it , which in this case , where the proposition suppos'd reveal'd , contradicts our knowledge or reason , will always have this objection hanging to it , ( viz. ) that we cannot tell how to conceive , that to come from god , the bountiful author of our being , which if received for true , must overturn all our principles and foundations of knowledge ; render all our faculties useless ; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship , our understandings ; and put a man in a condition , wherein he will have less light , less conduct than the beast that perisheth . for if the mind of man can never have a clearer ( and , perhaps , not so clear ) an evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation , as it has of the principles of its own reason , it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason , to give place to a proposition , whose revelation has not a greater evidence . § . . thus far a man has use of reason , and ought to hearken to it , even in immediate and original revelation , where it is supposedly made to himself : but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation but are required to pay obedience , and to receive the truths revealed to others , which , by the tradition of writings , or word of mouth , are conveyed down to them , reason has a great deal more to do , and is that only which can induce us to receive them . for matter of faith being only divine revelation , and nothing else , faith , as we use the word , ( called commonly , divine faith ) has to do with no propositions , but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed . so that i do not see how those , who make revelation alone the sole object of faith , can say , that it is a matter of faith , and not of reason , to believe , that such or such a proposition , to be found in such or such a book , is of divine inspiration ; unless it be revealed , that that proposition , or all in that book , was communicated by divine inspiration . without such a revelation , the believing , or not believing that proposition , or book , to be of divine authority , can never be matter of faith , but matter of reason ; and such as i must come to an assent to , only by the use of my reason , which can never require or enable me to believe that , which is contrary to it self : it being impossible for reason , ever to procure any assent to that , which to it self appears unreasonable . in all things therefore , where we have clear evidence from our ideas , and those principles of knowledge , i have above mentioned , reason is the proper judge ; and revelation , though it may in consenting with it , confirm its dictates , yet cannot , in such cases , invalidate its decrees : nor can we be obliged , where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason , to quit it , for the contrary opinion , under a pretence that it is matter of faith. § . . but thirdly , there being many things , wherein we have very imperfect notions , or none at all ; and other things , of whose past , present , or future existence , by the natural use of our faculties , we can have no knowledge at all ; these , as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties , and above reason , are , when revealed , the proper matter of faith. thus that part of the angels rebelled against god , and thereby lost their first happy state : and that the bodies of men shall rise , and live again : these , and the like , being beyond the discovery of reason , are purely matters of faith ; with which , reason has , directly , nothing to do . § . . but since all things that are under the character of divine revelation , are esteemed matter of faith ; and there are amongst them , several things , that fall under the examen of reason ; and are such as we could judge of by our natural faculties , without a supernatural revelation . in these , revelation must carry it , against the probable conjectures of reason : because the mind , not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know , but is only probably convinced of , is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony , which , it is satisfied , comes from one who cannot err , and will not deceive . but yet , it still belongs to reason , to judge of the truth of its being a revelation , and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered . indeed , if any thing shall be thought revelation , which is contrary to the plain principles of reason , and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas ; there reason must be hearkned to , as to a matter within its province : since a man can never have so certain a knowledge , that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge , was divinely revealed , or that he understands the words rightly , wherein it is delivered , as he has , that the contrary is true , and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason , and not swallow it , without examination , as a matter of faith. § . . the summ of all is , first , whatever proposition is revealed , of whose truth , our mind , by its natural faculties and notions , cannot judge , that is purely matter of faith , and above reason . secondly , all propositions , whereof the mind , by the use of its natural faculties , can come to determine and judge , from natural acquired ideas , are matter of reason ; with this difference still , that in those , concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence , and so is persuaded of their truth , only upon probable grounds , which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true , without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge , and overturning the principles of all reason : in such probable propositions , i say , an evident revelation ought to determine our assent even against probability . for where the principles of reason have not determined a proposition to be certainly true or false , there clear revelation , as another principle of truth , and ground of assent , may determine ; and so it may be matter of faith , and be also above reason . because reason , in that particular matter , being able to reach no higher than probability , faith gave the determination , where reason came short ; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay . § . . thus far the dominion of faith reaches , and that without any violence , or hindrance to reason ; which is not injured , or disturbed , but assisted and improved , by new discoveries of truth , coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge . whatever god hath revealed , is certainly true ; no doubt can be made of it . this is the proper object of faith : but whether it be a divine revelation , or no , reason must judge ; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident , nor prefer less certainty to the greater . there can be no evidence , that any traditional revelation is of divine original , in the words we receive it , and in the sense we understand it , so clear , and so certain as those of the principles of reason : and therefore , nothing that is contrary to , and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident dictates of reason , has a right to be urged , or assented to , as a matter of faith , wherein reason hath nothing to do . whatsoever is divine revelation , ought to over-rule all our opinions , prejudices , and interests , and hath a right to be received with a full assent : such a submission as this of our reason to faith , takes not away the land-marks of knowledge : this shakes not the foundations of reason , but leaves us that use of our faculties , for which they were given us . § . . if the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries , there will , in matter of religion , be no more for reason at all ; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies , that are to be found in the several religions of the world , will not deserve to be blamed : for , to this crying up of faith , in opposition to reason , we may , i think , in good measure , ascribe those absurdities , that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind . for men having been principled with an opinion , that they must not consult reason in the things of religion , however apparently contradictory to common sense , and the very principles of all their knowledge , have let loose their fansies , and natural superstition , and have been , by them , lead into so strange opinions , and extravagant practices in religion , that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies , and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise god , that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous , and offensive to a sober , good man. so that , in effect , that which most properly ought to distinguish us from beasts , that wherein we are elevated , as rational creatures , above brutes ; in that we appear most irrational , and more senseless than beasts themselves . credo , quia impossibile est : i believe , because it is impossible , might , in a good man , pass for a sally of zeal ; but would prove a very ill rule for men to chuse their opinions , or religion by . chap. xix . of wrong assent , or errour . § . . knowledge being to be had only of visible certain truth , errour is not a fault of our knowledge , but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that , which is not true . but if assent be grounded on likelihood , if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability , and that probability consist in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters , it will be demanded , how men come to give their assents contrary to probability : for there is nothing more common , than contrariety of opinions ; nothing more obvious , than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of , and a third stedfastly believes , and firmly adheres to . the reasons whereof , though they may be very various , yet , i suppose , may all be reduced to these four . . want of proofs . . want of ability to use them . . want of will to use them . . wrong measures of probability . § . . first , by want of proofs : i do not mean , only the want of those proofs which are no where extant , which are no where to be had ; but the want even of those proofs which are in being , or might be procured . and thus men want proofs , who have not the convenience , or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves , tending to the proof of any proposition ; nor likewise the convenience to enquire into , and collect the testimonies of others : and in this state are the greatest part of mankind , who are given up to labour , and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition ; whose lives are worn out , only in the provisions for living . these men's opportunity of knowledge and enquiry , are commonly as narrow as their fortunes ; and their understandings are but little instructed , when all their whole time and pains is laid out , to still the croaking of their own bellies , or the cries of their children 't is not to be expected , that a man , who drudges on , all his life , in a laborious trade , should be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world , than a pack-horse , who is driven constantly forwards and backwards , in a narrow lane , and dirty road , only to market , should be skilled in the geography of the country . nor is it at all more possible , that he who wants leisure , books , and languages , and the opportunity of conversing with variety of men , should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations which are in being , and are necessary to make out many , nay , most of the propositions , that in the societies of man , are judged of the greatest moment ; or to find out grounds of assurance so great , as the belief of the points he would build on them , is thought necessary . so that a great part of mankind are , by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world , and the constitution of humane affairs , unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those prooss , on which others build , and which are necessary to establish those opinions : the greatest part of men , having much to do to get the means of living , are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious enquiries . § . . what shall we say then ? are the greatest part of mankind , by the necessity of their condition , subjected to unavoidable ignorance in those things , which are of greatest importance to them ? ( for of those , 't is obvious to enquire ? ) have the bulk of mankind no other guide , but accident , and blind chance , to conduct them to their happiness , or misery ? are the current opinions , and licensed guides of every country sufficient evidence and security to every man , to venture his greatest concernments on ; nay , his everlasting happiness , or misery ? or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth , which teach one thing in christendom , and another in turkey ? or shall a poor country-man be eternally happy , for having the chance to be born in italy ; or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost , because he had the ill luck to be born in england ? how ready some men may be to say some of these things , i will not here examine ; but this i am sure , that men must allow one or other of these to be true , ( let them chuse which they please ; ) or else grant , that god has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take , if they will but seriously employ them that way , when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure . no man is so wholly taken up with the attendence on the means of living , as to have no spare time at all to think on his soul , and inform himself in matters of religion . were men as intent upon this , as they are on things of lower concernment , there are none so enslaved to the necessity of life , who might not find many vacancies , that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge . § . . besides thos● , whose improvements and informations are straitned by the narrowness of their fortunes , there are others , whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough supply books , and other opportunities of clearing of doubts , and discovering of truth : but they are cooped in close , by the laws of their countries , and the strict guards of those , whose interest it is to keep them ignorant , lest , knowing more , they should believe the less in them , that they are as far , nay farther , from the liberties and opportunities of a fair enquiry , than those poor and wretched labourers we before spoke of . these men , however they may seem high and great , are confined to narrowness of thought , and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man , their understandings . this is generally the case of all those , who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth , without knowledge ; where men are forced , at a venture , to be of the religion of the country ; and must therefore swallow down opinions , as silly people do empiricks pills , without knowing what they are made of , or how they will work , and have nothing to do , but believe that they will do the cure ; but in this , are much more miserable than they , in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing what , perhaps , they had rather let alone ; or to chuse the physician , to whose conduct they would trust themselves . § . . secondly , those that want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities , that cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads , nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies , making every circumstance its due allowance , may be easily misled to assent to positions that are not probable . there are some men of one , some but of two syllogisms , and no more ; and others that can but advance one step farther . these cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie , cannot constantly follow that which in its self is the more probable opinion . now that there is such a difference between men , in respect of their understandings , i think no body will question , who has had any conversation with his neighbours , though he never was at westminster-hall or the exchange on the one hand , nor at alms-houses or bedlam on the other ; which great difference in men's intellectuals , whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body , particularly adapted to thinking , or in the dulness or untractableness of those faculties , for want of use ; or , as some think , in the natural differences of men's souls themselves , or some or all of these together , it matters not here to examine : only this is evident , that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings , apprehensions , and reasonings , to so great a latitude , that one may , without doing injury to mankind , affirm , that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect , than between some men and some beasts . but how this comes about , is a speculation , though of great consequence , yet not necessary to our present purpose . § . . thirdly , there are another sort of people that want proofs , not because they are out of their reach , but because they will not use them : who though they have riches and leisure enough , and want neither parts nor learning , may , yet through their hot pursuit of pleasure , or business , or else out of laziness or fear , that the doctrines , whose truth they should enquire into , would not suit well with their opinions , lives , or designs , may never come to the knowledge of , nor give their assent to those probabilities which lie so much within their view , that to be convinced of them , they need but turn their eyes that way : but we know some men will not read a letter , which is supposed to bring ill news ; and many men forbear to cast up their accompts , or so much as think upon their estates , who have reason to fear their affairs are not in a very good posture . how men , whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings , can satisfie themselves with a lazy ignorance , i cannot tell : but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls , who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body , and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge ; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside , and would think themselves miserable in course cloaths , or a patched coat , and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of course patches , and borrowed shreds , such as it has pleased chance , or their country-tailor , i mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with , to cloath them . i will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state , and their concernment in it , which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes : nor shall i take notice what a shame and confusion it is , to the greatest contemners of knowledge , to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know . but this , at least , is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen , that however they may think credit , respect , power , and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune , yet they will find all these still carried away from them , by men of lower condition , who surpass them in knowledge . they who are blind , will always be led by those that see , or else fall into the ditch ; and he is certainly the most subjected , the most enslaved , who is so in his understanding . in the foregoing instances , some of the causes have been shewn of wrong assent , and how it comes to pass , that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons , which are to be had for their probability ; but hitherto it has been only of such probabilities , whose proofs do only exist , but do not appear to him that embraces the errour . § . . fourthly , there remains yet the last sort , who even where the real probabilities appear , and are plainly laid before them , yet do not admit of the conviction , nor yield unto manifest reasons , but do either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , suspend their assent , or give it to the less probable opinion . and to this danger are those exposed , who have taken up wrong measures of probability , which are , . propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident , but doubtful and false , taken up for principles . . received hypotheses . . predominant passions or inclinations . . authority . § . . first , the first and firmest ground of probability , is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge ; especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced , and continue to look on as principles . these have so great an influence upon our opinions , that 't is usually by them we judge of truth ; and measure probability to that degree , that what is inconsistent with our principles , is so far from passing for probable with us , that it will not be allowed possible . the reverence is born to these principles is so great , and their authority so paramount to all other , that the testimony not only of other men , but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected , when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established rules . how much the doctrine of innate principles , and that principles are not to be proved or questioned , has contributed to this , i will not here examine : this i readily grant , that one truth cannot contradict another ; but withal i take leave also to say , that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle ; to examine it strictly , and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of it self by its own evidence , or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so , upon the authority of others , for he hath a strong biass put into his understanding , which will unavoidably misguide his assent , who hath imbibed wrong principles , and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in it self not evidently true . § . . there is nothing more ordinary , than that children should receive into their minds propositions ( especially about matters of religion ) from their parents , nurses , or those about them ; which being insinuated into their unwary , as well as unbiass'd understandings , and fastened by degrees , are at last ( equally , whether true or false ) rivited there by long custom and education , beyond all possibility of being pull'd out again . for men , when they are grown up , reflecting upon their opinions , and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories , not having observed their early insinuation , nor by what means they got them , they are apt to reverence them as sacred things , not to suffer them to be profaned , touched , or questioned , but look on them as the vrim and thummim set up in their minds immediately by god himself , to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falshood , and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies . § . . this opinion of his principles ( let them be what they will ) being once established in any one's mind , it is easie to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find , how clearly soever proved , that shall invalidate their authority , or at all thwart with these internal oracles ; whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities , being but agreeable to such principles , go down glibly , and are easily digested . the great obstinacy , that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions , though many times equally absurd , in the various religions of mankind , are as evident a proof , as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles : so that men will disbelieve their own eyes , renounce the evidence of their senses , and give their own experience the lye , rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred tenets . take an intelligent romanist , that from the very first dawnings of any notions in his understanding , hath had this principle constantly inculcated , viz. that he must believe as the church believes , or that the pope is infallible : and this he never so much as heard questioned , till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles : how is he prepared easily to swallow , not only against all probability , but even the clear evidence of his senses , the doctrine of transubstantiation , and will believe that to be flesh , which he sees to be bread ? and what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds , who , with some philosophers , hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning , that he must believe his reason ( for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles ) against their senses ? let an enthusiast be principled , that he or his teacher is inspired , and acted by an immediate communication of the divine spirit ; and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrines . whoever therefore have imbibed wrong principles , are not , in things inconsistent with these principles , to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities , till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves , as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles , which many never suffer themselves to do . § . . secondly , next to these , are men whose understandings are cast into a mold , and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis . the difference between these and the former , is , that they will admit of matter of fact , and agree with dissenters in that ; but differ only in assigning of reasons , and explaining the manner of operation . these are not at that open defiance with their senses , as the former ; they can endure to hearken to their intelligence a little more patiently : but will by no means admit of their reports , in the explanation of things , nor be prevailed on by probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner , that they have decreed within themselves that they are . would it not be an insufferable a thing for a learned professor , and that which his scarlet would blush for , to have his authority of forty years standing wrought out of hard rock greek and latin , with no small expence of time and candle , and confirmed by general tradition , and a reverend beard , in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist ; and he made to confess , that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago , was all errour and mistake ; and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate ? what probabilities , i say , are sufficient to prevail in such a case ? and who ever by the most cogent arguments will be prevailed with , to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions , and pretences to knowledge and learning , which with hard study , he hath all his time been labouring for , and turn himself out stark naked , in quest a-fresh of new notions ? all the arguments can be used , will be as little able to prevail , as the wind did with the traveller , to part with his cloak , which he held only the faster . to this of wrong hypothesis , may be reduced the errors , that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis , or right principles , but not rightly understood . there is nothing more familiar than this , the instances of men , contending for different opinions , which they all derive from the infallible truth of the scripture , are an undeniable proof of it . all that call themselves christians , allow the text , that says , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty . but yet how erroneous will one of their practices be , who understanding nothing but the french , take this rule with one translation to be repentez vous , repent ; or with the other , faitez penitence , do penance . § . . thirdly , probabilities , which cross men's appetites , and prevailing passions , run the same fate . let never so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning , and money on the other ; and it is easie to foresee which will out-weigh . earthly minds , like mud-walls , resist the strongest batteries : and though , perhaps , sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression , yet they nevertheless stand firm , keep out the enemy truth , that would captivate , or disturb them . tell a man , passionately in love , that he is gilted ; bring a score of witnesses of the falshood of his mistress , 't is ten to one but three kind words of hers , shall invalidate all their testimonies . quod volumus , facilè credimus ; what suits our wishes , is forwardly believed , is , i suppose , what every one hath more than once experimented : and though men cannot always openly gain-say , or resist the force of manifest probabilities , that make against them ; yet yield they not to the argument . not but that it is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more probable side , but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its enquiries , and not permit a full and satisfactory examination , as far as the matter in question is capable , and will bear it to be made . until that be done , there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities . § . . first , that the arguments being ( as for the most part they are ) brought in words , there may be a fallacy latent in them : and the consequences being , perhaps , many in train , they may be some of them incoherent . there be very few discourses , are so short , clear and consistent , to which most men may not , with satisfaction enough to themselves , raise this doubt ; and from whose conviction they may not , without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness , set themselves free with the old reply , non persuadebis , etiam si persuaseris ; though i cannot answer , i will not yield . § . . secondly , manifest probabilities may be evaded , and the assent withheld upon this suggestion , that i know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side ; and therefore though he be beaten , 't is not necessary he should yield , not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind . this is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide , that it is hard to determine , when a man is quite out of the verge of it . § . . but yet there is some end of it , and a man having carefully enquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness ; done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly ; and cast up the whole summ on both sides , may in most cases come to acknowledge , upon the whole matter , on which side the probability rests : wherein some proofs in matters of reason , which are suppositious upon universal experience , are so cogent and clear ; and some testimonies in matters of fact so universal , that he cannot refuse his assent . so that , i think , we may conclude , that in propositions , where though the proofs in view are of most moment , yet there are sufficient grounds , to suspect that there is either fallacy in words , or certain proofs , as considerable , to be produced on the contrary side , there assent , suspense , or dissent , are often voluntary actions : but where the proofs are such , as make it highly probable , and there is not sufficient ground to suspect , that there is either fallacy of words , ( which sober and serious consideration may discover , ) nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered latent on the other side , ( which also the nature of the thing , may , in some cases , make plain to a considerate man , ) there , i think , a man , who has weighed them , can scarce refuse his assent to the side , on which the greater probability appears . whether it be probable , that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order , which should stamp in paper a coherent discourse ; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms , not guided by an understanding agent , should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals ; in these and the like cases , i think , no body that considers them , can be one jot at a stand which side to take , nor at all waver in his assent . lastly , when there can be no supposition , ( the thing in its own nature indifferent , and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses , ) that there is as fair testimony against , as for the matter of fact attested ; which by enquiry , is to be learned , v. g. whether there was years agone such a man at rome as iulius caesar : in all such cases , i say , i think it is not in any rational man's power to refuse his assent ; but that it necessarily follows , and closes with such probabilities . in other less clear cases , i think , it is in a man's power to suspend his assent ; and , perhaps , content himself with the proofs he has , if they favour the opinion that suits with his inclination , or interest , and so stop from farther search . but that a man should afford his assent to that side , on which the less probability appears to him , seems to me utterly impracticable , and as impossible , as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time . § . . as knowledge , is no more arbitrary than perception ; so , i think , assent is no more in our power than knowledge . when the agreement of any two ideas appear to our minds , whether immediately , or by the assistence of reason , i can no more refuse to perceive , no more avoid knowing it , than i can avoid seeing those objects , which i turn my eyes to , and look on in day-light : and what upon full examination i find the most probable , i cannot deny my assent to . but though we cannot hinder our knowledge , where the agreement is once perceived by our minds ; nor our assent , where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it : yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent , by stopping our enquiry , and not imploying our faculties in the search of any truth : if it were not so , ignorance , error , or infidelity could not in any case be a fault . thus in some cases , we can prevent or suspend our assent : but can a man , versed in modern or ancient history , doubt whether there be such a place as rome , or whether there was such a man as iulius caesar ? indeed there are millions of truths , that a man is not , or may not think himself concerned to know ; as whether richard the third was crook-back'd , or no ; or whether roger bacon was a mathematician , or a magician : in these and such like cases , where the assent one way or other , is of no importance to the interest of any one , no action , no concernment of his following , or depending thereon , there 't is not strange , that the mind should give it self up to the common opinion , or render it self to the first comer . these and the like opinions , are of so little weight and moment , that like motes in the sun , their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of . they are there , as it were , by chance , and the mind lets them float at liberty . but where the mind judges , the proposition has concernment in it , where the assent , or not assenting , is thought to draw consequences after it of moment , and good or evil to depend on chusing , or refusing the right side , and the mind sets it self seriously to enquire , and examine the probability ; there , i think , it is not in our choice , to take which side we please , if manifest odds appears on either : the greater probability , i think , in that case , will determine the assent ; and a man can no more avoid assenting , or taking it to be true , where he perceives the greater probability , than he can avoid knowing it to be true , where he perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas . if this be so , the foundation of errour will lie in wrong measures of probability ; as the foundation of vice , in wrong measures of good. § . . fourthly , the fourth and last wrong measure of probability i shall take notice of , and which keeps in ignorance , or error , more people than all the other together , is that which i have mentioned in the fore-going chapter , i mean , the giving up our assent to the common received opinions , either of our friends , or party ; neighbourhood , or country . how many men have no other ground for their tenets , than the supposed honesty , or learning , or number of those of the same profession ? as if honest , or bookish men could not err , or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude ; yet this with most men serves the turn . the tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity ; it comes to me with the pass-port of former ages , and therefore i am secure in the reception i give it : other men have been , and are of the same opinion , ( for that is all is said , ) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it . a man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions , than take them up by such measures . all men are liable to error , and most men are in many points , by passion or interest , under temptation to it . if we could but see the secret motives , that influenced the men of name and learning in the world , and the leaders of parties , we should not always find , that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake , that made them espouse the doctrines , they owned and maintained . this at least is certain , there is not an opinion so absurd , which a man may not receive upon this ground . there is no error to be named , which has not had its professors : and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in , if he thinks he is in the right way , where-ever he has the foot-steps of others to follow . § . . but notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions , i must do mankind that right , as to say , there are not so many men in errors , and wrong opinions , as is commonly supposed . not that i think they embrace the truth ; but indeed , because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about , they have no thought , no opinion at all . for if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world , he would not find , concerning those matters they are so zealous for , that they have any opinions of their own : much less would he have reason to think , that they took them upon the examination of arguments , and appearance of probability . they are resolved to stick to a party , that education or interest has engaged them in ; and there , like the common soldiers of an army , shew their courage and warmth , as their leaders direct , without ever examining , or so much as knowing the cause they contend for . if a man's life shews , that he has no serious regard to religion ; for what reason should we think , that he beats his head about the opinions of his church , and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine ? 't is enough for him to obey his leaders , to have his hand , and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause , and thereby approve himself to those , who can give him credit , preferment , or protection in that society . thus men become professors of and combatants for those opinions , they were never convinced of , nor proselites to ; no , nor ever had so much as floating in their heads : and though one cannot say , there are fewer improbable opinions in the world than there are ; yet this is certain , there are fewer that actually assent to them than is imagined . chap. xx. of the division of the sciences . § . . all that can fall within the compass of humane understanding , being either , first , the nature of things , as they are in themselves , their relations , and their manner of operation : or , secondly , that which man himself ought to do , as a rational and voluntary agent , for the attainment of any ends , especially happiness : or , thirdly , the ways and means , whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these , are attained and communicated ; i think , science may be divided properly into these three sorts . § . . first , the knowledge of things , as they are in their own proper beings , their constitutions , properties , and operations , whereby i mean not only matter , and body , but spirits also , which have their proper natures , constitutions , and operations as well as bodies . this in a little more enlarged sense of the word , i call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or natural philosophy . the end of this , is bare speculative truth , and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such , falls under this branch , whether it be god himself , angels , spirits , bodies , or any other of their affections , as number , and figure , &c. § . . secondly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the skill of right applying our own powers and actions , for the attainment of things good and useful . the most considerable under this head , is ethicks , which is the seeking out those rules , and measures of humane actions , which lead to happiness , and the means to practise them . the end of this is not bare speculation , and the knowledge of truth ; but right , and a conduct suitable to it . § . . thirdly , the third branch may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or the doctrine of signs , the most usual whereof being words , it is aptly enough termed also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , logick ; the business whereof , is to consider the nature of signs , the mind makes use of for the understanding of things , or conveying its knowledge to others . for since the things , the mind contemplates , are none of them , besides it self , present to the understanding , 't is necessary that something else , as a sign or representation of the thing it considers , should be present to it : and these are ideas . and because the ideas of one man's mind cannot immediately be laid open to the view of another ; nor be themselves laid up any where , but in the memory , which is apt to let them go and lose them : therefore to communicate our ideas one to another , as well as record them for our own use , signs of our ideas are also necessary . those which men have found most convenient , and therefore generally make use of , are articulate sounds . the consideration then of ideas and words , as the great instruments of knowledge , make no despicable part of their contemplation , who would take a view of humane knowledge in the whole extent of it . and , perhaps , if they were distinctly weighed , and duly considered , they would afford us another sort of logick and critick , than what we have been hitherto acquainted with . § . . this seems to me the first and most general , as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding . for since a man can employ his thoughts about nothing , but either the contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth ; or about the things in his own power , which are his own actions , for the attainment of his own ends ; or the signs the mind makes use of , both in the one and the other , and the right ordering of them for its clearer information . all which three , viz. things as they are in themselves knowable ; actions as they depend on us , in order to happiness ; and the right use of signs in order to knowledge , being toto caelo different , they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world , wholly separate and distinct one from another . finis . the contents . book i. of innate notions . chap. . introduction . . no innate speculative principles . . no innate practical principles . . other proofs against innate principles . book ii. of ideas . chap. . of ideas in general . . of simple ideas . . of ideas of one sense . . of solidity . . of simple ideas of more than one sense . . of simple ideas of reflexion . . of simple ideas both of sensation and reflexion . . other considerations concerning simple ideas . . of perception . . of retention . . of discerning . . of complex ideas . . of space , and its simple modes . . of duration . . of extension and duration considered together . . of number . . of infinity . . of other simple modes . . of the modes of thinking . . of the modes of pl●asure and pain . . of power . . of mixed modes . . of the complex ideas of substances . . of the collective ideas of substances . . of relation . . of cause and effect , and other relations . of other relations . . of clear and distinct , obscure and confused ideas . . of real and phantastical ideas . . of adequate and inadequate ideas . . of true and false ideas . book iii. of words . chap. . of words and language in general . . of the signification of words . . of general terms . . of the names of simple ideas . . of the names of mixed modes and relations . . of the names of substances . . of abstract and concrete terms . . of the imperfection of words . . of the abuse of words . . of the remedies of the foregoing imperfections and abuses . book iv. of knowledge and opinion . chap. . of knowledge in general . . of the degrees of our knowledge . . of the extent of humane knowledge . . of the reality of our knowledge . . of truth in general . . of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . . of maxims . . of trifling propositions . . of our knowledge of existence . . of the existence of a god. . of the knowledge of the existence of other things . . of the improvement of our knowledge . . some other considerations concerning our knowledge . . of iudgment . . of probability . . of the degrees of assent . . of reason . . of faith and reason , as contradistinguished . . of wrong assent , or errour● . the division of the sciences . the contents . book i. chap. i. introduction . sect . . an enquiry into the vnderstanding pleasant and useful . . design . . method . . vseful to know the extent of our comprehension . . our capacity proportioned to our state and concerns , to discover things useful to us . . knowing the extent of our capacities will hinder us from useless curiosity , scepticism , and idleness . . occasion of this essay . . apology for idea . chap. ii. no innate speculative principles . sect . . the way shewn how we come by any knowledge , sufficient to prove it not innate . . general assent the great argument . . vniversal consent proves nothing innate . . what is , is ; and , it is impossible for the same thing to be , and not to be , not universally assented to . . not on the mind naturally imprinted , because not known to children , idiots , &c. , . that men know them when they come to the use of reason , answer'd . . if reason discovered them , that would not prove them innate . — . 't is false that reason discovers them . . the coming to the vse of reason , not the time we come to know these maxims . . by this , they are not distinguished from other knowable truths . . if coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery , it would not prove them innate . , . the steps by which the mind attains several truths . . assenting as soon as proposed and understood , proves them not innate . . if such an assent be a mark of innate , then that one and two are equal to three ; that sweetness is not bitterness ; and a thousand the like must be innate . . such less general propositions known before these universal maxims . . one and one , equal to two , &c. not general nor useful , answered . . these maxims not being known sometimes till proposed , proves them not innate . . implicitly known before proposing , signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them , or else signifies nothing . . the argument of assenting on first hearing , is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching . . not innate , because not universally assented to . . these maxims not the first known . . and so not innate . . not innate , because they appear least , where what is innate shews it self clearest . . recapitulation . chap. iii. no innate practical principles . sect . . no moral principles so clear and so generally received , as the forementioned speculative maxims . . faith and iustice not owned as principles by all men. . obj. though men deny them in their practice , yet they admit them in their thoughts , answered . . moral rules need a proof , ergo not innate . . instance in keeping compacts . . vertue generally approved , not because innate , but because profitable . . men's actions convince us , that the rule of vertue is not their internal principle . . conscience no proof of any innate moral rule . . instances of enormities practised without remorse . . men have contrary practical principles . — . whole nations reject several moral rules . . those who maintain innate practical principles , tell us not what they are . — . lord herbert's innate principles examined . . obj. innate principles may be corrupted , answered . . contrary principles in the world. — . how men commonly come by their principles . . principles must be examined . chap. iv. other considerations about innate principles , both speculative and practical . sect . . principles not innate , unless their ideas be innate . , . ideas , especially those belonging to principles , not born with children . , . identity an idea not innate . . whole and part not innate ideas . . idea of worship not innate . — . idea of god not innate . . suitable to god's goodness , that all men should have an idea of him , therefore naturally imprinted by him ; answered . — . ideas of god various in different men. . if the idea of god be not innate , no other can be supposed innate . . idea of substance not innate . . no propositions can be innate , since ideas are innate . . principles not innate , because of little use , or little certainty . . difference of men's discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties . . men must think and know for themselves . . whence the opinion of innate principles . . conclusion . book ii. chap. i. of ideas in general . sect . . idea is the object of thinking . . all ideas come from sensation or reflexion . . the objects of sensation one sourse of ideas . . the operations of our minds about sensible ideas , the other sourse of them . . all our ideas are of the one or the other of these . . observable in children . . men are differently furnished with these , according to the different objects they converse with . . ideas of reflexion had later , because they need attention . . the soul begins to have ideas , when it begins to perceive . . the soul thinks not always ; for , first , it wants proofs . . secondly , it is not always conscious of it . . thirdly , if a sleeping man thinks without knowing it , the sleeping and waking man are two persons . . fourthly , impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming , that they think . . fifthly , that men dream without remembring it , in vain urged . . sixthly , vpon their hypothesis , the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational . . seventhly , on this hypothesis the soul must have ideas not derived from sensation or reflexion , of of which there is no appearance . . eightly , if i think when i know it not , no body else can know it . . ninthly , how knows any one that the soul always thinks ? for if it be not a self-evident proposition , it needs proof . . tenthly , that a man shoul● be busie in thinking , and yet not retain it the next moment , very improbable . — . no ideas but from sensation or reflexion , evident , if we observe children . . in the reception of simple ideas , the vnderstanding is most of all passive . chap. ii. of simple ideas . sect . . vncompounded appearances . , . the mind can neither make nor destroy them . chap. iii. of ideas of one sense . sect . . as colours of seeing , sounds of hearing . . few simple ideas have names . chap. iv. of solidity . sect . . we receive this idea from touch . . solidity fills space . . distinct from space . . from hardness . . on solidity depends impulse , resistence , and protrusion . . what it is . chap. v. of simple ideas by more than one sense . chap. vi. of simple ideas of reflexion . sect . . are the operations of the mind about its other ideas ? . the idea of perception , and idea of willing , we have from reflexion . chap. vii . of simple ideas , both of sensation and reflexion . sect . — . pleasure and pain . . existence and vnity . . power . . succession . . simple ideas the materials of all our knowledge . chap viii . other considerations concerning simple ideas . sect . — . positive ideas from privative causes . , . ideas in the mind , qualities in bodies . , . primary and secondary qualities . , . how primary qualities , produce their ideas . , . how secondary . — . ideas of primary qualities are resemblances ; of secondary , not . , . reason of our mistake in this . . secondary qualities two-fold ; first , immediately perceivable ; secondly , mediately perceivable . chap. ix . of perception . sect . . it is the first simple idea of reflexion . — . perception is only when the mind receives the impression . , . children , though they have ideas , in the womb , have none innate . . which ideas first is not evident . — . ideas of sensation often changed by the iudgment . — . perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings . . perception the inlet of knowledge . chap. x. of retention . sect . . contemplation . . memory . . attention , repetition , pleasure , and pain fix ideas . , . ideas fade in the memory . . constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost . . in remembring the mind is often active . . two defects in the memory , oblivion and slowness . . brutes have memory . chap. xi . of discerning , &c. sect . . no knowledge without it . . the difference of wit and iudgment . . clearness alone hinders confusion . . comparing . . brutes compare , but imperfectly . . compounding . . brutes compound but little . . naming . . abstraction . , . brutes abstract not . , . idiots and mad men. . method . . these are the beginnings of humane knowledge . . appeal to experience . . dark room . chap. xii . of complex ideas . sect . . made by the mind out of simple ones . . made voluntarily . . are either modes , substances , or relations . . modes . . simple and mixed modes . . substances single or collective . . relation . . the abstrusest ideas from the two sources . chap. xiii . of space , and its simple modes . sect . . simple modes . . idea of space . . space and extension . . immensity . , . figure . — . place● — . extension and body not the same . — . substance which we know not , no proof against space without body . , . substance and accidents of little use in philosophy . . a vac●um beyond the utmost bounds of body . . the power of annihilation proves a vacuum . . motion proves a vacuum . . the ideas of space and body distinct . , . extension being inseparable from body , proves it not the same . . ideas of space and solidity distinct . . men differ little in clear simple ideas . chap. xiv . of duration . sect . . duration is fleeting extension . — . it s idea from reflexion on the train of our ideas . . the idea of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep . — . the idea of succession not from motion . — . the train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness . . this train the measure of other successions . — . the mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea . . ideas , however made , include no sense of motion . . time is duration set out by measures . . a good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods . . the revolutions of the sun and moon the properest measures of time. . but not by their motion , but periodical appearances . . no two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal . . time not the measure of motion . . minutes , hours , and tears , not necessary measures of duration . . the measure of time two ways applied . — . our measure of time applicable to duration before time. — . eternity . chap. xv. of duration and expansion considered together sect . . both capable of greater and less . . expansion not bounded by matter . . nor duration by motion . . why men more easily admit infinite duration , than infinite expansion . . time to duration is as place to expansion . . time and place are taken for so much of either , as are set out by the existence and motion of body . . sometimes for so much of either , as we design by measures taken from the bulk or motion of bodies . . they belong to all beings● . all the parts of extension are extension ; and all the parts of duration , are duration . . their parts inseparable . . duration is as a line , expansion as a solid . . duration has never two parts together , expansion altogether . chap. xvi . of number . sect . . number the simplest and most universal idea . . it s modes made by addition . . each mode distinct . . therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise . , . names necessary to numbers . . why children number not earlier . . number measures all measurables . chap. xvii . of infinity . sect . . infinity , in its original intention , attributed to space , duration , and number . , . how we come by the idea of infinity . . our idea of space boundless . . and so of duration . . why other ideas are not capable of infinity . . difference between infinity of space , and space infinite . . we have no idea of infinite space . . number affords us the clearest idea of infinity . — . our different conception of the infinity of number , duration , and expansion . . infinite divisibility , , , , . no positive idea of infinite . , , . what is positive , what negative in our idea of infinite . . some think they have a positive idea of eternity , and not space . . supposed positive ideas of infinity cause of mistakes . . all these ideas from sensation and reflexion . chap. xviii . of other simple modes . sect . , . modes of motion . . modes of sounds . . modes of tastes . . modes of colours . . why some modes have , and others have not names . chap. xix . of the modes of thinking . sect . , . sensation , remembrance , contemplation , &c. . the various attention of the mind in thinking . . hence probable that thinking is the action , not essence of the soul. chap. xx. of modes of pleasure and pain . sect . . pleasure and pain simple ideas . . good and evil what . . our passions moved by good and evil. . love. . hatred . . desire . . ioy. . sorrow . . hope . . fear . . despair . . anger . . envy . . what passions all men have . , . pleasure and pain what . . shame . . these instances to shew how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflexion . ch●p . xxi . of power . sect . . this idea how got . . power active and passive . . power includes relation . . the clearest idea of active power had from spirit . . will and vnderstanding , two powers . . faculties . . whence the ideas of liberty and necessity . — . liberty what . . supposes the vnderstanding and will. . belongs not to volition . . voluntary opposed to involuntary , not to necessary . . necessity what . — . liberty belong not to the will. . but to the agent or man. — . in respect of willing , a man is not free . — . the will determined by something without it . . the greater apparent good determines the will. — . this is a perfection of humane nature . . and takes not away liberty . , . why men chuse differently . . why they chuse amiss . . from the different appearance of good. . and judging amiss on these appearances . — . first , in comparing present and future . . secondly , in thinking wrong of the greatness or certainty of the consequence of any action . . causes of wrong iudgment , ignorance , inadvertency , sloth , passion , fashion , &c. . preference of vice to vertue , a manifest wrong iudgment . . recapitulation . chap. xxii . of mixed modes . sect . . mixed modes what . . made by the mind . . sometimes got by the explication of their names . . the name ties the parts of the mixed modes into one idea . . the cause of making mixed modes . . why words in one language , have none answering in another . . and languages change . . mixed modes , where they exist . . how we get the ideas of mixed modes . . motion , thinking and power , have been most modified . . several words seeming to signifie action , signifie but the effect . . mixed modes , made also of other ideas . chap. xxiii . of the complex ideas of substances . sect . . ideas of substances how made . . our idea of substance in general . — . of the sorts of substances . . no clear idea of substance in general . . as clear an idea of spirit , as body . . powers a great part of our complex ideas of substances . . and why . . three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of sustances . , . the now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear , if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts . . our faculties of discovery suited to our state. . conjecture about spirits . . complex ideas of substances . . idea of spiritual substances , as clear as of bodily substances . . no idea of abstract substance . . the cohesion of solid parts , and impulse the primary ideas of body . . thinking and motivity , the primary ideas of spirit . — . spirits capable of motion . . idea of soul and body compared . — . cohesion of solid parts in body , as hard to be conceived , as thinking in a soul. , . comm●nication of motion by impulse , or by thought , equally intelligible . . ideas of body and spirit compared . . the notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it , than that of body . . we know nothing beyond our simple ideas . — . idea of god. . no ideas in our complex one of spirits , but those got from sensation or reflexion . . recapitulation . chap. xxiv . of collective ideas of substances . sect . . one idea . . made by the power of composing in the mind . . all artificial things are collective ideas . chap. xxv . of relation . sect . . relation what . . relations without correlative terms , not easily perceived . . some seemingly absolute terms contain relations . . relation different from the things related . . change of relation may be without any change in the subject . . relation only betwixt two things . . all things capable of relation . . the ideas of relations clearer often , than of the subjects related . . relations all terminate in simple ideas . . terms leading the mind beyond the subject denominated , are relative . . conclusion . chap. xxvi . of cause of effect , and other relations . sect . . whence their ideas got . . creation , generation , making alteration . , . relations of time. . relations of place and extension . . absolute terms often stand for relations . chap. xxvii . of other relations . sect . . proportional . . natural . . instituted . . moral . . moral good and evil. . moral rules . . laws . . divine law the measure of sin and duty . . civil law , the measure of crimes and innocence . , . philosophical law , the measure of vertue and vice. . its inforcements , commendation , and discredit . . these three laws the rules of moral good and evil. , . morality is the relation of actions to these rules . . the denominations of actions often mislead us . . relations innumerable . . all relations terminate in simple ideas . . we have ordinary as clear ( or clearer ) notion of the relation , as of its foundation . . the notion of the relation is the same , whether the rule any action is compared to , be true or false . chap. xxviii . of clear and distinct , obscure and confused ideas . sect . . ideas some clear and distinct , others obscure and confused . . clear and obscure , explained by sight . . causes of obscurity . . distinct and confused , what . . objection . . confusion of ideas , is in reference to their names . . defaults which make confusion . first , complex ideas made up of too few simple ones . . secondly , or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together . . thirdly , or are mutable and undetermined . . confusion without reference to names , hardly conceivable . . confusion concerns always two ideas . . causes of confusion . . complex ideas may be distinct in one part , and confused in another . . this if not heeded , causes confusion in our arguings . . instance in eternity . , . — divisibility of matter . chap. xxix . of real and fantastical ideas . sect . . real ideas are conformable to their archetypes . . simple ideas all real . . complex ideas are voluntary combinations . . mixed modes made of consistent ideas are real . . ideas of substances are real , when they agree with the existence of things . chap. xxx . of adequate and inadequate ideas . sect . . adequate ideas , are such as perfectly represent their archetypes . . simple ideas all adequate . . modes are all adequate . , . modes in reference to settled names , may be inadequate . , . ideas of substances , as referr'd to real essences not adequate . — . ideas of substances , as collections of their qualities , are all inadequate . . simple ideas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and adequate . . ideas of substances are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , inadequate . . ideas of modes and relations are archetypes , and cannot but be adequate . chap. xxi . of true and false ideas . sect . . truth and falshood properly belongs to propositions . . metaphysical truth contains a tacit proposition . . no idea as an appearance in the mind true or false . . ideas referred to any thing may be true or false . other men's ideas , real existence , and supposed real essences , are what men usually refer their ideas to . — . the cause of such references . . simple ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name , but are least liable to be so . . ideas of mixed modes most liable to be false in this sense . . or at least to be thought false . . and why . . as referred to real existences , none of our ideas can be false , but those of substances . — . first , simple ideas in this sense not false , and why . . though one man's idea of blue , should be different from another's . . secondly , modes not false . . thirdly , ideas of substances are false , when the combination is made of simple ideas that do never co-exist ; or has in it the negation of any one that does constantly coexist . . truth or falshood always supposes affirmation or negation . . ideas in themselves neither true nor false . . but are false , first , when judged agreeable to another man's idea without being so . . secondly , when judged to agree to real existence , when they do not . . thirdly , when judged adequate without being so . . fourthly , when judged to represent the real essence . . ideas when false . . more properly to be called right or wrong . . conclusion . book iii. chap. i. of words or language in general . sect . . man fitted to form articulate sounds . . to make them signs of ideas . , . to make general signs . . words ultimately derived from such as signifie sensible ideas . . distribution . chap. ii. of the signification of words . lect , . words are sensible signs necessary for communication . , . words are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them . . words often secretly referred , first , to the ideas in other men's minds . . secondly , to the reality of things . . words by use readily excite ideas . . words often used without signification . . their signification perfectly arbitrary . chap. iii. of general terms . sect . . the greatest part of words general . . for every particular thing to have a name is impossible . , . and useless . . what things have proper names . — . how general words are made . . general natures are nothing but abstract ideas . . why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions . . general and universal are creatures of the vnderstanding . . abstract ideas are the essences of the genera and species . . they are the workmanship of the vnderstanding , but have their foundation in the similitude of things . . each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence . . real and nominal essence . . constant connexion between the name and nominal essence . . supposition that species are distinguished by their real essences useless . . real and nominal essence the same in simple ideas and modes , different in substances . . essences ingenerable and incorruptible . . recapitulation . chap. iv. of the names of simple ideas . sect . . names of simple ideas , modes , and substances , have each something peculiar . . first , names of simple ideas and substances , intimate real existence . . secondly , names of simple ideas and modes signifie always both real and nominal essence . . thirdly , names of simple ideas undefinable . . if all were definable , 't would be a process in infinitum . . what a definition is . . simple ideas why undefinable . , . instances motion . . light. . simple ideas why undefinable , farther explained . , . the contrary shewed in complex ideas by instances of a statue and rainbow . . the names of complex ideas when to be made intelligible by words . . fourthly , names of simple ideas least doubtful . . fifthly , simple ideas have few ascents in linea praedicamentali . . sixthly , names of simple ideas stand for ideas not at all arbitrary . chap. v. of the names of mixed modes and relations . sect . . they stand for abstract ideas , as other general names . . first , the ideas they stand for , are made by the vnderstanding . . secondly , made arbitrarily , and without patterns . . how this is done . . evidently arbitrary , in that the idea is often before the existence . . instances murther , incest , stabbing . . but still subservient to the end of language . . whereof the intranslatable words of divers languages are a proof . . this shews species to be made for communication . , . in mixed modes 't is the name that ties the combination together , and make it a species . . for the originals of mixed modes . we look no farther than the mind , which also shews them to be the workmanship of the vnderstanding . . their being made by the vnderstanding without patterns , shews the reason why they are so compounded . . names of mixed modes stand always for their real essences . . why their names are usually got before their ideas . . reason of my being so large on this subject . chap. vi. of the names of substances . sect . . the common names of substances stand for sorts . . the essence of each sort is the abstract idea . . the nominal and real essence different . — . nothing essential to individuals . , . the nominal essence bounds the species . . not the real essence which we know not . . not substantial forms which we know less . . that the nominal essence is that whereby we distinguish species , farther evident from spirits . . whereof there are probably numberless species . . the nominal essence that of the species , proved from water and ice . — . difficulties against a certain number of real essences . . our nominal essences of substances , not perfect collections of properties . . but such a collection as our name stands for . . our abstract ideas are to us the measures of species , instance in that of man. . species not distinguished by generation . . distinguishing them by substantial forms , not pretended to but in this part of the world. substances distinguished into species , by their obvious appearances before substantial forms were thought of . . the specifick essences are made by the mind . . therefore very various and uncertain . . but not so arbitrarily as mixed modes . . though very imperfect . . which yet serves for common converse . . but makes several essences signified by the same name . . the more general our ideas are , the more incompleat and partial they are . . this all accommodated to the end of speech . . instance in cassuaries . . men make the species instance gold. . though nature make the similitude . . and continues it in the races of things . . each abstract idea is an essence . . genera and species , in order to naming , instance watch . . species of artificial things less confused than natural . . artificial things of distinct species . . substances alone have proper names . . difficulty to treat of words with words . , . instance of mixed modes in kineah and niouph . , . instance of substances in zahab . . their ideas imperfect , and therefore various . . therefore to fix their species , a real essence is supposed . . which supposition is of no use . . conclusion . chap. vii . of particles : sect . . particles connect parts , or whole sentences together . . in them consists the art of well speaking . , . they shew what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts . . instance in but. . this matter but lighly touched here . chap. viii . of abstract and concrete terms . sect . . abstract terms not predicable one of another , and why . . they shew the difference of our ideas . chap. ix . of the imperfection of words . sect . . words are used for recording and communicating our thoughts . . any words will serve for recording . . communication by words , civil or philosophical . . the imperfection of words is the doubtfulness of their signification . . causes of their imperfection . . the names of mixed modes doubtful . first , because the ideas they stand for , are so complex . . secondly , because they have no standards . . propriety not a sufficient remedy . . the way of learning these names contributes also to their doubtfulness . . hence unavoidable obscurity in ancient authors . . first , to real essences that cannot be known . , . secondly , to co-existing qualities , which are known but imperfectly . . with this imperfection , they may serve for civil , but not well for philosophical use . . instance liquor of nerves . . instance gold. . the names of simple ideas the least doubtful . . and next to them simple modes . . the most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances . . why this imperfection charged upon words . , . this should teach us moderation , in imposing our own sense of old authors . chap. x. of the abuse of words . sect . . abuse of words . , . first , words without any , or without ideas . . occasioned by learning names before the ideas they belong to . . secondly , unsteady application of them . . thirdly , affected obscurity by wrong application . . logick and dispute has much contributed to this . . calling it subtilty . . this learning very little benefited society . . but destroy'd the instruments of knowledge and communication . . as useful as to confound the sound of the letters . . this art has perplexed religion and iustice. . and ought not to pass for learning . . fourthly , abuse , taking them for things . . instance in matter . . this makes errors lasting . . fifthly , abuse setting them for what they cannot signifie . . v. g. putting them for the real essences of substances . . hence we think every change of our idea in substances , not to change the specie . . the cause of this abuse , a supposition of nature's working always regularly . . this abuse contains two false suppositions . . sixthly , abuse , a supposition that words have a certain and evident signification . . the ends of language , first , to convey our ideas . . secondly , to doe it with quickness . . thirdly , therewith to convey the knowledge of things . — . how men's words fail in all these , . how in substances . . how in modes and relations . . seventhly , figurative speech also an abuse of language . chap. xi . of the remedies of the fore-going imperfection and abuses . sect . . they are worth seeking . . are not easie . . but yet necessary to philosophy . . misuse of words the cause of great errors . . obstinacy . . and wrangling . . instance bat and bird. . first , remedy to use no word without an idea . . secondly , have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes . . and distinct and conformable in substances . . thirdly , propriety . . fourthly , to make known their meaning . . and that three ways . . first , in simple ideas by synonymous terms or shewing . . secondly , in mixed modes by definition . . morality capable of demonstration . . definitions can make moral discourses clear . . and is the only way . . thirdly , in substances , by shewing and defining . , , ideas of the leading qualities of substances , are best got by shewing . . the ideas of their powers best by definition . . a reflexion on the knowledge of spirits . . ideas also of substances must be conformable to things . . not easie to be made so . . fifthly , remedy , constancy in their signification . . where it ought to be explained , when varied . book iv. chap. i. of knowledge in general . sect . . our knowledge conversant about our ideas . . knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas . . this agreement four-fold . . first , of identity or diversity . . secondly , relative . . thirdly , of co-existence . . fourthly , of real existence . . knowledge actual or habitual . . habitual knowledge two-fold . chap. ii. of the degrees of our knowledge . sect . . intuitive . . demonstrative . . depends on proofs . . but not so easie . . not without precedent doubt . . not so clear . . each step must have intuitive evidence . . hence the mistake , ex praecognitis , & praeconcessis . . demonstration not limited to quantity . — . why it has been so thought . . sensitive knowledge of particular existence . . knowledge not always clear , where the ideas are so . chap. iii. of the extent of humane knowledge . sect . . first , no farther than we have ideas . . secondly , no farther than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement . . thirdly , intuitive knowledge extends it self not to all the relations of all our ideas . . fourthly , nor demonstrative knowledge . . fifthly , sensitive knowledge narrower than either . . sixthly , our knowledge therefore narrower than our ideas . . how far our knowledge reaches . . first , our knowledge of identity and diversity , as far as our ideas . . secondly , of co-existence a very little way . . because the connexion between most simple ideas is unknown . . especially of secondary qualities . — . and farther , because all connexion between any secondary a●d primary qualities is undiscoverable . . of repugnancy to co-exist larger . . of the co-existence of powers a very little way . . of the spirits yet narrower . . thirdly , of other relations it is not easie to say how far . morality capable of demonstration . . two things have made moral ideas thought uncapable of demonstration . their complexedness , and want of sensible representations . . remedies of those difficulties . . fourthly , of real existence we have an intuitive knowledge of our own , demonstrative of god's , sensible of some few other things . . our ignorance great . . first , one cause of it want of ideas , either such as we have no conception of , or such as particularly we have not . . because of their remoteness , or , . because of their minuteness . . hence no science of bodies . . much less of spirits . . secondly , want of a discoverable connexion between ideas we have . . instances . . thirdly , want of tracing our ideas . . extent in respect of vniversality . chap. iv. of the reality of our knowledge . sect . . objection , knowledge placed in ideas may be all bare vision . , . answer , not so , where ideas agree with things . . as , first , all simple ideas do . . secondly , all complex ideas , except of substances . . hence the reality of mathematical knowledge . . and of moral . . existence not required to make it real . . nor will it be less true or certain , because moral ideas are of our own making and naming . . mis-naming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge . . ideas of substances have their archetypes without us . . so far as they agree with those , so far our knowledge concerning them is real . . in our enquiries about substances , we must consider ideas , and not consine our thoughts to names or species supposed set out by names . — . objection against a changeling , being something between man and beast answered . . recapitulation . chap. v. of truth in general sect . . what truth is . . a right joining , or separating of signs ; i. e. ideas or words . . which make mental or verbal propositions . . mental propositions are very hard to be treated of . being nothing but the joining , or separating ideas without words . . when mental propositions contain real truth , and when verbal . . objection against verbal truth , that it may be thus alchimerical . . answered real truth is about ideas agreeing to things . . falshood is the joining of names otherwise than their ideas agree . . general propositions to be treated of more at large . . moral and metaphysical truth . chap. vi. of universal propositions , their truth and certainty . sect . . treating of words necessary to knowledge . . general truths hardly to be understood , but in verbal propositions . . certainty two-fold , of truth and of knowledge . . no proposition can be known to be true , where the essence of each species mentioned is not known . . this more particularly concerns substances . . the truth of few universal propositions concerning substances , is to be known . . because co-existence of ideas in few cases to be known . , . instance in gold. . as far as any such co-existence can be known , so far universal propositions may be certain . but this will go but a little way , because , , . the qualities , which make our complex ideas of substances , depend mostly on external , remote , and unperceived causes . . iudgment may reach farther , but that is not knowledge . . what is requisite for our knowledge of substances . . whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions , we can make but few general certain propositions concerning them . . wherein lies the general certainty of propositions . chap. vii . of maxims . sect . . they are self-evident . . wherein that self-evidence consists . . self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms . . first , as to identity and diversity , all propositions are equally self-evident . . secondly , in co-existence we have few self-evident propositions . . thirdly , in other relations we may have . . fourthly , concerning real existence we have none . . these axioms do not much influence our other knowledge . , . because they are not the truths the first known . . what use these general maxims have . . maxims , if care be not taken in the use of words , may prove contradictio●s . . instance in vacuum . . they prove not the existence of things without us . . their application dangerous about complex ideas . — . instance in man. . little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas . . their use dangerous where our ideas are confused . chap. viii . of trifling propositions . sect . . some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge . , . as first , identical propositions . . secondly , when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole . . as part of the definition of the defined . . instance man and palfry . . for this teaches but the signification of words . . but no real knowledge . . general propositions concerning substances are often trifling . . and why . . thirdly , vsing words variously , is trifling with them . . marks of verbal propositions , first , predication in abstract . . secondly , a part of the definition predicated of any term . chap. ix . of our knowledge of existence . sect . . general certain propositions concern not existence . . a threefold knowledge of existence . . our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive . chap. x. of the existence of a god. sect . . we are capable of knowing certainly that there is a god. . man knows that he himself is . . he knows also , that nothing cannot produce a being , therefore something eternal . . that eternal being must be most powerful . . and most knowing . . and therefore god. . our idea of a most perfect being not the sole proof of a god. . something from eternity . . two sorts of beings , cogitative and incogitative . . incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative . , . therefore there has been an eternal wisdom . . whether material or no. . not material , first , because every particle of matter is not cogitative . . secondly , one particle alone of matter , cannot be cogitative . . thirdly , a system of incogitative matter , cannot be cogitative . . whether in motion , or at rest . , . matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind . chap. xi . of the knowledge of the existence of other things . sect . . is to be had only by sensation . . instance whiteness of this paper . . this though not so certain as demonstration , yet may be called knowledge , and proves the existence of things without us . . first , because we cannot have them but by the inlet of the senses . . because an idea from actual sensation , and another from memory , are very distinct perceptions . . thirdly , pleasure or pain , which accompanies actual sensation , accompanies not the returning of those ideas without the external objects . . fourthly , our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things . . this certainty is as great as our condition needs . . but reaches no farther than actual sensation . . folly to expect demonstration in every thing . . past existence is known by memory . . the existence of spirits not knowable . . particular propositions concerning existence are knowable . . and general propositions concerning abstract ideas . chap. xii . of the improvement of our knowledge . sect . . knowledge is not from maxims . . ( the occasion of that opinion . ) . but from the comparing clear and distinct ideas . . dangerous to build upon precarious principles . . this no certain way to truth . . but to compare clear compleat ideas under steddy names . . the true method of advancing knowledge , is by considering our abstract ideas . . by which , morality also may be made clearer . . but knowledge of bodies is to be improved only by experience . . this may procure us convenience , not science . . we are fitted for moral knowledge , and natural improvements . . but must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles . . the true use of hypotheses . . clear and distinct ideas with setled names , and the finding of those which shew their agreement , or disagreement , are the ways to enlarge our knowledge . . mathematicks an instance of it . chap. xiii . some other considerations concerning our knowledge . sect . . our knowledge partly necessary , partly voluntary . . the application voluntary ; but we know as things are , not as we please . . instances in numbers . chap. xiv . of iudgment . sect . . our knowledge being short , we want something else . . what use to be made of this twilight estate . . iudgment supplies the want of knowledge . . iudgment is the presuming things to be so , without perceiving it . chap. xv. of probability . sect . . probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs . . it is to supply the want of knowledge . . being that which makes us presume things to be true , before we know them to be so . . the grounds of probability are two ; conformity with our own experience , or the testimony of others experience . . in this all the agreements pro and con ought to be examined , before we come to a iudgment . . they being capable of great variey chap. xvi . of the degrees of assent . sect . . our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability . . these cannot always be all actually in view , and then we must content our selves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of assent . . the ill consequence of this , if our former iudgment were not rightly made . . the right use of it is mutual charity and forbearance . . probability is either of matter of fact or speculation . . the concurrent experience of all other men with ours , produces assurance approaching to knowledge . . vnquestionable testimony and experience for the most part produce confidence . . fair testimony , and the nature of the thing indifferent , produces also confident belief . . experiences and testimonies clashing , infinitely vary the degrees of probability . . traditional testimonies , the more more their removed , the less their proof . . yet history is of great use . . in things which sense cannot discover , analogy is the great rule of probability . . one case where contrary experience lessens not the testimony . . the bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty . chap. xvii . of reason . sect . . various significations of the word reason . . wherein reasoning consists . . it s four parts . . syllogism not the great instrument of reason . . helps little in demonstration , less in probability . . serves not to increase our knowledge , but fence with it . . other helps should be sought . . we reason about particulars . . first , reason fails us for want of ideas . . secondly , because of obscure and imperfect ideas . . thirdly , for want of intermediate ideas . . fourthly , because of wrong principles : . fifthly , because of doubtful terms . . our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive , without reasoning . . the next is demonstration by reasoning . . to supply the narrowness of this , we have nothing but iudgment upon probable reasoning . . intuition , demonstration , iudgment . . consequences of words , and consequences of ideas . . four sorts of arguments : first , ad verecundiam . . secondly , ad ignorantiam . . thirdly , ad hominem . . fourthly , ad judicium . . above , contrary , and according to reason . . reason and faith not opposite . chap. xviii . of faith and reason , and their distinct provinces . sect . . necessary to know their boundaries . . faith and reason what , as contradistinguished . . no new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation . . traditional revelation may make us know propositions knowable also by reason , but not with the same certainty that reason doth . . revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason . . traditional revelation much less . . things above reason . . or not contrary to reason , if revealed , are matter of faith. . revelation , in matters where reason cannot judge , or but probably , ought to be hearkened to . . in matters where reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to . . if the boundaries be not set between faith and reason , no enthusiasm , or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted . chap. xix . of wrong assent , or errour . sect . . causes of errour . . first , want of proofs . . obj. what shall become of those who want them , answered . . people hindred from enquiry . . secondly , want of skill to use them . . thirdly , want of will to use them . . fourthly , wrong measures of probability , whereof . — . first , doubtful propositions taken for principles . . secondly , received hypothesis . . thirdly , predominant passions . . the means of evading probabilities , st . supposed fallacy . . dly . supposed arguments for the contrary . . what probabilities determine the assent . . where it is in our power to suspend it . . fourthly , authority . . men not in so many errours as is imagined . chap. xx. division of the sciences . sect . . three sorts . . first , physica . . secondly , practica . . thirdly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . this is the first division of the objects of knowledge . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e (α) gruber apud thevenot , part . p. . (β) lambert . apud there-not , p. . (γ) vossius de nili origine c. . . (δ) p. mart. dec. . hes des incas , l. . c. . (ζ) lery , c. . (α) rhoe apud thevenot , p . (β) jo. de lery , c. . notes for div a -e (α) a gry is / ●● of a line , a line / of an inch , an inch / ● of a philosophical foot , a philosophical foot / ● of a pendulum , whose diadroms● in the latitude of degrees , are each equal to one second of time , or / ● of a minute . i have affectedly made use of this measure here , and the parts of it , under a decimal division with names to the●● because , i think , it would be of general convenience , that this should be the common measure in the commonwealth of letters . second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding in a letter address'd to the author, being a vindication of the first remarks against the answer of mr. lock, at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester. burnet, thomas, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding in a letter address'd to the author, being a vindication of the first remarks against the answer of mr. lock, at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester. burnet, thomas, ?- . [ ], p. printed for m. wotton ..., london : . attributed to t. burnet. cf. bm. reproduction of original in yale university library. marginal notes. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng locke, john, - . -- essay concerning human understanding. burnet, thomas, ?- . -- remarks upon an essay concerning human understanding. locke, john, - . -- mr. locke's reply to the ... bishop of worcester's answer to his letter concerning ... mr. locke's essay of human understanding. knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding , in a letter address'd to the author . being a vindication of the first remarks , against the answer of mr. lock , at the end of his reply to the lord bishop of worcester . london , printed for m. wotton , at the three daggers in fleet-street . . the occasional paper will be continu'd next term. second remarks upon an essay concerning humane understanding , in a letter address'd to the author . sir , at the end of your reply to the lord bishop of worcester , i have met with your answer , as you are pleas'd to call it , to my short remarks upon your essay , and am very much surpriz'd to find it writ in such an angry style , and with such undeserved and ill-grounded reflections . i writ to you with civility and respect , and i dare appeal to any gentleman , if there be any thing unbecoming or provoking in the style or expressions of my letter . if you made a false surmise to your self , that a storm was coming , as you phrase it , and a design hatching to run down your book ; as there is no storm , i 'm sure , in my letter , but every line calm and peaceable , so i protest i never heard of any such design , never had communication with any , about the confuting or opposing your book : and as to these two short papers of remarks , 't is more than i know if any person in the world ( besides my self ) knows me to be the writer of them . so far was i from designing any thing by them but my own satisfaction , and to know the true state of your principles , that i might the better judge of their truth , and of their consequences . and whereas you say , if it was for my own information , what need of putting my doubts in print ? i thought that the best way , that your answer might give satisfaction to others ( as well as to me ) who probably might have the same or like scruples . and as to your self , i thought i had done you a kindness , by giving you an opportunity of explaining or vindicating some of your principles , which were likely , i thought , to fall under the censure of inquisitive persons . then , as to the crime of concealing my name , which is another thing objected , i think , of all men i know , mr. lock had the least reason to make that criminal , he , who hath writ so many books without putting his name to them , and some in confutation of the principles of other men. turpe est censori , cùm — but you have invented a strange reason for my concealing my name , with a black accusation contain'd in it , in these words : i cannot much blame him in another respect , for concealing his name . for , i think , any one who appears amongst christians , may be well asham'd of his name , when be raises such a doubt as this , viz. whether an infinitely powerful and wise being , be veracious or no ? unless falshood be in such reputation with this gentleman , that he concludes lying to be no mark of weakness and folly. this insinuation is the more inexcusable , because to bring it in , you have misrepresented and perverted the sense of the author . the question there is not , whether god be veracious ? but , whether , according to your principles , he can be prov'd to be so ? the reflection which falls upon your principles onely , you would have thrown upon god , and very unjustly suppose that the remarker calls in question the divine veracity , whereas he onely calls in question the truth of your principles : which , i think , is a very different thing from the divine veracity . in the pages you cite , the remarker says , veracity , according to his principles , may be prov'd to belong to the divine nature , as being a perfection ; but tells you at the same time , that you make no use of that argument , nor vouchsafe to give us any account or idea of perfection , tho' you do of many other terms and notions of less importance . you may see by this , that falshood and lying ( as your gross words are ) are not in reputation with this gentleman , seeing he looks upon them as imperfections inconsistent with the divine nature . now let every impartial reader judge , whether there is less of the christian in the first objection , or in the pretended answer ; and whether of these two persons hath more reason to be ashamed . you add in the same place , that you have more than once spoke of the goodness of god , another evidence of his veracity . be it so ; but where have you prov'd the divine goodness ? or how can it be prov'd , from your principles ? the question is not , as i told you before , whether god be good and veracious , &c. nor whether you think so , ( for i do not enter into your thoughts ) but onely , whether you have prov'd these attributes , or laid down any principles by which they may be prov'd . next , you proceed to what concerns the mathematical demonstration of morality : where i desired to know how it could be founded on your principles . in answer to this , you tell me , my judgment does not seem of that consequence , that any one should be in haste to gratifie my impatience . sir , i did not presume to desire to know the full systems of your morality , but the basis up on which you would build it : and you having declar'd more than once , that from grounds and principles laid down in your book , morality might be mathematically demonstrated , i thought it would give no offence to enquire which ground or principle you pitcht upon for your foundation . i thought , i say , that would have given no offence , especially seeing i was willing to suppose , that 't was not the deficiency of your principles , but my own short-sightedness , that made me at a loss . but however , if this enquiry , how modestly soever propos'd , be look'd upon by you as presumptuous , i beg your pardon , if that will satisfie at present ; and we shall have occasion hereafter to speak more at large concerning the grounds of morality ; where , tho' you be so reserv'd in declaring yours , i shall not be so in declaring mine . after this , you make a remark upon what i had said concerning the knowledge of our duty , and concerning the grounds of the divine law : and you express it in these words ; and since he thinks the illiterate part of mankind ( which is the greatest ) must have a more compendious way to know their duty , than by long deductions , ( you should have said , long and obscure deductions , if you had truly taken the words of the author ) he may do well to consider , whether it were for their sakes he publish'd this question , viz. what is the reason and ground of the divine law ? i suppose this is mentioned as containing something inconsistent or incongruous ; but i see no such thing in the words cited . may not the illiterate part of mankind know their duty by natural conscience , and the revealed law of god , and yet that divine law have a reason or ground ? i can see no interfering in this , nor any incongruity . but this is a gentle reprimand or ( intended ) reflexion upon me , in comparison of the next , which flies as high as the imputation of malice and ignorance ; in these words : a man that insinuates , as he does , as if i held , that the distinction of vertue and vice was to be picked up by our eyes , our ears , or our nostrils , shews so much ignorance , or so much malice , that he deserves no other answer but pity . malice and ignorance ! these are such vulgar topicks of railing amongst angry and ill-bred writers , that methinks it should be below the genius of a gentleman and a philosopher , to make use of them . do you find these hard words in the writing you criticize ? i know that is no rule to you ; but however , the world will consider these things ( whether you will or no ) to judge of the temper of a person , who treats another at this rate , that us'd him with respect , and in civil language . but let us consider the matter it self . you call this an insinuation of mine , not a thing directly exprest ; and you have reason for this diminution of it : but this also will make it more difficult to find out the particular passage you understand here . the first passage in the paragraph to which i suppose you refer , is this : your general principle of picking up all our knowledge from our five senses , i confess , does not sit easily in my thoughts , tho' you join reflexion to help us . now if this be the sentence you mean , surely you ought not to have omitted reflexion , and to have charg'd this only upon the five senses , which you see i do not . there is another sentence in the same paragraph , which possibly you may refer to ; and 't is this : as to morality , we think the great foundation of it is , the distinction of good and evil , vertue and vice , turpis & honesti , as they are usually call'd : and i do not find that my eyes , ears , nostrils , or any other outward sense , make any distinction of these things , as they do of sounds , colours , scents , and other outward objects ; nor from any idea taken in from them or from their reports , am i conscious that i do or can conclude , that there is such a distinction in the nature of things . in these two passages i though i had taken in enough to comprehend your sensation and reflexion , which you make the principles of all our knowledge , natural or moral , and consequently of the distinction of good and evil , vertue and vice. but we shall see further into this matter , and into your sense , when you have further explain'd your moral notions , and let us see what you make vertue and vice , good and evil to be , according to your way . but i must not forget to speak a few words to the charge it self , malice and ignorance . malice is against a person : now god knows , i never had either malice or envy against your person : and whosoever reads that paper of remarks , i believe , will think so ; for 't is writ in a courteous style , and with favourable expressions to you , from first to last . as to the imputation of ignorance , i am not so much concern'd to clear my self in that point . if it be my ignorance in general that you pity , i acknowledge your kindness , and own your pity well plac't : but if it be my ignorance of your principles that you pity , as it seems to be , that may be a weakness in me , i confess , but i hope no mortal sin , nor any thing that requires much pity . but however , if you pity my ignorance of your principles , and yet will not instruct me in them , nor help me when i beg your charity , that pity is but a mock-pity , and deserves no thanks . now we come to the last head of inquiries you are pleas'd to take notice of , the immortality of the soul. and for a proof of this , you refer me ( whether ludicrously and sarcastically , or no , you best know ) to the lord bishop of worcester's arguments , taken from your principles . then you add , but if that will not serve his turn , i will tell him a principle of mine that will clear it to him ; and that is , the revelation of life and immortality by jesus christ through the gospel . i write it immortality , for so i know it was intended ; tho' , by an unlucky slip of the press , 't is printed there immorality . the revelation of the gospel is no doubt an happy confirmation of the immortality of the soul ; but we are speaking of proofs to be made by the light of nature , and particularly by the principles of humane understanding , as you have represented them . and before you make use of revelation in this point , you should resolve the other point objected to you , viz. how you can prove the truth of revealed religion , according to your principles . sir , i have now done with your answer , as you call it ; but i can find neither answer nor explication in it to those doubts i proposed . you may have some particular reasons for that , which you best know : but i know no good reason you can have for writing in such a snappish and peevish way . if you affect the character of a captious disputant , i do not envy it you , i think you have taken the ready way to gain it , by your way of writing , both here and elsewhere . if you have been so treated by other pens , as to make you angry and out of humour , you ought not to take your revenge , or ease your spleen upon an inoffensive pen : and you will be less pitied , when roughly handled by others , if you treat them rudely that treated you civilly . there is nothing , i 'm sure , in my words or expressions that could offend you : it must be in the sense , by touching , it may be , upon some tender parts of your essay , that would not bear pressing without giving pain . if you concluded ' with your self , that the writer of those remarks was some mean contemptible thing , with whom you were not bound to observe the measures of common civility ; yet methinks , even in that case , it had been better to have wholly neglected a person of whom you had such an idea , than to have given an answer without giving any satisfaction to his doubts , or any vindication of your principles . as to the storm you speak of , preparing against you , i know nothing of it , as i told you before ; yet i can blame none that desire such principles of humane understanding as may give them proofs and security against such a system as this , cogitant matter , a mortal soul , a manichean god ( or a god without moral attributes , ) and an arbitrary law of good and evil. how far your principles are concern'd in these things , or lead to scepticism in these and other material points , is left to your consideration . this however i know , the ready way to prevent any such storm , is to give such a plain explication of your principles , without art or chicane , as may cure and remove any fears of this nature . after all , notwithstanding this imperfect and angry answer , i will not be discourag'd from solliciting once more a further explication of your principles upon the three grand points , the immortality of the soul , natural religion , and reveal'd religion . and whereas you seem to say , those that do not like your principles , or think them false or defective , let them find out better : we cannot tell how good or how bad , how full or defective your principles are , till we know the true state of them , and their consequences , in reference to moral things : and for that reason we desire a further explanation of them upon those heads . i am apt to believe , many of your readers , if not the generality , do not so far understand your principles , as to see what consequences they draw after them ; and possibly you did not reflect upon it your self . your readers may easily be amus'd in a multitude of names and notions , and signs of notions : they 're led into a wood of idea's ( simple and complex , and complex-collective ; absolute , relative , real , or phantastical , &c. ) and there they are lost ; pleasantly indeed , amongst lights and shades , and many pretty landskips ; but they know not where they are , nor see to the end of the wood. you know what philosophers ( ancient or modern ) your principles are said to imitate ; but i do not desire to make use of names , one way or other , but to argue every thing fairly and upon the square , as far as reason will go . and let those that are unconcern'd and impartial , judge what is fairly objected , what fairly answer'd , and what not . but if in these things , which concern religion and morality , you will give us no further light or answer , i may reasonably conclude , that i have not mistaken your sense , and that i have truly calculated the elevation of those principles . wherein , notwithstanding , i shall be always willing and desirous to be set right , if i have committed any errour . but let us proceed to the matters under debate . as to the immortality of the soul , in your answer to the lord bishop of worcester , you acknowledge the deficiency or limitation of your principles as to the proof of its immateriality : but however , you do not freely tell us , what you make the soul to be . you say indeed , 't is a thinking substance ; but so you say matter may be made , for any thing you know . then the soul may be mortal , for any thing you know , or any thing we know , by your principles . do you think the soul to be a permanent substance , distinct from the body ? or a modification or power of the body ? or life onely ? or a certain influence from without , acting in matter so and so qualified , or in such and such systems ? which dispositions or systems , when they come to be dissolved or destroy'd , that power ceases to act there ; either perishing , as a flame when the fewel is spent ; or returning to its fountain , whatsoever it was . this notion seems to me to suit best to the general air of your discourse about the soul , and with several particular passages relating to it . as when you make cogitation in us to be like motion in matter , which receives its motion from external impression . and when you speak about the sleep of the soul , or the suspension of cogitation when we sleep ; the body not being then receptive of the thinking influence . you say , the soul hath no extension , nor , at certain fits , any cogitation : what can the soul be then , but a certain power acting in the body , when the body is prepar'd for the exercise of it , and ceasing to act when the body is indisposed ? but whether that be a superiour divine power , distinct from matter , as a vis movens ; or a power fastned , i know not how , to the body , or upon such and such systems of matter : whether , i say , of these two suppositions better agrees with your doctrine , i cannot certainly tell ; but either of them destroys the immortality of the soul , upon the dissolution of the body . furthermore , this seems to be the supposition you go upon , when you question , whether a man waking and sleeping ( without thoughts ) be the same man. if there be still , sleeping or waking , the same soul , the same permanent substance , i see no room for that question or doubt which you make ; and your making of it , would induce one to believe , that it is a difficulty that arises to you particularly , and upon that principle , that the soul of man is not a permanent and distinct substance , but an extrinsick or intrinsick power , that acts or is suspended according to the disposition or indispositions of the body . accordingly , i do not see by your discourse , how st. peter , suppose , at the resurrection , will be the same man , unless he have the same body , or the same organization of parts ; tho' his soul be the same , with the same dispositions and habits : nor how our saviour , now in heaven , is the same man that was crucified at jerusalem ; or that he that was crucified at jerusalem , is the same man that will come again to judge the quick and the dead . but i do not love to walk in the dark , and therefore i refer these things to your further explication , if you so please . your doctrine of the soul seems to me obscure and ambiguous : men write , i think , to be understood ; and i hope i may , without offence , use the same sentence to you , which you have used to others , si monvis intelligi , debes negligi . however if you please to let us into the secret , if there be a secret , i shall make no other use of it than to give it a fair and free examination . i proceed now to another difficulty in your doctrine of the soul , which i mentioned formerly . you think the soul , when we are asleep , is without any thoughts or perceptions . i am still at a loss , i confess , how to frame any idea of a thoughtless , senseless , lifeless soul. this carcase of a soul i cannot understand : if it neither have cogitation , nor extension , as you suppose , what being or manner of being it hath , i am not able to comprehend . it must be a substance , and a particular finite substance , and yet without any mode . if you say you have no idea of it , why then do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible state of the soul , whereof neither you , nor others , can have any conception ? however , you ought to tell us , how you bring the soul out of this unintelligible state. what cause can you assign able to produce the first thought at the end of this sleep and silence , in a total ecclipse and intermission of thinking ? upon your supposition , that all our thoughts perish in sound sleep ; and all cogitation is extinct , we seem to have a new soul every morning . if a flame be extinct , the same cannot return , but a new one may be made . if a body cease to move , and come to perfect rest , the motion it had cannot be restord , but a new motion may be produc'd . if all cogitation be extinct , all our ideas are extinct , so far as they are cogitations , and seated in the soul : so we must have them new imprest ; we are , as it were , new born , and begin the world again . if you say , the ideas remain in the soul , in that state of silence and insensibility , and need only a new excitation ; why then , say i , may not infants have innate ideas ( which you so much oppose ) that want only objects and occasions to excite and actuate them , with a fit disposition of the brain ? sir , i am sorry my apprehension should be so slow , or your doctrine about the soul so shaded and cover'd , that i cannot , without further light , come to know your meaning ; or , which i most desire , see how it is consistent with reason and nature . to gratifie your readers with a clearer explanation of your principles in this particular , seems to be a debt due to them , which i shall take however as an obligation : but if you be otherwise minded , for reasons best known to your self , i shall use no further entreaty or importunity . another head wherein i desir'd your further explication , was in reference to reveal'd religion ; that we may see what ground we can have upon your principles for the certainty of it . if we cannot in your way be assur'd of the immortality of the soul by the light of nature , or by revelation , you leave us no certain way to know it . now if you do not make that revelation certain in it self , it cannot make us certain of any thing . you seem therefore the more oblig'd to give good proof of the certainty of reveal'd religion , by how much you make the assurance of our immortality to depend upon its testimony . i told you formerly , why i thought your principles would not reach to the proof of a certainty in reveal'd religion ; namely , because they do not prove , nor give us grounds whereupon we may prove the moral attributes of god ; upon which , and not upon infinite power and knowledge only , depends the satisfaction and assurance we have of the truth of a revelation . the divine veracity is the particular attribute upon which it mainly depends ; and that we think may be prov'd from the divine perfection : but you have given us no idea of perfection , unless you resolve it into power ; whereof indeed you have given a large account , but that will not reach and decide the case in question . however , i will wait your pleasure and leisure , to see if you are minded to give us any more instruction in this particular . the truth is , there is a passage in your late reply to the bishop of worcester , ( p. , . ) which would incline one to believe , that you think there is no certainty in reveal'd religion , seeing you do not allow the certainty of faith , but look upon that expression as jargon , or next to nonsense . to talk of the certainty of faith , say you , seems all one to me , as to talk of the knowledge of believing : a way of speaking not easie to me to understand . faith , methinks , must either be certain or uncertain ; and if you refuse the one , you must take the other . but this , i suppose , with what follows there , will fall under the examination and censure of a better pen : i will therefore insist no more upon it . i proceed now to the third head , that of natural religion and morality . this you think is demonstrable from your principles , mathematically demonstrable . this indeed would be an happy performance , and of great use to mankind . but , i cannot discern from what sure foundation , or in what method you can make out this demonstration . if you make natural religion and morality to depend upon future rewards and punishments , as i think you do , then they must depend upon the immortality of the soul ; and if they depend upon that , and that be only probable by the light of nature , then neither can the other by the light of nature be mathematically demonstrable . i should argue thus , if morality stands upon future punishments and rewards , and future punishments and rewards stand upon the immortality of the soul , and the immortality of the soul be only probable , then morality cannot be mathematically demonstrable . this is something like your indian comparison . if the earth stand upon an elephant , and the elephant upon a tortoise , then what supports the tortoise ? thus far we are clear ; there ought not , i 'm sure , be more in the conclusion , than was in the premises . you allow , i think , a law of nature , with or without revelation ; a natural conscience to distinguish good and evil , virtue and vice. this is generally understood by morality and natural religion . and this morality , if i understand you aright , is what you say is demonstrable by your principles . but if you use that word morality in another sense than what is generally understood by it in common conversation , or by ancient and modern authors , you ( who blame others so often for an uncertain use of words ) ought to fix and declare your peculiar signification of that word , that we may know your meaning . if by morality you understand the practical precepts of the christian religion , who doubts but that morality may be known clearly and evidently ? we have no need of your mathematical demonstration in that case , if you mean onely that you can prove morality from scripture . besides , if that were required , you must first give us a demonstration of the veracity of the revealer from your principles , before you can demonstrate morality in this sense . but if you understand natural morality , as others do ; we think , and say , you cannot give , by your principles , a demonstration of it . after all , whatsoever you understand by morality , you seem to ground your demonstration upon future punishments and rewards , and upon the arbitrary . will of the law giver : and i do not think these the first grounds of good and evil , vertue and vice. i do not think they are constituted by punishments and rewards , nor by the will of god onely , if you take that will for an arbitrury power : and i 'll give my reasons for it . if things were so , there would be no fixt notion of holiness , and god might be the author of sin : i mean , of what we call sin , and judge sin , and for which sinners are punisht . but in reality ( according to this principle ) there is nothing sin to this almighty being , nor any fixt notion of holiness . for if his will be the original rule of good and evil , and that will go by no rule , there is no rule of sin to him : all things are indifferent , till he declare this or that to be sin , according to his pleasure ; nor is there any rule of sin to us , but that revealed pleasure . this consequence , i believe , will be granted , admitting the supposition . but you will say , it may be , after god hath declar'd such and such things to be sin , they are so , and he cannot be the author of them . and why not , i pray ? i desire to know , what binds him to his word ? to this order or declaration he hath made ? it must be something antecedent to his will , and , in that respect , superiour : which if you allow , we have all we desire , an original standard for sin and holiness ; namely , the divine nature and essential perfections : a law from which the divine will can never deviate ; nor we , without sin , ever transgrefs . then , on the other hand , as to holiness , what definition or idea can you give us of it , according to this principle ? is holiness onely a due care and concern for our interest and happiness , present and future ? that 's a good thing , and very necessary ; but 't is rather prudence or wisdom , than holiness , in the proper sense of the word . suppose then you say , holiness is a conformity to the will of god : that also is very true ; for the divine will is never contrary to the divine nature : but this is not the original notion of intrinsick holiness , into which 't is ultimately resolv'd ; this is not the archetype . intrinsick holiness is a conformity to the divine nature , according to our capacities ; being like to god , and partakers of his perfections , pure as he is pure , so far as the measures of humanity will permit . this , i think , is clear in reason , and i m sure 't is confirm'd by good authorities ; that of revelation , and also that of the best esteem'd philosophers that have writ about morality . and furthermore , how can we know ( antecedently to revelation ) what the will of god is , or what he hath appointed to be good or evil , sin or holiness ? i say , how can you know this , if you do not know it from the immutable nature of god , and the immutable differences of good and evil ? and there will be the same difficulty to know or ascertain future punishments and rewards , without , or with a revelation : for tho' you have a revelation , if there be no immovable rules of good and evil , just and unjust ; nor any fixt rule of right betwixt god and his creatures , you can never be assur'd of performance , whatsoever is promis'd or threatned . there may be a reveal'd and a secret will , for any thing you know : and we may follow one , and the other be finally executed , according to a secret intention ; which will lay a ground for an incurable scepticism . but i have noted before , how these principles , upon another account , render the whole future state uncertain , and therefore prosecute it no further at present . i think you should tell us also , what is the love of god ( the fountain of vertue and piety ) according to your principles ; and how it is distinguish'd from self love : which , in your way , it seems to be in the last resolution of it . we love god ; but why ? not for his sake , but for our own sake ; because he will reward our love and obedience . without this motive , you seem to leave no argument to love him , or vertue , or piety : we may fear and admire an eternal , almighty , all knowing being : but if he have no other attributes , as i do not find you have prov'd any more , you lay no foundation for the love of god , nor for the love of vertue and piety . those verses express my sense in this particular : oderunt peccare mali , formidine poenae : oderunt peccare boni , virtutis amore . but your principles turn the latter verse another way ; oderunt peccare boni , mercedis amore . how , pray you , upon these principles , do you preserve the distinction ( that good old distinction , which it may be you despise ) of bonum utile & honestum ? in your way , either the parts are coincident , or bonum utile is superior to bonum honestum . 't is an open and free saying of tully's , but was always thought to have good sense in it , perspicuum est , nisi aequitas , fides , justitia , proficiscantur à naturâ , & si omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur , virum bonum non posse reperiri . many , you know , of our best authors in morality have spoken things to the same sense . in like manner , the distinction of positive laws , and natural or moral laws , seems to be confounded , if you make both to depend upon the arbitrary will of god. at least , these things need a further explication , if , according to this new way , you make them both to have the same ground and measure . give me leave to add one consideration more : as the reasons of good and evil , so likewise of true and false , seem to be unstable and unsettled , according to these principles . for , if the difference of true and false be immutable , or not determin'd by the arbitrary will of god , i see no reason why we should not make the same judgment as to the difference of good and evil ; or why moral truths should not be as fixt and unalterable as any other . let us take a proposition in mathematicks , and another in morality : suppose , in the former , that which is often made use of , that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones : and in morals , that it is a wicked thing for a man maliciously to kill his friend , or his father , or any innocent person . the truth of this seems to me as clear , eternal , and unalterable , as the other . there is a rectitude and obliquity in actions , as well as in lines , a congruity or incongruity . 't is true , moral cases are commonly more complex , and so not so easily stated ; but in those that are simple and general , or clearly stated , propositions about them are as certain as other truths . in every moral action or moral case there is a right and a wrong , as much as every number is even or odd , or every line straight or crooked . and the relations of moral things seem to me as necessary , as the relations of figures and numbers . i am also apt to believe , that the differences of good and evil , just and unjust , turpis & honesti , would be as sensible to us ( in nature pure ) as physical or mathematical differences ; as smeet and sowr , straight and crooked ; if interest , appetities , passions , and lusts did not deprave our taste and judgments in those intellectual things . which prejudices and brutish inclinations take no place , you know , in physical or mathematical speculations . sir , if you please to let us know your grounds of morality ( mathematically demonstrable ) as plainly as i have done mine , 't is all that i desire as to this particular . and in all other things , i think , 't is enough to express our thoughts clearly , with our reasons for them . more is not needful amongst persons that have no other design than to find out truth , by comparing the opinions of others with their own , and weighing the reasons on both sides . for a man to attend to his own thoughts and conceptions , and the best light he hath ; not to speak by roat , and blindly follow either new or receiv'd opinions , is so far commendable . but whether his principles and conclusions are just , and proportionate to the nature of things , is a further question , and must be left to time and trial. every man would be willing to know the sense of the authors that he reads , the state of their principles with their consequences ( especially as to moral things ) that he might make a sure judgment of them . i am sensible that when men have a different set of ideas and first principles , they may be easily mistaken in judging of one anothers meaning , or in drawing consequences from one anothers principles : but that , methinks , ought to give no offence ; but rather to be gently rectified ( without ill language ) by the authors themselves , who best know their own mind . and as i find that you say you are often at a loss in understanding the lord bishop of worcester's remarks upon some of your notions , so i hope you will not think it strange if i am sometimes at a loss also how to understand your writings ; which , we may reasonably presume , are not more clear , either as to sense or words . you tell me in your answer , that i pretend to have writ that letter to be inform'd : and so i did ; but withal gave you some reasons for my doubts . will you not allow a learner to desire his master to explain himself , when he does not understand his dictates ? and also to propose objections , when his teacher's sense seems to him contrary to reason ? we are taught by your self , not to give up our assent to the authority of others , without good evidence ; and you make it one great cause of errour , to relie blindly upon the opinions of others . i hope therefore i have obey'd your precepts in this , as i am ready to do in all other things that are reasonable . i can truly and sincerly say , that i do not write out of any spirit of opposition , nor for any by-ends whatsoever ; but for my own instruction and satisfaction , and for the discovery of truth in those great points . when i doubt of your sense , if you please to direct me ; and when i make objections , if you please to answer them , i have my design ; and desire onely that the merits of the cause may be spoken to on either hand , without course language , and personal reflexions , which , i think , is your own advice . * in your conclusion you tell me again of my fault , in not setting my name to my paper , in these hard , words ; to conclude , were there nothing else in it , i should not think it fit to trouble my self about the questions of a man , which he himself does not think wortby owning . to which i answer , tho' in some cases i think the sense is more impartially consider'd ( without favour or prejudice ) when the author is unknown ; yet if that will satisfie you , do you put your name to all the books and pamphlets you have writ , and i will put my name to this ; how unusual soever it is to put a name to such small papers . sir , your humble servant . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e answ. p. . pag. . remarks , p. pag. . pag. . pag. , . pag. , . effay , p. . pag. . fect . . p. , . & lib. . c. . pag. . sect . . pag. . p. . sect . , . p. . sect . . p. . sect . . p. . sect . . de fin . bon. & mal. c. . pag. . essay , p. . sect . . * no bodies notions , i think , are the better or truer , for ill-manners joined with them ; and i conclude , your lordship , who so well knows the different cast of mens heads , and of the opinions that possess them , will not think it ill manners in any one , if his notions differ from your lordship's , and that he owns that difference , and explains the grounds of it as well as be can : i have always thought , that truth and knowledge , by the ill and over-eager management of controversies , lose a great deal of the advantages they might receive from the variety of conceptions there is in mens understandings . could the heats , and passions , and ill language be left out of them , they would afford great improvements to those who could separate them from by-interests and personal prejudices . answer to the bishop of worcester , p. . philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, ?- . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing n ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing n estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of, ?- . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by tho: roycroft, for j. martin, and j. allestrye, at the bell in st. pauls church-yard, london : . partly in verse. the last leaf is blank. annotation on thomason copy: "may. .". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng conduct of life -- early works to . mind and body -- early works to . knowledge, theory of -- early works to . good and evil -- early works to . virtue -- early works to . a r (wing n ). civilwar no philosophicall fancies. written by the right honourable, the lady newcastle. newcastle, margaret cavendish, duchess of a this text has no known defects that were recorded as gap elements at the time of transcription. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion philosophicall fancies . written by the right honourable , the lady newcastle . london , printed by tho : roycroft , for j. martin , and j. allestrye , at the bell in st. pauls church-yard , . a dedication to fame . to thee , great fame , i dedicate this peece . though i am no philosopher of greece ; yet do not thou my workes of thoughts despise , because they came not from the ancient , wise . nor do not think , great fame , that they had all the strange opinions , wich we learning call . for nature's unconfin'd , and gives about her severall fancies , without leave , no doubt . shee 's infinite , and can no limits take , but by her art , as good a brain may make . although shee 's not so bountifull to me , yet pray accept of this epitome . an epistle to time . swift , ever-moving time , i write to thee , to crave thy pardon , if ill spent thou be . but i did chuse this way , thinking it best : for by my writing i do none molest . i injure none , nor yet disturb their way , i slander none , nor any one betray . if i do wast thee in a musing thought , yet i take paines , my braines constantly wrought . for in three weeks begun , and finisht all these philosophicall fancies , which i call . if thou thinkst much , that i should spend thee so , to write of that , i can but guesse , not know ; i le tell thee time , thou mayst bee worser spent , in wanton waies , which some call merriment . let me tell thee , this better pleaseth me , then if i spent thee in fine pageantry . a request to time . time , prethee be content , and let me write ; i le use thee better then the carpet knight , or amorous ladies , which doe dance , and play , casting their modesty , and fame away . i humbly cast mine eyes downe to the ground , or shut them close , while i a fancy found . and in a melancholy posture sit , with musing thoughts , till i more fancies get . besides , deare time , nature doth not me give such store of health , to hope i old shall live . then let me give my youth the most content , which is to write , and send it to the print . if any like my fancies when they 'r read , my time 's rewarded , though my body's dead . if they do not , my son'e will lye at rest , because my life did think , what 's harmlesse , best . an epistle to my braine . i wonder , braine , thou art so dull , when there was not a day , but wit past , through the yeare . for seven yeares 't is , since i have married bin ; which time , my braine might be a magazine , to store up wise discourse , naturally sent , in fluent words , which free , and easie went . if thou art not with wit inrich'd thereby , then uselesse is the art of memory . but thou , poor braine , hard ftozen art with cold , words seales , of wit , will neither print , nor hold . an epistle to a troubled fancy . fancies in sleep are visions , dreames we call , rais'd in the braine to sport themselves withall . sometimes they take delight to fright the minde , taking strange shapes , not like to natures kinde . after the soule they hunt , and run about , as from the body they would thrust it out . but if they are in humour kind , and good , in pleasing shapes before the minde they stood . an epistle to contemplation . i contemplating by a fires side , in winter cold , my thoughts would hunting ride . and after fancies they do run a race , if lose them not , they have a pleasant chase . if they do catch the hare , or kill the deere , they dresse them strait in verse , and make good cheere . an epistle to my musefull thoughts . thoughts , trouble not the soule with falling out , siding in factions , with feare , hope and doubt . but with the muses dance in measur'd feet , taking out all the fancies as you meet . some fancies are like wilde , and toyish girles , and some are sober , grave ; others are churles . let those that sober , sad , a pavin measure , corantoes are the lighter fancies pleasure . let churlish fancies dance with crabbed feet , in numbers odd , not even , smooth , nor sweet . another to the thoughts . my thoughts lye close imprison'd in the minde , unlesse through strange opinions passage finde . but when they finde a way , they run so fast , no reason can perswade to stay their hast . then they strait seek a credit for to win , perswading all they meet to follow them : and with their rhetoricke hope they to grow strong , striving to get beleife , as they go on . if contradiction chance to stop their way , they strait flye out , and oft times run away . and seldome they do back return again , to rally , or to muster in the brain . but the weak braine is forc'd more thoughts to raise , striving to get a victory of praise . reason , and the thoughts . thoughts , run not in such strange phantastick waies , nor take such paines to get a vulgar praise . the world will scorne , and say , you are all fooles , because you are not taught in common schooles . the world will think you mad , because you run not the same track , that former times have done . turn foolish thoughts , walke in a beaten path , or else the world ridiculously will laugh . reason forbeare , our study not molest , for wee do goe those waies that please us best . nature doth give us liberty to run , without a check , more swift far then the sun . but if we jar , and sometimes disagree , by thy disputes , we run unevenly . but prethee reason trouble us no more , for if you prate , wee 'l thrust you out of doore . to sir charles cavendish , my noble brother-in-law . sir , to forget to divulge your noble favours to me , in any of my works , were to murther gratitvde ; which i will never be guilty of : and though i am your slave , being manacl'd with chaines of obligation , yet my chaines feele softer then silke , and my bondage is pleasanter then freedome ; because i am bound to your selfe , who are a person so full of generosity , as you delight in bounty , and take pleasure to relieve the necessitated condition of your friends ; and what is freely given , is comfortably receiv'd , and a satisfaction to the minde . for , should a bountifull hand be joyn'd to repining thoughts , it would be like a gilded statue made of rotten wood . but your minde is the mint of virtues , which makes them currant coyne ; which i will never clip with a silent tongue , nor change with an unthankfull heart ; but locke it up with the key of admiration , in the chest of affection . i shall not feare to be turn'd out of your favour , though my deserts make me not worthy to dwell therein ; because you are so constant to charity , and so compassionate to misery ; so adverse to covetousnesse , so arm'd against mis-fortunes , so valiant in friendship , so victorious in naturall affections , as you are the conquerour of all merit . and may you ride in triumph on fame round the vniverse , untill the expiring thereof . thus doth your humble servant joy in your love , proud of your favour , glorie in your fame , and will die in your service . m. n. to the reader . noble readers , if this worke is not so well wrought , but that you may finde some false stitches ; i must let you understand it was huddl'd up in such hast , ( out of a desire to have it joyned to my booke of poems ) as i took not so much time , as to consider throughly ; for i writ it in lesse then three weekes ; and yet for all my hast , it came a weeke too short of the presse . besides my desire ( to have those works printed in england , which i wrote in england , before i leave england ) perswaded me to send it to the presse , without a further inlargement . but i imagine my readers will say , that there is enough , unless it were better . i can only say , i wish it were so good , as to give satisfaction : howsoever i pleased my selfe in the study of it . the table . of matter , and motion , page . of the forme , and the minde , . of eternall matter , . of infinite matter , . there is no proportion in nature , ib. of one kinde of matter , . of infinite knowledge , ib. there is no judge in nature , ib. of perfection , . of inequalities , ib. of unities , . of thin , and thick matter , ib. of vacuum , . the unity of nature , ib of division , the order of nature , ib. of war , and no absolute power , . of power , ib. similizing the spirits , or innate motion , of operation , . of natural , or sensitive war . . of annihilation , ib. of life , . of change , . of youth , and growth , . of increasing , . of decay , . of dead , and death , . of locall shapes , . this visible motions in animals , vegetables , and minerals , . of the working of the severall motions of nature , . of the minde , . of their severall dances , and figures , . the sympathy , and antipathy of spirits , . the sympathy of sensitive , and rationall spirits in one figure , . the sympathy of the rationall , and sensitive spirits , to the figure they make , and inhabit , . of pleasure , and paine , . of the minde , ib. of thinking , or the minde , and thoughts , . of the motions of the spirits , . of the creation of the animall figure . . of the gathering of the spirits , . the moving of innate matter , . of matter , motion , and knowledge , or understanding , . of the animall figure , . what an animall is , . of sense , and reason , exercis'd in their different shapes , . of the dispersing of the rationall spirits , . of the senses , . of motion that makes light , . of opticks , ib. of the flowing of the spirits , . of motion , and matter , . of the braine , . of darknesse , ib. of the sun , . of the clouds , ib. of the motion of the planets , . of the motion of the sea , ib. i speak not here of deiaticall infinites , but of grosse infinites , such , as philosophers call chaos . of matter and motion . there is no first matter , nor first motion ; for matter and motion are infinite , and being infinite , must consequently be eternall ; and though but one matter , yet there is no such thing , as the whole matter , that is , as one should say , all . and though there is but one kinde of matter , yet there are infinite degrees of matter , as thinner and thicker , softer and harder , weightier and lighter ; and as there is but one matter , so there is but one motion , yet there are infinite degrees of motion , as swifter and slower ; and infinite changes of motion : and although there is but one matter , yet there are infinite of parts in that matter , and so infinites of figures : if infinite figures , infinite sizes ; if infinite sizes , infinite degrees of higness , and infinite degrees of smalnesse , infinite thicknesse , infinite thinnesse , infinite lightnesse , infinite weightinesse ; if infinite degrees of motion , infinite degrees of strengths ; if infinite degrees of strengths , infinite degrees of power , and infinite degrees of knowledge , and infinite degrees of sense . of the form , and the minde . as i sayd , there is but one matter , thinner and thicker , which is the forme , and the minde , that is , matter moving , or matter moved ; likewise there is but one motion , though slower or swifter moving severall wayes ; but the slower or weaker motions are no lesse motion , then the stronger or swifter . so matter that is thinnest or thickest , softest or hardest , yet it is but one matter ; for if it were divided by degrees , untill it came to an atome , that atome would still be the same matter , as well as the greatest bulk . but we cannot say smallest , or biggest , thickest or thinnest , softest or hardest in infinite . eternall matter . that matter which was solid , and weighty from all eternity , may be so eternally ; and what was spungie , and light from all eternity , may be so eternally ; and what had innate motion from eternity , may be so eternally ; and what was dull without innate motion from eternity , may be so eternally : for if the degrees could change , then there might be all thin , and no thicke , or all thicke , and no thin , all hard , no soft , and fluid , or all fluid , and no solidity . for though contracting and dilating may bring and joyne parts together , or separate parts asunder , yet those parts shall not be any other wayes , then by nature they were . of infinite matter . infinite matter cannot have exact forme , or figure , because it hath no limits : but being divided by motion into severall parts , those parts may have perfect figures , so long as those figures last ; yet these parts cannot be taken from the infinite body . and though parts may be divided in the body infinite , and joyned severall wayes , yet infinite can neither be added , nor diminished ; yet division is as infinite , as the matter divided . no proportion in nature . in nature there is no such thing , as number , or quantity ; for number , & quantity have only reference to division : neither is there any such thing as time in eternity ; for time hath no reference but to the present , if there be any such thing as present . of one kinde of matter . although there may be infinite degrees of matter , yet the nature , and kind of matter is finite : for infinite of severall kindes of matter would make a confusion . of infinite knowledge . there can be no absolute knowledge , if infinite degrees of knowledge ; nor no absolute power , if there be infinite degrees of strength : nor present , if infinite degrees of motion . no judge in nature . no intreaty , nor petition can perswade nature , nor any bribes an corrupt , or alter the course of nature . justly there can be no complaints made against nature , nor to nature . nature can give no redresse . there are no appeales can be made , nor causes determined , because nature is infinite , and eternall : for infinite cannot be confined , or prescribed , setled , or altered , rul'd , or dispos'd , because the effects are as infinite as the causes : and what is infinite , hath no absolute power : for what is absolute , is finite . finite cannot tel how infinite doth flow , nor how infinite matter moveth to and fro . for infinite of knowledge cannot guess of infinite of matter , more , or lesse : nor infinite of causes cannot finde the infinite effects of every kinde . of perfection . in infinite can no perfection be , for why ? perfection is in unity ? in infinite no union can combine , for that has neither number , point , nor line ; though infinite can have no figure , yet not lye all confu'sd in heaps together . of inequalities . if infinites have infinite degrees , and none a like to make equalities . as if a haire be cut with curious arts , innumerable , but unequall parts , and that not any part alike shall be , how shall we joyn , to make them well agree ? if every one is like it selfe alone , there cannot be , unlesse three equal ones . if one , and one make two ; and two , and two make foure , yet there must be two equall ones to make two , and two equall twos to make foure . and as two and one make three , yet there must be two equall ones joyned to a single one , to make three , or three equall single ones to joyn in three . the like is in weight , and measure , in motion and strength . of unities . in infinite if infinite degrees , then those degrees may meet in unities . and if one man should have the strength of foure , then foure to equal him will be no more . as if one line should be in four parts cut , shall equall the same lino together put ; so two and one , though odd , is three ; yet three and three shall equall be . like those that equall spaces backwards go , to those that 's forward , equalls them we know . like buckets in a well , if empty be , as one descends , the other ascends , we see so motions , though they 'r crosse , may well agree , as oft in musick make a harmony . there is no vacuity . in nature if degrees may equall be , all may be full , and no vacuity . as boxes small , & smaller may containe , so bigger , and bigger must there be again . infinite may run contracting , & dilating , still , still , by degrees without a separating . of thin , and thick matter . thus may thin matter into solid run , and by its motion , make thick matter turne . in severall wayes , and fashions , as it will , although dull matter of it selfe lye still : t is not , that solid matter moves in thin , for that is dull , but thin which moves therein . like marrow in the bones , or bloud in veines . or thinner matter which the bloud containes . like heat in fire , the effect is strait to burne , so matter thin makes solid matter run . of vacuum . if infinite inequallity doth run , then must there be in infinite vacuum . for what 's unequall , cannot joyned be so close , but there will be vacuity . the unity of nature . nature tends to unity , being but of a kinde of matter : but the degrees of this matter being thinner , and thicker , softer , and harder , weightier , and lighter , makes it , as it were , of different kinde , when t is but different degrees : like severall extractions , as it were out of one and the same thing ; and when it comes to such an extract , it turnes to spirits , that is , to have an innate motion . of division . the severall degrees of matter cause division by different motion , making severall figures , erecting , and dissolving them , according as their matter moves , this makes motion , and figure alwayes to be in war , but not the matter ; for it is the severall effects that disagree , but not the causes : for the eternall matter is allwayes in peace , as being not subject to change ; but motion , and figure , being subject to change , strive for superiority : which can never be , because subject to change . the order of nature . the reason , that there is not a confusion in nature , but an orderly course therein , is , the eternall matter is allwayes one , and the same : for though there are infinite degrees , yet the nature of that matter never alters . but all variety is made according to the severall degrees , & the severall degrees do palliate , and in some sense make an equality in infinite ; so as it is not the severall degrees of matter , that strive against each other , but severall motions drive them against one another . of war , and no absolute power . the reason , that all things make war upon one another , is , the severall (†) degrees of matter , the contradiction of motion , and the degrees , and the advantage of the shapes of (†) figures alwayes striving . of power . there is no absolute power , because power is infinite , and the infinitenesse hinders the absolutenesse : for if there were an absolute power , there would be no dispute ; but because there is no absolute power , there would be no dispute ; but because there is no absolute power , therefore there are disputes , and will be eternally : for the severall degrees of matter , motion , and figure strive for superiority , making faction by (†) sympathy , and fraction , by (†) antipathy . similizing the spirits , or innate matter . the spirits , or essences in nature are like quick-silver : for say it be fluid , it will part into little sphaericall bodyes , running about , though it be nere so small a quantity : and though they are sphaericall , yet those figures they make by severall , and subtle motion , may differ variously , and infinitely . this innate matter is a kind of god , or gods to the dull part of matter , having power to forme it , as it please : and why may not every degree of innate matter be , as severall gods , and so a stronger motion be a god to the weaker , and so have an infinite , and eternall government ? as we will compare motions to officers , or magistrates . the constable rules the parish , the mayor the constable , the king the mayor , and some higher power the king : thus infinite powers rule eternity . or againe thus , the constable rules the hundred , the mayor rules the city , the king the kingdome , and caesar the world . thus may dull matter over others rule , according as 't is † shap'd by motions tool . so innate matter governs by degree , according as the stronger motions be . of operation . all things in the world have an operative power ; which operation is made by sympatheticall motions , and antipatheticall motions , in severall figures . for the assisting operation is caused by one , the destructive operation by another ; like poyson , and cordialls , the one kills , the other cures : but operations are as infinite , as motions . naturall , or sensitive war . all naturall war is caused either by a sympatheticall motion , or an antipatheticall motion . for naturall warre , and peace proceed from selfe-preservation , which belongs only to the figure ; for nothing is annihilated in nature , but the particular prints , or severall shapes that motion makes of matter ; which motion in every figure strives to maintaine what they have created : for when some figures destroy others , it is for the maintenance or security of themselves : and when the destruction is , for food , it is sympatheticall motion , which makes a particular appetite , or nourishment from some creatures to others ; but an antipatheticall motion , that makes the destruction . of annihilation . there can be no annihilation in nature : not particular motions , and figures , because the matter , remaines hat was the cause of those motions and figures . as for particular figures , although every part is separated that made such a figure , yet it is not annihilated ; because those parts remaine that made it . so as it is not impossible but the same particular figures may be erected by the same motions , that joynd those parts , and in the matter may repeat the same motion eternally so by succession : and the same matter in a figure may be erected , and dispersed eternally . thus the dispersing of the matter into particular figures by an alteration of motion , we call death ; and the joyning of parts to create a figure , we call life . death is a separation , life is a contraction . of life . life is the extract , or spirit of common matter : ( † ) this extract is agile , being alwayes in motion ; for the thinnesse of this matter causes the subtelty of the quality , or property which quality , or property is to work upon all dull matter . this essence , or life , which are spirits of sense , move of themselves : for the dull part of matter moves not , but as it is moved thereby . their common motions are foure . atractive . retentive . digestive . expulsive . atractive is that which we call growth , or youth . retentive , is that we call strength . digestive is that we call health , that is an equall distribution of parts to parts , and agreeing of those sprits . expulsive is that which we call death , or decay . the attractive spirits gather , and draw the materialls together . the digestive spirits do cut and carve out every thing . the retentive do fit , and lay them in their proper places . the expulsive do pull down , and scatter them about . those spirits most commonly move according to the matter they worke on . for in spungy and in porous light matter , their motion is quick ; in solid , and weighty , their motion is slower . for the solid parts are not onely dull , and immoveable in themselves , but they hinder and * obstruct those spirits of sense , and though they cut and peirce through all , yet it is with more labour , and slower motion ; for their motions change according to the quantity and quality of that matter they meet with ; for that which is porous and spungy , the figures that they forme that matter in , are sooner made , and suddenlier destroyed , then that which is more combustible . this is the reason mineralls last longer then vegetables and animals , because that matter is both tougher and harder to worke on , then vegetables and animals are . these sensitive spirits we may similize to severall workmen , being alwayes busily imployed , removing , lifting , carrying , driving , drawing , digging , and the like . and although these spirits are of substance thinner then dull matter , yet they are stronger by reason of their subtlety , and motion , which motion gives them power : for they are of an acute quality , being the vitrioll , as it were , of nature , cut and divide all that opposeth their way . now these spirits although they be infinite , yet we cannot thinke them so grosse an infinite , as combustible matter , yet those thinner infinites may cut , and carve the thicker infinites all into severall figures : like as aqua-fort is will eate into the hardest iron , and divide it into small parts . as i have sayd before , the spirits of life worke according as the matter is , for every thing is shap'd according to the solidity of the matter ; like as a man which builds a house , makes the beames of the house of such wood , which is tough , and strong , because he knows otherwise it will breake , by reason of the great weight they are to bear ; but to make laths he takes his wood and cuts it thin , that the nayls may easier passe through , so joyning and fitting severall forts to proper uses to build his house . or like a cooke when he 's to raise a pye , must take stiffe dough ; for otherwise it will not onely fall before it be finished , but it cannot be raised , and to make the lids to cover his pye , hee must use a softer paste , otherwise it will not rowle thinn ; thus a stiffe paste is not fit for a lid , nor a thinner paste for to raise a pye ; it may make a cake , or so . so the spirits of life must make figures , as the matter is fit , and proper thereto , for the figure of man or the like ; the spirits of life take the solid and hard matter for the * bones : the glutinous matter for the sinews , nerves , muscles . and the like ; and the oyly matter for flesh , fat , marrow . so the fluid for blood , and such like matter . and the spirits themselves do give this dull matter , motion , not onely in the building of the figure , but to make the figure move when it is built . now the spirits of life , or lively spirits do not onely move dull and in moving matter , but makes that matter to move , and worke upon others ; for some kinde of figures shall make † another to resemble it selfe , though not just be as it selfe is made , but as the shadow like the substance ; for it workes as a hand that is guided by another , and not of its owne strength : that is the reason , arts have not so much persection as nature . the copy is not so lively as the originall ; for the spirits of life move , and work of their own strength , and the dull matter by the strength of the spirits . of change . the change of motion in severall figures makes all change and difference in the world , and their severall properties and effects thereto . and that which we call death , or corruption , is not * an absence of life , but an expulsive motion which doth annihilate those figures , that erecting motion hath made . so death is an annihilation of the print , not of the mould of figures ; for the moulds of those figures of mankinde , beast , or plant , of all kinds whatsoever , shall never be annihilated so long as motion and matter last , which may alwayes be ; for the mould of all figures is in the power of motion , and the substance of matter . of youth , or growth . thus spirits of sense work according to the substance of the matter : for if the matter be porous and light , they form those figures quicker , and dissolve them suddenly : but if their matter be solid and hard , they worke slower , which makes some figures longer ere they come to perfection , and not so easily undone . and if their strength be too weake for the matter they worke upon , as wanting helpe , then the figure is imperfect , and mishapen , as we say . this is the reason animals & vegetables , which are young , have not so great strength as when they are full growne ; because there are fewer spirits , and the materialls are loose and unsetled , not knockt close : but by degrees more spirits gather together , which helpe to forward their worke , bring in materialls by food , setling them by nourishment , carrying out by evacuations that matter that is unusefull , and that rubbish and chips , as i may say , which would hinder their motion . if they bring in unusefull matter , their figure increases not , as we say , thrives not . and if they carry out the principall materials , the figure decayes , and falls downe . but those parts of matter which are not spirits , do not carry that part of matter which is spirit , but the spirits carry the dull matter . thus the spirits , the innated matter , move in dull matter , and dull matter moveth by the spirits ; and if the matter be fine , and not grosse , which they build withall , and their motion be regular , then the figure is beautifull and well proportioned . of increasing . the reason that the corruption of one figure is the cause of making of another of the same kinde , is , not onely , that it is of such a tempered matter that can onely make such a kinde of figure ; but that the spirits make figures according to their strength : so that the spirits that are in the seed , when they have undone the figure they are in , by a generall expulsion , which we call corruption , they begin to create againe another figure of the same kinde , if no greater power hinder it . for the matter that is proper , to make such like figures , is fitted , or temper'd to their strengths . so as the temper of the matter , and the strength of the spirits , are the erectors of those figures eternally . and the reason , that from one seed , lesse , or more numbers are increased and raisd , is , that though few begin the work , more will come to their help ; and as their numbers are increased , their figures are more , or lesse , weaker , or stronger . of decay . when spirits of life have created a figure , and brought it to perfection ; if they did not pull it down again they would be idle having no work to do ; and idlenesse is against the nature of life , being a perpetuall mption . for as soon as a figure is perfected , the spirits generally move to an expulsive motion . this is the reason , that age hath not that strength as full-growth : but like an old house falling down by degrees , shed their haires or leaves , instead of tiles , the windowes broke downe , and stopped with rubbish . so eyes in animals grow hollow and dimme . and when the foundation of a house is loose , every little wind shakes it . so when the nerves being slack , and the muscles untyed , and the joynts unhing'd , the whole body is weak , and tottering , which we call palsies : which palsies , as the wind , shakes . the blood , as the springe dries up , rheumes as raine fals down , and vapours , as dust , flye up . of dead , and death . dead is , where there is a generall alteration of such motion , as is proper to such figures . but death is an annihilation of that print , or figure , by an expulsive motion : and as that figure dissolves , the spirits disperse about , carrying their severall burthens to the making of other figures . like as a house that is ruin'd by time , or spoyled by accident ; the severall materials are imployed to other uses ; sometimes to the building of an house again . but a house is longer a building then a pulling down , by reason of the cutting , carving , laying , carrying , placing , and fitting every part to make them joyn together ; so all the works of nature are sooner dissolv'd then created . of locall shapes . some shapes have power over others , but t is not alwaies in the size , or bulck of the figure , but in the manner of their formes that gives advantage , or disadvantage . a little mouse will run through the snowt of a great elephant : a little flye will sting a great figure to death ; a worm will wind through a thick body ; the lions force lies in his clawes , the horses in his hoofe , the dogs in his teeth , the bulls in his hornes , and mans in his armes , and hands ; birdes in their bills , and talons : and the manner of their shapes gives them severall properties , or faculties . as the shape of a bird causes them to flye , a worm to creep , the shape of a beast to run , the shape of fish to swim ; yet some flye swifter , and higher then others , as their wings are made : so some run nimbler then others , according as their limbs are made ; and some swim glider then others , according as their fins are made . but man surpasses the shape of all other creatures ; because he hath a part , as it were , of every shape . but the same motion , and the same matter , without the shape , could not give such externall properties ; since all internall properties are wrought out of dull matter . so as it is their shapes , joyned with such motions proper thereunto , that give strength , & agilenesse . but the internall qualities may be alike in every figure ; because rationall spirits worke not upon dull matter , but figures themselves . the visible motion in animals , vegetables , and minerals . the externall motions of animals are , running , turning , winding , tumbling , leaping , jumping , shoving , throwing , darting , climbing , creeping , drawing , heaving , lifting , carrying , holding , or staying , piercing , digging flying , swimming , diving . the internall motion , is , contriving , directing , examining , comparing , or judging , contemplating , or reasoning , approving , or disapproving , resolving . from whence arise all the passions , and severall dispositions . these , and the like , are the visible , internall motions in animals . the internall motions of vegetables , and minerals , are in operation ; as , contracting , dilating ; which is attractive , retentive , digestive , expulsive . the vegetables externall motion , is , increasing , decreasing , that is enlarging , or lasting ; although there may be matter not moving , yet there is no matter , which is not moved . of the working of severall motions of nature . motions do work according as they finde matter , that 's fit , and proper for each kinde . sensitive spirits work not all one way , but as the matter is , they cut , carve , lay . joyning together matter , solid light , and build , & form some figures streight upright ; or make them bending , and so jutting out : and some are large , and strong , and big about . and some are thick , and hard , and close unite ; others are flat , and low , and loose , and light . but when they meet with matter , fine , and thin , then they do weave , as spiders when they spin : all that is woven is soft , smooth , thin things , as flowry vegetables , & animall skins . observe the graine of every thing , you le see , like inter-woven threads lye evenly . and like to diaper , & damask wrought , in severall workes , that for our table 's bought . or like to carpets which the persian made , or sattin smooth , which is the florence trade . some matter they ingrave , like ring , and seale , which is the stamp of natures common-weale . t is natures armes , where she doth print on all her works , as coyne that 's in the mint . some severall sorts they joyn together glu'd . as matter solid , with some that 's fluid . like to the earthly ball , where some are mixt of severall sorts , although not fixt . for though the figure of the earth may last longer then others ; yet at last may waste . and so the sun , and moon , and planets all , like other figures , at the last may fall . the matter 's still the same , but motion may alter it into figures every way : yet keepe the property , to make such kind of figures fit , which motion out can find . thus may the figures change , if motion hurles that matter of her waies , for other worlds . of the minde . there is a degree of stronger spirits then the sensitive spirits , as it were the essence of spirits ; as the spirit of spirits : this is the minde , or soule of animalls . for as the sensitive spirits are a weak knowledge , so this is a stronger knowledge . as to similize them , i may say , there is as much difference betwixt them , as aqua fortis , to ordinary vitrioll . these rationall spirits , as i may call them , worke not upon dull matter , as the sensitive spirits do ; but only move in measure , and number , which make figures ; which figures are thoughts , as memory , understanding , imaginations , or fancy , and remembrance , and will . thus these spirits moving in measure , casting , and placing themselves into figures make a consort , and harmony by numbers . where the greater quantity , or numbers , are together of those rationall spirits , the more variety of figure is made by their severall motion , they dance severall dances according to their company . of their severall dances , or figures . what object soever is presented unto them by the senses , they straite dance themselves into that figure ; this is memory . and when they dance the same figure without the helpe of the outward object , this is remembrance when they dance figures of their owne invention , ( as i may say ) then that is imagination or fancie . understanding is when they dance perfectly ( as i may say ) not to misse the least part of those figures that are brought through the senses . will is to choose a dance , that is to move as they please , and not as they are perswaded by the sensitive spirits . but when their motion and measures be not regular , or their quantity or numbers sufficient to make the figures perfect , then is the minde weak and infirme , ( as i may say ) they dance out of time and measure . but where the greatest number of these , or quantity of these essences are met , and joyn'd in the most regular motion , there is the clearest understanding , the deepest judgement , the perfectest knowledge , the finest fancies , the more imagination , the stronger memory , the obstinatest will . but sometimes their motions may be regular ; but society is so small , so as they cannot change into so many severall figures : then we say he hath a weak minde , or a poor soule . but be their quantity or numbers few or great , yet if they move confusedly , and out of order , wee say the minde is distracted . and the reason the minde , or soule is improveable , or decayable , is , that the quantity or numbers are increaseable , or decreaseable , and their motions regular , and irregular . a feaver in the body is the same motion amongst the sensitive spirits , as madnesse is in the minde amongst the rationall spirits . so lkewise paine in the body is like those motions , that make griefe in the minde . so pleasure in the body is the like motions , as make delight , and joy in the minde , all convulsive motions in the body , are like the motions that cause feare in the minde . all expulsive motions amongst the rational spirits , are a dispersing their society ; as expulsity in the body , is the dispersing of dull matter by the sensitive spirits . all drugs have an opposite motion to the matter they work on , working by an expulsive motion ; and if they move strongly , having great quantity of spirits gathered together in a little dul matter , they do not only cast out superfluous matter , but pul down the very materials of a figure . but al cordials have a sympatheticall motion to the matter they meet , giving strength by their help to those spirits they finde tired : ( as one may say ) that it is to be over-power'd by opposite motions in dull matter . the sympathy , and antipathy of spirits . pleasure , and delight , discontent , and sorrow , which is love , and hate , is like light , and darknesse ; the one is a quick , equall , and free motion ; the other is a slow , irregular , and obstructed motion . when there is the like motion of rationall spirits in opposite figures , then there is a like understanding , and disposition . just as when there is the like motion in the sensitive spirits , then there is the like constitution of body . so when there is the like quantity laid in the same symmetry , then the figures agree in the same proportions , and lineaments of figures . the reason , that the rationall spirits in one figure , are delighted with the outward forme of another figure , is , that the motions of those sensitive spirits which move in that figure agree with the motion of the rationall spirits in the other . this is love of beauty ; and when the sensitive motions alter in the figure of the body , and the beauty decaies , then the motion of the rationall spirits alter , and the love , or goodliking ceases . if the motion of the rationall spirits are crosse to the motion of the sensitive spirits , in opposite figures , then it is dislike . so if the motion be just crosse , and contrary , of the rationall spirits in opposite figures , it is hate ; but if they agree , it is love . but these sympathies , which are made only by a likenesse of motions without an intermixture , last not longe ; because those spirits are at a distance , changing their motion without the knowledge , or consent of either side . but the way that the rationall spirits intermix , is , through the organs of the body , especially the eyes , and eares , which are the common doors , which let the spirits out , and in . for the vocall , and verbal motion from the mouth , carry the spirits through the eares down to the heart , where love , and hate is lodged . and the spirits from the eyes issue out in beames , and raies ; as from the sun , which heat , or scorch † the heart , which either raise a fruitful crop of love , making the ground fertile , or dries it so much , as makes it insipid , that nothing of good will grow there , unlesse stinking weeds of hate : but if the ground be fertile , although every crop is not so rich , as some , yet it never growes barren , unlesse they take out the strength with too much kindness ; as the old proverb , they kill with too much kindnesse ; which murther is seldome committed . but the rationall spirits † are apt to take surfet , as wel as sensitive spirits , which makes love , and good-will , so often to be ill rewarded , neglected , and disdain'd . the sympathy of sensitive , and rationall spirits in one figure . there is a stronge sympathy , and agreement , or affection ( as i may say ) betwixt the rationall spirits , and the sensitive spirits joyned in one figure : like fellow-labourers that assist one another , to help to finish their work . for when they disagree , as the rationall spirits will move one way sometimes , and the sensitive spirits another ; that is , when reason strives to abate the appetite of the senses ; yet it is by a loving direction , rather to admonish them by a gentle contrary motion for them to imitate , and follow in the like motions ; yet it is , as they alwayes agree at last ; like the father , and the son . for though the father rules by command , and the son obeies through obedience , yet the father out of love to his son , as willing to please him , submits to his delight , although (†) it is against his liking . so the rationall spirits oftimes agree with the motions of the sensitive spirits , although they would rather move another way . the sympathy of the rationall and sensitive spirits , to the figure they make , and inhabit . all the externall motion in a figure , is , by the sensitive spirits ; and all the internall , by the rationall spirits : and when the rationall , and sensitive spirits , disagree in opposite figures , by contrary motion , they oft war upon one another ; which to defend , the sensitive spirits , and rationall spirits , use all their force , and power in either figure ; to defend , or to assault , to succour , or to destroy , through an aversion made by contrary motions in each other . now the rationall spirits do not only choose the materialls for their defence , or assault , but do direct the sensitive spirits in the management thereof ; and according to the strength of the spirits of either side , the victory is gain'd , or lost . if the body be weak , there is lesse sensitive spirit , if the direction be not advantageous , there is lesse rationall spirit . but many times the alacrity of the rationall and sensitive spirits , made by moving in a regular motion , overcomes the greater numbers , being in a disorder'd motion . thus what is lost by scarcity , is regain'd by conformity and unity . of pleasure , and paine . all evacuations have an expulsive motion ; if the expulsive motion is regular , t is pleasure , if irregular , t is paine . indeed , all irregular , and crosse motion , is paine ; all regular motion is pleasure , and delight , being a harmony of motion , or a discord of motion . of the minde . imagine the rationall essence , or spirits , like little sphericall bodies of quick-silver several ways (†) placing themselves in several figures , sometimes moving in measure , and in order , and sometimes out of order : this quick-silver to be the minde , and their severall postures made by motion , the passions , and affections ; or all that is moving in a minde , to expresse those severall motions , is onely to be done by guesse , not by knowledge , as some few i will guesseat . love is , when they move in equall number , and even measure . hate is an opposite motion : feare is , when those small bodies tumble on a heap together without order . anger is , when they move without measure , and in no uniforme figure . inconstancy is , when they move swistly severall wayes . constancy is a circular motion . doubt , and suspition , and jealousie , are , when those small bodies move with odd numbers . hope is when those small bodies move like wilde geese , one after another . admiration is , when those sphericall bodies gather close together , knitting so , as to make such a circular figure ; and one is to stand for a center or point in the midst . humility is a creeping motion . joy is a hopping , skipping motion . ambition is a lofty motion , as to move upwards , or * higher then other motions . coveting , or ambition is like a flying motion , moving in severall figures like that which they covet for ; if they covet for fame , they put themselves into such figures , as letters do , that expresse words , which words are such praises as they would have , or such figures as they would have statues cutt , or pictures drawne : but all their motion which they make , is according to those figures with which they sympathize and agree : besides , their motion and figures are like the sound of musick ; though the notes differ , the cords agree to make a harmony : so several symmetries make a perfect figure , severall figures make a just number , and severall quantities or proportions make a just weight , and severall lines make an even measure : thus equall may be made out of divisions eternally , and infinitely . and because the figures and motions of the infinite spirits which they move , and make , are infinite , i cannot give a finall description : besides , their motion is so subtle , curious , and intricate , as they are past finding out . some naturall motions work so curious fine , none can perceive , unlesse an eye divine . of thinking , or the minde , and thoughts . one may think , and yet not of any particular thing ; that is , one may have sense , and not thoughts : for thoughts are when the minde takes a particular notice of some outward object , or inward idea ; but thinking is only a sense without any particular notice . as for example ; those that are in a great feare , and are amazed , the minde is in confus'd sense , without any particular thoughts : but when the minde is out of that amaze , it fixes it selfe on particulars , and then have thoughts of past danger ; but the minde can have no particular thought of the amaze ; for the minde cannot call to minde that which was not . likewise when we are asleep , the mind is not out of the body , nor the motion that makes the sense of the minde ceast , which is thinking ; but the motion that makes the thoughts therein work upon particulars . thus the minde may bee without thoughts , but thoughts cannot be without the minde : yet thoughts go out of the minde very oft , that is , such a motion to such a thing is ceast ; and when that motion is made again , it returns . thus thinking is the minde , and thoughts the effect thereof : thinking is an equall motion without a figure , or as when we feele heat , and see no fire . of the motions of the spirits . if it be , as probably it is , that all sensitive spirits live in dull matter ; so rationall spirits live in sensitive spirits , according to the shape of those figures that the sensitive spirits form them . the rationall spirits by moving severall waies , may make severall kindes of knowledge , and according to the motions of the sensitive spirits in their severall figures they make , though the spirits may be the same , yet their severall motions may be unknown to each other . like as a point , that writes upon a table-book , which when the letter that was writ thereon , is rub'd out , the table is as plain , as if there was never any letter thereon ; but though the letters are out , yet the table-book , and pen remaine . so although this motion is gone , the spirit , and matter remaine ; but if those spirits make other kindes of motions , like other kindes of letters , or language , those motions understand not the first , nor the first understands not them , being as severall languages . even so it may be in a sound ; for that kind of knowledge the figure had in the sound , which is an alteration of the motion of the rationall spirits , caus'd by an alteration of the motion of the sensitive spirits in dull matter : and by these disorderly motions , other motions are ru'bd out of the table-book , which is the matter that was moved . but if the same kind of letters be writ in the same place again ; that is , when the spirits move in the same motion , then the same knowledge is in that figure , as it was before ; the other kind of knowledge , which was made by other kind of motion , is rub'd out ; which severall knowledge is no more known to each other , then severall languages by unlearned men . and as language is still language , though not understood , so knowledge is still knowledge , although not generall ; but if they be that , we call dead , then those letters that were rubbed out , were never writ again ; which is , the same knowledge never returnes into the same figure . thus the spirits of knowledge , or the knowledge of spirits , which is their severall motions , may be ignorant , and unacquainted with each other : that is , that some motion may not know how other motions move , not only in several spirits , but in one and the same spirit ; no more then every effect can know their cause : and motion is but the effect of the spirits , which spirits are a thin , subtle matter : for there would be no motion if there were no matter ; for nothing can move : but there may be matter without selfe-motion , but not selfe-motion without matter . matter prime knowes not what effects shall be , or how their severall motions will agree . because † t is infinite , and so doth move eternally , in which nothing can prove . for infinite doth not in compasse lye , nor hath eternall lines to measure by . knowledge is there none , to comprehend that which hath no beginning , nor no end . perfect knowledge comprises all can be , but nothing can comprise eternity . destiny , and fates , or what the like we call , in infinites they no power have at all . nature hath generosity enough to give all figures case , whilst in that form they live . but motion which innated matter is by running crosse , each severall paines it gives . of the creation of the animall figure . the reason , † that the sensitive spirits , when they begin to create an animal figure , the figure that is created feels it not , untill the modell be finished , that is , it cannot have an animall motion , untill it hath an animall figure ; for it is the shape which gives it locall motion : and after the fabrick is built , they begin to furnish it with † strength , and inlarge it with growth , and the rationall spirit which inhabits it , chooseth his room , which is the head ; and although some rationall spirits were from the first creating it , yet had not such motions , as when created : besides , at first they have not so much company , as to make so much change , as to take parts , like instruments of musick , which cannot make so much division upon few strings as upon more . the next , the figure being weak , their motions cannot be strong ; besides , before the figure is inlarged by growth , they want room to move in . this is the reason , that new-borne animalls seeme to have no knowledge , especially man ; because the spirits do neither move so strong , nor have such variety of change , for want of company to make a consort . yet some animalls have more knowledge then others , by reason of their strength , as all beasts know their dams , and run to their dugs , and know how to suck as soone as they are borne ; and birds and children , and the like weak creatures , such do not . but the spirits of sense give them strength , and the spirits of reason do direct them to their food , (†) & the spirits of sense give them taste , and appetite , and the spirits of reason choose their meat : for all animall creatures are not of one dyet , for that which will nourish one , will destroy another . the gathering of spirits . if the rationall spirits should enter into a figure newly created , altogether , and not by degrees , a childe ( for example ) would have as much understanding and knowledge in the womb , or when it is new-borne , as when it is inlarged and fully grown . but we finde by experience there are severall sorts and degrees of knowledge and understanding , by the recourse of spirits : which is the reason , some figures have greater proportion of understanding and knowledge , and sooner then others ; yet it is increased by degrees , according as rationall spirits increase . like as children , they must get strength before they can go . so learning and experience increase rationall spirits , as food the sensitive : but experience and learning is not alwayes tyed to the eare ; for every organ and pore of the body is as severall doores to let them in and out : for the rationall spirits living with the sensitive spirits , come in , and go out with them , but not in equall proportion , but sometimes more , sometimes fewer : this makes understanding more perfect in health then in sicknesse , and in our middle age , more then in the latter age : for in age and sicknesse there is more carryed out , then brought in . this is the reason , children have not such understanding , but their reason increaseth with their yeares . but the rationall spirits may be similized † to a company of good fellows , which have pointed a meeting ; and the company coming from severall places , makes their time the longer ere their numbers are compleated , though many a braine is disappointed ; but in some figures the rooms are not commodious to move in , made in their creation , for want of helpe : those are changelings , innocents , or naturall fooles . the rationall spirits seem most to delight in spungy , soft , and liquid matter ; as in the blood , brain , nerves , and in vegetables ; as not only being neerest to their own nature , but having more room to move in . this makes the rationall spirits to choose the head in animals , for their chiefe room to dance their figures in : (†) for the head is the biggest place that hath the spungy materialls ; thus as soon as a figure is created , those rationall spirits choose a room . the moving of innate matter . though motion makes knowledge , yet the spirits give motion : for those spirits , or essences , are the guiders , governours , directers ; the motions are but their instruments , the spirits are the cause , motion but an effect therefrom : for that thin matter which is spirits , can alter the motion , but motion cannot alter the matter , or nature of those essences , or spirits ; so as the same spirits may be in a body , but not one and the same knowledge , because not the same motion , that made that knowledge . as for example ; how many severall touches belong to the body ? for every part of the body hath a severall touch , which is a severall knowledge belonging to every severall part ; for every severall part doth not know , and feele every severall touch . for when the head akes , the heele feels it not , but only the rationall spirits which are free from the incumbrance of dull matter , they are agile , and quick to take notice of every particular touch , in , or on every part of the figure . the like motions of a paine in the body . the like motion of the rationall spirits , we call a griefe in the mind ; for touch in the body , is a thought in the mind ; and to prove it is the like motion of the rationall spirits to the sensitive , which makes the knowledge of it , is , that when the rationall spirits are busily moved with some fantasmes , if any thing touches the body , it is not known to the rationall spirits , because the rationall spirits move not in such a motion , as to make a thought in the head , of the touch in the heele , which makes the thoughts to be as senselesse of that touch , as any other part of the body , that hath not such paines made by such motions . and shall we say , there is no sense in the heele , because no knowledge of it in the head ? we may as well say , that when an object stands just before an eye that is blind , either by a contrary motion of the thoughts inward , by some deep contemplation , or otherwise : we may as well say there is no outward object , because the rationall spirits take no notice of that object ; t is not , that the stronger motion stops the lesse , or the swifter , the flower ; for then the motions of the planets would stop one anothers course . some will say , what sense hath man , or any other animall when they are dead ? it may be answered , that the figure , which is a body , may have sense , but not the animall ; for that we call an animall , is such a temper'd matter joyn'd in such a figure , moving with such kind of motions ; but when those motions do generally alter , that are proper to an animall , although the matter , and figure remain , yet it is no longer an animall , because those motions that help it to make an animall are ceas'd : so as the animall can have no more knowledge of what kind of sense the figure hath , ( because it is no more an animall ) then an animall , what sense dust hath . and that is the reason , that when any part is dead in an animall , if that those motions that belonged to the animall , are ceas'd in that part , which alter it from being a part of the animall , and knowes no more what sense it hath , then if a living man should carry a dead man upon his shoulders , what sense the dead man feels , whether any , or no . of matter , motion , and knowledge or understanding . whatsoever hath an innate motion , hath knowledge ; and what matter soever hath this innate motion , is knowing : but according to the severall motions , are severall knowledges made ; for knowledge lives in motion , as motion lives in matter : for though the kind of matter never alters , yet the manner of motions alters in that matter : and as motions alter , so knowledge differs , which makes the severall motions in severall figures , to give severall knowledge . and where there is a likenesse of motion , there is a likenesse of knowledge : as the appetite of sensitive spirits , and the desire of rationall spirits are alike motions in severall degrees of matter . and the touch in the heel , or any part of the body else , is the like motion , as the thought thereof in the head ; the one is the motion of the sensitive spirits , the other in the rationall spirits , as touch from the sensitive spirits : for thought is only a strong touch , & touch a weake thought . so sense is a weak knowledge , and knowledge a strong sense , made by the degrees of the spirits : for animall spirits are stronger ( as i sayd before ) being of an higher extract ( as i may say ) in the chymistry of nature , which makes the different degrees in knowledge , by the difference in strengths and finenesse , or subtlety of matter . of the animall figure . whatsoever hath motion hath sensitive spirits ; and what is there on earth that is not wrought , or made into figures , and then undone again by these spirits ? so that all matter is moving , or moved , by the movers ; if so , all things have sense , because all things have of these spirits in them ; and if sensitive spirits , why not rationall spirits ? for there is as much infinite of every severall degree of matter , as if there were but one matter : for there is no quantity in infinite ; for infinite is a continued thing . if so , who knowes , but vegetables and mineralls may have some of those rationall spirits , which is a minde or soule in them , as well as man ? onely they want that figure ( with such kinde of motion proper thereunto ) to expresse knowledge that way . for had vegetables and mineralls the same shape , made by such motions , as the sensitive spirits create ; then there might be wooden men , and iron beasts ; for though marks do not come in the same way , yet the same marks may come in , and be made by the same motion ; for the spirits are so subtle , as they can passe and repasse through the solidest matter . thus there may be as many severall and various motions in vegetables and mineralls , as in animals ; and as many internall figures made by the rationall spirits ; onely they want the animall , to expresse it the animall way . and if their knowledge be not the same knowledge , but different from the knowledge of animalls , by reason of their different figures , made by other kinde of motion on other tempered matter , yet it is knowledge . for shall we say , a man doth not know , because hee doth not know what another man knows , or some higher power ? what an animall is . an animall is that which wee call sensitive spirit ; that is , a figure that hath locall motion ; that is , such a kinde of figure with such kinde of motions proper thereunto . but when there is a generall alteration of those motions in it , then it is no more that we call animall ; because the locall motion is altered ; yet we cannot knowingly say , it is not a sensitive creature , so long as the figure lasts : besides when the figure is dissolved , yet every scattered part may have sense , as long as any kinde of motion is in it ; and whatsoever hath an innate motion , hath sense , either increasing or decreasing motion ; but the sense is as different as the motions therein , because those properties belonging to such a figure are altered by other motions . of sense and reason exercised in their different shapes . if every thing hath sense and reason , then there might be beasts , and birds , and fish , and men : as vegetables and minerals , had they the animall shape to expresse that way ; and vegetables & minerals may know , as man , though like to trees and stones they grow . then corall trouts may through the water glide , and pearled menows swim on either side ; and mermayds , which in the sea delight , might all be made of watry lillies white ; set on salt watry billows as they flow , which like green banks appeare thereon to grow . and marriners i th' midst their shipp might stand , in stead of mast , hold sayles in either hand . on mountaine tops the golden fleece might feed , some hundred yeares their ewes bring forth their breed . large deere of oake might through the forrest run , leaves on their heads might keepe them from the sun ; in stead of shedding hornes , their leaves might fall , and acornes to increase a wood of fawnes withall . then might a squerrill for a nut be crackt , if nature had that matter so compact : and the small sprouts which on the husk do grow , might be the taile , and make a brushing show . then might the diamonds which on rocks oft lye , be all like to some little sparkling flye . then might a leaden hare , if swiftly run , melt from that shape , and so a (†) pig become . and dogs of copper-mouths sound like a bell ; so when they kill a hare , ring out his knell . hard iron men shall have no cause to feare to catch a fall , when they a hunting were . nor in the wars should have no use of armes , nor fear'd to fight ; they could receive no harmes . for if a bullet on their breasts should hit , fall on their back , but strait-waies up may get . or if a bullet on their head do light . may make them totter , but not kill them quite . and stars be like the birds with twinckling wing , when in the aire they flye , like larks might sing . and as they flye , like wandring planets shew , their tailes may like to blazing comets grow . when they on trees do rest themselves from flight , appeare like fixed stars in clouds of night . thus may the sun be like a woman faire , and the bright beames be as her flowing haire . and from her eyes may cast a silver light , and when she sleeps , the world be as dark night . or women may of alabaster be , and so as smooth as polisht ivory . or , as cleer christall , where heartes may be shown , and all their falsehoods to the world be known . or else be made of rose , and lillies white , both faire , and sweet , to give the soule delight . or else bee made like tulips fresh in may , by nature drest , cloath'd severall colours gay . thus every yeare there may young virgins spring , but wither , and decay , as soon agen . while they are fresh , upon their breast might set great swarmes of bees , from thence sweet honey get . or , on their lips , for gilly-flowers , flies drawing delicious sweet that therein lies . thus every maid , like severall flowres shew , not in their shape , but like in substance grow . then teares which from oppressed hearts do rise , may gather into clouds within the eyes : from whence those teares , like showres of raine may flow upon the bancks of cheeks , where roses grow . after those showres of raine , so sweet may smell , perfuming all the aire , that neer them dwell . but when the sun of joy , and mirth doth rise , darting forth pleasing beames from loving eyes . then may the buds of modesty unfold , with full blown confidence the sun behold . but griefe as frost them nips , and withering dye , in their owne (†) podds intombed lye . thus virgin cherry trees , where blossomes blow , so red ripe cherries on their lips may grow . or women plumtrees at each fingers end , may ripe plummes hang , and make their joynts to bend . men sicomores , which on their breast may write their amorous verses , which their thoughts indite . mens stretched arms may be like spreading vines , where grapes may grow , soe drinke of their own wine . to plant large orchards , need no paines nor care , for every one their sweet fresh fruit may beare . then silver grasse may in the meadowes grow , which nothing but a sithe of fire can mow . the wïnd , which from the north a journey takes , may strike those silver strings , and musick make . thus may another world , though matter still the same , by changing shapes , change humours , properties , and name . thus colossus , a statue wonderous great , when it did fall , might strait get on his feet . where ships , which through his leggs did swim , he might have blow'd their sailes , or else have drown'd them quite . the golden calfe that israel joy'd to see , might run away from their idolatry . the basan bul of brasse might be , when roare , his mettl'd throat might make his voice sownd more . the hil , which mahomet did call , might come at the first word , or else away might run . thus pompey's statue might rejoyce to see , when kill'd was caesar , his great enemy . the wooden-horse that did great troy betray , have told what 's in him , and then run away . achilles armes against ulisses plead , and not let wit against true valour speed . of the dispersing of the rationall spirits . some think , that the rationall spirits flye out of animals , ( or that animall we call man ) like a swarm of bees , when they like not their hives , finding some inconvenience , seek about for another habitation : or leave the body , like rats , when they finde the house rotten , and ready to fall ; or scar'd away like birds from their nest. but where should this swarm , or troop , or flight , or essences go , unlesse they think this thin matter is an essence , evaporates to nothing ? as i have said before , the difference of rationall spirits , and sensitive spirits , is , that the sensitive spirits make figures out of dull matter : the rationall spirits put themselves into figure , placing themselves with number , and measure ; this is the reason when animals dye , the externall forme of that animall may be perfect , and the internall motion of the spirits quite alter'd ; yet not absent , nor dispersd , untill the annihilating of the externall figure : thus it is not the matter that alters , but the motion and forme . some figures are stronger built then others , which makes them last longer : for some , their building is so weak , as they fall as soon as finished ; like houses that are built with stone , or timber , although it might be a stone-house , or timber-house , yet it may be built not of such a sort of stone , or such a sort of timber . of the senses . the pores of the skin receive touch , as the eye light , the eare sound , the nose scent , the tongue tast . thus the spirits passe , and repasse by the holes , they peirce through the dull matter , carrying their severall burthens out , & in , yet it is neither the burthen , nor the passage that makes the different sense , but the different motion ; † for if the motion that comes through the pores of the skin , were as the motions that come from the eye , eare , nose , mouth , then the body might receive sound , light , scent , tast , all over as it doth touch . of motion that makes light . if the same motion that is made in the head did move in the heele , there would appeare a light to the sense of that part of the figure ; unlesse they will make such matter as the braine to be infinite , and onely in the head of an animall . opticks . there may be such motion in the braine , as to make light , although the sun never came there to give the first motion : for two opposite motions may give a light by reflection , unlesse the sun , and the eye have a particular motion from all eternity : as we say an eternal monopoler of such a kind of motion as makes light . of the flowing of the spirits . the spirit 's like to ants , in heapes they lye , the hill they make , is the round ball , the eye . from thence they run to fetch each object in , the braine receives , and stores up all they bring . and in the eares , like hives , as bees they swarm , buzzing , and humming , as in summers warm . and when they flye abroad , they take much paine , to bring in fine conceits into the braine . of which , as wax , they make their severall cells , in workes of poetry , which wit still fills : and on the tongue , they sit as flowres sweet , sucking their honey from delicious meat . then to the nose , like birds they flye , there pick up sweet perfumes , in stead of spices stick . of which within the braine they build a nest , to which delight , or else to take their rest . but in the porous skin , they spread as sheep , and feeding cattell which in meadowes keep . of motion , and matter . why may not vegetables have light , sound , taste , touch , as well as animals , if the same kind of motion moves the same kind of matter in them ? for who knowes , but the sappe in vegetables may be of the same substance , and degree of the braine : and why may not all the senses be inherent in a figure , if the same motion moves the same matter within the figure , as such motion without the figure ? of the braine . the braine in animals is like clouds , which are sometimes swell'd full with vapour , and sometimes rarified with heat , and mov'd by the sensitive spirits to severall objects , as the cloudes are mov'd by the wind to severall places . the winds seem to be all spirits , because they are so agile , and quick . of darknesse . to prove that darknesse hath particular motions which make it , as well as motion makes light , is , that when some have used to have a light by them while they sleep , will , as soon as the light goeth out , awake ; for it darknesse had no motion , it would not strike upon the optick nerve . but as an equall motion makes light , and a perturb'd motion makes colour , which is between light , & darknesse : so darknesse is an opposite motion to those motions that make light ; for though light is an equall motion , yet it is such a kind , or sort of motion . of the sun . why may not the sun be of an higher extract then the rationall spirits , and be like glasse , which is a high extract in chymistry , and so become a (†) shining body ? if so , sure it hath a great knowledge ; for the sun seemes to be composed of purer spirits , without the mixture of dull matter ; for the motion is quick , and subtle , as wee may finde by the effect of the light , and heat . of the cloudes . the cloudes seem to be of such spungy , and porous matter , as the raine , and aire , like the sensitive spirits that form , and move it , and the sun the rationall spirit to give them knowledge : and as moist vapours from the stomack rise , and gathering in the braine , flow through the eyes ; so do the clouds send forth , as from the braine , the vapours which do rise in showres . of the motion of the planets . the earth , sun , moon , the rest of planets all are mov'd by that , we vitall spirits call . and like to animals , some move more slow , and other some by quicker motion go . and as some creatures by their shapes do flye , some swim , some run , some creep , some riseth high . so planets by their shapes about do wind , all being made , like circles , round we find . the motion of the sea . the sea 's more quick , then fresher waters are , the reason is , more vitall spirits are there . and as the planets move still round about , so seas do ebb , & flow , both in , & out . as arrowes flye up , far as strength them lend , and then for want of strength do back descend . so do the seas in ebbes-run back againe , for want of strength , their length for to maintaine . but why they ebb , and flow , at certain times , is like the lungs that draw , and breath out wind . just so do seas draw back , and then do flow , as constant as the lungs do to and fro : alwaies in motion , never lying still , the empty place they leave , turn back to fill . we may as well inquire of nature , why animals breath in such a space of time , as the seas ebb , and flow in such a space of time . i could have inlarged my booke with the fancies of the severall motions , which makes the several effects of the sun , planets , or the suns ( i may say ) as the fixed stars : and whether they have not cast knowledge , and understanding by their various , and quicke , and subtle motions ; and whether they do not order and dispose other creatures , by the power of their supreamer motions . what motions make civil wars , and whether the aire causes it , or not ? whether the stars , and planets work not upon the disposition of severall creatures , and of severall effects , joyning as one way ? what motion makes the aire pestilent , and how it comes to change into severall diseases ? and whether diseases are just alike , and whether they differ as the faces of men do ? why some figures are apt to some diseases , and others not ? and why some kinde of drugs , or cordialls , will worke on some diseases , and not on others ? and why some drugs have strong effects upon some humours , and not upon others ? and why physicke should purge , and how some cordials will rectifie the disorderly motion in a distemper'd figure ? why some ground will beare some sorts of seeds , and not others ? why same food will nourish some figures , and destroy others ? how naturall affection is bred in the wombe . what makes a naturall aversion from some creatures to others , and what causes an unnaturalnsse to their owne kind and breed ? what motion makes thunder , lightning , vvinde , earthquakes , cold , ice , snow , haile , rain , what motions makes drought , heat . why the sun should give light , and not the other planets . what motions make fire , aire , water , earth . what manner of motions make sense . why some have haire , some wool , some feathers , some scales , and some onely skin . and why some vegetables beare some leaves , some none , some fruit , some none . and what motion makes particular taste , scent , colour , touch ; and why all do touch , not taste alike : and whether they be inherent , or not ; and how they may be inherent in every figure proper thereto , and yet another figure receive them in another sense : and how it comes , that some figures have more of some sense , then others , and what makes the society of every kinde of figure , and what makes the war with others , and amongst themselves : and how such degrees of matter with such kinde of motions , make the difference in vegetables , minerals , and animals ; and why such shapes must of necessity have such properties , and why some shapes have power over other shapes ; and why some shapes have power over some motions , and some motions over some shapes , and some motions over other motions , and what the severall effects are of severall shapes , and severall motions . what makes that which is fulsome , and nauceous , pleasant , and savory ; whether they are inherent , or not , whether they are in the contained , or the containing ; or whether a sympathy or likenesse from both , and so of all the senses ; whether the outward motition cause the sense , or the inward motion ; or whether the inward motion moves to the inward matter , or with the outward matter , and inward matter , agreeing in the like motions . and what the reason may bee , to make some creatures agree in some element , and not in others : as what 's the reason a beast , or a man , or fowles , cannot live in the water , or fish live long out of the water . and whether there may not bee a sympathy naturally betwixt some beasts , to other , although of a different figure , more then to others , by some secret , and obscure motions ; and whether the severall dispositions of men , may not have a naturall likeuesse , or sympathy to the severall dispositions , and natures of beasts . what causes the severall sorts of creatures to keep in particular societies , as in common- wealths , flocks , heards , droves , flights , covies , broods , eyes , swarmes , sholes , and of their particular enmity from some sorts to others , and their affections , love to others , their factions , side-takings , and disagreeings in their owne society , their craft and policies of selfe-love , and preservation , and their tender love and assistance to their young . what makes superstition : and many more . but fancy , which is the effect of motion , is as infinite as motion ; which made me despaire of a finall conclusion of my booke ; which makes my booke imperfect , and my fancies unsettled : but that which i have writ , will give my readers so much light , as to guesse what my fancies would have beene at . a dialogue between the body , and the minde . i write , and write , and 't may be never read ; my bookes , and i , all in a grave lye dead . no memory will build a monument , nor offer praise unto the soules content . but howsoever , soule , lye still at rest , to make thy fame to live , have done the best . for all the wit that nature to me gave , i set it forth , for to adorne thy grave . but if the ruines of oblivion come , t is not my fault , for what i can , is done . for all the life that nature to me lends about thy worke , and in thy service spends . but if thou thinkst , i take not paines , pray speake , before we part , my body is but weak . soule . braine thou hast done thy best , yet thou mightst go to the grave learned , their subtle tricks to know : and aske them , how such fame they do beget , when they do write , but of anothers wit . for they have little of their owne , but what they have from others braines , and fancies got . body . o soule ! i shall not need to take such paines , the labour will be more then all the gaines : for why ! the world doth cosen and so cheat , by railing at those authors wits they get ; muffling & hiding of their authors face , by some strange language , or by some disgrace . their wit into an anagram they make , that anagram for their owne wit they take . and here , & there they do a fancy steale , and so of strangers make a common-weale . tell to the world they are true natives bred , when they were borne all in another head . and with translating wit they march along , with understanding praise they grow so strong , that they do rule , by conquering fames great court : from whence they send out all their false report . this is the way my soule that they do use , by different language do the world abuse . therefore lye still thou troubled restless spirit , seek not for fame , unlesse thou hast a merit . soule . body , when thou art gone , then i dye too , unlesse some great act in thy life thou do : but prethee be not thou so wondrous nice , to set my fame at a great merits price . body . alas , what can i do to make thee live , unlesse some wise instructions thou canst give ? can you direct me to some noble act , wherein vain-glory makes no false compact ? can you direct me which way i shall take , those that are in distress , happy to make ? soule . no , that 's unpossible , unlesse all hearts could be divided into equall parts . body . then prethee be content , seek thou no more ; t is fortune makes the world to worship , and adore . a request to my friends . when i am dead , and buried lye within a grave ; if friends passe by , let them not turn away their sight , because they would forget me quite : but on my grave a teare let fall , and me unto remembrance call . then may my ashes rise , that teare to meet , receive it in my urne like balsome sweet . o you that are my dearest friends , do not , when i am dead , lye in the grave forgot , but let me in your mind , as one thought be ; so shall i live still in your memory . if you had dyed , my heart still should have been a room to keep , and hang your picture in . my thoughts should copies pencill every day , teares be the oyle , for colours on to lay . my lips shall mixe thy severall colour'd praise , by words compounded , various severall waies . innocent white , and azure truth agree , with modest red , purple in grain to bee . and many more , which rhetorick still can place , shadowes of griefe , to give a lively grace . an elegy . her corps was borne to church on gray goose wing , her sheet was paper white to lap her in . and cotten dyed with inke , her covering black , with letters for her scutcheons print in that . fancies bound up with verse , a garland made , and at the head , upon her hearse was laid . and numbers ten did beare her to the grave , the muses nine a monument her gave . i heare that my first booke was thought to be none of mine owne fancies ; onely , i owne it with my name . if any thinke my booke so well writ , as that i had not the wit to do it , truely i am glad , for my wits sake , if i have any that is thought so well of ; although mistrust lies betwixt me , and it ; and if it be so little wit in it , as they mistrust it was not mine ; i am glad they thinke me to have so much , as i could not write so foolish . and truely for any friend of mine , as i have none so cowardly , that dare not defend their honour , so i have none so foolish , as to be affear'd , or asham'd to owne their owne writings . and truely i am so honest , as not to steale anothers work , and give it my owne name : nor so vaine-glorious , as to straine to build up a fame upon the ground of another mans wit . but be it bad , or good , it is my owne , unlesse in printing t is a changeling grown . which sure i have no reason for to doubt , it hath the same mark , when i put it out . but be it faire , or brown , or black , or wilde , i still must own it , 'cause it is my childe . and should my neighbours say , t is a dull block , t is honestly begot , of harmlesse stock . by motion in my braine t was form'd , and bred , by my industrious study it was fed . and by my busie pen was cloathd , though plain the garments be , yet are they without stain . but be it nere so plain , not rich , and gay , phantasticall t is drest , the world will say . the world thinks all is fine , that 's in the fashion , though it be old , if fashion'd with translation . they nere consider what becomes them best , but think all fooles , that are not courtly drest . o nature , nature , why dost thou create so many fooles , and so few wife didst make ? good nature , move their braine another way , and then as beasts as beasts , perchance they may . lord how the world delight to tell a lye ! as if they thought they sav'd a soule thereby . more lyes they tell , then they will prayers say , and run about to vent them every way . some bragging lyes , and then he tells how free the ladies were , when he 's in company . or else what such a lord did say to him , and so what answer he return'd to them . or any action which great fame hath won , then he saies streight , t was by his counsell done . when any wit , that comes abroad in print , then he sayes strait he had a finger in 't : how he did rectifie , and mend the same , or else he wrote it all , or gav 't a name . thus in the world thousands of lyes are told , which none , but fooles , their words for truth will hold . but in the world there are more fooles then wise , which makes them passe for truth , when all are lyes . j begun a booke about three yeares since , which i intend to name the worlds ollio , and when i come into flaunders where those papers are , i will , if god give me live , and health , finish it , and send it forth in print . i imagine all those that have read my former books , wil say , that i have writ enough , unless they were better : but say what you will , it pleaseth me , and since my delights are harmlesse , i will satisfie my humour . for had my braine as many fancies in 't , to fill the world , would put them all in print . no matter whether they be well exprest , my will is done , and that please woman best . a farewell to the muses . farewell my muse , thou gentle harmlesse spirit , that us'd to haunt me in the dead of night . and on my pillow , where my head i laid , thou sit'st close by , and with my fancies play'd : sometimes upon my eyes you dancing skip , making a vision of some fine land-skip . thus with your sportings , kept me oft awake , not with your noise , for nere a word you spake : but with your faiery dancing , circling winde , upon a hill of thoughts within my minde . when t was your sport to blow out every light , then i did rest , and sleep out all the night . great god , from thee all infinites do flow , and by thy power from thence effects do grow . thou order'dst all degrees of matter , just , as t is thy will , and pleasure , move it must . and by thy knowledge orderd'st all the best ; for in thy knowledge doth thy wisdome rest . and wisdome cannot order things amisse , for where disorder is , no wisdome is . besides , great god , thy wil is just , for why , thy will still on thy wisdome doth rely . o pardon lord , for what i here now speak , upon a guesse , my knowledge is but weak , but thou hast made such creatures , as man-kind , and giv'st them something , which we call a minde ; alwaies in motion , never quiet lyes , untill the figure of his body dies . his severall thoughts , which severall motions are , do raise up love , hopes , joyes , doubts , and feare . as love doth raise up hope , so feare doth doubt , which makes him seek to finde the great god out . selfe-love doth make him seek to finde , if he came from , or shaell last to eternity . but motion being slow , makes knowledge weake , and then his thoughts 'gainst ignorance doth beat . as fluid waters 'gainst hard rocks do flow , break their soft streames , and so they backward go . just so do thoughts , and then they backward slide unto the place where first they did abide . and there in gentle murmurs do complaine , that all their care , and labour is in vain . but since none knowes the great creator , must man seek no more , but in his goodnesse trust . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- reason . thoughts . notes for div a e- i mean of forme , dull matter . some think there was a chaos , a confused heap . the readers may take either opinion . severall motions , and severall figures . (†) not the matter , but the degrees (†) not the bigness of figures , but the manner of shapes : which makes some shapes to have the advantage over others much bigger , as a mouse will kill an elephant . (†) which is in likenesse . (†) unlikenesse . one shape hath power over another ; one minde knowes more then another . either by growth , or sense , or reason . for when matter comes to such a degree it quickens , that it begins to move , & motion is life . * i meane when i say obstruct , that it either turnes their motion another way , or makes them move slower . * i do not say that bones are the solid'st matter in nature . † as the figure of man. * all motion is life . i mean the figure of dul matter as a plentifull crop , or a great brood . these degrees are visible to us . dancing is a measur'd motion . † scorching is , when the motion is too quick . † that is , when there come so many spirits , as they disagree , pressing upon one another . (†) those degrees that are neerest , have the greatest sympathy . (†) like chess-men , table-men nine-pins , or the like . * i say higher , for expressions sake . † nothing can bee made or known absolute out of infinite and eternall . † though it may have other motions , yet not the animall motion . † the figure might bee without an animall motion , but an animall motion cannot bee untill there is an animall figure (†) which food is when such materialls are not proper for such a figure . † the greater the number is , the more variety of motion is made , which makes figures in the braine . (†) in animall shapes . (†) a pig of lead . (†) the huske . † to prove that it is the several motion , is , that wee shall have the same sense in our sleep , either to move pleasure , or feele paine . (†) like glass . aggravation of sinne and sinning against knowledge. mercie. delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions. by tho: goodvvin b.d. goodwin, thomas, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) aggravation of sinne and sinning against knowledge. mercie. delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions. by tho: goodvvin b.d. goodwin, thomas, - . [ ], , [ ]; [ ], , [ ] p. printed by m. flesher for iohn rothwell, and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the sun in pauls churchyard, london : m dc xxxvii. [ ] the words "sinne: and sinning" and "knowledge. mercie." are bracketed together on title page. with an additional title page: aggravation of sinne. by tho: goodwin b.d. .. "aggravations of sinning against knovvledge" has separate dated title page; pagination and register are continuous. "aggravation of sinning against mercie" has separate pagination, register, and title page with imprint ".. printed by m.f. for r. dawlman ..". with a final imprimatur leaf. a variant of the edition with r. dawlman's name in the imprint on the general title page. reproduction of the original in the british library. closely trimmed with some loss of running title. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng sermons, english -- th century. sin, mortal -- early works to . knowledge, theory of (religion) -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - elspeth healey sampled and proofread - elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion aggravation of sinne : and sinning against knowledge . mercie . delivered in severall sermons upon divers occasions . by tho : goodvvin b. d. london , printed by m. flesher for iohn rothwell , and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the sun in pauls churchyard . mdcxxxvii . aggravation of sinne . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for iohn rothwell , and are to be sold at the sun in pauls church-yard . m dc xxxvii . a table of the contents of the aggravation of sin . the subject is the sinfulnesse of sin . page . the mischievous effects of the evill of sin . ibid. . it hath debased the soule . ibid. . it defiles the soule . in an instant . . totally . . eternally . . it robs the soule of the image of god. . it robs a man of god himselfe . . it was the first founder of hell . the essence of sin is the cause of all these evills . ibid. sin an evill that contains all the evils in the world . . it is the cause of sorrowes , and diseases , and all evills . ibid. . there is some peculiar mischief in sin , not found in other evils , as appears in divers instances . quest . what transcendencie of evill is in the essence of sin , that makes it above all other evill . answ . it is contrary to god and all that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is contrary to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being . ibid. being . ibid. . it is contrary to all his attributes which are his name , is to himselfe , and what ever is his . ibid. . to his lawes and ordinances . . to his favourites . . to his image in mans owne breast . sinfulness of sin aggravated from the person suffering , being god and man. the least sin virtually more or lesse containes all sin in the nature of it , proved . ibid. every sin inclines our nature more to sin . sin containes not onely all other evils in it , but also all of its owne kind . ibid. sinne a perfect evill . ibid. reasons why sin is the chiefest evill . . because it is simply to be avoided for its selfe . . because there can be no worse punishment than it selfe . because it cannot have a worse epithete given it than it selfe . use . wonder at the abounding nature of sin . examine our owne estates . ibid. quest . when a mans sins may be said to be his own ? answ . . then he commits sin out of his owne . . then he hates it not , but loves it . . then he nourisheth it , & cherisheth it . . then he provides for it . . then he lives in sin . use . consider , the punishment of sin is out of measure fearfull . it containes all miseries in it . what the damned speake of sinne in hell . ibid. use . onely iesus christ can conquer sin . christs righteousnesse abounds sins sinfulnesse . come to god through christ , and take him to be our lord and king. sinne and christ cannot stand together . ibid. we will not take christ while sin appears sinfull to us . ibid. imprimatur ; tho : weekes . r. p. ep o : lond. cap. domest . aggravation of sinne . rom . . . was that then which is good made death unto mee ? god forbid . but sinne , that it might appeare sin , working death in mee by that which is good : that sinne by the commandement might become exceeding sinfull . wee finde our apostle in the . verse to have been alive , but struck upon the sudden dead , by an apparition presented to him in the glasse of the law , of the sinfulnesse of sinne . sin revived , sayes the . verse , appeared to be sinne , sayes the . verse , lookes but like it selfe , above measure sinfull : and hee falls downe dead at the very sight of it : i dyed , sayes he in the . it wrought death in me , sayes the . that is , an apprehension of death and hell , as due to that estate i was then in . but yet as the life of sinne was the death of paul , so this death of his was but a preparation to a new life , i through the law and dead to the law , that i might live to god , gal. . . and here hee likewise speakes of gods worke upon him at his first conversion ; for then it was that hee relates how sinne became in his esteeme , so above measure sinfull . the subject then to be insisted on is the sinfulnesse of sinne , a subject therefore as necessary as any other , because if ever we be saved , sinne must first appeare to us all , as it did here to him , above measure sinfull . and first , because all knowledge begins at the effects which are obvious to sense , and interpreters of the nature of things , therefore wee will begin this demonstration of the evill of sin , from the mischievous effects it hath filled the world withall , it having done nothing but wrought mischiefe since it came into the world , and all the mischiefe that hath beene done , it alone hath done , but especially towards the poore soule of man , the miserable subject of it . which first it hath debased the soule of man , the noblest creature under heaven , and highest allyed , made to be a companion fit for god himselfe , but sinne hath stript it of its first native excellency , as it did reuben , gen. . . debased the soule more worth than all the world , as christ himselfe saith , that onely went to the price of it : yet sinne hath made it a drudge and slave to every creature it was made to rule : therefore the prodigall as a type is said to serve swine , and feed on huskes , so as every vanity masters it . therefore we find in scripture , that men are said to be servants to wine , tit. . . servants to riches , and divers lusts , &c. and hence it is that shame attends upon it , rom. . . now shame ariseth out of an apprehension of some excellencie debased : and by how much the excellencie is greater , by so much is the shame the greater , and therefore unutterable confusion will one day befall sinners : because sinne is the debasement of an unvaluable excellencie . secondly , it not onely debaseth it , but defiles it also ; and indeed there was nothing else that could defile it , mat. . . for the soule is a most pure beame , bearing the image of the father of lights : as farre surpassing the sinne in purenesse , as the sunne doth a clod of earth ; and yet all the dirt in the world cannot defile the sunne ; all the clouds that seeke to muffle it , it scatters them all : but sinne hath defiled the soule , yea , one sinne , the least defiles it , in an instant , totally , eternally . first , one sinne did it in the fall of adam , rom. . . one offence polluted him , and all the world . now suppose you should see one drop of darknesse seazing on the sunne , and putting out that light and eye of heaven , and to loosen it out of the orbe it moves in , and cause it to drop downe a lump of darknesse , you would say it were a strange darknesse : this sinne did then in the soule , to which yet the sunne is but as a taper . secondly , it defiles it thus in an instant . take the most glorious angell in heaven , and let one of the least sinnes seaze upon his heart , he would in an instant fall downe from heaven , stript of all his glory , the ugliest creature that ever was beheld : you would count that the strongest of all poysons , that would poyson in an instant ; as nero boiled a poison to that height , that it killed germanicus as soone as he received it ; now such an one is sinne . thirdly , sinne defiles it totally : it rests not in one member onely , but beginning at the understanding , eates into the will and affections ; soaks through all . those diseases we account strongest , which seaze not on a joynt or a member onely , but strikes rottennesse through the whole body . fourthly , it defiles eternally , it being aterna macula , a staine which no nitre or sope , or any creature can wash out , ier. . . there was once let in a deluge of water , and the world was all overflow'd with it ; it washed away sinners indeed , but not one sinne . and the world shall be a fire again at the latter day , and all that fire , and these flames in hell that follow , shall not purge out one sinne . thirdly , it hath robbed the soule of the image of god , deprived us of the glory of god , rom. . . the image of gods holinesse , which is his beauty and ours : wee were beautifull and all glorious once within , which though but an accident , is more worth than all mens soules devoid of it , it being a likenesse unto god , a divine nature , without which no man shall see god. though man in innocency had all perfections united in him via eminentiae , that are to be found in other creatures , yet this was more worth than all : for all the rest made him not like to god , as this did ; without which all paradise could not make adam happy ; which when he had lost , he was left naked , though those his other perfections remained with him ; which is profitable for all things , as the apostle sayes . the least dramme of which , the whole world emballanced with , would be found too light ; without which the glorious angels would be damned devills , the saints in heaven damned ghosts , this it hath robbed man of . fourthly , it hath robbed man even of god himselfe : your sinnes separate ( sayes god ) betwixt you and me : and therefore they are said to live without god in the world : and in robbing a man of god , it robs him of all things ; for all things are ours , but so farre as god is ours ; of god whose face makes heaven , he is all in all , his loving kindnesse is better than life , and containeth beauty , honours , riches , all : yea they are but a drop to him . but its mischiefe hath not staid here , but as the leprosie of the lepers in the old law , sometimes infected their houses , garments ; so it hath hurld confusion over all the world , brought a vanitie on the creature , rom. . . and a curse : and had not christ undertooke the shattered condition of the world to uphold it , it had fallen about adams cares . and though the old walls and ruinous palace of the world stands to this day , yet the beauty , the glosse , and glory of the hangings is soyled and marred with many imperfections cast upon every creature . but as the house of the leper was to be pulled downe , and traitors houses use to be made jakes : so the world ( if christ had not stept in ) had shrunke into its first nothing : and you will say , that is a strong carrion that retaines not onely infection in it selfe , but infects all the aire about : so this , that not the soule the subject of it onely , but all the world . lastly , it was the first founder of hell , and laid the first corner stone thereof : sinne alone brought in and filled that bottomlesse gulfe with all the fire , and brimstone , and treasures of wrath , which shall never be burnt and consumed . and this crucified and pierced christ himselfe , poured on him his fathers wrath , the enduring of which for sinne , was such , as that all the angels in heaven had crackt and sunke under it . but yet this estimate is but taken from the effects of it , the essence of it which is the cause of all these evills , must needs have much more mischiefe in it . shall i speak the least evill i can say of it ? it conteins all evills als● in it : therefore iames . . the apostle calls it filthinesse , and abundance of superfluitie , or excrement as it were , of naughtinesse . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . as if so transcendent , that if all evills were to have an excrement , a scumme , a superfluitie , sinne is it , as being the abstracted quintessence of all evill . an evill , which in the nature and essence of it virtually , and eminently , containes all evills of what kinde soever that are in the world ; insomuch as in the scriptures you shall finde that all the evills in the world , serve but to answer for it , and to give names to it . hence sinne it is called poyson , and sinners serpents : sinne is called a vomit , sinners dogs : sinne the stench of graves , and they rotten sepulchres : sinne mire , sinners sowes : and sinne darknesse , blindnesse , shame , nakednesse , folly , madnesse , death , whatsoever is filthy , defective , infective , painfull . now as the holy ghost sayes of nabal , as is his name , so is he ; so may wee say of sinne : for if adam gave names to all things , according to their nature , much more god , who calls things as they are . surely god would not slander sinne , though it be his onely enemie . and besides , there is reason for this , for it is the cause of all evills . god sowed nothing but good seed in the world ; he beheld , and saw all things were very good . it is sinne hath sowne the tares : all those evills that have come up , sorrowes and diseases , both unto men and beasts . now whatsoever is in the effect , is via eminentiae in the cause . surely therefore it is to the soule of man ( the miserable vessell and subject of it ) all that , which poyson , death , and sicknesse is unto the other creatures , and to the body ; and in that , it is all these to the soule , it is therefore more than all these to it : for corruptio optimi pessima : by how much the soule exceeds all other creatures , by so much must sinne , which is the corruption , poyson , death , and sicknesse of it , exceed all other evills . but yet this is the least ill that can be said of it . there is . some further transcendent peculiar mischiefe in it , that is not to be found in all other evills , as will appeare in many instances . for first , all other evills god proclaimes himselfe the author of , and ownes them all ; though sinne be the meritorious cause of all , yet god the efficient and disposing cause . there is no evill in the city but i have done it . he onely disclaimeth this , iam. . . as a bastard of some others breeding , for he is the father of lights , ver . . secondly , the utmost extremity of the evill of punishment god the sonne under-went , had a cup mingled him of his father , more bitter than if all the evils in the world had beene strained in , and he dranke it off heartily to the bottome ; but not a drop of sinne , though sweetned with the offer of all the world , would goe downe with him . thirdly , other evils the saints have chosen and imbraced as good , and refused the greatest good things the world had , as evill , when they came in competition with sinne . so moses those rather to suffer , much rather than to enjoy the pleasures of sinne , heb. . from . to . so chrysostome , when eudoxia the empresse threatned him : goe tell her , sayes he , nil nisi peccatum timeo , i feare nothing but sinne . fourthly , take the devill himselfe , whom you all conceive to be more full of mischiefe than all the evills in the world , called therefore in the abstract spirituall wickednesse , eph. . . yet it was but sinne that first spoiled him , and it is sinne possesseth the very devils : he was a glorious angell , till he was acquainted with it : and could there be a separation made betweene him and sinne , he would be againe of as good , sweet , and amiable a nature , as any creature in earth or heaven . fiftly , though other things are evill , yet nothing makes the creature accursed but sinne : as all good things in the world doe not make a man a blessed man , so nor all the evills accursed . god sayes not , blessed are the honorable , and the rich , nor that accursed are the poore : but cursed is the man that continues not in all things , gal. . . a curse to the least sinne ; and on the contrary , blessed is the man whose iniquities are forgiven , &c. rom. . . sixtly , god hates nothing but sinne . were all evills swept downe into one man , god hates him not simply for them , not because thou art poore and disgraced , but onely because sinfull . it is sin he hates , rev. . . isa . . . yea it alone : and whereas other attributes are diversely communicated in their effects to severall things : as his love and goodnesse , himselfe , his sonne , his children , have all a share in : yet all the hatred ( which is as large as his love ) is solely poured out upon , and wholly , and limited onely unto sinne . all the question will be what transcendencie of evill is in the essence of it , that makes it above all other evills , and hated , and it onely by god , christ , the saints , &c. more than any other evill . why ? it is enmity with god , rom. . . abstracts we know speake essences : the meaning is , it is as directly contrary to god , as any thing could be : for contrary it is to god , and all that is his . as . contrary to his essence , to his existence , and being god : for it makes men hate him , rom. . . and as he that hateth his brother is a murtherer , ioh. . . so hee that hateth god may be said to be a murtherer of him , and wisheth that he were not . peccutum est dei-cidium . . contrary it is to all his attributes which are his name : men are jealous of their names : gods name is himselfe ; as . it makes a man slight gods goodnesse , and to seeke happinesse in the creature , as if hee were able to be happy without him . and . it deposeth his soveraignty , and sets up other gods before his face . . it contemns his truth , power , and justice . and . turnes his grace into wantonnesse . and as to himselfe , so to what ever is his , or deare to him . besides , a king hath . things in an especiall manner deare to him : his lawes , his favour it es , his image stampt upon his coine : and so hath god. first , his lawes and ordinances : god never gave law , but it hath beene broken by sinne ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the definition of it , the transgression of the law , ioh. . . yea it is called destroying the law , psal . . . and know , that gods law , the least tittle of it , is more deare to him , than all the world . for ere the least tittle of it shall be broken , heaven and earth shall passe . the least sinne therefore , which is a breach of the least law , is worse than the destruction of the world : and for his worship , ( as envying god should have any , ) it turns his ordinances into sinne . secondly , for his favourites : god hath but a few poore ones ; upon whom because god hath set his love , sinne hath set its hatred . lastly , for his image even in a mans owne breast : the law of the members fights against the law of the mind , and endevoureth to expell it , though a man should be damned for it . gal. . . the flesh ( namely sinne ) lusteth against the spirit , for they are contraries . contrary indeed ; for me thinkes though it hates that image in others , that yet it should spare it in a mans selfe , out of self-love ; but yet , though a man should be damned , if this image be expelled , it yet laboureth to doe this ; so deadly is that hatred , a man hates himselfe , as holy , so farre as he is sinfull . it abounds now so high , as our thoughts can follow it no farther : divines say , it aspires unto infinity , the object against whom it is thus contrary unto , being god , who is infinite , they tell us , that objectively , sinne it selfe is infinite . sure i am , the worth of the object or party offended , aggravates the offence : an ill word against the king is high treason , not the greatest indignity to another man. sure i also am , that god was so offended with it , as , though he loves his sonne as himselfe , yet he ( though without sinne ) being but made sinne by imputation , yet god spared him not : and because the creatures could not strike a stroake hard enough , he himselfe was pleased to bruise him , esay . . he spared not his owne sonne , rom. . . his love might have overcome him , to have passed by it to his sonne ; at least a word of his mouth might have pacified him : yet so great was his hatred of it , and offence at it , as he powred the vialls of his wrath on him : neither would entreaty serve , for though he cryed with strong cryes it should passe from him , god would not , till he had out-wrastled it . and as the person offended , aggravates the offence , as before , so also the person suffering , being god and man , argues the abounding sinfulnesse of it . for , for what crime did you ever hear a king was put to death ? their persons being esteemed in worth above all crime , as civill . christ was the king of kings . and yet there is one consideration more to make the measure of its iniquity fully full , and to abound to flowing over , and that is this , that the least sinne virtually more or lesse containes all sinne in the nature of it ( i meane not that all are equall , therefore i adde more or lesse ) and i prove it thus : because adam by one offence contracted the staine of all , no sooner did one sinne seaze upon his heart , but he had all sinnes in him . and so every sinne in us by a miraculous multiplication inclines our nature more to every sinne than it was before : it makes the pollution of nature of a deeper dye ; not onely to that species of sinne , whereof it is the proper individuall act , but to all else : as bring one candle into a roome , the light spreads all over ; and then another , the light is all over more increased : so it is in sinne ; for the least cuts the soule off from god , and then it is ready to goe a whoring after every vanity that will entice it , or entertaine it . and this shewes the fulnesse of the evill of it , in that it containes not onely all other evills in the world in it , but also all of its owne kinde . as you would count that a strange poyson , the least drop of which containes the force of all poyson in it : that a strange disease , the least infection whereof brought the body subject to all diseases : yet such an one is sinne , the least making the soule more prone and subject to all . and now you see it is a perfect evill ; and though indeed it cannot be said to be the chiefest in that full sense wherein god is said to be the chiefest good ; because if it were as bad as god is good , how could he pardon it , subdue it , bring it to nothing as he doth ? and then how could it have addition to it , one sin being more sinfull than another ? ezek. . . iohn . . but yet it hath some analogie of being the chiefest evill , as god the chiefest good . for . as god is the chiefest good , who therefore is to be loved for himselfe , and other things but for his sake ; so also in sin the chiefest evill , because it is simply to be avoided for its selfe ; but other evills become good , yea desirable when compared with it . secondly , as god is the chiefest good , because he is the greatest happinesse to himselfe ; so sin , the greatest evill to it selfe : for there can be no worse punishment of it , than its selfe ; therefore when god would give a man over , as an enemie he meanes never to deale withall more , he gives him up to sinne . and thirdly , it is so evill , as it cannot have a worse epithete given it , than it selfe ; and therefore the apostle , when he would spek his worst of it , and wind up his expression hightest , usque ad hyperbolem , calls it by its own name , sinfull sinne , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rom. . . that as in god being the greatest good , quicquid est in deo est deus ipse , therefore his attributes and names are but himselfe , idem praedicatur de seipso : so it is with sinne , quicquid est in peccato , peccatum est , &c. he can call it no worse than by its owne name , sinfull sinne . use . and what have i beene speaking of all this while ? why ? but of one sinne in the generall nature of it . there is not a man here , but hath millions of them ; as many as the sands upon the sea shore ; yea , as there would be atomes , were all the world pounded to dust , it exceeds in number also ; and therefore ere we goe any further , let all our thoughts break off here in wonderment at the abounding of sinne , above all things else ; for other things , if they be great , they are but a few ; if many , they are but small : the world , t is a big one indeed , but yet there is but one ; the sands , though innumerable , yet they are but small ; your sinfulnesse exceeds in ●oth . and next , let all our thoughts be wound up to the most deepe and intense consideration of our estates ; for if one sin abounds thus , what tongue can expresse , or heart can conceive their misery , who to use the apostles phrase , cor. . are yet in their sinnes ? that is , stand bound to god in their owne single bond onely , to answer for all their sinnes themselves ; and cannot , in the estate wherein yet they stand of impenitencie and unbeleefe , plead the benefit of christs death , to take off and ease them of the guilt of one sinne , but , all their sinnes are yet all their owne , which to a man in christ they are not ; for his owne bonds are cancelled , and given in , and christ entred into bonds for him , and all his sins translated upon him . now for a proper character of their estate , and sutable to this expression : first then a mans sinnes may be said to be still his owne : when he committeth sinne , out of his owne , that is the full frame and inclination of his heart . thus the devill is said to sinne , ioh. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of his owne ; the whole frame of his spirit is in it ; which a man in christ cannot be so fully said to doe , for hee hath a new creature in him that sinneth not , ioh. . , . that can say even when he sins , it is not i , but sinne . and secondly , then sinne is a mans owne , when he hates it not , but loves it : the world loves his owne , saith christ , ioh. . . and so doth a wicked man his sinne , more than any good ; which is davids character , psal . . . and thirdly , what is a mans owne , he nourisheth and cherisheth ; therefore eph. . . no man hates his owne flesh , but loveth it , and cherisheth it : so doe men their sinnes , when they are their owne . those great and rich oppressors , iam. . . are said to nourish their hearts in wantonnes , and in pleasure , as in a day of slaughter ; as living upon the creame of sinning , and having such plenty , they pick out none but the sweetest bits to nourish their hearts withall . . so what a man provides for , that is his own ; so sayes the apostle , a man that provides not for his owne , is worse , &c. when therefore men make provision for the flesh , as the phrase is , rom. . . have their caterers and contrivers of their lusts , and whose chiefest care is every morning , what pleasures of sinne they have that day to be enjoyed , it is a signe that their sins are their owne . in a word , when men live in sinne , 't is the expression used , tim. . . she that lives in pleasure , is dead while she lives . when the revenewes of the comfort of mens lives come in , from the pleasures of sinne , and that supplies them with all those necessaries that belong to life ; as when 't is their element they drink in like water ; their meat , they eate the bread of wickednesse , prov. . . and it goes downe , and troubleth them not ; their sleepe also , they cannot sleepe till they have done or contrived some mischiefe , ver . . their apparell , as when violence and oppression covers them as a garment , and pride compasseth them as a chaine , psal . . their recreation also , it is a pastime for a foole to doe wickedly , he makes sport and brags of it , prov. . . yea their health , being sick and discontented , when their lusts are not satisfied , as ahab was for naboths vineyard ; amnon grew leane , when hee could not enjoy his paramore . all these , as they live in their sins here , and so are dead whilest they live , and so are miserable , making the greatest evill their chiefest good ; so when they come to die ( as we all must doe one day ) and how soone , and how suddenly we know not ; wee carry our soules , our precious soules , as precious water in a brittle glasse , soone cracked , and then we are spilt like water , which none can gather up againe ; or but as a candle in a paper lanthorne ; in clay walls , full of cranyes , often but a little cold comes in , and blowes the candle out ; ) and then , without a through change of heart before , wrought from all sinne , to all godlinesse , they will die in their sinnes . and all , and the utmost of all miseries is spoken in that one word : and therefore christ , when he would summe up all miseries in one expression , tells the pharisees they should die in their sins , iohn . . vse . and let us consider further , that if sin be thus above measure sinfull , that hell that followeth death , is then likewise above measure fearful . and so it is intimated to be a punishment without measure , ier. . . compared with isa . . punish them as i punish thee ( sayes god to his owne ) but i will punish thee in measure . and indeed , sinne being committed against god the king of kings , it can never be punished enough . but as the killing of a king , is amongst men a crime so hainous , that no tortures can exceed the desert of it : we use to say , all torments are too little , any death too good for such a crime . now peccatum est dei 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as i said before , a destroying god as much as in us lies : and therefore none but god himselfe can give it a full punishment : therefore it is called a falling into gods hands , heb. . . which , as he sayes there , is fearfull . for if his breath blowes us to destruction , iob . . for we are but dust heaps ; yea , his nod , he nods to destruction , psal . . . then what is the weight of his hands , even of those hands , which span the heavens , and hold the earth in the hollow of them ? and if god take it into his hands to punish , he will be sure to doe unto the full . sinne is mans worke , and punishment is gods , and god will shew himselfe as perfect in his worke , as man in his . if sinne be malum catholicum , as hath been said , that containes all evils in it ; then the punishment god will inflict shall be malum catholicum also , containing in it all miseries ; it is a cup full of mixture , so called psal . . . as into which god hath strained the quintessence of all miseries , and the wicked of the earth must drink the dregges of it , though it be eternity unto the bottome . and if one sin deserves a hell , a punishment above measure , what will millions of millions doe ? and we reade that every sinne shall receive a just recompence , heb. . . oh let us then take heed of dying in our sinnes , and therefore of living in them ; for we shall lie in prison till we have paid the very utmost farthing . and therefore if all this that i have said of it wil not engender answerable apprehensions of it in you , ( this being but painting the toad , which you can look upon and handle without affrightment ) i wish that if without danger you could but lay your eares to hell , that standing as it were behind the skreene , you might heare sinne spoken of in its owne dialect by the oldest sonnes of perdition there , to heare what cain sayes of murthering his brother abel ; what saul of his persecuting david , and the priests of iehovah ; what balaam and achitophel say of their cursed counsels and policies ; what ahab sayes of his oppression of naboth ; what iudas of treason ; and heare what expressions they have , with what horrors , yellings , groanes , distractions , the least sin is there spoken of . if god should take any mans soule here , and as he rapt his , into the third heavens , where he saw grace in its fullest brightnesse ; so carry any ones soule into those chambers of death , as solomon calls them , and leading him through all , from chamber to chamber , shew him the visions of darknesse , and hee there heare all those bedlames cry out , one of this sinne , another of that , and see sinne as it lookes in hell ! but there is one aggravation more of the evill and misery sinne brings upon men , i have not spoken of yet , that it blinds their eyes , and hardens their hearts , that they doe not see , nor lament their misery , till they be in hell ; and then it is too late . vse . but what , doth sin so exceed in sinfulnesse , and is the venome of it boyled up to such a height of mischiefe , that there should be no name in heaven and earth able to grapple with it , and destroy it ? is there no antidote , no balme in gilead more soveraigne , than it is deadly ? surely yes , god would never have suffered so potent and malicious an enemy to have set foot in his dominions , but that he knew how to conquer it , and that not by punishing of it onely in hell , but by destroying it : onely it is too potent for all the creatures to encounter with . this victory is alone reserved for christ , it can die by no other hand , that he may have the glory of it ; which therefore is the top of his glory , as mediator , and his highest title , the memory of which he beares written in his name jesus , for he shall save his people from their sinnes , mat. . . and therefore the apostle paul , his chiefest herauld , proclaimes this victory with a world of solemnity and triumph , cor. . . oh death , where is thy sting ? oh grave , where is thy victory ? the sting of death is sinne , the strength of sinne is the law : but thankes be to god that gives us the victory through our lord iesus christ : which yet again addes to the demonstration of the sinfulnesse of it : for the strength of sinne was such , that like goliah it would have defied the whole host of heaven and earth . it was not possible the blood of bulls and goats should take away sinne , heb. . . nor would the riches of the world , or the blood of men have beene a sufficient ransome : will the lord be pleased with rivers of oyle ? shall i give my first borne for my transgression ? no , sayes he , there is no proportion , for thy first borne is but the fruit of thy body , and sinne is the sinne of thy soule , mich. . . it must cost more to redeeme a soule than so , psal . . . no , couldest thou bring rivers of teares , in stead of rivers of oyle ; which if any thing , were like to pacifie god , yet are they but the excrements of thy braines ; but sinne is the sinne of thy heart : yea all the righteousnesse that we could ever do , cannot make amends for one sinne : for suppose it perfect , when as yet it is but dung . mal. . . and a menstruom cloath , yet thou owest it already as thou art a creature ; and one debt cannot pay another . if then we should goe a begging to all the angels , who never sinned , let them lay all their stock together , it would begger them all to pay for one sinne : no , it is not the merit of angels will doe it ; for sinne is the transgression , the destruction of the law , psal . . . and the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is more worth than heaven , and all that is therein . onely , though it be thus unconquerably sinfull by all created powers , it hath not gone beyond the price that christ hath paid for it ; the apostle compares to this very purpose , sinne and christs righteousnesse together , rom. . , . 't is true , sayes hee , that sinne abounds , and that one sinne , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and instanceth in adams sinne , which staineth all mens natures to the end of the world ; yet sayes he , the gift of righteousnesse by christ abounds much more ; abounds to flowing over , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes the apostle , tim. . . as the sea doth above mote-hills , malach. . . though therefore it would undoe all the angels , yet christs riches are unsearchable , eph. . . hee hath such riches of merit , as are able to pay all thy debts the very first day of thy mariage with him , though thou hadst beene a sinner millions of yeares , afore the creation to this day : and when that is done , there is enough left to purchase thee more grace and glory than all the angels have in heaven . in a word , he is able to save to the utmost , all that come to god by him , heb. . . let their sins be what they will. but then wee must come to him , and to god by him , and take him as our lord , and king , and head , and husband , as he is freely tendered , we must be made one with him , and have our hearts divorced from all our sinnes for ever . and why not now ? doe we yet look for another christ ? and to allude to us , as naomi said to ruth , is there yet any more sonnes in my wombe , that they may be your husbands ? so say i , hath god any more such sonnes ? or is not this christ good enough ? or are we afraid of being happy too soon , in being married to him ? but yet if we will have christ indeed ( without whom we are undone ) how shall we thou continue in sinne , which is thus above measure sinfull ? no not in one . the apostle speaks there in the language of impossibility and inconsistencie . christ , and the raigne of one sinne , they cannot stand together . and indeed , wee will not so much as take christ , untill first wee have seene more or lesse this vission here , and sinne appear to us , as to him , above measure sinfull : naturally we slight it and make a mock of , and account it precisenesse to stick and make conscience of it : but if once sinne thus appeares to any but in its owne colours , that man will looke upon the least sinne then , as upon hell it selfe ; and like a man affrighted , feare in all his wayes , lest he should meet with sinne , and starts at the very appearance of it ; he weepes if sinne doe but see him , and hee doe but see it in himselfe and others ; and cryes out as ioseph did , how shall i doe this , and sinne ? and then a man will make out for christ , as a condemned man for life , as a man that can no longer live , oh give me christ , or else i die ; and then if upon this christ appeares to him , and manifests himselfe , as his promise is to thē that seek him , ioh. . . his heart thereupon will much more detest and loathe it : he saw it evill afore , out then it comes to have a new tincture added , which makes it infinitely more sinfull in his eyes ; for he then lookes upon every sinne as guilty of christs bloud , as dyed with it , though covered by it ; the grace of god appearing , teacheth us to deny all ungodlinesse and worldly lusts . the love of christ constraines him . thinkes he , shall i live in that for which christ died ? shall that be my life , which was his death ? did he that never knew sinne , undergoe the torment for it , and shall i be so unkinde as to enjoy the pleasure of it ? no , but as david when hee was very thirstie , and had water of the well of bethleem brought him , with the hazard of mens lives , powred it on the ground ; for sayes hee , it is the blood of these men : so sayes he , even when the cup of pleasures is at his very lips , it cost the blood of christ , and so pours it upon the ground . and as the love of christ constraines him , so the power of christ doth change him . kings may pardon traytors , but they cannot change their hearts ; but christ pardons none , hee doth not make new creatures , and all old things passe away , because he makes them friends , favourites to live with , and delight in ; and if men put on christ , and have learned him , as the truth is in iesus , they put off as concerning the former conversation the old man , with the deceitfull lusts ; and he ceaseth from sinne , that is , from the course of any knowne sin : they are the apostles owne words , which shall judge us ; and if we should expect salvation from him upon any other termes , we are deceived ; for christ is author of salvation to them onely that obey him , heb. . . aggravations of sinning against knowledge . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for iohn rothwell , 〈…〉 be sold at the sun in pauls church 〈…〉 m dc xxxvii . contents of aggravation of sinning against knowledge . doct. to sinne against knowledge is the highest aggravation of sinning . page . demonstrations of the point , by comparing it with other kinds of sinning . how much sins against knowledge doe transcend sins of ignorance . . in sins of ignorance there may be a supposition , if he had known it , he would not have done it : but not so in these . ibid. . the vast difference between them appears in the repentance god accepts for each : a generall repentance for the one , not so for the other . . some kinds of sinning against knowledge exclude from mercy , which done ignorantly , leave a capacity of it . . sinning against knowledge is the highest , but that of sinning against the holy ghost . . reasons . . because knowledge is the greatest mercy . . knowledge is the immediate guide of men in all their waies : a man sins against his guide . that knowledge is so proved , in that an erroneous conscience binds . . reason : knowledge layeth a further obligation to obedience . ibid. lawes come in force when promulged . . there is the more contempt cast on the law . . in sins against knowledge the will of the sinner closeth more with sin , as sin . ibid. . in sinning against knowledge , a man condemnes himselfe . three things handled concerning sins against knowledge . ibid. . what it is to sin against knowledg explained . . distinction , to sinne with knowledge and against knowledge doe differ . ibid. a regenerate man guilty of more sins knowne than another . ibid. yet not of more sins against knowledge . . distinction . men sin against knowledge either objectively or circumstantially only . . what it is to sinne directly against knowledge . ibid. . what to sinne against knowledge circumstantially onely . ibid. this distinction explained out of this chap. ibid. sinnes directly against knowledge reduced to two heads . . in regard of our selves . wayes . ibid. . when we abuse knowledg to help us to sin . ib. . wayes . . to plot and contrive sin . . to colour sins committed by lyes . . to colour sins by pretence of religion , and use their knowledg of religion to plead for and justifie their sin . ibid. . when men neglect to get knowledge that might preserve them from sinning . . when men refuse knowledge that they may sin more freely . . is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . . when men hold opinions ag : their consciences . . men sin directly against knowledge it selfe in respect of others . . by concealing knowledge . ibid. . men indevor to suppresse knowledg in others . ib. . when men go about to make others sin against their consciences . . generall branch . sins committed collaterally or circumstantially against knowledge . it is done . either in particular acts of sinning , or . in continuing in an estate of sinning against knowledge . ibid. particular instances being infinite . a distinction is given concerning them . ibid. . some sins more transient . ibid. . some more permanent and continued , untill recalled , though but once committed . ibid. which are of all other most dangerous to commit , when against knowledge . . going on in a sinfull estate against knowledge . ibid. three sorts of men thus sin : . such as for worldly ends forbear to professe christ and his wayes , which they know to be such . . those that defer repentance . . apostate professors goe on in an estate of sinning against knowledge . ibid. application . . head : rules whereby to estimate sins against knowledge . of two sorts : before sinning , or in sinning . . before sinning , . rules . . the more a man considers the issues and consequents of a sin . ibid. . the more consultation , and debates before . . the more testimonies and warnings against a sin . . rules to measure the sinfulnesse of such acts in sinning , . . the lesse passion or temptation to a sinne against knowledge . ibid. . the more inward regreet , and sorow , & reluctancy , the stronger is the knowledg , & so more against it . . the more hardnesse of heart in committing a sin known to be a sin , the greater the sin , as it is a sin against knowledge . . head : aggravations drawn from the kind of that knowledge we sin against , which are five . the more strong the knowledg , the greater the sin . . to sin against the inbred light of nature . ibid. . to sin against the light of education . . the more real & experimental light men sin against . . the more shining the light is in the conscience , joyned with a taste , the greater the sin . . to sin against professed knowledge . how great an ingagement and motive it is to men of knowledg to turn to god , and to take heed of sinning . . such an one cannot sin so cheap as others : their sins are more castly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ibid. and will have lesse pleasure in sinning . ibid. . such are given up to greater hardnesse of heart . . such god gives up to the worst & grossest of sins . ibid. . at death , knowledge sinned against , gives up to more horror and dispaire . . in hell it increaseth torment . finis . aggravations of sinning against knowledge . rom . . . because that when they knew god , they glorified him not as god , neither were thankfull , but became vaine in their imaginations , and their foolish heart was darkned . there are two generall aggravations the apostle insists on , in these two chapters , of the gentiles sinfulnesse : first their unthankfulnesse , ver . . in despising the riches of gods goodnesse , chap. . . secondly , of rebellion , in sinning against knowledge : that when they knew him , they glorified him not as god. and of all other hee inculcateth this of sinning against knowledge , as the greatest : for bringing in a long , large , and particular indictment of many severall sinnes , idolatry , ver . . unnaturall uncleannesse , ver . . &c. and all kinds of unrighteousnesse , ver . . hee doth both in the beginning , and end of the bill , bring in this aggravation , that they sinned against knowledge in all these . so ver . . he begins the indictment and promulgation of gods wrath above all for this , that they with-held the truth in unrighteousnesse ; which was as much as all that unrighteousnesse committed , barely in it selfe considered : and then again in the end , when hee comes to pronounce sentence , he comes in with this , after all particulars had beene reckoned up , who knowing the judgement of god against those which doe such things , yet doe them . so that this doctrine is cleare from hence , that to sinne against knowledge , either in omitting good duties which we know we ought to performe , or committing of sinnes we know wee ought not to doe , is the highest aggravation of sinfulnesse . i put both in both sinnes of omission and commission : for so the particular sinnes the gentiles are taxed for here , are of both sorts ; as not glorifying , or worshipping god , as well as turning his glory into a lye , &c. to omit prayer , when your consciences tell you , you ought to doe it : to omit holy discourse , examining the heart , when you know you ought to doe them , are as well sinnes against knowledge , as to tell a lie against your knowledge , or as to steale and forsweare , or murder , or be drunke , &c. now when i say , it is an aggravation to these sinnes , my meaning is this : that take any sinne thou thinkest most grosse , and view it barely in the act of it , put the act nakedly in the one scale , be it a sinne of uncleannesse , or drunkennesse ; and then put this circumstance which was added to it in the other scale , that before and when thou diddest it , thou knewest it to be a sinne , this alone weighs as much , yea more than the sinne it selfe doth : that as it is said of herod , that he added this to all his other sinnes , that he cast iohn in prison , who told him of his herodias , and so is made as much as all his former sinnes : so is this brought in here , that in and unto all their unrighteousnesse , this was added , they with-held the truth , the light of their consciences ( which is as a prophet from god ) they did imprison in unrighteousnesse , ver . . and therefore when daniel would convince balshazzar of his deservednesse to lose his kingdome , and that he was not able to hold weight in the ballance , dan. . . what puts he into the other scale against him to weigh him up , and to shew he was too light , ver . , ? he tells him how his father knew the god of heaven , and how that his knowledge cost him seven yeares the learning among wild beasts , and thou ( sayes he ) his sonne knewest all this , and yet didst not humble thy selfe . here is the aggravation weighs downe all : he knew the god of heaven against whom he sinned , and that judgement on his father for his pride ; and then withall he tels him , that this god , in whose hands is thy breath , and all thy wayes , thou hast not glorified . i name this place among many others , because it is parallel with this in the text . i le name no more , but give reasons and demonstrations for it . first , demonstrations . the greatnesse of this kind of sinning might many wayes be made appeare ; we will demonstrate it onely by comparing it with other kinds of sinning . to sinne , though out of simple ignorance , when that ignorance is but the causa sine qua non of sinning , that is , so as if a man had knowne it a sinne , he had not done it , doth not yet make the fact not to be a sinne , though it lesseneth it . for luke . . he that did not know his masters will , was beaten , when the thing committed was worthy of stripes , though he did not know so much , because the thing deserves it . and the reason is , because the law being once promulged , as . to adam it was , and put into his heart , as the common ark of mankinde ; though the tables be lost , yet our ignorance doth not make the law of none effect . for the law of nature for ever binds , that is , all that was written in adams heart , because it was thereby then published in him , and to him for us . but positive lawes , as i may call them , as to beleeve in christ , &c. anew delivered , bind not , but where they are publisht . iosiah rent his clothes , when the booke of the law was found , because the ordinances were not kept , although they had not knowne the law of many yeares ; yet because they ought to have knowne it , therefore for all their ignorance , he feared wrath would come upon all israel . so also lev. . . sinnes of ignorance were to be sacrificed for : yet however , it lesseneth the sin , therefore he shall be beaten with few stripes . and sure , if ignorance lesseneth them , knowledge aggravates ; for contrariorum eadem est ratio : therefore he that knowes , shall be beaten with many stripes . yea such difference is there , that god is said to wink at sins of ignorance . acts . . the time of this ignorance god winks at . whiles they had no knowledge , god tooke no notice : yea and he abates something for such sinnes , because the creature hath a cloake , hath something to say for its selfe ; ( as christ sayes , iohn . . ) but when against knowledge , they have no cloak . yea farther , christ makes a sinne of ignorance to be no sinne , in comparison : so there , if i had not spoken and done those workes never man did , they had had [ no sinne . ] ( that is ) none in comparison , but now they have no cloak , no shelter to award the stripes , or plea to abate of them . and that you may see the ground of this vast difference betweene sinnes of ignorance , and against knowledge , consider first , that if a man sin ( suppose the act the same ) out of ignorance meerly , there may be a supposition , that if hee had knowne it , he would not have done it ; and that as soone as he doth know it , he would or might repent of it . so cor. . . if they had knowne , they had not crucified the lord of glory . the like sayes christ of tyre , sidon , and gomorrha , that if the same things had beene done in them , they would have repented . but now when a man knowes it afore , and also considers it in the very committing it , and yet doth it , then there is no roome for such a supposition , and lesse hope . for what is it that should reduce this man to repentance ? is it not his knowledge ? now if that had no power to keepe him from his sinne , then it may be judged , that it will not be of force to bring him to repentance for it ; for by sinning the heart is made more hard , and the knowledge and the authority of it weakned and lessened , as all power is , when contemned and resisted , rom. . . their foolish heart becomes darker . aristotle himselfe hath a touch of this notion in the third of his ethicks , that if a man sinne out of ignorance , when he knowes it , he repents of it ; if out of passion , when the passion is over , he is sorry for what he hath done : but when a man sinnes deliberately , and out of knowledge , it is a signe he is fixed and set in mischiefe ; and therefore it is counted wickednesse and malice . and hence it is , that those that have beene enlightned with the highest kind of light , but that of saving grace , heb. . , . and heb. . if they sinne wilfully after such a knowledge of the truth , god lookes on them , as those that will never repent . and therefore likewise the schoole gives this as the reason why the devills sinne obstinately , and cannot repent , because of their full knowledge they sinne with ; they know all in the full latitude that it may be knowne , and yet goe on . secondly , the vast difference that in gods account is put betweene sinnes of knowledge , and of ignorance , will appeare by the different respect and regard that god hath to them , in the repentance he requires and accepts for them ; and that both in the acts of repentance , and also in the state of grace and repentance , upon which god accepts a man , or for want of which he rejecteth him . first , when a man comes to performe the acts of repentance , and to humble himselfe for sinne , and to turne from it , god exacteth not , that sins of ignorance should particularly be repented of . but if they be repented of but in the general , & in the lumpe , be they never so great , god accepts it . this is intimated psal . . . who can understand his errour ? cleanse me from my secret sinnes : that was confession enough . but sinnes of knowledge must be particularly repented of , and confessed , and that againe and againe , as david was forced to doe for his murder and adultery , or a man shall never have pardon . yea farther , greater difference will appeare , in regard of the state of grace and repentance : for a man may lye in a sinne he doth not know to be a sinne , and yet be in the state of grace , as the patriarchs in poligamie , and in divorcing their wives : but to lye in a sinne of knowledge , is not compatible with grace : but unlesse a man maintaineth a constant fight against it , hateth it , confesseth it , forsaketh it , hee cannot have mercy . this cannot stand with uprightnesse of heart . a friend may keepe correspondencie with one , hee suspects not to be an enemy unto his friend , and be true to his friendship notwithstanding : but if hee knowes him to be an enemie , he must break utterly with the one , if he leanes to the other . thirdly , yet farther in the third place , so vast is the difference , that some kind of sins committed out of and against knowledge , utterly exclude from mercy for time to come ; which done out of ignorance , remained capable of , and might have obtained it ; as persecuting the saints , blaspheming christ , &c. pauls will was as much in those acts themselves , and as hearty as those that sin against the holy ghost : for he was made against the church , and in these sins , as himselfe sayes , not sinning willingly herein onely , but being carried on with fury , as hot and as forward as the pharisees that sinned that sinne : onely sayes hee , tim. . . i did it ignorantly , therefore i obtained mercie . though it was ignorantly done , yet there was need of mercie : but yet in that he did it but ignorantly , there was a capacity and place for mercie , which otherwise had not beene . but thus to sin after a man hath received the knowledge of the truth , shuts a man out from mercie , heb. . and there is no more sacrifice for sinne , for such sins ; i say , such sins as these , thus directly against the gospell , when committed with knowledge . for sins against the law , though against knowledge , there was an atonement , as appeares levit. . from the . verse to the . where hee instanceth in forswearing : but to persecute the saints , and christs truth , with malice , after knowledge of it , there is no more sacrifice : not that simply the sin is so great in the act it selfe of persecution , for paul did it out of ignorance ; but because it is out of knowledge : so vast a difference doth knowledge and ignorance put betweene the guilt of the same sinne . and therefore indeed , to conclude this in the last place , this is the highest step of the ladder , next to turning off : the very highest but that of sinning against the holy ghost : which must needs argue it the highest aggravation of sinning , when it ascends so high , when it brings a man to the brinck , and next to falling into the bottomlesse pit , irrecoverably . and therefore to sinne presumptuously ( which is all one ) and to sinne against knowledge , ( as appears numb . . , , , , . it being there opposed to sinning out of ignorance , ( such a sinne as david did , of whom it is said , sam. . . that he despised the word of the lord : which phrase also is used to expresse sinnes of presumption , ver . . of that . of numbers ) to sinne , i say , presumptuously , is the highest step : so in davids account , psal . . , . for first he prayes , lord keepe me from secret sinnes , ( which he maketh sinnes of ignorance ) and then next he prayes against presumptuous sinnes , ( which , as the opposition shewes , are sinnes against knowledge : ) for ( sayes he ) if they get dominion over me , i shall not be free from [ that great offence . ] that is , that unpardonable sinne , which shall never be forgiven : so as these are neerest it of any other : yet not so , as that every one that fals into such a sinne commits it , but he is nigh to it , at the next step to it . for to commit that sinne , but two things are required ; light in the mind , and malice in the heart : not malice alone , unlesse there be light ; for then that apostle had sinned it : so as knowledge is the parent of it , it is after receiving the knowledge of the truth , heb. . , . these are the demonstrations of it , the reasons are first , because knowledge of god and his wayes , is the greatest mercie , next to saving grace : hee hath not dealt [ so ] with every nation . wherein ? in giving the knowledge of his wayes : and as it is thus , so to a nation , so to a man ; and therefore christ speaking of the gift of knowledge , and giving the reason why it so greatly condemneth , luke . . sayes , for to whom [ much ] is given , much is required . as if hee had said , to know his masters will , that is the great talent of all other . there is a [ much ] in that . thus it was in the heathens esteeme also : they acknowledged their foolish wisdome in morall and naturall philosophie , their greatest excellencie : and therefore plato thank'd god for three things ; that he was a man , an athenian , and a philosopher . and rom. . . the apostle mentions it as that excellencie they did professe . and soloman , of all vanities sayes this is the best vanity , and that it exceeds folly , as light doth darknesse , eccles . . but surely much more is the knowledge of the law , and of god , as we have it revealed to us ; this must needs be much more excellent . and so the jewes esteemed theirs ; as in this second chapter of the romanes , the apostle shewes also of them , that they made their boast of the law , and their forme of knowledge of it , and approving the things that are excellent . and what doe the two great books of the creatures , and the word , and all meanes else serve for , but to increase knowledge ? if therefore all tend to this , this is then the greatest mercie of all the rest . for secondly , god hath appointed knowledge as the immediate guide of men in all their wayes , to bring them to salvation and repentance , for to that it leads them . it is that same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as the philosopher call'd it : and therefore the law , rom. . , . is compared to an husband , ( so farre as it is written in , or revealed in the heart ) that as an husband is the guide of the wife in her youth , so is the law to the heart . and whereas beasts are ruled by a bit and bridle , god hee rules men by knowledge . and therefore if men be wicked , notwithstanding this light , they must needs sinne highly , seeing there is no other curbe for them , as they are men , but this : if he will deale with them as men , this is the onely way ; and therefore if that will not doe it , it is supposed nothing will. it is knowledge makes men capable of sin , which beasts are not ; therefore the more knowledge , ( if men be wicked withall ) the more sinne must necessarily be reckoned to them : so as god doth not simply looke what mens actions and affections are , but chiefly what their knowledge is , and accordingly judgeth men more or lesse wicked . i may illustrate this by that comparison , which i may allude unto : that as in kingdomes , god measures out the wickednesse thereof , and so his punishments accordingly , principally , by the guides , the governors thereof , what they are , and what they doe ; as in the . of ieremie , the . verse it appeares ; where first god lookes upon the poore people , but , he excuseth them , these are foolish , and know not the way of the lord : and therefore god would have beene moved to spare the kingdome , notwithstanding their sins . but from them at the . verse he goes to view the rules , i will get me to the great men , for these have knowne the way of the lord : and when he saw that these had broken the bands , then , how shall i pardon thee for this ? so is it in his judgement towards a particular man : when god lookes downe upon a man , and sees him in his courses exceeding loose , and wicked , hee lookes first upon those rude affections in him , which are uncleane , profane , debaucht , greedy of all wickednesse ; ay but sayes he , these are foolish of themselves , but i will looke upon his understanding , and upon the superiour faculties , which are the guides of these affections , and see what they dictate to these unruly affections , to restraine them : and when he findes that the guides themselves are enlightned , and have knowne the way of the lord , and that the will and the affections , though informed with much knowledge , yet break all bands , then how shall i pardon thee ? thee , who art a knowing drunkard , and a knowing unclean person , &c. so as thus to sin , aggravates and maketh sin out of measure sinfull . now that knowledge and reason is a mans guide , will further appeare by this : that even erroneous knowledge doth put an obligation , a bond , and a tye upon a man : which can be in no other respect , but because knowledge is appointed to be a mans guide . thus if a man thinkes a thing ( which is in it selfe common and indifferent ) to be a sinne , and forbidden , ( as rom. . . ) although the law forbids it not , yet to him it is uncleane , though in christ it is not uncleane , that is , by the law of christ . for , this his knowledge and judgement of the thing hath to him the force of a law : for it propounds it to him as a law , and as from god ; which reason of his , god hath appointed as his immediate guide : and the will is to follow nothing that is evill , which is represented to it , as evill ; this is the law of meere nature in all conditions ; therefore if a man should doe an action which is in it self good , if he thought it to be evill , he should sinne , and so è contra , for he goes against the dictate of nature . so that erroneous knowledge , though against the law , is a law to me , though not per se , yet per accidens . now therefore if to go against a false light of conscience be yet a sinne , though it proves that the commandement allowes the thing was done , and was for it , then to go against the true light of the law , how sinfull is it ? againe , thirdly , the knowledge of the law binds the person so much the more to obedience , by how much the more he knowes it : so as though it would be a sinne , when he knowes not the law to transgresse it , yet when he knowes it , it is a greater sinne . 't is true indeed , that conscience and the law , when they meet , make up but one law , not two distinct laws : and therefore in sinning against knowledge , though a man doth not commit two distinct sinnes , yet the knowledge of it doth adde a further degree of sinfulnesse to it : as a cloath is the same cloath when it is white , that it was when it is dyed with a scarlet dye ; yet then it hath a dye , a tincture given it , which is more worth than the cloath : and so when you sinne , not knowing the law , the sin is the same for substance , it would be if you had known it ; yet that knowledge dyes it , makes it a scarlet sinne , as esay speaks , farre greater and deeper in demerit than the sinne it selfe : and the ground of this is , because lawes then come to be in force , when they are promulged , and made known : so as the more they are promulged and knowne , the more is the force of their binding , and so the greater guilt . therefore deut. . . . . god straitens the cords more , the binding force of the law more upon those jewes consciences , to whom he at the first personally with majesty had promulgated it , than upon their children , though upon theirs also . now if all gods lawes , being made knowne to adam , binde us , and are in force , and this when we know them not ; then if we do know them , or might know them , they binde much more : and still the more clearely wee know them , the obligation increaseth , and the guilt insuing with it : and the rather , because now when wee come to know them , they are anew promulged , in a way of a peculiar mercie ; wee having defaced the knowledge of them in our fall . fourthly , when the law , being knowne , is broken , there is the more contempt cast upon the law , and the law-giver also ; and so a higher degree of sinning . and therefore numbers . . he that sinnes out of knowledge , is said to reproach the lord , and to despise the word . and therefore saul sinning against knowledge , samuel calleth it rebellion : and though it were but in a small thing , yet he parallels it with witchcraft . so also iob . . they are said to rebell , when they sinne against light ; because rebellion is added to disobedience : for knowledge is an officer set to see the law executed , and fulfilled ; and makes god present to the conscience . therefore rom. . . it is called a witnesse ; and therefore in sinning against knowledge , men are said to sinne before the face of the lord himselfe ; now what a great contempt is that ? therefore also psal . . the hypocrite sinning against knowledge , is said to cast the law of god behind his back : so as there is a contempt in this sinning , which is in no other . fiftly , the more knowledge a man sinneth against , the more the will of the sinner is discovered to be for sinne , as sinne . now voluntarium est regula & mensur a actionum moralium : willingnesse in sinning , is the standard and measure of sinnes . the lesse will , the lesse sinne : so much is cut off , the lesse the will closeth with it ; at least wise so much is added , by how much the will is more in it : and therefore the highest degree of sinning is exprest to us by sinning willingly , and this after knowledge , heb. . now though an ignorant man commits the act as willingly , as when paul persecuted the church , yet he commits it not considered as sinne , till he hath the knowledge of it : but then when it is discovered to be sinne , and the more clearely it is so discovered , the will may be said to joyn with it as sinne . therefore the apostle sayes , to him that knowes to doe well , and doth it not , to him it is sinne . iames . . because by his knowledge the thing is represented as sinne ; and so he closeth with it the more , under that notion and apprehension . sixtly , in sinning against knowledge , a man condemns himselfe ; but when out of ignorance meerely , the law onely doth condemne him . so rom. . . a man having knowledge in that wherein hee judgeth another , he condemneth himselfe . so rom. . now as self-murder is the highest degree of murder , and an aggravation of it ; so self-condemning must needs be reckoned . god tooke it as a great advantage over him that hid his talent , that out of thine owne mouth i will condemne thee , thou wicked servant . the doctrine being thus proved , first , i will explaine , what it is to sin against knowledge . secondly , i will give the aggravations of it . thirdly , i will give rules to measure sinnes of knowledge by , and the greatnesse of them in any act . lastly , the use of all . for the first , what it is to sinne against knowledge . first , to explaine it , i premise these distinctions . the first distinction . that it is one thing to sinne with knowledge , another thing against knowledge . there are many sinnes doe passe from a man with his knowledge , which yet are not against knowledge . this is to be observed for the removall of a scruple which may arise in some that are godly , who else may be wounded with this doctrine through a mistake . a regenerate man is , and must needs be supposed guilty of more knowne sinnes , than an unregenerate man : and yet he commits fewer against knowledge , than he . first , i say , hee is guilty of more knowne sinnes : for he takes notice of every sinfull disposition that is stirring in him , every by-end , every contrariety unto holinesse , deadnesse to duty , reluctancie to spirituall duties : and when regenerated , beginneth to see and know more evill by himselfe , than ever he did before : he fees as the apostle sayes of himselfe , rom. . . all concupiscence : and the holier a man is , the more he discernes and knowes his sins : so sayes the apostle , rom. . . i know that in me dwels no good thing . and ver . . i finde when i would doe good , evill is present with me . and . i see another law . all these , he sayes , he perceived and found daily in himselfe : and the more holy that he grew , the more he saw them . for the purer and clearer the light of gods spirit shines in a man , the more sinnes he knowes : he will see lusts steaming up , flying in his heart , like moates in the sun , or sparkes out of a furnace , which else he had not seene : the clearer the sun-beame is which is let into the heart , the more thou wilt see them . but yet in the second place , i adde , that neverthelesse he sinnes lesse against knowledge : for then wee are properly said to sinne against knowledge , when wee doe take the fulfilling of a lust , or the performance of an outward action , a dutie , or the like , into deliberation and consideration , and consider motives against the sinne , or to the dutie , and yet commit that sinne , yeeld to it , and nourish that lust , and omit that dutie : here now we sinne not onely with knowledge , but against knowledge : because knowledge stept in , and opposed us in it , comes to interrupt and prevent us : but now in those failings in dutie , and stirring of lusts in the regenerate afore mentioned , the case is otherwise : they are committed indeed with knowledge , but not against it : for it is not in the power of knowledge to prevent them ; for motus primo primi non cadunt sub libertatem ; but yet though such sinnes will arise againe and againe , yet sayes a good heart , they must not think to passe uncontrouled and unseene : therefore let not poore soules mistake me , as if i moant , throughout this discourse , of all sins which are knowne to be sinnes , but i meane such sinnes as are committed against knowledge : that is , when knowledge comes and examines a sinne , in or before the committing of it , brings it to the law , contests against it , condemnes it , and yet a man approveth it , and consenteth to it ; when a dutie and a sinne are brought before knowledge , as barrabas and christ afore pilate , and thy knowledge doth againe and againe tell thee such a sinne is a great sinne , and ought to be crucified , and yet thou cryest , let it goe ; and so for the duty , it tels thee again and againe it ought to be submitted unto , and yet thou omittest it , and committest the sin , choosest barrabas rather than christ , these are sinnes against knowledge : now such sins against knowledg break a mans peace , and the more consideration before had , the more the peace is broken . the second distinction is , that men sinne against knowledg , either directly , or collaterally : objectively , or circumstantially . first directly : when knowledge it selfe is the thing men abuse , or fight against , becommeth the object , the terminus , the butt and mark shot at ; this is to sin directly against knowledge it selfe . the second way , collaterally , is , when knowledge is but a circumstance in our sinnes : so as the pleasure of some sinne ( we know to be a sin ) is the thing aimed at ; & that our knowledge steps but in between to hinder us in it , and we commit it notwithstanding , though we doe know it ; here knowledge is indeed sinned against , yet but collaterally , and as a stander by , but as a circumstance onely , shot at per accidens , concomitanter , and by the by , as one that steps in to part a fray is smitten , for labouring to hinder them in their sin , as the sodomi●es quarrelled with lot : they are both found in this chapter , and therefore come fitly within the compasse of this discourse . first , this collaterall kinde of sinning against knowledge is mentioned in the . verse , where he saies , they knew god , yet they glorified him not : there knowledge is made but a circumstance of their sinning ; they sinned against it but collaterally . but then that other kind of sinning directly against knowledge , is mentioned ver . . they liked not to retaine god in their knowledge : that is , they hated this knowledge it selfe , so as now they did not onely love sin , they knew to be sin , but also they loved not the knowledge of it ; so that because both are thus clearly instanced in , wee will speake of both more largely . now sinnes directly against knowledge it selfe are many : i will reduce the chiefe heads of them into two branches : first , in regard of our selves . secondly , in regard of others . first , in regard of our selves , five wayes we may thus sin against knowledge it selfe . first , when we abuse knowledge to helpe us to sinne : as first , to plot and contrive a sin , as iudas plotted to betray his master , if hee could conveniently ; so the text sayes , mark . . hee would doe it wisely : and thus those that came to intrap christ with most cunning questions , did sinne , and those who plot against the just , as psal . . . so secondly , when men use their wisedoms to tell a cunning lye , to cover a sin ; as plato sayes , men of knowledge , sunt ad mendacia potentiores & sapientiores : whereas fooles , though they would lye , yet often tell truth ere they are aware . but also thirdly , when they abuse morall knowledge , which yet , as aristotle sayes , is least apt to be ( i am sure should least be ) abused , so as to make a shew of good pretences to cover their sins , and dissemble them ; not onely by finding out some cunning artificiall colour , as david did in the matter of vriah — chance of warre ( sayes he ) falls to all alike : but when men are so impudently hypocriticall , as to make use of religious pretexts , ( as the devill sometimes doth ) as saul , who pretends to samuel , i have done the will of the lord : and when samuel told him of the cattell , oh , sayes he , they are for a sacrifice ; when god had expresly commanded to kill them all . but this shift shifted him out of his kingdome , samuel pronounceth him a rebell in it , rebellion is sinne against knowledge , therefore he knew it . thus also iezabel coloured over the stoning of naboth with a solemne fast . so iudas fisheth for money with a charitable pretence , this might have beene sold , and given to the poore . in sins against knowledge , usually the mind indevours to find out a colour , and that provokes god more than the sinne , because we goe about to mock him . we see men cannot endure a shift , much lesse the all-knowing god , not to be mocked : and we see it is hard to convince such an one . david was faine to be brought to the rack , ere he would confesse , when he had a shift ; and men doe seeke such shifts onely in case of sinning against conscience : for else there were no need , they would be sure to plead ignorance , as abimelech did . secondly , when men neglect the getting and obtaining of knowledge , which knowledge might keep & hinder them frō sinning , and might make them expert in duties . this is as much as to sin against knowledge , although the sins be committed out of ignorance : yet that ignorance being through their owne default , it comes all to one : when it may be said of men , as the apostle doth of the hebrewes , chap. . . that for the time they have had to learn , they might have beene teachers ; they had yet need be taught againe the first principles ▪ if a man had an apprentice , who through negligence and want of heeding , and observing what hee daily sees and heares about his trade , might have got for his time much knowledge in his trade , whereby he might have saved his master much , which hee now hath lost him ; and rid and perfected much worke , hee daily spoiles him ; such carelesse blockish ignorance it is just for his master to correct him for , and to charge on him all that waste and losse , because he might have knowne how to have done better . and therefore even they who thought ignorance in it selfe no sin ( wherein they erred ) yet the neglect of knowledge upon this very ground , they thought a great sinne , and that it would be so farre from excusing sinnes , as that it would aggravate them . so here we see these gentiles shall not onely be reckoned with for the actuall knowledge , they had attained to , and sinned against ; but also for what they might have had , and have picked out of the creatures . for so the apostle brings in this here in the . verse , that the power of god being cleerly seen in the creatures , they neglecting to spell and reade it , so much knowledg as they might have got , god will reckon to them , and aggravate their sins by . thirdly , which is yet much worse , when men refuse knowledge , that they may sinne the more freely ; and doe stop the eare , lest they should be charmed : as when men are loath , and afraid , and dare not reade such a booke as discovers , or might discover that truth to them , the submission to which would prejudice them , and this to the end that they may plead ignorance of their sinne . thus also those that assent not to truth when it comes in strongly upon them , but seek to evade it . but cor. . . when the apostle had cleerely discovered the truth in those things controverted , so as who ever was spirituall , or not fully blind , might see , and would acknowledge the truth : then he shuts up his discourse about them , ver . . if any be ignorant , let him be ignorant : for it is wilfull , it is affected ; hee speakes it , as elsewhere , revel . last , it is said , he that is unjust , let him be unjust still : that is , hee that will be unjust , and refuseth to turne , let him goe on . this is a great sinne , for god , you see , gives such a man over : one that is but neglectfull , or dull of capacity , god will take paines with him , to teach him , and beare with him , as christ did with his disciples : but if he be wilfully ignorant , he lets him die in his ignorance , and yet will reckon with him , as if all his sinnes had beene committed against knowledge , because hee refused to know . the fourth is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . this is yet much worse , when men hate the word , and the ministers of it , the examples of gods people , and the light they carry with them ( they shining as lights in a crooked generation , phil. . . and yet they hate these , as theeves doe a torch in the night , and fly against the light , as batts doe , and as the iewes did , iohn . . ) this christ sayes is the great condemning sinne of all others . so these gentiles put socrates to death for reproving them . and thus men sinne also , when they labour to extinguish the light in their owne consciences , and like not to retaine god in their knowledge , verse . but would studie the art of forgetfulnesse : when men have put the candle out , and drawne the curtaines , that they may sinne , and sleepe in sin more freely and securely . thus those also sin in a higher measure , who have had a cleare conviction , that they ought to be thus strict , and ought to sanctifie the lords day , and pray privately , but now have lost this light , and think they need not be so strict : when men continue not in what they were once assured of , as the apostle speaks , tim. . . these sinne against their knowledge , and are the worst of such sinners : and this estate aristotle himselfe makes statum maligni , the state of a wicked one , namely , when the sparkes of light are extinguisht or hated . for when any mans light is lost and turned into darknesse by sinning , then , as christ sayes , how great is that darknesse ? when good lawes are not onely not enacted and embraced , but repealed also , ( it is aristotles similitude , to distinguish an incontinent person , and a wicked man ) this is an high kind of sinning : so of these gentiles it is said , their foolish heart was darkned ; they had extinguisht some of that light god gave them . as some drink away their wits , so some sin away their consciences ; and thus by degrees , they first sinne away the light of the word they had , as they in iude , who were religious once , and then they quench even that little sparke of nature that is left . also verse . corrupting themselves in what they know naturally . fiftly , men sinne against knowledge yet worse , when they hold opinion against their knowledge . so many are said to doe , in tim. . . he foretels they should speake lyes in hypocrisie , and invent lyes that should have a pretence of holinesse ; which they know to be a lye , or else they should not be said to speake lyes in hypocrisie ; but they doe it to maintaine their honour and greatnesse , which must downe , if their doctrine prove false : and though many are given up to beleeve their lyes , thes . . . as a punishment of their not loving the truth ; yet others of them shall know they are lies , and yet vent them for truths . thus when men fashion their opinion to the times and wayes of preferment , and their dependances on great ones , or to maintaine and uphold a faction , or out of pride , having broached an error , maintaine it , though the pulling out that one tile doth untile all the house . these are the two causes given of perverting the truth , tim. . , . namely , pride and covetousnesse , and supposing gaine godlinesse , and so fashioning their religion accordingly : when men are knights of the post , that will write or speak any thing , whereby they may get gaine and preferment . secondly , men sin against knowledge in regard of others . first , by concealing it : the apostle indeed sayes in a certaine case , hast thou knowledge ? keepe it to thy selfe . he speakes it of opinions , or practices about things indifferent , which might scandalize the weake ; but if thou hast knowledge , which may edifie thy brother , thou oughtest to communicate it . socrates , knowing there was but one god , said , in his apologie for his life , that if they would give him life , upon condition to keep that truth to himselfe , and not to teach it to others , hee would not accept life upon such a condition : and i remember he expresseth his resolution in words very nigh the same words the apostles used , acts . . whether it be better to obey god than men , judge you : and , we cannot but teach the things wee have heard and seene , sayes christ : for knowledge is a thing will boyle within a man forvent , and cannot be imprisoned : it is light , and the end why light was made , was to be set up to give light . and christ argues from an apparent absurdity to put a light under a bushell , which may give light to all the house ; hast thou knowledge of god and of his wayes , thou canst not but speake ( if withall thou hast but a good heart ) to all in the familie , to thy wife in thy bosome , &c. god took it for granted , that abraham would teach his children what he should know from him : the same disposition is in all the children of abraham . secondly , when men endeavour to suppresse knowledge . as the pharisees , they kept the keyes of it in their hands , and would not open the treasures of it themselves , nor let others doe it neither . so they ( acts . . ) could not deny but a great miracle was done by the apostles ( say themselves ) but that it spread no further , let us threaten them , and charge them , that they speake no more in his name . and this they did against their consciences by their owne profession , we cannot deny it : as if they had said , if wee could we would , but it was too manifest it was the truth . so when masters keep their servants from the meanes of knowledge , they are thus guilty . thirdly , when wee would make others sinne against their consciences . the pharises , when the blind man would not say as they said , they cast him out ; they would have had him say that christ was a sinner , when through the small light he had , hee judged it evident enough , that a sinner should not doe such a miracle , as was never done since the world began . and so iezabel made the judges , and witnesses sinne against conscience in accusing naboth : and so some of the gentiles , that would hold correspondencie with the jewes , would have constrained the galathians to be circumcised , gal. . . those that knew that circumcision was to be abolisht , yet they would perswade them to it by a clubb argument , drawn from avoiding persecution , not from evidence of the truth , or by reasons that might convince them , and their consciences : therfore he sayes , they constrained thē . the perswaders might indeed glory , as having their cause and side strengthened , but they wanne little credit to their cause by it ; for as the perswaders arguments were suited to flesh , so the others yeelding was out of flesh , and so they glory in your flesh and weaknesse , sayes he ; as the papists urged cranmer , not by arguments , but threats and promises to recant ; this is the greatest cruelty in the world , to have a man murder himselfe , stab his conscience . to offend a weak conscience is a sinne , if but passively , when thou dost something before his face , which his conscience is against : but if thou makest him wound his own conscience , and to doe an act himselfe , which his owne conscience is against , it is much worse : as if thou beest a master , and hast a servant who pleadeth conscience , that hee cannot lye for thy advantage in thy shop , or who will not doe unlawfull businesses on the sabbath day , and pleads conscience , wilt thou smite him and whip him ? god will smite thee , thou whited wall . how darest thou smite him , and so cause him to doe that for which god will whip him worser ? shew mercy to those under you , enforme their consciences , wring them not , you may hap to break the wards if you doe . now for sinnes committed collaterally , or per modum circumstantia ( that i may so expresse it ) against knowledge , they are done either when particular acts of sinne are committed , and duties omitted , against light and knowledge ; and so the saints may and doe often sinne against knowledge . or , secondly , in regard of a knowne estate of sinne , and impenitencie persisted in ; when men continue , and goe on in such a state against conviction of conscience , that such is their estates . for the first , because particular acts of sin committed against knowledge are infinite , and there will be no end of instancing in particulars , therefore i will not insist : onely in briefe this distinction concerning such acts may be observed , and the observation of it may be usefull : that some acts of sinnes against knowledge , are meerely transient : that is , are done and ended at once . and though the guilt of them is eternall , yet the extent of the act is finished with the committing it , and reacheth no further : as a vaine oath , breach of the sabbath , &c. which acts cannot be repealed , though they may be repented of . but others there are , which though the act may be but once outwardly and professedly done , yet have an habituall and continued permanency , life , & subsistence given it , such as that untill a man doth recall them , hee may be said continually to renew those acts , and every day to be guilty of them , and to maintaine it , and so habitually to cōmit them . as it is with laws , which though made but once , are yet continued acts of the state , whilest they stand in force unrepealed : so is it in some sins . for instance , when a man doth take goods from his neighbour unjustly , the act indeed is done but once : but till hee restores them , he may be said to steale them ; every day , every houre , he continues to doe it habitually ; so a man having subscribed to falshood , or recanted the truth publiquely , the act , though done but once , yet untill a retractation be some wayes made , hee continues that act , and so is daily anew guilty of it . so if a man should marry one , whom it is unlawfull for him to marry , ( as herod did ) though that sinfull act of espousals , whereby they entred into it , was soon dispatcht ; yet , till a divorce , he lives in a continuall sin . and such acts ( of this latter sort i meane ) against knowledge are most dangerous to commit ; because to continue thus in them , though but once committed , hazards a mans estate ; and therefore men find , when they come to repent , the greatest snare , and trouble , and difficulty in such kind of sins ; to extricate themselves out of them by a meet and true repentance . but as concerning the first branch of this distinction , namely , of particular acts committed against knowledge ; besides this last distinction briefly touched ; i will anon give you severall aggravations and rules whereby to measure the sinfulnesse that is in such acts so committed : but in the meane time the second branch of this former distinction must be insisted upon , and therefore i will bring in these aggravations and rules which concerne particular acts , as distinct heads , after i have briefly spoken to this other , which is , that secondly , those sinne against knowledge , who goe on in an estate of sin and impenitencie , which they know to be damnable : as pharaoh , exod. . . who confest that the and his people were wicked , and yet hardned himselfe in sinne most dangerously : and yet three sorts of men may apparently be convinced thus to sin . first , those that keep out , and with-draw themselves from professing christ and his wayes , and the feare of his name , out of shame or feare of man , or losse of preferment , or the like worldly ends , when yet they are convinced that they are gods wayes , and ought to be professed by them . i doe not say , that all , who doe not come in to professe christ , and that doe not joyne themselves with his people , that they goe on against knowledge ; for many are ignorant , and mistaken about them : but when men are convinced of the truth , and necessity of professing and confessing of it even unto salvation , ( as the apostle speaks , rom. ) and yet out of fear , or shame , keep still on the other side , drawing in their hornes all together . these goe on in an estate of impenitencie against knowledg ; for put all these together , and it must needs appeare to be so : as first , when they are convinced that this is the truth , and that salvation and the power of religion is onely to be found in such wayes and men : and secondly , that these are to be practiced and professed , and yet thirdly , out of shame , &c. keepe still a loofe off , and goe on a contrary way ; these must needs know , that they goe on in an estate of impenitencie against knowledge . this was the case of many of the pharises , who therefore sinned highly : they beleeved , and were convinced , that christ was the messiah ; and so then to be confest , and followed , and to be cleaved unto : and then also they must needs know , that his followers onely were the children of god : yet ioh. . . it is said , though they thus beleeved on him , yet they durst not confesse him for feare of the iewes , and of the pharises , and of being put out of the synagogues . at the latter day , christ shall not need to sever such from the rest , as hee will doe the sheepe from the goats ; for they willingly remaine all their dayes amongst them , whom they know to be goats , and refuse the company , and fould , and food , and marks of the sheep ; which they know to be such : they may apologize , and make fair with the saints , that their hearts are with them , but they will be rankt at the day of judgement , as here they ranked themselves , with the workers of iniquity . of these doth the psalmist speake , those that turne aside by their crooked wayes , them shall the lord leave with the workers of iniquity . those also thus sinne , and are to be joyned with these , who know the tearms and condition of salvation , and how they must part with all for christ , and yet will not come to the price ; such doe goe desperately on against knowledge in a bad estate , and doe judge themselves unworthy of eternall life . thus the young man in the gospell , he was told , that he was to sell all , and that was the condition , and hee knew heaven was worth it , and was convinced of the truth herein , that thus he ought to doe , for he went away sorrowfull : now if he had not knowne that he went away without happinesse , he needed not have beene sorrowfull at all ; but he knew the bargaine of salvation was not struck up , and likewise what it stuck at , and yet still rested in his former condition , and chose rather to enjoy his many possessions : this man now went on in his state against knowledge . secondly , as also those who upon the same or like ground defer their repentance , these go on in a bad estate , and must needs know they doe so ; for in that they promise to repent hereafter , and take up purposes to doe it , when they have gone on a little while longer , to adde drunkennesse to thirst , they doe thereby professe that there is a work of grace , which they must attaine to , ere they can be in the state of grace : for they would not promise so much hereafter , but that they know not how , without such a work , they should be saved . whilest therefore such shall rest without present endevouring after it , so long they are judged in themselves to be in a bad estate at present . when men know the curses due to their present estate , and yet say as hee , deut. . . i will goe on in the way of my heart , and shall have peace afterward . this man sinnes most highly , and therefore gods wrath smoakes against that man , and he sayes of him , that he will not be mercifull to him , in that place . thirdly , sunk and broken professors , such cannot but goe on in a bad estate against knowledge , when either men are falne from the practice and profession of what is good , which once they thought necessarie to salvation ; or when they continue to hold forth their profession in hypocrisie . those that have escaped the pollutions of the world , through the knowledge of iesus christ , but are returned to their vomit againe , some of these are ingenious , and acknowledge both themselves faln , & their present estate most miserable , and yet goe on in it ; and such are to be pittyed , but yet are in a most dangerous condition . saul when he was fallen away , yet had this ingenuity a while left , hee desired samuel to pray to his god for him , and told david , that he was more righteous than he ; yet still went on in his courses , and in the end ( as some have thought ) sinned against the holy ghost . but others there are , who though they be fallen from all the inward , powerfull and secret performance of duties they once did practice , and from all conscience of sinning , yet retain their profession which they know to be but an out-side : these of all others goe on against knowledge : and rev. . . they are said to make a lye ; not onely to tell a lye in words , but to make a lye in deeds . now a lye is a sin of all others most against knowledge , and indeed against a double knowledge , both facti and juris : & so is this . . that they professe themselves to be that they know they are not . . that they will not endevour after that state they know they ought to get into , if ever saved . this is the condition of many , who being convinced of the power of religion , have launched forth into a profession , and hoyst up saile , but now the tyde is fallen , the spirit withdrawne , the conscience of sinne extinguisht in them ; yet for their credit sake still beare their sails up as high as ever : even as many merchants doe , who are sunk in their estates , still beare a faire shew , yea will seeme richer than ordinary , by purchasing lands , &c. such a professor was iudas , hee began seriously , and thought to have gone to heaven , and was earnest in good duties at first : as they also , pet. . . they really , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , escaped the pollutions of the world , through the knowledge of christ : but in the end iudas became a grosse hypocrite , one that pretended the poore , when he loved the bag ; and on the sudden betrayed his master , when yet the disciples knew it not , suspected iudas as little as themselves ; and the end of those also , in that fore-named place , is said to be worse than their beginning . now because such sinne so highly against knowledge , therefore their punishment is made the regula of all other wicked mens ; as when it is said , that other sinners shall have their portion with hypocrites : as the wicked angels punishment is made the measure of mens : goe ye cursed into the fire prepared for the devill and his angels : so among men , such grosse hypocrites , their punishment is made the rule , and so the chiefe of all kind of torments , which sinners of the sonnes of men shall undergoe . now let mee speake a word to all such as thus go on in a state of impenitencie against knowledge : this is a high kinde of sinning , and of all the most desperate , and doth argue more hardnesse of heart , and despising the riches of gods goodnesse . for if , as in the rom. . . to go on in sinne , when a man [ knowes not , ] that is , considers not that gods mercy leads him to repentance , is made the signe and effect of a very hard heart , treasuring up wrath , then much more , when thou knowest and considerest thou art in an impenitent condition , and hast many motions leading thee to repentance , is thy heart then to be accounted hard ? when a man commits a particular act against knowledge , he haply and usually still thinks his estate may be good , and that he shall not lose god utterly , or hazard the losse of him ; onely his spirit , being at present empty of communion with him , he steales out to some stolne pleasure : but when a man knowes his estate bad , and that he is without god in the world , and yet goes on , he doth hereby cast away the lord , and professeth he cares not for him , or that communion which is to be had by him , as esau did his birth-right . david , though he despised the lord , yet hee did not cast away the lord , as saul did : for saul ventured utterly to lose him , knowing his estate naught . david , when hee sinned , thought gods eternall favour would still continue , though for the present he might lose the sense of it . but when a man goes on in a state of sinning , he ventures the losse of gods eternall love , and slights it , and knowes he doth so : when a man knowes that he is condemned already , as being impenitent , and that all his eternall estate lyes upon the non-payment of such duties of repentance , &c. and that the guilt of all his sinnes will come in upon him , and that an execution is out , and yet goes on , this is more than to commit one act against knowledge , whereby he thinks he brings upon himself but the guilt of that one sinne ; and upon the committing of which , he thinks not the morgage of all lyes , though it deserves it ; herein men shew themselves more desperate . in the next place , i come to those rules , whereby you may measure and estimate sinning against knowledge , in any particular act of sinning ; and they are either before the sinne , or in sinning : three of either , which i make a second head , to explaine this doctrine by . first , before . the first rule is , the more thou knewest , and didst consider the issues and consequents of that sinne thou didst commit , the more thou sinnest against conscience in it : when as in rom. . ult . thou knowing ( sayes the apostle ) that those that commit such things , are worthy of death : that is , thou considerest that hell and damnation is the issue and desert of it , and yet committest it ; yea and this when haply hell fire at present flasheth in thy face , and yet thou goest on to doe it , in this case men are said to choose death , and to love it , prov. . . when a man considers , that the way to the whorehouse are the wayes to death ( as solomon speaks ) so when thou a professor considerest with thy selfe before , this sinne will prove scandalous , and undoe me , disable me for service , cast mee out of the hearts of good men , and yet dost it . thus that foolish king was told againe and againe , ier. . , , . that if he would yeeld to the king of babel , he should save his life , and city , and kingdome , and live there still ; but if hee would not , he should not escape : but as ieremie told him , verse . thou shalt cause this city to be burnt with fire , yet he would not hearken : this is the word of the lord ( sayes ieremie , ) and he knew it to be so ; and yet being a weake prince , led by his nobles , he would not follow his counsell : and thus iudas fully knew the issue : christ had said againe and againe , woe be to him by whom the sonne of man is betrayed , and yet went on to doe it . the second rule is , the more consultations , debates , and motives against it , did runne through thee before thou didst it , so much the greater and more hainous . how often did mercy come in , and tell thee , that if thou lookest for any hope or part in it , thou shouldest not doe such an evill ? how often came that in , shall i doe this , and sinne against god ? did any scripture come in to testifie against thee in the nick ? did god send in the remembrance of such a mercie past , to perswade thee ; or some mercies to come , which thou dependest upon him for ? that which made spira's sinne so great , was such debates as these before : and this made darius sinne , in casting daniel into the lions den , so great ; he debated it with himselfe , dan. . . he was sore displeased with himselfe , and laboured to the going downe of the sunne to deliver him ; he considered that he was as his right hand in all the affaires of his kingdome , and a man entrapped meerely for his conscience , and that to put him to death was to sacrifice him to their malice ; he knew him to be holy , and wise , worth all the men that sought after his life , and yet yeelded ; these considerations troubled him afore , and also after ; insomuch as he could not sleep for them , ver . . now because that every such consultation should set an impression upon the heart , and countermand the motions of sin , when therefore thou dost it , maugre all such debates and motives to the contrary , this is much against knowledg , and very heynous . therefore the pharises , luke . . are said to have rejected the counsell of god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in or against themselves : the words will beare either : in themselves , because they knew it , and tooke it into consideration , and yet rejected it : and against themselves , because it was their destruction . the third rule is , that the more confirmations any man hath had of the knowledge of that which he sinneth in , and testimonies against it , the greater sinne against knowledge it is : when a man hath had a cloud of witnesses in his observation against a particular sinne , and yet doth it , and goes on in it , it is the more fearfull . to goe on against that one witnesse , the bare light and grudging of naturall conscience onely , is not so much ; but when it is further confirmed , and backed by the word written , which a man hath read , and with testimonies , out of which a man meets with such places , wherein againe and againe in reading of it , such a practice is condemned , and observes it ; and then also heares it reproved in sermons , and of all sinnes else , heares in private conference that sinne spoken against also ; yea hath in his eye many examples of others sinning in the like kinde , which have beene punished , yea haply himselfe also ; yet to sin against all these is exceeding hainous . sometimes god orders things so , as a sinne is made a great sinne , by such forewarnings ; so he contrived circumstances that iudas sinned a great sinne ; for iudas knew before that christ was the saviour of the world ; he knew it by all the miracles he had seene , as also by his gracious words and converse ; and he professed as much in following of him ; and he had the written word against it , thou shalt not murder the innocent . but yet further , god to aggravate his sinne to the highest , orders it so , that christ should tell him of it when he was to goe about it , pronounceth a woe to him , iohn . . that it had beene good for that man that he had never beene borne . mar. . . and the disciples they were sorrowfull at christs speech , when hee suspected one of them ; and shewed an abomination and detestation of such a fact , there was a jurie of eleven men , yea witnesses against it ; yea and iudas against himselfe , he asked if it were he ; yea and christ gave him a sop , and told him , thou hast said it , and doe what thou doest quickly : which even then might argue to his conscience , that he was god , and searched and knew his heart , and yet hee went out and did it immediately . how did hee sinne against the haire , as wee speak , and how did all these circumstances aggravate his sin ? but yet a more cleare evidence of this is that instance of pilate , whom god many wayes would have stopt in his sinne of condemning christ , who examining him before the pharises , he could finde no fault with him , as concerning those things whereof they accused him , luke . . and yet to allay their malice , unjustly scourged him , verse . and further , when he sent him to herod , as being willing to rid his owne hands of him , herod also found nothing worthy of death in him , verse . which was another witnesse might have confirmed him concerning christs innocencie . yea yet further , that the fact might be more aggravated , a most notorious murtherers life must be put into the scale with christs , and either the one or the other condemned : and when the people yet chose barrabas , why ( sayes pilate ) what evill hath he done ? ver . . then he distinctly knew and considered , that he was delivered up through envie : yea and when hee was upon the bench , and ready to pronounce sentence , as it were , god admonisht him by his owne wife , mat. . . whom god himselfe had admonished in a dreame , she sending him word shee had suffered many things by reason of him that night , and therefore have nothing ( sayes shee ) to doe with that just man : yea he himselfe , when he condemns him , washeth his hands . and thus it falls out in many sinfull businesses which men are about , that god often and many severall wayes would knock them off , and stops them in their way , as hee did balaam ; reproves them , as he did him by a dumbe asse , pet. . . so there by some silent passage of providence , and not onely so , but by his spirit also standing in their way , with the threatnings ready drawne and brandisht against them , as the angell did with a drawne sword against balaam , and yet they goe on ; this is fearfull . there are . rules also , whereby the sinfulnesse of sin , as it is against knowledge , may be measured , from what may be observed in the act : as first , the lesse passion , or inward violence or temptation to a sinne committed against knowledg , the greater sinne against knowledge it is argued to be : for then the knowledge is the clearer , passion or temptation being as a mist . but then to sinne , when a man is not in passion , is to stumble at noon-day . for as drunkennesse takes away reason , so doth passion ( which is a short drunkennesse ) cloud and mist a mans knowledge . and so aristotle compares the knowledge of an incontinent person , to the knowledge of one that is drunk . when peter denied his master , though hee had warning of it before , and so it was against knowledge , and it was by lying , and swearing , and forswearing , which are sinnes of all other most directly against knowledge , yet he was taken unexpectedly ; and when that which might stir up feare to the utmost in him , was in his view ; for hee was then in the judgement hall , where his master , just before his face , was arraigned for his life , and he thought he might also have presently been brought to the barre with him , if he had beene discovered to have been his disciple ; so as his passion being up , his soule was distempered , reason had little time to recover it selfe ; and therefore though it was against knowledge , yet the lesse against knowledge , because knowledge had laesam operationem , it had not its perfect worke upon his heart : but now iudas , in betraying his master , had not onely warning before , but was not tempted to it , but went of himselfe , and made the offer to the pharisees , sought how conveniently to doe it , plotted to doe it , had his wits about him , had time to think of it , and therefore it was ( besides the hainousnesse of the act ) more also against knowledge , and so the greater . so david when he went to slay nabal , was in hot blood , in a passion ; but when hee plotted to kill vriah , he was in cold blood : he was drunke when he lay with bathsheba , but sober when hee made vriah drunke : hee went quietly and sedately on in it . and therefore we find david blamed onely in the matter of vriah , not so much for that of bathsheba . secondly , the more sorrow , renisus , or reluctancie , and regreeting of mind there is against a sinne , 't is a sign that the knowledge of it is the stronger , and quicker against it , and so the sinne the more against knowledge : for that gaine-saying and displeasure of the minde against it , ariseth from the strength and violent beating of the pulse of conscience , and opposition of it against the sinne , it springs from the greater and deeper apprehension of the evill of the sinne in the action , which is then in doing ; and though that reluctancie be a better signe of the estate of the person , than if there were none at all ; as there is not in those who are past feeling , & commit sin with greedinesse ; whose estate is therefore worse , and more uncapable of repentance , yet the fact it self is argued to be the more hainous , for it argues it to be against strong , active , stirring knowledge . this argued herods sinne to be much against knowledge ( as indeed it was ) mark . . the text sayes , he was exceeding sorrowfull : now that he could not have beene , unlesse he had exceedingly apprehended what a great sinne it was to behead iohn , who , he knew , was a just and an holy man , ver . . and who was one that had a great place in his estimation , for he observed him , and was wrought much upon by his ministerie , and he knew that he did but sacrifice him to the malice of a wicked woman ; and in this case the sinne is also hereby made so much the greater , in that conscience doth stir up a contrary violent passion in the heart against the temptation , and therefore yet to doe it , when there is such a bank cast up that might resist it , yet then to break all downe , such a sin wasts the conscience much . thirdly , on the contrary , the more hardnesse of heart there is , and want of tendernesse , in committing that sinne , which a man knowes to be a sinne , it is argued thereby to be the greater sinne against knowledge ; not onely the greater sinne , but the greater sinne against knowledge . for hardnesse of heart in sinning , is an effect of having formerly sinned much against knowledge before . for as the light of the sun hardneth clay , so the beames of knowledge and conscience , lighting upon mens hearts , use to harden them , and doe make them in the end past feeling . and therefore in tim. . . sinning against knowledge is made the cause of a seared conscience , they speak lyes in hypocrisie : and therefore knowingly that they are lyes , and such lyes as damne others as well as themselves , which who beleeve are damned , thes . . , . and if so , no wonder if it followes , having their consciences seared with an hot iron . it is not a cold iron will seare their consciences , and make them insensible , but an hot iron , a burning and a shining light , which once having had place in their consciences , and being rejected , they begin to be hardned and seared . for knowledge makes sinnes and the apprehensions of them , familiar to a man , and so lesse terrible and frightfull in the end , as beares and lyons doe become to their keepers , through custome . iudas had a hard heart , when he came to betray his master , surely his conscience had smitten him at first more for nimming out of the bag , than it did now for this of murder . he could never have had such a hard heart , had he not had much knowledge : was it not a hard heart , that when he was challenged to his face , hee could set a brazen face on it , and did aske as well as the rest , is it i ? when also christ cursed him to his face , who should doe it , and the disciples all abhorr'd it : had not iudas lived under such blessed and glorious meanes , and sinned long against knowledge , all this would have startled him , and have staggered in his purpose : but he goes on as if it were nothing , though when he had done it , his conscience was then opened too late ; when a man formerly hath beene troubled with a small sinne , more than now with a grosse lye , which he can digest better than once the other : or , when before , if he omitted praying , it troubled him , now he can goe a weeke without , and is not sensible of it , it is a signe that his knowledge hath hardned him . thus having given such rules , whereby you may estimate the sinfulnesse of particular acts , i will now proceed to other wayes , aggravations taken from the kind of knowledge a man sins against , to sin against what kind of knowledge is most hainous and dangerous ; and these are five , drawn from the severall qualifications of that knowledge , and the light which men sinne against . for the greater , or the more strong & efficacious the light and knowledge is , the greater is the sinne of knowledge thou committest ; and this i make a third generall head to explaine this doctrine by . all these five rules being applicable and common both to particular acts against knowledge , and also lying in an estate of impenitencie against knowledge , and all other particulars which have beene mentioned . first then , to sinne against the inbred light of nature , that is , in such sinnes , as though thou hadst wanted the light of the word in , thou wouldst have knowne to be such : this is a high kind of sinning . such the apostle speaks of , iude . what things they know naturally , in these they corrupt themselves , as bruit beasts , putting as it were no difference of actions , no more than beasts , no not in what nature teacheth them , and therefore therein are as beasts : for it is the light of nature puts the first difference betweene men and beasts ; and in such kinde of sinnes the apostle instanceth in this first chapter , as namely , that of unnaturall uncleannesse , in three particulars : as . self-uncleannesse , ver . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , alone by themselves : so beza and theophilact understand it , which he makes there the first degree of unnaturall uncleannesse , which is therefore unnaturall , because thou destroyest that which nature gave thee for propagation , quod perdis homo est . then . the uncleane love of boyes , men burning in lust with men , ver . . be it discovered in what dalliance it will , though not arising to an act of sodomie , doing that which is unseemely , ver . . which hee therefore sayes , is the perverting the use and intent of nature , and so is a sin against nature , leaving the naturall use of women . my brethren , i am ashamed to speak of such things as are done in secret . these kind of sinnes , by the apostles ranking them , are in a further degree of unnaturalnesse , than any other , because they are made the punishments of other sinnes , which yet were against the light of nature also : namely , not glorifying god when they knew him : yet that being a sinne , the light of nature was not so clear in comparison of these , therefore these are made the punishments of the other , as being more against nature . so for men to be disobedient to parents , stubborne to them , and without naturall affection , as the apostle sayes , ver . , . this is against nature , even the instinct of it . so unthankfulnesse , and requiting evill for good , is against a common principle in mens mindes . doe not the gentiles doe good to those that do good to them ? your hearts use to rise against such an one out of common humanity ; or if you see one cruell and unmercifull , which is another reckoned up , ver . . there being usually principles of pitty in all mens natures , by nature ; therefore for one man to prey upon , and tyrannize over another , as fishes doe over the small ones , as habakkuk complaineth , this is against nature ; which teacheth you to doe as you would be done to . so covenant-breakers , and lying , and forswearing , mentioned ver . . inventers of evill , and truce-breakers , are sins against nature , and natural light ; lying is against a double light , both morall ; both juris , which tels us such a thing ought not to be done ; and facti , whilest we affirm a thing that is not , the knowledge of the contrary ariseth up in us against , though there were no law forbade it ; therefore of all sins else , the devills lusts are expressed by two ; lying , which is a sinne in the understanding , and malice in the will , iohn . . secondly , to sin against that light which thou didst suck in , when thou wert young , to sin against the light of thy education , this is an aggravation , and a great one . there is a catechisme of a blessed mother bathsheba , which shee taught solomon when a child , put in among the records of sacred writ , prov. . wherein she counsels him betimes , not to give his strength to women ; she foretold him of that sinne : and because it is incident to kings most , they having all pleasures at command , she tells him particularly , it destroyes kings : and so also not to drink wine , was another instruction there he was forewarned of : this aggravated solomons fault the more ; for reade the . chapter of ecclesiastes , and we shall finde there , that hee was most guilty in the inordinate love of these two ; but hee had not beene brought up so , his good mother had not thus instructed him . and thus also when god would aggravate his owne peoples sin unto them , he recalls them to their education in their youth in the wildernesse . so ierem. . . goe and cry to them , iremember the kindnesse and towardlinesse of thy youth : he puts them in mind of their education by moses their tutor , and their forwardnesse then . and so hos . . when he was a child , i loved him ; and then god had their first fruits , ver . . this he brings to aggravate their back-sliding , ver . . therefore the apostle urgeth it as a strong argument to timothie , to goe on to persevere in grace and goodnesse , that he had knowne the scriptures from a child : and therefore for him to fall , would be more hainous . the reason is , because the light then infused , it is the first , a virgin light , as i may call it , which god in much mercy vouchsafed to pre-possesse the minde with , before it should be deflowred and defiled with corrupt principles from the world ; and did put it there to keep the mind chaste and pure : and this also then , when the minde was most soft and tender , and so fitter to receive the deeper impression from it . and hence ordinarily the light suckt in then , seasons men ever after , whether it be for good , or for evill ; it fore-stalls , and pre-judgeth a man against other principles : and though a man comes to have more acquired knowledge and reasons after put into him when he is come to perfect age , yet the small light of his education , if it were to the contrary , doth bias him , and keeps him fixt , and bent that way . so we see it is in opinions about religion : the light then entertained , can never be disputed out : so in mens wayes and actions , traine up a child in his way , and he will not depart from it . prov. . . to sin therefore against it , and to put out the beames of it , or defile it , and to weare out the impressions of it , how wicked is it , and what a wretch art thou to do so ? many of you young schollers have had a good bathsheba that instructed you , not to poure out your strength to drinke or women , but to pray privately , and to feare god , and love him ; and when you come hither , you have good tutors also , who teach you to pray ; ministers , who instill blessed truths into you , from which , one would think , you should never depart ; yet you doe . think how grievous this is ; for if it is made an excuse for many a man in sinning , that it answers but his education ; that he never knew or saw better , as you say of many papists ; then must it needs on the contrary , be an aggravation of sinfulnesse . and as it was timothies commendation , that hee knew the scriptures from a child , so it will be thy condemnation , that thou knewest better from a child , and yet rebellest against thy light . thirdly , the more reall and experimentall the light is , men sinne against , still the more sinne ; as when they have learnt it from examples of godly men , whom they have lived amongst , or the observations of gods dealings with themselves or others , and not onely from the word notionally . to sinne against such light , this addes a further degree ; not onely to sinne against the bare light of nature , but also further , when nature hath besides lighted her torch at the scripture , and then when beyond all this , the reall examples and observations made of gods dealings with a mans selfe and others , shall confirme all this , this makes a mans sinfulnesse much more grievous ; for as exempla efficacius docent quàm praecepta , so the knowledge got by experiments of mercies or judgements , is of more force and evidence . knowledge learnt by experience , is the most efficacious . therefore christ himselfe , who knew all things already , yet learnt ( in the schoole of experience ) by what he suffered . a little of some knowledge distill'd out of a mans owne observation , is most precious , every drop of it ; therefore the apostle urgeth it on timothie , tim. . . continue in the things thou hast learned , and beene assured of , knowing of whom thou hast learned them . there is a two-fold motive , and both emphaticall ; first , he was assured in himselfe ; and secondly , that which strengthned that assurance , and was a meanes to worke it , was the example of the holy apostle , and of his owne parents , knowing of whom thou hast learned it : and so ver . . the apostle againe urgeth his owne example , thou hast fully knowne my doctrine and manner of life ; and then also brings to his mind the education of those his godly parents , who instructed him . hence also , esay . . it is made an aggravation , that in the land of uprightnesse men deale unjustly . thus light drawn from the observation of gods judgements upon others , it much aggravates : it is laid to belshazzars charge , dan. . . thou knewest all this , how god dealt with thy father nebuchadonezer . so some of you come here , and live in a religious society , and see sometimes one , sometimes another of thy colleagues turn to christ , yea haply chamber fellow converted from his evill courses , and yet thou goest on , this is sinning against a great light . fourthly , the more vigorous , strong , powerfull the light is that is in thee , and more stirring in thy heart , and joyned with a taste , the greater the sins committed against it are to be accounted . the more thou hast tasted the bitternesse of sinne , and gods wrath , and hast beene stung with it as with a cockatrice , the more thou hast tasted gods goodnesse in prayer , and in the ordinances , the more of such a knowledge , and yet sinnest the worse . in the . of iohn , . christ aggravates the iewes unbeleefe in himselfe , and their present hardnesse , that iohn was to them , not only a shining , but also a burning light ; that is , they had such knowledge engendred by his ministery , as wrought joy and heat , as well as light ; therefore it is added , they rejoyced therein for a season . and thus their fall , heb. . is aggravated , that it was such a light as had tasting with it . for to explaine this , you must know , that between ordinary notionall light , or that assenting to spirituall truths which is common with men , from traditionall knowledge living in the church , that between it and true saving light , or the light of life , there is a middle kind of light , which is more than the common conviction men have , and lesse than saving light : it is a light which leaves also some impression on the affections , makes them feele the powers of heaven and hell , and be affected with them . now the more of such light against a sinne , be it drunkennesse , or uncleannesse , or oppression , and yet fallest to it againe , the worse . for this is a further degree added to knowledg , and not common to all wicked men . and therefore as those iewes , who had not onely common meanes of knowledge , but miracles also , and yet beleeved not , iohn . . shall be more condemned ; so those who have such tasting knowledg set on by the holy ghost ( which is as much as if a miracle were wrought , for it is above nature , a supernaturall worke of the spirit . ) and therefore to sinne against such light , and such onely , is that which makes a man in the next degree of fitnesse to sin against the holy ghost . fiftly , to sin against professed knowledge , is an aggravation also , and an heavy one . to sin against a mans owne principles which he teacheth others , or reproves or censureth in others . titus . last , those that professe they know god , and yet deny him , these are most abominable of all others : for these are lyars , and so sinne against knowledge as lyars doe , in the iohn . . such an one is called a lyar in a double respect , both in that he sayes hee hath that knowledge he hath not , it not being true ; and because also he denyes that in deed , which he affirmes in word , this is scandalous sinning . so rom. . . the iewes beasting of the law , and of having the forme of knowledge in their braines , caused the gentiles to blaspheme , when they saw they lived cleane contrary thereunto : and therefore a brother that walkes inordinately , was to be delivered to satan , to learne what it was to blaspheme , tim. . . that is , to learne to know how evill and bitter a thing it is , by the torments of an evill conscience , to live in such a course , as made god and his wayes evill spoken of , as it befell david when he thus sinned . yea cor. . , . though they might keep company with a heathen , because hee was ignorant , and professed not the knowledge of god ; yet if a brother , one that professed , and so was to walke by the same rules , did sinne against those principles he professed , then keepe him not company : thus did saul sinne . all the religion he had and pretended to in his latter dayes , was persecuting witches : yet in the end he went against this his principle ; hee went to a witch in his great extremitie at last . and thus god will deale with all that are hollow , and sinne secretly against knowledge in the end . hee suffers them to goe against their most professed principles . these are aggravations in generall , applicable both to any act of sinning , or going on in a known state of sinning . use . now the use of all that hath been spoken , what is it , but to move all those that have knowledge , to take heed , more heed of sinning than other men ? and those of them that remaine in their naturall estate , to turne speedily and effectually unto god ? for if sinning against knowledge be so great an aggravation of sinning , then of all engagements to repentance , knowledge is the greatest . first , thou who hast knowledge , canst not sin so cheap as another , who is ignorant : therefore if thou wilt be wicked , thy wickednesse will cost thee ten times more than it would another . places of much knowledge , and plentifull in the meanes of grace , are dear places to live in sin in . to be drunk , and uncleane , after enlightning , and the motions of the spirit , and powerfull sermons , is more than twentie times afore ; thou mightest have committed ten to one , and beene damned lesse . this is condemnation ( sayes christ ) that light came into the world . neither canst thou haue so much pleasure in thy sin as an ignorant person ; for the conscience puts forth a sting in the act , when thou hast knowledge , and does subject thee to bondage and the fear of death . when a man knows how dearely he must pay for it , there is an expectation of judgement embittereth all . therefore the gentiles sinned with more pleasure than we . therefore eph. . , . the apostle speaking of them , sayes , that through their ignorance , and darknesse , and want of feeling , they committed sin with greedinesse , and so with more pleasure ; they not having knowledge or hearts sensible of the evils that attend upon their courses . secondly , thou wilt in sinning against knowledg be given up to greater hardnesse . if the light that is in thee be darknesse ( sayes christ ) how great is that darknesse ? therefore the more light a man hath , and yet goes on in works of darknesse , the more darknesse that man will be left unto , even to a reprobate mind in the end . thirdly , it will procure thee to be given up to the worst of sins , more than another man ; for god when he leaves men , makes one sin the punishment of another , & reserves the worst for sinners against knowledge . these gentiles , when they knew god , they worshipped him not , god gave them up to the worst of sinnes , whereof they were capable , as unnaturall uncleannesse , &c. but these are not sinnes great enough for thee , that art a sinner of the christians ; to be given up to drunkennesse , or adultery , &c. otherwise than to discover thy rottennesse , these are too small sins ; but thou shalt be given up to inward profanenesse of heart , ( as esau was , having been brought up in a good family ) so as not to neglect holy duties onely , but to despise them ; to despise the good word of god and his saints , and to hate godlinesse and the appearance of it ; thou shalt be given up to contemne god and his judgements , to trample under foot the blood of the covenant , or else unto devilish opinions ; those other are too small to be punishments of thy sinne : for stil the end of such an one must be seven times worse than the beginning , as christ sayes it shall ; if thou wert a drunkard , a swearer , or an uncleane person before , and thy knowledge wrought some alteration in thee , thou shalt not haply be so now at thy fal , but seven times worse ; profane , injurious to saints , a blasphemer , or derider of gods wayes and ordinances . fourthly , when thou commost to lay hold on mercy at death , thy knowledge will give thee up to more despaire , than another man. knowledge , though when it is but newly revealed , it is an help ; yet not made use of , turns against the soul , to wound it , and to work despaire ; and this both because we have sinned against the meanes that should have saved us , as also because such as sinne against knowledge , sin with more presumption ; and the more presumption in thy life , the more despaire thou art apt to fall into at death . therefore esay . , . what brought such trouble , and roarings like beares upon these jewes ? and that when salvation was looked for , that yet it was so far off from them , in their apprehensions ? our iniquities ( say they ) testifie to our face , and we know them . now then sins testifie to our face , when our conscience tooke notice of them , even to our faces , when we were committing them ; and then also the same sins themselves will againe testifie to our faces , when we have recourse for the pardon of them . therefore thou wilt lye roaring on thy death bed , and that thou knowest them , will come as an argument , that thou shalt not have mercie . as ignorance is a plea for mercie , i did it ignorantly , therefore i obtained mercie ; so i did it knowingly , will come in as a bar and a plea against thee , therefore i shall not have mercie . fiftly , both here and in hell , it is the greatest executioner and tormenter . in this sense it may be said , qui auget scientiam , auget dolorem : he that increaseth knowledge , increaseth sorrow , as solomon speaks : for knowledge enlargeth our apprehension of our guilt , and that brings more feare and torment . have they no knowledge , who eate up my people ? yes , there is their feare ( sayes david . ) therefore heb. . . after sinning after knowledge , there remaines not onely a more fearfull punishment , but a more fearfull expectation in the parties consciences . and this is the worme in hell , that gnawes for ever . light breeds these wormes . but then you will say , it is best for us to be ignorant , and to keep our selves so . i answer , no : for to refuse knowledge will damn as much as abusing it . this you may see in prov. . . ye fooles ( sayes wisedome ) you that hate knowledge , turne , and i will poure my spirit upon you , and make known my words to you . well , ver . . they refused , and would none of his reproof : therefore sayes god , i will laugh at your calamitie : that is , i will have no pitty , but instead of pitty , god will laugh at you ; and when your feare comes , i will not answer , because ye hated knowledge , ver . . so as this is as bad . there remaines therefore no middle way of refuge , to extricate thy selfe at , and avoid all this , no remedy but turning unto god : otherwise thou canst not but be more miserable than other men ; yea and this must be done speedily also : for thou having knowledge , god is quicker in denying thee grace , and in giving thee up to a reprobate mind , than another man , who is ignorant . he will wait upon another that knows not his will & waies , twenty , thirty , forty yeares , as he did upon the children of the israelites that were borne in the wildernesse , and had not seene his wonders in egypt , and at the red sea : but those that had , he soone sware against many of them , that they should never enter into his rest . christ comes as a swift witnesse against those to whom the gospell is preached , mal. . . he makes quick dispatch of the treaty of grace with them . therefore few that have knowledge are converted when they are old , or that lived long under the meanes . and therefore you that have knowledge , are engaged to repent , and to turn to god , and to bring your hearts to your knowledge , and that speedily also , or else your damnation will not only be more intolerable than others , but the sentence of it passe out more quickly against you . therefore as christ sayes , ioh. . . whilst you have the light , walk in it : for that day of grace , which is very clear and bright , is usually a short one . and though men may live many naturall dayes after , and enjoy the common light of the sunne , yet the day of grace , and of gracious excitements to repent , may be but a short one . finis . aggravation of sinning against mercie : by exaggerating the riches of common mercies men sinne against . by tho : goodwin b. d. london , printed by m. f. for r. dawlman , at the brazen serpent in pauls church-yard . mcd xxxvii . the table . the first generall head. what goodnesse , or bounty , patience , and long suffering are in god. page . bounty in god described . ibid. . he must be a giver . . what he gives must be his owne . ibid. . he must give largely . . he must give all he gives freely . . he looks for no recompence for time to come . patience is a further thing than mercy . . though we injure god , and he be sensible of it , yet he is patient . ibid. . he vouchsafeth that time he forbeares them in to repent . . he waits that men would come in and repent . ib. lastly , long suffering is but patience lengthned out farther . ibid. the second generall head. riches of this goodnesse spent on us . . they are riches in themselves . ibid. . all the world spend on these riches . . the time he hath forborne men . . the expensive prodigality of sinners in all ages . ibid. patience is precious . . in regard of what those manifestations of his goodnesse cost . . in regard of the usefulnesse . the third generall head. all this patience is used as meanes to bring men to repentance . . all this goodnesse witnesseth a gracious hand in all these . ib. . our owne conscience beares witnesse of offending a good god. . a common principle will witness against us when we returne evill for good . ibid. an vse of expostulation with sinfull and impenitent men , and considerations drawn from . . their creation out of nothing . . their being made men . . having all the members of a man. . preparing the world for them . . suffering them to live a long time in it . . giving them space to repent in . . living upon his cost and charges . . filling up their yeers and time with goodnes . as riches , credit , friends , comfort in them all . aggravations of sinning against mercie . rom . . , . or despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse , and forbearance , and long suffering , not knowing that the goodnesse of god leadeth thee to repentance ? but after thy hardnesse and impenitent heart , treasurest up unto thy selfe wrath against the day of wrath , and revelation of the righteous judgement of god ? this is the last & most weighty aggravation which the apostle puts into the measure of the gentiles sinfulnesse ( which in the former chapter he had , verse . pronounced full before ) to make it fuller yet : their sinning against mercies , and despising the riches of gods goodnesse , patience , and forbearance , the hatefull evill and iniquity whereof , can be better no way set off and illustrated unto mens consciences , than by a display of the riches of that goodnesse which mea sinne against . my purpose therefore is to unlock and carry you into that more common treasury of outward mercies , and leade you through the severall roomes thereof , all which doe continually leade you unto repentance : that then reflecting upon our ungratefull waste , and abuse of so many mercies in sinning , thereby our sins , every sinne , the least , may yet appeare more sinfull unto us , who are lesse than the least of all those mercies . know then , that besides that peculiar treasure of unsearchable riches of grace laid up in christ ( the offer of which neglected and despised , addes yet to all that sinfulnesse , a guilt as farre exceeding all that which shall be spoken of , as heaven exceeds the earth ) there is another untold mine of riches the earth is full of , as the psalmist tells us , and the apostle here , which these gentiles onely heard of , and which we partake of all as much as they . as there are riches of grace offered to you which can never be exhausted ; so there are riches of patience spent upon you , which you will have spent out in the end ; the expence of which , cast up , will alone amount to an immense treasure , both of guilt in you , and of wrath in god , as these words informe us . to helpe you in this account , i will . in generall , shew what goodnesse , or bounty , patience , and long suffering are in god. . that there are riches of these spent upon all the sons of men . . that these all leade men to repentance . and then . i will expostulate with you , and aggravate your sinfulnesse , in going on to despise all these by unrepentance , as the apostle here doth . first , in that god is said here to be good , or bountifull : . patient , or forbearing : . long-suffering , they seeme to note out three degrees of his common mercies unto men . first , he is a good , or a bountifull god : for so , as goodnesse is here used , i exegetically expound it : for though it be true , that goodnesse and bounty may differ ; yet when riches of goodnesse are said to be communicated , it imports the same , and is all one with bounty ; and such is god. and all those noble and royall qualifications and properties which concurre to make one truely good , and bountifull , doe meet and abound in him , in all those good things which he doth bestow ; and are found truly in none but in him : so that it may be truly said , that there is none good but god , as christ sayes of him . now bounty , in the generall , which is in god , may be thus described : it is a free , willing , and a large giving of what is meerly his own , looking for no recompense againe . to explaine this , that you may see , that all these conditions are required to true goodnesse , and all of them to be found in god onely . . he that is bountifull , he must be a giver , and bestower of good things : and all he bestows , it must be by way of gift , not by way of recompence unto , or by desert from the party hee bestowes all on : therefore christ sayes , luke . . that to doe good to those who have done , or doe good to us , is not thank-worthy , nor is it bounty . but god is therefore truely good , because hee simply , meerely , and absolutely gives away all which he bestowes : for hee was not , nor can any way become beholden to any of his creatures ; nor had formerly received any thing from them , which might move him hereunto : so rom. . . who hath first given him , that hee may recompence him againe ? nay untill he gave us a being , we were not capable of so much as receiving any good thing from him . . he who is truly termed good , or bountifull , all that he gives away must be his owne ; and so all which god bestowes , it is his owne . so psal . . . the earth is the lords . the ground wee tread on , the place wee dwell in ; hee is our landlord . but is that all ? for the house may be the landlords , when the furniture is the tenants : therefore he further addes , and the fulnesse of it is his also : that is , all the things that fill the world , all the furniture , and provision of it both ; all the moveables . ( so psal . . , . ) the cattell and the fowles upon a thousand hills are mine , sayes hee ; and also all the standing goods , the corne and oile ( which you set and plant ) are mine , hos . . . yea and the psalmist in the same . psalme , adds further , that they who dwell therein are his also : not the house and furniture onely , but the inhabitants themselves . and this , by the most sure , and most soveraigne title that can be , better than that of purchase , or inheritance , of and from another : for he hath made them ; all is thine , because all comes of thee , sayes the same david , chron. . , . and all things are not onely [ of him ] but [ through him ] rom. . . that is , they cannot stand nor subsist without him . even kings , ( the greatest and most bountifull of men ) their bounty is but as that of the clouds , which though they showre down plentifully , yet they first received all from the earth below them . . he must give largely , it is not bounty else . now god is therefore said to be rich in goodnesse , because he is abundant in it . so we finde it , comparing psal . . . with psal . . . in which it is said , that the earth is full of his goodnesse , and his riches ; which we may judge of , by what he sayes in the . verse of that . psalme , of what an house he keepes , and what multitudes he feeds : all these ( saith the psalmist ) wait on thee , that thou mayest give them meat , and thou openest thy hand , and they are filled with good . king ahasuerus , to shew his bounty , made a feast to his chiefe subjects , but it was but for halfe a yeare , and not to all : some few halfe yeeres more would well nigh have beggard him ; but god doth thus continually . the greatest and most bountifull of men , when they would expresse the largest of their bounty , speake but of giving halfe of their kingdomes , ( so herod , and he did but talk so too ) but god bestowes whole worlds , and kingdomes , as daniel speakes , dan. . . and gives them to whom he please . . he that is bountifull , must give all he gives freely , and willingly . which , though i put together , yet may imply two distinct things : as first , that he that gives , must be a free agent in it , who is at his choice , whether he would give any thing away or no. the sunne doth much good to the world , it affords a large light , and even halfe the world at once is full of its glory : yea and all this light is its owne , not borrowed , as that of the moone and starres is ; yet this sunne cannot be called good or bountifull , because it sends forth this light necessarily , and naturally ; and cannot choose but doe so ; nor can it draw in its beames . but god is a free giver , he was at his choice , whether he would have made the world or no ; and can yet when hee pleaseth , with-draw his spirit and face , and then they all perish , psal . . . secondly , it must be willing by also : that is , no way constrained , nor by extraction wrung from him , who is to be called bountifull . a willing mind in matter of bounty , is more accepted than the thing , cor. . . now of god it is said , dan. . . that he gives the kingdomes of the world to whom he will , and none swayes him , or can stay his hand , ver . . yea hee gives all away with delight . so psal . . . having spoken of feeding every living thing , and of other the like works of his goodnesse , throughout that psalme , hee concludes with this , god rejoyceth in all his workes : that is , doth all the good he doth to his creatures with delight ; it doth him good ( as it were ) to see the poore creatures feed . last of all , looking for no recompence for the time to come . this is another requisite in bounty . sayes christ , luke . . if you give to receive againe , as sinners doe , this is not thank-worthy : but ver . . so doth not your heavenly father : for ( sayes he ) doe good , and hope for nothing againe , so shall you be like your father , and then you shall shew your selves true children of the [ most high. ] in which word , he insinuates a reason why god gives all thus : because he is so great , and so high a god , as nothing wee doe can reach him ; as david speaks , psal . . . my goodnesse extends not unto thee : he is too high to receive any benefit by what we doe . and even that thankfulnesse he exacts , he requires it but as an acknowledgement of our duty , and for our good , deut. . . and so much for the first , namely , what goodnesse and bounty is : and how god is truely good , and he onely so . but this attribute of his , and the effects of it , he exerciseth towards all our fellow creatures , and did to adam in paradise . but now to us ward ( as the apostle speaks ) namely the sons of men , now fallen , hee extendeth and manifests a further riches , namely , of patience and long-suffering , which the devills partake not of , the good angels and other creatures : that sinned not , are uncapable of . for as christ sayes , luke . . in what he bestowes on us , he is kind to such , as are evill and unthankfull . mercy is more than goodnesse , for mercy alwaies doth respect misery : and because all the creatures are subject to a misery , rom. . , , . of bondage and vanity , therefore his tender mercies are over all his workes . but yet patience is a further thing than mercy , ( as mercy is than goodnesse ) being exercised , not towards miserable creatures onely , but towards sinners , and includes in it more three things further towards them . . not only that those persons he doth good unto do offend , and injure him ; but that himself also is exceeding sensible of all those wrongs , and moved by them , and also provoked to wrath thereby ; it is not patience else . so in the . of pet. . . it is not slacknesse ( sayes he there : ) god is not slack : that is , he sits not in heaven as one of the idol gods , that regarded not what acts were kept here below ; or took not to heart mens carriages towards him ; but is long-suffering , or patient ; that is , he apprehends himselfe wronged , is fully sensible of it ; is angry with the wicked every day , psal . . . he hath much adoe to forbear , even when he doth forbeare , and letteth them alone ; he exerciseth an attribute , a vertue towards them , namely , patience , in keeping in of his anger ; which is as to keepe fire in ones bosome . but secondly , this is not all ; he doth not simply forbeare , and restraine his anger , but vouchsafeth that time he forbeares them in , that they might repent in it ; and his mercies , as meanes leading to repentance . so it followes in that pet. . . but god is long suffering to us-ward , and his long suffering hath this in it , not willing that any should perish , but come unto repentance . so also revel . . . it is called space to repent . and all the blessings he vouchsafeth , he gives them as means and guides to leade them on to repentance , as here . and mat. . . have patience with me , and i will pay thee all . that is , give me a longer day and space to pay the debt in , and be willing to accept it when i bring it , and let me lye out of prison , that i may be enabled to pay it . thirdly , there is yet a further thing in his patience , namely , a waiting , and expectation that men would come in , and repent . so luke . . these three yeeres have i [ come seeking ] fruit , but have found none : there was an expectation , a longing , a desire it would bring forth fruit , oh when shall it once be , sayes god , ier. . last ? in the last place , that other attribute of long suffering , which is the third , is but as a further degree of patience ; but patience lengthened out farther , that is , when god hath beene thus patient , hath forborne and waited for their comming in , and that not for three yeeres , but haply thirty , forty yeeres , and still they turne not ; his patience then begins ( as we would think ) to be ( as it were ) worne out , and his anger begins to arise , as if he could forbeare no longer ; ( as it was towards that tree , why cumbereth it the ground ? cut it downe ) yet hee goes on to spare a man another yeere , and many more yeares still after that ; and endureth with much long suffering ( as rom. . . ) the vessels of wrath , endures to wonderment , above measure , beyond all expectation , all patience , as it were ; this is long suffering . the second generall head is , that there are [ riches ] of this his goodnesse , &c. expended on us . it is a rich goodnesse , patience and long suffering : rich in themselves , in regard of their abundance , as they came from him : and rich also in regard of their precious usefulnesse unto us , as they may be improved by us . first , in themselves they are rich : if wee consider what is expended , all that while , hee layes out , not simply his power to sustain and uphold all things , and to maintaine us freely : so to doe is nothing to him . for whilst he doth but so , nothing goes out of purse , or is detracted from him ; ( as i may so speak ) he feeles not the expence either of power , providence , &c. all this cost him but words : for he upholds all , creates all by the word of his power , hebr. . and thus to maintaine the angels , and to have maintained all mankinde before they fell , had beene no more . but ( my brethren ) when now he maintains us sinners , not simply power goes forth from him , but his glory is expended , and taken from him , and for the while wasted , detracted from ; he loseth , at present , every day infinitely by us , and he is sensible of it ; every sinne takes glory from him , robs him , as he himselfe complaines : that he who made the world , upholds it , ( keeps it together , as the hoops doe the barrell , it would fall to pieces else , to nothing ; in whom all live , as fishes in the sea , yea upon whom all live ) that he should live unknown , unthought of , unserved ; yea disgraced , dishonoured in the world , and have this world lost to him , as it were ; and sinne , the devill , wicked men , to have all the glory from him , to be exalted , to carry the whole world afore them : this spends upon him , he had need of riches to doe this . secondly , consider the multitude of sinners , that thus spend , and live upon these riches , no lesse than all the world : hee had need of multitudes of patience in him : he forbeares not one , but all and every one . we looke upon one man , and seeing him very wicked , wee wonder god cuts him not off ; we wonder at our selves , that god did not cut us off before this , when once our eyes are opened : nay then cast your eyes over all the world , and stand amazed at gods forbearance towards it . take the richest man that ever was , to have millions of men in his debt , it would undoe him soone . all the world are in gods debt , and run still in debt every day more and more , and yet he breaks not , nay breaks not them . nay thirdly , to manifest this abundance yet more , consider not onely the multitude hee forbeares , but the time he hath done it : to forbeare much , and to forbeare it long : he hath forborne , and beene out of purse from the beginning of the world , since men were upon the face of the earth , five thousand yeeres and a halfe already ; and how long it is yet to the day of judgement , wee know not : and yet ye see , he is as patient , and as bountifull now in the latter dayes of the world , as he was at the first . did that greatest convert that ever was , that had not lived past thirty yeeres in his sinfull estate ( for he was young when he held the stoners clothes that stoned stephen ) and yet was the chiefest of sinners , did he yet ( as himselfe sayes ) thinke himselfe a patterne of long suffering , tim. . . though it a great matter god should forbeare so long ? what is the whole world then ? if he , being but one small poore vessell , was so richly laden with the riches of gods patience , how is this great bark of the world then fraught , that hath gone over so vast a gulfe of time ? how much of these his riches have been laden in it ? and then fourthly , adde to this the expensive prodigality of all these sinners in all ages ; every sinner spends something , and how lavish are men of oathes ? all the thoughts of mens hearts from their youth up , they are evill , and onely evill , and continually : and how much then hath every man spent him ? every sin is a debt . in the second place , this is a rich goodnesse and patience in regard of the preciousnesse and usefulnesse . first , precious , in regard of what all these manifestations of his goodnesse and forbearance cost , even the blood of his sonne , who as a lord hath bought and purchased all wicked men ; their lives , and their reprivall , all that time that here they live ; and all the blessings and dispensations of goodnesse , which here they do enjoy . christs mediation so far prevailes with god for all the world , that it puts a stop to the present proceedings of justice , which otherwise had said of all , that day thou sinnest , thou dyest . so that as christ may be called the wisdome and the power of god ; so also the patience and the long suffering of god. for , for his sake , and through his meanes , it is exercised : god would not shew a drop of mercy , but for his sonne . which , i take , strongly and clearly intimated , in that dealing of his , with the jewes , ( exod. . . compared with exod. . , , , &c. immediately after god had given the law , ( by the rules and threatnings whereof , god the father in his government was to proceed ) and after they had transgressed it , he there declares , that he could not goe with them : rested thee , and told thee , this world was no place for thee , for hell is onely our owne place , acts . . thou shoulest have beene executed the first day . and is not so much time of ease from punishment infinite mercy ? cast but your thoughts upon the angels that fell , that have been in hell from the first moment of their sinning , doe but thinke with your selves , what they would give to have so much time , cut out of that eternity , they are to run through , & to have it set apart for ease , and to be void of torment ; if the rich man in hell , made it such a great suit , and counted it so great a favour to have but one drop of water ( which could but for a little while ( scarce more than a moment ) have cooled and eased , not his whole body , but the tip of his tongue only ) how much more would he have thought it mercy , to have lived so many yeares againe as he had done free from torment ? what is it then for thee , to live so many yeares free from the falling of the least drop of that wrath , whereof the full vialls should have been poured out many yeares agoe ? the same law was out against us , which was out against the angels ; that day thou eatest , thou shalt dye the death : what put the difference ? the apostle tells us , his long suffering to us ward : not to them : for in chap. . . he had told us that hee spared not the angels which fell , but posted , and threw them into hell , as soone as they had sinned . sixtly , but further , in the . place ; is this all ? hath it beene barely a time of ease given thee , a time of reprivall ? no , it hath beene more , space to repent , and so to obtaine thy pardon in , rev. . . and as it hath beene more than ease of torment unto thee , so also consider it hath beene more than slacknesse in him that hath afforded it to thee , as the apostle there doth tell us . it is not that he hath tooke no notice of thy offending him , but he is sensible of every idle thought , of every oath , vaine word , and as the scripture tels us , he is pained at the very heart , in so much as he repents that ever he made thee ; he is angry with thee every day thou risest , every time hee lookes on thee , when ever he meets thee going into the taverne to be drunk , the whorehouse to be uncleane , when he meets thee reeling in the streets , he hath much adoe to forbeare killing thee , as he had to forbeare moses when he met him in the inne : he is ready to have a blow at thee , and it should not need be any great stroake , or fetching his arme about ; if he did but blow on thee , thou wert consumed . to suffer thee to live , doth therefore cost him much riches of patience ; but to cut thee off , need cost him nothing : hee can doe that with ease . but further , all is joyned with a willingnesse that thou shouldst repent , and not perish , as that place tells thee . it were much mercy for a traytor to be reprived , to have a lease of his life for twenty yeeres , though there were no hope nor meanes of obtaining his finall pardon after that time spent , and this also , though moneth , a yeere ? what others , who have laine gasping , would have given a world for time againe , ( as i have heard one crying day and night ( call time againe ) or if not then , oh what in hell : the third thing i am to shew , is , that all this goodnesse , patience , and forbearance , is afforded towards you as a meanes , and helpes to bring you to repentance . acts . , , . god ( sayes the apostle there ) hath allotted to men , both their times to live in , and also their places of abode and habitations , all richly furnished with blessings to uphold their lives & beings . and to what end are both these thus afforded ? that they might seek the lord , if by groping after him ( even as men in the darke ) they might haply finde him . but men being in the darke , and destitute of guides to bring thē unto god , may yet be as far of finding him as ever . therefore adde but the words of my text , to what the apostle sayes there , and we see , that this goodnesse of god takes us by the hand , and leads us to repentance ; to turne from sinne unto god , and so to finde him . and thus lead are you unto god , by the help of three severall guides , which each after other sweetly leade you , and point you out to this . first , all this goodnesse beares witnesse to your hearts of a gracious hand that extends it self in all these ; therefore in that . of the acts , he subjoynes , god is not far off any of us . that there is a good god bestowes all things on you , is a thought lyes at next doore of all his blessings , not far off . yea they all ( sayes the apostle to the same gentiles , acts . . ) doe beare witnesse of him , ( though they went on in their owne wayes ) yet ( sayes he there ) god left not himselfe without witnesse ; that is , an impression on their hearts that his good hand bestowed all on them , when he filled their hearts with foode and gladnesse . secondly , his goodnesse having brought thus god to mens thoughts , then your owne consciences take you , and leade you downe into your selves , and beare witnesse , that you by walking in your owne wayes , doe nothing but provoke and offend this good god. so rom. . . and then thirdly , there is an indelible principle common to all men to love those who love them ; which after the two former have brought you hitherto , point , you to repentance , as the conclusion . [ shall we goe on to sinne against this good , so good ? returne evill for good ? ] is not this a naturall necessary consequent out of all these , to say as they , let us therefore feare the lord , who giveth us the early and the latter raine , as it is ier. . , ? and though men are said not to know this , in the text , yet the meaning is , they doe not throughly and effectually consider thus much , so as thereby to be brought to repentance , yet however there is such a witnesse of all this in all mens hearts , and thus are they led on unto repentance , would they see their way and follow their guide . the use shall be an use of expostulation ( as here the apostle carryes it ) with men sinfull and impenitent , for going on to sinne against all this mercy ; together with an aggravation of their sinfulnesse hereby . men , if young , doe usually take the advantage of this their precious time , ( which out of so much long suffering is vouchsafed them ) and of all those precious opportunities , and blessings they enjoy , to improve them onely , in reaping and gathering in to themselves the pleasures of sinne ; making the time of youth their harvest of sinning , and yet thinke to escape by repenting , afterwards : and then when old , after they have already enjoyed a long and a faire sunshine day to turne to god in , and to have sowne much seed to the spirit , the comfort whereof they might now have reaped ; yet as they have altogether neglected so to doe all their youth , so they goe on to doe so still , whilst they see they have any day left , be it never so neare the setting ; and doe choose rather desperately to venture their estate in the world to come , upon the riches of his mercy pardoning , ( though without all care and endeavour to change their hearts or lives ) upon the experience they have had of the riches of his mercy forbearing them in this world , thinking to finde him the same in both . with all such , let me reason a little , and from the riches of gods goodnesse , patience , &c. spent upon them , at once expostulate with them , for their impenitency , and aggravate to them their sinfulnesse , and also , if possible , prevail with them to goe on to despise it thus no longer . and if there be any principle of common ingenuity , any sparke ( i doe not say of grace , but of goodnesse of nature ) left unextinguisht , me thinkes it should affect you , and doe some good on youere i have done . and to that end , consider a little , and compare together gods loving kindnesses towards you , and your unkind dealings towards him . to begin at the very beginning of thy being : how much riches of goodnesse were there laid and buried in thy foundation ? when the first corner stone was laid , when thou wert made a man , ( besides the cost which hath beene spent upon this building since ) and , cursed as thou art , even that very foundation was laid in bloody iniquities , in which thou wert conceived ; and the very materialls of soule and body , thou consistest of , being tempered with sinne , like the stone in the wall , and beame out of the timber , cry out every moment to god against thee , as edom did , rase it , rase it , even to the very ground . consider how but the other day thou were meere nothing , and when an infinite number that never were nor shall be , were in as great a possibility of being as thou , ( for when he made this world , he could have laid it aside wholly , and created millions of otherworlds ) yet he chose thee to have a roome in this , but one world , ( for he means to make no more ) and this world could have stood without thee , and did before thou wert , and shall doe when thou art gone : yet he called thee forth out of nothing , and by his almighty power , bade thee stand forth when there was no need of thee . i say he chose thee to have a being : for as there is an election of things that are to salvation , so out of things that were not unto being . and wretch that thou art , if thou repentest not , thou destroyest what god hath made , and hadst better have kept nothing still , and never have peept out , or else to skulk into thy first nothing againe , for thou art lost , better never to have beene borne . secondly , consider yet more goodnesse . thou mightest have beene admitted into the lowest forme of creatures , have beene a worme , a flea , a flye , which we men fillip and crush to death at pleasure : but to be made a man , created one of the states , barons , lords of the world the first houre , admitted into the highest order , crowned a king in the wombe , as david sayes of man , psal . . . made a little lower than the angels , but crowned with glory and honour ; made to have dominion over all the works of his hands . the one halfe of thee is more worth than a whole world , [ thy soule ] as christ sayes , that went to the price of soules ; upon which god hath bestowed an eternity of being , and made it the picture of his face , his image , when other creatures do weare but his footsteps . and thy body the other peece , and indeed but the case , the sheath , ( as daniels phrase and the chaldee hath it , dan. . . ) of thee , what a curious workmanship is it ? wonderfully and fearfully made , as david sayes , psalm . . . curiously wrought in the lower parts of the earth : so there he calls the womb ; because as curious workmen , when they have some choice piece in hand , perfect it in private , and then bring it forth to light for men to gaze at : so god out of a teare , a drop , he hath limmed out the epitome of the whole world ; the index of all the creatures . sunne , moone , starres , are to be found in thee . and yet wretch as thou art , thou art withall the epitome of hell , and broughtest into the world with thee , the seeds and principles of all the villanies , that have beene acted in the world , and if thou repentest not , thou hadst better have beene a toad , or serpent , the hatefullest of creatures ; and wouldst change thy condition with them one day . thirdly , being a man , hast thou all thy members that belong unto a man ? it is because hee wrote them all in his booke , psal . . . if he had left out an eye in his common-place booke , thou hadst wanted it ; is not that a mercy ? aske the blinde . if thou hadst wanted those windows to looke out at , thy body would have beene a dungeon , the world a prison . if a tongue ( which is thy glory ) or an eare , thou hadst lived among men , as a beast among men . and yet when god gave thee all these , what did he but put weapons into an enemies hand ? for hast thou not used all these , as weapons of unrighteousnesse ? insomuch as the tongue , but one member , is called a world of iniquity by the apostle ; and if thou repentest not , thou hadst better ( as christ sayes ) have entred into the world without an eye , an care , a tongue , than with these goe for ever into hell . fourthly , when thou wert taken out of the wombe , ( where thou didst remaine , but whilest thou wert a framing ) what a stately palace hath he brought thee into , [ the world ] which thou findest prepared , and ready furnisht with all things for thy maintenance , as canaan was to the children of israel ; a stately house thou buildest not , trees thou plantedst not , a rich canopy spangled , spread as a curtaine over thy head ; he sets up a taper for thee to work by [ the sun ] till thou art weary , psal . . . and then it goes down without thy bidding , for it knows its going downe , ver . . and then he drawes a curtain over halfe the world , that men may goe to rest , thou causest darknesse , and it is night , ver . . an house this world is , so curiously contrived , that to every roome of it , even to every poore village , springs doe comes as pipes to finde thee water . so psal . . , . the pavement of which house thou treadest on , brings forth thy food , ver . . bread for strength , wine to cheere thy heart , oyle to make thy face to shine , ver . . which three are there synecdochically put for all things needfull to strength , ornament , and delight . the very chambers of that house ( as david calls them ) drop fatnesse , and water the earth , ver . . hee wheeles the heavens about , and so spins out time for thee , every moment of which time brings forth some blessing or other , and no one is barren . therefore psal . . . the yeere is said to be crowned with goodnesse : a diadem of goodnesse encircles it round : and yet thou hast filled this world thou thus art brought into , with nothing but rebellions , as hee hath done with blessings , and hast piled up sins to heaven ; and thou hast pressed all these armies of blessings thou findest the world filled with , to fight against their maker , under the devills banner , whom thy wickednesse sets up as the god of this world . and as the yeere is crowned with goodnesse , so thy yeeres with wickednesse , and no moment is barren ; but all thy imaginations are evill continually . yea thou hast sinned against heaven and earth , and subjected the whole creation unto vanity , laden the earth , and filled it so with wickednesse , that it groanes , the axeltree of it is even ready to crack under thee , and the ground thou treadest on to spue thee out . fiftly , since thou camest into the world , what a long time hath god suffered thee to live in it ? hee hath not spared thee three yeares onely , ( as he did the figtree ) but thirty , forty . and when thou first madest bold to thrust forth thy trayterous head into the world , death ( which thy sin brought into the world with it ) might have arrested but for one treason , and though all that time of his reprivall he carryes and behaves himselfe never so obediently . but unto thee , this time hath beene more than a longer day of life , and putting off the execution ( which for the guilt of that first rebellion should have been acted on thee in the womb ) it hath beene time to repent in : and yet hath not this time of thy reprivall made thee so much the more rebellious ? and hast not thou spent all this time in making up the measure of thine iniquity full ? and hath it beene will ingnesse onely in god that thou shouldest not perish ? yea more , joyned with waiting also , when it should once be , thinking the time long , as longing and desiring that thou wouldst repent , that he might pardon thee . thus ierem. . last , god expresseth himselfe , when shall it once be ? yea and consider how many dayes of payment have been set , and how many promises made , and broken all by thee , and yet still hee walteth unto wonderment . thou receiuedst presse money at thy baptisme , when thou didst promise to forsake the devill and all his workes , and to begin to serve him , when thou shouldst begin to discerne betweene good and evill . but no sooner did the light of knowledge dawne in thy heart , but thou beganst to fight against him ; and thy first thoughts to this day have beene onely and continually evill . and then ( haply ) in thy younger yeares , before thou hadst tasted of the pleasures of sinne , he gave thee an inkling , by meanes of thy education , of his goodnesse towards thee , and of that happinesse to be liad in him , and thou hadst the first offer of him , ere thy tender yeares were poysoned by the world ; and he hath dealt with thee againe and againe , both by his word and spirit ; not waited onely , but wooed thee , and hath beene a suiter to thy heart long : and i appeale to your hearts , how many promises you have made him , of turning from all your rebellions to him , after such a sermon , which was brought powerfully home : in such a sicknesse , and in such a strait , thy conscience knowes full well : and still god hath made tryall of thee , and given thee longer day ; and though thou hast broke with him againe and againe , yet he hath forborne thee againe and againe , and hath waited this twenty , thirty , forty , fifty , sixty years , when thou shouldest come in , and be as good as thy word , and still thou hast failed him . and yet behold and wonder , and stand confounded at the riches of his long suffering , that after so many yeares expence , and promises broken by thee , expectations failed in him , and many mockeries of him , after all this he is yet willing to accept of the remainder , if thou wouldst spend the rest of the time , left thee in the flesh , according to his will , as the apostle speaks , pet. . . even to lose principall , use , and all , for what is past , and requires but the same composition was propounded the first day ; yea and not onely so , but with promise to become a debtor unto thee , to bestow further riches on thee than ever yet thou sawest , or art able to conceive : yea and all this , when he could have his penyworths out of thee another way , and lose not one farthing by thee , but by punishing thee in hell , recover all to the utmost . neither , seventhly , hath it beene barely and simply an act of patience and forbearance , though joyned with this willingnesse , thou shouldst not perish ; or meerely a permissive act of suffering thee to live . but god shewes forth yet more riches of goodnesse joyned with this long suffering ; in him ye live , and move , and have your being ; and dost thou live in him onely ? nay thou livest on him also , upon his cost and charges ; i have hung upon thee ( sayes david ) from my mothers wombe . and consider what thy life is , that of so small a bottome , he should spin out so long a thred ! had hee not drawne it out of his owne power , as the spider doth her web out of her owne bowels , it had beene at an end the second minute ; to maintaine that radicall moisture , that oyle that feeds the lampe , and light of thy life , that radicale balsamum , this is as great a miracle as the maintaining the oyle in the cruze of the poore famished widow . and further yet ; hath he maintained thee onely ? nay more , hath he not defended thee , tooke thy part , protected thee , tooke thee under his wing , as the hen doth her chickens , to shelter thee from those many dangers thy life hath been exposed unto ? otherwise , how many wayes , ere this , hadst thou been snatcht away out of the land of the living ? is thy case , the case of the figtree onely , which before we mentioned , that when god cryed , cut it downe , another cryed , spare it ? but there have beene many have cryed , cut thee downe , and god hath cryed , spare thee : there is never a minute , but the devills would have had a blow at thy life , as he longed to have had at iohs . that thou , a poore lump of flesh , shouldst walke through , and in the midst of such an host of fierce and cruell enemies , whose hearts are swelled with malice at thee , and god should say to them all , concerning thee , as he did to laban concerning iacob , touch not this man. and yet if thou wert not liable to their malice and power , yet consider how many dangers and casualties , besides , thou hast beene kept in , and from ; as falls , drowning , killing many wayes ; how often have the arrows of death come whisking by thee , took away those next thee , ( haply of thy kindred , brother , sister , yoke-fellow , of the same house , family with thy selfe ) and yet have missed thee ? and if we look no farther than these dayes of mortality we have lived in ; two great plagues in this kingdome , how have the most of us all here survived , and now the third is increasing and growing upon us ? to have our lives in such deare yeares of time , when to have our life for a prey is mercy enough , as ieremy told baruch ! that these arrows should flye round about us , over our heads , and misse us ! that gods arrests should seize upon men , walking , talking with us , and spare us ! how often , many other wayes , hath thy neck been upon the block , and the axe held over , and yet hath fallen besides ! to goe no farther than thy own body , the humours thereof , if god should not restraine them , would overflow and drowne it , as the waters would the earth , if god should not say to them , stay your proud waves . and when in a sicknesse they have been let out , yet god hath kept a sluce , that so much should break forth , and no more , which should purge , and wash the body , and make it more healthfull , as the overflowing of nilus doth . and when then thy body hath been brought low and weake , and like a crazy rotten ship in a storme , taking in water on all sides , so that all the physitians in the world could not have stopt those leakes ; yet hee hath rebuked wind and sea , hath careened , mended thee , and launched thee into the world againe , as whole , as sound , and strong as ever ; and god hath said , as iob. . that thou shouldst not dye . in a word , if thou consider but what thy life is , and the dangers it is subject to , thou wilt acknowledge it as great a wonder to preserve it , as to see a glasse , that hath beene in continuall use , gone through many hands , and hath had many knocks , and falls , to be kept for forty , fifty , sixty yeeres whole and unbroken : god hath carryed thy life in his hand , as it were a candle in a paper lanthorn in a strong windy night , and kept it from being extinct , when as wee often see in many , that a little cold comes but in at a little cranny , and blowes their candle out , as iob speaks . and eightly , how have these yeeres and hours of thy time been filled up with goodnesse ? and with how many comforts ? for a traytor to live , though but upon bread and water all his dayes , what favour is it ? and so hadst thou lived all this time , never so miserably , though all thy dayes thou hadst eaten thy bread in darknesse , and hadst had much sorrow with thy sicknesse , ( as solomon speaks . ) some there are , who , as iob speaks , iob . . dye in the bitternesse of their soules , and never eate with pleasure , scarce seeing a good day ; and if this had beene thy case , yet this is infinite mercy . even whatsoever is on this side hell , is mercy . lam. . . say they in the worst estate the church was ever on earth , it is thy [ mercies , ] not mercy onely , but multitude of mercies are shewne us , that we are not consumed , because his mercies are renewed every morning . if at the brink of hell , and not in , it is mercy . but hath he not all this while filled thy heart with food and gladnesse , as the apostle speaks , acts . ? it were infinite to goe over the particular kinds of common comforts , which god vouchsafes men here : not halfe the riches of his goodnesse is yet told : it would require an age to make an inventory of them . hast a house in the world to hide thy head in , and keepe thee from the injuries of the weather ? ( which was more than christ had ) god he is thy landlord , ( though it may be thou payest him no rent ; ) he it is that builds the house , psal . . . hast a bed to lye upon ? he makes it , especially in thy sicknesse , psal . . . hast thou sleepe ( which is the nurse of nature , the parenthesis of all thy cares and griefes , ) he rocks thee asleep every night ; and as he gives thee a house , so hee gives thee rest , psal . . . it is god keeps off those gnatts of distracting cares , and griefes , and thoughts , and terrors of conscience , would buzze about a man , and keepe one continually waking . and when thou sleepest , is thy sleepe pleasant to thee ? god makes it so , ier. . . hast thou cloathes to cover thy nakednesse ? reade old iacobs indentures , gen. . . and thou shalt see by them whose finding they are at ; if thou wilt give mer rayment , that is one of his conditions mentioned . yea , doe thy cloathes keepe thee warme ? even this is attributed to him , iob . . he fills thee , feeds thee , spreads thy table , serves thee , fills thy cup , as david describes his goodnesse , psal . . . and gives thee thy meat in due season ; and hath not failed thee a meales meat , but thou hast had it at thy appointed time , as iob speaks . and hast thou health ? which is the salt to all these blessings , ( without which thou wouldst say , thou hadst no pleasure in them ) he is the god of thy health , and keeps off diseases . exod. . . i will put none of those diseases on thee ; i am the lord who healeth thee ; that is , preserve thee from them which else would seize on thee . and these mercies hee vouchsafeth unto you that are the poorest , and loades you with these and the like benefits every day . but hast thou riches added to these , and abundance ? the blessing of god maketh rich , prov. . . though thou hadst them by birth , yet hee made those friends , and parents of thine , but feoffees in trust for thee : they were no more , it was god who bequeathed them , eccl. . last . or whether thou hast got them since by thine owne industry , it is hee gives thee power to get wealth , deut. . . prov. . . and out of a small estate maketh men great , iob . . it is hee by his providence hath stopt the secret issues and draynes of expence , at which other mens estates runne out ; hath stopt that hole in the bottome of the bag , as the prophet speaks . and with these riches hath he given thee a heart to use them . this , as it is a farther mercy , eccles . . . and chap. . . so also from him , as it is noted there . or hast thou credit ( which is better than riches ? so sayes solomon , prov. . . ) it is god who gives it , not thy wisedome , parts , or worth : eccles . . . favour is not alwaies to men of skill : that is , not acceptation of what they doe , without a farther blessing from god. therefore besides the gift of wisdome , he gave a further promise of honour also unto solomon , chron. . . it is god who fashions mens opinions . the apostle prayes to god his service might be accepted of the saints , though no service was like to be more acceptable , for it was the gathering and bringing in of almes and reliefe to them . it is he rules mens tongues , bids men blesse , as well as he bade shimei curse : and he hath kept thee from such grosse sinnes , which , as flyes , would have putrifyed the oyntment of thy good name , who also conceales those thou hast committed , and hides thee from the strife of tongues , iob . . hast thou friends , or doe any love thee ? ( wherein much of the comfort of our lives consists , and therefore david sayes of ionathan , sam. . . thou wert pleasant to me ) it is god who gives favour in mens eyes : so hee did ioseph , gen. . . if any man or creature doth thee a kindnesse , he toucheth their hearts , ( as it is said of the men who clave to saul ) and visits for thee ; he made the aegyptians beyond all reason the israelites friends , gave them favour in their eyes , as the text tells us . and hence , gen. . . iacob sayes , he saw the face of god , in reconciled esaus face ; for gods favour appeared in his looke . he put you into your callings , ranks , and stations , gives you all your skill , successe in them ; the meanest of trades , to sow , and plough , and thresh , they are from the lord , who is wonderfull in working , ( esay . from the . to the end ) even as well as the skill of the most curious ingraver , limbner , or embroyderer ( as of bezaleel ) the scripture sayes , god was his master , taught him . hast thou enlarged parts and gifts for higher imployments ? it is not thy birth , or age hath acquired them unto thee : iob . , . great men are not alwaies wise , therefore it goes not by birth ; nor have the aged alwaies understanding , it goes not onely by experience ; but it is the inspiration of the almighty . and hast a calling answerable to thy parts , to be a scholler , and have thy minde enriched and ennobled with the best and choisest jewell the world hath , wisdome and knowledge ; whereby the minde is elevated as much above other mens , as they are above beasts ? god hath beene thy great tutor , the mind of man is gods candle , and hee maketh wiser than a mans teachers , as he did moses in egyptian learning , daniel , david . to conclude , hast thou comfort in all these ? in riches , learning , credit , wife , children , meat , drink , &c. hee puts in all the sugar , delight and pleasure that especially depends on him ; even to fashion the heart to all these . as ayre lights not without the sunne , nor wood heats not without fire ; so neither doth thy condition comfort thee without god. and therefore acts . . it is said , he filled their hearts , as with food , so , with gladnesse . and besides all these , consider the many peculiar passages and turnings of his providence towards thee for thy good ; the working of things together , ever and anon to doe thee a good turne ; the packing and plotting all for thee , better than thou couldst have plotted for thy selfe ; as thy reliefe in many streights , successe in many businesses ; he workes all our works in us and for us , as esay speaks , esay . hath he not taken such speciall care and providence of thee , as if hee had regarded no man else in the world ? and now when thou hast considered all , bethinke thy selfe withall a little of thy dealings towards him : what have beene the effects and fruits of all this goodnesse ? hold up thy head man , looke god in the face . it is well yet , that shame begins to cover thee . how hath that his patience and long suffering , vouchsafing thee space to repent , wrought with thee ? how nigh to repentance hath it brought thee ? such is the perversenesse of mans nature , as solomon tells us , eccles . . . that because sentence against an evill worke is not presently executed , therefore the hearts of the sonnes of men are fully set to doe evill : because god defers punishing , they defer repenting ; thou thinkest to spend the most precious of thy time and strength in sinning , and give god the dreggs , the bottome , the last sands , thy dotage , which thy very selfe and friends are weary of , and all these blessings and comforts which god hath vouchsafed thee , how hast thou used them against him ? this oyle which should have beene fuell to thy thankfulnesse , hath encreased the fire of thy lusts , and thy lusts have consumed them all , iames . the riches hee hath given , thou hast made idols of , and sacrificed thy dearest , morning , daily thoughts and affections unto , as god complaines , ezek. . from the . and so on : [ his meat ] ( as at the . ver . he calls it ) thou sacrificedst to thy belly , which thou hast made thy god ; thy strength to women ; the wealth hee hath given you , you have made use of , but to live at a high rate of sinning , and to procure the sweetest bits , the daintiest and most costly sinnes ; the edge of that sword of power god hath put into thy hand , thou hast turned against him and his , haply both his children and ministers ; so that god , by giving thee all these , hath but made thee more able to offend him , and hath strengthned an enemy , and by sparing thee thus long , hath but made thee more bold to doe it ; all his mercyes have but fortifyed thy heart against him ; doe ye requite the lord thus , ye foolish people and unkind ? as moses expostulates the case , deut. . . as christ said to the jewes , for which of all my good workes doe yee stone me ? so say i to you , for which of all his mercies is it , ye sinne against him ? what , to fight against him with his owne weapons ? to betray all he gives you into the devills , his enemies hands ? what iniquity did you ever finde in him , thus to deale ? god will one day thus expostulate his cause with you , and heape coales of fire upon all your heads , ( if that you turne not ) because you have rendred him evill for good : and all these mercies thus abused , will be as so many coales to make hell fire the hotter . and to reason this point yet further with you out of the text , and what arguments it will afford to work upon you . consider , first , what it is thou doest ; whilest thus thou goest on , thou art a despiser of the riches of his goodnesse : that which is opposite to goodnesse , must needs be transcendently evill . what , art thou evill , because god is good ? and so much the more evill , by how much the more he is good , surely there must needs be an unexhausted treasure of wickednesse in thee , which will also cause in the end a treasure of wrath in him ; what and sinne against mercy , patience , long suffering , added to goodnesse ? of all attributes , as the richest to the most glorious ; for it is that he glories in : in the abusing of which , therefore he thinkes himselfe most debased : of all attributes the tenderest : what , kick against his bowels ? so are his mercies called : canst hit him no where else but there ? to despise a mans wisdome , power , learning , is not so much as to despise his love ; what canst thou imagine will become of thee , when thou commest to dye ? what is it thou wilt then come to plead and cry for ? o mercy , mercy ; why wretch that thou art , it is mercy thou hast sinned against . riches of mercy and patience abused ; turnes into fury . i may allude to that speech , sam. . . if a man sinne against his brother , the iudge shall judge him ; but if against god , who shall plead for him ? so hadst thou sinned against any other attribute , mercy might have pleaded for thee ; but if against mercy it selfe , who shall ? well , if thou goest on thus to doe so still , thou hast a hard heart ; it argues the greatest hardnesse of all other ; that is the second . you use not ( however it comes to passe ) to deale thus with the worst of men , sinner like to your selves ; but to them that love you , you tender love againe , luke . . and will you deale so with god ? is it a small thing to weary men , but you must weary god also ? sayes esay , . . hee thought it infinitely lesse to abuse men than god ; but you carry your selves as men , to men , but as devills towards god ; herein ye have not the hearts of men in you ; not principles of common humanity , whereby ye differ from beasts ; the cords of love are called the cords of a man , hos . . . the spirit of man breakes , melts under kindnesse ; beasts indeed yee use to prick with goades , but the cords of a man are the cords of love ; no principle being more deepely engraven in mens hearts , than this , to doe good to those who doe good to you , mat. . . nay , would ye had herein yet the hearts of beasts ; the oxe knowes his owner , the asse his masters cribb , but my people have rebelled against mee . a sinne so much against nature , that he calls upon those creatures , who have no more than meere nature in them , viz. the heavens to stand astonisht at it . but as nature elevated by grace , riseth higher than it self ; so being poysoned with sinne , it is cast below it selfe , sins against it self , and the principles which are begotten in and with it selfe ; if it were not so , how were it possible thou shouldst hate him , who never did thee hurt ? and goe on to wound him , who weepeth overthee ? and despise that in him most , which seekes to save thee ? and load him with sins ? amos . . who loades thee daily with his mercies , psal . . . there is a third consideration the text suggests , to shew the fearfulnesse of thy sin in this respect ; and that is , that thou goest on every minute sinning and in impenitency , by despising his goodnesse , to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath ; to sin against mercy , of all other encreaseth wrath ; thou must pay treasures , for treasures spent . as thou lavishly spendest riches of mercy , so god will recover riches of glory out of thee : god will not lose by thee , but will reckon with thee in wrath for every offer of patience spent ; for every sand of long suffering that runs out , hee drops in a drop of wrath into his vialls , and it will prove a treasure , such a treasure as shall bring in an eternall revenue of glory unto god , of all his glory lost , and riches spent , with advantage ; such a treasure , as will aske an eternity of time to be spent upon thee , and yet be never emptied or made lesse ; and the longer thou goest on , the greater heap it will swell unto . and dost thou know and consider how fast this treasure fills , and how much the longer thou goest on to adde to it , still the more thou addest , still the last yeere more than all the yeeres before ? every minutes impenitency adding to this heape and summe , as new figures added in a summe use to doe ; the first is but one , the second makes it ten , the third an hundred , the fourth a thousand , and what a summe will this grow to ? ay but thou wilt say , tush , i am in prosperity , in health , wealth , and ease , and to day shall be as to morrow , and much more abundant . esay . . well , but fourthly , consider out of the text , that there will come a day at last , the morrow whereof will be a day of wrath : it is treasuring up now , but is not brought forth till the day of wrath , till which day thou mayest goe on and prosper , as iob giving us the reason why wicked men prosper here , sayes , chap. . they are reserved to the day of wraths , in the plurall , because treasures are laid up against then ; thou art yet spared , because thy sins are not yet full , and that treasure is not full , as the sins of the amorites were not ; and all this thy present prosperity fits thee but for hell . so rom. . . they are said to be vessells fitted for destruction , by long suffering . and so nahum tells us , they are but as stubble laid out in the sunne a drying , till it be fully dry , nahum . . that it may burne the better ; and like grapes that are let to hang in the sunshine till they be ripe , revel . . . and so thou for the winepresse of gods wrath . but thy senselesse heart may hap to say , i see no such thing , and these are but threats , i thinke so ; therefore it is said in the text , that it is a treasure ; which , as treasures use to be , is hid till that day comes , & then revealed , as the words have it . for though thou seest not this day a comming , yet god who sits in heaven , sees thy day a comming , as david sayes , psal . . . who is therefore said to see it , because himselfe sees it not ; and it is a comming faster than thou art aware of it , pet. . . damnation slumbereth not , though thou dreamest not of it ; lingreth not : as an hue and cry , it is sent out , and is on its course , and will in the end overtake thee , and that when thou least thinkest of it , as a theefe in the night , when thou art asleepe , yet dreamest not of it , thes . . when thou art least prepared for it , as in the old world , when they were eating and drinking : as god watcheth when his child is at the best and ripest , and then takes him ; so he will watch thee to take thee for thy neglect , at thy worst , and give thee haply no time to prepare ; they goe downe to hell in a moment , psal . . finis . imprimatur ; tho : weekes . r. p. ep o : lond. cap. domest . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e gen. . heb. . . rom. . sam. . . isa . . rom. . pet. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes for div a -e doct. to sin against knowledge is the highest aggravation of sinning . demonstratiōs of the point , by comparing it vvith other kinds of sinning . how much sinnes against knowledge doe transcend sins of ignorance . in sins of ignorance there may be a supposition , if he had known it , he would not have done it : but not so in these . the vast difference between them , appears in the repentance god accepts for each . a generall repentance for the one , not so for the other . some kinds of sinning against knowledge exclude frō mercy , which done ignorantly leave a capacity of it . sinning against knowledge is the highest to sinning against the holy ghost . secondly , reasons , which are . . because knowledge is the greatest 〈◊〉 . . reason . knowledge is the immediate guide of men in all their wayes : a man sins against his guide . that knowledge is so , proved , in that an erroneous conscience bindeth . knowledg layeth a further obligation as obedience . lawes come in force when promulged . there is the more contempt cast upon the law. in sins again●… knowledge , 〈◊〉 will of the sinner closeth more with sin as sin . in sinning against knowledge a man condemns himselfe . ● . things handled concerning sins against knowledge . . what it is 〈◊〉 sinne gainst knowledge , explained . . distinction to sinne with knowledge and against knowledge doe differ . a regenerate man guilty of more sinnes known , than another . yet not of more sinnes against knowledge . . distinction . men sin against knowledge , either objectively , or circumstantially onely . what it is to sin directly against knowledge . what to sinne against knowledg circumstantially onely . this distinction explained out of this chapter . sins directly against knowledg reduced to two heads . . in regard of ourselves five wayes . when we abuse knowledge to help us to sin , . wayes . . to plot and contrive sinne . . to colour sins committed by lyes . . to colour sins by pretence of religion , and use their knowledg of religion to plead for , and instifie their sin● . when men neglect to get knowledge that might preserve them from sinning , &c. when men refuse knowledge that they may sin more freely . is to hate the light , and to endevour to extinguish it . when men hold opinions against their consciences . . men sin directly against knowledge it selfe in respect of others , by concealing knowledge . men endevour to suppresse knowledge in others . when men go about to make others sinne against their consciences . iohn . . generall branch : sins committed collaterally or circumstantially against knowledge . it is done , . either in particular acts of sinning , or . in continuing in an estate of sinning against knowledge . particular instances being infinite . a distinction is given concening them . . some sinne more transient . some more permanent and continued , until recalld , though but once committed . which are of 〈◊〉 other most ●angerous to ●ommit , when against knowledge . . going on in a sinfull estate against knowledge . three sorts of men thus sin : such as for worldly end forbear to professe christ a●… his waies , whi●●… they know to be such . psal . . ult . those that defer repentance . apostate professors goe on in an estate of sinning against knowledge . application . . head : rules whereby to estimate sinnes against knowledge . of two sorts before sinning or in sinning before sinning , . rules . . the more a man consider the issues and consequents o● a sinne . rule , the more consultations and de●●tes before . . rule , the more testimonies and warnings against sinne . . rules to measure the sinfulnesse of such acts in sinning , . the lesse passion or temptation to a sin against knowledge . the more inward regreet , and sorrow , and reluctancy , the stronger is the knowledge , and so more against it . the more hardnesse of heart in committing a sinne knowne to be a sin , the greater the sin , as it is a sin against knowledge . . head. aggravations drawne from the kind● of that knowledge we sinne against , which are five . the more ●…ong the knowledge , the ●●eater the sin . to sin against the inbred light of nature . hab. . . to sin against the light of education . the more reall and experimentall light men sin against . the more shining the light is in the conscience joyned with a taste , the greater the sin . to sin against professed knowledge . how great an engagement & motive it is to men of knowledge to turne to god , and to take heed of sinning . such an one cannot sin so cheap as others : their sins are more costly and chargeable , and will have lesse pleasure in sinning . such are given up to greater hardnesse of heart . such god gives up to the worst and grossest of sins . at death , knowledg sinned against , gives up to more horror and despaire . hell it ineaseth torent . notes for div a -e ephes . . . psal . . . luke . . rom. . . psal . . . psal . . , . chron. . psal . . . luke . . psal . . . luke . . psal . . . revel . . . mat. . . luke . . heb. . iohn . . tim. . . pet. . . acts . . pet. . . gen. . acts . , , . acts . . luke . ier. . , . hab. . , . psal . . . psal . . . psal . . . eccl. . . rom. . psal . . . psal . . , . psal . . . pet. . . iob . eccles . . . iob . . lamen . . . acts . . psal . . . psal . . . ier. . . gen. . . iob . . exod. . . psal . . . deut. . . prov. . . iob . . sam. . . gen. . . iob . , . acts . . eccles . . . deut. . . sam. . . esay . . hos . . . mat. . . esay . amos . . psal . . . pet. . . thes . . the vanity of dogmatizing, or, confidence in opinions manifested in a discourse of the shortness and uncertainty of our knowledge, and its causes : with some reflexions on peripateticism, and an apology for philosophy / by jos. glanvill ... scepsis scientifica glanvill, joseph, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing g estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the vanity of dogmatizing, or, confidence in opinions manifested in a discourse of the shortness and uncertainty of our knowledge, and its causes : with some reflexions on peripateticism, and an apology for philosophy / by jos. glanvill ... scepsis scientifica glanvill, joseph, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by e.c. for henry eversden ..., london : . published also as: scepsis scientifica, or, confest ignorance the way to science. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng philosophy -- early works to . knowledge, theory of -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the vanity of dogmatizing : or confidence in opinions . manifested in a discourse of the shortness and vncertainty of our knowledge , and its causes ; with some reflexions on peripateticism ; and an apology for philosophy . by ios . glanvill , m. a. london , printed by e. c. for henry eversden at the grey-hound in st. pauls-church-yard . . to the reverend my ever honored friend , mr. ioseph mynard , b. d. sir , i dare not approach so much knowledge , as you are owner of , but in the dress of an humble ignorance . the lesser sporades must vail their light in the presence of the monarch luminary ; and to appear before you , with any confidence of science , were an unpardonable piece of dogmatizing . therefore whatever be thought of the discourse it self , it cannot be censur'd in this application ; and though the pedant may be angry with me , for shaking his indear'd opinions ; yet he cannot but approve of this appeal to one , whose very name would reduce a sceptick . if you give your vote against dogmatizing : 't is time for the opinionative world , to lay down their proud pretensions : and if such known accomplishments acknowledge ignorance ; confidence will be out of countenance ; and the sciolist will write on his most presumed certainty ; this is also vanity . whatever in this discourse is less consonant to your severer apprehensions , i begge it may be the object of your charity , and candor . i betake my self to the protection of your ingenuity , from the pursuits of your judicious censure . and were there not a benign warmth , as well as light attended you , 't were a bold venture to come within your beams . could i divine wherein you differ from me ; i should be strongly induced to note that with a deleatur ; and revenge the presumption , by differing from my present self . if any thing seem to you to savour too much of the pyrrhonian : i hope you 'l consider , that scepticism is less reprehensible in enquiring years , and no crime in a juvenile exercitation . but i have no design against science : my indeavour is to promote it . confidence in uncertainties , is the greatest enemy to what is certain ; and were i a sceptick , i 'de plead for dogmatizing : for the way to bring men to stick to nothing , is confidently to perswade them to swallow all things . the treatise in your hands is a fortuitous , undesigned abortive ; and an aequivocal effect of a very diverse intention : for having writ a discourse , which formerly i let you know of , of the soul's immortality : i design'd a preface to it , as a corrective of enthusiasm , in a vindication of the use of reason in matters of religion : and my considerations on that subject , which i thought a sheet would have comprised , grew so voluminous , as to fill fourteen : which , being too much for a preface ; i was advised to print apart . and therefore reassuming my pen , to annex some additional inlargements to the beginning ; where i had been most curt and sparing : my thoughts ran out into this discourse , which now beggs your patronage : while the two former were remanded into the obscurity of my private papers : the latter being rendred less necessary by his majesties much desired , and seasonable arrival ; and the former by the maturer undertakings of the accomplisht dr. h. more . i have no apologie to make for my lapses , but what would need a new one . to say they are the errata's of one that hath not by some years reach't his fourth , climacterical , would excuse indeed the poverty of my judgement , but criminate the boldness of this address . nor can i avoid this latter imputation , but by being more criminal : and to shun this respectful presumption , i must do violence to my gratitude . since therefore your obligations have made my fault , my duty ; i hope the same goodness , that gave birth to my crime , will remit it . hereby you 'l further indear your other favours : and make me as much an admirer of your vertues , as i am a debtor to your civilities : which since i cannot do them right in an acknowledgement ; i 'le acknowledge , by signifying that the greatness of them hath disabled me from doing so : an impotence , which a little charity will render venial ; since it speaks your self its author . these your indearments will necessitate me to a self-contradiction ; and i must profess my self dogmatical in this , that i am , sir , your most obliged and affectionate servant jos. glanvill . cecill house in the strand , march . . the preface . reader , to complain in print of the multitude of books , seems to me a self-accusing vanity , whilest the querulous reprehenders add to the cause of complaint , and transgress themselves in that , which they seem to wish amended . 't is true , the births of the press are numerous , nor is there less variety in the humors , and phancies of perusers , and while the number of the one , exceeds not the diversity of the other , some will not think that too much , which others judge superfluous . the genius of one approves , what another disregardeth . and were nothing to pass the press , but what were suited to the universal gusto ; farewel typography were i to be judge , and no other to be gratified , i think i should silence whole libraries of authors and reduce the world of books into a fardle : whereas were another to sit censor , it may be all those i had spared , would be condemn'd to darkness , and obtain no exemption from those ruines , and were all to be supprest , which some think unworthy light ; no more would be left , then were before moses , and trismegistus . therefore , i seek no applause from the disgrace of others , nor will i huckster-like discredit any mans ware , to recommend mine own . i am not angry that there are so many books already , ( bating only the anomalies of impiety and irreligion ) nor will i plead the necessity of publishing mine from feigned importunities . those that are taken up with others , are at their liberty to avoid the divertisement of its perusal : and those , to whom 't is not importunate will not expect an apology for its publication . what quarter the world will give it , is above my conjecture . if it be but indifferently dealt with , i am not disappointed . to print , is to run the gantlet , and to expose ones self to the tongue - strapado . if the more generous spirits favour me , let pedants do their worst : there 's no smart in their censure , yea , their very approbation is a scandal . for the design of this discourse , the title speaks it . it is levied against dogmatizing , and attempts upon a daring enemy , confidence in opinions . the knowledge i teach , is ignorance : and methinks the theory of our own natures , should be enough to learn it us . we came into the world , and we know not how ; we live in 't in a self-nescience , and go hence again and are as ignorant of our recess . we grow , we live , we move at first in a microcosm , and can give no more scientifical account , of the state of our three quarters confinement , then if we had never been extant in the greater world , but had expir'd in an abortion ; we are inlarg'd from the prison of the womb , we live , we grow , and give being to our like : we see , we hear , and outward objects affect our other senses : we understand , we will , we imagine , and remember : and yet know no more of the immediate reasons of most of these common functions , then those little embryo anchorites : we breath , we talk , we move , while we are ignorant of the manner of these vital performances . the dogmatist knows not how he moves his finger ; nor by what art or method he turns his tongue in his vocal expressions . new parts are added to our substance , to supply our continual decayings , and as we dye we are born daily ; nor can we give a certain account , how the aliment is so prepared for nutrition , or by what mechanism it is so regularly distributed ; the turning of it into chyle , by the stomachs heat , is a general , and unsatisfying solution . we love , we hate , we joy , we grieve : passions annoy us , and our minds are disturb'd by those corporal aestuations . nor yet can we tell how these should reach our unbodyed selves , or how the soul should be affected by these heterogeneous agitations . we lay us down , to sleep away our diurnal cares ; night shuts up the senses windows , the mind contracts into the brains centre . we live in death , and lye as in the grave . now we know nothing , nor can our waking thoughts inform us , who is morpheus , and what that leaden key , that locks us up within our senseless cels : there 's a difficulty that pincheth , nor will it easily be resolved . the soul is awake , and solicited by external motions , for some of them reach the perceptive region in the most silent repose , and obscurity of night . what is 't then that prevents our sensations ; or if we do perceive , how is 't , that we know it not ? but we dream , see visions , converse with chimaera's , the one half of our lives is a romance , a fiction . we retain a catch of those pretty stories , and our awakened imagination smiles in the recollection . nor yet can our most severe inquiries finde what did so abuse us , or shew the nature , and manner of these nocturnal illusions : when we puzzle our selves in the disquisition , we do but dream , and every hypothesis is a phancy . our most industrious conceits are but like their object , and as uncertain as those of midnight . thus when some dayes , and nights have gone over us , the stroak of fate concludes the number of our pulses ; we take our leave of the sun and moon , and bid mortality adieu . the vital flame is extinct , the soul retires into another world , and the body to dwell with dust . nor doth the last scene yield us any more satisfaction in our autography ; for we are as ignorant how the soul leaves the light , as how it first came into it ; we know as little how the union is dissolved , that is , the chain of the so differing subsistencies , that compound us , as how it first commenced . this then is the creature that so pretends to knowledge , and that makes such a noise , and bustle for opinions . the instruction of delphos may shame such confidents into modesty ; and till we have learn't that honest adviso , though from hell , ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ confidence is arrogance , and dogmatizing unreasonable presuming . i doubt not but the opinionative resolver , thinks all these easie knowables , and the theories here accounted mysteries , are to him revelations . but let him suspend that conclusion till he hath weigh'd the considerations hereof , which the discourse it self will present him with ; and if he can untie those knots , he is able to teach all humanity , and will do well to oblige mankinde by his informations . i had thought here to have shut up my preface , being sensible of the taedium of long praeliminaries . but lest the ingenious stumble at my threshold , and take offence at the seemingly disproportionate excess , which i ascribe to adam's senses : i 'le subjoyn a word to prevent the scruple . first then , for those that go the way of the allegorie , and assert pre-existence ; i 'm secure enough from their dissatisfaction . for , that the aetherial adam could easily sense the most tender touches upon his passive vehicle , and so had a clear and full perception of objects , which we since plung'd into the grosser hyle are not at all , or but a little aware of ; can be no doubt in their hypothesis . nor can there as great a difference be supposed between the senses of eighty , and those of twenty , between the opticks of the blind bat and perspicacious eagle , as there was between those pure un-eclipsed sensations , and these of our now-embodyed , muddied sensitive . now that the prae-existent adam could so advantageously form his vehicle , as to receive better information from the most distant objects , than we by the most helpful telescopes ; will be no difficult admission to the friends of the allegory . so that what may seem a meer hyperbolical , and fanciful display to the sons of the letter ; to the allegorists will be but a defective representation of literal realities . and i cannot be obnoxious to their censure , but for my coming short in the description . but i am like more dangerously to be beset by them that go the way of the plain : and 't will be thought somewhat hard , to verifie my hypothesis of the literal adam . indeed , there is difficulty in the mechanical defence ; and dioptrical impugnations are somewhat formidable . for unless the constitution of adam's organs was diverse from ours , and from those of his fallen self ; it will to some seem impossible , that he should command distant objects by natural , as we do by artificial advantages . since those removed bodies of sun and stars ( in which i instance ) could form but minute angles in adam's retina , and such as were vastly different from those they form in ours assisted by a telescope . so that granting adam's eye had no greater diametrical wideness of the pupil , no greater distance from the cornea to the retiformis , and no more filaments of the optick nerves of which the tunica retina is woven , than we : the unmeasurable odds of sensitive perfections which i assign him ; will be conceiv'd mechanically impossible . these difficulties may seem irresistibly pressing , and incapable of a satisfactory solution . but i propound it to the consideration of the ingenious objectors , whether these supposed organical defects might not have been supplyed in our unfallen protoplast by the vast perfections of his animadversive , and some other advantageous circumstances : so that though it be granted , that an object at the distance of the stars could not form in the eye of adam any angles , as wide as those it forms by the help of a tube ; yet i think my hypothesis may stand unshaken . for suppose two eyes of an equal and like figure , in the same distance from an object ; so that it forms equal angles in both : it may come to pass by other reasons , that one of these eyes shall see this object bigger then the other : yea , if the difference of the reasons on both sides be so much greater , one eye shall see it clearly , and the other not at all : for let one of these eyes be placed in an old body , or in a body deprived quite , or in a great measure of those spirits which are allowed the instruments of sight , or of the due egress and regress of them , in their natural courses and channels ; and let the other have a body of a clean contrary quality ; or let the soul that actuates one of the said eyes , be indued with an higher faculty of animadversion ( i mean with a greater degree of the animadversive ability ) than the soul hath , that actuates the other . in either of these cases , the fore-mention'd difformity of vision , will fall out in the same uniform case of dioptrical advantages . for a little angle made in the eye , will make as discernible an impression to a soul of a greater animadversive power , and assisted by more and meeter instruments of sight ; as a greater angle can make to a soul of a less power , and destitute of those other instruments , which are as necessary to sight as those dioptrical conveniencies . so that grant that the object set at the same distance made angles in the eye of adam , no wider than those it formes in ours ; yet that which we discern not , might have been seen by him , having more and better spirits , and being endued with a stronger animadversive , according to mine hypothesis . for there is the same proportion between a great power , and a little help , or a little angle ; which is between a small power , and a great help , or a great angle . if all this satisfie not , i begg from the ingenious the favour of this consideration : that some grains must be allow'd to a rhetorical display , which will not bear the rigour of a critical severity . but whether this mine hypothesis stand or fall , my discourse is not at all concerned . and i am not so fond of my conjectures , but that i can lay them down at the feet of a convictive opposition . to the learned author , of the eloquent and ingenious vanity of dogmatizing . poets are but libe'lers , i implore no muse ; parnassian praise is an abuse . call up the spirit of philosophy : your worth 's disgrac't by poetry . summon des-cartes , plato , socrates : let this great triad speak your praise . other encomiasts that attempt , set-forth their own defects , and not your worth . as if a chamber-light should dare essay , to gloss the beauty of the day . he that thinks fully to describe it , dreams : you 're only seen by your own beams ▪ and only eagle-eyes can bear that light ; your strength and lustre blindes weak sight . let pedants quarrel with th' light that detects their belov'd vanities and defects . and let the bat , assoon as day 's begun , commence a suit against the sun. let reprehended dogmatizers stamp ; and the scorch't moore curse heavens lamp : while nobler souls , that understand what 's writ , are debtors to your strength and wit. you have remov'd the old antipathy 'tween rhetorick , and philosophy : and in your book have cloath'd socratick sense , in demosthenian eloquence . yo 've smooth'd the satyr , and the wanton have reform'd and made rhetorick grave . and since your pen hath thus oblig'd them both , 't is fit they club t' express your worth . h. darsy , esq to his worthy friend mr. ioseph glanvill ; upon the vanity of dogmatizing in philosophy , displayed in his ingenious book . no controversies do me please , unless they do contend for peace : nor scarce a demonstration , but such as yours ; which proves , there 's none . doubful i liv'd , and doubtful die : thus ΑΥΤΟΣ gave Ε'ΦΗ the lye ; and with his own more aged criticks , expung'd his youthful analyticks . to make my shrift , that certain i am only of uncertainty ; is no less glorious , then due , after the stagirite and you : i am absolved , if the hand of great apollo's priest may stand . you have made ignorance a boast : pride hath its ancient channel lost ; like arethusa , only found by those , that follow 't under ground ▪ title your book , the works of man ; the index of the vatican : call it arts encyclopaedy ; the universal pansophy ; the state of all the questions , since peter lumbard , solv'd at once ; ignorance in a learned dress , which volumes teach , but not profess ; the learning which all ages knew , being epitomiz'd by you . you teach us doubting ; and no more do libraries turn'd o're and o're : take up the folio , that comes next , 't will prove a comment on your text ; and the quotation would be good , if bodley in your margin stood . a. borfet , m. a. to his ingenious friend the author , on his vanity of dogmatizing . let vaunting knowledge now strike sail , and unto modest ign'rance vail . our firmest science ( when all 's done ) is nought but bold opinion . he that hath conquer'd every art th' encyclopaedy all by heart ; is but some few conjectures better than he that cannot read a letter . if any certainty there be , 't is this , that there 's no certaintie . reason's a draught that do's display , and cast its aspects ev'ry way . it do's acknowledge no back parts , 't is fac'd like ianus : and regard's opposite sides ; what one frowns on , t'other face sweetly smiles upon . then may the sciolist hereby correct his metoposcopy . let him , e're censure reason , found and view her lineaments all round . and since that science he has none , let him with you his nescience owne . weakness acknowledged is best : and imperfection when confest . meek and unboasting ignorance , is but a single impotence : but when 't is clad in high profession , 't is then a double imperfection . a silly ape struttingly drest , would but appear the greater jest . but your example teacheth us to become less ridiculous . he that would learn , but what you show , the narrow bounds of what men know : and would but take a serious view , of the foundations with you : he 'd scarce his confidence adventure , on bottomes which are so unsure . in disquisitions first gust it would be shipwrackt , sunk , and lost . p. h. reader , that the author may not be accountable for more faults , then his own ; he desires thee to correct , or at least to take notice of these typographical mistakes : some of which are less considerable , but others , if unobserv'd , may disturb the sense , and render the meaning less obvious : thou art therefore requested to exercise thine ingenuity , in pardoning the printer ; and thy justice , in doing right to the author . errata . page . line . read . . . unite . . . apprehenders . . . spirits . . . spontaneous . . . principles and. . . motions . . . conceive it . . . considerations . . . composition . . . makes . . . and our . . . of reason . . . mad , that . . . be what . . . of . . . cousenage . . . the world . . . the best . books newly published . a perfect history of the civil warrs of great brittain and ireland , by an impartial pen , in folio . britannia baconica , or the natural rarities of england , scotland and wales , as they are to be found in every shire , in octavo . the vanity of dogmatizing ; or , confidence in opinions . chap. i. a display of the perfections of innocence , with a conjecture at the manner of adams knowledge , viz. that it was by the large extent of his senses ; founded upon the supposition of the perfection of his faculties , and induc'd from two philosophick principles . our misery is not of yesterday , but as antient as the first criminal , and the ignorance we are involved in , almost coaeval with the humane nature ; not that we were made so by our god , but our selves ; we were his creatures , sin and misery were ours . to make way for what follows , we will go to the root of our antient happiness , and now ruines , that we may discover both what the man was , and what the sinner is . the eternal wisdome having made that creature whose crown it was to be like his maker , enrich't him with those ennoblements which were worthy him that gave them , and made no less for the benefit of their receiver , then the glory of their author . and as the primogenial light , which at first was difused over the face of the unfashion'd chaos , was afterwards by divine appointment gathered into the sun and stars , and other lucid bodies , which shine with an underived lustre : so those scatter'd perfections which are divided among the several cantons of created beings , were as it were constellated and summ'd up in this epitome of the greater world , man. his then blisful injoyments anticipated the aspires to be like gods ; being in a condition not to be added to , as much as in desire ; and the unlikeness of it to our now miserable , because apostate , state , makes it almost as impossible to be conceiv'd , as to be regain'd . a condition which was envied by creatures that nature had plac't a sphaere above us , and such as differ'd not much from glory , and blessed immortality , but in perpetuity and duration . for since the most despicable and disregarded pieces of decay'd nature , are so curiously wrought , and adorned with such eminent signatures of divine wisdome , as speak it their author , and that after a curse brought upon a disorder'd universe ; what think we was done unto him whom the king delighted to honour ? and what was the portion of he●●ens favorite , when omniscience it self sat in councel to furnish him with all those accomplishments which his specifick capacity could contain ? which questionless were as much above the hyperbolies that fond poetry bestowes upon its admired objects , as their flatter'd beauties are really below them . the most refined glories of subcoelestial excellencies are but more faint resemblances of these . for all the powers and faculties of this copy of the divinity , this meddal of god , were as perfect as beauty and harmony in idea . the soul was not clogg'd by the inactivity of its masse , as ours ; nor hindered in its actings , by the distemperature of indisposed organs . passions kept their place , as servants of the higher powers , and durst not arrogate the throne , as now : no countermands came hence , to repeal the decretals of the regal faculties ; that batrachomyomachia of one passion against an other , and both against reason , was yet unborn . man was never at odds with himself , till he was at odds with the commands of his maker . there was no jarring or disharmony in the faculties , till sin untun'd them . he could no sooner say to one power go , but it went , nor to another do this , but it did it . even the senses , the souls windows , were without any spot or opacity ; to liken them to the purest crystal , were to debase them by the comparison ; for their acumen and strength depending on the delicacy and apt disposure of the organs and spirits , by which outward motions are conveyed to the judgement-seat of the soul : those of innocence must needs infinitely more transcend ours , then the senses of sprightful youth doth them of frozen decrepit age . adam needed no spectacles . the acuteness of his natural opticks ( if conjecture may have credit ) shew'd him much of the coelestial magnificence and bravery without a galilaeo's tube : and 't is most probable that his naked eyes could reach near as much of the upper world , as we with all the advantages of art . it may be 't was as absurd even in the judgement of his senses , that the sun and stars should be so very much , less then this globe , as the contrary seems in ours ; and 't is not unlikely that he had as clear a perception of the earths motion , as we think we have of its quiescence . thus the accuracy of his knowledge of natural effects , might probably arise from his sensible perception of their causes . what the experiences of many ages will scarce afford us at this distance from perfection , his quicker senses could teach in a moment . and whereas we patch up a piece of philosophy from a few industriously gather'd , and yet scarce well observ'd or digested experiments , his knowledge was compleatly built , upon the certain , extemporary notice of his comprehensive , unerring faculties . his sight could inform him whether the loadstone doth attract by atomical effluviums ; which may gain the more credit by the consideration of what some affirm ; that by the help of microscopes they have beheld the subtile streams issuing from the beloved minerall . it may be he saw the motion of the bloud and spirits through the transparent skin , as we do the workings of those little industrious animals through a hive of glasse . the mysterious influence of the moon , and its causality on the seas motion , was no question in his philosophy , no more then a clocks motion is in ours , where our senses may inform us of its cause . sympathies and antipathies were to him no occult qualities . causes are hid in night and obscurity from us , which were all sun to him . now to shew the reasonableness of this hypothesis , i 'le suppose what i think few will deny ; that god adorn'd that creature which was a transcript of himself , with all the perfections its capacity could bear . and that this great extent of the senses horizon was a perfection easily competible to sinless humanity , will appear by the improvement of the two following principles . first , as far as the operation of nature reacheth , it works by corporeal instruments . if the coelestial lights influence our earth , and advance the production of minerals in their hidden beds , it is done by material communications . and if there be any virtue proceeding from the pole , to direct the motion of the enamour'd steel ( however unobserv'd those secret influences may be ) they work not but by corporal application . secondly , sense is made by motion , caus'd by bodily impression on the organ , and continued to the brain , and centre of perception . hence it is manifest that all bodies are in themselves sensible , in as much as they can impress this motion , which is the immediate cause of sensation : and therefore , as in the former principle , the most distant efficients working by a corporeal causality , if it be not perceiv'd , the non-perception must arise from the dulness and imperfection of the faculty , and not any defect in the object . so then , is it probable that the tenuous matter the instrument of remoter agents , should be able to move , and change the particles of the indisposed clay or steel , and yet not move the ductile easie senses of perfected man ? indeed we perceive not such subtile insinuations , because their action is overcome by the strokes of stronger impressors , and we are so limited in our perceptions , that we can only attend to the more vigorous impulse : but this is an imperfection incident to our degraded natures , which infinite wisdom easily prevented in his innocent master-piece : upon such considerations , to me it appears to be most reasonable , that the circumference of our protoplast's senses , should be the same with that of natures activity : unless we will derogate from his perfections , and so reflect a disparagement on him that made us . and i am the more perswaded of the concinnity of this notion , when i consider the uncouth harshness either of the way of actuall concreated knowledge , or of infant growing faculties ; neither of which methinks seem to be much favour'd by our severer reasons . thus i have given a brief account of what might have been spun into volumes ; a full description of such perfections cannot be given but by him that hath them ; an attainment which we shall never reach , till mortality be swallowed up of life . chap. ii. our decay and ruins by the fall , descanted on . of the now scantness of our knowledge : with a censure of the schoolmen , and peripatetick dogmatists . but 't is a miserable thing to have been happy : and a self-contracted wretchedness , is a double one . had felicity alwayes been a stranger to humanity , our now misery had been none ; and had not our selves been the authors of our ruines , less . we might have been made unhappy , but since we are miserable , we chose it . he that gave them , might have taken from us our extern injoyments , but none could have robb'd us of innocence but our selves . that we are below the angels of god , is no misery , 't is the lot of our natures ; but that we have made our selves like the beasts that perish , is so with a witness , because the fruit of our sin . while man knew no sin , he was ignorant of nothing else , that it imported humanity to know : but when he had sinned , the same trangression that opened his eyes to see his own shame , shut them against most things else , but it , and his newly purchased misery . with the nakedness of his body , he saw that of his soul ; and the blindness , and disaray of his faculties , which his former innocence was a stranger to : and that that shew'd them him , made them . whether our purer intellectuals , or only our impetuous affections , were the prime authors of the anomie , i dispute not : sin is as latent in its first cause , as visible in its effects ; and 't is the mercy of heaven that hath made it easier to know the cure , then the rise of our distempers . this is certain , that our masculine powers are deeply sharers of the consequential mischiefs , and though eve were the first in the disobedience , yet was adam a joint partaker of the curse . we are not now like the creatures we were made , and have not only lost our makers image , but our own : and do not much more transcend the creatures , which god and nature have plac't at our feet , then we come short of our antient selves ; a proud affecting to be like gods , hath made us unlike men. for whereas our ennobled understandings could once take the wings of the morning , to visit the world above us , and had a glorious display of the highest form of created excellencies , it now lies groveling in this lower region , muffled up in mists , and darkness : the curse of the serpent is fallen upon degenerated humanity , that it should go on its belly , and lick the dust . and as in the cartesian hypothesis , the planets sometimes lose their light , by the fixing of the impurer scum ; so our impaired intellectuals , which were once as pure light and flame in regard of their vigour and activity , are now darkned by those grosser spots , which our disobedience hath contracted . and our now overshadow'd souls ( to whose beauties stars were foils ) may be exactly emblem'd , by those crusted globes , whose influential emissions are intercepted , by the interposal of the benighting element , while the purer essence is imprison'd within the narrow compasse of a centre . for these once glorious lights , which did freely shed abroad their harmeless beams , and wanton'd in a larger circumference , are now pent up in a few first principles ( the naked essentials of our faculties ) within the straight confines of a prison . and whereas knowledge dwelt in our undepraved natures , as light in the sun , in as great plenty , as purity ; it is now hidden in us like sparks in a flint , both in scarcity , and obscurity . for considering the shortness of our intellectual sight , the deceptibility and impositions of our senses , the tumultuary disorders of our passions , the prejudices of our infant educations , and infinite such like ( of which an after oecasion will befriend us , with a more full and particular recital ) i say , by reason of these , we may conclude of the science of the most of men , truly so called , that it may be truss'd up in the same room with the iliads , yea it may be all the certainty of those high pretenders to it , the voluminous schoolmen , and peripatetical dictators , ( bating what they have of first principles and the word of god ) may be circumscrib'd by as small a circle , as the creed , when brachygraphy had confin'd it within the compass of a penny . and methinks the disputes of those assuming confidents , are like the controversie of those in plato's den , who having never seen but the shadow of an horse trajected against a wall , eagerly contended , whether its neighing proceeded from the appearing mane , or tail , which they saw moving through the agitation of the substance , playing in the winde : so these in the darker cels of their imagin'd principles , violently differ about the shadowes and exuviae of beings , words , and notions , while for the most part they ignore the substantial realities ; and like children make babies , for their phancies to play with , while their useless subtilties afford but little intertain to the nobler faculties . but many of the most accomplish't wits of all ages , whose modesty would not allow them to boast of more then they were owners of , have resolv'd their knowledge into socrates his summe total , and after all their pains in quest of science , have sat down in a profest nescience . it is the shallow unimprov'd intellects that are the confident pretenders to certainty ; as if contrary to the adage , science had no friend but ignorance . and though when they speak in the general of the weakness of our understandings , and the scantness of our knowledge , their discourse may even justifie scepticism it self ; yet in their particular opinions are as assertive and dogmatical , as if they were omniscient . to such , as a curbe to confidence , and an evidence of humane infirmities even in the noblest parts of man , i shall give the following instances of our intellectual blindness : not that i intend to poze them with those common aenigma's of magnetism , fluxes , refluxes and the like , these are resolv'd into a confest ignorance , and i shall not persue them to their old asylum : and yet it may be there is more knowable in these , then in lesse acknowledg'd mysteries : but i 'le not move beyond our selves , and the most ordinary and trivial phaenomena in nature , in which we shall finde enough to shame confidence , and unplume dogmatizing . chap. iii. instances of our ignorance propounded , ( ) of things within our selves . the nature of the soul , and its origine , glanc'd at and past by ; ( ) it 's union with the body is unconceivable : so ( ) is its moving the body , consider'd either in the way of sir k. digby , des-cartes , or dr. h. more , and the platonists . ( ) the manner of direction of the spirits , as unexplicable . in the prosecution of our intendment wee 'll first instance in some things in the generall , which concern the soul in this state of terrestriall union ; and then speak more particularly to some faculties within us , a scientificall account of which mortality is unacquainted with . secondly we intend to note some mysteries , which relate to matter and body . and thirdly to shew the unintelligible intricacy of some ordinary appearances . § . it 's a great question with some what the soul is . and unlesse their phancies may have a sight and sensible palpation of that more clarified subsistence , they will prefer infidelity , it self to an unimaginable idea . i 'le onely mind such , that the soul is seen , as other things , in the mirrour of its effects , and attributes : but , if like children they 'll run behind the glass to see its naked face , their expectation will meet with nothing but vacuity & emptiness . and though a pure intellectual eye may have a sight of it in reflex discoveries ; yet , if we affect a grosser touch , like ixiō we shal embrace a cloud . § . and it hath been no less a trouble to the world to determine whence it came , then what it is . whether it were made by an immediate creation , or seminall traduction , hath been a ball of contention to the most learned ages : and yet after all the bandying attempts of resolution it is as much a question as ever , and it may be will be so till it be concluded by immortality . some ingenious ones think the difficulties , which are urged by each side against the other , to be pregnant proofs of the falshood of both ; and substitute an hypothesis , which for probability is supposed to have the advantage of either . but i shall not stir in the waters , which have been already mudded by so many contentious enquiries . the great st. austin , and others of the gray heads of reverend antiquity have been content to sit down here in a profest neutrality : and i 'le not industiously endeavour to urge men to a confession of what they freely acknowledge ; but shall note difficulties which are not so usually observ'd , but as insoluble as these . § . it is the saying of divine plato , that man is natures horizon ; dividing betwixt the upper hemisphere of immateriall intellects , and this lower of corporeity : and that we are a compound of beings distant in extreams , is as clear as noon . but how the purer spirit is united to this clod , is a knot too hard for fallen humanity to unty . what cement should unite heaven and earth , light and darkness , natures of so divers a make , of such disagreeing attributes , which have almost nothing , but being , in common ; this is a riddle , which must be left to the coming of elias . how should a thought be united to a marble-statue , or a sun-beam to a lump of clay ! the freezing of the words in the air in the northern climes , is as conceivable , as this strange union . that this active spark , this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ as the stoicks call it ] should be confined to a prison it can so easily pervade , is of less facill apprehension , then that the light should be pent up in a box of crystall , and kept from accompanying its source to the lower world : and to hang weights on the wings of the winde seems far more intelligible . in the unions , which we understand , the extreams are reconciled by interceding participations of natures , which have somewhat of either . but body and spirit stand at such a distance in their essentiall compositions , that to suppose an uniter of a middle constitution , that should partake of some of the qualities of both , is unwarranted by any of our faculties , yea most absonous to our reasons ; since there is not any the least affinity betwixt length , breadth and thickness , and apprehension , judgement and discourse : the former of which are the most immediate results [ if not essentials ] of matter , the latter of spirit . § . secondly , we can as little give an account , how the soul moves the body . that , that should give motion to an unwieldy bulk , which it self hath neither bulk nor motion ; is of as difficil an apprehension , as any mystery in nature . for though conceiving it under some phancied appearance , and pinning on it materiall affections , the doubt doth not so sensibly touch us ; since under such conceptions we have the advantage of our senses to befriend us with parallels , and gross appre●henders may not think it any more strange , then that a bullet should be moved by the rarified fire , or the clouds carryed before the invisible winds : yet if we defaecate the notion from materiality , and abstract quantity , locality and all kind of corporeity from it , and represent it to our thoughts either under the notion of the ingenious sir k. digby as a pure mind and knowledge , or as the admir'd des-cartes expresses it , une chose qui pense , as a thinking substance ; it will be as hard to apprehend , as that an empty wish should remove mountains : a supposition which if realized , would relieve sisyphus . nor yet doth the ingenious hypothesis of the most excellent cantabrigian philosopher , of the souls being an extended penetrable substance , relieve us ; since , how that which penetrates all bodies without the least jog or obstruction , should impress a motion on any , is by his own confession alike inconceivable . neither will its moving the body by a vehicle of spirits , avail us ; since they are bodies too , though of a purer mould . and to credit the unintelligibility both of this union and motion , we need no more then to consider , that when we would conceiue any thing which is not obvious to our senses , we have recourse to our memories the store-house of past observations : and turning over the treasure that is there , seek for something of like kind , which hath formerly come within the notice of our outward or inward senses . so that we cannot conceive any thing , which comes not within the verge of our senses ; but either by like experiments which we have made , or at least by some remoter hints which we receive from them . and where such are wanting , i cannot apprehend how the thing can be conceived . if any think otherwise , let them carefully examine their thoughts : and , if they finde a determinate intellection of any modes of being , which were never in the least hinted to them by their externall or internall senses ; i 'le beleeve that such can realize chimaera's . but now in the cases before us there are not the least footsteps , either of such an union , or motion , in the whole circumference of sensible nature : and we cannot apprehend any thing beyond the evidence of our faculties . § . thirdly , how the soul directs the spirits for the motion of the body according to the several animal exigents ; is as perplex in the theory , as either of the former . for the meatus , or passages , through which those subtill emissaries are conveyed to the respective members , being so almost infinite , and each of them drawn through so many meanders , cross turnings , and divers roades , wherein other spirits are continually a journeying ; it is wonderfull , that they should exactly perform their regular destinations without losing their way in such a wilderness : neither can the wit of man tell how they are directed . for that they are carried by the manuduction of a rule , is evident from the constant steddyness and regularity of their motion into the parts , where their supplies are expected : but , what that regulating efficiency should be , and how managed ; is not easily determin'd . that it is performed by meer mechanisme , constant experience confutes ; which assureth us , that our sponta●●eous motions are under the imperium of our will. at least the first determination of the spirits into such or such passages , is from the soul , what ever we hold of the after conveyances ; of which likewise i think , that all the philosophy in the world cannot make it out to be purely mechanicall . but yet though we gain this , that the soule is the principle of direction , the difficulty is as formidable as ever . for unless we allow it a kinde of inward sight of the anatomicall frame of its owne body of every vein , muscle , and artery ; of the exact site , and position of them , with their severall windings , and secret chanels : it is as unconceivable how it should be the directrix of such intricate motions , as that a blind man should manage a game at chess . but this is a kinde of knowledge , that we are not in the least aware of : yea many times we are so far from an attention to the inward direction of the spirits , that our employ'd mindes observe not any method in the outward performance ; even when 't is manag'd by variety of interchangeable motions , in which a steady direction is difficult , and a miscariage easy . thus an artist will play a lesson on an instrument without minding a stroke ; and our tongues will run divisions in a tune not missing a note , even when our thoughts are totally engaged elsewhere : which effects are to be attributed to some secret art of the soul , which to us is utterly occult , and without the ken of our intellects . chap. iv. ( ) we can give no account of the manner of sensation : nor ( ) of the nature of the memory . it is consider'd according to the philosophy of des-cartes , sir k. digby , aristotle and mr. hobbs , and all ineffectuall . some other unexplicables mention'd . § . but besides those abstrusities , that lie more deep , and are of a more mysterious alloy ; we are at a loss for a scientificall account even of our senses , the most knowable of our facultyes . our eyes , that see other things , see not themselves : and those princip●●●● foundations of knowledge are themselvs unknown . that the soul is the sole percipient , which alone hath animadversion and sense properly so called , and that the body is only the receiver and conveyer of corporeall impressions , is as certain , as philosophy can make it . aristotle himself teacheth so much in that maxime of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and plato credits this position with his suffrage ; affirming , that 't is the soul that hath life and sense , but the body neither . but this is so largly prosecuted by that wonder of men , the great des-cartes , and is a truth that shines so clear in the eyes of all considering men ; that to goe about industriously to prove it , were to light a candle to seek the sun : we 'll therefore suppose it , as that which needs not amuse us ; but yet , what are the instruments of sensible perceptions and particular conveyers of outward motions to the seat of sense , is difficult : and how the pure mind can receive information from that , which is not in the least like it self , and but little resembling what it represents ; i think inexplicable . whether sensation be made by corporall emissions and materiall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or by motions imprest on the aethereall matter , and carryed by the continuity thereof to the common sense ; i 'le not revive into a dispute : the ingenuity of the latter hath already given it almost an absolute victory over its rivall . but suppose which we will , there are doubts not to be solv'd by either . for how the soule by mutation made in matter a substance of another kind , should be excited to action ; and how bodily alterations and motions should concern it , which is subject to neither ; is a difficulty which confidence may triumph over sooner , then conquer . for body connot act on any thing but by motion ; motion cannot be received but by quantative dimension ; the soul is astranger to such gross substantiality , and hath nothing of quantity , but what it is cloathed with by our deceived phancies ; and therefore how can we conceive under a passsive subjection to material impressions ? and yet the importunity of pain , and unavoydableness of sensations strongly perswade , that we are so . some say , that the soul indeed is not passive under the materiall phantasms ; but doth only intuitively view them by the necessity of her nature , and so observes other things in these there representatives . but how is it , and by what art doth the soul read that such an image or stroke in matter [ whether that of her vehicle , or of the brain , the case is the same ] signifies such an object ? did we learn such an alphabet in our embryo-state ? and how comes it to pass , that we are not aware of any such congenite apprehensions ? we know what we know ; but do we know any more ? that by diversity of motions we should spell out figures , distances , magnitudes , colours , things not resembled by them ; we must attribute to some secret deduction . but what this deduction should be , or by what mediums this knowledge is advanc'd ; is as dark , as ignorance it self . one , that hath not the knowledge of letters , may see the figures ; but comprehends not the meaning included in them : an infant may hear the sounds , and see the motion of the lips ; but hath no conception conveyed by them , not knowing what they are intended to signify . so our souls , though they might have perceived the motions and images themselves by simple sense ; yet without some implicit inference it seems inconceivable , how by that means they should apprehend their archetypes . moreover images and motions are in the brain in a very inconsiderable latitude of space ; and yet they represent the greatest magnitudes . the image of an hemisphere of the upper globe cannot be of a wider circumference , then a wall-nut : and how can such petty impressions notifie such vastly expanded objects , but through some kind of scientifical method , and geometry in the principle ? without this it is not conceivable how distances should be perceiv'd , but all objects would appear in a cluster , and lie in as narrow a room as their images take up in our scanter craniums . nor will the philosophy of the most ingenious des-cartes help us out : for that striking upon divers filaments of the brain cannot well be supposed to represent their respective distances , except some such kind of inference be allotted us in our faculties ; the concession of which will only steed us as a refuge for ignorance , where we shall meet , what we would seem to shun . § . . the memory is a faculty whose nature is as obscure , and hath as much of riddle in it as any of the former ; it seems to be an organical power , because bodily distempers often marr its idea's , and cause a total oblivion : but what instruments the soul useth in her review of past impressions , is a question which may drive enquiry to despair . there are four principal hypotheses by which a resolution hath been attempted . the first that i 'le mention , is that of the incomparable des-cartes , who gives this account : the glandula pinealis , by him made the seat of common sense , doth by its motion impel the spirits into divers parts of the brain ; till it find those wherein are some tracks of the object we would remember ; which consists in this , viz. that the pores of the brain , through the which the spirits before took their course , are more easily opened to the spirits which demand re-entrance ; so that finding those pores , they make their way through them sooner then through others : whence there ariseth a special motion in the glandula , which signifies this to be the object we would remember . a second is , that of the ingenious sir k. digby , a summary of which is , that things are reserved in the memory by some corporeal exuviae and material images ; which having impinged on the common sense , rebound thence into some vacant cells of the brain , where they keep their ranks and postures in the same order that they entred , till they are again stirr'd up ; and then they slide through the fancy , as when they were first presented . these are the endeavours of those two grand sages , then whom it may be the sun never saw a more learned pair . and yet as a sad evidence of the infirmities of laps'd humanity : these great sophi fail here of their wonted success in unridling nature . and i think favour it self can say no more of either hypothesis , then that they are ingenious attempts . nor do i speak this to derogate from the grandeur of their wits us'd to victory : i should rather confer what i could to the erecting of such trophies to them , as might eternize their memories . and their coming short here , i think not to be from defect of their personal abilities , but specifick constitution ; and the doubt they leave us in , proceeds from hence , that they were no more then men . i shall consider what is mentioned from them apart , before i come to the other two : and what i am here about to produce , is not to argue either of these positions of falseness ; but of unconceiveableness . in the general , what hath been urg'd under the former head , stands in full force against both these , and them that follow . but to the first ; if memory be made by the easie motion of the spirits through the opened passages , according to what hath been noted from des-cartes ; whence have we a distinct remembrance of such diversity of objects , whose images without doubt pass through the same apertures ? and how should we recall the distances of bodies which lye in a line ? or , is it not likely , that the impell'd spirits might light upon other pores accommodated to their purpose through the motion of other bodies through them ? yea , in such a pervious substance as the brain , they might finde an easie either entrance , or exit , almost every where ; and therefore to shake every grain of corn through the same holes of a sieve in repeated winnowings , is as easie to be performed as this to be conckived . besides , it 's difficult to apprehend , but that these avennues should in a very short time be stopped up by the pressure of other parts of the matter , through its natural gravity , or other alterations made in the brain : and the opening of other vicine passages might quickly obliterate any tracks of these : as the making of one hole in the yeelding mud , defaces the print of another near it ; at least the accession of enlargement , which was derived from such transitions , would be as soon lost , as made . but for the second , how is it imaginable , that those active particles , which have no cement to unite them , nothing to keep them in the order they were set , yea , which are ever and anon justled by the occursion of other bodies , whereof there is an infinite store in this repository , should so orderly keep their cells without any alteration of their site or posture , which at first was allotted them ? and how is it conceivable , but that carelesly turning over the idea's of our mind to recover something we would remember , we should put all the other images into a disorderly floating , and so raise a little chaos of confusion , where nature requires the exactest order . according to this account , i cannot see , but that our memories would be more confused then our mid-night compositions : for is it likely , that the divided atomes which presented themselves together , should keep the same ranks in such a variety of tumultuary agitations , as happen in that liquid medium ? an heap of ants on an hillock will more easily be kept to an uniformity in motion ; and the little bodies which are incessantly playing up and down the air in their careless postures , are as capable of regularity as these . much more m●ght be added , but i intend only a touch . but a third way , that hath been attempted , is that of aristotle , which says , that objects are conserved in the memory by certain intentional species , beings , which have nothing of matter in their essential constitution , but yet have a necessary subjective dependence on it , whence they are called material . to this briefly . besides that these species are made a medium between body and spirit , and therefore partake of no more of being , then what the charity of our imaginations affords them ; and that the supposition infers a creative energie in the object their producent , which philosophy allows not to creature-efficients : i say , beside these , it is quite against their nature to subsist , but in the presence and under the actual influence of their cause ; as being produc'd by an emanative causality , the effects whereof dye in the removal of their origine . but this superannuated conceit deserves no more of our remembrance , then it contributes to the apprehension of it . and therefore i pass on to the last . which is that of mr. hobbs , that memory is nothing else but the knowledge of decaying sense , which is made by the reaction of one body against another ; or , as he expresses it in his humane nature , a missing of parts in an object . the foundation of this principle [ as of many of its fellows ] is totally evers't by the most ingenious commentator upon immaterial beings , dr. h. more in his book of immortality . i shall therefore leave that cause in the hands of that most learned undertaker , and only observe two things to my present purpose . ( ) . neither the brain , nor spirits , nor any other material substance within the head can for any considerable space of time conserve motion . the former is of such a clammy consistence , that it can no more retain it then a quagmire : and the spirits for their liquidity are more uncapable then the fluid medium , which is the conveyer of sounds , to persevere in the continued repetition of vocal airs . and if there were any other substance within us , as fitly temper'd to preserve motion , as the author of the opinion could desire : yet ( . ) which will equally press against either of the former , this motion would be quickly deadned even to an utter cessation , by counter-motions ; and we should not remember any thing , but till the next impression . much less can this principle give an account , how such an abundance of motions should orderly succeed one another , as things do in our memories : and to remember a soug or tune , it will be required , that our souls be an harmony more then in a metaphor● continually running over in a silent whisper those musical accents which our retentive faculty is preserver of . which could we suppose in a single instance ; yet a multitude of musical consonancies would be as impossible , as to play a thousand tunes on a lute at once . one motion would cross and destroy another ; all would be clashing and discord : and the musicians soul would be the most disharmonious : for according to the tenour of this opinion , our memories will be stored with infinite variety of divers , yea contrary motions , which must needs interfere , thwart , and obstruct on another : and there would be nothing within us , but ataxy and disorder . § . . much more might be added of the difficulties , which occurr touching the understanding , phancy , will , and affections . but the controversies hereabout , are so hotly manag'd by the divided schools , and so voluminously every where handled ; that it will be thought better to say nothing of them , then a little . the sole difficulties about the will , its nature , and sequency to the understanding , &c. have almost quite baffled inquiry , and shewn us little else , but that our understandings are as blind as it is . and the grand question depending hereon , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; i think will not be ended , but by the final abolition of its object . they , that would lose their knowledge here , let them diligently inquire after it . search will discover that ignorance , which is as invincible , as its cause . these controversies , like some rivers , the further they run , the more they are hid . and i think a less account is given of them now , then some centuries past ; when they were a subject of debate to the pious fathers . chap. v. how our bodies are form'd unexplicable . the plastick signifies nothing ; the formation of plants , and animals unknown , in their principle . mechanisme solves it not . a new way propounded , which also fails of satisfaction . ( . ) no account is yet given how the parts of matter are united . some considerations on des-cartes his hypothesis , it fails of solution . ( . ) the question is unanswerable , whether matter be compounded of divisibles , or indivisibles . therefore we 'l pass on to the next , the consideration of our bodies , which though we see , and feel , and continually converse with ; yet its constitution , and inward frame is an america , a yet undiscovered region . the saying of the kingly prophet , i am wonderfully made , may well be understood of that admiration , which is the daughter of ignorance . and with reverence it may be applyed , that in seeing we see , and understand not . three things i 'le subjoyn concerning this sensible matter , the other part of our compositoin . § . . that our bodies are made according to the most curious artifice , and orderly contrivance , cannot be denyed even by them , who are least beholden to nature . the elegance of this composure , sav'd the great aesculapius , galen , from a profest atheism . and i cannot think that the branded epicurus , lucretius , and their fellows were in earnest , when they resolv'd this composition into a fortuitous range of atoms . to suppose a watch , or any other the most curious automaton by the blind hits of chance , to perform diversity of orderly motions , to indicate the hour , day of the moneth , tides , age of the moon , and the like , with an unparallel'd exactness , and all without the regulation of art , this were the more pardonable absurdity . and that this admirable engine of our bodies , whose functions are carryed on by such a multitude of parts , and motions , which neither interfere , nor impede one another in their operations ; but by an harmonious sympathy promote the perfection and good of the whole : that this should be an undesign'd effect , is an assertion , that is more then melancholies hyperbole . i say therefore , that if we do but consider this fabrick with minds unpossest of an affected madness ; we will easily grant , that it was some skilful archeus who delineated those comely proportions , and hath exprest such exactly geometrical elegancies in its compositions . but what this hidden architect should be , and by what instruments and art this frame is erected ; is as unknown to us , as our embryo-thoughts . the plastick faculty is a fine word : but what it is , how it works , and whose it is , we cannot learn ; no , not by a return into the womb ; neither will the platonick principles unriddle the doubt : for though the soul be supposed to be the bodies maker , and the builder of its own house ; yet by what kind of knowledge , method , or means , is as unknown : and that we should have a knowledge which we know not of , is an assertion , which some say , hath no commission from our faculties . the great des-cartes will allow it to be no better , then a downright absurdity . but yet should we suppose it , it would be evidence enough of what we aim at . nor is the composition of our bodies the only wonder : we are as much non-plust by the most contemptible worm , and plant , we tread on . how is a drop of dew organiz'd into an insect , or a lump of clay into animal perfections ? how are the glories of the field spun , and by what pencil are they limn'd in their unaffected bravery ? by whose direction is the nutriment so regularly distributed unto the respective parts , and how are they kept to their specifick uniformities ? if we attempt mechanical solutions , we shall never give an account , why the wood-cock doth not sometimes borrow colours of the mag-pye , why the lilly doth not exchange with the daysie , or why it is not sometime painted with a blush of the rose ? can unguided matter keep it self to such exact conformities , as not in the least spot to vary from the species ? that divers limners at a distance without either copy , or designe , should draw the same picture to an undistinguishable exactness , both in form , colour , and features ; this is more conceivable , then that matter , which is so diversified both in quantity , quality , motion , site , and infinite other circumstances , should frame it self so absolutely according to the idea of its kind . and though the fury of that apelles , who threw his pencil in a desperate rage upon the picture he had essayed to draw , once casually effected those lively representations , which his art could not describe ; yet 't is not likely , that one of a thousand such praecipitancies should be crowned with so an unexpected an issue . for though blind matter might reach some elegancies in individual effects ; yet specifick conformities can be no unadvised productions , but in greatest likelyhood , are regulated by the immediate efficiency of some knowing agent : which whether it be seminal forms , according to the platonical principles , or what ever else we please to suppose ; the manner of its working is to us unknown ▪ or if these effects are meerly mechanical ; yet to learn the method of such operations may be , and hath indeed been ingeniously attempted ; but i think cannot be performed to the satisfaction of severer examination . that all bodies both animal , vegetable , and inanimate , are form'd out of such particles of matter , which by reason of their figures , will not cohaere or lie together , but in such an order as is necessary to such a specifical formation , and that therein they naturally of themselves concurre , and reside , is a pretty conceit , and there are experiments that credit it . if after a decoction of hearbs in a winter-night , we expose the liquor to the frigid air ; we may observe in the morning under a crust of ice , the perfect appearance both in figure , and colour , of the plants that were taken from it . but if we break the aqueous crystal , those pretty images dis-appear and are presently dissolved . now these airy vegetables are presumed to have been made , by the reliques of these plantal emissions whose avolation was prevented by the condensed inclosure . and therefore playing up and down for a while within their liquid prison , they at last settle together in their natural order , and the atomes of each part finding out their proper place , at length rest in their methodical situation , till by breaking the ice they are disturbed , and those counterfeit compositions are scatter'd into their first indivisibles . this hypothesis may yet seem to receive further confirmation , from the artificial resurrection of plants from their ashes , which chymists are so well acquainted with : and besides , that salt dissolved upon fixation returns to its affected cubes , the regular figures of minerals , as the hexagonal of crystal , the hemi-sphaerical of the fairy-stone , the stellar figure of the stone asteria , and such like , seem to look with probability upon this way of formation . and i must needs say 't is handsomly conjectur'd . but yet what those figures are , that should be thus mechanically adapted , to fall so unerringly into regular compositions , is beyond our faculties to conceive , or determine . and how those heterogeneous atomes ( for such their figures are supposed ) should by themselves hit so exactly into their proper residence in the midst of such tumultuary motions , cross thwartings , and arietations of other particles , especially when for one way of hitting right , there are thousands of missing ; there 's no hypothesis yet extant can resolve us . and yet had heaven afforded that miracle of men , the illustrious des-cartes a longer day on earth , we might have expected the utmost of what ingenuity could perform herein : but his immature fate hath unhappily disappointed us ; and prevented the most desirable complement of his not to be equall'd philosophy . § . . ( . ) it 's no less difficult to give an account , how the parts of the matter of our bodies are united : for though superficial enquirers may easily satisfie themselves by answering , that it is done by muscles , nerves , and other like strings and ligaments , which nature hath destin'd to that office ; yet , if we seek for an account how the parts of these do cohere , we shall find the cause to be as latent , as the effect of easie discovery . nothing with any shew of success hath yet appeared on the philosophick stage , but the opinion of des-cartes ; that the parts of matter are united by rest. neither can i conceive , how any thing can be substituted in its room , more congruous to reason ; since rest is most opposite to motion , the immediate cause of disunion . but yet i cannot see , how this can satisfie , touching the almost indissolvible coherence of some bodies , and the fragility and solubility of others : for if the union of the parts consist only in rest ; it would seem that a bagg of dust would be of as firm a consistence as that of marble or adamant : a bar of iron will be as easily broken as a tobacco-pipe ; and bajazets cage had been but a sorry prison . the aegyptian pyramids would have been sooner lost , then the names of them that built them ; and as easily blown away , as those inverst ones of smoke . if it be pretended for a difference , that the parts of solid bodies are held together by hooks , and angulous involutions ; i say , this comes not home : for the coherence of the parts of these hooks [ as hath been noted ] will be of as difficult a conception , as the former : and we must either suppose an infinite of them holding together on one another ; or at last come to parts , that are united by a meer juxta-position : yea , could we suppose the former , yet the coherence of these , would be like the hanging together of an infinite such of dust : which hypothesis would spoil the proverb , and a rope of sand , should be no more a phrase for labour in vain : for unless there be something , upon which all the rest may depend for their cohesion ; the hanging of one by another , will signifie no more then the mutual dependence of causes and effects in an infinite series , without a first : the admission of which , atheism would applaud . but yet to do the master of mechanicks right ; somewhat of more validity in the behalf of this hypothesis may be assign'd : which is , that the closeness and compactness of the parts resting together , doth much confer to the strength of the union : for every thing continues in the condition , wherein it is , except something more powerful alter it : and therefore the parts , that rest close together , must continue in the same relation to each other , till some other body by motion disjoyn them . now then , the more parts there are pen't together , the more able they will be for resistence ; and what hath less compactness , and by consequence fewer parts , according to the laws of motion will not be able to effect any alteration in it . according to what is here presented , what is most dense , and least porous , will be most coherent , and least discerpible . and if this help not , i cannot apprehend what can give an account of the former instances . and yet even this is confuted by experience ; since the most porous , spongy bodies are oft-times the most tough in consistence . 't is easier to break a tube of glass or crystal , then of elm or ash : and yet as the parts of the former are more , so they are more at rest ; since the liquid juyce , which is diffused through the parts of the wood , is in a continual agitation , which in des-cartes his philosophy is the cause of fluidity ; and a proportion'd humidity conferr's much to union [ sir k. digby makes it the cement it self ] ; a dry stick will be easily broken , when a green one will maintain a strong resistence : and yet in the moist substance there is less rest , then in what is , dryer and more fragill . much more might be added : but i 'le content my self with what 's mentioned ; and , notwithstanding what hath been said , i judge this account of that most miraculous wit to be the most ingenuous and rational , that hath or [ it may be ] can be given . i shall not therefore conclude it false ; though i think the emergent difficulties , which are its attendants , unanswerable : which is proof enough of the weakness of our now reasons , which are driven to such straights and puzzles even in things which are most obvious , and have so much the advantage of our faculties . § . . the composition of bodies , whether it be of divisibles or indivisibles , is a question which must be rank'd with the indissolvibles : for though it hath been attempted by the most illustrious wits of all philosophick ages ; yet they have done little else , but shewn their own divisions to be almost as infinite , as some suppose those of their subject . and notwithstanding all their shifts , subtilties , newly invented words and modes , sly subterfuges , and studyed evasions ; yet the product of all their endeavours , is but as the birth of the labouring mountains , wind and emptiness . do what they can ; actual infinite extension every where , equality of all bodies , impossibility of motion , and a world more of the most palpable absurdities will press the assertors of infinite divisibility . neither can it be avoided , but that all motions would be equal in velocity , the lines drawn from side to side in a pyramid , may have more parts then the basis , all bodies would be swallow'd up in a point , and endless more inconsistences , will be as necessarily consequential to the opinion of indivisibles . but intending only to instance in difficulties , which are not so much taken notice of ; i shall refer the reader , that would see more of this , to oviedo , pontius , ariaga , carelton , and other iesuites : whose management of this subject with equal force on either side , is a strong presumption of what we drive at . chap. vi. difficulties about the motion of a wheel , which admit of no solution . besides the already mention'd difficulties , even the most ordinary trivial occurrents , if we contemplate them in the theory , will as much puzzle us , as any of the former . under this head i 'le add three rhings touching the motion of a wheel , and conclude this . § . . and first , if we abstractly consider it , it seems impossible that a wheel should move : i mean not the progressive , but that motion which is meerly on its own centre . and were it not for the information of experience , it 's most likely that philosophy had long ago concluded it impossible : for let 's suppose the wheel to be divided according to the alphabet . now in motion there is a change of place , and in the motion of a wheel there is a succession of one part to another in the same place ; so that it seems unconceivable that a. should move until b. hath left its place : for a. cannot move , but it must acquire some place or other . it can acquire none but what was b's , which we suppose to be most immediate to it . the same space cannot contain them both . and therefore b. must leave its place , before a. can have it ; yea , and the nature of succession requires it . but now b. cannot move , but into the place of c ; and c. must be out , before b. can come in : so that the motion of c. will be pre-required likewise to the motion of a ; & so onward till it comes to z. upon the same accounts z. will not be able to move , till a. moves , being the part next to it : neither will a. be able to move [ as hath been shown ] till z. hath . and so the motion of every part will be pre-requir'd to it self . neither can one evade , by saying , that all the parts move at once . for ( . ) we cannot conceive in a succession but that something should be first , and that motion should begin somewhere . ( . ) if the parts may all change places with one another at the same time without any respect of priority , and posteriority to each others motion : why then may not a company of bullets closely crowded together in a box , as well move together by a like mutual and simultaneous exchange ? doubtless the reason of this ineptitude to motion in this position is , that they cannot give way one to another , and motion can no where begin because of the plenitude . the case is just the same in the instance before us ; and therefore we need go no further for an evidence of its inconceivableness . but yet to give it one touch more according to the peripatetick niceness , which says , that one part enters in the same instant that the other goes out : i 'le add this in brief : in the instant that b. leaves its place , it 's in it , or not : if so ; then a. cannot be in it in the same instant without quantative penetration . if not ; then it cannot be said to leave it in that instant , but to have left it before . these difficulties , which pinch so in this obvious experiment , stand in their full force against all motion on the hypothesis of absolute plenitude . nor yet have the defenders hereof need to take notice of them , because they equally press a most sensible truth . neither is it fair , that the opposite opinion of interspers'd vacuities should be rejected as absurd upon the account of some inextricable perplexities which attend it . therefore let them both have fair play ; and which soever doth with most ease and congruity solve the phaenomena , that shall have my vote for the most philosophick hypothesis . § . . it 's a difficulty no less desperate then the former , that the parts vicine to the centre , which it may be pass not over the hundredth part of space which those do of the extreme circumference , should describe their narrower circle but in equal time with those other , that trace so great a round . if they move but in the same degree of velocity ; here is then an equality in time and motion , and yet a vast inequality in the acquired space . a thing which seems flatly impossible : for is it conceivable , that of two bodies setting forth together , and continuing their motion in the same swiftness , the one should so far out-go its fellow , as to move ten mile an hour , while the other moves but a furlong ? if so , 't will be no wonder , that the race is not to the swift , and the furthest way about may well be the nearest way home . there is but one way that can be attempted to untie this knot ; which is , by saying , that the remoter and more out-side parts move more swiftly then the central ones . but this likewise is as unconceivable as what it would avoid : for suppose a right line drawn from the centre to the circumference , and it cannot be apprehended , but that the line should be inflected , if some parts of it move faster then others . i say if we do abstractedly from experience contemplate it in the theory , it is hard to conceive , but that one part moving , while the other rests , or at least moves slower ( which is as rest to a swifter motion ) should change its distance from it , and the respect , which it had to it ; which one would think should cause an incurvation in the line . § . . i 'le add only this one , which is an experiment that may for ever silence the most daring confidence . let there be two wheels fixt on the same axel in diameter ten inches a piece . between them let there be a little wheel , of two inches diameter , fixed on the same axel . let them be moved together on a plane , the great ones on the ground suppose , and the little one on a table [ for because of its parvitude it cannot reach to the same floor with them ] and you 'l find that the little wheel will move over the same space in equal time with equal circulations , with the great ones , and describe as long a line . now this seems bigg of repugnancies , though sense it self suffragate to its truth : for since every part of the greater wheels makes a proportionable part of the line , as do the parts of the little one , and the parts of those so much exceeding in multitude the parts of this : it will seem necessary that the line made by the greater wheels should have as many parts more then the line made by the less , as the wheels themselves have in circumference , and so the line would be as much longer as the wheels are bigger : so that one of these absurdities is unavoidable , either that more parts of the greater wheels go to the making one part of their lines , which will inferr a quantitative penetration ; or that the little wheel hath as many parts as the great ones , though five times in diameter exceeded by them , since the lines they describe are of equal length ; or the less wheel's line will have fewer parts then the others , though of equal extent with them , since it can have no more parts then the less circle , nor they fewer then the greater . but these are all such repugnancies , as that melancholy it self would scarse own them . and therefore we may well enter this among the unconceivables . should i have enlarged on this subject to the taking in of all things that claim a share in 't , it may be few things would have been left unspoken to , but the creed . philosophy would not have engross'd our pen , but we must have been forced to anger the intelligences of higher orbs. but intending only a glance at this rugged theam , i shall forbear to insist more on it , though the consideration of the mysteries of motion , gravity , light , colours , vision , sound , and infinite such like [ things obvious , yet unknown ] might have been plentiful subject . i come now to trace some of the causes of our ignorance and intellectual weakness : and among so many it 's almost as great a wonder as any of the former ; that we can say , we know . chap. vii . mens backwardness to acknowledge their own ignorance and error , though ready to find them in others . the ( i ) cause of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. the depth of verity discours't of , as of its admixtion in mens opinions with falsehood , and the connexion of truths , and their mutual dependence : a second reason of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. because we can perceive nothing but by proportion to our senses . the disease of our intellectuals is too great , not to be its own diagnostick : and they that feel it not , are not less sick , but stupidly so . the weakness of humane understanding , all will confess : yet the confidence of most in their own reasonings , practically disowns it : and 't is easier to perswade them it from others lapses then their own ; so that while all complain of our ignorance and error , every one exempts himself . it is acknowledged by all , while every one denies it . if the foregoing part of this discourse , have not universally concluded our weakness : i have one item more of my own . if knowledge can be found in the particulars mention'd ; i must lose that , which i thought i had , that there is none . but however , though some should pick a quarrel with the instances i alleadged ; yet the conclusion must be owned in others . and therefore beside the general reason i gave of our intellectual disabilities , the fall ; it will be worth our labour to descend to a more particular account : since it is a good degree of knowledge to be acquainted with the causes of our ignorance . and what we have to say under this head , will be comprehensive both of the causes of that , and ( which are the effects thereof ) of our misapprehensions and errours . § . . and first , one cause of the little we know may be , that knowledge lies deep , and is therefore difficult ; and so not the acquist of every careless inquirer . democritus his well hath a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and truth floats not . the useless froth swims on the surface ; but the pearl lies cover'd with a mass of waters . verisimilitude and opinion are an easie purchase ; and these counterfeits are all the vulgars treasure : but true knowledge is as dear in acquisition , as rare in possession . truth , like a point or line , requires an acuteness and intention to its discovery ; while verisimility , like the expanded superficies , is an obvious sensible on either hand , and affords a large and easie field for loose enquiry . and 't is the more difficult to find out verity , because it is in such inconsiderable proportions scattered in a mass of opinionative uncertainty ; like the silver in hiero's crown of gold : and it is no easie piece of chymistry to reduce them to their unmixed selves . the elements are no where pure in these lower regions ; and if there is any free from the admixtion of another , sure 't is above the concave of the moon : neither can any boast of a knowledge , which is depurate from the defilement of a contrary , within this atmosphear of flesh ; it dwels no where in unblended proportions , on this side the empyreum . all opinions have their truth , and all have what is not so ; and to say all are true and none , is no absurdity . so that to crown our selfs with sparks , which are almost lost in such a world of heterogeneous natures , is as difficult as desirable . besides , truth is never alone ; to know one will require the knowledge of many . they hang together in a chain of mutual dependence ; you cannot draw one link without many others . such an harmony cannot commence from a single string ; diversity of strokes makes it . the beauty of a face is not known by the eye , or nose ; it consists in a symmetry , and 't is the comparative faculty which votes it : thus is truth relative , and little considerable can be attain'd by catches . the painter cannot transcribe a face upon a transient view ; it requires the information of a fixt and observant eye : and before we can reach an exact sight of truth 's uniform perfections , this fleeting transitory our life , is gone . thus we see the face of truth , but as we do one anothers , when we walk the streets , in a careless pass-by : and the most diligent observers , view but the back-side o' th' hangings ; the right one is o' th' other side the grave : so that our knowledge is but like those broken ends , at best a most confused adumbration . nature , that was veil'd to aristotle , hath not yet uncover'd , in almost two thousand years . what he sought on the other side of euripus , we must not look for on this side immortality . in easie disquisitions we are often left to the uncertainty of a guess : yea after we have triumph'd in a supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; a new-sprung difficulty marrs our ovations , and exposeth us to the torment of a disappointment : so that even the great master of dogmatists himself concludes the scene with an anxius vixi , dubius morior . § . . another reason of our ignorance and the narrowness of our apprehensions may arise hence ; that we cannot perceive the manner of any of natures operations , but by proportion to our senses , and a return to material phantasms . a blind man cannot conceive colours , but either as some audible , gustable , odoriferous , or tactile qualities ; and when he would imagine them , he hath questionless recourse to some of these , in an account of which his other senses befriend him . thus more perfect apprehenders misconceive immaterials : our imaginations paint souls and angels in as dissimilar a resemblance . thus had there not been any night , shadow , or opacity ; we should never have had any determinate conceit of darkness ; that would have been as inconceiveable to us , as its contrary is to him that never saw it . but now our senses being scant and limited , and natures operations subtil and various ; they must needs transcend , and out-run our faculties . they are only natures grosser wayes of working , which are sensible ; her finer threads are out of the reach of our feeble percipient , yea questionless she hath many hidden energies , no wayes imitated in her obvious peices : and therefore it is no wonder that we are so often at a loss ; an infirmity beyond prevention , except we could step by step follow the tracks and methods of infinite wisdom , which cannot be done but by him that owns it . chap. viii . a third reason of our ignorance and error , viz. the impostures and deceits of our senses . the way to rectifie these mis-informations propounded . des-cartes his method the only way to science . the difficulty of exact performance . § . . another reason is the imposture and fallacy of our senses , which impose not only on common heads , who scarce at all live to the higher principle ; but even more refined mercuries , who have the advantages of an improved reason to disabuse them , are yet frequently captivated to these deceiving prepossessions : appealing to a judicature both uncommissioned and unjust ; and when the clearest truth is to be tryed by such judges , its innocence will not secure it from the condemning award of that unintelligent tribunal : for since we live the life of brutes , before we grow into man ; and our understandings in this their non-age , being almost meerly passive to sensible impressions , receiving all things in an uncontroverted and promiscuous admission : it cannot be , that our knowledge should be other , then an heap of mis-conception and error , and conceits as impertinent as the toys we delight in . all this while , we have no more ●o reason , then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [ as plotinus cals it ] amounts to . and besides this our easie submission to the sophistications of sense , and inability to prevent the miscarriages of our iunior reasons ; that which strikes the great stroke toward our after-deceptions , is the pertinacious adherence of many of these first impressions to our graduate understandings . that which is early received , if in any considerable strength of impress , as it were grows into our tender natures , and is therefore of difficult remove . thus a fright in minority , or an antipathy then contracted , is not worn out but with its subject . and it may be more then a story , that nero derived much of his cruelty from the nurse that suckled him . now though our coming judgments do in part undeceive us , and rectifie the grosser errors which our unwary sensitive hath engaged us in ; yet others are so flesht in us , that they maintain their interest upon the deceptibility of our decayed natures , and are cherish't there , as the legitimate issues of our reasonable faculties . indeed sense it self detects its more palpable deceits , by a counter-evidence ; and the more ordinary impostures seldom out-live the first experiments . if our sight represent a staff as crooked in the water ; the same faculty rectifies both it , and us , in the thinner element . and if a square tower seem round at a distance ; the eye , which mistook in the circumstance of its figure , at that remove , corrects the mistake in a due approach : yea , and befriends those who have learn'd to make the advantage of its informations , in more remote and difficil discoveries . and though his sense occasion the careless rustick to judge the sun no bigger then a cheese-fat ; yet sense too by a frugal improvement of its evidence , grounds the astronomers knowledge , that it 's bigger then this globe of earth and water . which it doth not only by the advantageous assistance of a tube , but by less industrious experiments , shewing in what degrees distance minorates the object . but yet in inifinite other cases , wherein sense can afford none , or but very little help to dis-intangle us ; our first deceptions lose no ground , but rather improve in our riper years : so that we are not weaned from our child-hood , till we return to our second infancy ; and even our gray heads out-grow not those errors , which we have learn't before the alphabet . thus our reasons being inoculated on sense , will retain a rellish of the stock they grow upon : and if we would endeavour after an unmixed knowledge ; we must unlive our former lives , and ( inverting the practise of penelope ) undo in the day of our more advanc'd understandings , what we had spun in the night of our infant-ignorance . he that would rebuild a decayed structure , must first pluck down the former ruines . a fabrick , though high and beautiful , if founded on rubbish , is easily made the triumph of the winds : and the most pompous seeming knowledge , that 's built on the unexamin'd prejudices of sense , stands not , but till the storm arise ; the next strong encounter discovers its weakness , in a shameful overthrow . and now since a great part of our scientifical treasure is most likely to be adulterate , though all bears the image and superscription of verity ; the only way to know what is sophisticate , and what is not so , is to bring all to the examen of the touchstone : for the prepossessions of sense having ( as is shewen ) so mingled themselves with our genuine truths , and being as plausible to appearance as they ; we cannot gain a true assurance of any , but by suspending our assent from all , till the deserts of each , discover'd by a strict enquiry , claim it . upon this account i think the method of the most excellent des-cartes not unworthy its author ; and ( since dogmatical ignorance will call it so ) a scepticism , that 's the only way to science . but yet this is so difficult in the impartial and exact performance , that it may be well reckon'd among the bare possibilities , which never commence into a futurity : it requiring such a free , sedate , and intent minde , as it may be is no where found but among the platonical idea's . do what we can , prejudices will creep in , and hinder our intellectual perfection : and though by this means we may get some comfortable allay to our distempers ; yet can it not perfectly cure us of a disease , that sticks as close to us as our natures . chap. ix . two instances of sensitive deception . ( ) of the quiescence of the earth . sense is the great inducement to its belief ; its testimony deserves no credit in this case , though it do move , sense would present it as immoveable . the sun to sense is as much devoid of motion as the earth . four cases in which motion is insensible , viz. ( ) if it be very swift . ( ) if it be steddy and regular . ( ) if very slow . ( ) if the sentient partake of it . applyed to the earths motion . the unweildiness of its bulk is no argument of its immobility . now before i leave this , i shall take the opportunity , which this head offers , to endeavour the detection of some grand prejudices of sense , in two instances ; the free debate of which i conceive to be of great importance , though hitherto for the most part obstructed , by the peremptory conclusion of sense , which yet i shall declare to have no suffrage in the case of either : and the pleasantness and concernment of the theories , if it be one , i hope will attone the digression . § . . first , it is generally opinion'd , that the earth rests as the worlds centre , while the heavens are the subject of the universal motions ; and , as immoveable as the earth , is grown into the credit of being proverbial . so that for a man to go about to counter-argue this common belief , is as fruitless as to whistle against the windes . i shall not undertake to maintain the paradox , that stands diameter to this almost catholick opinion . it s assertion would be entertained with the hoot of the rabble : the very mention of it as possible , is among the most ridiculous ; and they are likely most severely to judge it , who least understand the cause . but yet the patronage of as great wits , as it may be e're saw the sun , such as pythagoras , des-cartes , copernicus , galilaeo , more , kepler , &c. hath gain'd it a more favourable censure with the learned world ; and advanc'd it far above either vain , or contemptible . and if it be a mistake , it 's only so : there 's no heresie in such an harmless aberration ; at the worst , with the ingenuous ; the probability of it will render it a lapse of easie pardon . now whether the earth move or rest , i undertake not to determine . my work is to prove , that the common inducement to the belief of its quiescence , the testimony of sense , is weak and frivolous : to the end , that if upon an unprejudiced tryal , it be found more consonant to the astronomical phaenomena ; its motion may be admitted , notwithstanding the seeming contrary evidence of unconcerned senses . and i think what follows will evince , that this is no so absurd an hypothesis , as vulgar philosophers account it ; but that , though it move , its motion must needs be as insensible , as if it were quiescent : and the assertion of it would then be as uncouth and harsh to the sons of sense , that is , to the generality of mankind , as now it is . that there is a motion , which makes the vicissitudes of day and night , and constitutes the successive seasons of the annual circle ; sense may assure us , or at least the comparative judgement of an higher faculty , made upon its immediate evidence : but whether the sun , or earth , be the common movent , cannot be determin'd but by a farther appeal . if we will take the literal evidence of our eyes ; the aethereal coal moves no more then this inferior clod doth : for where ever in the firmament we see it , it 's represented to us , as fixt in that part of the enlightened hemisphear . and though an after-account discover , that it hath changed its site and respect to this our globe ; yet whether that were caused by its translation from us , or ours from it , sense leaves us in an ignoramus : so that if we are resolved to stand to its verdict , it must be by as great a miracle if the sun ever move , as it was that it once rested , or what ever else was the subject of that supernal change . and if upon a meer sensible account we will deny motion to the earth ; upon the same inducement we must deny it the sun ; and the heavens will lose their first moveable . but to draw up closer to our main design , we may the better conceive that , though the earth move , yet its motion must needs be insensible ; if we consider that in four cases motion strikes not the sense . . the velocity of motion prevents the sense of 't . thus a bullet passeth by us , and out-runs the nimblest opticks ; and the fly of a jack in its swiftest rounds , gives the eye no notice of its circulations . the reason is , for that there is no sense without some stay of the object on the faculty : for in sense there are two considerables : the motion made on the brain ; and the souls act consequent thereupon , which we call animadversion : and in this latter consists the formality of sensitive perception . now though possibly the aethereal matter might convey the stroke and motion made on it quite to the brain , before the pass of the object ; yet the soul being taken up with other attendances , perceives not , till engaged to it by iterated impressions , except the first impulse be very strong and violent . thus in the clearest night we cannot see some of the smaller stars , upon the first cast of the eye to their celestial residence : yet a more intent view discovers them ; though very likely their motion reach't the brain , assoon as the more noted impress of their fellows . thus upon a slight turn of our sight , we omit many particularities in nearer objects , which a more fixed look presents us with . and thus the swiftest motions , though they knock at the dore ; yet they are gone before the soul can come , to take an account of their errand . . if regularity and steddiness accompany velocity ; the motion then leaves not the least track in the sensitive . thus a french top , the common recreation of school-boys , thrown from a cord which was wound about it , will stand as it were fixt on the floor it lighted ; and yet continue in its repeated gyrations , while the sense discovers not the least footsteps of that praecipitate rotation . the reason is much what the same with the former : for that meeting no joggs , or counter-motions to interrupt it , the return of the parts is so quick , that the mind cannot take notice of their succession to each other : for before it can fix to the observation of any one , its object is gone : whereas , were there any considerable thwart in the motion ; it would be a kind of stop or arrest , by the benefit of which the soul might have a glance of the fugitive transient . but i pass these ; they concern not our present enquiry . . if the motion be very slow , we perceive it not . thus vegetables spring up from their mother earth ; and we can no more discern their accretive motion , then we can their most hidden cause . thus the sly shadow steals away on times account-book the dyal ; and the quickest eye can tell no more , but that it 's gone . if a reason of this be demanded ; i conceive it may be to some satisfaction return'd , that 't is because motion cannot be perceived without the perception of its terms , viz. the parts of space which it immediately left , and those which it next acquires . now the space left and acquir'd in every sensible moment in such slow progressions , is so inconsiderable , that it cannot possibly move the sense ; ( which by reason either of its constitutional dulness , or the importunity of stronger impressions , cannot take notice of such parvitudes ) and therefore neither can the motion depending thereon , be a●y more observable , then it is . . if the sentient be carryed passibus aequis with the body , whose motion it would observe ; [ supposing the former condition , that it be regular and steddy ] in this case especially the remove is insensible , at least in its proper subject . thus , while in a ship , we perceive it not to move : but our sense transfers its motion to the neighbouring shores , as the poet , littus campique recedunt . and i question not , but if any were born and bred under deck , and had no other information but what his sense affords ; he would without the least doubt or scruple , opinion , that the house he dwelt in , was as stable and fixt as ours . to express the reason according to the philosophy of des-cartes , i suppose it thus : motion is not perceived , but by the successive strikings of the object upon divers filaments of the brain ; which diversifie the representation of its site and distance . but now when the motion of the object is common with it , to our selves ; it retains the same relation to our sense , as if we both rested : for striking still on the same strings of the brain , it varies not its site or distance from us ; and therefore we cannot possibly sense its motion : nor yet upon the same account our own ; least of all , when we are carryed without any conamen and endeavour of ours , which in our particular progressions betrayes them to our notice . now then the earths motion ( if we suppose it to have any ) having the joynt concurrence of the two last , to render it insensible ; i think we shall need no more proof to conclude the necessity of its being so . for though the third seems not to belong to the present case , since the supposed motion will be near a thousand miles an hour under the equinoctial line ; yet it will seem to have no velocity to the sense any more then the received motion of the sun , and for the same reason . because the distant points in the celestial expanse [ from a various and successive respect to which the length , and consequently the swiftness of this motion must be calculated ] appear to the eye in so small a degree of elongation from one another , as bears no proportion to what is real . for since the margin of the visible horizon in the heavenly globe is parallel with that in the earthly , accounted but miles diameter ; sense must needs measure the azimuths , or vertical circles , by triplication of the same diameter of . so that there will be no more proportion betwixt the sensible and real celerity of the terrestrial motion , then there is between the visible and rational dimension of the celestial hemisphear ; which is none at all . but if sensitive prejudice will yet confidently maintain the impossibility of the hypothesis , from the supposed unwieldiness of its massy bulk , grounded on our experience of the ineptitude of great and heavy bodies to motion : i say this is a meer imposture of our senses , the fallacy of which we may avoid , by considering ; that the earth may as easily move , notwithstanding this pretended indisposition of its magnitude , as those much vaster orbs of sun and stars . he that made it , could as well give motion to the whole , as to the parts ; the constant agitation of which is discover'd in natural productions : and to both as well as rest to either : neither will it need the assistance of an intelligence to perpetuate the begun rotation : since according to the indispensable law of nature [ that every thing should continue in the state wherein it is , except something more powerful hinder it ] it must persevere in motion , unless obstructed by a miracle . neither can gravity , which makes great bodies hard of remove , be any hinderance to the earths motion : since even the peripatetick maxime , nihil gravitat in suo loco , will exempt it from this indisposing quality ; which is nothing but the tendency of its parts , which are ravish't from it , to their desired centre . and the french philosophy will inform us , that the earth as well as other bodies is indifferent in it self to rest , or its contrary . i have done with this instance , and my brevity in the following shall make some amends for my prolixity in this . he that would be inform'd in this subject of the earths mobility , may find it largely and ingeniously discuss'd , in galilaeo's systema cosmicum . chap. x. another instance of the deceptions of our senses : which is of translating the idea of our passions to things without us . properly and formally heat is not in the fire , but is an expression of our sentiment . yet in propriety of speech the senses themselves are never deceived , but only administer an occasion of deceit to the understanding : prov'd by reason , and the authority of st. austin . secondly the best philosophy [ the deserved title of the cartesian ] derives all sensitive perception from motion , and corporal impress ; some account of which we have above given . not that the formality of it consists in material reaction , as master hobbs affirms , totally excluding any immaterial concurrence : but that the representations of objects to the soul , the only animadversive principle , are conveyed by motions made upon the immediate instruments of sense . so that the diversity of our sensations ariseth from the diversity of the motion or figure of the object ; which in a different manner affect the brain , whence the soul hath its immediate intelligence of the quality of what is presented . thus the different effects , which fire and water have on us , which we call heat and cold , result from the so differing configuration and agitation of their particles : and not from , i know not what chimerical beings , supposed to inhere in the objects , their cause , and thence to be propagated by many petty imaginary productions to the seat of sense . so that what we term heat and cold , and other qualities , are not properly according to philosophical rigour in the bodies , their efficients : but are rather names expressing our passions ; and therefore not strictly attributable to any thing without us , but by extrinsick denomination , as vision to the wall. this i conceive to be an hypothesis , well worthy a rational belief : and yet is it so abhorrent from the vulgar , that they would assoon believe anaxagoras , that snow is black , as him that should affirm , it is not white ; and if any should in earnest assert , that the fire is not formally hot , it would be thought that the heat of his brain had fitted him for anticyra , and that his head were so to madness : for it is conceiv'd to be as certain , as our faculties can make it , that the same qualities , which we resent within us , are in the object , their source . and yet this confidence is grounded on no better foundation , then a delusory prejudice , and the vote of misapplyed sensations , which have no warrant to determine either one or other . i may indeed conclude , that i am formally hot or cold ; i feel it . but whether these qualities are formally , or only eminently in their producent ; is beyond the knowledge of the sensitive . even the peripatetick philosophy will teach us , that heat is not in the body of the sun , but only vertually , and as in its cause ; though it be the fountain and great distributour of warmth to the neather creation : and yet none urge the evidence of sense to disprove it : neither can it with any more justice be alledged against this hypothesis . for if it be so as des-cartes would have it ; yet sense would constantly present it to us , as now. we should finde heat as infallible an attendant upon fire , and the increase thereof by the same degrees in our approach to the fountain calefacient , and the same excess within the visible substance , as now ; which yet i think to be the chief inducements to the adverse belief : for fire ( i retain the instance , which yet may be applyed to other cases ) being constant in its specifical motions in those smaller derivations of it , which are its instruments of action , and therefore in the same manner striking the sentient , though gradually varying according to the proportions of more or less quantity or agitation , &c. will not fail to produce the same effect in us , which we call heat , when ever we are within the orb of its activity . and the heat must needs be augmented by proximity , and most of all within the flame , because of the more violent motion of the particles there , which therefore begets in us a stronger sense . now if this motive energie , the instrument of this active element , must be called heat ; let it be so , i contend not . i know not how otherwise to call it : to impose names is part of the peoples charter , and i fight not with words . only i would not that the idea of our passions should be apply'd to any thing without us , when it hath its subject no where but in our selves . this is the grand deceit , which my design is to detect , and if possible , to rectifie . thus we have seen two notorious instances of sensitive deception , which justifie the charge of petron. arbiter . fallunt nos oculi , vagique sensus oppressâ ratione mentiuntur . and yet to speak properly , and to do our senses right , simply they are not deceived , but only administer an occasion to our forward understandings to deceive themselves : and so though they are some way accessory to our delusion ; yet the more principal faculties are the capital offenders . thus if the senses represent the earth as fixt and immoveable ; they give us the truth of their sentiments : to sense it is so , and it would be deceit to present it otherwise . for [ as we have shewn ] though it do move in it self ; it rests to us , who are carry'd with it . and it must needs be to sense unalterably quiescent , in that our rotation with it , prevents the variety of successive impress ; which only renders motion sensible . and so if we erroneously attribute our particular incommunicable sensations to things , which do no more resemble them then the effect doth its aequivocal cause ; our senses are not in fault , but our precipitate judgements . we feel such , or such a sentiment within us , and herein is no cheat or misprison : 't is truly so , and our sense concludes nothing of its rise or origine . but if hence our understandings falsly deduct , that there is the same quality in the external impressor ; 't is , it is criminal , our sense is innocent . when the ear tingles , we really hear a sound : if we judge it without us , it 's the fallacy of our iudgments . the apparitions of our frighted phancies are real sensibles : but if we translate them without the compass of our brains , and apprehend them as external objects ; it 's the unwary rashness of our understanding deludes us . and if our disaffected palates resent nought but bitterness from our choicest viands , we truly tast the unpleasing quality , though falsly conceive it in that , which is no more then the occasion of its production . if any find fault with the novelty of the notion ; the learned st. austin stands ready to confute the charge : and they , who revere antiquity , will derive satisfaction from so venerable a suffrage . he tells us , si quis remum frangi in aquâ opinatur , & , cùm aufertur , integrari ; non malum habet internuncium , sed malus est iudex . and onward to this purpose , the sense could not otherwise perceive it in the water , neither ought it : for since the water is one thing , and the air another ; 't is requisite and necessary , that the sense should be as different as the medium : wherefore the eye sees aright ; if there be a mistake , 't is the judgement 's the deceiver . elsewhere he saith , that our eyes mis-inform us not , but faithfully transmit their resentment to the mind . and against the scepticks , that it 's a piece of injustice to complain of our senses , and to exact from them an account , which is beyond the sphear of their notice : and resolutely determines , quicquid possuut videre oculi , verum vident . so that what we have said of the senses deceptions , is rigidly to be charg'd only on our careless understandings , misleading us through the ill management of sensible informations . but because such are commonly known by the name of the senses deceipts ( somewhat the more justifiably in that they administer the occasion ) i have thought good to retain the usual way of speaking , though somewhat varying from the manner of apprehending . chap. xi . a fourth reason of our ignorance and error , viz. the fallacy of our imaginations ; an account of the nature of that faculty ; instances of its deceptions ; spirits are not in a place ; intellection , volition , decrees , &c. cannot properly be ascrib'd to god. it is not reason that opposeth faith , but phancy : the interest which imagination hath in many of our opinions , in that it impresses a perswasion wiihout evidence . fourthly , we erre and come short of science , because we are so frequently mislead by the evil conduct of our imaginations ; whose irregular strength and importunity doth almost perpetually abuse us . now to make a full and clear discovery of our phancies deceptions ; 't will be requisite to look into the nature of that mysterious faculty . in which survey we must trace the soul in the wayes of her intellectual actions ; whereby we may come to the distinct knowledge of what is meant by imagination , in contradistinction to some other powers . but first premising , that the souls nature ( at least as far as concerns our inquiry ) consists in intelligibility : and secondly , that when we speak of powers and faculties of the soul , we intend not to assert with the schools , their real distinction from it , or each other , but only a modal diversity . therefore i shall distribute intellectual operations according to the known triple division , though with some difference of representation . the first is simple apprehension , which denotes no more , then the souls naked intellection of an object , without either composition or deduction . the foundation of this act , as to materials , is sensitive perception . now our simple apprehension of corporal objects , if present , we call sense ; if absent , we properly name it imagination . thus when we would conceive a triangle , man , horse , or any other sensible ; we figure it in our phancies , and stir up there its sensible idea . but in our notion of spirituals , we , as much as we can , denudate them of all material phantasmes ; and thus they become the object of our intellects , properly so called . now all this while the soul is , as it were , silent ; and in a more passive way of reception . but the second act advanceth propositions from simple intellections : and hereby we have the knowledge of the distinctions or identities of objective representations . now here , as in the former , where the objects are purely material ; the judgment is made by the imagination : if otherwise , we refer it to the understanding . there is yet a third act , which is a connecting of propositions and deducing of conclusions from them : and this the schools call discourse ; and we shall not miscall it , if we name it , reason . now this , as it supposeth the two former , so is it grounded on certain congenite propositions ; which i conceive to be the very essentials of rationality . such are , quodlibet est , vel non est ; impossibile est idem esse , & non esse ; non entis nulla sunt praedicata , & c. not that every one hath naturally a formal and explicit notion of these principles : for the vulgar use them , without knowledge of them , under any such express consideration ; but yet there was never any born to reason without them . if any ask , how the soul came by those foundation - propositions : i return , as quantity did by longum , latum , & profundum ; they being the essential annexes , or rather constitutives of it , as reasonable . now then , when the conclusion is deduc'd from the unerring dictates of our faculties ; we say the inference is rational : but when from mis-apprehended , or ill-compounded phantasmes ; we ascribe it to the imagination . so we see , there is a triple operation of the phancy as well as intellect ; and these powers are only circumstantially different . in this method we intend a distinct , though short account , how the imagination deceives us . first then , the imagination , which is of simple perception , doth never of it self and directly mislead us ; as is at large declared in our former discourse of sense . yet is it the almost fatal means of our deception , through the unwarrantable compositions , divisions , and applications , which it occasions the second act to make of the simple images . hence we may derive the visions , voyces , revelations of the enthusiast : the strong idea's of which , being conjur'd up into the imagination by the heat of the melancholized brain , are judged exterior realties ; when as they are but motions within the cranium . hence story is full of the wonders , it works upon hypochondriacal imaginants ; to whom the grossest absurdities are infallible certainties , and free reason an impostour . that groom , that conceited himself an emperour , thought all as irrational as disloyal , that did not acknowledge him : and he , that supposed himself made of glass ; thought them all mad , that dis-believed him . but we pity , or laugh at those fatuous extravagants ; while yet our selves have a considerable dose of what makes them so : and more sober heads have a set of misconceits , which are as absurd to an unpassionated reason , as those to our unabused senses . and , as the greatest counter-evidence to those distemper'd phancies is none : so in the more ordinary deceits , in which our imaginations insensibly engage us , we give but little credit to the uncorrupted suggestions of the faculty , that should disabuse us . that the soul and angels are devoid of quantitative dimensions , hath the suffrage of the most ; and that they have nothing to do with grosser locality , is as generally opinion'd : but who is it , that retains not a great part of the imposture , by allowing them a definitive ubi , which is still but imagination ? he that said , a thousand might dance on the point of a needle , spake but grossly ; and we may as well suppose them to have wings , as a proper ubi . we say , spirits are where they operate : but strictly to be in a place , or ubi , is a material attribute , and incompatible with so depurate a nature . we ask not , in what place a thought is , nor are we solicitous for the ubi of vertue , or any other immaterial accident . relations , ubications , duration , the vulgar philosophy admits into the list of something ; and yet to enquire in what place they are , were a soloecism . so that , if to be and to be in a place be not reciprocal ; i know not why spirits may not be exempted , having as much to plead from the purity of their nature , as any thing but one , within the circle of being . and yet imagination stands so strongly against the notion , that it cannot look for the favour of a very diffusive entertainment . but we are more dangerously deceiv'd , when judging the infinite essence by our narrow selves ; we ascribe intellections , volitions , decrees , purposes , and such like immanent actions to that nature , which hath nothing in common with us , as being infinitely above us . now to use these as hypotheseis , as himself in his word , is pleas'd to low himself to our capacities , is allowable : but a strict and rigorous imputation is derogatory to him , and arrogant in us . to say , that god doth eminently contain all those effects in his glorious simple essence , that the creature can produce or act by such a faculty , power , or affection ; is to affirm him to be ● what he is , infinite . thus , to conceive that he can do all those things in the most perfect manner , which we do upon understanding , willing , and decreeing ; is an apprehension suteable to his idea : but to fix on him the formality of faculties , or affections ; is the imposture of our phancies , and contradictory to his divinity . 't is this deception misleads the contending world ; and is the author of most of that darkness and confusion , that is upon the face of the quinquarticular debates . now then , we being thus obnoxious to fallacy in our apprehensions and judgements , and so often imposed upon by these deceptions ; our inferences and deductions must needs be as unwarrantable , as our simple and compound thoughts are deceitful . thus the reason of the far greatest part of mankind , is but an aggregate of mistaken phantasms ; and in things not sensible a constant delusion . yea the highest and most improved parts of rationality , are frequently caught in the entanglements of a tenacious imagination ; and submit to its obstinate , but delusory dictamens . thus we are involv'd in inextricable perplexities about the divine nature , and attributes ; and in our reasonings about those sublimities are puzled with contradictions , which are but the toyings of our phancies , no absurdities to our more defaecate faculties . what work do our imaginations make with eternity and immensity ? and how are we gravell'd by their cutting dilemma's ? i 'm confident many have thus imagin'd themselves out of their religion ; and run a ground on that more desperate absurdity , atheism . to say , reason opposeth faith , is to scandalize both : 't is imagination is the rebel ; reason contradicts its impious suggestions . nor is our reason any more accountable for the errours of our opinions ; then our holiness for the vitiosity of our lives : and we may as well say , that the sun is the cause of the shadow , which is the effect of the intercepting opacity , as either . reason and faith are at perfect unisons : the disharmony is in the phancy . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is a saying of plato's ; and well worthy a christian subscription , reason being the image of the creators wisdom copyed out in the creature . though indeed , as 't is now in the subject , 't is but an amassment of imaginary conceptions , praejudices , ungrounded opinions , and infinite impostures ; and 't is no wonder , if these are at odds with the principles of our belief : but all this is but apish sophistry ; and to give it a name so divine and excellent , is abusive and unjust . there is yet another as deplorable a deceit of our imaginations , as any : which is , its impressing a strong perswasion of the truth of an opinion , where there is no evidence to support it . and if it be such , as we never heard question'd or contradicted ; 't is then held as indubitate , as first principles . thus the most of mankind is led by opinionative impulse ; and imagination is praedominant . hence we have an ungrounded credulity cry'd up for faith ; and the more vigorous impressions of phancy , for the spirits motions . these are the grand delusions of our age , and the highest evidence of the imaginations deceptions . this is the spirit , that works in the children of phancy ; and we need not seek to remoter resolutions . but the excellent dr. h. more hath follow'd enthusiastick effects to their proper origine , and prevented our endeavours of attempting it . his discourse of enthusiasm compleatly makes good the title ; and 't is as well a victory , as a triumph . chap. xii . a fifth reason , the praecipitancy of our understandings ; the reason of it . the most close ingagement of our minds requisite to the finding of truth ; the difficulties of the performance of it . two instances of our praecipitating ; as the concluding thing impossible , which to nature are not so ; and the joyning causes with irrelative effects . § . . again another account of the shortness of our reasons and easiness of deception , is , the forwardness of our understandings assent , to slightly examin'd conclusions , contracting many times a firm and obstinate belief from weak inducements ; and that not only in such things , as immediately concern the sense , but in almost every thing that falls within the scope of our enquiry . for the declarement of this , we are to observe , that every being uncessantly aspires to its own perfection , and is restless till it obtain it ; as is the trembling needle , till it find it s beloved north. now the perfection of a faculty is union with its object , to which its respective actions are directed , as the scope and term of its endeavours . thus our understanding being perfected by truth , with all the impatience , which accompanies strong desire , breaths after its enjoyment . but now the good and perfection of being , which every thing reacheth at , must be known , and that in the particular instances thereof ; or else 't is not attain'd : and if it be mistaken , that being courts deceit and its own delusion . now this knowledge of their good , was at first as natural to all things , as the desire on 't : otherwise this innate propension would have been as much a torment and misery to those things that are capable of it , as a needless impertinency to all others . but nature shoots not at rovers . even inanimates , though they know not their perfection themselves , yet are they not carryed on by a blind unguided impetus : but that which directs them , knows it . the next orders of being have some sight of it themselves : and man most perfectly had it , before the touch of the apple . so then beside this general propensity to truth , the understanding must know what is so , before it can entertain it with assent . the former we possess ( it may be ) as entirely as when nature gave it us : but of the latter little , but the capacity : and herein have we made our selves of all creatures the most miserable . and now such a multitude , such an infinite of uncertain opinions , bare probabilities , specious falshoods , spreading themselves before us , and solliciting our belief ; and we being thus greedy of truth , and yet so unable to discern it : it cannot be , that we should reach it any otherwise , then by the most close meditation and engagement of our minds ; by which we must endeavour to estrange our assent from every thing , which is not clearly , and distinctly evidenc't to our faculties . but now , this is so difficult ; and as hath been intimated , so almost infeasable ; that it may well drive modesty to despair of science . for though possibly assiduity in the most fixed cogitation be no trouble or pain to immaterializ'd spirits ; yet is it more , then our embodyed souls can bear without lassitude or distemper . for in this terrestrial state there are few things transacted , even in our intellectual part , but through the help and furtherance of corporal instruments ; which by more then ordinary usage lose their edge and fitness for action , and so grow inept for their respective destinations . upon this account our senses are dull'd and spent by any extraordinary intention ; and our very eyes will ake , if long fixt upon any difficultly discerned object . now though meditation be to be reckoned among the most abstracted operations of our minds ; yet can it not be performed without a considerable proportion of spirits to assist in the action , though indeed such as are furnish't out of the bodies purer store . this i think to be hence evidenc't ; in that fixed seriousness herein , heats the brain in some to distraction , causeth an aking and diziness in founder heads , hinders the works of nature in its lower and animal functions , takes away or lessens pain in distemper'd parts , and seldom leaves any but under a weary some dullness , and inactivity ; which i think to be arguments of sufficient validity to justifie our assent to this , that the spirits are imploy'd in our most intense cogitations , yea in such , whose objects are most elevated above material . now the managing and carrying on of this work by the spirits instrumental co-efficiency requires , that they be kept together without distraction or dissipation ; that so they may be ready to receive and execute the orders and commissions of the commanding faculty . if either of these happen , all miscarries : as do the works of nature , when they want that heat , which is requisite for their intended perfection . and therefore , for the prevention of such inconveniences in meditation , we choose recess and solitude . but now if we consider the volatile nature of those officious assistants , and the several causes which occur continually , even from the meer mechanism of our bodies to scatter and disorder them , besides the excursions of our roving phancies ( which cannot be kept to a close attendance ) ; it will be found very hard to retain them in any long service , but do what we can , they 'l get loose from the minds regimen . so that it 's no easie matter to bring the body to be what it was intended for , the souls servant ; and to confine the imagination , of as facil a performance , as the goteham's design of hedging in the cuckow . and though some constitutions are genially disposited to this mental seriousness ; yet they can scarce say , nos numeri sumus : yea in the most advantag'd tempers , this disposition is but comparative ; when as the most of men labour under disadvantages , which nothing can rid them of , but that which loosens them from this mass of flesh . thus the boyling bloud of youth , fiercely agitating the fluid air , hinders that serenity and fixed stayedness , which is necessary to so severe an intentness : and the frigidity of decrepite age is as much its enemy , not only through penury of spirits , but by reason of its clogging them with its dulling moisture . and even in the temperate zone of our life , there are few bodies at such an aequipoiz of humours ; but that the prevalency of some one indisposeth the spirits for a work so difficult and serious : for temperamentum ad pondus , may well be reckon'd among the three philosophical unattainables . besides , the bustle of business , the avocations of our senses , and external pleasures , and the noyse and din of a clamorous world are impediments not to be master'd by feeble endeavours . and to speak the full of my sentiments , i think never man could boast it , without the precincts of paradise ; but he , that came to gain us a better eden then we lost . so then , to direct all this to our end , the mind of man being thus naturally amorous of , and impatient for truth , and yet averse to , and almost incapacitated for , that diligent and painful search , which is necessary to its discovery ; it must needs take up short , of what is really so , and please it self in the possession of imaginary appearances , which offering themselves to its embraces in the borrowed attire of that , which the enamour'd intellect is in pursuit of , our impatient minds entertain these counterfeits , without the least suspicion of their cousenage . for as the will , having lost its true and substantial good , now courts the shadow , and greedily catches at the vain shews of superficial bliss : so our no less degenerate understandings having suffered as sad a divorce from their dearest object , are as forward to defile themselves with every meretricious semblance , that the variety of opinion presents them with . thus we see the inconsiderate vulgar , prostrating their assent to every shallow appearance : and those , who are beholden to prometheus for a finer mould , are not furnisht with so much truth as otherwise they might be owners of , did not this precipitancy of concluding prevent them : as 't is said of the industrious chymist , that by catching at it too soon , he lost the long expected treasure of the philosophical elixir . i 'le illustrate this head by a double instance , and close it . . hence it is , that we conclude many things within the list of impossibilities , which yet are easie feasables . for by an unadvised transiliency leaping from the effect to its remotest cause , we observe not the connexion through the interposal of more immediate causalities ; which yet at last bring the extreams together without a miracle . and hereupon we hastily conclude that impossible , which we see not in the proximate capacity of its efficient . hence , that a single hair should root up an oak ( which the mathematicks teach us to be possible ) will be thought fit to be number'd with the story of the brazen-head , or that other of the wishing hat. the relation of archimedes's lifting up the ships of marcellus , among many finds but little more credit , then that of the gyants shouldering mountains : and his other exploits sound no better to common ears , then those of amadis de gaule , and the knight of the sun. and yet mathematicians know , that by multiplying of mechanical advantages , any power may conquer any resistance , and the great syracusian wit wanted but tools , and a place to stand on , to remove the earth . so the brag of the ottoman , that he would throw malta into the sea , might be performed at an easier rate , then by the shovels of his ianizaries . and from this last noted head , ariseth that other of joyning causes with irrelative effects , which either refer not at all unto them , or in a remoter capacity . hence the indian conceiv'd so grossly of the letter , that discover'd his theft ; and that other , who thought the watch an animal . from hence grew the impostures of charms , and amulets , and other insignificant ceremonies ; which to this day impose upon common belief , as they did of old upon the barbarism of the incultivate heathen . thus effects unusual , whose causes run under ground , and are more remote from ordinary discernment , are noted in the book of vulgar opinion , with digitus dei , or daemonis ; though they owe no other dependence to the first , then what is common to the whole syntax of beings , nor yet any more to the second , then what is given it by the imagination of those unqualifi'd judges . thus every unwonted meteor is portentous ; and the appearance of any unobserved star , some divine prognostick . antiquity thought thunder the immediate voyce of iupiter , and impleaded them of impiety , that referr'd it to natural causalities . neither can there happen a storm , at this remove from antique ignorance , but the multitude will have the devil in 't . chap. xiii . the sixth reason discours't of , viz. the interest which our affections have in our dijudications . the cause why our affections mislead us ; several branches of this mention'd ; and the first , viz constitutional inclination largely insisted on . again we owe much of our errour and intellectual scarcity to the interest in , and power which our affections have over , our so easily seducible understandings . and 't is a truth well worthy the pen , from which it dropt ; periit iudicium , ubi res transiit in affectum . that iove himself cannot be wise and in love ; may be understood in a larger sense , then antiquity meant it . affection bribes the judgement to the most notorious inequality ; and we cannot expect an equitable award , where the judge is made a party : so that , that understanding only is capable of giving a just decision , which is , as aristotle saith of the law , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : but where the will , or passion hath the casting voyce , the case of truth is desperate . and yet this is the miserable disorder , into which we are laps'd : the lower powers are gotten uppermost ; and we see like men on our heads , as plato observ'd of old , that on the right hand , which indeed is on the left . the woman in us , still prosecutes a deceit , like that begun in the garden : and our understandings are wedded to an eve , as fatal as the mother of our miseries . and while all things are judg'd according to their suitableness , or disagreement to the gusto of the fond feminine ; we shall be as far from the tree of knowledge , as from that , which is guarded by the cherubin . the deceiver soon found this soft place of adam's ; and innocency it self did not secure him from this way of seduction . the first deception enter'd in at this postern , and hath ever since kept it open for the entry of legion : so that we scarse see any thing now but through our passions , the most blind , and sophisticate things about us . thus the monsters which story relates to have their eyes in their breasts , are pictures of us in our invisible selves . our love of one opinion induceth us to embrace it ; and our hate of another , doth more then fit us , for its rejection : and , that love is blind , is extensible beyond the object of poetry . when once the affections are engag'd , there 's but a short step to the understanding : and , facilè credimus quod volumus , is a truth , that needs not plead authority to credit it . the reason , i conceive , is this : love as it were uniting the object to the soul , gives it a kind of identity with us ; so that the beloved idea is but our selves in another name : and when self is at the bar , the sentence is not like to be impartial : for every man is naturally a narcissus , and each passion in us , no other but self-love sweetned by milder epithets . we can love nothing , but what is agreeable to us ; and our desire of what is so , hath its first inducement from within us : yea , we love nothing but what hath some resemblance within our selves ; and whatever we applaud as good or excellent , is but self in a transcript , and è contrà . thus , to reach the highest of our amours , and to speak all at once : we love our friends , because they are our image ; and we love our god , because we are his . so then , the beloved opinion being thus wedded to the intellect ; the case of our espoused self becomes our own : and when we weigh our selves , iustice doth not use to hold the ballance . besides , all things being double-handed , and having the appearances both of truth , and falshood ; where our affections have engaged us , we attend only to the former , which we see through a magnifying medium : while looking on the latter , through the wrong end of the perspective , which scants their dimensions , we neglect and contemn them . yea , and as in corrupt judicial proceedings , the fore-stalled understanding passes a peremptory sentence upon the single hearing of one party ; and so comes under the poets censure of him , qui statuit aliquid parte inauditâ alterâ . but to give a more particular account of this gullery ; our affections engage us as by our love to our selves , so by our love to others . of the former we have the observable instances of natural disposition , custom and education , interest , and our proper invention : of the latter in that homage , which is payd to antiquity , and authority . i take them up in order . . congruity of opinions , whether true or false , to our natural constitution , is one great incentive to their belief , and reception : and in a sense too the complexion of the mind , as well as manners , follows the temperament of the body . thus some men are genially disposited to some opinions , and naturally as averse to others . some things we are inclined to love , and we know not why : others we disesteem , and upon no better account then the poet did sabidius , hoc tantùm possum dicere , non amo te . some faces at first sight we admire and dote on : others , in our impartial apprehensions no less deserving our esteem , we can behold without resentment ; and it may be with an invincible disregard . i question not , but intellectual representations are received by us , with as an unequal a fate upon a bare temperamental relish or disgust : and i believe the understanding hath its idiosyncrasies , as well as other faculties . some men are made to superstition , others to frantick enthusiasm ; the former by the cold of a timorous heart , the latter by the heat of a temerarious brain : and there are natures , as fatally averse to either . and the opinions , which are suited to their respective tempers , will be sure to find their welcome , and to grow without manure . your dull phlegmatick souls are taken with the dulness of sensible doctrines : and the more mercurial geniuses calculated to what is more refined , and intellectual . thus opinions have their climes and national diversities : and as some regions have their proper vices , not so generally found in others ; so have they their mental depravities , which are drawn in with the common air of the countrey . and i take this for one of the most considerable causes of the diversity of laws , customes , religions , natural and moral doctrines , which is to be found in the divided regions of the inhabited earth . and therefore i wonder not at the idolatry of the iews of old , or of the several parts of the world to this day , nor at the sensual expectations of the mussel-men , nor at the fopperies of the superstitious romanists , nor the ridiculous devotions of the deluded indians : since that the most senseless conceits and fooleries cannot miss of harbor , where affection , grown upon the stock of a depraved constitution , hath endeared them . and if we do but more nearly look into our faculties , beginning our survey from the lowest dregs of sense , even those which have a nearer commerce with matter , and so by steps ascend to our more spiritualiz'd selves : we shall throughout discover how constitutional partiality sways us . thus to one palate that is sweet , desirable , and delicious , which to another is odious and distastful ; or more compendiously in the proverb , one mans meat is anothers poyson . thus what to one is a most grateful odour , to another is noxious and displeasant ; 't were a misery to some to lye stretch't on a bed of roses : and in the sense of life ; that 's a welcome touch to one , which is disagreeing to another . and yet to rise a little higher to the nobler pair ; the musical airs , which one entertains with most delightful transports , to another are importune : and the objects , which one can't see without an extasie , another is no more mov'd at , than a statue . if we pass further , the phancies of men are so immediately diversify'd by the individual crasis , that every man is in this a phoenix ; and owns something , wherein none are like him : and these are as many , as humane nature hath singulars . now the phancies of the most , like the index of a clock , are moved but by the inward springs and wheels of the corporal machine ; which even on the most sublimate intellectuals is dangerously influential . and yet this sits at the helm of the worlds belief ; and vulgar reason is no better then a more refined imagination . so then the senses , phancy , and what we call reason it self , being thus influenc'd by the bodies temperament , and little better then indications of it ; it cannot be otherwise , but that this love of our selves should strongly incline us in our most abstracted dijudications . chap. xiv . a second thing whereby our affections ingage us in error , is the prejudice of custom and education . a third , interest . the fourth , love to our own productions . . another genuine derivation of this selfish fondness , by reason of which we miscarry of science , is the almost insuperable prejudice of custom , and education : by which our minds are encumber'd , and the most are held in a fatal ignorance . now could a man be composed to such an advantage of constitution , that it should not at all adulterate the images of his mind ; yet this second nature would alter the crasis of the uuderstanding , and render it as obnoxious to aberrances , as now . and though in the former regard , the soul were a pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; yet custom and education will so blot and scrible on 't , as almost to incapacitate it for after-impressions . thus we judge all things by our anticipations ; and condemn or applaud them , as they agree or differ from our education-prepossessions . one countrey laughs at the laws , customs , and opinions of another , as absurd and ridiculous ; and the other is as charitable to them , in its conceit of theirs . this confirms the most sottish idolaters in their accustomed adorations , beyond the conviction of any thing , but dooms-day . the impressions of a barbarous education are stronger in them , then nature ; when in their cruel worships they launce themselves with knifes , and expose their harmless infants to the flames as a sacrifice to their idols . and 't is on this account , that there 's no religion so irrational , but can boast its martyrs . this is it , which befriends the talmud and alcoran ; and did they not owe their credit more to it , then to any rational inducement , we might expect their ashes : whereas education hath so rooted these mis-believers in their ungrounded faith , that they may assoon be pluck't from themselves , as from their obstinate adherencies ; and to convert a turk , or iew , may be well a phrase for an attempt impossible . we look for it only from him , to whom our impossibles are none . and 't is to be feared , that christianity it self by most , that have espoused it , is not held by any better tenure . the best account that many can give of their belief , is , that they were bred in it ; which indeed is no better , then that which we call , the womans reason . and thousands of them , whom their profession , and our charity styles christians , are driven to their religion by custom and education , as the indians are to baptism ; that is , like a drove of cattle to the water . and had our stars determin'd our nativities among the enemies of the cross , and theirs under a christian horoscope ; in all likelyhood antichristianism had not been the object of our aversion , nor christianity of theirs : but we should have exchang'd the scene of our belief with that of our abode and breeding . there is nothing so monstrous , to which education cannot form our ductile minority ; it can lick us into shapes beyond the monstrosities of those of affrica . and as king iames would say of parliaments ; it can do any thing , but make a man a woman . for our initial age is like the melted wax to the prepared seal , capable of any impression from the documents of our teachers . the half-moon or cross , are indifferent to its reception ; and we may with equal facility write on this rasa tabula , turk , or christian. we came into the world like the unformed cub ; 't is education is our plastick : we are baptized into our opinions by our juvenile nurture , and our growing years confirm those unexamined principles . for our first task is to learn the creed of our countrey ; and our next to maintain it . we seldom examine our receptions , more then children their catechisms ; for implicit faith is a vertue , where orthodoxie is the object . some will not be at the trouble of a tryal : others are scar'd from attempting it . if we do , 't is not by a sun-beam or ray of universal light ; but by a flame that 's kindled by our affections , and fed by the fewel of our anticipations . and thus like the hermite , we think the sun shines no where , but in our cell ; and all the world to be in darkness but our selves . we judge truth to be circumscrib'd by the confines of our belief , and the doctrines we were brought up in : and with as ill manners , as those of china , repute all the rest of world , monoculous . so that what some astrologers say of our fortunes and the passages of our lives ; may by the allowance of a metaphor be said of our opinions : that they are written in our stars , being to the most as fatal as those involuntary occurrences , and as little in their power as the placits of destiny . we are bound to our countreys opinions , as to its laws : and an accustomed assent is tantamount to an infallible conclusion . he that offers to dissent , shall be out-law'd in his reputation : and the fear of guilty cain , shall be fulfilled on him , who ever meets him shall slay him . thus custom and education hath seal'd the canon ; and he that adds or takes away from the book of orthodox belief , shall be more then in danger of an anathema : and the inquisition is not confined to the jurisdiction of the triple-crown . so we preposterously invert the precept ; holding fast what hath the vote of our antedating apprehensions , we try all things by these our partial prolepses . he that dares do otherwise , is a rebel to orthodoxy ; and exposeth his credit to sequestration . thus custom conciliates our esteem to things , no otherwise deserving it : what is in fashion , is handsom and pleasant ; though never so uncouth to an unconcern'd beholder . their antick deckings with feathers is as comely in the account of those barbarous nations , which use them ; as the ornaments of lace , and ribband , are in ours . and the plucking off the shooe is to the iapanners as decent a salutation ; as the uncovering of the head is to us , and their abhorred neighbours . on the other hand we start and boggle at what is unusual : and like the fox in the fable at his first view of the lyon , we cannot endure the sight of the bug-bear , novelty . hence some innocent truths have been affix'd with the reproach of heresie : into which , because contrary to the inur'd belief , the violent rejecters would not endure a patient inspection : but as children frighted in the dark , who run away with an out-cry from the monsters of their own imaginations framing ; and will not stay for the information of a better discovery : so they looking on them through their unadvised fears , and uncharitable suspicions ; command their understandings to a praecipitate flight , figuring their phancies to shapes monstrous and horrible , through which they make them the objects of their aversion . hence there is no truth , but its adversaries have made it an ugly vizard ; by which it 's exposed to the hate and disesteem of superficial examiners : and an opprobrious title with vulgar believers is as good as an argument . 't is but writing the name , that customary receptions have discredited , under the opinions we dislike ; and all other refutation is superfluous . thus shallow apprehenders are frighted from many sober verities ; like the king of arabs , who ran away from the smoaking mince-py , apprehending some dangerous plot in the harmless steam . so then , while we thus mistake the infusions of education , for the principles of universal nature ; we must needs fail of a scientifical theory . and therefore the two nations differing about the antiquity of their language , made appeal to an undecisive experiment ; when they agreed upon the tryal of a child brought up among the wild inhabitants of the desert . the language it spake , had no reason to be accounted the most ancient and natural : and the lucky determination for the phrygians by its pronouncing the word beck , which signified bread in the dialect of that countrey , they owed not to nature , but the goat-herd ; from which the exposed infant , by accompanying that sort of animals , had learnt it . . again , interest , is another thing , by the magnetisme of which our affections are almost irresistibly attracted . it is the pole , to which we turn , and our sympathizing judgements seldom decline from the direction of this impregnant . where interest hath engaged us ; like hannibal , we 'l find a way to veritie , or make it . any thing is a truth , to one whose interest it is , to have it so . and therefore self-designers are seldom disappointed , for want of the speciousness of a cause to warrrant them ; in the belief of which , they do oft as really impose upon themselves , as industriously endeavour it upon others . with what an infinite of law-suits , controversies , and litigious cases doth the world abound ? and yet every man is confident of the truth and goodness of his own . and as mr. hobbs observes , the reason that mathematical demonstrations are uncontroverted , is ; because interest hath no place in those unquestionable verities : when as , did the advantage , of any stand against them , euclids elements would not pass with a nemine contradicente . sir h. blunt tells us , that temporal expectations bring in droves to the mahumetan faith ; and we know the same holds thousands in the romish . the eagles will be , where the carcase is ; and that shall have the faith of most , which is best able to pay them for 't . an advantageous cause never wanted proselytes . i confess , i cannot believe that all the learned romanists profess against their conscience ; but rather , that their interest brings their consciences to their profession : and self-advantage can as easily incline some , to believe a falshood , as profess it . a good will , help'd by a good wit can find truth any where : and , what the chymists brag of their elixir , it can transmute any metal into gold ; in the hand of a skilful artificer , in spight of the adage , ex quolibet ligno mercurius . though yet i think , that every religion hath its bare nominals : and that pope was one with a witness , whose saying it was , quantum nobis lucri peperit illa fabula de christo ! . besides , fourthly , self-love engageth us for any thing , that is a minerva of our own . we love the issues of our brains , no less then those of our bodies : and fondness of our own begotten notions , though illegitimate , obligeth us to maintain them . we hugge intellectual deformities , if they bear our names ; and will hardly by perswaded they are so , when our selves are their authors . if their dam may be judge , the young apes are the most beautiful things in nature ; and if we might determine it , our proper conceptions would be all voted axioms . thus then the affections wear the breeches : and the female rules , while our understanding governs us , as the story saith themistocles did athens . so that to give the sum of all , most of the contests of the litigious world pretending for truth , are but the bandyings of one mans affections against anothers : in which , though their reasons may be foil'd , yet their passions lose no ground , but rather improve by the antiperistasis of an opposition . chap. xv. . our affections are engaged by our reverence to antiquity and authority . this hath been a great hinderer of theorical improvements ; and it hath been an advantage to the mathematicks , and mechanicks arts , that it hath no place in them . our mistake of antiquity . the unreasonableness of that kind of pedantick adoration . hence the vanity of affecting impertinent quotations . the pedantry on 't is derided ; the little improvement of science through its successive derivations , and whence that hath hapned . another thing , that engageth our affections to unwarrantable conclusions , and is therefore fatal to science ; is our doting on antiquity , and the opinions of our fathers . we look with a superstitious reverence upon the accounts of praeterlapsed ages : and with a supercilious severity , on the more deserving products of our own . a vanity , which hath possess'd all times as well as ours ; and the golden age was never present . for as in statick experiment , an inconsiderable weight by vertue of its distance from the centre of the ballance , will preponderate much greater magnitudes ; so the most slight and chaffy opinion , if at a great remove from the present age , contracts such an esteem and veneration , that it out-weighs what is infinitly more ponderous and rational , of a modern date . and thus , in another sense , we realize what archimedes had only in hypothesis ; weighing a single grain against the globe of earth . we reverence gray-headed doctrines ; though feeble , decrepit , and within a step of dust : and on this account maintain opinions , which have nothing but our charity to uphold them . while the beauty of a truth , as of a picture , is not acknowledg'd but at a distance ; and that wisdom is nothing worth , which is not fetcht from afar : wherein yet we oft deceive our selves , as did that mariner , who mistaking them for precious stones , brought home his ship fraught with common pebbles from the remotest indies . thus our eyes , like the preposterous animal's , are behind us ; and our intellectual motions retrograde . we adhere to the determinations of our fathers , as if their opinions were entail'd on us as their lands ; or ( as some conceive ) part of the parents soul were portion'd out to his off-spring , and the conceptions of our minds were ex traduce . the sages of old live again in us ; and in opinions there is a metempsychosis . we are our re-animated ancestours , and antedate their resurrection . and thus , while every age is but another shew of the former ; 't is no wonder , that science hath not out-grown the dwarfishness of its pristine stature , and that the intellectual world is such a microcosm . for while we account of some admired authours , as the seths pillars , on which all knowledge is engraven ; and spend that time and study in defence of their placits , which with more advantage to science might have been employ'd upon the books of the more ancient , and universal author : 't is not to be admired , that knowledge hath receiv'd so little improvement from the endeavours of many pretending promoters , through the continued series of so many successive ages . for while we are slaves to the dictates of our progenitours ; our discoveries , like water , will not run higher then the fountains , from which they own their derivation . and while we think it so piaculous , to go beyond the ancients ; we must necessarily come short of genuine antiquity , truth ; unless we suppose them to have reach'd perfection of knowledge in spight of their aknowledgements of ignorance . now if we enquire the reason , why the mathematicks , and mechanick arts , have so much got the start in growth of other sciences : we shall find it probably resolv'd into this , as one considerable cause : that their progress hath not been retarded by that reverential aw of former discoveries , which hath been so great an hinderance to theorical improvements . 't was never an heresie to out-limn apelles ; nor criminal to out-work the obelisks . galilaeus without a crime out-saw all antiquity ; and was not afraid to believe his eyes , in spight of the opticks of ptolomy and aristotle . 't is no discredit to that ingenious perspicill , that antiquity ne're saw in 't : nor are we shy of assent to those celestial informations , because they were hid from ages . we believe the verticity of the needle , without a certificate from the dayes of old : and confine not our selves to the sole conduct of the stars , for fear of being wiser then our fathers . had authority prevail'd here , the earths fourth part had to us been none , and hercules his pillars had still been the worlds seneca's prophesie had yet been an unfulfill'd prediction , and one moiety of our globes , an empty hemisphear . in a sense , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is wholesom instruction ; and becoming the vote of a synod : but yet , in common acceptation , it 's an enemy to verity , which can plead the antiquity of above six thousand ; and bears date from before the chaos . for , as the noble lord verulam hath noted , we have a mistaken apprehension of antiquity ; calling that so , which in truth is the worlds nonage . antiquitas seculi est juventus mundi . so that in such appeals , we fetch our knowledge from the cradle ; which though it be nearest to innocence , it is so too to the fatal ruines which follow'd it . upon a true account , the present age is the worlds grandaevity ; and if we must to antiquity , let multitude of days speak . now for us to supersede further disquisition , upon the infant acquirements of those juvenile endeavours , is foolishly to neglect the nobler advantages we are owners of , and in a sense to disappoint the expectations of him that gave them . yet thus we prevent our selves of science ; and our knowledge , though its age write thousands , is still in its swadlings . for like school-boys , we give over assoon as we have learn't as far as our masters can teach us : and had not the undertakings of some glorious heroes prevented ; plato's year might have found us , where the days of aristotle left us . for my part , i think it no such arrogance , as our pedants account it ; that almost two thousand years elapsed since , should weigh with the sixty three of the stagirite . if we owe it to him , that we know so much ; 't is long of his pedantick adorers that we know so little more . i can see no ground , why his reason should be textuary to ours ; or that god , or nature , ever intended him an universal headship . it was another , in whom were hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge : his reason only is the yea and amen ; who is the alpha and omega , the christian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 't was this vain idolizing of authors , which gave birth to that silly vanity of impertinent citations ; and inducing authority in things neither requiring , nor deserving it . that saying was much more observable , that men have beards , and women none ; because quoted from beza : and that other , pax res bona est ; because brought in with a , said st. austin . but these ridiculous fooleries , to your more generous discerners , signifie nothing but the pedantry of the affected sciolist . 't is an inglorious acquist to have our heads or volumes laden , as were cardinal campeius his mules , with old and useless luggage : and yet the magnificence of many high pretenders to science , if laid open by a true discovery , would amount to no more then the old boots and shooes , of that proud , and exposed embassadour . methinks 't is a pitiful piece of knowledge , that can be learnt from an index ; and a poor ambition to be rich in the inventory of anothers treasure . to boast a memory ( the most that these pedants can aim at ) is but an humble ostentation . and of all the faculties , in which some brutes out-vie us , i least envy them an excellence in that ; desiring rather to be a fountain , then a hogs-head . 't is better to own a judgment , though but with a curta supellex of coherent notions ; then a memory , like a sepulchre , furnished with a load of broken and discarnate bones . authorities alone with me make no number , unless evidence of reason stand before them : for all the cyphers of arithmetick , are no better then a single nothing . and yet this rank folly of affecting such impertinencies , hath overgrown our times ; and those that are candidates for the repute of scholars , take this way to compass it . when as multiplicity of reading , the best it can signifie , doth but speak them to have taken pains for it : and this alone is but the dry , and barren part of learning , and hath little reason to denominate . a number of receits at the best can but make an emperick . but again , to what is more perpendicular to our discourse , if we impartially look into the remains of antique ages ; we shall finde but little to justifie so groundless a tyranny , as antiquity hath impos'd on the enslaved world . for if we drive the current of science as high , as history can lead us ; we shall finde , that through its several successive derivations it hath still lain under such disadvantages , as have rendred any considerable accession unfeasable . and though it hath oft chang'd its channel , by its remove from one nation to another ; yet hath it been little more alter'd , then a river in its passage through differing regions , viz. in name and method . for the succeeding times still subscribing to , and copying out those , who went before them , with little more then verbal diversity ; science hath still been the same pityful thing , though in a various livery . now if we look upon it , either in the hand of the superstitious egyptian , fabulous and disputing graecian , or as garrulous roman : what hath it been , but only a pretty toy in an hieroglyphick ; a very slender something in a fable ; or an old nothing in a disputation ? and though those former days have not wanted brave wits , that have gallantly attempted , and made essays worthy immortality ; yet by reason either of the unqualified capacities of the multitude , ( who dote on things slight and trivial , neglecting what is more rare and excellent ) or the clamorous assaults of envious and more popular opposers , they have submitted to fate , and are almost lost in oblivion . and therefore , as that great man , the lord bacon hath observ'd , time as a river , hath brought down to us what is more light and superficial ; while things more solid and substantial have been immersed . thus the aristotelian philosophy hath prevailed ; while the more excellent hypotheses of democritus and epicurus have long lain buryed under neglect aud obloquy : and for ought i know might have slept for ever , had not the ingenuity of this age recall'd them from their urne . but it is somewhat collateral to my scope , as well as disproportion'd to my abilities , to fall upon particular instances of the defects and errours of the philosophy of the ancients . the foremention'd noble advancer of learning , whose name and parts might give credit to any undertaking ; hath handsomly perform'd it , in his ingenious novum organum . and yet , because it may conferr towards the discovery of how little our adherence to antiquity befriends truth , and the encrease of knowledge ; as also how groundless are the dogmatists high pretensions to science : i shall adventure some considerations on the peripatetick philosophy ; which hath had the luck to survive all others , and to build a fame on their ruines . chap. xvi . reflexions on the peripatetick philosophy . the generality of its reception , no argument of its deserts ; the first charge against that philosophy ; that it is meerly verbal . a censure of the peripatetick iesuites . materia prima in that philosophy signifies nothing . a parallel drawn between it and imaginary space : this latter pleads more for its reality . their form also is a meer word , and potentia materia insignificant . an essay to detect peripatetick verbosity , by translating some definitions . that aristotles philosophy hath been entertain'd by the most ; hath deceiv'd the credulous into a conceit , that it 's best : and its intrinsick worth hath been concluded from the grandure of its retinue . but seneca's determination , argumentum pessimi turba est , is more deserving our credit : and the fewest , that is the wisest , have always stood contradictory to that ground of belief ; vulgar applause by severer wisdom being held a scandal . if the numerousness of a train must carry it ; vertue may go follow astraea , and vice only will be worth the courting . the philosopher deservedly suspected himself of vanity , when cryed up by the multitude : and discreet apprehenders will not think the better of that philosophy , which hath the common cry to vouch it . he that writ counter to the astrologer in his almanack , did with more truth foretell the weather : and he that shall write , foul , in the place of the vulgars , fair ; passes the juster censure . those in the fable , who were wet with the showre of folly , hooted at the wise men that escap'd it , and pointed at their actions as ridiculous ; because unlike their own , that were truly so . if the major vote may cast it , wisdom and folly must exchange names ; and the way to the one will be by the other . nor is it the rabble only , which are such perverse discerners ; we are now a sphear above them : i mean the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of pretended philosophers , who judge as odly in their way , as the rascality in theirs : and many a profest retainer to philosophy , is but an ignoramus a in suit of second notions . 't is such , that most revere the reliques of the adored sophy ; and , as artemesia did those of mausolus , passionately drink his ashes . whether the remains of the stagirite deserve such veneration , we 'll make a brief enquiry . . that the aristotelian philosophy is an huddle of words and terms insignificant , hath been the censure of the wisest : and that both its basis and superstructure are chimaerical ; cannot be unobserv'd by them , that know it , and are free to judge it . 't is a philosophy , that makes most accurate inspections into the creatures of the brain ; and gives the exactest topography of the extramundane spaces . like our late politicians , it makes discoveries , and their objects too ; and deals in beings , that are nothing beholden to the primitive fiat . thus the same undivided essence , from the several circumstances of its being and operations , is here multiplied into legion , and emprov'd to a number of smaller entities ; and these again into as many modes and insignificant formalities . what a number of words here have nothing answering them ? and as many are imposed at random . to wrest names from their known meaning to senses most alien , and to darken speech by words without knowledge ; are none of the most inconsiderable faults of this philosophy : to reckon them in their particular instances , would puzzle archimedes . now hence the genuine idea's of the mind are adulterate ; and the things themselves lost in a crowd of names , and intentional nothings . thus these verbosities do emasculate the understanding ; and render it slight and frivolous , as its objects . me thinks , the late voluminous iesuites , those laplanders of peripateticism , do but subtilly trifle : and their philosophick undertakings are much like his , who spent his time in darting cumming-seeds through the eye of a needle . one would think they were impregnated , as are the mares in cappadocia ; they are big of words : their tedious volumes have the tympany , and bring forth the wind . to me , a cursus philosophicus , is but an impertinency in folio ; and the studying of them a laborious idleness . 't is here , that things are crumbled into notional atomes ; and the substance evaporated into an imaginary aether . the intellect , that can feed on this air , is a chamaelion ; and a meer inflated skin . from this stock grew school-divinity , which is but peripateticism in a theological livery . a school-man is the ghost of the stagirite , in a body of condensed air : and thomas but aristotle sainted . but to make good our charge against the philosophy of the schools , by a more close surveying it . that its principles are steril , unsatisfying verbosities ; cannot escape the notice of the most shallow inquirer . to begin at the bottom ; their materia prima is a meer chimaera . if we can fix a determinate conceit of nothing ; that 's the idea on 't : and , nec quid , nec quale , nec quantum , is as as apposite a definition of nothing , as can be . if we would conceive this imaginary matter : we must deny all things of it , that we can conceive , and what remains is the thing we look for . and should we allow it all , which its assertors assign it , viz. quantity interminate ; 't is still but an empty extended capacity , and therefore at the best , but like that space , which we imagine was before the beginning of time , and will be after the universal flames . 't is easie to draw a parallelism between that ancient , and this more modern nothing ; and in all things to make good its resemblance to that commentitious inanity . the peripatetick matter is a pure unactuated power : and this conceited vacuum a meer receptibility . matter is suppos'd indeterminate : and space is so . the pretended first matter is capable of all forms : and the imaginary space is receptive of any body . the matter can be actuated at once but by a single informant : and space is replenisht by one corporal inexistence . matter cannot naturally subsist uninform'd : and nature avoids vacuity in space . the matter is ingenerate , and beyond corruption : and the space was before , and will be after either . the matter in all things is but one : and the space most uniform . thus the foundation-principle of peripateticism runs but parallel to an acknowledg'd nothing : and their agreement in essential characters makes rather an identity , then a parity ; but that imaginary space hath more to plead for its reality , then the matter hath , and herein only are they dissimilar . for that hath no dependence on the bodies which possess it ; but was before them , and will survive them : whereas this essentially relies on the form , and cannot subsist without it . which yet , me thinks , is little better then an absurdity : that the cause should be an eleemosynary for its subsistence to its effect , and a nature posterior to , and dependent on it self . this dependentia a posteriori , though in a diverse way of causality , my reason could never away with : yea , one of their own , oviedo a spanish jesuite , hath effectually impugn'd it . so then there 's nothing real , answering this imaginary proteus ; and materia prima hath as much of being , as mons aureus . but to take a step further , their form is as obnoxious ; and as dry a word , as the formention'd nominal . i 'le not spend time in an industrious confutation : the subject is dry , and i long to be out on 't ; with a note on its imaginary origine , i 'le leave it . it 's source is as obscure , as nile's ; and potentia materiae is a pitiful figment . did it suppose any thing of the form to pre-exist in the matter , as the seminal of its being ; 't were tolerable sense to say it were educed from it . but by educing the affirmers only mean a producing in it , with a subjective dependence on its recipient : a very fine signification of eduction ; which answers not the question whence 't is derived , but into what it is received . the question is of the terminus à quo , and the answer of the subject . so that all that can be made of this power of the matter , is meerly a receptive capacity : and we may as well affirm , that the world was educ'd out of the power of the imaginary space ; and give that as a sufficient account of its original . and in this language , to grow rich were to educe money out of the power of the pocket . to make a full discovery of the jejune emptiness of these philosophick principles , were a task as easie for an ordinary undertaker ; as it would be tedious to an ingenious reader . gassendus hath excellently perform'd it , and , i am confident , to the conviction of those , whom nobler principles have not yet emancipated from that degenerous slavery . i shall not attempt a work that hath been finished by such an apelles . only to give an hint more of this verbal emptiness ; a short view of a definition or two will be current evidence : which , though in greek or latine they amuse us , yet a vernacular translation unmasks them ; and if we make them speak english , the cheat is transparent . light is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith that philosophy : in english , the act of a perspicuous body . sure aristotle here transgrest his topicks : and if this definition be clearer , and more known then the thing defin'd ; midnight may vye for conspicuity with noon . is not light more known then this insignificant energie ? and what 's a diaphanous body , but the lights medium , the air ? so that light is the act of the air : which definition spoils the riddle ; and makes it no wonder , a man should see by night as well as by day . thus is light darkned by an illustration ; and the sun it self is wrap'd up in obscuring clouds : as if light were best seen by darkness , as light inaccessible is known by ignorance . if lux be umbra dei ; this definition is umbra lucis . the infant , that was last enlarged from its maternal cels ; knows more what light is , then this definition teacheth . again , that motion is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. is as insignificant as the former . by the most favourable interpretation of that unintelligible entelechy ; it is but an act of a being in power , as it is in power : the construing of which to any real meaning , is beyond the criticisms of a mother tongue ; except it describes our modern acts of parliaments . sure that definition is not very conspicuous , whose genus pos'd the devil . the philosopher , that prov'd motion by walking , did in that action better define it : and that puzled candidate , who being ask'd what a circle was , decrib'd it by the rotation of his hand ; gave an account more satisfying . in some things we must indeed give an allowance for words of art : but in defining obvious appearances , we are to use what is most plain and easie ; that the mind be not misled by amphibologies , or ill conceived notions , into fallacious deductions . to give an account of all the insignificancies of this philosophy , would be almost to transcribe it ; a task that i should never engage in , though i ow'd no account for my idle hours . 't will need a pardon from the ingenious for the minutes already spent , though in a confutation . chap. xvii . . peripatetick philosophy is litigious ; it hath no setled constant signification of words ; the inconveniences hereof . aristotle intended the cherishing controversies : prov'd by his own double testimony . some of his impertinent arguings derided . disputes retard , and are injurious to knowledge . peripateticks are most exercised in the controversal parts of philosophy , and know little of the practical and experimental . a touch at school-divinity . that this philosophy is litigious , the very spawn of disputations and controversies as undecisive as needless ; is the natural result of the former : storms are the products of vapours . for where words are imposed arbitrariously , having no stated real meaning ; or else distorted from their common use , and known significations : the mind must needs be led into confusion and misprision ; and so things plain and easie in their naked natures , made full of intricacy and disputable uncertainty . for we cannot conclude with assurance , but from clearly apprehended premises ; and these cannot be so conceiv'd , but by a distinct comprehension of the words out of which they are elemented . so that , where they are unfixt or ambiguous ; our propositions must be so , and our deductions can be no better . one reason therefore of the uncontroverted certainty of mathematical science is ; because 't is built upon clear and settled significations of names , which admit of no ambiguity or insignificant obscurity . but in the aristotelian philosophy it's quite otherwise : words being here carelesly and abusively admitted , and as inconstantly retained ; it must needs come to pass , that they will be diversly apprehended by contenders , and so made the subject of controversies , there are endless both for use and number . and thus being at their first step out of the way to science , by mistaking in simple terms ; in the progress of their enquiries they must needs lose both themselves , and the truth , in a verbal labyrinth . and now the entangled disputants , as master hobs ingeniously observeth , like birds that came down the chimney ; betake them to the false light , seldom suspecting the way they enter'd : but attempting by vain , impertinent , and coincident distinctions , to escape the absurdity that pursues them : do but weary themselves with as little success , as the silly bird attempts the window . the mis-stated words are the original mistake ; and every other essay is a new one . now these canting contests , the usual entertainment of the peripatum , are not only the accidental vitiosities of the philosophers ; but the genuine issues of the philosophy it self . and aristotle seems purposely to intend the cherishing of controversal digladiations , by his own affectation of an intricate obscurity . himself acknowledg'd it , when he said ; his physicks were publish'd , and not so : and by that double advice in his topicks 't is as clear as light . in one place , he adviseth his sectatours in disputations to be ambiguous : and in another , to bring forth any thing that occurs , rather then give way to their adversary ; counsel very well becoming an enquirer after verity ! nor did he here advise them to any thing , but what he followeth himself , and exactly copies out in his practise . the multitudes of his lame , abrupt , equivocal , self-conttadicting expressions , will evidence it as to the first part : which who considers , may be satisfied in this ; that if aristotle found nature's face under covert of a veil , he hath not removed the old , but made her a new one . and for the latter , his frequent slightness in arguing doth abundantly make it good . to instance , he proves the world to be perfect , because it consists of bodies ; and that bodies are so , because they consist of a triple dimension ; and that a triple dimension is perfect , because three are all ; and that three are all , because when 't is but one or two , we can't say all , but when 't is three , we may : is not this an absolute demonstration ? we can say all at the number three : therefore the world is perfect . tobit went forth and his dog follow'd him ; therefore there 's a world in the moon , were an argument as apodictical . in another place he proves the world to be but one : for were there another , our earth would fall unto it . this is a pitiful deduction , from the meer prejudice of sense ; and not unlike theirs , who thought , if there were antipodes , they must needs [ as it 's said of erasmus ] in coelum descendere . as if , were there more worlds , each of them would not have its proper centre . elsewhere shewing , why the heavens move this way rather then another , he gives this for a reason : because they move to the more honourable ; and before is more honourable then after . this is like the gallant , who sent his man to buy an hat , that would turn up behind . as if , had the heavens moved the other way ; that term had not been then before , which is now the contrary . this inference is founded upon a very weak supposition , viz. that those alterable respects are realities in nature ; which will never be admitted by a considerate discerner . thus aristotle acted his own instructions ; and his obsequious sectators have super-erogated in observance . they have so disguised his philosophy by obscuring comments , that his revived self would not own it : and were he to act another part with mortals ; he 'd be but pitiful peripatetick , every sophister would out-talk him . now this disputing way of enquiry is so far from advancing science ; that 't is no inconsiderable retarder : for in scientifical discoveries many things must be consider'd , which the hurrey of a dispute indisposeth for ; and there is no way to truth , but by the most clear comprehension of simple notions , and as wary an accuracy in deductions . if the fountain be disturb'd , there 's no seeing to the bottom ; and here 's an exception to the proverb , 't is no good fishing for verity in troubled waters . one mistake of either simple apprehension , or connexion , makes an erroneous conclusion . so that the precipitancy of disputation , and the stir and noise of passions , that usually attend it ; must needs be prejudicial to verity : its calm insinuations can no more be heard in such a bustle , then a whisper among a croud of saylors in a storm . nor do the eager clamors of contending disputants , yeeld any more relief to eclipsed truth ; then did the sounding brass of old to the labouring moon . when it 's under question , 't were as good flip cross and pile , as to dispute for 't : and to play a game at chess for an opinion in philosophy [ as my self and an ingenious friend have sometime sported ] is as likely a way to determine . thus the peripatetick procedure is inept for philosophical solutions : the lot were as equitable a decision , as their empty loquacities . 't is these nugacious disputations , that have been the great hinderance to the more improveable parts of learning : and the modern retainers to the stagirite have spent their sweat and pains upon the most litigious parts of his philosophy ; while those , that find less play for the contending genius , are incultivate . thus logick , physicks , metaphysicks , are the burden of volumes , and the dayly entertainment of the disputing schools : while the more profitable doctrines of the heavens , meteors , minerals , animals ; as also the more practical ones of politicks , and oeconomicks , are scarce so much as glanc'd at . and the indisputable mathematicks , the only science heaven hath yet vouchsaf't humanity ; have but few votaries among the slaves of the stagirite . what , the late promoters of the aristotelian philosophy , have writ on all these so fertile subjects ; can scarce compare with the single disputes about materia prima . nor hath humane science monopoliz'd the damage , that hath sprung from this root of evils : theology hath been as deep a sharer . the volumes of the schoolmen , are deplorable evidence of peripatetick depravations : and luther's censure of that divinity , quam primum apparuit theologia scholastica , evanuit theologia crucis , is neither uncharitable , nor unjust . this hath mudded the fountain of certainty with notional and ethnick admixtions ; and platted the head of evangelical truth , as the iews did its author's , with a crown of thorns : here , the most obvious verity is subtiliz'd into niceties , and spun into a thread indiscernible by common opticks , but through the spectacles of the adored heathen . this hath robb'd the christian world of its unity and peace ; and made the church , the stage of everlasting contentions : and while aristotle is made the centre of truth , and unity , what hope of reconciling ? and yet most of these scholastick controversies are ultimately resolv'd into the subtilties of his philosophy : and me thinks an athenian should not be the best guide to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; nor an idolater to that god he neither knew nor owned . when i read the eager contests of these notional theologues , about things that are not ; i cannot but think of the pair of wise ones , that fought for the middle : and me thinks many of their controversies are such , as if we and our antipodes , should strive who were uppermost ; their title to truth is equal . he that divided his text into one part ; did but imitate the schoolmen in their coincident distinctions : and the best of their curiosities are but like paint on glass , which intercepts and dyes the light the more desirable splendor . i cannot look upon their elaborate trifles , but with a sad reflexion on the degenerate state of our lapsed intellects ; and as deep a resentment , of the mischiefs of this school-philosophy . chap. xviii . . it gives no account of the phaenomena ; those that are remoter , it attempts not . it speaks nothing pertinent in the most ordinary : it s circular , and general way of solution . it resolves all things into occult qualities . the absurdity of the aristotelian hypothesis of the heavens . the gallaxy is no meteor : the heavens are corruptible . comets are above the moon . the sphear of fire derided . aristotle convicted of several other false assertions . . the aristotelian hypotheses give a very dry and jejune account of nature's phaenomena . for as to its more mysterious reserves , peripatetick enquiry hath left them unattempted ; and the most forward notional dictators sit down here in a contented ignorance : and as if nothing more were knowable then is already discover'd , they put stop to all endeavours of their solution . qualities , that were occult to aristotle , must be so to us ; and we must not philosophize beyond sympathy and antipathy : whereas indeed the rarities of nature are in these recesses , and its most excellent operations cryptick to common discernment . modern ingenuity expects wonders from magnetick discoveries : and while we know but its more sensible ways of working ; we are but vulgar philosophers , and not likely to help the world to any considerable theories . till the fountains of the great deeps are broken up ; knowledge is not likely to cover the earth as the waters the sea. nor is the aristotelian philosophy guilty of this sloth and philosophick penury , only in remoter abstrusities : but in solving the most ordinary causalities , it is as defective and unsatisfying . even the most common productions are here resolv'd into celestial influences , elemental combinations , active and passive principles , and such generalities ; while the particular manner of them is as hidden as sympathies . and if we follow manifest qualities beyond the empty signification of their names ; we shall find them as occult , as those which are professedly so . that heavy bodies descend by gravity , is no better an account then we might expect from a rustick : and again , that gravity is a quality whereby an heavy body descends , is an impertinent circle , and teacheth nothing . the feigned central alliciency is but a word , and the manner of it still occult . that the fire burns by a quality called heat ; is an empty dry return to the question , and leaves us still ignorant of the immediate way of igneous solutions . the accounts that this philosophy gives by other qualities , are of the same gender with these : so that to say the loadstone draws iron by magnetick attraction , and that the sea moves by flux and reflux ; were as satisfying as these hypotheses , and the solution were as pertinent . in the qualities , this philosophy calls manifest , nothing is so but the effects . for the heat , we feel , is but the effect of the fire ; and the pressure , we are sensible of , but the effect of the descending body . and effects , whose causes are confessedly occult , are as much within the sphear of our senses ; and our eyes will inform us of the motion of the steel to its attrahent . thus peripatetick philosophy resolves all things into occult qualities ; and the dogmatists are the only scepticks . even to them , that pretend so much to science , the world is circumscrib'd with a gyges his ring ; and is intellectually invisible : and , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , will best become the mouth of a peripatetick . for by their way of disquisition there can no more be truly comprehended , then what 's known by every common ignorant : but ingenious inquiry will not be contented with such vulgar frigidities . but further , if we look into the aristotelian comments on the largest volumes of the universe : the works of the fourth day are there as confused and disorderly , as the chaos of the first : and more like that , which was before the light , then the compleatly finish'd , and gloriously disposed frame . what a romance is the story of those impossible concamerations , intersections , involutions , and feign'd rotations of solid orbs ? all substituted to salve the credit of a broken ill-contrived systeme . the belief of such disorders above , were an advantage to the oblique atheism of epicurus : and such irregularities in the celestial motions , would lend an argument to the apotheiosis of fortune . had the world been coagmented from that supposed fortuitous jumble ; this hypothesis had been tolerable . but could the doctrine of solid orbs , be accommodated to astronomical phaenomena ; yet to ascribe each sphear an intelligence to circumvolve it , were an unphilosophical desperate refuge : and to confine the blessed genii to a province , which was the hell of ixion , were to rob them of their felicities . that the galaxy is a meteor , was the account of aristotle : but the telescope hath autoptically confuted it : and he , who is not pyrrhonian to the disbelief of his senses , may see ; that it 's no exhalation from the earth , but an heap of smaller luminaries . that the heavens are void of corruption , is aristotles supposal : but the tube hath betray'd their impurity ; and neoterick astronomy hath found spots in the sun. the discoveries made in venus , and the moon , disprove the antique quintessence ; and evidence them of as course materials , as the globe we belong to . the perspicil , as well as the needle , hath enlarged the habitable world ; and that the moon is an earth , is no improbable conjecture . the inequality of its surface , mountanous protuberance , the nature of its maculae , and infinite other circumstances [ for which the world 's beholding to galilaeo ] are items not contemptible : hevelius hath graphically describ'd it : that comets are of nature terrestrial , is allowable : but that they are materiall'd of vapours , and never flamed beyond the moon ; were a concession unpardonable . that in cassiopaea was in the firmament , and another in our age above the sun. nor was there ever any as low as the highest point of the circumference , the stagyrite allows them . so that we need not be appal'd at blazing stars , and a comet is no more ground for astrological presages then a flaming chimney . the unparallel'd des-cartes hath unridled their dark physiology , and to wonder solv'd their motions . his philosophy gives them transcursions beyond the vortex we breath in ; and leads them through others , which are only known in an hypothesis . aristotle would have fainted before he had flown half so far , as that eagle-wit ; and have lighted on a hard name , or occult quality , to rest him . that there is a sphear of fire under the concave of the moon , is a dream : and this , may be , was the reason some imagin'd hell there , thinking those flames the ignis rotae . according to this hypothesis , the whole lunar world is a torrid zone ; and on a better account , then aristotle thought ours was , may be supposed inhabitable , except they are salamanders which dwell in those fiery regions . that the reflexion of the solar rays , is terminated in the clouds ; was the opinion of the graecian sage : but lunar observations have convicted it of falshood ; and that planet receives the dusky light , we discern in its sextile aspect , from the earth's benignity . that the rainbow never describes more then a semicircle , is no creditable assertion ; since experimental observations have confuted it . gassendus saw one at sun-setting , whose supreme arch almost reached our zenith ; while the horns stood in the oriental tropicks . and that noble wit reprehends the school-idol , for assigning fifty years at least between every lunar iris. that caucasus enjoys the sun-beams three parts of the nights vigils ; that danubius ariseth from the pyrenaean hills : that the earth is higher towards the north : are opinions truly charged on aristotle by the restorer of epicurus ; and all easily confutable falsities . to reckon all the aristotelian aberrances , and to give a full account of the lameness of his hypotheses , would swell this digression into a volume . the mention'd shall suffice us . chap. xix . aristotle's philosophy inept for new discoveries ; it hath been the author of no one invention : it 's founded on vulgarities , and therefore makes nothing known beyond them . the knowledge of natures out-side confers not to practical improvements . better hopes from the new philosophy . a fifth charge against aristotle's philosophy , it is in many things impious , and self-contradicting : instances of both propounded . the directing all this to the design of the discourse . a caution , viz. that nothing is here intended in favour of novelty in divinity ; the reason why we may imbrace what is new in philosophy , while we reject them in theologie . . the aristotelian philosophy is inept for new discoveries ; and therefore of no accommodation to the use of life . that all arts , and professions are capable of maturer improvements ; cannot be doubted by those , who know the least of any . and that there is an america of secrets , and unknown peru of nature , whose discovery would richly advance them , is more then conjecture . now while we either sayl by the land of gross aud vulgar doctrines , or direct our enquiries , by the cynosure of meer abstract notions ; we are not likely to reach the treasures on the other side the atlantick : the directing of the world the way to which , is the noble end of true philosohpy . that the aristotelian physiology cannot boast it self the proper author of any one invention ; is praegnant evidence of its infecundous deficiency : and 't would puzzle the schools to point at any considerable discovery , made by the direct , sole manuduction of peripatetick principles . most of our rarities have been found out by casual emergency ; and have been the works of time , and chance , rather then of philosophy . what aristotle hath of experimental knowledge in his books of animals , or elsewhere ; is not much transcending vulgar observation : and yet what he hath of this , was never learnt from his hypotheses ; but forcibly fetch'd in to suffrage to them . and 't is the observation of the noble st. alban ; that that philosophy is built on a few vulgar experiments : and if upon further enquiry , any were found to refragate , they were to be discharg'd by a distinction . now what is founded on , and made up but of vulgarities , cannot make known any thing beyond them . for nature is is set a going by the most subtil and hidden instruments ; which it may be have nothing obvious which resembles them . hence judging by visible appearances , we are discouraged by supposed impossibilities which to nature are none , but within her sphear of action . and therefore what shews only the outside , and sensible structure of nature ; is not likely to help us in finding out the magnalia . 't were next to impossible for one , who never saw the inward wheels and motions , to make a watch upon the bare view of the circle of hours , and index : and 't is as difficult to trace natural operations to any practical advantage , by the sight of the cortex of sensible appearances . he were a poor physitian , that had no more anatomy , then were to be gather'd from the physnomy . yea , the most common phaenomena can be neither known , nor improved , without insight into the more hidden frame . for nature works by an invisible hand in all things : and till peripateticism can shew us further , then those gross solutions of qualities and elements ; 't will never make us benefactors to the world , nor considerable discoverers . but its experienc'd sterility through so many hundred years , drives hope to desperation . we expect greater things from neoterick endeavours . the cartesian philosophy in this regard hath shewn the world the way to be happy . me thinks this age seems resolved to bequeath posterity somewhat to remember it : and the glorious undertakers , wherewith heaven hath blest our days , will leave the world better provided then they found it . and whereas in former times such generous free-spirited worthies were , as the rare newly observed stars , a single one the wonder of an age : in ours they are like the lights of the greater size that twinkle in the starry firmament : and this last century can glory in numerous constellations . should those heroes go on , as they have happily begun ; they 'll fill the world with wonders . and i doubt not but posterity will find many things , that are now but rumors , verified into practical realities . it may be some ages hence , a voyage to the southern unknown tracts , yea possibly the moon , will not be more strange then one to america . to them , that come after us , it may be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions ; as now a pair of boots to ride a iourney . and to conferr at the distance of the indies by sympathetick conveyances , may be as usual to future times , as to us in a litterary correspondence . the restauration of gray hairs to iuvenility , and renewing the exhausted marrow , may at length be effected without a miracle : and the turning of the now comparatively desert world into a paradise , may not improbably be expected from late agriculture . now those , that judge by the narrowness of former principles , will smile at these paradoxical expectations : but questionless those great inventions , that have in these later ages altered the face of all things ; in their naked proposals , and meer suppositions , were to former times as ridiculous . to have talk'd of a new earth to have been discovered , had been a romance to antiquity : and to sayl without sight of stars or shoars by the guidance of a mineral , a story more absurd , then the flight of daedalus . that men should speak after their tongues were ashes , or communicate with each other in differing hemisphears , before the invention of letters ; could not but have been thought a fiction . antiquity would not have believed the almost incredible force of our canons ; and would as coldly have entertain'd the wonders of the telescope . in these we all condemn antique incredulity ; and 't is likely posterity will have as much cause to pity ours . but yet notwithstanding this straightness of shallow observers , there are a set of enlarged souls that are more judiciously credulous : and those , who are acquainted with the fecundity of cartesian principles , and the diligent and ingenuous endeavours of so many true philosophers ; will despair of nothing . . but again , the aristotelian philosophy is in some things impious , and inconsistent with divinity ; and in many more inconsistent with it self . that the resurrection is impossible ; that god understands not all things ; that the world was from eternity ; that there 's no substantial form , but moves some orb ; that the first mover moves by an eternal , immutable necessity ; that , if the world and motion were not from eternity , then god was idle ; were all the assertions of aristotle , which theology pronounceth impieties . which yet we need not strange at from one , of whom a father saith , nec deum coluit nec curavit : especially , if it be as philoponus affirms , that he philosophiz'd by command from the oracle . of the aristotelian contradictions , gassendus hath presented us with a catalogue : we 'll instance in a few of them . in one place he saith , the planets scintillation is not seen , because of their propinquity ; but that of the rising and setting sun is , because of its distance : and yet in another place he makes the sun nearer us , then they are . he saith , that the elements are not eternal , and seeks to prove it ; and yet he makes the world so , and the elements its parts . in his meteors he saith , no dew is produced in the wind ; and yet afterwards admits it under the south , and none under the north. in one place he defines a vapour humid and cold ; and in another humid and hot . he saith , the faculty of speaking is a sense ; and yet before he allow'd but five . in one place , that nature doth all things best ; and in another , that it makes more evil then good . and somewhere he contradicts himself within a line ; saying , that an immoveable mover hath no principle of motion . 't would be tedious to mention more ; and the qualiiy of a digression will not allow it . thus we have , as briefly as the subject would bear , animadverted on the so much admired philosophy of aristotle . the nobler spirits of the age , are disengaged from those detected vanities : and the now adorers of that philosophy are few , but such narrow souls , that know no other ; or if any of them look beyond the leaves of their master , yet they try other principles by a jury of his , and scan cartes with genus and species . from the former sort i may hope , they 'l pardon this attempt ; and for the latter , i value not their censure . thus then we may conclude upon the whole , that the stamp of authority can make leather as current as gold ; and that there 's nothing so contemptible , but antiquity can render it august , and excellent . but , because the fooleries of some affected novelists have discredited new discoveries , and render'd the very mention suspected of vanity at least ; and in points divine , of heresie : it will be necessary to add , that i intend not the former discourse , in favour of any new-broach'd conceit in divinity ; for i own no opinion there , which cannot plead the prescription of above sixteen hundred . there 's nothing i have more sadly resented , then the phrenetick whimsies with which our age abounds , and therefore am not likely to patron them . in theology , i put as great a difference between our new lights , and ancient truths ; as between the sun , and an unconcocted evanid meteor . though i confess , that in philosophy i 'm a seeker ; yet cannot believe , that a sceptick in philosophy must be one in divinity . gospel-light began in it zenith ; and , as some say the sun , was created in its meridian strength and lustre . but the beginnings of philosophy were in a crepusculous obscurity ; and it 's yet scarse past the dawn . divine truths were most pure in their source ; and time could not perfect what eternity began : our divinity , like the grand-father of humanity , was born in the fulness of time , and in the strength of its manly vigour : but philosophy and arts commenced embryo's , and are compleated by times gradual accomplishments . and therefore , what i cannot find in the leaves of former inquisitours : i seek in the modern attempts of nearer authors . i cannot receive aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in so extensive an interpretation , as some would enlarge it to : and that discouraging maxime , nil dictum quod non dictum prius , hath little room in my estimation . nor can i tye up my belief to the letter of solomon : except copernicus be in the right , there hath been something new under the sun ; i 'm sure , later times have seen novelties in the heavens above it . i do not think , that all science is tautology : the last ages have shewn us , what antiquity never saw ; no , not in a dream . chap. xx. it 's queried whether there be any science in the sense of the dogmatists : ( ) we cannot know any thing to be the cause of another , but from its attending it ; and this way is not infallible ; declared by instances , especially from the philosophy of des-cartes . all things are mixt , and 't is difficult to assign each cause its distinct effect . ( ) there 's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible . we can scarce conclude so of any thing : instances of supposed impossibles which are none . a story of a scholar that turn'd gipsy ; and of the power of imagination . of one mans binding anothers thoughts ; and a conjecture at the maner of its performance . confidence of science is one great reason , we miss it : whereby presuming we have it every where , we seek it not where it is ; and therefore fall short of the object of our enquiry . now to give further check to dogmatical pretensions , and to discover the vanity of assuming ignorance ; we 'll make a short enquiry , whether there be any such thing as science in the sense of its assertours . in their notion then , it is the knowledge of things in their true , immediate , necessary causes : upon which i 'le advance the following observations . . all knowledge of causes is deductive : for we know none by simple intuition ; but through the mediation of its effects . now we cannot conclude , any thing to be the cause of another ; but from its continual accompanying it : for the causality it self is insensible . thus we gather fire to be the cause of heat , and the sun of day-light : because where ever fire is , we find there 's heat ; and where ever the sun is , light attends it , and è contrà . but now to argue from a concomitancy to a causality , is not infallibly conclusive : yea in this way lies notorious delusion . is 't not possible , and how know we the contrary , but , that something , which alway attends the grosser flame , may be the cause of heat ? and may not it , and its supposed cause , be only parallel effects ? suppose the fire had ne're appear'd , but had been still hid in smoke ; and that heat did alway proportionably encrease and diminish , with the greater or less quantity of that fuliginous exhalation : should we ever have doubted , that smoke was the cause on 't ? suppose we had never seen more sun , then in a cloudy day , and that the lesser lights had ne're shewn us their lucid substance ; let us suppose the day had alway broke with a wind , and had proportionably varyed , as that did : had not he been a notorious sceptick , that should question the causality ? but we need not be beholding to such remote suppositions : the french philosophy furnishes us with a better instance . for , according to the principles of the illustrious des-cartes , there would be light , though the sun and stars gave none ; and a great part of what we now enjoy , is independent on their beams . now if this seemingly prodigious paradox , can be reconcil'd to the least probability of conjecture , or may it be made but a tolerable supposal ; i presume , it may then win those that are of most difficil belief , readily to yeeld ; that causes in our account the most palpable , may possibly be but uninfluential attendants ; since that there is not an instance can be given , wherein we opinion a more certain efficiency . so then , according to the tenour of that concinnous hypothesis , light being caused by the conamen of the matter of the vortex , to recede from the centre of its motion : it is easily deducible , that were there none of that fluid aether , which makes the body of the sun in the centre of our world , or should it cease from action ; yet the conatus of the circling matter would not be considerably less , but according to the indispensable laws of motion , must press the organs of sense as now , though it may be not with so smart an impulse . thus we see , how there might be light before the luminaries ; and evening and morning before there was a sun. so then we cannot infallibly assure our selves of the truth of the causes , that most obviously occur ; and therefore the foundation of scientifical procedure , is too weak for so magnificent a superstructure . besides , that the world 's a mass of heterogeneous subsistencies , and every part thereof a coalition of distinguishable varieties ; we need not go far for evidence : and that all things are mixed , and causes blended by mutual involutions ; i presume , to the intelligent will be no difficult concession . now to profound to the bottom of these diversities , to assign each cause its distinct effects , and to limit them by their just and true proportions ; are necessary requisites of science : and he that hath compast them , may boast he hath out-done humanity . but for us to talk of knowledge , from those few indistinct representations , which are made to our grosser faculties , is a flatulent vanity . . we hold no demonstration in the notion of the dogmatist , but where the contrary is impossible : for necessary is that , which cannot be otherwise . now , whether the acquisitions of any on this side perfection , can make good the pretensions to so high strain'd an infallibility , will be worth a reflexion . and , me thinks , did we but compare the miserable scantness of our capacities , with the vast profundity of things ; both truth and modesty would teach us a dialect , more becoming short-sighted mortality . can nothing be otherwise , which we conceive impossible , to be so ? is our knowledge , and things , so adequately commensurate , as to justifie the affirming , that that cannot be , which we comprehend not ? our demonstrations are levyed upon principles of our own , not universal nature : and , as my lord bacon notes , we judge from the analogy of our selves , not the universe . now are not many things certain by the principles of one , which are impossible to the apprehensions of another ? thus some things our juvenile reasons tenaciously adhere to ; which yet our maturer judgements disallow of : many things to meer sensible discerners are impossible , which to the enlarged principles of more advanced intellects are easie verities : yea , that 's absurd in one philosophy , which is a worthy truth in another ; and that 's a demonstration to aristotle , which is none to des-cartes . that every fixt star is a sun ; and that they are as distant from each other , as we from some of them ; that the sun , which lights us , is in the centre of our world , and our earth a planet that wheels about it ; that this globe is a star , only crusted over with the grosser element , and that its centre is of the same nature with the sun ; that it may recover its light again , and shine amids the other luminaries ; that our sun may be swallow'd up of another , and become a planet : all these , if we judge by common principles or the rules of vulgar philosophy , are prodigious impossibilities , and their contradictories , as good as demonstrable : but yet to a reason inform'd by cartesianism ; these have their probability . thus , it may be , the grossest absurdities to the philosophies of europe , may be justifiable assertions to that of china : and 't is not unlikely , but what 's impossible to all humanity , may be possible in the metaphysicks , and physiologie of angels . now the best principles , excepting divine , and mathematical , are but hypotheses ; within the circle of which we may indeed conclude many things , with security from error : but yet the greatest certainty , advanc'd from supposal , is still but hypothetical . so that we may affirm , things are thus and thus , according to the principles we have espoused : but we strangely forget our selves , when we plead a necessity of their being so in nature , and an impossibility of their being otherwise . that one man should be able to bind the thoughts of another , and determine them to their particular objects ; will be reckon'd in the first rank of impossibles : yet by the power of advanc'd imagination it may very probably be effected ; and story abounds with instances . i 'le trouble the reader but with one ; and the hands from which i had it , make me secure of the truth on 't . there was very lately a lad in the university of oxford , who being of very pregnant and ready parts , and yet wanting the encouragement of preferment ; was by his poverty forc'd to leave his studies there , and to cast himself upon the wide world for a livelyhood . now , his necessities growing dayly on him , and wanting the help of friends to relieve him ; he was at last forced to joyn himself to a company of vagabond gypsies , whom occasionly he met with , and to follow their trade for a maintenance . among these extravagant people , by the insinuating subtilty of his carriage , he quickly got so much of their love , and esteem ; as that they discover'd to him their mystery : in the practice of which , by the pregnancy of his wit and parts he soon grew so good a proficient , as to be able to out-do his instructours . after he had been a pretty while well exercis'd in the trade ; there chanc'd to ride by a couple of scholars who had formerly bin of his acquaintance . the scholars had quickly spyed out their old friend , among the gypsies ; and their amazement to see him among such society , had well-nigh discover'd him : but by a sign he prevented their owning him before that crew : and taking one of them aside privately , desired him with his friend to go to an inn , not far distant thence , promising there to come to them . they accordingly went thither , and he follows : after their first salutations , his friends enquire how he came to lead so odd a life as that was , and to joyn himself with such a cheating beggerly company . the scholar-gypsy having given them an account of the necessity , which drove him to that kind of life ; told them , that the people he went with were not such impostours as they were taken for , but that they had a traditional kind of learning among them , and could do wonders by the power of imagination , and that himself had learnt much of their art , and improved it further then themselves could . and to evince the truth of what he told them , he said , he 'd remove into another room , leaving them to discourse together ; and upon his return tell them the sum of what they had talked of : which accordingly he perform'd , giving them a full account of what had pass'd between them in his absence . the scholars being amaz'd at so unexpected a discovery , earnestly desir'd him to unriddle the mystery . in which he gave them satisfaction , by telling them , that what he did was by the power of imagination , his phancy binding theirs ; and that himself had dictated to them the discourse , they held together , while he was from them : that there were warrantable wayes of heightening the imagination to that pitch , as to bind anothers ; and that when he had compass'd the whole secret , some parts of which he said he was yet ignorant of , he intended to leave their company , and give the world an account of what he had learned . now that this strange power of the imagination is no impossibility ; the wonderful signatures in the foetus caus'd by the imagination of the mother , is no contemptible item . the sympathies of laughing & gaping together , are resolv'd into this principle : and i see not why the phancy of one man may not determine the cogitation of another rightly qualified , as easily as his bodily motion . this influence seems to be no more unreasonable , then that of one string of a lute upon another ; when a stroak on it causeth a proportionable motion in the sympathizing consort , which is distant from it and not sensibly touched . now if this notion be strictly verifiable ; 't will yeeld us a good account how angels inject thoughts into our minds , and know our cogitations : and here we may see the source of some kinds of fascination . if we are prejudic'd against the speculation , because we cannot conceive the manner of so strange an operation ; we shall indeed receive no help from the common philosophy : but yet the hypothesis of a mundane soul , lately reviv'd by that incomparable platonist and cartesian , dr. h. more , will handsomly relieve us . or if any would rather have a mechanical account ; i think it may probably be made out some such way as follows . imagination is inward sense . to sense is required a motion of certain filaments of the brain ; and consequently in imagination there 's the like : they only differing in this , that the motion of the one proceeds immediately from external objects ; but that of the other hath its immediate rise within us . now then , when any part of the brain is strongly agitated ; that , which is next and most capable to receive the motive impress , must in like manner be moved . now we cannot conceive any thing more capable of motion , then the fluid matter , that 's interspers'd among all bodies , and contiguous to them . so then , the agitated parts of the brain begetting a motion in the proxime aether ; it is propagated through the liquid medium , as we see the motion is which is caus'd by a stone thrown into the water . now , when the thus moved matter meets with any thing like that , from which it received its primary impress ; it will proportionably move it , as it is in musical strings tuned unisons . and thus the motion being convey'd , from the brain of one man to the phancy of another ; it is there receiv'd from the instrument of conveyance , the subtil matter ; and the same kind of strings being moved , and much what after the same manner as in the first imaginant ; the soul is awaken'd to the same apprehensions , as were they that caus'd them . i pretend not to any exactness or infallibility in this account , fore-seeing many scruples that must be removed to make it perfect : 't is only an hint of the possibility of mechanically solving the phaenomenon ; though very likely it may require many other circumstances compleatly to make it out . but 't is not my business here to follow it : i leave it therefore to receive accomplishment from maturer inventions . chap. xxi . another instance of a supposed impossibility which may not be so . of conference at distance by impregnated needles . a way of secret conveyance by sympathized hands ; a relation to this purpose . of the magnetick cure of wounds . this discourse weakens not the certainty of truths mathematical or divine . mathematical science need not elate us , since by it we know but our own creatures , and are still ignorant of our makers . ( ) we cannot know any thing in nature , without the knowledge of the first springs of natural motions , and these we are ignorant of . des-cartes his philosophy commended . but yet to advance another instance . that men should confer at very distant removes by an extemporary intercourse is a reputed impossibility , but yet there are some hints in natural operations that give us probability that 't is feasible , and may be compast without unwarrantable assistance from daemoniack correspondence . that a couple of needles equally toucht by the same magnet , being set in two dyals exactly proportion'd to each other , and circumscribed by the letters of the alphabet , may effect this magnale , hath considerable authorities to avouch it . the manner of it is thus represented . let the friends that would communicate take each a dyal : and having appointed a time for their sympathetick conference ; let one move his impregnate needle to any letter in the alphabet , and its affected fellow will precisely respect the same . so that would i know what my friend would acquaint me with ; 't is but observing the letters that are pointed at by my needle , and in their order transcribing them from their sympathized index , as its motion direct's : and i maybe assured that my friend described the same with his : and that the words on my paper , are of his inditing . now though there will be some ill contrivance in a circumstance of this invention , in that the thus impregnate needles will not move to , but avert from each other ( as ingenious dr. browne in his pseudodoxia epidemica hath observed : ) yet this cannot prejudice the main design of this way of secret conveyance : since 't is but reading counter to the magnetick informer ; and noting the letter which is most distant in the abecedarian circle from that which the needle turns to , and the case is not alter'd . now though this desirable effect possibly may not yet answer the expectation of inquisitive experiment ; yet 't is no despicable item , that by some other such way of magnetick efficiency , it may hereafter with success be attempted , when magical history shall be enlarged by riper inspections : and 't is not unlikely , but that present discoveries might be improved to the performance . there is besides this another way , which is said to have advanced the secret beyond speculation , and compleated it in practice . that some have conferr'd at distance by sympathized hands , and in a moment have thus transmitted their thoughts to each other , there are late specious relations do attest it : which say , that the hands of two friends being sympathized by a transferring of flesh from one into the other , and the place of the letters mutually agreed on ; the least prick in the hand of one , the other will be sensible of , and that in the same part of his own . and thus the distant friend by a new kind of chiromancy may read in his own hand what his correspondent had set down in his . for instance , would i in london acquaint my intimate in paris , that i am well : i would then prick that part where i had appointed the letter [ i : ] and doing so in another place to signifie that word was done , proceed to [ a , ] thence to [ m ] and so on , till i had finisht what i intended to make known . now that there have been some such practices , i have had a considerable relation , which i hold not impertinent to insert . a gentleman comes to a chirurgeon to have his arm cut off : the surgeon perceiving nothing that it ailed , was much startled at the motion ; thinking him either in jest , or besides himself . but by a more deliberate recollection , perceiving that he was both sober , and in earnest ; entreats him to know the reason of so strange a desire , since his arm to him seem'd perfectly sound : to which the gentleman replyes , that his hand was sympathiz'd , and his friend was dead , so that if not prevented by amputation , he said , it would rot away , as did that of his deceased correspondent . nor was this an unreasonable surmise ; but , if there be any such way of manual sympathizing , a very probable conjecture . for , that which was so sensibly affected with so inconsiderable a touch , in all likelyhood would be more immuted , by those greater alterations which are in cadaverous solutions . and no doubt , but that by the same reason it would have been corrupted , as some times warts are by the decay of buryed lard that was rubb'd upon them . now if these wayes of secret conveyance may be made out to be really practicable ; yea , if it be evincible , that they are as much as possibly so , it will be a warrantable presumption of the verity of the former instance : since t is as easily conceivable , that there should be communications between the phancies of men , as either the impregnate needles , or sympathized hands . and there is an instance yet behinde , which is more creditable than either , and gives probability to them all . that there is a magnetick way of curing wounds by anointing the weapon , and that the wound is affected in like manner as is the extravenate bloud by the sympathetick medicine , is for matter of fact put out of doubt by the noble sir k. digby , and the proof he gives in his ingenious discourse on the subject , is unexceptionable . for the reason of this wonder , he attempts it by mechanism , and endeavours to make it out by atomical aporrheas , which passing from the cruentate cloth or weapon to the wound , and being incorporated with the particles of the salve carry them in their embraces to the affected part : where the medicinal atomes entering together with the effluviums of the bloud , do by their subtle insinuation better effect the cure , then can be done by any grosser application . the particular way of their conveyance , and their regular direction is handsomly explicated by that learned knight , and recommended to the ingenious by most witty and becoming illustrations . it is out of my way here to enquire whether the anima mundi be not a better account , then any mechanical solutions . the former is more desperate , the later hath more of ingenuity , then solid satisfaction . it is enough for me that de facto there is such an entercourse between the magnetick unguent and the vulnerated body , and i need not be solicitous of the cause . these theories i presume will not be importunate to the ingenious : and therefore i have taken the liberty ( which the quality of an essay will well enough allow of ) to touch upon them , though seemingly collateral to my scope . and yet i think , they are but seemingly so , since they do pertinently illustrate my design , viz. that what seems impossible to us , may not be so in nature ; and therefore the dogmatist wants this to compleat his demonstration , that 't is impossible to be otherwise . now i intend not by any thing here to invalidate the certainty of truths either mathematical or divine . these are superstructed on principles that cannot fail us , except our faculties do constantly abuse us . our religious foundations are fastned at the pillars of the intellectual world , and the grand articles of our belief as demonstrable as geometry . nor will ever either the subtile attempts of the resolved atheist ; or the passionate hurricanoes of the phrentick enthusiast , any more be able to prevail against the reason our faith is built on , than the blustring windes to blow out the sun. and for mathematical sciences , he that doubts their certainty , hath need of a dose of hellebore . nor yet can the dogmatist make much of these concessions in favour of his pretended science ; for our discourse comes not within the circle of the former : and for the later , the knowledge we have of the mathematicks , hath no reason to elate us ; since by them we know but numbers , and figures , creatures of our own , and are yet ignorant of our maker's . ( . ) we cannot know any thing of nature but by an analysis of it to its true initial causes : and till we know the first springs of natural motions , we are still but ignorants . these are the alphabet of science , and nature cannot be read without them . now who dares pretend to have seen the prime motive causes , or to have had a view of nature , while she lay in her simple originals ? we know nothing but effects , and those but by our senses . nor can we judge of their causes , but by proportion to palpable causalities conceiving them like those within the sensible horizon . now 't is no doubt with the considerate , but that the rudiments of nature are very unlike the grosser appearances . thus in things obvious , there 's but little resemblance between the mucous sperm , and the compleated animal . the egge is not like the oviparous production : nor the corrupted muck like the creature that creeps from it . there 's but little similitude betwixt a terreous humidity , and plantal germinations ; nor do vegetable derivations ordinarily resemble their simple scminalities . so then , since there 's so much dissimilitude between cause and effect in the more palpable phaenomena , we can expect no less between them , and their invisible efficients . now had our senses never presented us with those obvious seminal principles of apparent generations , we should never have suspected that a plant or animal could have proceeded from such unlikely materials : much less , can we conceive or determine the uncompounded initials of natural productions , in the total silence of our senses . and though the grand secretary of nature , the miraculous des-cartes have here infinitely out-done all the philosophers went before him , in giving a particular and analytical account of the universal fabrick : yet he intends his principles but for hypotheses , and never pretends that things are really or necessarily , as he hath supposed them : but that they may be admitted pertinently to solve the phaenomena , and are convenient supposals for the use of life . nor can any further account be expected from humanity , but how things possibly may have been made consonantly to sensible nature : but infallibly to determine , how they truly were effected , is proper to him only that saw them in the chaos , and fashion'd them out of that confused mass . for to say , the principles of nature must needs be such as our philosophy makes them , is to set bounds to omnipotence , and to confine infinite power and wisdom to our shallow models . chap. xxii . ( ) because of the mutual dependence and concatenation of causes , we cannot know any one without knowing all . particularly declared by instances . ( ) all our science comes in at our senses ; their infallibility inquir'd into . the authors design in this last particular . ( ) . according to the notion of the dogmatist , we know nothing , except we knew all things , and he that pretends to science affects an omniscience . for all things being linkt together by an uninterrupted chain of causes ; and every single motion owning a dependence on such a syndrome of prae-required motors : we can have no true knowledge of any , except we comprehended all , and could distinctly pry into the whole method of causal concatenations . thus we cannot know the cause of any one motion in a watch , unless we were acquainted with all its motive dependences , and had a distinctive comprehension of the whole mechanical frame . and would we know but the most contemptible plant that grows , almost all things that have a being must contribute to our knowledge : for , that to the perfect science of any thing it 's necessary to know all its causes ; is both reasonable in its self , and the sense of the dogmatist . so that , to the knowledge of the poorest simple , we must first know its efficient , the manner , and method of its efformation , and the nature of the plastick . to the comprehending of which , we must have a full prospect into the whole archidoxis of nature's secrets , and the immense profundities of occult philosophy : in which we know nothing till we compleatly ken all magnetick , and sympathetick energies , and their most hidden causes . and ( ) if we contemplate a vegetable in its material principle , and look on it as made of earth ; we must have the true theory of the nature of that element , or we miserably fail of our scientifical aspirings , and while we can only say , 't is cold and dry , we are pitiful knowers . but now , to profound into the physicks of this heterogeneous masse , to discern the principles of its constitution , and to discover the reason of its diversities , are absolute requisites of the science we aim at . nor can we tolerably pretend to have those without the knowledge of minerals , the causes and manner of their concretions , and among the rest , the magnet , with its amazing properties . this directs us to the pole , and thence our disquisition is led to the whole systeme of the heavens : to the knowledge of which , we must know their motions , and the causes , and manner of their rotations , as also the reasons of all the planetary phaenomena , and of the comets , their nature , and the causes of all their irregular appearings . to these , the knowledge of the intricate doctrine of motion , the powers , proportions , and laws thereof , is requisite . and thus we are engaged in the objects of geometry and arithmetick , yea the whole mathematicks , must be contributary , and to them all nature payes a subsidy . besides , plants are partly material'd of water , with which they are furnisht either from subterranean fountains , or the clouds . now to have the true theory of the former , we must trace the nature of the sea , its origen ; and hereto its remarkable motions of flux and reflux . this again directs us to the moon , and the rest of the celestial faces . the moisture that comes from the clouds is drawn up in vapours : to the scientifical discernment of which , we must know the nature and manner of that action , their suspense in the middle region , the qualities of that place , and the causes and manner of their precipitating thence again : and so the reason of the sphaerical figure of the drops ; the causes of windes , hail , snow , thunder , lightning , with all other igneous appearances , with the whole physiology of meteors must be enquired into . and again ( ) in our disquisition into the formal causes , the knowledge of the nature of colours , is necessary to compleat the science . to be inform'd of this , we must know what light is ; and light being effected by a motion on the organs of sense , 't will be a necessary requisite , to understand the nature of our sensitive faculties , and to them the essence of the soul , and other spiritual subsistences . the manner how it is materially united , and how it is aware of corporeal motion . the seat of sense , and the place where 't is principally affected : which cannot be known but by the anatomy of our parts , and the knowledge of their mechanical structure . and if further ( ) we contemplate the end of this minute effect , its principal final cause , being the glory of its maker , leads us into divinity ; and for its subordinate , as 't is design'd for alimental sustenance to living creatures , and medicinal uses to man , we are conducted into zoography , and the whole body of physick . thus then , to the knowledge of the most contemptible effect in nature , 't is necessary to know the whole syntax of causes , and their particular circumstances , and modes of action . nay , we know nothing , till we know our selves , which are the summary of all the world without us , and the index of the creation . nor can we know our selves without the physiology of corporeal nature , and the metaphysicks of souls and angels . so then , every science borrows from all the rest ; and we cannot attain any single one , without the encyclopaedy . ( ) the knowledge we have comes from our senses , and the dogmatist can go no higher for the original of his certainty . now let the sciolist tell me , why things must needs be so , as his individual senses represent them ? is he sure , that objects are not otherwise sensed by others , then they are by him ? and why must his sense be the infallible criterion ? it may be , what is white to us , is black to negroes , and our angels to them are fiends . diversity of constitution , or other circumstances varies the sensation , and to them of iava pepper is cold . and though we agree in a common name , yet it may be , i have the same representation from yellow , that another hath from green . thus two look upon an alabaster statue ; he call's it white , and i assent to the appellation : but how can i discover , that his inward sense on 't is the same that mine is ? it may be , alabaster is represented to him , as jet is to me , and yet it is white to us both . we accord in the name : but it 's beyond our knowledge , whether we do so in the conception answering it . yea , the contrary is not without its probability . for though the images , motions , or whatever else is the cause of sense , may be alike as from the object ; yet may the representations be varyed according to the nature and quality of the recipient . that 's one thing to us looking through a tube , which is another to our naked eyes . the same things seem otherwise through a green glass , then they do through a red . thus objects have a different appearance , when the eye is violently any way distorted , from that they have , when our organs are in their proper site and figure , and some extraordinary alterations in the brain duplicate that which is but a single object to our undistemper'd sentient . thus , that 's of one colour to us standing in one place , which hath a contrary aspect in another : as in those versatile representations in the neck of a dove , and folds of scarlet . and as great diversity might have been exemplified in the other senses , but for brevity i omit them . now then , since so many various circumstances concurre to every individual constitution , and every mans senses , differing as much from others in its figure , colour , site , and infinite other particularities in the organization , as any one mans can from it self , through diverse accidental variations : it cannot well be suppos'd otherwise , but that the conceptions convey'd by them must be as diverse . thus , one mans eyes are more protuberant , and swelling out ; anothers more sunk and depressed . one mans bright , and sparkling , and as it were swimming in a subtile , lucid moisture ; anothers more dull and heavy , and destitute of that spirituous humidity . the colour of mens eyes is various , nor is there less diversity in their quantitative proportions . and if we look further into the more inward constitution , there 's more variety in the internal configurations , than in the visible out-side . for let us consider the different qualities of the optick nerves , humors , tunicles , and spirits ; the divers figurings of the brain ; the strings , or filaments thereof ; their difference in tenuity and aptness for motion : and as many other circumstances , as there are individuals in humane nature ; all these are diversified according to the difference of each crasis , and are as unlike , as our faces . from these diversities in all likelyhood will arise as much difference in the manner of the reception of the images , and consequently as various sensations . so then , how objects are represented to my self ; i cannot be ignorant , being conscious to mine own cogitations ; but in what manner they are received , and what impresses they make upon the so differing organs of another , he only knows , that feels them . there is an obvious an easie objection , which i have sufficiently caveated against ; and with the considerate it will signifie no more then the inadvertency of the objectors . 't will be thought by slight discerners a ridiculous paradox , that all men should not conceive of the objects of sense alike ; since their agreement in the appellation seems so strong an argument of the identity of the sentiment . all , for instance , say , that snow is white , and that jet is black , is doubted by none . but yet 't is more then any man can determine , whether his conceit of what he cals white , be the same with anothers ; or whether , the notion he hath of one colour be not the same another hath of a very diverse one . so then , to direct all against the knowing ignorant , what he hath of sensible evidence , the very ground-work of his demonstration , is but the knowledge of his own resentment : but how the same things appear to others , they only know , that are conscious to them ; and how they are in themselves , only he that made them . thus have i in this last particular play'd with the dogmatist in a personated scepticism : and would not have the design of the whole discourse measur'd by the seeming tendency of this part on 't . the sciolist may here see , that what he counts of all things most absurd and irrational , hath yet considerable shew of probability to plead its cause , and it may be more then some of his presumed demonstrations . 't is irreprehensible in physitians to cure their patient of one disease , by casting him into another , less desperate . and i hope , i shall not deserve the frown of the ingenuous for my innocent intentions ; having in this only imitated the practice of bending a crooked stick as much the other way , to straighten it . and if by this verge to the other extream , i can bring the opinionative confident but half the way , viz. that discreet modest aequipoize of judgement , that becomes the sons of adam ; i have compast what i aim at . chap. xxiii . considerations against dogmatizing . ( ) 't is the effect of ignorance . ( ) it inhabits with untamed passions , and an ungovern'd spirit . ( ) it is the great disturber of the world . ( ) it is ill manners , and immodesty . ( ) it holds men captive in error . ( ) it betrayes a narrowness of spirit . i expect but little success of all this upon the dogmatist , his opinion'd assurance is paramont to argument , and 't is almost as easie to reason him out of a feaver , as out of this disease of the mind , i hope for better fruit from the more generous vertuoso's , to such i appeal against dogmatizing , in the following considerations ; that 's well spent upon impartial ingenuity , which is lost upon resolved prejudice . . opinionative confidence is the effect of ignorance , and were the sciolist perswaded so , i might spare my further reasons against it : 't is affectation of knowledge , that makes him confident he hath it , and his confidence is counter evidence to his pretensions to knowledge . he is the greatest ignorant , that knows not that he is so : for 't is a good degree of science , to be sensible that we want it . he that knows most of himself , knows least of his knowledge , and the exercised understanding is conscious of its disability . now he that is so , will not lean too assuredly on that , which hath so frequently deceived him , nor build the castle of his intellectual security , in the air of opinions . but for the shallow passive intellects , that were never ingag'd in a through search of verity , 't is such are the confidents that ingage their irrepealable assents to every slight appearance . thus meer sensible conceivers , make every thing they hold a sacrament , and the silly vulgar are sure of all things . there was no theoreme in the mathematicks more certain to archimedes , then the earth's immoveable quiescence seems to the multitude : nor then did the impossibility of antipodes , to antique ages . and if great philosophers doubt of many things , which popular dijudicants hold as certain as their creeds , i suppose ignorance it self will not say , it is because they are more ignorant . superficial pedants will swear their controversal uncertainties , while wiser heads stand in bivio . opinions are the rattles of immature intellects , but the advanced reasons have out-grown them . true knowledge is modest and wary , 't is ignorance that is so bold , and presuming . thus those that never travail'd without the horizon , that first terminated their infant aspects , will not be perswaded that the world hath any countrey better then their own : while they that have had a view of other regions , are not so confidently perswaded of the precedency of that , they were bred in , but speak more indifferently of the laws , manners , commodities , and customs of their native soil : so they that never peep 't beyond the common belief in which their easie understandings were at first indoctrinated , are indubitately assur'd of the truth , and comparative excellency of their receptions , while the larger souls , that have travail'd the divers climates of opinions , are more cautious in their resolves , and more sparing to determine . and let the most confirm'd dogmatist profound far into his indeared opinions , and i 'le warrant him 't will be an effectual cure of confidence . ( ) confidence in opinions evermore dwells with untamed passions , and is maintain'd upon the depraved obstinacy of an ungovern'd spirit . he 's but a novice in the art of autocrasy , that cannot castigate his passions in reference to those presumptions , and will come as far short of wisdom as science : for the judgement being the hegemonical power , and director of action , if it be led by the over-bearings of passion , and stor'd with lubricous opinions in stead of clearly conceived truths , and be peremptorily resolved in them , the practice will be as irregular , as the conceptions erroneous . opinions hold the stirrup , while vice mounts into the saddle . ( ) dogmatizing is the great disturber both of our selves and the world without us : for while we wed an opinion , we resolvedly ingage against every one , that opposeth it . thus every man , being in some of his opinionative apprehensions singular , must be at variance with all men . now every opposition of our espous'd opinions furrows the sea within us , and discomposeth the minds serenity . and what happiness is there in a storm of passions ? on this account the scepticks affected an indifferent aequipondious neutrality as the only means to their ataraxia , and freedom from passionate disturbances . nor were they altogether mistaken in the way , to their design'd felicity , but came short on 't , by going beyond it : for if there be a repose naturally attainable this side the stars , there is no way we can more hopefully seek it in . we can never be at rest , while our quiet can be taken from us by every thwarting our opinions : nor is that content an happiness , which every one can rob us of . there is no felicity , but in a fixed stability . nor can genuine constancy be built upon rowling foundations . 't is true staidness of mind , to look with an equal regard on all things , and this unmoved apathy in opinionative uncertainties , is a warrantable piece of stoicism . besides , this immodest obstinacy in opinions , hath made the world a babel ; and given birth to disorders , like those of the chaos . the primitive fight of elements doth fitly embleme that of opinions , and those proverbial contrarieties may be reconcil'd , as soon as peremptory contenders . that hence grow schisms , heresies , and anomalies beyond arithmetick , i could wish were of more difficult probation . 't were happy for a distemper'd church , if evidence were not so near us . 't is zeal for opinions that hath fill'd our hemisphear with smoke and darkness , and by a dear experience we know the fury of those flames it hath kindled . had not heaven prevented , they had turn'd our paradise into a desert , and made us the habitation of iim , and ohim . 't is lamentable that homo homini daemon , should be a proverb among the professors of the cross , and yet i fear it is as verifiable among them , as of those without the pale of visible christianity . i doubt we have lost s. iohn's sign of regeneration . by this we know that we are past from death , to life , that we love one another , is i fear , to few a sign of their spiritual resurrection . if our returning lord , shall scarse find faith on earth , where will he look for charity ? it is a stranger this side the region of love , and blessedness ; bitter zeal for opinions hath consum'd it . mutual agreement and indearments was the badge of primitive believers , but we may be known by the contrary criterion . the union of a sect within it self , is a pitiful charity : it 's no concord of christians , but a conspiracy against christ ; and they that love one another , for their opinionative concurrences , love for their own sakes , not their lords : not because they have his image , but because they bear one anothers . what a stir is there for mint , anise , and cummin controversies , while the great practical fundamentals are unstudyed , unobserved ? what eagerness in the prosecution of disciplinarian uncertainties , when the love of god and our neighbour , those evangelical unquestionables , want that fervent ardor ? 't is this hath consum'd the nutriment of the great and more necessary verities , and bred differences that are past any accommodation , but that of the last dayes decisions . the sight of that day will resolve us , and make us asham'd of our pety quarrels . thus opinions have rent the world asunder , and divided it almost into indivisibles . had heraclitus liv'd now , he had wept himself into marble , and democritus would have broke his spleen . who can speak of such fooleries without a satyr , to see aged infants so quarrel at put-pin , and the doating world grown child again ? how fond are men of a bundle of opinions , which are no better then a bagge of cherry-stones ? how do they scramble for their nuts , and apples , and how zealous for their pety victories ? methinks those grave contenders about opinionative trifles , look like aged socrates upon his boys hobby-horse , or like something more ludricous : since they make things their feria , which are scarse tolerable in their sportful intervals . ( ) to be confident in opinions is ill manners , and immodesty ; and while we are peremptory in our perswasions , we accuse them all of ignorance and error that subscribe not our assertions . the dogmatist gives the lye to all dissenting apprehenders , and proclaims his judgement fittest , to be the intellectual standard . this is that spirit of immorality , that saith unto dissenters , stand off , i am more orthodox then thou art : a vanity more capital then error . he that affirms that things must needs be as he apprehends them , implies that none can be right till they submit to his opinions , and take him for their director . this is to invert the rule , and to account a mans self better then all men . ( ) obstinacy in opinions holds the dogmatist in the chains of error , without hope of emancipation . while we are confident of all things , we are fatally deceiv'd in most . he that assures himself he never erres , will alwayes erre ; and his presumptions will render all attempts to inform him , ineffectual . we use not to seek further for what we think we are possest of ; and when falshood is without suspicion imbrac't in the stead of truth , and with confidence retained : verity will be rejected as a supposed error , and irreconcileably be hated , because it opposeth what is indeed so . ( ) it betrays a poverty and narrowness of spirit , in the dogmatical assertors . there are a set of pedants that are born to slavery . but the generous soul preserves the liberty of his judgement , and will not pen it up in an opinionative dungeon ; with an equal respect he examins all things , and judgeth as impartially as rhadamanth : when as the pedant can hear nothing but in favour of the conceits he is amorous of ; and cannot see , but out of the grates of his prison . the determinations of the nobler spirit , are but temporary , and he holds them , but till better evidence repeal his former apprehensions . he won't defile his assent by prostituting it to every conjecture , or stuff his belief , with the luggage of uncertainties . the modesty of his expression renders him infallible ; and while he only saith he thinks so , he cannot be deceiv'd , or ever assert a falshood . but the wise monseur charron hath fully discourst of this universal liberty , and sav'd me the labour of inlarging . upon the review of my former considerations , i cannot quarrel with his motto : in a sense ie ne scay , is a justifiable scepticism , and not mis-becoming a candidate of wisdom . socrates in the judgement of the oracle knew more then all men , who in his own knew the least of any . chap. xxiv . an apology for philosophy . it is the glory of philosophy , that ignorance and phrensie are her enemies . now to vindicate this abused excellence from the mis-reports of stupid and enthusiastick ignorants , i 'le subjoyn this brief apology : lest those unintelligent maligners take an advantage from our discourse , to depretiate and detract from what hath been alway the object of their hate , because never of their knowledge , and capacities ; or , which is the greater mischief , lest this should discourage those enlarged souls , who aspire to the knowledge of god , and nature , which is the most venial ambition . if philosophy be uncertain , the former will confidently conclude it vain ; and the later may be in danger of pronouncing the same on their pains , who seek it ; if after all their labour they must reap the wind , meer opinion and conjecture . but there 's a part of philosophy , that owes no answer to the charge . the scepticks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , must have the qualification of an exception ; and at least the mathematicks must be priviledg'd from the endictment . neither yet are we at so deplorable a loss , in the other parts of what we call science ; but that we may meet with what will content ingenuity , at this distance from perfection , though all things will not compleatly satisfie strict and rigid enquiry . philosophy indeed cannot immortalize us , or free us from the inseparable attendants on this state , ignorance , and error . but shall we malign it , because it entitles us not to an omniscience ? is it just to condemn the physitian , because hephestion dyed ? compleat knowledge is reserv'd to gratifie our glorified faculties . we are ignorant of some things from our specifical incapacity , as men ; of more from our contracted , as sinners : and 't is no fault in the spectacles , that the blind man sees not . shall we , like sullen children , because we have not what we would ; contemn what the benignity of heaven offers us ? do what we can , we shall be imperfect in all our attainments ; and shall we scornfully neglect what we may reach , because some things to mortality are denyed ? 't is madness to refuse the largesses of divine bounty on earth , because there is not an heaven in them . shall we not rejoyce at the gladsome approach of day , because it 's over-cast with a cloud , and follow'd by the obscurity of night ? all sublunary vouchsafements have their allay of a contrary ; and uncertainty , in another kind , is the annex of all things this side the sun. even crowns and diadems , the most splendid parts of terrene attains ; are akin to that , which to day is in the field , and to morrow is cut down , and wither'd : he that enjoy'd them , and knew their worth , excepted them not out of the charge of universal vanity . and yet the politician thinks they deserve his pains ; and is not discourag'd at the inconstancy of humane affairs , and the lubricity of his subject . he that looks perfection , must seek it above the empyreum ; it is reserv'd for glory . it 's that alone , which needs not the advantage of a foyl : defects seem as necessary to our now-happiness , as their opposites . the most refulgent colours are the result of light and shadows . venus was never the less beautiful for her mole . and 't is for the majesty of nature , like the persian kings , sometimes to cover , and not alway to prostrate her beauties to the naked view : yea , they contract a kind of splendour from the seemingly obscuring veil ; which adds to the enravishments of her transported admirers . he alone sees all things with an unshadowed comprehensive vision , who eminently is all : only the god of nature perfectly knows her ; and light without darkness is the incommunicable claim of him , that dwells in light inaccessible . 't is no disparagement to philosophy , that it cannot deifie us , or make good the impossible promise of the primitive deceiver . it is that , which she owns above her , that must perfectly remake us after the image of our maker . and yet those raised contemplations of god and nature , wherewith philosophy doth acquaint us ; enlarge and ennoble the spirit , and infinitely advance it above an ordinary level . the soul is alway like the objects of its delight and converse . a prince is as much above a peasant in spirit , as condition : and man as far transcends the beasts in largeness of desire , as dignity of nature and employment . while we only converse with earth , we are like it ; that is , unlike our selves : but when engag'd in more refin'd and intellectual entertainments ; we are somewhat more , then this narrow circumference of flesh speaks us . and , me thinks , those generous vertuoso's , who dwell in an higher region then other mortals ; should make a middle species between the platonical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and common humanity . even our age in variety of glorious examples , can confute the conceit , that souls are equal : and the sole instances of those illustrious heroes , cartes , gassendus , galilaeo , tycho , harvey , more , digby ; will strike dead the opinion of the worlds decay , and conclude it , in its prime . and upon the review of these great sages , me-thinks , i could easily opinion ; that men may differ from men , as much as angels from unbodyed souls : and , it may be , more can be pleaded for such a metaphysical innovation , then can for a specifical diversity among our predicamental opposites . such as these , being in a great part freed from the entanglements of a drossie vehicle , are imploy'd like the spirits above ; in taking a survey of natures riches , and beginning those anthems to their maker , which eternity must consummate . this is one part of the life of souls . while we indulge to the sensitive or plantal life , our delights are common to us with the creatures below us : and 't is likely , they exceed us as much as in them , as in the senses their subjects ; and that 's a poor happiness for man to aim at , in which beasts are his superiours . but those mercurial souls , which were only lent the earth to shew the world their folly in admiring it ; possess delights , which as it were antedate immortality , and [ though at an humble distance ] resemble the joys above . the sun and stars , are not the worlds eyes , but these : the celestial argus cannot glory in such an universal view . these out-travel theirs , and their monarchs beams : skipping into vortexes beyond their light and influence ; and with an easie twinkle of an intellectual eye look into the centre , which is obscur'd from the upper luminaries . this is somewhat like the image of omnipresence : and what the hermetical philosophy saith of god , is in a sense verifiable of the thus ennobled soul , that its centre is every where , but it 's circumference no where . this is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and what plotinus calls so , the divine life , is somewhat more . those that live but to the lower concupiscible , and relish no delights but sensual ; it 's by the favour of a metaphor , that we call them men. as aristotle saith of brutes , they have but the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , only some shews and apish imitations of humane ; and have little more to justifie their title to rationality , then those mimick animals , the supposed posterity of cham : who , had they retain'd the priviledge of speech , which some of the fathers say they they own'd before the fall ; it may be they would plead their cause with them , and have laid strong claim to a parity . such , as these , are philosophies maligners , who computing the usefulness of all things , by what they bring to their barns , and treasures ; stick not to pronounce the most generous contemplations , needless unprofitable subtilties : and they might with as good reason say , that the light of their eyes was a superfluous provision of nature , because it fills not their bellies . thus the greatest part of miserable humanity is lost in earth : and , if man be an inversed plant ; these are inversed men , who forgetting that sursum , which nature writ in their foreheads , take their roots in this sordid element . but the philosophical soul is an inverted pyramid ; earth hath but a point of this aethereal cone . aquila non captat muscas , the royal eagle flyes not but at noble game ; and a young alexander will not play but with monarchs . he that hath been cradled in majesty , and used to crowns and scepters ; will not leave the throne to play with beggars at put-pin , or be fond of tops and cherry-stones : neither will a soul , that dwells with stars , dabble in this impurer mud ; or stoop to be a play-fellow and copartner in delights with the creatures , that have nought but animal . and though it be necessitated by its relation to flesh to a terrestrial converse ; yet 't is , like the sun , without contaminating its beams . for , though the body by a kind of magnetism be drawn down to this sediment of universal dreggs ; yet the thus impregnate spirit contracts a verticity to objects above the pole : and , like as in a falling torch , though the grosser materials hasten to their element ; yet the flame aspires , and , could it master the dulness of its load would carry it beyond the central activity of the terraqueous magnet . such souls justifie aristotles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and in allayed sense that title , which the stoicks give it , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if we say , they are not in their bodies , but their bodies in them ; we have the authority of the divine plato to vouch us : and by the favour of an easie simile we may affirm them to be to the body , as the light of a candle to the gross , and faeculent snuff ; which , as it is not pent up in it , so neither doth it partake of its stench and and impurity . thus , as the roman oratour elegantly descants , erigimur , & latiores fieri videmur ; humana despicimus , contemplantesque supera & coelestia , haec nostra , ut exigua & minima , contemnimus . and yet there 's an higher degree , to which philosophy sublimes us . for , as it teacheth a generous contempt of what the grovelling desires of creeping mortals idolize and dote on ; so it raiseth us to love and admire an object , that is as much above terrestrial , as infinity can make it . if plutarch may have credit , the observation of natures harmony in the celestial motions was one of the first inducements to the belief of a god : and a greater then he affirms , that the visible things of the creation declare him , that made them . what knowledge we have of them , we have in a sense of their authour . his face cannot be beheld by creature-opticks , without the allay of a reflexion ; and nature is one of those mirrours , that represents him to us . and now the more we know of him , the more we love him , the more we are like him , the more we admire him . 't is here , that knowledge wonders ; and there 's an admiration , that 's not the daughter of ignorance . this indeed stupidly gazeth at the unwonted effect : but the philosophick passion truly admires and adores the supreme efficient . the wonders of the almighty are not seen , but by those that go down into the deep . the heavens declare their makers glory ; and philosophy theirs , which by a grateful rebound returns to its original source . the twinkling spangles , the ornaments of the upper world ; lose their beauty and magnificence ; while they are but the objects of our narrow'd senses : by them the half is not told us ; and vulgar spectators see them , but as a confused huddle of pety illuminants . but philosophy doth right to those immense sphears ; and advantagiously represents their glories , both in the vastness of their proportions , and regularity of their motions . if we would see the wonders of the globe we dwell in ; philosophy must reare us above it . the works of god speak forth his mighty praise : a speech not understood , but by those that know them . the most artful melody receives but little tribute of honour from the gazing beasts ; it requires skill to relish it . the most delicate musical accents of the indians , to us are but inarticulate hummings ; as questionless are ours to their otherwise tuned organs . ignorance of the notes and proportions , renders all harmony unaffecting . a gay puppet pleaseth children more , then the exactest piece of unaffected art : it requires some degrees of perfection , to admire what is truly perfect ; as it 's said to be an advance in oratory to relish cicero . indeed the unobservant multitude , may have some general confus'd apprehensions of a kind of beauty , that guilds the outside frame of the universe : but they are natures courser wares , that lye on the stall , expos'd to the transient view of every common eye ; her choicer riches are lock't up only for the sight of them , that will buy at the expence of sweat and oyl . yea , and the visible creation is far otherwise apprehended by the philosophical inquirer , then the unintelligent vulgar . thus the physitian looks with another eye on the medicinal hearb , then the grazing oxe , which swoops it in with the common grass : and the swine may see the pearl , which yet he values but with the ordinary muck ; it 's otherwise pris'd by the skilful ieweller . and from this last article , i think , i may conclude the charge , which hot-brain'd folly lays in against philosophy ; that it leads to irreligion , frivolous and vain . i dare say , next after the divine word , it 's one of the best friends to piety . neither is it any more justly accountable for the impious irregularities of some , that have payd an homage to its shrine ; then religion it self for the sinful extravagances both opinionative and practical of high pretenders to it . it is a vulgar conceit , that philosophy holds a confederacy with atheism it self ; but most injurious : for nothing can better antidote us against it ; and they may as well say , that physitians are the only murtherers . a philosophick atheist , is as good sense as a divine one : and i dare say the proverb , ubi tres medici , duo athei , is a scandal . i think the original of this conceit might be ; that the students of nature , conscious to her more cryptick ways of working , resolve many strange effects into the nearer efficiency of second causes ; which common ignorance and superstition attribute to the immediate causality of the first : thinking it to derogate from the divine power , that any thing which is above their apprehensions , should not be reckon'd above natures activity ; though it be but his instrument , and works nothing but as impower'd from him . hence they violently declaim against all , that will not acknowledge a miracle in every extraordinary effect , as setting nature in the throne of god ; and so it 's an easie step to say , they deny him . when as indeed , nature is but the chain of second causes ; and to suppose second causes without a first , is beneath the logick of gotham . neither can they [ who , to make their reproach of philosophy more authentick , alledge the authority of an apostle to conclude it vain ] upon any whit more reasonable terms make good their charge ; since this allegation stands in force but against its abuse , corrupt sophistry , or traditionary impositions , which lurk'd under the mask of so serious a name : at the worst , the text will never warrant an universal conclusion any more ; then that other , where the apostle speaks of silly women , ( who yet are the most rigid urgers of this ) can justly blot the sex with an unexceptionable note of infamy . now , what i have said here in this short apology for philosophy , is not so strictly verifiable of any that i know , as the cartesian . the entertainment of which among truly ingenuous unpossest spirits , renders an after-commendation superfluous and impertinent . it would require a wit like its authors , to do it right in an encomium . the strict rationality of the hypothesis in the main , and the critical coherence of its parts , i doubt not but will bear it down to posterity with a glory , that shall know no term , but the universal ruines . neither can the pedantry , or prejudice of the present age , any more obstruct its motion in that supreme sphear , wherein its desert hath plac'd it ; then can the howling wolves pluck cynthia from her orb ; who regardless of their noise , securely glides through the undisturbed aether . censure here will disparage it self , not it . he that accuseth the sun of darkness , shames his own blind eyes ; not its light . the barking of cynicks at that hero 's chariot-wheels , will not sully the glory of his triumphs . but i shall supersede this endless attempt : sun-beams best commend themselves . finis . the contents . chap. i. a display of the perfections of innocence ; with a conjecture at the manner of adams knowledge . page . chap. ii. our decay , and ruines by the fall , descanted on : of the now scantness of our knowledge . . chap. iii. instances of our ignorance ( ) of things within our selves . the nature of the soul , and its origine glanc't at , and past by . ( ) it 's union with the body is unconceiveable : so ( ) is its moving the body consider'd either in the way of sir k. digby , des-cartes , or dr. h. more , and the platonists . ( ) the manner of direction of the spirits as unexplicable . . chap. iv. ( ) we can give no account of the manner of sensation : nor ( ) of the nature of the memory . it is consider'd according to the philosophy of des-cartes , sir k. digby , aristotle , and mr. hobbs , and all in-effectual . some other unexplicables mention'd . . chap. v. ( ) how our bodies are form'd , unexplicable . the plastick signifies nothing . the formation of plants , and animals unknown , in their principle . mechanism solves it not . a new way propounded , which also fails of satisfaction . ( ) no account is yet given how the parts of matter are united . some considerations on des-cartes his hypothesis ; it fails of solution . ( ) the question is unanswerable , whether matter be compounded of divisibles , or indivisibles . . chap. vi. difficulties about the motion of a wheel , which admit of no solution . . chap. vii . mens backwardness to acknowledge their own ignorance and errour , though ready to find them in others . the first cause of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. the depth of verity discourst of : as of its admixtion in mens opinions with falshood ; the connexion of truths . and their mutual dependence . a second reason of the shortness of our knowledge , viz. because we can perceive nothing but by proportion to our senses . . chap. viii . a third reason of our ignorance and errour , viz. the impostures and deceits of our senses . the way to rectifie these mis-informations propounded . des-cartes his method the only way to science . the difficulty of the exact performance . . chap. ix . two instances of sensitive deception . ( ) of the quiescence of the earth . four cases in which motion is insensible , applyed to the earth's motion . . chap. x. another instance of the deceptions of our senses : which is of translating the idea of our passions to things without us . in propriety of speech our senses themselves are never deceived ; prov'd by reason , and the authority of st. austin . . chap. xi . a fourth reason of our ignorance and errour , viz. the fallacy of our imaginations . an account of the nature of that faculty ; instances of its deceptions . spirits are not in a place . intellection , volition , decrees , &c. cannot properly be ascrib'd to god. it is not reason that opposeth faith , but phancy . the interest which imagination hath in many of our opinions , in that it impresses a perswasion without evidence . . chap. xii . a fifth reason , the precipitancy of our understandings , the reason of it . the most close ingagements of our minds requisite to the finding of truth ; the difficulties of the performance of it . two instances of our precipitating . . chap. xiii . the sixth reason discourst of , viz. the interest which our affections have in our dijudications . the cause why our affections mislead us . several branches of this mention'd ; and the first , viz. constitutional inclination , largely insisted on . . chap. xiv . a second thing whereby our affections ingage us in errour , is the prejudice of custom and education . a third interest . ( ) love to our own productions . . chap. xv. . our affections are ingag'd by our reverence to antiquity and authority ; our mistake of antiquity ; the unreasonableness of that kind of pedantick adoration . hence the vanity of affecting impertinent quotations : the pedantry on 't is derided . the little improvement of science through its successive derivations , and whence it hath hapned . . chap. xvi . reflexions on the peripatetick philosophy . the generality of its reception , no argument of its deserts ; the first charge against that philosophy . . chap. xvii . . peripatetick philosophy is litigious , it hath no setled constant signification of words ; the inconveniences hereof . aristotle intended the cherishing controversies , prov'd by his own double testimony . some of his impertinent arguings derided . disputes retard , and are injurious to knowledge . peripateticks are most exercised in the controversal parts of philosophy , and know little of the practical and experimental . a touch at school-divinity . . chap. xviii . . it gives no account of the phaenomena . those that are remoter it attempts not ; it speaks nothing pertinent in the most ordinary ; its circular , and general way of solution ; it resolves all things into occult qualities . the absurdity of aristotelian hypothesis of the heavens . the galaxy is no meteor . the heavens are corruptible . comets are above the moon . the sphear of fire derided . aristotle convicted of several other false assertions . . aristotle's philosophy inept for new discoveries . it hath been the author of no one invention : it 's founded on vulgarities , and therefore makes nothing known beyond them . the knowledge of natures out-side , conferrs not to practical improvements : better hopes from the new philosophy . a fifth charge against aristotle's philosophy , it is in many things impious , and self-contradicting ; instances of both propounded . the directing all this to the design of the discourse . a caution , viz. that nothing is here intended in favour of novelty in divinity . the reason why we may imbrace what is new in philosophy , while we reject novelties in theologie . , . chap. xx. it 's quaeried whether there be any science in the sense of the dogmatist : ( ) we cannot know any thing to be the cause of another , but from its attending it ; and this way is not infallible , declared by instances , especially from the philosophy of des-cartes . ( ) there 's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible . we can scarce conclude so of any thing . instances of supposed impossibles , which are none . a story of a scholar that turn'd gipsy ; and of the power of imagination : of one mans binding anothers thought , and a conjecture at the manner of its performance . , . chap. xxi . another instance of a supposed impossibility which may not be so . of conference at distance by impregnated needles . away of secret conveyance by sympathized hands ; a relation to this purpose . of the magnetick cure of wounds . ( ) we cannot know any thing in nature , without the knowledge of the first springs of natural motion , and these we are ignorant of . des-cartes his philosophy commend●d . chap. xxii . ( ) because of the mutual dependence and concatenation of causes , we cannot know any one without knowing all . particularly declared by instances . ( ) all our science c●mes in at our senses , their infallibility inquired into . chap. xxiii . considerations against dogmatizing , ( ) 't is the effect of ignorance . ( ) . it argues untamed passions . ( ) it disturbs the world . ( ) it is ill manners , and immodesty . ( ) it holds men captive in errour . ( ) it betrayes a narrowness of spirit . . chap. xxiv . an apology for philosophy . . finis . reflections upon the conduct of human life with reference to the study of learning and knowledge : in a letter to the excellent lady, the lady masham / by john norris ... ; to which is annex'd a visitation sermon, by the same author. norris, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing n wing n _partial estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) reflections upon the conduct of human life with reference to the study of learning and knowledge : in a letter to the excellent lady, the lady masham / by john norris ... ; to which is annex'd a visitation sermon, by the same author. norris, john, - . masham, damaris, lady, - . norris, john, - . sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath ... july , . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for s. manship ..., london : . "a sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath" has special t.p., with imprint: london, . advertisement: [ ] p. at end. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. marginal notes. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng church of england -- sermons. knowledge, theory of (religion) -- early works to . sermons, english -- th century. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licens'd , november . . reflections upon the conduct of human life : with reference to the study of learning and knowledge . in a letter to the excellent lady , the lady masham . by iohn norris , m. a. rector of newton st. loe , in somersetshire , near bath ; and late fellow of all souls college in oxford . to which is annex'd , a visitation sermon , by the same author . london , printed for s. manship , at the black bull in cornhil . m dc xc . madam , the affliction your ladyship is under for the loss of your sight is so great , and your complaints upon that occasion so just , that i can neither blame you for the one , nor excuse my self from pittying you for the other . and indeed since you have been so unhappy as to be deprived of the use of your eyes , i think i owe your ladyship so much compassion , that i cannot better employ mine , than in writing you such a consolation , as the opportunity of my new retirement , with the serious reflections i have lately made in it , will suggest . and that i believe will be such , as is more peculiarly adapted to the circumstance of your trouble , which tho occasion'd by a common accident , yet , i find , proceeds upon an uncommon principle . for tho 't is to be presumed that , notwithstanding your great contempt of the world , it must be a considerable part of your affliction to lose the sight of some delectable objects in it , since the wisest of men ( from whom your ladyship cannot much dissent ) after a censure of vanity past upon all things under heaven , is yet forc'd to confess that truly the light is sweet , and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun ; yet i perceive the chief reason why your ladyship is so concern'd for the loss of your sight , is because you are thereby deprived of conversation with your books , and consequently retarded in your earnest pursuit after learning and knowledge . 't is upon this hinge i know that the main weight of your sorrow turns , and therefore you will not want a specific proper for your malady , if you should chance to be convinced that our learning is generally misplaced , and that such an importunate pursuit after learning and knowledge is no way agreeable to the present station and condition of man. for certainly you will no longer lament the loss of your eyes , for disabling you from doing that , which perhaps would not be adviseable for you to do , if you had them again . if therefore you once come to be convinc'd of this , one main ground of your discontent is removed ; and that you may , is the design of the following reflections . the first reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd , for placing learning and knowledge , in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding . i. being naturally more than ordinarily disposed to thoughtfulness , and from the circumstances of my present solitude and retirement further invited to it ; i began one day to fall into a deep meditation upon the conduct of my own , and of humane life . what reflections i made upon my own , are too peculiarly calculated for my proper circumstances , to be of any general use , and therefore i shall not trouble you with them . but as for those past upon the conduct of humane life , i think they are of too general use , and withal of too weighty consequence , not to be communicated . these therefore i shall think worth while to draw up into a little more orderly form than wherein they were first conceived , and present to your ladyships consideration . ii. first then i consider that the conduct of human life must be to the end of human life , which is the same with the end of man , which is happiness . this conduct therefore must be and and necessarily is , in gross to happiness . but now whereas there are two faculties or powers of man , by the right ordering of which this happiness is to be attain'd , vnderstanding and will , therefore more immediately and distinctly , this conduct of human life is in order to the government and exercise of these two faculties , the due regulation of which is the immediate end , to which human life is to be conducted . there is therefore a double conduct of human life , intellectual and moral . iii. as to the moral conduct of human life , i do not intend at present to spend any reflections upon it . not because 't is unexceptionable , but because 't is too obnoxious , the general impertinence and irregularity of it being too open and exposed , to need any . and besides 't is a butt , that has been shot at so often , ever since preaching and writing has been in the world , that 't is now so thick-set with holes , that there is scarce room left to fasten a new arrow in it . . the undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really perfective of it . . the too importunate and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . these are the three cardinal irregularities , i have observ'd in the intellectual conduct of human life , and upon each of these i shall bestow a reflection . vii . the business of this first reflection shall be to tax the general conduct of human life , for placing learning and knowledge , in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the understanding . this i confess to be a charge of more than ordinary severity and boldness ; because it fastens an imputation of folly upon the learned order ( for with them only is my present concern ) and not only so , but also in that very thing wherein they think their wisdom and intellectual accomplishment consists , and upon which they value themselves above the rest of mankind . to question their conduct in any thing else , would be but a trivial charge , and such as they would not only readily pardon , but acknowledge ; it being a common thing with learned men not only to own , but studiously to affect ignorance in things besides their profession , as in secular business , the common affairs of life , the mysteries of trades and the like . but to censure them as defective in that one thing they pretend to , to make that their blind-side where they think they see clearest ; to maintain that they are not only not really wise and knowing , but that generally they don't so much as know what true knowledge is , and that they generally place it in such things as contribute little or nothing to the perfection of that , whereby they really excel the brutes , and would be thought to excel the common sort of men ; this is so high , and so disobliging a charge , that i fear those who from the force of what shall be here urg'd , may be convinc'd of the truth of it , will hardly forgive the boldness of it . viii . but as high a charge as it is , i question not but that it may be , and will be here made good . and that it may appear to be true , we will first of all by way of address or preparation , consider what antecedent grounds of probability there are , that men should generally place learning and knowledge in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the rational part ; and then in the second place we will proceed directly to prove that they do so . ix . as to the first , your ladyship cannot be so little acquainted either with hidden springs , or outward workings of humane nature , as not to have observ'd that however strong and uuiversal is the desire of knowledge , yet men are generally more in love with the fame and reputation of it , than with the thing it self . there are indeed here and there a few humble retired souls that are otherwise disposed , and like your ladyship are so far from loving the fame and credit of knowledge before knowledge it self , that they don't love it at all , but are content to court wisdom privately , and enjoy their own light in the dark . for it may be they consider that be their attainments what they will , fame is a thing of infinite uncertainty and contingency , that it depends more upon the humours of men , or some more secret unaccountable fate , than upon real excellency and merit , that some have the luck to be popular and cry'd up for nothing , when in the mean while others that are really and highly deserving can scarce keep their heads above contempt ; that the world is seldom just to true merit , and that nothing is weigh'd in a falser ballance than real excellency , whether moral or intellectual ; and that there is little reason to expect it should ever be otherwise as long as envy and ignorance hold the scales . then again it may be they consider with themselves , that suppose true worth were secure of reputation , yet what a poor slender good is it ! for what is it to be talk'd of , or pointed at ? should a man be never so popular the antipodes will never hear of him , or if they do , what is he the better for what is said of him there ? and should his fame , like the sun , travael round the whole globe , besides that he is but master of a point when he has all , he can enjoy no more of it but just what he hears , which is inconsiderable . and yet as inconsiderable as it is , 't is like to be his whole portion . for as for posthumous glory , it comes too late to be any thing valuable . he will either not be sensible of it , or despise it . for certainly it must needs be mightily beneath the improvements of a separate state to put any value upon the injudicious praises of poor mortals here below . or suppose that a deceas'd spirit could take any delight in reflecting upon the fame he has left behind him , yet 't is to be considered that the fashion of this world passes away , that those in whose praises he outlives himself , must also shortly dye , and that then his fame will have a funeral , as well as himself . these perhaps , or such like considerations , may prevail with your ladyship and a few more thinking persons , to have but a very cold and indifferent regard for the reputation of learning and knowledge : but as for the generality of mankind it must be own'd that they are fond of it to a strange degree , and are more concern'd to be accounted wise and learned , than really to be so . otherwise i question whether our libraries would be so full as they are . x. but now , tho the generality of men be so passionately and keenly set upon the fame of being learned and knowing , yet ( so little hath nature design'd to gratify this ambitious humour ) there are but a very few that have either a genius and inclination for learning it self , or a capacity of attaining to it . not an inclination , because there is a great variety in the speculative , as well as moral inclinations of men , one being naturally disposed to this sort of study , and another to that , whereas true knowledge whatever it be ( which shall be consider'd in its due place ) is of one determinate kind or nature in general , and consequently must require a certain peculiar frame and disposition of mind . not a capacity , because the generality of men are known to have but indifferent intellectuals , suited to the exigencies of common life , when as true knowledge ( what ever it be ) must be supposed to be a thing of uncommon difficulty , and the study of it a work fit only for sublimer wits , the more elevated and awaken'd part of mankind . xi . now put these two things together , that almost all men would fain be thought learned and knowing , and that there is but here and there one that is naturally made and fitted for true knowledge , and then consider what is like to be the result of this complication . why , the latter few may succeed well in the search of what they were naturally qualified for , and having attain'd to a competency of true knowledge , such as is perfective of the understanding , they find themselves under no temptation to place it in any thing else , or to bring into credit any other sort of knowledge . because having arrived so far , they are either wise enough to undervalue the fame of being learned , or else despair not of attaining it by their proficiency in true knowledge . here therefore they take up their rest . xii . but now what shall we do with the others ? are they to be perswaded that they are not of a make for the study and attainment of learning ? you 'll find it tough work to convince them of that . but suppose it possible that they could be made sensible that they are not like to commence very learned and knowing , yet all the world shall never be able to perswade them to lay aside that natural itch of being so accounted . but you 'll say , tho this inclination be too natural and inbred to be quite laid aside , yet there 's hopes it may be govern'd . no nor that neither . they must put in for the prize , and 't is in vain to disswade them from it . but they must despair of ever winning it in a fair way , being supposed not able to reach the tree of knowledge . true. they have therefore but one way left , and that is , to turn the tables , and cry up something or other for learning which they are capable of . no matter whether it deserve that name , that is , whether it be really perfective of the rational part or no , 't is enough if they can reach it . for those that can't compass true riches , and yet will have the name and credit of it , are put upon the necessity of coyning and counterfeiting . xiii . and truly this supposition seems to me so very reasonable , that were experience altogether silent in the case , and were i utterly unacquainted with the state of learning in the world , yet if i had a draught given me of human nature , and were told how much the ambition of being esteem'd as learned and knowing exceeds both the desire and the ability to be so , and were then ask'd what i thought would be the intellectual conduct of human life , i should without any further enquiry conclude that in all probability men would generally place learning and knowledge in such things as signifie little or nothing to the perfection of the understanding . xiv . but from grounds of probability that they should do so , let us proceed to prove directly that they do so . now in this charge there is something supposed , and something asserted . the supposition is that there are some things , the knowledge of which is little or nothing perfective of the understanding . the assertion is , that learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things . the proof of the supposition will ingage my pen upon the discussion of a very gurious and weighty question , wherein the perfection of the understanding does consist , or what it is that is perfective of the understanding ? which when we have duly fix'd and stated , we shall then have a certain measure to go by in the proof of the assertion . xv. to the question then i answer , that the perfection of the understanding , as that of the will , is either formal or objective . the formal perfection of the understanding , as that of the will , is no other than its exercise or operation , which is thinking and perception , as that of the other is willing and chusing . according to the vulgar maxim , that the perfection of every thing is its operation , which must be understood only of the formal perfection . the objective perfection of the understanding is truth , as that of the will is good. the result of these two perfections joyn'd together , is what in the understanding we call knowledge , and what in the will we call vertue . xvi . our concern is not at present with the formal , but with the objective perfection of the understanding . this we have said in general to be truth , as that of the will is good. and thus far there is neither difficulty , nor controversie . all therefore that further remains to be here considerd , is , what truth that is which is the objective perfection of the understanding , or , what truth that is , in the knowledge of which the perfection of the understanding does consist , xvii . now since there is so great a proportion and correspondence between the understanding and the will , and the perfection of each , the first entrance we shall make upon the resolution of this question shall be to consider , what good that is which is the objective perfection of the will , or , what good that is in the desiring and embracing of which the perfection of the will does consist . which being determin'd , will afford at least a fair ground and occasion , tho not an infallible measure for the determination of the other . xviii . here then 't will be necessary to premise a consideration of the kinds of good . the most general distribution of which i conceive to be into these two , necessary and contingent good . by necessary good i understand that which cannot but be good , that which is always and immutably good . and this comprizes under it the good of the end which is desireable for it self , commonly called pleasant good . and the good of the means , which has an immutable connexion with it , and is desirable for the other , commonly call'd profitable good. by contingent good i understand that which may , or may not be good , and is good , whenever it is so , only upon a positive account , because enjoyn'd by the will of a competent authority . this can never be the good of the end , or a self-desirable good ; nor can it be such a good of the means as has a natural and immutable connexion with it ; but is always an arbitrary and mutable means . xix . this being briefly premised , i shall venture to assert that that good which is the objective perfection of the will is necessary good. either that which is self-desirable , as god the universal , or any other particular pleasant good . or else that which has an immutable connexion with it , as moral good . as for contingent good , that is no otherwise perfective of the will , than in the force and vertue of the necessary good . for obedience to a positive law is no otherwise a vertue , than as 't is included in some general natural law , whereof 't is a contingent instance . which is also the ground commonly assign'd by casuists , why human laws oblige in conscience . according to that of aquinas , lex humana obligat in conscientia , quatenus participat legem aeternam & naturalem . an human law obliges in conscience as much as it partakes of the eternal and natural law. that is , as far as it is founded , or relies upon the immutable will of god and the dictate of natural reason . xx. this is too plain to need much proof , though not so plain but that it may be demonstrated . if then a reason be demanded why the objective perfection of the will is only necessary , not contingent good , 't will be sufficient to say , that that only is perfective of the will , which naturally , and of it self , makes it happy , and wherein she can acquiesce with satisfaction and delight . but this is only necessary good , that which is essentially , intrinsically , and immutably good , either as the end , or as having a natural connexion with it , either of which involves happiness . as for contingent good , that is supposed to be of it self indifferent as to happiness , and tho by positive ordination it may be made a condition of it , yet still it contributes to it only as an arbitrary means , which has no inward goodness in it self , and whose whole moral excellency is deriv'd from some general law of reason , whereof 't is an instance by accident , and in vertue whereof it obliges . thus moses's striking the rock , had nothing morally good or perfective of the will in it , but only as 't was an instance of that general law of obeying the divine will in all things . nor did the vertue of moses consist , properly and strictly speaking , in striking the rock , but in obeying god by striking the rock . xxi . by this it appears what good that is , in the desiring and embracing of which the moral perfection of the will does properly and ultimately consist . that it is necessary , not contingent good . whence we may take instruction how to state the perfection of the understanding , which we shall do by following the same common measure . first then be it here also premised , that as in relation to the will , all good is either necessary or contingent , so in relation to the understanding , all truth is either necessary or contingent . for besides the immediateness of the opposition , which is contradictory , i further consider , that that must be the adaequate division of truth which is of being , truth being a property of being , and such a one , as tho formally and abstractly different ( for the subject must never be included in the precise reason of the property ) is yet materially , and concretely the same with it . but now necessary and contingent is the adequate division of being , therefore also of truth . xxii . by necessary truth i understand that which cannot but be true , that which is always and immutably true. such is god among simple truths , who is immutably what he is , and all the divine ideas which ( as i have elsewhere abundantly explain'd it ) are the very essence of god , as variously imitable or participable , thus or thus . such also among complex truths are all propositions of eternal truth , whether absolute or hypothetical , with all their regular inferences and conclusions , which ( as i have also elsewhere shewn ) are nothing else but the divine ideas themselves as they respect each other according to their several immutable habitudes and combinations . xxiii . by contingent truth i understand that which may or may not be true , that whose truth depends not upon the essence of god. ( that ground and pillar of all necessary truth ) but only upon his meer will and free pleasure , either decreeing or permitting . such among simple truths are all created beings , the whole ectypal world , and all things in it , which tho made according to the eternal and immutable patterns of the divine ideas or archetypal world , yet in themselves are temporary and mutable . such also among complex truths are all those propositions the terms of which have no essential or immutable connexion with each other , but are so and so combined and related , meerly by the decree or permission of him , who is the author of whatever is besides himself . xxiv . under the first order of truths are comprehended all those things which are the matter of those arts and sciences which are built upon stable and immoveable foundations , which depend not upon the system of the present world , but were antecedent to it , and might have been study'd before 't was made , and according to which the world it self was made , such as theology , metaphysics , morality , geometry , &c. together with all those unchangeable rules and measures of reason and consequence which are to be used about them all , which is the subject of that art or science we call logic. under the second order are comprehended all matters of fact , all temporary events , all natural or artificial effects , &c. which are the matter of all arbitrary and mutable sciences ; as history , chronology , knowledge of tongues , &c. which began with this mundan system , and stand or fall with it . xxv . now as that good which is primely and properly perfective of the will is necessary good , so following the same proportion i shall not doubt to assert , that that truth which is primely and properly perfective of the understanding is also necessary truth . and as contingent good is no otherwise perfective of the will , than in the force and vertue of the necessary good ( as was above explain'd ) so likewise contingent truth , is no otherwise perfective of the understanding than in the force and vertue of necessary truth , that is , of the divine ideas wherein 't is contain'd . as for example , when i speculate some particular artificial triangle which is a contingent simple truth , it is no otherwise perfective of my understanding than as it is beheld in its necessary and immutable nature , or ( which is all one ) in the divine idea . and thus again when i form a proposition concerning this triangle , by ascribing to it some property or other , which is a contingent complex truth , this again is no otherwise perfective of my understanding than as it belongs to , and is beheld in the nature of a triangle in common , which is necessary and immutable , being no other than an idea , or a determinate mode of the divine omniformity . so that at length the perfection of the understanding is resolv'd into the knowledge of necessary truth , which is its only objective perfection ; that which is contingent being no way perfective of it , but only in vertue of the other . xxvi . i am ( madam ) very sensible how strange and paradoxical this way of philosophizing will seem to those who are either unaddicted to meditation in general , or not conversant in theories of this kind , and therefore for their sakes , rather than for any inevidence of the argument , i will give some proof and confirmation of it , which i will so order , that it shall be an explanation at the same time . i will therefore first shew that 't is so , and secondly , how and why 't is so . that it is so i prove thus : first , i suppose that god was once when there was nothing besides god. again , i suppose that as the being of god did go before all other being in order of time , so in order of nature it was antecedent even to the will of creating , putting , or permitting any thing . again , i suppose that there was therefore then no other truth but necessary truth , that is , the divine ideas with their several habitudes and complications . i suppose again , that therefore god must be consider'd as knowing then only these necessary truths . and yet i suppose again , that god was as perfect then as he is now ; and consequently , that the divine vnderstanding was as perfect then as now , the nature of god requiring not only that he should be absolutely perfect , but that he should be so in himself . whence i infer , that therefore the whole perfection of the divine understanding is to be resolv'd into the sole knowledge of necessary truths , and that the knowledge of contingent truth gives no perfection to it , any otherwise than as 't is beheld in that which is necessary , as was said before . xxvii . from this process of reasoning , i presume 't is sufficiently evident , that the objective perfection of the divine vnderstanding is only necessary truth , which i take in the first place to be a strong ground of presumption , that the perfection of human vnderstanding does also consist in the same . but to make it further plain that it does so , i suppose again , that nothing were to exist but only god , and one intelligent being ; and that this intelligent being had the full and perfect fruition of god. upon this supposition i enquire , whether this intelligent being would be perfectly happy or no ? without all question he would , as enjoying an all-sufficient good. well , if so , then he must be perfectly happy in his vnderstanding . and yet 't is most certain , that he could then have the knowledge of very little more than necessary truth ; for all that he could possibly know besides , would be only that he himself did exist , and that he knew these necessary truths , and that he was happy in the knowledge of them , and the like . and lest the knowledge of such contingencies should be thought any accumulation to his happiness , we will carry our hypothesis a little further , by supposing that this intelligent being were not to attend to any of his own perfections , or to any of those few contingent truths resulting from them , but were only to contemplate god and the divine ideas ; and then i demand whether his understanding would be sufficiently perfected or no ? 't is necessary to answer in the affirmative , whence 't is also as necessary to conclude , that the only objective perfection of our understanding is necessary truth . xxviii . this i think sufficient to prove that 't is so . i shall now briefly explain the mode of it , by shewing how and why 't is so ; and i account for it after this manner . necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ; and accordingly plato , i remember , calls science a participation of ideas , and the divine ideas are the very essence of god , as 't is variously imitable according to its omniformity : necessary truth therefore is no other than the essence of god , the very substance of the divinity . more particularly , it is the same with the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the second person in the holy triad , who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as philo speaks , the archetypal seal , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the intellectual world , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the archetypal paradigme , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the idea of ideas . whom also the scripture represents as the wisdom of his father , and as the light of the world , and who inlightens every man that comes into it , not only efficiently ( as 't is vulgarly understood ) but also formally , he himself being the truth , and the light , in which we see all things . xxix . these things ( madam ) i only hint to you , referring you for further satisfaction to your deservedly admired monsieur malebranche in his de la recherche de la verité , and to a treatise of mine call'd reason and religion ; where i have purposely treated of the divine ideas , and of our seeing all things in them : in which however whatever is deficient shall be supplied in another latin treatise of a larger compass , now under my hands , and which i shall communicate to the world e're long ( if god please to continue my life and health ) under the title of theoria mundi idealis , sive metaphysica platonica . xxx . however , lest i should be thought to proceed upon a precarious ground , i will here give you one short and evident demonstration that necessary truth is the very essence of god , and then advance . that god is the cause of whatever is besides himself , or that whatever is , is either god or the effect of god , is a clear and acknowledg'd principle . upon which i thus argue : necessary truth is either god , or the effect of god. but it is not the effect of god , therefore it is no other than god himself . xxxi . that it is not the effect of god , is evident from the many absurdities that would follow upon that supposition . for first , god would be then a necessary agent ; for if necessary truth be an effect , 't is a necessary effect , and a necessary effect must have a necessary cause . again , god would not only be a necessary agent , but also ( which is worse ) an vnintelligent agent . the consequence is unavoidable , for if truth be the effect of god , then antecedently to the effecting of it , there was no truth , and consequently no knowledge . again , if necessary truth be the effect of god , then the perfection of the divine understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not god ; nay , upon something created by god. 't will follow again , that god has made something which he cannot destroy . and lastly , to add no more , if necessary truth be the effect of god , then there will be something necessary , immutable , and eternal , &c. besides god. the consequences are all plain , and so are the absurdities . the last of which appeared so great to the excellent monsieur poiret , a stiff opposer of your beloved malebranche , and of the ideal philosophy , that he urges this as one argument against the very being of necessary truth , because then there would be something necessary besides god , not considering that this necessary truth is really one and the same with god himself . and this alone puts by the force of his argument against the being of necessary truth , which however is sufficiently conclusive to the purpose we now aim at , that necessary truth is not the effect of god. for if it were , then his absurdity would come in , and there would be something necessary besides god. since then necessary truth is not the effect of god , it remains by vertue of the premised disjunction , that it must be no other than the very substance and essence of the deity . xxxii . i further consider , that the essence of god is intimately and immediately united to the mind of man ; this is plain from scripture , which tells us that in god is our life , our motion , and our being . and from philosophy , which assures us , that what pervades all things , must needs be immediately united with every thing . and for this , you have the authority of your excellent malebranche , who therefore calls god the place of spirits , as space is the place of bodies . xxxiii . now upon these two suppositions , that necessary truth is the same with god himself , and that the essence of god is immediately united to the mind of man , 't is easie to conceive how and why necessary truth should be the objective perfection of our understanding ; since to make an object perfective of the faculty , nothing else is requisite , than that it be its proper good , and that it be intimately present to it . and this will also sufficiently give us to understand that contingent truth cannot be the objective perfection of the mind ; first , because that is a created being , whereas god alone is our proper good. and secondly , because 't is without us , and cannot be immediately united to our minds , without which condition , were it never so perfective otherwise , it could contribute nothing to the perfection of our understandings . xxxiv . and thus have i given a full resolution to that curious and important question which the proof of my supposition ingaged me upon , and which is to be the measure of what follows in this reflection . it is plain from hence , that there are some things the knowledge whereof is little or nothing perfective of the understanding . for as i have shewn , 't is not contingent but necessary truth , wherein the perfection of the understanding does consist . whence it follows that true learning ought to be placed in the knowledge of necessary truth , in the comprehension of those arts and sciences whose foundations are not arbitrary , but stable and immutable , and in understanding the eternal and unchangeable laws and measures of reason and consequence . he therefore is the truly learned and knowing man , who has furnish'd his mind with bright and clear ideas , lodg'd them orderly and regularly in his head , and settled the relations and consequences of one to another . he that is able to think clearly and distinctly ( for so much a man knows , as he distinctly understands , and no more ) to judge truly and solidly , and to reason dependently and consequentially . in short , he that sees most of the divine ideas , is most familiarly conversant in the intelligible world , and has the largest and the clearest view of the field of truth . this i hold to be learning , and intellectual perfection , and besides what arguments i have alledged in behalf of this hypothesis ; it is further confirmed by the authority of plato , when he makes the happiness or perfection of man ( for 't is all one ) to consist in the contemplation of ideas . xxxv . but notwithstanding the unquestionable certainty of the premises , this is not that measure which the generality of the world has thought fit to proceed by . learning is generally placed in the knowledge of contingent , not of necessary truth . for your ladyship very well knows that the world does not esteem him a learned man whose learning has clear'd his understanding , who is arrived to clearness and distinctness of conception , and is a thorough master of notion and discourse . no , 't will cost great pains , great labour of mind , and anxiety of thinking to arrive to this pitch . nor will all the pains in the world do , unless a man be naturally made for it , unless he be of a notional complexion , and has had his head cast in a metaphysical mould . whereupon this attainment is like to be the lot of a very few . this therefore must not be learning , but something else must , that lies more within common reach , tho of no real moment to the perfection of the understanding . such ( as i have shewn ) are contingent truths , and yet learning is generally placed in the knowledge of these . xxxvi . for first , 't is reckon'd a notable point of learning to understand variety of languages . this alone gives a man a title to learning without one grain of sense ; and on the other side , let a man be an angel for notion and discourse , yet unless he can express the same thoughts in variety of words , he may go for a rational , but will by no means be esteem'd a learned man. and this brings to my mind a passage which i met with not long since in london , where being in company with an ingenious french man , i ask't him of what repute m. malebranche was with the learned in france ? he told me , that he was look'd upon as a great master of notion and speculation , but as a man of no great learning . i ask'd him , why ? because , said he , he understands but few languages . how much that excellent authors talent may lie that way i am not concern'd . but whatever it be , the most learned of them all must give me leave to say , that i would rather be master of a quarter of his sense , than of all the languages that may be form'd out of the alphabet . but is it not a strange thing that so much stress should be laid upon such a triflle ? for what am i the better for being able to tell what 't is a clock in several languages ? what does this signifie to the perfection of my understanding ? words are purely in order to thought and sense , and therefore are of no further value than as they serve as helps either to learn , or to communicate the other . to affect them therefore for themselves , is to turn the means into the end , than which nothing is more absurd . and yet this vain peice of pedantry has prevail'd all the world over , and with some to that degree , that they have confounded ideas with words , and have made all science to terminate in the latter . thus the philosophers of the nominal way , and particularly mr. hobbs who makes reason to be nothing else but sequela nominum , a well order'd train of words . never certainly was there a grosser peice of idolatry , nor a plainer argument of the great degeneracy of mankind . and tho all the multipliers of tongues are not comprehended under this latter charge , yet it may concern them to consider , how great a folly it must needs be , to place learning in that , which is one of the greatest curses upon earth , and which shall utterly cease in heaven . xxxvii . again , it passes for an extraordinary part of learning to understand history , that is , in other words , to know what a company of silly creatures , call'd men , have been doing for almost this years . now what is my understanding the perfecter for knowing this ? i deny not but that there are some matters of fact , as the more remarkable turns of ecclesiastical history , together with the greater revolutions of the civil world , that may be of moment to be known , not that the knowledge of them as such is learning , or perfective of the understanding , but because by discovering to us the conduct of divine providence they supply us with occasions of adoring and glorifying the wisdom and goodness of god. i am not therefore against the knowing these things , but only i would not have men think themselves the wiser or more learned for such knowledge . for 't is one thing to say that a thing deserves to be known , and another to say that 't is learning or wisdom to know it . for a thing may deserve to be known , not as perfecting the understanding , but meerly as touching upon our interest . i grant therefore that it may be of consequence to know some historical passages , if we are any way concerned in them , and so it may to know the clock has struck one , if i have appointed an assignation at that time ; but sure the bare naked theory of the clock's having struck one , can add but little to the stock of my intellectual perfection . the most trivial matter of fact in the world is worth knowing , if i have any concern depending upon it ; and the greatest without that is utterly insignificant . so that 't is not from the perfecting of our vnderstanding , but from the relation they have to our interest , that these things deserve to be known . xxxviii . this is sufficiently plain from the measure we have premised , by which no truth is perfective of the understanding but only necessary truth . but to address my self more convincingly to the great magnifiers of history , i shall only desire their answer to this one question . suppose such and such matters of fact , on the knowledge of which they found their title to learning , and perhaps , glory more in the knowing them , than the actors themselves did in the doing them . suppose , i say , such matters of fact had never been done ; suppose fabius had never weather'd out hannibal by delays ; nor cyrus took babylon by draining the river into the ditches , what loss or diminution would this have been to the perfection of their understandings ? they cannot say it would have been any . and why then should the knowing them now they are done , be reckon'd as an intellectual improvement ? and yet we find that 't is so , and that men study these things not only for their use ( for that i allow ) but for their meer theory , placing learning in such history , which has nothing to commend it but only that it tells you such and such things were done . of this impertinent sort is the greatest part of the roman and grecian history , which ( had not the world voted it for learning ) would no more concern a man to know , than that a bird has dropt a feather upon the pyrenoean mountains . xxxix . again , it goes for a notable piece of learning to understand chronology , to be able to adjust the intervals and distances of time , to know when such an action was done , when such a famous man flourish'd , and who and who were contemporary , and the like . now i deny not , but that while men live in this world , they may be concern'd to have some acquaintance with these things , by reason of some interest or other that depends upon it . it may therefore , i say , for some purposes , be convenient to know that . for instance , there is a twofold aera ( or date ) of the victory at actium , the one reckon'd from the fight at the promontory of actium , according to the account of dio and xiphilinus ; the other from the taking of alexandria , and the death of cleopatra , according to ptolemy , iosephus , eusebius , and censorinus . but however , concerning this may be , with respect to its usefulness , yet certainly as to any intellectual perfection that accrues by it , it must needs be a very unedifying stuffage of mind ; and yet 't is counted a great accomplishment and enrichment of it . xl. another thing there is which passes for wonderful learning , which i cannot well reduce either to necessary or contingent truth , for indeed it does not belong to truth at all , and that is our sophistical way of disputation . and indeed it may well be call'd so , for as 't is generally manag'd , 't is nothing but meer quibbling and jesting , not arguing but punning . for suppose the question be , whether he that has faith shall be saved ? no says the opponent , if the damn'd have faith , then not every one that has faith shall be saved ; but the damn'd have faith. therefore , &c here 't is plain that the word faith , tho it has something in common in both propositions , yet according to the intire idea signifies one thing in one proposition , and another in another . and why then is not the whole proceedure to be rejected as idle and impertinent ? as for downright fallacy and equivocation where there is a manifest ambiguity ( as between dog and dog , one signifying a celestial sign , and the other a terrestial animal ) this is every where despised and laught at as unbecoming both the acumen and the gravity of a disputant . and we think we have sufficiently discharged our hands of such an argument , by crying out that these are four terms in the syllogism . but now i would fain know whether it be not the same to all real purposes in the foremention'd instance , which is after the common way of our scholastic disputation ? is not faith and faith there , as much an ambiguity as dog and dog here ? for my part i can perceive but this only difference , that dog and dog have nothing in common but the name , whereas faith and faith have some generical part wherein they agree . but what does this mend the matter ? for tho there be some generical agreement , yet take 'em according to their whole ideas , that is , take the generical part with its contracting difference , and 't is plain that they signifie two different things , and consequently that there is really as great an ambiguity here as there . and this we plainly confess when we come to distinguish . for what is a distinction but a pointing out of an ambiguity ? what is it else but to say , that such a thing is true in this sense , but not in that , true in that sense wherein the point of the question is not concern'd , but not in that wherein it is . no ? why then , notwithstanding the generical agreement the procedure is as fallacious and impertinent as when the question being about star-dog , the opposition is about land-dog . and yet ( such is the inconsistency of human judgment ) the one is counted trifling , and the other serious arguing . whereas indeed no arguing can be so , but where the terms of the question are first defined ( as is done in geometry ) and then always used according to the first stated sense . all disputing any otherwise than so , must necessarily be nothing else but meer punning , only much worse than what is in common use , because 't is punning when a man pretends to be serious . and yet this is made a considerable part of our academical education and learning . and to this i add this further remark , that 't is reckon'd a notable excellence to be able to spin out an argument to a great length , and he is counted the best arguer that can thus pun longest . whereas indeed did a man speak to the purpose , brevity would be his greatest excellence . xli . there are many other things which the unaccountable humour of the world has turn'd up for learning , which ignorance will never be the better for , and which wisdom does not need . thus 't is counted learning to have tumbled over a multitude of books , especially if great ones , and old ones , and obscure ones , but most of all , if manuscripts ; the recovery of one of which is reckon'd so much added to the commonwealth of learning , as they call it . a well-read man signifies the very same as a learned man in most mens dictionaries , and by well-read they dont mean one that has read well , that has clear'd and improv'd his understanding by his reading , but only one that has read a great deal , tho perhaps he has puzzled and confounded his notions by doing so . thus again it goes for learning , to be acquainted with mens opinions , especially of the ancients , to know what this or that philosopher held , what this or that author says , tho perhaps he says nothing but what is either absurd , or obviously true. thus for instance , what can be more absurd than that fancy of empedocles , that there are two semi-circles compassing betwixt them the earth , one whereof was composed of fire , the other of air , and that the former made the day , and the latter night ? and yet to know this is learning . and what again is more obviously true , than that grave doctrine of aristotle , that privation must go before the introduction of the form in all generation ? and yet 't is learning to know that he taught thus , tho it be a thing so plain , and so near the surface , that a child can't miss of it . to know the thing is nothing , because so plain and easie , but to know that aristotle held it , that 's the learning . nay , to instance in a matter of greater difficulty , tho i know very well , and am able to demonstrate the grounds of the atomical philosophy , or the motion of the earth , or the circulation of the blood , yet i shall not be admitted into the order of the learned , unless i am able to tell that moscus the phoenician invented the first , and that democritus and leucippus afterwards improved it , and that the two latter owe their discovery to copernicus and harvey . so much more learned an atchievement is it to know opinions than things ; and accordingly , those are reckon'd the most learned authors , who have given the greatest specimens of this kind of knowledge . thus is picus mirandula more admired for the examination he has made of the doctrine of the pagans , than any of them were for what they deliver'd ; and plutarch has got more credit from the history he gives of their opinions , in the d tome of his works , than from any of his rational and moral discourses . and were he not accounted learned for the former , i question whether the latter ( tho far more excellent than they are ) would ever have given him that title . xlii . now ( madam ) what an hard and unreasonable imposition is this , that tho i am able to think and write never so much like an angel my self , yet i must not be accounted a man of learning , unless i can tell what every whimsical writer has said before me ! and how hard will this fall upon those , whose lot is to breathe in the last ages of the world , who must be accountable for all the whims and extravagancies of so many centuries ? and yet this is made so great a part of learning , that the learning of most men lies in books rather than in things ; and among authors , where one writes upon things , there are twenty that writes upon books . nay , some have carried this odd humour on so far , that 't is thought learning to know the very titles of books , and their several editions , with the time and place , when and where they were printed . and i have met with several my self , that have valued themselves not a little upon this mechanical faculty , tho they knew no more of what was in them , than they do of what is written in the rolls of destiny . xliii . from this placing of learning in the knowledge of books , proceeds that ridiculous vanity of multiplying quotations , which is also reckon'd another piece of learning , tho they are used so unseasonably and impertinently , that there can be no other end in them , but only to shew that the author has read such a book . and yet 't is no such convincing evidence of that neither , it being neither new nor difficult , for a man that 's resolv'd upon it , to quote such authors as he never read nor saw. and were it not too odious , as well as obvious a truth , i could name to your ladiship , some of those author-mongers , who yet pass for men of shrewd learning , and vast reading . xliv . these , and many other such things ( for 't were endless to reckon up all ) are by the majority of the world voted for learning , and in these we spend our education , our study , and our time , tho they are all of them contingent truths , that are not perfective of the understanding ( nothing being so but only necessary truths , or the divine ideas , the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word and wisdom of the father ) and also most of them impertinent and unconcerning ones . so that in short , the charge of this reflection amounts to thus much , that learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things , which neither the intellectual perfection , nor any other interest of man is concern'd to know . the end of the first reflection . the second reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd , for using undue and irregular methods , in prosecuting what is really perfective of the vnderstanding . i. in the preceding reflection , the intellectual conduct of human life was censured for the general misplacing of learning , for placing it in such things as are not perfective of the understanding . in the present reflection supposing it to be free from that fault , we shall consider it as chargeable with another , namely , with an undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really perfective of it . the first was an errour about the end ; this second is an errour about the means , which are the two hinges upon which all prudence , and all imprudence turns . ii. that the truth of this charge may appear , we must here also propose a measure , whereby we may proceed , as we did in the former reflection . and as there we took upon us to determine what that is which is objectively perfective of the vnderstanding , so we must here consider what is the right method of prosecuting what is so . which being stated will be a measure to us in this , as the other was in the former reflection . iii. i design not here a just and particular treatise concerning the method of study or inquiry after truth , this province being already professedly undertaken , and excellently adorn'd by two as great masters of thinking as ever were , or are like to be in the world , cartesius and malebranche , of both which your ladyship is so much a mistress , that a further undertaking of this kind would be as needless to your better information , as to the argument it self , after the management of it under such excellent hands . however something i must say , it being impossible to shew that wrong methods are used in this grand inquest , but by predefining which is the right . this therefore i shall do , but briefly only , and in general . iv. since therefore that truth which is perfective of the understanding is necessary truth , and since this necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ( both which being already proved , are here supposed ) following the thred of the same hypothesis , i find it necessary to affirm , that the right and indeed only method of enquiry after that truth which is perfective of the understanding is by consulting the ideal world , where only it is , or the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who says of himself that he is not only the truth , but also the way . v. here i suppose two things , first that this divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world is intimately united with , and presential to the mind . secondly that we see and understand all things in him , that he is our light and our wisdom , the light by which we see , and the light which we see , that he is the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the inward word and substantial conception of our minds , as he is of the father , and that in this sense he inlightens every man that comes into the world. this i need not prove now , because i have done it professedly elsewhere , only i shall pass one necessary remark upon the manner of our being inlighten'd by the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , who may be said to inlighten us in a double respect , either fundamentally and potentially by putting us into a capacity of illumination , by his intimate union and presence with us , or else effectually and actually , when we attend to his divine light , which is always present to us , tho we are not so to it . in the former sense he inlightens every man , in the latter only those who duly consult him and attend to him . vi. for i consider , that the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is an inlighteness in the same proportion as he is a redeemer . now he redeems us either by putting us in a salvable and reconcilable state , which is a redemption vniversal incondionate and antecedent , or by actually reconciling and saving us , which depends upon , and is consequent to certain conditions , and is conferr'd only upon those who are qualify'd accordingly . and as his redemption is double , so is his illumination . he inlightens either by putting us in a state or possibility of illumination by being intimately present with us , and surrounding us with his divine ideal light , which is a benefit common to all , or by actually informing our understandings when we apply our selves with due attention to his all-diffused light , which is ever present to us , and to the whole creation , and shineth even in the darkness , tho the darkness comprehend it not . vii . and i was not a little glad to find the grounds of this distinction in the writings of that elevated heathen , hierocles , which i shall give you in the words of my own translation . this bright heathen commenting upon that mystical prayer of pythagoras , o father jupiter , either free all from their manifold evils , or else discover to all what daemon they use , moves this question , since they that know god and themselves are free from mortal passions ; why then are not all freed , since all are sufficiently assisted with the opportunities of this knowledge ? to which he first gives this general answer , because the greatest part of men embrace evil of their own accord , since they neither see nor hear neighbouring good . then a little after he is more particular in his account . since therefore ( says he ) that any thing may be shewn to any one , 't is necessary that the actions of two persons concur ( for how can you shew what you have a mind should be shewn , to a blind man , although you offer it to him a thousand times , or how can you shew to one that sees , if you offer nothing to his sight ) both these must be present , some good proposed by him that shews , and an eye capable of seeing in him to whom it is to be shewn ; so that from a visible object , and a faculty of seeing , may result a manifestation . this being so , let us suppose that all would be freed from evil , if their maker did shew to all the knowledge of his own nature , and what daemon they themselves use . but we find that all are not deliver'd from evil , it follows therefore that he does not make this discovery to all , but to those only who of their own accord endeavour to free themselves from evil , and voluntarily fix their eye upon what is shewn by the intention of contemplation . and again a little after , thus every illumination of god by the concurrence of our vision , becomes a discovery . viii . in all which process , this refined heathen supposes that god is ready on his part to inlighten all men ; nay , that he does inlighten them all so far as to put them in the way , and within the possibility of illumination , which then becomes actual and effectual when they yield due attention to the divine light. he does not indeed descend to so much nicety and particularity as to ascribe this illumination to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , but only to god in general , nor does he determine whether god does inlighten us only efficiently , by infusing acts or habits of knowledge ( as is more vulgarly held , than understood , and indeed is no way intelligible ) or formally by being himself the very formal light of our minds , and the immediate object of our knowledge . this i say he does not determine , nor do i cite him to this purpose , having sufficiently explain'd and establisht this theory elsewhere , but only to shew his concurrence with me in this distinction of the double illumination of god. ix . these supposals being premised , first , that that truth which is perfective of the understanding is necessary truth ; then secondly , that this necessary truth is the same with the divine ideas ; then thirdly , that the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , is intimately united with , and praesential to the mind ; then fourthly , that we see and understand all things in him , and that 't is he that is our inlightner ; and that lastly , tho he inlightens all fundamentally and potentially , yet this illumination is not reduced to act , and made effectual , but by the intervening of some condition on our parts , which is duly to consult and apply our selves to him . from these premises the same conclusion which we touch't on before , necessarily and evidently follows , that the right and only method of enquiry after that truth which is perfective of the understanding , is to consult the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world. for this is the region of truth , and here are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge . this is that great and universal oracle lodged in every man's breast , whereof the antient vrim and thummim was an expressive type or emblem . this is reason , this is conscience , this is truth , this is that light within so darkly talk'd of , by some who have by their aukward , untoward , and vnprincipled way of representing it , discredited one of the noblest theorys in the world. but the thing in it self rightly understood is true , and if any shall yet call it quakerism , or euthusiasm , i shall only make this reply at present , that 't is such quakerism as makes a good part of st. iohn's gospel , and of st. austin's works . but to return , this i say is that divine oracle which we all may , and must consult , if we would inrich our minds with truth , that truth which is perfective of the understanding . and this is the true method of being truly wise . and this is no other method , than what is advised us by this divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the substantial wisdom of god. blessed is the man that heareth me , watching daily at my gates , waiting at the posts of my doors . and again says the same substantial wisdom , who so is simple , let him turn in hither . and again , i am the light of the world , he that follows me , or ( as the word more properly signifies ) he that consorts or keeps company with me , walketh not in darkness . this therefore is via intelligentiae , the way and method of true knowledge , to apply our selves to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to consult the ideal world. x. thus in general . if now it be further demanded how this is to be done , i answer that there are three ways of doing it , and i can think of no more . the first is by attention . the second is by purity of heart and life . and the third is by prayer . upon each of which i shall bestow some few remarks , such as may rather give hints than full entertainment to your thoughts , because i know your ladyship loves to have something left to work out by your self in your own private meditations . which consideration has made me all along use less prolixity than the quaintness and weightiness of my argument would otherwise justify . xi . the first method assign'd is attention , or application of mind to the intelligible world , the world of truth . this is the same with thinking or speculating , which if intelligibly accounted for , will be found to be nothing else but the conversion of the mind to the ideal world , or omniformity of the divine essence ; which as it is the first , so is it also the directest and most compendicus method of science . for this is to go directly to the spring-head , to the lucid fountain of good , 't is to take hold of essential truth nakedly as it is in it self ( as a very contemplative person expresses it ) 't is to fix the eye of the mind upon the intellectual sun , upon him who is substantial truth , and the light of the world. which must needs be the most ready way to be inlightned . for the more heedfully we attend to the ideal world , the more we shall see and discover of it ; and not only so , but also more clearly distinguish what we do discover . for so a man that casts a short careless glance upon the galaxy , sees only a confused whiteness arising from the numerous mixture of little splendors , but when the same person fixes his eye with steadiness and delay of application , he begins to discern something more distinctly , a new star ever and anon arises under his inspection , not discover'd before , and still the longer and harder he looks , the more he discerns , till at length he has discover'd as much as he can well atttend to at once , and has satiated his faculty with the brightness and multitude of light. the application is as obvious , as the figure is pertinent , and therefore i shall only remark this one thing more upon this part , that this was the method of the first inventors of arts and sciences , who made their way into the coasts of learning by meer dint of thinking ; and further , that this is the very method that has been used by the greatest improvers of them ever since , such as bacon , boyle , descartes , galileus , harvey , mersennus , digby , malebranche , poiret , and ( whom i name with particular honour and reverence ) our excellent friend dr. more . all these must be allow'd , and i think are to be great improvers of learning , and that 't was by this method they did it . and i dare prophesie , that if ever any extraordinary advancement be for the future made in the world , 't will be done by thinking . xii . this as to thinking in general . but now as to the order of thinking , if your ladiship can be supposed to need any instruction about it , i cannot recommend you to a better tutor than your friend m. malebranche , in his second part of his sixth book of inquiry after truth , where he purposely describes the method of thinking , which you may remember he reduces to these few following laws . xiii . the first law is , that evidence be maintain'd in our reasonings . from this principle depends this general law concerning the matter of our studies , that we ought not to reason but only of those things whereof we have clear ideas , and by necessary consequence , that we ought always to begin with the most simple and easie things , and also to dwell long upon them , before we advance to the inquisition of things more complex and difficult . xiv . upon the same general principle , depend the laws concerning the manner whereby we are to proceed in the solution of questions . the first of which laws is this , that the state of the question to be solved is to be most distinctly conceived . besides , the ideas of the terms ought to be distinct that they may be compared with one another , and that the relations which are sought for may be known . xv. but when the relations of things to one another cannot be known by immediately comparing them , then the second law is , that we should employ our thoughts to find out one or more middle ideas , which we may use as a common measure to know by their help the relations that are between those things . and withal he advises that we should study to have those ideas clear and distinct , proportionably to the accuracy and numerousness of those relations which we endeavour to deprehend . xvi . but when the questions are difficult and require a long examination , then the third law is , that from the matter in hand all those things should be removed whose examination is not necessary to the discovery of the sought for truth . because the capacity of the mind is not to be without reason divided , but all its force is to be imploy'd about those things from which it may perceive light. and all those things which can be removed , and which being remov'd , the question remains intire ; they are the things that do not belong to the question . xvii . when the question is included within a few terms , then the fourth rule is , that the matter of our meditation is to be divided by parts , and those parts to be handled singly according to their natural order , by beginning with the more simple , that is , with those which include fewest relations . and that we should not pass on to the more complex , till the more simple be distinctly known , and render'd familiar . xviii . when by meditation these things become familiar to us , then the fifth rule is , that the ideas of all these are to be contracted , and disposed in the imagination , or to be written down in paper , that they may no longer fill the capacity of the mind . this rule , tho always useful , yet he makes it necessary only in the most difficult questions , which require a great capacity of mind . and he says withal , that the use of this and the following rules , is not to be accurately known but only in algebra . xix . when the ideas of all things necessary to be consider'd , are clear , familiar , contract , and orderly digested in the imagination , or exprest in paper ; then the sixth law is , that all things are to be compared or collated according to the laws of combination , alternately among one another , either by the sole intuition of the mind , or by the motion of the imagination , joyn'd with the intuition of the mind , or by the calculation of the pen joyn'd with the attention of the mind and of the imagination . xx. if none of all those relations which result from all those collations , be that which is sought after , then again from all those relations those are to be removed which are of no use to the solution of the question : and the others are to be made familiar , to be contracted , and to be orderly disposed in the imagination , or express'd in paper , and to be compared with each other , according to the laws of combination . and then we are to see whether the compound relation which is sought for be any one of all those compound relations which result from those new comparisons . xxi . if none of those found relatitions include the solution of the question , then again from all those relations , the unserviceable are to be cast away , the other are to be made familiar , &c. and by proceeding in this manner , the truth or relation sought for , be it never so complex , will at last be found , provided we are able sufficiently to extend the capacity of our mind , by contracting ideas , and that in all our operations we always attend to the end and scope which is to be arriv'd at . for in every step of this intellectual progress , we ought to have our eye perpetually fix'd upon the state of the question . to all which he adds one caution more , that we should beware lest we should sit down contented with a false light or appearance , and so be deceived . and that therefore our collations in order to the finding out the truth we look after , be so often repeated , till we can no longer with hold our assent without being secretly chid and reprehended by a certain master answering from within to our questions , that is to our labour , application of mind , and desire of heart . by which master within this admirable theorist can mean nothing else but the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world , that universal oracle of mankind , and of all the intelligent creation . this is a short view of those laws which the excellent m. malebranche has given concerning the method of thinking . and i believe if an angel had been ingaged in the undertaking , he could not have given better . they are all natural , clear , distinct , easie , and depending ; few enough not to burthen or distract the mind , and yet many enough to inform it . and therefore i shall not be guilty of so much presumption and impertinence as to prescribe any other , thinking it sufficient to consider and practice these . and so much for the first way of consulting the ideal world , which is by thinking . xxiii . the second way is by purity of heart and life . this i confess has a more immediate and special influence upon the knowledge of spiritual and moral truths , according to that of our saviour , if any man will do his will , he shall know of the doctrine , &c. and that of his prime apostle , the animal man perceiveth not the things of god , &c. but its efficacy is not confined here , but has a larger sphere of activity , and serves to the discovery even of all ideal or necessary truth . for as viciousness not only proceeds from ignorance , but also causes it , by besotting and clouding the understanding , so purity of heart and life not only proceeds from light and knowledge , but also produces it , and helps the soul to see more clearly and distinctly . hence the pythagoric and platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the method of purification and purgation so much talk'd of by perphyry , iamblichus , plotinus , and particularly by hierocles in his introduction to his noble comment , where he has these words , as a blear eye cannot behold a very bright object till it be purged , so a soul not yet clarify'd and refined by vertue is not qualify'd to gaze upon the beauty of truth . and the same method is no less recommended in scripture . wisdom will not enter into a polluted spirit , says the wise man. and says the angel to daniel , many shall be purify'd and made white , and none of the wicked shall understand , but the wise shall understand . and says the psalmist , i am wiser than the aged because i keep thy commandments . and to this purpose also is that of our lord to be understood , he that follows me , that is , that lives after my example , walketh not in darkness . the purity of his heart will be a light to his understanding . xxiv . but to represent his more distinctly , there are two ways whereby purity of heart serves to the acquirement of knowledge . by natural efficacy , and by the divine grace and benediction . and first it does it by natural efficacy , either by clarifying the medium , or by assisting the faculty . the former i conceive and represent after this manner . i suppose in the first place that the soul sees through a medium ; secondly , that this medium is our terrestrical vehicle ; thirdly , that the grosness of this medium hinders the vision of the soul. all which i ground upon those words of the apostle , now we see through a glass , darkly . xxv . this supposed , it follows that whatsoever clarifys this medium does also help the vision of the soul. and this purity does , especially that more eminent part of it which consists in chastity and temperance . for first it composes the passions , especially that of lust , by that the animal spirits , and by that the blood. for the motion of the passions ferments the spirits , and the fermentation of the spirits agitates the blood , and by agitation raises all the feculent and drossy parts of it ; and makes it like a troubled fountain , thick and muddy . and this i take to be one true reason why men in any passion can't reason so clearly as when they are in more quiet and silence of spirit . but now by purity of heart all this disturbance is allay'd and composed , the passions are becalm'd , the spirits fix'd , the fountain of the blood clears up , and so all the inner part of that glass the apostle speaks of , becomes more bright and pellucid , more apt to transmit the rays of the ideal light , and consequently we see more clearly through it . tho it be still but darkly in comparison of what we shall do hereafter . xxvi . but this is not all ; this purity does also clarifie the outward part of the glass too . first by consequence , because the finer the spirits and blood are , the finer will be the threds of the outward veil also . then more directly , because temperance does refine and subtilize the texture of the body , diminishes from its bulk and grossness , and unloads the soul of a good part of that burthen which not only presses down her aspirations , but also hinders her sight : and besides , it refines the the inner part too , by bringing in fresh supplies of fine spirits . this was that temperance which made the faces of daniel , hananiah , mishael and azariah look clear and fair , and which made them wise too , gave a quick and delicate air to their countenances , and let in the light of the ideal world upon their souls . this was that philosophical temperance of the pythagoreans , which ( to use the words of dr. more commenting upon that place ) is the mother of that wisdom which makes the face to shine , and nourishes the luciform vehicle of the soul. xxvii . and as this purity does clarify the medium , so does it also assist the faculty . and this it does by the same general way whereby it clarifies the medium , that is , by composing the passions . for the passions not only trouble and thicken the medium ( as was noted and explain'd before ) but al●o divide and disperse the faculty . for the more things a man desires , the more things he will be engaged to think upon , and the more things he thinks upon at once , the more languid and confuse will his conception be . but now this purity by composing the passions , contracts the desires , and by contracting the desires , it contracts also by consequence the thoughts , and by this the man is reduced to a greater vnity , simplicity , and recollection of mind , and having but few thoughts to divide him , he is the better inabled to think clearly and distinctly . xxviii . and thus have i given a clear and distinct account how purity of heart serves to the acquirement of knowledge by a natural efficacy . this it does also secondly by the divine grace and benediction . purity of heart is that heavenly lure which invites not only the holy spirit , but also the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to come and dwell in the soul , and to inrich it with his ideal communications . this we may be assured of from his own mouth , he that loveth me , shall be lov'd of my father , and i will love him , and manifest my self to him . and again , if a man love me , my father will love him , and we will come unto him , and make our abode with him . the pure , chaste and good soul shall not only be loved by the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but be also of his council and privacy . for this is the spouse of the word eternal , who first assumed innocent nature , and then assumes innocent persons , the first by a natural , the second by a mystic union . this is the beloved disciple who has the priviledge to lean upon the bosom of his lord , and to be admitted to his more secret communications . and therefore says the psalmist , the secret of the lord is with them that fear him , and he will shew them his covenant . and says our lord himself , blessed are the pure in heart , for they shall see god. and concerning the four children that refused to defile themselves with the portion of the kings meat , it is said , that god gave them knowledge , and skill in all learning and wisdom ; and that daniel had understanding in all visions and dreams . for they were not only pure and temperate but religiously so , in obedience to the law of their god , the god of israel . which the said god rewarded with knowledge and skill in all learning and wisdom in them all , but in daniel peculiarly , with a faculty of interpreting aenigmatical dreams and visions ; as the learned dr. more observes in his excellent comment upon that place . xxix . the third and last way of consulting the ideal world is by prayer . this is a method which the scripture also advises us to : if any of you lack wisdom , let him ask of god , that giveth to all men liberally , and upbraideth not , and it shall be given him . and this we know was the method whereby the wisest of men attain'd his unparallel'd wisdom . for as wisdom was his choice , so the method of his seeking and gaining , it was by prayer . and 't is further observable that he address'd himself to the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or ideal world in particular , as you may see in that solemn prayer of his recorded in the book of wisdom , give me wisdom that sitteth by thy throne , &c. which i commend to your ladyships perusal at leisure . xxx . and thus ( madam ) have i defined and by scripture and reason proved , what is the right method of prosecuting that truth which is perfective of the understanding . this in general i have shewn to consist in consulting the ideal world ; the manner of doing which i have also shewn to be , first , by thinking , the order of which is also defined , secondly , by purity of heart and life , and lastly by prayer . this i take to be via intelligentiae , the way and method of wisdom , whose house i think is now built , tho not upon seven , yet upon three substantial pillars , and i should be glad if any one would be so kind as to shew me the weakness of the ground upon which they stand . xxxi . and now ( madam ) i think i i need not use many words to shew that as learning is generally placed in such things as are not perfective of the understanding , so that what is so is generally prosecuted by undue methods . for 't is but to compare the methods in common use with that which we have premised and demonstrated , and you will immediately perceive the falseness and irregularity of them . for first , whereas the first and general method of wisdom and knowledge is by consulting the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal world , the world of light , that light which inlightens every man that comes into this world , the generality of students don 't so much as dream of this , nor make any such application , but apply themselves altogether to the ectypal world , to the world of darkness and obscurity . so verifying that complaint of god by the prophet , my people have forsaken me the fountain of living waters , and have digg'd to themselves broken cisterns , that will hold no water . xxxii . then again , whereas another more particular method is by attention and thinking , this is generally so little regarded , that no sort of men think so little for the most part as they that are ingaged in the profess study of learning and knowledge . this they don't reckon as any part of study , nor as any progress in the stage of learning , but only as a graver way of being idle . 't is then only they study when they are hanging their heads over an old musty folio , and are making huge common-places , and stuffing their memories with grey sentences , and venerable sayings : and thus they spend their time and their ink , and having scambl'd through a company of books ( most of which perhaps were written to as little purpose , as they are read ) they think themselves learned men , and the world is too often of their opinion , tho they have not made themselves masters of any sense or notion , nor are able to demonstrate one single truth upon solid principles , and in a consequential process . xxxiii . and this is the method not only of those who misplace learning , but also of the most of those that place it aright . for even those that place it in ideal truths do not generally think for it , but read for it , seek it not in their souls , but in books . and this methinks i can never sufficiently wonder at . indeed as for those that place learning not in being able to frame clear and distinct conceptions of ones own , but in knowing the opinions of others , 't is no wonder that they take this method , for tho it be not a means to the end they should propose , yet , t is a means to the end which they do propose . but the wonder is how those that place learning as they should , in the clear conception of ideal truths , should think to find this meerly by tumbling over books . xxxiv . i deny not but that reading is one way of knowing ( otherwise i should not be at the pains to write this to your ladyship ) but then , t is only by accident that it is so , as it gives hints and occasions for thinking . and therefore thinking is the only thing to be regarded even in reading ( for reading as such is nothing ) and then we read to most purpose , when we are thereby most enabled to think . so that thinking is the end of reading , as understanding is the end of thinking . we ought therefore to read only in order to thinking . and yet this method is generally so much inverted , that the main stress is laid upon reading . nothing but read , read , as long as eyes and spectacles will hold , not regarding whether the head be clear , so that it be full . xxxv . as to the particular order in thinking proposed by m. malebranche , i refer your ladyship to the same excellent author to shew you how much it is transgress'd . which he does at large , and to wonderful satisfaction , shewing first that the school-philosophers do not observe that general law concerning the matter of study , which is the cause of a great many errors in their physiology . then shewing that the second part of the general law is not observed by the common philosophers , and what extraordinary advances cartesius made in learning by the exact observation of it . then he proceeds to explain the principles of aristotle's philosophy , where he shews that he never observed the second branch of the general law , and reflects upon those errors of his philosophy occasioned by his not doing so . but for a fuller account in these things i refer you to the author himself . xxxvi . then again , whereas purity of heart and life is another method of arriving to the light and knowledge of ideal truth , your ladyship cannot but know , and 't is a sad as well as a true observation , that this is not only neglected among that part of mankind that sit down contentedly in ignorance , and aspire to no greater stock of knowledge than what they brought with them into the world , but also among the generality of those few that addict themselves to the cultivation and improvement of their minds . nay these in proportion to their number seem more guilty of this neglect than the other , and nothing so common as to see men of curious and inquisitive tempers and of famed learning , who yet are very corrupt in the moral state of their minds , and live very ill lives . whence some have taken occasion to represent learning , as an enemy to religion , and have cry'd up ignorance as the mother of devotion . and tho the conclusion of these men be notoriously weak and absurd , yet it must be confest that the ground upon which they build it , is too true . men famed for learning , are oftentimes as infamous for living , and many that study hard to furnish their heads , are yet very negligent in purifying their hearts , not considering that there is a moral , as well as a natural communication between one and the other , and that they are concern'd to be pure in heart and life not only upon the common account , in order to a happy state hereafter , but also in pursuance of their own particular way and end here . xxxvii . then again lastly , whereas another method of wisdom is prayer , i do not find that the generality of students do at all apply themselves to this method . pray indeed ( 't is to be hoped ) they do for other things , which they think lye more out of their reach , but as for learning and knowledge , they think they can compass this well enough by their own proper industry , and the help of good books , without being beholden to the assistance of heaven . and this , tho they do place learning in the knowledge of necessary truth . which procedure of theirs i cannot resolve into any other principle , ( i mean as to those that act by any ) but the meer want of knowing or considering that this necessary truth is really the same with god himself . for did they attentively consider that god is truth , and that so much as they possess of truth , so much they have of god , 't is not to be imagined they should be so indifferent in using prayer , or any of the other preceding methods of consulting god for his own light. the end of the second reflection . the third reflection . wherein the general conduct of human life is tax'd with a too importunate , and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . i. having pass'd over the two first stages of the intellectual conduct of human life , that of the end , and that of the means ; and reflected upon the irregularities of each , by shewing how both are generally mistaken and misplaced ; i am now arrived to the third and last , which consists not in the choice of the object , or of the method to it ( that belonging to the two former ) but in the degree of affection wherewith they are prosecuted . which part of our intellectual conduct , as it is equally capable of being faulty , so i shall here make it my business to shew that it is actually as faulty and irregular , if not more than either of the two former . and the fault that i tax it with , is , a too importunate and over-earnest pursuit after knowledge in general . ii. the charge of this reflection is of a larger compass and extent than either of the two preceding , those being directed against such as either misplace the object , or else mistake the method of learning and knowledge ; but this takes in both together , and others also not concerned in either of the former . for not only those that err in the placing of learning , or in the method to it , but also those who are right in both , come under the censure of the present reflection , they all agree in this , in being too importunate and vehement in the pursuit of knowledge . iii. now in the making out the truth of this charge , we must here also according to the method observ'd in the two former reflections , first lay down a common measure of proceeding , by stating the due bounds of our present affection to , and search after knowledge , or , how far it becomes man to imploy himself in the prosecution of learning and knowledge ? the due stating of which question will be a certain direction to us in the determination of this , whether our general inquest after knowledge be immoderate or no. now for the determination of the first it will be necessary to draw up the true state or hypothesis of man according to the posture wherein he now stands . which i shall do distinctly in these following considerations . iv. first i consider , that the utmost pitch of knowledge man by his utmost endeavours can arrive to in this world is very inconsiderable . god indeed has given us reason enough to distinguish us from the brute part of the creation , and we may improve it so far as to distinguish our selves from one another , and so one man may deserve to be call'd learned and knowing in comparison of another that is either naturally more ignorant , or more unimproved ; but absolutely speaking , the most that any or all of us either know or can know here is of little or no consideration . what we know of god is but little , for as the apostle says , we see through a glass , darkly ; what we know of our selves perhaps is less , and what we know of the world about us is not much . we have seen but a few of gods works , as the wise man observes , and we understand yet fewer . there are almost an infinite number of things which we never so much as thought of , and of most things we conceive very darkly and uncertainly , and there is not one thing from the greatest to the least , which we do or can understand thoroughly . those that apply their whole study to any one thing , can never come to the end of that one thing , for not only every science but every particular of it has its unmeasurable depths and recesses ; and 't is confess'd by a great inquirer into the nature of antimony ( as 't is related by the honourable mr. boyle ) that 't is impossible for one man to understand throughly that one single mineral only . and if a man i cannot understand all of so little , how little must he understand of all ! suppose further , that all the knowledge of the learned were put together , 't would weigh but light , for what one art or science is there that is brought to any tolerable perfection ? and if the common stock be so little , how small a pittance is it that must fall to every particular man's share ! and where is that man who after all his poring and studying , is able to answer all the questions , i will not say which god put to iob , but which may be askt him by the next idiot he meets ? v. 't were an endless undertaking to represent at large the little that we know , or are capable of knowing . nor do i design to turn a second agrippa , and entertain your ladyship with a long harangue about the vanity of humane sciences , only give me leave to touch upon two notorious instances of our ignorance , and in that very science which is pretended to be at the very vertical point of improvement . 't is concerning the the maximum and the minimum naturale , the greatest and the least thing in nature . as to the first , the question is whether the extension of the universe be finite or infinite ? if you say 't is positively infinite , besides the difficulty of conceiving how any thing can be so extended , 't will follow that god himself cannot add the least further dimension to it . if you say 't is finite , suppose your self in the utmost extremities of it , and try whether it be possible for you to dis-imagin further extension . then as to the second , the question is whether every , even the least assignable part of matter be infinitely divisible or no ? if you say yes , then 't will unavoidably follow that the least atom will have as many parts as the whole world. if you say no , then you must say that matter may be divided so long till at last you come to a part that does not contain more other parts , if so , then i enquire has this uncontaining part figure , or has it not ? if not , then 't is infinite , figure being only the termination of quantity . but if it has , then it has more other parts above , below and of each side , and consequently may again be divided , contrary to what you suppos'd . so that you see here are desperate difficulties on both sides , say what you will you are equally baffled , and yet 't is most certain that one only can be true , they being two opposite parts of a contradiction , but which is so , is beyond the capacity of humane understanding to determine . vi. the like difficulties we meet with when we inquire concerning time , whether it be infinitely divisible , or only into moments ? and so again in the business of motion , whether there be any such thing as the extream degree of swiftness and slowness , or no ? neither of which can be defined without manifest absurdity . but 't is superfluous , as well as endless , to display the particulars of our ignorance , tho indeed when all accompts are cast up , that will be found to be our best knowledge . this only in general , our life is so short , our progress in learning so slow , and learning in it self so long and tedious , and what we do or can know so very little , that the patrons of scepticism had much more reason to conclude from the disability of our facculties and the slightness of our attainments , than from the uncertainty and instability of truth , that there is no knowledge . vii . secondly , i consider , that as we can here know but little , so even that very little which we do , serves more to our trouble and disquiet , than to our pleasure and satisfaction . and here comes in that experimental reflection of the wise man , in much wisdom is much grief , and he that increases knowledge , increases sorrow . this proposition is not true , absolutely consider'd , knowledge being the perfection of human nature , the image of god , and the principal ingredient of our future happiness ; but only with relation to the present state and posture of man. and in this respect it is abundantly true . first , because the more we know , the more we shall discover of our ignorance , ( that being the chiefest thing we learn by our study ) which we shall find to be of an infinitely larger sphere than our knowledge , and consequently shall be more troubled for what we do not know , than pleas'd with what we do . secondly , because the prospect of what yet further remains to be known will inflame our thirst after it . for wisdom says of her self , they that eat of me shall yet be hungry , and they that drink of me shall yet be thirsty . which tho it be a great commendation of wisdom , and an argument of her inexhaustible excellence , yet 't is withal a great instrument of punishment to those who can attain to so little of it , as cannot satisfie that thirst which it has inflamed . thirdly , because the more a man improves his thinking faculty , the more apt he will be to be disgusted and offended with the follies of society ; as the most delicate touch is the soonest put to pain . there being a thousand impertinencies that will strike very disagreeably upon a discerning mind which won't so much as affect a grosser understanding . viii . but the principal ground of this assertion , and which , did not the quickness of your ladyship's apprenhension oblige me to brevity , i could be voluminous upon , is this . 't is most certain that man is now placed in the midst of vanities and unsatisfying objects , and and that his true good is not within his reach , and consequently whatever pleasure he takes in those things that are , is purely owing to his ignorance of their vanity . well , if so , then vae sapienti , woe be to the wise man. this is not a place to be wise in . there is nothing here solid enough to endure the test of wisdom . the wise man cannot find a paradice here , tho the fool can . the more he knows the more he discovers the vanity of all pretended enjoyments , and the more he does this , the more he streightens and retrenches his delights , and the more he does this , the more he retires and withdraws himself from all worldly diversions , and this sets him the more a thinking and musing , and this again presents to his mind a fresh and more lively conviction of the worlds vanity , and this makes him again retrench his delights , and so on in this returning circle , till at length he finds nothing but his bare wisdom to delight in . and a little more thinking makes him see the vanity of that too . and now all 's gone . to dispatch this part in one word , this is the fruit of being wise , to be able to taste nothing that 's present , nor to flatter ones self with the prospect of what is to come , which is a state of horrible privation and sterility . this is the thorough wise mans lot , and every advance in wisdom is a step towards this condition so true is it , that he who increases wisdom , increases sorrow , while in the mean time the fool laughs , and is merry . ix . thirdly , i consider , that if our knowledge could yield us more satisfaction than it occasions trouble , yet our life is so short , and so incumber'd , that we can make but little of the enjoyment , so little , that 't is not answerable to the meer labour we undergo in acquiring it . all the morning of our days is spent in the preliminaries of learning , in learning words and terms of art , wherein there is nothing but toil and drudgery , and before we can taste any of the fruits of the tree of knowledge , before we can relish what is intellectual and rational in it , our sun is got into the meridian , and then it presently begins to decline and our learning with it ; our light , our strength , and our time make haste to consume , nothing increases now but the shadows , that is our ignorance and darkness of mind , and while we consider and look about us , the sun sets , and all is concluded in the darkness and shadow of death . but oftentimes the sun is intercepted by a cloud long before it setts , and we live backward again , grow weak and childish , silly and forgetful , and unlearn faster than we learnt ; or if it chance to shine bright to the last , then we improve too much , and grow too wise for our selves , and reject the greatest part of what we learnt before , as idle and insignificant . so that we are under a necessity of unlearning in a short time most of what we have so dearly learnt , either through forgetfulness , or improvement of iudgment . fourthly , i consider , that there is no necessity of our being so wonderfully learned and knowing here . 't is neither necessary as injoin'd by god , nor as a means to any considerable end. we can be good , and we can be happy without it . and as to the interest of communities and public societies , 't is civil prudence and honesty , and not learning which makes them happy . and lest any advantage in our after state should be alledged for its necessity , this makes it more unnecessary than any consideration besides . for tho we are never so unlearned now , provided we know enough to do our duty , and live well , we shall in a short time arrive to such a degree of knowledge as is requisite to our supream perfection , to which our present learning cannot add , and from which our present ignorance will not diminish . i do not say this will be immediately upon our discharge from the body , there being some reasonable controversie about that , ( which would be too great a digression at present to pursue ) tho 't is most certain that even then there must needs be great inlargements of understanding ; however 't is most unquestionable that this our intellectual accomplishment can be no further off than our enjoyment of the beatific vision . we shall then commence instantaneously wise and learned , and be fully possess'd of the tree of knowledge , as well as of the tree of life . for then that glass through which we now see darkly shall be laid aside , and there shall be no other but the speculum deitatis , the glass of the divinty , which is no other than the ideal world , which shall be now more intimately united to us , and more clearly display'd before us . and tho even now there shall be degrees of knowledge according to the various participiation of the ideal light , yet the variety of this dispensation shall not proceed by the degree of our knowledge in this life , but by some other measure . for , xi . fifthly , i consider , that tho there is no necessity of our being so very learned and knowing , yet there is an absolute necessity of our being good and vertuous . this is necessary both ways , as commanded by god , and as a means to our final perfection . and besides 't is necessary now , there being no other opportunity for it . if we don't know here , we may know hereafter , and shall infalliably do so if we are but good here ; but if we be not good here , we shall neither be good , happy , nor knowing hereafter . the main opportunity for knowledge is after this life , but the only opportunity for being good is now. and if we take care to improve this , we are sufficiently secure of the other , and of whatever else appertains to the perfection of our natures . but if this be neglected all is lost . this therefore is indispensably necessary , and 't is the only thing that is so , and 't is necessary now , necessary not only to our happiness in general , but also to that of our intellectual part in particular . for , xii . sixthly , and lastly i consider , that thus stands the case between god and man. first , man is supposed to be made in a state of innocence and perfection , in perfect favour and communion with god , his true good , and in a capacity so to continue . from this excellent state he is supposed to fall , and by his fall so to disable himself that he cannot by his own strength repent and live well , and so to provoke god , that tho he could and did repent , yet he would not be pardon'd and accepted , without satisfaction made to divine justice . this satisfaction man is supposed not able to make , nor any other creature for him . whereupon god in great mercy and pitty is supposed to ordain a mediator , his own son , god and man , between himself and his laps'd creature , who by the sacrifice of himself should effect two things , answerable to the double necessity of man , first make repentance available , which otherwise would not have been so ; and secondly merit grace for him that he might be able to repent . and this is what we are to understand by the restoration or redemption of man , which thus far is vniversal and inconditionate . xiii . but still notwithstanding all that this mediator has done for him , man is supposed only so far restored , as to be put in a pardonable and reconcilable state ( for as for our being actually and immediately reconciled by the death of christ , that 's a silly , fond , antinomian conceit , and no way consistent with the great mystery of godliness ) i say man is yet only in a capacity or possibility of pardon and reconciliation , which is then , and then only reduced to act , when he actually performs the conditions of reconciliation , when he believes , repents and leads a good life , with which he may , and without which he shall not be pardon'd and saved , notwithstanding that christ has dy'd for him . the design of whose death was not to make a good life unnecessary , but only to render it efficacious and available , not to procure a priviledge of being saved without it ( as some fancy ) but that we might be saved with it . if this qualification be wanting , we shall be so far from being any thing advantaged from the redemption purchas'd by our mediator , that we shall be accountable for it , to the great aggravation both of our guilt and misery . it therefore highly concerns man to improve with all diligence this short and only opportunity of making his great fortune , to adorn his mind with all moral and religious perfections , and his life with all good actions , since with this he may be happy in all his capacities , and without it he shall not only fall into a state of unutterable misery , but be also accountable for the possibility he had of escaping it , for neglecting so great salvation , so great an opportunity of being saved . xiv . these things being premised concerning the present hypothesis or state of man , first , that he can there know but very little , secondly , that even that little knowledge which he can attain to serves more to his trouble than satisfaction , and so is not only vanity , but also vexation of spirit . thirdly , that supposing it as pleasant as may be , yet such is the shortness and incumbrance of his life , that the enjoyment of it is not answerable to the labour of acquiring it . fourthly , that there is no necessity of such a deal of learning and knowledge , either as to this world , or to the next , and that e're long he shall have his fill of knowledge in the beatifick vision of the ideal world , one glance whereof shall instruct him more , than an eternal poring upon all the books in this , and undistinguish the greatest doctor from the most ignorant peasant . fifthly , that there is an absolute necessity of his being good and vertuous , this being the condition not only of his happiness in general , but also of the accomplishment of his vnderstanding in particular . and that now is the only opportunity for it . sixthly , and lastly , that the attainment of happiness and intellectual perfection upon this condition was the purchase of his saviours death , who has also merited grace for his assistance in the performance of it . which if he neglect , he shall not only miss of happiness , but be also answerable for so great and so dear an opportunity of gaining it ; from these premises 't will i think follow with no less than mathematical evidence . xv. first , that learning and knowledge is not the thing for which god design'd man in this station , nor consequently the end or reason of his bestowing upon him those intellectual and rational powers which he has . for had this been the end and design of god he would have made it more possible for him , and withal more his interest and concern , to attain it . secondly , 't will follow that the end for which god intended man here , and the reason why he made him a rational creature , was that he might live vertuously and well , so serve him here , that he might be rewarded with happiness and perfect knowledge hereafter ; having furnish'd him with intellectual abilities sufficient for this , tho not for the other . thirdly and lastly , 't will follow that the principal care and concern of man both because of his own interest , and out of compliance with the designs of god , ought to be to live a good and regular life , to accomplish the moral part of his nature , to subdue his passions , to rectifie his love , to study purity of heart and life , in one word , to perfect holiness in the fear of god , and ( which is what we have been hitherto inquiring after ) that he ought to busy himself in the study of learning and knowledge no further , than as 't is conducive to the interest of religion and vertue . xvi . this therefore is the measure to be observ'd in our prosecution of learning and knowledge . we are to study only that we may be good , and consequently ought to prosecute such knowledge only as has an aptness to make us so , that which the apostle calls the truth , which is after godliness . for that 's the only business we have to do in this world. whatever knowledge we prosecute besides this , or further than 't is conducive to this end , tho it be absolutely consider'd , never so excellent and perfective of our rational part , yet with respect to the present posture and station of man , 't is a culpable curiosity , and an unaccountable vanity , and only a more solemn and laborious way of being idle and impertinent . xvii . and this will be found ( if well examin'd ) to be nothing different from the censure of the wise preacher . and i gave my heart to to know wisdom , says he , and i perceiv'd that this also is vanity and vexation of sptrit . not that he now first applied himself to the study of wisdom . no , he had been inspired with that before , and and by the help of it had discover'd the vanity of all other things . but that wisdom which saw through all other things , did not as yet perceive the vanity of it self . he therefore now gave his heart to know wisdom , that is , to reflect upon it , and consider whether this might be excepted from his general censure , and struck out of the scroll of vanities . and upon deep reflection he found that it could not , and that even this also was as much a vanity as any of the rest . now this proposition of solomon's cannot be understood absolutely ( knowledge being an undoubted perfection of human nature ) but only with respect to the present posture of man in this world. neither can it be understood of all kind of knowledge even in this life , some kind of knowledge being necessary to qualifie him for happiness in the next . it must therefore necessarily be understood of all that knowledge which contributes not to that great end. so that from these two necessary limitations the sense of solomon's proposition ( if it have any ) must be this ; that to man in this present juncture all knowledge that does not contribute to the interest of his after-state , is downright vanity and vexation of spirit . xviii . for , to what purpose should we study so much , considering that after all we are able to know so little , considering that even that little is enough to trouble and disquiet us , considering that our life is as much too short for the enjoying what knowledge we have , as for compassing what we would have , and withal considering that there lies no manner of obligation or necessity upon us to do thus . but ( which is what i would most of all inculcate ) to what purpose imaginable should we be so busy , and vehement in the pursuit of learning , of any learning , but what is of use to the moral conduct of our life , considering these two things , first , that 't is but to stay a little while and we shall have all that knowledge gratis , from the communications of the ideal world , which we so unsuccessfully drudge for here , to the neglect of more important and concerning exercises . and secondly , considering that there is such an absolute necessity of being good , and of living well , and that this short uncertain life is the only time for it , which if neglected , this great work must lie undone for ever ? upon the former consideration this studious , bookish humour is like laying out a great sum of money to purchase an estate which after one weak , dropping life will of course fall into hand . and i am sure he would be reckon'd fool or mad that should do so . and upon the latter , 't is as if a man that was riding post upon business of life and death , should as he passes through a wood , stand still to listen to the singing of a nightingale , and so forget the main and only business of his journey . xix . 't is most certain that the two cases here supposed , are as great instances of folly and impertinence as can well be conceiv'd , and yet ( however it comes to pass that we are not sensible of it ) 't is certain that they are very applicable to the intellectual conduct of human life as 't is generally managed . and tho we are all ready enough to call such men fools as shall do as in the two mention'd instances is supposed , yet 't is most certain that we do the very same or worse , that we are too much concern'd in the application of the parable , and that of most of us it may be truly said , thou art the man. xx. for i demand , what difference is there between him that now labours and toils for learning and knowledge , which in a little time he shall be easily and fully possest of , and him that dearly buys an estate which would otherwise come to him after a short interval ? what difference is there , but only this , that he that buys the estate , tho he might have spared his money , yet however he gets what he laid out his money for ; his expence indeed was needless , but not in vain . whereas he that drudges in the pursuit of knowledge , not only toils for that which in a short time he shall have with ease , and in abundance , but which after all he can't compass in any considerable measure , and so undergoes a vain as well as unnecessary labour . and is therefore the greater fool. xxi . again i demand , what difference is there between him who when he is imploy'd upon business of life and death shall alight from his horse , and stand idling to hear a nightingale singing in the wood , and him who having an eternity of happiness to secure by the right ordering of his life and manners , and having only this point of time to do it in , shall yet turn vertuoso , and set up for learning and curiosity . 't is true indeed the nightingale sings well , and 't were worth while to stand still and hear him , were i disingaged from more concerning affairs , but not certainly when i am upon life and death . and so learning and knowledge are excellent things , and such as would deserve my study , and my time , had i any to spare , and were more at leisure , but not certainly when i have so great an interest as that of my final state dependi●g upon the good use of it . my business now , is not to be learned , but to be good . xxii . for is my life so long , am i so over-stock'd with time , or is my depending interest so little , or is it so easily secured , that i can find leisure for unnecessary curiosities ? is this conduct agreeable to the present station and posture of man , whose entrance into this world , and whose whole stay in it , is purely in order to another state ? or would any one imagin this to be the condition of man by such a conduct ! shall a prisoner who has but a few days allow'd him to make a preparation for his trial , spend that little opportunity in cutting and carving , and such like mechanical contrivances ? or would any one imagin such a man to be in such a condition , near a doubtful trial of life and death , whom coming into a prison he finds so imploy'd ? and yet is there any thing more absurd and impertinent in this , than in the present supposition , than to have a man who has so great a concern upon his hands as the preparing for eternity , all busy and taken up with quadrants , and telescopes , furnaces , syphons and air-pumps ? xxiii . when we would expose any signal impertinence , we commonly illustrate it by the example of archimedes , who was busy in making mathematical figures on the sands of syracuse while the city was taking by marcellus , and so though there were particular orders given for his safety , lost his life by his unseasonable study . now i confess there was impertinence and absurdity enough in this instance to consign it over to posterity . but had archimedes been a christian , or otherwise assured of the great concerns of another world , i should have said , that the main of his impertinence did not lie here , in being mathematically imploy'd when the enemy was taking the city , but in laying out his thoughts and time upon such an insignificant unconcerning study , while he had no less a concern upon him than the securing his eternal interest . which must be done now or never . nothing certainly is an impertinence , if this be not , to hunt after learning and knowledge in such a juncture as this . xxiv . sure i am , and your ladyship too very well knows , that many other proceedings in the conduct of life are condemn'd of vanity and impertinence upon the very same grounds , tho not half so inconsistent with the character of man , nor so disagreeable to his present posture in this world , for is not the world full of invectives , and have not the pens of moral writers been all along imploy'd against those that apply themselves to secular acquirements , spend their short and uncertain lives , which ought to be imploy'd in the pursuit of an infinitely higher interest , in gaping up and down after honours and preferments , in long and frequent attendances at court , in raising families , getting estates and the like ? these things i say and such like are condemn'd and censured not only upon the stock of their particular viciousness , as crimes of ambition or covetousness respectively , but for what they have in common , as they are mispendings of time , and unconcerning excentrical imployments . xxv . but now i would fain know , whether any of these misconducts of life be more expensive of our time , more remote and alien from the main business of it , more unrelating to our grand concern , and consequently more impertinent , than to be busily imploy'd in the niceties and curiosities of learning : and whether a man that loiters away six weeks in court-attendances for a place of honour , be not every whit as accountably imploy'd with respect to the end of man in the other world , and his business in this , as he that shall spend so much time in the solution of a mathematical question , as m. descrates i remember confesses of himself in one of his epistles . and why then the prosecution of learning should be the only thing excepted from the vanities and impertinencies of life i have not head enough to understand . xxvi . and yet so it is . all other excentrical unconcerning occupations are cried down meerly for being so , as not according with the present character and state of man. this alone is not contented with the reputation of innocence , but stands for positive merit and excellence , for praise and commendation . to say a man is a lover of knowledge , and a diligent inquirer after truth , is almost as great an encomium as you can give him , and the time spent in the study , tho in the search of unedifying truth , is reckon'd almost as laudably bestow'd as that in the chapel , and ( so inconsistent with its self is human judgment ) 't is learning only that is allow'd not only to divide , but to devour the greatest part of our short life , and is the only thing that with credit and public allowance stands in competition with religion and the study of vertue . nay , by the most is preferr'd before it , who would rather be counted learned , than pious . xxvii . but is not this a strenge and unreasonable competition ? it must indeed be confess'd that the perfection of man is double , of the intellectual as well as of the moral part , and that knowledge is a very divine excellence . but certainly rectitude of will is a greater ornament and perfection than brightness of vnderstanding , and to be good is more divine than to be wise and knowing , that being the principal , perhaps only difference between an angel and a devil . and tho solomon's choice be universally applauded , yet i think that of mary is to be preferr'd before it , and ( to use the expression of the excellent monsieur poiret ) that 't is better like an infant without much reasoning to love much , than like the devil to reason much without love. xxviii . but suppose knowledge were a much diviner excellence than 't is , suppose it were more perfective of , and ornamental to human nature than the habit and practice of vertue , yet still this competition would be utterly against reason . for 't is to be consider'd ( as i have already suggested ) that the former we can't have now in any measure , and shall have it hereafter without measure , but the latter we may have now ( for we may love much tho we can't know much ) and cannot have it hereafter . now the question is , whether we ought to be more solicitious for that intellectual perfection which we can't have here , and shall have hereafter , or for that moral perfection which we may have here , and cannot hereafter ? and i think we need not consult an oracle , or conjure up a spirit to be resolv'd of this question . xxix . and this one solitary consideration ( much more in conjunction with the other parts of the human character ) i take to be sufficient to justifie the truth of what measure we have prescribed to our intellectual conduct , that we ought to prosecute learning and knowledge no further than as 't is conducive to the great ends of piety and vertue . and consequently that when ever we study to any other purpose , or in any other degree than this , we are unaccountably impertinently , i may add sinfully imploy'd . for this is the whole of man , to fear god and keep his commandments , the whole of man in this station , and consequently this ought to be the only scope of all his studys and endeavours . xxx . and accordingly 't is observable that the scripture whenever it makes mention of wisdom with any mark of commendation , it always means by it either the very practice of religion and vertue , or such knowledge at least , that has a near and strong influence upon it ; thereby implying that that is the only wisdom which becomes the study of man. remarkable above the rest to this purpose is the th chapter of iob , where having run through several instances of natural knowledge , at length says he , but where shall wisdom be found ? and where is the place of understanding ? as much as to say that in none of the other things mention'd did consist the wisdom of man. then it follows , man knoweth not the price thereof , neither is it found in the land of the living , the depth saith , it is not in me , and the sea saith it is not in me . not in the depths of learning , nor in the recesses of speculation , seeing it is hid from the eyes of all living , and kept close from the fowls of the air , from men of high and towring notions , and sublime theories . destruction and death say , we have heard the fame thereof with our ears . as much as to say , that after this life , and then only , unless perhaps about the hour of death , men begin to have a true sense and lively savoury relish of this wisdom . but in the mean time , god understandeth the way thereof , and he knoweth the place thereof . and unto man he said , behold the fear of the lord that is wisdom , and to depart from evil , that is understanding . to man he said . had it been to another creature , suppose an angel , in a state of security and confirmation , he would perhaps have recommended for wisdom the study of nature , and the curiosities of philosophy , but having to do with man , a probationary and unfixt creature , that shall be either happy or miserable according as he demeans himself in this short time of trial , the only wisdom he advises to such a creature in such a station , is to look well to his moral conduct , to study religion and good life . xxxi . and now ( madam ) since we are upon scripture-authority ( for indeed so little has this matter been consider'd , that i have scarce any other to follow ) will your ladyship give me leave in further confirmation of the measure propos'd , to commend to your consideration two great scripture-examples , both of men eminently wise , and of a learned education . the men i instance in are moses and st. paul. the latter of which professedly declares that he determin'd to know nothing , but iesus christ and him crucify'd , that is , nothing but what concerns either the faith or the practice of christianity . and the former complaining of the gross ignorance of the people committed to his charge , and desiring they would become wiser , breaks out into this passionate wish , o that they were wise , that they understood this , that they would consider their latter end. xxxii . moses had been bred a scholar , as well as a courtier , and was well instructed in all the secrets of the aegyptian philosophy , which was then the best in the world. besides , he was himself a wise man , a man that besides the advantages of pharaoh's court , had the divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 himself for his tutor , and convers'd personally with his maker , and therefore must needs be supposed to know what was true wisdom . but now this he does not make to consist either in the accomplishments of courtly education , or in the deep mysteries of philosophy , but in the consideration of our latter end. he wishes that his people were wise , and to this end he does not wish that they were as well-bred as he , or as learned as he , but only that they understood this , this one thing , that they would consider their latter end. which he makes the summary and abstract of all wisdom . much like that of plato , when he defines philosophy to be , the theory of death . xxxiii . and here , if your ladyship will dispence with a short digression , a digression from the immediate thred of my discourse , tho not from the general design of it , i would upon this occasion briefly represent to you what an excellent part of wisdom it is for man seriously to consider his latter end . to make this distinctly appear , i shall proceed upon these two grounds : first , that the consideration of death is the most proper exercise that a wise man can be employ'd about . and secondly , that this is the most compendious way of making him wise that is not so . xxxiv . and first , it is the most proper exercise that a wise man can employ himself about . for wisdom consists in a due estimation of things ; and then things are duly estimated , when they are measured and rated , first as they are absolutely in themselves ; and secondly , as they stand in relation to us . if they are great and extraordinary then they deserve to be consider'd for their own sakes ; and if they nearly relate to us , then they deserve to be consider'd for ours . and upon both these accounts , death and its consequences are highly deserving a wise mans thoughts and reflections . xxxv . for first , they are great and extraordinary transactions , barely as in themselves consider'd , and as such would deservedly ingage the most attentive consideration , even of a stander by , of any other indifferent being , suppose an angel , that can be no otherwise concerned in it , than as t is a great event , a noble scene of providence , a matter of wonder and curiosity . i say upon this single account death with its consequences is as fit a subject for the contemplation of a wise man as auy in nature . xxxvi . or if there be within the sphere of nature things of a greater and more bulky appearance , yet certainly there is nothing wherein man is so nearly concern'd , so highly interessed as in death . since upon the manner of this depends his eternal happiness or ruin. there is therefore nothing that so much deserves to be consider'd by him . whether therefore we regard the absolute greatness of the thing , or its relative greatness with respect to us , as we are interessed and concerned in it , but especially if we weigh both , the consideration of death is as proper an exercise as a wise man can be imploy'd about . xxxvii . and as 't is so fit an imployment for him that is wise already , so secondly is it the most compendious way of making him wise , truly wise , that is not so . for all wisdom is in order to happiness , and to be truly wise , is to be wise unto salvation . whatever knowledge contributes not to this , is quite beside the mark , and is as the apostle calls it , science falsly so called . the knowledge itself is vain , and the study of it is impertinent . xxxviii . now the only way to happiness is a good life , and consequently all wisdom being in order to happiness , that 's the only wisdom that serves to the promoting of good life , according to that of iob before cited , and to man he said , behold the fear of the lord that is wisdom , and to depart from evil is understanding . that therefore is the most compendious way of making a man wise , that soonest makes him good , and reduces his mind to a moral regularity . and nothing does this so soon and so well as the serious and habitual consideration of death . and therefore says the wise man , remember death and corruption , and keep the commandments . the shortest compendium of holy living that ever was given . as if he had said , many are the precepts and admonitions left us by wise and good men , for the moral conduct of life , but would you have a short and infallible directory of living well ? why , remember death and corruption ; do but remember this , and forget all other rules if you will , and your duty if you can . xxxix . and what is here remarked by one wise man is consented to by all . hence those common practises among the antients of placing sepulchres in their gardens , and of using that celebrated motto , memento mori . hence also that modern as well as antient custom of putting emblems of mortality in churches , and other public places , by all which t is implied that the consideration of death , is the greatest security of a good life . as indeed it must be upon this general ground , because it does that at a blow , which other considerations do by parts , and gives an entire defeat to the three great enemies of our salvation at once . it sets us above the temptations of the world the flesh , and the devib . for how can the world captivate him , who considers he is but a stranger in it , and that he must shortly leave it ! how can the flesh insnare him who has his sepulchre always in his eye , and reflects upon the cold lodging he shall have there ! and how can the devil prevail upon him , who remembers always he must dye , and then enter upon an unchangeable state of happiness or misery , according as he has either resisted or yeilded to his temptations ! of so vast consequence is the constant thinking upon death above all other things that fall within the compass even of useful and practical meditation , and so great reason had moses for placing the wisdom of man in the consideration of his latter end. xl. but to return ( if being still in pursuit of my general design , i may well be said to be out of the way ) i now perswade my self that from the character i have drawn of man and his present circumstances , together with those reflections built upon it , and interwoven with it , and lastly from divine authority , the measure we have given is so well establish'd , that if your ladyship be not yet , you ought to be convinc'd that however naturally desirous we may be of knowledge , yet that this appetite is to be govern'd as well as those that are sensual ; that we ought to indulge it only so far as may tend to the moralizing our souls , and the conducting our lives , and the fitting us for that happiness which god has promised not to the learned , but to the good. and that if it be gratify'd to any other purpose , or in any other measure than this , our curiosity is impertinent , our study immoderate , and the tree of knowledge still a forbidden plant. xli . and now ( madam ) having fix'd and stated the measure of our present affection to , and inquiry after learning and knowledge , which i think is establish'd upon irrefutable principles , i may leave it to your ladyship to consider how much 't is observ'd in the general conduct of our studies . t is plain that 't is not observ'd at all . for these two things are too notorious to need any more for their proof than only to look abroad into the world. first , that very little of that which is generally made the subject of study has any manner of tendency to living well here , or happily hereafter . and secondly , that these very studies which have no religious or moral influence upon life , do yet devour the greatest part of it . the best and most of our time is devoted to dry-learning , this we make the course of our study , the rest is only by the by , and 't is well if what is devotional , practical or divinely-relishing , can find us at leisure upon a broken piece of a sunday or holiday . but the main current of our life runs in studies of another nature , that don't so much as glance one kind aspect upon good living , 't is well if some of them dont hinder it . i am sure st. austin thought so , and makes it part of his penitentials . and yet to these our youth is dedicated , in these we imploy our riper years ; nor do we see the vanity and impertinence of it in old age. and then when we dye , this very thing makes one great part of our funeral elegy , that we were so diligent and indefatigable in our studies , and so inquisitive in the search of knowledge , perhaps that we procured an early interment by it , when according to the principles before laid down , we were as impertinently imploy'd all the while , as if we had been so long picking straws in bedlam . i say as impertinently , tho perhaps not so innocently . the sum of all comes to this : the measure of prosecuting learning and knowledge is their usefullness to good life . consequently all prosecution of it beyond or beside this end is impertinent and immoderate . this has been fully proved by evident principles . but now of this sort is the general prosecution of learning and knowledge , as is plain by appealing to the general conduct of study . the conclusion therefore unovoidably follows . that the intellectual conduct of human life is justly chargeable with an immoderate and impertinent pursuit of knowledge . which was the proposition to be made out , and i am sorry to see it so well proved . the end of the third reflection . the conclusion . and now ( madam ) having finish'd my threefold reflection upon the intellectual conduct of human life , i have a double application to make , one to your ladyship , and another to my self . that to your ladyship is this , that you would consider to what a narrow compass , by vertue of the preceding discourses , these three things are reduced , which before use to take up so large a room , viz. learning it self , the method of learning , and the desire and prosecution of learning . the first of which is comprized within the limits of necessary truth , the second within those of thinking , purity and prayer ; the third within its usefulness to the furtherance of good life . these indeed are great retrenchments , but i think such as are just and necessary to the regulation of our intellectual conduct , which i am glad to find so compendious and disincumber'd , that being a mark of no small probability to confirm me in the truth of it , as the rightest line is also always the shortest . and since both learning it self , its method , and limits of prosecution are all so reduced , i would further commend to your ladyships consideration , whether from this great abridgment you can forbear deducing these two corollaries , first , that this bookish humour which every where so prevails , is one of the spiritual dyscrasys , or moral diseases of mankind , one of the most malignant reliques of original depravation . it carrying in it the very stamp and signature of adam's transgression , which owed its birth to curiosity , and inordinate desire of knowledge . secondly , that those who have eyes , may in a great measure spare them , and that those who have not , should not , upon the account of learning , much lament the want of them which is what particularly concerns your ladyship's case , and is now address'd to your private considerarion . now as to my own particular concern , the result of what i have written is this . i am so inwardly and throughly convinc'd of the certainty of those principles , i have here lay'd down , that i think i am not only under a particular obligation , but almost under a necessity of conducting my studies according to the measures proposed . the last of which has left such a strong influence , such a deep impression upon me , that i think i shall now follow the advice of the heathen ( m. antonius as i remember ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , rid my self of the thirst after books , and study nothing but what serves to the advancement of piety and good life . i have now spent about thirteen years in the most celebrated university in the world , and , according to the ordinary measures , perhaps not amiss , having accomplish'd my self in a competent degree both with such learning as the academical standard requires , and with whatever else my own private genius inclined me to . but truly i cannot say that i have order'd my studies in that theatre of learning , so much to my own satisfaction , as to my reputation with others . to be free with you , i must declare , that when i reflect upon my past intellectual conduct , i am as little satisfy'd with it as i am with that of my morals , and that i think i have nigh as much to answer for the former , as i have for the latter , being very conscious that the greatest part of it has been imploy'd in vnconcerning curiosities , , such as derive no moral influence upon the soul that contemplates them . but i have now ( if i sufficiently understand my self ) a very different taste and apprehension of things , and intend to spend my uncertain remainder of time in studying only such things as make for the moral improvement of my mind , and the regulation of my life , not being able to give an account upon any rational and consistent principles , why i should study any thing else . more particularly i think i shall cheifly apply my self to the reading of such books as are rather perswasive , than instructive , such as are sapid , pathetic and divinely-relishing , such as warm , kindle and inlarge the interiour , and awaken the divine sense of the soul , as considering with my self that i have now , after so much reading and speculation , more need of heat than of light. tho if i were for more light still , i think this would prove the best method of illumination , and that when all 's done , the love of god is the best light of the soul. for i consider with the excellent cardinal bona , that a man may have knowledge without love. but he that loves , altho he wants sciences humanely acquired , yet he will know more than human wisdom can teach him , because he has that master within who teaches man knowledge . purity of heart and life being one of the methods of consulting the ideal world , as was shewn in the second part. and now ( madam ) i cannot well presage how your ladyship will relish this renunciation of all studies meerly curious , from one whom you apprehended ( perhaps upon too just grounds ) to have been so naturally disposed to them , and so deeply ingaged in them . perhaps you 'll say i am already countrify'd since i left the vniversity . how far that metamorphosis may seize upon me , i can't yet tell , if solitude and retirement be enough to bring it , i am i confess in great danger , being now got into a little corner of the world , where i must be more company to my self than i have been ever yet . but the best on 't is , i have not been so great a stranger to my own company all along , as to fear any great alteration by it now . nor do i think the management of the present undertaking a sign of any such change . whether i should have had the same thoughts in the vniversity or no , i can't say , i rather believe they are owing to my country-retirement ( as i hinted in the beginning ) but however that be , sure i am they were entertain'd upon the deepest and severest consideration , and i believe are so well grounded , that the more your ladyship considers , the more you will be convinc'd both of the truth of what i have discours'd , and of the reasonableness of what i design ; which is to devote my self wholly to the accomplishment of my moral part , and of my intellectual , only so far as is subservient to the other . and now ( madam ) having bid farewel to all unconcerning studies , all the dry and unsavoury parts of learning , 't is high time to take my leave of your ladyship too ; which i do with this hope , that one great ground of your trouble for the misfortune of your eyes is by the foregoing considerations removed : and with this assurance , that if these discourses be too weak to bring you over to my present opinion , they will however prove strong enough to work you into a better , which is to believe , that i still continue in all reality , your ladyships most faithful friend and servant , iohn norris . newton st. loe , sept. . . a sermon preach'd in the abby church of bath , before the right reverend father in god , thomas , lord bishop of bath and wells : at his visitation held there iuly . . by iohn norris , m. a. rector of newton st. loe , near bath , and late fellow of all-souls college in oxford . london , printed in the year . john . v. . so when they had dined , iesus saith to simon peter , simon son of ionas , lovest thou me more than these ? he saith unto him , yea lord ; thou knowest that i love thee . he saith unto him , feed my lambs . the words consist of three considerable parts . first , of a question put by our lord to st. peter . secondly , of st. peter's answer . thirdly , of a command by way of inference from it . the question was whether st. peter loved him beyond the rest of his disciples then present . this demand of our lord was not so high as were st. peter's former professions and pretensions . this warm and zealous apostle had always profess'd a more than ordinary adhesion to his lord and master , and pretended to as great a supremacy of love , as his successours do of knowledge and iurisdiction . he seem'd to be among the apostles what the seraphim are among the angels , to out-shine and out-burn not this or that vulgar disciple only , but the whole apostolical order in zeal , courage , and flames of divine love. for no less can that eminent profession of his import , tho all men should be offended because of thee , yet will i never be offended . but not having made good his high pretensions , our lord now puts the question to him in terms more moderate than those wherein he had before voluntarily boasted of his own fidelity ; and whereas he had before made shew of a superlative love beyond all the disciples , our lord only asks him this modest question , lovest thou me more than these ? the good apostle having now partly from the late experiment of his own frailty , and partly from the manner of our lords question , learnt more humility and modesty , returns such an answer as was short not only of his former professions , but even of the question too . he does not reply , lord thou knowest that i love thee more than these . no , he dares not venture any more so much as to determine any thing concerning the measure of his love , but is contented barely to aver the truth , and sincerity of it . and for this he fears not to appeal at last to the divine omniscience , lord thou knowest all things , thou knowest that i love thee . our lord takes the answer , and does not at all question the truth and sincerity of it , only he gives him a test whereby it might be tried and justified , both before god , himself and the world , by subjoining this illative command , feed my lambs , as it is in the text , or as in the two following verses , feed my sheep . this whole intercourse between our lord and st. peter , may i conceive , as to the full stress and scope of it , fitly be reduced to this short hypothetical sceme of speech , if thou lovest me , feed my sheep . like that of our saviour , upon another occasion to his disciples in common , if ye love me keep my commandments . this under a shorter view takes in the full force of the words , and i shall accordingly discourse upon them , as if they had stood in this posture . hence then i shall take occasion to consider these three things , as naturally arising from the words , and as no less pertinent to our present concern . first the great love of our lord christ to his church , which he here calls his lambs , and his sheep , which he here commands st. peter as he loved him to feed , and which lastly he would not absolutely and finally commit to his charge , till after three distinct inquiries whether he truly loved him . secondly , i shall consider the command here given , and shew the great obligation that lies upon all spiritual pastors and guides of souls to feed this flock of christ which is so dearly beloved by him . thirdly , i shall consider the connexion and dependence that is between the practice of this command and the love of christ. if thou lovst me feed my sheep . lastly , i shall close all with an earnest exhortation to the conscientious practice of the duty enjoyned . the first thing i shall consider is the great love of christ to his church . and certainly if there be any secret in religion fit for angels to contemplate , and too high for them to comprehend ; if there be any love that has breadth and length , and depth , and heighth , if there be any love that passes knowledge , if there be any love that is stronger than death , and dearer than life , if there be any , lastly , that is truly wonderful , and that passes love not only of women , but of the whole creation , 't is this love of our lord to his church . we have no line long enough to fathom so vast a depth , nor can mortality furnish us with ideas to conceive , or with words to utter so deep a mystery . if there be any words that can reach it , they must be such as st. paul heard in his rapture , strange words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 words that cannot be pronounced by an human tongue , and that would be meer barbarism to a mortal capacity . but however , that we may take some measure of that which really has none , and be able to frame some notion of this love of christ , which as the apostle tells us passes knowledge , we will exhibit a prospect of it in a double light ; first , in those verbal representations which the scripture gives of it , and secondly , in those real and actual proofs whereby christ himself has exprest this his most excellent , and otherwise incredible love. as to the first , the scripture we know is full of great things , and those set forth with as great and magnificent expressions . the rhetoric and stile of scripture runs incomparably high , beyond that of any other writings in whatever it treats of . but there are three things more especially , in the description of which the holy spirit seems to labour , and be at a stand for expression . and these are the glories of heaven , the miseries of hell , and the love of christ to his church . these the scripture represents under all the variety of symbols , figures and images that can be supplied either from the intellectual or material world ; that so what is wanting in each single representation , might be made up from the multitude and combination of them , that if one should miss , another might strike us , to make if possible some impression of so strange and so concerning truths upon the minds of men. but the last of these , as 't is most wonderful and mysterious ( it being a greater wonder that god should love man , than that either there should be so much happiness in the enjoyment of god , or so much misery in the loss of him ) so is it more frequently inculcated , and more strongly represented . so frequently inculcated is it , that were it not for the mystery of the thing , and that there is no tautology in love , the scripture would seem chargeable with vain repetitions . every page almost in holy writ breathes forth this mystery of divine love , and besides that , there is one whole book particularly imploy'd in the representation of it , by all the flowers and delicacies of the most exalted poetry ; it may be said of the whole sacred volumn that 't is but one continued expression of love from christ to his church , one larger canticles . and as 't is thus frequently inculcated , so is it no less strongly represented . 't is represented by that which is the most proper effect , and the last end and accomplishment of all love , by vnion . for there are three most admirable unions proposed to our faith in the christian religion . the unity of essence in the trinity , the unity of person in jesus christ , and the union that is between christ and his church . the first of these is an example and prefiguration as it were to the second , and the second to the third . for we cannot better represent the union of christ with his church , than by the hypostatic vnion , or the union of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with human nature . for first , as in this mystery the plurality of nature is consistent with the unity of person , so does love effect the same miracle in the union between christ and his church . for here also we meet with a new theanthropy , a strange composition of god and man , two vastly different substances , which without confusion of either natures or properties , make up one and the same body . for if christ be head of the church , he is also one body with it . and so st. austin , totus christus secundam ecclesiam & caput & corpus est . again , as in the mystery of the hypostatic union there is a communication of idioms or properties whereby what primarily and abstractly belongs to one , may secondarily and concretely be attributed to the other , as that god is man , and man is god , so has love introduced the like communication between christ and his church , which may be said to be happy and glorified in christ , as he is said to suffer in his church . again , as in the mystery of the hypostatic union the word uniting it self to human nature adorn'd and exalted it , not only by the priviledge of so sacred a confederacy , but also with many distinct graces and excellencies , whereby it was necessarily tho not forcibly determin'd to love the divinity , and highly fitted to be loved by it , so is it also in this union between christ and his church . he has not only innobled her by so sacred an alliance , but is ever conferring upon her his gifts and graces , and will never cease to do so , till at length he present her to himself a glorious church , without spot or blemish , and make her in some measure worthy of so great a love , and so intimate an vnion . for 't is observable , that in scripture jesus christ is set out as the author and dispencer of all grace , to him is ascribed the work of the second as well as of the first creation , from his fulness we all receive , and the apostle says expresly , that to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of christ. but not to pursue this metaphysical parallel any further , let us return to consider this union , as 't is represented in holy scripture . now there are but two sorts of union in the world , natural and moral . and the holy spirit has made choice of the closest of each , whereby to figure out to us the union between christ and his church . the closest of natural unions is that between the head and the body ; and the closest of all moral unions is that between the husband and the wife . and both these are by the holy spirit applied to this mystery . thus is christ oftentimes call'd the head of the church , and the church the body of christ. thus again is he stiled the bridegroom , and the church honour'd with the name of his spouse . and because this latter figure carries in it more of sensible endearment , therefore is it of more frequent use , and withal of more antient date . for besides that adam first open'd this mystery , and by his miraculous marriage typified to us that of christ with his church , which came out of the wounded side of our lord , as eve was taken out of adam's , the prophets have also given our lord the title of bridegroom in the old testament . the th psalm is a plain spiritual epithalamium , and so is the whole book of canticles , and the holy baptist , in whom both types and prophesie expire , calls him expresly by the name of bridegroom . strange miracle of humility and love ! that ever god should come down to seek a spouse upon earth ! was it not enough , o blessed jesu , that thou wast one with the father and holy spirit , in the eternal trinity ? was it not enough that thou hadst made thy self one with our mortal flesh by assuming our nature , but that thou must yet heap mystery upon mystery , and as if thou wert not yet near enough allied to us , must also make thy self one with thy church ? but such is thy love to man as not to be contented with one single union with him ? and so great thy condescention as if thou need'st a partner , to compleat thy happiness , and as if it were no more good for the second , than 't was for the first adam to be alone . these are the two principal figures under which the scripture pictures out to us the love of christ to his church , and his union with it . not that they rise up to the heighth of the mystery , but because they come the nearest of any to it . for indeed they fall vastly short , and give but a faint shadowy resemblance of what they are intended to represent . and therefore as we have hitherto represented the dearness between christ and his church , by that between the head and the members , and the husband and wife , so we may , and with better reason invert the order , and propose the former as an example and measure for both the latter . and 't is observable that st. paul does so ; for says he , husbands love your wives , even as christ loved the church . and again , no man ever yet hated his own flesh , but nourishes and cherishes it even as the lord the church . where you see the love of christ to his church is not , as before , set out by that of married persons , and that of a man to his own flesh , but these are set out and illustrated by the other . so great and transcending all love , yea even all knowledge , is this love of christ to his church . but 't will appear yet greater , if we take a prospect of it in the second light , namely in those real and actual proofs whereby christ himself has exprest this his most excellent and otherwise incredible love. and certainly they are such as never were , will , or can be given by any other lover . for ( to make the prospect as short as maybe ) was it not an amazing instance of love for the great and ever blessed god , who could neither be advantaged by our happiness , nor damaged by our misery , to come down and assume our nature in its meanest circumstances , to live a needy and contemptible life , and dye a painful aud execrable death , and all this to reconcile a rebel , to restore an apostate ? indeed the work of man's redemption , if we deeply consider the whole method and contrivance of it , is such an heroic instance of love , and so much exceeding that of his creation , that 't is well man was created and redeem'd by the same good being , since otherwise his obligations to his redeemer being so much greater than those to his creator , he would be very much divided and distracted in his returns of love and gratitude . but let us reflect a little upon the life , before we further consider the death of our redeemer . it was one constant argument , one continued miracle of love. he lived as one purely devoted to the good of mankind . all his thoughts , all his words , all his actions were love , his whole business was to glorify his father , and ( which was his greatest glory ) to express his love to man , which tho at all times exceeding wonderful , yet toward the evening of his life it thicken'd and grew stronger , like motion within the neighbourhood of the center , and as then he prayed , so he loved yet more earnestly . for 't was then that he wept over condemn'd ierusalem , and bedew'd with tears the grave of lazarus . 't was then that with desire he desired to eat the passover with his disciples , instituted a perpetual monument of love , his holy supper , and left another of humility by condescending to wash their feet . 't was then that he comforted his disciples with the variety of the heavenly mansions , with a declaration that he himself was the way , the truth and the life , with an assurance that their prayers in his name should be effectual , with a promise of the holy spirit , and with a legacy of his own peace , to compensate for the tribulation they should meet with in the world. 't was then , lastly , that he recommended the state of his apostles , together with his own glorification , in one and the same solemn prayer to his father , that he would preserve them in unity and truth , and at length glorify them with the whole body of true believers with himself in heaven . and all this at a time when one would have thought his own concern should have been his only meditation , and fear his only passion , for now was he within view of his amazing sufferings , and the shade was just ready to point at the dreadful hour , and yet even now his love was truly stronger than death , and the care of his disciples prevailed over the horrors of his approaching agony . which he further shewed by giving up himself to a cruel and shameful death , for the life and salvation of the world. a death ( to say no more of it ) of such strange sorrow and anguish , that the very prospect of it put him into a sweat of blood , and the induring it made him complain of being deserted of his father . and then that his redemption might prove effectual , after his resurrection he gives commission to his disciples to go and publish it with its conditions throughout the world , and orders them all , as he does here st. peter , to feed his sheep . and lest the the benefit of his death should be again frustrated for want of power to perform the conditions , presently after his ascension he sent down the spirit of consolation upon his apostles , and does continually confer grace upon , and make intercession for his church . so tenderly affected was he toward this his spouse , that even the felicities of heaven could not make him forget her , as he further shew'd by complaining in behalf of his church , when from the midst of his glory he said , saul , saul , why persecutest thou me ? which words shew him as much concern'd for the wounds given to his mystical , as for those he felt in his natural body . and now since the love of our lord to his church is so exceeding great , it certainly concerns all christians , especially those whom he has intrusted with the care of his church to be alike minded . which leads me in the second place to consider the command here given , and to shew the great obligation that lies upon all spiritual pastors , to feed this flock of christ which is so nearly beloved by him . feed my sheep , says our lord to st. peter , and in him to all the pastors of the christian church , who are equally concerned both in the command and in the duty . and that they are so is , already sufficiently concluded from what has been discoursed concerning the great love of christ to his church . to make you therefore more sensible of this duty i need only propose to your meditation , how affectionately our lord loves his church , and how dear her interests are to him , that out of this his abundant love , he has set apart a distinct order of men on this very purpose , to promote and further her in the way of salvation , that he has intrusted the care of her in their hands , and has made them his vicegerents and trustees ; that 't is a charge worthy their greatest care , for which there needs no other argument than that 't is committed to them , by him who knows the worth . of souls ; that he strictly commands them , as they have any love or regard for him , to feed his sheep ; that 't was the very last command that he gave them , when he was just leaving the world , and upon the very confines of glorification , and that lastly as this is the greatest trust that was ever by god reposed in men , so there will be the severest account taken of it at the last day , at the great visitation of the bishop of souls . this is enough , if duely weighed , to shew the obligation of this command , and to conclude this part , were it not necessary to add something concerning the manner of discharging it . feed my sheep is the command given by christ to the pastors of his church , and we have seen the obligation of it : but how are they to feed them ? i answer , first by prayer for their respective charges both in public and in private . this is the first thing belonging to the pastoral office , and accordingly with this st. paul begins his admonition to his son timothy . i exhort therefore that first of all , supplications , prayers , intercessions and giving thanks be made for all men. secondly by preaching , with private instruction and admonition as occasion shall serve and require . and here their first care should be to preach nothing but what is true. secondly , to confine their discourses to vseful truths , such as tend to the promotion of good life , that which the apostle calls the truth which is after godliness . thirdly , to deliver only plain truths . for there are many truths which are highly useful and have a very practical aspect when they are once understood , which are not so easie and obvious to be so . these therefore ought as much to be waved as those which are not useful , because tho useful , simply speaking , yet respectively they are not . and upon these two latter accounts we should not trouble our unlearned auditories , either with thorny questions and knotty controversies which in themselves have no practical use , or with more refined theories and school niceties , which to them are as useless and unpractical as the other . to feed them with the former would be to give them stones instead of bread ; and to feed them with the latter would be like placing a man in the region of pure ether ; why , he can't breath in it , and will starve by reason of the over-fineness of his diet. nor is it enough that the truths we preach be vseful and plain , unless in the fourth place they be deliver'd in a plain and intelligible manner . for what signifies it that the things are in themselves plain , if we make them obscure in our expressing them ; we are all ready enough to laugh at the poor frier for going about to preach the gospel to beasts and trees , and are not they alike ridiculous that order discourses so as not to be understood by those that hear them ? don't these also preach to beasts and trees ? we ought therefore to consult the capacity of our hearers , and consider to whom , as well as what we speak . and to this plainness of expression we would do well to join some degrees of warmth and concernedness . and this i rather recommend because there are some that affect a cold , dead , careless and heartless way of delivery . but certainly this has as little decorum in it as it has of devotion . for since the things we speak are supposed not only to be truths , but concerning and important truths , what can be more absurd than to see a man deliver a sermon as drily and indifferently , as one would read a mathematical lecture ? 't is said of iohn the baptist , that he was a burning , as well as a shining light. and truly we have need of such in this cold frozen age. plain sermons , preach'd with warmth and affection do more than the best , coldly deliver'd . you know the story in eusebius of the heathen philosopher coming into the council of nice , who was baffled into christianity by the meer warmth and heartiness wherewith the good old man address'd him . he could have resisted his arguments , but not the spirit and zeal wherewith he spake . and this is all i shall think proper to remark to you upon the preaching part . the next way whereby the pastors of the church are to feed the sheep of christ , is by duely administring to them the holy sacrament , which is their true spiritual food , the manna that must sustain them in this wilderness . this is the most proper way of feeding them , for the body of christ is meat indeed , and his blood is drink indeed . there remains yet one way more of feeding the flock of christ , without which the rest will signifie but little , and that is by a good example . among the other properties of a good shepherd , our saviour reckons this as one , that he goes before his sheep , and leads them by his steps , as well as with his voice . there ought to be a connexion between hear and do , but much more between preach and do. and he that is not careful of this , as he cannot expect to do much good to others , so he will certainly condemn himself . to be short ( for i hope i need not inlarge , speaking to wise men ) a good preacher who is an ill liver is such a monster as cannot be match'd in all affrica . and for his state hereafter , i may leave it to be consider'd how great a condemnation awaits him , whom not only the book of god , and of conscience , but even his own sermons shall judge at the last day . these are the several ways of discharging this precept , feed my sheep ; to which however i think it necessary to add one thing more , and that is that we feed them our selves , and not by proxy , or deputation . for out lord does not say to st. peter , do thou get some body to feed my sheep , but do thou feed them thy self . for however st. peter's shadow might do cures upon the body , it must be his person that must do good upon the souls of his charge . to speak out plainly what i intend , non-residency is one of the greatest scandals of the reform'd , yea of the christian religion , contrary to all reason and justice , as well as primitive practice . and whoever are guilty of it , plainly shew that they are lovers of ease , honour or profit more than lovers of christ. for certainly he that loves christ as he ought will not think himself too good to feed his sheep . which leads me in the third and last place to consider the connexion and dependance that is between the practice of this command and the love of christ. now this i briefly make out upon a double ground . the first ground is , because the love of christ will naturally ingage us to love whatever he loves , and consequently since his church is so exceeding dear to him , 't will ingage us to love his church , and if to love it , then consequently to be diligent in feeding it , that being the most proper instance of shewing our love to it . the second ground is , because the person of jesus christ consisting of a double nature , god and man , the love of him must include the love of his humanity ; as well as of his divinity . if therefore we love christ , we love the human nature as well as the divine , and if so , then we love man as man , consequently all men , and if we love all men , we shall desire and endeavour their salvation , and accordingly take care to feed them with the bread of life . upon these two grounds it plainly appears that there is a strong connexion between the loving of christ , and the feeding of his sheep , and that such pastors as do not well discharge the latter , have no right of pretending to the former . this is the test whereby both st. peter's and every spiritual pastor's affection to our lord must be tried , if you love me , feed my sheep . let me therefore exhort you all , as you love our lord jesus christ , and as you desire to be loved and approv'd of by him , to a sincere and conscientious discharge of your pastoral duty , to take heed unto your selves and to all the flock over which the holy ghost has made you overseers , to feed the church of god , which he has purchased with his own blood. let me beseech you to consider what you are , and what you should be . what you are by your character and profession , and what you should be in the exercise of it , and therefore to take heed to your selves , to your doctrine , and above all to your publick life and conversation . for certainly it cannot be an ordinary measure of religion that will serve our turn , who are concern'd not only to be good , but exemplary , and must live well for others as well as for our selves , what therefore is perfection in others , will be but strict duty in us . the devotion of our ordinary days , ought to exceed that of their festivals , and we should live in as much warmth of religion as they dye . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in all things shewing thy self a pattern of good works , that 's our rule , we ought to be patterns and examples of a holy and refined conversation . let your lamps therefore be always trimm'd , and your lights always burning , and that with such brightness , as to shame those that will not be allured by the glory of the flame . and that you may the better do all this , let me desire you all frequently and seriously to meditate upon the excellent example of the great and good shepherd christ jesus , whose life was wholly imploy'd , and at last laid down for the good of his sheep . i pray you ( my reverend brethren ) consider this and all that has been said , that so when this great shepherd shall return to visit his flock , you may all give up the same account to him , that he did to his father , those that thou gavest me i have kept , and none of them is lost . amen . finis . books printed for sam. manship , at the black-bull , in cornhil . odes . satyrs , and epistles of horace , done into english ; the second edition . lives of the most famous english poets , or the honour of parnassus , in a brief essay of the works and writings of above two hundred of them , from the time of k. william the conqueror , to the reign of the late k. iames the second , in octav. reason and religion , or the grounds and measures of devotion , considered from the nature of god and the nature of man , in several contemplations , with exercises of devotion , applied to every contemplation ; by iohn norris , m. a. and fellow of all-souls-college in oxford . octavo , price s. the theory and regulation of love , a moral essay in two parts , to which is added letters philosophical and moral , between the author and doctor more , by i. noris , m. a. and fellow of all-souls-college in oxford . s. a cap of gray-hairs , for a green head , or the fathers counsel to his son an apprentice in london : containing wholesome instructions for the managements of a man's whole life : the fourth edition in twelves . s. the injured lovers , or the ambitious father a tragedy ; acted by their majesties servants , at the theatre royal : by w. mountfort . a comedy . the comical revenge , or love in a tub ; as it is now acted at their majesties theatre : by sir geo. ethenege . the gallant hermaphrodite , an amorous novel , translated from the french , of the sieur de chouigny . price s. the marrow of divinity , or the chief grounds of protestant religion , briefly explained in a form of catechising ; by way of question and answer , by william ames , d. d. price . d. finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e eccles. . . notes for div a -e exod. . . vid. reason and religion . pag. . vid. the same treatise . pag. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . p. . cogitationes rationales de deo p. . de la recherche de la verite p. . cor. . . notes for div a -e vide , reason and religion . joh. . . p. . p. . p. , reason and religion . colos. . . prov. . . c. . . joh. . . tauler sermon , . pasch. p. . joh. . . cor. ● . . wisd. . dan. . . psal. . joh. . . cor. . . dan. . joh. . . v. . psal. . . dan. . . pag. . jam. . . king. . . notes for div a -e eccl. . nat. hist. p. . job . . eccles. . . colos. . . cogitat . ration . de deo. p. ● . eccles. . . v. . v. . v. . v. . v. . v. . v. . cor. . deut. . . confess . lib. c. . . notes for div a -e via compendii ad deum . p. . notes for div a -e mat. . . ephes. . . ephes. . . ephes. . . ephes. . . ver. . luke . . . jo. . tim. . . titus . john . . john . act. . . tit. . . john . .