Scepsis scientifica, or, Confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of The vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius / by Joseph Glanvill ... Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680. 1665 Approx. 196 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 51 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2009-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A70185 Wing G828_pt2 ESTC R13862 11839211 ocm 11839211 49777 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A70185) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 49777) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 70:14, 31:5) Scepsis scientifica, or, Confest ignorance, the way to science in an essay of The vanity of dogmatizing, and confident opinion : with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius / by Joseph Glanvill ... Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680. 2 v. Printed by E. Cotes, for Henry Eversden ..., London : 1665. Vol. 2 has special t.p.: Scire/i tuum nihil est, or, The authors defence of the vanity of dogmatizing, against the exceptions of the learned Tho. Albius in his late Sciri ... London : Printed by E.C. for H. Eversden, 1665. First ed. published under title: The way of dogmatizing. Copy at reel 31:5 (G827) is volume 1; copy at reel 70:14 (G828) is volume 2. "A letter to a friend concerning Aristotle": v. 2, p. 77-92. 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Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800. 2007-08 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2007-08 Apex CoVantage Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2008-02 John Pas Sampled and proofread 2008-02 John Pas Text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-09 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion SCIRE / I tuum nihil est : OR , The AUTHORS DEFENCE OF The Vanity of DOGMATIZING ; Against the EXCEPTIONS OF The Learned THO. ALBIUS In his Late SCIRI . No doubt but ye are the Men , and Wisdom shall dye with you ! Job . LONDON , Printed by E. C. for Henry Eversden at the Grey-Hound in St. Pauls-Church-Yard , 1665. The AUTHORS APOLOGY FOR HIS STYLE . IT may perhaps seem to some incongruous , that my Reply is not written in the language of the Objections ; and I should have thought so too , had the Objections spoke the Language of my Discourse . But since my Assailant takes the Liberty to recede from my Style , I know no reason obligeth me to humour his . And 't is less improper for a Book to differ in fashion from another that opposeth it ; than from that of which 't is a part and vindication . And this Answer were sufficient for the seeming impropriety : But yet I have Reasons more considerable to excuse it . I must confess then , that by that time Sciri was extant , I was grown so indifferent to those matters , that I had much ado to perswade my self to a Review of what I had written ; and could have ben content to have left it without any other vindication , then what it could it self obtain from the good nature and ingenuity , of impartial perusers . And in this coldness of humor had without doubt deserved it , but that my Bookseller importun'd me for another Edition : which request of his having consented to , I saw my self under a necessity of decorum to return something on an occasion , in which silence perhaps might have been ill-manners to an ingenious and learned Adversary . But though the constraint of these circumstances overcame my aversness to writing any more on a subject , with which I thought I had done for ever ; yet could it not prevail against the humour I had of troubling my self no more then needs in a business , to which I was driven , rather then inclined or perswaded . So that after I had resolv'd an Answer ; it had been more difficult to have drawn my self to put it into any other drss , then what is most easie and familiar . Which yet was not the effect only of the indisposition and laziness of my humour ; but a dictate of my discretion . For the truth is , I foresaw the occasion would not engage me in any thing , that I could think worthy of the universal Language ; except I should have written a Discourse , and not an Answer . Besides which , had I used another style I must have been more diffuse in reiterating what I had said in the opposed Essay ; otherwise those that understood not English , had been uncapable of my justification ; and my self , and those that do , nauseated by the repetition . These then were the chief reasons of my continuing the Language I began with ; which I confess I was the more easily perswaded by , because there are late great examples of like practice , whose fashions 't is no discredit to imitate . And to all I might add , that I love not that my Discourse should wear Linsy-Woolsy . SCIRI , A. Sive Sceptices & Scepticorum à Jure Disputationis Exclusio . Remarques on the Title . G. I Should never have thought my self concern'd in a Book , that wears such a Title ; but that I found my Name in the first page made an ungrateful adjunct : and the opposing a discourse I had publish't , profest the occasion , and mark it aim'd at . How unjust 't is to suggest that I am a Sceptick , is I think clear enough from what I have said already , and shall make more fully appear in the process . And how little kindness I have for the disputing way of procedure , I have publiquely declared . How proper then that part of the Title is in this application , any one may pass an easie judgement . But to what purpose old Cato stands there , with that instructive oracle in his mouth , which I remember ever since I cap't verses , Contra verbosos : I was posed to conjecture . Especially since the insignificant prattle , and endless garrulity of the Philosophy of the Schools , which this Gentleman seems to vindicate , is none of the least offences to those whom , whither they will or no , he will have be Scepticks . In consideration of this , and some such other misapplyed appellations , I thought that this learned Man had an other notion of Sceptick then was usual ; and casting mine eye over his late Purgation , presented to the Cardinals of the inquisition , I found that his Scepticks were some of the modern voluminous ●●sputing Peripateticks , whom in that part of my Discourse where I deal with the Aristotelian Philosophy , I bestow a particular Reflection on . These it seems by the solicitation of their complaints against his Writings had obtain'd a general condemnation of them from the Pope and Consistory of Cardinals ; whom therefore in his Appeal to the said Cardinals he accuseth of ignorance , corruption of the Aristotelian Doctrines , and tendency to Heresie and Atheism . And that these are the Scepticks of our Philosopher , appears also from several passages both of the Praeface and Body of the Discourse I am rejoyning to . But then upon what account the celebrated Gassendus and the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing should be comprised under a common name with these , with whom they have so little confederacy either in Doctrin or Design ; I cannot yet find the least ground for conjecture . A. Junioribus Academicis . ETsi non dubitem validioribus & magis opportunis auxiliis obviam itum esse exitiali illi Pyrrhonicae contagio , quod nova audere non ita pridem occaepit ; tamen , quia nil publici cauterii adactum ad ulous Glanvillanum jam biennio integro aestuofum audiveram , visum est filentibus potioribus ad meam infirmitatem devolutum esse onus , iniquitatem indisciplinatae illius calumniae Universo Philosophantium choro impositae , si non avertere , certe aperire , & plumis disertioribus lacerandam exponere . — Page 1. UPon the supposal then that I am a Sceptick , the learned G. Gentleman invades my harmless and peaceable Essay as a deadly Pyrrhonical contagion , and an enemy to Science . But with what ingenuity I am charg'd , with what I have so frequently disclaim'd , I appeal to the professions of the Discourse it self to evidence : which whether they are arguments of a Sceptical aim and temper , let the Dogmatist judge between us . And though my Apology for Philosophy may perhaps be defective in point of Judgement and Argument , for the clearing of what I undertook to vindicate ; yet both the design and menage of it , one would think , should have secured me from suspicion of endeavouring to discourage Philosophical enquiries , by introducing a despair of Science . For on the contrary , one of my chief designs was , to remove that sloath and laziness which in these later ages hath cramp't endeavour , and made men content to sit down with their slender acquists , as Certainties and Demonstrations which are scarce Probabilities . I desire it may be taken notice of once for all then , that I have nought to do with that shuffling Sect , that love to doubt eternally , and to question all things . My profession is freedom of enquiry , and I own no more Scepticism then what is concluded in the Motto which the ROYAL SOCIETY have now adopted for theirs , NULLIUS IN VERBA . So that there was no need of so solemn a warning to the Universities against my innocent discourse ; whose greatest fault is , that 'tas been so unhappy as to be mistaken . For the Ulcus Glanvillanum ( as my learned Assailant is pleased to call it ) contains none of the supposed venome . Nor will it inspire any but supine and passive tempers with any other spirit then that of more diligent research , and careful pursuits of nature . I am not therefore concern'd in the Question our Author propounds to his junior Academicks to this purpose : Whether they would be severely wise for the conduct of their Manners and Religion , or enticingly Rhetorical , pleading for Ignorance and Uncertainty , and whistling their dependants into apparent precipices ? Since one of the greatest quarrels I have against Confident Opinion , is , that it renders the Dogmatist conceited , not wise . And is so far from being serviceable to good manners , that it mischievously corrupts them , sowring Mens spirits with Envy , ill Nature , and Moroseness ; and mingling their Religion with Schism , bitrer Zeal , and Sedition : And these are worse precipices then a modest and reserv'd belief can betray Men into . To what follows within this period , I 'le say no more , then that there 's a Medium between being Blind and Infallible . And vanitas Dogmatizandi , is not well explained by vera pollicendi . A. Viro non irascor , qui magno ingenio & eloquentiae cum annis maturandae flumine non vadando , — pag. 3. G. IN this clause the learned Gentleman acknowledgeth my confession of certainty in Faith , and hopes of Science from experiment ; neither of which can consist with a criminal and dangerous Scepticism : which yet he seems not willing to have me free from , adding , that I point at one , as the ground of my expectation , whom this learned Man will have believed a Favourer of the Pyrrhonian Nihil Sciri : The person aim'd at in this Reflection , I conceive , is Des-Cartes ; though I confess , I remember not that sentence mention'd in his writings ; for after the proposal of what might be expected from experiment and the progress of enquiry , I adde , That those that are acquainted with the fecundity of the Cartesian Principles will dispair of nothing . And if that great Man , possibly one of the greatest that ever was , must be believed a Sceptick , who would not ambitiously affect the title ? And to give the Pyrrhonians one of the noblest and happiest wits that hath shone upon the world , is to yield a greater advantage to their Cause , then would be done by a thousand profest assertions of it So that had I been guilty of such a Concession , I might thence more reasonably have been judged a Favourer of the Scepticks , then by any thing I have writ against the Dogmatists . For I am apt to think , that Mankind is like to reap more advantage from the Ignorance of Des Cartes , then perhaps from the greatest part of the science was before him , and I cannot forbear pronouncing him the Phosphoros of that clear and useful light , that begins to spring in plentifully upon an awakened world . So that though the following expostulations are proper and seasonable in reference to our Authors Peripatetical Scepticks , yet are they most improper and injurious , if they have any aspect on Des-Cartes , or those that endeavour to promote that free and useful way of Philosophizing which he hath insisted in . But I add no more on this occasion , because 't is possible I have mistaken the person intended by my Assailant . However , if the Reflection be not directed to him , 't is to the excellent Gassendus , who is presently after introduced , under the Title of the Great Interpreter of Epicurus ; who hath as little reason to be suspected of Criminal Scepticism , as the other . It is well known that these great men were Inquirers , and it becomes not such to be swearers , nor is it therefore reasonable to conclude them Scepticks . A. Aliud offendiculum est complurium Modernorum effraenis impudentia , qui Aristotelem — pag. 7. G. I Am glad to find my learned Assailant justifying all my censures of the Modern Aristotelians ; only he accuseth them of one fault which I seldom find among them , viz. modesty in proposing their opinions ; which our Authour inveighs against as a criminal diffidence . But for my part I think the greatest number of that spirit can plead Not guilty to the accusation . And for those of them that are less assured in their sentiments , I should not reckon it among their crimes , to be wary and sparing of assent in notions so lubricous and uncertain , as are those they deal in . Though I confess , to keep such voluminous ado about acknowledg'd uncertainties , is a very reprehensible vanity . And doubtless the unprofitable toyes of these later Peripateticks , have offended many against that Philosophy . But whether most of them are not the genuine derivations of the Hypothesis they claim to , may without difficulty be determin'd by any that will consider the natural flatulency of that aery scheam of notions . And I think they have no great reason to pretend to ingenuity or judgement , that accuse Aristotle for the faults of his Sectators . But from this last period of sence , I desire chiefly it may be noted , that our learned Author pleads not for the Modern Aristotelianism , which yet obtains in most of the Schools of Christendom : All the advantage I shall make of which at present is to question , Whether the reseuing men from an over fond value of such small wares , and the preventing the expence of time and pains upon such solemn trifles , as our Philosopher deservedly calls them , be like to be a prejudice to their persuits of more useful Knowledge , and the Furtherance of Science ? Vos modo novi palmites surgentes in Vinum quod A. laetificet corda hominum , memores quod — pag. 9. THough I confess I have not so great a value for the G. Aristotelian learning , as some others ; yet I am none of those , that would disswade junior Academicks from the study of that Philosophy . Especially , I think Aristotles Logick and Rhetorick are to be acknowledg'd ; though , I am not of the opinion of Averroes that he was the inventer of either . And doubtless that reverence and observance is due to the Statutes of those Universities that recommend this Author ; yea and the Antiquity of that Philosophy ( though it be far from being the antientest ) will commend it to the Students of universal learning . Besides , I would have nothing avoided or condemn'd till it be understood : And were I more an enemy to that Philosophy then my Assailant can suppose I am , yet should I not disswade the learning It ; since primus sapientiae gradus , est falsa intelligere . Only , I think , 't would be very injurious to Knowledge , if Aristotle should ingross men , and should his Placits be all receiv'd as the dictates of universal Reason . There are other Hypotheseis more antient , and possiby more useful , that deserve to be enquired into . And 't is an enlargement and enobling the minds of men to acquaint them with the various Scheams in which things have been represented . My design was not then to discourage any from inquiring into the Aristotelian Doctrines , especially as they are in their original : But to prevent mens sitting down for ever on his Composures , and making his Placits the infallible measures of Truth and Nature . Let Aristotle be studied then , but not adored . Let him have the first of our Time , but not all ; the advantage of prepossession is great , which yet Free Philosophers I presume will grant him ; only let Pythagoras , Democritus , Plato , and the more antient Chaldaean wisdom , have their turns to be inquired into , and let the great and illustrious Moderns have theirs . 'T is an unaccountable vanity , to spend all our time in raking into the scraps and imperfct remains of former ages , and to neglect the knowledge and clearer notices of our own , which ( my Lord Bacon makes the third , but reckoning in the Aegyptian ) is the Fourth , and perhaps greatest enquiry of Learning . For many have gone to and fro , and Science is increased . Methinks 't is pity that so many improveable wits as frequent the Universities , should be hindred from enquiry ; and tyed up to the writings of a single Authour , from the knowledge of the Sentiments of the Philosophick world , and studying the more instructive volumn of the Universe . Doubtless , since the dayes of Aristotle , the face of things is alter'd , and new Phaenomena are disclosed , which his Hypotheseis will no more suit , then the Coats of Children will a body that is at full and advanced stature . Besides , the greatest spirits of our dayes , proceed in another way of enquiry , which , if there were nothing in 't but the fashion of the learning of the Age , it were however fit to be known by those that lay any claim to ingenuity , and have leisure for such researches . And it seems to me an unpardonable kind of sloath , ( especially in youth that useth to be busie and inquisitive ) to be contentedly ignorant of those great Theories that make such noise in the Age they live in ; and to spend all their time in that which will signifie little without the walls of a Colledge . For the wiser world is of a differing opinion from our Philosopher in the assertion of this Paragraph , viz. that no progress can be made in Sciences without the Aristotelian Grounds ; and I think will hardly be brought to believe , That those that have quitted those foundations must be alwayes to seek for Principles , and necessarily come short of Science . For to think that the Principles of any Man should be the only and infallible measures of things , seems a fond overvaluing credulity that hath nothing to warrant it . And he that phancies that all succeeding mankind cannot light upon Principles as happy and likely , as those of Aristotle , but must eternally despair of Science , if they proceed in any other way , then he hath prescribed them ; hath no pretence for so bold a judgment of Possibilities . ACTIO PRIMA . SCepsin infaelici naturae aborsu antiquitùs natam , A. & ipsiusmet pudore è linguis disertorum ubi diu habitaverat elatam , & fidei Christianae constantiâ tumulatam , à vermium & insectorum epulis raptam , magicâ quadam operâ vivis restituere conatus est Petrus Gassendus , acerrimae vir Sagacitatis , nitidae Eloquentiae , copiosae facundiae , suavissimorum morum , & diligentiae admirandae . Idem ( quod his omnibus majus est ) Catholicae fidei tenacissimus , & nusquam pravorum áogmatum suspectus , cùm tamen haec Sceptica infinitorum Errorum & omnium Haereseôn mater sit , & illa ipsa seductrix Philosophia , & inanis fallacia , quam cavendam Apostoli monitu docuêre Sancti . Hanc vir ille , caetera magnus , in exercitatione suâ paradoxâ adversus Aristotelaeòs , non ut priùs tectam & scortorum more in tenebris vagantem , sed effronti vultu & fucatâ formâ turbis & foro ostentare ausus est . 2. Illius exemplo , apud nos linguâ vernaculâ eandem exornatam produxit Vanitatis Dogmatizandi Author ; ipse quoque & ingenio pollens & Eloquio . Neque enim à vulgaribus mentibus timenda sunt grandia infortunia . Haec mei laboris est occasio ; propositum verò , si lumen caelitùs affluat & vires calamo ministret , hanc cadaveream scientiae aemulam in sua sepulcreta compellere , & inominatis dentibus rodendam tradere . Agedum igitur , quaesiti nodum evolvamus . G. THe Scepticism which the constancy of Christianity lay'd in it's Grave , I dare say the Illustrious Gassendus would never have redeemed from thence . The Scepticism which consists in Freedome of inquiry , that noble pen recommended , and adorned ; but did not restore : for Campanella and the great Verulam were before him ; yet , Avicenna and others of his spirit among the Antient Peripateticks , were Free Philosophers . But what that Scepticism should be , that is consistent with so sharpe a wit , so neat and copious an Eloquence , such sweet manners , and admirable diligence , such firmness and fledfastness in the Faith , and so unsuspected an Orthodoxie , as are ascribed , and deservedly , to that great person : And yet be the source of infinite Errorus and Heresies , that seducing Philosophy and vain deceit , against which we have the Caveat of an Apostle ; is beyond the reach of my conjecture . And I am the more confounded when I am told , That this Mother of Heresie , this vain deceit , is nothing but an endeavour to lessen the imposing Authority of a vain-glorious Heathen , whom some excellent persons , both Fathers and Philosophers , have accused , as one impious in Manners , and worse in Doctrine and Belief . A suppressor of the more antient and more valuable Wisdom : And one , that from a proud and insolent Tassus contemned , and continually quarrel'd with his betters : Yea , and who grew so far into this humour and contradiction that he would frequently unsay and contradict his own Assertions . One , whose credit grew up in the night of Barbarism and Ignorance ; and whose Principles are repugnant , many of them , to the nature of things , and the Fundamentals of Faith : I say , that an attempt to redeem the free ▪ born spirits of Men , from an unworthy vassallage to so stigmatiz'd an Authority , should be to this Learned Man so criminal and dangerous a business , is , I confess , to me , occasion of some surprise and wonder And if this be the faulty Scepticism Gassendus , and the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing , are accused of ; let those that have a mind to pass their censure , make the worst they can of the Imputation . That Gassendus was no Sceptick in the old and common notion , is apparent from the voluminous pains he hath taken in the building up a Body of Philosophy upon the Principles of Democritus and Epicurus ; and if he was not so fond of the Principles he undertook to illustrate , as to boast their certainty ; proposing them not in a confident and assertive form , but as probabilities and Hypotheseis : I see no reason why his modesty should be made his crime , and be so severely animadverted on . Nor doth the Author of the impugned Essay yet see any cause to be ashamed of having followed his example in an affair so innocent ; to say no more on 't . And he cannot yet decern how that discourse could yield an occasion to this learned Man of opposing Scepticism , which he may lay in the dust without concernment to the Vanity of Dogmatizing , or it's Author : who is no otherwise interested in the Paragraphs that follow for the asserting Science , and opposition of the Scepticks , but only to wish our Author his desired success in the undertaking . I am not therefore concerned to take notice of any thing further , till the Second Section of the Fourth Action . For though possibly in the intermediate discourse , some things are said , which are not so cogent , and othersome which might appear obnoxious to one that would be quarrelsome ; yet because I wish well to the design , and attend not an assault , but defence , I shall pass all that without any other Remarque ; but ; that if this learned Gentleman had thought Gassendus and my self Scepticks in good earnest , his proof which must suppose the certainty of some principles , had been precarious ; or , if not , needless . A. ACTIO QUARTA . Sect. 2. Ipsae jam loquantur querelae , illae nempe quibus quatuor a tertio Capitula , cumulavit — pag. 51. G. IT seems the learned Gentleman had a desire to make an occasion to solve the motion of the Sea , and Magnetick Attractions ; since in my discourse I gave him none , having only mention'd them as things I would not insist on , and confest them better accounted for then less acknowledg'd Mysteries . Whether the reason of these darke Phaenomena be well assigned by this Philosopher ; I 'le not put my self upon the occasion of inquiring . That they are the certain and infallible causes , I suppose this learned Man's modesty will not permit him to affirm ; and if they are but confest probabilities , here 's no opposition to the Scepticism of the Author ; which allowes ingenious and hopeful conjecture in resolving the appearances of Nature : though he fears , few Accounts will amount to Certainties and Demonstrations . So that though for mine own part I acquiesce in the Cartesian solution of these Magnalia , as an Hypothesis that may content one , that is not restlesly and unreasonably inquisitive : Yet even in that , when I would look deep , I descern objections which perhaps will very difficulty be satisfied : And which speak those ingenious offers to be but attempts , no absolute performances . And if this acute Philosopher think the impulse of the external Winds a sufficient cause of the Flux and Reflux ; I shall not go about to disturbe him in his satisfactions . That will ease one Man's mind , that will leave an others restless . Only I cannot well apprehend how so constant and regular an effect as the motion of the Sea , should depend upon so uncertain and proverbially inconstant a cause as the winds are . Or , if there were no difficulty in that , yet the learned Author may please to consider , that this is but the next cause of the Phaenomenon , the cause of which , perhaps , is more hardly assigneable then the other . And the nature and original of the winds , is , it may be , as abstruse a Theory as any in Philosophy . For in assigning Causes , in the second or third , commonly we are lost and non-plust , which is no inconsiderable evidence of humane Ignorance and Deficiency . ACTIO QUINTA . Sect. I. A. Tertio itaque eloquentissimae dissertationis capite objicit ignorantiam illius rei quae notissima — pag. 57. MY learned Assailant is now descended to the difficulties G. I propounded , and judge not yet satisfactorily accounted for ; concerning which I affirm not , that they are doubts that cannot possibly be unriddled ; for this were to discourage , and not to awaken inquiry : but that they have not yet been sufficiently explain'd , or explicable by any yet extant Hypothesis ; a sad argument of intellectual deficience , that after so much talk and indeavour after Science , the whole world should yet be to seek in matters they have the greatest advantages of being acquainted with . I am not therefore an enemy to any Essayes can be made towards the explication of the difficulties proposed ; but should heartily embrace any hopeful offers for the clearing of those mysterious Theories . So that if this learned man propose any thing that may be probable ; though it come not near the title of certainty or science : I have so great a kindness for Ingenuity , and such a desire for the quieting my anxious and inquiring mind , that I shall give it an entertainment not like the usual ones of angry Disputants , who cannot endure any thing that proceeds from an Antagonist ; but such a one as may evidence , that Truth is welcome to me , though it comes in a way of opposition to the petty interest of mine opinions . To the business then , If to suppose the soul a distinct substance from the body and extrinsically advenient , be a great Error in Philosophy , almost all the world hath hitherto been mistaken : so that if this Gentlemans opinion be true , he hath confirm'd the Scepticism I endeavor to promote . But if we enquire into the Philosophy of the Soul , as high as any accounts are given of it , we shall find It's distinction from the body to have been the current belief of all the wiser Ages . For , ( 1. ) The highest times of whose Doctrines we have any History , believed it's Praeexistence , and therefore certainly asserted it's diversity and substantial distinction from the body it informs . Of which briefly . We have Praeexistence among the Chaldean Oracles , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And afterwards more clearly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And Psellus in his Exposition of the Chaldean Theology , tells us , that according to their Doctrine Souls descended hither ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And again Zoroaster , speaking of souls , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Besides which ( 2. ) Trismegistus is express in the assertion of the same Doctrine ; of which a testimony or two perhaps will not be impertinent . In his Minerva Mundi , he brings in God threatning those he had placed in an happy condition of life and enjoyment , with bonds and imprisonment in case of disobedience . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And they transgressing , he adds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And in another place , assignes this for the cause of their incarceration ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 3. ) It was also the opinion of the ancient Jews , that Souls were first created together , and resided in a place they call Golph , a Coelestial region . Ad therefore 't is said in the Mishna , Non aderit Filius David priusquam exhaustae fuerint universae animae quae sunt in Golph . So that they believed all generations on earth to be supplyed from that Promptuary and element of Soules in Heaven ; whence they supposed them to descend by the North-Pole , and to ascend by the South . Hence the saying of the Cabbalists , Magnus Aquilo scaturigo Animarum . And probably that other Omne malum nobis ex Aquilone . From which tradition 't is likely also Homer had this notion , — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 4. ) What was the opinion of Pythagoras , Plato , and the greatest of the Greek Philosophers in this particular , is notoriously known to all men that know any thing of these matters . And I need no testimonies in so clear a business . It appears then from the allegations I have produced , that the most valuable wisdom of the antient world asserted a Doctrine which necessarily inferres and supposeth their opinion of the Souls being a distinct substance from the body . Which also ( 2 ) Must be supposed by all that believe it 's natural Immortality . For separability is the greatest argument of real distinction ; especially that , which the Schools call mutual . Now the Souls immortality is a truth that hath had an unanimous reception from the better and wiser world . The Aegyptians , Chaldaeans , Assyrians , Indians , Jews , Greeks , and universally all that ever had a name for wisdom among the Antients , believed it . And what hath been the apprehension of latter ages , I need inform no body that is capable of judging in such inquiries . A Councel of the Church of Rome it self hath determin'd it , and recommended it's proof and demonstration to all Christian Philosophers . But what need of more ? 't is the belief of Sir K. Digby , and our Authors own . And how real separability can consist with identity and indistinction , I know no possibility of apprehending . For that a thing can be separated from it self , can never be believed by any , but those that make a Religion of absurdities . ( 3. ) The Sacred and Mosaical Philosophy supposeth the like real distinction ; of which the expression of God's breathing into Adams nostrils the breath of life , is sufficient evidence . Yea , and all the Arguments that are alledg'd to prove it's immediate creation , do strongly conclude it an other substance from the body . Yea ( 4 ) Aristotle himself affirmes it ; for saith he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Elsewhere , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And yet more clearly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And once more , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Other testimonies I could bring to like purpose , but these are sufficient to evince that if Aristotle be consistent with himself , he believed the real distinction I contend for ; And his Peripateticks I 'me sure unanimously affirm it . To all which if I can add Sir K. Digby's opinion , I shall bid fair for our Authors assent to my conclusion , that 't was Aristotle's , and the Truth . ( 5 ) Then , That noble and celebrated friend of our Authors , affirmes in his Immortality [ that the soul is a substance , and a substance besides the body . ] Yea , almost all that discourse of his leans upon that supposal . Yea ( 6 ) Our Philosopher himself in his Peripatetical Institutions , affirms as much as ever I supposed . For he saith that [ 'T is most evident that the mind is something of an other kind from Quantity and Matter , that 't is noble and wholy opposite to the nature of Quantity , that 't is a substantial Principle of Man , and no mode or determination of divisibility , and that there is nothing common to Body and Spirit . ] Besides which , in the Fifth Book of the same Institutions , he discourses of the Souls separation from the body , and asserts it to be evident , that it perisheth not with it ; because it hath actions that belong not to a body , but hath of it self the vertue of a being . And that it's power of existence is not taken away when the body fails , the soul being apart from and besides it . And that matter is not necessary to the Souls existence . Many other expressions there are in that discourse to like purpose , which seem to speak the Souls real distinction from the Body in as great variety of phrase as diversity and distinction can be spoken . So that how such passages consist with the doctrine of it's Identity with the body , I confess I am not Metaphysical enough to comprehend . And I believe very few else can perceive the consistency besides this Philosopher ; whose Metaphysicks of whole and part , have yet been entertain'd by none that I know of ; and therefore though this should be acknowledged a good account , yet 't is an Argument of the weakness of humane understanding that it hath not yet comprehended it . I think by this time 't is clear then , that the supposition of my procedure , the Souls distinction from the Body , is not peccant ; except all the world , both Antient and Modern , hath been mistaken , and our Author also : which if it be granted , 't is an instance of what I plead for . If not , my supposition is good , and the emergent doubt unanswer'd . And if our learned Author yet thinks it plain , that either Man is no being , or that the soul and body are not two , I must acknowledge such Palams to be the Dogmatizing I suppose . And I am willing to put it upon the issue , whether it be so to any body else but this Philosopher . But ( 2 ) besides all this , it seems to me very clear from the nature of the Things themselves abstracting from Authority ; That the Soul is a substance distinct from the body . For I think , ( 1 ) 'T is strongly concluded by the common Arguments that prove it immaterial ; for perception , perception of spirituals , universals and other abstracts from sense , as Mathematical lines , points , superficies , congenit notions , Logical , Metaphysical , and Moral ▪ self-reflection , Freedom , indifferency and universality of action : these , I say , are properties not at all competible to body or matter , though of never so pure a mixture . Nor is it conceiveable how any of these should arise from modificaiions of quantity being of a diverse kind from all the Phaenomena of motion But ( 2 ) If the soul be not a distinct substance from the body , 't is then a certain disposition and modification of it ; which this Gentteman in the 10 Lesson of his Institutions seems to intimate , saying , [ That since the soul is a certain affection — which is introduced and expell'd by corporeal action — ] he thence inferrs some thing that is not to our purpose to relate . And if so ▪ since all diversities in matter arise from motion and position of parts , every different preception will require a different order and position of the parts of the matter perceiving , which must be obtained by motion . I demand then , when we pass from one conception to another , is the motion , the cause of this diversity , meerly casual ; or directed by some act of knowledge ? The former , I suppose , no Man in his wits will affirm ; since then all our conceptions will be non-sense and confusion ; chance being the cause of nothing that is orderly and regular . If therefore there be a knowledge in us that directs the motions that form every distinct conception : I demand concerning that knowledge , Whether it be in like manner directed by some other , or is it the effect of meer casual motions ? If the former , we must run up in infinitum in our inquiry : and the latter admits the alledged absurdities . There is no way then of defending the assertion of the souls being matter , or any modification of it : but by affirming with Master Hobbs a certain connexion between all our thoughts , and a necessary fate in all things : which who ever affirmes , will find difficulties enough in his assertion to bring him to mine , That there 's a Vanity in Dogmatizing , and Confidence is unreasonable . But of this I have had occasion to discourse more in an other Treatise , and I shall not repeat what I have there written , or what others have said on the subject . Especially since perhaps this learned Gentleman will not think himself concern'd in the Proof of this Conclusion , he having in his writings asserted it . But whether he have not unsaid it again in this , I appeal to any equal Decerner . And that the soul should be a substance of another kind from matter , that hath nothing common with it ; a substance separable from all body , to which matter is not necessary , and actually in the other state divided from it : ( all which and more to like purpose our Author hath in some of his Books affirmed ; ) and yet not be a distinct substance , but really the same with the body to which it is united ; which he asserts in this ; I say ▪ how these so opposite affirmations can be reconciled , I have either not wit , or not charity enough to help me to imagine . I know this Authors doctrine is , that there are no parts before separation and division , and therefore no real distinction . But whether things in their natures so divers as body and spirit , which almost in nothing , even according to this Philosophy , communicate ; are not essentially divided , though not locally distant , I am willing to leave to the Readers judgment . And I would fain know whereupon the separability of the soul and body is founded , if not upon the real distinction of their natures : so that though this notion may be less obnoxious when it relates only to substances of the same kind , and quality ; yet when it concerns those that are so essentially distinct , as body and spirit , it seems most strangely lyable . Yea though it should be supposed a Truth , yet it must be acknowledged unconceiveable ; which sufficeth to satisfie my Conclusion . A. Neque me terret distinctio ( quae pueris philosophiam garrientibus in sacco parata est ) Entis perfecti & imperfecti — pag. 58. THe distinction of the Schools of a Being perfect and G. imperfect , is not I think so childish and impertinent as our Author would have believed . For though Ens Imperfectum in the Metaphysical sence , be non-sence and a contradiction ; yet in genere Physico , as they speak , 't is no absurdity : since a being may want some circumstances of natural compleatness and perfection ; and yet be Metaphysically compleat and perfect : so that to affirm the soul an imperfect Being nakedly in it self , is to say no more , then that 't was made with a natural aptitude , and congruity to a body by union with which 't is perfected and compleated , being then furnish't with the requisites of its nature ; which in like manner may be said of a body in humane form , viz. that 't is defective and incompleat till it be furnished with the principle of Humane actions , for which it was designed . So that there 's no absurdity in affirming , That a thing may be one in a Physiological and natural sense ; and two in a Metaphysical ; And so out Philosopher's inference is no sequel . A. 2. Quando itaque petit , Unde Anima veniat ? Reponendum est , An dubitet unde Homo veniat ? — pag. 59. G. THe Foundation of our learned Authors Answers to the proposed difficulties being overthrown ; and it being made secure enough , That the soul is a distinct substance from the body ; 't is a pertinent and material enquiry to ask , whence the Soul is ? And if our Philosopher will call this the Man according to the Maxim , let the question be proposed in his own phrase , and there 's no danger of an absurdity . A. Neque Majorum quamtumvis Reverendorum me quatit Authoritas ; non dico illorum qui — pag. 59. G. IT seems the learned Gentleman would fain reconcile the Authority of the Church asserting the Souls Creation to his main conclusion , that 't is no distinct substance from the body ; and to his inference thereupon , that 't is improper and impertinent , to inquire whence It came . But whether what is said be a clear salve or a shuffle , let it be determin'd by any equal judgment . For either by Homo quatenus intellectivus , our Author means something that is the same with the body ; or really distinct and diverse . If the former , he hath not satisfied the Authority of the Church , which affirms , the Soul as a distinct substance , to be the immediate subject of Creation ; founded upon that clear distinction in the inspired writings [ The body to the dust , and the Soul to God that gave it . ] But if he mean the latter , he hath not provided for his own assertion and hypothesis . Besides ( 2. ) If man as intellective be created , then either he means the whole man , or only that by which he 's intellective ; the former is against all sense and experience . And the latter overthrows all our Author's Answers , with the Proposition upon which they are erected . For if there be some thing in man which is the subject of divine power and action ; and some other thing that is the subject of natural production and generation ; it seems to me apparent that these must be two things really distinguish't . For the same thing cannot be created and naturally produced . For Creation supposeth the production of the whole ex nihilo , both sui & subjecti ( as the Schools phrase it ) without the co-operation of any thing with the divine superlative power : whereas all generation , according to truth and the same Hypothesis , at least supposeth one of them , and is perform'd by natural agents . And I think the case is plain enough when 't is brought to this , Whether the same thing can be produced of something and nothing , with created assistance , and without it ? Since the Actions then are so infinitely diverse , I think I shall not be reprehensibly Dogmatical , in affirming the terms distinct . What the Gentleman says more , seems to be involv'd , and looks like a designed evasion . And if [ one action produceth a man , a Creature equivalent to a Beast and Angel ] I demand , Whether this one action be divine or natural , from God or the generant ? If the former , every man is as immediately created as the first . And the latter quite excludes crea ion , and supposeth God no otherwise to act in giving being to our Souls , then in each common production . 'T is necessary therefore that the terms produced be distinct , when the Actions whereby they are produced are so vastly diverse ; and that the Soul have an Origination different from the Formation of the body , of which 't is more pertinent to inquire , then easie to return an Answer . 3. Ex hâc Veritate derivamur ad sequentes duos A. nodos patentissimè solvendos . — pag. 60. IN this and the following Paragraphs our Author supposeth G. his Doctrin of the identity of the soul and body for an Answer ; And I think after what hath been said , I have as good reason to suppose mine of the diversity for a reply . But how the definition of a Part enervates my enquiry , I cannot imagine , since if [ Parts are , out of which by composition are made one ] And the body and soul be supposed parts of the Man ( which may well enough be allowed upon the account of what hath been said ) I see not but why we may inquire , how these parts , whose natures are so different , can be compounded and united . A. Currit idem Error in sequenti difficultate , quae luget nesciri quomodo Anima moveat corpus , — pag. 61. G. WHether my supposal be an Error , we have seen already ; if it be not , our Philosophers Answer is so . And whither the implyed assertion that the Soul moves not the body be not one , I appeal to any man , that understands he hath any claim to such a being . For though many of our actions , and possibly more then are suspected , may be allowed to be meer Mechanick motions ; yet the experience of all the World attests , that our wills determine and excite not a few of our corporeal motions . What else means the distinction of the Schools of actions imperate and elicit ? And how is it that we can speak and move at pleasure , and in spight of all corporeal impulse , desist from external action ! And if Man be a meer Mechanicks Engine , farewel Free-will , Virtue , Vice , Laws , Religion , rewards and punishments . A clock were as capable of these , according to our Philosopher's Hypothesis , as an humane Automaton . A. Vere enim Unum membrum animatum movet aliud , sed non aliqua substantia quae sit pura Anima — pag. 61. ▪ T Is true , one animate member moves another , but the G. motion must somewhere begin . And though those which are purely corporeal in us are excited by material agents ; yet others we find , which derive from an higher Principle , viz. a free and unconstrained will. And it seem strange to me that men should be so much in love with their private speculations , as for their sakes to confront their own , and all the worlds experience . What follows , no body that I know , affirms , viz. [ That a substance which is a pure Soul moves a member wherein there is none ] . But to what concerns other Animals , the learned Author knows , that the Platonists assign them Souls independent on their Bodies ; and the Peripateticks , substantial Forms distinct from matter , which are the source and Principle of their Actions . So that according to either of these Hypotheseis , the question may as pertinently be proposed concerning their kind , as our own , and will be as difficultly answered . Indeed the excellent Monsieur Des-Cartes , and his followers that affirm , all bruit Actions to be Mechanical , are not concern'd in the inquiry . And if this be the belief of our Philosopher , I 'le not indeavour to disturb his Hypothesis . Only this I 'le add to our purpose , That though we suppose the Actions of Beasts to be fatal and material , yet there 's no reason to infer the same of ours , since we feel it otherwise . And 't is no very reasonable method of arguing , to conclude from an opinion of things we can but conjecture , to the denyal of things we certainly feel , and know . So that though , as our Author insinuates , there may perhaps be no kind of corporeal Actions in our selves , which are not in bruits ; yet 't is not therefore necessary to inferr , that they proceed from a like principle in both : much less that we should conclude , that none of our own actions are begun by a principle distinct from the body and immaterial ; because we believe that theirs are not so . On the other side methinks the Argument will be stronger to inferr , That because we feel a substance distinct from matter to be the cause of some of our motions ; that therefore there may likely be an incorporeal substance that is the principle and spring of some of theirs : And 't is better to conclude from certainty to conjecture , then from conjecture against certainty . A. 4. Ultimae , quas in hoc capitulo plangit , tenebrae collocatae sunt in ignorantiâ illius motus , — pag. 62. G. THe difficulties about the direction of the Spirits concern not only Man , but all other Animals , supposing them to do any thing by a principle of Knowledge and Animadversion . Or , though we judge all their actions M chanical , yet the Account will be more difficultly rendred that way , then by supposing them to act by an animadversive principle . For how such an infinite variety of motions should be regularly menaged , and conducted in such a Wilderness of passages and distinct avennues by meer blind impellents and material conveyances , I have not the least shadow of conjecture . And though Des-Cartes hath made the best attempts in this kind of any hath yet appear'd in the Theory , yet there are Mechanical difficulties in the way of his Solutions , which perhaps will never be well satisfied . But our Philosopher confesseth here the defect of his Anatomy ; and though he thinks himself secure of the general Cause , yet the particular Direction he acknowledges wonderful , and not yet sufficiently discover'd . Verùm Author casum proprium Homini constituere videtur , A. ostentans voluntatem & fortassis — pag. 63. TO prove that the Will is not alwayes moved by some G. precedent passion , and consequently that the Soul is the immediate principle of some of our actions , I make this double offer : ( 1. ) 'T is clear from experience , that , though many of our volitions are motions from the Passion , yet some of our Determinations are from the Understanding and immaterial Faculties . And sometimes we set our Wills to determine in things that are purely indifferent , to make tryal of our Liberty ; when we find not the least provocation or incitement to the action from any emotion of the body . And indeed to suppose every action of the Will to depend upon a previous Appetite or Passion , is to destroy our Liberty , and to inferr a Stoical Fatality with all the dangerous consequences of that Doctrine ▪ ( 2. ) Our Author's proof that there is no dispassionate volition , is an insinuation , that there is no Knowledge without an impulse from the Phantasms ; a Conclusion which may be easily disproved , by those highly abstract Speculations which the mind of Man sometimes entertains it self with , when it puts off all the cloathing of the Imagination , and raiseth it self to a temper for those noble enquiries about God and Immaterials : And if there be no Intellect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as Aristotle speaks , for ought I know , we lose one of our chiefest Arguments for our Immortality : Besides which , I suppose our learned Author will not think it for his credit , to be told , that he is in the very rode of the Hobbian Hypothesis ; which will clearly enough appear , if we consider these his Assertions ; [ That the Soul is no distinct substance from the Body , that it contributes nothing towards its motion ; that our Wills are moved by precedent or present Passion , which doubtless is excited by something that is not in our power ; that all our Intellections are from Phantasms , and consequently , nothing else but elevated sense , and that all both natural and free actions are performed by motions deriv'd from the heart ] I say , who ever considers , how these symbolize , yea , and are one with the main Principles of that irreligious Philosophy , must without an excess of Charity , suppose our Philosopher to have shaken hands with the Leviathan . Briefly then , 't is confest , that the Mechanical way of conveyance and direction of the Spirits in Animal performances is yet undiscover'd , and that the channels and particular passages of Mechanical motions ( which all ours are supposed to be ) is yet occult and manifest . And though this Gentleman affirms , the Heart to be the Fountain of animate Operations , yet 't is but an unapproved presumption ; and the greatest Master of Mechanicks that ever was , the Illustrious Des-Cartes has deriv'd all these motions from the brain , in which he 's follow'd by the greatest part of profoundest Speculators ; so that it seems we are not certain of the first spring of the motions we enquire of ; much less can we certainly determin the minutes and particularities of direction : and if any of our actions are deriv'd from our Souls , which our Author seems unwilling to hear of , though I think I have made it sufficiently evident , the difficulties I urg'd upon that supposal have not had the least offer towards solution . A. 5. Caput quartum Sensationis & Memoriae inexplicabiles esse naturas objicit . — pag. 64. I Am no further concern'd in the beginning of this Section , G. then to mind this learned Gentleman how different his apprehension of Des-Cartes his Hypothesis of the manner of Sense , is , from that of his ingenuous and applauded friend Sir K. Digby ; who calls not his opinion a fanstatical conjecture , but thus Prefaces to the recital of his Hypothesis . [ Monsieur Des-Cartes , ( who by his great and heroick attempts , and by shewing mankind how to steer and husband theit reason to the best advantage , hath left us no excuse of being ignorant of any thing that is worth the knowing ) explicating the nature of Sense — and then goes on to declare his opinion of this matter , which he concludes with this character ; of a colour very diverse from our Author 's [ This then is the sum of Monsieur Des-Cartes's Opinion , which he hath very finely exprest with all the advantages that opposite examples , significant words and clear method , can give unto a witty Discourse ; which yet , is but a part of the commendations he deserveth , for what he hath done on this particular : he is over and above all this , the first I ever met with who hath published any conceptions of this nature , whereby to make the Operations of Sense intelligible , Certainly , this praise will ever belong unto him that he hath given the first hint of speaking groundedly , and to the purpose upon this Subject ; and whosoever shall carry it any further ( as what important mystery was ever born and perfected at one ? ) must acknowledge to have deriv'd his light from him . ] This is the censure that excellent person gives of Des-Cartes , and his Opinion , which his dear Friend our Author , hath with so much severity reflected on . And the learned Knight professeth himself of Des-Cartes's mind in all the other circumstances of this Hypothesis , except the Subject of this Motion . So that I wonder that our Philosopher should so far forget himself , as to put such a slurre upon the judgment of his admired Friend , by speaking so contemptuously of a Notion that learned Man had so much , and so deservedly , applauded . What follows is already answer'd . A. Sed nè nihil novi dicat , calumniatur sensu solo non posse agnosci quantitates rerum , distantias , — pag. 65. G. OUr Author in this Period , wonders at my Assertion , and I wonder as much at his wonder ; which is not occasioned by any affirmation of mine , but by a mistake of his own : for my doubt ( as plain as I could express it ) is , How , since there is nothing in the Brain , the seat of Sense , to represent external objects but motion , ( for which I have the suffrage of his noble friend , whose method he professeth to follow ) how , I say , we should by that know figures , distances , magnitudes , and colours , things of another kind from motion ; which therefore cannot represent them , but by some knowledge in the Soul , which we are not aware of ; and how the scant and narrow images in the Brain should notifie the vastest objects , in their large dimensions , without some secret Inference and Geometry in the Soul , is unconceiveable : But what this Knowledge is , we know not . This is the sense of the difficulty propos'd , which , how it is explicated by the Optical demonstrations the Gentleman talks of , the Opticks of my understanding cannot discover . For the rest I dare venture it without an Answer . 6. Proximus in Memoriam labor expenditur . Illius A. explanationem ut impossibilem declaret , — pag. 66. 7. Imprimis , decîdi à moventibus sensum quasdam exuvias & corporis delibamenta , quoad tactum , — pag 68. I Take not upon me to determin of Possibilities ; and therefore G. from the present ignorance of the nature of Memory I infer not , that it will never be explained hereafter : Only I affirm , that no Hypothesis extant hath yet made it manifest ; which is sufficient for my conclusion of the present narrowness of our Knowledge , though not of my Assailants of the impossibility of enlarging it . But our Philosopher thinketh the nature of Memory sufficiently explained already , and the account he gives is that of Sir K. Digby , which was one of the four that I examin'd in the Discourse impugn'd . This is the Hypothesis which our Author hath adopted , and undertook the defence of ; with what success , we shall discover when we have examin'd the Answer he makes to my Impugnations . Which after a large recital of the Hypothesis he descends to in the ninth Section . 9. Attamen , perturbat novum Naturae miratorem A. multitudo objectorum cavis cerebri — pag. 72. THe difficulty I urg'd against the Digbaean account of G. the Memory , was , that 't is inconceiveable how those active particles , which are the images and representations of things remembred , should keep their distinct and orderly Situations without confusion or dissipation in a substance wherein there is continual motion ? to which the learned Gentleman returns ; That 't is as conceivable as how the Rays of Light should come in a direct line to the Eye ; or how the Atomical Effluvia that continually flow from all bodies , especially the Magnetical and Sympathetick , should find their way to the place they tend to . To this I rejoyn briefly , ( 1 ) what the Gentleman himself suggests , were answer sufficient , that the multiplying of difficulty doth not solve it : For supposing the direction of the corpuscles of light , and those mention'd Effluvia , to be of a difficult apprehension , as the continuance and regularity of those images in the Brain : yet this only argues another defect in our Knowledge , and so is a new evidence of the truth of my General Conclusion . But ( 2 ) the proposed Instances are far more accountable then this before us . For , as to what concerns the light , supposing with Des Cartes ( as is most probable ) that the action of Light consists in nothing but the conamen of the Aethereal matter , receding from the centre of its motion : The direct tendency of it to the Eye , is no difficulty worth considering , but as clear as the Light it self the subject of the enquiry ; or , if the rays be Atomical streams , and effluxes of the Sun , there is no more difficulty in this Hypothesis neither , then in the direct spouting of water out of a Pipe ; yea no more , then in the beating of the waves against the sides of a Ship , when it swims in the Ocean . For there 's an whole Sea of Atomes which derive from the Fountain illuminant , whose course can no more be diverted , by those little bodies that swim up and down in the air ; then that of the Ocean can by those Sands , Pebles , Fishes , and Rocks , that are mingled with the waters . And as for the other Instances of corporeal Emissions , it would require to be prov'd that they perform all those feats that are ascrib'd to them : whereas perhaps it is more likely , that those strange operations are not Mechanical but Magical , being effected by the continuity of the great Spirit of Nature , which runs through all things : or however , to suppose this act of the Memory to be as clear as Magnetisme and Sympathies , will be no great advantage to the belief of its certain Intelligibility . At ego ipsum sic nodum scindo . In majoribus ubi facilior A. est experiendi facultas , palàm est multa — pag. 73. THat what our Author has answer'd in this Period , G. should resolve the difficulty , is to me as great a wonder , as the Mystery we are discoursing of . And if the knot be cut , 't is certainly by some occult and sympathetick Instrument , for the gross of his Answer comes not near it . The difficulty was ; How the Images of such an infinite of Objects , as we remember , should be kept distinct without confusion , be brought forth when we have occasion , and remanded back again into their own cells when they have done the errant they were sent for . To which our Author saith no more , but to this purpose ( if I understand him ) That if the Object stays not on the Sense , it makes not impression enough to be remembred , but if it be repeated there , it leaves plenty enough of those Images behind it to confirm and strengthen the Knowledge of the Object : In which radicated Knowledge , if the Memory consist , there would be no need of reserving those Atomes in the Brain , or calling them forth upon occasion , as the Hypothesis supposeth ; or , if there be , the difficulty is untouched . Besides all which , I might adde , that if these material Images are a sufficient account of the Memory , how will our remembrance of Distances , Magnitudes , Relations , Words , Metaphysical Notions , and those of Immaterials , which leave no such Idola , in the Brain , be accounted for ? Let this Gentleman tell me how — Et erit mihi Magnus — A. 10. Palàm est me in hâc Responsione Digbaeanam Methodum caeteris praetulisse . Ipsius enim — pag. 74. G. IF I am mistaken in the Opinion of Aristotle in this matter , ( 1. ) I err with the great body of his Commentators and followers ; yea , and all the Schools in Christendom , who unanimously concurr in the assignment of the Doctrine of Intentional Species to their Master Aristotle ; So that if all the Peripateticks hitherto have been so grossly out in imposing an Opinion he never taught upon their ador'd Philosopher , for ought I know , there is no such thing as the Aristotelean Philosophy in the Universities of Europe : For the taking in , or denying these Intentional Species will make material and mighty alterations in the whole frame of the Hypothesis ; and I see not how the denial of them is consistent with the Aristotelean Doctrine of Qualities and Forms . But ( 2. ) If Aristotle taught the Digbaean Philosophy , as our Author sayes , he taught the Atomical , which is notoriously known to have been the way of Democritus and Epicurus , which Aristotle frequently and professedly opposeth . That Democritus taught the Atomical Hypothesis , we have the affirmative of Aristotle to justifie , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of Leucippus and Democritus ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And neerer to our purpose , that these solved the way of Sensation , by material Images , we have from Plutarch ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . This Hypothesis Aristotle endeavours to confute ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , sayes he , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Aristotle then thought the Doctrine of Sensation by corporeal Images absurd in Democritus and Epicurus ; and therefore certainly would not himself affirm it ; as he must do on the supposal of his having taught the same Hypothesis with Sir K. Digby about the Memory , which is exactly the same with that of these Sages : For that learned Knight affirms , Sensation to be perform'd [ by driving of solid material bodies , exceeding little ones , that come from the Objects themselves , ( they are his own words ) against that part of the brain where Knowledge resideth , which same bodies rebounding thence into certain cells of the Brain , perform the offices of the Memory ] as he has largely discourst upon the Subject . Sir K. Digby then proceeds in the Corpuscularian method which Aristotle opposeth , and particularly in the business of Sensation ; and consequently cannot be of his belief in his Hypothesis of the Memory , which the learned Knight gives account of by the same material Idola , which Aristotle laught at . And doubtless the Memory is excited to action by the like Instruments as are the external Senses , consonantly to that of Plato in his Phaedo , speaking of the Senses , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And Aristotle himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . I think 't is clear then that Aristotle's Doctrine of the Memory is not the same with Sir K. Digby's . And if I have been out in intitling the Opinion of Intentional Species to Aristotle , my mistake is the more venial , because the whole Army of his most devoted Sectators are deceived with me . But our Author is more reprehensible in his mistake , if it be one ; because he 's alone in his opinion . And an Error hath by so much the more of guilt , as it hath of singularity and self-assurance . But whether this were Aristotle's Doctrine or not , I think 't is not very material , since I make this none of the charges against him . If it be not his , 't is the general Opinion of his Schools ; and I have proved it an insufficient Account of the Faculty we are discoursing of . ACTIO SEXTA . A. 1. Capite quinto formationis Corporum naturalium , Viventium praesertim , obscuritatem intentat : — pag. 76. G. TWo methods it seems our Philosopher proposeth , for the giving an account of the Formation of Animals ; neither of which seems to me a sufficient solution of the doubt attempted . For first , he that supposeth all the vastly differing parts of a Worm or Insect to be actually contain'd , though in myriate and indivisible proportions , in a drop of dew out of which they are sometimes generated , believes gratis , without any ground of his supposal ; and therefore will be very bold to assert this the certain account of the Phaenomenon . ( 2. ) If the Seed contain , though invisibly , all the parts of the Animal ; then either in the same Site , and Position , that they are found in in the compleated Body ; or they lie there in a confused huddle and mixture ; the former , is contrary to all experience , which assures us , that the immediate matter of all generations is a certain fluid , and , as far as can be discern'd , an homogeneous substance . Now fluidity consisting in the motion of the parts of the fluid body , as is testified by Experience and the best Philosophy , the Seminal Parts can be of no setled Form or Consistence . And if the second be supposed , which doubtless is the truth , the difficulty under debate will be unanswer'd , ( viz. ) how such an Infinite of distinct Parts should be brought into their regular and orderly Positions without the guidance and conduct of some knowing Agent ; to fly to a first Cause is Unphilosophical ; and he that pretends a second , let him shew it . And fortuitously it cannot be : for Chance is the cause of no constant and regular Effect ; and to suppose an undirected Motion to shuffle these fluid parts into the wonderful and exact form of an Animal , or any other regular body ; is as likely , as that the divided Letters of an Alphabet should be accidentally jumbled into an elegant and polite Discourse ; which when once I see effected , I 'le believe , that there wants nothing to the formation of the World and all bodies therein , but Matter and Motion . Some intelligent Principle then must be suppos'd to guide these Elementary parts into their orderly situations . But what that is , who is 't will determine ? ( 2. ) The Second Account also is too general , and flies very wide of my particular enquiry . For my Quaery is concerning the principle of the conduct of the parts of the various matter in those rare and methodical Composures ; and our Philosopher's Answer concerns only the gross and material parts of the Composition . And therefore little can be collected from the Chymical Processes he speaks of , for our purpose ; and the Elementary Solutions mention'd , signifie nothing towards the accounting for the unerring exactness we find in Animal Formations . For all these being suppos'd , the matter is in the same circumstances of difficulty as before ; and this Gentleman's Solution seems to me to signifie no more , then if a man should answer to one that that desires an account of the art and method of the motions of a Watch , or any other ingenious Automaton ; that they are perform'd by Steel , Iron , Brass , or Silver , wherein the matter indeed of the work is declar'd , but not the artifice . And in the case before us , I inquire of the principle of direction of those intricate and methodical motions , and am answer'd with an account of the gross and material Ingredients . Nor is what follows of any whit more avail to the Solution pretended ; for let the matter resolve into parts dry , subtle , and liquid ▪ Let the dryer dispose themselves into divers figures , and constitute what Vessels our Philosopher is pleas'd to fancy ; yet how from hence forward the infinite variety of the parts of an Animal will result , will require something more to help us to conjecture . A. 2. Haec qui mente comprehenderit , non plorabit Plasticam vanum nomen esse & vocem sine re . — pag. 78. G. THough by a close and recondite search into the Seminalities of Plants , and Vegetables , the future processes may be judg'd , as our Philosopher assures us ; yet this only argues , that the grown parts were all contain'd pack't up in their Seeds and Berries ; so that in the growth and progress Nature did only display and unfold , what before was in the minute proportions more closely laid together ; Supposing which , the main doubt still remains unsatisfied , viz. How these SMALLER SEMINAL parts were so order'd , and framed ? And this Brachygraphy of Nature cannot be thought less difficult then it 's Text. And , secondly , what relates to Animals we have seen already ; for 't is not likely , that the formed parts were ever actually contain'd in the seed , out of which they were produced . Neque quemquam terreant artificum dicta , admirantium A. ea quorum causas non intelligunt , — pag. 79. I Might well wonder at the specifical uniformity of things , if G. unguided matter were the only principle of their formation , against which Hypothesis this doubt was raised ; and the variation from the kind which happens in some regions , would not be so observable , as an identity in any . 3. Eodem capitulo duas alias quaestiones movet quas A. absolutè inexplicabiles putat ; Mihi contra — pag. 80. IF the doubts I propose of the union of the Parts , and composition G. of quantity , contain scarce any difficulty at all ; our Philosopher is more lucky in his enquiries , then others that have dealt in those Theories ; most men confessing the perplexity of the mention'd Phaenomena , especially of the latter . And the vast diversity of Philosophers about it , testifies , that the speculation of them is not of so facile an explication . And 't is strange that the Ancients should keep such ado about an easie Probleme , and the Moderns despair of a solution , so pretendedly obvious . I will not differ with the learned Gentleman about the order of the questions , and grant , that they both suppose actual parts in Quantity ; which because our Author denies , & makes this the foundation of his Answer to these , and some of my former propos'd difficulties , I must be fain to prove it ; which I attempt ( 1. ) By giving some evidence of my Affirmative , and ( 2. ) by shewing the weakness and insufficiency of the grounds of the contrary Assertion . For the first then , That there are Actual parts in Quantity , I evince it by these considerations . ( 1. ) The formal nature of Quantity is Extension in the notion of Aristotle's Schools ; and Divisibility in the Philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby , and our Authour ; Both which suppose parts , and parts actual : for to be extended , in the School phrase , is to have partes extrapartes ; and if the extension be actual , the parts must be so : for it is not conceiveable how a thing can be extended , but by parts which are really distinct one from another , though not separate : which seems to me so evident , that nothing can be spoken plainer ; and I appeal in this matter to the common sense of all men . Nor can a thing be divided , except we suppose the parts praeexistent in the divisible : for divisibility is founded upon real distinction , and 't is impossible to divide what is one without diversity . ( 2. ) Except there are parts in quantity before division , there are none at all : for after they are divided they are no parts , but have a compleatness and integrality of their own , especially if the subject were homogeneous . ( 3. ) Except there are parts actually in quantity , contradictions may be verified de eodem , with all the other circumstances , which the Metaphysicks teach impossible . For the same body may be black and white , cold and hot , seen and not seen , and partake of all other most contrary qualities . Which contradictions , and inconsistences cannot be accommodated in the same subject , without supposal of the contended-for diversity . Nor will the answer , which Sir K. Digby has provided for such Objections help the Hypothesis , viz. [ that it is not one part of the thing that shews it self , and another that doth not , one that is hot , and another cold , &c. But it is the same thing , shewing it self according to one possibility of division , and not another . ] For first , these distinct possibilities are founded upon distinct actualities , which are the parts I would have acknowledged . And such a capacity of receiving things so different , cannot be in the same subject , without the supposal of parts actually distinct and divers . ( 2. ) The subjects of these contrary qualities are things actual : whereas possibilities are but Metaphysical notions . And these subjects are distinct , or contradictions will be reconcil'd de eodem ; from which the inference seems necessary , that quantity hath parts , and parts actual , and distinct possibilities will not salve the business . And ( 3. ) why must the common speech of all mankinde be alter'd , and what all the world cals parts , be call'd possibilities of division ? which yet if our Philosopher will needs name so , they being acknowledg'd distinct , and prov'd actual , or at least founded immediately upon things that are so ; my question will as well proceed this way as in the common one , viz. How the things that answer to these distinct possibilities are united , and of what compounded ? There is another Answer which I find in our Authors Peripatetical Institutions , the sum of which is , [ That the contradictions have only a notional repugnance in the subject as 't is in our understandings : and since the parts have a distinct being in our understanding , from thence 't is that they are capable to sustain contradictions ] which Answer , if I understand , I have reason to wonder at : for certainly the Subject sustains the Contradictories as it is in re . And , I never heard of a notion black or white , but in a Metaphor ; 't is the real substance is the subject of these contrarieties ; which were impossible , if it had not divers realities answering to the qualities so denominating . And therefore 't is not the Understanding that makes the divers subjects of these Accidents , as our Author suggests : but there being such is the ground that we so apprehend them . I hope I need say no more then to establish the supposal of the difficulty under consideration , That there are parts actually in Quantity : only I am obliged by my proposed method to add further , ( 2. ) That the grounds of the excellent Sir K. Digby , and our Author , on which they built their asserted Paradox , seem to me very insufficient to sustain so great a weight as leans upon them . The Reasons are ( 1. ) Quantity is Divisibility . ( 2. ) Divisibility is capacity of Division . ( 3 ) What is only capable of division , is not actually divided . ( 4. ) Quantity is not actually divided , and therefore hath no parts actually , To which in short , ( 1. ) That Quantity is Divisibility , is presumed ; but extension is before it , in nature , and our conception , and is the received notion , though perhaps Impenetrability is the truest . However ( 2. ) even this supposeth parts , and those actual : For Division is but Solution of Union . And Union supposeth Parts to be united . ( 3. ) What is only capable of division in a Physiological and Mechanical lense ; may , yea and ought , to be divided in a Metaphysical . That is , they ought to be divers in their being , before they can be separate and distinct in their material bulk and quantity . For separability must presuppose diversity . ( 4. ) Though Quantity be not actually divided in one sense , 't is in another : Every part having a distinct place and being of its own , though it doth not yet enjoy it separately and apart from others . But ( 2. ) it is pleaded against actual parts in Quantity , that if we admit them , we cannot stop till we come down to Indivisibles ; of which to suppose Quantity composed , is said to be absurd and impossible . In return to which , I grant the Inference , and have acknowledged the Hypothesis of Indivisibles to be full of seeming inconsistencies ; as is the other also : And therefore reckon both among the Unconceiveables ; of which there can be no greater Argument then their having driven so great and sagacious wits upon such an Assertion , ( to which out of reverence to these celebrated persons , I shall not affix an Epithete ) against the evidence of our Senses , and the apprehension of all the world : That there are no parts in quantity . But ( 2. ) 't is no good method of reasoning , to deny what is plain and obvious , because we cannot conceive what is abstruse and difficult . And I think the Assertor cannot answer it to his severer faculties , who affirms , there are no parts actually in quantity , against all his Senses and the universal suffrage of Mankinde ; because he cannot untie the difficulties that emerge from the supposal , that Bodies are compounded of Indivisibles ; a nice and in tricate Theory . Yea how will our Author answer for the Assertion to his Master Aristotle ? who saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Argumenta asserentium partes actu vel Sensum A. citant , de quo nihil certius est quàm — pag. 81. I Believe the Assertors of Actual parts may well appeal G. to the Senses , notwithstanding what our Author , and the learned Knight have alledg'd to invalidate their evidence . For what though the sense discovers not the distinct term of the hand or finger ; Can it not therefore discern them to be distant and distinguish't from the foot and toes ? And is not this enough to ground the belief of their diversity ? Cannot we distinguish the motions of our parts ; though we know not their first springs and exact beginnings ? or discern a difference between the apple and the twig it grows on ; except we could see the point where one begins and the other endeth ? And whether an Hypothesis is like to stand , that is put to such poor shifts to defend it self against the grossest of our faculties , I leave to be conjectured ? The supposition then of my doubts , being thus asserted and prov'd , we see yet but small hope to expect their Solution . Or , if this be an aenswer , t' is an evidence of our intellectual weakness , that all the world hath all this while been confounded about a plain Problem upon a false supposal . The Answer to my other difficulty about the union of the parts of quantity , is grounded also upon the presumption that there are actually none ; which I think I have sufficiently disprov'd . A. 5. Caput sextum totum motui Rotarum dedicatum est , neque si credimus Authori de cujus — pag. 83. G. I Conclude not only that no part can move , but the whole must ; but also that in the circular motion of a wheel , it seems that the motion of every part must be praerequired to it self , which I think is clear enough in the inference , though the proposition inferred , be impossible and absurd . And what inconvenience there is in this conclusion , that all the parts change their place at once , I have made sufficiently evident , in the place where the difficulty is urged . I confess in our Authors Hypothesis that there are actually no parts in bodies , the doubt is none ; and the whole matter will pass into words and air : but supposing that in quantity there are distinct realities , I think 't will be hard to dis-incumber this trite Phaenomenon from the perplexities I mention'd . A. Subjungit Author secundam difficultatem , quomodo in rotâ circumvolutâ viciniores centro partes — pag. 84. G. I Say again , however we find it in the event , while yet we consider the remote parts , moving swifter then the central ones , in the speculative notion , 't is hard to conceive , but that the Line drawn from the Centre to the Circumference , should be inflected ; since one point of the line rests while the other moves , which in the Theory seems to argue a disunion , and consequently an incurvation . So that though it be true in the experiment and event , yea and while we look upon the reason of the thing , in one position ; that the line would be made crooked , were it not for the unequal velocity of the parts ; yet it appears as clear to reason , in another posture , that this inequality should inferre it . For if B move swifter then A. A rests some instant while B is in motion . There 's no motion , but where there 's change of place , viz. of that place , in respect of which the body is said to move : The place in respect of which the body is said to move , is the next superficies that is considered as quiescen ' . And consequently it seems if B move any instant , in which A doth not : it is proportionably to its motion remov'd from that of A to which it was adjacent , and by consequence one would expect it should be disjoyn'd , or inflected . 6. Jactatum tandem experimentum capite alto ingreditur A. Author ille , prefatus audentisseme — pag. 85. SInce the publishing my Discourse ; I have met an ingenious G. Account , among some excellent Geometricians of this Probleme , which perhaps may satisfie the difficulty . The Account briefly is , That in volutation the whole circumference moves by a motion both progressive and circular : But the centre by the progressive only . And consequently by how much the nearer the parts are to the centre the more they have of the progressive motion , and the less of circulation . So that the little wheel in our experiment draws , and hath so much more progression then the greater , as makes amends for it's defect of parts . Which solution I 'le acknowledge perfect , if two things answer experiment , which I have not yet had occasion to make tryal of ; viz. ( 1. ) Supposing both wheels to be denticulated , the little wheel will with it's teeth describe lines ; and the great one with it's make points . And ( 2. ) the disproportion being augmented , suppose to an hundred to one , the drawing of the lesser wheel will be exceeding palpable , and discoverable by the dullest sense . I say , if these circumstances answer experiment ; this difficulty is for ought I know well accounted for . And I need add no more to this confession : For our Authors Answer is either materially the same with this , or much less to purpose . ACTIO SEPTIMA . A. 1. In sequentibus aliquot Capitulis satis exquisitè investigat causas Errorum & Ignorantiae — pag. 90. G. THat the present Age abounds with pratling Ignorance , and vain shews of Science falsly so called , will not be denyed by one , who hath directed some indeavours against them . And did I not deeply apprehend how much bold affirmers , and lazy Inquisitors have prejudiced the advance of true and substantial knowledge , I had never engaged against Dogmatizing and Peripatetick Philosophy . I wonder therefore that my learned Assailant should object my omission of these causes of Ignorance , which had the greatest interest in drawing from me the Discourse he opposeth ; in which , I have largely insisted on those reasons of the defect of Knowledge , viz. the depth of Truth , the praecipitancy of mens understandings , and aversness to deep search , and close engagement of their mindes . Besides which , I have professedly attacqued the disputing way of Inquiry , and the verbal emptiness of the Philosophy of the Schools ; which how guilty it is of laying a foundation for sloath and loquacity , is particularly made appear in the Discourse I directed against it . And while the Schools of Learning are under the regency of that kind of Spirit , I fear little is to be expected from Philosophy but bold talk ; and endless disputes and quarrels . For what else can be the fruit of a Philosophy made up of occult Qualities , Sympathies , Entelechia's , Elements , Celestial Influences , and abundance other hard words and lazy generalities , but an arrest of all ingenious and practical indeavour ; and a Wilderness of Opinions instead of certainty and Science ? But thanks be to Providence , the World begins to emerge from this state of things , and to imploy it self in more deep and concerning Disquisitions ; the issue of which , we hope , will be a Philosophy fruitful in works , not in words , and such as may accommodate the use of Life , both natural and moral . Testis mihi esto Author qui sub finem prioris Capitis A. conqueritur de obscuritate Speculationum , — pag 90. HOw justly the Author is made an instance and witness G. of that , which , in the very Discourse , by which only , I suppose , he is known to our Philosopher , he hath so earnestly witnest against , which his spirit is so averse unto , which gave the occasion of the Dispute between us ; I say , with what justice I am made an instance of that I have so professedly opposed , let it be judg'd by any , that is not unreasonably partial . 'T is true , I complain of the obscurity of Motion , Gravity , Light , Colours , Vision , and Sounds ; and yet am not ignorant of the Accounts Sir K. Digby , and other Philosophers both Antient and Modern , have given of these Phaenomena . My mind is anxious in speculation , and hath engag'd me to look as far , as my capacity could reach , into these Theories ; I could never content my self with superficial put ▪ offs ; nor am I apt immediately to dispair , if I find not present satisfaction in my first enquiries . I have with my best diligence examined the most hopeful accounts are extant of these appearances , and yet must profess , That though the first sight of their respective solutions is pleasant and encouraging , and seems to promise my mind a requiem ; yet the longer I view the most likely of these Hypotheses , the more liable and obnoxious I apprehend them . Like Pictures they will not bear to be look't upon , but at a distance , and when I come neer , I easily detect their imperfections . So that deep search discovers more ignorance , then it cures ; and confidence of Science seems to be built upon a slight and superficial view of things ; as Aristotle himself hath somewhere observed , and every one else may , that will but take notice , that young talking Sophisters use to be far more assured of their Assertions , then the deepest and most exercis'd Philosophers . I 'le not disparage the account given by the learned Sir K. Digby of the mention'd Phaenomena ; they are to be acknowledg'd pretty , and ingenious : But yet I cannot think , that 't is an argument of shallowness and impatience in enquiry , not fully to acquiesce in his Hypotheses as infallible Solutions . I suppose , that ingenious Philosopher's own modesty and justice will not suffer him to own such a fondness for his notions , which I know he proposeth , but as likely and convenient supposals . I confess the most satisfaction . I any where meet with , is in the accounts of Des-Cartes , to whom Sir K. Digby himself bears this Testimony , [ That he hath shown the World the way to Science , ] And yet that great man , the excellence of whose Philosophick genius and performances , the most improv'd spirits acknowledge , propounds his Principles but in the modest way of Hypotheses , and pretends not to have explain'd things as they are , but as they may be . And I believe our Author will not reckon , him among the slight and talkative Philosophers ; which is so far from being true , that such as love only to skim things , and have not the patience to keep their minds to a deep and close attention , cannot with any face as much as pretend acquaintance with his Principles ; the comprehension of which , will require the most severe meditation , and fix't engagement of the mind , of any Philosophy that is intelligible . Not , that this excellent person affects obscurity either in Matter , Style , or Method , being indeed very perspicuous in all of them : but because , his way is unusual , and his Principles so coherent and closely pack't together , that the letting fall any link of connexion , will spoil the dependance , and hinder the understanding of the sequel . But I return from this excursion . If all then must be accounted impatient and shallow Philosophers , who acquiesce not in the Digbaean Hypotheses ; all the learned Cartesians , Platonists , the whole stock of the ingenious recent Philosophers ; yea and All , that follow not the way of Sir K. Digby , must unavoidably fall under the shame of these appellatives ; and perhaps that great person himself , who I dare say thinks not the light his Philosophy hath afforded these perplexing Speculations , to be so clear , as to admit of no shadow or obscurity . What ever haste therefore those discover , that will not be fully contented with the Principles in which our Philosopher is so well satisfied , I am confident that a little reflection will inform him , that he hath betrayed some , in his censure . A. 2. Altera ab Authore nostro neglecta Ignorantiae causa mihi apparet esse quidam specialis — pag. 91. G. IF any are so weak to affirm nothing can be demonstrated , against which any thing is , or can be objected ; let them answer for their Assertion , I am not to account for the mistakes of others : And if there are those who will not admit of certainty or evidence in a conclusion that any hath made a doubt of , as our Author intimates in the following Paragraph , I have as little to answer for their Scepticism and incredulity . For I never expect to see the world agree in any thing ; and therefore I assent where I see cause , and proportion the degree of my belief to that I have of evidence , without expecting the hopeless encouragement of a universal suffrage . Though I confess , where deep and enquiring spirits differ , I judge I have reason to be cautious , and to suspect uncertainty . Our Author concludes with a reprehension of those endless talkers , the Modern Peripateticks , and their voluminous trifles , in which I dissent not from him : But pass from them to their Master Aristotle , whom our Philosopher undertakes to vindicate from my reflections ; with what success , will be the subject of our next enquiry . ACTIO OCTAVA . 1. Et jam defunctus labore imperato videor , nisi A. summâ cum invidiâ Aristotelem omnibus — pag. 95. OUr Author in this Paragraph is of a very different G. apprehension from all other Aristotelians , if we 'l believe Patritius , who saith , Tritum vero jam est ac emnium Aristotelicorum assensu comprobatum , nullam esse in Aristotelicis Libris Scientificam Demonstrationem . Our Philosopher then denies all Science among the other Antients , and the rest of the Aristotelians allow none in Aristotle . And if either be true , or both , 't is an evidence against Dogmatizing , and fond doating upon Authorities . But this action is professedly directed against Gassendus ; some few of whose charges against Aristotle our Author indeavours to defeat and disable ; which should he succeed in according to his desires , yet the far greater , and perhaps the more formidable number stands unanswer'd . Briefly then ( 1. ) he excepts at Gassendus's animadverting on Aristotle's manners , which he insinuates , to be more like a crafty Orator , then a close and severe Philosopher . To which in behalf of that excellent Neoterick , it may be rejoyn'd , That if Aristotle were vicious and immoral , there is much the less reason why we should revere his authority : For truth and vertue use to dwell together ; and the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom . Vice drowns the noble Idea's of the Soul , and fills the mind with those foul steams of the body , which are prejudicial to deep and worthy enquiries ; so that with all good men and true Philosophers 't will not a little detract from the credit of Aristotle's Intellectuals , if his Morals are acknowledg'd , or can be prov'd obnoxious . Whither the charge be just or not , our Philosopher makes no enquiry , which seems a tacite confession of the truth of the accusation ; and then I think he hath no reason to object the impropriety . After this remark he descends ( 2. ) to some particular instances of Gassendus's charge , to as many of which , as I am concern'd in , I make this brief rejoynder : ( 1. ) Then Aristotle expresly makes God an Animal in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . If he sayes otherwise elsewhere , 't is only an argument of the inconsistency of Aristotle , not of the injustice of Gassendus . ( 2. ) That God acts by necessity , Aristotle clearly enough insinuates in that conclusion of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is testimony sufficient of the truth of my charge ; if Gassendus accused him of more , 't is like he was able to make it good . ( 3. ) That Aristotle made the world eternal , our Author allows me . But that hereby he prov'd himself the chief of all the Ethnick Philosophers , I cannot grant him so easily . For ( 1. ) Aristotle was not the first in this Assertion , but had it from Ocellus Lucanus ; from whom also he transcrib'd the Arguments he made use of to enforce it : Which yet ( 2. ) are not such , as do so highly commend his Philosophy , and faculty of arguing . He proves the World eternal then , because the Heavens are so ; the Assertion of which he attempts by five Arguments : ( viz. ) ( 1. ) From the Etymology of aether , viz. ab 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ( 2. ) From the silence of History of any change or alteration they have undergone . ( 3. ) From the Opinion of the Antients . ( 4. ) From the freedom of the Heavens from contrarieties . And ( 5. ) from the eternity of the Caelestial motions , which he proves with the eternity of time by reasons borrow'd from Ocellus , who was the Author of the main Argument . Now whoever affirms that such arguings as these set Aristotle so much above all the more antient Philosophers , expresses more fondness towards him , then justice to his betters . Nor can the comparative excellency of his wit be any more reasonably concluded from his allowing the natural inference of that acknowledg'd Principle , Ex nihilo nihil ; which doubtless the Antients never meant in the general notion ; but in a sense which restrain'd it to natural productions ; else their Assertion of the Worlds beginning had been nonsense and a contradiction . ( 4. ) The learned Gentleman admires that we should charge Aristotle with the denyal of the Resurrection of the dead ; which though he acknowledges truly to be alledg'd ; yet he thinks it unreasonably objected , since he supposes this doctrine only to be discoverable by supernatural light and revelation . To which briefly , ( 1. ) Though the Resurrection in the particular circumstances , in which Christianity hath cloathed it , be not known by our unassisted faculties : Yet that the Soul shall live , and live united to a Body in the other State , I think deducible from the meer principles of Nature : For the Philosophy of the Soul informs us , that it uses matter in its highest operations , which is fair ground of conjecture , that it is alwayes united to some body . Besides which , it may be argued from the analogy of Nature , which useth not in other things , to leap from one extream unto another ; And therefore 't is not likely that the Soul should pass immediately , from the state of so deep an immersion into the gross matter , to a condition of pure and absolute immateriality . To which may be further added , that , even according to the principles of Aristotle , there can be no Knowledge without Sense , nor Sense without corporeal Motion , which cannot well be perceiv'd by a being that is perfectly disjoyn'd from matter . Thus the principles of meer reason suggest , that the Soul is joyn'd to another Body after its discharge from the present . And ( 2. ) others of the Greek Philosophers , by the meer conduct of their natural light , believ'd it . The Academicks generally assign'd Bodies to those in the other state , and such as were suitable to the regions of the World they resided in ; and therefore Plato calls some of them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And to others of more inferior conditon he attributes Aerial bodies ; yea , generally the Greeks appointed corporeal punishments for the wicked in their Acheron , and Cocytus , as Theocritus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And Virgil , — Aliis sub gurgite vasto Infectum eluitur scelus , aut exuritur igni . But the business is so well known that it needs no testimony ; and from hence 't is sufficiently evident , that they believ'd the corporeal state of the Soul after its separation from this Terrestrial body : So that Aristotle's Assertion herein , is contrary both to the nature of the thing ; and the belief of most of his contemporaries ; nay , and the most venerable wisdom that was before him . And indeed , what he taught of the Soul , is at the best uncertain , he using the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for the mind one while , and then for the phancy ; applying it now to Angels , and at another time to Brutes ; so that none of his Sectators could ever tell what was his opinion about it . ACTIO NONA . 1. A Gassendo ad Authorem Vanitatis Dogmatizandi A. reducenda est oratio , postquam ipse — pag. 104. I Think still that the Many are very incompetent Judges G. of worth either in Men or things , admiring trash , and slighting excellence ; And 't is my Lord Bacon's Observation , which signifies much more with me ; then all our learned Author has said in this Paragraph , viz. [ I hat the lowest vertues are the subjects of the Peoples praise ; the middle ones of their admiration ; but the highest they have no sense at all of ; ] which saying holds not only in Morals , but in all things else which the vulgar use to judge in : for they regard nothing , but what is like themselves , that is , mean and trivial ; which is the reason of that other Observation of the same great Philosopher ; That Time , like a River bears up what is light and chaffy , while the things that are more weighty and considerable , are lost at the bottom . 2. Subjicit Author noster Sapientium arbitrio Peripateticam A. esse vocum nihil significantium — pag. 105. THe excellent Lord Verulam is one of the wise men that G. hath reprov'd the arbritrariness of Aristotle's words , particularly in his Instauratio Magna , where he saith , [ I cannot a little marvel at the Philosopher Aristotle , that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all antiquity , not only to frame new words of Science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all antient wisdom ] and his affected obscurity , Patricius sayes , All the Greeks confessed ; yea Themistius one of his great Sectators sayes of him , Se , veluti sepiam a●ramento suo sese occuluisse . And Simplicius another , writes thus in his Prolegomena to the Praedicaments : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Besides which clear testimony the Author of the censure prefixt to Aristotle's works cited by Gassendus after great praises of him , adds , Ingenium viri tectum & callidum & metu●ns reprehensionis , quod inhibebat eum , ne proferret interdum aperiò , quae sentiret ; Indè tam multa per ejus opera obscura & ambigua . And again the forementioned Themistius , Cum plerèque omnia Aristotelis scripta quasi de composito caligine quadam offusa oppletaque habeantur : like unto which is that , which Simplicius sayes of him : In Acroamaticis datâ operâ obscurus esse voluit . We see then who the wise Men are , that have accused the obscurity of the Aristotelean processes . And that he was not so clear from aequivocatiens as our Author suggests ; I 'le give but a double instance ( 1. ) of his applying the foremention'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Beasts and Angels , to the Imagination and abstracted Intellect . And ( 2. ) his calling God , the Quintessence , Form , the Soul , and Motion , by the common appellative of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To all which might be added , that 't is an argument that the Aristotelean method was not so clear and cautious , as our Author would have it believed ; since his Commentators have been infinitely divided about his meaning : And our Author himself complains , That those of the latter Schools have quite receded from his genuine doctrine , which either accuses their ignorance , or his obscurity . It appears then , that the wise Men I mention to have accused Aristotle's ambiguities and aequivocations were those that understood the Aristotelean Doctrines , being some of them his most genuine and ancient Interpreters ; and not those who are so little acquainted with the matters of this Philosophy , as to charge Aristotle with the faults of , I know not what , apish Peripateticks , and Pyrrhonians . 3. Prosequitur deinde Actionem in Peripateticos per A. dubia quaedam , quae illi clara non sunt , — pag. 107. IN this Paragraph I can understand nothing proved , but G. that a thing is possible to be before it is ; which possibility our Author will have to be neither quid , nor quale , nor quantum : Though not absolutely nothing . And if this learned Gentleman take this posse of a thing for Aristotle's materia prima , he mistakes the Metaphysical , for the Physical matter : Or , if hereby he would only insinuate , that the first mater may be something , though neither quid , quale , nor quantum ; the instance is too short for his conclusion , since the posse of a thing before it is , is no real beeing , but an extrinsecal denomination , and a mode of our conception . 4. Duae aliae Voces molestae sunt Sceptico nostro . Hae A. sunt forma , & educi de potentiâ materiei ▪ — pag. 109. I Call the Aristotelean form an empty word , because I G. believe there 's nothing real that answers it ; All bodies are sufficiently distinguish'd by figure and position of parts , and I see no necessity to introduce such an arbitrary being ; However , if our Author pleases , let him call that by which things are distinguish'd , their form : But if with Aristotle he will make this a substantial principle of things ; I must be excused in a dissent to which my reason inforces me . And if his Hypothesis be , that forms are accidents , ( as it seems , he supposes , by the instances alledged ) he recedes from his Master Aristotle , who expresly makes his Form a Substance . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , And again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . A. 5. Quoad posteriorem vocem , seu educi de potentiâ , videat Vir ingeniosus an illud quod — pag. 110. G. THat which was brought out of the dark , was in it . And Caesar adds nothing to the Marble , but the Figure ; which is but a mode of Matter , and answers not our case . But Forms are not supposed Praeexistent in the Matter from whence they were educed ; and are Substances really distinguisht from it : which I have prov'd from Aristotle , and 't is the sense of his Commentators , though it seems 't is not our Authors . I inquire then , are these Substantial Forms produced of something , or of nothing ? An Aristotelian will not allow the latter ; for this were against the Maxime , Ex Nihilo Nihil , and a Creation . He affirms it produced of something then , and this something is Potentia Materia . I enquire further therefore , whether any thing of the Form did actually Praeexist in this Power of the Matter , or not ? If so , all possible Forms reside in the Subjects out of which they are educed , which is not consonant to their Hypothesis . If not , the latter part of the disjunction is confest ; to avoid the shame of which , they fly to subjective dependence : And this is the Potentia Materiae , they talk of ; from which follow the absurdities I inferred . And this is the Philosophy of the Schools ; and this the Peripateticism I charge : If our Author saith , it is not according to Aristotle's Doctrine , let him dispute it out with Aristotle's followers ; I charge it not on him , but on his Schooles , in which all the world can justifie me . ACTIO DECIMA . 1. Proximè sagittant duas Aristotelis Definitiones , A. utramque exactissimam & quicquam in — pag. 112. LEt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie as our Author would have it , G. viz. That which remains of an Action , and is introduced by it . But I enquire then , ( 1. ) Whether this Interpretation be not arbitrary ? I 'me sure the word in this sense is so . ( 2. ) Light is then something that remains of an operation : And this Explication notably helps the perspicuity of the Definition , which is as good a one as that was lately given of a Thought in a University Sermon , viz. A Repentine Prosiliency jumping into Being . And if our Author's Description be all contain'd in Actus Perspicui ▪ I shall need no more proof of Aristotle's obscurity in this ▪ instance . 2. Idem est reliquae Definitionis Vitium . Est autem A. ipsa Definitio , Motus est Actus entis — pag. 113. G. IF 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the definition of Motion signifie the Mode , whereby the subject is affected in the end of Action , according to our Author ; with what congruity doth Aristotle then apply it to the Soul ? except he thought it a mode of matter , and then our Philosopher had no reason to suppose he believed its Immortality ; But whatever he concluded of this , he affirm'd it to be a Substance , as in that passage , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And Galen of him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . A. 3. Nova calumnia Capite decimo septimo instruitur adversus Aristotelem , tantò indigniùs — pag. 115. G. THat Aristotle was not so careful in distinguishing the signification of words , as is pretended , we have evinced already : And it appears clearly enough from the last instance ; In which things are coupled together by a common appellative that agree in nothing . And for the other mistake this period chargeth me with , I answer ; That if I take the Scepticks for Peripateticks , I hope our Philosopher will henceforward absolve me from the so often objected Scepticism . For according to our Author my Peripateticks are Scepticks , and he knows how much friendship I have for those . But whether they are Scepticks or not , they are Aristotle's followers , if he have any in the Schools of Christendom ; And I leave them to justifie the title they have assumed . It sufficeth for me , that the genuine Aristotelian method is a way of obscurity and dispute ; for which , besides the instances I have given , I have alledged the clear testimonies of his acknowledg'd Sectators . And if the modern Peripateticks can prove themselves Aristotelians , we have a charge of sufficient aggravation from our Author against them also . For thus he censures them under the name of Scepticks [ Scepticorum conatus esse vanissimos facile agnosco , illos parum de vocum usu sollicitos esse quo liberum sit iis quaslibet nugas vanitatis aut alterius lucri causa divendere , oratorculos vel magis rabulas , non Philosophos esse , Aristotelicorum nomen assumere ut corrumpant juventutem , & Discipulos post sese abducant ; hos omnibus Scientiae sectatoribus veluti pestem vitandos non inficior , neque quicquam ab iis solidi expectandum esse . ] 4. Confirmant fictam adversus Philosophum actionem A. ex ipsis Philosophi dictis & gestis . — pag. 116. IT seems it was not only the abstractedness of the matter , G. that rendred Aristotle's Physiology so difficult of comprehension , since our Author confesseth that scarce any understand it , but who are assisted by the Commentaries of the Ancients . And certainly all the Moderns had never receded so far from his sense , if his expressions had not been obscure and involved , as well as his matter difficult . And for that which the learned Gentleman calls a more grievous and unhappy calumny : He confesseth it to be Aristotle's Instruction to perfect his Scholars in the method of disputing , which is all I charge him with ; And I think ambiguity and obstinate garrulity in Controversies , which the Philosopher seems to advise them to , is a way of Disputation that will not much commend the Practisers , or Instructor . A. 5. Merebatur haec actio instantias ex opere . Premit Author tres ( ex fide credo Gassendi — pag. 117. G. THat I have done Aristotle no wrong in the first instance alledged , will appear to any one that will take the pains to peruse the first Chapter of his first De Celo . For attempting there the Proof of the perfection of bodies in order to the evincing that of the World , he doth it thus : The magnitude that is one way divisible , is a line ; two , is a superficies ; and what may three ways be divided , is a Body . Besides which there is no other magnitude , for this reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he proves by a saying of the Pythagoreans , and this Reason in Nature ( if it be one ) viz. because the beginning , end , and middle , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which also is confirmed by that I quoted from him : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And concludes , wherefore since All and perfect , differ not as to their form , Body will be the only perfect magnitude , and that for the reason I assign'd from him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . This is the genuine tenour of Aristotle's argument , and our Authors sense and interpretation seems to me , ( as I suppose 't will to any one else , who considerately compares it with the Text ) forraign , arbitrary , and unnatural . As to the second Instance , the learned Gentleman hath mistaken the words of my charge . For if he pleaseth to look again into my Book , he will find , that I object no such consequence to Aristotle , as , That if there were more worlds then one , the Moon would fall to the Earth . But on the contrary , that the Earth would fall to that other World. So that our Authors justification of Aristotle's argument , viz. That he fixt the Centre of the World in the Earth , is a strange one , and concludes the quite contrary to what Aristotle would inferre . And why the Moon should fall , upon the suppositions , that the Earth is the Centre , and that there are other Worlds , ( as our Author suggests ) rather then as things are at present , I cannot conjecture . My Third Instance of Aristotle's trifling , and inconsequent arguings , was ; That he inferrs the Heavens to move towards the West , because they move towards the more Honourable , and before is more honourable then after . Which is clearly his consequence in the 5. Chapter of his second De Coelo : For thus he argues , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Nature doth alwayes what is best . Now saith he , as the motion which is upwards is more excellent then that which is downward , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; so in like manner is that which is forward more excellent then that which is backward . Thence he concludes this the reason why the Heavens move antrorsum . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . So that this seems the substance of the Inference ; The Heavens move by a motion that is natural , Nature doth what is best , before is better then behind , and consequently that way the Heavens move . The weakness of which argumentation consists in supposing , that those variable respects of before , and after , are realities in Nature , which is a poor vulgar conceit , arising from the meere prejudice of misapplyed Sensations , and very unbecomming a Philosopher . And that this was the supposal of Aristotle's Argument , is confirmed by the margin of Pacius's Edition , in which he hath given this account of the contents of this period , Coelum movetur ad anteriorem partem , quia hujusmodi motus est praestantior quam motus ad partem posteriorem . Yea , when our Author himself saith in the Account he gives of the Argument , Motum naturalem esse ad honorabilius , unde clare sequitur occidentem esse nobiliorem oriente , he hath given me all I have contended for . ACTIO UNDECIMA . A. Indignatur sub finem Capituli , quod doctorum opera ita in Logicam , Physicam , & Metaphysicam — pag. 123. G. OUr Author confesseth the Schools neglect of the profitable Doctrines of the Heavens , Meteors , Minerals , and Animals . But his Scepticism , viz. the present Peripateticism , is the cause . And this is that which I charge in the place animadverted on . So that I accuse not Aristotle here ; but by name the modern Retainers to the Stagyrite : But whether the notionality and obscurity of the Aristotelian method it self do not give occasion to the endless babble of those reprehended Scepticks , I have already past my conjecture . A. 2. Capite decimo octavo arguit doctrinam Peripateticam , quasi ad Phaenomena salvanda — pag. 124. G. I Am not yet convinced , but that the Aristotelian Philosophy is insufficient for the Solution of the Phaenomena ; And yet question not Aristotle's endeavours in that kind , but his success , upon what Accounts my Discourse declareth . I acknowledge the ingenuity of Sir Kenelm Digbye's Hypotheseis : But cannot yet understand that to have been Aristotle's method . And I think our Author is one of the first that asserts Aristotle to have taught the Corpuscularian and Atomical Philosophy ; for all the World hath hitherto taken his , to be the way of Qualities and Forms : Yea Aristotle mentions the Atomical Hypothesis of Democritus in a way of dissent and profest opposition ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which last passage is the main substance of the Corpuscularian Philosophy . And elsewhere he recites the same Hypothesis from Leucippus and Democritus , to the same purpose ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Urget adversarius systema coeli ab Aristotele sequiùs A. esse constitutum . Aperi accusationem . — pag. 125. I Cannot see but that Aristotle without Optick Instruments , G. the defect of which our Author thinks excuseth his Astronomy , might have discovered the Motion of the Earth , and Fluidity of the Heavens , as well as the more antient wisdom that believ'd them . He recites the former as the opinion of the Pythagoreans , but could not overcome the prejudice of sense against it . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And in another place hath a profest redargution of this Pythagorean opinion . As for the Hypothesis of the Fluidity of the Heavens , 'T is said in the Jewish Gemara , Non orbes sed in Coelo liquido moveri sidera , vetustissima Haebreorum sententia est . And if Aristotle had own'd a wit so much more excellent then others of the Antients , as our Author somewhere intimates , I see not why he might not have received these Theories , as well as some of those , to whom Optick Tubes were as much strangers as to the Contriver of the Orbs. That the Christian Doctrine teacheth the Motion of the Heavens by Intelligencies ▪ I cannot yet comprehend . And our Author cannot think it so evident as to be believed without proof . Our Air according to the best computations can be made of the weight of the Astmosphear , reacheth not much above 50 miles upwards ; and the thin Element there , is nothing to the sphear of Fire supposed under the concave of the Moon . A. 3. Caput decimum nonum exagitat Aristotelis doctrinam quasi infaecundam & sterilem . — pag. 126. G. IF it belong not to Philosophers to make Experiments ; the noble Lord Bacon , Des Cartes , our Illustrious Royal Society , and all experimental Philosophers , have been needlesly imployed , and out of the way in their inquiries . And if we must use no Experiments but those that are made by ordinary Mechanicks without design of Science , we shall never make any great progress into the knowledg of the Magnalia ; which are not known by the common methods of action . He that will erect a lasting and stately Fabrick , must have Stones digged from the Quarries , and not expect that the High-wayes should furnish him . What these common Aristotelian Principles are , without which no account can be given of natural effects , our Author would do well to tell us . Some Principles indeed are necessary , and without them nothing can be inquired or determin'd : But such are common to all Philosophers , and not peculiarly Aristotle's . Those that admit vacuities , think there can be no action without them ; holding it impossible there should be motion in absolute pleno ; And we have but our Author 's bare assertion against their arguments . The Cartesian vortices will serve to account for the Phaenomena , and teach a way of Theory not unserviceable to experiment . And for the Salvo of Aristotle's credit in those contradictory passages we meet in his Writings ; viz. that they are the sayings of others , it seems to me an arbitrary shift and evasion : Since we find them in his Discourses without mention of any such matter . And if it be confest his custom to insert forrein Doctrines and Sayings into his Works , without any intimation to distinguish them from his own ; who then can know when Aristotle speaks himself , or when he speaks the words and sense of others ? 4. Caput vicesimum manifestam reddit eminentiam A. Peripatetices supra reliquas Methodos — pag. 127. IN that Chapter I impugn not Aristotle's Philosophy , but G. had concluded my Reflections in the former . Causalities are first found out by concomitancy , as I intimated . And our experience of the dependence of one , and independence of the other shews which is the Effect , and which the Cause . Definitions cannot discover Causalities , for they are formed after the Causality is known . So that in our Authors instance , a man cannot know heat to be the Atoms of Fire , till the concomitancy be known , and the efficiency first presumed . The question is then , How heat is known to be the effect of Fire ? our Author answers by it's definition . But how came it to be so defined ? The answer must be , by the concomitancy and dependence ; for there 's nothing else assignable . But who is our Authors Peripatetick that concludes heat to be the Atomes of Fire ? And who that adorer of Des-Cartes that professeth Scepticism ? A. 5. Nihilo validius est Argumentum à varietate Opinionum Philosophantium ad impossibilitatem — pag. ●●9 . G. I Urge no such argument as the variety of Philosophers Opinions against the possibility of Science , but from the notion of the Dogmatists ; that demonstration supposeth certainty , as Aristotle himself affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; And certainty , impossibility of being otherwise ; as Aristotle proceeds , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; I say , from hence I inferre 't is scarce modest to conclude any thing so a demonstration , and consequently , Science in their notion ; The reason of my Inference is fully declared in my Discourse , the least view of which will be evidence enough of the wideness of this answer . Sub finem Capitis assumit nihil sciri posse nisi in primas A. causas resolvatur . Unde diluxisse — pag. 131. WHen I affirm nothing can be known but by a resolution of things into their first causes , I mean the Mechanical , not Metaphysical : For I am of opinion with the excellent Lord Verulam ; That Natural Theory hath been very much hindered , and corrupted by Metaphysical admixtures ; And this is a considerable fault of Aristotle and his Sectators . Some general notices indeed are necessary to direct us in particular researches , but then they must be such as are concluded from induction in particulars ; and perhaps the instances our Philosopher alledges to shew the necessity of Metaphysicks to Physiology will be better determin'd and accounted for in the way of experiment , then notion ; and I think our Author 's Metaphysical argument against a Vacuum , ( the exploding of which he thinks so necessary for the establishment of a grounded Philosophy ) I think , I say , his argument is a Sophism , whose greatest force lies in the scarcity of words and defect in language : For this is the sum of the presumed demonstration . A Vacuum is imaginary space ; Imaginary space is nothing real , and those bodies are together , that have nothing between them : If the middle of which Propositions be denyed , the argument comes to nothing ; and it may without absurdity be affirmed , that though space have not the nature of any of the beings that are in our praedicaments , yet 't is something real and not meerly imaginary : For the notion of space strikes so close to our minds , that we cannot conceive , but that 't is infinite and eternal , viz. is every where , and has been alwayes ; and therefore has a kind of being , that is no arbitrary figment ; Though such a one , for the expressing of which our words are defective : We see then , how this pretended Metaphysical impossibility may be answered ; For though supposing a Vacuum there be nihil corporis between the bodies distant , yet is there aliquid spatii , which is sufficient to avoid the contradiction ; so that there may be a vacuum , notwithstanding our Author's Metaphysicks : Yea , that Aristotle himself asserted it , though I know he has opposed it also , is affirmed by Aetius in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and there seems a strong necessity that there should be one , since it looks like an impossibility that there should be motion in pleno , or at least that any thing should be moved , but that all the World must be moved with it ; which I alledge only to shew , that Metaphysicks may both ways be urged almost for any thing , and that all matters of notion are double-handed . And if we must determine nothing in Physiology till Metaphysicks have concluded it ; for ought I know we shall be at an eternal loss , and never fix on any thing . And by this method of mingling Metaphysicks with Natural Philosophy , we shall fill plain Theories with infinite intricacy and dispute . Indeed , the impatient mind of Man , as my Lord Bacon observes , is too apt to fly to general conclusions ; and more averse to the way of experiment and induction , which he thought the only method for the establishing of a solid and grounded Theory : In which there is none has more happily succeeded then the Philosopher Des-Cartes , whose Philosophy is not a prescribed form how things should be made , as our Author injuriously suggests , but professes it self only an Hypothesis how they may be , and how by such Principles the Phaenomena may be salved : And the Mechanicks of Des-Cartes are much more likely methods for the expounding Nature , then the Metaphysicks of Aristotle ; Which his own Sectators have confest a meer rhapsody and confused ramble of they knew not what : Yea , and 't is doubtful whither they are not the spurious issue of some more modern Author , since Diogenes Laertius , who uses to give a full and faithful Catalogue of the Writings of Philosophers , hath omitted this out of the Works of Aristotle , and Philoponus affirms that Book written by Pasicrates Rhodius . And if so , Aristotle will lose the credit of demonstration in Metaphysicks , with which our Author hath invested him . 7. Sequens Capitulum laborat illo Errore quem Aristoteles A. saepius & detexit & confutavit : — pag 132. IMperfect knowledge , according to the notion of the Dogmatists , G. is not Science , but Opinion . Scire , our Author knows , is per causas Scire ; and the conditions of those Causes are that they be true , immediate , and necessary ; This is perfect Knowledge , this is the Science the Dogmatist pretends to ; and to this according to his own Maxime , every thing that is must contribute , as my Discourse declareth . Nor do our Philosophers Instances weaken my Conclusion ; for they relate to another kind of Knowledge , viz. that of the Existence , not of the Nature of things ; which latter is that which I am treating of ; and the knowledge of the being of a thing , as is its object , is a simple act , and consequently , to this , a single evidence is sufficient : But the comprehension of the nature , like the thing it self , is complex , and requires the knowledge of the things of which 't is constituted . What is added within this Paragraph about two Persons , seeing the same object in the same circumstances of sentiment , is our Author 's bare assertion , against my proof of the contrary : And the last period is built upon the fore ▪ mentioned mistake of my design and intentions . A. 8. Attamen Academicus noster non dubitat generatim dogmaticè procedentibus affingere quaevis — pag. 134. G. THe Learned Gentleman is now discended to my Moral Considerations against Confident Opinion : His reflections on the two first of which are built upon the supposal of my being a Sceptick , which charge I think I 've sufficiently disabled . The truth of my Third Accusation is confest , but the guilt , not acknowledged ; since that which excites men to endless bawlings , and altercations ; Schisms , Heresies , and Rebellions , by the vehemencies of Dispute , is it seems with our Author no more noxious and criminal , then the Sun that stirrs men up to their work in the morning , by the importunity of it's beams . To the Fourth absurdity of Dogmatizing , our Philosopher also gives a kind reception ; and it seems can be content with a Confidence that accuseth all the World of Ignorance . But whether be the more modest , the Dogmatist that chargeth all that are not of his mind as Ignorants ; or the Sceptick that involves himself also in the common reproach , let them dispute it out when they will , I have nothing to do with their Quarrel . In the last I 'me agreed with our Author in the Truth of his assertion , That Science inlargeth Mens mindes ; but cannot acknowledge the pertinency . For he could scarce have named things more opposite then Confidence and Science . Science indeed inlargeth : But there 's a Knowledge that only puffeth up . And I 'me of Solomon's Opinion , That 't is the Fool that rageth and is confident . Our Author concludes as he began , in the supposition that I am a Sceptick , and in this I 'me certain he is mistaken ; And will be Dogmatical in affirming , that I am none . THus have I concluded my Reply with a Brevity , that shews I am not fond of an occasion of Disputing ; and a Carelesness , that will witness the little delight I have in matters that are not of very material speculation . The truth is , I dropt these Reflections with such a dulness and inactivity of humor : That when my pen had traced one period , it was indifferent whether it began another . And I remember not an heat in the whole performance . For I felt no concernment to defend a Discourse , which perhaps I had less kindness for then one , who hath professedly opposed it . Not to mention the other reasons of my coldness and indifference in this Action . And though I have still a quick resentment of the Vanity of confiding in Opinions , and possibly could with an humor brisk enough have reassailed the spirit of proud and unreasonable presumption ; Yet I hitherto see no necessity of adding more to what I have said on the Subject : And the Reflections that engaged my Pen , have made me but few new occasions . So that looking on my impugned Discourse as too inconsiderable for a Subject of Publick Vindication , and meeting but little opportunity for general and discursive notion in that which opposed it ; I was , I profess , sometimes more inclined to have throwne away these sheets among the rubbish of my Papers , then to permit them thus to shew themselves to the Publique . But my Civility to this Learned Man obliged me to some Answer , and whatever I apprehend of it otherwise , my laziness or my judgement made me think this sufficient for that service . What others will judge of it I am ignorant and careless , and am sufficiently satisfied with this , that I think it pertinent , and that I have finish't it . FINIS . A LETTER To a FRIEND CONCERNING ARISTOTLE . SIR , I Am very Sensible how bold and adventurous a thing it is , for Men of private condition to oppose what custom and great names have render'd venerable . And though I am still of opinion ▪ that a lazie acquiescence in the discoveries of any Single Author , how great and august soever , be a disadvantage to the encrease of knowledge ; yet I think it not wise in every Man that hath only a naked reason to assist him , to confront such celebrated Authorities . Upon which account I acknowledge some juvenile heat and praecipitancy in those reflections your friendship has animadverted on . Which , besides the pardon young pens may expect from those who are not unreasonably severe , hath a claim to your candour upon other considerations , which I intend this Paper shall acquaint you with . In order to which , I suppose I need not tell you , that 't was no enmity to the learning of the Universities , which with all duty I acknowledge , that drew my pen upon the Sage their constitutions have made textuary . You know me too well , to think I designed any thing against the appointments and purposes of our pious Ancestors in those venerable nurseries of Piety and Learning . I too well apprehend the danger of such Innovations in an Age so prone to fancies and dissettlements . In which nothing howsoever worthy and sacred , has been able to defend it self against the rude hands of proud , because Successeful violence guilded with the plunder'd titles of Reformation and Religion . I 'le assure you then , though I had been so fond and unwise to engage in a design so unlikely in the undertaker ; I should never have been so disingenious and undutiful as to form a project so inconvenient and hazardous in the event , as to discourage young Students from a method of Studies the Constitutions of the place they live in have enjoyn'd them : Which indeed , considering the circumstances wherein things stand , 't is in a manner necessary they should be vers'd in ; since that Philosophy is wrought into the current Theology of Europe : which therefore would not be comprehended without an insight into those Hypotheses . Nor can a Man make a reasonable choice of his Principles , except he have some knowledge of all that offer themselves Candidates for his favour : and a Wise Man's belief is not chance , but election ; besides which , it enlarges and ennobles the Minds of Men to furnish them with variety of conception , and takes them off from doating on the beloved Conclusions of their private and narrow Principles . I blame not therefore the use of Aristotle in the Universities among the Junior Students , though I cannot approve the streightness and sloath of Elder Dijudicants , from whom more generous temper might be expected , then to sit down in a contented despair of any further progress into Science , than has been made by their Idolized Sophy ; and depriving themselves and all this World of their Liberty in Philosophy by a Sacramental adherence to an Heathen Authority . And I confess , 't was this pedantry and boyishness of humor that drew from me those reflections I directed against Aristotle . Which perhaps you 'le think not so censurable an action when you consider , ( 1. ) That whatever fondness these latter ages have express'd towards him , the pious Fathers of the first and purest times of Christianity , own'd for him no such regard and veneration ; but frequently reprehended him with a keen and impartial severity . And if we may believe the learned and industrious Patricius [ Multos ê Patribus habuit oppugnatores , Celebratorem neminem . ] Clemens Alex. Epiphanius , and Nazianzen accuse him of impiety against God and Religion ; Lactantius of Contradiction and inconsistency ; Justin Martyr professedly wrote a Book against him ; S. Basil reprehends his Ethicks ; and Origen set's Epicurus before him . Theodoret accuses him for denying Providence below the Moon . And 't is notoriously known that Platonism was the Philosophy of the first Christian Centuries when Aristotle was not much regarded . Yea as the excellent Gassendus has observ'd , in the flourishing times of Rome and Athens , the Academicks and Stoicks ; and Laertius sayes in his , the Epicureans , were the only valued Sects of Philosophers , while the Peripateticks were but little accounted of . Yea Cicero , Pliny , Quintilian that had otherwise the greatest esteem of Aristotle , prefer'd Plato before him . And I find ( 2. ) Not that Aristotle had such an excess of respect and worship , till after Barbarism had overrun Rome and Athens . For when the Empire began to emerge from that black night of Ignorance which had with it's rude Conquerours invaded it ; Averroes and some others of the Arabian Interpreters chanced to light upon the remains of this Philosopher , which they translated into the language of the Moors , and as 't is usual for Men to dignifie what they have bestowed pains upon , especially if it be rare and new ; these first Interpreters would not fail to celebrate the Author , that they might reconcile credit to their Writings upon him , and recommend their own elucubrations . And therefore Aristotle shall be the prime of Philosophers , that they may be next him . Insomuch that his Redeemer Averroes arriv'd to that Vanity in Commendation as to affirm , that Aristotle invented Logick , Divinity and Physiology ; never spoke any thing without strong reason , and that there was nothing defective or superfluous in his Writings , but all things in the most full and perfect order ; and that no errour had been found in his Composures : which Commendations coming down to the Latines , with the Books they celebrated , and they having no other Philosopher , but Aristotle , nor Interpreter , but his Idolater Averroes , greedily swallowed both the Books and the Character together , making sacred Text of the Writings of the Author , and Axioms of the Commendations of the Interpreter . For the mighty cry of the first admirers , assisted by the Ignorance of those times , and the natural temper that is in Men to revere the first Author that pleases them , bore down others to an assent to those applauses ; and being at last by the Schoolmen mingled with Divinity , and by others adopted into other faculties , grew in a manner Sacred and Universal . Aristotle became an Oracle , his placits were enacted Laws , and his dixit an unquestionable argument ; and thus was the reasoning World despoil'd of that freedom which is the priviledge of Humane Nature , and subjected to a forreign Authority , that could lay no reasonable claim to their respect or observance . So that the esteem of the Aristotelean Philosophy having been so small in the best and wisest times , and having sprung up to this bulk by accidental occasions in the latter and less cultivated ages , I cannot yet think it so piacular to question the dueness of those superlative praises are bestowed upon him in these , wherein Mankind seems awaken'd to enquire into the World of things , not of Words , and is resolv'd no longer to court Names , but Nature . And you 'le see less reason for your displeasure against that engagement of mine , when I shall have told you Thirdly , That 't is very doubtful whether those Writings that go under his Name , are Aristotle's or not . For besides that the antient Greek Interpreters have alwayes made this Quaery in the beginning of their Expositions , Whether the Books they were about to expound were Aristotle 's ; besides this suspicion I say , several very learned men have professedly undertook to prove the uncertainty of all his Writings , among whom are Picus , Patricius , and Gassendus , and from these Author's I 'le give you a brief account of this matter . ( First ) then Theophrastus , Aristotle's Scholar , wrote several things that had the same title with those we presume are his : And who then can tell whether they were wrote by Aristotle , or Theophrastus ? to say Aristotle's Works are discoverable by their style , is to presume the question , That some are known to be his : which being supposed , the enquirer may notwithstanding be deceived in his judgment , since learned Men in the same age are often delighted with the same mode of writing , especially the Scholars of any great Author use to imitate the Way and Method of their Masters ; yea and diversity of Age and Matter make's them sometimes differ more in their Styles from themselves , than others do from them . At least ( Secondly ) Theophrastus had great advantages of adding , altering , and mingling Aristotle's Works as he pleased : He himself putting forth few Books while he lived , but leaving them in the hands of this his great Scholar and Sectator . And 't is the observation of Strabo and Plutarch that the first Peripateticks had few or none of Aristotle's Writings among them ; upon which account impostures and forgeries might be more securely practiced . Besides which , ( Thirdly ) Theophrastus himself did not publish these Writings , but left them in the hands of Neleus , as is testified by Plutarch and Athenaeus . Now this Neleus of two Copies which he kept of Aristotle's writings , sold one to Ptolomy for the famous Library at Alexandria ; the other he kept himself and left with his Posterity ; who , as Strabo testifies , diligent search being made by the Attalick Kings after Books to furnish the Library at Pergamus , hid them in a pit underground about 160. years till they were almost spoil'd with moths and rotteness , and after sold them to Apellicon Tejus an Athenian , who got them transcribed and supplyed in those places in which they had been impair'd by their concealment , but as Strabo says arbitrarily , and at a venture ; insomuch that the Transcripts were full of errour and incurable defects . At length Sylla taking Athens , this Library of Apellicon , in which were the Writings of Aristotle , was transported to Rome , as is testified by Plutarch , and there fell into the hands of Tyrannio Grammaticus under whom they contracted new and worse errors . From him they pass to Andronicus Rhodius who distributed them into the order we now find them in , adding and altering as he pleased . After him , Picus says the contending Peripateticks still mended what they understood not ; and every man as he fancyed . All which circumstances are more than suspicions of much forgery and corruption in Aristotle's Composures . Yea , if that be true which Marius Nizolius asserts , and largely endeavours to prove , that most of the Books of Aristotle that are extant are but Epitomes and Compendiums drawn up by Nicomachus of his Father's writings , 't will be another evidence against their Authority . To which I add ( 4. ) What has been observed by the forecited Learned Men , that Diogenes Laertius , who lived when most of the Antient Authors might be seen , who was very industrious in the search of Antiquities , and who perused above two hundred Authors in order to the compiling of his History , forty of which had professedly wrote the lives of Philosophers ; yet this Diogenes hath omitted all we have now extant of Aristotle's works except nine , viz. duo de Plantis , Physiogn . Categoriae , de Interpret . Mechan . Contra Xenophanem ; Contra Gorgiam & Zenonem . Yea and Patricius gives sufficient reason why all these but the four last should be suspected also . Now why so many forged pieces were ascribed to Aristotle , three reasons are given by Ammonius . viz. ( 1. ) Because there were several others of his name ( Diogenes Laertius sayes eight ) by reason of which 't was an easie matter to shelter the mean and contemptible products of others under his name and authority . ( 2. ) Because several of his Disciples wrote Books on the same Subjects , and with the same Titles with their Master . ( 3. ) There being great rewards propos'd by Ptolomy to those that brought in any considerable Author 's to his Library , several out of a covetous design to enrich themselves by the forgery , inscribed other Writings by the Name of this Philosopher , to render them more currant and vendible . So that there were 40. Books of Analyticks ascribed to Aristotle in Ptolomy's Library , when as he wrote but four ; and two de Categoriis , when he wrote but one . It appears then that the Books of Aristotle are of very uncertain and suspicious authority . Yea , and though his Writings were never so unsuspect and certain in the main , yet no man can be assur'd in particular what is Aristotle's in them and what not , they having met with such hard usage as we mention'd . Yea , the Books themselves give notorious evidence of those abuses in the confusions , inversions , contradictions , tautologies , defects , abruptness , and other gross imperfections they abound with . Upon the account of which Gassendus sayes , he thought Aristotle a greater Man than to be the Author of such mean and obnoxious writings . But however , whether these are genuine or not , they contain the Aristotelianism of the present Peripatetick Schools , and if those works are none of his , there 's less reason why we should fall down before the ΕΦΗ of an uncertain Authority . Besides which , I must confess Fourthly , That the reverence I have to the more antient Sages , which Aristotle frequently traduced , and unworthily abused , animated me to more Severity against him , than upon another occasion had perhaps been so pardonable and becoming . And that Aristotle dealt so invidiously with the Philosophers were before him , will not need much proof to one , that is but indifferently acquainted with his writings . The great Lord Bacon hath particularly charged him with this unworthiness in his excellent Advancement of Learning , wherein he says , that [ Aristotle as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans , thought he could not reign , except the first thing he did , he kill'd all his Brethren . ] And elsewhere in the same Discourse [ I cannot a little marvel at the Philosopher Aristotle , that proceeded in such a spirit of difference and contradiction to all Antiquity , undertaking not only to frame new words of Science at pleasure , but to confound and extinguish all the antient Wisdom , insomuch that he never names any Antient Author , but to confute or reprove him ] consonant whereunto are the observations of Patricius that he carpes at the Antients by name in more than 250 places , and without name in more than 1000. he reprehends 46 Philosophers of worth , besides Poets and Rhetoricians , and most of all spent his spleen upon his excellent and venerable Master Plato , whom in above 60 places by name he hath contradicted . And as Plato opposed all the Sophisters , and but two Philosophers , viz. Anaxagoras and Heraclitus ; so Aristotle that he might be opposite to him in , this also , oppos'd all the Philosophers , and but two Sophisters viz. Protagoras and Gorgias . Yea , and not only assaulted them with his arguments , but persecuted them by his reproaches , calling the Philosophy of Empedocles , and all the Antients Stuttering ; Xenocrates , and Melissus , Rusticks ; Anaxagoras , simple and inconsiderate ; yea , and all of them in an heap , as Patricius testifies , gross Ignorants , Fools and Madmen . How fit then think you is it that the World should now be obliged to so tender and awful a respect to the Libeller of the most Venerable Sages , as that it should be a crime next Heresie to endeavour , though never so modestly , to weaken his textuary and usurp'd authority ? and how just think you is your charge of my Reflections as a piece of irreverence to Antiquity ? when my veneration of the greater Antiquity extorted from me those strictures against the proud Antagonist of all the ancient and more valuable Wisdom ? of whose unworthy and disingenuous usage of the Elder Philosophers , I 'le present you among many with some particular instances , that most easily offer themselves to my pen and memory . Briefly then , he accuses Zeno for making God a Body , because he call'd him a Sphear in a Metaphor . He sayes of Parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he made hot and cold Principles , and yet in two long Chapters falls upon him as making all things one . These two Principles of Parmenides Aristotle interprets of Fire and Earth , when 't is clear enough that the Philosophers meant Light and Darkness . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . He says of Parmenides and Melissus , that they denyed all generation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And yet in another place , having it seems forgot this charge , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . He accused Empedocles for constituting the Soul of Elements , for which he took occasion from that verse of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 When as the Elements he means are not corporeal , as Aristotle would suggest to force an absurdity on that Philosopher , but Intellectual ones , as Simplicius one of his own Interpreters expounds Empedocles . He blasphemes Anaxagoras's Mind in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And yet after gives excellent attributes to that Mind of Anaxagoras . He accuses the Pythagoreans of making Numbers the Principles of things ; when as 't is evident that Numbers were intended by Pythagoras , but as Symbolical representations of them , which serv'd him but for the same purposes the Hieroglyphicks did the Aegyptians , from whom that Sage had his Method of Philosophy ; as Philoponus himself confessingly affirms , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ But of all the Philosophers he quarrel'd with , there was none he pursued with so much gall and animosity , as his incomparable Master Plato , whom he not only insolently opposed and ingratefully thrust out of his School while he lived , but with a severe pen persecuted his very ashes , and followed him with injuries beyond the grave . And all for no other reason , but because that Venerable old Man reproved his evil life , and preferr'd the better deserving Speucippus , Xenocrates , and Amyclas before him . The particular instances of those ungrateful abuses are too numerous to be insisted on ; therefore I shall only pitch my observation on Plato's Doctrine of Idea's which Aristotle in all his Books inveigh's against , and hath render'd ridiculous among his credulous Sectators . Concerning which you may please to take notice , that this Opinion was not originally Plato's , though Aristotle charge him as the Author , but was the Doctrine of the Pythagoreans , Aegyptians and Chaldaeans . We have it in Timaeus Locrus the Pythagorean , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And before him Trismegistus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . But originally this Doctrine of Idea's was Chaldaean , for which I offer you the ensuing Testimonies which will also clear the antient sense and nature of those Idea's . We have them then in the Oracles of Zoroaster , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And again , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And these Idea's , by which we may understand their natures , he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Briefly then , the Chaldaeans by their Idea's understood the forms of things as they were in their Archetypa Mente , which answers to the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Christian Trinity . They called them also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as they were in this primaeval Mind . In the Soul of the World they call'd them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in Nature , they were Seeds ; and in Matter , Forms . Thus therefore ; In the Seeds of all things there is heat ; in that , Spirit ; in this , Nature which depends on the Universal Soul , and that on God , in whom 't is Jynx or Idea . This was the Chaldaean notion of Idea's , and this was the Platonical ; which how unlike it is the Chimaera of Universal abstract notions , Aristotle and his Peripateticks falsly affix upon the Divine Philosopher , is of easie apprehension . So that Aristotle in his impugnation of the Platonical Idea's , fights against notions of his own creating , and no assertions of his Venerable Master . And I must confess the reverence I have for that Excellent Sage and his Philosophy , lessens my esteem of Aristotle , and his . Which I cannot without some regret behold so Sacred in Christendom , while the incomparable Prince of Philosophers with his divine Theories seems to be neglected and forgotten ; especially since this latter is so consonant in his Dogmata to the principles of Christianity , and the other so opposite to most the articles of our belief in his . Of which Patricius has presented the World with a large Catalogue of Instances , and I 'le offer you a few of them . Plato affirms God to be one ; Aristotle make's one first mover , but 56 other Gods movers of the Orbs. Plato own 's God under the notion of the Father ; which Aristotle no where acknowledges . Plato , that God is the Supreme Wisdom ; Aristotle , that he is ignorant of particulars . Plato , that God is Omnipotent ; Aristotle , that he can do nothing , but move the Heavens . Plato , that God made the World ; Aristotle , that the World is uncreated , and eternal . Plato , that God made the World of nothing ; Aristotle , that of nothing is made nothing . Plato that God is free from all body ; Aristotle , that he 's tyed to the first Orb. Plato , that Providence is over all things ; Aristotle , that 't is confin'd to the Heavens . Plato , that God governs the Universe ; Aristotle , not God , but Nature , Chance , and Fortune . Plato , that God created the Soul ; Aristotle , that 't is the Act of the body . Plato , that the happiness of a Man is in his likeness to God ; Aristotle , that a Man is happy in the goods of Fortune . Plato , there will come one that shall teach us to pray , a prophecy of our Saviour . Aristotle , prayers are in vain , because God knows not particulars . Plato , that after death good Men shall enjoy God. Aristotle , no pleasure after this life . Plato , the Souls of the wicked shall be punish't after death ; Aristotle , they shall perish with the body , and suffer nothing . Plato , the dead shall rise . Aristotle , à privatione ad habitum . Plato that the Soul and Body of the wicked shall be punish't in Hell. Aristotle knew no such matter . These are some instances among many , of the divine temper of the Platonical Philosophy , and the impiety of the Aristotelian ; for a further account of which I referre you to the fore-mentioned learned Author . So that I doubt not , but when you have duly consider'd the matter , you 'l judge those Reflections the effects of a laudable zeal for Antiquity , and what is more sacred , Truth . To which I adde ( 5. ) That the Aristotelian was not the antient Philosophy , but the Corpuscularian and Atomical , which to the great hinderance of Science lay long buryed in neglect and oblivion , but hath in these latter Ages been again restored to the light and it 's deserv'd repute and value . And that the Atomical Hypothesis was the First and most Antient , of which there is any memory in Physiology , is notoriously known to all , that know the Age of Democritus ; who was one of those Four Sages that brought the learning of the Aegyptians among the Grecians ; Orpheus bringing in Theology ; Thales the Mathematicks ; our Democritus , natural Philosophy ; and Pythagoras all Three , with the Moral . Now the learning of the Aegyptians came from the Chaldaeans , and was convey'd to them , as some learned Men affirm , by Abraham , who was of kin to Zoroaster the great Chaldaean Legislatour and Philosopher ; which Zoroaster lived 290 years after the Flood , and as Pliny saith , was the Schollar of Azonaces , whom Antiquáries affirm to have been of the Schoole of Sem and Heber . The Atomical Philosophy then coming from the Aegyptians to the Grecians , and from the Chaldaeans to them ; is without doubt of the most venerable Antiquity ; and the Aristotelian a very novelty in compare with that grey Hypothesis : at the best , a degeneracy and corruption of the most antient Wisdom . Yea , and 't is the complaint of several learned Men , which whoever knows any thing of Aristotles Sectators will justifie , That the Modern Peripateticks have as farr receded from his sense , as from the Truth of Things . For it hath been the Fashion of his Interpreters both Greeks , Latins , and Arabians , to form whole Doctrines from catches and scraps of sentences , without attending to the analogy and main scope of his Writings . From which method of interpretation hath proceeded a spurious medly of nice , spinose and useless notions , that is but little of kin to Aristotle or nature . So that whatever of genuine Aristotelian is in those works that bare his name ; There 's little of Aristotle in his Schools . And 't is no indignity to Antiquity or the Stagyrite , to oppose the corruption and abuse of both . And to endeavour to restore the Antients to their just estimation , which hath been usurp't from them by a modern and spurious Learning . And though I grudge not Aristotles esteem while it is not prejudicial to the respect we owe his Betters ; yet I regret that excessive and undue veneration which fondly sets him so much above all the more valuable Antients . And I 'le propose it to your judgment ( 6. ) Whether 't was likely that Aristotle was so farr beyond other Philosophers in his Intellectuals , as these latter Ages have presumed , when he came so farr short of most of them in his Morals ? I believe there 's a near connection between Truth and Goodness , and there 's a taste in the soul whereby it relisheth Truth , as the Palate Meats ; which sence and gusto vice depraves and vi●iates . So that though Witt may make the Vicious , cunning Sophisters , and subtile Atheists , yet I doubt seldom the best and most exercised Philosophers . Now what the Ancients have related of Aristotle's manners , I 'le present you in an Instance or two , and dismiss this displeasing subject . Suidas then accuseth him of Sodomy with Hermias , Aeschriones , Palephatus , and Abydenus ; St. Jerome of Drunkenness : Lycus and Aristocles , two of his own disciples , charge him with Avarice : Aelian of Cavelling , Loquacity , Scoffing , and Ingratitude ; of which last , there are two notorious instances in his usage of Alexander and Plato . How he used his venerable Master , I have already noted . And what return he made to the kindnesses of his Glorious Schollar , you may see in these few words from Arrian , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . And to sum up much in one , Timaeus the Historian in Suidas gives this Account of him , That he was forward , impudent , saucy , unwise , indocile , and hatefully glutinous , or in the words of Suidas , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . But to conclude these ungrateful remarques , Plutarch makes him a Traytor to Alexander ; and Eusebius to his Countrey . And being at last banisht for his impiety , He made himself away by poyson , according to the Testimony of Laertius . Thus then you see an ill Character of Aristotle's manners from disinteressed Authorities ; on consideration of which , 't is to me matter of some wonder , that the memory of the Vitious should be so blessed , and his authority so irreproveable . Unto all which may be added . ( Lastly ) That there is less reason that Aristotle should be valued beyond all others that have had a name for wisdom , if we consider , that he borrowed almost all he writ from the more antient Philosophers , though he had not the ingenuity and gratitude to acknowledge it : Particularly from Architas and Ocellus , transcribing them word for word in many places , especially the latter ; and yet never as much as mention'd him in all his writings . And I think you ascribe more to Aristotle then is his due when you call him the INVENTOUR of SCIENCES ; for we owe that honour to others of the Antients ; particularly to Zeno the Invention of Logick , and of Rhetorick to Empedocles , according to his own Testimony in Laertius , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( speaking of Zeno ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Perictione a Pythagorean woman writ Metaphysicks ▪ before Aristotle . Stobaeus in his Morals hath a Fragment of her Book de Sapientia , of which she declares the subject in these words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Besides whom Plato , Parmenides , Xenophanes , Pythagoras , the Aegyptians , Trismegistus , and before all , the Chaldeans writ of this Science , long before Aristotle was extant . And , Democritus brought natural Philosophy , as did Pythagoras the Moral , from the Aegyptians , before the Stagyritè was an Infant . And for the Mathematicks , they were studied in Aegypt , before He was born in Greece , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is his own confession . Thus then you see Sir , we are not so much beholden to Aristotle , as most men have presumed . And perhaps by this time you may be convinc't that we have no reason so passionately to revere his Authority . But whither you are , or not , I am not much concerned , being willing to leave all men to the liberty of their own sentiments . It sufficeth for my purpose , that I have given you some of the grounds of my dissatisfactions in Aristotle and his Hypotheseis . If you are convinced , at the bar of your judgment , I am justified ; if you are not , your dissent I presume is rational , and when I have seen your reasons , I shall either be more disposed to your apprehensions , or be more confirm'd in the justice and reasonableness of mine own . To which I 'le add no more , but my desires of your pardon of this voluminous trouble , and acceptance of the affectionate regards of SIR , Your Humble Servant J. G. FINIS .