Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D. Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. English Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. 1663 Approx. 1184 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 360 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2007-10 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A50322 Wing M134AA ESTC R213827 99826098 99826098 30490 This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A50322) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 30490) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 1798:3) Machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of T. Livius, translated out of the Italian. To which is added his Prince. With some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. By E.D. Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. English Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. Dacres, Edward. Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. Principe. English. [26], 499, [1]; [8], 168, [4] p. printed for G. Bedell, and T. Collins, and are to be sold at their shop at the Middle-Temple Gate in Fleetstreet, London : 1663. Dedication signed: Edward Dacres. A translation, by Edward Dacres, of: Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. "Nicholas Machiavel's Prince" has separate title page, with impint: London, printed for Daniel Pakeman, 1661; register and pagination are seaparate. 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Political science -- Early works to 1800. 2006-09 TCP Assigned for keying and markup 2006-09 Apex CoVantage Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2006-10 Jason Colman Sampled and proofread 2006-10 Jason Colman Text and markup reviewed and edited 2007-02 pfs Batch review (QC) and XML conversion Machivael's DISCOURSES Upon the First Decade of T. LIVIUS , Translated out of the Italian . To which is added His Prince . With some Marginal Animadversions Noting and Taxing his ERRORS . By E. D. LONDON , Printed for G. Bedell , and T. Collins ; and are to be sold at their Shop at the Middle-Temple Gate in Fleetstreet 1662 To the most Noble and Illustrious JAMES Duke of Lenox , Earl of March , Baron of Setrington , Darnly , Terbanten , and Methuen , Lord great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland , Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter , and one of his Majesties most honorable Privy Council in both Kingdoms . I Offer here to your Graces patronage my best endeavors , discovering at large their imperfections , in what I can claim mine in this work . For which however I may have incurred the blame of some , as unable to do the Author , I have undertaken , his full right , but rather by my rude stile wronging his original lustre ; yet perhaps , with others more moderate , I may find favor and good acceptance , as well for my choice of the Author , whose worth will somewhat beare me out , as because I have contributed hereunto what I ought , which can be no more then what I could . Mine Author was a Florentine , whose national attribute among the Italians is subtilty , and whose particular eminence in cunning hath styled the most cunning , as his Sectaries , Machiavillians . Nor hath this workman taken in hand a work unproper for his skill , being the discovery of the first foundations , and analyzing of the very grounds upon which the Roman Commonwealth was built , and afterwards rose to such glory and power , that neither before nor after all the ages of the world ever afforded the like example . This book I conceived , I might not unfitly present your Grace with , as unto whose service I owe my self and what I can , and whom as well for neereness of blood , as affection and favor , his Sacred Majesty may most probably imploy in this our ship of State near the helme , to the end it may in some part serve for your experience , as a good sea-card , whereby you may become able and expert , as well in the entrances and passages into all creeks and harbors of quiet , as in the discovery and avoidance of all rocks and shelves ; for as at sea it is alwaies seen , that in a stormy and tempestuous time , the master dares not trust the rudder in the hand of others then such as are the best approved and experienced Mariners ; so , in all States we find , that however in time of peace and quiet , allyance , blood , and favor have a main stroke in matter of preferments and imployments too yet when the times grow perplexed with perils and difficulties , true worth and experience are sought after , and then of value . No climate is so benigne , as to afford a perpetual calme , and therefore your Grace may do well to enable your self for the service of your Prince and Countrey , that being called for into the steerage in turbulent times , not favor , onely may give you a place there , but use find you necessary , whereunto if I could contribute a poore mite , I had done enough . Notwithstanding however my Authour , in what he hath done well , hath far excelled others , yet is he not without his blemishes and errors to ; which , as well as I was able to discover them , I have markt , and thereunto added some observations , taking ( as I think ) all his notorious errors in this book : Wherein I may have committed faults too , which you may be pleased to pass over , as no strange thing , but accept rather the duty of Your Graces humblest servant , EDWARD DACRES . A Table of the Arguments of each several Chapter . WHat were in general the beginnings of every City , and especially that of Rome . Chap. 1. How many kindes of Commonwealths there are , and what was that of Rome , Chap. 2. Vpon what occasions the Tribunes of the People were created in Rome , whereby the Common-wealth became more perfect , Chap. 3. That the disagreement of the Senate and people of Rome made the Commonwealth both free and mighty . Chap. 4. Whether the people or the Nobility are the the better guardians of liberty , and which have greater occasions of being tumultuous , either they that strive to inlarge the State , or they that endeavor but to maintain it . Chap. 5. Whether in Rome there could have been such a State founded as would quite have taken away the hatreds between the people and the Senate . Chap. 6. How usefull accusations are in a Republique for the maintenance of liberty ; Chap. 7. Accusations are not more beneficial to Commonwealths then Calumnies pernicious . Chap. 8. How needful it is , that he who frames anew the laws , and laies new fonndations of a Commonwealth , be alone without Companion or Competitor . Chap. 9. As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are praise-worthy , so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy . Chap. 10. Of the Romans Religion . Chap. 11. Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion ; and that Italy for having faild therein by means of the Church of Rome hath gone to wrack , Chap. 12. In what manner the Romans avail'd themselves of their Religion , in ordering the City , in undertaking their designes , and stopping of tumults Chap. 13. The Romans interpreted their auspices as necessity . required , and with discretion made a shew to observe their Religion ; yet upon occasion they neglected it ; but if any did rashly contemn it , they punished him . Chap. 14. The Samnites for the extream remedy to their broken state , have recourse to Religion . Chap. 15. People accustomed to live under a Prince , if by any accident they become free , have much adoe to maintain their liberty . Chap. 16. A disorderly people getting their liberty , cannot keep themselves free without great difficulties . Chap. 17. In what manner , in a corrupted City ; a free state may be maintained , being gotten ; or how when they have it not , it may be gotten and well ordered . Chap. 18. A very mean Prince may easily subsist , succeeding a brave and valorous Prince ; but a mean one following one that is mean , brings a state into great hazard . Chap. 19. Two continued successions of valorous Princes work great effect , and Commonwealths well ordered , of necessity have valorous successions : And therefore are their gains and increases great . Chap. 20. What blame that Prince or Republique deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects . Chap. 21. What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans , and the three Curiatij Albans . Chap. 22. That the whole fortune ought not to be laid at stake , where the whole forces trie not for it : and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages . Chap. 23. Commonwealths well ordered appoint rewards and punishments for their people , and never recompence the one with the other . Chap. 24. Whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free City , let him retain at least the shadow of the old customs . Chap. 25. A new Prince in a City or Province taken by him , should make innovations in every thing . Chap. 26. It is very seldom , that men know how to be altogether mischievous , or altogether good . Chap. 27. For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull to their Citizens , then the Athenians . Chap. 28. Whether of the two be more ungratefull , people , or a Prince . Chap. 29. What means a Prince or Republ should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude , and what a Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger . Chap. 30. That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd , for any error committed , nor at all punish'd when either by their ignorance , or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them , the Commonwealth suffered . Chap. 31. A Prince or Republ. should not defer to do good unto men , until their necessity require it . Chap. 32. When an inconvenience is grown in a state or against a state , it is better to bear with it for a while , then presently to struggle with it . Chap. 33. The Dictators authority did good and not harme to the Commonwealth of Rome , and how authorities which the Citizens take upon them of themselves , and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices , are hurtfull to the government . Chap. 34. The reason why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that Republique , notwithstanding that it was made by publique and free voices . Chap. 35. The Citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth , ought not disdain the less as unworthy of them . Chap. 36. What distastes the Agrarian law gave in Rome , and that it is very ●ff●●sive to make a law in a Commonwealth , that looks far backwards , and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the City . Chap. 37. Weak Commonwealths are hardly drawn to a certain resolution and know not how to determine , and the course they ordinarily take , they are rather forc'd too , then choose of themselves . Chap. 38. The same accidents are seen to befall several People . Chap. 39 The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome , and what therein is to be noted , where among many other things is considered , how by the like accident a Republique may be preserved or suppressed . Chap. 40. Of humble to become proud , of mercifull cruell , without passing through the due means between these extreams , argues indiscretion , and turns not to advantage . Chap. 41. How easily men may be corrupted . Chap. 42. They that fight for their own glory , are the good and faithfull soldiers . Chap. 43. A multitude without a head is unprofitable , and a man should not first threaten , and afterwards demand the power . Chap. 44. It is a matter of very evill example , when he that makes a law , neglects the observing of it : and it is very dangerous in a State , to make a continual practice of cruel executions . Chap. 45. Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another , and first they ayme no further then that they themselves suffer no harme of others , afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others . Chap. 46. Men though they are deceived in generalities , yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars . Chap. 47. He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd , let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and very lewd , or by one that is very noble and very good . Chap. 48. If those Cities , that have had their beginning free as Rome , have found difficulty to make laws , that can maintain them so ; those that have had their beginning immediatly servile , find almost an impossibility . Chap. 49. The power of stopping the publique actions of the City , should not be given into the hands of one Council , or one Magistracy . Chap. 50. A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind , which indeed meere necessity compells them to do . Chap. 51. To stay the insolence of one that grows powerfull in a Commonwealth , there is no way more secure and less offensive , then to seize beforehand , and so prevent him of those ways , by which he attains to that power . Chap. 52. The People deceived by a false shew of good , oftentimes seek their own ruine , and great hopes and large promises do easily move them . Chap. 53. What authority the presence of a great and worthy personage hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude . Chap. 54. How easily things are ordered in a City where the people is not corrupted ; and that where a parity is , there is no place for a Principality ; and where that is not , a Republique cannot be . Chap. 55. Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or Countrey , usually there are some prodigies that forerun them , or men that foretel them . Chap. 56. A Common people united are strong and vigorous , but taken apart and separated , vile and contemptible . Chap. 57. The multitude is more wise and constant then a Prince . Chap. 58. What confederation or league is rather to be trusted ; either that which is made with a Republique , or that is made with a Prince . Chap. 59. How the Consulship and every other magistracy in Rome , was given without respect of age . Chap. 60. The Table of the second book . VVHich contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire , either their vertue or their fortune . Chap. 1. What people the Romans had to make warr withall , and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty . Chap. 2. Rome became a great City , by ruining those that were near neighbors unto her , and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignities . Chap. 3. Republiques have taken three particular courses to amplify and inlarge their states . Chap. 4. That the changes of Religions and languages , together with the chances of flouds and pestilences , abolish the memory of things . Chap. 5. How the Romans proceeded in making of war. Chap. 6. How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies . Chap. 7. The occasions , wherefore people leave their own native soyles , and invade other countreys . Chap. 8. Vpon what occasions wars are begun among Princes . Chap. 9. Moneys are not the sinews of war , according to the common opinion . Chap. 10. It is not a match wisely made , to joyn alliance with a Prince , whose credit is greater then his strength . Chap. 11. Whether it is better for a Prince fearing to be assaild by his enemy , himself first to begin the war with him , or to expect while it comes home to him . Chap. 12. That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes , rather by the help of guile then force . Chap. 13. They are often deceived who think with humility to overcome pride . Chap. 14. Weak States are alwaies irresolute in their determinations ; and slow deliberations are alwayes hurtful . Chap. 15. How much the order used by our soldiers in these modern times , differ from those of the ancients . Chap. 16. What esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery , and if the opinion which is generally conceived of it be true . Chap. 17. How by authority taken from the example of the Romans , and from the use of the ancient military discipline , the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse . Chap. 18. That conquests in Republiques not well governed , and that proceed not according to the Roman valour , procure rather their ruine then advancement . Chap. 19. What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs , which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers . Chap. 20. The first Rector that ever the Romans sent to any place , was to Capua four hundred years after they began to make war. Chap. 21. How erroneus many times the opinions of men are , when they give their judgments touching great affairs . Chap. 22. How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects , whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto , avoyded the middle way , and rather betook themselves to one of the extreams . Chap. 23. Fortresses in general do more harme then good . Chap. 24. It is a wrong course , to assail a City fallen into discord , thinking by means thereof to become master of it . Chap. 25. Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it , without any return of advantage to them . Chap. 26. Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be content with the victory , for oftentimes when that suffices not , they lose it . Chap. 27. How dangerous a thing it is for a Republique or Prince , not to revenge an injury done against the publique State , or against a private person . Chap. 28. Fortune blinds mens eyes , when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs . Ch. 29. Republiques and Princes that really are mighty , seek not by moneys to make alliance with others , but with their valor and repute of their forces . Chap. 30. How dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banishd out of their Countrey . Chap. 31. How may wayes the Romans used to make themselves masters of Towns. Chap. 32. That the Romans gave their Commanders of their armies , free and large Commissions . Chap. 33. The Table of the third book . FOr the maintenance of a Religion or Commonwealth long in being , it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds . Chap. 1. It is a very great part of wisdom sometimes to seem a fool . Chap. 2. That it was necessary for preservation of the new gotten liberty , to put Brutus his sons to death . Chap. 3. No Prince lives secure in his Principality , while those are living who were despoyled of it . Chap. 4. What it is that makes a Prince lose his Kingdome , which he injoys by right of inheritance . Chap. 5. Of Conspiracies . Chap. 6. From whence proceeds it , that of the changes from liberty to slavery , and from slavery to liberty , some are without blood , others exceeding bloody . Chap. 7. He that will make alteration in a Republique , must consider the subject he is to worke upon . Chap. 8. How a man must of necessity change with the times , if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings . Chap. 9. That a Captain cannot avoid battel when his enemy will fight in any case . Ch. 10. He that hath to deal with many , however that he be the weaker , provided that he can but support their first violence , overcomes . Chap. 11. That a wise Commander upon his own soldiers , should lay all manner of necessity to fight , and take it , as much as he can , from his enemies . Chap. 12. Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander having a weak army , or in a good army having a weak Commander . Chap. 13. New sleights and inventions that are used in the midst of a fight , and new cryes that are heard , what effects they produce . Chap. 14. That the command of an army ought to be given in charge onely to one , and where there are more , they alwaies erre . Chap. 15. In time of difficulty and peril , true worth and vertue is sought after ; and in calm and quiet times , not their vertues but their wealth , friends and parentage prefer them . Chap. 16. That he who hath received any not able disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Republique , should never be intrusted by them in any employment or service of importance . Chap. 17. There is nothing more worthy of a Commander , then to be able to discover before-hand and espy out the enemies practices . Chap. 18 Whether in the government of a multitude , mildness or severity be of greater availe . Chap. 19. One example of humanity prevailed with the Falisci , more then all the force of Rome could . Chap. 20. From whence it came that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes , wrought the same effect in Italy , which the other did in Spain . Chap. 21. How Manlius Torquatus his rigor , and Valerius Corvinus his mildness gaind each of them the same glory . Chap. 22. For what cause Camillus was banished Rome . Chap. 23. The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom . Chap. 24. Of Cincinnatus and many Romans poverties ' Chap. 25. How that upon the occasion of Women , states have been ruined . Chap. 26. How a City at discord in it self is to be united : and how that opinion is not true , that to maintain Cities in obedience , it is necessary to keep them in discord , and divided into factions . Chap. 27. That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed : for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds , are laid the fouudacions of Tyranny . Chap. 28. That the peoples faults grow from their Princes . Chap. 29. A Citizen , that will of his own authority do any good in his own City , of necessity must first extinguish all envy : and what order is to be taken for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach . Chap. 30. Powerful Commonwealths , and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity . Chap. 31. What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace . Chap. 32. It much furthers an army in the winning of a battel , to be confident of their own forces and their Generals valor . Chap. 33. What fame , report , or opinion causes the people , to begin to cast their favors upon a Citizen : and whether a Prince or a People do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement . Chap. 34. What dangers they incur , that put themselves forwards as Principals to advise any designe , which are so much the greater , by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril . Chap. 35. The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men , and afterwards less then women . Chap. 36. Whether slight skirmishes or battels are necessary before a great battel ; and what is to be done to know a new enemy , when one would avoid those skirmishes . Chap. 37. What manner of man that General ought to be , on whose abilities an army may confidently rely Chap. 38. That a Commander ought exactly to know scituations . Chap. 39. How deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war. Chap. 40. That the defence of ones countrey ought to be undertaken , either with ignominy or with glory , or whatsoever way it be done , it is well defended . Chap. 41. Promises extorted by force ought not to be kept . Chap. 42. Those men that are bred in the same Country , do throughout all ages keep very neere the same nature and dispositim . Chap. 43. By sudden supprisal and boldness many times more is obtained , then by ordinary means can be gotten . Chap. 44. Which course is the better in a battel , either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall , or else as upon themaine to venture all upon the fury of the first onset Chap. 45. Whence proceeds it that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition . Chap. 46. That a good Citizen for the good of his Country ought to forget all private wrongs . Chap. 47. When we see the enemy commit a great error , we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business . Chap. 48. A Republique if one would preserve it free , hath every day neeed of provision of new orders : and in regard of his good deserts that way , Fabius was termed Magnus , Chap. 49. FINIS . MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES UPON THE First DECADE OF T. LIVIVS Translated out of Italian . The Preface . WHen I consider the esteem which is made of antiquity , and that many times ( letting pass further examples ) a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate , only to have it at hand , to adorn the house withall , and that thereby they may be able to cause others , who take delight in the art , to draw copies thereof , and these likewise endeavour , as lively as they can , to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous actions that histories relate us , to have been archieved by Kingdomes , ancient Common-wealths , Kings Captains , Citizens and Law-givers , and such others who have undergone much for their Countries good ; that these , I say , have been rather admired then follow'd , or rather by every one have been so much avoided , that now the very footsteps of that ancient vertue is utterly defac'd , I cannot but both marvaile and grieve : and the rather , because I perceive , that in matters of process arising in a Commonwealth among citizens , or in criminal causes , recourse is alwaies made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients ; for the civil-lawes are nothing else , but the opinions given by ancient Lawyers , which since having been reduc'd to a method , todirect our Doctors of the Law now a daies , in giving of their judgements : yet for all this in the ordering of Commonwealths , in the maintenance of States , in the government of Kingdomes , in ordeining of military discipline , in waging of war , in giving judgment upon the subjects , in amplifying of the Empire , there are neither Princes , nor Republiques , Commanders , nor Citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patternes , which I perswade my self proceeds not so much from that weakness , into which the breeding and customes now a daies have brought the world , or from that evill which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many Christian countries and Cities , as from their want of the true knowledge of histories , in that by reading them , they conceive not that meaning nor relish that tastethey have in them : whence it arises that many who read , take delight to hear the variety of accidents , which are frequent in them , without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard , but unpossible , as if the heavens , the sun , the elements , and men were alter'd from what they were of old , in the●ir motion , order and power . Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this errour , I thought fit to write upon these bookes of T : Livius , which have escap'd the malice of the times , what I thought , conformable to moderne and ancient affaires , of purpose for the better understanding of them , that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine , may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historie ought to be sought after . And however this be a taske of great difficulty , yet by the helpe of those who have incourag'd me to undergoe this burden , I beleeve I shall carry it so far onwards , that there shall be left for him that comes after me , but very little way to bring it to a good end . CHAP. I. What were in generall the beginnings of every city , and especially that of Rome . WHosoever shall reade what beginning the City of Rome had , who were the Lawmakers , and how it was founded , will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city , and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire , to which that Commonwealth attain'd . And therefore to discourse first of her birth , I say , that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in , or by strangers . The first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe , each one not having strength apart , as well by reason of their situation , as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them ; or if they would joyn together for their defence , the enemy comming upon them , they cannot do it in time ; and when they should be in one body , they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats , & so become a sudden prey to their enemies : Wherefore to escape these dangers , either of themselves , or upon the motion of some one of authority among them , they confine themselves to dwell together , in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence . Of this sort among many others were Athens & Venice . The first under the command of Theseus , was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants : the other , much people being retired into certain little Ilands at the point of the Adriatique Sea ( to avoid those wars which then were beginning in Italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of Barbarians upon the declining of the Roman Empire ) began among themselves without the authority of any particular Prince , to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation : which prov'd luckily to them , for the long quiet their situation gave them , that Sea having no outlet , and those people which then afflicted Italy , not having ships to annoy them , so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have . The second sort is , when a City is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves , or depend upon others , & such are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants , or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten , and would safely keep without much expence ; of which sort the Romans built many througouht all their dominions ; others were built by some Prince , not to make his seate there , but for his glory ; and so was Alexandria by Alexander : and because these cities have not their beginning free , they seldome attain to that greatness , as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdomes . The like beginning had Florence ( whither it was built by Syllaes Souldiers , or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesola ; who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian , came down & dwelt in the plain upon the Arne ) for it was built under the Romau government , neither could it in the beginning make greater increase , then what the Princes favour allow'd it . The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free , when any people either led by a Prince , or of themselves , are forc'd by contagion , famine , or war to abandon their native Soyle , and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered , as Moses did , or build new , as did Aeneas . In this case appeares the ability of the founder , and the fortune of the City founded , the which is more or less admirable , as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities : which is seen in two kindes ; the first in choyce of the situation , the second in making the lawes . And because men act some things upon necessity , others by their own election , and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power ; it is to be consider'd , whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in , to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance , might live the better in agreement , the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord , as it was in Raugia : and in many other Cities built in like places , which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable , of men were content to live of their own , and not seek to rule over others , but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force , it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle , and to plant themselves in fruitful places , where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them , and over-master all that would oppose their greatness . And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people , it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines , the situation doth not , and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries , and apt to breed men given to Luxury , loth to use that industry vertue requires , and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle , and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause : having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers , as by means of their strict discipline , they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce ; such was the Kingdome of the Aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies , the laws strictness prevail'd so far , as there were bred by them many great personages : and if time had not worne out their names , it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise , as did Great Alexauder , and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us : and whosoever had considered the Soldans Kingdome , and the Mamalucks order , with their military discipline , before they were ruin'd by Selimus the great Turke , would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises , and therein have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them , unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes . I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place , when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance . When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory , Dinocrates the Architect came to him and shewed him , how it might be built upon Mount Athos , which place , besides that it would be strong , he could so order , that the City should be made in forme of a man : which would be a wonder worthy his greatness : and being askd again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live , answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet : whereat having laught , he left the mountain alone , & built Alexandria so , that people might resort thither , as well for the farness of the soyle , as the commodity of of the sea , and the River Nilus . Whoever then shall examine the beginning of Rome , if Aeneas be taken for the first founder , it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers ; If Romulus , among those that were built by the Natives ; And in what manner soever It were , it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any ; and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus , Numa , and others , kept it under in an exact obedience ( as hereafter shall be said : ) so that neither the fruitfulness of the country , the commodity of the Sea , the osten victories , nor the vastness of the Empire , could in many ages corrupt it ; but maintained it so eminent for vertue , that never any commonwealth came near it . And because those exploits she did , and are recited by T. Livius , were acted upon publique or private Counsel , and either within or without the city , I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice , which I shall think worthy of remarke , adding likewise all the dependences thereupon ; with which the first book or first part shall end . CHAP. II. How many kinds of Commonwealths there are ; and what was that of Rome . I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others , and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain servi●ude , having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands , either as a Commonwealth , or as a Principality which have had . as divers beginnings , so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances : for some either in their beginning , or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone , and that at once , as the Spartans did theirs from Lycurgus : others had their 's casually and at several times , and upon occasion , as Rome : so that it is a great happiness for a Common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the State , as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them : as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years . And on the contrary , that City may in some degree be termd unhappy , which having not met with a judicious founder , is forc'd to give it self a new frame : and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss : and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances , hath much mistaken the right way to perfection : for it is almost impossible for those of this degree to be setled again by any accident : those others although their order be not exact , yet the beginning they have taken being good , and like enough to prove better , have a good possibility , as may fall out , to become perfect : but sure it is , ' will never be without danger : for the multitude seldome agrees to a new law , if it touch any change of government in the City , unless the necessity of doing it be shew'd them by some extremity , which never coming without danger , it is like enough the Commonwealth may be sooner ruin●d , then brought into good order . Of which that of Florence gives sufficient proof , which upon that accident of Arezo in the second year was anew orderd , and by that of Pirato in the twelfth inbroyld again . Intending then to treate what were the ordinances of the City of Rome , and the accidents that brought it to perfection , I say , that some , who have writ of Commonwealths , will have it that there was one of these three kinds of States term'd by them a Principality , another an Aristocracy , and a third a Popular government : and that they who lay the first grounds of rule and order in a City , ought most to have regard to some one of these , as it seems fittest to their purpose . Some others ( and that following the opinion of many more wise ) think that there be six sorts of governments ; of which three are bad in extremity , and three good in themselves , but so easie to be corrupted , that even they become pernicious . Those which are good , are the three aforesaid ; the bad are the other three which depend on these , and every one of them in such sort resemble that which it ap● preaches , that they change suddenly from one into the other : for the Principality easily becomes Tyranny ; that of the Nobility falls into the hands of some few ; and the Popular will as easily become tumultuous : so that if he that lays the foundation of a Commonwealth , ordaines in a City one of these three sorts , it is but for a small continuance : for it is beyond the power of any remedy to hinder that it slip not into its contrary , for the resemblances which in this case there is between the vertue and the vice . These differences of governments grew by chance among men ; for in the beginning of the World , when the inhabitants were thin , they were scatter'd abroad for a time like wild beasts ; afterwards man kind increasing , they gather'd together , and that they might be able better to defend themselves , they began to cast their eyes upon him who had the most strength and courage among them , and made him their head and obeyed him . Hereupon began the discerning of things good and honest from bad and hurtful : for seeing that if any one hurt his benefactour , it caused hatred and pitty among men , blaming the ungrateful , and honouring the thankful ; and thinking withal that the same injuries might as well be done to themselves ; to avoid the like evil , they betook them to make laws and to make punishments against the offenders : Hence came the knowledge of justice , which was the occasion that when they were to chuse a Prince , they sought not after him that was the lustiest , but the wisest and justest . But afterwards when they had their Prince by succession , and not by election , suddenly the heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors ; and forsaking vertuous actions , they thought that Princes had nothing to do but to exceed others in luxurie and wantonness , and in what belong'd to their pleasure : so that the Prince beginning to be hated , and because he was hated to fear , and passing on beyond this fear to hurt , hereon grew Tyranny . Thence afterwards grew those violences , conspiracies and treasons against Princes , which were not undertaken by those that were fearful or weak ; but if any surpassed others in courage , valour , wealth , and birth , those were the actors , not being able to indure the shameful life of that Prince . The multitude then following the authority of those great ones , took armes against the Prince ; and he being down , they yeelded obedience to these as to their deliverers : and they hating the name of one head alone , fram'd a government of themselves , and in the beginning ( in regard of the tyranny past ) carried themselves fairly according to the laws they had made , preferring the publique good before their own advantage , and in summe , rul'd and maintain'd the state with exceeding diligence . This government afterwards falling into the hands of their children , who never knew the change of fortune , nor had the experience of adversity , not being content to live in a civil equality , but abandoning themselves to covetousness , ambition , and ravishing of women , so carried it , that they ingross'd in the hands of some few the government that belong'd to the whole Nobility , without any regard of the state , in so much that it befell to them quickly as to the Tyrant . For the multitude loathing their government , serv'd it self of any one that had any design against these governours , and so some there were quickly found that made head against them , who with the aid of the people put them down . And the remembrance of the Prince being yet fresh , and of the wrongs they suffered under him , having taken away this government of few , and being unwilling to restore that of a Prince , they chose the Popular , which they so ordain'd , that neither a few that were mighty , nor one Prince alone should have any power there . And because all states in the beginning are venerable , this Popular state subsisted a while but not long , especially when that generation was out that ordain'd it : for suddenly they grew licentious , not fearing private men , nor publick Ministers , so that every one living as he listed , they daily did one another divers outrages , and at length wereforc'd by necessity , or by the perswasion of some good man , for to avoid such insolency , to change a new into a Principality , and so from thence by degrees , they grew exorbitant in their behaviour , and upon the occasions aforesaid : And this is the circle , in which all states turning about have been and are governed : but seldome do they returne into the self same governments : for hardly any Commonwealth can be of so long durance as to undergoe so many changes , and yet stand afoot : but rather it comes to pass , the state while it is in tumult , counsell and force then alwaies failing , becomes subject to some neighbouring government which is better order'd then it self : but were it not for this , a state were always capable of revolution into these sorts of government : I say then , that all these kinds are pernicious for the short continuance of the three which are good ; and the malignity of the other three which are bad : Whereupon the sage Law-givers having perceived this defect , avoiding each one by it self , chose one that might partake of all , esteeming that more sound and firme : for the one guards the other , being that in one and the same City , there was the Principality , Nobility , and Commonalty as parts of the governments . Among those , who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most commendations , is Lycurgus , who made his laws after such a manner in Sparta , that giving the King the Nobility , and the people their shares , he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares , to his great credit and that Cities quiet . The contrary befell Solon , who made the laws in Athens , which because it was a popular state , prov'd but short liv'd , and he before he died saw the Tyranny of Pisistratus begun : and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence , and Athens recover'd its liberty ( because it took again a popular government according to Solons institutions ) it maintain'd it not above a hundred years , notwithstanding that to hold it , there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general : which were never provided for by Solon : yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility , Athens continu'd but a short time in respect of Sparta . But let us come to Rome , which though it had not a Lycurgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free , yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it , by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate , that what their founder had not provided for , chance did : for if Rome lit not upon the best fortune , it lit upon the next to the best ; for though the first ordinances were defective , yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection : because Romulus and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty . But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdome , and not of a Commonwealth , when the City became free , there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty , but were never ordain'd by those Kings . And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alledged , yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the Kings stead , chas'd out of Rome the Regal title only , & not the Regal power ; so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate , it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities , that is to say , of the Principality & Nobility . There remain'd only to give the Commonalty a place in the government , whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent , upon the occasions ( which shall be hereafter told ) the people rose up against them , so that rather then to lose all , they were constrain'd to allow the people their part ; & on the other side , the Senate & the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth : & so began the creation of the Tribuns of the people , after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firme , all the three kinds of governments having their shares . And fortune did so much favour them , that though they proceeded from the rule of a King , & of the Nobility , to that of the people , by the same degrees , and for the same reasons set down before ; yet to give power to the Nobility , they never took away all the authority from the Royalty ; nor was the power of the Nobility quite diminish'd , to give it to the people : but being mingled , it made an exact Commonwealth , to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate , as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following Chapters . CHAP. III. Vpon what occasions the Tribuns of the people were created in Rome : whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect . ACcording as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government , and so every History is full of examples to that purpose , it is necessary that he who frames a Common-wealth , and ordaines Laws in it , should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief , and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds , so oft as occasion shall serve : and that when any mischief lies covert for a time , it proceeds from an occasion unknown , which is not come to light , because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made , but time afterwards discovers it , which they say is Father of the truth . It seem'd that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate , when the Tarquins were banisht , and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride , were become of a popular disposition , and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke . This deceit lay hid , nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the Tarquins liv'd , of whom the Nobility being afraid , and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people , they might side with them , behav'd themselves with good respect towards them : But no sooner were the Tarquins dead , and the Nobility delivered of that feare , but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts , and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them : which thing confirmes what I said before , that men never do good , unless inforc'd thereto : but where choice is abundant , and liberty at pleasure , confusion and disorder suddenly take place . Wherefore it is said , that hunger and poverty make men laborious , and Laws make them good . But where one thing alone by it self without a Law does good , there , is no need of the Law : but when that good custom failes , the Law becomes necessary forthwith . Yet the Tarquins being foil'd , who with feare of them kept the Nobility in awe , it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the Tarquins did , when they were alive . And so at length after many broyles , tumults , and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility , at length for the peoples assurance , the Tribuns were created , and they bore such sway and had such credit , that they could alwaies after mediate between the people and the Senate , and stop the Nobilities insolency . CHAP. IV. That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome , made the Commonwealth both free and mighty . I Must not fail to discourse upon these tumults , which were in Rome from the Tarquins death till the creation of the Tribuns ; and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many , who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth , and full of such confusion , that if good fortune and military vertue had not supplyed their defects , it would have been inferiour to any . I cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the Roman Empire : but methinks they do not consider , that where good discipline is , it is likely too that there is good order , and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune . But let us come to the other particulars of that City . I say that they who condemne the troubles between the Nobility and the people , to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of Romes liberty : and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults , then they regard the good effects they brought forth : and that they consider not , how there are two severall humours in every Republique , that of the Commons , and the other of the great-ones ; and how all the laws that are made in favor of liberty , spring first from their disagreement , as easily we may perceive it follow'd in Rome . For from the Tarquins to the Gracchies more then 300. years , the tumults of Rome seldome times caus'd banishment , and very seldome blood : Insomuch as no man can well deem these stirres hurtful , nor say the Commonwealth was divided , which in so long a time through her discord , banish'd not above eight or ten Citizens , and put very few to death , nor yet condemn'd many in sums of money . Neither can that be term'd with reason in any sort a disorderly Commonwealth , whence we have so many rare examples of vertue : for good examples proceed from good education & a good education from good laws , & good laws from those tumults which many unadvisedly do condemn : for whosoever shall examin the end thereof , shall not find that they produc'd any banishment or violence in hinderance of the common good , but laws & ordinances in benefit of the publick liberty . And if any man should alledge that the means were extravagant , & in a manner outragions . To see the people together cry out against the Senate , and the Senate against the people , to run tumultuously through the streers , to shut up their shops , and the whole people of Rome to quit the town , all which things fright even those that read them . I say that every city ought to have its own waies whereby the people may vent their ambition , & especially those cities that in matters of importance wil availe themselves of their people ; among which Rome had this way , that when the people would have a law made , either they did some of the things forenamed , or refus'd to have their names inrolled for the warres , so that to quiet them , there was a necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction . And it is but seldom seen , that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty ; for they arise either from their oppression , or from their suspicion they are falling into it . And in case these opinions were false , yet is there a meanes to rectifie them , if some discreet Oratour in their assemblies perswade them of their error ; and the people ( as Tully says ) though of themselves ignorant , yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth , being told them by any man worthy of credit , and do easily submit . Wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the Roman Government , and consider the good effects issued from that Commonwealth , which never proceeded but from good causes . And for creating the Tribuns , they deserve exceeding great praise ; for besides the giving to the people their share of Government , they were ordain'd as guardians of the Roman liberty , as it shall appear in the Chapter following . CHAP. V. Whether the people or the nebiliry are the better Guardians of liberty ; and which have greater occasions of being tzmvltuous ; either they that strive to enlarge the state , or they than endeavour but to maintain it . THey who have judiciously laid the foundations of a Commonwealth , have , among other principal things ordain'd by them , provided a safegard for liberty , which as it is rightly plac'd , so is it of long or shorter durance . And because in every Republick there are the Nobility and the Commons , question is made to which of these two more safely may be intrusted the Guard of liberty . And among the Lacedemonians , and in our times among the Venetians it hath been given to the Nobility ; but among the Romans it was committed to the peoples trust ; and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two Common-wealths made the better choyce . And if a man list to argue the case , there want not arguments on both parts : butif we look to the issue they had , we should yeeld it to the Nobility , because Sparta and Venice enjoy'd either of them their freedome , longer then Rome . And comming to argument I say ( first taking part with the Romans ) that they ought rather to be intrusted as guardians of any thing , who are least desirous to usurpe it , & without doubt considering the designes of the nobility & of the people , we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule , these only desire not to be oppress'd , and consequently affect the continuance of their freedome , having less hope to usurpe it , then the Nobility ; so● that the people being set as guardians of the Common liberty , it is probable , they are more careful of it ; and being themselves out of hope of it , will never suffer that it fall into others hands . On the other side , he that argues for the Spartan and Venetian customes , sayes , that they who intrust it with them that are powerful , doe two good things at once ; the one , that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition , that having a greater part in the Common-wealth , by holding this staffe in their hand they have greater reason to be contented : the other is , that they free the peoples unquiet minds from such a kinde of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the Commonwealth , and like enough to bring the Nobility to some desperation , which in time may do much mischief : and they give us Rome it self for an example hereof , that when the Tribuns of the people had this authority in their hands , they were not content to have one Consul to be a Plebeyan , but would have both , and thereupon they would have the Censor and the Pretour , and all other dignities in the rule of the City : nor was this enough , but led on still with the same rage , they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curbe the Nobility , whereupon grew the power of Marius and the ruine of Rome : and , truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly , the one and the other , would much doubt which he should make choyce of for the guardians of liberty , not knowing which sort of men is more hurtsull in a Commonwealth , either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not , or the other which endeavours to maintain what they have already got ; and at last , whosoever shall examin the whole throughly , will make this conclusion ; Either you reason of a Republick that aymes at such a dominion as Rome had , or of one which seeks no farther then her own preservation . In the fir● case , it is best to doe as Rome did , and follow her footsteps . In the second , he may follow Venice and Sparta for those occasions , as it shall be said in the Chapter following . But to return to the point , what kind of men are the more hurtful in a Republick ? either they that would enlarge the State , or those that are wary not to lose what they have already gotten ; I say that Marcus Menenius being made Dictatour , and Marcus Follius General of the horse , both Plebeyans , to inquire after certain conspiracies , which were made in Capua against Rome , authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consu●ship , and the other great honours of the City ; whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as against them , they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means , but the Plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths , sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees , and particularly accused the Dictatonr ; and so powerfull was the accusation , that Menenius in a publick assembly , where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him , quit the Dictatourship , and submitted himself to the tryal , which was made before the People , and after his cause was heard , he was absolved : where it was argued , whether savour'd more of ambition , either he that would maintain , or he that would gain ; for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults . Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession , because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest : because men think they hold not surely what they have , unless they make a new addition of somewhat else ; and besides this , the larger territories they are Master of , the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect ; and this also may we adde , that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not , a desire to have , or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them , or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours , which they see others use ill . CHAP. VI. Whether in Rome there could have been ●uch a State founded , as would quite ha●● taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate . WEE have discours'd upon the effects , which the differences , betwixt the People and the Senate , made . Now they continuing till the Gracchies , where they occasion'd the ruine of the common liberty , some man would wish , that Rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did , without those jarres in her . Yet it seems worthy the consideration , to see , if it were possible , so to frame a State in Rome , as could void all differences● ; and if a man would examin this , he should have recourse to those Republiques , which , without so many fallings out and bickerings , have been long free , and see , what kind of State theirs was , and whether Rome were capable of it . An example among the ancients is Sparta , among the modernes Venice , both by me formerly named . Sparta made it self a King with a little Senate to govern it . Venice divided not the government with the names , but in one general tearm , all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen , which chance rather cast on them , then the deliberation of their founder : for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks , where now stands that City upon the occasions foretold , when they were grown to such a number , that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain Lawes they appointed a forme of government , and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City , when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick , they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there , from all power in State affaires . And in success of time , finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government , to give them reputation that govern'd , they call'd them Gentlemen , and the others Plebeyans . So that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any : for when it was first made , every one that dwelt at Venice , did equally partake of the Government , so that none could complain : they , who afterwards came to inhabit there , finding the State setled and limited , had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult : there was no occasion , because nothing was taken from them : and the meanes they had not , because they that govern'd kept them in subjection , nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take authority upon them . Add hereunto , that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice , were not many , nor of so great a number , that there was disproportion between the Governors and those that were governed ; for the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them , or greater then they were : so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity . Sparta , as I said , was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate , and might well maintain it self so a long time ; because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants , and they having seis'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there , and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus Lawes , took away quite all occasion of discord , so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement ; for Lycurgus by his Laws ordain'd in Sparta more equality of estates , and less of dignities ; for here poverty was to all alike ; and the Plebeyans less ambitious : for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens , and were held apart from the People , neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them . This eame from the Spartan Kings , who being plac'd in that Principality , and set in the midst of that Nobility , had no surer means to maintain their dignity stedfast , then to defend the People from injurious oppressions : which made the People , that it neither feared nor affected the Government , and not having the rule nor fearing it , the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided , and all occasion of tumults : and in this sort they might live in peace a long time . But two principal things caus'd this agreement ; because the inhabitants of Sparta were few , and therefore might be govern'd by few : the other , because not accepting of strangers into their Republick , they had not occasion , either of being corrupted , or making great increase , so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them . Wherefore considering these things , it appears ; that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients , if they desir'd to maintain it quicker , like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of : either not to imploy the common people in War , as the Venetians ; or not admit strangers into the City , as the Spartans : both of which they did , which gave the people force and increase , and sundry occasions of tumults . So that if the Roman State grew more quiet , this inconvenient follow'd , that it was also weaker ; because it disabled it self of the means to come to the greatness it attain'd . And therefore , if Rome would take away the occasions of disagreements , it took away the means of amplifying the State. And in all humane affaires it is plain , whosoever does throughly examin it , that upon the cutting off one inconvenient , another will streight arise : therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people to inlarge far the bounds of the Empire , thou mak'st them of such a temper , that they shall never be maneggiable at thy will ; a● if thou keptst them weake and disarmed to have them at command : but if they get the rule into their hand , thou shalt not be able to bridle them ; or else become so base , that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemy so e're assaults thee . And for this cause in all our deliberations wee ought to advise , where least inconvenients are , and to take that for the best course : for there is non● absolutely free from hazard and suspicion Rome then , like Sparta , could have made 〈◊〉 ●rince for life , and a small Senate , but could nor then , as shee , not increase the number of her Citizens , having a desire to extend her dominions : which was the cause that a King for terme of life , and the little number of Senators , touching their agreement , would have nothing availd . Whereupon if a man were anew to lay grounds of a Republick , he should first resolve , whether hee would have it extend its power and rule , as Rome : or confine it self to small limits . In the first case then , hee must order it , as Rome , and give place to tumults and general differences , the best he may ; for without great number of men , and those warlike , could never any Commonwealth increase , or if it increase , continue . In the second case thou maist so order it , as Sparta or Venice . But by reason that ambition to extend the dominions , is the poison of such like Commonwealths , their founder ought , as much as may be , in all those waies forbid them to inlarge themselves ; for all such gaines grounded upon a weake Common-wealth , do quite ruine it , as it befell Sparta and Venice : whereof the first , having subdued as it were all Greece , upon a very small accident , discover'd its own weak foundation : for the Rebellion of Thebes following , caus'd by Pelopidas , with other Cities imitating , utterly ruin'd that Republick . In like manner Venice , having possest her self of a great part of Italy , and the greatest not by force , but by mony , and craft , when it came to make trial of its force , lost all in a day . I should well beleeve , that the way to frame a Commonwealth of long continuance , were to order it within as Sparta or Venice , to place it in a strong situation , and make it of such resistance , that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden ; and on the otherside , that it be not so great , to become a terror to the neighbors , and so likely it may long enjoy its State. For upon two occasions ordinarily men make War against a Republick ; the one , to become master of it , the other for fear it become master of them . And this way I have spoken of , takes quite away these two causes ; for if it be hard to overcome , as I presuppose it , being well furnish'd for defence , it will seldome , or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it : and if it containes it self within its own limits , and it be manifest by experience , that in it there is no ambition , it shall never come to pass , that any for feare interrupt its quiet . And this would the rather be , if in it were made a Law or order to forbid the amplifying of the State. And without doubt I beleeve , that the bringing of things to consist in these termes and in this equality of temper , were the true civil Government , and the perfect quiet of a City . But being that all humane things are in continual motion , and nothing stands firm , they must ever be rising or falling . And to many things that reason doth not perswade thee , necessity bindes thee ; so that having settled a Commonwealth able to maintain it self , not augmenting ; and necessity should force it to inlarge it self , it would manifestly loosen its own foundations , and suddenly bring it self to ruine . On the otherside , if the heavens should prove so favourable , as to blow away all clouds and tempests of War , thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them , or make them effeminate . Which two things together , or either by it self , would occasion their ruine And therefore , being impossible ( as I think ) to poise all things so justly by the balance , or reduce them to this perfection of temper , it is properest , in founding the Republick , to provide for the most honorable part , and so to order it , that when necessity shall inforce its inlarging , it may be able to keep what it hath gotten . And to return to our first discourse , I think it necessary to follow the Roman Ordinances , and not those of other Common wealths ; for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other , I think it not possible . And those enmities , which should grow betwixt the people and the Senate , ought to be tolerated , taking them for a necessary inconvenient , to attain to Romes greatness . For besides other reasons alledged , where the authority of the Tribunes is prov'd necessary for the preservation of liberty , it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in Commonwealths of the power of accusing , which among other things was committed to the Tribunes , as in the Chapter following shall be declar'd . CHAP. VII . How useful accusations are in a Republike for the maintenance of Liberty . THere cannot be a more profitable or necessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty , then is that of accusing the Citizens to the people , or before any Magistrate , or any councel , whensoever they offend in any thing against the free State. This order workes two very useful effects in a Republick . The first is , that the Citizens for feare of being accused , attempt nothing against the State ; and in case they do , forthwith without any respect given them , are suppres'd . The other is , that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the Cities , in any manner against any Citizens . And when these humours have not ordinary vents , they burst out extraordinary waies , and so are the ruine of a Commonwealth . And there is not any thing renders a Republick more setled and stedfast , then to ordain it in such a manner , that the alteration of these humours that stir it , have some out-let , appointed by the Lawes ; which may be shew'd by divers examples , and especially by that of Coriolanus , which Titus Livius reports : where he saies , that the Nobility of Rome being angry with the people , as thinking them to have too much Authority , by creation of the Tribunes , who protected them ; and Rome ( as some time it chances ) being in great want of provisions , and thereupon the Senate sent for Corne into Sicily , Coriolanus an Enemy of the popular faction advis'd , that now the time was come , they had power to chastise the people , and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility , by keeping them in hunger and want , distributing the Corn to them . Which opinion of his they hearing of , took such distast against Coriolanus , that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause , the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate . Upon which accident , we note that which before was said , how fit and usefull it is , that the Commonwealths with their Lawes give meanes to vent the choler , which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one Citizen . For when they have not these ordinary meanes , they have recourse to extraordinary ; and out of question these are of worse effect then those . For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppres'd , although it were wrongfully done , yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the Republick , because the execution is done without any private mans power , or assistance of forrein forces , which are those , that take away the common liberty ; but by the publick and lawful power , which have their particular bounds , nor any way pass so far as to endammage , the Commonwealth . And to confirm this opinion with examples , this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me ; upon which let every one consider , what mischief thereby had faln on the Common-wealth of Rome , if in a tumult he had been flain ; for thereupon had grown offences between particular men ; offences cause feare , feare seekes defence , for defence men make partisans , and thus parties grow in Cities , and from them the ruine of Cities . But the matter being order'd by publick authority , they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd , had it been carried by private power ; we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republick , in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen : as it befel in the time of Franciscus Valorus , who was as it were Prince of the City , and being by many thought ambitious , and a man that by his insolent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil Government , and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him , unless with some faction opposite to his , thence it came , that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes , began to seek favourers of his party , to defend him . On the other side , they that oppos'd him , having no ready way to suppress him , devis'd some extraordinary waies : insomuch as they came at length to fight , and where ( if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd : ) his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it , there ensued not only his , but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens . There might also be alledged , to confirm our former conclusion , the accident chanc'd in Florence , upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus , which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick , to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens ; for , it was not enough to accuse a mighty man , before eight Judges in a Commonwealth . The Judges ought to be in great number ; for a few do after the manner of two or three ; so that if such courses were taken , either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill , and thereby , without calling the Spanish Army to aid , would have wreak'd their anger on him ; or not behaving himself ill , they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine , for feare themselves of incurring danger . And so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty , which was the cheif occasion of offence . Whereupon we may conclude this , that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens , we may well beleeve that in that City there is lack of good , Ordinances : even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordinary waies the maligne humors which grow in men ; whereunto it is sufficiently remedied , by allowing of accusations before many Judges , and withall countenancing them . Which courses were so well order'd in Rome , that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate , neither the one nor the other , nor any particular Citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength ; because they having a remedy at home , were not necessitated to go seek it abroad . And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this , yet I will alledg another , related by Titus Livius in his History : who reports , that in Clusia , the Noblest City in those daies in all Tuscany , by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished , and he , not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might , went and found out the French-men who then raign'd in that place we now call Lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an Army to Clusia , showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him : and if Aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the City , he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power . But as these accusations are profitable in a Commonwealth : so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful , as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter . CHAP. VIII . Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-wealths , then Calumnies pernitious . NOtwithstanding , that the virtue of Furius Camillus , after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen , had brought to pass , that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree , to give him place : yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him . Being of opinion , that touching the safety of Rome , in that he , had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserv'd as much as Camillus ; and in regard of other warlike glories , he was no way second to him . So that overburden'd with envy , nor being able to take rest for this mans honor , and perceiving he could sow no discord among the Fathers , he made his address to the people , scattering among them divers sinister opinions . And among other things , he said this also , that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen , and after not given them , was usurp'd by some private Citizens ; and if it were had again , it might be turn'd to the publick good , easing the people of their tributes , or some private debts . These words were of force with the people , so that they began to run together , and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City : Which thing much displeasing the Senat , and they taking it for a matter of great moment , and dangerous , created a Dictatour , that he might examin the case , and bridle the violence of Manlius . Whereupon the Dictator cited him , and they met in publick one against the other , the Dictator environ'd with the Nobility , Manlius with the People , Manlius was demanded , who had the treasure he spoke of , for the Senate was as desirous to understand as the people . Whereunto Manlius answer'd not particularly , but as by excuses , said there was no need to tell them what they already knew , so that the Dictator caus'd him to be put in prison . Hereupon may we observe , how extreamly pernicious and damageable are calumnies , as well in free Cities , as in any other kind of Government ; and therefore to repress them ought not any Law or Ordinance be spar'd , that may serve to the purpose . Neither can there be found any better expedient to extinguish them , then to open many waies to accusations ; for as they do much help a Republick , so calumnies hurt it : and ●on the other part , there is this difference , that calumnies have no need of Testimonies , nor of any particular incounter to prove them ; so that every one may be caluminated , but not accus'd ; accusations being tied to certain particulars and circumstances , to udemonstrate their truth . Men are accus'd before Magistrates , the People and Councells ; slander'd they are by calumnies , as well in private as in publick . And there slander is most in use , where accusations are nor accustomed , and where the Cities are loth to receive them . Therefore every founder of a Republick ought so to order it , that therein any Citizen may be accused without feare or suspect . And this done and well observ'd , he ought sharply to punish the slanderers , who have no reason to complain when they are punish'd , there being publick places to heare his accusations , whom they in private would have slandered . And where this part is not well order'd , there alwaies follows much confusion ; for calumnies do provoke and not chastise the Citizens ; and those that are provok'd , think to availe themselves rather by hating , then fearing the things that are said against them . This part ( as it is said ) was well order'd at Rome , and alwaies ill in our City of Florence . And as at Rome this order did much good , so at Florence this disorder did much harme : And whosoever reades the stories of this City , shall see , how many slanders have from time to time been devis'd against those Citizens , who have been imployed in the most important affairs of it . Of one they said , he rob'd the common : Treasury ; of another , he fail'd of such an attempt , being corrupted ; and of a third , he ran , into this or that inconvenient through ambition . From whence proceeded , that on every side grew hatred ; whereupon came division , from division they came to factions , from factions to ruine . But had there been a meanes in Florence to accuse the Citizens , and punish slanderers , that infinite number of calumnies , that afterward grew , had never followed ; for those Citizens either condemned or assoild that they had been , could never have hurt the City , and would have been less accused , then they were slander'd ; every one ( as I have said ) being not so readily able to accuse as to slander . And among other things , some Citizens have serv'd themselves of these calumnies , as steps and helps to their ambitious ends ; who having to incounter powerful men opposed themselves as they listed , and left nothing undone to work their intent ; for taking part with the people , and confirming them in their evil opinion , already conceived of these , have made the people their own friends . And though I could bring examples enough , I will be content with this one . The Florentine Army was in the field at Lucca commanded by John Guicchiard an able Captain . Either his Government was so ill , or the success prov'd so unlucky , that he faild in taking the Town . So that howsoever the case stood , John was blam'd for it , saying , he had been bribed by the Luccheses : which slander being favour'd by his Enemies , brought John to extream despair . And though to justifie himself he offer'd his submission to trial and imprisonment , yet could he never wipe away that blur , because in that Commonwealth there were not the meanes to do it , whereupon grew much distast between Johns friends , who were the greater part of the potent men , and his Adversaries , who were some that desir'd to make innovations in Florence . Which matter , upon these and otherlike occasions , increased so , that thereupon ensued the ruine of that Republique . M. Capitolinus therefore was a slanderer , and not an accuser , and the Romans shewed directly in this case , how slanderers ought to be punish'd . For they ought to make them become accusers : and when the accusation proves true , either reward them , or at least not punish them ; and when false , punish them , as Manlius . CHAP. IX . How needful it is , that he who frames anew the Laws , and laies new foundations of a Common wealth , be alone without Companion or Competitor . ANd perchance some will think , that I have run too far within the Roman History , not having made any mention yet , of the founders of that Republick , nor of the Laws which belong'd , either to their Religion , or their military discipline . And therefore not willing to hold them longer in suspence , who are desirous to understand somewhat in this case , I say , that many peradventure will think this a matter of evil example , that the ordainer of a civil Government , as was Romulus , should first have taken his brothers life from him , and after have consented to T. Tacius the Sabines death , chosen by him his companion in the Kingdom ; judging hereby that his own Citizens might by Authority taken from their Prince for ambition , or desire to rule , endamage those that should oppose their power . Whose opinion we should acknowledg true , if we consider nor the end which induc'd him to commit this homicide . And we may take this for a general rule , that never or seldom it chances , that any Republick or Kingdom is from the beginning well ordein'd or throughly new reformed of its old customs , unless the disposing of it depend absolutely upon the will of one . Nay rather there is a necessity of it , that that one be absolute , that appoints the manner how , and by whose understanding all such ordination is regulated . Wherefore a wise founder of a Republick , who seeks not his own advantage , but the publick good ; not to strengthen his own succession , but seeks his Countries profit , ought indeavor to get the power wholly into his own hands : neither will any man of good judgment ever blame any extraordinary action he shall put in practice , for the setling of a good Government in a Kingdom , or framing sure foundations in a Commonwealth . It holds well together , though the act accuse him , that the effect excuse him ; and when that is good , as it prov'd to Romulus , it will alwaies excuse him ; for he that uses violence to waste , is blameable , not he that uses it for redress and order . And therefore ought he be so wise and virtuous , that the Authority he hath possest himself of , he leave not to descend hereditarily on another . For men being more inclined to ill then good , his successor may turne that to ambition which he manag'd vertuously . Besides this , though one be fit to ordein a thing , yet it s not so ordein'd to last long , when it rests upon the shoulders of one man ; well may it indure , being committed to the care of many , to whom it belongs to maintain it . For even so , as many are not proper for the framing of one thing , because all of them hit not on the true good of it , by reason of their several opinions among them so ; after they have known it , neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage . And that Romulus was one of those , who for the death of his brother and companion , might be excus'd : and that what he did was for the common good , and not for his own ambition , it appears , in that he forth with ordain'd a Senate , with whom he might take counsell , and by their opinions be advis'd . And he , who considers well the Authority Romulus reserv'd himself , will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies , when they had resolv'd on War ; and to assemble the Senate ; which was apparent afterwards , when Rome became free upon the banishment of the Tarquins : whereupon the Romans were never brought in any new order , unless that in lieu of a King during life , they made two Consuls yearly : Which confirms , that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Government , then to one absolute and Monarchical . To verifie the thing abovesaid , we might bring many examples , as Moses , Lycurgus , Solon , and other founders of Kingdomes and Commonwealths , who could well , having an absolute power in their hands , ordain laws for the common good ; but I will let them pass , as well know . I shall alleadg only one , not so famous , but well worthy their consideration , who desire to be good Law-makers : which is , That Agis King of Sparta advising to reduce the Spartans within those bounds the Laws of Licurgus had included them ; thinking that , because they had broken out of that strictness , his City had lost very much of the ancient vertue , and by consequent of force and government , was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the Spartan Ephores , as one , that aim'd to possess himself of the Tyranny . But Cleomenes afterwards succeeding him in the Kingdom , upon his reading of Agis Records and Writings , which fell into his hands , he understood his intention , and grew desirous himself , to bring the same thing to pass ; but found it was impossible to do that good to his Country , unless he became absolute of authority , it seeming to him , by reason of mens ambition , that he was unable to do good to many , against the will of a few . And taking a fit opportunity , at length hee brought in all the Ephores , and every one else that could withstand him , and afterwards restor'd into force Licurgus his Lawes : Which deliberation had bin able to have a new reviv'd Sparta , and gain'd Cleomenes the reputation Licurgus had , if then the Macedons power had not grown so vast , and the other Grecian Republick been so weake . For after such order given , being set upon by the Macedons , and finding himself single too weak to deale with them , there being none could give him assistance , was overcome ; and his project ( though just and commendable ) became unperfect . Wheresore , upon the weighing of all these things together , I conclude , it necessary that a founder of a Republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority ; and that Romulus , for the death of Remus and Tatius , deserves rather excuse than blame . CHAP. X. As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are exceedingly praise-worthy , so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy . AMongst all commendable men , those deserve esteem in the first place , who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship , and true Religion : the next belongs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms . After those are they famous that commanding over Armies have inlarg'd either their Kingdom or Country . To these wee may adjoyn learned men . And because they are of different dignities , every one of them are valued according to their degree . And to all other men , whose number is infinite , wee use to give that share of commendations , which their Art and Skill deserves . On the contrary , infamous are they and execrable , that are the perverters of Religion , the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republicks , enemies of vertue and learning , and of any other art , that brings profit , and renown to mankind ; as also are the irreligious , the mad-braind , the ignorant , the slothful , and base . And there will never be any so foolish , or so wise , so mischievous or so good , that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him , will not commend that which is commendable , and blame the blameable . Notwithstanding seeing that the most part , as it were , beguiled by counterfeit good , and vain glory , suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame then praise● And having meanes with their perpetual honor to frame a Republick or Kingdom , yet affect they a Tyranny ; neither are they advis'd by this course , what reputation , what glory , what honor , security , quiet , and satisfaction of mind they flie from , and into what infamy , dispraise , blame , danger , and unquietness they plunge themselves : And it is impossible , that , they that live private men in a Common-wealth , or that by fortune , or by their vertues become Princes , if they read the histories , or make any account of antiquities therein related , that those private men , I say , had not rather be Scipioes in their native Country , than Cesars ; and those that are Princes , rather Agesilaus , Timoleon , or Dion , than Nabis , Phalaris , or Dionysius : for they would perceive these execedingly in all mens hatred , and , these as much beloved . They would see also how Timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their Country , then had Dionysius or Phalaris ; but they would find also they had far more security . Nor let any be deeeived by Cesars glory , seeing his memory much celebrated by writers : for they that Praise him , were corrupted by his fortune , and frighted by the continuance of the Empire , which being govern'd under that name , gave not writers leave to speak freely of him . But he that would know what free writers would say of him , let him look upon that they say of Cataline : and Cesar is so much the more to be disprais'd , in that he executed the ill , the other did but intend . Let him see also how much they praise Brutus ; so that not daring to blame the other , because of his power , they attributed much honor to his Enemy . Let him consider also him that is become Prince in a Republick , what praises , after Rome was made an Empire , those Emperors rather deserv'd , that liv'd under the Laws , as good Princes , than they that went a contrary course to them ; and he shall find , that Titus , Nerva , Trajan , Adrian , and Antonius and Marcus had no need of Praetorian soldiers , nor a multitude of the legions to guard them ; for their own vertues , the good will of the people , and the love of the Senate did defend them . Moreover he shall see , that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula , Nero , Vitellius , and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies , whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them . And if their Story were well read over , it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince , to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace , the way of security , and of distrust . Fot of 26 Emperors , that were from Cesar to Maximinus , 16 were slain , 10. only died natural deaths . And if any of those that were slain were good , as Galba and Pertinax , it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers . And if among those , those that died natural deaths , any were wicked or lewd , as Severus , it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr , which two accompany very few . Hee shall see also by reading this Story , how a man may order a good Kingdome : for all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance , except Titus , were mischievous ; those that were adopted , were all good , as were those five from Nerva to Marcus. And as the Empire fell upon the heyres , it return'd alwaies to its destruction . Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus , and compare them with those that went before them , and that follow'd them ; let him choose in which he would have been borne , or over whether he would have had command . For in those that were govern'd by the good , he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens , the world replenish'd with peace and justice , the Senate enjoying their authority , the Magistrates their honours , and the wealthy Citizens their estates , nobility and vertue exalted , and with these all rest and good . And on the other side all rancour , dissoluteness , corruption , and ambition extinguished , he shall see a returne of the golden age , where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases , and in the end shall see the world triumph , the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd , and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperours , he shall find the warres made them terrible , and seditions full of discord ; as well in peace as in war cruell ; so many Princes slain with the sword , so many civil , so many forrain warres , Italy afflicted , and full of new misfortunes , the Cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd ; he shall see Rome burnt , the Capitol by her own Citizens defac'd and spoyl'd , the antient temples desolated , and their ceremonies neglected , the cities repleate with adulteries , the sea full of banishments , and the rocks besmeard with blood . He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties ; and Nobility , wealth , honours , and above all , vertue reputed as a most capital crime . He shall see accusers rewarded , servants corrupted against their masters , children against their parents , and they , who had not enemies , oppressed by their friends , and then he shall know very well , how much Rome , Italy , and the world was beholding to Caesar . And without doubt , if he be borne of mankind , he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times , and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good . And truly a Prince ayming at glory , would with to be Lord of a disorder'd City , not to ruine it wholly , as did Caesar , but to recompose and restore it , as Romulus . And beleeve me , the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory , nor men desire it . And if to renew and restore the frame of a City , there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality , the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity , should yet deserve excuse . But when he could hold his Principality , and yet restore the government , he is no way excusable . And in sum , let them be well advis'd , to whom the heavens present such opportunity , that either of these two wales be propounded them , the one that gives them security in life , and makes them glorious after death ; the other that causes them to live in continual troubles , and leave behind them in everlasting infamy . CHAP. XI . Of the Romans Religion . THough Romulus were Romes first founder , and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up ; notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire , put it into the Roman Senat 's mindes to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus , that what he left unfinished , the other might supply . Who finding a very fierce people , and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies , applied himself to Religion , as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility ; and ordain'd it in such a sort , that for many ages there was not such a feare of God , as in that Commonwealth . Which facilitated much any enterprise , whatsoever either the Senate , or those brave Roman courages did undertake . And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly , and of many of the Romans by themselves in severall , shal perceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath , than the lawes ; as they that made more account of the power of God , than of man ; as it appears manifestly , by the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus : for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an overthrow at Canna , many Citizens assembled together , and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country , and go into Sieily ; which Scipio understanding went and found them out , and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare , they would never forsake their native country . Lucius Manlius , that was afterwards call'd Torquatus , was accus'd by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people , and before the judgment day came , Titus went to find Marcus , and threatning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father , bound him by his oath : and he though by feare compell'd to sweare , yet took the accusation off : and so those Citizens , whom neither the love to their country , nor the lawes thereof could retain in Italy , were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take : and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father , the injury he receiv'd of the son , and his own reputation , to keep the oath he took : which proceeded of nothing else , but the Religion Numa brought in among them . And it is manifest , if a man consider well the Roman histories , of how much availe their Religion was for the commanding of armies , to reconcile the common people , to preserve good men , and to shame the lewd . So that if we were to dispute , to whether Prince Rome were more oblig'd , Romulus or Numa ; I beleeve Numa would be prefer'd ; for where Religion is , military discipline is easily brought in ; and where they are already warlike , and have no Religion , this hardly followes . And it is plain , that Romulus to order the Senate , and frame certain other civil and military ordinances , had no need of the authority of a God , which to Numa was necessary , who feign'd to have familiar conversation with a Nymph , who instructed him wherewith continually to advise the people . And all sprung from this , because he desiring to settle new orders , and unaccustomed in that City , doubted that his own authority was not of full force . And truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation , that had not his recourse to God ; for other . wise the laws had not been accepted . For many several goods are known by a wise man , which have not such evident reasons in themselves , that he by perswasion can quickly make others conceive them . Therefore the wise men , that would free themselves of this difficulty , have recourse to a God : so did Lycurgus , so Solon , so many others , whose design was the same with theirs . Thereupon the people of Rome admiring his goodness and wisdom yeelded to all his purposes . But it is true , because those times were then full of Religion , and those men rude and gross , on whom he spent his pains , this much facilitated his designs , being thereby able to mould them into a new forme . And without question , if any one in these daies would frame a Republick , he should find it easier to deale with rude mountainers , who had never known any civility , than with those who had been accustomed to live in Cities , where the government 's corrupted : and a carver shall easier cut a saire Statue out of a rough marble , than out of one that hath been bungl'd upon by another . Wherefore having well considered all , I conclude , that the Religion introduc'd by Nutna was one of the principal occasions of that cities happiness ; for that caus'd good orders , good orders brought good fortune , and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterprises : and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a Commonwealth ; so the contempt of it destroys it . For where the feare of God is wanting , it must needs be that either that Kingdom goes to ruine , or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the Prince , who may supply the defects of Religion : and because Princes are but short-liv'd , that Kingdom must needs have an end quickly , according as the vertue thereof failes : from whence it comes , that governments which depend upon the vertue of one man , abide but a while , because that vertue ends with his life ; and it seldome chances that it is renew'd by succession , as well saies the Poet Dante . Rade volte discende per li rami L'humana probitate & questo vuole , Quel , che lada , perche da lui si chiami . Therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a Prince that governs wisely while he lives , but in one that so orders it , that he dying , it can preserve it self . And although it be easier to work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame , yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevaile with men that have liv'd in a civill government , and presume somewhat to understand themselves . The Florentines think not themselves either ignorant or rude , yet were they perswaded by Frier Jerom Savanarola , that he talked with GOD. I will not judge whether it were true or not , because we ought not to speak of such a great personage , but with reverence . But truly I say , that very many beleev'd him , not having seen any great matter to perswede them thereto : for his life , doctrine , and the subject he took , were sufficient to make them credit him . Wherefore let no man be discouraged , as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attaind ; for men , as we said in our preface , were born , liv'd and died , under the same laws of nature . CHAP. XII . Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion , and that Italy for having fail'd therein , by means of the Church of Rome , hath gone to wrack . THose Princes or those Republicks which would keep themselves from ruine , are above all other things , to preserve the ceremonies of their Religion incorrupted , and maintain it alwaies venerable . For there is no greater sign of a countries going to destruction , then to see in it the contempt of divine worship . And this is easie to be understood , it being once known upon what ground the Religion is built where a man is born . For every Religion hath the foundation of its being upon some principal thing . The life of the Gentiles Religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles , and upon the sect of the conjecturers and soothsayers : all the other ceremonies , sacrifices , and rites depended on these . Because they easily believ'd , that that God that could foretell thee thy future good or evill , could also send it thee . From hence came the Temples , the Sacrifices and supplications , and all other ceremonies in their veneration : for the Oracle of Delos , the Temple of Jupiter Ammon , and other famous Oracles held the world in devotion and admiration . As they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner , and their falshood was discover'd among the people , men began to be incredulous , and apt to disturb all good orders , Therefore the Princes of a Republick or Kingdom should maintain the grounds of the Religion they hold ; and this being done , they shall easily keep their Commonwealth religious , and eonsequently vertuous and united . They ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it , howsoever that they think them false ; and the rather should they do it , the wiser they are and understand the causes of natural things . And because this course hath been taken by many wise men , hence grew the opinion of miracles which are celebrated even in false Religions ; for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have , and their authority afterwards gives them credit . Of these miracles there was great quantity at Rome : and among others there was this one ; the Roman soldiers sacking the Vejentes City , some of them went into the Temple of Juno , and comming to her image ask'd her , wilt thou go to Rome ? some thought she nodded , another thought she said , yes . For those men being very religious ( which T. Livius shews , for that entry into the Temple was without tu mult ) all devout and full of reverence , imagined they heard that answer , which p●radventure they presuppos'd before ●and would be made them ; this opinion and belief was altogether favour'd and augmented by Camillus and the other principal men of the City . Which Religion if it were maintained among the Princes of the Christian Republick according as by the institutor thereof it was ordain'd , the Christian States and Republicks would be far more in unity , and enjoy more happiness far then now they do : nor does any thing give us so shrewd a conjecture of the declining of it , as to see , that those people that are neerest neighbours to the Church of Rome , head of our Religion , are the most inreligious . And whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof , and look upon the present use how much this differs from those , without question he would judge the ruine or scourge thereof were near at hand . And because some are of opinion , that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome , yet the contrary might rather be proved , considering those that in the Church of Rome observe not the precepts they ought , but rather adulterate the holy and Catholick Ordinances which were wont to be kept . Moreover this comes to pass , because the Church hath alwaies held , and still holds this Country divided : and truly never was any Province either united or happy , unless it were wholly reduc'd to the obedience of one Commonwealth , or Prince ; as it befel France and Spain . And the cause that Italy is not in the same terms , nor hath not one Republick or one Prince to govern it , is only the Church ; for having inhabited there and held the ●e●●mporal Government , it hath never been so potent , nor of such prowess , that it could get the rest of Italy into its hands , and become Lords thereof . And on the other side , it was never so weak , that for fear of losing the temporal dominion it could not call in a powerfull friend to defend it against him that were grown too puissant in Italy ; as anciently it hath been seen by sundry experiences , when by means of Charles the Great it drove out the Lombards , who had as it were the absolute power of all Italy ; and when in our daies it took the Venetians power from them by the Frenchmens ayd , and afterwards chased away the French by help of the Swisses . Therefore the Church being not powerfull to subdue all Italy it self , nor yet suffering any other to master it , hath been the cause , that it could never be brought to have but one head ; but hath alwaies been under more Princes and Lords ; whereupon is grown such a disunion , and so much weakness , that Italy hath been made asprey not only of powerfull Barbarians , but of any the next assaylant . For which we and other Italians are beholding to the Church & none else . And whosoever would readily see the truth by certain experience , it were needfull he were of such power , as to send the Court of Rome , with the authority it hath in Italy , to dwell in the Switzers Country , who at this day are the only people that live , for their Religion and military discipline , as their ancestors did : and he should find that in a short time the ill orders and customs of that Court would breed more disorder in that Country , then any accident else could , that should evergrow there . CHAP. XIII . In what manner the Romans avail'd themselves of their Religion , in ordering the City , in undertaking their designes , and in stopping of tumulis . I Think it not out of purpose , to bring some example , where in the Romans serv'd themselves of their Religion , for the ordering of their City , and the following of their enterprises . And though many there are in T. Livius , yet I will content my self with these . The people of Rome having created their Tribunes of Consular power , and except one , all Plebeians , and it falling out that year , that there was pestilence and famine , and certain other prodigies , the Nobility of Rome took hold of this occasion , at the Tribunes new creation , to say that the Gods were angry , because Rome had abus'd the Majesty of their Empire , and that they had no other means to appease them , then to reduce the election of the Tribunes to the former course . Whence it came , that the people frighted by this superstition made the Tribunes all of the Nobility . The like was also in their Conquest of the Vejentes City , that the Commanders of their Armies did serve themselves of the Religion , to keep them in heart for any enterprise : for that year the Albanilak being miraculously sweld , and the Roman Soldiers weari●d with the long siege , and intending to ●return to Rome , the Romans found , that Apollo and certain other Oracles told them , that that year the Vej●ntes City should be taken , that the water of the Albanlake should be pour'd out : which thing made the soldiers endure the tediousnes , of the war and the siege , perswaded by the hope they had to take the Town , and were contented to continue the enterprise ; so that Camillus being made Dictatour subdued the City after ten years siege . And so the accustomed Religion help'd well , both for the taking in of that Town , and for the restitution of the Tribunship to the Nobility ; for without the ayde thereof , the one or the other had hardly had their success . And this other example I must also add to this purpose . There were in Rome a great many tumults rais'd upon the occasion of Terentillus a Tribune , he desiring to make a law , for causes which hereafter we shall declare in their place . Among the first remedies which the Nobility serv'd themselves of , was the Religion , whereof they made use two waies : In the first , they made the Sibill's books be searcht , and answer as it were to the City , that by means of civill discord they should hazzard the loss of their liberty that year : which thing , though the Tribunes had herein discover'd their subtilty , yet it so frighted the people , that it quite took off their eagerness in the pursuit . The other way was , that when Appius Herdonius with a great number of outlaws , and slaves , near upon four thousand men , having possess'd themselves by right of the Capitoll , so that it might be fear'd that if the Aequi or Volsci , the Romans sworn enemies , had approacht the Town , they might have taken it : the Tribunes not forbearing for all this to continue in their obstinacy , and to enact the law made by Terentillus , saying this assault of their ; feigned , and not true , one Puhlius Valerius a grave citizen , and of good authority , went out of the Senate , and told them partly in friendly termes , and partly in threatning , the dangers in which the City stood , and the unseasonableness of their demand , and thereby brought the people to swear , they would not forsake the Consuls command . Whereupon the people being return'd to obedience , recover'd the Capitoll by force . But the Consul Publius Valerius being slain in this conflict , there was forthwith another Consul made , one Titus Quintius , who to keep the people from idleness , and to give no space to think again of Terentillus his law , commanded them to go forth of Rome with him against the Volsci , saying that by the oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul , they were bound to follow him ; whereunto the Tribunes oppos'd , saying , that oath was made to the Consul now slain , not to him . Yet Titus Livius shews that the people in awfulness to their Religion world rather obey the Consul● than beleeve the Tribunes , saying these words in favour of the ancient Religion : Men did not then adaies so little reverence the Gods , as now ; nor people wrest their oaths , nor the laws , to their own ends . Whereby , the Tribunes doubting then to lose their whole dignity , agreed with the Consul to submit to his obedience , and that for a whole year they would treat no more of Terentillus his law , and the Consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war ; and thus the Religion gave the Senate means to overcome that difficulty , which , without it , they could never have master'd . CHAP. XIV . The Romans interpreted their Auspices , as necessity requir'd , and with discretion made a shew to observe their Religion , yet upon occasion they neglected it ; but if any did rashly contemn it , they punisht them . THe Soothsayings were not only ( as before we have discours'd ) for the most part , the ground of the Gentiles ancient Religion , but they were also the occasions of the Roman Republiques welfare . Whereupon the Romans had more regard of them , than of any order else , and made use of them in their Consular assemblies , in the beginning of their enterprises , in drawing forth their armies into the field , in fighting of pitcht battells , and in any other action of theirs of importance either civill or military . Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition , till first they had perswaded the soldiers , the Gods had promis'd them the Victory . And among the other orders of Soothsayers , they had some in their Armies , they call'd Pollarij . And whensoever they intended to fights battell with the Enemy , they would have the Pollarij to make their conjectures : and when the Chickens peckt , they went to fight with good Auspaces ; and not pecking , they forbare to fight . Notwithstanding when ●ason shew'd something was to be done , hough the divination , were averse , yet were they not scarr'd from it : but , they turn'd and woond it with such terms and fashions so properly , that it appear'd , they did it not with an contempt of Religion . Which course was us'd once in a fight , by Papirius the Consull , which he had ( of great importance ) with the Samnites , after which they were much worn and broken . For Papirius encountring with the Samnites , and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure , had a mind hereupon to fight a full battell , and therefore commanded the Pollarij , they should make their conjectures ; but the Chickens not Pecking , and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight , and the opinion the General and all the soldiers had of the victory , that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the Consull , that the soothsayers answer'd well ; so that while Papirius was ordering his squadrons , some of the Pollarij having told certain soldiers , that the Chickens had not peckt , they told it to Spurius Papirius the Consulls nephew , and he again to the Consul ; whereto he suddenly reply'd , that he should take a care to perform his own duty well , and that for himself and the army the conjectures were faire ; and if the Soothsayer had told lyes , it would turn to his own loss : and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication , he commanded the L●vetenants to place the Pollarij in the forefront of the battell . Whereupon it chanc't that going forward against their enemies , one of the Roman Soldiers threw a dart , and as it hap'd , slew a principal Soothsayer : which being come to the Consuls eare , he said that all things went forward luckily , and with the Gods favour , for the Army by the death of that lyer was purg'd of all crime , and excus'd of the wrath conceiv'd against them . And thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations , he chose to fight , the Army never perceiving that he had any whit neglected the rites of their Religion . Appius Pulcher went a contrary course to this , in Sicily , in the first Carthaginian wars ; who desirous to fight with the enemy , caus'd the Pollarij to make their divinations ; and they answering that the Chickens did not feed , he said , let us see then if they will drink , and so made them be thrown into the sea , and then fighting , lost the day . And thereupon he was afterwards condemn'd at Rome , and Papirius honour'd ; not so much , the one for having won , and the other for having lost , as the one for having crost the soothsayers with much discretion , the other very rashly . Nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying , then to incourage the soldiers to fight , for boldness always wins the victory : which thing was not only in use with the Romans , but with forrainers also ; whereof I have a purpose to bring an example in the Chapter following . CHAP. XV. The Samnites , for the extream remedy to their broken State , have recourse to Religion . THE Samnites having been sundry times routed by the Romans , and at last overthrown in Tuscany , their Armies and their Captains slain , and their confederates overcome , who were the Tuscans , French , and Umbrians : They could not suhsist , neither by their own , nor their friends forces , yet they would not quit the war , not regarding though they had but ill success in the defence of their liberty ; but had rather be overcome , then forbear to trie if they could get the victory . Whereupon they put it to the last proof . And because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward , and to induce them hereto , there was no better means then Religion , they advis'd to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of Ovius Pattius their Priest : which they order'd in this manner ; the folemn sacrifice being made , and amidst the slain beasts , and the altars set on fire , having caus'd the chief of the Army to swear never to forsake the fight , they cal'd the soldiers one by one , and in the midst of those altars enclos'd by many Centurions with their fwords drawn , first they made them swear , they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw : afterwards with words of execration , and verses full of horrour made them vow and promise to the Gods , to be ready in whatsoever their General should command , never to abandon the fight , and kill whomsoever they saw fly ; which if they fail'd in , might it light upon their family and kindred . And some of them being amaz'd , and refusing to swear , were presently slain by their Centurions , so that the rest that followed them , frighted by the sierceness of the spectacle , swore all . And to augment the magnificence of their meeting , being sixty thousand men , half of them were clad with white cloth , with plumes and seathers upon their helmets , and thus arrai'd they incamp'd themselves at Aquilonia . Against these came Papirius , who in his speech to incourage his soldiers , said , Surely their plumes could make no wounds , nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the Roman Pikes . And to take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken , said , it was rather a discouragement to them then otherwise ; for they were afraid of their own people , the Gods , and their enemies . And when they came to the fight , the Samnites were overthrown , for the Roman vertue , and the feare conceiv'd by reason of their former losses , overcame what ever obstinacy they could have resolv'd on by force of their Religion or oath taken . Yet it is plain , how they thought they could have no other refuge , nor try other remedy , that could give them hope to recover their lost vertue . Which fully shewes , how great confidence Religion well us'd can give . And though haply this part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters , yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the Roman Republick , I thought better to insert it in this place , that I might not be driven to interrupt my discourse , and have need to return hereunto many times . CHAP. XVI . People accustomed to live under a Prince , if by any accident they become free , have much adoe to maintain their liberty . HOW hard it is for a people , us'd to live , in subjection to a Prince , afterwards to maintain their liberty , if by any accident they get it , as Rome did upon the Tarquins banishment , very many examples shew us , which we read in the memorialls of ancient histories . And not without good reason : for the people is nothing different from a brute beast , which ( though fierce of nature and wilde ) hath been bred alwaies in a den and under command ; and though by ehance it hath got loose into the fields , yet not being used to seek the sood , nor being acquainted with the coverts , where to hide itself , becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it , The self-same thing befalls a people used to live under the government of others ; the which not having knowledg to treat of publick desences or offences , not knowing the neighbour Princes , nor yet known by them , quickly returns under the yoke , which oftentimes is heavier , then that which before was taken from their neck ; and they come to fall into these difficulties , though as yet there be not entred among them much disorder . For a people that is quite debauch'd cannot for a little while , no not a whit , enjoy their liberty , as it shall after appear . And therefore our speeches are not of those people , where corruption is overgrown , but where there is more good then naught . To this former we may add another difficulty , which is , that the State that becomes free , procures enemies that side against it , and not friends to side with it . Those hold together as enemies , who got advantages by the tyrannical government , feeding upon the Princes riches whereby they used to help themselves , which being now taken from them , they cannot rest content , but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the Royalty , that so they may recover their former advancements . They get not , as I have said , friends to side with them ; for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions , otherwise it rewards none , nor honours none . And when a man hath received those honours and those advantages , which he thinks , he deserv'd ; he acknowledges no obligation to them that reward him . Moreover , that common good which men reap of free government , is not known by any , while it is possest ; which is , to injoy freely ones own without suspicion , not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours , not to be in fear for his sons , or for himself . For no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not . And therefore if they come to have a free State , as it is above mentioned , there arise those that will be partisans against them , and not side with them : and to prescribe a remedy for these inconvenients and disorders , which these difficulties might bring us , there is none more potent , nor soveraign , nor necessary , than to kill Brutus his sonns , who as the Story shews , were induc'd together with other young Romans , to conspire against their native country , for no other reason , than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the Consuls , as under the Kings ; so that they thought the peoples liberty was become their slavery . And he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or by way of Principality , and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new State , is not like to continue long . True it is , that I judge those Princes very unfortunate , who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant waies , having the vast multitude for their enemies : for he that hath but few enemies , easily and without many offences secures himself ; but he that hath the universality against him , is never out of jealousie ; and the more cruelty he uses , the weaker becomes his power . So that the greatest remedy he hath , is to make the people friendly . And though this discourse be different from the former , treating here of an exceeding good Prince , and there of a Republick , yet that I may not return here often upon this occasion , I shall say somewhat of it , but briefly . And therefore if a Prince would gain the good will of a people , that was enemy to him ( speaking of those Princes , that are become Tyrants of their native country ) I say , he ought to examine first , what the people desire ; and he shall alwaies find , that they desire two things ; the one , to be reveng'd of him that occasion'd their slavery ; the other , to have their liberty restor'd . To the first , the Prince can satisfie in whole , to the second in part . As for the first , there is an example to the point . Clearchus a Tyrant of Heraclea being in banishment , it happen'd that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of Heraclea , that the nobility , finding themselves too weak , turn'd to favour Clearchus , and conspiring with him , against the will of the people , let him into the Town , and took away the peoples liberty ; so that Clearchus being in a streight between the insolence of the nobility , whom he could not any way content , nor rectify , and the rage of the people , that could not indure thus to have lost their liberty , resolv'd in one , to free himself of the importunity of the Nobles , and withall to gain the people . And to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity , cut in pieces all the Nobility , to the peoples great satisfaction , And thus he satlsfy'd one of the desires the people have , that is , to be reveng'd . But as for the people 's other desire , to recover their liberty , if the Prince cannot satisfy them , let him examine , what are the reasons make them desire sreedom , and he shall find , there is but a small number of them would be free , to command . But all the rest , which are the many , desire liberty to life securely . For in all Republicks of what manner soever ordered , not above forty or fifty Citizens attain to the degrees of authority : and because these are but few , it is an easie thing to be sure of them , either by taking them out of the way , or by letting them share of such honours , as agree to their conditions , which they may very well be contented with . Those others , whom it suffices , If they can live securely , are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws , wherewith together with his power , he may comprehend their safety in general . And when a Prince does this , and that the people perceive it , that by no accident he breaks those laws , they will begin in a short time to live secure and content . Wee have an example of the Kingdom of France , which continues not in quiet by other means , than that their Kings are tyed to many laws , wherein the security of all his people is containd . And he that was the founder of that State , ordain'd , that the Kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures , but with all other matters they had nothing to do , but they were at the laws appointment . That Prince therefore or Republick , which secures not themselves at their entrance into the government , ought at least take hold of the first occasion , as the Romans did . He that lets that pass , repents himself too late , of not having done what he should . The people of Rome being not as yet debauch't , when they recovered their liberty , might well maintain it , when Brutus his sonnes were slain , and the Tarquins dead , by those remedies , and orders , which we have at several times recounted . But had the people been corrupted , neither in Rome , nor any where else , could they have found means strong enough to preserve it , as in the Chapter sollowing we shall shew . CHAP. XVII . A disorderly people , getting their liberty , cannot keep themselves free without very great difficulties . I think it necessarily true , that either the Kings were to be expelled out of Rome , or else Rome it self would have grown feeble and of no worth ; for considering how exceedingly the Kings were corrupted , if after that rate two or three successions had followed , and that corruption that was in them had distended it self throughout the members , so that they likewise had received of the corruption , it had been impossible ever to have reformed it . But losing the head when the body was sound , it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government . And this should be presupposed for certain , that a debaucht City living under a Prince , though that Prince with all his stock be rooted out , yet can it not become free , but rather fall still into the hands of new Lords , who continually make an end one of another . And without the creation of some new Prince , they shall never have an end , unless he by his goodness and valour maintain them free . But their liberty is of no longer conyinuance than his life , as was that o● Syracusa for Dions and Timoelons lives : whose vertues in several times , while they liv'd kept that City free ; so soon as they were dead , it fell into the former servitude , We find not a braver example then that of Rome , which upon the Tarquins banishments , could presently lay hold off , and maintaine that liberty . But Caesar being slain , C. Caligula , Nero , and the whole race of the Caesars blotted out , it could not , not onely keep , no not so much as give a beginning to their liberty . Neither did so great variety of accidents in one and the same citie proceed from other , than that , when the Tarquins were expell'd , the people of Rome were not toucht with this corruption , and in these latter times they were throughly infected . For then to settle their mindes in a resolution against Kings , it was enough to take an oath of them , that never any King should raigne at Rome . But in the after ages , the authority and severity of Brutus , with all the Orientall Regions , were not of force to hold them in disposition to maintain that Liberty , which he like the first Brutus had restored them . Which sprung from that corruption , which Marius his faction spread among the people ; whereof Caesar coming to be the Chiefe , could so blind that multitude , that they could not perceive the yoke , which he himself put on their neck . And though this example of Rome be better than any other , yet will I alleadge to this purpose , some people known in our dayes . And therefore I say , that no meanes could ever bring Milan or Naples to their freedome , by reason of the infection of all their members . Which appeared after the death of Philip Visconti , when Milan desiring to recover her liberty , neither was able , nor knew how to keepe it . Yet that of Rome was a great happiness , that their Kings grow naught suddenly , that they were banisht , and that before the infection was gone down into the bowels of that Citie , which was the occasion that those many tumults , which were raised in Rome ( men doing it to a good end ) did not hurt , but help the Commonwealth . And we may make this conclusion , that where the matter is corrupted , lawes , though well made , profit little , unless they have such a maker , that with strong hand forces obedience to them , till the matter become good : which , whether it hath ever happened , I know not , or whether it be possible it can happen : for it is plain , as a little before I said , that a City declining by corruption of matter , if ever it chances to rise again , it is meerly by the vertue of one man , who is then living , and not by the vertue of the generality , that keepes the good lawes in force : and suddenly when that man is dead , it returnes to the old guise , as it came to pass at Thebes , which , by the vertue of Epaminondas while he liv'd , could subsist in forme of a Republique and government , but he being gone , it fell into the former disorders . The reason is , because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccustome them to the ill , and accustome them throughly to the good . And if one man of a very long life , or two vertuous Governors successively continued , do not dispose of them to good , when one of them failes , as I have said before , they are presently ruined , unless the other with many dangers , and much bloudshed recover them out of destruction . For that corruption and unfitness for freedome , arises from an inequality , that is in the City : and if a man would reduce it to equality , he must use many extraordinary wayes , which few know or will serve themselves of , as other where more particularly shall be said . CHAP. XVIII . In what manner in a corrupted City a free state may be maintained , being gotten ; or how when they have it not , it may be gotten , and well order'd . I Thinke , it will not be out of the way , nor disagreeing to the former discourse , to consider whether in a City disordered , a free State can be preserv'd , that being there a soot already ; or not being there , how it may be attain'd , and then reduc'd to good order . Whereupon , I say , that it is very hard to do the one or the other : and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof ( because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the corruption ) yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing , I shall not let this pass . And I presuppose a city corrupted in extremity , from whence I shall come more to augment such a difficulty , because there are no lawes nor ordinances sufficient to bridle a universall corruption . For as there is need of lawes , to preserve good customes ; so , to have the lawes well observ'd , there is need of good customes . Besides this , the ordinances and lawes made in a Republique at birth thereof , when men were good , serve not to purpose afterwards , when once they are growne vicious . And if the lawes vary being accommodated according to the accidents , seldome or never vary the old orders of the city : which makes that the new lawes suffice nor , because the orders that continue in force do corrupt . And to lay this part more plain to the understanding , I say , that in Rome there was the order of government , or rather of the states , and the lawes afterwards which together with the Magistrates did bridle the Citizens . The order of the state was the authority of the people , of the Senate , of the Tribuns , and of the Consuls the manner of demanding or creating of Magistrates and the manner of making lawes . These orders little or nothing did they vary among the Citizens ; the lawes varied which bridled the citizens , as did that law against adulteries , against expences , against ambition , and many others , according as by degrees the citizens grew corrupted . But the orders of state standing sted . fast , which in the time of corruption were no longer good , those lawes which were renew'd again , were not of force to keep men good , but would have been well helpt , if when the lawes were renew'd , the orders also had bin chang'd . And that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good , it is expresly seen in two principal heads . As for the creation of Magistrates , and making lawes , he people of Rome gave the Consulate and the other Prime degrees of the city , onely to those that sued for them . This order was in the beginning good , because none stood for them , but those citizens that esteem'd themselves worthy of them , and to receive the repulse was a shame ; so that to be thought worthy , every one did well . But this way afterwards in a corrupted City proov'd very hurtfull ; for not the best deserving men , but the most powerfull , sued for the magistracy , and those of small power ( howsoever vertuous ) forbore to demand them for fear . It came not to this inconvenient , at once , but by degrees , as men fall into all other inconvenients . For the Romans having brought under Affrica , and Asia , and reduc'd well nigh all Greece to their obedience , doubted no way of their liberty , and thought they had no more enemies could scare them . Thus farre their security , and the weakness of their enemies workt , that the people of Rome in bestowing the Consulate , regarded not vertue so much as favour , raising to that dignity those that could make most friends , not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies . After , from those that had most favour , they fell to give them to those that had most power . So that the good , by reason of the defect of this order , were quite excluded . A Tribun of the people and any other Citizen might propound a law to the people , and thereupon every Citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it , or against it , before it were determin'd of . This order was commendable , while the integrity of the Citizens held : for it was alwayes well , that every one may give his opinion thereupon , that the people , having heard every one , may after make choyce of the best . But the Citizens being grown mischievous , this order became naught ; for those that were powerfull onely propounded lawes , not for the common good , but to advance their own powers , and against those dar'd none to speak , for fear of these . So that the people was brought either by falshood or force to determine their own ruine . Therefore it was necessary , to the end that Rome in her corrupted age should maintaine her liberty , that as in the progress of her life she had made new lawes , so should she have made new orders : for other orders and other manners of living ought to be ordain'd in a good subject , and others in a bad ; nor can the forme be like , where the matter is quite contrarily dispos'd . But these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good , or else by little and little , when their defaults be taken notice of by every one : I say , that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible . For to renew them by degrees , it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it , who should foresee this inconvenient afarre off : and when any of these arise , it is a very likely thing that none of these men step forth ; and when they should they would never be able to perswade another what they eonceiv'd ; because men accustomed alwaies to live in one manner , will not alter it ; and the rather not seeing that evill present , which is to be shew'd by conjectures . Touching the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knowes they are not good ; I say , that this unprofitableness , which is easily knowne , is hard to correct ; for to effect this ordinary meanes serve not , they being rather hurtfull ; but of necessity extraordinary remedies are to be put in practise , as violence and war ; and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure . And because the restoring of a city to a politique and a civil government , presupposes a good man ; and by violence to become Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man , for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass , that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mifchievous wayes , although his ends therein be all good ; nor will a wicked man by wicked meanes attaining to be Prince , do good ; nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well , which by evil meanes he came to . From all these things above written arises the difficulty or impossibility , that is in corrupted cities , theree to maintaine a Republique , or to create one anew . And when it were to be created or maintained , it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state ; to the end that those men , who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the lawes , might in some manner be restrained as it were by a regall power . And to constraine them by any other way to become good , would either be a most cruel attempt , or altogether impossible : As I said before , that Cleomenes did , who that he might command alone flew the Ephores ; and if Romulus for the same reasons slew his brother , and Titus Tatius the Sabine , but afterwards excercised very vertuously their authority : yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject staind with that corruption , whereof we have discoursed in this Chapter : and therefore they might intend well ; and when they did not , give colour to a bad designe with a good success . CHAP. XIX . A very mean Prince may easily subsist , succeeding a brave and valourous Prince : but a mean one following a mean , brings a State into great hazzard . WHen we consider the valour , and the manner of Romulus , Numa , and Tullus proceedings , the first Roman Kings , we shall find , that Rome hit upon a very great fortune , having the first King fierce and warlick , the second peaceable and religious , the third of like courage to Romulus , and a lover of war rather then peace . For in Rome it was necessary , that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government ; but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other Kings should betake themselves again to Romulus his valour , otherwise that City would have become effeminate , and been prey'd on by her neighbours . Whence we may observe , that the successor , though not of so great valour as the predecessour , is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before , and enjoy the fruits of his labour : but if it come to pass , either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first , of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine . So on the contrary , if two of great valour successively follow one the other , it is often seen , they effect mighty things , and eternize their names . David was a man for armes , for learning and judgement excellent : and such was his valour , that having overcome and subdued his neighbours , he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom , which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes , without any war , and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue . But he could not leave it now to Roboam his sonn , who not resembling his Grandfather in vertue , nor having the like good hap his father had , with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom . Bajazet the Turkish Sultan , although he gave himself rather to peace then war , yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomets labors ; who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a setled Kingdom , easie to be continued by peace : but if his sonn Selimus , now raigning , had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather , that Kingdom had gone to wrack . But we see this man like to outgoe his Grandfathers glory . Whereupon I agree with these examples , that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist , but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another , unless it be such a one as France , which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances . And those are weak Princes , that are not in the exercise of war. And therefore I conclude with this discourse , that such was Romulus his valour , that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern Rome . But him followed Tullus , who by his courage recover'd Romu'us reputation : after him came Ancus , so endowed by nature , that he knew how to use peace , and support war. And first he addrest himself in a peaceable way ; but presently when he knew that his neighbours , thinking him esseminate , undervalu'd him , he consider'd that to maintain Rome , he was to apply himself to the warres , and rather follow Romulus his steps , than Numas . Hence let all Princes , that hold a State , take example , that he that resembles Numa , shall either keep it or lose it , as the times prove , and fortunes wheele turns ; but he that takes after Romulus , arm'd as he with wisdom and force , shall hold it in any case , unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him . And certainly we may well think , if Rome had light upon a man , for her third King , who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation , she could never afterwards , or not without much adoe , have taken root , or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to . And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings , she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King. CHAP. XX. Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects ; and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous succession : And therefore are their gains and increases great . AFter Rome had banisht her Kings , she was deliver'd of those dangers which , as is before said , she hazzarded , a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her . For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls , who came not to the government , by inheritance , or treachery , or by extream ambition , but by the voices of the Citizens ; and they were alwaies very worthy men , whose vertue and fortune Rome enjoying , could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness , in but so many more years , as she had been under her Kings . For we see , that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world , as was Philip of Macedon , and Alexander the great . Which so much the rather ought a Republick do , having the means to choose not only two successions , but an infinite number of valorous Princes , who follow one the other ; which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth . CHAP. XXI . What blame that Prince or Republick deserves , that wants soldiers of his own subjects . THE Princes of these times , and the modern Republicks , who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own , may be ashamed of themselves , and consider by the example of Tullus , that this defect is not for want of men fit for war , but by their fault , who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers . For Tullus , Rome having been forty years in peace , found not ( when he succeeded in the Kingdom ) a man that had been ere at war. Yet he intending to make war , serv'd not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans , nor of others train'd up in armes , but advis'd as a very prudent man , to make use of his own people . And such was his vertue , that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers . Truer it is than any other truth , if where men are , there want soldiers , it is the Princes fault , not any other defect either of scituation or nature . Whereof we have a very late example : For every one knows , how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France , and took no other soldiers than his own people . And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before , it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war ; yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnisht with Captains and good Armies , who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy . All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man , and that Kingdom well govern'd ; which in time of peace neglected not military discipline . Pelopidas and Epaminondas , Thebans , after they had set Thebes at liberty , and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government , perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude , and in the midst of esseminate people , yet made no difficulty ( such was their vertue ) to train them up in arms , and with those to go and meet the Spartan Armies in the field , and overcome them . And he that makes relation of it , saies , that these two prov'd in short time , that not only in Lacedemon soldiers were bred , but in any other place where men are bred , if they found any could train them in the exercise . As it appears that Tullus knew how to train them to the war. And Virgill could not better express this opinion , nor with other words come near it , where he saies : — — — Residesque movebit Tullus in arma viros — — — — People with peace grown dull , that nere us'd armes . Tullus shall soldiers make — — — — CHAP. XXII . What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans , and the three Curiatij Albans . TULLUS the Roman King and Metius the Alban made an agreement , that that people should be Lord of the other , whose three , above mentioned , champions vanquisht the others . All the Curiatij , Albans , were slain ; there remain'd alive onely one of the Horatij , Romans ; and by this , Metius King of the Albans with his people became subject to the Romans . And this Horatius the Conquerour returning into Rome , and meeting one of his own sisters , who had been married to one of the three dead Curiatij , that lamented the death of her husband , slew her . Whereupon that Horatius was brought into judgement , and after many disputes freed , rather at his Fathers suite , than for his own merits , Where three things are to be considered . One , that the whole fortune of the State ought never be hazzarded with a part of the forces . The other , that in a City well govern'd faults be never made amends for with deserts : The third , that matches were never wisely made , where a man-ought or can doubt the performance will not follow . For so much imports it a City to become subject , that a man ought not beleeve , that any of those Kings or people would rest content , that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke ; of which mind we saw Metius was : who , though presently after the Romans victory , he acknowleg'd himself vanquisht , and promis'd obedience to Tullus , yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the Vejentes , it appear'd , how he sought to deceive him ; as he , that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made . And because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted , we shall speak onely of the other two , in the two following Chapters . CHAP. XXIII . That the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake , where the whole forces try not for it : and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages . NEver was he thought good gamester , that would hazzard his whole ●●st , upon less then the strength of his whole game : And this is done divers waies . One is , doing as Tullus and Metius did , when they committed the whole fortune of their countrey , and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies , to the vafour and fortune of three of their citizens , which were but a very small part of either of their forces . Nor did they consider , how by this adventure all the toyle their ancestors had taken in ordering the Commonwealth so , that it might long continue free , and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty , was all in vain , it being left in the hands of so few to lose it . Which thing those Kings could not have known how more to have undervalued . And for the most part they likewise fall into the same inconvenient , who ( upon the enemies approach ) intend to keep the hard places and guard the passages . For this resolution will alwayes be hurtfull , unless in that hard passage thou canst bring together all thy whole forces . And in such case , this course may be well taken . But the place being rough , and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there , there is loss in it . And to judge thus I am perswaded by the example I finde of those , that when they are assaulted by a powerfull enemy , their country being environed with mountaines and rocky places , have never endeavoured to fight with the enemy upon the passages or mountaines , but have gone beyond to encounter them : or when they would not do this , they have expected them among the mountains , in plain and easy places and not mountainous ; and the reason thereof hath been given before . For it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places , because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnish'd , and because the passages are streight and capable of few , and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army . And it is an easy thing for the enemy to come on with his gross ; because his intention is but to pass on , and not to stay . And it is impossible for him that awaits him , to await in gross , having to lodge there for a longer time , not knowing when the enemy wiil pass in places ( as I said ) streight and barren . Loosing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep , and wherein thy people and thy army repos'd some trust , most commonly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people , that without any means to make trial of their valor , thou art left the loser , and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes . Every one knows with what difficulty Anniball past the Alpes , which divides Lombardy from France , and those , which divide Lombardy from Tuscany ; yet the Romans first expected him upon the Tesin , and afterwards upon the plain of Arezo ; and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies , in places where they might overcome , then bring it upon the Alpes , where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place . And whosoever shall with discretion read histories , shall find that very few expert Commanders have assayd to keep the like passages , for these reasons we have said ; and because they cannot all divide themselves , the mountains being as open fields , and not having only ordinary and accustomed , but many by-waies , though not known to strangers , yet to the inhabitants , by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despight of the opposers . Whereof we can alleadg a very late example . In the year 1515 when Francis the first King of France intended to pass into Italy , to recover the State of Lombardy , the greatest ground they had that disswaded his enterprise , was , that the Swisses would step his passage on the mountains , And as after experience shew'd it , this ground of theirs was slight . For that King having left aside two or three places kept by them , came from thence by another way unknown , and was sooner in Italy then any were aware of him , So that herewith being daunted , they retir'd into Milan , and all the people of Lombardy took the French party , having fail'd in the opinion they had , that the French men would be stop'd on the top of the mountains . CHAP. XXIIII . Commonwealths well order'd appoint rewards and punishments for their people , and never recompence the one with the other . THE deserts of Horatius had been exceeding great , having by his valour vanquish'd the Curiatij . His offence was horrible , having slain his sister . Notwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeas'd the Romans that it brought them to dispute , whether they should grant him his life , though his merits were so great and so fresh : Which thing , to him that looks but superficially on it , would seem an example of popular ingratitude . Yet he that shall examin better , and with more consideration inquire , what the orders of Commonwealths ought to be , shall rather blame that people for having absolv'd him , then for having had a mind to condemn him . And this is the reason , For never any Republick in good ordrr , eancell'd the faults of their citizens with their deserts . But having ordain'd rewards for good service , and punishments for desservice , and having rewarded one when he had done well , if afterwards he commit any offence , they chastise him without any regard to his former merits . And when these orders are strictly observ'd , a city continues long free , otherwise it would soone go to ruine . For if a man growne into great reputation for some notable peece of service done to the state , should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence , in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent , that the civill state could no longer consist . It is very necessary , if we would have punishment for offences fear'd , alwayes to reward good deserts , as it appeares they did at Rome . And though the Republique be but poore , and can bestow but little , yet may the subject well content himselfe with that little ; for so even a small gift bestowd on any one , for requitall of a good , though great , shall finde with him that receives it an honourable and thankfull acceptance . The story of Horatius Cocles is very well knowne , and that also of Mutius Scevola ; how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge , till it was cut off behinde him ; the other burnt his owne hand , for having mistaken , when he meant to have killed Porsena the Tuscan King. To these for two such notable acts was given by the publilick two acres of ground to each of them . And marke also the story of Manlius Capitolinus . To him for having delivered the Capitoll from the French , which were encamp'd before it , they who together with him were within besieg'd gave him a small measure of flour , which reward ( according to the then present fortune of Rome ) was large , and of such a quality too , that afterwards Manlius , either moov'd by envy , or his owne ill nature , occasion'd a sedition in Rome , and seeking to get the people of his faction , was , without any regard had of his good deserts , thrown headlong downe from that Capitoll which he , to his great renowne , had formerly deliver'd . CHAP. XXV . Whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free city , let him retain at least the shadow of the old customes . HE that hath a minde to reforme the state of a City , to bring it into liking , and the better with every ones satisfaction to maintaine it , is forc'd to keep the forme or shadow of the ancient customes , to the end the people perceive not the change of them , though indeed they are quite new , & farr different from the fore-past . For they generally satisfy themselves as well with that that seemes to be , as that that is . Nay rather are they many times more mov'd with appearances , then truthes . And for this cause , the Romans knowing this necessity , when first they lived free , having in change of one King created two Consuls , would not suffer them to have more then twelve Lictors , because they should not outgo the number of those that attend on the King. Moreover , when the yearly sacrifice was made in Rome , which could not be done without the presence of the King , and the Romans willing that the people , by the absence of a King , should not find a lacke of any of the old ceremonies , created a head of the said sacrifice , whom they call'd the King Priest ; who yet was lower in degree , then the high Priest . So that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice , and never had any occasion by any default in it , to wish their Kings again restored . And this they all ought to observe , that would cancell the old manner of living in a city , and reduce it to a new and free course . For being these novelties somewhat moove mens mindes , therefore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits about thee , and work these alterations in the old mould , as much as might be . And if the magistrates , both in number , and authority , and durance , differ from the ancient , at least let them keep the same name : And this ( as I have said ) rather ought he to observe , who meanes to take upon him an absolute authority , which is call'd a Tyranny , for he is to innovate every thing . CHAP. XXVI . A new Prince in a city or Province taken by him , should make innovations in every thing . WHosoever becomes Prince of a city or state , and the rather , when his forces are but weake to keep it , and means not to hold it neither as a Kingdome , nor as a regular Republique , the best expedient he can find , for the maintenance of that Principality , is , that he ( himself being a new Prince ) make every thing new in the state , as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names , with new jurisdictions , with new men , and to enrich the poore , as David did , when he came to the crowne . That filled the hungry with good things , and the rich sent empty away . To build moreover new cities , and to pull down some that are built , to remove the inhabitants from one place to another , and in some to leave nothing untoucht in that Province , that there be neither degree , order , nor state , nor wealth , but he that possesses it , acknowledges it from these . And to take for paterne Philip of Macedon Alexanders father , who by these means became of a little King , Prince of all Greece . And he that writes of him sayes , that he chang'd his people from Province to Province , as herds-men change their herds from pasture to pasture . These courses are very cruel , and against all Christian and humane manner of living . And every man ought refuse to be a King , and desire rather to live a private man , then reigne , so much to the ruine of mankind . Yet he that will not use that first way of good , if he will preserve himself , must enter into this of evil . But men take to certain middle wayes , which are very naught ; for they know not how to be all good , nor all evil : as shall be shewed for example in the next chapter . CHAP. XXVII . It is very seldom , that men know how to be altogether mischievous , or altogether good . POpe Julius the second going in the year 1505 to Bolonia to chase out of that state the house of the Benticogli , which had held the Principallity of that city a hundred years , had a minde also to draw Iohn Pagolus Baglioni out of Perugia , whereof he was a Tyrant , as he that had conspired against all Tyrants , that were seised of any of the Churches lands : and being come near Perugia , with this resolution knowne to every one , stayed not to enter the City with his Army to guard him , but went in without a guard , notwithstanding that Iohn Pagolus was therein with much people , which he had got together for his defence . So that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things , with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemies hands , whom afterwards he led away with him , leaving a governor in that city , to keep it for the Church . By the wise men , that were with the Pope , was noted the rashness of the Pope , and the base cowardise of John Pagolus ; nor could they conceit , whence it came , that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy , and enrich himself with the prey , all the Cardinalls being then with the Pope , who had the best of all their Jewels with them . Neither could any man think that he abstain'd either for goodness or conscience sake , that withheld him . For into the heart of a wicked man , that incestuously convers'd with his sister , and that had slain his cousins and nephewes , to rule , there could never enter any religious respect . Whereupon every one concluded , that men know not how to be honourably mischievous , nor perfectly good . And where a mischief hath in it greatness , and is generous in some part , they know not how to enter into it . So Iohn Pagolus , who made no account of being an incestuous and publique paricide , knew not ( or to say better ) had not the courage , though upon just occasion , to do an exploit that every one should have admir'd him for , and he left of himself an everlasting memory ; being the first that had shew'd the Prelats what a thing it is to set at naught , him that lives , and reignes , as they did ; and so had done an act , whose greatness had surpast all infamy , and what ever danger could depend on it . CHAP. XXVIII . For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull to their citizens , than the Athenians . WHosoever reades the actions of Republiques , shall find in all of them some kinde of ingratitude towards their citizens , but less in Rome , than in Athens , or peradventure than in any Commonwealth else . And if we would enquire after the reason thereof , speaking of Rome and Athens , I think it happen'd , because the Romans had less occasion to suspect their citizens , than had the Athenians . For at Rome , considering her from the banishment of her Kings till Sylla , and Marius , her liberty was never taken away by any of her citizens , so that she had no great reason to suspect them , or by consequence suddenly to offend them . The contrary befell Athens ; for her liberty being taken from her in her most flourishing time , and under colour of doing her some good , so soon as she became free , remembring the wrong she had receiv'd , and the slavery she had indur'd , became a sharp revengeress , not only of her citizens faults , but of the shadow of their faults . From hence came the banishment and the death of so many rare men . From hence the order of the Osteacisme , and all other violence , which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens , And that is very true which those that write of civil government say , that the people bit● more siercely , after they have recover'd their liberty , than while they have continually maintain'd it . Whosoever then considers what is said , will neither in this blame Athes , nor commend Rome : but will ●ccuse onely the necessity , because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city For he shall see , if narrowly he look into affairs , if Romes liberty had been taken away , as was that of Athens , Rome would not have been more pitifull to her citizens , than was Athens . Whereof one may make a very good guess , by that which chanc't , after the banishment of the Kings , against Collatine , and Publius Valerius : whereof the first ( although he had his hand in the setting of Rome at liberty ) was banisht , for no other occasion , than that he was sirnamed Tarquin . The other having onely given suspicion of himself , by building a house upon the hill Celius , was like to have bin banisht . So that we may well think ( seeing how suspicious and severe Rome was in these two things ) that she would have bin as ungratefull , as Athens , if , as she in her infancy and before her growth , had bin so much wrong'd . And that I need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude , I shall speak further of it in the Chapter following . CHAP. XXIX . Whether of two be the more ungratefull , a people , or a Prince . ME thinks it is not out of the purpose of our former matter , to discourse , whether a Prince or people give us greater examples of ingratitude . ●nd the better to argue this part , I say , this vice of ingratitude growes either of covereousness or suspicion . For when a people or Prince have sent out a Commander of theirs , in any expedition of importance , where that Commander overcoming hath gain'd a great deale of glory , that Prince or people is in like manner bound to reward him : and if in F●w of reward he disgraces him , or wrongs him , incited thereunto by avarice , not willing by reason of this coveteousness , to satisfie him , he commits an errour , without excuse , and drawes upon himself everlasting infamy . Yet are there many Princes , who offend in this kind . And Cornelius Tacitus declares in this Sentence the occasion . It is more pleasing to revenge an injury , then to requite a courtesy : for thanks is thought a burden , but revenge a gain . But when he rewards him not , but rather hur●s him , not through avarice , but upon suspicion , then the people or Prince deserves some excuse . And of these ingratitudes practis'd for such cause we read many ; for that Commander who valorously hath gain'd his Lord a Kingdom , by conquering his enemies , replenishing himself with glory , and his souldiers with riches , of force gets such reputation with his own soldiers , with his enemies , and his Kings own subjects , that that victory can no wayes sayour well to his Lord that put him in the imployment . And because mens natures are ambitious , and full of suspicion , and know not how to set limits to their fortune , it is impossible , but that suspicion which grows in the Prince after that Commanders victory , shall by himself be increas'd upon some way or terme insolently us'd ; so that the Prince cannot advise himself otherwise , than to provide for his own safety . And to this end , thinks either to put him to death , or to take away his reputation , which he hath gotten in his army , or among his people , and withall diligence to shew , that his valour got not the victory , but rather it came by chance , or by the enemies cowardise , or by the direction of the other Captaines , who were together with him in that imployment . After that Vespasian , being in Judea , was by his army declar'd Emperor , Antonius Primus , who was then with another army in Illiria , took his part , and came thence into Italy against Vitellius , who commanded at Rome , and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies , and made himself , Master of Rome ; so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor , and all difficulties surpassed . The reward Antonius gain'd hereby , was , that Mutianus took away his command of the army , and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome ; whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian , who was yet in Asia , by whom he was so coldly receiv'd , that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire . And of these examples stories are full . In our daies , every one living knows , with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand , warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon , brought that Kingdom under his obedience ; and how he had for reward of his conquest , that Ferdinand parted from Arragon , and came to Naples , and first discharged him of his command of soldiers , afterwards took from him the fortresses , and then brought him away with him into Spain , where a while after he dyed in disgrace . Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes , that they cannot escape it ; and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those , who by victory have under their banners made great conquests . And from that which a Prince is not free , 't is no marvaile , nor a thing worthy of greater note , that a people is not free . For a city living free hath two ends , the one to gain , the other to keep it self free ; and it cannot be , but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre . Touching the errors in getting , they shall be spoken of in their place : as for the errors in maintaining their liberty , there are these among others , to hurt those citizens they should reward , and to suspect those they should repose upon . And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption , cause great evils , and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny , as at Rome it befell Caesar , who by strong hand took away that , which unthankfulness denied him : yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted , are they causes of great good , and make it live more free , keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious . It is true , that of all people that ever reign'd , upon the causes above alleadg'd , Rome was the least ungratefull ; for of her ingratitude we may say , there is no other example , but that of Scipio ; for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury , the one and the other had done the people . But the one was not pardoned , because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people ; the other was not only recall'd , but all his lifetime after , ador'd as a Prince . But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio , grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him , which was never conceived of the others ; which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome ; from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him ; from the quick dispatch of it : from those favours which youth , wisdome , and other his memorable vertues had gotten him . Which things were so great , that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority , more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men , as a matter not accustomed in Rome . And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary , that Priscus Cato , reputed a man of great integrity , was the first that stir'd against him , and said , that a city could not be called free , where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen . So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion , they deserve that excuse , which I said before , those Princes and people merit , who through suspicion prove unthankfull . Wherefore concluding this discourse , I say , that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness , it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness , and upon suspicion less than Princes , having less cause to be suspicious , as quickly it shall be declared . CHAP. XXX . What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude : or what A Commander or Citizen , to be free from their danger . A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion , or being ungratefull , ought personally go to the warrs , as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors , and in our daies the Turk does ; and as those that are valorous have done , and yet do . For overcoming , the glory and the gain is all their own . And when they are not there in person , ( the glory of the action belonging to another ) they think , they cannot well make that conquest their own , unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get , and so become ungratefull , and unjust . And without doubt greater is their loss , than their gain ; but when either through negligence , for lack of judgment they stay idle at home , and send out a Commander , I have no other precept to give them , than what they know of themselves . But I advise that Commander , because , as I think , he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness , that he betake himself to one of these two expedients ; either presently upon his victory let him leave his army , and put himself into his Princes hands , abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition , that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him , or at least not hurt him : Or when he likes not to do thus , let him resolutely take part against him , and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten , procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills ; let him make friendship with his neighbors , possess with his men the strong places , corrupt the Chief of his army , and assure himself of those he cannot ; and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him . Otherwaies there are not ; but ( as it was said before ) men know not how to be wholly vicious , nor wholly good . And alwaies it comes to pass , that presently after the victory , they will not part with their army ; behave themselves with modesty they cannot , and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how . So that being irresolute which way to take , between delay and doubt they are suppressed . But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude , we cannot apply the same remedy , we may to a Prince ; that is , that she go herself , and not send out in her imployments , being necessitated to make use of some one of her citizens . It sutes well therefore , that for her best remedy , she take the same course the Commonwealth of Rome took , to be less unthankfull then all others . Which grew from her manner of government ; for the whole city , both Nobles and Plebeians being train'd up to war , there arose alwaies in Rome in all ages men of such valour , experience , and reputation , that there was no occasion to doubt of any one of them , they being many who kept one another in order . And so long they continued ●iu integrity , and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition , nor give occasion to the people to do them harme , taking them for ambitious persons ; for if any one were made Dictator , he got most honor by it , that laid down his Dictatorship soonest . And so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect , could not breed ingratitude . So that a Republique that would not have cause given her to be unthankfull , should governe her self in the same manner Rome did . And a citizen that would be free from all their despights , should follow the same steps the citizens of Rome went. CHAP. XXXI . That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd for any error committed ; nor at all punish'd , when either by their ignorance , or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffer'd loss . THE Romans , as formerly we have discours'd , were not only less ungrateful , than other Commonwealths , but also were more pitifull , and more advised in the punishment of the Generalls of their armies , than any else . For if their fault proceeded from malice , yet they gently chastis'd them ; but if it was through ignorance , they were so far from punishing them , that they rewarded and honour'd them . This manner of proceeding was well consider'd by them ; for they judg'd it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies , to have their mind free , without any clog upon it , and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions ; because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by it self hard and dangerous : advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot bravely execute his designs . For example , when they sent an army into Greece , against Philip of Macedon , or into Italy against Anniball , or against those people they first overcame ; That Commander to whom the imployment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance . Now if to such cares , this were added , that many examples of the Romans were recorded , where they had crucifyed or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battels , it was impossible , that that Captain among so many suspicions cou'd resolve any thing couragiously . Therefore they deeming these sufficiently punish'd with the shame of their loss , they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment Here is one example , of a fault committed , and not through ignorance . Sergius and Verginius were incamp'd against the Veyans , each of them commanding a part of the army : Sergius was to incounter the Tuscans , and Verginius was to set upon the other side : It chanc'd , that Sergius being assaulted by the Falisci , and other people , endur'd rather to be quite rout'd and put to flight , before he would send for ayd to Verginius . And on the other side , Verginius , staying til til he should humble himself , would rather see the dishonour of his country , and the ruine of the army , than succour him . A case indeed very exemplary , and of much malice ; neither would it have bin for the Common-wealth of Romes reputation , to have let the one or the other pass without censure . True it is , that where another Republique would have punish'd them with death , this punish'd them only in a sum of money . The cause hereof was , not that their offences deserv'd not greater punishment , but because the Romans would in this case , for the reasons already alleadged , continue their ancient customes . And touching errors of ignorance , we have no better example , than that of Maro ; through whose rashness the Romans having bin broken at Canne by Hanniball , where the Republique came indanger to lose her liberty , yet because it was ignorance , and not malice , they not only did not chasise him ; but honor'd him , and the whole order of the Senat●rs m●thim upon the way in his return to Rome ; and because they could not thank him for the battel fought , they thankt him yet that he was return'd to Rome , and had not despair'd of the Roman State. When Papirius Cursor would have put Fabius to death , for having contrary to his command fought with the Samnites , among other reasons which Fabius his Father brought against the Dictators obstinacy was this , that the people of Rome , in any loss that ever her Captains had made , had never done that which Papirius in a victory would have done . CHAP. XXXII . A Republique or Prince should not defer to do good unto men , until their necessity requires it . ALthough it succeeded happily to the Romans , to have us'd liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger , when Porsenna made war against Rome , to restore the Tarquins , where the Senate doubting of the people , lest they would sooner accept of the Kings , than endure out the war ; to make themselves sure of them , they took off from them the taxes of salt , and every kind of grievance , saying , the poor contributed enough to the common good , if they did but nourish their children ; and thereupon in regard of this benefit , the people expos'd themselves to indure the siege , the famine , and the war. Yet let none , presuming upon this example , delay to gain the good will of the people til the times of danger ; for it will never prove so well to them , as it did to the Romans ; for the generality will think they have not this good from thee , but from thy adversaries ; and being to fear , that , when that necessity is past , thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them , they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee . And the reason why this business succeeded well to the Romans , was , because the State was new , and not well setled yet ; and that people also had seen , that formerly laws had bin made for their advantage , as that of appeal to the people ; so that they might well perswade themselves , that the good they had , was done them , not so muth upon occasion of their enemies coming , as from the good disposition of the Senate towards them . Moreover , the Kings were yet fresh in their memory , by whom they had bin many waies scorn'd , and abus'd . And because such like occasions seldom fall out , it seldom also comes to pass , that the like remedies are of use : whosoever therefore sit at the helme in a state , be it either a Commonwealth , or a Prince , should consider before hand , what contrary times may come upon them , and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of ; and therefore should live with them alwaies in such a manner , that upon any accident chancing , they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions . And he that governs otherwise , either Prince , or Republique , but especially a Prince , and afterwards upon the exigent , when danger is at hand , thinks with any benefits to recover or obligemen to him , is much deceiv'd ; for he does not onely not secure himself , but hastens his own destruction . CHAP. XXXIII . When an inconvenient is much grown , either in a state , or against a state , it is better to beare with it for a while , then presently to struggle with it . WHen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation , force , and rule , the neighboring people , who at first were not aware of the harme this new Republique might do them , began , though late , to know their fault ; and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected , nigh fourty several people were joyned together a●ainst Rome ; whereupon the Romans , among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers , betook them to create a Dictatour , that is , to give power to one man , that without calling any Council he might resolve , and without any appeal , he might execute his resolutions . Which remedy , as then it serv'd to purpose , and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dangers : so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions , which in the grow'th of the Empire at any time did rise against the Republique . Upon which accident we are first to discourse , how that , when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth , caus'd by an inward or an outward cause , is become so great , that it begins to make every one afraid , the safer course is , to temporise with it , then strive forthwith to extinguish it . For most commonly it proves , that they who indeavor to quench it kindle it much more , and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads , which was then but fear'd from thence . And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth , oftner upon inward oceasions then outward . Where oftentimes , either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable ; or else some law begins to be corrupted , which is the very nerve and life of liberty . And this error is suffer'd to pass on so far , that there is more danger in the remedy , then in the evil . And so much the harder is it to know these inconvenients at their birth , by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures , alwaies to favor things in their beginnings : and these favors are of more force , rather then in any thing else , in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them , and are done by young men . For if in a republique any young noble man put forward himself , having in him extraordinary vertue , all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him , and agree together without any consideration to honor him ; so that if he hath any touch of Ambition , meeting with those favors nature affords him , and this accident coming suddenly in place , before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in , it falls out that they have small means to help themselves . And when these , that have the remedies in their powers , would put them in practise , they do but with haste augment his authority . Hereof we might alleadge sundry examples ; but I will give onely one out of our own city . Cosmus of Medici , from whom the house of Medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness , came into such reputation , through the favor that his own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him , that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him , so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him , and others as dangerous to let him alone . But Nicholas of Vizzano living at the same time , who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs ; and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon Cosmus his reputation , while he liv'd , would never suffer , that they should make the second , which was , that they should indeavor to put him down ; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state , as in effect it came to pass , which was after his death . For those citizens that were left , not following this advice , made themselves strong against Cosmus , and chas'd him out of Florence . Whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury , a while after recall'd him , and made him Prince of the Commonwealth ; to which step he could never have climb'd , without that manifest opposition . The selfsame befell Rome with Caesar , whose vertue being favor'd by Pompey and others , at length came to change their favor into fear , whereof Cic●ro witnesses , saying , that Pompey had late begun to fear Caesar . Which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies , and the remedies they us'd hasten'd the ruine of their Commonwealth . I say then , that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise , this difficulty being occasion'd by a deceit , wherewith most things in their beginning do deceive , the wiser way is to dissemble them , when they are knowne , then to oppose them . For temporizing with , them they either are extinguish'd of themselves , or at least the evill is put off for a longer time . And in all affaires Princes ought to be well advis'd , who intend either to suppresse evills , or to oppose their forces and their invasions , that in liew of hurt they do them not good ; and thinking to thrust on forward a businesse , they draw it not after them ; or instead of choaking a plant , they water is not . And they should well consider , wherein the greatest force consists , and when they find their powers sufficient to heale what is amiffe , they should then apply their strongest remedies ; or otherwise , let it alone , nor in any case meddle with it ; for it would fall out as before hath bin said , and as it befel the neighbours of Rome ; for whom it had bin better , after that Rome was so growne in strength , with treaties of peace to indeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward , rather then by making a strong warre against it , to force it to new courses , and new defences . For to what other purpose serv'd their conspiracy , then to make them more lively , and to thinke upon new wayes , whereby in a farre shorter time they much inlarg'd their power ? Among which , was the creation of a Dictatour , by which , new order they not onely overcame the dangers that hung over their heads , but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes , which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurr'd . CHAP. XXXIIII . The Dictatours authority did good , and not harme , to the Commonwealth of Rome ; and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves , and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices , are hurtfull to the civill government . THose Romans are by some writer condemned , that found out in that city the way to create a Dictatour , as a thing that in time might occasion the Roman Tyranny ; alleadging , that the first tyrant that was in that city , commanded it under the title of a Dictatour , saying , that if this had not bin , Caesar could never with any publque title have given any honest colour to his tyranny . Which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion , but beleev'd without ground . For it was not the name , not the degree of the Dictatour , that brought Rome into bondage , but it was the authority the Citizens tooke upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule . And if in Rome there had bin wanting the title of a Dictatour , they would have taken another : for forces will easily gaine titles , but not titles forces . And we see it , that the Dictatour , while he was made according to the publique orders , and not by his owne authority , alwayes did good to the city . For those magistrates that are created , and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the Republiques , and not those that come the rodinary way As it appeares it followed in so long a processe of time , that never any Dictatour did otherwise , then good to the Commonwealth . Whereof there are very evident proofes . First because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt , and take extaordinary authority upon him , we must suppose him to have many conditions , which in a Republique not corrupted he can never have ; for he must be very rich , and have many adherents and partisans , which he cannot have , if the lawes be strictly observ'd ; and in case they had , such kind of men are so doubted , that the citizens free votes seldome meete in them . Moreover , the Dictarous was created onely for a time , and not for ever , and onely to remedy the present necessity ; for which he was created . And by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger , and to execute any thing without calling a counsell , and to punish any one without appeale . Yet could he do nothing , tending to the diminution of the state , as it would have bin● to take away the Senates authority , or the peoples , to disanull the old ordinances of the city , and to make new ; so that , the short time of his Dictatourship meeting with his authority , which was limited to him , and the people of Rome not corrupted , it was unpossible he should exceed his bounds , and hurt the city : and , we finde by experience , that he evermore advantag'd it . And indeed among other Roman ordinances , this is one deserves consideration , and worthy to be reckoned among those which contributed to the inlargement of that Empire : for without such like course taken , cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant michiefes ; for the wayes ordinarily us'd in Republiques . which more slowly ( being that no counsell , nor magistrate hath power of himselfe to go through with any matter , but in many things nave neede of of one another , because there goes time in getting together their consents ) their remedies are very dangerous , when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time : and therefore Commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way ; and the Republique of Venice ( which is excellent among these modernes ) hath reserv'd the authority to a few citizens , that in occurrences of importance , without more advice , all of them joyntly of accord may resolve ; for when in a Republique there wants such an expedient , it must needs by keeping the old customes go to ruine , or to escape it , break them . And in a Commonwealth , it were to be desir'd , that nothing should chance , which might call in the use of extraordinary courses . For though that extraordinary way at that time did good , yet the example prooves of ill consequence : for the custome is brought in , to breake the old orders at first for good , which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent . So that a Republique can never be perfect , unlesse with her lawes she hath provided for all things , and for every mischance ordain'd the remedy , and tract out the way of her government : and therefore concluding I say , that those Republiques which in their dangers have not recourse to a Dictatour , or such like authorities , will alwayes in those heavy accidents fall to ruine . And , in this new ordinance the manner of making the choice is to be noted , how judiciously it was provided for by the Romans ; for the creation of the Dictatour being some what a disgrace to the Consulls , the heads of the City being as well to come under obedience , as others ; and presupposing , that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens , they ordein'd the power of making this choice should be in the Consuls ; thinking , that when the occasion came , that Rome should stand in need of this Royall power , they would do it with a good will , and that they doing it themselves , it would lesse grieve them : For the hurts , or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself , and of his owne choyce , are farre lesse troublesome , then those that are done him by another : although that afterwards in the latter times , the Romans us'd in liew of a Dictatour , to give such authority to the Consull in these words , Let the Consull takecare the Commonwealth receive no dammage . And to returne to our matter , I conclude , that the neighibouring inhabitants of Rome by seeking to suppresse them , made them not onely provide for their defence , but also gave them the way how they might with more force , better advice , and greater authority offend them . CHAP. XXXV . The reason , why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtfull to the liberty of that Republique , notwitstanding that it was made by publique and free voices . AND it seemes contrary to that which was said before , that the authority which is seis'd on by violence , not that which is given by suffrages , is hurtfull to Commonweales , as the election of the ten Citizens created by the people of Rome to make lawes therin , who in time became tyrants in it , and without any respect laid hold on the liberty thereof . Where we ought well consider the manner of giving the authority , and the time for which it is given : and when an absolute authority is given for a long time ( calling a yeare or somewhat more a long time ) it will alwayes be dangerous , and will produce either good or bad effects , according as the persons to whom it shall be intrusted shall proove good or bad : and if we looke into the authority the ten had , and that which the Dictatours had , we shall find that of the ten farre to outreach the other . For when the Dictatour was created , the Tribuns , the Consuls , and the Senate remain'd still in their authority , nor could the Dictatour take it from them And if he could deprive one of the Consulship , and remove another from the Senate , yet could he not disanull the whole order of Senatours , and make new lawes : so that the Senate , the Consuls , and the Tribuns continuing with their authority , came to be as a guard upon him , to keepe him from swerving out of he right way . But in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary ; for they cashierd the Consuls and Tribuns and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else , as absolutly as the people of Rome . So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls , without Tribuns , without appeale to the people , and hereby having none to looke into their courses , the second yeare they had the meanes , especially moov'd by the ambition of Appius , to become insolent . And hereupon it is to be noted , that when it is said , that a power given by free suffrages , never hurt any Commonwealth , we must presuppose , that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it , unlesse with due circumstances , and at due seasons . But when , either being deceiv'd , or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold , they are brought to give it undiscreetly , and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten , it will befall them alwayes , as it did to these . Which is easily proov'd , considering the causes that held the Dictatours in goodnesse , and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill . And advising also how those Republiques have done , that have bin thought well governed , in the giving of authority for a long time , as the Sparitans gave their Kings , and the Venetians their Duke ; for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them , that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their pleasures abuse that authority . Nor availes it in this case , that the matter is not corrupted ; for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time , gathers friends , and makes partisans , neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let ; for wealth , and every other advantage presently runnes after them , as particularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treate . CHAP. XXXVI . The citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth , ought not to disdaine the lesse , as unworthy of them . THe Romans had made Marcus Fabius , and Caius Manlius Consuls , and gain'd a very glorious battell of the Veyentes and the Etruscans , where in Quintus Fabius was slaine . the Consuls brother , who had bin consul the yeare before . Where we should well consider , how proper the lawes of that citie were for her advancement . and how much those other Republique that trace not herfoote steps , decevie themselves . For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory , yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey , where other whiles they had commanded ; and to serve in that army whereof they had bin Commanders . which custome is contrary to the opinion , lawes , and courses of the citizens of our times . And in Venice yet is this errour , that a citizen having borne a great office , esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse , and the citie allowes him to refuse it . Which thing though it were honourable for the private , yet is it wholly unprofitable for the publique For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from , and repose more trust in that citizen , who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse , then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater . Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres , unlesse they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority . And if in Rome there had bin that custome which is in Venice , and other Republique and moderne Kingdomes , that he who had once bin Consull would never goe to the warr afterwards , but as Consul , many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne therupon ; and through the errours committed by these new men , and by their ambition , which they might have us'd with more freedome , not having those grave men about them , by whose presence they might be so kept in awe , that they should not dare to step aside : and so they would have become dissolute ; which would all have turn'd to the publique losse . CHAP. XXXVII . VVhat distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome , and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth , that lookes far backwards , and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the Citie . IT is an opinion of the ancient writers , that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses , and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity ; and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects : for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity , they are presently together by the ears through ambition ; which is so powerfull in mens hearts , that to what degree fo●ver they arise , it never abandons them . The reason is , because nature hath created men in such a sort , that they can desire every thing , but not attaine to it . So that the desire of getting being greater then the power to get , thence growes the dislike of what a man injoyes , and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof . Hereupon arises the change of their states , for some men desiring to have more , and others fearing to lose what have they already , they procede to enmities and warre , from whence comes the destruction of one country , and the advantage of another . This discourse I have made , because it suffis'd not the Commons of Rome , to secure themselves from the Nobility by creating the Tribuns , to which desire they were forc'd by nenecessity ; but that they suddenly , upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition , and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes , as the things that are in most value with men . Whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the Agrarian law . And in conclusion , caus'd the destruction of the Roman Republique . And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy , and the particulars poore , it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law , which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning , but that every day it had need of some revising and amending ; or that the making of it was so long put off , that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards ; or that being well instituted at first , in time it grew by use corrupt . So in what manner soever it were , that law was never mention'd in Rome , but that the whole city was in a tumult . This law had two principall heads . By one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground : by the other , that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome . It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of wayes ; because they that had the greatest states in possessio , were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the Nobility ; and there upon ought not to injoy it : and when the enemies goods should be divided among the common people , they tooke from the Nobility the meanes to grow rich . These quarrells then being taken up against potent persons , and they by their resistance thinking to defend the publique , whensoever ( as it is said ) mention was made of this law , the whole city was in an uproare ; and the Nobility wrought it out with patience and with diligence , either by drawing an army forth into the field , or by opposing another Tribune against him that propounded it , or sometimes by yeelding a part , or else by sending a Colony into that place which was to be divided , as it befell them of the Country of Antium , for which upon a dispute touching this law , there was a Colony drawne out of Rome and sent into this place , unto whom the said County was consign'd . Where Titus Livius uses a notable kind of speech , saying , that with much adoe they found any one in Rome , that would give in their names to go to the said Colony , the people being rather desirous of these advantages in Rome , then to go and injoy them in Antium . And the quarrell touching this law continued a good while , till the Romans transported their armes into the uttermost parts of Italy , and likewise out of Italy . After which , as it seemes , it ceas'd : which so fell out , because the fields , which the enemies of Rome possessed , were farre apart from the peoples sight , and in a place where it was not safe to come to cultivate them , and therefore grew they lesse desirous of them , and the Romans also did lesse use to punish their enemies in that manner . And when they did dispossess any towne of the territory , they there distributed Colonies , so that upon such reasons this law was laid asleepe till the Gracchies time , by whom it being afterwards awaked , quite ruin'd the Roman liberty . For they found their adversaries strength doubled ; and hereupon kindled such a hatred betweene the people , and the Senate , that they came to blowes and to bloud without civill meane , or order . So that the publique magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto , nor either of the factions relying on them , they sought private helpes , each party thinking to make a head should defend them . In this quarrell , and disorder , the people chose Marius , and made him foure times Consull ; and so long he continued his Consulship , with small interva's , that he had power of his owne selfe to make himselfe thrice more Consul . Against which pestilence the Nobility having no other remedy , began to favour Sylla ; and having made him head of their faction , they came to civill warres , and after much bloodshed and change of chance , the Nobility remain'd conquerer These quarrells were anew reviv'd in Caesar and Pompeyes time ; for Caesar being made head of Marius his party , and Pompey of Syllaes , coming to fight , Caesar remain'd victour ; who was the first tyrant in Rome , ( so that that city never after injoy'd her liberty , such beginning then , and end had the Agrarian law . And although we shew'd other where , how the discords of Rome between the Senat and the People preserv'd Romes liberty , because they sprung from those lawes in favor of liberty , and therefore the end of this Agrarian law may seeme disagreeing to such a conclusion ; yet I say , that upon this I no way change my opinion ; for so great is the Nobilities ambition , that if by divers wayes and sundry meanes it were not abated in a city , it would suddenly bring that city to destruction : so that if the strife touching the Agrarian law had much adoe in three hundred yeares to inthrall Rome ; it is like enough it would have bin brought much sooner into servitude , when the people both with this law , and also with their other humours , had not alwayes bridled the Nobilities ambition . We see by this also , how much men esteeme wealth rather then honours , because the Nobility of Rome , if it toucht matter of honour , ever gave way to the people without any extraordinary distasts : but when it concern'd their wealth , so obstinatly did they defend it , that the people to vent their humour had their recourse to those extravagant wayes that are above discours'd of . The Authors of which disorder were the Gracchi , whose intention ought to be commended , rather then their discretion . For to take away a disorder grown in a Commonwealth , and hereupon to make a law that lookes faire backwards , is a course ill advis'd of ; and ( as formely it hath been said at large ) it doth nothing else but hasten that evill to which the disorder guides thee ; but giving way to the time some what , either the mischiefe comes slower , or of it selfe at length before it comes to the upshot ) goes out CHAP. XXXVIII . Weake Commonwealths are hardly drawne to a certaine resolution , and know not how to determine : and the course they ordinarily take , they are rather forc'd to , then choose of them selves . THere being in Rome a very grievous pestilence , and thereupon the Volsci and the Equi thinking a fit time presented to bring the city of Rome into subjection , these two people having got a very great army together , set upon the Latini and the Hernici , and wasted their country : this the Latini and Hernici were constrain'd to give notice of at Rome , and intreat , that the Romans would undertake their defence : to whom the Romans , exceedingly afflicted by the plague , answer'd that they should take a course to defend themselves with their owne forces , because they were not then able to do it . Wherein appeares the magnanimity and wisdome of that Senate , that even in all fortunes they would reigne and give law to those deliberations their vassalls should make ; nor were they asham'd to resolve any thing , when necessity press'd them to it , though contrary to their manner of living , and the resolutions usually made by them . This I say , because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arme and defend themselves ; and therefore to a Senat , whose judgment had bin weaker then was theirs , it would have seem'd an abatement of reputation , to have granted them such a defence . But they alwayes weighed businesses in their due balance , and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good : for it agreed ill with them ; to see themselves unable to defend their subjects ; and they were as little content , that they should arme without them , for the reasons alleadged , and others also that are evident . Yet knowing , that in any case upon necessity they were to take armes , having the enemy upon their backes , they tooke the more honourable part , and would rather , that what they were to do , they should do it with their leave , to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity , they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily . And though this may well appeare a course fit for every Republique to take , the weake and ill advised Common wealths cannot do the like , nor know not how to stand upon termes of honour in the like niceties . The Duke Valentine had taken Faeuza , and made Bologna yeeld to his conditions ; afterwards desiring to returne from thence to Rome through Tuscany , sent a confident of his into Florence to aske passage for himselfe with his army . Hereupon they consulted at Florence , how to manage this businesse , nor did any one advise them to grant it him . Wherein they followed not the course the Romans tooke : for the Duke being exceedingly well armed , and the Florentines in a manner disarmed , that they could not hinder his passage , it had bin much more for their honour , if it had seem'd that he had passd with their licence , rather then by force ; for there it was wholly their disgrace , which had bin in part lesse , if they had carried it otherwise . But the worst condition these weak Republiques have , is to take to no resolution , so that what party soever they take , they take it perforce ; and if any good be done them , it is forc'd upon them , for which they owe no thankes to their owne wisdome . I will give two other examples , that happen'd in our dayes in the state of our city , In the yeare 1500 , when Lewi the 12 of France had recover'd Milan , being desirous to put Pisa into our hands , for the summe of 50000 ducats , which the Florentines had promis'd him , after such restitution , he sent his army commanded by the Lord Beaumont towards Pisa , in whom , ( although he were a French man ) yet the Florentines repos'd much trust . This army and Captaine came on betweene Cascina and Pisa , to assaile the walls , where staying some daies to give order for the siege , there came some Deputies of Pisa to Beavmont , who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the French army with these conditions , that upon the Kings word he should promise , not to give them into the Florentines hands , till after foure monthes , which termes were utterly resus'd by the Florentines , whereupon ensued , that after a while they left the siege with disgrace . Nor was that accord refus'd for other reason , then because they doubted of the Kings word ; although ( such was the weaknes of their counsell ) that they were forc'd to put themselves into his protection , though they trusted him not : nor in the meane while did they consider , that the King could easier deliver Pisa into their hands , having gotten possession of it , than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power : wherein if hee had fayl'd , it had bin easy to discover the Kings intention , and so have spar'd their cost . In such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage , had they agreed , that Beaumont should have taken it upon any promise ; as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare 1502. when upon the rebellion of Arezzo , the Lord Jubalt was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines . Who being come neare to Arezzo , began to treate agreement with the towne , which upon certaine termes would have yeelded , as before the Pisans , but were againe refused by the Florentines . Which Jubalt perceiving , and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves , hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself , without admitting the commissaries into the party , so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head , and thereupon entred Arezzo with his owne people , shewing the Florentines , they were fooles , and understood not the affaires of the world ; and if they desir'd to have Arezzo in their hands , they should let the King know of it , who could more easily deliver it them , having his people already in the towne , then if they were without before the walls . In Florence they forbare not to rayle upon , and blame the said Jubalt , till they understood , that if Beaumont had bin like Jubalt , they should have had Pisa as well as Arezzo . And thus to returne to our purpose , Republiques which will not come to resolution , seldome make any party much to their advantage , unlesse they are forc't thereupon : because their weaknesse will never suffer them to determine , where there is any doubt : and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward , they remaine always in suspence . CHAP. XXXIX . The same accidents are seene to befall severall peoples . THIS is easily knowne by any one that considers things present and things long past , that in all Cities and all peoples there are now the same desires and the same humours , there were alwayes ; So that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past , to foresee the future in any Commonwealth , and to serve himself of those remedies , which were in use among the auncients ; or not finding of those which were us'd , to devise new , for the resemblance these accidents have with the auncient . But because these considerations are neglected , or not understood by the Reader ; or if understood , not knowne to him that governs , it followes , that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen . The Citie of Florence after 94 yeares having lost a part of their dominions , as Pisa and other Townes , was forc't to make warre against those that held them . And because hee that had them in his hands , was of great power , it came it passe , that they were at great expence in the warrs , without good successe . From these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people , and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints . And for that this warre was order'd by a Magistracie of tenne Citizens , who were call'd the Councell of tenne for the warre , they were malic't by the whole body of the Citie , as the Authours of the warre , and the expences of the same ; and they began to p●rswade themselves , that by taking away that Magistracie , they should end their wars ; so that having to make new , they would not supply the places , but rather suffering that Magistracie to expire , they referr'd their imployments all to the Senate : Which resolution was so hurtfull , that not onely it ended not the warre , ( as the generality was perswaded ) but those men being put out of the imployment , who guided it with understanding , there followed such confusion , that besides Pisa , they lost Arezzo , and many other places , in so much that the people perceiving their errour , and that the feaver occasion'd the mischiefe , and not the Physitian , they created anew the Magistracie of tenne . The selfe same humour grew up in Rome against the name of the Consuls ; for the people seeing one warre arise from another , giving them no rest , where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours ambition , who d●sir'd to suppresse them , they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobilitie ; who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the , Tribunitiall power , indeavour'd to draw them our of Rome under the Consuls , and there to oppresse them , where they had no assistance . And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls , or so to limit their power , that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad . The first that assa●d to put that law in practise , was one Terentillus a Tribun , who propounded they should create five men , to consider the Consuls power , and moderate it . Which thing much angred the nobility , giving them to thinke , that the Majestic of the Empire was wholly declined ; and that there was not left to the Nobilitie any dignity more in the Commonwealth . Yet such was the Tribuns obstinacie , that the Consuls name was quite put out , and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken , rather to create Tribuns with Consulan power , than the Consuls ; in such hatred had they their name and their authority . And so they proceeded a long time , till at length , having knowne their errous , as the Florentins return'd to the Counsell of tenne , so they anew created their Consuls . CHAP. XL. The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome , and what the rein is to be noted ; where among many other things is consider'd , how by the like accident a Republique may be preserv'd , or suppressed . HAving a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happen'd at Rome upon the creation of the Decemvirate , methinks it is not much out of the way first to relate summarily the story of that creation ; and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions ; which are many and of good consideration , as well for those that endeavor to maintain a Republique free , as for them that intend to bring it under the yoke ; for in this discourse there will appear many errors committed by the Senate , and by the people , in prejudice of the Common liberty , and many faults made by Appius Chiefe of the Decemvirate , lammageable to that tyrannie which he had presupposed already founded in Rome . After many disputes and strifes past between the people and the Nobility , about the framing of new lawes in Rome , whereby they might firmly establish the liberty of that State , with one accord they sent Spurius Posthumius with two other Citizens to Athens , for the copies of those lawes which Solon gave to that City , that thereupon they might found the Roman Ordinances . After their returne , they came to appoint the men that were to examine and frame the said lawes . And they ordained ten Citizens for a year , of which Appius Claudius was one , a cunning and a turbulent man. And that they might without any respect make such lawes , they took away the power of all other Magistrates in Rome , espeaially of the , Tribuns and Consuls . They took away also all appeal to the people ; so that these new officers became absolute Princes of Rome . Afterwards Appius gain'd the authority of all his other companions , by means of the favors the people did him , for he was grown so popular in his behaviour , that it seem'd a mervail , how so suddenly he had chang'd his nature and disposition , having alwaies before this time bin thought a cruel persecutor of the common people . These ten governed themselves very moderately , not having above twelve Lictors , who always went before him that was Chiese among them . And although they had the absolute authority , yet when they were to punish any Citizen of Rome for homicide , they cited him in presence of the people , and made them judge him . They writ their laws in ten Tables ; and before they confirm'd them , published them to the general view , that every man might read and understand them , whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them , which before their confirmation should be amended . After this Appius caus'd a rumour to be spread throughout Rome that if to these ten Tables an addition of twoothers were made , they would be perfect So that the conceithereof gave the people occasion to make the Councell of tenne againe for another yeare , whereunto the people consented willingly , as well because they would not have the Consuls anew ●created , as for that they hop'd they might well subsist without Tribuns , these being judges of the causes , as is aforesaid : It being then agreed to make a new election , the whole nobility betook themselves to sue for these honors , and Appius was amongst the formost of them , and behav'd himself in his suit with so much courtesie towards the people , that all his competitors were jealous of it . They did not beleeve , that he being so proud a man , used all this courtesie for nought . And being in doubt publiquely to oppose him , they resolved to do it cunningly , and so though he were the youngest of them all , they gave him the authority to propound to the people the ten that were to be elected , thinking he would use the same terms others did , not to name himself , being a thing unusual and disgracefull in Rome . But he took this impediment for an opportunity : And named himself among the first , to the admiration , and displeasure of all the Nobility ; and after named nine others to his own purpose . Which new creation made for another yeer , began to shew the people and the Nobility their error ; for suddenly , Appius made an end of dissembling to be what he was not : and began to show his inbred pride : and infected his companions with his own evil conditions : and to fright the people and the Senate , in exchange of twelve Lictors , they made a hundred and twenty . The fear was equall in all , for a while ; but they began afterwards to give respect to the Senate , and rudely to handle the Commons . If any one being wrong'd by one of these Iudges did appeal to another , he was worse abused in his appeal , than in his first tryal . So that the people having perceived their error , began to look the Nobility in the face with a great deal of sorrow ; And thence they took occasion to seek after their liberty , from whence by fearing their bondage , they had brought the Commonwealth into that misery . And the Nobility was wel pleased with this their affliction : That being weary of their present condition , they might desire to have their Consuls restored . The dayes came at length that ended the year : the two Tables of the lawes were finished but not published . The ten hereupon tooke occasion to continue on their Magistracie , and hold the State by violence , and make the young Nobilitie their guard , on whom they bestowed the goods of those they condemned . With which gifts the youth being corrupted , lov'd rather their own licentious life , than the common liberty . It fell out about this time , that the Sabini and the Volsci made war against the Romans . Upon which fear the ten began to see the weakness of their own estate : for without the Senate they could not take order for the war ; and assembling the Senate together they thought they lost their authority : yet upon meer necessity they took this last course ; and having gotten the Senators together , many of them spake against the pride of the tenn , and in particular Valerius and Horatius ; and their authority had bin quite abolished , but that the Senate , of meer envy to the Common people , would not shew their authority , thinking , that if the ten should voluntarily depose their Magistracy , the making of Tribuns of the people might perhaps be left . The war was then resolved of , and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten : and Appius staid at home to govern the City . Whereupon it happen'd , that he fell in love with Virginia ; and when he would have taken her by force , her Father Virginius to free her , slew her ; whereupon ensued divers tumults at Rome , and in the armies , which being brought back again and joyn'd with the remainder of the people at Rome , went apart thence to the holy mount : where they staid , til the ten had deposed their Magistracy , and that the Tribuns and Consuls being created , Rome was restor'd to the ancient forme of liberty . It is noted then by the text , that the inconvenient of setting up a Tyranny grew first upon the same occasions , that the greater part of Tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in Cities , and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty , and the excessive ambition the Nobility have to command . And when they agree not to make a law in favor of liberty , and either party betakes it self to favour some one , then suddenly starts up a tyranny . The people and the Nobility of Rome consented to create the ten ; and to create them with so great authority , as they did for the desire they both had , the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls , the other of the Tribuns . When they were created , the people thinking that Appius was become of the popular faction , and rudely handled the Nobility , the people betook themselves to favour him . And when a people is led into such an error , as to give reputation to any one , because he creates those evil that they hate , if he hath wit , it will alwaies come to pass , that he shall make himself Lord of that City ; for he will wait his opportunity together with the peoples favor to extinguish the Nobility , and will never endeavor to oppress the people , till he hath quite supprest the Nobles ; at which time when the people shall perceive themselves to be in bondage , they shall not know whether to have recourse for help . This course have they all held , that have laid the foundations of a Tyrannie in any Commonwealth . Which if Appius had likewise held , his tyrannie would have bin of longer durance , and not have fail'd so quickly ; but he went the clean contrary way ; nor could a man have done more undiscreetly , than he , who to maintain a tyrannie , made those his enemies that bestowed it first upon him , and could still make it good , and fought to gain those to be his friends , who neither agreed to give it him , nor could maintain it to him , and so lost those that were his friends , and strove to make those his friends , that could not be so : For though the nobility desire to tyrannize , yet that part of the nobility that hath not a share in the tyrannie , is alwaies enemy to the tyrant ; nor is it possible ever to gain them all to his side , by reason of the nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive avarice , seeing that the tyrant cannot have so great wealth , nor so many honors , as to satisfie them all . And thus Appius , forsaking the people , and cleaving to the nobility , committed a most evident error , and so for other reasons abovesaid ; and because , if a man will hold any thing by violence , he that forces must needs be stronger than he that is forced . From whence it comes , that those Tyrarts who have the generality to friend , and the great ones their enemies , are in the more safety , because , their violence is supported with greater forces , than that which is favored by the Nobility , and hated by the people : for with the peoples favor the Forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves , as they were to Nabis Tyrant of Sparta , when all Greece and the people of Rome assaulted him , having made himself sure of some few of the Nobility , and alwaies having the people his friend , wherewith he defended himself : which he could not have done , if they had bin otherwise . In that other degree , to have but few friends at home , the forces within suffice nor , but must be sought after abread : and they are to be of three kinds , the one to have a guard of strangers , to assure thy person ; the other , to have an army in the country , which may serve the same turn the people could ; the third , to hold correspondence and friendship with thy put issant neighbours , who may defend thee . And whosoever takes these courses , and observes them rightly , though the people be his enemy , yet in some sort may he save himself . But Appius could not by any army make himself master of the Country , the country there and Rome being one and the same thing ; and what he could do , he knew not how to do , and so perish'd in his beginning . The Senate also and the people in the creation of the Decemvira●e committed very great errors . For , though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a Dictator , that those Magistrates , who are made of themselves , not those that are chosen by the people , endammage the liberty , yet the people ought , when they make their Magistrates , take such order in their making , that they restrain them by some regards from growing wicked . And where they should set a guard over them , to keep them good , the Romans took it away , creating that the sole Magistracy in Rome , nullifying all the rest , for the excessive desire ( as we before said ) The Senate had to suppress the Tribuns , and the Common people the Consuls : which blinded them both so , that they concur'd in this disorder : for men ( as King Ferdinand said ) do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey , who so eagerly pursue the prey , whereunto they have a natural provocation , that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them . The people of Romes error then is made plain by this discourse , as I propounded it in the beginning , in going to save their liberty ; as Appius his errors also in going to seize upon the Tyranny . CHAP. XLI . Of humble to become , proud , of● mercifull cruel , without passing through the due means between these extreams , argues indiscretion , and turns nothing to advantage . AMong other termsill us'd by Appius , to maintain his tyranny , it was not of small moment , to leap too suddenly from one quality to another : for his craft in deceiving the people , by dissembling popularity , was used to good purpose . The terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten , were well us'd : As also his boldness in creating himself one of them , contrary to the nobilities opinion It was a course rightly taken , to chuse his collegues to his own turn : but it was not advisedly done , presently upon this ( according as I sayd above ) to change his disposition at an instant , of a friend to shew himself enemy to the people , of curteous to become insolent , of mild harsh , and to do this so suddenly , that without any excuse he discovers to all the falshood of his heart . For he that hath seem'd good for a while , and would , to serve his own turn , become wicked , should come to it by the due degrees ; and in such sort goeon with his occasions , that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favors , it may have given him so many new , that his authority be no way diminished : otherwise being found unmask'd and without friends , he perishes . CHAP. XLII . How easily men may be corrupted . IT is remarkable also in this matter touching the Decemvirate , how easily men are corrupted , so that they make themselves become of aquite contrary nature , though at first good , and well brought up : considering how that youth , which Appius had taken near to him for guard of his person , began to favor the tyranny , for a very small profit which they made thereof . And how Quintus Fabisu , one of the second ten that were chosen , being an excellent man ; blinded with a little ambition , and perswaded by the malignity of Appius , chang'd all his good conditions into very bad , and became like him ; which being throughly examin'd , shall cause those that institute the lawes of Republiques or Kingdoms to be more exactin bridling humane desires , and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free whensoever they offend . CHAP. XLIII . They that fight for their own glory , are the good and faithfull soldiers . IT is considerable also upon the above written treaty , what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in it self , fighting for its own glory , and that which is ill dispos'd , fighting for other mens ambition ; for where the Roman armies were alwaies wont under the Consuls to be victorious , under the Decem. virate they were alwaies losers . From this example may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable , who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee , but some small stipend thou bestowest on them . Which cannot be a motive so sufficient , or of such weight , as to gain thee their truth and love so far , as to die in thy behalf . For in those armies , wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight , which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valor , as to subdue or resist an enemy that hath never so little vertue or courage . And because neither this affection , nor contention can grow in others , more then in thy natural subject , it is necessary in the maintaining of a state , whether it be Commonwealth or Kingdom , to arme the native subjects , as we see all they have done , who with their armies have made any great conquests . The Roman armies under the Decemvirates were valorous as formerly : but because the same disposition was not in them , they atchiev'd not the like exploits . But so soon as the Decemvirate had an end , and they , as free men , began to war , they took to them again their former courages , and by consequence their undertakings prov'd successfull , according to their ancient wont . CHAP. XLIIII . A multitude without a head is unprofitable : and a man should not first threaten ; and afterward demand the power . THe Common people of Rome , upon the occasion of Verginius being gone apart armed into the Holy Mount , the Senate deputed some unto them to demand , by what authority they had forsaken their Captains and retired into the mountain ; and such was the esteem of the Senates authority , that the people having no head of their multitude , no man durst make answer . And Titus Livius sayes , they wanted not what to answer , but they wanted who should answer : Which thing does punctually shew the unprofitableness of a multitude without a head , and therefore Verginius perceiving the disorder , sound the expedient of creating twenty Tribuns of war who should be their head to answer , and confer with the Senate . And having demanded , that Valenius and Horatius should be sent them , to whom they would declare their mindes , these refused to go , til the ten had deposed their magistracy : and being come to the mountain where the people was , the demands were , that they would have the Triburs of the people created again , and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate , and that all the ten should be deliver'd into their hands , and they would burn them quick : Valerius and Horatius commended their first demands : and blam'd their latter , as Impious , saying , You condemn cruelty , and yet you use it your selves . And they were advis'd to leave making mention of the ten , and attend onely to lay hold of their authority and power , and afterwards they should not want means of satisfaction ; where plainly it appears , how much it savors of folly , and little of wisdome , to demand a thing , and before-hand to say , I will do ill with it . For a man ought not herein discover his intention , but first in any case indeavor to be master of what he desires . For it is enough to ask a man his weapons , without saying to him , I will kill thee with them , being thou hast power , when thou art possest of them , to do as thou list . CHAP. XLV . It is a matter of very evil example , when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it : and it is very dangerous in a state , to make a continuall practise of cruel executions . THe agreement being made and Rome reduc'd to her ancient forme , Verginius cited Appius before the people , to defend his own cause : whom appearing accompanied with many of the Nobility , Verginius commanded to be cast into prison . Appius began to cry out , and appeal to the people . Verginius said , he was not worthy to be allow'd that appeal which himself had destroy'd , or have the people defend him , who had so much endammag'd them . Appius replied , that they ought not to violate that appeal , which they with such earnest desire had ordain'd . For all this he was imprison'd , and before the day of giving judgment , he slew himself . And though Appius his lewd life deserv'd any punishment , yet savor'd it but little of eivil government , to violate the lawes , and especially that which was but then made . For I beleeve not , there is any thing of worse example in a Republique , then to make a law , and not observe it ; and the more , when he that makes it breaks it . Florence after the ninty fourth year having its state reestablish'd by the aid of Frier Ierom Savanarola , whose writings shew his learning , wisdome , and vertue , and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens , caus'd a law to be made , that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences , which for matter of state , the Eight , or the Seignory should give : which law he long perswaded , and with much a do at length obtain'd . It happen'd that a while after the confirmation of it , five citizens were condemn'd to death by the Seignory for some offence touching the state ; and they desiring to appeal , were not suffer'd , and so the law not observ'd . Which more wrong'd the reputation of that Frier , then any other accident . For if that appeal was profitable , he should have caus'd it to be observ'd , if otherwise , he should never have so urg'd the making of it . And so much more remarkable was this accident , in that the Frier in those many sermons which he made , after the breach of this law , never either condemned him that broke it , or excus'd the breach , as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose ; and excuse it he could not . Which having discover'd his ambitious and sactious mind , took much from his credit , and charg'd him with blame enough . It is a very great fault also in a state , every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments , as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate . For all the ten , and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd , and condemn'd , so that all the Nobility were exceedingly affrighted , thinking they would never leave condemning them , til they had destroyed the whole Nobility . And certainly it had produc'd some inconvenient in the city , if Marcus Duellius the Tribun had not taken order for it . Who made a decree , that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome , which assur'd all the Nobility . Where we see , how great a hurt it is to a Republique or Prince , to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments : and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken . For men that begin to doubt of mischief , in any case provide for themselves in their dangers , and grow bolder , and less respectfull how they venture on novelties . Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any , or the hurt that is to be done to do at once , and afterwards let men injoy some assurance , that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds . CHAP. XLVI . Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another : and first they aime no further , then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others , afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others . THe people of Rome having recovered their liberty , and being return'd into their former state , or rather greater , insomuch as they had made new laws , which were as new foundations laid to establish their power , it seem'd probable , that Rome for some while would have bin at quiet ; yet by experience the contrary was seen , for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements . And because Titus Livius very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew , methinks it is not out of purpose , punctually to relate his words where he sayes , that alwaies either the people or the Nobility waxed proud , when the other grew humble ; and when the Commons containd themselves modestly within their bounds , then began the youth of the Nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries ; nor could the Tribuns much remedy this , for they also had their shares in the sufferance . The Nobility on the other side , although well they wot that their youth was too insolent , yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side , they wished rather their own should be the actors , then the commonalty . And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other . And the order of these accidents is , that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves , they begin to put others in fear ; and that injury which they chase from themselves , they thrust upon another , as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt . Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Common-wealths come to dissolution , and men rise from one ambition to another . And as that sentence of Salust put in Caesars mouth , was very true ; That all evil examples first spring from good beginnings . The first thing that those citizens ( as is above said ) endeavor , who behave themselves ambitiously in a Republick , is , not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs , but out of the Magistrates power . To attain hereto , they seek after friendships , which they gain by means , in appearance honest , either by supplying their want of moneys , or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them . And because this seems worthy and noble , every one is easily deceived , and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it , till he presevering in the same course without let , becomes such a one , that the private Citizens stand in aw of him , and the Magistrates bear him respect . And when he is grown to this height , and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness , he comes to be in such termes , that it proves very dangerous to justle with him , for the causes I have formerly alleadged , of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient , which is already come to some growth in a city , because then it is brought to such an exigent , that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruine : or letting it alone , to submit to the yoke of bondage , unless death or some other accident prevent it . For being once come to the terms above written , that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him , and his , without much adoe after will they understand their own strength , and hurt at their own pleasure . Whereupon a Republique among her wayes of government ought to use this , to watch carefully over her citizens , that they have not power under the colour of good to do mischief : and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth , and not wrong it , as in its own place we shall argue it . CHAP. XLVII . Men , though they are deceiv'd in generalities , yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars . THE people of Rome ( as is abovesaid ) having taken in distaste the very name of Consuls , & being desirous that Plebeyans might be made Consuls , or their authority limited , the Nobility , that the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility ; The people were herewith contented , thinking to abolish the Consulate , and to have their share in this highest dignity Hence grew a notable accident , that when they came to create these Tribuns , which they could have made all Plebeyans , the people chose them all out of the Nobility ; whereupon Titus Livius uses these words : The event of these assemblies , or Councils , shewed , that mindes differ much , when contention is made for liberty or honour , and when all strife being appeas'd , the judgments rest clear . And examining from whence this proceeds , I beleeve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities , than in particularities . The Common people of Rome thought generally , they deserv'd the Consulate , because they were the greatest part of the City , because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars , because they were they , by force of whose armes Rome maintain'd her liberty , and became mighty . And thinking ( as is said ) this their desire reasonable , they would have this authority in any case . But when they came to pass their judgments in particular upon their own men , they perceiv'd their weakness , and judg'd that no one of them deserv'd that , which raking them all together , they thought they had bin worthy of . So that being asham'd of them , they had recourse to those that were of merit : At which resolution Titus Livius worthily marvailing , sayes thus ; This modesty , uprightness , and greatness of mind , where shall you now adayes find it in one man , which then was in whole people ? In confirmation hereof , another notable example may be brought which happen'd in Capua , after that Hanniball had broken the Roman army at Cannae : upon which occasion all Italy being in an uproar , Capua was ready to rise too , for the hatred there was between the people and the Senate . And at that time Pacuvius Calanus being the principal Magistrate , and perceiving the great hazzard they went to be slain by them , and the city yielded up to Hanniball , now that the State of Rome was in distress . Afterwards he added , that if they would let him order the business , he would provide so , that they should be both friends ; but he would shut them all up in the Palace , and by giving the people power over them to chastise them , save them . The Senators yielded to his advice , and he call'd the people together , having the whole Senate shut up in the Palace , and said , that the time was come wherein they might take down the Nobilities pride , and revenge themselves on them for the injuryes they had received at their hands , he holding them all prisoners in his keeping : but because he thought they liked not their City should be without government , it was fit ( being they intended to kill the old Senators ) to create new ones first . And therefore he had put the names of all the Senators in a bag , and so would begin to draw them forth one by one before them ; and so put them to death presently , as soon as they should have made choice of a Successor . And having begun to take out one , when he was nam'd , there was a great noise made , calling him a proud , cruell , and arrogant man. And Pacu 〈…〉 vius requiring that they should make an exchange of him , the whole multitudestood silent . And after a little while one of the Commons was named : whereat one began to whistle , another to laugh , some to speak in one sort , some in another . And so followed all the rest one after another as they were nam'd , being thought unworthy to be made Senators , so that Pacuvius hereupon taking occasion , sayd ' seeing that you judge that this City must needs be in ill case without a Senate , and you are not agreed to change your old Senators , I think it would be well that ye were made friends ; for this fright wherein the Senators have bin put will so humble them , that the courtesie which ye sought otherwhere , ye shall find with them . And hereunto being agreed , there followed the union ; and it was plain , how they were deceived , when they were forc'd to come to particulars . Besides , people in judging generally of affairs and their accidents are beguil'd , which they afterwards understand in particular , and perceive the deceit . After the year 1494. the Principal men of the City being chac't out of Florence , and there being not any orderly government , but rather an ambitious licentiousness , so that things went from bad to worse , many of the popular faction perceiving the destruction of the City , and understanding no other cause thereof , they blam'd the ambition of some powerfull man , that nourish'd these disorders , to the end he might make of it a State to his own purpose , and take away the liberty ; and these men were alwayes in the publique places of meeting , speaking evil of many Citizens , and threatning them , that if ever they came to the government of the State , they would discover this their treachery and chastise it . It happen'd oftentimes , that some of these or the like were prefer'd to the Principal Magistracy , and when they were once in the place , and saw things nearer , they knew well the disorders from whence they grew , and the dangers that hung over them , and the difficulty to remedy them . And having seen how the times and not the men caus'd the disorder , became forthwith of another mind , and chang'd their opinion . For the knowledg of things in particular took away that deceit , which when they considered generally , was presupposed in them : so that they that had first , when they were private men , heard them speak , and saw them afterwards being prefer'd to the chief Magistracy stand quiet , thought it came not from an exacter knowledge of things , but because they had bin carried away , and corrupted by the great ones . And this befalling many men many times , it came to a Proverb , that said , these are of one mind in the piazza , and of another in the palace . Considering therefore this whole discourse , we see , how a man may quickly open the peoples eyes , for seeing that a generality deceives them , it is expedient to bring them to descend to particulars , as Pacuvius did in Capua , and the Senate in Rome . I think also , this may pass for a conclusion , that no wise man ought to avoyd the peoples judgment in particular things , about the distributions of degrees and dignities : for onely in this the people are not deceived ; or if sometime they are deceived , it is very seldom ; but a few men are oftentimes deceived , when they are to make the like distribution : Nor do I take it to be superfluous , to shew , in the next Chapter , the order the Senate held to clear the peoples judgments in these distributions . CHAP. XLVIII . He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd , let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and lewd , or by one that is noble and very good . WHen the Senate was afraid that the Tribuns with Consular authority would be chosen out of the Plebeyans , they held one of these two courses to prevent it : either they made some of the best reputed men of Rome stand for the magistracy , or they used fit means to corrupt some forbid Plebeyan and of the basest condition , who crept in to be competitor with the Plebeyans that usually of the best quality stood for it . This last way made the people asham'd to bestow it , and the first asham'd to refuse it , all which turnes to the purpose of our former discourse : where it s shewed , though the people be deceived in generals , yet is it not in particulars . CHAP. XLIX . If those cities that have had their beginning free , as Rome , have found difficulty to make lawes that can maintain them ; so those that have had their beginning immediatly servile , find almost an impossibility of it . How hard a thing it is , in the ordering of a Republique to make provision of all such laws as may keep it free , the proceedings of the Roman Republique does well shew ; Where notwithstanding that many lawes were made first by R●mulus , after by Numa , Tullus Hostilius , and Servius , and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work , nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd , and it was needfull to make new laws : as it befell when they created the Censours , which was one of those orders that help'd to keep Rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty : for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome , they were a special occasion that Rome held off so long from being corrupted . Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years : but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdome of Mamercus the Dictator , who , by a new law he made , reduc'd the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen moneths . Which the Censour , that were then in office took so much a miss that they put Mamercus out of the Senate ' which thing was much blam'd both by the people and the fathers . And because the story shews not any where , that Mamercus could defend himself , it must needs be , that either the historian was defective , or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect : for it is not well , that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordein'd , that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in , should be wrong'd without any remedy , But returning to the beginning of this discourse ; I say , that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate , that if those cities that have had their beginnings free , and were under their own government , as Rome , with much adoe can find out good laws to maintain them free , it is no marvel , that those cities which have had their beginnings immediatly servile , have not found not onely difficulty , but impossibity ever so to order themselves , that they can quietly come to a civil government , as appears it befell the city of Florence , because her beginning was in Subjection to the Roman Empire , and having gotten leisure to breathe , began to make her own laws , which having bin mingled with the ancient , that were naught , could not work any good effect , and thus she proceeded in a government for 200 years ( as we have by certain relations ) without ever attaining to such a condition , that she could truly be term'd a Republique : and these difficulties which she hath had , have those Cities alwaies had whose beginnings have bin like hers And though many times by publique and free voices ample authority hath bin given to some few Citizens to reforme this , yet never have they order'd it to the advantage of the publique , but to serve the turn of their own faction , which hath caus'd more disorder , then order in the City . And to come to some particular example , I say , among other things which he that ordains a Republique should consider , is , that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his Citizens . This was well provided for in Rome ; for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people : yet if there were any occasion of importance , where , to delay execution , by means of the appeal , was dangerous , they had the help of a Dictator , who had power immediatly to execute ; which remedy they never us'd , but upon necessity . But Florence and other Cities beginning as she did , that is servile , had this authority committed alwaies to a stranger , who was sent by the Prince , to this purpose . When afterwards they became free , they continued this authority in a stranger , whom they called their Captain . Which thing , because he might easily be corrupted by the potent Citizens , was very pernicious . But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states , they ordained eight Citizens , to supply the Captains place . Which order of evil became very evil , for the reasons we have otherwhere alleadged , that a few are alwaies servants of a few , and especially of the most wealthy : from which the City of Veuice is well guarded , which hath ten citizens , who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal : and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent , though they have the authority they have ordained the Quarantie , or council of forty : and besides , they have taken care , that the council of the Pregai , which is the chiefer council , may punish them : so that , where there is no want of an accuser , they are never destitute of a Judge , to restrain the great mens insolency . There is then no marvail ( seeing that in Rome order'd by it self , and by so many sage persons , there grew every day new occasions , whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the Common liberty ) if in other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered , there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery . CHAP. L. The power of stopping the publique actions of the city , should not be given into the hands of one council , or one magistracy . TItus Quincius Cincinnatus ; and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome , who upon a quarrel arisen between them two , made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique : which the Senate seeing , perswaded them to create a Dictator , to the end that might be done , which , by reason of their discord , was hindred . But the Consuls disagreeing in every thing else , in this alone were of accord both of them , not to make a Dictator : so that the Senate finding no other help , desir'd assistance from the Tribuns , who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to obey . Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable , which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens ambitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people , but also among themselves : in the next place , that it should never be so ordain'd in a city , that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Common-wealth . For example , if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits , or to a Magistrate to dispatch some business to be done , it is fit to impose a necessity on him , that he do it in any case , or so provide that another might and should do it : otherwise the order would be defective , and perilous , as we see it was in Rome , unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authority . In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits . It sometime chanc't , that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd , or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities , nor to their Ministers of State abroad , which was a very great disorder ; for all at once , their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges ; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased , or were no longer deceived . And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes , had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them . Who having layd hold of a fit occasion , made a law , that all the Magistrates within or without the Citie should continue still in their offices , till new choice were made , and their successours appointed . And thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them , with the Commonwealths danger , to stop the publique actions . CHAP. LI. A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind , which indeed meere necessitie compells them to doe . WIse men gaine themselves alwayes the thanks of every thing in their actions , although in truth meere necessitie constraines them in any case to doe them . This discretion was well made use of by the Romane Senate , when they resolv'd to ad a dayly stipend out of the Common treasury to those that served in the warres ; it being then of custome there to serve as their own proper charges . But the Senate ceiving , that after that manner they could not long make warre ; and hereupon neither could they besiege townes , nor lead their armies farre off ; and judging it needfull they should doe the one and the other , they determined to allow the sayd stipends , which they did in such a way , that they got themselves thanks for that , to which they were bound by necessitie . And this present was so acceptable to the people , that all Rome seem'd overjoyd with it , they thinking it to be a great benefit , which they never had hopes of , nor of themselves had ever sought after . And though the Tribuns did their best to blot out these thanks , by shewing it was a matter of grievance and not of case to the people , seeing of necessitie they were to impose greater taxes on them , wherewith to pay these stipends , yet could they not prevayle so much , but that the people tooke it very thankfully . Which also the Senate augmented by the course they tooke in ordering of the tributes . For the greatest and heaviest were those they layd upon the Nobilitie , and so were those that were first payd . CHAP. LII . To stay the insolence of one that growes powerfull in a Commonwealth , there is no way more secure , and lesse offensive , than to seike before hand , and so prevent him of those wayes by which he attains to that power . WEe see by the above written discourse , how great credit the Nobility got with the people , upon the demonstrations make for their advantage , as well by the stipend appoined , as also by the course they tooke in imposing the taxes : in which way if the Nobilitie had continued , they had wholly avoyded all manner of tumult in that Citie , and they had taken from the Tribuns the credit they had with the people , and by consequence their authority . And truly it is not possible in a Commonwealth , especially in those that are corrupted , by any better way , lesse hurtfull , and more easy to oppose the ambition of any Citizen , than to prepossesse those wayes , by which a man perceives he takes his course , to attaine that dignitie hee aymes at . Which meanes if they had put in practise against Cosmus of Medici , his adversaries had gotten more by the bargaine , than by chasing him from Florence : For if those Citizens that were at brabble with him had taken the course to favour the people , they had without any imbroyle or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage . Peter Soderini gain'd himself credit with this onely in the Citie of Florence , that he favou'd the universality . Which universality gave him the repute , to be a lover of the Cities libertie . And surely for those Citizens that envyed his greatnesse , it was much easier , and had bin a businesse of fairer carriage , of lesse danger and dammage to the Commonwealth , to lay hold before hand of those wayes by which he became great , than by offering to oppose him , lest that in ruining him , the whole remainder of the Common-wealth also should have fallen to ruine . For if they could have taken out of his hands the forces whereby hee became strong , which they might easily have done , they could in all their publique counsells and resolutions have oppos'd him without suspicion or regard . And if any man should reply , that if the Citizens that hated Peter committed an orrour in not prepossessing the wayes wherby he gain'd upon the people : Peter also came to commit an errour in not laying hold beforehand of those wayes by which his adversaries frighted him : I answer , that Peter deserves excuse , as well because it was hard for him to doe it , as because the meanes were not fit for him to use . For the wayes by which he was hurt , were to favour the house of Medici , by which favours they overmaster'd him , and at last ruin'd him . Yet Peter could not fairely take his part , because hee could not with any good repute destroy that libertie , over which hee was appointed as guardian ; and seeing these favors could not passe in private , they were suddenly exceeding dangerous to Peter : for what way soever it had bin that he had bin discover'd to be a friend of the Medici , he had fallen into the jealousie , and incurr'd the hatred of the people . Whereupon his enemyes had had greater power to suppresse him , then formerly they had . Therefore men ought in every resolution , consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging , and not fasten on any one of them , when they carry with them more danger then profit , notwithstanding that they seeme well to tend to the end propounded : for being otherwise , in this case it would befall them , as it befell Tullius , who by going about to diminish Marc Antonius his power , increas'd it . For Marc Antonius being judged an enemy of the Senate , and he having got together a great army , good part whereof had followed Caesars faction , Tullius to take these souldiers from him , perswaded the Senate to set up the reputation of Octavianus , and seng him accompanied with the Consuls , and an armie against Marc Antonius ; alleadging , that so soone as ere the souldiers that followed Marc Antonius should heare the name of Octavianus , Caesars nephew , and that would be call'd Caesar too , they would forsake the other , and follow this . So that Marc Antonius being dispossest of his advantages would easily be suppressed . Which fell out cleane contrary . For Marc Antonius got Octavianus to his part , who leaving 〈…〉 lius and the Senate joyned forces with him . Which thing proov'd wholly the ruine of those great mens party . Which also it was easy to have conjectur'd : nor was that credible which Tullius perswaded himselfe ; but he should rather have made account , that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies , and gain'd himself the principality in Rome , nor yet his heirs , or adherents , would ever suffer them quietly to injoy their libertie . CHAP. LIII . The people deceiv'd by a false shew of good oftentimes seek their owne ruine ; and that great hope and large promises doe easily move them . WHen the ●yentes Citie was taken , the people of Rome were possess'd of an opinion , that it would be profitable for them to send halfe the Romans to dwell at Veyum : and because that Citie had a plentifull country about it , frequent with buildings , and neare neighbouring to Rome , halfe of the Romane Citizens might thereby be enrich't , without giving any disturbance to the civill government by reason of their neare scituation . Which thing the Senate and the graver Romans thought so unprofitable or rather so hurtfull , that they freely profess'd , they would rather suffer death , then agree to any such matter : so that the businesse coming to dispute , did so iorage the people against the Senate , that they had come to blowes and to bloud , had not some of the graver and reverenter Citizens oppos'd themselves against their furie ; whose regard bridled the people so , that they proceeded not in their insolencie . Here two things are to be noted , the first , 〈◊〉 people many times deceived by an imaginary good , cover their owne ruine ; and unlesse they be given to understand , which is the evill , and which the good , by some man they trust , the Republiques ordinarily run much hazzard . And when it so falls out , that the people hath no great confidence in any one , as sometimes it comes to passe , having bin of late deceived either by things , or men , of necessitie they goe to ruine . And Dante , to this purpose , sayes , in his discourse of a Monarchie : A populo molte volte grida , Viva la sua morte amocoia lavita The vulgar oftimes their own ruine chuse And life for death ignorantly refuse . From this increduliti 〈…〉 ises , that sometimes in Commonwealths good courses are not taken , as formerly it was sayd touching the Venetians , when being set upon by so many enemyes , they could not resolve till they were quite ruin'd , to gain any of them againe , by restitution of what they had wrongfully taken Whereupon warre was made against them , and a conspiracie of the Princes . Wherefore when we consider here , that which is easy , and that which is hard to perswade a people to , this distinction is to be made . Either , that which thou art to perswade them to , represents at the first view gaine or losse ; or is a course that carryes somwhat in it of courage or cowardise , And when in things that are propounded to the people , there appears advantage , though cover ly therebe disadvantage in it ; and when it seemes couragious , though underneath there be covertly hid the destruction of the Republique , it will alwayes be very easy to draw the multitude thereto . And so likewise it will bee alwayes very difficult to perswade them to those courses , where there appears either cowardise or losse , though when it is better weigh'd and advis'd upon , therin is contein'd both safety and advantage . And what I have said is confirmed with very many examples of the Romans , as also with those from abroad , both moderne and ancient . For from hence grew the evill opinion which was rais'd in Rome of Fab Max. who could not perswade the people of Rome , that it was profitable for that commonwealth to proceed slowly in that war , & to susteine and beare up against Hanniballs violence without fighting : for the people deem'd it a base course , nor had they judgement to discerne the advantage there was to be gotten by it : nor had Fab. reasons sufficient to make it plaine by demonstrations : & ordinarily the people are so much blinded in these opinions of courage , that though they of Rome had committed that error to give power to him that was Commander of the horse under Fab. to fight with Hannib . whether F. would or no , & that by reason thereof the Roman army had like to have bin broken , if F. had not succourd it , yet this experience serv'd them not , but that they afterwards made Varro C. not for any other worth of his , but because in al meetings & publique places of Rome , he had bragg'd he would discomfit Han. whensoever he had power given him to do it : whence came the battell & discomfiture at Cannae , & near upon the ruine of Rome . I will alleadge one other Ro. example . Hanniball had bin in Italy 8. or 10. yeares , & had fill'd the whole country full of bloudy slaughters of the Romans , when there came into the Senate one M. Centenius Penula , a very base fellow , yet he had had some place of charge in the armie ; And offer'd , that if they would give him authoritie to leavy an armie of voluntaries , in what place soever it were in Italie , hee would in a short time deliver into their hands Hanniball , either prisoner or dead . The Senate thought his demand very rash , yet they considering that if it were denied him , and afterwards his motion were made knowne to the people , that some trouble might arise thereupon , and so the evill will and envy thereof light upon the Senate , they yielded to him , being content rather to suffer the hazzard of all those that went out with him , then to give any occasion of raising new discontents among the people , considering how likely this course was to be acceptable , and how hard to be disswaded . He went then with this inordinate and rude multitude to seek out Hanniball , with whom he no sooner met , but he and all his troops were either slaine or routed . In Greece in the city of Athens , Nicias a very grave and discreet man , could never perswade the people that it was not for their good to go and undertake an expedition against Sicily , so that they having resolved thereupon , contrary to the wise mens likeings , there ensued the whole ruine of Athens . Scipio when he was made Consull , and that he desir'd the province of Affricke , promising the utter ruine of Carthage , whereunto the Senate not agreeing by the advice of Fabius Maximus , threatened to propound it to the people , as he that well knew how such like resolutions pleas'd them . We could also to this purpose lay downe some examples of our owne city , as was that of Hercules Betivogli , commander for the Florentines , together with Antoni Giacomini ; after they had routed Bartolomeus Alvianus at Saint Vincenti , they went to incampe before Pisa , which enterprise was resolv'd on by the people upon the brave promises Hercules made them ; though many discreet citizens did no way like of it , yet they could not hinder it , thrust on by the generall desire , which was grounded on the commanders large promises . I say therefore , that there is not an easier way to inlarge a Commonwealth , where the people hath the authority , then to put them into brave undertakings . For where the people is of any worth or valour , those will be alwayes well lik'd of , and if any man be of different opinion , he shall not be of force to perswade it . But if hereupon comes the destruction of the city , thence proceeds also , and most ordinarily the particular ruine of those citizens who are made the commanders of such like undertakings ; for the people having presupposed the victory , when they go by the losse , never impute it to their General 's evill fortune or want of sufficient forces , but blame him rather of treason or ignorance , and so either put him to death , imprison or confine him , as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains , and Athenians . Nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten , afterwards shelter them , for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past : as it befell Antoni Giacomini our countrey man here , who not having overcome the Pisans , as the people presupposed , and he had promised , fell into such disgrace with the people , that for all his many good services past , he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people , protected him , then by any assurance else was given him . CHAP. LIV. What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude . THe second thing remarkable upon the text alleadged in the former Chapter is , that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude inraged , as the reverence of some grave man comming among them , as Virgil sayes to the same purpose , and not without reason . Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere , silent , arrectisque auribus astant . And therefore that man of worth and merit , that either hath the command of an army , or that abides in a city where a tumult arises , ought represent himself upon the occasion , with the greatest grace , and in as honorable termes as may be , cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality , to gain him the more reverence . A few years agoe , Florence was divided into two factions , of the Frateschi and Arrabiati , for so they were called : and comming to blowes , the Frateschi were overcome , among whom was Paul Antonius Sodorini , a citizen of great esteem in those dayes : and the people in the time of those tumults going in armes to sack his house , Franciscus his brother then Bishop of Valterra , and now Cardinal , was by chance in his house , who presently having perceived the stir , and seen the multitude comming , clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet , and so met these armed people , where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them : Which thing throughout the City for many dayes was much noted and celebrated . I conclude then that there is not a more setled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude , then the presence of such a man , who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him . And thereupon we see ( to return to the text formerly alleadged ) with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party , to go to Veium , thinking it advantagious to them , but never considering the mischief therein involved ; and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion , there would have bin harme done , had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages restrained their fury . CHAP. LV. How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted : and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity ; and where that is not , a Republique cannot be . ALthough that heretofore we have sufficiently treated , what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are corrupted : yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took , touching the vow Camillus made , to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Veientes , to Apollo . Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands , seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it , the Senate made an edict , that every one should publiquely produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Veium . And though this resolution took not place , the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient , and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the people , yet we perceive by these determinations , how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd , that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict . And on the other side , how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict , by giving less then was due , but rather to free themselves therefrom , by shewing their open distaste at such course taken . This example with many others , above alleadged , give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people , and what might be hop'd for of them . And truly where this goodness is not , little can be hop'd for : as we can hope for nothing in those countreys , which in these daies we see corrupted , as in Italy above others , so France and Spain retain a part of the same corruption : and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy , it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness ( which is very much fail'd ) as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union , not onely by his vertue , but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes , which is not yet quite perverted . This goodness is yet seen in Germany , and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people , which is the occasion that many Republiques continue free , and do so strictly observe their own laws , that no forrain enemy abroad , nor ambitious man at home , dares offer to seize on them . And to proove this true , that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness , I will give another example , like to that abovesaid of the Senate and of the people of Rome . Those Republiques use , when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good , that the Magistrates , or the Consuls , having , authority , should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred , of that which every man is worth . And such a resolution being made according to the order of the town , every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax , and having first taken an oath to pay a convenient sum , he throws into a chest , appointed to that purpose , what in his conscience he thinks he should pay . Of which payment there is no other witness , but he that payes . Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men . And we may well think , that every one payes the due sum ; for if it were not paid , the imposition would not yeeld that quantity , as those of old time were wont to do : which failing , the deceipt would appear : whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys , then this . Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times , because it is very rare , or rather remains onely in this countrey . Which proceeds from two things , the one , because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors ; for neither have these gone into their countreys , nor they come to visit these , because they have bin contented with those goods , to feed on those victuals , and to be clad with those wools , which the countrey affords ; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation , and the beginning of all corruption . For so they could not learn the French , Spanish , or Italian manners , which nations together corrupt the whole world . The other reason is , because those Republiques where the common liberty is preserv'd , and uncorrupted , do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman , but rather maintain among them an equality ; and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen . And if by chance they fall into their hands , they put them to death , as the principal authors of corruption , and occasions of scandal . And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is , I say , that those are call'd gentlemen , that live in idleness , yet deliciously , of the profits of their estates , without having any care to cultivate their lands , or to take any other pains necessary to the maintenance of mans life . These kind of men are very hurtfull in every Commonwealth , and countrey ; but worse are they , that , besides the foresaid fortunes , hold strong Castles , and have vassals that obey them . With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds . the countrey about Rome , Romagna , and Lombardia . This is the cause , that in those countreys there hath never bin any Republique nor any civil government : for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government . And if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a Commonwealth , he would find it impossible ; but to bring them under some order , if any man had the power , he could take no other course , then reduce them to a Royalty . The reason is this , because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted , that the laws are not able to restrain it , it is needfull to ordain together with them a greater power , which is the authority of a King , who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty . This reason is verified in the example of Tuscany : where we see that in a small space of countrey three Republiques have long consisted , Florence , Siena , and Lucca ; and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind , that they have their dispositions and their orders much like them , and that they would willingly maintain the common liberty , all this arises from hence , because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys , and never a one , or very few Gentlemen ; but such equality , that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments , might easily reduce them to a free state . But their misfortune hath bin so great , that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution . This conclusion then I draw from hence , that he that strives to frame a Republique where there are many gentlemen , cannot do it , unless he first dspatch them all out of the way : and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principallity where there is much equality , shall never effect it , unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent mindes , and makes them rather gentlemen in effect , then in title , enriching them with Castles , and possessions , allowing them the favor of wealth and men , to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them , by their means may maintain his power , and they by his favor preserve their ambition , and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure . And there being by this way a proportion from him that forces , to him that is forced , thereby men continue setled every one in their order . And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a Kingdom , and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome , is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority ; many there have bin that have endeavor'd it , but few have bin able to go through with it : because the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them , and partly so overbears them , that they fail in their first beginnings . I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion , that where there are gentlemen , a Republique cannot be instituted : for there none can partake of the dignities , unless they be gentlemen . The answer hereto is , that this example makes no opposition against us ; for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name , then in effect : for they have not great revenues out of possessions , and lands , but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise , and moveable goods ; and moreover none of them hold any Castles , or have any jurisdiction over men : but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit , not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen . And as other Republiques have all their divisions under several names , so Venice is divided into the Gentility , and the Commonalty ; and their order is , that those are capable of all honors , these not . Which is not any cause of imbroile among them , for the reasons we have other where said . Let a Common-wealth then be there ordain'd , where allthings are reduc'd to an equality ; and contrariwise , let a Prince be made , where great inequality is ; otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance . CHAP. LVI . Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a countrey , usually there are some prodigies which forerun them , or men that foretell them . FRom whence this proceeds I know not , but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples , that no very heavy accident ever befell any countrey or City , that hath not bin foretold either by some Diviners , or by some revelations , or prodigies , or signes from heaven . And not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof hereof , every one knows how long before the coming of Charles the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Fryer Jerome Savanarola : and how besides this , it was said throughout all Tuscany , that there were heard in the aire , and seen over Arrezzo , many men in armes skirmishing together . Moreover we all know here that before Laurens of Medici the old mans death the Duemo or principal Church was fir'd with lightning on the top , even to the ruine thereof . Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that Peter Soderini , who had bin made the Florentines chief Standard-bearer for life , was banish'd and depriv'd of his dignities , the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning . A man might alleadge other examples beside these , but I leave them rather to avoyd tediousness . I shall relate that onely which Titus Livius speaks of , before the the Frenchmens coming to Rome , and that is , how one Marcus Ceditius a Plebeyan told the Senate , that he had heard at midnight , as he past by the new way , a voyce greater than any mans , which warn'd him to tel the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome . The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon , and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things , which I profess not . Yet it may be , as some Philosophers will have it , that the ayre being full of spirits , who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men , and advertise them by such like signes , to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence . But however it is , we may find it true , that alwaies after such strange accidents , new and extraordinary chances befall countreys . CHAP. LVII . The Common people united are strong and vigorous , but taken apart and separated , vile and contemptible . MAny Romans ( the countrey all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome ) were gone to dwell at Veyum , contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate ; who , to remedy this disorder , commanded by their publique edicts , that every one within a set time , under a certain penalty , should return to inhabite at Rome . At which edicts at first , they against whom they were directed , scoffed ; but afterwards , when the time drew near that they were to obey , they all yielded their obedience . And Titus Livius uses these words : Of fierce that they were all in general , each one out of his particular fear became obedient . And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open , than here in this Text it is shewed : for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Princes decrees . Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain , not trusting to one another , they hasten all to obedience ; so that it plainly appears , that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him ; if it be good , to take such order that it may still continue ; if ill , to provide so that it cannot hurt him . This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion , than for the loss of their liberty , or for the love of their Prince , who is yet living . For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure , and have need of great remedies to restrain them . Their other indispositions will be easy , when they have not made choyce of any heads , to whom they may have their recourse : for on oneside , there is not a more dreadfull thing , than a dissolute multitude , and without a head : and on the other side , there is nothing weaker then it ; for though they have their weapons in their hands , yet will it be easy to reduce them , provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie : for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home , they begin then a little to doubt of themselves , and to take a care for their safety , either by flight or agreement . Therefore a multitude up in armes , desiring to escape these dangers , is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them , keep them united , and provide for their defence , as did the common people of Rome , when after the death of Verginia , they departed from Rome , and for their own preservations , they chose 20 Tribuns from among themselves : which if they do not , there allwaies befalls them that which Titus Livius saies in his above written discourse , that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor ; but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger , they become weak and contemptible . CHAP. LVIII . The multitude is more wise and constant , then a Prince . THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude , as well our Author Titus Livius , as all other Historians do affirm : for we find it often in the relations of mens actions , that the multitude hath condemned some man to death , whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again : as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus , whom after they had condemn'd to death , they much desir'd again . And these are the words of the Author . The people , after that by his death they perceiv'd themselves free from danger , wished him alive again . And in another place , when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of Hieronymus , Hie 〈…〉 nephew , he sayes , This is the nature of the multitude , that they are either slavish in their obedience , or insolent in their auihority . I know not , whether herein I undertake not too hard a task , so full of difficulties , that I must either give it over with shame , or continue it with blame , having a desire to defend that , which , as I have said , is accused by all writers . But however it be , I do not judge it , nor ever will , a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons , without any intention to use either authority or force . Therefore I say , that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude , all men in particular are guilty , and especially Princes : for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does . And this we may easily know , for there are and have bin many evil Princes ; and vertuous and discreet ones but a few . I speak of Princes , that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them ; among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt , when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes ; nor those of Spavta , nor those that in our daies are in France , which Kingdom is order'd more by the laws , than any other which in these times we have knowlege of . And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number , from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself , and discerne if he be like the multitude : for in parallell with them , we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes , as they are , and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them : and we shall see they neither insolently domineere , nor slavishly serve , as the people of Rome , which whilest the Republique continued uncorrupted , never serv'd basely , nor rul'd proudly , but with their own customes , and Magistrates held their own degree honorably . And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull , they did it , as it appear'd in the example of Manlius , and in that of the ten , and others , who went about to oppress them . And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators , and the Consuls , for the common safety , they did it likewise : and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead , it is no marvail ; for they desired his vertues , which had bin such , that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion , and might be of force likewise to work the same effect in a Prince : for it is the opinion of all writers , that vertue is commended even in ones enemies . And if Manlius , in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd , the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison , and condemn'd him to death . In like manner we see there were some Princes esteem'd wise too , that have put some men to death , whom afterwards they have much desired again ; as Alexander did Clitus , and others of his friends , and Herod Mariamme . But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude , belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes , as was that of the Romans , but to that which is loose , as was that of the Syracusians , which committed those errors that men inraged and dissolute fall into , as did Alexander the Great , and Herod , in the cases aforesaid . Therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy , than that of Princes : for all equally do erre , when all without respect have power to erre . Whereof , besides this I have alleadged , there are examples enough , as well among the Roman Emperors , as other Kings and Princes , where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life , as never was yet seen in any multitude . I conclude then , beyond the common opinion , which sayes , that the people when they have the Principallity in their hands , are various , mutable , unthankfull , affirming that these faul●s are no otherwise in them , than they are in particular Princes . And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together , he might say true ; but exempting Princes , he is deceiv'd . For a people that rules , and is well in order , will be constant , prudent and gratefull , as well as a Prince , or better , though esteem'd wise . And on the other side , a Prince loosen'd from the law will be unthankfull , various , and imprudent , more than the people : and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions ( because in all of them it is much after one manner , and if there be any advantage on either side , it is on the peoples part ) but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live , than the other . And he that considers the people of Rome , shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hatefull to them , and yet were they zealous for the glory , and common good of their countrey : and he shall see many examples among them that witness the one thing , and the other of them And if any man alleadge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used towards Scipio , I answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter , where it was made plaine , that people are lesse ungratefull than Princes . But as touching wisedome , and settled stayednesse , I say that a people is wiser and more stayd , and of more exact judgment than a Prince . And therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to Gods voyce ; for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their presages , so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill . And touching their judgement in things , it is seldome seene , that when they heare two Oratours , pleading each of them a contrary part , when they are both of equall worth , but that they follow the better opinion , and are very capable of the truth they heare . And if in matters of courage , or in things that appeare profitable ( as it was abovesayd ) they erre , many times also does a Prince erre , drawne aside by his owne passions , which are greater in them then in the people . We see likewise in their choosing of Officers , they make a farre better choice then does a Prince . Nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life , to which a Prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought . We see a people begin to hate some one thing , and continue many ages in the same opinion , which we see not it a Prince . And of the one and the other of these two things , the people of Rome shall serve me for witnesse , which in so many hundreds of yeares , in so many electio 〈…〉 of Consulls and Tribuns , never made foure choices , whereof they had cause to repent them . And they hated so much ( as I said ) the name of a King , that no citizen of theirs could ever so farre oblige them , that if once he affected the Royalty , they would pardon his due punishment . Moreover we see , that in those cities where the Principality is in the people , in a short time exceeding great increases are made , and farre greater then those that have bin made under the government of a Prince , as Rome did after the banishment of her Kings , and Athens after she freed her selfe from Pisistratue ; which proceeds from nothing else , but that the peoples governments are better then Princes . Nor will we agree to this , that all that our Historian sayes in the text before alleadged , or any where else , opposes this our opinion ; for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples , & the disorders of Princes , and all the glorious actions of people , as those also of Princes , we shall see the people farre surmount the Princes in vertue and in glory . And if Princes exceede the people in ordaining of Lawes , in framing a civill government , in making of statutes and new institutions , yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so farre beyond them , that they attaine to the glory of their founders . And in summe , to conclude this matter , I say , that as Princes states have lasted long , so likewise have those of Republiques ; and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the lawes : for a Prince that hath the power to doe what he list , commits divers follies ; and a people that can do what they will , seldome give great proofes of their wisdome . If then the argument be touching a Prince and a people tied and chained to their lawes , a man shall see more vertue in the People , then in the Prince : but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes , fewer errours will appeare in the people then in the Prince ; and those lesse , and which are capable of greater remedies : for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people , and so reduce them to reason . But to a mischievous Prince no man can speake , nor is there any other remedy but the sword . Whereupon a man may guess at the importance of one and the others evill : for if words are of Where he cut off the lappet of Sauls garment , and therefore was checkt by his owne conscience . And that in the Psalm , 140. Touch not mine anointed , &c. Nor doe the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto ; wherefore Tacitus sayes , Ferenda regum ingenia , neque usui crebras mutationes . Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem & caetera naturae mala , ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate : Vitia erunt donec homines , sed neque haec continua , & meliorum interventu pensantur . Hist . 4. I neede not alleadge others : The troubles that fell upon the Roman Empire when they began to murder their Princes , however bad , may argue their part : which was when Nero , Otho , Galba , Vitellius successively were slaine , Tacitus speaking of the story he writ of it , sayes it was , Opus plenum magnis casibus , arroxpraelijs , discors seditioni bus , ipsa etiam pace saevum , Hist . 1. For they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by meanes of a Tyrants death : for as Iulius Caesar said , Kingdomes never change them without great combustions , and states suffer worser michiefes , by not enduring insolent princes . For howbeit both particulars , and the publique also smarts because of this disorder , yet the life of the Prince is the very soule and bond of the Republique : Rege incolumi mens omnibus una est , Amisso rapere fidem , sayes the Poet. This case hath bin argued by diverse at large , and the onely remedy is thus concluded on . The treacle of this venim is prayer and not vengeance : the people oppressed shal lift up their heart to God , as did the Israelites , when tyrannis'd over by Pharaoh ; for the cruelties of bad Princes come not to passe by chance ; and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to God , who sometimes for chastisement sometimes for try all permits them . force to cure the peoples evill , when as that of Kings requires the sword ; there is no man that will not say , but that where the medicines mustbe stronger , the more dangerous are the evills . When a people is risen in tumult , the follies which they commit are not so perillous , nor is there such feare to be had of the present evill , as of that which may befall , it being possible some Tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion . But during the time of mischievous Princes the contrary happens ; for the greatest feare is of the present evill ; and of the time to come there is hope , men easily perswading themselves , that his evill life may produce their liberty . So that a man may see the difference between the one and the other ; the desperate feare of the one , is , of the present state ; of the other , of the state into which it may fall . The multitudes cruelties are exercis'd against those that they feare , lest they should seize upon the common good . The Princes against those that they feare , lest they should seeke to recover their owne againe . But the opinion against the people growes dayly , for every one may freely speake evill of the people without feare , even while they have the government in their hands . A man speakes not evill of Princes , but with many fears and jealousies . Nor is it much out of purpose ( seeing the matter drawes me to it ) to argue in the Chapter following , what Confederacies a man may best trust to , either those that be made with a Republique , or that are made with a Prince . CHAP. LIX . What Confederation or league is rather to be trusted , either that which is made with a Republique , or that is made with a Prince . BEcause every day we have it , that one Prince with another , or one Republique with another make leagues , and joyne friendship together , and in like manner also confederacies are drawne and agreements made betweene a Republique and a Prince . I thinke to examine , which is the firmest league , whereof a man should make surest account of ; either of that with a Republique , or the other with a Prince . And examining the whole , I beleeve that in many cases they are alike , and in some there is some difference : and therefore , that accords made by force shall not be truly kept thee neither by Prince nor commonwealth . And I thinke that when feare comes upon them touching their state , as well the one as the other , rather then perish , will breake their faith with thee , and requite thee with unthankfulnesse . Demetrius , he that was ever termed the taker of cities , had done exceeding much good to the Athenians ; it chanc'd afterwards , that being routed by his enemies , and seeking refuge in Athens as in a city that was his friend , and much ingag'd to him , he was not admitted into it . Which griev'd him much more then the losse of his souldiers and army had done . Pompey when his army was routed by Caesar in Thessaly , fled into Egypt to Ptolomy , who formerly had bin restor'd by him into his kingdome , and was put to death by him . Which things we see had the same occasions : yet more humanity and lesse injury was us'd by the Republique , then by the Prince . Therefore where there is fear , a man shal finde in effect the same faith . And if there be any Commonwealth or Prince who to keepe their faith with thee , expect while they ruine , it may proceed also from the same occasion . And as for a Prince , it may well chance , that he is allied to some powerfull Prince , who though he then hath not the opportunity to defend him , yet may he well hope , that in time he may restore him into his state , or else that having taken side with him as partisan , he thinkes he cannot obtaine a faithfull and fair accord with his enemy . Of this sort were those Princes of the Kingdome of Naples , that tooke part with the French. And for Republiques , of this sort was Saguntum in Spaine , which till it was ruin'd tooke part with the Romans ; and so was Florence for siding with the French in the yeare one thousand five hundred and twelve . And I believe , having summ'd up every thing , that in these cases , where the danger is urgent , there is more assurance rather in the Republiques , then in the Princes : for though the Republiques were of the same minde and had the same intention as Princes had , yet for that they move but slowly , it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves , then a Prince will ; and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he . Confederacies are broken for profit , Wherein Commonwealths are farre stricter in their observance of accords , then Princes . And we might bring many examples , where even for a very small gaine a Prince hath broken his faith ; and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a Commonwealth , as was the party Themistocles propounded to the Athenians , to whom in an oration made them he said , that he could advise them so , that their country should gaine much advantage by it , but them he might not tell it , for feare of discovering it , for by the discovery the opportunity of doing it would be taken away . Whereupon the Athenians chose Aristides , to whom he should communicate this secret , and together with him consult upon it : whom Themistocles shew'd how the whole navall army of all Greece was in their hands under their protection , though intrusted them upon their faith , so that it was in their power by the ruine thereof to make themselves Lords of all Greece . Whereupon Aristides told the people that Themistocles advice was exceeding profitable , but very dishonest . For which cause the people wholly resus'd it , which Philip of Macedon would not have done , nor those other Princes who seeke their owne gaine rather , and have made more advantage by breaking their faith , than by any way else . Touching the breaking of agreements , upon the not observance of some particulars therein , I meane not to meddle with them , being ordinary matters ; but I speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points . Wherein , by what we have said , I beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the Princes , and therefore may better bee trusted than they . CHAP. LX. How the Consulship and every other Magistracie in Rome was given without respect of age . IT appeares by order of the Story , that the Commonwealth of Rome , after that the Consulship came among the people , bestowed it upon their Citizens , without regard of yeares or bloud : and indeed they never had respect to age , but altogether aimed at vertue , whether it were in young , or old . Which wee perceive by the testimonie of Valerius Corvinus , who at 23. yeares of age was made Consul . And the same Valerius , speaking to his souldiers , sayd , That the Consulship was the reward of vertuc , and not of bloud . Which thing , whether it were advisedly sayd or no , might require much dispute . And touching bloud , this was yeelded to upon necessitie , and this necessitie that was in Rome might be in every Citie that would doe the same things Rome did , as otherwhere is sayd : for toyle , and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward ; nor can their hopes of obtaining reward bee taken from them , without danger . And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship , and by this hope were they a while fed without having it ; at length that hope served not , but there was a necessity to come to performance with them . But the Citie that imployes not their people in any glorious action may treate the mafter their owne manner , as other where it was argued . But that which will take the same course Rome tooke , must make this distinction . And grant that it be so , for that of time there is no reply : nay rather it is necessary ; for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man , it is likely ( the people being to make the choyce ) that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto . And when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions , it were a very great wrong , that that Citie might not serve her selfe of him then , but should be put off to expect , till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull , whereof in that age his country might have made good use , as Rome did of Valerius Corvinus , of Scipio , and Pompey , and many others , that triumphed very young . THE SECOND BOOKE . THE PREFACE . MEN do alwaies commend , but not alwaies with reason , the times of old , and blame the present : and they take part so much with things past , that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them , but those also , which now being old , they remember they have seen in their youth . And when this their opinion is false , as most commonly it is , I perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error , are divers . And the first I take to be , that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known , & of thoi● actions most commonly those things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times , but whatsoever advances their credit & glory is set out with magnificence . For most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune , that to make their victories glorious , they not only augment what they have vertuously done but they so illustrate their enomies actions , that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys , either conquering or conquered , have cause to admire those men and times , and so consequently are forc'd exceedingly to praise and love them . Besides this , men hating things either for fear , or envic , two very powerfull causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed , being they are not able to hurt , nor can give occasion of envic . But on the contrary part , it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand , and we see , which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them , no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us , and knowing in them together with the good , many things worthy dislike , hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much Inferior to matters of old , although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation : this I say , not arguing touching the arts , which are now brought to such perfection , that the times cannot take from them , nor add but little more glory to them ; but speaking of things belonging to means lives and manners , whereof the proofes are not very evident ; I answer , that this custome above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true : for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth ; because all humane things are continually in motion , and either rise or fall . As we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person , that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man , the State mends much , and is more and more amplified : he that is then borne in that State , and commends more the times of old , than those moderne , is much deceiv'd : and the cause of his errour proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd . But those that are afterwards born in that City or countrie , whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence , then erre nor . And I devising with my selfe whence these things proceed , I think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner , and that in i● hath beene alwayes as much good as evill ; but that that good and evill does change from country to country , as it appeares by that which is discover'd to us of those ancient kingdomes , which alter'd from the one to the other , by change of manners . But the world continued the same . There was onely this difference , that where it first had plac'd its vertue in Assiria , it afterwards remov'd it into Media , then into persia , in so much that at length it came into Italie , and so to Rome . And if after the Romane Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted , nor where the world had retired all its vertue together ; yet we see it was spread abroad into severall Nations , where men behav'd themselves very bravely and valouroufly , as in the Kingdome of France , the Kingdome of the Turks , and that of the Soldan ; so now adayes in Germanie , and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect , which did great exploits , and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world , after they had destroyed the Easterne Empire of Rome . In all these Provinces then , after the Romanes were ruined , and in all these sects hath that vertue resided ; and now in some of them indeed it may be wished for , but in othersome worthily commended . And he that is borne in those Countries , and praises the times past more than the present , may be deceived : but he that is borne in Italy and not in Greece , and is not become either in Italy , a Tramontan , or in Greece , a Turk , hath reason to blame the times present , and commend the former , for therein were many things made them marvail , but in these there is nothing can recover them out of extream misery , infamy , and disgrace , where there is no observance either of Religion or Lawes , nor of warlike discipline , but they are wholly bespotted with all manner of filthiness . And so much the more detestable are these vices , by how much they are most in those that are greatest , who sitting in their Tribunals command all , and will be ador'd . But returning to our discourse , I say , that if mens understandings are corrupted in matter of judgment , touching which age is the better , the present or that of old , in those things by reason of their antiquitie they could not have such an exact knowledge , as they might have of their own times , yet should they not be corrupted in old men touching the judgement of the times of their youth , and old age , having known and seen equally the one and the other ; Which thing would be true , if those men all the time of their lives continued still at the same state of judgement , and had the same desires . But they altering , though the times , change not , yet cannot seem so to men to continue the same , they having other desires , other delights , and other considerations in their old age , than in their youth : for the strength of mens bodies , when they grow old , decaying , and their judgements and understandings increasing , as must needs be , that those things which in their youths they thought supportable and good , becomes afterwards to them growing old intollerable and hurtfull : and where these men ought herein to lay the fault upon their own judgements , they blame the times . Besides this , the desire of man being insatiable ( because of nature he hath it , that he can and will desire every thing , though of fortune he be so limited , that he can attain but a few ) there arises thence a dislike in mens minds , and a loathing of the things they injoy which causes them to blame the times present and commend those pass'd , as also those that are to come , although they have no motives grounded upon reason to incite them thereto . I know not then , whether I shall deserve to be numbred among them that are deceiv'd ; if too much in these discourses of mine I shall praise the times of the ancient Romans , and blame our own . And truly if the vertue that then reign'd , and the vice that now reigns , were not more clear than the Sun , I should not speak so freely , for fear I should incur the censure of that error whereof I have now blam'd others : but the matter being so evident , that every man sees it , I shall with boldness speak that plainly which I conceive of those & these times , to the end those young men who shall chance to read these my writings , may avoyd the evil of these times , and prepare their minds to imitate the good of these of old , whensoever their good , fortune shall give them occasion : for it is the duty of a good man , to reach unto others that good , which by reason of the malignity of the times , and of fortune , thou hast not bin able to do thy self , to the end that many being given to understand hereof , some of them , whom the heavens shall more favor , may put it in practice . And having in my former book of discourses spoken of the Romans deliberations , touching their affairs within the City ; in this we shall treat of those which the people of Rome did , belonging to the enlargement of the Empire . CHAP. I. Which contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire , either their virtue , or their fortune . MAny have bin of opinion , among whom is Plutarch a great Writer , that the people of Rome were more favor'd by fortune , than assisted by their vertues , in gaining their Empire . And among other reasons which he alleadges to that purpose , he sayes , it appears by the confession of the same people , that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune , having consecrated more Temples to her , than to any other god . And Livie seems to side with this opinion : because it is very seldome , that he brings in any Roman speaking where he makes mention of vertue , but that he joynes fortune therewith . Whereunto I will not yield in any termes , nor think I it can be maintain'd : for if never any Republique made the same Progress that Rome made ; it is because never hath any Republique bin so order'd to make its advantage , as Rome was : for the valour of their armies gain'd them their Empire , and their order of proceeding , and their own mannor with that which their first founder likewise devised for them , made them keep what they had gotten , as hereafter in several discourses shall be declar'd . That two strong wars never at the same time met together to shake their state , they say , it was the people of Romes fortune , and not their valor : for they had no wars with the Latins , til they had not onely beaten the Samnites , but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them . Neither war'd they with the Tuscans , til they had first subdued the Latins , and wholly weakned the Samnices with many routes : whereof if two entire powers ( when they were fresh ) had joyned together against the Romans , without doubt a man may easily conjecture that the ruine of the Roman Republique would have followed thereupon . But however this thing came to pass , it never befell them to have two strong wars made against them at once , but rather luckily it proov'd , that when one began , the other ended , and at the end of one another began , Which we may easily see , by viewing their wars , how they followed in order : for letting alone those wars which they made before Rome was taken by the Frenchmen , we see , that whilest they fought with the Aequi and the Volsci , never ( so long as these people were of any considerable power ) did any other people set upon them . They they being conquer'd , the war against the Samnites began ; and though before the finishing of this war the Latins Rebel'd against the Romans , nevertheless , when that rebellion followed , the Samnites were in league with Rome , and with their army help'd the Romans to bring down the Latins pride ; and when they were subdued , the war with the Samnites again was reviv'd . But their forces being broken by divers defeats given them , the war with the Tuscans arose ; and when that was quieted , the Samni es began anew to stir , upon Pyrrhus has passage into Italy ; when he was defeated , and beaten back into Greece , then first was kindled the fire of the Carthaginian wars : nor was that quenched til that all the French , as well beyond , as on this side the Alpes , conspired against the Romans ; so that between Pobolonia and Pisa , where now is the tower at Saint Vincenti , they were vanquish'd with a very great slaughter . After this , for the space of 20 years , they had not any war of much importance : for they had no quarrel with any but with the Ligurians , and the remainder of those French that werein Lombardie : and so they continued , til the second Carrhaginian war begin ; Which troubled Italie for 16 years space . Which being made an end of with great glory , that of Macedon sprung up , and was ended , when that of Antiochus , and afterwards that of Asia took their turns . After which victorie , there remained not in the whole world neither Prince nor Republique that either by themselves or altogether could oppose the Roman Forces . But before that last victory , he that considers the order of these wars , and the manner of their proceeding , shall find mingled with their fortune much valour and wisdome ; so that he who examines the occasion of such fortune , shall easily discover it : for it is very certain , that when a Prince or a people have gained such a reputation , that neither prince nor people bordering upon him dares by himself assault him , and is afraid of him , it will alwaies so fall out , that none of them all will set upon him , unless forc'd thereto , so that it shall be at that great Princes choyce , to war with which of his neighbors he shall please , and the rest with little pains to quiet . Who , partly in regard of his power , partly beguil'd by some devices he shall make use of to lull them asleep , are easily kept from stirring . And for other powerfull Princes , who are more remote and have no dealing with him , they look upon the matter , as a thing afar off , and nothing belonging to them . In which error they continue so long , til the fire comes close to their doors : which then being come so near , they have no means to extinguish it , but only to use their own armes , which suffice nor , the enemy being now grown exceeding mighty . I will let pass , how the Samnites stood still and look'd upon the Romans , while they overcame the Volsci and the Aequi : and that I may not be too tedious , I will satisfie my self with the Carthaginians , who were of great power and estimation , when the Romans war'd with the Samnites and Tuscans : for even then they were Masters of all Affrica , and had Sardinia and Scicily in their hands , and had the rule of some part of Spain . Who being that their forces were remote from the people of Romes confines , never thought of assaulting them , nor of giving succours to the Samnites , and Tuscans ; but as if the Romans increase had bin the Carthaginians advantage , they made a confederacy with them , seeking their friendship : nor did they perceive their error committed , til the Romans having subdued all those peoples that lay between them and the Carthaginians , began to make war with them for the rule of Scicily and Spain . The self-same befell the French , that hapned to the Carthaginians , and so to Philip of Macedon , and Antiochus ; and every one of them beleeved ( while the Romans were busy with another ) that that other might chance to vanquish them , and that they had time enough , either by peace or war , to defend themselves from them . So that , I beleeve , that the same fortune herein the Romans had , all Princes would have had , provided , that they proceeded as the people of Rome did , and were of equal valour with them . To this purpose it would not be unfit , to declare the course the people of Rome held in their entryes into other Princes countreys , but that inour treaty of Principallities , we have discoursed thereupon at laege . I will only say this in bries , they alwaies did put in practice to make themselves some friends in the Countreys they came newly acquainted with , who served them for a ladder to climb up to them , or a gate to enter them , or a tye to hold them ; as it appears , by means of the Capuans they enterd into Samnium , by the Camertins into Tuscany , by the Mamertins into Scicly , by the Saguntins into Spain , by Mafinissa into Affrica , by the Ae olians into Greece , by Eumenes and other Princes into Asia , by the Masilians and the Heduans into France . And so they never fail'd of the like supports , whereby to facilitate their undertakings , either in the inlargement of their dominions , or in the maintaining them . Which , those people that shall observe , shall find themselves in less want of good fortune , than they who neglect it . And to the end , that every one may know of what avail our vertue was beyond their for une , in the conquest of their Empire , we will treat in the Chapter following , concerning the quality of those people with whom they were to make war , and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty . CHAP. II. What people the Romans had to make war withall , and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty . NOthing made it more painfull to the Romans to vanquish their neighbors near about them , as also some other Countreys further off , then the affection that in those days many people did bear to their liberty , which they so obstinately defended , that they had never bin subdu'd , but by an excessive valour : for , by many examples , we know to what dangers they expos'd themselves , as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it ; and what revenges they took against those that had laid hold on it . We know likewise what dammages peoples and cities receive by servitude And whereas now adayes , there is onely one Countrey that can say , she hath free Cities in her : in ancient-times people liv'd very free in all countreys . We see that in those times whereof at this present we speak , in Italy from the Alpes ( which make a partition between Tuscany and Lombardy ) even to the very point of Italy , there were many free peoples , as were the Tuscans , the Romans the Samnites , and many others , that dwelt in the other parts of Italy : nor does any man relate , that there was any King , besides those that raign'd in Rome , and Porsena King of Tuscany ; whose race how it came to an end , history leaves us no memory . But we plainly see , that at the same time the Romans went to incamp before Vejum , Tuscany was free , and so absolutely injoy'd their liberty , and withall so much hated the name of a Prince , that the inhabitants of Vejum for their defence having made a King among them , ask'd aid of the Tuscans against the Romans ; but they resolv'd after many deliberations taken , to give them none whiles they liv'd under a King , judging it not right to defend their countrey , who of themselves had subjected it to another . And it is an easy thing to gue●s , whereupon it is that people take such an affection to their liberty : because we see by experience , that cities have never bin much amplified neither in domition nor riches , unless only during their liberty . And truly it is a strange thing to consider , unto what greatness Athens attained in the space of a hundred years , after she had freed her self from Pisistratus his tyranny : but above all it is most strange to think unto what greatness Rome attained after she was deliver'd from her Kings : The reason thereof is easy to be understood : for it is no mans particular go●● , but the common good , that amplifies the city . And without question this common good is not regarded but in Republiques , for there whatsoever makes for their advantage is put in practice : and though it turns to this or that private mans loss , yet are they so many , whom the said good concerns , that they are alwaies able to put it forward , in despight of those few that suffer by it . The contrary falls our , when there is a prince ; where , most commonly , that which makes for him endammages the City , and that which makes for the city hurts him ; so that suddenly where a Tyranny growes upon a free state , the least ill that can thence result to those cities , is not to proceed , nor increase more in power , nor wealth : but for the most part , or rather alwaies , it comes to pass , that they go backward : And if hap would have it , that a Tyranc should proove valorous , who by his courage and prowess should inlarge his dominions , there would thence no profit arise to the Republique , but to him alone : for he cannot advance any of these citizens that are brave and worthy , over whom he tyrannizes , unless he desires to give himself some jeulousy of them . Nor can he yet subject or make tributary the cities that he conquers , to that city which he tyrannizes over ; for it is not for his advantage to make it powerfull ; it rather makes for him , to hold the state disjoyn'd , that each town and province acknowledge him , in so much that of his conquests , he onely reaps he good , and not his countrey . And he hat would see the confirmation of this opinion , let him read Xenophon in his treaty of a Tyranny It is no marval then , that the peoples of old did so extreamly harc Tyrants , and lov'd the free gouernment , & that the very name of liberty was in such request amongst them : as it happen'd , when Hieronymus , nephew of Hiero the Siracusan , was slain in Siracusa : for the news of his death being brought to his army , which lay not far from the city , they began to rise up in tumult , and take their armes in hand against them that slew him : but when they perceiv'd that in Siracusa all cried out liberty , allured with the delight of that name , they were all appeas'd , and laid aside their anger conceiv'd against them that kil'd the Tyrant , & advis'd together by what means there might be ordain'd in that city a free government . And it is no marvail , that people take extraordinary revenge of those that have laid hold of their liberty . Touching which there are many examples , whereof I intend to relate onely one , that fell out in Corcira a City of Greece , in the times of the Peloponnesian wat : where the province being divided into two factions , one of which followed the Athenians , the other the Spartans ; it came to pass , that of many cities which were divided among themselves , the one part follow'd the friendship of the Spartans , the other that of Athens ; it happening so , that in the said city the Nobility prevail'd , and tooke from the people their liberty ; but the people by means of the Athenians took heare again , and having laid hold on the Nobility , shut them up into a prison capable of them all , from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time , pretending to banish them into severall parts , but they put them to death after a cruell manner . Whereof they that remain'd having some notice , resolv'd as much as lay in their power , to avoid this shamefull death ; so that arm'd with what they could get , and fighting with those that sought to enter , they defende'd the passage into the prison : whereupon , the people running together uncovered the top of the house , and with the ruines thereof overwhelm'd them . There follow'd also in the said province many such other horrible chances , so that we find it true , that people pursue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once taken from them actually , then of that which was onely contriv'd in the intention to be pluck'd from them . Weighing then from whence it may arise , that in the times of old people esteem'd more of liberty , then now a dayes , I beleeve it proceeds from the same cause which makes men lesse valiant now adayes then formerly , which I thinke is the difference of our education from that of old , grounded upon the difference of our Religion from the ancient : for our Religion having shew'd us the truth , and the true way , causes us lesse to make account of the honour of this world ; whereupon the Gentiles esteeming much of it , and placing therein their greatest good , became braver in their actions . Which may be consider'd from many of their orders , beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices and the poorenesse of ours , where indeede the pompe is more delicate then magnificke , but not any action of bravery or fiercenesse . And with the Gentiles also there was no want of pompe and magnificence in the ceremonies , but thereunto was added the action of the sacrifice full of bloud and cruelty , slaying a multitude of beasts ; The sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition . Besides , the ancient Religion did not beatificate but onely men fraught with worldly glory , as were the Commanders of armies , and Princes of nations . Our Religion hath rather glorified humble and contemplative men , then those of action . Moreover it hath plac'd the chiefe good in humility , and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things . That other imagin'd the chiefe happinesse to consist in the greatnesse of courage , in the strength of body , and in all other things fit to make men exceeding valiant : and if our Religion requires valour in a man , it is rather that he be fit for a strong sufferance , then for a strong action . This manner of living then , as it seemes , hath made the world become feeble , and given it in prey to wicked persons , who may securely rule over it , as they list , seeing that all men to obtaine paradise , think rather of suffering their wrongs , then revenging them : and though it may appeare , that the world is growne effeminate , and the heavens disarm'd , it proceeds without doubt from the cowardise of men , who have given an interpretation of our Religion according to their owne lazy and idle dispositions , and not agreeable to vertue : for if they would consider how much it allowes the advancement and defence of ones country , they should see that it wills , that we should love and honour it , and so prepare our selves that we may be able to defend it . These kindes of educations then , and false interpretations , cause that there be not so many Republiques now adayes in the world as were of old . Nor by consequence do we see among people such an affection to liberty as formerly : although I beleeve rather the reason hereof is , because the Roman Empire with its force and power extinguish'd all the Republiques and free governments . And though afterwards that Empire was dissolv'd , yet could not the cities againe be restor'd , and anew order'd in a civill government , unlesse it were in very few places of that Empire . Yet howsoever it was , the Romans in every little corner of the world found , as it were , a conspiracy of Commonwealths very strongly arm'd , and very obstinate to defend their liberties ; which shewes that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them . And to give an example of some member thereof , that of the Samnires shall s●ffice me : who ( and indeed it is admirable , and so Titus Livius avowes it ) were so powerfull and warlike , that they were of force , till the time of Papirius Cursor the Consul , sonne of the first Papirius , to resist the Romans , which was for the space of forty six yeares , after so many routes , destruction of their townes , and so many slaughters made in their country : especially considering the country then , where so many cities were , and such a vast number of men , though now almost not inhabited . And then there was such order , and so great force , that it was insuperable , had it not bin assaulted by a Roman power . And it is an easy thing to know , whence that order and this disorder arise , for all that came from the free manner of living then , and this from the slavery now . For all countries and provinces which live free in every part , as formerly I said , make exceeding large progresses : for here we see the people more numerous , because the marriages are more free , and desir'd by men : being that every one willingly begets those children which he beleeves he can bring up , and nourish , without doubting their patrimony will be ravish'd from them ; and when he knowes they are borne free and not slaves , so that by meanes of their vertue they may become Princes . We see riches likewise increase there in greater measure , as well those which arise from cultivation , as those which are gotten by the trades of handicraftsmen : for every one is more provident in gaining and multiplying of those goods , which , when he hath gotten , he beleeves he shall peaceably injoy . From whence it comes to passe , that men even contend who shall more advance the private and publique good ; so that the one and the other increase exceedingly . The contrary hereof followes in al those countries that live in servitude ; and so much the more faile they of their accustomed good , by how much their servitude is harder . And of all hard servitudes , none exceeds that which is subject to a free Republique , because ordinarily it is of longest continuance , and so least hopes there are of being deliver'd from it : a second reason is , the end of a Republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her , whereby to augment her owne . Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not , especially if it be not some Barbarian Prince , a ruiner of countries , and a destroyer of all civill societyes among men , as are the easterne Princes . But if any of them have bin instructed in humane customes and the arts ordinary among men , they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued , and let them still possesse all their arts and ancient customes ; so that , if they cannot increase , as in liberty , they goe not to wracke , as in thraldome , speaking of that thraldome into which cities fall , when they serve a stranger ; for I have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native . Whosoever then considers well all that which is said , will not much marvaile at the power which the Samnites had being free , nor at their weakenesse into which afterwards they fell by servitude . And Titus Livius gives us good testimony thereof in many places , in Hanniballs warres , where he declares , that the Samintes being oppressed by one Legion of souldiers , that were in Nola , sent Ambassadours to Hanniball to intreat him for succours ; whose speeches were to this purpose , that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the Romans , serving themselves onely of their owne souldiers and Captaines , and had many times withstood two Consular armies , and two Consuls , and that now they were brought so low , they had much a doe to defend themselves from one small Roman legion that was in Nol●● . CHAP. III. Rome became a great citie , by ruining those that were near neighbours to her , and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignisies . ALL this while Rome wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba. Those that intend a city should farre inlarge the bounds of her domnions , ought withall indeavour provide , that she be well fraught with inhabitants : for without a great multitude of men in her , she will never be able to grow great . And this is done two wayes , either by love or by force : by love holding the wayes open and secure to strangers , that might have a design to come and dwell in it , to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it ; by force ruining and defacing the neighbour cities and sending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine : all which was punctually observ'd in Rome , so that in the timeof the sixth King in Rome there dwelt 80 thousand men able to beare armes : for the Romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman , who to make a plant grow big , and fructify , and ripen well its fruits , cuts off the firstsprouts it thrusts forth , that so the vertue thereof remaining yet in the roote of the plant , may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitfull . And that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and inlarging of an Empire , the Example of Sparta and Athens shewes us plaine , who being both very warlike Republiques , and furnished with excellent lawes , yet could they never attaine to the Roman Empires greatnesse , which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they , whereof can be alleadged no other reason , then that aforesaid . For Rome having inlarged by those two wayes the body of her city , was able to put in armes six hundred and 80 thousand souldiers , whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men . Which proceeded not from that the scituation of Rome was more bountifull then theirs , but onely from the different course they tooke : for Licurgus founder of the Spartan Republique considering that nothing could soone take away the power of his lawes , then a commixtion of new inhabitants , did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them ; and that they should neither joyne matrimonies with them , nor admit them into their civill government , nor have any thing to do with them , which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men . He ordained likewise that leather money should passe currant , thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandise , or art to them : so that , that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants . And because all our actions imitate nature , it is neither possible , nor naturall , that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough ; therefore a smal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strength then she her selfe is ; and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them , it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body , that sustaining it with much adoe , with every small b'ast it is broken , as we see it happen'd to Sparta : which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Greece , Thebes no sooner rebell'd against her , but all the other cities likewise fell from her , and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches : which could never befall Rome , having her body and stocke so huge , that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever . This manner then of proceeding , together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of , made Rome exceeding great and powerfull . Which Titus Livius shewes in few words where he sayes , All this while Rome wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba CHAP. IIII. Republiques have taken three particular courses , to amplifie and inlarge their states . HE that hath read the ancient histories with observation , findes that Commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their states . The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuscans followed , to make a league of many Republiques together , where no one is preserred before the other , neither in authority nor in dignity ; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains ; just as now adayes the Swisses do , and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Etolians were wont . And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans , the better to shew the quality of this first way , I will inlarge my self in giving notice of them par ieularly . Before the Romans had any great power in Italy , the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land : and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs , yet is there some small remembrance thereof , and some signes left us of their greatness ; and we know , how they sent a colony to the sea coast above , called by them Adria , which prooved of such renown , that it gave the name to that sea , and the Latins call it the Adri tick to this day . Moreover we know , that they had conquered all from Tiber , to the very foot of the Alpes , which encompass the whole body of Italy . Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength , the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called Lombardy ; Which was seized on by the French ; who either driven by necessity , or allured by the delicacy of the fruits , especially the wines , came into Italy under the conduct of Bellovesus their Captain , and having defeated and chased out the natives ; seated themselves in that place , therein built many cities , and called the Countrey Gallia , from the name they then bare ; and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans . The Tuscans then liv'd with that equality , and proceeded in the amplifying their State , in that first manner , spoken of before : and there were twelve Cities , among which were Clusium , Vejum , Desola , Aretium , and Volaterra and the like ; who by way of league rul'd their dominions ; nor could they inlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy , whereof also there was a great part left untoucht by them , for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell . The other manner is to make allies , yet not so thought , that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits , which course was alwaies observ'd by the Romans . The third manner is , to make them immediatly subjects , and not allies , as did the Spa●tans and Athenians : of which three waies , this last is altogether unprofitable ; as it appears , it was in the two foresaid Republiques , which , for no other cause went to ruine , but for possessing themselves of those dominions , which they were not able to hold . For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence , especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free . And if thou beest not in armes , and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers , thou canst neither command , nor rule them . And to be able to do this , it is necessary to make friends and companions , who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City . And because these two Cities , did neither the one nor the other of these , their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them . And because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner , did the one and the other , therefore grew it to that excessive power : and for that she alone took this course of living , she alone therefore became so mighty : For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her , who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes ; but on the other side , as is abovesaid , reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the Empire , and the title of commanding , these their companions ( who were never aware of it ) with their own pains & loss of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke : for when they began to transport their Armies out of Italy , and to reduce Kingdomes into Provinces , & to make thosetheir subjects , who for that they were used to live under Kings , were never much troubled to become Subjects ; and receiving Roman Governors over them , and having bin overcome by Armies , whereof the Romans had the name and title , they acknowledged no other head , but Rome . So that those allyes of Rome that were in Italy , found themselves on a sudden begirt round by Romes Subjects , and oppress'd by an exceeding vast City , as then Rome was : and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd , it was too late to help it , Rome had then gotten such authority with forrein Nations , and was then of such strength within it self , the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike . And although those their companions , to be reveng'd on them for these injuries , conspir'd together against them , yet in a short time were they losers by the war , making their own conditions worse : for of allies , they became Subjects . Which manner of proceeding ( as is said ) hath bin observ'd onely by the Romans : nor can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other ; for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true . This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues , wherein anciently the Tuscans , Acheans , and Aerosians liv'd , and which now adayes the Swisses use , is the better way next after that the Romans took : for , it being not possible by it to grow very great , thou gainest two advantages thereby , the one , that easily thou drawest no war upon thee ; the other , that what thou gettest thou easily holdest . The reason why they cannot grow great , is , because they are disunited Republiques , and placed in divers seats ; which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve . And besides , because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions ; for that divers Commonalties being to participate of that rule , they value not so much such conquests , as does a Republique alone , which hopes to injoy it all her self . Moreover , they govern themselves by common advice and counsel , and therfore of force they must be slower in every deliberation , then they that live within the walls of the same City . It is plain also by experience , that this manner of proceeding prescribes it self certain bounds , which it passes not ; nor have we any example that they were exceeded . And these were to joyn together some dozen or fourteen Commonalties , and afterwards never seek to go beyond that : for being come to those terms , that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one , they desire no greater power , as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force ; as also because they understand not any great profits that arise from such like purchases , for the causes formerly alledged : for then of necessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allyes , and so the multitude would make a confusion ; or els to make them their subjects : and because they see herein many difficulties , and no great advantage in holding them , they make no account of them . Whereupon , when they have attaind to such greatness , that they think they may live secure , they apply themselves to two things ; the one to entertain others in their protection , and undertake their defences , and by these means to draw money from every part , which they can very easily divide among one another , and the other to serve in the wars under another , and to take pay of this or that Prince , who gives them wages for their service , as now adayes the Switzers do , and as we read , those we spoke of before did , whereof Titus Livius bears witness , where he sayes , that when Philip King of Macedon came to a parley with Titus Quintius Flamminius , to treat an accord in presence of a Prercur of the Aetolians , the said Pretour comming to some words with Philip ; was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity , saying , that the Ae●olians were not ashamed to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides , so that many times their ensignes were seen in two contrary Armies . We know withall , that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath bin alwayes alike , and hath prodec'd the same effects . We see also , that that way of making people become subjects hath bin alwaies weak , and brought forth but small advantages ; and when they have exceeded the due mean , they have gone to ruine , And if this course of making Subjects , be unprofitable in warlike Commonwealths , surely in those that are disordered , it must needs be far worse , as in our daies have bin the Republiques of Italy . Wherefore we find that to be the true way , which the Romans held , which is the rather to be admired , in somuch as there was no other example thereof before that of Rome , nor since hath bin any that hath imitated it . And touching the leagues , there are the Switzers onely & the Swevian league that follows them . And , as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said , so many orders observ'd by the Romans , as well concerning the affairs within the City , as those without , in these our times are not onely not followed , but made no account of ; some of them are deem'd untrue , some unpossble , others nothing to purpose , or unprofitable : so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance , we become a prey to any that invades our Countrey . And though it should seem difficult to imitate the Romans , yet ought it not seem so , to follow the steps of the ancient Tuscans , especially to the Tuscans now living : for though they were not able for the reasons alledged , to make themselves an Empire like that of Rome , yet could they gain them that power in Italy , that their manner of proceeding would permit them , which for a long time was with great glory of their rule , and wars , and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion . Which power and glory was first abated by the French , and afterwards quite put out by the Romans , and so put out , that of this power , which two thousand years since was very great , at this present we have no memory left . Which hath made me muse , what the cause is that matters are thus forgotten , whereof in the Chapter following we shall treat . CHAP. V. That the changes of Religions and Languages , together with the chances of floods or pestilences , abolish the memory of things . TO those Philosophers , who would have made men beleeve that the world is eternal , I think one might have replyed , that if such antiquity were true , it would be consequent , that we should have some notice of more then five thousand years time past , being that it is not apparent , how the remembrances of times by several occasions were abolish'd . Whereof part proceeds from men , and part from heaven . Those that proceed from men , are the changes of sects and tongues : for when a new sect begins , that is , a new religion , the first endeavor , to gain it self reputation , is , to blot out the memory of the old ; and when it so falls out , that the founders of the new sect are of a different language , they easily extinguish it : which thing is known , by considering the waies , which the Christian Religion used against the Sect of the Gentiles , whereby it hath cancel'd all their orders and ceremonies , and defac't the whole remembrance of thatancient Theology . It is true , that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof , which was occasioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue , to which they were forc't , being they were to write this new Law in it : for if they could have writ it in a new tongue , considering the other persecutions they made against it , there would have bin no remembrance left of things past . And whosoever reads what courses St. Gregory took , and the other heads of the Christian Religion , shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials , burning all the Poets and Historians works , defacing their images , and destroying every other thing that gave any lightwww . of that antiquity ; so that if to this p●rsecution , they had added a new language , we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten . It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Christian Religion did against the sect of the Gentiles , they of Gentilis●●e had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it : and because the sects in a five or six thousand years chance two or three times , the memory of things past before that time is utterly lost . And though yet there remain some remembrance thereof , we take it as some fabulous thing , whereunto no man gives credit , as it befalls the story written by Diodorus Siculus , in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thousand years , nevertheless is it esteemed ( and so I think it too ) a false tail . As for the causes that proceed from heaven , they are such as extinguish the race of mankind , and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world ; and this comes to pass , either by pestilence or famine , or by a deluge of waters ; but that of most importance is this last , because it is more universal , and because those that escape , are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people , who having no knowledge of antiquity , cannot derive it to their posterity : and if among them any knowing man chance to escape , to gain himself , reputation and a name , he conceals it , and alters it at his own pleasure , so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing , and no more . And that these in undations , pestilences , and famines sometimes come , I beleeve there is no doubt , as well because all histories are full of them , as for that we see this effect of defacing the memory of things , as also becauie it accords well with reason that it is so : for nature , as in simple bodies , when there is gatherd together enough superfluous matter , moves many times of it self , and makes a purgation , which is the preservation of that bodie ; so it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde , that when all countries are stuffed with inhabitants , that they can neither live there , nor go otherwhere , because all places are already possessed and replenish'd , and when the subtilty and wickedness of man is grown to that fulness it can attain to , it holds with reason , that of force the world be purged by one of these three waies , that men being become few , and having suffer'd much , may live with more convenience and grow better , whereupon it is nothing strange , that , as it is abovesaid , the Tuscan nation in old time was very potent , full of Religion and vertue , had their own manners and their native tongue , which the power the Romans quite abolish'd , so that , as it is said , onely their name remains still in the memory of posterity . CHAP. VI. How the Romans proceeded in making of war. HAving discours'd , how the Romans proceeded in enlarging their State , we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war , and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement , they left aside the common way that others went , whereby they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness . The intention of that man , that makes war , either by election or by ambition , is to get , and keep what he hath gotten , and to proceed so there with , that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country . It is necessary for him then , both in getting and holding , to take a care not to diminish , but rather to augment the publique profit of his countrey . He that will do these things , must follow the way and course the Romans took , who at first made their wars great and short ; for comming into the field with huge armies , all the wars they had with the Latines , Samnites and Tuscans , they dispatcht in a very short time : and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of Rome , til the siege of Veium , we should find they were all ended , one in six dayes , another in ten , and a third in some twenty dayes space : for their custome was this ; so soon as ever they had discover'd the war , they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies , who being overmaster'd ( to save their Countrey from spoil ) yeilded to their conditions , and the Romans condemn'd them in loss of some of their territories , and those they turn'd to their private Profits , or bestow'd them upon some Colony they sent thither , which being seituate upon some Frontier of theirs , became Guardians of their confines , to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony , who had those fields in possession , and with the profit of the generality of Rome , that held this guard without expence . Nor could there be any way more assured , nor of more strength or advantage : for til the enemy went into the field , this guard was sufficient . And when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that Colony , the Romans also went out with their forces , and join'd battel with them , wherein having got the day , they laid more heavy burdens on them , and so return'd home . Thus came they by little and little to great credit among them , and forces in themselves . And this course held they alwaies , till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war : which was after the siege of Vejum , where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers , whereas formerly , being that the wars were short , there was no need to give them pay . And though the Romans gave pay , and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars , and to make those more remote , they were forc'd to stay longer in the field , yet did they never alter from their first order , to dispatch them quickly , according to the time and place . Nor did they ever leave sending of Colonies : for besides their natural guise , the Consuls ambition held them to their first custome of making their wars short ; for being created but for a years time , and thereof to stay at home six moneths , they desired to finish the war , that they might triumph . To send Colonies , the profit and great advantage they made thereof , still prevail'd with them . They altered indeed somwhat touching the spoiles , whereof they were not so liberal , as in former times they had bin ; because they thought there was not so great need , the soldiers receiving their stipends ; as also because the spoiles being greater , they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure , that they might not be constrain'd upon any enterprise in hand to leavy monies upon the City . Which order in a very short time much enrich'd their treasury . These two courses then they took , about the dividing the spoiles , and sending of Colonies , caus'd Rome to grow rich by the war , whereas other Princes and Republiques , if they find that means to releeve themselves , become impoverishd ; so that it came to this at last , that a Consul thought he might not triumph unless he brought much gold and silver and spoils of every kind into the treasury : Thus the Romans by their above written waies , sometimes by making a quick end of the wars , otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with discomfitures and invasions and treaties to their advantage , grew alwaies more mighty . CHAP. VII . How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies . BY what parcels the Romans did divide the land among them , I beleeve it is hard to find out the truth , because I think they bestow'd on them more or less , according to the places , whether they sent the Colonies ; and it is credible , howsoever the case went , and whether soever they were sent , the allowance was but small . First to the end they might be able to send the more men thither , they being intrusted with the guard of that countrey . Besides , because they living sparingly at home , it agrees not with reason , that they would allow their men , where wishall to abound much abroad And Titus Livius sayes , that , when they had taken Veium , they sent a Colony thither , and to each man they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth part . For besides the things above written , they judge it was not the quantity of the land that suppli'd their wants , but the well c●●tiating of it . And moreover it is very necessary , that the whole Colony have fields in common , were every one may freely feed his cattel , and woods from whence to fetch fuell for firing , without which a Colony cannot well subfist . CHAP. VIII . The occasion , wherefore people leave their own native soyles , and invade other countreys . Seeing that we have formerly discours'd of the manner of proceeding in war which the Romans us'd , and how the Tuscans were assail'd by the French , me thinks it were not much from the matter , to shew , that there are two sorts of war made . The one is through the ambitions of Princes , or Commonwealths , who indeavor the inlargement of their dominions ; such as were the wars of Alexander the Great , and the Romans , and such as now adayes every Prince and Potentate makes one with another . Which wars are dangerous indeed , but yet they do not wholly chase the inhabitants out of a countrey ; for the Conqueror is contented onely with the obedience of nations , and most commonly suffers them to live under their own Laws , and enjoy their own goods in their own houses . The other kind of war is , when the whole people with all their families , rise from a place , forced either by famine or war , and goe to seek a new habitation and new Countrey , not out of ambition to command , as the others , but to possess it by themselves , and to drive thence or destroy the ancient inhabitants thereof . This kind of war is very cruel and terrible : And touching these wars , Salust speaks in the end of the Jugurthin , where he sayes , that when Jugurth was overcome , the French were perceived to stir , who then came into Italy : and there he relates , that the people of Rome fought with all other Nations for rule and command , but with the French every one fought for his life and safety : For it sufficeth a Prince or Commonwealth that assails a Countrey , to destroy onely those that command , whereas these populations must make a general destruction , being that they will live upon that , which formerly sustained others . The Romans had three several wars of these , exceeding dangerous . The first was that when Rome was taken , which was seis'd on by those Frenchmen , that ( as is above said ) had taken Lombardy from the Tuscans , and seated themselves there ; whereof Titus Livius alledges two reasons ; The first , as we said before , is , that they were allur'd by the pleasantness of the fruits and the wines of Italy , whereof they had scarcity in France : the second , that the people in France being exceedingly multiplyed , the Countrey could not seed them , whereupon the Princes of those places thought it fit , that part of them should goe to seek some new habitation , and that resolution being taken , they chose for Captains of them that were to depart , Bellovessus , and Sicovessus , two French Kings , whereof Bellovessus came into Italy , and Sicovessus went into Spain . Upon the passage of which Bellovessus follow'd the seisure of Lombardy , and thereupon the war , which first the French made against Rome . Next this was that , they made after the first Carthaginian war , when between Piombin and Pisa they slew more then hundred thousand , French. The third was , when the Germans and Cimbrians came into Italy , who having overcome several Roman Armies , were subdu'd by Marius . The Romans then masterd these three very perilous wars , nor was there need of less valor than theirs to overcome them : for we see , how that after the valor of the Romans faild , and their armies lost their ancient vertue , that Empire was ruind by such like people , as the Goths , Vandalls , and such others , who possessd themselves of the whole western Empire . Such people come out of their own Countreys , as is above said , compell'd thereto by necessity , which necessity proceeds either from famine , or from some war and oppression inflicted on them in their own Countreys . So that they are constraind to seek new habitations . And these either are in great multitudes , and then they break with violence into others countreys , destroy the Inhabitants , possess their goods , make a new Kingdome , and change the name of the country , as Moses did , and those people likewise that seiz'd upon the Romane Empire ; for these new names , that are in Italy , and in the other Provinces , grew from nothing else , than that they were so named by their new Lords . As is Lombardy now , which was called Gallia Cisalpina ; France was called Gallia Transalpina , and now is named of the French ; for so were those people called , that made themselves masters of it . Sclavonia was called Illyrium ; Hungary , Pannonia ; England , Brittanny ; and many other Countreys , that have changed their names , which it would be too long to recite . Moses allso called that part of Syria , which he made himself master of , Jury . And , because I have formerly said , that some people are driven out of their own habitations by war , whereupon they are forc'd to seek a new , where to seat themselves , I will alleage an example to that purpose , of the Maurusians , ancientiy a people of Syria ; Who having notice of the Hebrews comming , and thinking they could not resist them , thought it better to leave their Countrey , than in striving to save that , lose themselves ; And so rising thence with their families , they went into Affrique , where they sate down , driving out the Inhabitants they found in those places . And so they , who could not defend their own Countrey , could yet take that of others from them . And Procopius , who writes of the war , that Bellifarius made with the Vandals , that possessed themselves of Affrique , reports that he read Letters written in certain pillars , in those parts where these Maurusians did inhabite , thus saying , We are Maurusians who fled from the face of Jesu the robber , who was Son of Nave . Where the occasion of the departure of these people out of Syria plainly appears ; wherefore these people are very terrible , when they are driven out by extream necessity , and unless they be encountred by puissant forces , cannot be stopd : but when those that are constraind to abandon their Countrey are not very numerous , there is no such danger of them , as of those people we spoke , because they cannot use such violence , but ought rather by some stratagem , make themselves masters of some strong place , and therein being setled , keep it by making of friends and allies ; as we see Aeneas did with Dido , the Massilians and others , who all by agreement with their neighbors , where they once set themselves down , were able to continue . The people that goe forth in the greatest multitudes , and those also that have gone forth , almost all came out from those parts of Scythia , cold , and poore Countries , where , because there are men in abundance , and the Country of that condition , that it cannot feed them all , they are compeld to goe forth , having many causes to drive them out , and nothing to keep them in . And if now for these five hundred years it hath not happend , that any of these nations have made an inundation upon any Countrey , it hath proceeded from several reasons . The first is , the great evacuation that Countrey made in the declining of the Empire , they having since sent out huge swarms more than thirty several times : the second is , because Germany , and England , from whence these people came , have their Countries well mended , so that they are able to live there , with better conveniency ; and thereupon not necessitated to change their seat . On the other side , these men being very warli● , are as it were a Bulwark against the Scythians , who border upon them , to keep them within their confines and territories : and many times there chance great risings among the Tartars , who are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks : who vaunt , and not without reason , that were it not for their forces , Italy and the Church had often felt the weight of the Tartars Armies . And this shall suffice , touching those forenam'd peoples . CHAP. IX . Vpon what occasions commonly warres are begun among Princes . THe occasion , that gave beginning to the warres betweene the Romanes and Samnites , who had beeng long in league together , is very ordinary , and happens often to powerfull Principalities Which occasion , either comes by chance , or else is offerd by him that desires to make warre . That which was betweene the Romans and Samnites , feil out by chance : for the Samnites intention was not , by making warre first against the Sidicini , and then against the Campani , afterwards to set upon the Romanes . But the Campani being oppressed , having their recourse to Rome , beyond the Romanes expectation and the Samnites , the Campani giving themselves into the Romans hands , they were constraind to desend them , as their subjects , and take upon them that warre , which they thought with their honour they could not avod : For it seemd very reasonable to the Romans , not to undertake the defence of the Campani , though their friends , against the Samnites their friends ; but they thought it also a shame not to dessend them , when they were their subjects ; or recommended to their protection , judging that when they had not taken that defence in hand , they cut off the way from all others that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power . And Rome having for her maine end the Empire and glory , and not qui●t , could not refuse this enterprise . The selfe same occasion gave beginning to the first warre against the Carthaginians , for the defence of the Massineses , which the Romans undertooke in Sicily ; which fell out by chance also . But now the second warre , that grew between them , came not by chance . For Hannibal the Carthaginian Captaines , set upon the Saguntins that were allyes to the Romans in Spaine , not so much for to endammage them , as to provoke the Romanes to warres , and to have occasion to fight with them , and so to passe into Italie . This manner of kinoling new warres hath been alwayes usd among those that are mighty and that have some saith joynd , some other respects : for if I desire to make warre with a Prince , and between us some capitulations of peace have firmly been observed a long time , upon some other title fair justifiable , and under some other colour , I will assayle some ally of his , rather than himselfe , knowing very well , that in setting upon his alley , eyther he will resent it , and so I shall have my intent of moving warre against him ; or not resenting it , his weaknesse shall be discoverd , or his infidelitie , in not defending one that is under his protection ; and the one and the other of these two is sufficient to discredit him , and facilitate my designes . Therefore what wee have formerly sayd , may be noted touching the taking occasions to move warre , out of this example of the yeelding of the Campani ; and besides what remedie a Citie may have , which cannot by her selfe alone make her defence , and yet in any case would not fall into her assaylants hands . Which is freely to give her selfe into his hands , who thou hast a purpose should defend thee , as the Capuans to the Romanes , and the Florentines to Robert King of Naples , who though he would not defend them as allyes , yet afterwards defended them being his subjects , against the forces of Castruvius of Lucca , who then put them hard to it . CHAP. X. Moneys are not the sinews of war , according to the common opinion . BEcause every one can begin a warre at his owne pleasure , but not end it , a Prince should before he undertake an enterprise , measure his owne forces , and order himselfe according to them ; he should also have so much judgement , that he deceive not himselfe with the conceit of his owne forces ; and he shall alwayes be sure to be deceiv'd when he measures them , either by the scituation , or by the good will of men towards him , his owne proper forces on the other side fayling him : for the things aforesayd may increase well thy forces , though give thee them they cannot ; and by themselves alone they are of on worth , nor nothing avayle without the helpe of Souldiers fathfull to thee : for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that ; nor the strength of thy Country , neither doth the faithfulnesse nor good will of men last ; for these cannot be faithfull to thee , thou not having force to defend them . Every mountaine , every lake , every unaccessible place is made plaine , where the strong defendants are wanting . Nay rather moneys are so far from defending thee , that they expose thee for a prey . Nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion that affirmes Moneys to be the sinews of warre , which sentence was first given by Q. Curtius , in the warre betweene Antipater the Macedonian , and the King of Sparta ; Where he relates , that for want of moneys , the King of Spar●a was forc'd to fight , and was broken whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes , newes had come into Greece of Alexanders death , where he had remaind conqueror without combat . But his treasure fayling , and he doubting his Armie would leave him for want thereof , was constraind to hazard the battell ; whereupon Q Curtius sayes , that moneys are the firews of war ; which sentence is alledgd every day , and followd too by some Princes , not quite so wise as they should be : for making this their ground , they beleeve , that this is able to defend them , if they have treasure enough ; and never consider , that if treasure were of force to overcome , that Darius would have conquerd Alexander , the Greekes masterd the Romanes , and in our dayes the Duke Charles subdu'd the Swissers , and not long time since the Pope and the Florentins together would have found no difficultie in overcomming Francis Maria nephew of Pope Julius the second in the warre of Orbin . But all these above nam'd , were overcome by those who esteemd not mony , but good Souldiers the sinews of warre . Among other things , that Croesus King of Lydia shewd to Solon the Athenian , was a treasure unmeasurable , and asking him what he thought of his power , Solon answerrd him , he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that ; for warre was made with iron and not with gold , and some one might come , who had more iron than be , and take his gold from him . Moreover , when after the death of Alexander the Great , a vast multitude of French pass'd over into Greece , and after into Asia , the French sending Ambassadours to the King of Macedon to treate some accord , that King to shew them his power , and to fright them , let them see his treasure , where was much gold and silver , whereupon these French , who had in a manner concluded a firme peace , brake t ; their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him : and so was that King despoyld for that which he had gatherd together to defend him . The Venetians also , a few yeares since , having their treasury full of coyne , lost their whole State , being not able to defend themselves thereby . Wherefore I say , that gold as the common opinion cryes it up , is not the sinewes of warre , but a good Armie of slour Souldiers ; for gold is not sufficient to finde good Souldiers , but good Souldiers are able well to finde our gold . As for the Romanes ( if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather tha with the sword ) the treasure of the world , considering their vast undertakings , and the great difficulties they had therein , would not have servd their turnes . But they making their warres with the sword , never found scarcitie of gold ; for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by those that stood in feare of them . And if that Spartan King for want of money , were to hazard the fortune of a battell , that befell him upon the matter of moneys , which many times hath chanc'd upon other occasions : for it hath been often seene , that when an Armie wants provision of victualls , and is necessitated either to samish or sight , usually they make choyce to fight , because it is greater honour , and where in some sort Fortune hath in her power to savour thee . Moreover , it hath often come to passe , that a Commander perceiving succours comming to his enemies Armie , must either fight with them quickly , and make tryall of the chance of battell , or expecting the i●grossing of the Armie , come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages . Besides , it hath been seene , as it befell Asdruball , when in the Mar●hes he was ass●ulted by Claudius Nero , together with the other Romane Consull , that when a Captaine is necsstated either to fly or fight , he alwayes makes choyce to fight ; thinking by this bargaine , though exceeding hazardous , he may gaine ; but in that other he must needs lose in any case . There are therefore many necessities that can force a Captaine beyond what he intended , to resolve to put it to a battell , among which sometimes may happen the scarcitie of moneys , though not therefore should wee esteeme moneyes to be the sinews of warre rather , than other things , which bring men into the like necessities . Wee may therefore resolve the question , that money is not the sinews of warre , but good Souldiers rather . It is true , moneys are necessary in the second place , but it is such a necessitie , which good Souldiers themselves may overcome : for it it as impossible that good Souldiers should lack money , as by moneys alone to produce good Souldiers . What we here averre , every History shews us to be true in many places , notwithstanding that Pericles perswaded the Athenians to make warre with a●l Peloponnesus , declaring , that they might overcome that warre with industry and by force of money ; and though in that warre the Athenians sometimes prospeed , yet at last they lost it , and the advice , and good Souldiers of Sparta prevayld more , than the industry and money of Athens . But Titus Livius gives us a better testimony for this opinion then any one else , where discoursing of Alexander the Great , whether if he had come into Italie , he had been able to vanquish the Romans , he shews there three things necessary in the warre ; a great number of Souldiers , & those good , wise Commanders , and good fortune : where examining , whether eyther the Romanes or Alexander excelld herein , at length he concludes , without making any mention of moneys . The Capuans , when they were requird by the Sidicins , to take Armes in their behalfe against the Samnites , should not have measurd their power by their treasure , but by their good Souldiers : for by taking that course they tooke to assist them , after two overthrowes , to save themselves , they were forc'd to become tributaries to the Romanes . CHAP. XI . It is not a match wisely made , to joyne alliance with a Prince , whose credit is greater then his strength . TItus Livius having a purpose to shew the Sidicins errour in relying upon the Capuans aid , and the Capuans errour also in beleeving they were able to defend them , could not expresse it in more lively termes then these , The Capuans contributed to the Sidicins ayd , rather more reputation then forces . Where we may observe , that those leagues that are made with Princes , who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the distance of place , or forces to do it , because of some disorder of their owne at home , or for some other occasion , add rather reputation to them that trust in them , then any strength to their party : as in our dayes it befell the Florentines , when in the yeare 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples assayl'd them : who being allyes of the King of France , drew from that allyance more reputation to their side , then safe guard : as likely enough it would befall that Prince now , who under Maximilian the Emperours protection should undertake any enterprise : for this is one sort of those allyances , which bring more fame then advantage , as here in this text is alledg'd , that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins . Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an errour , in esteeming their owne forces greater then they were . And so sometimes the small discretion men have , causes them when they neither know how , nor have the meanes to defend themselves , to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines also did : who , when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites , sent their Ambassadours to the Roman Consul , to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betweene those two people ; and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refu●e it . So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition , caus'd the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadours , and so made his army march towards the enemy , shewing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserv'd . And having now discours'd in this Chapter against some courses Princes take amisse for others defence , I will in that that followes speake touching those they take for their owne defence . CHAP. XII . Whether it be better for a Prince , fearing to be assail'd by his enemy , himselfe first to begin the warre with him , or to expect while it comes home to him . I Have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline , if there be two Princes neare of equal force , and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other , which were the best course for that other , either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him , or else to goe finde him at home , and there assaile him . And I have heard them alledge arguments on both sides ; and those that argue for this going to assaile him , produce the counsell that Croesus gave Cyrus , when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Messagetes to make warre against them , their Queene Thomyris sent him word , that he should take his choice , either to enter into her kingdom where she would awaite him , or if he would rather that she should come and si●nde him in his owne . And when the matter came to dispute , Croesus advis'd against the opinion of the rest , to goe & seeke her in her owne country ; urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines , he could not take her kingdome from her , because she would have time to repaire her losses ; but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories , he might pursue her just upon her slight ; & so giving her no time of recovery , take the state from her . Moreover they alledge the advice that Hanniball gave Antiochus , when that King had a purpose to make warie against the Romans , where he shewes how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy ; for there another might availe himselfe of their armes , their wealth , and their friends also . But whosoever fought with them out of Italy , leaving Italy free to them , left them that strength , that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions . And concluded , that it was easier to take Rome from them , then the Empire ; and Italy , rather than their other provinces . Agathocles also is alleadg'd , who not being able to support the war at home , assail'd the Carthaginians , who then had made warre against him , and brought them to aske peace . The example of Scipio is likewise urg'd , who to take the warre out of Italy , assail'd Affricke . They that maintaine the contrary , say , that he that would bring his enemy to destruction , should withdraw him from home . The Athenians are brought for example , who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes , remain'd victors : but when they departed out of their country , and transported their army into S●cily , they quite lost their liberty . They alledge the poeticall sables withall , where it is shew'd , how that Anteus King of Lybia assail'd by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable , whiles he staid for him within the confines of his owne Kingdome , but when by Hercules subtilty he was trained out of it , he lost both state and life . Whereby occasion was given to the fable of Anteus , that while he was upon the ground , he recovered forces from his Mother , which was the ground , which Hercules perceiving , took him up in his armes , and held him from the earth . Moderne advices also are alledged ; every one knowes that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his dayes held a very wise Prince ; and some two years before his death fame flying , that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and assail him , after he had made much preparation fell sick , when on his death-bed , among other memorials he left his sonne Alphonsus , was this also , that he should attend his enemies comming within his Countrey , and upon no case should dr●w any of his forces out of his state , but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire . Which was not followed by him , but there was an army sent into Romania , which without any combat , lost both it self and the state . The arguments , which besides the things abovesaid , are brought on each side , are these ; that he , that assailes , comes on with more courage , then he that attends , which gives the army more confidence : Besides this , it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own ; for he cannot help himself upon those subjects , whose houses have first bin sackt and their goods pillaged : and for having the enemy in the house ; the Prince is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them , and vexes them : so that he comes to dry that fountain , as Hannibal sayes , which furnishes , him with means to sustain the war. To this may be added , that the souldiers being in a forrain countrey , are forced to fight , and of that necessity makes a vertue , as we have often said ; on the other side , they say , when one awaits his enemy , he does it with much advantage : for without any discommodity to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions , and other necessaries belonging to an army . Thou canst also better hinder his designs , because thou knowest the countrey better then he . Thou canst also incounter him with more forces , because there they may easily be united , which thou canst not draw all from home . Thou canst also being routed , recover thy self with more ease , because many of thy army will save themselves , in that they have their places of refuge near , as well because the supplies are not to come from far ; thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces , and not all thy fortune ; whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces . And some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie , suffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey , and take divers townes , to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them , he may weaken his army , and so they may afterwards fight with him at more ods . But to give my opinion herein what I think , I beleeve , this distinction is to be made ; Either my countrey is armed , as was that of the Romans , or that of the Switzers is , or it is disarmed as that of the Carthaginians was , or else that of the King of France , or the Italians countrey is . In this case the enemy is to be kept off from comming in , because thy advantage than consists in thy revenue , and not in thy men , so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee , thou art quite spoil'd ; nor doth any thing so much hinder thee , as the war within thy doores . The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof , who , whiles they had their own home free , were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans , which , when it was assaild , could not supply them against Agathocles . The Florentines had not any remedy against Castruccius Lord of ●ucca , because he warr'd with them in their owne country , so that they were faine , for their defence , to yeeld themselves to Robert King of Naples . But Castruccius being dead , the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his owne home , and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him ; so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars , and such cowardise in their domestick . But when countries are armed , as that of Rome was , and as the Switzers are , the nearer thou commest to them , the harder they are to vanquish ; for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence , then they are to , assail an enemy abroad . Neither in this case does the authority of Hanniball move me , because his passion , and his own interest , made him say so to Antiochus ; ●r if ●h● Romans had in that space of time received those three routs in France , which they had in Italy by Hanniball , without doubt they had bin quite undone : for then they could not have helped themselves by the remainders of their armies , nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses , nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did . We never find , that to afsail any countrey they sent out an army passing the number of 50000. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Punicke war , they armed eighteen hundred thousand men . Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy , as they did in Tuscany : because against so great a maltitude of enemies , they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out , nor fight with them upon the like advantage . The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany , nor could the Romans any way help themselves . But when they came into Italy , that they once united their forces together , they presently dispatched them . The Switzers it is easy to vanquish our of their own Countrey , whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men : but to overcome them at home , where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men , is exceeding difficult . I conclude therefore anew , that that Prince , who hath his people armed and addrest for war , may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home , neither let him goe to meet it . But he , whose subjects are unarmed , and his countrey unaccustomed to war , let him alwaies keep it as far from home as he can . And so the one and the other , each in their degree , will better defend themselves . CHAP. XIII . That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes , rather by the help of guile than force . I Take it to be very true , that seldome or never it comes to pass , that men of meane fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud : unless that dignity , which a man hath gotten , came to him by gift , or was cast on him by inheritance Neither do I think , we ever find , that force alone suffices ; but we often see , that guile alone avails , as he shall clearly perceive , that reads Philip of Macedons life , and that of Agathocles the Sicilian , and many others such like , who from very vile and poore fortunes have gain'd either a Kingdome , or some other great dignities . Xenophon in Cyrus his life , declares this necessity of deceit , being that the first expedition which he makes Cyrus to undertake against the Armenian King , is full of guile , and how by deceit , and nor by force he makes him seize on his Kingdom ; by which Action he concludes nothing else , but that it is necessary for a Prince , that will atcheive great matters , to learn to be a cunning deceiver . Besides this he makes him deceive Ciaxares King of the Medes his Mothers uncle many waies , without which fraud he shews Cyrus could never have attain'd to that greatness he afterwards came . And I beleeve , that there was never any plac'd in a low condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force ; and ingenuously ; though I grant that by guile alone one well may , as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy . And that , which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase , Republiques are likewise forc'd to , till they are become mighty ; then force alone suffices . And because Rome in every part lit either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great , it failed not also of this , nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly , than to take the course we formerly discoursed of , to make her some companions ; for under this name , she brought many to be her servants , as were the Latins , and other people neare about her : for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round about , and in taking upon her self the reputation of the state ; afterwards when she had brought them under likewise , she came to such growth , that no power was able to withstand her . And the Latins never perceived their own servitude , til after that they saw the Samnites twice broken , and forced to agreement . Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with forrain Princes , whereby they heard of the Romans name , though they never felt their armes : so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength , among which were the Latins : And so far prevailed this envie and fear , that not onely the Latins , but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended , conspired all against the name of the Romans . And the Latins mov'd that war in that manner , as is formerly said , that for the most part wars are mov'd , not assailing the Romans , but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites , against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave . And that it is true , that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit , T. Livius declares it by the mouth of Annius Setinus a Latin Pretour , who told them in their assemblie , thus , For if yet we can endure servitude , under the name of an equal league . Wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile , which they had need to make use of , that from low beginnings aim to mount high , which the more covert it is , is the less discommendable , as was this of the Romans . CHAP. XIIII . They are often deceiv'd , who think with humility to overcome pride . WEE often see that humility does not onely not help , but hurt some times , especially when it is used towards insolent men ; who either for envie or some other occasion , have conceiv'd hatred against thee . Whereof our Historian gives us good testimony in this occasion of war between the Romans and the Latins : for the Samnites complaining to the Romans , that the Latins had assaild them , the Romans would not yet forbid the Latins that war , being desirous nor any way to incense them . Whereby they did not onely not incense them , but made them become more insolent towards them , so that they sooner discover'd themselves enemies , whereof the words us'd by the forenamed : Latin Pretour , Annlus in the same assembly , give good proof , saying : Te tryed their patience in refusing them souldiers ; who doubts but they were angry , yet this disgrace have they sufferd : they have heard we prepare an armie against the Samnites their allyes ; nor for this stirred they one foot out of the City : and whence came this modesty of theirs think ye , but from their knowledge as well of your Forces as their own ? And therefore hereby we plainly see , how much the Romans patience increased the Latines arrogance . Wherefore a Prince should never agree to descend a whit from his ra●ck , not ever let goe any thing upon accord , if he have a minde to leave it honorably , but onely then when he is able , or when he thinks also he is able to maintain it : for it is better for the most part ( the matter being brought to such termes , that thou canst not let it goe in the manner above said ) to let it be taken from thee by force , rather than by fear of forces : for it thou lettestit goe for fear , thou doest it to free thy self from war , which most commonly it will not doe ; for he to whom with such open cowa●dise thou hast yeelded this , will not there with rest satisfi'd , but take other things from thee also , and will the rather be incited against thee , in that he values thee less ; when likewise on the other side , thou shalt finde thy friends more slack in thy defence , esteeming thee either weak or cowardly . But if thou forthwith upon discovery of thy enemies intent , gettest thy forces in a readiness , howsoever they be inferior to his , he will begin to make account of thee , as also will other Princes thy neighbours abou thee , so that some there will be who will have a minde to ayd thee ( thou being in armes ) who , if thou hadst abandon'd thy self , would never have struck stroke for thee . This is meant , when thou hast but one enemy . But in case thou hast more , thou shalt do very wisely , to render what thou hast belonging to any one of them for to regain him to thee , notwithstanding the war be discoverd , that thou mayest take him asunder from the other confederates thine enemies . CHAP. XV. Weake states are alwaies irresolute in their determinations ; and slow deliberations are alwaies hurtfull . IN this very same matter , and in the same beginnings of the War between the Latins and the Romans , we may observe , that in every consultation it is good to come to the particular of that which is to be deliberated on , and not to stay long in doubt , and upon the uncertainty of a thing . Which is manifest in the consultation the Latins made , when they thought to quit themselves of the Romans : for the Romans having had some sent of this ill humour that had possessed the Latins , to be ascertained of the master , and to try if without armes they could regain those people , gave order they should send eight Citizens to Rome , to the end they might advise with them . The Latins , understanding this , and being conscious to themselves of many things done contrary to the will of the Romans , called an assembly together , to appoint who should go to Rome , and to give them order what they should say . And Annius their Pretour being in the assembly during this dispute , utter'd these words : The sum of our affairs is , as I take it , that ye should advise rather what we should do , than what we should say ; for it is an easy matter , when things are once resolved on , to put them into fit termes . Without question these words are most true , and ought to be relished by every Prince , and every Commonwealth : for during the uncertainly and doubt of that which a man will do , there is no man knowes what he should say : but when the mind is once setled and resolved of what is to be done , words to the purpose easily follow . I have the more willingly noted this passage , by reason that many times I have known that such doubt hath much wrong'd publick actions , even to the loss and disgrace of our Republike . And it shall ever come to pass , that , in doubtfull cases , and where there is need of judgement to deliberate , this resolution shall be when they are to be advised , and deliberated on by weak man. No less hurtfull also are slick and slow consultations , than these ambigu●us , especially those that are to be taken in favour of any friend ; for slowness helps no body , and hurts ones self . These resolutions so taken , proceed either from weakness of courage , or forces , or from their malignity that should resolve , who guided by their own passtors , to ruine a State , and to fulfill some desire of their own , s●ff●r not the consultation to goe forward , but rather hinder and cross it . For good Citizens , though they perceive the whole stream of the people to run the more dangerous way , yet will they never hinder the delibaration , being that those affairs attend not time . When Jerome the Tyrant in Syraacusa was dead , there being a great war between the Carthaginians , and the Romans , the Syracusians put it to question , which allyance they should take , the Roman or Carthaginian ; and such was the eagerness of the parties , that the matter remain'd in doubt , and they took to neither side , til ' that Apollonides one of the cheif men in Syracufia , in a very discreet Oration of his , shewed that they were not to be blam'd that advised to adhere to the Romans , nor they that would take part with the Carthaginians , but rather that irresolution and slowness in taking to any side was detestable ; for he saw fully in that ambiguity the ruine of the Republique . But were it that the party were once made , on which side soe'r it were , a●man might conceive some good hopes upon it . Nor could Titus Livius more fully shew , than in his part he does , the harme which this hanging in suspence drawes after it . He makes it plain also in this case of the Latins ; for the Lavinians being sought to by them for ayd against the Romans , put off the resolut on of it so long , that when they were just going forth of the town to give succors to them , news came that the Latins were defeated . Whereupon their Pretour Milonius said , We shall pay ●ear to the Romans for this little way we have gone : for if at first they had resolv'd either to help , or not to help the Latins , not helping them they had not given offence to the Romans ; but helping them , had their aid , come in time , with the addition of their Forces , they might have gain'd them the victory ; but by delay loss came every way , as it befell them . And had the Florentines observ'd this well , they had never receiv'd so many dammages nor troubles by the French , as they had in Lewis the twelfths passage into Italy against Lodowicke Duke of Milan : for the King treating of such a passage , sought the Florentines for their consent ; and their Agents that were with the King , agreed with him , to stand neuters , and that the King comming into Italy , should maintain them in their State , and receive them into his protection , and gave the City a moneths time to ratifie this . Which ratification was delayd by some , who in their little wisdome favour'd Duke Lodowicks affairs , til that the King was even upon the point of victory , when the Florentines offering the ratification , it would not be accepted by the King , who knew the Florentines came by force , and not willingly to his friendship . Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear , and like enough to have lost the state , as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r . And so much the worse was the course they took ; for it was of no advantage to Duke Lodowicke , who if he had bin victour , would have shewed more displeasure against them , than did the King. And though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a Republique , we have formerly spoken in another Chapter ; yet upon a new occasion offerd by a new accident , I had a minde to repeat it thinking it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republiques like unto ours . CHAP. XVI . How much the orders used by our Souldiers in these modern times , differ from those of the ancients . THe Romans fought not a battel in any war they undertook with any Nation , of greater importance than this with the Latins , in Torquatus and Decius his Consulship : for in all reason it had followed , that as the Latins by losing it became Subjects , the Romans should have undergone the same condition , had not they got the mast●ry ; and of this opinion is Titus Livius : for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order , valour , resolution , and number ; he makes there this difference only , that the Commanders of the Roman Army were of more valour than those of the Latins . It appears also that in the ordering of this battel , there befell two accidents , the like whereof was never seen before , nor since have we had but rare examples following them : that of two Consuls , to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands , and resolute to fight , the one kill'd himself , the other his Son. The equality which Titus Livius sayes in these two Armies , was , because they had both serv'd in the wars a long time together ; they used the●ame language , order , and armes : for in the ordering of their battel , they had the same manner , and their Troupes and the Captains of them had the same names ; there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour , that something extraordinary should happen , that could se●tle and fix the ones resolution , rather than the others : in which ( as otherwhere we have said ) consists the victory : for while that lasts in the combarants hearts , the Armies never turne their backs . And to the end it might last the longer in the Romans breasts than in the Latins , partly fortune , and partly the Consùls valour were cause ; for Torquatus killed his son , and Decius himself . Titus Livius , where he shews the equality of their forces , sets downe the whole order the Romanes used in their Armies and in their battels . Which being that he relates at large , I will not rehearse againe , but discourse onely upon that I shall thinke remarkable , and which , because it hath been neglected by all our Captaines of later times , hath been the occasion of many disorders in severall Armyes stand battells . I say therefore , that out of Livius his words wee gather that the Romane Army had three principal divisions , which in proper termes may be calld Squadrons ; the first was of the Hastati , the second of the Prencipi , the third of the Triarij : and each of these had their horsemen . In the ordering of a battell , they plac't the Hastati for most , in the second place on the right side , upon the shoulders of those the Prencipi were set , and in the third place yet in the same file , the riarij came . The horse of all these ranks they plac't on the right hand and on the left of these three battells : which Squadrons of horse from their formes and Places were call'd wings : because they lookt like the two wings of that body . They rangd the first Squadron of the Hastati , which was in front , in a manner close shut together , that it might be able either to force upon , or sustain the enemy . The second Squadron of the Prencipi ( because it was not the first to fight , but was ordeind to succour the for most , in case it was either beaten or driven backe ) this they made not so compact together , but kept their ranks thinne , so that they might receive in to them without disordering themselves the first Squadron , whensoever being prest on by the enemy , they were forc't to retire . The third Squadron of the Triarij had their ranks yet thinner than the second ; that , if need were , they might receive the two former Squadrons of the Hastati and Prencipi . The troupes then being all plac'd in this order , began the fight : and if the Hastati were forc'd or overcome , they retir'd into the thinnesse of the ranks of the Prencipi , and they united together , and having made of two battallions one body , undertooke the fight afresh ; and if these were beaten back and routed , they fell backe into the thinner rankes of the Triarij , and so all the battallions became one body , renewd the fight againe , where if they vanquished , because they had not other repayre , they lost the day . And because that alwayes when this last quadron of the Triarij came to try for it , the Army was in danger , thereupon grew his Proverb , Thematter came so farre as the Triarij . The Commanders of our dayes , as they have abandoned all the other instructions , and follow nor in any part the ancient discipline , so have they quite neglected this part , which is of no small importance : for he that so arrang●s his Armie , that in the fight he can three times repair himself , to lose he must have fortune three times his enemy , and be to incounter a valour sufficient to vanquish him . But he that stands onely on the first shock ( as now our Christian Armies doe ) may easily lose : for every little disorder , or meane valour , is able to take from him the victory . That which makes our Armyes not able to recover themselves three times , is , because they have lost the manner of receiving one Squadron within another : Which comes to passe , because now adayes battells are rangd which one of these two disorders ; either they place their troupes at the shoulders the one of another , and make their battell large of breadth , and thinne in depth ; which makes it weaker , because there is but small distance from the brest to the backe . And when to make it stronger , they reduce the troupes to the Romane manner , if the first front be broken , not having order to be receivd in the second , they fall together into a confusion , and rout themselves : for if that before be beaten backe , it falls upon the second ; if the second strives to advance , it is hindred by the first : Whereupon the first and the second both beating upon the third , causes such a confusion , that commonly a very little matter destroys a whole Army . The Spanish and French Armyes in the battle at Ravenna , where the Lord de Pors Generall of the French forces dyed , which was ( according to our times ) a well fought battell , was arranged in one of these forenam'd wayes : which is , that one and the other Armie came on with all their people plac'd to shoulder the one the other , so that neither army had but one front , and were much more in breadth then in depth . And this befalls them alwayes , where they have a large plaine , as they had at Ravenna . For knowing the disorder they make in retiring , by placing themselves in one file , they avoide it when they can , which they do by making the front large , as it is said . But when the scite of the country restraines them , they remaine in the forenam'd disorder , without advising themselves of the remedy . In which they passe through their enemies countries , they goe out to forrage , or venture on any other exploit . And at Saint Regulus in that occasion of Pisa , and otherwhere , where the Florentines were routed by the Pisans , during the warre which was betweene the Florentines and that city , for their rebellion , after Charles the King of France his passage into Italy , those defeates were caused by nothing else but by their owne horse : which being in vantgard , and by the enemies beaten backe into the Florentine foote , routed it , whereupon all the remainder turn'd their backes ; and Criacus de Borgo , the ancient generall of the Florentine infantery , hath said it many times in my hearing , that they had never bin routed but by their own horse . The Swisses who are the principall masters of our modern warres , when they serve with the French , above all things have a care to place themselves on the side , for feare their owne horse driven backe should beate upon them . And howbeit these things seeme easie to understand , and very easie to practise , yet hath not there been any of our contemporary Commanders , that would follow these ancient orders , or amend the moderne . And though they have made their Armies tripartite , terming the one the Vauntguard , the other the Battell , and the last the Rereguard : they make no other use thereof , but to command them when they are quatered in their lodgings , but in any service , very seldome it is ( as is formerly said ) but that they make all these bodies run one fortune . And because many to excuse their own ignorance , alledge that the violence of the Artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be observd , I will argue it in the next Chapter , and examine , whether the Artillery doe hinder the practise of the ancient valour . CHAP. XVII . What esteeme our moderne armies ought to have of artilery , and if the opinion ; which is generally conceived of it , be true . WHen I consider , besides the things formerly written , how many pitcht battells were fought by the Romans at severall times , that general opinion which many hold , comes into my minde , that if a●tilery had bin used in those dayes , the Romans could never so easily have subdued the countryes they did , nor have brought these nations they did , to become their tributaries , nor in any case could they have made such brave conquests . They say moreover , that by reason of these guns , men cannot put in practice nor shew the valour they could of old . And then they adde a third matter , that it makes it more difficult to come to a battell now , then formerly ; nor can they containe themselves within the orders of those times , so that in time the warre will be all reduced to the artillery . And being desirous now not out of purpose to argue touching the the truth of such opinions , and how much artillery hath augmented or diminished the force of armies , and whether they bereave or affoard good Captaines occasion to behave themselves valourously , I will begin to speake concerning , their first opinion ; that the ancient Roman armies would never have made those conquests they did , had artilery bin then in use . Whereupon I say in answer , that warre is made either in defence or offence . And then we are to examine , to which of these two parts it does more good or hame . And though reasons may be alledged on both sides , yet I thinke , that without comparison the defendant receives more dammage by it , then the assailant . The reason , which hereof I give , is , that the defendant is either within a walled towne , or in the field within trenches : If he be in a towne , either it is but little , as most commonly for tresses are , or great and large . In the first case , the defendant is quite lost ; for such is the force of artillery , that no wall be it of what thicknesse it will , but in a few dayes is ruined by it . And if those that are within the walls , have not good roome to retire themselves , with retrenchments and fortifications , they are lost ; nor can they support the shocke of the enemy , when he would enter by breach in the wall , nor hath he any helpe herein of his artillery : for this is a maxime , that where met can enter in by throngs and with violence , the artillery cannot keep them off . Therefore the furious assaults of the Tramontaines it is not possible for the defendant to resist ; but the assaults the Italians give , are well enough endured , who never all in a ●hrong , but scatteringly come to the fight , which they by a name very fit for the purpose , call skirmishes . And these that goe with this disorder and timcrousnesse to enter a breach , where artillery is , go to an apparent death , and against them artillery is a good use : but those who in throngs , when the one presses forward the other , come to the breach , unlesse sustained by ditches and ramparts , will enter any place , and the artillery shall never beat them off ; and though some few of them be slaine , yet can they never be so many as can hinder them of victory . That this is true , we finde in many conquests which fortainers have here made in Italy , especially in that of Brescia : for that towne having rebelled against the French , and the fort holding good yet for the French King , the Venetians were to support all the violence , that from thence could fall in upon the towne , having all that way guarded with artillery , that descended from the fortresse into the city , some of them being planted against the front , others upon the flankes , and so in every other place fir . Whereof the Lord of Fois made not any account , but descending a foote with his troopes passed through the midst of them , and tooke the towne , nor ever appeared it that he had received thereby any notable losse . So that he who defends a little towne ( as it is said ) which is walled in , but hath not space to retire with ●etrenchments and fortifications , and trusts upon the artillery , is presently lost . And thou defendest a great towne , and hast conveniency for retreat , yet without comparison is the artillery more availeable to those without , then within the walls . First , because thou wouldest with thy artillery annoy those without , thou must of force raise thy selfe with it above the levell : for while thou art on the levell , every small fence or trench that the enemy makes secures him , and thou canst no wayes dammage him ; so that thou being to raise thy selfe , and to mount thy peeces on the curtaine of the wall , or some other way , drawest two difficulties upon thee . The first is , that thou canst not bring ordnance thither , neither of that bignesse nor effect , that he without can , being that great things are not manageable in small spaces . The other is , that though we grant thou canst bring such peeces thither , yet canst thou not make those safe and strong fortifications to secure thy artilery within which they without can , being upon the plaine ground , and having those conveniences , and that roome , they can desire . So that it is impossible for him that defends a towne to keepe his artillery mounted on those high places , when those without have store of great and good peeces . And if he brings them into lower places , they become for the most part unprofitable , as it is said . So that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men , as it was the custome of old , and with the small shot : Whereby if they make any small advantage , in regard of the small shot , they suffer as much losse , which counterpoises all the good the artillery can do them : for by them the towne walls are all laid flat , and , as it were , buried in the ditches , so that when the enemy comes to enter by assault , either because the walls are beaten downe , or that the ditches are filled , he that is within , hath more disadvantages thereby , then otherwise he had . And therefore ( as it was formerly said ) these instruments of wa●re do more helpe the besieger , then the besieged . Touching the third point , which is to retire into the campe , and there to make intrenchments , to keepe off from battell till some convenience or advantage gotten , I say , that herein thou hast no more helpe ordinarily to keepe thee from fighting , then had the ancients . And sometimes by reason of the artillery thou hast more disadvantage : for if the enemy come upon thee , and have some small advantage of the field , as it may easily chance that he gets the upper ground of thee , or that at his arrivall thou hast not fully cast up thy trenches , nor cover'd thy selfe well with them , presently he dislodges thee whithout remdy , and thou art forced to come cut of thy fortifications and fight : which befell the Spaniards in the battell at Ravenna , who , being fortified betweene the river Roncus , and a trench they had cast up , the fence whereof was not of that hight was needfull , so that the French had gotten some small advantage of the ground , were forc'd by the artillery out of their fortifications to come to fight . But grant ( as most commonly it should be ) that the place where thou hast encamped , were higher then those others whereof the enemies were masters , and that their fortifications were good and secure in such sort as by meanes of scituation and other thy preparations the enemy dares not assaile thee , in this case they will be forced to use those meanes , which of old they were wont , when any one lay with his army , where he could not be endammag'd , which were to forrage the country and pillage it , to beleager some of the cheife townes , to hinder thy provisions , so that by some necessity thou shalt of force dislodge and be brought to fight , where the artillery , as we shall hereafter shew is not of so great effect . Considering then what sort of warres the Romars made , being in all most all of them they were assailants , and not defendants , it shall appeare ( being that these things above written are true . ) that they would have had greater advantages , and sooner have made their conconquests , had the artillery bin in those times . Touching the second point , that men cannot make proofe of their valour as of old they might , by reason of the artillery , I say , that it is true , that where men are to shew themselves in scattered troops , they run more hazard , then when they are to scale a wall or make such like assaults , where they are not all in one body , but each one a part shewes himselfe . It is true also that the Captaines and Commanders of armies are exposed to more danger of death , being that then the artillery can reach them in any place ; nor availes it them to be in the hindermost rankes , or invironed by their valiantest Souldiers . Yet we see , that neither of these two dangers do often endammage much ; for places fortified are not easily scal'd , nor do they weakly goe to assaile them : but if they will take them , they must besieges them , as it was the custome of old . And where they take their townes by assault , the dangers now a dayes are not much greater then they were wont to be : for even in those times they who defended the townes , wanted not their instruments of warre where with to shoote at their enemies , which ( though perhaps they were not of that violence ) yet for slaughter were of the same effect . Touching the death of Captaines and Commanders , in foure and twenty yeares time , that these last warres have bin in Italy , we have not so many examples , as in ten yeares the ancients had : for from Count Lodowicke of Mirandola , that died at Ferrara , when the Venetians , a few yeares since , assai'd that state , and the Duke of Nemours , that died at Cerignuola , there hath not any one bin slaine by the canon : For the Lord of Fois was slain by the sword at Ravenna , and not by the Cannon . So that if men give no particular proofs of their valour , it is not caused by their canon , but prooeeds from their evil orders , and the feebleness of their armies , which when they want valour in the gross , cannot then in any particular make shew of it . Touching the third allegation made by them , that they can never come to joyne battel , but that the sum of all will depend upon the artillery , I say that this opinion is utterly false , and so shall it be held by those who according to the valour of old will imploy their armies : for whosoever will have a good army , must use them in trainings or rather in battels to come up close to the enemy , and there fall to handy blows with him , and take him by the coller : and they ought to ground more upon the infantry then the cavallery , for some reasons we shall here , after alledge . And when they shall rely most upon the foot , and upon these waies we have spoken of , the artillery becomes quite unprofitable ; for more easily can the infantry avoyd the blow of the cannon by comming up close to the enemy , then of old they could escape the sury of the Elephants , the chariors arm'd with hooks , and such other unaccusiomed encounters which the Roman infantry met with , and sound remedy against , which they would to much the more easily have found against these , as much as the time is of very short durance in which the artillery can harme thee , in comparison of of that wherein the Elephan●s and chariots ●id mischeif : for these in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into disorder ; whereas the artillery hinders thee onely before the battel : which hinderance the infantry easily avoid , either by going cover'd under the naturall scite of the place , or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot : which also we see by experience is not necessary , especially to escape the canon , which can hardly be so right levell'd , but that if they go high they miss thee , if low they come short of thee . Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes , this is more clear then the light , that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm : for if the enemy places the artillery before him , thou mayst easily take it ; if behind him , it hurts himself before it can touch thee : or if it be on either side of thee , it cannot so gall thee , but that thou mayest come up close to it ; whereupon will follow the effect we have said . Nor needs there much dispute upon this : for we have seen it by the example of the Switzers , who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horse assail'd the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery , and yet routed them being no way hinder'd thereby : and the reason is , ( besides the things formerly alledged ) because the artillery hath need to be guarded , if we would it should make any good execution , either by some wall , or trenches or some kind of fortifications , and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy , & so is made unprofitable , as it comes to pass when it is defended onely by men , or as it may be in field battels , it cannot be plac'd on the flank , unless it be on that manner , that the ancients used their instruments of war , when they plac'd them without their squadrers , because they should play from without the ranks ; and whensoever they were put at , either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions : whose ever accounts otherwise of them , does not well understand the use of them , and trusts'upon that , which may easily deceive him , and if the Turk by the help of his artillery , have gaind any victory of the Sophy and the So'dan , it was not occasion'd by other vertue of it , then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse into . Therefore I conclude , comming to the end of this discourse , that the artillery is prossitable in an army , where there is a mingle of the ancient valour , without which it avails little against a couragious army . CHAP. XVIII . How by authority taken from the Romans , and from the use of the ancient military discipline , the foot is more to be esteemd , than the horse . WEE can plainly sshew it by many reasons and examples , how much the Romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry , and thereupon grounded the assurance of all their executions , as it appears by many examples , and among others , when they sought with the Latins near the lake of Regillum , where the Roman Army giving ground a little , for their succours , the horse-men were commanded to light and serve a soct whereby they made good the fight and gaind the victory . Where it is manifest , the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot , than a horseback , They us'd the same termes in many other fights , and sound it alwaies a present help in their dangers . Nor let Hannibals opinion counterballance this , who seeing in the battel at Canna that the Consuls made their horsemen light and serve afoot , scoffing at the course they took , said , I had rather indeed they should be delivered bound into my hands . Which opinion however that it was utterd by a very able man , yet if we are to follow authorities , we may rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth , and so many excellent Captains , that flourished in it , than to one Hanniball alone , though without this authority the reasons are evident : for a man on foot can go in many places , where a horseback he cannot : he may be able to instruct them , how to keep their ranks , and being somewhat confus'd , how they may be restored again . It is very hard to make the horse keep their ranks , and when once they are in disorder , it is impossible to recover them . Besides this , as we see it among men , so is it among horses ; some there are which have but small courage , others again exceeding couragious . And many times it falls out , that a brave horse is back'd by a cowardly fellow , and sometimes a timerous jade is mounted by a stout Souldier ; and there which way soever it is that this disparitie follows , arises uprofitableness and disorder . The infantry well united in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse , and very hardly can they be routed by them : Which opinion is confirmed ( besides many ancient moderne examples ) by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient Republiques , where they shew us , how that at first they began to make war a horseback , because they understood neither the order nor the use of the foot , which when they once had the knowledge of , they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horse . But hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies , to discover , and to forrage and prey about in the Countrey , and to pursue the enemies in their slight , and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse . But the ground-worke , and the very nerves of the army , and whereof most account is to be made , is the Infantry . And among the Italian Princes faults , which have euthral'd Italy to strangers , there is none greater than that they made no account of this order , and turn'd all their regard towards the service of horsemen : Which disorder proceeded from the evil disposition of the Captains , and their ignorance that govern'd the State : by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no setled estates , but were Captains adventurers , serving where they could have pay , who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation , they continuing in armes when the Princes were unarmed . And because they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot , nor had any subjects whereof to serve themselves , and a small number got them no credit , they be took themselves to horse : for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horse , subsisted thereby in good repute , and the payment was not such , but that those that rul'd the State could easily satisfie it . And to the end this should come on more easily , and to keep themselves the better in esteem , they took all respect and reputation from the foot , and reserred all to their cavallery ; And so far increas'd they this disorder , that in the greatest Armie they levyed , the least part of them was foot . Which custom , together with many other disorders intermixt with it , hath much weakned the Italian Soldiery , so that this Country hath easily bin trodden under foot by all strangers . This error , of esteeming the horse more than the foot , is laid open yet more plainly , by another example of the Romans . The Romans were incamped at Sora ; and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assualt the Camp , a Captain of the Roman horse went to incounter them with his Cavalry , whereupon the first shock , meeting brest to brest , it chanc'd that the Commander of each troop was slain , and the residue being left without government , and the skirmish still continuing , the Romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies , light from their horses , and forc't their enemies ( if they would defend themselves ) to do the like , wherewith the Romans carried away the victory . This example could not serve better to the purpose , in shewing of how much value the infantry is , above the horse : for if in other occasions the Consuls made the horsemen to dismount , it was to succour the foot that were in distress , and had need of ayd . But in this place they light not to assist the foot , nor to fight with their enemies foot , but fighting a horseback with horsemen , they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback , that alightning they could more easily vanquish them : I will therefore conclude , that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by another body of foot . Crassus and Marchus Antonius both Romans , made an introde of many daies journeys into the Parthians Kingdome , with a very few horse and a good number of foot , where they incountred with numberless troops of the Parthian horse . Crassus was left there dead with part of the Army ; Marcus Antonius valorously sav'd himself . Nevertheless , in these Roman losses it appears , how much the Infantry exceeded the horse : for being in an open Country , where there are few mountains , and very few rivers , and the Sea-coast far off , and remote from all conveniency , yet for all this did Marcus Antonius even in the opinion of the Parthians themselves , very valourously escape , nor ever durst the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army . If Crassus perish'd there , whosoever well reads his actions , shall find , that he was rather treacherously beguild , than forc'd , nor ever in all his disorders , durst the Parthians set upon him , but alwaies went along by him , to keep in his soldiers from stragling , and getting of provisions , and by promising fairly , but observing nothing , brought him at length unto extream distress . I should think I were to take much pains in perswading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horse , but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testimony . And t is well known that 9000 Swisses at Navarra , formerly alleaged by us , went to encounter 10000 horse and as many more foot , & vanquish'd them : for the horse could no way harm them , and the foot being for the most part Gascoignes and ill ordered , they made small account of . We see likewise that afterwards 36000 Swisses , went to find Francis the French King about Milan , who had an army of 20000 horse and 40000 foot , and a 100 tire of Ordnance ; and though they gaind not the battel at at Navarra , yet they fought bravely two dayes together , and when at length they were broken the moity of them escap'd . Marcus Regulus Attilius presum'd with his infantry to incounter not onely the enemies horse , but their Elephants ; and though his purpose came not to effect , yet was it not so , but that the valour of his infantry was such , that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty . And therefore I answer , that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array , must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they ; otherwise he sustains an evident loss . In the dayes dayes of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan , there came down into Lombardy some 16000 Swisses , whereupon the Duke Carmignuola being then his General , sent him with neare upon a thousand horse and some few foot to incounter them : Who not knowing the manner of their fighting , went to meet them with his horse , not doubting but that he could presently rout them . But finding them to stand firm , and having lost many Souldiers , retir'd ; yet being a very able man , and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes , having repaird his broken troupes , he went again to meet them , where he made all his armed men a light , and serve on foot , and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry , he invested the Swisses , who found no way to help themselves : for Carmignuolaes horsemen bring lighted , who were wel arm'd , were able with facilitie to enter into the Swisses ranks without much hurt : which when they had pierc'd , they could easily harme ; so that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive , that was by Carmignuolaes curtesie preserv'd . I beleeve well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders , but so unhappy are these times , that neither the ancient nor modern examples , nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readvise themselves and consider , that to recover the reputation of the Souldiery of a Countrey or State , it is necessary to revive again these orders and entertain them near their persons , to encourage them and allow them means to live , to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation . But as we use to forsake these customs , so we leave other orders also formerly spoken of ; whereupon it comes to pass , that the very conquests we make turne to our losses , and not to the advancement of a State , as hereafter we shall say . CHAP. XIX . That Conquests in Republiques not well govern'd , and which proceed not according to the Roman vertue , prove rather their ruine , than advancement . THese opinions contrary to the truth , and grounded on evil precedents , which have bin introduced by these our corrupt ages , cause men not to stand much upon straying from old wonted uses . Some thirty years agoe , an Italian would never have bin perswaded , that ten thousand foot in a plain had ever bin able to assault ten thousand horse and so many more foot , and not only fight with them , but vanquish them too , as it is plain by the example of the battel at Navarra ; by us sundry times alleag'd . And however that Stories are full of them , yet would they not have given us credit : and if they had beleeved us , they would have said , that in these dayes men are better arm'd , and that a squadron of men at armes would have bin of force to have shock'd with a rock , and not only with a body of foot , and thus with these false excuses they corrupted their judgments . Nor would they have taken into consideration , that Lucullus with a few foot routed a 150000 horse that Tigranes led , and yet among those horsemen there was a sort of them very like our men at armes . And so this fallacy was discover'd by the example of forrain Nations . And as thereby it proves true , touching the infantry , which is related in Story , so ought it be beleev'd that all the rest of the ancient orders are true and usefull . And when this we re once credited , Republiques and Princes would fail less , and be of more strength to resist any force should come upon them , nor hope so much in the flight ; and those that should have in their hands the government of State , would be better able to guide it , either by way of amplification or by way of preservation , and would think that to increase the number of their Citizens , and make them as their associates and not vassals , to send forth Colonies to keep the countries gained , to make a general stock out of the booties taken , to tame the enemy with incursions , & by set battels , & not long sieges , to maintain the publique state in wealth , & the private in scarcity , and to be industrious in keeping the armies in good discipline , are the means to inlarge a Commonwealth & gain an Empire . And when this way of amplification should not like them , then should they think that all addition to their state are the ruine of Commonwealths , and therefore should restrain all ambition , regulating their City according to their lawes and customs , forbidding all inlargments , only ayming at defenee of what they have , and keeping them under good government , as the Republicks of Germany do , and so have liv'd free a good while . Notwithstanding ( as otherwhere I have said , when I discours'd touching the difference there was in the ordering of a State to become fit to conquer ; and the ordering of one to be able to maintain it self ) it is impossible , that a Republick should have the hap to stand quiet , and enjoy her own liberty , with her small Territories : for though she molest not others yet she shall be molested her self : she may also have some mind or some necessity in some part to extend her bounds : and in case she have no enemy abroad , yet may she find some one at home , as it must needs be alwaies that such be found among a great many potent citizens , and if those Republicks of Germany can subsist in that manner , & have been able to continue for a time it arises from some conditions , that are in that Country , & which are no where else sound , nor could they maintain such a manner of government without them . This part of Germany , whereof I speak , was subject to the Roman Empire , as were France & Spain ; but when the Empire began to decline , & the title of the Empire was brought into that Country , the most potent of those Cities began ( according to the baseness or the necessity of those Emperors ) to set themselves at liberty , buying themselves out from the Empire , and reserving thereunto only a a certain annual rent . Insomuch as by little and little , all those Cities , which he●d immediatly of the Emperor , and were no way in subjection to any Prince , in such like manner set themselves free . It happened in the same times , when these Cities bought out their liberties , that certain communalties of the Duke of Austria's subjects , rebell'd agianst him , among which were Tilibourg , the Swisses and others , who prospering in the beginning , by little and little came to such growth , that they not only shook off the Austrian yoke , but even became a terror to all their neighbours , and these are those they call Swisses . This Country therefore is divided into the Swisses , Republcks , which they call-free Townes , Princes , and the Emperor . And the reason why among such variety of governments there arise no warres , or if any do , why they continue not , is that reverence they yeeld to the Emperor , who albeit he hath no great forces , yet is held in such esteem among them , that he alwaies reconciles them , & with his authority interposing himself as Mediator , takes away all discontents : & the greatest & longest warrs that have been there , were those that follow'd between the Swisses & the Duke of Austria ; and though now for these many years the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been one and the same thing , yet was he never so powerful as to tame the Swisses insolence , where there was never any means of accord , unless it were by force ; nor hath the residue of Germany ever given him much assistance : partly because those communalties cannot find in their hearts to hurt those that desire to live under a civil government , as they themselves do and partly because those Princes are not able , being poor , or will not , by reason that they envy too great puissance . Those commonalties therfore may live contented with their small dominions , because they have no occasion ( in regard of the Imperial Authority ) to wish it greater . They may live the better in union within their owne walls , because they have the enemy near at hand , who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them , whensoever they should fall into discord : but if that country were otherwise conditioned , it were fit for them to seeke the inlargement of their State , & so interrupt their owne rest : and because otherwhere there are not the like termes , this manner of living cannot be followed , and there is a necessity either to strengthen the State by way of leagues , or to amplifie it as the Romans did . And whosoever undertake any other course of government , seeke not their owne life , but ruine and desttruction : for many wayes , and for many reasons are conquests hurtfull : for it is very possible to gaine dominion , and not strength ; and he that does increase his dominions , & yet growes not in strength , must needs go to wrack . They cannot grow strong , that grow poore in the wars , although they prove victorious , because their conquests cost them more then they get by them , as the Venetians & the Florentins did , who have bin much weaker , when the one commanded all Lombardy , and the other Tuscany , then when the one was contented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories : for al this preceeded from their desire to conquer , & their ignorance to take the right course : and they deserve the more blame , in that they have very little excuse having seene the ways the Romanes went , because they might have followed their example , being that the Romanes without any patterne to follow , by their own judgment , found out a fit way to go . Moreover sometimes such gains gotten do no smal harm to a well govern'd Commonwealth , when either such a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleasures , where by conversation with them , their manners are learned , as it happen'd to Rome at first in the conquest of Capua , & afterwards to Hannibal . And had Capua been of further distance from the City , that the soldiers error had not had the remedy near hand , or that Rome had been in some part corrupted , without question that conquest had prov'd the Roman Republicks ruine . And T. Livius witnesses the same in these words : Even then was Capua little good for the military discipline , which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures , besotted the soldiers minds so , that they forgot their native Countries . And truly such like Cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their Conquerors without fight , or loss of blood ; for by infecting them with their contagious vices , they expose them to the conquest of whoever assailes them . And Juvenal could not better have expressed this , then where in his Satyres he saies , that by their conquests of forrain nations , their minds were possessed with forrain vices , in exchange of parsimony , & other excellent vertues ; Glutrony and luxury making their habitation there , revenged the worlds Conquest on them . If therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans , in the times that they proceeded with such wisdome and vertue , how will they prove to those who go on in much different waies from them ? and who besides the other errors they run into ( whereof we have formerly spoken enough ) serve themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers ? whereupon those mischiefs often befall them , which we shall mention in the following chap. CHAP. XX. What hazzard that Prince or Commonwealth runs , which is serv'd by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers . IF in another work of mine I had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary soldiers how unprofitable they are , and how very profitable the native soldiers of the Country are , I would much more have inlarged my self in this discourse , than now I purpose ; but having otherwhere discours'd hereupon at length , I shall now only point at it . Not yet did I think fit wholly to pass it over , having found in Titus Livius so large an example belonging to those soldiers : for auxiliary soldiers are those that a Prince or Commonwealth sends with their Captains and pay ready furnish'd in thy aid . And comming to the text of T. Livius , I say , that the Romans having in severall places broken two armies of the Samnites with their forces , which they sent to succor the Capuans , and thereby freed them from that warr the Samnites made against them , purposing to return to Rome , to the end the Capuans dispoyl'd of ayd should not a new becom a prey to the Samnites , left behind them in the country about Capua two legions to defend them . Which legions growing corrupt through idleness , began to be insnar'd with the delicacies thereof So that having for gotten their owne country , and the reverence they ought to the Senate , they resolved to take armes , and make themselves Lords of that Country , which they by their valours had defended , thinking those inhabitants not worthy to injoy those goods , which they knew not how to defend . Which thing , the Romanes having had some inkling of it before , was stopped , and punished by them , as , where we speak of conspiracies , it shall be show'd at large . Therefore I say again , that of all kindes of souldiers the auxiliaries are the most dangerous ; Because among those , that Prince or Republique that uses them for ayd , hath no authority , but onely he that sends them : for auxiliary souldiers are those that are sent th●e by a Prince , as I have sayd , under the command of his own Captaines , under his own ensignes and pay also , as this army was , which the Romanes sent to Capua . These kinds of souldiers , when they have vanquished , most commonly pillage as well them that have hir'd them , as the enemy against whom they have hired them ; and this they do , either through the maligne disposition of their Prince that sends them , or through their owne ambition And however the Romanes had no intention to violate the agreement and conventions made with the Capuans , yet the facility wherewith those souldiers thought themselves able to take their towne , was such that it might have been of force to perswade them to think of taking the town and State from the Capuans : Many examples to this purpose may be alledg'd ; but this , and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium shall suffice me , from whom both lives & town were taken by one legion of soldiers , which the Romans had there left in garrison . Therefore a Prince or a Republick should rather take any other course , than seek to bring auxiliary soldiers into his Country , principally when he is most to rely upon them : for any accord or agreement ( though very hard ) to which he shall yeeld with his enemy , shall be more tolerable than this . And if things past were well call'd to mind , and those that are present well consider'd on , for one that hath had good success in such a business , a man shall find exceeding many who have been abus'd . And a Prince , or an ambitious Republick can never have a fitter opportunity to seise on a Town or Country , than when they are requir'd to send their armies for defence thereof . Wherefore he that is so ambitious , that not only for his own defence , but for offence to another , calls in such like aids , seeks to gain that he cannot hold , and which also he that gets it for him , can at his pleasure take from him , But so great is mans ambition , that if he can fulfill his desire for the present , he is never aware of that evill , which shortly after may thence redound to him . Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him , as well in this , as in other things we have treated of : for were men hereby mov'd , they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours , and the farther of they were from making themselves masters of them , the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their armes , as hereafter shall appear by example of the Capuans . CHAP. XXI . The first Pretour that the Romans ever sent to any place , was to Capua , four hundred years after they began to make war. HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those , who now a daies inlarge their dominions , we have formerly discours'd enough , and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly race , to live with their own laws , as well those that yeelded to them as subjects , as those that came under their protection as associates . And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire , but tied them to some certain conditions , which whiles they observ'd , they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity . And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy , and that they reduc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces . Whereof the example is very clear ; for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua , whether they sent him not through their own ambition , but upon the Capuans intreaty , who ( being they were at discord one with another ) judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them , that might put them in order again and reunite them . The Antiates also mov'd by their example , and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them . And T. Livius saies upon this occasion , and upon this new way of ruling ; That now not only the Roman armes , but their lawes also were in great repute . We see therefore how much this course taken , further'd the Romans advancement : for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free , or to be govern'd by their own Citizens , are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not ( though it may bring some burden with it too ) rather than under that which they having every day in their view , continually reproaches them with their slavery . Besides this ; the Prince gains hereby another advantage , that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies , whereby they were to regulate those Cities , there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince . And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away . And that this is true , besides ancient examples , which we could alledge , we have one of late memory in Italy : for as it is well known ( Geneva having been several times possessed by the French ) that King did alwaies ( except at this present time ) send them a French Governor , who under him should govern them . For this present only , but upon any intention of the Kings ; but it seem'd necessity so order'd it , he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes , and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate . And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them , & gives the people most satisfaction , would the rather alow of this latter . Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes , the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule ; & so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty , by how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them . This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to aske a Prerour of the Romans : but had the Romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher , they would presently have been in jealousie of them , and started from them . But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples , having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany ? It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yeelded it self to the government of Florence . It is as well known also , what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans , the Luckeses and the Seneses ; and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence , that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty , as well as others do , but because the Florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers , but the others they treated as enemies . This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them ; and the others struggle with all might and main , as yet they do also , not to come under them . And doubtless , had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours , and not have alwaies scar'd them , they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany . But hereupon I advise not , that armes and force are not to be us'd , but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place , where and when other meanes will not serve . CHAP. XXII . How erroneous many times the opinions of men are , when they give their judgements touching great affaires . HOw false oftentimes mens opinions are , they well see , who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations , which many times unless they be determined of by able men , are contrary to all truth . And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths ( especially in peaceable times ) both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned , such adwise is follow'd , as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of , or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good . This error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity , and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten , as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of . There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled , if not well experienced in affaires , the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible , whereof in such a case men are perswaded . These words are spoken upon that which Numicius the Pretour ( after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans ) perswaded them ; and upon that which few years since , many beleeved , when Francis the first , King of France came to the Conquest of Milan , which was defended by the Swissers . Therefore I say , that Lewis the Twelfth being dead , and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdome of France , and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the Switzers had of late possessed themselves , by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement , desired to have some aid in Italy , which might further his undertakings , so that besides the Venetians , whom King Lewis had gain'd , he tried the Florentines , and Pope Leo the tenth , thinking his enterprise much facilitated , by having them to side with him , because the King of Spains soldiers were in Lombardy , and some of the Emperors forces in Verona . Pope Leo yeelded not to the Kings desire , but by those that counselled him , he was perswaded ( as it was said ) to stand neuter , showing him that herein consisted certain victory : for it was nothing at all for the Churches good , to have either mighty in Italy , the King or the Swissers . But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty , it was fit to free it from the one and the other . And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other , divided or united , it was not ami's to let them overcome one another , and that afterwards the Church with her allies should assaile the conqueror , and it was impossible to find a better occasion then the present , both being incamped : and so the Pope having his forces in order , whereby he might be able to present himself upon the confines of Lombardy , near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state , should there abide till they had fought their battell : which in all probability ( each army being very valorous ) could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the Conqueror so feeble , that the Pope might easily assaile and break him , and thereby he should attain to become Lord of Lombardy , and only arbitrator of all Italy . And how erroneous this opinion was , appear'd by the event of the matter : for the Swissers being vanquish'd after a long fight , the Popes and the Spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the Conquerors , that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight ; which also would have little avail'd them had it not been for the Kings humanity or coldness in their pursuit , who sought not after a second victory , but was contented to make agreement with the Church . This opinion hath some arguments for it , which carry a colour of truth , but indeed are far from it : for it seldome comes to pass , that the Conqueror loses many of his soldiers ; for of them , there are some only slai in the battel , and not in the flight : and during the heat of the combat , whiles men stand face to face one with another , few of them fall , especially because for the most part this continues but a small while . And in case it should last long , and many of the Conquerors should fall ; yet such is the reputation , and terror also , that victory draws with it , that it far exceeds the dammage , that by the death of those soldiers can be suffer'd . So that an Army , which upon the opinion , that such a one were weakned , going to assaile it , would be much deceived , unless it were such an Army that at all times , before and after the victory , were able to deale with it . In this case the assailing Army may be able according to the fortune and valor it hath to win or lose : but that which had formerly fought , & vanquish'd , would have some advantage of the other : Which appears plainly by the experience the Latins gave us , and the fallacy by which Numicius the Pretour was abus'd , as also by the dammage which those people brought upon themselves by beleeving him , who ( when the Romans had vanquish'd the Latins ) cried out through all Latium , that then was it time to assaile the Romans , who were weakned with the late fight they had with the Latines ; that the Romans had carried away only the name of the victory , but had suffered all other sorts of dammages , even as much as if they had been overcome , and that any small force , if now a fresh it should assaile them , were enough to dispatch them . Whereupon those people that gave credit to him , levied a new army , and were presently defeated , and so suffered that loss , which others shall that hold the like opinion . CHAP. XXIII . How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects , whensoever occasion was offer'd , that constrain'd them thereunto , avoided the mid way , and rather betook themselves to one of the extreames . THe Latins were now reduc'd to such termes , that they could neither endure peace , nor maintain War. Of all unhappy conditions this is the worst , unto which a Prince or Republick can be brought , that they can neither accept of peace , nor support the War ; unto which those are reduc'd , who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace , and on the other side , if they have a mind to make war , either they must cast themselves as a prey into the hands of those that ayd them , or become a prey to their enemy . And into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses , by not having well weighed their own forces , as before it was said : for that Republique or Prince , that should well weigh them , very hardly would ever be brought to those termes the Latines came , who when they should not have made accord with the Romans , made it , and when , they should not have broke peace with them brake it . Whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the Romans did equally endammage them . The Latins then were overcome and much broken at first by Manlus Torquatus , and afterwards by Camillus ; who having forc't them to yeeld and render themselves to the Romans , and put Garrisons in all the I owns in Latium , and taken hostages of them all , when he came back to Rome , related to the Senate , that all Latium was in the people of Romes hands . And because this judgement is remarkable , and deserves note , to the end it may be follow'd , when Princes have the like occasions given them , I will produce the very words , that Livie put in Camillus his mouth , which did testifie both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State , and that in their judgements touching the State , they alwaies avoided the middle way , and turn'd to the extreams : for a government is nothing else , but to have such a tye upon the subjects , that they either cannot , or will not hurt thee . This is done either by making thy self fully sure of them , in taking away from them all means to hurt thee , or by doing them so much good , that it is not probable they will wish to change their state : all which is there comprehended ; first by the proposition Camillus made , and afterwards by the judgement the Senate gave thereupon . His words were these , In this consultation , the immortal Gods have given you so much power , that it is wholly in your hands to chuse , whether Latium shall continue still a Nation or no. And therefore now may ye for ever procure your selves repose and security from thence , either by rigor and punishment , or by clemency and pardon ; chuse ye whether . Are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty against those that have yeelded , and are vanquish'd ? ye may indeed blot out the very name of Latium ; But will ye , as your ancestors have done before you , enlarge the Roman Empire , by receiving into your City those whom ye have conquer'd ? Then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory . Certes that government is of all other most sure , where the subjects take joy in their obedience . And therfore it is behoovefull , whiles their mindes are in suspence between fear and hope , to prevent them either with speedy punishment or benefit . To this purpose followed the Senates deliberation , which was according to the Consuls words ; for calling them Town by Town , before them , those that were of any moment , they either much benefited , or quite ruined them , granting divers exemptions and priviledges to those they would do good to , freely making them Citizens , and giving them security every way . They dismantled the other strong Towns , and sent Colonies thither , and brought the people from thence into Rome , and so dispersed them , that neither with their arms nor counsel they could do any more harm : Nor ever did they make use of any neutral way , in things ( as I have said ) of moment . Princes should imitate this judgment given ; and hereunto the Florentines should have intended , when in the year 1502. Arezzo and the valley of Chiana rebelled ; which had they done , they had secured their Government , and much amplified the City of Florence , and likewise might have given them those fields they wanted for their sustenance : But they made use rather of that middle way , which is the most pernicious , in giving judgment upon men , so that part of the Aretins they confined , part they condemned , and took from all of them their honors , and ancient degrees in the City , and yet left the City whole and untouched : And if any Citizen in their Consultations advised that Arezzo should be dismantelled , and razed , they who seemed to be of the wiser sort , said it would be a disgrace to the Florentines to raze it ; because it would be thought then that Florence wanted forces to hold them ; which are some of those Reasons that seem to be , but are not true : For by the same reason a patricide were not to be put to death , not any vile or scandalous person , it being a shame for that Prince to shew that he is not able to bridle such a man alone : and these kind of men having such opinions , perceive not , how men in particular , and sometimes a whole City together too , do wrong a State : so that for others example , and his own safeguard , a Prince hath no other remedy , but uterly to raze it . And indeed the honor consists in the knowledg and power to chastise , and not in being able to hold a City under stil with many dangers : for the Prince that punishes not him that offends , so that he cannot offend more , is esteemd ignorant and unworthy . This sentence which the Romans gave , is confirm'd by the judgement they gave upon the Privernates . Where by the Text in Livie two things may be observed : the one , which is formerly spoken of , that subjects are either to be oblig'd by good done them , or else to be quite extingnish'd ; the other is , how much avails the generous conrage of the minde , and true speaking in the presence of sage and discreet men . The Senate of Rome was assembled to give their sentence upon the Privernates , who having been in Rebellion , were by force reduc'd to the Roman obedience . Many Citizens were sent from the Privernates to crave pardon of the Senate , who being come before them , were thus ask'd by one of the Senators , What Punishment he should censure the Privernates worthy of ? Whereunto one of the Privernates reply'd , The same that they deserve , who think themselves worthy of liberty . Whereunto the Consul answerd , What if we remit you your punishment , what peace shall we hope for with you ? To which he said again , If it be good you give us , you shall have it faithfully and perpetually observ'd , if ill , not long . Whereupon the wises of those of the Senate , howbeit many were angry thereat , said , That they had heard a stout and a free man speak ; neither was it credible that any Nation , or any man indeed , would continue any longer , than he must needs , in such a condition , whereof he repents himself ; and there onely was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept , where it was made of their own good wills and freely ; but it was in no case to be hop'd for there , where they were brought into bondage and servitude . and upon these words they decreed , that the Privernates should be made Citizens of Rome , and honoured them with all the priviledges of their Bourgessie , saying , That they finally were worthy to be Citizens of Rome , who valu'd nothing else in comparison of their liberty . So much were these generous spirits taken with this stout and free answer : for , an answer else would have been false and cowardly . And those that think otherwise of men ( especially such as are us'd to be free , or to their thinking are free ) are much deceiv'd , and by this deceit are they feduc'd to take wrong courses for themselves , and of little satisfaction to others : from whence arise the often rebellions and ruines of States . But to return to our discourse , I conclude as well by this , as by that judgement given upon the Latins , when sentence is to pass upon puissant Cities , and that have been accustomed to enjoy their liberties , it is necessary either utterly to raze them , or by benefiting of them to oblige them ; otherwise it is all to no purpose ; for the middle way here in is absolutely to be avoided , which is dangerous , as it prov'd to the Samnites , having inclos'd the Romans at the gallows of Gaudium , when they would not follow that old mans counsell that advis'd them , either to let them go with all courtesie and love , or put them all to the sword . But they taking that neutral way , disarming them , and putting them all to pass under the gallows , let them go with shame and disdain so that a while after they found by their own dammage how advantageous that old mans advice had been , and how hurtfull their own resolution was , as we shall discourse thereof more at large in its own place . CHAP. XXIV . Fortresses in general do more harm then good . PEradventure it may seem to the wise men of our times a matter not well advised on , that the Romans , when they would make themselves sure of the people of Latium , and of the City of Privernum , never thought upon the building of some Fortress which might serve for a bridle to hold them in obedience , especially being it passes for a Proverb in Florence , alledg'd by our States men , that Pisa and other such like Cities should be kept with Citradells . And truely had the Romans been like them , they would have provided for the building of them : but because they were of another kind of courage , and judgement , and had another manner of power , therefore they never built any . and whiles Rome liv'd free , and observ'd her own ordinances , & institutions , for the propagation of vertue , she never built any one to keep under Cities or Provinces , though it may be , she preserv'd some of them she found already built . Whereupon having seen the manner of the Romans proceedings herein , and that of the Princes of our times , I think to take it into consideration , whether it be good to build Fortresses , & whether they advantage or wrong him that builds them . We must consider then , that Fortresses are built either for resistance against the enemy , or for defence against any tumult of the subjects . In the first case they are unnecessary , in the second hurtfull . And to give a reason , wherefore in the second case they are hurtfull , I say , that that Prince or Republick that is afraid of his own subjects , and their rebellion , must needs have his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him ; and that hatred from his own evill carriages , which evill carriages proceed from thence , either that he beleeves he is able to keep them under by force , or from the Princes small discretion : and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force , is the having built these Citradels , over them : for evill treatings , which are the causes of hatred , for the most part are deriv'd from thence , that that Prince or Republick hath Cittadels upon them ; which ( when this is true ) are far more hurtful , than profitable : for first ( as it is said ) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects , being that thou hast thy security within them : for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withall , are of no value , but these two ; either that thou hast alwaies a good Army ready to send into the field , as the Romans had , or that thou doest disperse , extinguish , disorder , and disunite them so , that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee : for be it that thou doest impoverish them , They that are despoil'd of their goods , have weapons left them . If thou disarmst them , Even rage will find them weapons . If thou destroyest their heads , and proceedest still to injure the rest , there will grow up again new heads , as fast as those of Hydra . If thou buildest Cittadels , they are quite unprofitable in time of peace , because they encourage thee to wrong them ; but in time of war they are of least use ; for then are they assaulted by the enemy , and thy subjects too ; nor is it possible they can resist them both . And if ever they were unprofitable , they are now a dayes so , in regard of the Artillery , by reasons of whose fury and violence , it is unpossible to defend small fortresses , and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments , as formerly hath been shew'd . But I will dispute this matter more plainly yet . Wilt thou O Prince with these Cittadels curb thy Citizens ? or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art , bridle a City thou hast taken by war ? I will address my self to the Prince , and tel him , that such a Fortress to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable , for the reasons above alleadgd : because it makes thee prompter , and less careful how thou doest oppress them , which oppression makes them desperate in attempting thy ruine , and so inrages them , that that Fortress , which is the cause thereof , can no way preserve thee ; so that a sage and good Prince , to keep himself still good , and that he may not give occasion to , nor imbolden his children to become bad , will never build fortress , to the end they relie not upon the Cittadels , but rather upon the hearts of men . And if Count Francis Storce that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wise , and yet in Milan he built a Cittadel , I say , that herein he little shewd his wisdome , as appeard by the effect , seeing that Fortress proved rather a disadvantage and loss , then any safeguard to his heirs : for thinking that by means thereof they might pass their time in security , and yet injure their Citizens and subjects , they forbare not any kind of violence ; whereupon being grown very odious , they lost the state , so soon as they were assail'd by their enemy . Nor could that fortress defend them , nor did it any way advantage them in the war , and in time of peace it had done them much harme ; for if there had been no such citradel , and they for want of discretion onely had sharply handled some of their subjects , they might sooner have discover'd the danger , and withdrawn themselves from it , and so afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have resisted the French fury , having their subjects to freind without any fortress , then having them become thine enemies with thy fortress , which gives thee no help at all . For either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it , or is forced by the assailant , or else by famine . And if thou wouldest that these should avail thee , and help the to recover a state lost , where only the fortress holds for thee , thou must have an army , wherewith thou maist assault him that chased the from thence . And whensoever thou hast this army , thou couldest not in any wise faile of recovering the State , howsoever there were no fortress at all ; and that the more easily , by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends , then if thou hadst ill-treated them through presumption upon thy fortress . And it hath been proved by experience , how that this Cittadell of Milan hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adversity of the one or other , but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and mischiefes , having never advised , by means thereof , upon any fair way to keep that state . Guido Vbaldo Duke of Vrbin , son to Frederick , who in his daies was esteemed a great Captain , being driven out of his state by Caesar Borgia son to Pope Alexander the sixt , when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again , he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the Country , thinking they did more harme then good : for he having gained mens hearts to him , for their sakes would not abide them ; and in regard of enemies , he saw they were not able to defend him , it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preserve them withall , so that he resolved to raze them all . Pope Julius , having driven the Bentivogli out of Bolonia , built a Cittadell there , and caused a governor of his to ransacke them shrewdly , insomuch that the people rebelled , and he suddenly lost the Cittadel , so that it served him to little purpose , or rather wronged him as much , as carrying himself otherwise it could have helped him . Nicolas of Castello father of the Vitelli , returning into his Country from whence he had been banished , forthwith demolished two several fortresses , which Pope Sextus the fourth had built there , deeming that not the fortress , but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his State. But of all other examples , the freshest and of most remarke in every point , and that which is fittest to shew the incommodity of building them , and the fruit of razing them , is that of Genua which fell out in these latter times . It is well known how that Genua in the yeare 1507. rebelled against Lewis the Twelfth , King of France , who came in person , and with all his strength to regain it : which being done , he caused an exceeding strong Cittadel to be built there , surpassing in strength all others that are now adaies known : for in regard of the scituation , and the other circumstances belonging thereto , it was impregnable , being placed upon the very point of a hill , which stretched it self out into the sea , called by the Genueses , Godefa . And hereby the whole port , and a great part of the Town of Genua was subject to its battery : It happend afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of Italy , for all the fortress , Genua rebelled and Octavian Fregoso recovered the State thereof , who by his industry in the terme of 16 moneths took it by famine , and as every one beleeved , so he was advised by many , to reserve it for his refuge in any accident . But he , as he was exceeding wise , knowing that they were not fortresses , but mens good wills that preserved Princes in their state , razed it to the ground , And so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress , but rather upon his own valour and judgement , he hath continually held it , and holds it yet . And whereas a thousand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of Genua , his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand , and have not been able to hurt him . By this therefore it appears , how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not Octavian at all , nor did the building of it advantage the King of France : for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an army with him , he might recover Genua , though he had no fortress there ; but when he could bring no army with him into Italy , neither could he keep the Genueses in obedience , though he had a fortress there . It was therefore an expence to the King to build it , and a shame to lose it , and to Octavian a glory to regain it . But let us come to those Republiques that raise up fortresses , not in their native countries , but in those they have conquered . And to shew this fallacy , if that example of France and Genua suffice not , this of Florence and Pisa may , where the Florentines had built a cittadel , to keep that town in subjection : And never advised themselves , that a City which had alwaies been a prosessed enemy to the Florentines , having lived free , which hath a recourse to liberty for a colour of Rebellion , it was necessary ( being desirous to keep her ) to use that manner the Romans had , either to take her as a companion into the state , or to deface and ruine her : for of what value cittadels are , we saw in King Charles his comming into Italy , to whom they were yeelded , either through the treachery or cowardise of their governors . Whereas if they had not been , the Florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping Pisa stil upon them , nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereaved the Florentines of that City ; and those means , whereby untill that time it had been maintained , would peradventure have been of force to preserve it . And without doubt they could not have made a worse triall , then that of the fortresses . I conclude therefore , that for the safety of ones native Country , a strong hold is but hurtfull ; & to keep under Towns that are conquered , cittadels availe little . And hereunto the Authority of the Romans shall suffice me , who dismantelled the Towns they intended to hold by force , & never built up their walls ; and if any one against this opinion should alledge me the example of Tarentum in ancient times , and in these modern that of Brescia , which places , by means of the cittadells , were recovered from the subjects rebellion : I answer , that at the years end Fabius Maximus was sent with the whole Army to recover Tarentum , who would have been able to recover that , though thete had been no cittadell there . And though Fabius put those means in practise , yet had they never been , he would have us'd some other , which would have produced the same effect . And I know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds , that to regain thee the Town , requires a Consular Army , and a Fabius Maximus for commander , before it can be done . And that the Romans in any case had recover'd it plainly , appears by the example of Capua , where there was no cittadell , but they got it by the soldiers valor . But to that of Brescia , I say , that seldome chances which befell in that rebellion , that the fortress which is possessed still by thy forces ( the Town being fallen into rebellion ) should have a great army to friend and near hand , as was that of the French : for the Lord De Fois the Kings General being with his army at Bolonia , when he understood the loss of Brescia , by means of the Fortress indeed recover'd the Towne . Therefore that Fortress yet stood in need ( to do any good ) of such a one as was the Lord of Fois , and a French army , that in three daies might relieve them ; so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight : for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our daies , and recover'd by the same fortune that the field hath been taken , and recovered again , not only in Lombardy , but in Romania , in the Kingdom of Naples , and in all parts of Italy . But touching the building of sortresses for defence against forrain enemies , I say , they are not usefull to those people , nor Kingdoms , who have good armies on foot ; they are rather unprofitable , because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them : but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee . And this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things , as we know the Romans and Spartans were : for if the Romans built no fortresses , the Spartans did not only forbear from them , but suffered none of their Cities to be wall'd in neither , because they would have no other guard but a mans own valor , to defend him . Whereupon when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian , whether the walls about Athens were not very faire , he answered him , yes , if all the inhabitants of the Town were women . To that Prince then that hath good armies , when upon the maritime frontiers of his state he hath a fortress , that for some few daies he is able to sustain the enemy , till things are somewhat order'd , it would sometimes be of small avail , but of no necessity . But when a Prince hath no strong army , fortresses either in the heart of his State , or at his frontiers , are hurtfull , or unprofitable : hurtfull , because he easily loses them , and being lost they make war upon him ; or put case they are so strong , that the enemy cannot take them , they are left behind by the enemies army , and so they become of no service . For good armies , if they meet not with very sharp encounters , enter far into their enemies Countries , 〈◊〉 thout regard either of Town or fortress they leave behind them : As it was evident in the ancient Stories , and as we see Francis Maria did , who in these latter times without any regard of them , left ten of the enemies Cities behind him , to assayl that of Vrbin , That Prince then that can raise a good army , can do well enough , without having any strong holds : but he that cannot have an army ready , should never build any : well may he fortifie the City of his abode , and keep it in good strength , and the Citizens thereof well disposed , whereby he may be able to support the enemies violence , till either some accord , or some forrain aid come to his relief . All other designes are expensive in time of peace , and unfruitfull in time of war. And whosoever shall well weigh all this that I have said , shall perceive that the Romans as they were in all other their affairs very judicious , so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the Latins , and the Privernates , where taking no care at all for citadels , they assur'd themselves of them by wiser and better waies . CHAP. XXV . It is a wrong course to assayle a City fallen into discord , thinking by means thereof , to master it . IN the Roman Republick the people and the Nobility were so far fallen asunder , that the Veyentes together with the Eburans by means of their disagreement , thought they might be able quite to root out the Romans : and having levied an Army , and forrag'd all the Country of Rome , the Senate armed out Cneus Manilius and M. Fabius against them , who having brought their Army near to that of the Veyntes , they forbear not with all insolences and reproaches to revile them , and disgrace the Roman name , and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the Romans though then they were ar●ods one with another , came to agreement , and so comming to the combat , broke and vanquish'd them . We see therefore how much men deceive themselves ( as formerly we have treated ) in the courses they take , and that many times where they think to get , they lose . The Veyentes beleev'd , that by getting upon the Romans that were at variance one with another , they should overcome them , but it prov'd the occasion of reconcilement to the Romans , but of ruine to themselves : for the causes of discord in Republicks , is most commonly idleness and peace ; and the cause of union and concord is fear and war. Wherefore had the Veyentes been wise , the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been , so much the more should they have forborn from war against them , and with devices of Peace cast about how to master them . The way is , to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City , which is in discord : and whiles they come not to armes , to carry himself as an Umpire between both parties . And when they do come to armes , to afford some slow favours to the weaker party , as well to keep them still at war , and consume them , as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meanest to suppress them , and become their Prince . And when this part is well plaid , it cannot fail ordinarily , but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for . The City of Pistoya ( as in another discourse and to another purpose I said ) came to the Florentines Republick , by no other trick than this : for it being divided in factions , the Florentines now favouring the one , and then the other without any imputation of blame from either , brought them to such terms , that being tir'd with their tumultuous living , they came willingly to cast themselves into the Florentines armes . The City of Siena never changed her State upon the Florentines favour , but when their courtesies came but thin and small : for when they were frequent and strong , they united them rather for the defence of the State in which they liv'd . I will adde to these aforesaid one other example . Philp Visconti Duke of Milan , several times made war against the Florentines , grounding much upon their disagreements , and alwaies came off a loser . Whereupon he was wont to say , when he complained of the evill success of his undertakings , that the Florentines follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose . Therefore ( as it was said before ) the Veyentes and the Etruscans deceived themselves by this conceit of theirs , and were at last in a set battell vanquish'd by the Romans . And thus will others find themselves deceiv'd , whoever shall seek by the like course , and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people . CHAP. XXVI . Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it , without any returne of advantage to them . I Eeleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wisdome in men , to abstain from threatning or injuring of any one in words ; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength ; but the one makes him more wary of thee , and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee , and devise by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee . This is plain by the example of the Veyentes , whereof we spake in the former Chapter : who to the wrong of making war against the Romans , added the reproach of words , from which every prudent Commander ought to restrain his soldiers : so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to revenge , and are no defence ( as it is said ) against the hurt he does , insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee , which returne againe upon thee , Whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in Asia , where Gabades a Commander of the Persians , having a long while lien incamped before Amida , and determined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart , and therefore to that purpose rising with his campe , those of the Town being come all upon the walls , and grown insolent upon their victory , forbore no kind of outrage , disgracing , blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baseness and cowardise : whereupon Gabades being incensed , alter'd his purpose , and return'd to the siege , where such was their indignation at the contumely , that in a few daies they took and sack'd the Town . In the same manner it befell the Veyentes , who were not content ( as is said ) to make war against the Romans , but they rayl'd on them in vile termes , going even to their very trenches to reproach them , so that they incensed them more with their words then blowes : and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight , constrein'd the Consul to begin to fight , so that the Veyentes suffer'd , as the others we spoke of before , for their insolence . Wherefore every good Commander of armies , and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practice all possible remedies , that these injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army , neither one among another , nor against the enemy : for being practised against the enemy , there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients : and among themselves they would do worse , when there is no reparation made , which wise and judicious men have alwaies awarded . When the Roman legions left at Capua conspired against the Capuans , as in its place shall be related , and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy , ( which was afterwards quieted by Valerius Corvinus ) among other constitutions which were made in the agreement , they ordained very grievous punishments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition . Tiberius Gracchus , who during the warrs with Hannibal was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves , whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes , ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude : so hurtful a matter ( as it is said ) was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought , and reproach them with any disgrace ; for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them , whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast . Bitter taunts when they have too great a mingle of truth with them , leave behind them a very distastfull remembrance . CHAP. XXVII . Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory : for oftentimes when that suffices them not , they lose it . THE using of disgracefull words against the enemy , proceeds most commonly from an insolencie , which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to : which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings , but in their doings also : for this hope when it enters into mens breasts , makes them go beyond the point , and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good , hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good : and because this is a matter worthy consideration , men often deceiving themselves , to the dammage of their State , I am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and modern , being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons . Hannibal , after he had defeated the Romans at Canna , sent his Agents to Carthage , to give them notice of the victory , and to demand new supplies . It was argued in the Senate , what was fit to be done . Hanno an old man and a discreet Citizen of Carthage advised , to use this victory wisely , and make peace with the Romans , being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes , having gained a battell ; and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost : for it should be the Carthaginians design to shew the Romans , that they were able to deal with them , and having gotten a victory , they should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater . This course was not taken , but afterwards the Senate of Carthage understood that this was very good counsell , when the occasion was lost . When Alexander the Great had conquer'd all the Levant , the Commonwealth of Tyre , famous in those daies , and puissant , by reason that their City was seated in the water , as Venice is , seeing Alexanders greatness , sent Ambassadors to him to tell him , that they would become his faithfull servans , and yeeld him what obedience he should desire , but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town . Whereat Alexander disdaining , that any one City should shut her gates against him , seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world , would not accept their conditions , but rejected them , and forthwith sent his army thither . That Town stood in the water , and was well provided with victualls , and other munition fit for defence , so that Alexander after four moneths spent , considering that one City took away all that time from his glory , which many other great conquests never did , and therefore determined to try an agreement , and to grant what they of themselves had asked . But they of Tyre being grown insolent hereupon , not only refused the conditions , but slew those that came to treat with them . Whereupon Alexander all enraged at this affront , so stronly assaulted the Town , that he took it , destroy'd it , and slew or made slaves all the men therein . A Spanish Army came upon the Florentines Territories , to restore the Medici into Florence , and to lay some taxes upon the Town , being hired hereunto by some Citizens inhabiting therein , who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country , they would take armes in favour of them ; they comming into the plain , and none of these discovering themselves to be for them , because they had want of victualls , tryed to make an agreement , whereupon the Florentines grown proud , would not accept of any , upon which occasion followed the loss of Prato , and the ruine of that State. Therefore Princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assail'd ( in case the assailants are far more puissant then they ) then to refuse all termes of agreement , especially when they are proffer'd them : for never will such poor ones be offerd , wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them , and some part of his victory . Wherefore the Tyrians should have satisfied themselves , that Alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused : and their victory had been great enough , when with their armes in hand , they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yeeld to their demands . It should have sufficed the Florentines also , and they had gotten a good victory too , if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires , though they had not fulfilled all of them ; for that armies design was to change the State of Florence , to take away her devotion to France , and to draw some monies from her . When of these three the people had yeelded to two , which were the last , and had gotten themselves but one , which was the preservation of their state , they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction , nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things , one remaining to them ; nor should they have offered , sing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion , trying even the extremity thereof , which never any wise man will endanger himself in , unless it be upon necessity . Hanniball being departed out of Italy , where he had been very glorious for sixteen years , recalled by his own country men the Carthaginians , to releive his native Country , found Asdruball and Siphax defeated , the Kingdome of Numidia lost , and Carthage restrain'd within the compass of her own walls , which had no other refuge but him and his army : and knowing that was his Countries last hopes , he would not hazard it , till he had first made trial of all other remedies : nor was he asham'd to ask peace , judging , that if there was any way to save his Country , it was by that , and not by war , which being refused him , though he had been sure to lose , he would not faile to fight , thinking that it might fall out so , that possible it was for him to overcome , and if lose , it he must lose it gloriously . And if Hanniball , who was so valorous a captain , and had his army intire , did require peace , before he would hazard the battell , when he perceived that in losing it , his country would be subdued , what should another of less valor and experience then he do ? But men run into this error , by not knowing how to limit their hopes , so that grounded on their own vast conceits , without weighing their strengths , they are utterly ruin'd . CHAP. XXVIII . How dangerous a thing it is for a Republick or Prince not to revenge an injury done against a publick State , or against a private person . WHat , indignation may cause men to do , is easily known , by that which befell the Romans , when they sent the three Fabij for Ambassadours to the French , who came to invade Tuscany , and in particular Clusium : for the people of Clusium , having sent to require aide at Rome , the Romans sent their Ambassadors to the French , to let them know they were to forbear from making warr against the Tuscans , which ambassadours being upon the place , and fitter to play the Soldiers part , then the Ambassadors , the French and the Tuscans comming to fight , they rank'd themselves amongst the foremost to combat the French , whence it came , that being known by them , they converted all the hatred they bore the Tuscans against the Romans , which hatred became greater : for the French by their Ambassadors having complained to the Senate of this injury , and required in satisfaction of the dammage , that the aforementioned Fabij should be given into their hands , they were not only not given them , or in any other manner punished , but when the time of their Assemblies came , they were made Tribuns with Consular power : insomuch that the French perceiving those to be honored , that should have been punipunished , took all this as done in despight and disgrace to them : and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assaile Rome , which they took , the Capitoll excepted . Which destruction fell upon the Romans , only for their inobservance of justice : for their Ambassadors having offended against the law of nations , when they should have been punished , were honored . Therefore it is worthy consideration , how much every Republick or Prince should beware of doing the like wrong , not only against a nation , but also against any particular man : for if a man be exceedingly offended either by the publick , or by any private man , and hath had no reparation made him to his content : if he lives in a Commonwealth , he will seek even with the utter ruine thereof to avenge himself : if he lives under a Prince , and be a man of any courage , he will never rest , till in some kind or other he be revenged on him , however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head . And to verify this , there is not a fitter nor truer example , then that of Philip of Macedon Alexanders Father . In his Court there was a very handsome young noble man named Pausanias , and of him one Attalus , one of the cheifest men , that was neer about Philip , was inamourd ; who having several times tryed if he would yeeld to him , and finding him far off from consenting to any such thing , determined to gain that by a trick and by force , which no way else he saw he could attain to . And having made a solemn invitation , whereat Pausanias and many other noble men met , after that every one had liberally eate and drinke , caus'd Pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-chamber , were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him , but the more to disgrace him , he made him be so used by many others in the like manner . Of which injury Pausanias several times made his complaint to Philip , who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him , instead thereof made Attalus governour of a Province in Greece ; whereupon Pausanias seeing his enemy honored , and not punished , converted his indignation not against him that had injured him , but against Philip that had not aveng'd him . And on a morning when Philips daughter was solemnly married to Alexander of Epirus , as Philip went to the Temple to celebrate the espousals , he slew him between the two Alexanders , the son , and the son in law . Which example is much like that of the Romans , and is remarkeable for all those that rule , who should never value any man at so low a rate , as to think ( that by heaping injury upon injury ) he that is thus wrong'd will not devise some way to be reveng'd , though it be with his own utter loss and destruction . CHAP. XXIX . Fortune blinds mens minds , when she will not suffer them to prevent her designes . IF we consider well the course of humane affaires , wee shall many times see things come to pass , and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not , that order should be taken to prevent . And in as much as this , which I speak of , befell Rome , where there was so much valor , so much Religion and good order , it is no marvail if the same thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the said things : and because this place is very remarkable to shew the power heaven hath over human things , T. Livius at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it , saying , that the heavens would for some end , that the Romans should know their power ; and therefore caus'd those Fabij to erre , that were sent Ambassadors to the French , and by their means provokt them to make war against Rome . And afterwards ordaind , that for the suppressing of that war , there was nothing done in Rome worthy of the Romans , having first ordain'd , that Camillus , who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to Ardea . And then the French comming towards Rome , they who to resist the fury of the Volsci and many their neighbouring enemies , had several times created a Dictatour ; now upon the approach of the French never created any . Moreover , for their choyce of Soldiers , it was very weake , and without any extraordinary diligence : & they were so slow in taking of arms , that they were hardly time enough to incounter the French at the river Allia , ten miles from Rome . Here the Tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordinary diligence : not viewing the ground first , neither incompassing it with trench or pali●ado , making use neither of human nor divine helps . And in ranging of their battell , they left their ranks so thin and weak , that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the Roman discipline . They fought afterwards without any effusion of blood , for they fled before they were assayl'd : the greater part went thence to Veium , the other retir'd to Rome , who never going into their own houses , went unto the Capitoll : so that the Senate taking no care to defend Rome , did not so much as shut the gates , and part of them fled from thence , and part got into the Capitoll ; yet in defence thereof , they had not such disorder ; for they did not cloy it with unusual people , they furnished it with all the Corne they could possibly get , that it might endure out the siege : and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of old men , women , and children , fled unto the neighbouring Towns about , the rest staid at Rome for a prey to the French. So that whoever should have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before , and afterwards of these times following them , would have much a do to beleeve it were the same people . And T. Livius having reckon'd up the aforesaid disorders , concludes thus , So much does fortune blind mens eyes , when shee would not have her force withstood . Nor can this conclusion be more true . Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame , as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse ; for we shall many times see those led to their destruction , and these advanc'd to an extraordinory greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto , giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously , & quite bereaving the other of them . And we may well say fortune does this , for she makes choyce of a man ( when she purposes to bring great matters to pass ) of such judgement and spirit , that knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him . So in like manner , when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any Place , she there preferrs men to that purpose , that they may help to draw on that ruine . And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes , shee either brings him to his end , or else deprives him of all abilities to do any goood . This we very well know by our Authors discourse , how that fortune for to amplify Rome , and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to , deemd it necessary to scourge it , as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following , but yet would not wholly ruin it . And this appears , in as much as shee banished Camillus , but put him not to death : shee made Rome be taken , but not the Capitoll : shee ordein'd that the Romaus should not think out any thing of avayle to save Rome ; yet for defence of the Capitoll , they wanted of no good advice . To the end Rome should be taken , she causd the greater part of those Soldiers , that were routed at Allia , to go to Vejum . And as for defence of the City of Rome , she cut off all the waies to order it , so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again , having conducted an intire Roman Army to Vejum , and Camillus to Ardea , whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet , & throughly whole in his reputation , for the recovery of his Country . Wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said : but because I think it unnecessary , being this may well suffice , I shall omit it . I avow therefore this to be very true , as by many histories wee may see it , that men may well follow fortune , but not oppose it ; they may well weave her webs , but not break them . Wherefore let men never abandon themselves , being they know not what shall become of them in the end , the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies ; they should ever hope , and so hoping put on still , and never give over in despaire , whatsoever chance or trouble they be faln into . CHAP. XXX . Republicks and Princes , that really are mighty , seek not by monies to make alliance with others , but by their valour , and repute of their Forces . THe Romans were straightly besiegd in the Capitoll , and however they lookt for ayd from Vejum , and from Camillus , being forc't by famine , they came to termes of agreement with the French , to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money , upon which agreement , as they were weighing the gold , Camillus , arriv'd with his Army , which fortune brought to pass ( saies our Historian ) to the end that the Romans should not live redeemd by gold . Which thing is not only remarkable in this part , but in the procese of this Commonwealths actions , where it is evident , that they never vanquished Towns with moneys , nor ever bought peace by mony , but by prowesse in the warres . Which I think never befell any other Republick ; and among other signes by which a man discerns the power of a State , he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States . And when it is so orderd , that they become tributaries thereunto , to keep friendship with it , there is an assured sign , that that State is powerfull . But when the said neighbours , though inferious to it , draw money from thence , there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof . Read all the Roman Stories , and ye shall see how the Massilians , the Aeduans , the Rhodians , Hiero , the Siracusan , Enmenes , and Massinissa Kings joyning upon the confines of the Roman Empire , to have friendship with it , concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was , seeking after no other requitall thereof , but to be protected by it . Wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States ; and so beginning at ours of Florence in the times past , even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest , there was never a great Lord in Romania , that had not some allowance from thence , and besides she gave to those of Perugia , and Castella , & to all the rest of her neighbours . For had this City been warlick and strong , the contrary would have followd ; for all those to have been under the protection of it , would have given money , and have sought to buy its friendship , and not to sell their own . Neither have the Florentines alone liv'd in this baseness , but the Venetians , and the King of France , who , though a Prince of great Dominions , lives tributary to the Swisses , and the King of Engl. The cause whereof is , in that he disarmes his subjects , and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeese them , and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger , than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy . Which disorder , though some while it may produce quiet , yet in time it proves the cause of want , losses , and unrecoverable ruine . And it would be too long to relate , how many times the Florentines , the Venetians , and this Kingdome , have redeemd themselves even in the warrs , and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace , which the Romans were only once like to have done . It would be tedious to tell , how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought , whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found , and how that those things that are bought with gold , men know not how to desend with the sword . The Romans observd this brave way and manner of living , while they were free ; but after they came under their Emperors governments , and that those Emperors grow naught , and lov'd the shade , and could not endure any toyle in the Sun , they began also to redeem themselves , somtimes from the Parthians , somtimes from the Germans , and now and then also from some others of their neighbours , which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine . Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarm'd their people , from whence also proceeds another greater , that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee , the weaker he finds thee ; for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above , treats evill those subjects he hath within his dominions , because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars , as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds , that to keep the enemy off : he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country . And thereupon , those States make some resistance upon the confines only , which when the enemy hath past , they have no kind of remedy left : and they perceive not , that this their manner of proceeding , is quite contrary to all good order : for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd , and not the extremities thereof ; for it can live without those , but if these be hurt it dyes : but these States keep the heart disarm'd , and arme their hands and feet . What this disorder hath done at Florence , hath been and is daily seen : for when any Army posses the frontiers , and enters near to the heart of the Country , there is no further remedy . Wee saw not long since the same proof of the Venetians ; and had not their . City been begirt by the waters , we should have seen an end of it . Wee have not so often seen this tryal in France , because it is so great a Kingdom , that it hath few enemies mightier than it : nevertheless . when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd , and the King himself , and every one thought , that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State. The contraty befell the Romans ; for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome , the more able he found the City to make resistance . And it was evident , when Hannibal came into Italy , that after three defeats , and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers , they were not only able to sustain the enemy , but to vanquish him . All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart , and made small account of the extremities ; for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome ; and the Latins , and the other Townes their allyes in Italy , and their Colonies , from whence they drew so many Soldiers , that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world . And that this is true , it appears by the question Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents , after that great overthrow at Canna , who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts , were asked by Hanno , whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace , or if any Town of the Latins , or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman ; and they denying the one and the other , Hanno reply'd , Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first . We see therefore by this discourse , and what wee have otherwhere said , what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes , and those of the ancients . Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses , and wonderfull great conquests : for where men are but of small valour and resolution , fortune shews much power : and because shee is alwaies various , therefore do Common-wealths and States change often , and will alwaies change , till at length some one stand up , who is so much a lover of antiquitie , as to regulate her , that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun , how great her power is . CHAP. XXXI . How dangerons a thing it is , to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country . MEthinks it is not out of purpose , to treat among these other discourses , how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country , these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States ; especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history , though this thing be out of his purpose quite . When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army , Alexander of Epirus his kinsman & uncle , came with certain troopes into Italy , being cald upon by some outlawd Lucans , who put him in hope , that by their means he might become master of that whole Country . Whereupon it came to pass , that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance , was slain by them ; their Citizens , having promisd them their return into their Country , if they slew him . Therefore should it be consider'd , how vain their words and promises are , who are banished their Countries ; for , in regard of their word , it is to be thought , that whensoever by other means than thine , they can be restord to their Country , they will forsake thee , and cleave to others , notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee . And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word , because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes , that naturally they beleeve many things that are false , and some things out of their own cunning they adde ; so that between what they think , and what they say they think , they put thee in such hopes , that grounding thereupon , thou art brought to a vain expence , or to undertake somwhat that proves thy destruction . I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of Alexander , and only this other of Themistocles the Athenian , who being outlawd , fled to Darius in Asia , where he promised him so much , when he should invade Greece , that Darius undertook the enterprise . But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises , either for shame or fear of punishment , poisoned himself . And if Themistocles a rare man committed this error , what should we think but that they do much more erre , who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires . And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men ; for otherwise he suffers either great shame , or dammage by them And because it seldom comes to pass , that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth , or by intelligence that any one hath in them ; methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the Chapter following , adding thereunto by how many waies the Romans got them . CHAP. XXXII . How many waies the Romans used to make themselves masters of townes . THe Romans applying themselves all to the war , did evermore make it with all advantage possible , as well for the expence , as for every thing else belonging thereto . From hence it proceeded , that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges , thinking it a matter of great charges , and incommodity , that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring . And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage , to take a town any way else then by siege . Whereupon in such great and so many wars , we have very few examples of sieges made by them . The waies then whereby they got their townes , were either by conquest or yeilding . And this conquest was either by force or open violence , or by force mingled with fraud . Open violence was either by assault , without beating the walls , which was to beleagure a town round with an army : for they environd it , and combatted it on all parts , and many times it prov'd so luckily to them , that in one assault they took a town , though a very vast one , as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain . Or when this assault served not , they betook them to break down the walls with their rams , and oher their warlike engines , or else by some mine or vault they made , whereby they enter'd the City , by which way the took the City of Veium ; or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls , they made towres of wood , or cast up mountains of earth , which leaned upon the wall on the outside , whereby they might get to the hight of it . Against these assaults , they that defended the towns , in the first case in regard of their being besing'd round , rannne a more sudden hazard , and had more doubtfull remedies : for having need in every place of many defendants , perchance either those that they had , were not so many as could supply every place , or change often to refresh them : or if they could , they were not all of equal courage to make resistance : and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part , all had bin lost . Therefore it came to pass ( as I said ) that this way lit many times on good success . But when it succeeded not at first , they did not much more try that way , because it was dangerous for the army : for the City being able for so long a space to defend it self , the army could not but grow weak , and hardly be able to withstand any fally of the enemies from within , and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby , yet notwithstanding for once , and that on the sudden , they assayld that way ) As for the breaking down of the walls , they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations , and against their mines , they made countermines , and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand , or with other engines , & among others this was one , they fill'd divers vessels with feathers , and set fire on them , which being thus kindled they put into the Mine , so that by the smoke and stink thereof , the enemy was hindred of entring thereinto : and if they assail●d them with towers of wood , they sought to fire them . And for the mounts of earth , they commonly broke open the wall underneath , whereupon the mount did lean , drawing thence the earth into the town , whereby they without did raise their mount , so that however they brought the earth without , being that they within carried it away , the mount came to no great matter . These waies of assailing cannot be continued long : for they must either rise from the siege , and seek by other means to make an end of the war , as Seipio did when being entred into Affricke he assaulted Vtica , but could not take it , he rose thence with his whole camp , and sought how to overthrow the Carthaginian armies ; or else they must turne again to the siege , as they did at Veium , Capua , Carthage , and Ierusalem , and other like townes , which they took by siege . As for conquest by force and fraud , as it befel Palepolis , it chanced that the Romans , by treating with the inhabitants took some towne . But by his assailing the Romans and others , tried many , but prevail'd in few : the reason is , because every small impediment breakes the designe , and impediments easily happen : for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect ; and without much difficultie it is discovered , as well through their infidelity , to whom it is communicated , as by the difficulty to put it in practise , being they are to agreee with enemies with whom they cannot parly , but under some other colour . But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the ordering of it , there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution : for if either thou commest before the time appointed , or after , all is spoiled , if any false alarme be given , as was that of the geese in the Capitol ; if any usual order be broken , every little error , or affright taken , spoiles the designe . Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perilous things . And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises , being unexperienced in the scituation , the countrey , and the places , whether they areled , become astonished , disheartned , and confused upon every small accident shall happen ; And every shadow is of force to make them run away . Nor ever was there any more happy in thefe fraudulent night plots , then Aratus Sicioneus , who was as base and cowardly in any action by day , as he was of worth and spirit in these by night . Which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed , then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck . Many of these waies are put in practice , few of them come to trial , and very few take effect . Touching the gaining of townes by yeelding , they yeeld either of good will or by force : this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity , which compels them to fly unto thy protection , as Capua did unto the Romans , or through a desire to be wel governed , being allur'd by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands : as the Rodians , the Massilians , and other like cities did , that gave themselves unto the Romans . Touching surrendring up upon force , proceeds either from a long siege , as is formerly said , or from a continual oppression of incursions , pillagings , and other hard usages , which when a city desires to be freed from she yeelds her self . Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routs and incursions , and by gaining credit with them , by gaining credit with them , by means of agreements made , as we have said otherwhere ; and upon that way they alwaies grounded , though they tryd all , but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable . For in a siege , there is length of time and expences : in forcible assault , doubt and danger : and in conspiracies , uncertainty . And they saw , that by the defeat of an enemies army , sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day , and to take by siege a town that was obstinate , it cost them many years . CHAP. XXXIII . How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions . I Think it fit for him ( that by reading of Livies story would make advantage thereof ) wel to consider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings : and among other things that merite consideration , his is one , to see with what authority they sent forth their Consuls , Dictators , & Commanders of armies , which we see was very great , and the Senate reserved thing else to themselves , but a power to make new wars , and to confirme peace , but they referred every thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul : for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war , ( as for example sake against the Latines ) they left all the rest to the Consuls discretion , who had free power either to fight a batttel , or to leave it , and to besiege either this , or any other town else as he pleas'd . Which things by many examples are verified , and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans : for Fabius the Consul having overcome them near unto Sutrium , and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina , and go into Tuscany , he did not onely not advise with the Senate , but gave them no notice at all of it , though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers : which is witnessed by a resolution of the Senate taken directly against this very course ; who having understood of the victory Fabius had gotten , and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany , thinking it would be well not to try that war , nor ruin that hazzard , sent two Deputies unto Fabius , to give him notice , they would not have him pass into Tuscany : who came thither , when he had already past , and gotten the victory , and in liew of hindring the war , they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten . And whosoever considers these termes , will find them discreetly used : for if the Senate would have had the Consull to proceed on forwards in the war , onely as they gave him order , they had made him less circumspect , and slower in his actions : for he would have thought , that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his , but that the Senate had participated with him , by whose counse he had bin governed . Besides this , the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand . For , notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars , yet being they were not upon the place , and therefore ignorant of very many particulars , which are needfull for him to know that will advise well , by interposing their Councell , they would have committed many errors . And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself , and that the glory thereof should be entirely his , the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well . I have the more willingly marked this place , because I see that the Republiques now adayes , as the Venetian and the Florentine , understand it not so : and if their Commanders , Proveditours , and Commissioners are to plant any battery , they will know it first , and advise thereupon . Which course deserves the same praise the others do , which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer . THE THIRD BOOKE . CHAP. I. For the maintenance of a Religion or a Common-wealth long in being , it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds . IT is most true , that all things in the world have an end of their life : but those things eninjoy that course that is generally ordaind them by heaven , whichdisorder not their body , but govern it in such a regular course , that either it changes not , or if it does , it is for the better , and not for the worst . And because I speak of mixt bodies , such as are Republiques and sects , I say , that those changes are for the health thereof , which bring them back to their first beginnings : and therefore are they the best order'd , and subsist the longest which ( by the help of their own orders ) may often be renewed , or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation . And it is more clear than the light , that these bodies not being renewed , last not ; and the way to renew them is ( as is said ) to reduce them to their first beginnings ; for all beginnings of Sects , Commonwealths and Kingdoms , must needs contain some goodness in them , by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase : for in process of time that goodness growes corrupt , and unless something happen , that reduces it to the just mark , that body must needs be destroyed . And our Doctors of Physick say ( speaking of the bodies of men ) That a man daily gathers some evil , which sometimes hath need of cure . This reducing to the beginning ( speaking of Commonwealths ) is done either by some outward accident , or by some prudence within . Touching the first , we see it was necessary , that Rome should be taken by the French , if we would have her spring again ; and thus springing again , should recover a new life , and a new vertue , and take her self a new to the observance of religion , and justice , which began in her to be much blemish'd , which we may easily gather by the Story of Livie , where he shews that in drawing gut the army against the French , and in creating the Tribunes with Consular power , they observed not any religious ceremonie : so in like manner , they did not onely not punish the three Fabij who against the law of nations had fought against the French , but created them tribunes . And we may well think , that of other good laws also ordained by Romulus , and their other sage Princes , they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable , or necessary to maintain a free government . This forrain blow therefore lit on them , to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their City , and to shew that people , that it was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice , but to esteem well of their good Citizens , & to make more account of their vertue , than of those profits , which they thought they lost or got by their means : Which we see , came directly to pass ; for presently after Rome was recovered from the French , they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion , they punished those Fabij who fought against the Law of Nations , and afterwards made such account of Camillus his vertue and goodness , that the Senate & all others wholly laying envy aside , gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into hit hands . It is necessary therefore ( as I have said ) that men , who live together in any order , should often revise themselves , either upon occasion given by outward , or else by inward accidents . And for these last , they must either proceed from a law , which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body , or else from some good man that may arise among them , who by his example & vertuous actions may work the same effect , which that law or order can . This good then arises in Common-wealths , by the vertue of some man , or the force of some order . And touching this last , those orders that reduc'd the Roman Republick to its own beginning , were the Tribuns of the people , the Censors , & all those other laws , which were made against the ambition or insolence of men , which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of some one Citizen , that couragiously joynes with them for their execution , maugre the power of those that break them . The executions whereof , before the sacking of Rome by the French , were notable , the death of Brutus his sons , the death of those of the Decemvirate , that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne : after the taking of Rome , was the death of Manlius Capitolinus , the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus , the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie , the accusation of the Scipios : which things being they were extraordinary & remarkable , whenosever any of them did chance , caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule ; and when these began to fall out seldom , then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught , and become more dangerous and tumultuous ; for from one to another of such like executions , there should not pass more than ten years time ; for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes : and unless something chance , which anew calls the punishment to memory , and puts them in fear thereof , there meer together so many delinquents , that without danger they cannot be punished . To this purpose , they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the State , otherwise it was hard to maintain it ; and they call'd reforming of the State , to put that terror and fear in men , which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes , having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living . But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished , men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations , and speak ill of the present State : and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds . Also this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings , arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man , without dependance on any law , inciting thee to any execution : yet are they of so great reputation , and of such remarke , that the good men desire to follow them , and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them . Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects , were Horatius Cocles , Scevola , Fabritius , the two Decij , Regulus , Attilius , and some others , who by their rare and worthy examples , in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could . And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City , it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted : but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome , the corruptions multiplied : for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen . And though in Rome there arose the two Catoes , yet such was the distance between him and them , and between them , from th' one to th' other , and they remained so alone , that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing , and especially the last Cato , who finding a great part of the City corrupted , could not prevaile so by his example , as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republicks . But touching Religions , wee see also these reformations are necessary , by example of our Religion : which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis , and Saint Dominique , it would have been quite defac'd : for these by their poverty , and their imitation of Christs life , made a new impression thereof in mens minds , which was quite blotted our thence : and their new rules were so powerfull , and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates , and the heads of the Religion , do not ruine it , partly by their living in poverty , and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people , and preaching to them , whereby they give them to understand that it is evill , to speak evil against him that is evill ; and that it is good , rather to live in obedience to them ; and if they are faulty , to leave them to the chastisement of God. And so they offend the most they can ; for they feare not the punishment they see not , and beleeve not . This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion . Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings . And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France ; Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other Kingdom else . Of which lawes and customes , the Parliaments are the principal maintainers , and especially that of Paris , which restores them again to life , whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm , and that they condemn the King in their sentences : and till this present it hath maintained it self , by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility : but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished , and they chance to multiply , without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder , or that Kingdom come to a dissolution . Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government , Sect , Kingdom , or Commonwealth that it be , than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had , and take a care that either the customes be good , or the men good , that they may rather work this effect , that it be not left to some forraign force to do it : For ( however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy , as it prov'd to Rome ) yet is it so dangerous , that it is in no case to be desir'd : And to make it appear to any man , how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness , and wrought many good effects in that City , I will come to the narration and discourse of them , within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book , and last part of this first decade . And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable , being the History sets them down at large , we shall omit them , nor speak of them otherwise , unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage ; and here we will begin with Brutus , Father of the Roman liberty . CHAP. II. It is a very great part of wisdome , sometime to seem a fool . NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did , as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool ; and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto , which was to live in security , and preserve his patrimony ; yet if we consider his manner of proceeding , we may beleeve , that he thus dissembled , to the end he might be less observed , & have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings , and free his Country , upon any occasion offered . And that he thought upon this , it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle , when he fained to fall down , that he might kiss the ground , deeming thereby that the Gods favour'd his designes ; and afterwards when at the occasion where Lucretia was slain , among the Father , husband , and other of her kindred , he was the first that drew the knife out of the wound , and made those that were present sweare they would never more endure in time to come a King in Rome . From his example are those to learn , that are discontented with any Prince : and firct they should measure and weigh their own forces : and if they are so powerfull , that they are able to discover themselves as enemies , and openly make war against him , then ought they plainly go that way , as least dangerous and the morehonorable . But if they be of such condition , that they are not able to enter into termes of open hostilitie against him , then ought they to use al industry in seeking to gain his favour ; and to this effect enter into him by all those waies that are fit , following him in his sports , and taking pleasure in all those things they see he delights in . This familiarity first causes thee to live secure , and without running any hazard , gives thee means to enjoy that Princes good fortune with him , and layes the way open to thee to satisfie thy own mind . It is true that some say , they would not stand so near the Princes , as to be oppressed with their ruines , nor so far off , but that when their ruine comes , they may be able time enough to rise upon some part of their ruines . Which middle way would be the truest , were it rightly kept . But because I think it is impossible , it is meet to reduce it to the two waies above mentioned , which is either to be at large from them , or cleave close to them . Hee that does otherwise , if he be a man of eminent qualities , lives in continuall danger . Nor sufficeth it to say , I care not for any thing , I desire neither honors , nor wealth , I will live quietly , and without entring into any faction ; for these excuses are heard , but pass not as current . Neither can men of quality chuse this standing quiet , however that heartily they make choyce of it and without any ambition , because they are not beleeved in it , in so much as though they themselves would , yet others will not let them live so . They must then play the fool as Brutus did ; and he plaies the fool a great deal , that prayses , and prates to them , is present at , and bears a part in those things that are against his own mind , to comply with his Princes delights . And seeing we have spoken of this mans wisedome in recovering of the State , we will now speak of his severity in maintaining it . CHAP. III. That it was necessary , for preservation of the new gotten liberty , to put Brutus his sons to death . B Butus his severity was no less necessary than usefull to maintain Rome in the liberty she had gotten , which was of rare example in all memorials of things happen'd , to see the Father sit on his Tribunal , and not only condemn his sons to death , but be present and assistant at it . And this is alwaies well known to those that read ancient stories , how that after the change of a State , either from a Republick into a Tyranny , or from a Tyranny into a Republick , some memorable execution upon the enemies of the present condition is needfull . And hee that sets up a Tyranny , and flaies not Brutus ; and hee that brings in liberty , and slayes not Brutus his sons , can hardly subsist . And because for merly wee have discoursed hereof at large , I referr my self to what was then spoken hereof . I shall alledge here only one example which was in our times , and in our Country : that of Peter Soderini , who thought with his patience and goodness to overcome that passionate desire which was in the sons of Brutus , to return under another government , but deceived himself therein . And albeit hee by his wisdome perceived well this necessity , and that the way and ambition of those that shov'd against him , gave him occasion to extinguish them , yet hee never bent his mind to it : for besides his opinion that he was able by patience and goodness to worke out all ill humors , and by liberality towards them , to weare out any enmity was borne against him , hee was of advice ( as many times by discourse hee shewed some of his friends ) that if hee would strongly incounter the oppositions were made against him , and master his adversaries , he had need take upon him extraordinary authority , whereby he should break the civil equality among them . Which thing ( however that hee should never afterwards act tyrannically ) would so much affright the multitude , that they would never agree after his death to create a new standard-bearer for life , which dignity he held fit to put forward and maintain . This respect was wise and good : yet must we never suffer any evill to continue in regard of a good , being that good may easily be supprest by that evill . And he should beleeve , being his actions and his intentions were to bee judged by their end ( in case that good fortune and life should have accompanied him ) that he could have assured every one , how that what he had done , was for the safety of his Country , not for his own ambition , whereby he might have been able to regulate things in such a manner , that no successor of his could do that for evill , which hee had done for good . But the first opinion deceived him , not knowing that malice is not abated by time , nor appeased by any good turne . So that because he was ignorant how to imitate Brutus , he lost together with his Country the State , and his own reputation . And as it is a hard thing to save a free State , so is it not easie to preserve a Monarchy , as in the Chapter following it shall be shewed . CHAP. IV. No Prince lives secure in his Principality , while those are living who were despoyld of it . THe death of Tarquinus Priscus causd by the sons of Ancus , and the death of Servius Tullus causd by Tarquinius the proud , shew how hard and dangerous it is , to despoyle any one of a Kingdome , and suffer him to live , though he indevour by many favours to gaine him . And we see how Tarquinius Prisons was deceived in thinking legally to possess that Kingdom , in that it was given him by the people , and confirm'd by the Senate . Neither did he beleeve that disdain could so much prevaile with Ancus his sons , that they would not be satisfied , with what all Rome was contented . And Servius Tullus deluded himself , in thinking he could with new obligations gain the good will of Tarquins sons . So that touching the first , every Prince may well be advisd that he cannot live sure of his Principality , while they live who were bereavd of it . Touching the second , every one that is of power may well remember , that never were old injuries cancelld with new favours , especially when the new favours are less of value than the wrongs done And without all doubt Servius Tullus was nothing wise to think that Tarquins sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law , whose King they thought by right they ought to be . And this desire of reigning is so great , that it not only enters their breasts , that look to succeed in the Kingdome , but they also who no waies expect it . As in Tarquinius his wife , Servius his young daughter , who would wish this rage against that piety shee ought her father , set her husband against him , to take his life from him , and his Kingdome thereby ; so much more accounted she to be a Queen , than the daughter of a King. If then Tarquininus Priscus and Servius Tullus lost the Kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurpd , Tarquinius the proud lost it for not observing the ancient Kings Customes , as shall be shewd in the Chapter following . CHAP. V. What it is that makes a King lose his Kingdome , which he enjoyes by right of inheritance . TArquinius the proud having stain Servius Tullus , and of him no heirs remaining behind , came to possess the Kingdom securely , having no cause to feare , those things that had hurt his predecessours . And however his way of getting the Kingdom had been so extraordinary , and odious , yet had he observd the ancient customes of the other Kings , he would have been borne with : nor would the Senate nor the Commonalty have risen against him to wrest the State out of his hands . Hee was not then banished because his son Sextus ravisht Lucretia , but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdome , and ruld tyrannously , having taken all authority from the Senate , and reserved it wholly to himself , and those affaires , which had been dispatcht in publick by the Senate of Rome with generall satssfaction , he reduc'd to be treated in his own Palace , which gain'd him both blame and envie : so that in a very short time he despoyld Rome of all that liberty which she had alwaies maintained under others . Nor was this enough to make the Senate his enemy , but he provok'd the people also against him , tiring them out in base mechanick services , and such as were far different from that , wherein his ancestors had imployd them : so that having replenish'd Rome with examples of his cruelty and pride , he had now dispos'd all the Romans minds to rebellion , whensoever occasion should be off r'd And had not that accident of Lucretia fallen out , so soon as any other should have chanc'd , it would have produc'd the same effect : for if Tarquinius had liv'd , as the other Kings did , and Sextus his son had committed that offence , Brutus & Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarquinius , for revenge against Sextus , and not to the people of Rome . Therefore let Princes know , that at the same houre they begin to lose the State , when they begin to violate the Laws , & and those manners & customs that are ancient , under which men have liv'd a long time . And in case they come to lose their State , and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their Principalities , who follow good counsell , they themselves would much more lament their loss & blame themselves more than others would : for it is much easier to be belov'd by the good , than by the bad ; & to obey the Laws , than command over them . And if they would understand what course they were to take , whereby to put this in practice , and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good Princes , & take them for looking-glasses , such as were Timoleon the Corinthian , & Aratus Sicioneus , & such like , in whose lives they shall find security & satisfaction , as well of him that rules , as of him that is ruled , they would have a desire to become like them , being able for the reasons alledgd to do so ; for men , when they are well governd , seek after no other liberty , as it befell the people that were governd by the two were named before , who were constraind to be Princes whiles they liv'd , however they tryed many times to retire themselves to a private life . And because in this & the two precedent Chapters , we have discoursed of humors stird up against Princes , and of the conspiracy made by Brutus his sons against their Country , & of those against Tarquinius Priscus & Servius Tullus : methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following Chapter , being a matter whereof Princes and private men may worthly take notice . CHAP. VI. Of Conspiracies . I Would not omit to discourse somewhat touching Conspiracies , being they are dangerous for Princes and private men also : for wee see that more Princes have lost their lives thereby , and States too , than by open war : because few are able to make open war against Princes , but every one may conspire against them On the other side , private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this : for it is full of difficulties , and exceeding perillous every way ; From whence proceeds it , that many of them are practisd , but few succeed . To the end there of that Princes may learn to beware of these dangers , and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them , or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them , I shall speak thereof more at large , not omitting any thing remarkable , that may serve for instruction of the one or the other . And truly that of Tacitus is well termd a golden sentence , where he saies , that men are to reverence things past , and submit to what is present ; and should wish for good Princes , but whatsoever they are , endure them : and verily he who does otherwise , ruines both himself and his Country . Wee must then ( entring into the matter ) consider against whom Conspiracies are made and wee shall find they are plotted against amans Country , or against his Prince , of which two I intend this present discourse : for touching those that are practis'd to deliver a Town into the enemies hands that besiege it , or that have likelihood with this for any cause , wee have already sufficiently spoken . And wee will treat in this first part , touching that against a Prince : and first we will examine the reasons thereof , which are many , though one there is of more importance than all the rest . And this is general hatred : for that Prince , that hath provok'd general hate , must needs have net●ed some particulars , somwhat more than others , insomuch that they long to be revengd on him : and they are the more incited hereto , by the general hatred they find conceivd against him . A Prince then ought to avoyd these publick blames , and how he should behave himself to avoid them ( having treated otherwhere ) I will not now middle : for if he beware well of them , offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him : one reason is , because Princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extream hazard to revenge them ; the other is , that though they were of such resolution , and force , as might serve to do it , yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it . The injuries must be either touching the fortunes , lives , or honors . Of those that are touching mens lives , the threats are more dangerous than the execution , or rather the threats are very dangerous ; but in the execution there is no danger at all ; for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge ; and those that remain alive , most commonly leave to think of him that is dead : but he that is threatned , and sees himself put to a point , either to do or suffer , becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince , as we shall say particularly in due place . The fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity , touch men more nearely then any other offence , where of a Prince should be wel aware : for he can never strip a man so bare , but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himself , nor so much dishonour any one , but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance . And touching honours , the dishonoring of women is of most importance , and after this the scorne and disgrace of their persons . This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon , and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers Princes . And in our dayes Julius Belanti had no other motive to conspire against Pandulphus the tyrant of Siena , but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him , as in its place we shall relate . The greatest cause the Pazzi had to conspire against the Medici , was , the inheritance of John Bonrosnei , whereof they were dispossess'd by their order . And another cause , and a very great one too , why men plot treachery against a Prince , is a desire which they have to free their countrey , which hath bin seis'd on by him . This mov'd Brutus and Cassius against Caesar . This incited many others against Falaris , Dionysius , and such other usurpers of their Countries . Nor can any Tyrant free himself from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his Tyranny . And because we find none will doe this , there are but few of them that come not to ill ends ; Which gave Iuvenal occasion to say , Few Tyrants unto Plutoes Court do goe , But that are thither sent by bloody blow . The dangers that ( as I said before ) accompany conspiracies , are great , and continual : for in such cases there is danger in plotting them , in executing them , and after they are executed too . Those that conspire , are either one or more ; that of one cannot be termed a conspiracy , but a setled resolution bred in a man to slay a Prince . This alone of all the three dangers , which conspiracies hazard , is free from the first . For before the putting it in execution , it carries no hazard with it , being none is made privy to his secret , nor is there any danger , that his purpose come to the Princes eare . A resolution after this sort may happen to be found in any man of any condition , little or great , Noble or ignoble , familiar or not familiar with he Prince : for at some times it is permitted to any man to speak with him and ; he that comes to speak with him may vent this passion of his minde . Pausanias , of whom we have otherwhere spoken , slew Philip of Macodon , as he was going to the Temple environ'd with a thousand armed men , and between his own son and son in law ; but he was one of the Nobles , and well known to the Prince . A poore and abject Spaniard strook Ferdinand King of Spain with a knife in the neck ; however the wound was not mortal , yet hereby it appeared , that he had both courage and opportunity to do it . A Turkish Priest nam'd Dervis , drew a scimitarre against Bajazet , father of this present Turk , but hit him not , yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose . Of this sort of resolutions thus bent , I think there are many , that would do it : for in willing this , there is neither punishment , nor danger at all , but few venture to act it ; and of those that do , exceeding few or none there are , that are not slaine in the act . Therefore no man willingly will thrust himselfe upon a certaine death . But let us leave these single resolutions , and come to consider the conspiracies have bin made by great men , or those that are very familiar with the Prince : for others ( unless they be stark mad ) will never offer to conspire : for mean men , and not familiar with the Prince , want all those conveniencies , which are required in the executing of a conspiracy . First● , mean men cannot find those that will be true to them : for no one man can apply himself to their wills for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers , so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons , some one of them becomes an accuser , and ruines all . But in case they should be so happy , that none should discover their plots , yet in the execution are they beset with such difficulties having not free access unto the Prince ) that it is impossible , but that there in they must perish : for if great men , who ordinarily come near him , are oppress'd with such difficulties , which we shall presently mention , it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase . Therefore men ( because where there is losse both of life and fortunes they are not stark mad ) when they find themselves weak , are well aware of what they do : and when they are very weary of a Prince , they are contented onely to curse him , and expect , while those that are of higher quality then themselves , do avenge them . And yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing , the design they had might well be laudable , but not their wisdome . We see therefore , that those that have conspired , were all great men , or familiar with the Prince : Whereof many have conspired , as well being mov'd by too many favors , as by too many injuries . As Perennius was against Commodus , Plautianus against Severus , Sejanus against Tiberius . All these were by their Emperors so enriched with wealth , and dignified with titles and honours , that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire it self , which they meaning not to fail of , betook themselves to conspire against their Prince , and their treasons all had that end , which their ingratitude well deserved . However that among those of this sort in these latter times that of Iacob Apianus against Petrus Gambacorti Prince of Pisa succeeded fortunately , which Iacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him , afterwards took the state from him . Of this sort was that of Coppola in our dayes against Ferdinand King of Arragon , which Coppola having attained to that greatness , that he thought he wanted nothing but the Kingdom , meaning not to go without , lost his life . And indeed if any conspiracie against Princes made by great men be ever like to take effect , this was very probable , being made by one that might have been termed a King for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will. But that greedy ambition which blinds them in their desire to rule , blinds them as well in the mannaging of this enterprise : for if they know how to act this villany with discretion , it were impossible but it should succeed . A Prince then that would be well wary of conspiracies , should be more jealous of those to whom he hath afforded most favours , then of those to whom he hath done most wrongs : for these want the means , and those have them at pleasure , and the will is a like ; for the desire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge . Wherefore they are to confer but so much authority upon their favourites , that still between it and the Principality they keep a distance , and leave ( as it were ) some obstacle in their way ; otherwise seldome falls it out but that it chances to them , as to the forementioned Princes . But let us return to our order . I say , that being they are to be great men that plot these treasons , and have easie access unto the Prince , we are to discourse upon the successes of these their undertakings , what they have been , and point at the reason that hath caus'd them to prove happy or unhappy . And ( as I formerly said ) at three severall times , herein are dangers found . In the plotting , in the acting , and after . Therefore are there very few that prove lucky : for it is almost impossible to pass all these happily . And beginning to treate touching the dangers of the the first , that are of most importance , I say , there had need be much circumspection and advisement , which likewise had need be seconded by good fortune , that in the contriving and ordering of a conspiracy , it be not disclosed ; for that is done either by relation , or by conjecture . This relation proceeds from the small faith ; or small discretion of those men with whom thou communicatest thy secret . And it is a thing ordinary to find but small saith ; for thou canst not communicate it but to thy confidents , who for love of thee may adventure death , or to men that are discontented with the Prince . Of confidents , possible it is that one or two may be found ; but when thou openest thy self to more ; it is impossible thou shouldest find them . Besides the good will they beare thee , had need be very great , to the end they be not affrighted at the punishment and peril they incurre . Moreover men are often deceived touching the love , which thou beleevest another bears thee , nor canst thou ever assure thy self of it , unless thou hast had experience thereof ; and to make proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous ; and though thou hast had proof thereof in some other dangerous exploit , where they have stuck close upon thee , yet canst thou not from thence measure them for this , being this danger surpasses all others . If thou measurest their faith by their discontent against their Prince , therein thou mayest easily deceive thy self : For so soon as thou hast revealed thy mind to that malecontent , thou givest him a subject whereupon to work again his own content ; and either his hatred had need be great , or thy power with him of much force to keep him faithful . Hereupon it arises , that very many of them are discover'd & crush'd even in the egge ; and when one of them among many men hath bin kept secret any time , it hath bin thought of as a miracle as was that of Piso against Nero , & in our daies that of Laurence and Iulian of Medici , whereunto above fifty persons were made privy , who met together all to discover themselves in the execution thereof . As for the discovery for want of discretion , that falls out when a conspirator is not wary in his talk , so that a servant or another third person comes take notice thereof , as it befe Brutus his sonnes , who in contriving the business with Tarquins Ambassadors , were understood by a slave who accused them : or else through a certain lightness of thine own , thou communicatest it to a woman , or a child which thou lovest , or some such slight person , as Dimus did , one of those that conspir'd with Philotas against Alexander the Great , who told the treason to Nicomacus , a child which he lov'd , who presently told it to Ciballinus his brother , and Ciballinus to the King. Touching discovery by conjecture , we have an example for it , where Piso conspired against Nero , at which time Sceuinus one of the conspirators , the day before that he was to slay Nero , made his will , and gave order that Milichius his freeman should cause his old and rusty dagger to be scoured ; he made all his slaves free , and gave them money ; he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared ; by which conjectures Milichius being assured of the business , accused , him before Nero. Scevinus was taken , and with him Natalis one of the Conspirators , who had bin seen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company , who not agreeing concerning the discourse they held , were forc'd to confess the truth . So that the treason was bewraied , and the conspirators utterly ruin'd . From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to beware , but that through malice , indiscretion , or fondness all comes to light , whensoever the complotters thereof pass the number of three or four ; and in case that more then one of them chance to be taken , it is impossible but that it must be so ; for two cannot be so well agreed of all their discourses together , but that in some things they shall jarre . When one alone that is resolute , is laid hold on , he may through the strength of his courage , be able to conceal the rest of his complices : but then must his consors shew no less resolution than he , in standing firm and not discovering themselves by flight : for on which side soever courage failes , either on his that is taken , or his that is at liberty , the conspiracy is disclosd . And the example alleadgd by T. Livius , is very rare in the treason that was plotted against Ier lamus King of Siracusa , where Theodorus one of the conspirators being taken , with a stout courage conceald all his companions , and accused the Kings friends ; and on the other part , all the confederates were confident of Theodorus his resolution , that not one of them forsook Siracusa , or made any shew of fear , Wherefore all these dangers are to be passed in the ordering of a conspiracy , before the acting of it . Against which these are the remedies ; The first and truest whereof , or better to term it , the only one is , not to give leisure to our complices to accuse us , nor communicate the matter unto them , till just when thou meanest to put it in execution , and not before . They who have thus done , assuredly escape the dangers belonging to the practise thereof ; and oftentimes the others also , or rather have they all had good success : and I think every one that is wise should endeavor to carry the matter thus . I will content my self to produce only two examples . Nelematus not being able to indure the tyranny of Aristorimus , Tyrant of Epirus , assembled together in his house many of his friends and kinsfolke , and having encourag'd them to set their Country at liberty , some of them requir'd time to be advised and prepared : whereupon Nelematus causd his servants to shut the doors , and told those he had cald together , That they should either swear presently to do this , or if not , he would deliver them all prisoners to Aristotimus : whereby all of them , being mov'd , swore , and so without more delay , went and put in execution what Nelematus had orderd . One of the Magi having by treachery seisd upon the kingdom of Persia , Orthanus a great man had notice thereof , and found out the deceit , and thereupon conferd with six other Princes of that State , saying , he was now underraking to vindicate the Kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magician ; and when some of them demanded time , Darius rose up ( one of the six that was cald by Orthanus ) and said , Either wee will all now go and execute this , or else I will go and accuse you all : so rising all by consent , and not giving any one time to repent himself , they happily effected what they desir'd . Like unto these two examples also , is the course the Aetolians took to put Nabis the Spartan Tyrant to death , who sent Alessamenes a Citizen of theirs with 300 horse and 1000 foot to Nabis , under colour of giving him ayd : the secret they communicated to Alessamenes only ; the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatsoever matter it were , under pain of banishment . This man went into Sparta , never communicating his Commission to any , till just he was to put it in execution , whereupon it fell out that he slew him . They then by these means escap'd the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of Conspiracies ; and whoever shall do as they did , shall alwaies be sure to escape them : And that every one also is able so to do , I will shew by the example of Piso alledged before . Piso was a very great man , and of much esteem , and very familiar with Nero , on whom we much rely'd : And Nero went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens : Piso therefore might have procur'd himself friends of spirit and courage , and willing too to put such a thing in execution , being a matter easie for any great man to compass ; and when he had had Nero in his gardens , then communicated the business to them , and with fit words perswaded them to it , so that they could not have had time to refuse , and impossible had it bin , but that it must have taken effect . And if we shall examine all the others we have mentiond , we shall find very few could have bin otherwise carried . But men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world , often commit very great errors , and the greater in those actions , that have something of extraordiry in them , as this . The matter then is never to be communicated , but upon necessity , or even at the very acting of it , and yet if thou wilt communicate it , let that be but unto one of whom thou hast had long experience , or that therein is interested upon the same reasons thou art . It is easier to find one man of that condition than many , and thereby also is less danger . Moreover , when he should deceive thee , there were some means left yet to desend thee , which could not be where the conspirators are many : for it is the saying of a wise man , that with one alone a man may speak any thing for one man ; I , is as good as another mans No , provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing . And of writing any thing a man shouldbe as wary as of a perilous rock ; for nothing convicts thee sooner than thine own hand . Plautianus having a mind to skill Severus the Emperor , Antonius his son , committed the execution of it to Saturninus a Tribune : who purposing to accuse and not obey him , yet doubting when he should come to the tryal , Plautianus would be beleev'd before him , asked him a note under his hand , that might give him assurance of his Commission ; which Plautianus , blinded with ambition , gave him , whereupon it follow'd , that he was accus'd and convicted by the Tribune , without which , and certain other tokens , Plautianus had carried it clear against him , so boldly he deny'd it . Therefore when one only accuses , there may be some remedy , especially in case thou beest not convicted by any writing of thiue , or countermarks , whereof a man should be well aware . In Pisoes conspiracie there was a woman called Epicaris , which formerly had bin one of Neroes Mistresses , who thinking it would serve well to purpose to joyn with the conspirators , one that was a Captain of some galleys , which Nero kept for his safeguard , opened to him the conspiracie , but not who were the conspirators , whereupon that Captain contrary to his word given , accus'd her before Nero ; but such was her boldness in denying it , that Nero was astonish'd thereat , & condemned her not . There are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers ; the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuse thee , alledging some proof against thee ; the other that he detect thee not constraind and forc't thereunto by torture , having been apprehended upon some conjecture or suspition had of him : but in either of these two dangers there is some remedy , being that in the one it may be deny'd , by saying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee ; and in the other , by alledging that the extremity of torture compell'd him to utter any thing , though false . It is wisdome then to make no man privy to such a secret , but rather to order it conformably to the above alledged examples ; or in case thou revealst it , not to exceed one , where though there be somwhat more danger , yet is there much less than when it is discoverd to divers . Near unto this course is , when a necessity constrains thee to do that to the Prince , which thou seest he would do unto thee , which necessity is so excessive , that it gives thee leisure only to provide for thy security . This necessity brings the business ordinarily to a good end ; and to prove it , two examples shall suffice mee . Cammodus the Emperor did use Lettus and Elettus , Captains of his guard , among his familiar and principal friends , and Martia among his chief Concubines and Mistresses : but because sometime he had been reprehended by them for some things done , whereby he had disgrac'd his person and the Empire , he resolve'd to put them to death , and writ in a list the names of Martia , Lettus , and Eletius , and some others , who the night following he meant should die , and so put that list under his pillow ; and when he went to rise , a little boy which he lov'd , playing about his chamber and his bed , found that list , and going out with it in his hand met with Martia , who took it from him , and read it , and having seen the contents thereof , sent for Lettus and Elettus , whereupon they three knowing the danger they were in , resolv'd to prevent it , and so without longer delay the night following slew Commodus . Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor was in Mesopotamia with his Armies , whereof Macrinus was chief Commander , a man more politick than wa●lick ; and as it comes to pass , Princes that are not good , are alwaies fe●rfull , least others work against them , what they are guilty to themselves they well deserve ; Antoninus writ to Mate nianus his friend at Rome , that he should inquire of the Astrologers if any one aspird to the Empire , and should advise him of it . Whereupon Maternianus writ back unto him , Macrinus was he that aspired therto ; but the Letter comming first to Macrinus his hand , before the Emperors , and he thereby perceiving the necessity imposd upon him , agreed with Martialis 〈◊〉 Centurion , one of his confidents ( whose brother a few daies before Antoninus had slain ) that he should kill him , which was luckily done by him . It is evident then , that this necessity which gives no leisure , works even the same effect which that course did , I formerly said , Nelematus of Epirus took . We see also that prov'd which I spoke of in the beginning of this discourse , that Princes threats r●tort more mischiefes on them , and occasion more desperate conspiracies , than the wrongs they do ; wheroef a Prince ●ought to take good heed : for men are either to be well treated by them , or at least to be put out of doubt of them , that they be not reducd to such terms , as to think they must of force either kill or be kild : Touching the dangers that are incurrd upon the execution , they arise either from changing the order given , or from want of courage in the actor , or from some error the actor commits for want of judgement , or from the fayle of fully perfecting the matter in hand by leaving some of those surviving who were appointed for death . I think therefore that nothing so much disturbs or hinders mens actions , as at an instant without respite of time , to be compeld to alter an order once given , or divert the course of it a different way from that it was first intended And if this variation causes disorder in any thing , it is in the actions of warr , and such like matters , whereof we now speak : for in such occasions , there is nothing so necessary for men to do , as to resolve with themselves to execute fully all that is look'd for at their hands . And if men have a good while bent their minds to one course or order , and that chance suddenly to be alterd , it must needs breed some disturbance to them all , and ruine the whole design , so that it is much better for them to execute any thing according to the order first given ( however that some inconvenient ensue thereupon ) then , by desiring to cancell that , to enter into a thousand inconveniences . This happens when they have not time to put themselves in order again : for when a man hath leisure , he may go his own way he likes best . The Conspiracy of the Pazzi against Laurence and Julian of the house of Medi●ia , is well known : the order given amongst them was this , that they should invite the Cardinal of Saint George to dinner , and thereat kill them they intended ; where they had their appointments who were to slay these , as those also that were to seize on the Palace , and they that were to run about the streets , and call the people together to lay hold of their liberty . It so fell out , that the Pazzi and the Medici together with the Cardinal being in the Cathedral Church of Florence at Masse , notice was given that Julian would not dine there that day , which caused the Conspirators to consult together , and what they were to have done in the house to those of Medici , they resolv'd to do in the Church , which gave disturbance to the whole order : for John Baptista de Monte sacro , would not be guilty of murder committed in the Church , insomuch as they were forc't to change the actors in every part , who having not time to settle & confirm their resolutions , committed such errors , that in the very execution thereof they were all ruin'd . Courage sayles him that is to execute any thing , either through reverence of the person he is to do the mischief upon , or through the executioners own innate cowardise . Such is the Majesty and reverence which the presence of a Prince carries along with it , that it is an ordinary thing for it , either to mitigate or toaffright an executioner . A Slave was sent to Marius , when he was taken prisoner by the Minturveses , to kill him , who amaz'd at the presence of the man , and at the remembrance of his name prov'd so cowardly , that he lost all power to slay him . And if there be such power in the person of a man that is bound , and in prison , and in a manner choak'd up with ill fortune , how much more may we think there is in a Prince that is at liberty at●ir'd in the Majesty of his ornaments of state , and inviron'd with his trayne , insomuch that the pompe thereof is of force to affright , or else with the least courtesie he shall receive thee , to humble thee again before him . There were some conspir'd against Sitalces King of Thrace , and they appointed amongst them a day for the execution , and met at the place agreed on where the Prince was , but none of them once mov'd to hurt him , so that they parted all thence without attempting any thing , and without knowing what it was that hinder'd them , but blaming one another for the fayle : into such errors they often fall afterwards , in so much as the treason was discover'd , and they suffer'd punishment for that evill , which they could , but durst not act . Against Alfonsus Duke of Ferrara , two of his own brothers conspir'd together , and us'd the helpe of one Giannes a Priest & Musitian belonging to that Duke who many times at their intrety brought the Duke amongst them , so that it was in their power to kill him ; yet never was any of them so hardy as to do it , whereupon at length being discoverd they suffered for their wickedness , and want of wit. This negligence could not proceed from elsewhere then from that of necessity the Princes presence did affright them , or that some courtesie he shew'd them humbled them . In such executions an inconvenient or error many times arises , either for lack of discretion or courage : for when the one or other of these two once amazes thee , thou art borne forward in such confusion of thy understanding , that it makes thee both say and do what thou oughtst not . And that men are thus astonished and confounded , Livie does very well shew it , where he sets forth Alexamenes the Etolian , as he went about to kill Nabis the Spartan , whereof we spake formerly , that when hee came to the execution , and discoverd to those that were with him , what he was to do , T. Livius saies these words : He gathers together his wits to him , which the consideration of so weighty a matter had somewhat disorderd For it is impossible , that any man ( though of a resolute courage , & accustomed to the slaughters of men , and use of his weapons ) should not be quite astonished . Therefore choice is to be made of men experienced in such matters , nor should one commit them to any other , however he be esteem'd very couragious : for let no man that hath not formerly made tryall of himself , presume too much upon his courage in the performance of any great exploit . This amazement then may either cause thee to let thy weapons fall out of thy hands , or such words from thy month , as may work the same effect . Luciila Commodus his sister had so order'd it , that Quintianus should kill him . And he awaited Cowmodus in the passage into the Theater , where with a naked poinard comming up to him , he cryed out , This the Senate sends thee ; which words caus'd him to be first laid hold on , before hee could bring down his arme to strike him . M. Antonius of Volterra appointed ( as wee said before ) to kill Laurence of Medici , as hee came near him , said , Ah Traitor ! which saying of his occasioned the safety of Laurence , and the wrack of that Conspiracy . Such a matter may be fully perfected , when it is practised only against one head , for the reasons alledged : but very hardly can it well be accomplished against two principals , or rather impossibly : for it is impossible that one and the like action should succeed at the same instant in several places : for it cannot be , but whither a man will or no , the one shall ruine the other , being done at several times . So that if it be a thing very hazardous and full of danger and small advisedness to practise against the person of one Prince alone ; certainly to conspire against two , is wholly vain and to no purpose . And were it not for the reverence I bear to the Historian , I would never beleeve , that were possible , which Herodian says of Plautianus , that he gave the charge to Saturninus the Centurion to kill Severus and Antoninus abiding in severall place ; for it dissents so much from reason , that nothing else but this authority would make me credit it . Certain young men of Athens conspir'd together against Diocles and Hippias Tyrants of that City , and slew Diocles ; but Hippias that remaind , revenged it . Chiones and Leonides , Heracleans , that were Platoes Disciples , conspird against Clearchus and Satirus that were Tyrants ; they slew Clearchus , and Satirus that was left alive punished the fact . And the Pazzi , several times alledged by us , has not the fortune to kill but Iulian alone . Insomuch as every one should be so wise as forbear to conspire against several principals : for he neither advantageth himself , nor his Country , nor any body else : but rather they that are left behind , become more intolerable and fiercer , as Florence , Athens , and Heraclea , which I spoke of before , know well It is true , that the conspiracy which Pelopidas practised to free Thebes his native Country , had all manner of difficulties , yet it succeeded luckily : for Pelopidas conspired not only against two Tyrants , but against ten : and not only was he not a confident of any of theirs , and so had no easie access unto any of those Tyrants , but he was a rebell : yet for all this came he into Thebes , slew the Tyrants and set the Country at liberty . Nevertheless he affected all this with the assistance of one Carion a Counsellor belonging to those Tyrants , by whose means he had easie access to execute his purpose . Yet let none take example from him : for it was an enterprise almost impossible , and a miracle it was that it succeeded ; and so it was , and is now esteemed by those writers that celebrate the memory thereof , as a matter of great rarity , and without patterne . Such an execution may be hindred by a false imagination , or upon some sudden accident , that arises just upon the fact . On the morning that Brutus and the other Conspirators purposed to kill Caesar , it fell out so that he talked a good while with Cn. Popilius Len●● , one of the Conspirators , whereupon the others seeing this long discourse , they were in fear least the said Popilius had revealed the Conspiracy to Caesar , and they were about to attempt to slay Caesar there , & not expect till he came into the Senate , had it not been that when the discourse ended , they saw that Cesar made not any extraordinary motion thereat , and so they settled themselves anew . These false conceits are to be consider'd , and weigh'd with discretion , & the rather , because they are easy to be taken ; for he that hath aguilty conscience , easily beleeves that others talk of him a word may be herd spoken to another purpose , that may much trouble thy mind , and make thee beleeve it touches the matter thou hast in hand , and cause thee by thy flight to discover thine own Conspiracy , or put the action into disorder by hastening it faster than its time . And this comes to pass the more easily , where Many are made privy to the Conspiracy . Touching the accidents ( because they fall out unexpected ) they cannot be shewed but by examples , and make men wary , according to their rule . ●ulius Belanti of Siena ( of whom I have formerly made mention ) for the hatred which he bore to Pandulphus that had taken his daughter from him , whom he had first given him to wife , resolv'd to kill him , and chose this time . Pandulphus went almost every day to visit a kinsman of his that was sick , and in going thither passed by Julius his house : Who perceiving this , provided so , that his Conspirators were altogether ready in his house to kill Pandulphus , as hee should pass and having plac'd them all arm'd in the entry , he had one stood in the window , that as Pandulphus should pass , when he came near to the entry , should make a sign . It chanc't that Pandulphus comming , & the other having given the sign , he met a friend that stopt him , and some of those that were with him passed forward before him , and hearing the noise of armes , they discoverd the ambush laid , so that Pandulphus escap'd , and Julius with his confederates were constrain'd to fly from Siena . The chance of that meeting hindred the success of that action , & ruin'd quite Julius his enterprise . For which accidents ( because they are very rare ) we cannot find any remedy , it is very necessary to examin well those that may chance , and help them as we can . It remaines now only , that we discourse of the dangers which they run after the execution done , which are all but one , and this it is , when any one is left alive to revenge the dead Prince . There may then his brothers or his sons be left , or other of his allyes to whom the Principality may belong , & may be left alive by thy negligence , or upon some occasions ( formerly spoken of ) that may execute this revenge , as it befell John Andreas of Lampognano , who together with his Complotters having slain the Duke of Milan , and there being left alive one son of his and two brothers , they were ready at hand time enough to revenge his death . And truly in this case these conspirators are excusable : because they have here no remedy , but when any of them survives , for lack of good advisement , or through their negligence , then indeed thereis no excuse to be made for them . Some conspirators at Forly slew Count Ierolamus their Lord , took prisoners his wife and sons , which were but little ones ; and thinking they could have no security , unless they became masters of the fortress , which the governour was not willing to give into their hands ; whereupon the Lady Katherine ( for so the Countess was called ) promised the Traitors , that if they would let her enter therein , she would cause it to be delivered up to them , and that they should keep her sons for pledges . They upon her word thus given , suffered her to enter in , who so soon as shee was within the walls , reproached them with the murder of her husband , and threatned them with all manner of revenge ; & to let them know shee had no regard of her children , she shewed them her privy parts , saying she had the means left her to bring forth others , so that they not knowing what to do , and too late perceiving their own error , suffered perpetual exile in punishment of their lack of wit. But of all dangers that can befall after the execution , there is node mone certain , nor more terrible , then when the people is a friend to that Prince thou hast slain : for against this the conspirators can have no remedy : for they can never secure themselves . We have Caesar for example hereof , who because he had the people of Rome to friend , was by their means revenged : for when they had chased the conspirators from Rome they caused all of them in several places to be slain . Treasons that are practised against ones own Countrey , are less dangerous for those that work them , then those that are practised agaist Princes : for in the ordering of them the dangers are less then in the others , and in executing of them they are the same , and after the execution there is none at all . In the plotting and working them the dangers are not many : for a Citizen may frame himself so , as to be capable of power , without manifesting his mind therein or intention to any one ; and unless those his purposes receive some interruption , he may happily proceed in his design : but if any law made , chance to cross them , he must stay his time , and seek some other course . This is to be understood of a Republique where in corruption is entred in some part ; for in one not corrupted ( no evil beginning taking 〈◊〉 place there ) these thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen . The Citizens then may by several means and many waies aspire unto the Principality , where they run no hazard of being oppress'd , as well because Republiques are more slew then a Prince and stand less in doubt , & ●●h refore are less wary as also because they carry more respect towards their principal citizens , and therefore are they the more audacious and more insolent to practise against them . Few there are but have read Catalines conspiracy written by Salust , & know how that afterwards when it was discovered , Cataline , did not only abide in Rome , but came into the Senate-house , & spoke in villanous termes against the Senate and the Consul ; so great was the respect that that City bore to her Citizens so that when he was departed from Rome , and had his Armies already on foot , Lentulus nor those others had never been layd hold on , had not there been letters of his own hand brought against him , which manifestly accused him . Hanno the most potent Citizen in Carthage , aspiring to a Tyranny , had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poison all the Senate , and afterwards make himself Prince . When this matter was known , the Senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the excess of expences anbanquets and weddings ; such was the respect they bore to men of their qualities . It is very true that in the executing of a treason against ones native Country , there is more difficulty , and greater dangers ; for very seldome is it , that thy own forces suffice , being to conspire against so many ; for every one hath not an Army at his command , as Cesar Agathocles or Cl●omenes , and such like , who at one pluck have been able to seise on the Country : for unto such the way is easie and safe enough , But others that have not such advantages of forces , must do it either with some slight or artifice , or by the aide of forraine forces . As for slights and tricks , Pisistratus the Athenian having over come the Megarenses , and thereby got credit with the people , one morning came out among them wounded , saying , The nobility through envy had thus wrong'd him , and ask'd leave of them for his defence to have a guard of armd men about him . By this power he easily attain'd to such greatness , that he brought Athens under his Tyranny . Pandulfus Petrucci return'd himself with others that were out-law'd into Siena , & there he had the charge given him over the common guard of Justice , as a Mecanick office , and which others refus'd , yet in time those arm'd men gave him such reputation , that shortly after he became Lord of the Town . Many others have used other endeavors , and other waies , and in a short space , and without danger have attained to the same . Those that by their own force , or by help of forrain-forces have conspir'd to make themselves Lords over their native Countries , have had several successes , as fortune hath befriended them or otherwise . Cataline we spoke of before , was ruined thereby . Hanno ( of whom we formerly made mention ) when the poison took not effect , armed many thousands of his partisans , who with himself were all slain . Some of the prime Citizens of Thebes , to the end they might become Lords of the Town , called to their aid a Sparian army , and so took upon them the rule of that City . So that when we shall have examined all the conspiracies made against a Country , we shall not find any , at least very few , that in the plotting thereof have been suppressed , but all of them either have taken effect , or bin ruined in the execution rather . When they are once acted , they carry not with them any further dangers , then the nature of a Principality hath in it self : for when a man hath once gotten to be a Tyrant , he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him , against which there are no other remedies then those we have formerly touch'd . This is that which I had to write touching conspiracies : and if I have discours'd of those onely that are executed with the sword , and not done by poison , it is because they have all the same rule . It is rue , that those done with poison , are the more dangerous , because they are more uncertain , for that a man cannot administer by every one , and he must needs reveal it to him that he makes his instrument ; and from this necessity of revealing it , arises thy danger : moreover upon many accidents a draught of poison cannot prove deadly , as it befell those that slew Co●modus ; for he having vomited up the poison which they gave him , they were forced to strangle him , before they could make him dye . Whereupon I judge that Princes have not a greater enemy then treason ; because when a treason is once practised against them , it either brings them to their end , or procures them much infamy ; for if it succeeds , they die ; if it be discovered , and they slay the traitors , men always suppose it hath been some device of that Princes , to vent his ava●ice and cruelty against the bloods and estates of those he hath put to death . I would not fail therefore to warn those Princes or Republiques against which treasons have been devised , that they be wary , when a conspiracy is once disclosed to them , before they go about to revenge it , but first to pty narrowly into it , and to seek to understand well the qualities thereof , and weigh well the conditions of the conspirators , and their own ; and when they finde them great and mighty , never to discover them , till they be furnished with sufficient forces to crush them ; for in doing otherwise , they should discover it to their own ruin : Wherefore they ought to dissemble it with all possible care ; because the conspirators , when they finde themselves discovered , of force are driven to act what they can without respect . We have an example hereof from the Romanes , who having lift two legions of souldiers to guard the Capuans against the Samnitcs , as otherwhere we have said , the heads of those Legions conspired together to oppress the Capuans : Whereof notice being given at Rome , the matter was committed to Rutilius the new Consul , that he should take order for it , who to lull asleep the conspirators , gave it out , that the Senate had again confirmed the Capuan Legions aboad there : Which those soldiers giving credit to , and thinking they had time enough to execute their purpose , they never went about to hasten the matter : And so they stood still , till they began to see that the Consul separated them one from another , which thing having begotten suspicion in them , made them discover themselves , and execute their design . Nor can there be a fuller example on the one or the other part : for hereby it appears how slow men are in matters , where they think they have time enough ; and how quick , when a necessity drives them to it . Nor can a Prince or Republique ( that would defer the discovery of a treason for his own advantage ) take a better course , then by some device or trick offer the conspirators shortly some handsome opportunity , to the end that they attending that , or thinking they have time enough , may give leasure to that Prince or Commonwealth to punish them . They who have done otherwise , have hastened their own destruction , as the Duke of Athens did , and William of the family of the Pazzi . The Duke being become the tyrant of Florence , and understanding that there was a conspiracy plotted against him , caused without further examining the matter , one of the conspirators to be laid hold on , which gave and alarme to the rest , whereupon arming themselves , they took the state from him . William being a Commissary in the valley of Chiana in the year 1501. having had notice , that in Arezzo there was a conspiracy in favour of the Vitelli , to take that Town from the Florentines , presently went to the town , and not considering his own forces , nor the conspirators , nor taking order to furnish himself with any , by the Bishops advice , who was his sons , caused one of the conspirators to be laid hands on , whereupon the first presently took arms , got away the town from the Florentines , and William of a Commissary was made a prisoner . But when those conspiracies are feeble , they may and ought without any regard be suppressed . Yet in any case we must not follow two courses which have been used in a maner contrary one to the other : The one by the forenamed Duke of Athens , who to shew he believed that he had the citizens of Florence good wills , put one to death that detected a conspiracy against him : The other by Dion a Siracusan , who to sound the minde of one whom he had in suspicion , agreed that Callippus , of whom he was very confident , should make him believe that he were working a plot against him ; but these matters fell out ill for them both . For the one took all courage away from the accusers , and encouraged traitors ; the other made the way easie to his own ruine , or rather he himself was principal of the conspiracy against himself , and so it fell out ; for Callippus ( being that he could without any respect practise such a thing against Dion ) did it so in earnest , that he took both his life and his State from him . CHAP. VII . From whence proceeds it , that of the changes from liberty to slavery , and from slavery to liberty , some are without blood , others exceeding bloody ? SOme will marvail perchance from whence it comes to pass , that of many changes which are made from a free State to a Tyrannical , and contrarily , some are with much effusion of blood , others quite without any : for , as we learn by Histories , in such like alterations sometimes very many men have been slain , and sometimes again not one hath suffered any injury , as i● befell in the change that Rome made from her Kings to Consuls , wherein none but the Tarquins were banished , without wrong done to any body else . Which depends hereupon ; for that State that is changed , begins first either by violence , or without it : and when it begins with violence , it must needs begin with doing wrong to many ; and it is necessary afterwards that in its destruction , they who have been wronged , revenge themselves , and so from their desire of revenge proceeds the effusion of blood and death of many . But when that State is begun by the common consent of an universality , and thereby hath been amplify'd , it hath no cause afterwards , when that universality is ruined , to wrong others then the head onely ; and of this kinde was the State of Rome , and the Tarquins banishment , as also was in Florence the State which the Medici held , when afterwards in their destructions in the year 1444. none else were hurt but they . And so such like changes never prove very dangerous ; but those rather are very full of danger , which are wrought by those that endeavor to revenge themselves withall , which have been such , that they have caused horror even in him that reads them . And because of examples to this purpose histories are full fraught , I will let this pass . CHAP. VIII . He that will make alteration in a Republique , must consider the subject he is to work upon . IT hath been formerly treated how that a malicious Citizen cannot work mischief in a Republique that is not grown corrupted ; which conclusion is confirmed ( besides the reasons that then were alledged ) with the example of Sp. Cassius , and of Manlius Capitolinus . Which Spurius being an ambitious man , and desirous to take upon him extraordinary authority in Rome , and gain the people to him by doing them many good turns , as was that , to sell them those fields , which the Romans had taken from the Hermici , this his ambition was desc●yed by the Fathers , and so much suspected , that when hh spoke to the people and offered to give them those moneys , which the Corn was sold for , that the Publique had caused to be brought from Sicily , they wholly refused them , thinking that Spurius meant to give them the price of their liberty . But had that people been already corrupted , they would not have refused the said price , but rather have opened him that way to the tyranny , which now they shut against him . A fuller example hereof Manlius Capitolinus represents unto us ; for in him we see , what excellencies of mind and body , how many brave exploits acted in defence of a mans native Country , a brutish desire of rule quite rases out : which ( as it appeared ) grew in him , through the envy he bore Camillus for the honors were done him , whereby his understanding was so blinded , as not considering the manner of Government used in the City , nor examining , whereupon he was to work , unapt as yet to receive so evil a form , betook himself to raise tumults in Rome against the Senate , and contrary to the Laws of his Country . Wherein the perfection of that City is very evident , and the goodness of the matter thereof ; for in his case none of the Nobility , however that they were very eager defenders the one of another , never stirred in his favour , nor any of his kindred undertook any thing in his defence : whereas ordinarily when others were accused , they used to accompany them in a rueful manner , clad in black , and all sorrowful ; whereby they might gain compassion in favor of the defendant , and with Manlius none of these were seen . The Tribunas of the people , who were wont to favour those things , which seemed to be mov'd for the peoples advantage , and the more they were against the Nobility , so much the forwarder used to thrust them , in this case held with the Nobility to suppress a common mischief . The people of Rome exceedingly desirous of their own advantage , and a great favourer of any thing that thwarted the Nobility , however they afforded Manlius many favors , nevertheless , when the Tribunes cited him , and referred his cause to be judged by the people , that people being become judge of a defendant , without regard condemned him to death . Wherefore I believe there is not any example in this History more proper to shew the goodness of that Common-wealths orders , then this , seeing that not one of this whole City moved in behalf of a very valourous Citizen , who as well publikely as privately had done many worthy acts : because in all of them the love of their country was of more force than any other regard , and they considered more the present danger ; that depended on him , than his fore-past deserts , so that by his death they set themselves at liberty . And T. Livius says , This end had that man , who had he not been born in a free State , was worthy of admiration . Where two things are to be considered ; the one , that by other means a man ought to seek after glory in a City corrupted , than in one that lives strictly according to the civil government ; the other is ( wich is almost the same with the first ) that men in their proceedings , and the rather in actions of consequence should consider the times , and conforme themselves thereunto : and those that by their evill choice , or natural inclination disagree with the times , most commonly live unhappily , and their actions have but ill successes . The contrary befalls those that can accord with the times : and without question , by the Historians words which we for merly mentioned , we may make this conclusion , that if Manlius had been borne in the times that Marius and Silla were , where the matter was already corrupted , that his ambition could have made some impression therein , he might , have workd the same effect , and had the same success that Silla and Marius had , and others afterwards , who after them aspird to the Tyranny . So in like manner , if Silla and Marius had liv'd in Manlius his daies . they had been crushd in the very egge : for one man may indeed begin with his evill courses and mischievous waies to debauch the people of a City : but it is impossible that one mans life can suffice to corrupt it so , that he himself can make any advantage thereof . And in case it were possible , that in tract of time , he could do it , yet would it be impossible , in regard of the manner of mens proceedings , who are impatient , and cannot defer any passion of theirs long . Moreover , they erre in their affairs , and in those especially which they much desire , in so much as either through their small patience , or through their error , they would venture upon the executing of their purposes , in counter time , and so come to an evill end . Therefore is it necessary , if a man would gain authority in a Republick , and induce some ill for me thereinto , to find the matter already disorderd by time , and that by little and little , and from age to age is brought into disorder , which of force comes thereunto , when it is not ( as formerly hath been said ) refreshd by vertuous examples , or by new ●aws reduc'd to the first principles . Manlius ●hen had been a rare man , and famous , had he been borne in a corrupted City . And therefore should those Citizens that in Republicks undertake any thing either in favour of liberty , or in favour of Tyranny , consider the subject they are to work on , and from thence conjecture the difficulty of the worke : for it is as hard and dangerous to set free a people that would live in thral●om , as to inthrall a people that would live free . And because we have before rouchd , that in all manner of actions men should consider the quality of the times , and proceed conformably to those , we will speak of them at length in the Chapter following . CHAP. IX . How a man must of necessity change with the times , if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings . I Have many times consider'd , how the occasion of mens good or evill fortunes depends upon the manner of the encounter of their proceedings with the times : for it is evident , that some men proceed in their affaires with violence , others with regard and wariness . And because that in the one and other of these two ways , the convenient terms are transgressed , being that they cannot hit upon the true way ; both in the one and the other they fail . But he fails least , and oftnest lights upon good success , that meets ( as I have said ) time in its own way , and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward . Every one knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded with his Army carefully and warily , far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the Romans used ; and his good fortune would have it , that this his way agreed well with the times : for Hannibal being come a young man into Italy , and with a fresh gale of fortune , and having twice broken the Romane Armies , and that Republike almost lost all her good soldiers , and therefore being affrighted , could not light upon better fortune than to have such a Captain , who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delaies : Nor could Fabius have met with times fitter for his ways : whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious . And that Fabius did this upon the instigation of his own nature , and not upon a meer choice , we see that when Scipio desired to pass over into Affrica with those Armies , whereby to make an end of the war , Fabius much contradicted it , as he that could not go out of his own pace , nor leave his own custome , so that for all him , Hannibal might have continued still in Italy ; for he perceived not , that the times were changed , and it was needful to alter the manner of making war. And had Fabius been King of Rome , he might easily have spoiled that war , because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times . But being he was born in a Republike , where there was divers Citizens , and divers humors , as she had Fabius , who was excellent in those times , when the war was onely to be supported ; so had she Scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome . Whence arises it , that a Republike hath a longer life , and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality : because she can better fit her self for several accidents , by reason of the variety of her Subjects that are in her , then can a Prince : for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner , never alters , as it is said , and must of necessity , when the times disagree with his way , go to wrack . Peter Soderini , formerly spoken of , proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience : and he and his Country prospered , while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings : but when the times fell out so , that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness , he knew not how to do it : so that together with his Country he fell to ruine . Pope Julius the second carried himself all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage , and because the times sorted well therewith , all his undertakings succeeded well . But if other times had come , that would have required other advice , of force he must have gone to destruction : because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings . And that we cannot change our selves , there are two reasons ; the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to ; the other is , because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily , it is impossible to perswade him , that things will prove well , where hee proceeds otherwise . Whereupon it comes to pass , that in one man fortune varies , because shee changes the times , and he changes not his courses . Thence arises also the ruine of a City , because the orders of Common wealths change not with the times , as we have treated heretofore at large , but they are flower : for it is a greater trouble to them to change ; and to effect it , they have need of times which should in a manner take a Republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her : for which one man alone suffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings . And because wee have made mention of Fabius Maximus , who held off Hannibal with delayes , I purpose to treate in the following Chapter , whether a Captain , being desirous to fight a battel with the enemy in any case , can be so hindred that he do it not . CHAP. X. That a Captain cannot avoid battell , when his enemy will fight in any case . CNeus Sulpitius the dictator held off from fighting with the French , being not willing to stand at fortunes discretion in a tryall against his enemy , whom time and a strange Country would continually weaken and consume . When such an error en●ues , where all men or the greater part of them erre , I think it not much amiss mary times to reprove it . Wherefore though I have formerly several times shewed , how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times ; yet I think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it : for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders , it is especially in military orders , where now is not any of those things observed , which the ancients made much account of . And this inconvenient grew first hereupon , because Commonwealths and Princes , have committed this care to o●hers , and to avoid dangers , have much lai● aside that exercise ; and if perchance sometime a King in our days venture to go in person , we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders , that are more commendable : for when they chance to give themselves to that imployment , they do it rather in shew of their pompe , then upon any other laudable occasion . Yet do these commit lesser errors , personally visiting their armies , and keeping in their own hands the Majesty of their Government , then Republikes do , especially those of Italy , which trust to others , not understanding any thing in the wars , or attending to any thing belonging to them : and on the other side , when they are desirous ( whereby they may seem to be Princes ) to take any thing into deliberation , they commit therein exceeding many errors . And however that other where I have treated of some of them , yet at this present I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance . When these lazy Princes , or effeminate Commonwealths send forth any Commander of theirs , the wisest commission that they think they can give him , is to charge him , that in any case he fight not a battel , but avoid it , and conceiting with themselves that herein they imitate Fabius Maximus his discretion , who by forbearing to fight , saved the Romane State ; they understand not that most commonly , this commission is either to no purpose , or else hurtful . For we must take this for a conclusion , that a General , that will abide in the field , cannot avoid a battel , when the enemy will in any case fight . So that this commission is but thus , as if he should say , fight with thine enemy at his pleasure , and not at thine own . For if a man will abide in the field and not fight , the surest way is to keep himself fifty miles off from his enemy at least , and then keep good espiouns , so that if he chance to bend towards thee , thou maist avoid him at leisure . Another course is to immure himself up in a City ; but the one and the other of these two courses is very pernicious . In the first he leaves his Country in prey to the enemy ; and a valiant Prince will rather hazard the battel than prolong the war with so much dammage to his Subjects . And in the second the loss is evident ; for it must needs be , that retiring thy self within the walls of a Town with thy Army , thou be besiged , and at length suffer famine , and so be forced to yeeld : insomuch as to avoid battel by either of these two means , must needs prove very hurtful . The course that Fabius Maximus held , to abide in strong places is very good , when thou hast an Army so valorous , that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages . Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided fighting , but rather that he would fight at his advantage . For if Hannibal had gone to find him , Fabius would have staid for him , and fought with him ; but Hannibal durst not deal with him after his manner . So the battel was as well avoided by Hannibal as by Fabius ; but if one of them had been desirous to have hazarded in any case , the other had but one of these three remedies , to wit those two we have before mentioned , or to flie . There are many examples and maximes in the war , which the Romanes made with Philip of Macedon , Father of Perses , to make good what I say ; for Philip being assailed by the Romanes , resolved not to come to battel ; and therefore first he thought to do as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy , and placed himself with his Army upon the top of a mountain , where he fortified himself all he could , deeming that the Romans had not the heart to come and find him there ; but when they went thither , and fought with him , and drove him from the mountain , being not able to withstand them , he fled with the greater part of his people : and that which saved him was the roughness of the Country , so that the Romans could not follow the pursuite . Philip then being unwilling to fight , and having pitcht his campe near the Romans , had no other mean but to fly ; and having found by this experience , that when they meant not to fight , it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains ; and having no mind to inclose himself in any Town , resolved to take the other course , to remove many miles distant from the Romanes Campe. Whereupon , if the Romanes were in one Province , they went into another , and so always they went thither from whence the Romanes were parted : and considering in the end , how that in prolonging the war this way , his own estate declined , and how that his Subjects were sometimes by himself , otherwhile by his enemies daily oppressed , resolved to put it to the tryal of a day , and so came to a set battel with the Romanes . It is profitable then not to fight , when the Armies have these conditions which Fabius his Army had , or that then had that of Cneus Sulpirius , which are , to have an Army so good , that the enemie dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications , and that the enemy though he be in thy Country , yet hath he not much footing therein , where he may suffer want of provisions ; and in this case the course is advantagious for the reasons Titus Livius alledges : Vnwilling to stand at fortunes discretion on a tryal against his enemy , whom time and a strange Country would daily weaken and consume . But in any other case the battel cannot be avoided , but with thy shame and danger : for to flie ( as Philip did ) is the same that it is to be routed , and that with the more disgrace , by how much the less thou hast made proof of thy valor . And however he had the luck to escape , another could not have had the like , unless he had help by the scituation of the Country , as well as he . That Hannibal was a master in the art of war , I think every one will acknowledge , and being to oppose Scipio in Affrica , if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war , without doubt he would have done it , and peradventure could too ( being a good Commander and having a good Army ) as well as Fabius did in Italy . But being he did it not , we may well believe , that some important reason perswaded him so ; for a Prince that hath an Army levied , and sees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together , is a very fool if he ventures not his fortune , before his Army falls asunder ; for by delaying he certainly loses , whereas hazzarding he might overcome . Another thing there is yet much to be accounted of , which is , that a man ought ( even in his losing ) seek to gain glory ; and it is more glory , to be overcome by force , than by any other inconvenient , that may have made thee lose . Therefore it must needs be that Hannibal was forc't by these necessities ; and on the other side Scipio , if Hannibal would have protracted the war , and he durst not have adventured to go seek him in his Trenches , had not suffered therein , in that he had already overcome Siphax , and taken so many Towns in Affrick , so that he could have continued there with security and conveniency , as well as in Italy . Which was not so with Hannibal , when he had to deal with Fabius , nor with those French-men , when they were opposed by Sulpitius . So much the less also can he avoid the fight , that with an Army invades another mans Country , he must ( whensoever the enemie faces him ) fight with him , and if he incampes before any Town , so much the rather is he obliged to fight , as in our days it befell Duke Charles of Burgundy , who being set down before Morat , a Town belonging to the Swissers , was assaulted by them and broken : and so it chanc'd to the French Army , that incamping at Novarra , was in like manner routed by the Swissers . CHAP. XI . He that hath to deal with many , however that he be the weaker , provided that he can but support their first violence , overcomes . THe Tribunes of the peoples power in Rome was great , and necessary , as many times we have said : for otherwise it would never have been possible to bridle the Nobilities ambition , which would much sooner , then it did , have corrupted that Commonwealth : yet because in every thing ( as is often said ) some evil proper to every thing lies lurking in it , which causes new accidents to arise , it is needful with new orders to remedy them . Wherefore the Tribunitial power being grown insolent , and terrible to the Nobility , and to all Rome , some very hurtful inconvenient to the Romane liberty would have risen , if the way had not been shewed by Appius Claudius , whereby they might defend themselves against the Tribunes ambition : which was that they always found some one among them , that either was fearful or might be corrupted , or that was a lover of the common good : so that they disposed him to oppose other mens wills , that desired to draw forward any deliberation against the Senates will. Which remedy was a great allay to such an authority , and a long time much helped Rome . Which thing hath made me consider , that whensoever many powerful ones are united together against one that is powerful , though all they together are much more puissant then he , yet may there much more be hoped for in him alone , though less powerful , then in those many , though very strong : for ( leaving a part all those things , wherein one alone is able to do more then many , which things are innumerable ) this will always come to pass , that one alone , taking but a little care , shall be able to disunite those many , and so weaken that body which was strong . I will not herein alledge ancient examples , which are very frequent ; the modern shall suffice me , which have faln in our days . In the year 1484. all Italy conspired against the Venetians , who when they were in a manner wholly lost , and could not any more abide in the field with their Army , they corrupted Lodwick that then ruled in Milan , and by means of that corruption made an accord , wherein they not only had again the towns they had lost , but usurped a part of the state of Ferrara . And thus they that had been loosers in the war , remained gainers by the peace . A few years past , the whole world conspired against France ; yet before they came to see the end of the war , Spain broke off from her confederates , and made agreement with her , in so much as the rest of the confederates also were forced to make their accords too . So that without doubt , we ought always judge , when we see a war made by many against one , that that one is like to be a gainer at the end , provided that he be of such valour , that he is able to sustain the first brunts , and so govern himself with the time as to attend time : which if he were not able to do , he would run the hazard of many dangers , as it happened to the Venetians in the eighth year , who if they could have temporised with the French Army , and so have had time to gain themselves some of those that were confederated against them , they might have escaped that destruction , but not having so good an Army , as thereby to play with the enemy awhile ; and hereupon not having had leisure to take any of them asunder , they were ruined : for we saw , that the Pope when he had what was his , became their friend , and so Spaine , and very willingly the one and the other of these two Princes would have saved them the state of Lombardy against France , for fear of making it too great in Italy , if it had been in their power . The Venetians then might have given a part , to save the rest , which if they had done in time , that it had appeared it was not of extream necessity , and before the beginning of the war , would have been wisely done of them ; but when the wars were begun , it was disgraceful , and peradventure of small benefit . But before such imbroiles , few of the Citizens of Venice could foresee the danger , very few the way to help , and none to advise it . But to return again to the beginning of this discourse , I conclude , that even so as the Senate of Rome had a remedy to save their country from the Tribunes ambition , because they were many , so shall any Prince that is assailed by many , finde a remedy , whensoever he knows with discretion how to use the convenient means to disunite them . CHAP. XII . That a wise Commander upon his own souldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight , and take it , as much as he can , from his enemies . AT other times we have treated , of what advantage necessity is to hamane actions , and to what glory they have thereby been promoted ; and that by some moral Philosophers it hath been written , that mens hands and tongues two of their worthiest instruments to ennoble them , would never have worked so perfectly , nor have brought mens labors to that excellency , whereunto we see them now come , had they not been thrust forward by necessity . The vertue then of such necessity being known by the ancient Commanders of Armies , and how thereby the souldiers minds were made the more obstinate to fight , they used all their industry , to force them by it . And on the other side , they aswell endeavored , to free their enemies from it ; and hereupon many times they opened that way to the enemy , which they could have shut against them , and shut it against their own soldiers , which they could have left open for them . He then that desires , either that a City defend it self obstinately , or that an Army in the field fight it out resolutely , must try his wits to make an impression in the brests of them that are to fight , that such a necessity lies upon them . Whereupon a discreet Commander that is going to besige a Town , may conjecture of the facility or difficulty in taking it , by the knowledge and consideration of the necessity that binds the inhabitants to defend themselves ; and as he finds the necessity urging them to be great , so let him judge it difficult to overcome them , or otherwise easie . Whence it proceeds , that those Towns which have rebelled , are harder to be regained then they were at their first conquest ; for in the beginning not having any cause to fear punishment , as not having offended , they yeeld easily ; but thinking ( after they have rebelled ) that they have offended , and hereupon fearing the chastisement , they prove harder to be recovered . Moreover such obstinacy arises from the innate hatreds which neighboring Princes and Republiques , bear one to another , which proceeds from their ambition to rule , and the jealousie of their own state , especially if they be Republikes as it chances in Tuscany . Which strife and contention hath caused , and ever will , a great difficulty in the mastery of the one or other . Whereof he that considers well the City of Florences neighbors , and those of Venice , will not marvel ( as many do ) that Florence hath spent more in her wars , and gained less then Venice , for this is , because the Venetians never found their neighboring Towns so obstinate in their defence , as Florence hath ; for that all the Towns confining upon Venice have been accustomed to live in subjection under a Prince , and not free ; and those that have been used to serve , make small account of changing their Lord , or rather many times they much desire it . So that Venice ( however she hath had more powerful neighbors then Florence ) yet because she hath found the Townes lesse obstinate against her , hath been able sooner to subdue them then the other could , being enuironed round , by free Towns. A Commander therefore should ( to return to our first discourse ) when he sits down before any Town , provide with all diligence to take from the defendants all scruples of such necessity , and conquently such obstinacy , promising pardon , if they are afraid of punishment : and if they doubt their liberty is aimed at , shew them there is nothing intended against the common good , but against some few ambitious men in the City , which thing hath , many times facilitated such enterprises and takings of Towns. And though such colours are easily seen through , and especially by understanding men , yet are the people ost deceived thereby , who being desirous of the present peace , shut their eyes against any other , snare that under large promises can be laid for them . And this way exceeding many Cities have been reduced to servitude , as it befell Florence in these latter days , and Crassus also with his whole Army , who though he knew the Parthians promises were not to be credited , which were made onely to take from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves , yet could he not keep them obstinate , being blinded by the offers of peace made them by their enemies , as in particular may be seen in his life , by him that shall read it . When the Samnites , contrary to the articles of agreement , upon the ambition of some few had forraged and spoiled the Romans their confederates fields , and afterwards sent Ambassadors to Rome to require peace , offering to make restitution of all that was taken , and deliver them prisoners the authors of those broyles and robberies , they were refus'd by the Romans , and sent back to Samnium without hope of agreement : Claudius Pontius the commander of the Samnites Army , with a notable oration of his shewed , the Romans would have war in any case ; and though for their own parts they wished for peace , yet necessity made them take the war in hand , saying these words , They justly take arms that are forced to do so ; and piously too who have no other hope but in them . Upon which necessity he with his souldiers grounded his hopes of victory . And to the end I need not return again to this matter , I think it fit to alledge those examples of the Romans , which are most worthy of remarke ; Caius Manilius went forth with an army to incounter the Veientes , and part of their Army having forced his trenches , Manilius came speedily with new Troops to sucour his own , and that the Veientes should not escape , guarded all the passages into the campe . Whereupon the Veientes seeing themselves shut in of all sides , began to fight with such fury , that they slew Manilius , and would have otherthrown all the rest of the Romans , if , by the wisdom of one Tribune , a way for them to escape by , had not been opened . Where we see that whiles necessity constraned the Veientes to fight , they stood to it stoutly ; but as soon as a way was opened for them , they thought more upon flying then fighting . The Volsci and Equi having entered with their armies upon the Roman territories , the Consuls were sent against them , and whiles they were in fight , the Volscies army , the chief whereof was Vectius Metius , chanced to to be inclosed between their own trenches , which the Romans were now become masters of , and the other Roman Army , who seeing they must all either die or make way by the sword , he spake thus to his soldiers , Come along with mee ; there is neither rampire nor ditch to oppose you , but men only against men : you are equall to them in valour , and , which is the last and hardest weapon , your necessity gives you advantage of them . Insomuch as this necessity is term'd by Titus Livius the extreamest and greatest weapon . Camillus the wisest of all the Roman commanders being got within the walls of the Vejentes City with his Army , whereby to take it more easily , and to free the enemies from that last necessity of defending themselves gave command so that the Vejentes heard it , that none should hurt those that were disarmd : so that having cast all their armes upon the ground , that City was taken with little or no effusion of blood ; Which course was afterwards followed by many Commanders . CHAP. XIII . Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander that hath a weak Army , or in a good Army that hath a weak Commander . COriolanus being banished from Rome , went from thence to the Volsci , where having gotten together an Army to be reveng'd of his own Citizens , came from thence to Rome ; from whence he was mov'd to depart , rather for pitty to his mother , than by the Romans forces . Upon which place T. Livius saies , that hereby it is known that the Commonwealth of Rome grew more by the Captains valours , than the soldiers , considering that the Volsci formerly had been alwaies losers , and only then had overcome when Co●iolanus was their General : And how ever that Livie holds such an opinion , yet we see in many places of his History , that Soldiers without any Captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valors , and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their Consuls , than before they were slain , as it happend in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Scipioes , which when the two Captains were slain , was able by its own valor not only to save it self , but overcome the enemy , and keep that Province for the Republick . So relating all , wee shall find many examples where the Soldiers valor alone hath got the day , and many others where the Generals valor only hath done the same effect . In so much as wee may well judge , that either of them hath need of the other . And here it is not amiss to consider first , whether is most to be feared , either a good Army led by an unskilfull Commander , or a good Commander followed by a bad Army . And taking after Cesars opinion , small account is to be made of the one or the other : for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petrejus , who had with them a good Army , he said he little doubted them , Because he went against an Army that lacked a Commander , shewing the Commanders weakness . On the contrary when he went into Thessaly against Pompey , he said , I go against a Commander without an Army . Another thing may be considerd , which is more easie , either for a good Commander to make a good Army , or for a good Army to make a good Commander ; Whereupon I answer , that the question seems already decided : for more easily many shall find one , or shall instruct one so that he become good , than one alone shall many . Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates , was altogether unexpert in the war ; yet that good Army , wherein were so many good Chieftaines , quickly made him a skilful Commander . For want of Soldiers the Romans put many slaves in Armes , and gave order to Sempronius Gracchus to train them , who in a small time made a very good Army of them . Pelopidas and Epaminondas ( as we have said otherwhere ) after they had delivered Thebes their native Country out of the Spartans bondage , made the Thebans exceeding good Soldiers in a short time , that they were able not only to sustain ' , but overcome the Soldiers of Sparta ; so that the case is equal on both sides : for the one being good , may soon find the other so : yet a good Army without a good head , ordinarily becomes insolent and dangerous ; as was the Macedonian Army after Alexander his death , and likewise the Veterane soldiers in the civil warres . So that I think , that much more account is to be made of a Commander that hath time and convenience to train up and arme his Soldiers , than of an insolent Army , having a Captain from among them tumultuarily made their Chief . Wherefore double glory and renown may well be ascrib'd to those Commanders , who have not only taken upon them to overcome the enemy , but before their comming to fight with them , have to make them fit for the occasion , disciplind and instructed their Armies well : for therein appears their vertuo double and admirable ; whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many , far less account or esteem would be made of them . CHAP. XIV . New sleights and inventions , that are usd in the midst of a fight , and new cryes that are heard , what effects they produce . OF what moment in combates and fights a new accident is , that arises upon any new matter seen or heard , appears in many places , and especially in that occasion , where the Romans fought with the Volsci , where Qu●ntius seeing one of the horns of his Army beginning to fayle , began to cry out aloud , that they should stand firm : because the other horne of the Army was already victorious : by which words , having encourag'd his own , and affrighted his enemies , hee overcame them . And if such vociserations in an Army well orderd be of great effect , in one then that is but tumultuary and ill disciplind , they must needs be of much greater : because the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind . To this purpose I will alledge a notable example befaln in our dayes . The City of Perugia , a few years since , was divided into two factions , of the Oddi , and the Bagliori ; these raignd there , the others were banishd men , who having by help of their allies gotten an Army together , and brought it into some Town consining upon Perugia , by favour of their faction one night enterd the City , & without being descryd , came to take the Piazza ; & because that City hath chains on all the corners of the waies , which kept them bard , the Soldiers belonging to the Oddi had a man went before them , who with a bar of Iron was to break the locks of those chains , to the end the horse might pass , & there being but one only left them to break , which immediately opened into the Piazza , and now a generall alarme being given , and he that broke them , being oppressed by the multitude that followd him , and not able therefore well to lift up his armes with his bar , whereby to imploy it , chanc'd to say Stand back ; which word going by degrees , saying back , began to cause the furthest off to flie , and so by little and little the rest with such force , that they all routed one another . And thus the design of the Oddi , by occasion of so poor an accident , became frustrate . Where we may consider , that discipline and order is not usefull in an Army so much for orderly fighting , as that every small accident put thee not quite into disorder : for , were it for nothing else , the ordinary multitude is unfit for the warrs , because every rumor , every voice , every noise changes them , and puts them to flight . And therefore a good Commander , among his other orders , ought appoint those that are to take the word from him , & to pass it to others , and accustome his Soldiers , so that they give no credit save only to their own officers , to the end that they tell them only , what is given them in charge from him : for when this part is not well observ'd , many disorders often fall out . Touching the sight of these new things every Commander ought well bend his wits , to make some shew whiles the battail is in tryal , whereby to encourage his own , and dishearten the enemy , because among those accidents which may give thee the victory , this is the most effectuall . Whereof wee alledge for testimony the example of Cneus Sulpitius the Roman Dictatour , who comming to fight a battell with the French , arm'd all the poor drudges and rascality of the Camp : and having mounted them upon Mules and poor Asses with armes and ensignes , to make them seem as if they were cavallry , he plac'd them behind a hill , and commanded that at a signall given , whiles he was in the hottest of the battel they should shew themselves to the enemy , which thing so ordered and done , put the French men in such a fright that they lost they day . And therefore a good Commander ought to do two things ; the one is , to try some of these inventions to startle the enemy : the other , to stand so prepard that the enemy offering any such to him , he may be able to discover and quite frustrate them , as did the Indian King to Semiramis ; who seeing , that King had a great number of Elephants , to affright him , and make him think shee had more her self than he , made a great many of them of Bulls and Bufaloes hides , and having put them upon Camells , sent them before : but that King finding out her deceit , turnd it upon her not only vain but hurtfull . Mammercus was sent Dictator against the Fidenates , who to affright the Roman Army , appointed that in the heat of the skirmish a good number of soldiers should sally forth of Fidenas with lights upon the top of their Lances , to the end that the Romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter , should fall into some disorder . Whereupon it is to be noted , that when such devices carry more truth than appearance with them , they may well be represented to the view of men , because that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely , their weakness cannot so quickly be discoverd : but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth , it is better either not to use them , or using them to keep them off at such a distance that a full discovery of them cannot suddenly be made , as was that trick of the Muleters Cn. Sulpitius practisd : for when there is nothing but weakness within them , as they are approached , they are quickly seen through , and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage , as those Elephants did to Semiramis , and the fires to the Fidenates ; which however that at first they a little troubled the Army , yet when the Dictatour came up to them , and began to cry out , That they might be ashamd to fly from the smoak like Bees , but that they should rather turn back their slames upon them , saying , Bnrne out these people of Fidenas with fire , whose rancorous spirits you could never asswage with all your courtesie . Thus that device of the Fidenates servd them to no purpose , and so they lost the fight . CHAP. XV. That the command of an Army ought to be given in charge only to one ; and where there are more , they alwaies erre . THe Fidenates having rebelld , and slain that Colony , which the Romans had sent to Fidenas , the Romans created four Tribuns with Consular power to exact satisfaction for this wrong done : whereof one being left for the safeguard of Rome , the rest were sent against the Fidenates , and the Vejentes , who because they were at variance one with another , brought back disgrace from the service , though no loss : of the disgrace they were the cause , but that they receivd no loss , the Soldiers valour was the cause . Whereupon the Romans seeing this disorder , had their recourse to the creation of a Dictator , to the end one alone should rectifie again , what three had disorderd . Whence we see the unprofitableness of many Commanders in one Army or Town , that is to defend it self : and T. Livius cannot more plainly express it , than in these words , here written ; Three Tribuns with Consular power taught us how unprofitable a thing it was , to have many Commanders in the warr ; for every one of them making severall parties , and each one thinking his own best , gave opportunity to the enemy . And however that this is example sufficient to prove the disorder which a plurality of Commanders causes in the war , yet will I alledge some other as well modern as ancient , for the better declaration of it . In the year 1500. after the reprisal of Milan by Lewes the twelfth of France , he sent his Army to Pisa , to restore it to the Florentines , whether John Baptista Ridolphi and Luke Antony of the Albizzi were sent Commissaries . And because Iohn Baptista was a man of credit and years , Luke left the whole government in every thing unto him . And if he did not discover his ambition in opposing him , yet he manifested it by his silence , and neglecting and scorning every thing that was orderd , so that he nothing furtherd the actions of the Campe neither in word nor in deed , as if he had been a man of no worth . But afterwards it appeared quite contrary , when upon an occasion following , Iohn Baptista was fain to returne to Florence ; Luke being left alone shewd his abilities , both by his courage , industry and counsell . All which things were in a manner quite lost in him , while he had a companion . I will anew produce in confirmation hereof T. Livius his words , who relating , how that Quintius and Agrippa his Collegue , being sent by the Romans against the Aequi , the whole disposing of the war was in Quintius his hands , and saies : In the managing of weighty affaires , it is the safest way to commit the main charge to one . Which is clean contrary , to what is now adaies practised by our Republicks and Princes : who use to send into those places , that they may the better order them , more Commissaries , and more Commanders than one , which causes much confusion : and if the occasion were inquired after , why the Italian and French Armies are now adaies ruined , we should find this had been the principall . And it may truly be concluded , that it is to more purpose to imploy one man alone of but ordinary judgement in such an expedition , then two very able men together with equall commission . CHAP. XVI . In times of difficulty and perill true worth and vertue is sought after , and in calme and quiet times , not mens vertues , but their wealth , friends , and parentage preferre them . IT was alwaies and ever will be , that great personages and the worthyest men , in peaceable times , are of small esteem : for because of envy , following the reputation which their vertue hath gained them , in such times there are many Citizens , that are ambitious , not only to bee their equals , but superiors ; and to this purpose there is a place in Thucydides the Greeke Historian , which serves very fitly , where he shewes that when the Athenian Republick came off victour in the Peloponnesian war , and had taken down the Spartanes pride , and in a manner subjected all Greece , the Athenians conceited so highly of themselves , as that they designed the conquest of Sicile also . This enterprise came to be disputed in Athens : Alcibiades and some other Citizens perswaded it , as they that little caring for the publick good , thought only upon the advancing their own particular reputations , each one of them having hopes to bee sent Commander in the imployment . But Nicias that was the principal among the best reputed of Athens , disswaded it : and the greatest reason he alledged in perswading the people to give credit to his words , was this , because while hee advised them thus that the warr should nor proceed , he perswaded them to that which was not for his advantage ; for while Athens was in peace , he knew , there were many Citizens would go before him ; but in time of war hee was sure none could go before , no nor come near him . Wee see therefore , that in Republicks there is this disorder , in times of peace to make small account of able men , which thing enrages them two several waies , the one to see their own degrees fayl them ; the other to see unworthy men , and of smaller abilities then themselves , made their companions or rather their superiors : which disorder in Republicks hath caused much destruction ; for those Citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised , and know that quiet times are the occasion thereof , devise all the wayes they can to disturbe them , suggesting inducements to new wars in prejudice of the Commonwealth . And devising what might be the remedies hereof , we find two ; the one to keep the Citizens alwaies poor , to the end that riches without vertue should not be able to corrupt neither those nor others : the other to be alwaies so ready for the war , as that they may be able continually to make war , & may have need alwaies of well reputed Citizens , as Rome did in her first beginnings ; for that City having alwaies some Armyes abroad , there was ever place left to mens vertues , nor could they bereave such a one of his dignity , that deserved it ; or confer it upon another not deserving it ; for in case that such a thing were done , some times upon mistake or for tryall , there quickly ensued such a disorder thereupon and a danger , that all returned presently into the right way . But these other Common-wealths , that are not so ordered as shee , and that then only make war when necessity constrains them , cannot free themselves of such an inconvenient , or rather they will alwaies incurr it , and there will ever some disorder be ready to arise , when that vertuous Citizen thus neglected is of a revengefull disposition , and hath in the City some good repute and correspondence ; and from this the City of Rome kept her self free a good while . Yet she ( after she had subdu'd Carthage and Antiochus , as we said otherwhere , being no more in doubt of the issue of her warrs ) thought she might give the Command of her Armies to whom she pleas'd , not so much regarding their vertues as their other qualities , ingratiating them with the people : for we see Paulus Emilius had several repulses in demanding the Consulate , before he was made Consul , till the Macedonian war chanc'd , which because it was thought dangerous , by general consent of the City was committed to him . In our City of Florence after the year 1494. many warrs following , one upon the neck of the other , and all the Citizens of Florence having made unlucky tryal of themselves , the City by chance lit upon one man who-shewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded , which was Antoni Giacomini : and whiles the warrs in hand were perillous , the other Citizens ambitions ceas'd ; and in the election of Commissary or Commander of their Armies , he had no competitor stood with him . But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was , but a great deal of honor and dignity , he found alwaies so many competitors , that they being to make election of there Commissaries to beleager Piza , he was left out of the number . And however it was not perceiv'd evidently , that evill would befall the State , because Antony was not sent thither , yet may we easily conjecture , because the Pisans having no means for further defence or sustenance , had Antony been sent thither , they would before that have been so straightly beset , that they should have surrendred themselves to the Florentines directions . But they being besieged by Commanders that understood not how to begirt , nor force them , were so long held in hand , that the City of Florence bought them , whereas they might have had them by force . It was likely that such a distaste with Antony might have done much , and he had need truly of much patience , and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon , either with the destruction of the City ( if he were able ) or with the wrong of any particular Citizen , where of a Republick ought to beware , as in the Chapter following we shall treate . CHAP. XVII . That he who hath receiv'd any notable disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Commonwealth , should never after be intrusted by them with any imployment or service of importance . A Commonwealth should be well advis'd , never to commit any weighty service to any one , to whom any notable injury hath been done . Claudius Nero ( who left his Army which he had lying in front against Hannibal , and with part thereof went into the Marches to find the other Consul , to combate Asdrubal , before he should joyn with Hannibal ) had formerly in Spain been incamp'd against Asdrubal , and having shut him up in a place with his Army , so that Asdrubal , was either to fight at disadvantage , or perish by famin , was cunningly by Asdrubal so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement , that hee scap'd him , and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him . Which thing being known at Rome , got him great discredit as well with the Senate as the people , and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the City , to his great disreputation and despight thereat too : but being afterwards made Consul , and sent against Hannibal , took the course we have said , which was a very dangerous one , so that Rome was amazed and in tumults , till news arived of Asdrubals defeat , and Claudius being afterwards asked on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course , where without an extream necessity he had hazarded the liberty of Rome , answer'd that he had done it , because if it prov'd lucky , he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in Spain : and if it fayl'd him , and this course fell out cross , he knew he should be reveng'd of that City and those Citizens , who had unthankfully and undiscreetly wrong'd him . And when these passions , arising from such offences , are of such force in a Citizen of Rome , and in those dayes before corruption was crept into Rome , we may well ghesse how powerfull they are in a Citizen of such a City that is not so regulated nor order'd as she then was : and because to such like disorders which grow up in Common-wealths , no certain remedy can be assign'd , there followes an impossibility to frame a perpetual Commonwealth for by many unexpected waies desiruction breaks in upon it . CHAP. XVIII . There is nothing more worthy of a Commander , than to be able to discover before ha●d , and espye out the enemies practises . EPaminondas the Theban said , that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a Commander , than to know the enemies designes and purposes ; and because it is hard to attaine to that knowledge . ●he deserves the greater commendations , who takes such a course that he ghesses it out . And it is not so hard to discover the enemies purposes as some times to understand his actions , and not so much his actions , which by him are done a far off , as those present and near hand : for it hath many times chanc'd , that a fight having continued til night , he hath vanquished that thinks he hath lo● , and he lost that thought he had overcome ; which error hath caus'd some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good , as it befell Brutus and Cassius , who upon this mistake lost their war ; for Brutus having overcome on his wing , Cassius beleev'd he had lost , that the whole Army was broken , and upon this error despairing of his own safety , slew himself . In our daies in the battell at Saint Cecily in Lombardy that Francis the King of France sought with the Swissers , the night overtaking them , that part of the Swissers , which remained entire , thought they had got the victory , knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain . Which error was the occasion that they themselves escap'd not , staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage : such like error also caused to mistake , and well near ruined thereby the Popes & the Spanish Army , which upon this false advice of victory passed the Po , and had it gone never so little on for warder , had been prisoner to the French , who were the Conquerors . The like error to this happened in the Romans Campe , and in that also of the Equi , where Sempronius the Consul was with the Army to enconnter the enemy , and the battell being joyned , the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side : and night being come , each Army being halfe broken , neither of them returned to their quarters , but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoyning hills , where they thought they might bē more secure , and the Roman Army divided itself into two parts , whereof the one went with the Consul , the other with one Tempanius a Centurion , whose valor that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed ; the morning being come , the Roman Consul , without hearing further of the enemy , retired towards Rome , and the like did the Equies Armie , because each of these thought the enemy had been victour , and therefore they each withdrew themselves , without any regard that they left their Campes in prey to the Enemy . It fell out that Tempanius who was there with the remainder of the Roman Army , retiring too , learned by certain wounded soldiers of the Equi , that their Captaines were gone and had abandoned their quarters , upon which news he went into the Roman quarters and saved them , but sacked those of the Equi , and so returned victorious to Rome : which victory ( as wee see ) consists only in , who hath notice of the enemies disorder . Where we should consider , that it may often come to pass , that the two Armies which are in front one against another , may be both in the like disorder , and suffer the same wants , and that after remaines vanquisher that first comes to knowledge of the others necessities . And hereof I will give a domestick and moderne example . In the year one thousand four-hundred ninty eight , when the Florentines had a great Army about Pisa , and beleaguerd the Town very strongly , whereof the Venetians having undetaken the protection , and notseeing any otherway to save it , resolved to divert the war , by assayling the territories of Florence on the other side ; wherefore with a strong Army they entred by the vally of Lamona , and seised upon the Village of Marradi , and besieged the Fortress of Castiglione which is upon the hill above : Which the Florentines perceiving , resolved to succour Marradi , and yet not lessen their forces which they had about Pisa ; so that having levied new foot , and appointed new horse , they sent them that way , whose Commanders were Jacobus Quartus of Appian , Lord of Piombin , and Count Rinuccius of Marcian . These then being come to the hills above Marradi , the enemies lest beleaguering Marradi , and betook themselves to the Village ; where these two Armies being infront one against the other for some daies , both suffered much for the scarcity of provisions . and other necessaries ; and neither daring to set upon the other , nor either knowing the others wants , both at once resolved over night to raise their Campes the morning following , and retire , the Venetian toward Berzighella and Faenza , the other toward Casaglia and Mugello . the morning then come , and each Campe having begun to send away their carriages , by chance a woman parted from the Bourg of Marradi , and came towards the Florentine Campe , being secure enough from wrong , because of her old age , and poverty , desirous belike to see some of her friends in that Campe , by whom the Florentine Captains understanding of the Venetian Camps departure , upon this news grew a little more couragious , and having changed their purpose , as if they had dislodged their enemies , went out , and took their quarters , and writ to Florence , they had repulsed and vanquished them . Which victory proceeded from nothing else , than from having first had notice of their enemies departure : which notice had it been given on the other side , would have wrought the same effect against ours . CHAP. XIX . Whether in the government of a multitude , mildness or severity be of greater availe . THe Commonwealth of Rome was in a combustion , because of the differences between the Nobles and the Commons : nevertheless as occasion of wars was offered them , they sent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius : Appius because he was cruell and rough in commanding , was ill obeyed by those that followed him , so that almost quite broken he fled from his charge . Quintius by using a mild and gentle behaviour towards his soldiers , found them very obedient , and returned with victory . Whereupon it seems , that to governe a multitude , it is better to be courteous then insolent , compassionate rather then cruel . Notwithstanding Cornelius Tacitus with whom many other writers agree , in a saying of his , concludes the contrary , where he saies , To rule a multitude , severity is of more force then mildness . And devising with my self how each of these opinions may be made good , I say either thou art to governe men that ordinarily are thy companions , or that are alwaies in subjection to thee . When they are thy companions , severity or rigour cannot fully be us'd against them according as Cornelius argues : and because the common people of Rome had equal power in the Roman government with the Nobility , he that became Prince among them for a time , could not rule them with roughness and rigor . And many time it was evident , that the Roman Commanders did more good that got the good wills of their soldiers , and held but a gentle hand over them , then those that by rough handling kept them in a slavish aw of them , unless they were accompani'd with extraordinary endowments , as was Manlius Tarquatus . But he that commands over subjects ( whereof Cornelius discourses ) to the end they grow not insolent , and by reason of thy two great mildness tread thee not under foot , ought rather betake himself to rigor then gentleness . But this a so is not to exceed moderation , for fear of incurring hatred : for it never turns to any Princes advantage to gain the peoples hate . The way to avoid it is , to lay no hands on the subjects estates : for of blood ( when rapine is not the covert cause there ) no Prince is thirsty , unless forc'd thereto , which seldome he is : but where rapine is mixt , this necessity comes alwaies upon them , nor ever want they occasion , nor desire to shed blood , as in another treaty to this purpose is discours'd at large . Quintius was more praise worthy then Appius ; and yet the saying of Cornelius limited as it ought to be , but not in the case observ'd by Appius , deserves approbation . And because we have spoken of severity and mildness , methinks it is not more then needs to shew , how one action of humanity was of more force with the Falisci , then many violent acts of hostility . CHAP. XX. One example of humanity prevail'd more with the Falisci , then all the force of Rome could . CAmillus with the Army being set down before the Faliscies Town , and besieging it , a Pedagogue that taught the children of the cheifest men of the City , thinking to gratify Camillus and the people of Rome , under colour of exercise going forth with them out of the Town , brought them all into the Campe before Camillus : where having presented them he said , that by means of them the Town would forth with be deliver'd into his hands . Which present was not only not accepted by ●amillus , but having caus'd the Pedagogue to be strip'd , and his hands bound behind him , and given to each one of those children a rod in his hand , caus'd him to be whip'd back again by them with many stripes into the Town . Which when they of the Town understood , Camillus his humanity and integrity so much pleasd them , that not desiring longer to defend themselves , they resolv'd to render up the Town to him . Where it is to be considered by this true example , how much more a curteous and charitable act works in mens minds then any one full of cruelty and violence ; and how that many times those countries and cities ; that no weapons , nor warlick instruments , nor any other force of man hath been able to open , one action of humanity , piety , chastity , or liberality hath laid wide open . Whereof in stories ( besides this ) we have many other examples . And we all see that the Romans by war were not of power to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy ; and yet Fabritius his Frankeness sent him out , when he discover'd to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the Romans to poison him . We see also , that the conquest of new Carthage got not Scipio Affricanus so much credit in Spaine , as the example he gave of his chastity , when he restored a young woman he took , which was exceeding beautifull , untoucheed by him to her husband . The fame of which action got him friendship throughout all Spaine . We see moreover how much these vertues are by the people wished for in great men , and how much commended by writers , both by those that set forth Princes lives , and those also that give instructions how they ought to live . Among whom Zenophon takes much painesin shewing what honours , how great conquests , and how exceeding good reputation Cyrus gained by his humanity and affability , and by abstaining from all actions of pride , cruelty , luxury , and other vices , which blemish men lives . Yet notwithstanding , seeing Hannibal by courses contrary to these , gained great fame , and great victories , I purpose to discourse thereupon in the Chapter following , from whence this proceeded . CHAP. XXI . From whence it came , that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes , wrought the same effects in Italy , which the other did in Spaine . I Think , that some men could well marvaile , seeing certain Commanders ( notwithstanding that they have led a contrary course of life ) bring to effect the like things , which they have done that lived in the manner above written : so that it appears , that the cause of these victories depends not upon the aforesaid reasons ; and it seems that those waies gain thee neither more force nor better fortune , being that glory and reputation may be gotten by contrary courses . And not to part from the men I have above written of , and the better to clear what I propounded , I say , as we see Scipio enter into Spain , and by his humanity and mildness gain the friendship of that whole country , and for them be adored and admired of those nations : on the contrary side wee see Hannibal enter into Italy , using all contrary waies , which is , by violence , cruelty and rapine , and all manner of infidelity , worke the same effect that Scipio did in Spain : for to Hannibal all the Towns in Italy rebelled , and all the people ran after him . And considering whence this may arise , we see therein many reasous : the first is , that men are desirous of new matters , insomuch as very often times as well they that live at case , as they who do not , desire novelty : for ( as we said otherwhere , and it is true ) men are as well glutted with good , as afflicted and vexed with evill . This desire therefore opens the gates wide to every one , that in any Country makes himself the cheif of any innovation . And be he a stranger , they run after him ; if of the Country , they come all about him , they strengthen and favour him , so that in what sort soever it be he proceeds , he comes to advance exceedingly in those places . Besides this , men are thrust forward by two principal things , either by love or feare , so that he as well commands them that makes himself beloved , as he that causes himself to be feared ; and most commonly he is more followed and obeyed that makes himself be feared , then he that makes himself beloved . Therefore it little imports a Commander by which of these wayes he goes , provided that he be a Worthy man , and that worth causes him to be of great repute among men : for when that worth is great as it was in Hannibal and Scipio , it cancells all the errors they commit , either by the great love they beare them , or the great feare they stand in of them . For from the one and the other of these two waies great inconveniences may arise , of force to ruine a Prince : for he that desires to be too much belov'd , any little that he swerves from the true way , becomes contemptible . And that other who would be too much feared , when he a little exceeds the mean , growes odious ; and to keep the middle way it is not possible : for our nature will not comport it . But it is necessary to allay these things , that exceed , with an extraordinary worth , as Ha nibal and Scpio both did : yet it appeard that the one and the other of them were endamag'd by their manner of life , for which they were esteem'd and valu'd . The valuation of both of them we have already spoke of : the damage as for Scipio , was that his own Soldiers in Spain together with some of his friends mutined against him , which proceeded from nothing else than because they feard him not : for men are so unsetled that upon the least overture made to their ambition , they forth with forget all the good will they owe their Prince for his mildness and courtesie , as did the aforesaid Soldiers and friends , in so much as Scipio , to remedie this inconvenient , was constraind to practise that cruelty in some part , which he had abhor'd . As for Hannibal , we have no particular example , where the cruelty he us'd , or his small faith did him any harm . But we may well conceive , that Naples and many other Townes that continued in obedience to the Romans , did it for fear thereof . This we see plainly , that his wicked manner of living , made him more odious to the people of Rome , than any other enemy that Commonwealth ever had : so that , whereas to Pyrrhus ( while he was with his Armie in Italy ) they discoverd the party that intended to poyson him , they never forgave it Hannibal ( though disarm'd and banish'd ) till they had made an end of him . These incommodities then accru'd to Hannibal for being held impious , a breaker of his faith , and cruel : but on the other side , he thereby got one very great advantage , which is much admired by all Writers , that in his army ( though composed of several Nations ) there never arose any mutiny , neither among themselves , nor against him . Which we caunot derive from any other cause than from the terror that grew from his person , which was so great , mixt with the reputation he gave of his valor , that it kept his Soldiers in quietness and concord . I conclude then , that it imports not much , in which of these two waies a Commander proceeds , provided he hath so great worth in him , as may well season the one and the other manner of living : for ( as it is said ) both in the one and the other there is defect and danger , when it is not corrected by some extraordinary endowments . And if Hannibal and Scipio , the one by commendable means , and the other by detestable courses , wrought the same effect , me thinks I should not forbear to discourse also of two Roman Citizens , who by several wayes , but both honorable , attaind one and the same glory . CHAP , XXII . How Manlius Torquatus his rigor , and Valereus Corvinus his mildness , gaind each of them the same glory . AT the same time there were in Rome two famous Captaines , Monlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus : who both of equal vertue , had a like triumph'd , and liv'd in equal credit & reputation in Rome ; & each of them ( touching the enemy ) had with equal valor gained it ; but as for the Armyes , and treating of their Soldiers , they proceeded exceeding differently : for Manlius with all kind of severity commanded them , without intermitting his Soldiers pains or punishments . Valerius on the other part in all kinds and termes of courtefie treated them with a familiar way of affability ; for it appears , that the one to keep his Soldiers in obedience put his own son to death , and the other never hurt any . Yet in such a differency of proceeding , each produc'd the same fruit , as well to the enemies loss , as the Commonwealths profit , and his own particular ; for never any Soldier refus'd the fight or mutini'd against them , or in any part disagreed from their wills , however that Manlius his commands were so rigorous , that all other kinds of commands , which exceeded measure in everity , were termed Manlian commands . Where we are first to consider , whence it was that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly : the next is , what was the cause that these two different waies brought forth the same effect : and in the last place , which is the better of the two , and more profitable to imitate . If any man consider well Manlius his disposition , from the time that T. Livius begins to make mention of him , he shall find him , a very valiant man , religiously loving his Father and his Countrey , and exceedingly reverencing his Superiors . These things we gather from the slaughter of the Frenchmen , from the defence of his Father against the Tribune , and in that before he went to fight with the Frenchmen , he went to the Consul , with these words , Without thy allowance , I will never fight with the enemy ; no though I were assured of victory . When a man then so dispos'd attains to such dignity as to command , he desires to find all other men like himself , and his strong courage moves him to command strong and stout things : and the same ( when once they are commanded ) will likewise that they be observed ; and the rule is most certain , that when rigid and hard things are commanded , it is fit with rigour to see them observd ; otherwise wouldst thou find thy self much deciv'd . Where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed , it is necessary he know how to command ; and they know how to command , that make a comparison between their own quality , and theirs that are to obey ; and when they see a proportion , then let them command ; but when a disproportion , let them forbeare . And therefore a wise man said , that to hold a Common-wealth by violence and force , it was needfull there were a proportion between the person forcing , and the party forced : and whenever that proportion was , there it was credible that that violence would last : but when the party forced was of more force than the person forcing , it might be doubted that violence would every day fail . But returning to our discourse . I say , that to command stout and strong things it is necessary to be stout too : and he that is of this stoutness , and commands such things , can never by mildness cause them to be observ'd : but he that hath not this strength of courage , ought beware of these extraordinary commands , and in those ordinary he may well use his own humanity : for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince , but to the lawes and customes . We ought then to be-believe , that Manlius was forced to proceed so roughly , by his own extraordinary commands , whereunto his own nature was inclinable , which are very useful in a Commonwealth , because they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigor . And if a Republike were so fortunate , that she often had ( as we have formerly said ) some one by his example to renew and revive the Laws , and not retain them onely from running to ruine , but draw them quite back to their beginnings , she might be perpetual . So that Manlius was one of those , who by the rigor of his commands maintained the military discipline in Rome , drawn thereunto first by his own nature , afterwards from a desire which he had that that should be observed , which his natural inclination had made him ordain . On the other side Valerius might as he pleased proceed with curtesie , as he , whom it sufficed , that the accustomed orders were observed in the Romane Armies : which custome ( because it was good ) was enough to honor him , and yet not painful to observe ; nor did it force Valerius to punish the offenders , as well because it may be there were none , as for that if there had been any , they imputed ( as it is said ) their punishments to the wonted orders and customes , and not to the Princes cruelty . So that Valerius had power to cause all humanity and mildness to fl●w from himself , whereby he might easily gain his souldiers good wills . Whereupon it came to pass that the one or the other having the same obedience , were able , though proceeding diversly , to work the same effect . They that would follow these , may chance to fall into those vices of contempt and hatred , as I said in my discourse before of Hanaibal and Scipio , which is avoided by an excessive worth in thee , and not otherwise . It remains now that we consider which of these ways of proceeding is the more commendable : which I take to be a matter disputable , because as well the one as other is much prais'd by writers . Yet they that write how a Prince should rule his subjects , come nearer to Valerius then Manlius . And Xenophon , alledged formerly by me , giving many examples of Cyrus his humanity , accords much with that which T. Livius says of Valerius : for being made Consul against the Samnites , & the day come he was to fight , he spake to his souldiers with that affability and familiarity , with which he used to behave himself towards them and after such speaking , T. Livius saies these words ; There was never any Captain more familiar with his souldiers , among the meanest of them , freely undergoing all services : besides in military exercises , whereas the soldiers use to contend with their equals either in swiftness or strength , he himself without change of countenance as graciously and easily lost as won , nor scorned he any one that offered himself to match him ; liberal he was , and affable , no less mindful of other mens liberties then of his own dignity ; and which is the greatest point of popularity , the same course he took to attain to his magistracy , the same he followed in executing it . In like manner T. Livius speaks honorably of Manlius , shewing that his severity in putting his son to death , made the Army so obedient to the Consul , that it was a cause the Romans gain'd the victory of the Latines : and he proceeds so far in commending him , that after this victory , having set down all the order of the battel , and shewed all the dangers which the people of Rome ran , and the difficulties there were to overcome , he concludes thus , that onely Manlius his valour gave the Romans that victory . And comparing the forces of the two Armies together , affirms , that that side would have overcome , which soever had had Manlius for their Consul . So that considering all that writers speak hereof , it would be hard to give a good judgement hereupon . Nevertheless , not to leave this part undecided , I say , that in a Citizen living under the laws of a Republike , it is more laudable and less dangerous to proceed as Manlius did ; for that way is wholly in favour of the publike , and no whit regards private ambition ; for by such a course a man cannot gain any partisans , shewing himself rigid to every one , favoring onely the common good : for no man behaving himself thus , can get any particular friends , which we term ( as it was said before ) Partisan . In so much that a like manner of proceeding cannot be more profitable nor more approved in a Republike : the publike advantage nothing failing in it , and being impossible to give thereby any jealousie of private ambition . But in the course Valerius tooke it is contrary ; for , however that in regard of the publike , the same effects are produc'd , yet there arise many doubts , by reason of the particular good will , which this man gaines of his soldiers , which in a long continuance of government might much wrong the common liberty . And if in publike there grew no mischief hereupon , the reason was , because the Romans minds as yet were not corrupted , nor he long continued in his command . But if we are to consider a Prince as Xenophon does , we must wholly take to Valerius , and leave Manlius : for a Prince ought in his soldiers and subjects aim at love and obedience : that he maintains the old orders , and is esteemed vertuous , will yeeld him obedience : and love his affability , humanity , his pity and those other indowments Valerius had , which Xenophon also writes were in Cyrus : for to be a Prince well-willed in particular , and to have his whole Army as particularly affected to him , agrees well with all other parts of his state . But in a Citizen , having an Army so to take part with him , this part agrees not with the rest , which are to oblige him to live under the Laws , and obey the Magistrates . We read among the ancient stories of the Venetian Republike , how that the Galleys of Venice being returned home , and a difference arising between them of the Gallies and the people , whereby an uprear and tumult was raised , nor could the matter be quieted by force of officers , reverence of Citizens , nor fear of the principal Magistrates , of a sudden when Peter Loredanus shewed himself to those Mariners , who the year before had been their Commander , for love of him they departed and left the fight . Which obedience . begot such a suspition in the Senate , that a little while after the Venerians either by im●prisonment or death assured themselves o , him . I conclude therefore that Valerius his manner of proceeding is profitable in a Prince , and hurtful in a Citizen , not onely to his country , but to himself : to his country , because those courses prepare a way to tyranny : to himself ; for when his country is suspicious of his proceedings , it is constrained to make sure of him with his damage . So on the contrary I affirm that Manlins his proceeding in a Prince is hurtful , and in a citizen profitable , and especially to the country , and also seldom offends , if now this hatred which thy severity draws after it , be not increased by suspicion which by means of thy great reputation thy other vertues charge thee with , as by and by shall be discoursed touching Camillus . CHAP. XXIII . For what cause Camillus was banished from Rome . WE have formerly concluded that by proceeding as Valerius did , a man hurts both his country and himself . And by proceeding as Manlius did , a man advantages his country , and sometimes hurts himself . Which is sufficiently proved by the example of Camillus , who in his manner of proceeding came nearer to Manlius then Valerius . Whereupon Titus Livius speaking of him , says , His vertue the souldiers hated , and yet admired . That which caused the admiration of him , was his carefulness , his wisdom , the magnanimity of his spirit , and the good order in imploying and commanding his Armies . That which got him hatred , was , that he was more fevere in chastising then liberal in rewarding them . And Titus Livius alledges these occasions of this hatred . The first was , that the monies which were made of the sale of the Veientes goods , he brought all into the treasury , and divided not together with the spoile among the soldiers . The second , that in his triumph he made his triumphal Chariot be drawn with four white horses , where they said that in his pride he strove to equal the Sun. The third , that he made a vow to give Apollo the tenth part of the prey taken from the Veientes , which ( he desiring to pay his vow ) was to be taken out of the soldiers hands , who already had got possession of it . Where those things are very easily marked , that make a Prince odious with his people . Of which the principal is , to bereave them of any profit , which is a matter of much importance : for the things that carry any profit with them , when a man is deprived thereof , he never forge●s , and every little necessity puts thee in mind of them ; and because necessities haunt us every day , thou remembrest these things every day : the other thing is to appear lofty and puft up with pride , then which nothing is more odious to the people , especially those that enjoy their liberty . And however that from that pride and stat●liness of theirs the people receive no hur●●ye do they always hare them that use it : whereof a Prince ought to beware , as of a rock ; for to procure hatred without advantage , is but a rash and foolish course . CHAP. XXIV . The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom . IF we consider well the proceedings of the Roman Republike , we shall see that two things were the cause of that Republikes dissolution : the one was contentions which grew upon the Agrarian law ; the other was the continuation of governments . Which things had they been well seen into in the beginning , and due remedies applied thereto , their free state would have lasted longer , and probably have been less turbulent . And however , that as for the prolonging of any charge we see not that in Rome any tumult was raised , yet in effect we see how much that authority hurt the City , which the Citizens took upon them by such decrees . And if the other Citizens , whose magistracies were prorogued , had been wise and vertuous , as L. Quintius , this inconvenient would never have fallen out , whose goodness in one example is remarkable : for there being an agreement made between the Commons and the Senate , and the Commons having prolonged the Tribunes charges for one year , judging them able to resist the Nobilities ambition , the Senate would for strife sake , with the Commons , and not to seem of less power then they , prologue T. Quintius his Consulship : who absolutely denyed this determination of theirs , saying , that they should endeavor to blot out and cancell evil examples , rather then increase their number with another evil one ; and so would needs have them make new Consuls . Which goodness and wisdom had it been in all the Cities of Rome , it would never have suffered the introducing of that custome , to prolong magistracies : and from thence they would not have proceeded to the continuation of Commands over Armies , which thing at length ruined that Republike . The first who had his command continued to him , was P. Philo , who being incamped before the City of Palepolis , and his Consulship coming to an end , the Senate thinking he had need upon gotten the victory , sent him no successor , but made him Proconsul , so that he was the first Proconsul . Which thing ( though propounded by the Senate for the publike good ) was that which in time brought Rome into bondage : for the further abroad the Romans went with their Armies , the more thought they such prorogation necessary ; and the more they used it ; which thing produced two inconveniences ; the one that a smaller number of men were imployed and practised in commands : and by this the reputation hereof came to be restrained to a few : the other was , that one Citizen continuing long time commander of an Army , got it to himself , and made it of his own faction . For that Army in time forgot the Senate , and took him only for their head . Hereby it came that Sylla and Marius could finde soldiers that would take their parts against the Publike . By these means could Caesar make himself Lord of his native country . Yet if the Romans had not prolonged these magistracies and commands , they had never so quickly attained so great power : and had their conquests been more slow , they would not so soon have faln into servitude . CHAP. XXV . Of Cincinnatus and many other Roman Citizens poverties . WEE have otherwhere discoursed , that the most profitable ordinance that can be made in a free State , is , that the Citizens be kept bare and poore . And however in Rome it appears not what order that was which wrought this effect ( especially considering the Agrarian law had such opposition ) never theless it was seen by experience , that four hundred years after Rome was built , there was very great poverty : nor is it credible , that other greater order produc'd this effect , than to see , that poverty was no bar to any preferment whatsoever , or any honor , and that they went to find out vertue in what cottage soever she dwelt . Which manner of living made people less covet wealth . This appears plain , because when Minutius the Consul besieged with his Army by the Equi , Rome was exceedingly afraid , least that Army should be lost , so that they created a Dictator , being the last recourse they had in their difficulties , and this was L. Quintius Cincinnatus , who at that time was in his little Country farm , which he then manured with his own hands . Which thing is celebrated by T. Livius in golden words , saying : It is worth the while , to bear them talke , that value nothing in regard of wealth : nor think they a man can have access either unto honours or vertue , but where riches flow abundantly . Cincinnatus was then at plough in his Country Village , which exceeded not the quantity of four acres of ground , when from Rome Deputies were sent him by the Senate to let him know the election of his Dictatourship , and to shew him in what danger the Commonwealth then was . Hee then having taken to him his gown , came to Rome , and levied an Army , and went thence and deliverd Minutius ; and having broken and despolyed the enemies , and set him free , would not permit that the besieged Army should partake of the prey , saying these words , I will not allow thou shouldst partake of th●● prey , whose prey thou wert to have been : And deprived Minutius of the Consulship , and made him Lieutenant , telling him , Thou shalt stay at this degree , till thou knowest how to be Consul . He had made L. Tarquinius General of his horse , who out of meer poverty served afoot . It is observable ( as is said ) what honour they did unto poverty , and how that to a good and worthy man four acres of land were sufficient to maintain him . Which poverty we see that it was also in the dayes of Marcus Regulus : for being with the Armies in Affrica , he asked the Senate leave , he might turne to his Country farme , which was spoyled by his husbandmen . Where wee see two very notable things , thè one the poverty , and how they were conten●cd therewith , and how it sufficed these Citizens to gain honour from the wars , & the profits thereof they left to the publick : for if they had purposed to grow rich by the wars , it would little have troubled them , that their fields were spoyled . The other is to consider the generous rage of those Citizens , who when they were made Commanders of an Army , exceeded any Prince in magnanimity of spirit , they valued neither Kings nor Commonwealths , nothing affrighted or terrified them ; and afterwards when they were returned to live private men , became parsimonious , humble , and men that themselves husbanded and took pains in manuting their own small possessions , obedient to the Magistrates , reverencing their superiors , so that it seems impossible that the same mind could endure such change . This poverty continued yet till the days of Paulus Emilius , which were in a manner the last happy daies of that Republick , where a Citizen who by his triumph enrich'd Rome , notwithstanding kept himself very poor . And moreover , so much was poverty in esteem , that Paulus for reward of behaving himself bravely in the war , gave a silver cup to a son-in-law of his ; which was the first peece of Plate he ever had in his house . It were easy with a long discourse to shew , how much better fruits poverty produces than riches ; and that the one hath honored Cities , Countries , and Religions ; and the other hath been the destruction thereof , had not this subject been handled several times by other writers . CHAP. XXVI . How that upon the occasion of women , States have been ruined . THere fell out in the City of Ardea between the Nobles and the Commons a debate by reason of an alliance : where a young woman that was an heire being as yet to marry , one of the Commons and one of the Nobles woed her at the same time , and she having no Father alive , her Tutors desired to bestow her on the Plebeyan , and her Mother on the Nobleman : whereupon such a tumult was rais'd , that they came to blowes , where the Nobility was in armes in favour of the Nobleman , and the Commons in favour of the Plebeyan , so that the Commons having the worse , went out of Ardea , and sent for ayd to the Volsci , and the Nobles sent to Rome . The Volsci were there first , and as soon as they arrived they sat down before Ardea . The Romans came afterwards upon them , and inclosed the Volsci between the Town and them , so that they forc'd them ( brought to it by famine ) to yeeld to their discretion . And the Romans entring into Ardea , and putting to death the principals of the sedition , accorded all the matters of that City . In this text are many things to be observed . First we see , that women have been the occasions of many destructions , and have brought great mischiefes upon the Governors of Cities , and have caused many dissentions in them . And ( as it hath been already seen in this our Story ) that excess committed against Lucretia lost the Tarquins their State. That other act against Virginia deprived the ten of their power . And Aristotle among the principal occasions hee shewes of Tyrants destructions , reckons the injuries they did some others for their women in deflowring and ravishing them , or defiling their marriage beds ; as touching this part , in the Chapter where we treated of Conspiracies , we spoke at large . I say then , that absolute Princes , and Governors of Commonwealths are to take no smaller care hereof , but ought well consider the disorders , which may grow upon such an accident , and remedy it in time , so that the remedy be neither with the hurt , nor disgrace of their state , or Commonwealth , as it befell the Ardeates , who for having suffered that difference to increase among Citizens , came to take part with their several tactions : and when they would have reunited themselves , were forc'd to send for forrain ayds , which is the beginning of a servitude at hand . But let us come to the other remarkeable thing of the manner of reuniting Cities , whereof in the Chapter following we mean to treate . CHAP. XXVII . How a City at discord in it self is to be united ; and how that opinion is not true , that to maintain Cities in obedience , it is necessary to keep them in discord , and divided into factions . BY the example of the Roman Consuls , who made a reconciliation among the Ardeates , the way is shewed how , matters are to be composed in a City at variance ; which is no other , nor can otherwaies be held , then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of seditions : for of necessity one of these three waies is to be goneeither to put them to death , as they did , or remove them out of the City , or cause them to make peace one with another , with assurance given not to wrong either the other . Of these three waies this last is the most pernicious , less certain , and most unprofitable : for it is unpossible , where much blood hath been shed , and other like outrages , that a peace made by force should continue , looking one another in the face every day : and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another , being there may every day be given amongst them by reason of their dayly conversation new occasions of quarrels . Whereupon a better example cannot be alledged then the City of Pistoya . That City was divided ( as still it is ) fifteen years agoe , into the Panciatichi , and the Cancellieri : but then were they in armes , now they have laid them aside . And after many brabbles among them , they came at length to the shedding of blood , to demolishing of houses , and pillaging of goods , and to all other termes of hostilitie . And the Florentines that were to reconcile them , alwaies took that third course : and thereupon alwaies arose greater tumults and greater scandals : So that weary hereof , they came to take that secoud course , to remove the heads of the factions , some of which they put in prison , others they confined in several places : in so much as the agreement was able to continue , and so hath done till this present day ; but without doubt the safest way had been the first . But because such like executions have some thing in them of greatness of spirit and magnanimity , a feeble Republick knows not how to put them in practise , but is so far there from , that hardly arrives she to use the second remedy . And these are some of those errors , of which I spake in the beginning , that the Princes of our times commit , being to give their judgements in matters of weight : for they should have a mind to se , how they have carried themselves , who of old have deliverd their opinions in like cases . But the weakness of men now a daies , caused by their weak education , and their little knowledge of things makes them esteem those opinions of the ancients partly in human , partly impossible . Whereas they have certain of their moderne opinions , quite contrary to the truth , as is that , where the wise man of our City a while agoe said , it was neeedfull to hold Pistoia by factions ; and Pisa with Cittadells : nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of these things is . I will pass over the Cittadels , because formerly wee spake of them at large , & now discourse of the incommodity that arises from holding the Towns thou hast under thy government , divided into factions . And touching the former , it is impossible thou canst maintain both those ancient factions , Prince or Republick thou art that governst them : for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided , and to be pleased more with this than with that ; so that the having a faction in that Town discontented with thee , is a cause that the first war that comes , thou losest it : for it is impossible to guard a City , that hath enemies without dors , & within dores . If it be a Republick that governes this City , there is no readier way to make thy Subjects become nought , and to set thy City at variance , than by having in thy dominions a Town thus at odds ; for each faction seeks favour , and each part strives to gain friends by all manner of corruption , so that two very great inconveniences arise thereupon : the one is , that thou canst never make them thy friends , because thou canst not well govern them , the rule ofttimes varying , sometimes with the one humor , sometimes with the other : the other is , that that favouring of sides must needs divide thy Republick . And Blondus speaking of the Florentines , and the Pistoyeses , tells us certainly , that while the Florentines thought to reconcile those of Pistoya , they divided themselves . Whereupon wee may easily perceive the evill which grows upon this division . In the yeare 1501. when Aretium was lost , and the whole vale of Tiber , and that of Chiana was taken by the Vitelli and the Duke Valentine , there came a Gentleman call'd de Lant , sent by the King of France , to cause a restitution of all those Towns lost to the Florentines again : and this de Lant finding in every one of those Fortresses men , who when they came to visit him , told him they were of the faction of Marzocco , he much blamd their division , saying that if in France one of the Kings Subjects should say hee were of the Kings party , he would be punished : because such a speech could signifie no less , than that there in the Country were people enemies to the King , whereas that King will that all those Towns be his friends , united in themselves , and without factions . But all these waies , & opinions disserting from the truth , arise from the weakness of those that are Princes , who seeing they are not able to hold their States by force and valour , betake themselves to such like devices , which sometimes when things are in quietness helpe somewhat ; but if they come to any distress , and that they have warrs , they quickly shew them what little trust thereis to be had in them . CHAP. XXVIII . That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed : for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds are laid the foundations of a Tyranny . THe City of Rome being much oppressed by famine , and the publick provisions unsufficient to ease it , one Spurius Melius had a mind , being very rich in those times , out of his private estate to make provision of Gorn , and feed the common people to their content . Whereupon the people flocked so thick about him in favour of him , that the Senate perceiving the inconvenient that grew upon this his liberality , to suppress it before it took better hold , created a Dictatour , and set him on his back , who put him to death . Here is to be noted , that many times those works which seem to be done upon charity and piety , and no way with reason to be condemn'd , prove very pernicious and dangerous , when they are not looked to in good time . And to argue this matter more particularly , I say that a Republick cannot subsist , nor in , any case be well govern'd without Citizens of good credit and reputation . On the other side the Citizens reputation , is the occasion of Tyranny in a Commonwealth . And if we will regulate this matter , it must so be order'd , that the Citizens stand upon such manner of reputation , as may advantage and not endammage the City , nor the liberty thereof . And therefore the means are to be examin'd , whereby they gain reputation , which in effect are two , either publick or private . The publick means are , when one by advising well , and doing better for the publick benefit , gains reputation . To this honour the way should be set open to the Citizens , and rewards given , as well for good advices , as good actions , so that they are therefore both to be honoured and satisfied : for when these reputations are gotten by these plain and honest courses , they will never prove dangerous . But when they are gain'd by particular waies ( which is the other means by us alleadged before ) they are very dangerous and hurtfull . The private waies are the benefiting this and that other particular , lending monies , matching with their daughters , protecting them against the magistrates , and doing them such other like favours , which make men become factions , and encourage him that is thus favour'd by them , to think he may be able to corrupt the publick , & violate the laws . Therefore ought a Republick that is well ordered , give easy access to those that seek favour by publick means , but bar out those that work by their own private by waies , as Rome did , we see . For in reward of him that did the publick goood service , she ordain'd their triumphs and all those other honors , which she bestowed on her Citizens : and to punish those , who under diverse colours aspired to greatness by private waies , she appointed the publick accusations : and when these would not serve , because the people was blinded with the shew of a false good , she created a Dictator , who by a Kinglike power should reduce those into their rankes again that were broken out , as she did to punish Spurius Melius . And when one of these things is left unpunished , it is of force to ruine a Republick ; for hardly upon such an example may she afterwards be brought into the right way again . CHAP. XXIX . That the peoples faults grow first from their Princes . PRinces have no reason to complain of any fault , which the people that is under their governments do commit : for their faults must needs proceed either from their negligence , or because they are blemished with the like errors . And whoever shall run over the nations that in our dayes have been accounted full of robberies , and such like offences , shall perceive they all wholly proceeded from those that govern'd them who were of the like condition . In Romania those Princes in it before they were extinguish'd by Pope Alexander the sixth , gave patterns to every one of a most ungodly and unconscionable life : for here a man might see horrible executions upon every slight occasion , and exceeding great rapines : Which first grew from the wickedness of those Princes , not from the mischeivous disposition of the people , as they said : for those Princes being but poor , and yet having a mind to live as stately as those that were rich , were necessitated to apply themselves to many rapins , and to practise them diverse waies , and among other dishonest waies they toook , this was one ; they made lawes and forbad some kind of action to be done ; afterwards they were the first that gave the occasion to break it , nor ever punish'd they the breakers of it , till afterwards when they saw many others had committed the same fault , and then they began to punish the breach , not for any zeal towards the law made , but for covetousness to recover the penalty : whereupon grew many inconvenients : and above all this , that the people were impoverish'd , and no way amended , and those that were impoverish'd used all their wits to work upon those that were their inferior . Whereupon arose all these evils ( we have now spoken of ) whereof the Prince was the only cause . And that this is true , T. Livius shews us , where he relates , that the Roman Ambassadors , carrying a gift of the spoile taken from the Vejentes to Apollo , were taken by the Corsaires of Lipari in Sicily , and there brought to land . But Timasitheus their Prince , having understood , what gift it was , whether it went , and who sent it , though he were borne in Lipari , yet behaved he himself like a worthy Roman , and told the people , that it was impiety to lay hands on such a gift , in so much as by general consent they set the Ambassadors at liberty with all that was theirs : and the Historians words are these , Timasitheus made all the multitude religious , which is done alwaies like a true governor , And Laurence of Medicim confirmation so this opinion saies , The Princes actions as examples move , And those as their best patterns men approve . CHAP. XXX . A Citizen , that will of his own authority do any good work in his own City , of necessity must first extinguish all envy ; and what order is to be given for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach . THe Romane Senate having notice , that all Tuscany had made a new levy of souldiers , with purpose to endammage Rome , and that the Latini and Hernici , who formerly had been their friends , were now joyned to the Volsoi , the perpetual enemies of Rome , considered that this war might prove perillous . And Camillus at that time being Tribune with Consular power , thought all might be well done without creating a Dictator , if the other Tribunes his collegues would yeeld up unto him the sum and whole command of the Empire , which the said Tribunes willingly did . Nor thought they ( says T. Livius ) it any thing derogated from their Majesty , what they had yeelded to his . Whereupon Camillus having taken this obedience upon their words , commanded they should inroll three Armies . Of the first he would be general to go against the Tuscans ; Of the second he made Quintus Servilius Conmander , whom he would have to abide near about Rome , to withstand the Latini and the Hernici , if they should stir . He gave Lucius Quintius the command of the third Army , which he levied for the guard of the City , the defence of the gates and the court of justice , in case any chance should happen ; besides this he ordained , that Horatius one of his Collegues , should make provision of arms and corn and other things requisite in time of war. He made Cornelius also his Collegue chief of the Senate , and over the publike Councel , to consult upon those things which in general were to be executed . Thus were the Tribunes in those times disposed for the good of their Country to command , and to obey . It is noted by the text here , what a vertuous and prudent man may do , and what great good he may because of , and how much he may be able to advantage his country , when by means of his goodness and vertue , he hath quite extinguished all envy , which many times is the cause that men cannot effectuate a good work , the said envy not allowing them that authority which it is necessary they should have in matters of importance . And this envy is quite put out two ways ; either by some strong and difficult accident , where every one seeing themselves ready to perish , laying ambition aside , willingly run to obey him , whom they believe by his vertue able to deliver them , as it befell Camillus : who having given so many proofs of his being an admirable man , and having been thrice Dictator , and performed that place alwayes with the advantage of the publike , and no way to his own profit , had now caused men not to be afraid of his greatness And because he was so magnanimous , and of such great credit , they thought it no shame to them to be inferiors to him : And therefore saies Titus Livius very wisely these words , Nor thought they it any things , &c. Another way is envy blotted out , when either by violence or by course of nature they dye that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation , or greatness ; who seeing the more esteemed then they , it is unpossible they ever should be at rest , or have any patience . And when they are accustomed to live in a corrupted City , where their education hath not bred any goodness in them , it is unpossible , let what accident will fall out , that they should ever go back from any thing ; and without doubt to have their wills , and satisfy the waywardness of their minds , they would be contented even to see the ruine of their native Country . To overcome this envy , there is no other remedy but the death of those that bear it : and when fortune is so favorable to that vertuous man , as that those men dye a natural death , he becomes glorious without giving any scandal , when without any obstacle or offence he may display his vertues . But when he hath not this good luck , he must devise by any means to take them out of his way . And before he can do any thing he must practise those wayes whereby to overcome this difficulty . And he that reads the Bible with understanding , shall see that Moses was forced ( if he would have his lawes and ordinances proceed ) to put a great number of men to death , who provoked by nothing else but envy , withstood his purpose . This necessity Fryar Jerom Savonarola knew very well , and Peter Soderini chief standard-bearer of Florence knew it also . The one could not overcome it , because he had not power to do it , which was the Fryar , and because he was not well understood by those that followed him who might have had power to have done it . But it was not his fault , and his sermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wise men of the world , and of invectives against them ; for so he terms those envious men , and all that opposed his ordinances . That others believed that in time , by his goodness , and good fortune , and doing good turns to some of them , quite to extinguish this envy , seeing himself young enough too , and then wearing so many new favors , which the manner of his proceeding afforded him , so that he thought he was able to overcome those many that enviously opposed him , without any scandal , violence , or tumult . And did not know that time cannot stay ; goodness is not sufficient , fortune changes ; and there is no gift can appease malice . So that the one and the other of these two went to ruine , and their ruine proceeded either from their ignorance , or their disability to overcome this envy . The other thing remarkeable is the order which Camillus took both within and abroad for the preservation of Rome . And indeed not without reason the good Historians ( as ours here is ) set down particularly and distinctly certain cases , to the end posterity should learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themselves . And it ought well be observ'd in this text , that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence then that which is confusedly made , and with out order , and this appears by this third army which Camillus caused to be inrolled , and to be left at Rome to guard the Town : for many would have judg'd that part superfluous , where the people is most commonly arm'd , and warlick ; and for this cause a man would not think it needfull to have them inroll'd otherwise , but only that it sufficed to cause them to be in armes as occasion should require . But Camillus and who else were wise as he was , think otherwise , who never allow a multitude to take armes , unless by certain order and appointment : Wherefore upon this example , he that is appointed over the guard of a City , should avoid , as a rock , the arming of men in confusion , but ought first have those chosen and registred ? which he would have in armes , and whom he would have them obey , where their rendezvous , and whether to go , and command those that are not inrolled to abide every man at his own house , for the safeguard thereof . They that shal take this order in a City assailed , will easily be able to defend themselves : whoever does otherwise , shal neither imitate Camillus , nor defend himself . CHAP. XXXI . Powerfull Commonwealths , and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage , and the same dignity . AMong other matters of magnificence , that our Historian brings in Camillus speaking or doing , to shew how an excellent man ought to behave himself , he puts these words in his mouth : Neithor did my Dictatorship elevate my courage , nor hath my banishment abated it : By which words we see that great personages are alwaies the same in all fortunes . And though she varies , now exalting them , and then bringing them low , they never differ from themselves , but alwaies hold a constant resolution , so steadily fastened to their ordinary course of living , that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them . Weake men behave themselves in another manner : for they befoole and besot themselves in good fortune , attributing all the good they have to those vertues which they never knew ; whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them ; whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune , which so soon as they look once in the face , they fall presently into the other defect , and become vile and abject . From hence it comes that such manner of of Princes thinke rather in adversitie how to make an escape , than to stand upon their defence , as those that for having made evil use of good fortune , are not prepared for any kind of safegard . This vertue , and this vice , which I say , is found in one man alone , we find also in a Republike , of which the Romanes and the Venetians serve us for example . Those former never any bad fortune could make abject , nor any good fortune insolent , as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at Canna , and after the victory they got against Antiochus : for upon that defeat , however a very great one , because it had been the third together , they never grew base upon it , but continued to send forth Armies ; they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made , nor send to Hannibal or Carthage to ask peace , but casting aside all those unworthy courses , they thought still upon providing for the war , arming for want of souldiers their old men and slaves . Which thing being known to Hanno the Carthaginian ( as was said before ) he shewed that Senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at Canna . And so it appeared , as those hard times did not affright , nor abase them , on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puffe them up : for , when Antiochus sent Ambassadors to Scipio to require an agreement , before they came to joyn battel , or that he had lost it , Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace , which were , that he should retire into Syria , and leave the rest to the Romans disposing , which Antiochus refusing , and coming to battel and losing it , sent again his Ambassadors to Scipio , with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the Conqueror should impose on him , to whom he propounded no other conditions than what he had fomerly offered before the victory , adding these words : That the Romanes if they be overcome , lose not their courages , nor when they overcome grow they insolent . Clean contrary hereunto we have seen the Venetians do : who in their prosperity ( thinking they had gotten it by their own valor which they never were guilty of ) grew to such an excess of insolence , that they termed the King of France Saint Marks son , they contemned the Church ; and their ambition all Italy would not hold , but imagined they were to frame a Monarchy like that of the Romanes . Afterwards their good fortune abandoning them , and that they were a little routed by the King of France at Vayla , they not onely lost all their State by rebellion , but a good part of it they gave up to the Pope and the King of Spaine , even through meer baseness and cowardise . And they became so vile and abject , that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor , to offer themselves to be his tributaries , and writ letters to the Pope full of baseness and submission , whereby to move him to compassion . Into which unhappiness they fell in four days space , and after a half defeat : for their Army come to battel and to fight , in their retreat lost near one half of their men , yet so that one of their Proveditors that escaped , came to Verona with above five and twenty thousand souldiers between foot and horse : in case that if either the Venetians , or any of their orders had been of value , they might easily have recovered themselves , and looked fortune again in the face , and have been ready either to overcome , or lose more gloriously , or get more honorable terms of agreement : but the baseness of their spirits caused by the quality of their orders , nothing good in matters touching the war , made them at once lose both their State and courage . And so will it alwaies befall any that shall behave themselves as they did : for this growing insolent in good fortune , and abject in evill , arises from the manner of thy proceeding , and from the education wherein thou hast been traind up : Which when it is weak & vain , makes thee like to it self , when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould , and makes thee know the world better , rejoycing less at the good besalls thee , as also grieving less at the evill comes upon thee : and that which is said of one man alone , is said also of many that live in the same Commonwealth , who attain to that perfection , which the order and manner of government thereof wil afford . And though otherwhere we have said , that the foundation of all States is good military discipline ; and where this is not , there can neither be good lawes , nor any other thing good , methinks it is not more than needs to repeate it again ; for to many purposes , in the reading of this Story , wee see this necessity appeares , and wee see that neither can the soldiers be good , unless they be traind and practis'd , nor can they be train'd , unless compos'd of thy own subjects : for the wars do not alwaies last , & unpossible it is they should : therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace ; neither can this exercise be us'd in regard of the expence , with others then with thy own subjects . Camillus was gone ( as we said before ) with the Army against the Tuscans , and his souldiers hāving seen the greatness of the enemies Army were much amazd at it , thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies : the rumor of this fearefulness comming to Camillus his eares , he came forth abroad amongst them , and going about through the Camp , speaking now to one soldier , and then to another , workt this opinion out of their heads , and in conclusion , without any otherwise ordering of his Army , said , Let every man doe what he hath learned and used to doe . And whosoever shall well consider these termes and the words he said to them , for their encouragement to encounter with their enemies , shall perceive that none of these things could be said or done to an Army that had not first been orderd and exercised as well in peace as in war : for upon those soldiers that have not learned to do any thing , a Commander cannot rely , nor beleeve they can do any thing to the purpose : and were a new Hannibal to command them , he could not subsist : for a General ( during the battell ) not being able to be in every part , unless he have first taken order to have men of his manner of courage , knowing well his orders , and the wayes of his proceeding , must of force ruine there . If then a City shall be armed and orderd as Rome , and that every day the Citizens are put to it to make tryal in particular and in general of their own valor , and the power of fortune , it shall alwaies come to pass , that at any time whatsoever , they shall continue setled in the same resolution , and keep themselves in the same dignity . But when they shall be disarmed , and rest only upon the helpes of fortune , and not upon their own valours , they shall change as her wheel turns , and give that example of themselves , which the Venetians gave . CHAP. XXXII . What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace . CIrcei and Velitre two Roman Colonies being rebelled , in hope that the Latines would defend them , afterwards the Latines being overcome , and so those hopes failing them , divers of the Citizens advised , they should send Ambassadors to Rome , to recommend them to the Senate : which course was hindred by those that had been Authors of the rebellion , who were afraid least the whole punishment should fall upon their heads ; and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace , they incited the multitude to take arms , and make an incurfion upon the Rome territories . And truely when any one desires that a people or Prince should wholly take their minds off from agreement , there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do some foul act against him , with whom thou wouldst not have the accord made . For the fear of that punishment which he shall think he hath deserved for his fault , shall always keep him off . After the first wars which the Carthaginians had with the Romanes , those soldiers who had served the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily and Sardinia , when the peace was concluded , went back into Affrica , where not being satisfied for their pay , they made wars against the Carthaginians , and having chosen two out of themselves for their heads , Mathus , and Spendius , they took divers Towns of the Carthaginians , and sacked divers . The Carthaginians willing to try any other way then battell , sent Asdrubal a Citizen of theirs Ambassadour to them , who they thought had some credit with them , having formerly been their General . And he being come , and Spendius and Mathus desiring to oblige all these Souldiers , never to hope they could have peace again with the Carthaginians , and to engage them in the war , perswaded them it was better to kill him , with all the Citizens of Carthage , which then they had prisoners , Whereupon they not only slew them , but put them to death with torments , to this villainy adding an edict , that all Carthaginians , who in time to come were taken , should in the same sort be slain . Which deliberation and execution made that Army exceeding cruell and obstinate against the Carthaginians . CHAP. XXXIII . It much furthers and advantages an Army in the winning of a battell , to be confident of their own forces , and their Generals valour . IT much helpes an Army towards the winning of a battell , to make them confident , that in any case they cannot chuse but vanquish . The things that give them this confidence , are , that they be well armed and well orderd , and be acquainted one with another . Nor can this confidence or this order be but among those Soldiers that have been borne and liv'd together . The Commander also must be of repute , so that the Soldiers may be confident of his wisdome : and they shall alwaies be so , when they perceive him to be a man orderly carefull , and couragious , and that maintains well , and with esteem the Majesty of his dignity : and he shall alwaies be able to do so , while he punisheth their faults , while he tires not out the soldiers to no purpose , keeps his word with them , shewes them an easie way to vanquish the enemy ; those things that may endanger them , conceals from them ; or if they be evident , by his speeches lessons their opinion of them : which things well observed , are a great occasion of confidence in the Army ; and that confidence of victory the Romans us'd to make their Armies thus confident by way of Religion : from hence proceeded , that by their southsayings and auspiees they created their Consuls , they levied their souldiers , march'd with their armies , and fought their battels ; and without having done some of these things , never would a good or discreet Commander , have put any thing to hazard , deeming that he might easily lose , unless his souldiers had first understood that the gods were on their side . And when any Consul or Captain of theirs should have fought contrary to the auspices , they would have punishd him , as they did Claudius Pulcher. And however we find this true in all the Roman Histories , yet it is proved more certain by the words which Livie brings in Appius Claudius speaking , who complaining to the people of their Tribunes insolency , and shewing that by means of them the auspices and other matters pertaining to Religion were corrupted , sayes thus : Let them now scoffe at Religion ; for , what matter is it , whether the chickens feed , or whether they come slower out of their cage , whether a bird hath sung or no ? these , t is true , are all small things : but by not contemning of these little things , our Auncestours have exceedingly amplified this Commonwealth . For in these small matters there is force to hold the souldiers united and confident , which thing is a principall occasion of any victory . Yet must these things be accompanied with valour , otherwise they will avail little . The Prenestini having their Army abroad against the Romans , went to incampe upon the river of Allia , a place where the Romans had been overcome by the French , which they did to make their own souldiers confident , and to affright the Romans with the fortune of the place . And though the course they took , was probable for those reasons wee have already said , yet the conclusion of the matter shewed , that true valour feares not every small accident : Which the Historian sayes very well , in those words which he makes the Dictatour speak , who saies thus to the Master of his Cavallerie : Seest thou how they taking benefit of their fortune , have incamped themselves upon the river Allia ? But thou making use of thy Armes and courage assayle the very heart of their Armie . For a true valour , a good discpline , and an assurance taken from so many victories , cannot be extinguished by matters of small moment , nor does any vain matter affright them , nor one disorder hurt them , as we saw it ; for two Manlij being Consuls against the Volsei , by reason that they had rashly sent part of their Army to forrage , it followed , that both they that were gone and those that staid behind , were besieged ; from which danger , not the wisedome of the Consuls , but the Souldiers own valour freed them , where T. Livius says these words , The Souldiers valour even without a Commander was thought firme and constant . I will not let pass one terme us'd by Fabius , being newly entred with his Army into Tuscany , to make them confident , deeming such a confidence to be the more necessary , now that he had brought them into a new Country , and to fight with new enemies ; who speaking to his souldiers before the fight , and having told them many reasons , whereupon they might hope for the victory , said , that he could also tell them certain good things , and where they might plainly see the victory , but that it was dangerous to disclose them . Which course as it was discreetly us'd , so deserves it it to be followed . CHAP. XXXIV . What fame , report , or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favours upon a Citizen : and whether a Prince or a people do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement . OTherwhere we said , that T. Manlius , who afterwards was termed Torquatus , sav'd L. Manlius his Father from an acccusation , which M. Pomponions Tribune of the people had made against him . And however the manner of saving him , was somewhat violent and extraordinary , yet that filial piety towards his Father , was so acceptable to the generall , that it was not only not blamed , but when Tribune were to be appointed over the Legions , T. Manlius was chosen in the second place . Upon which success , I beleeve it fit to consider , what way the people take to give their judgements upon men in distributing of their charge that thereby we may see , whether that be true which we formerly concluded , that the people is a better distributer than a Prince . I say then , that the people in their distribution follows the report that goes of one by publick voyce and fame : when they know him not otherwise by his ordinary behaviour , or by presumption or opinion conceived of him . Which two things have been caused either by the Fathers of such , who for that they have been great personages , and of ability in the Cities , it is thought their sons should be like them , untill by their actions the contrary be found : Or else it is caused by the courses such a one takes , of whom we speak : the best courses and waies that can be held , are to keep company with grave men , well dispos'd , and such as by every one are reputed wise . And because there cannot be a greater marke or discovery of a man then by the company he frequents , without question he that uses good company , gaines a good name : for it is impossible but that he shall much resemble them . Or indeed this publick reputation is gotten by some extraordinary and notable exploit , however private , that hath proved in thy hands very honorable . And of all these three things , which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation , nothing gives if more amply then this last : for that first of parents , and fathers is so deceitfull , that men advance therein very leisurely , and that is presently quite spent , when it is not accompanied by the the proper vertue of him that is to be censured . The second way , which makes thee be known by the company thou usest , is better then the first ; but is much inferior to the third ; for untill thou hast given evidence of thy self by some worthy exploir , thy repute is wholly grounded upon opinion , which is very easily cancelled . But that third being begun and grounded upon thy workes , gives thee at first such renown , that needs must it be , that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto , if thou wouldst disannul it . Therefore ought those men that spring up in a Common-wealth , take this course , and indeavour by some extraordinary act to begin their rise . Which many at Rome did in their youths , either by publishing of a law , furthering the common good , or by accusing some potent Citizen as a breaker of the laws , by doing such like notable things , and unwonted , whereof men should have occasion to speak afterwards . Neither are such like things needfull only to begin ones reputation , but they are as necessary for the maintenance and advancement of it . And to do this , a man had need to renew them again , as Manlius did during his whole life : for when he had defended his father so vertuously and beyond the ordinary strain , and by this action taken his first degree of reputation , after some years he fought with that Frenchman , and took from him that chain of gold , which gave him the name of Torquatus : nor stay'd he upon this , but afterwards in riper years he put his son to death for having fought without his allowance , however he had vanquished his enemy . Which three actions gave him a greater name , and throughout all ages make him more famous , then ever any triumph or victory did , wherewith he was adorn'd as much as any other Roman . And the reason is , because in those victories Manlius had very many like him , but in these particulars he had either very few or none . Scipio the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs , then that action of defending his father upon the Tesin gained him in his youth , and that other when after the defeate at Canna , couragiously with his sword drawn he made many young Romans swear they would never abandon Italy , as already then among them it was resolv'd which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation , which made him a way to his triumphs of Spain and Africa , which opinion of him was also increased , when he sent back the daughter to her Father , and the wife to her husband in Spain . This manner of proceeding is not alone needful for those Citizens , that would gain reputation , whereby to attain the dignities in their Commonwealth , but is also necessary for Princes to maintain their credits in their Principalities : for nothing gives them so great esteem as to yeeld some rare examples of themselves , by some deed or pithy saving , agreeable with the common good , which may evidently prove the Prince either magnanimous , or liberall , or just ; and that he is such a one , that his life may serve for a patterne , and his wise sayings may be used by his subjects as proverbs . But to returne , whereat we began this discourse , I say ' that the people , when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their Citizens , grounding upon any of those reasons before alledged , take no ill ground ; but when afterwards the frequent examples of one mans good carriage makes him better known , then is a better ground taken ; for in such case there can never fall any deceit . I speak only of those honours which are given to men in the beginning , before they be well known by a certain experience , or that they transgress from one action to another unlike it ; Where both touching the salfe opinion and the corruption , they alwaies commit less errors , then Princes . And because it may fall out , that the people might be deceived in the report , in the opinion , and actions of a man , conceiving them greater then in truth they are , which would not be so with a Prince , because it is like it should be told him , or that he should be advertised thereof by some of his Counsellours ; to the end therefore that the people want not these advertisements , the good founders of Republicks have ordained , that when the cheisest dignities of Cities are to be bestowed , whereunto it might prove dangerous to prefer unsufficient men , and seeing the peoples wills sometimes bent to advance some one unfit , that it may be lawfull for any Citizen , and accounted as an honour to him , to publish in their assemblies that mans defects , that the people ( this notice not failing them ) may the better give their judgments thereupon . And that this was customary at Rome , the oration which F. Maximus made , witnessed , which he uttered before the people in the second Punicke warr , when at the creation of the Consulls they took a liking to T. Ottasilius ; and Fabius ; deeming him unsufficent to marnage the Consulate in those times , spake against him , declaring his unsufficiency , insomuch as he hindred him of that dignity , and converted the peoples favours to one that deserved it better then he . The people then in the choice of their Magistrates judge according to the truest markes they can have of men . And when they can be advised , as Princes are , they run into fewer errors then Princes ; and that Citizen that will begin to seek the peoples favour , must with some notable exploit gain it , as Titus Manlius did . CHAP. XXXV . What dangers they incurre that put themselves forwards as principals to advise any design , which are so much the greate , by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and perill . HOw dangerous a thing it is for any man to become the ringleader of any new matter , which belongs to many , and how hard a thing it is to meddle in it , and bring it on forwards , and make it good being thus brought forwards , would be too long and too deep a matter to discourse on . Therefore reserving it for a fitter place , I will only treate of those dangers , which Citizens incur , or those that advise a Prince , making themselves chief in perswading him to any weighty and important resolution , so that the Councell thereof is wholly imputed to them : for , men judging things by their events , of all the evill that arises thereupon , the blame is wholly laid on him as author ; and if good come of it , he is commended for it ; but the reward comes much short of the loss is hazarded . This present Sultan Selimus ' termed the great Turk , having made preparation ( as some report , who now come from his Country ) for the Conquest of Syria and Egypt , was encouraged by one of his Bashawes , who was then upon the confines of Persia , to undertake rather an expedition against the Sophy ; by whose Counsell being perswaded , he went to that enterprise with an exceeding great army , and comming into a very vast country , where a great part of it is desert , and rivers very few , and finding there those difficulties , which long since had ruin'd many Roman armies , was so distressed thereby , that he lost there by famine and plague ( however that in the war he were the vanquisher ) a great part of his army . Whereupon being errag'd against the author of that Counsell , he put him to death . We reade of many Citizens , that were the advisers to such and such enterprises , who because these had evill success , have straightway been banished . Certain Citizens of Rome there were , who as authours of the advice , stood to have a Consul from among the Commons in Rome ; it happened , that the first of them , that went abroad with their armies , was defeated . Whereupon it had prov'd but unluckily to the authors of that Counsell , had not their party been strong , by whose favour such resolution was taken . It is then most certain , that they who advise a Republick and they that Counsell a Prince , are equally brought into these streights ; and if they do not advise those things , which they take to be profitable either for the City or the Prince without respect , they faile of their duties ; and in case they do counsell them , they run the hazard of their lives , and of their estates ; all men herein being so blind as to judge advices good or evill by the success they take . And devising with my self by what means they might escape this infamy or danger , I see no other way , then that they put things forward moderately , and not take any thing upon them as their own enterprise , and give their opinion without passion , and defend it also modestly without passion , so that if either the City or the Prince followthat advice . it may seem they willingly took that course , and were not drawn thereto by thy importunity . When thou dost so , it is not reasonable that a Prince or a people should seek revenge on thee for thy counsell , it being not followed against other mens wills : for here the danger is , that many having contradicted thee , in the unhappy success of thy advice they will concur in working thy ruine . And if in this case , one should say , that when he failes of that glory which another gets by being one alone against many in advising any course , when it proves luckily , we meete here with two advantages to countervail it : the first is to be quite exempt out of all danger : the second is , if thou advisest any thing modestly , and by reason of the opposition made against it , thy Counsell be not taken , and some disaster follow upon the advice another hath given , thou gainest much glory thereby . And however the glory , which is gotten by mischiefs , befallen thy City or thy Prince , cannot well be said to be enjoyed , yet is there some account to be made of them . I beleeve there is no other advice can be given to men in this part ; for the perswading them to hold their peace , and not give their opinion , would be a thing very unprotable to the Commonwealth and their Princes , & they would hardly be able to escape danger ; for in a small time would they be suspected ; it might also befall them , as it did those friends of Porse the King of Macedon , who having been defeated by Paulus Emilius , & flying with a few of his confidents , it chanc'd , that in relating things past , one of them began to tell Perse of many errors committed by him , which were the occasion of his ruine , to whom Perse turning said , Traitor , and hast thou delay'd to tell me it , untill now that I have no remedy ? and upon these words slew him with his own hand . And thus he suffer'd punishment for his silence when he should have spoken , and for having spoken when he should have held his peace : neither avoided he the danger , by not giving his advice . Wherefore I beleeve the rules above given , are to be kept and observ'd . CHAP. XXXVI . The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men , and afterwards less then women . THe fierceness of that Frenchman who challeng'd any Roman whatsoever , near the river Anien , to fight with him , and afterwards the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him and T. Manlius , put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that which T. Livius sayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the Frenchmen in the beginning of the combat are more then men , and in the end thereof prove less then women . And weighing well from whence this may proceed , many beleeve that naturally they are so dispos'd , which I think is true : but hence it followes not that this their naturall humor , which makes them so fierce in the beginning , might not be so order'd by art , as to continue them fierce till the very conclusion : And for proof hereof , I say , that there are armies of three sorts : the one where there is both fury and order , for from the order arises fury and valour , as was that of the Romans ; for it appears in all their histories , that there was a very good order in that army , which military discipline in tract of time had brought in amongst them . For in a well train'd army , no man is to do any thing but by rule and order . And we find hereby , that in the Roman Army ( from which , insomuch as it conquer'd the whole world , all others may take example ) they neither ate , nor slept , nor bought , neither did they any military action nor domestick without the Consuls order : for those armies which do otherwise , are not right armies ; and if they come to make any trial of themselves in any action , they do it by force of rage and violence , and not by valour : but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances , it makes good use of the fury in such manner and in such times that no difficulty abates it , nor ever quailes the courage , because those good ordinances reinforce the spirit , and the fury , both being still maintained by the hope of over comming , which never failes while the orders hold firme . The contrary falls out in those armies wherein is fury and not order , as were those of the French , who ever faild by little and little For it proved not , that their first assault prevailed , and that their fury whereon they much relied , was not maintained by an ordinate valour , not having any thing else , besides that , wherein to trust , as that grew coole , so they failed . On the other side the Romans doubting less of dangers by reason of their good orders , not distrusting the victory , fought resolutely and obstinately with the same courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning , or rather enraged by fighting , they grew still more fierce . The third kind of armies is , where there is no naturall fury , nor accidentall order , as the Italian armies are in our daies , which are quite unprofitable : and unless they incounter with an army which upon some accident chances to run away , they shall never overcome : and without alledging other examples , we every day see that they give good proofes they have no valour at all . And because by T Livius his testimony , every one may understand , how the good s●uldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is , I will set down Papirius Cursor his words , having a mind to punish Fabius the commander of the horse ; where he said , Let neither GOD nor man be had in any reverence , nor the Generals commands , nor his auspices be regarded ; let the souldiers pillaging up and down for want of provision as well in their friends country as in their foes , let them casheere themselves , at their pleasures , for , getting their oaths , let them quit their Ensignes , nor come together at command : let them fight without the Generals leave by night or by day in place of advantage or disadvantage , caring neither for ranke nor order : and let the sacred and and solemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obscure tricks and chances of robberies . By the text here we may easily see whether the warfare in our daies , be blind and casuall , or sacred and solemn , and how much it comes short of resembling that which properly is termed a warfare , & how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the Romans , or from a furious only as was that of the French. CHAP , XXXVII . Whether slight skirmishes or combats are necessary before a great battell , and what is to be done to know a new enemy , when one should avoid those skirmishes . IT seemes that in humane actions ( as otherwhere we have discoursed ) besides other difficulties , found in bringing any thing to its perfection , there is alwaies some evill very nearly neighbouring to the good : Which so easily grows up with that good , that it seems unpossible , if a man would injoy the one , to be quit of the other . And this wee see in all the works of man : and therefore is that good attain'd with difficulty , unless by thy good fortune thou be so assisted , that she by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient . The Combate between Manlius T●rquatus and the Frenchman hath put me in mind hereof , where T. Livius saies That combate so much imported the event of the war , that the French Army leaving their Campe in a fright , went into the Tiburtine Country , and thence into Campania . For I consider on the one side , that a good Commander ought wholly avoid to do any thing which being but of small moment , may produce but evill effects in his Army : for to begin a skirmish or a combate wherein the whole forces are not imployed , and yet the whole fertune is there laid to stake , is a thing savouring too much of rashness , as I said before , when I condemn'd the guarding of the passages . On the other side I consider , that wise and experienced Commanders , when they meet with a new enemy , and that is of reputatson , are forc'd before they come to joyne battell , to cause their souldiers to make tryall of them by light skirmishes , to the end that beginning to know them , and to have to deale with them , they may be rid of that terror which the report and reputation of these men have put them in . And this part in a Generall is of exceeding great importance ; for there is a kind of necessity in it , which forceth thee thereunte ; for thou wilt think that thou goest to thy manifest destruction , unless thou have first by these small experiences made thy soldiers cast out that terror , which by means of the enemies reputation had possessed their minds . Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army against the Samnites , who were new enemies , and these formerly had never proved the one the others forces , where T. Livius sayes , that Valerius caused the Romans . to make some small skirmishes with the Samnites , That a new war , and a new enemy might not affright th●m . Notwithstanding it is a very great hazzard , that thy Souldiers in those skirmishes remaning losers , their fear and cowardise grow not more upon them , and that effects contrary to thy purpose follow not thereupon , that is , that thou fright them not , whereas thy design was to assure them . So that this is one of those things , which hath the evill so near neighbouring unto the good , or rather they are so neare joyn'd together , that it is very easy to mistake the one for the other : Whereupon I say , that a good Commander should be very careful , that nothing arise , which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his soldiers . That which may be of force to take away their courage , is to begin to lose : and therefore a man should be well aware of these small skirmishes , and no way suffer any of them , unless with exceeding great advantage , and certain hope of victory . Nor ought he undertake to guard any passages , where he cannot bring his whole Army together . Nor should he keep any Towns unless it be those that by losing of them , his utter ruine followes thereupon ; and those that he guards , he should take such care both with their defences and also with his Army , that whenever the enemy hath any design to assayle them , he may make use of all his forces in rescue of them : the others he should leave undefended : for whensoever any thing is lost , that was before abandon'd , the Army being yet afoot , there is neither the reputation of the war lost , nor the hope of conquest . But when any thing is lost , which thou hadst purposed to defend , and every one beleeve , thou mightst , defend , there is the dammage and loss , and there thou hast in a manner , as those Frenchmen did , by a matter of small moment lost the whole war. Philip of Macedon the Father of Perse , a warlick man , and of great esteem in his time , being assavl'd hy the Romans , forsook and laid wast much of his Country , as he , who because he was wise , thought it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend , then by leaving it in prey to the enemy , to lose it as a thing neglected . The Romans when after the defeat at Canna , their estate was in great perplexity , refus'd many that were under their protection , and so also divers of their own Subjects , charging them to defend themselves the best they could , which are better courses far , than to undertakes defences , and afterwards nor be able to go through with them ; for hereby those friends are lost , and forces only in those friends . But returning to the small skirmishes , I say ; that yet if a Commander be forc'd by reason of the newness of the enemy to make any skirmish , he ought take so much advantage in it , that he run no hazard to lose it , nor do , as Marius did , which is the better way . Who going against the Cimbrians , which were an exceeding fierce people , and came to make a prey of Italy , and wheresoever they came , casting a great terror , because of their fierceness and multitude , and by reason they had formerly vanquish'd a Roman Army , Marius thought it necessary before he came to joyn battell , to worke somewhat , which might make his Souldiers lay aside that terrour , which the feare of the enemy had put them in ; and as a very well advis'd Commander , brought his Army several times , where the Cimbrians with their troupes were to pass : And thus within the fortifications of his Campe he would that his Souldiers should see them , and accustome their eyes to the view of that enemy , to the end that by seeing a disordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable armes , and in part too disarm'd , they might reassure themselves , and grow desirous of battell , which course as it was discreetly practis'd by Marius , so likewise ought it be diligently imitated by others , whereby they might not be forc'd to incurre those dangers which I mentioned before , nor to do as the Frenchmen did : Who for a matter of small moment fled in a fright into the Triburtine Country , and streight after into Compania . And because wee have alledg'd Valerius Corvinus in this Treaty , in the Chapter following I intend , by the helpe of his words , to shew what manner of man a Commander should be . CHAP. XXXVIII . What manner of man that General ought to be , on whose abilities an Army may confidently relie . VAlerius Corvinus was ( as we faid formerly ) abroad with an Army against the Samnites , new enemies of the people of Rome , whereupon partly to assure his own Souldiers , and partly to make them know the enemy , he caus'd some of his to enter into certain light skirmishes with them , nor contented herewith , before the day of battell would needs speak to his own souldiers , and shew with all efficacy , how little esteem they were to make of such enemies , putting them in minde of their own and his valour also : where it may be noted by the words that Livius brings him in speaking , what manner of man a Commander ought to be , in whom an Army is to have confidence : which words are these ; And also to consider , under whose conduct and auspices you fight ; whether he you are to hearken unto , be only a magnificent exhorter , fierce in words , but not of prowesse to shew you any military examples , or else such a one that knows how to make use of your armes to march before your ensignes , and behave himself bravely in the thickest of your troops . I would have yon my souldiers to follow my deeds rather then my words , and not to seek your discipline only from me , but your example , who by this right hand have gained three Consulships and the height of honour . Which words well consider'd teach every man how he ought to proceed if he would hold the dignity of a Commander ; and whosoever shall otherwise carry it , shall find in time that dignity ( when either by chance or ambition he is raised thereunto ) will rather take from him , then any way gain him reputation : for titles honour not men , but men their titles . And from the beginning of this discourse we may consider , that if great Commanders have us'd extraordinary means to confirme the resolutions of an Army of old soldiers , when they were to encounter with unaccustomed enemies , how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of fresh-water soldiers , who never yet look'd the enemy in the face for if an unaccustomed enemy terrifies an army of old soldiers ; much more probable is it that any enemy should affright an army of new soldiers , Yet we have many times seen all these difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wisdome of good Commanders , as Gracchus the Roman did and E●aminondas the Theban , of whom we have spoken otherwhere , who with their armies of new souldiers vanquished armies of Veteranes , who had been of long experience . The courses they took , were for many months to exercise them in counterfeit skirmishes , and train them up in obedience and order , and from thence they came to imploy them with a great deal of assurance in very fierce battells . Therefore ought no warlike man doubt , but that he may be able to make good soldiers when he wants not men : for that Prince who hath many men , and wants souldiers , should complain rather of his own sloth and small wisdome , then of the peoples cowardise . CHAP. XXXIX . That a Commander ought exactly know scituations . AMong other things befitting the General of an Army , is the knowledge of scituations and countries ; for without this knowledge in general and in particular , the Commander of an Army cannot well effectuate any thing . And because all sciences , if a man would be exact in them , require practice , this is one that askes exceeding much practice . And this practice or ( as I may terme it ) particular knowledge is gain'd rather by means of hunting , then by any other exercise . Wherefore the ancient writers say , that those Heroes , that rul'd the world in their days , were brought up in the woods and in frequent huntings : for the chace teacheth thee many things besides this knowledge , which very much concernes the war. And Xenophon in Cyrus his life shewes , that Cyrus going to assaile the King of Armenia , as he gave order for the service , he put his souldiers in mind that this was nothing else then one of those chaces which they had many times made in his company . And he told those he sent to lie in ambush upon the mountains , that they were like unto those that went to pitch their toiles upon the hills , and those that scowred the plain ; that they were like those that went to put up the beast out of his covert , to the end that being chased , he fall into the toiles . This is said to shew that the chase according as Xenophon allowes of it , hath a kinde of resemblance of war. And therefore is such exercise very honorable and well beseeming great personages . Nor can this knowledge of countries by any fitter means be learned then by way of hunting : for the chace makes him that frequents it know how in particular the country lies where he uses to hunt ; and when a man hath made himself well acquainted with the scite , of one country , he afterwards with facility comprehends that of all other strange Countries : for every Country and every member of them have some kind of conformity one with another , so that he who knows the one well , may easily attain to the knowledge of the other . But he that hath never practised the one , very hardly or never , unless it be by long experience , can know the other ; whereas he that is well versed therein , at the first cast of his eye knows how that plane lies , or that hill rises , how far that vally reaches , and all such other like things , whereof for the time to come he hath gained a settled knowledge . And that this is true , T. Livius shewes us by the example of Publius Decius , who being Tribune of the souldiers in the Army which Cornelius the Consull led against the Samnites , when the Consull was forc'd to betake himself to a vally , where the Romans , army might easily have been inclosed by the Samnites , this Decius perceiving the danger they were in , said to the Consul , Seest thou Aulus Cornelius that hill which is above the enemy ? that is the strength of our hope and safety , if we , because the Samnites being blinde have neglected it , quickly seise on it . And before these words uttered by Decius , T. Livius sayes , Publius Decius the souldiers Tribune shewed a pretty high hill which lay a little higher then the enemies campe , of hard ascent to men incombred with compleat armes , but of easy access to men lightly harnessed . Whereupon being sent thither himself by the Consull with 3000 souldiers , and having sav'd the Roman army , and purposing when night came , himself to depart , and so to save himself and his own souldiers , he is brought in thus speaking , Follow me , that yet while it is day light we may discover what places the enemy guards and which way we may get out . All these things he went to view clad in a souldiers cassocke , to the end the enemy should take no notice the Captaine rounded them . He therefore that well considers this whole text , shall see how profitable and necessary for a Commander it is to understand the natural scituations of countries ; for if Decius had not well known them , he had never been able to judge what advantage it was to the Roman army to seize upon that hill ; nor could he have been able to discerne at such distance , whether thall hill were accessible or no. And when he had once gotten there upon it , having a mind to depart and return again to the Consul , being invironed round with enemies , he would never have been able so far off to spy out the passages to escape thence , and discerne which places were guarded by the enemy , so that it must be of necessity , that Decius had a very exact knowledge , whereby he brought it to pass that by the taking of that hill , the Roman Army was delivered , and afterwards he himself ( being besieged ) knew how to find a way of escape both for himself and those that were with him . CHAP. XL. How deceit is commendable , used against the enemy in time of war. HOwever that the use of fraud in any action be detestable , yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious , and he is as much praise , that vanquishes the enemy by deceit , as he that overcomes him by force . And this we see , by the judgment of those that write the lives of great personages , who commend Hannibal and others , who have been very notable in such like ways of proceeding . Whereof because there are many examples every where obvious , I will not adde any . I will say this only , that I mean not , that that fraud is glorious , which causes thee to breake thy faith given , and agreements made : for that , though it may sometimes gain thee a state or Kingdom , as formerly hath been said , yet will it never get thee any glory But I speak of such a deceit , which is put in practise against such an enemy that trusts not in thee , and that consists properly in matter of war : as was that of Hannibal , when at the lake of Perugia he feigned a flight , whereby he might have inclos'd the Consul and the Roman Army ; and when to escape out of Fabius Maximus hishand , he tied flaming fire-brands to the horns of his whole heard of cattel . The like unto which was that , which Pontius the Samnites General practised to shut in the Roman Army at the gallows of Caudium , where having placed his army behind the mountains , he sent many of his soldiers clad like shepherds with much cattel through the plain , and they being taken by the Romans , and required of where the Samnites army was , agreed all , according to the order received from Ponutis , to say that it was gone to the siege of Nocera . Which thing the Consuls believing , gave them opportunity to shut them up in those precipices of Caudium , wherein as soon as they entred , they were presently besieg'd by the Samnites ; and this victory gained by fraud , would have proved very glorious to Pontius , if he had followed his fathers counsel , who advised either to set the Romans freely at liberty , or put them all to the sword , and in no case take the middle way , Which neither gaines friends , nor takes foes out of the way . Which middle way was always pernicious in matters of state , as other where it hath formerly been said . CHAP. XLI . That the defence of ones country ought to be undertaken , either with ignominy , or with glory , or whatsoever way it be done , it is well defended . THe Consul and the Romane Army , as is above said , were besieged by the Samnites , who having propounded to the Romans exceeding dishonorable terms , as was that to make them go under the gallows , and send them without Arms to Rome ; and hereupon the Consuls standing amazed , and the whole army in despair , Lucius Lentulus the Romanc Lieutenant said , that , as he thought , no conditions were to be refused to save their country : for the safety of Rome consisting in the life of that Army , he thought it good to save it in any case : and that the Country is well defended , by what means soever it be , either with disgrace , or with glory : for that Army being saved , Rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy ; but in case it were not saved , however it should dye gloriously . Rome and her liberty was utterly lost , and so his advise was followed . Which thing deserves well to be noted by any Citizen that chances to be called to counsel his country : for where the deliberation is wholly touching the safty of the country , there ought no consideration to be had of just or unjust , pitiful or cruel , honorable or dishonorable , but rather all other respect being laid aside , that course is to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof , which thing is followed by the sayings and deeds of the French , in defence of the Majesty of their King , and the power of their Kingdom ; for they heat nothing with more impatience , then that it should be said Such a course was dishonorable to their King ; for say they , their King cannot suffer dishonor in any resolution taken by him , either in prosperous or adverse fortune : for whether he wins or loses , they commend the action , and say it was done like a King. CHAP. XLII . Promises extorted by force , ought not to be kept . WHen the Consuls were return'd to Rome with their disarm'd army , and the disgrace which was put upon it , the first that spake in the Senate , that the peace made at Candium should not be observ'd , was the Consul S. Posthumius , saying that the people of Rome was not tied thereunto , but that he himself indeed was bound , and the rest that had promis'd the peace ; and therefore the people if they would free themselves from all tyes , were to yeeld up him and the rest that had promis'd it with him into the Samnites . hands : and this conclusion he held with such obstinacy , that at length the Senate was content therewith , and so sending him and the others to Sanmiam , protested to the Samnites , that the peace was of no force . And in this case so favourable was fortune to Pesthumius , that the Samnites held him not ; and when he was returned to Rome among the Romans , he was more glorious by his loss , then Pentius was among the Samnites by his conquest . Where two things are to be noted . The one is , that in what action soever glory may be gotten ; for in victory it is ordinarily gain'd , but in loss , it is obtained either by shewing that loss came not by thy default , or by the atcheivement of some valorous action which may cancell it . The others is : that it is no dishonour to violate those promises which by force thou wert constrain'd to make ; and always premises extorted regarding the publick , when there is want of strength , shall be broken , and that without the disgrace of him that breaks them . Wherefore in all histories we read several examples , and every day in these moderne times we see many of them ; and , not only among Princes , promises forc'd when they want strength , are not kept , but also all other promises are not observed , when the occasions faile that mov'd them to promise . Which if it be a thing commendable or no , or whether such like ways are to be followed by a Prince or no , it is at large disputed by us in our treaty concerning a Prince , so that for this present we shall not touch it . CHAP. XLIII . Those men that are bred in the same country , do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and disposition . WIse men are wont to say ( and not by chance nor without reason ) that he who will see what shall be , let him consider what hath been : for all things in the world at all times have their very incounter with the times of old , Which comes to pass , because those things are wrought by men , who were always & are subject to the same passions ; & therefore follows it of necessity , that they take the same effect . It is true , that their actions sometimes in this province are more vertuous , then those in that , & so sometimes in that more then in this , according to the forme of their education , wherein those people have taken their manner of living . It gives a facility also in the knowledge of future things by those that are past , to see one Nation a long time hold the same customes and conditions , being either alwayes covetous , or always treacherous , or having some other such vice or vertue . And whosoever shall read the things past belonging to our City of Florence , and consider also what hath happened in the latter times , shall finde the Germans and French very covetous , proud , cruel , and unfaithful : for in all these four , several times have they much wronged our City . And touching their small faith , every one know monies were given to King Charles the 8. of France , and he promised to render the Cittadels of Pisa , and yet he never did it . Wherein that King manifested his small faith , and muth avarice . But let us pass over these matters of late memory . Every one may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the Florentines had with the Vicounts of Milan : when Florence being deprived of all other expedients , thought to bring the Emperor into Italy , by his reputation and forces to assail Lombardy . The Emperor promised to bring a good Army with him , and undertake that war against the Vicounts , and defend Florence against their whole power , in case that at his rising up in arms the Florentines would pay him an hundred thousand ducates , and at his arrival in Italy another hundred thousand ; to which agreements the Florentines consented , and having made the first paiment , and afterwards the second , he came onely to Verona , and thence returned back again , having not done any thing in their behalf , blaming them , as if it were their fault , for not having observed the conditions between them . So that if Florence had not been either constrained by necessity , or overcome by passion , and had read and known the ancient customes of the Barbarians , she would never have been neither this time , nor many other times deceived by them , they having behaved themselves always after one manner , and in every part , and with every one used the same terms , as it appears they formerly did to the Tuscans , who being oppressed by the Romans , by reason they had been several times put in flight by them and routed , and seeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make resistance , they agreed with the French , who dwelt on this side the Alps in Italy , to give them a sum of mony , to oblige them to joyn their Armies with them , whereby to make head against the Romans . Whereupon it followed , that they having taken the monies , would not afterwards take arms for them , saying these they had received , not to make war upon their enemies , but that they should forbear to forrage the country of Tuscany . And thus the Tuscans through the covetousness and small truth of the French , were bereft of their monies and left without the succors they expected from them . Insomuch as we see by this example of the ancient Tuscans , and that of the Florentines , that the French have continually used the same terms : and hereby may it easily be conjectured , what trust Princes can repose in them . CHAP. XLIV . By sudden ; surprisall and boldness many times more is obtained , then by ordinary means can be gotten . THe Samnites being invaded by the Romans , and their army unable to stand in the field against them , determin'd having left their Towns well guarded in Samnium , to pass with their whole Army into Tuscany , which then had made truce with the Romans , to try with that passage , if by the presence of their Army they could induce the Tuscans to take armes again : which they had denied to their Ambassadors ; and in the parly the Samnites had with the Tuscans ( shewing what principally moved them to take armes ) they used a notable terme , where they said , They had rebelled , because peace was more grievous to these in subjection , then was war to them that enjoy their liberty . And so partly by perswasions , partly by the presence of their army , they wrought them to take armes . Where it is to be noted , that when any Prince desires to obtain any thing of another , he ought ( if the occasion will bear it ) never give him time to advise himself , but carry the matter so , that he may see the necessity of his sudden resolution , which is , when he that is required , perceives that by his deniall , or delay , there may arise a sudden and dangerous distaste . These termes were seen to have been well used by Pope Julius with the French , and by De Fois the French Kings General with the Marquess of Mantua : for Pope Julius having a mind to expell the Bentivolij out of Bolonia ; and to this purpose thinking he had need of the French forces , and that the Venetians should stand Newtralls ; and having sollicited the one and the other to this intent , but receiv'd from them a doubtful and various answer , resolv'd by not giving them leisure to bring them both to his bent . Whereupon parting from Rome with those forces he could put together , he went thence towards Bolonia , and to the Venetians he sent that they should continue Newters , and to the King that he should send him forces ; so that they all being restrain'd by the small time they had , and considering that the Pope might with reason take an open distast at either their delay or refusal , gave way to his will , and the King sent him aid , and the Venetians remain'd newters . De Fois also being with his Army in Bolonia , and having had notice of the rebellion of Bressia , and being desirous to go to recover it , had two ways , the one through the Kings own dominions long and tedious , the other short through the dominion of Mantua ; and not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominions of that Marquess , but of force was to pass by certain sluces between marish grounds and lakes , whereof that country is full , which with fortresses & other means were shut up , and guarded by him : whereupon De Fois having resolv'd to take the shorter passage , to overcome all difficulties , & give no time to the Marquess to deliberate , at the same instant brought his souldiers on that way , and signified to the Marquess that he should send him the keys of the passage . So that the Marquess surprised by this sudden resolution , sent him the keys , which he would never have done , if De Fois had carried himself more cooly in the matter , that Marquess being in league with the Pope and the Venetians , and having a son of his in the Popes hands , which things gave him many fair colours to deny him . But being assailed by the sudden course taken ( upon the reasons already alledged ) yeelded . So did the Tuscans with the Samnites , having upon the presence of that Army of Samnium taken arms , which they had otherwise denyed them . CHAP. XLV . VVhich course is the better in a battel , either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock , and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall , or else as upon the main to venture all upon the fury of the first onset . DEcius and Fabius the Roman Consuls were in the field with two armies against the Samnites and Tuscans , and coming to the skirmish and to joyn battel together , it is worth the noting in that service , which of those ways of proceeding , practised by those two Consuls , were the better : for D●●ius with all his force and violence assailed the enemy ; Fabius only held them up , judging the slow assault to be of more advantage , reserving his blow till the last , when the enemy should have lost his first heat of fight , or rage ( as some terme it ) where we see by the success that follow'd , that Fabius his design took effect better then that of Decius , who tir'd himself so in the first onset , that seeing his souldiers ready to turne their faces , to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not , in imitation of his father , he sacrific'd himself for the Roman Legions . Which thing when Fabius understood , that he might gain no less glory by living , then his Collegue had gotten by dying , put forward all these forces , which he had reserv'd for the last pinch , whereby he carried away a very happy victory . From hence is it evident , that Fabius his manner of proceeding is the more secure and warrantable . CHAP. XLVI . Whence proceedes it , that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition . IT seems that not only one City hath certain wayes and orders different from those of another City , and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate , but in the same City we see the same difference among families : which we find to be true in every City : and in Rome we reade of many examples to this purpose : for we see the Manlij were hard and obstinate men , the Publicoli courteous and lovers of the people , the Appij ambitious and enemies of the commonalty , and so many other families , have had their qualities differing one much from the other . Which thing cannot proceede from the blood only , for that must needs alter by reason of the variety of marriages ; but it must come from the education , which one family hath diverse from another . For it avails much , that a youth from his tender years begins to relish well or ill any one thing : for of necessity it must make an impression , and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the dayes of his life : and were not this so , it would be impossible that all the Appij should have had the same will , and been led by the same passions , as T. Livius rema●kes in many of them : and for the last , one of them being made Censor , and his Collegue at the end of eighteen moneths having ( as the law order'd it ) depos'd his magistracy , Appius would not depose his , saying that he might hold his yet five years , according to the first law ordain'd by the Censors . And however hereupon many speeches were made , and many tumults were caus'd ; yet was there no helpe to make him lay it down , maugre the people and the greater part of the Senate . And whosoever reads the oration he made against P. Sempronious Tribune of the people , shall note upon that occasion all the Appian insolences , and the goodness and humanity used by many other Citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their Country . CHAP. XLVII . That a good Citizen for the love of his country ought to forget all private wrongs . MAnlius the Consul was imployed with an Army against the Samnites , and he having been wounded in a battell , and the Army therefore running some hazard , the Senate judg'd it necessary to send Papirius Cursor thither for Dictator , to supply the want of the Consul ; and there being a necessity that the Dictator should be nam'd by Fabius who was then in Tuscany with an Army , and doubting that because he was his enemy , he would not name him , the Senators sent him two Ambassadours to intreate him , that laying aside all private differences for the publick goods sake he would name him . Which Fabius did , moved by the love he bore his Country ; howbeit by his silence , and many other signes , he shewed that nomination pressed him , much . Whereof all those , that would be thought good Citizens , ought take example . CHAP. XLVIII . When we se the enemy commit a great errour , we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business . FVlvius remaining Lieftenant in the Army which the Romans had in Tuscany , for that the Consul was gone to Rome by reason of some ceremonies there , the Tuscans to see if they could draw this man forth , laid an ambuscado near the Romans campe , and sent some soldiers clad like shepherds with good store of cattel , and caused them to come insight of the Roman army , who so disguised came near their very trenches , whereupon the Lieftenant marvelling at this their presumption , not thinking it a thing reasonable , found such an expedient as discovered the deceit , and so the Tuscans , plot was spoiled . Here it may firly be noted , that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an errour , which he plainly sees the enemy run into : for there will alwaies be some treachery lurking , it being not a thir 〈◊〉 reasonable that men should be so unwary . But oftentimes the desire of victory so blinds mens eyes , that they can se nothing else , but what they think makes all for their advantage . The Frenchmen having overcome the Romans at Alia , and comming to Rome , and finding the gates open , and without guard , stayed all that day , and the next night , without entring in , fearing some treachery , and not possibly beleeving , there could be such cowardise and so small understanding in the Romans , as utterly to abandon their Country . When in the year 1508 the Florentines besieged Pisa , Alphonso del Mutola , a Citizen of Pisa , was then the Florentines prisoner , and promised if he were set free that he would open a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army , whereupon he had his liberty ; afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution , he came many times to treate with the commissaries Deputies , but came not privately nor by stealth , but openly and accompanied by some Pisans , who stood aside , while he talked with the Florentines : so that a man might well have guest at his double heart : for there was no probability , that if the end of this practice had been faithfuly intended , as it was promis'd , it should ever have been so openly treated . But the desire the Florentines had to be masters of Pisa , did so blind them , that by his order comming to the gate of Lucca , they left there divers of their Captains and many others , to their great dishonour , by meanes of the said Alphonsoes double dealing with them . CHAP. XLIX . A Republick , if one would preserve it free , hath every day need of provision of new orders , and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was term'd Maximus . THere is a necessity ( as it hath been said ●other where ) that every day in a vast City such accidents , happen as have need of the Physitian : and according as they are of more consequence , so have they need of the wiser Physician . And if in any City the like : accidents ever happen'd , it was in Rome , where there fell out both strange and unexpected , as was that , when it seemed , that all the Roman dames had conspir'd to kill their husbands : so many were there that had poisoned their husbands , and so many that had prepared the poyson to give their husbands . Such like also was that conspiracy of the Baccanalls , which was discovered in the time of the Macedonian wars , wherein were intangled many thousands of men and women : and had it not been revealed , it would have proved very dangerous for that City , or else if the Romans had not been accustomed to chastise a whole multitude of offenders : for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to shew forth the greatness and magnificence of that Republick and power of her executions , yet would it sufficiently appear by the quality of the punishment she imposed on the offenders . She never stood upon it , to put to death by way of justice a whole legion at once , and a whole City , and to confine eight or ten thousand men , with extraordinary hard conditions , had it been to one man alone , much more to so many . As it befell those souldiers , who had fought unfortunately at Canna , whom she confined to Sicily , and layd this on them , that they should never lodge in any Townes , andshould always eate standing . But of all the other execution , the most terrible was that decimation of armies , where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death . Nor could there , to chastise a whole multitude , a more horrible punishment be found : for when a multitude offends , where the author is not certain , all cannot suffer , because they are too many : and to punish one part , and let the other go scotfree , were to wrong those they should punish , and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time . But to put to death the tenth part by lot , when all deserve it , he that suffers , blames his evill fortune : and he that escapes , is afraid least that another time the lot may fall on him , and so is wary not to offend . Those empoisoners then & Baccanalls were punished as their offences deserved : And however these diseases in a republick produce evill effects , yet are they not deadly : for that almost alwayes there is time given to correct them ; but there is hardly any leasure in those that regard the state , which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man , ruine the City . There was in Rome , by reason of the liberality the Romans used in bestowing the Burgeouship & freedom of their City upon strangers , so many new people borne , that they began to have such a part in the suffnages , that the government began to vary , and parted with those things and from those men , by whom it was accustomed to walke . Which Q. Fabius , who was then Censor , perceiving , the placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended , under four Tribes , to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome . This thing was well understood by Fabius , and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change : which was so well accepted by the City , that they always after gave him the title of Maximus . Nicolas Machiavel to Zanobius Buondelmontius and Cosimus Rucelayus health . I Send you a present , which if it answers not my obligations to you , yet certainly is it the greatest that Nicolas Machiavel could commend unto you : for herein I have expressed what I know , and what I have learned by a long experience , and continnal reading of the affairs of the world . And being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me , you have no reason to complain , I have given you no more . Well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding , being that these relations of mine here are but weake , and at the errour of my judgment , being that I my self several times in my discourses am deceived . Which being so , I know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other , either I to you , who have forced me to wri●e that which of my own self I should never have undertaken : or you to me , who have given you but smal satisfaction in my writings . Receive this then so , as things should be taken by friends , where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends , then to the worth of what is sent . And beleeve that herein I have one alone satisfaction , when I think that , however perchance I may have erred in many circumstances herein , in this alone I know I have not fail'd in making choise of you to whom before all others I may dedicate these my discourses , partly because in thus doing I have shewed some thankfulness for the good turnes you have done me , and partly for that me thinks I have quit the common custome of those that write , who use alwayes to dedieate all their works to Princes ; and blinded by ambition , and covetousness , attribute to him the commendations of all vertuous qualities , whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him . Whereupon , that 's I may not run into this error , I have made choice , not of those that are Princes , but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so : nor of those that are able to bestow preferments , honours , nor wealth upon me , but of those who though they are not powerfull , yet are they willing to do well for me : for men , if they would carry a right judgment , should esteem of those that in themselves are , and not of those that have the means to be liberall ; and so of those that understand how to governe , and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom . And writers commend rather Hieron of Siracusa when he was a private man , then Perse of Macedon , when he was a King : For Hieron wanted nothing else of being a Prince , then a Principality : that other had no part of a King but a Kingdome . Enjoy therefore that good or that evill which you your selves have desired : and if you shall continue still in this error , that these my opinions be acceptable to you , I shall not faile to proceed in the rest of the story , as in the beginning I made my promise . FINIS . Nicholas Machiavel's PRINCE . ALSO , The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca . AND The meanes Duke Valentine us'd to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli , Oliverotto of Fermo , Paul , and the Duke of Gravina . Translated out of Italian into English , By E. D. With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errors . LONDON , Printed for Daniel Pakeman , 1661. To the most noble and Illustrious , JAMES Duke of Lenox , Earle of March , Baron of Setrington , Darnly , Terbanten , and Methuen , Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland , Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter , and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes . POysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality , that as destructives of Nature , they are utterly to be abhord ; but we find many , nay most of them have their medicinal uses . This book carries its poyson and malice in it ; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life , with advantage . The Lamprey , they say , hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it ; take that out , and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates ; Epictetus the Philosopher sayes , Every thing hath two handles , as the fire brand , it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt : the other being laid hold on , will cleave to the very flesh , and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart . Sin hath the condition of the fiery end ; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule : nay it is worse ; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences . Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author : your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him : I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors , and have devoted them to your Graces service : which if you shall accept and protect , I shall remain Your Graces humble and devoted servant , EDVVARD DACRES . The Epistle to the Reader . QUestionless some men will blame me for making this Author speak in our vulgar tongue . For his Maximes and Tenents are condemnd of all , as pernicious to all Christian States , and hurtfull to all humane Societies . Herein I shall answer for my self with the Comoedian , Placere studeo bonis quam plurimis , & minimé multos laedere : I endeavor to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed , and no scandal to any . I grant . I find him blamed and condemned : I do no less my self . Reader , either do thou read him without a prejudicate opinion , and out of thy own judgement taxe his errors ; or at least , if thou canst stoop so low , make use of my pains to help thee ; I will promise thee this reward for thy labor : if thou consider well the actions of the world , thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him ; who willingly would walk as theeves do with close lanternes in the night , that they being undescried ; and yet seeing all , might surprise the unwary in the dark . Surely this book will infect no man : out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart , he drawes his malice and mischief . From the same flower the Bee sucks honey , from whence the Spider hath his poyson . And he that means well , shall be here warnd , where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares . A judge who hath often used to examine theeves , becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks . If mischief come hereupon , blame not me , nor blame my Author : lay the saddle on the right horse : but Hony , soit qui mal y pense : let shame light on him that hatcht the mischief . Nicholas Machiavelli , to the Magnificent Laurence sonne to Peter of Medicis health . THey that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince , commonly use to offer themselves to his view , with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in : whereupon we see they are many times presented with Horses and Armes , cloth of gold , pretious stones , and such like ornaments , worthy of their greatness . Having then a mind to offer up my self to your Magnificence , with some testimony of my service to you , I found nothing in my whole inventory , that I think better of , or more esteeme , than the knowlege of great mens actions , which I have learned by a long experience of modern affairs , and a continual reading of those of the ancients . Which , now that I have with great diligence long workt it out , and throughly sifted , I commend to your Magnificence . And however I may well think this work unworthy of your view ; yet such is your humanity , that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance , considering , that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift , than to present you with the means , whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that , which I , in the space of many years , and with many sufferances and dangers , have made proof and gaind the knowledge of . And this work I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile , nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader , as others use , because I would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter , and the gravity of the subject . Nor can this be thought presumption , if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of Princes ; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys , get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains , and other high places above ; and again to consider the plains below , they get up to the tops of the mountains ; in like manner to understand the nature of the people , it is fit to be a Prince ; and to know well the dispositions of Princes , sutes best with the understanding of a subject . Your Magnificence then may be pleased , to receive this small present , with the same mind that I send it ; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider , you shall perceive therein that I exceedingly wish , that you may attain to that greatness , which your own fortune , and your excellent endowments promise you : and if your Magnificence from the very point of your Highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places , you shall see how undeservedly I undergoe an extream and continual despight of Fortune . THE PRINCE , Written by Nicholas Machiavelli , Secretary and Citizen of Florence . CHAP. I. How many sorts of Principalities there are , and how many wayes they are attained to . ALl States , all Dominions that have had , or now have rule over men , have been and are , either Republiques or Principalities . Principalities are either hereditary , whereof they of the blood of the Lord thereof have long time been Princes ; or else they are new ; and those that are new , are either all new , as was the Dutchy of Millan to Francis Sforce ; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary State of the Prince that gains it ; as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain . These Dominions so gotten , are accustomed either to live under a Prince , or to enjoy their liberty ; and are made conquest of , either with others forces , or ones own , either by fortune , or by valor . CHAP. II. Of Hereditary Principalities . I Will not here discourse of Republiques , because I have otherwhere treated of them at large : I will apply my self only to a Principality , and proceed , while I weave this web , by arguing thereupon , how these Principallities can be governed and maintained . I say then that in States of inheritance , and accustomed to the blood of their Princes , there are far fewer difficulties to keep them , than in the new : for it suffices only not to transgress the course his Ancestors took , and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen ; that if such a Prince be but of ordinary industry , he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his State , unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof ; and when he had lost it , upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper , he recovers it again . We have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara for example hereof , who was of ability to resist the Venetians , in the year 84. and to withstand Pope Julius in the tenth for no other reason , than because he had of old continued in that rule ; for the natural Prince hath fewer occasions , and less heed to give offence , whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved ; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him unto hatred , it is agreeable to reason , that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects : and in the antiquity and continuation of the Dominion , the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished : for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent , to fasten the building of another . CHAP. III. Of mixt Principalities . BUt the difficulties consist in the new Principality ; and first , if it be not all new , but as●a member , so that it may be termed altogether as mixt ; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty , which we commonly finde in all new Principalities ; for men do willingly change their Lord , beleeving to better their condition ; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them , whereby they deceive themselves , because they find after by experience , they have made it worse : which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity , forcing him alwaies to offend those , whose Prince he newly becomes , as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries , which a new conquest draws along with it ; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies , whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality , and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it , for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations , nor put in practice strong remedies against them , being obliged to them . For however one be very well provided with strong armies , yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the Countrey , to enter thereinto . For these reasons , Lewis the twelfth , King of France , suddenly took Milan , and as soon lost it ; and the the first time Lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands ; for those people that had opened him the gates , finding themselves deceived of their opinion , and of that future good which they had promised themselves , could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them . True it is , that Coutreys that have rebelled again the second time , being recovered , are harder lost ; for their Lord , taking occasion from their rebellion , is less respective of persons , but cares only to secure himself , by punishing the delinquents , to clear all suspicions , and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest : so that if to make France lose Milan the first time , it was enough for Duke Lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines ; yet afterwards , before they could make him lose it the second time , they had need of the whole world together against him , and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of Italy ; which proceeded from the forenamed causes : however though both the first and second time it was taken from him . The generall causes of the first we have treated of ; it remains now that we see those of the second ; and set down the remedies that he had , or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was , whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the King of France did . I say therefore , that these States which by Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conquerors , are either of the same province and the same language , or otherwise ; and when they are , it is very easy to hold them , especially when they are not used to live free ; and to enjoy them securely , it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them : For in other matters , allowing them their ancient conditions , and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them , men ordinarily live quiet enough ; as we have seen that Burgundy did , Britany , Gascouy , and Normandy , which so long time continued with France : for however there be some difference of language between them , yet can they easily comport one with another ; and whosoever makes the conquest of them , meaning to hold them , must have two regards ; the first , that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished ; the other , that he change nothing , neither in their lawes nor taxes , so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality . But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language , manners , and orders , here are the difficulties , and here is there need of good fortune , and great industry to maintain them ; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies , for the Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there ; this would make the possession here of more secure and durable ; as the Turk hath done in Greece , who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that State , had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell , it had never been possible for him to have kept it : for abiding there , he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings , and forthwith can remedy them ; whereas being not there present , they are heard of when they are grown to some height , and then is there no help for them . Moreover , the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither : the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at hand , whereupon have they more reason to love him , if they mean to be good ; and intending to do otherwise , to fear him : and forrein Princes will be well aware how they invade that State ; insomuch , that making his abode there , he can very hardly lose it . Another remedy , which is also a better , is to send Colonies into one or two places , which may be as it were the keys of that State ; for it is necessary either to do this , or to maintain there many horse and foot . In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence , and either without his charge , or at a very small rate , he may both send and maintain them ; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses , to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State ; and those that he offends , remaining dispersed and poore , can never hurt him : and all the rest on one part , have no offence given them , and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet : on the other side , they are wary not to erre , for fear it befalls not them , as it did those that were dispoild . I conclude then , that those colonies that are not chargeable , are the more trusty , give the less offence ; and they that are offended , being but poor and scattered , can do but little harme , as I have said ; for it is to be noted , that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall , or else be quite crusht ; for they revenge themselves of small dammages ; but of great ones they are not able ; so that when wrong is done to any man , it ought so to be done , that it need fear no return of revenge again , But in lieu of Colonies , by maintaining soldiers there , the expence is great ; for the whole revenues of that State are to be spent in the keepingof it ; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it , & endammages him rather ; for it hurts that whole State to remove the army from place to place , of which annoyance every one hath a feeling , and so becomes enemie to thee ; as they are enemies , I wis , who are outraged by thee in their own houses , whensoever they are able to do thee mischief . Every way then is this guard unprofitable . Besides , he that is in a different Province , ( as it is said ) should make himself Head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors , and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein , and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself ; for it will alwaies come to pass , that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented , either upon ambition , or fear ; as the E●olians brought the Romans into Greece ; and they were brought into every countrey they came , by the Natives ; and the course of the matter is , that so soon as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey , all those that are the less powerfull there , cleave to him , provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they ; so that for these of the weaker sort , he may easily gain them without any pains : for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten : He hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths , nor their authorities , and so he shall easily be able by his own forces , and their assistances , to take down those that are mighty , and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Countrey . And he that playes not well this part , shall quickly lose what he hath gotten ; and while he holds it , shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations . The Romans in the Provinces they seiz'd on , observed well these points , sent colonies thither , entertained the weaker sort , without augmenting any thing their power , abated the forces of those that were mighty , and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there . And I will content my self only with the countrey of Greece for example hereof . The Achayans and Etolians were entertained by them , the Macedons kingdome was brought low , Antiochus was driven thence , nor ever did the Achayans or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them , that they would ever promise to enlarge their State , nor the perswasions of Philip induce them ever to be his friends , without bringing him lower ; nor yet could Antiocbus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any State in that countrey : for the Romans did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do , who are not only to have regard unto all present michiefs , but also to the future , and to provide for those with all industry ; for by taking order for those when they are asarre off , it is easie to prevent them ; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee , the remedy comes too late ; for this malignity is grown incurable : and it befalls this , as the physicians say of the hectick feaver , that in the beginning it is easily cur'd , but hardly known ; but in the course of time , not having been known in the beginning , nor cured , it becomes easie to know , but hard to cure . Even so falls it out in matters of State ; for by knowing it aloof off ( which is given only to a wise man to do ) the mischiefs that then spring up , are quickly helped ; but when , for not having been perceived , they are suffered to increase , so that every one sees them , there is then no cure for them : therefore the Romans , seeing these inconvenients af●ar off , alwaies prevented them , and never sufferd them to follow ; for to escape a war , because they knew that a war is not undertaken , but deferred for anothers advantage ; therefore would they rather make a war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece , to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy , though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other , which they thought not good to do : nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the Sages of our dayes , to enjoy the benefits of the present time ; but that rather , to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome ; for time drives forward every thing , and may bring with it as well good as evil , and evil as good . But let us return to France , and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them : and we will speak of Lewis 〈◊〉 not of Charles , as of whom by reason 〈…〉 he long possession he held in Italy we better knew the wayes he went : and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions . King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition , who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy : I will not blame his comming , or the course he took , because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy ; but having not any friends in the country , all gates being barred against him , by reason of King Charles his carriage there , he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could ; and this consideration well taken , would have proved lucky to him , when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error . The King then having conquered Lombardy , recovered presently all that reputation that Charles had lost him ; Genua yeelded to him , the Florentines became friends with him ; the Marquess of Mantua , the the Duke of Ferrara , the Bentivolti , the Lady of Furli , the Lord of Faenza , Pesaro Rimino , Camerino , and Piombino , the Luc●heses , Pisans and Sieneses , every one came and offered him friendship : then might the Venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken , who , only to get into their hands two Townes in Lombardy , made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy . Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy , if he had followed these aforenamed rules , and secured & defended those his friends , who because their number was great , and they weak and fearful , some of the Church , and others of the Venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him , and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest : but he was no sooner got into Milan , than he took a quite wrong course , by giving ayd to Pope Alexander , to seize upon Romania , and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself , ruining his own friends , and those had cast themselves into his bosom , making the Church puissant , by adding to their Spiritual power , whereby they gaind their authority , and so much temporal estate . And having once got out of the way , he was constrained to go on forward ; insomuch as to stop Alexanders ambition , and that he should not become Lord of all Tuscany , of force he was to come into Italy : and this sufficed him not , to have made the Church mighty , and taken away his own friends ; but for the desire he had to get the Kingdome of Naples , he divided it with the King of Spain : and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy , he brought in a competitor , to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country , and all that were ill affected to him , might have otherwhere to make their recourse : and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice King of his own , he took him from thence , to place another there , that might afterward chace him thence . It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary , to desire to be of the getting hand : and alwaies when men undertake it , if they can effect it , they shall be prais'd for it , or at least not blam'd : but when they are notable , and yet will undertake it , here lies the blame , here is the error committed . If France then was able with her own power to assail the Kingdome of Naples , she might well have done it ; but not being able , she should not have divided it : and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians , deserv'd some excuse , thereby to set one foot in Italy ; yet this merits blame , for not being excus'd by that necessity . Lewis then committed these five faults ; extinguisht the feebler ones , augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy , brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner , came not thither himself to dwell there , nor planted any colonies there : which faults while he liv'd , he could not but be the worse for ; yet all could not have gone so ill , had he not committed the sixt , to take from the Venetians their State ; for if he had not enlarg'd the Churches territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy , it had bin necessary to take them lower ; but having first taken those other courses , he should never have given way to their destruction ; for while they had been strong , they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy . For the Venetians would never have given thoir consents thereto , unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves ; and the others would never have taken it from France , to give it them : and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together . And if any one should say , that King Lewis yeelded Romania to Alexander , and the Kingdome of Naples to Spain , to avoid a war ; I answer with the reasons above alledged , that one should never suffer any disorder to follow , for avoiding of a war ; for that war is not sav'd , but put off to thy disadvantage . And if any others argue , that the King had given his word to the Pope , to do that exploit for him , for dissolving of his marriage , and for giving the Cardinals Cap to him of Roan ; I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words , how they ought to be kept . King Lewis then lost Lombardy , for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd , who have possessed themselves of countries , and desir'd to keep them . Nor is this any strange thing , but very ordinary and reasonable : and to this purpose I spake at Nantes with that French Cardinal , when Valentine ( for so ordinarily was Caesar Borgia Pope Alexanders son call'd ) made himself master of Romania ; for when the Cardinal said to me , that the Italians understood not the feats of war ; I answered , the Frenchmen understood not matters of State : for had they been well vers'd therein , they would never have suffer'd the Church to have grown to that greatness . And by experience we have seen it , that the power hereof in Italy , and that of Spain also , was caused by France , and their own ruine proceeded from themselves . From whence a general rule may be taken , which never , or very seldom fails , That he that gives the means to another to become powerful , ruines himself ; for that power is caused by him either with his industry , or with his force ; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant . CHAP. IV. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome taken by Alexder , rebelled not against Alexanders Successors after his death . THe difficulties being consider'd , which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new gotten , some might marvaile how it came to pass , that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years ; and having hardly possessed himself of it , died ; whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled ; nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it , nor found they other difficulty in holding it , than what arose among themselves through their own ambition . I answer , that all the Principalities , whereof we have memory left us , have been governed in two several manners ; either by a Prince , and all the rest Vassals , who as ministers by his favor and allowance , do help to govern that Kingdom ; or by a Prince and by Barons , who not by their Princes favor , but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree . And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own , and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords ; and bare them a true natural affection . Those States that are govern'd by a Prince and by Vassals , have their Prince ruling over them with more authority : for in all his countrey , there is none acknowledged for superior , but himself : and if they yeeld obedience to any one else , it is but as to his minister and officer , nor beare they him any particular good will. The examples of these two different Governments now in our dayes , are , the Turk , and the King of France . The Turks whole Monarchy is govern'd by one Lord , and the rest are all his Vassals ; and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments , he sends several thither , and those he chops and changes , as he pleases . But the King of France is seated in the midst of a multitude of Lords , who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects , and being belov'd by them , enjoy their preheminencies ; nor can the King take their States from them without danger . He then that considers the one and the other of these two States , shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State ; but when once it is subdu'd , great facility to hold it . The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him , are , because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom , nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him , to be able to facilitate his enterprize : which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid ; for for they being all his slaves , and oblig'd to him , can more hardly be corrupted ; and put case they were corrupted , little profit could he get by it , they not being able to draw after them any people , for the reasons we have shewed : whereupon he that assails the Turk , must think to find him united ; and must rather relie upon his own forces , than in the others disorders : but when once he is overcome and broken in the field , so that he cannot repair his armies , there is nothing else to be doubted than the Royal blood , which being once quite out , there is none else left to be feard , none of the others having any credit with the people . And as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them ; so after it , ought he not to fear them . The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of France : for it is easie to be enter'd by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom ; for there are alwaies some male-contents to be found , and those that are glad of innovation . Those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that State , and to further thy victory , which afterwards to make good to thee , draws with it exceeding many difficulties , as well with those that have ayded thee , as those thou hast supprest . Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race : for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will be be the ring-leaders of new changes ; and in case thou art not able to content these , nor extinguish them , thou losest that State , whensoever the occasion is offerd . Now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of Darius was , thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion , and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly , and drive him out of the field ; after which victory Darius being dead , that State was left secure to Alexander , for the reasons we treated of before : and his successors , had they continued in amity , might have enjoy'd it at ease : nor ever arose there in that Kingdome other tumults , than those they themselves stir'd up . But of the States that are order'd and grounded as that of France , it is impossible to become master at such ease : and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain , France , and Greece against the Romans , by reason of the many Principalities those States had : whereof while the memory lasted , the Romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them ; but the memory of them being quite wip't out , by the power and continuance of the Empire , at length they enjoy'd it securely ; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another , each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces , according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein : and that because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent , they acknowledg'd no other but the Romans . By the consideration then of these things , no man will marvaile that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia ; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest , as Pyrrhus , and many others ; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour , but from the difference of the subject . CHAP. V. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd , which , before they were conquer'd , liv'd under their own Laws . WHen those States that are conquered , as it is said , have been accustomed to live under their own Laws , and in liberty , there are three wayes for a man to hold them . The first is to demolish all their strong places ; the other , personally to goe and dwell there ; the third , to suffer them to live under their own Laws , drawing from them some tribute , and creating the rein an Oligarchy , that may continue it in thy service : for that State being created by that Prince , knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force , who is like to doe all he can to maintain it ; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens , which hath been us'd before to live free , than by any other way of keeping . We have for example the Spartans and the Romans ; the Spartans held Athens and Thebes , creating there an Oligarchy : yet they lost it . The Romans to be sure of Capua , Carthage , and Numantia , dismantell'd them quite , and so lost them not : they would have kept Greece as the Spartans had held them , leaving them free , and letring them enjoy their own Laws ; and it prospered not with them : so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it . For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under , than by demolishments ; and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free , and dismantells it not , let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it ; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of libetry for refuge , and the ancient orders it had ; which neither by length of time , nor for any favours afforded them , are ever forgotten ; and for any thing that can be done , or order'd , unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd , that name is never forgotten , nor those customes : but present●ly in every chance recourse is thither made : as Pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the Florentines . But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince , and that whole race is quite extirpated ; on one part being us'd to obey ; on the other , not having their old Prince ; they agree not to make one from among themselves : they know not how to live in liberty , in such manner that they are much slower to take armes ; and with more facility may a Prince gaine them , and secure himselfe of them . But in Republiques there is more life in them , more violent hatred , more earnest desire of revenge ; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them , or suffer them to rest : so that the safest way , is , either to ruine them , or dwell among them . CHAP. VI. Of new Principalities , that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour . LEt no man marvaile , if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities , both touching a Prince , and touching a State , I shall alledge very famous examples : for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others , and proceed in their actions by imitation ; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd , nor their vertues , whose parterue thou set'st before thee , attain●d unto ; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons , and imitate those that have been the most excellent : to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto , at least if may yeeld some savour thereof , and doe as good Archers use , who thinking the place they intend to hit , too farre distant , and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry , they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark ; not for to hit so high with their arrow , but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at . I say , that in Principalities wholly new , where there is a new Prince , there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them , as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser . And because this successe , to become a Prince of a private man , presupposes either vertue , or fortune ; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties ; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune , hath maintain'd himselfe the better . Moreover it some what facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd , because he hath not other dominions , in person to come and dwell there . But to come to these who by their owu vertues , and not by fortune , attain'd to be Princes ; the excellentest of these are Moses , Cyrus , Romulus , Theseus , and such like ; and though of Moses we are not to reason , he onely executing the things that were commanded him by God ; yet merits he well to be admir'd , were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God. But considering Cyrus , and the others , who either got or founded Kingdomes , we shall find them all admirable ; and if there particular actions and Lawes be throughly weigh'd , they will not appeare much differing from those of Moyses , which he receiv'd from so Sovraigne an instructer . And examining their lives and actions , it will not appeare , that they had other help of fortune , than the occasion , which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd ; and without that occasion , the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd ; and without that vertue , the occasion had been offer'd in vaine . It was then necessary for Moses to find the people of Israel slaves in Aegypt , and oppress'd by the Aegyptians , to the end that they to get out of their thraldome , should bee willing to follow him . It was fit that Romulus should not be kept in Albia , but expos'd presently after his birth , that he might become King of Rome , and founder of that City . There was need that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the Medes government , and the Medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace . Theseus could not make proof of his vertue , had not he found the Athenians dispers'd . These occasions therefore made these men happy , and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of , whereby their countrey became enobled , and exceeding fortunate . They , who by vertuous waies , like unto these , become Princes , attain the Principality with difficulty , but hold it with much ease ; and the difficulties they find in gaining the Principality , arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in , to lay the foundation of their State , and work their own security . And it is to be consider'd , how there is not any thing harder to take in hand , nor doubtfuller to succeed , nor more dangerous to mannage , than to be the chief in bringing in new orders ; for this Chief finds all those his enemies , that thrive upon the old orders ; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders , which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage ; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly believe not a new thing , unless there be some certain proof given them thereof . Whereupon it arises , that whensoever they that are adversaries , take the occasion to assayle , they do it factiously ; and these others defend but cooly , so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard . Therefore it is necessary , being we intend throughly to discourse this part , to examine if these innovators stand of themselves , or if they depend upon others ; that is , if to bring their work to effect , it be necessary they should intreat , or be able to constrain ; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill , and bring nothing to pass ; but when they depend of themselves , and are able to force , then seldom it is that they hazzard . Hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd , prevail'd ; but those that were unarm'd , were too weak : for besides what we have alledg'd , the nature of the people is changeable , and easie to be perswaded to a matter ; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion . And therefore it behoves a man to be so provided , that when they beleeve no no longer , he may be able to compel them thereto by force . Moses , Cyrus , Theseus , and Romulus would never have been able to cause their Laws long to be obey'd , had they been disarm'd ; as in our times it befel Fryer Jerome Savanarola , who perish'd in his new constitutions , when the multitude began not to beleeve him ; neither had he the means to keep them firme , that had beleev'd ; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him . Wherefore such men as these , in their proceedings find great difficulty , and all their dangers are in the way , and these they must surmount by their vertue ; but having once master'd them , and beginning to be honored by all , when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities , they remain powerful , secure , honorable , and happy . To these choice examples , I will add one of less remark ; but it shall hold some proportion withthem , and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind , which is Hiero the Sitacusan . He of a private man , became Prince of Siracusa , nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion : for the Siracusans being oppress'd , made choyce of him for their Captain , whereupon he deserv'd to be made their Prince : and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune , that he who writes of him , sayes , he wanted nothing of reigning , but a Kingdom ; this man extinguish'd all the old soldiery , ordaind the new ; left the old allyances , entertained new ; and as he had friendship , and soldiers that were his own , upon that ground he was able to build any edifice ; so that he indured much trouble in gaining , and suffered but little in maintaining . CHAP. VII . Of new Principalities , gotten by fortune , and other mens forces . THey who by fortune only become Princes of private men , with small pains attain to it , but have much a do to maintain themselves in it ; and find no difficulty at all in the way , because they are carried thither with wings : but all the difficulties arise there , after they are plac'd in them . And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money , by the favor of some one that grants it them : as it befell many in Greece , in the cities of Jonia , and Hellespont ; where divers Princes were made by Darius , as well for his own safety as his glory ; as also them that were made Emperors ; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers , attaind to the Empire . These subsist meerly upon the will , and fortune of those that have advanced them ; which are two voluble and unsteady things ; and they neither know how , nor are able to continue in that dignity : they know not how , because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue , it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life , can know how to command : neither are they able , because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them . Moreover those States that suddenly fall into a mans hands , as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly , cannot well have taken root , nor have made their correspondencies so firm , but that the first storm that takes them , ruines them ; in case these , who ( as it is said ) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be Princes , are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms , and can afterwards lay those foundations , which others have cast before they were Princes . For the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince , by Vertue , or by Fortune , I will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory . These were Francis Sforza , and Caesar Borgia ; Francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue , of a private man got to be Duke of Millan ; and that which with much pains he had gaind , he kept with sma 〈…〉 do . On the other side Caesar Borgia ( commonly termed Duke Valentine ) got his state by his Fathers fortune , and with the same lost it ; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd , nor any thing omitted , which by a discreet and valorus man ought to have been done , to fasten his roots in those Estates , which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him ; for ( as it was formerly said ) he that lays not the foundations first , yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards , however it be with the great trouble of the architect , and danger of the edifice . If therefore we consider all the Dukes progresses , we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power , which I judge a matter not superflnous to run over ; because I should not well know , what better rules I might give to a new Prince , than the pattern of his actions ; and however the courses he toook , availd him not , yet was it not his fault , but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extream malignity of fortune . Pope Alexander the sixt , desiring to make the Duke his son a great man , had a great many difficulties , present and future : first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him Lord of any State , that was not the Churches ; and if he turnd to take that from the Church , he knew that the Duke of Milan , and the Venetians would never agree to it ; for Faenza and Riminum were under the Venetians protection . Moreover , he saw that the armes of Italy , and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use , were in their hands , who ought to fear the Popes greatness : and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them : being all in the Orsins and Colonies hands , and those of their faction . It was necessary then , that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed , and the States of Italy disordered , to be able safely to master part of them , which he then sound easie to do , seeing the Venetians upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the French men back again into Italy : which he not only did not withstand , but furthered , with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage . The King then past into Italy with the Venetians ayd , and Alexanders consent ; nor was he sooner arrived in Milan , than the Pope had soldiers from him for the service of Romania , which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the Kings forces . The Duke then having made himself master of Romania , and beaten the Colonies , desiring to hold it , and proceed for ward , two things hindered him : the one , his own soldiers , which he thought were not true to him ; the other , the French mens good wills ; that is to say , he feared that the Princes soldiers , whereof he had served himself , would fail him , and not only hinder his conquest , but take from him what he had gotten ; and that the King also would serve him the same turn . He had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion , when after the taking of Faenza he assaulted Bolonia , to which assault he saw them go very cold . And touching the King , he discovered his mind , when having taken the Dutchy of Vrbin , he invaded Tuscany ; from which action the King made him retire ; whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune , and other mens armes . And the first thing he did , was , to weaken the Orsini , and Colonnies factions in Rome : for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen , giving them large allowances , and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments : so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht , and wholly bent to the Duke . After this , he waited an occasion to root out the Orsini , having before dispers'd those of the family of Colonnia , which fell out well to his hand ; and he us'd it better . For the Orsini being too late aware , that the Dukes and the Churches greatness was their destruction , held a Council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyning to Perusia . From thence grew the rebellion of Vrbin , and the troubles of Romania , and many other dangers befell the Duke , which he overcame all with the help of the French : and having regained his reputation , trusting neither France , nor any forrein forces , to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again , he betook himself to his sleghts ; and he knew so well to disguise his intention , that the Orsins , by the mediation of Paul Orsine , were reconciled to him , to whom the Duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security , giving them rich garments , money , and horses , til their own simplicities led them all to to Sinigcllia , into his hands . These heads being then pluck'd off , and their partisans made his friends , the Duke had laid very good foundations , to build his own greatness on , having in his power all Romania with the Dutchy of Vrbin , and gained the hearts of those people , by beginning to give them some relish of their well being . And because this part is worthy to be taken notice of , and to be imitated by others , I will not let it escape . The Duke , when he had taken Romania , finding it had been under the hands of poor Lords-who had rather pillag'd their subjects , than chastis'd or amended them , giving them more cause of discord , than of peace and union , so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies , quarrels , and other sorts of insolencies ; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification , and obedience to a Princely power , was , to give them some good government : and therefore he set over them one Remiro D' Orco , a cruel hasty man , to whom he gave an absolute power . This man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation . Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose , and doubting it would grow odious , he erected a civil Iudicature in the midst of the countrey , where one excellent Iudge did Preside , and thither every City sent their Advocate : and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred against him , to purge the minds of those people , and to gain them wholly to himself , he purpos'd to shew , that if there was any cruelty used , it proceeded not from any order of his , but from the harsh disposition of his Officers . Whereupon laying hold on him , at this occasion , he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at Cesena , where he was left upon a gibbet , with a bloody sword by his side ; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people . But to return from whence we have digressd : I say , that the Duke finding himself very strong , and in part out of doubt of the present dangers , because he was arm'd after his own manner , and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces , which , because of their vicinity , were able to annoy him , he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest , but the consideration of of France : for he knew , that the King , who now , though late , was advis'd of his error , would never suffer him : and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances , and to waver with France , when the French came towards Naples against the Spaniards , who then besieged Gagetta ; and his design was only to be out of their danger , which had been effected for him , had Pope Alexander lived . And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate . As for the future , he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend , and would endeavor to take that from him that Alexander had bestowed on him ; and he thought to provide for this foure waies : First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had dispoyled , whereby to take those occasions from the Pope . Secondly , by gaining 〈◊〉 the gentlemen of Rome , whereby he might 〈◊〉 able with those to keep the Pope in some awe . Thirdly , to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be . Fourthly , by making of so large Conquests , before the Popes death , as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies . Three of these fowre at Pope - Alexanders death he had effected , and the fourth 〈◊〉 had neare brought to a point . For of those Lords he had stript , he put to death as many as he could come at , and very few escap'd him : he gaind him the Roman Gentlemen : and in the Colledge he had made a great faction . And touching his new Conquest , he had a designe to become Lord of Tuscany . And he had possessed himself already of Perusia , and Pombin , and taken protection of Pisa : and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to France ( which now he meant to hold no longer ) being the French were now driven out of the Kingdome of Naples by the Spaniards , so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes ; he was then to leap into Pisa . After this Lucca and Siena were presently to fall to him , partly for envy to the Florentines , and partly for fear . The Florentines had no way to escape him : all which , had it succeeded with him , as without question it had , the very same year that Alexander dy'd , he had made himself master of so great forces , and such reputation , that he would bave been able to have stood upon his own bottom , without any dependance of fortune , or resting upon others helps , but only upon his own strength and valor . But Alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword : and left him setled only in the State of Romania , with all his other designes in the ayre , sick unto death , between two very strong armies of his enemies ; and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage : and he understood so well , how men are to be gaind , and how to be lost , and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time , that , had he not had those armies upon his back , or had been in health , he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition ; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good , it appeard in that Romania held for him above a moneth , and he remained secure in Rome , though even at deaths doore : and however the Baglioni , Vitelli , and Orsini came into Rome ; yet found they none would take their parts against him . And this he was able to have effected , that if he could not have made him Pope whom he would , he could have hindred him that he would not should be Pope . But had he been in health when Alexander dy'd , every thing had gone easily with him ; and he told me on that day that Julius the second was created Pope , that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen , in case his father chanc'd to dye , and for every thing provided its remedy , this onely excepted , that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also . Having then collected all the Dukes actions , me thinks I could not well blame him , but rather ( as I have here done ) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an Empire . For he being of great courage , and having lofty designes , could not carry himself otherwise ; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexanders life , and his own sickness . Whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality , to secure himself of his enemies , and gain him friends , to overcome either by force , or by cunning , to make himself beloved , or feared of his people , be followed and reverenced by his soldiers , to root out those that can , or owe thee any hurt , to change the ancient orders with new wayes , to be severe , and yet acceptable , magnanimous , and liberall ; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery , and create new ; to maintain to himself the armities of Kings and Princes , so that they shall either with favor benefit thee , or be wary how to offend thee ; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. He deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of Julius the second , wherein an evil choice was made for him : for , as it is said , not being able to make a Pope to his mind , he could have withheld any one from being Pope ; and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy , whom he had ever done harme to ; or who having attaind the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him : because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear , or hatred . Those whom he had offended , were among others , he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula , Colonna , Sr. George , and Ascanius ; all the others that were in possibility of the Popedome , were such as might have feard him rather , except the Cardinal of Roan , and the Spaniards ; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him , the other because of the power they had , having the Kingdome of France on their party ; wherefore the Duke above all things should have created a Spanyard Pope , and in case he could not have done that , he should have agreed that Roan should have been , and not St. Peter ad Vincula . And whoever beleeves , that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries , is much deceiv'd . The Duke therefore in this election , was the cause of this own ruine at last . Till wee come to this seaventh Chapter , I find not any thing much blame-worthy , unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second Chapter ; whereupon hee builds most of thiis Fabrick , viz. That Subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall , or quite crusht . Whereby our Author advises his Prince to support his authority with two Cardinall Vertues , Dissimulation and Cruelty . He considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body , though the principall ; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole . And here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt Chapter of his Rep. l. 1. where hee blames Philip of Macedon for such courses , terming them very cruell , and against all Christian manner of living ; and that every man shou'd refuse to be a King , and desire rather to live a private life , than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind . The life of Caesar Borgia , which is here given as a paterne to new Princes , we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning Carriage of things so , that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle , and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition . For if you runne ever his life , you shall see the Father Pope Alexander the sixt and him , both imbarqued for his advancement , wherein they engag'd the Papall authority , and reputation of Religion ; for faith and conscience these men never knew , though they exacted it of others : there was never promise made , but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage ; Liberali ey was made use of ; Clemency and Cruelty , all alike , as they might serve to worke with their purposes . All was sacrific'd to ambition ; no friendship could tye these men , nor any religion : and no marvell : for ambition made them forget both God and man. But see the end of all this cunning : though this Caesar Borgia contrived all his businesse so warily , that our Author much commends him , and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes , and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy ; Policy shewd it selefe short-sighted ; for hee foresaw not at the time of his Fathers death , he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also . And me thinks this Example might have given occasion to our Author to confesse , that surely there is a God that ruleth the earth . And many times God cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes , when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties . To the intent that the living may know , that the most high ruleth in the Kingdome of men , and giveth it to whomsoever he will , and setteth up over in the basest of men . Daniel . 4. 17. CHAP. VIII . Concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a Principality . BUt because a man becomes a Prince of a private man two wayes , which cannot wholly be attributed either to Fortune or Vertue , I think not fit to let them passe me : howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon , where the Republicks are treated of . These are , when by some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the Principality ; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes Prince of his countrey . And speaking of the first manner , it shall be made evident by two Examples , the one ancient , the other moderne , without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part ; for I take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them . Agathocles the Sicilian , not of a private man onely , but from a base and abject fortune , got to be King of Siracusa . This man borne but of a Potter , continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune : neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution , that applying himselfe to military affaires , by the degrees thereof he attained to bee Praetour of Siracusa , and being setled in that degree , and having determined that he would become Prince , and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other , which by consent had been granted him : and to this purpose haveing had some private intelligence touching his designe with Amilcar the Carithaginian , who was imployd with his army in Sicily , one morning gatherd the people together and the Senate of Syracusa , as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the Commonwealth , and upon a signe given , caus'd his souldiers to kill his Senatours , and the richest of the people ; who being slaine , he usurp'd the Principality of that City without any civill strife : and however he was twice broken by the Carthaginians , and at last besieged , was able not onely to defend his own City , but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof , with the other invaded Affrique , and in a short time freed Siracusa from the siege , and brought the Carthaginians into extreme necessity , who were constraind to accord with him , be contented with the possession of Affrique , and quitt Sicily to Agathocles . He then that should consider the actions and valour of this man , would not see any , or very few things to be attributed unto Fortune ; seeing that as is formerly sayd , not by any ones favour , but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers , to which he had risen , he came to the Principality ; and that hee maintaned afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings . Yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to flay his own Citizens , betray his friends , to be without faith , without pitty , without religion , which wayes are of force to gaine dominion , but not glory : for if Agathocles his valour bee well weighd , in his enturing upon , and comming off from dangers , and the greatnesse of his courage , in supporting and mastering of adversities , no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest Captaines . Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses , allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men . That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or Vertue , which without the one or the other was attaind to by him . In our dayes , while Alexander the sixth held the sea , Oliverotie of Fermo , who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents , was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side , called John Foliani , and in the beginning of his youth given , by him to serve in the warres under Paulo Vitelli : to the end that being well instructed in that discipline , he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs . Afterwards when Paulo was dead , he served under Vitellozzo his brother , and in very short time , being ingenious , of a good personage , and brave courage , he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in : but thinking it but servile to depend upon another , he plotted by the ayd of some Citizens of Fermo ( who lik'd rather the thraldome of their City than the liberty of it ) and by the favour of the Vitelli , to make himselfe master of Fermo ; and writ to John Foliani , that having been many yeeres from home , he had a mind to come and see him and the City , and in some part take notice os his own patrimony ; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour , to the end his Citizens might perceive , that he had not vainely spent his time , he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants ; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order , that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of Fermo , which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle , as his that was the nephew . In this , John faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew : and caus'd him to be well receivd by them of Fermo , and lodged him in his own house : where having passed some dayes , and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany , he made a very solemne feast , whether he invited John Foliani , and all the prime men of Fermo : and when all their chear was ended , and all their other entertainments , as in such feasts it is customary , Oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses ; speaking of the greatnesse of Pope Alexander , and Caesar his son , and their undertakings ; where unto John and the others making answer , he of a sudden stood up , saying , that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place , and so retir'd into a chamber , whether John and all the others Citizens followd him ; nor were they sooner set downe there , than from some secret place therein came forth diverse souldiers , who slew John and all the others : after which homicide Oliverotto got a horse-backe and ravaged the whole towne , and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace , so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him , and to settle a government , whereof hee made himselfe Prince ; and they being all dead who , had they been discontented with him , could have hurt him ; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders , so that in the space of a yeer that he held the Principality , he was not only secure in the City of Fermo , but became fearefull to all his neighbours ; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult , as that of Agathocles , had he not let himselfe been deceivd by Caesar Borgia , when at Sinigallia , as before was said , he took the Orsini and Vitelli : where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide , was strangled together with Vitellozzo ( whome he had had , for master both of his vertues and vices . ) Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed , that Agathocles , and such like , after many treacheries and crueltyes , could possibly live long secure in his own contrey , and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies , and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him , seeing that by means of cruelty , many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their States , much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre . I beleeve that this proceeds from the well , or ill using of those cruelties : they may bee termd well us'd ( if it bee lawfull to say well of evill ) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake , not insisting therein afterwards ; but there is use made of them for the subiects profit , as much as may be . But those that are ill us'd , are such as though they bee but few in the beginning , yet they multiply rather in time , than diminish . They that take that first way , may with the help of God , and mens care , find some remedy for their State , as Agathocles did : for the others , it is impossible they should continue . Whereupon it is to be noted , that in the lay ing hold of a State , the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once , that he be not forced often to returne to them , and that he may be able , by not renewing of them , to give men some security , and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies . Hee that carries it otherwise , either for fearefullnesse , or upon evill advice , is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand ; nor ever can heerely upon his subjects , there being no possibility for them , because of his daily and continuall injuries , to live in any safety : for his injuries should bee done altogether , that being seldomer t●sted , they might lesse offend ; his favours should bee bestowd by little , and little to the end they might keep their taste the better ; and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in such sort , that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary : for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversries , thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties ; and the favours which then thou bestowest , will little help thee , being taken as if they came from thee perforce , and so yeeld no returne of thanks . CHAP. IX . Of the Civill Principality . BUt comming to the other part , when a principall Citizen , not by villany , or any other insufferable violence , but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey : which we may terme a Civill Principality ; nor to attaine hereunto is Verue wholly ' or Fortune wholly necessary , but rather a fortunate cunning : I say , this Principality is climb'd up to , either by the peoples help , or the great mens . For , in every City we finde these two humours differ ; and they spring from this , that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones , and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people : and from these two several appetites , arise in the City one of these three effects , either a Principality , or Liberty , or Tumultuary licentionsnesse . The Principality is caused either by the people , or the great ones , according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd ; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people , begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them , and make him Prince , whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes . The people also , not being able to support the great mens insolencies , converting the whole reputation to one man , create him their Prince , to be protected by his authority . He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones , subsists with more difficulty , than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour ; for he being made Prince , hath many about him , who account themselves his equalls , and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure . But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor , finds himselfe alone in his throne , and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend : besides this , the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied , or without doing of wrong to others , where as a small matter contents the people : for the end which the people propound to themselves , is more honest than that of the great men , these desiring to oppresse , they only not to be oppressed . To this may be added also , that the Prince which is the peoples enemy , can never well secure himselfe of them , because of their multitude ; well may hee bee sure of the Nobles , they being but a few . The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy , is to be abandoned by them : but when the greatones once grow his enemies , he is not only to feare their abandoning of him , but their making of a party against him also : for there being in them more forecast and craft , they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves , and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery . The Prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people , but can doe well enough without the same great men ; he being able to create new ones , and destroy them again every day , and to take from them , and give them credit as he pleases : and to cleare this part , I say , that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally , that is , if they take thy proceedings so much to heart , as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine , in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle , they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd : those that bind themselves not to thy fortune , are to be considerd also two wayes ; either they doe it for lack of courage , and naturall want of spirit , and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them , and of them especially that are men of good advice ; for if thy affaires prosper , thou dost thy selfe honour thereby ; if crost , thou needst not feare them : but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose , and upon occasion of ambition , it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee : and of these the Prince ought to beware , and account of them as his discoverd enemyes : for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee . Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince by the peoples favour , keepe them his friends : which he may easily doe , they desiring only to live free from oppression : but he that becomes Prince by the great mens favour , against the will of the people , ought above all things to gaine the people to him , which he may easily effect , when he takes upon him their protection : And because men when they find good , where they look for evill , are thereby more endered to their benefactour , therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him , as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity . And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes , which because they vary according to the subject , no ●ertaine rule can be given thereupon ; wherefore we shall let them passe I will only conclude , that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend ; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe . Nabis Prince of the Spartans supported the siege of all Greece , and an exceeding victorious army of the Romans , and against those defended his native countrey and State , and this suffic'd him alone , that as the danger came upon him , he secur'd himself of a fewer ; whereas if the people had been his enemy , this had nothing availd him . And let no man think to overthrow this my opinon with that common proverb , that He who relyes upon the people , layes his foundation in the dirt ; for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them making his account that the people shall free him , when either his enemyes or the Magistrates oppresse him : In this case he should find himself often deceiv'd , as it befell the Gracchyes in Rome , and in Florence George Scali : but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon , who can command , and is a man of courage , who hath his wits about him in his adversiryes , and wants not other preparations , and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders , shall not prove deceiv'd by them , and shall find he hath layd good foundations . These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the ciuil order to the absolute : for these Princes either command of themselves , or by the Magistrate ; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous , because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens , who then areset over the Magistrates , who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up against them , or by nor obeying them ; and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him : for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates , are not like in those fractions to obey his : and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust ; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times , when the Citizens have need of the State ; for then every one runs , and every one promises , and very one will venture his life for him , when there is no danger neare ; but in times of hazzard , when the State hath need of Citizens , there are but few of them then , and so much the more is this experience dangerous , in that it can be but once made . Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government , and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him . CHAP. X. In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured . IT is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities , to have another consideration of them , that is , if a Prince have such dominions , that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself , or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him . And to clear this point the better , I judge them able to stand of themselves , who are of power either for their multitudes of men , or quantity of money , to bring into the field a compleat armie , and ioyn battel with whoever comes to assail them : and so I think those alwaies to stand in need of others help , who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy , but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them . Touching the first case , we have treated already , and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require . In the second case , we cannot say other , save only to encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city , and of the countrey about , not to hold much account ; and whoever shall have well fortified that town , and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects , as hath been formerly said , and hereafter shall be , shall never be assaild but with great regard ; for men willingly undertake not enterprises , where they see difficulty to work them through ; nor can much facility be there found , where one assails him , who hath his town strong and wel guarded , and is not hated of his people . The cities of Germany are very free ; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them ; and they obey the Emperor , when they please , and they stand not in fear , neither of him nor any other Potentate about them : for they are in such a manner fortified , that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious : for all of them have ditches and rampires , and good store of Artillery , and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer : besides this , whereby to feed the common people , and without any loss to the publick , they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city , and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves : they hold up also the military exercises in repute , and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them . A Prince then that is master of a good strong city , and causeth not himself to be hated , cannot be assaulted ; and in case he were , he that should assail him , would be fain to quit him with shame : for the affairs of the world are so various , that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer : and if any should reply , that the people having their possessions abroad , in case they should see them a fire , would not have patience , and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their Prince : I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious , will easily master those difficulties , now giving his subjects hope , that the mischiief will not be of durance ; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies , and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy . Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey , upon his arrival , and at those times while mens minds are yet warme , and resolute in their defence : and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt : for after some few dayes , that their courages grow coole , the dammages are all done , and mischiefs received , and there is no help for it , and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince , thinking he is now more bound to them , their houses having for his defence been fired , and their possessions wasted ; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do , as for those they receive ; whereupon if all be well weigh'd , a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege , when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition . CHAP. XI . Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities . THere remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities , about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten : for they are attained to either by vertue , or Fortune ; and without the one or the other they are held : for they are maintaind by orders inverterated in the religion , all which are so powerfull and of such nature , that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live . These only have an Estate and defend it not ; have subjects and govern them not ; and yet their States because undefended , are not taken from them ; nor their subjects , though not govern'd , care not , think not , neither are able to aliene themselves from them . These Principalities then are only happy and secure : but they being sustained by superior causes , whereunto humane understanding reaches not , I will not meddle with them : for being set up and maintained by God , it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them . Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds , that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness , seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt , the Italian Potentates , and not only they who are entituled the potentates , but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition , in regard of the temporality , made but small account of it ; and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof ; and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy , and ruine the Venetians ; and however this be well known , me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory . Before that Charles King of France past into Italy , this countrey was under the rule of the Pope , Venetians , the King of Naples , the Duke of Milan , and the Florentines . These Potentates took two things principally to their care ; the one , that no forreiner should invade Italy ; the other , that no one of them should inlarge their State. They , against whom this care was most taken , were the Pope and the Venetians ; and to restrain the Venetians , there needed the union of all the rest , as it was in the defence of Ferrara ; and to keep the Pope low , they served themselves of the Barons of Rome , who being divided into two factions , the Orsini and Colonnesi , there was alwaies occasion of offence between them , who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope , held the Popedome weak and feeble : and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope , as was Sextus ; yet either his fortune , or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities , and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof ; for in ten years ; which time , one with another , Popes ordinarily liv'd , with much ado could they bring low one of the factions . And if , as we may say , one had near put out the Colonnesi , there arose another enemy to the Orsini , who made them grow again , so that there was never time quite to root them out . This then was the cause , why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in Italy ; there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt , who of all the Popes that ever were , shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces : and he effected , by means of his instrument , Duke Valentine , and by the ocasion of the French mens passage , all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions : and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions , but to make the Duke great ; yet what he did , turnd to the Churches advantage , which after his death when the Duke was taken away , was the heir of all his pains . Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius , and found the Church great , having all Romania , and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out , and by Alexanders persecutions , all their factions worne down ; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys , never practised before Alexanders time ; which things Julius not only follow'd , but augmented ; and thought to make himself master of Bolonia , and extinguish the Venetians , and chase the French men out of Italy : and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him , and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church , and in no private regard : he kept also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi , in the same State he found them : and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration ; yet two things have held them quiet ; the one the power of the Church , which somewhat affrights them ; the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions , who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them : nor shall these parties ever be at rest , while they have Cardinals ; because they nourish the factious both in Rome , and abroad ; and the Barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them : and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons . And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedome exceeding puissant , of whom it is hoped , that if they amplified it by armes he by his goodness , and infinite other vertues , will much more advantage and dignifie it . CHAP. XII . How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercinary soldiers . HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities , which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon , and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being , and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain , and hold them , it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences , that may chance in each of the forenamed . We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid ; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack . The Principal foundations that all States have , as well new , as old , or mixt , are good laws , and good armes ; and because there cannot be good laws , where there are not good armes ; and where there are good armes , there must needs be good laws , I will omit to discourse of the laws , and speak of armes . I say then that the armes , wherewithall a Prince defends his State , either are his own , or mercenary , or auxiliary , or mixt . Those that are mercenary and auxiliar , are unprofitable , and dangerous , and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes , he shall never be quiet , nor secure , because they are never well united , ambitious , and without discipline , treacherous , among their friends stout , among their enemies cowardly ; they have no fear of God , nor keep any faith with men ; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief , till the enemy comes to assul thee ; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them , in war by thy enemies : the reason hereof is , because they have no other love , nor other cause to keep them in the field , but only a small stipend , which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee : they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers , till thou goest to fight ; but then they fly , or run away ; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade ; for the ruine of Italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes , than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes ; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service , and among themselves they may have been thought valiant : but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared , they quickly shewed what they were . Whereupon Charles the King of France , without opposition , made himself master of all Italy : and he that said , that the causes thereof were our faults , said true ; but these were not those they beleeved , but what I have told ; and because they were the Princes faults , they also have suffered the punishment . I will suller shew the infelicity of these armes . The mercenary Captains are either very able men , or not : if they be , thou canst not repose any trust in them : for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements , either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord , or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose : but if the Captain be not valorons , he ordinarily ruines thee : and in case it be answered , that whoever shall have his armes in his hands , whether mercenary or not , will do so : I would reply , that armes are to be imployed either by a Prince , or Common-wealth . The Prince ought to go in person , and performe the office of a commander : the Republick is to send forth her Citizens : and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities , she ought to change him then ; and when he does prove valorous , to bridle him so by the laws , that he exceed not his commission . And by experience we see , that Princes and Republiques of themselves alone , make very great conquests ; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme ; and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own Citizens , than one that is armed by forrein armes . Rome and Sparta subsist●d many ages armed and free . The Swissers are exceedingly well armed , and yet very free . Touching mercenary armes that were of old , we have an example of the Car thagians , who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers , when the first war with the Romans was finished ; however the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains . Philip of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death , General of their Armies ; and after the victory , he took from them their liberty . The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead , entertaind Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians , who having vanquisht their enemie at Cara●aggio , afterwards joyned with them , where by to usurp upon the Milaneses his Masters . Sforza his father , being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay , left her on a sudden disarmed ; whereupon she , to save her Kingdom , was constrained to cast her self into the King of Arragon's bosome . And in case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State with these kind of armes , and their own Captains , and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes , but rather defended them : I answer , that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend : for of valorous Captains , which they might any way fear , some have not been victors , some have had opposition , and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way . He who overcame not , was John Aouto , of whose faith there could no proof be made , being he vanquisht not ; but every one will acknowledge , that , had he vanquisht , the Florentines were at his discretion . Sforza had alwaies the Bracceschi for his adversaries , so that they were as a guard one upon another . Francis converted all his ambition against Lombardy . Braccio against the Church , and the Kingdome of Naples . But let us come to that which followed a while agoe . The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General , a throughly advis'd man , and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation : had he taken Pisa , no man will deny but that the Florentines must have held fast with him ; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay , they had no remedy ; and they themselves holding of him , of force were to obey him . The Venetians , if we consider their proceedings , we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously , while themselves made war , which was before their undertakings by land , where the gentlemen with their own Commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely : but when they began to fight by land , they lost their valor , and follow'd the customes of Italy ; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land , because thee had not much territory , and yet were of great reputation , they had not much cause to fear their Captains ; but as they began to extend their bounds , which was under their Commander Carminiola , they had a taste of this error : for perceiving he was exceeding valorous , having under his conduct beaten the Duke of Milan ; and knowing on the other side , how he was cold in the war , they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him ; and because they neither would , nor could cashier him , that they might not lose , what they had gotten , they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death . Since they have had for their General Bartholomew of Berganio , Robert St. Severin , the Count of Petilian , and such like : whereby they were to fear their losses , as well as to hope for gain : as it fell out afterwards at Vayla , where in one day they lost that , which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years : for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains ; but sadden and wonderfull losses : And because I am now come with these examples into Italy , which now these many years , have been governd by mercenary armes , I will search deeper into them , to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd , they may be the better amended . You have to understand , that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the Italian Empire began to be shaken off , and the Pope had gotten reputation in the temporality , Italy was divided into several States : for many of the great cities took armes against their Nobility ; who under the Emperors protection had held them in oppression ; and the Pope favored these , whereby he might get himself reputation , in the temporality ; of many others , their Citizens became Princes , so that hereupon Italy being come into the Churches hands as it were , and some few Republicks , those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of armes , began to take strangers to their pay . The first that gave reputation to these soldiers was Alberick of Como in Romania . From his discipline among others descended Brachio and Sforza , who in their time were the arbitres of Italy ; after these followed all others , who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of Italy ; and the success of their valor hath been , that it was overrun by Charles , pillaged by Lewis , forc'd by Ferdinand , and disgrac'd by the Swissers . The order which they have held , hath been , first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the Infantry . This they did , because they having no State of their own , but living upon their industry , their few foot gave them no reputation , and many they were not able to maintain ; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavalery , and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honored : and matters were brought to such termes , that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot . They had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and their soliders of all pains and fear , in their skirmishes , not killing , but taking one another prisoners , and without ransome for their freedom ; they repaired not all to their tents by night , nor made palizado or trench thereabout , nor lay in the field in the summer : and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders , whereby ( as is said ) to avoid pains and dangers , insomuch as they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace . CHAP. XIII . Of Auxiliary Soldiers , mixt , and native . THe Auxiliary forces , being the other kind of unprofitable armes , are , when any puissant one is called in , who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee ; such as in these later times did Pope Julius use , who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of Ferrara , applied himself to the Auxiliaries , and agreed with Ferdinand King of Spain , that with his Forces he should aid him . These armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves ; but for him that calls them in , hurtfull ; because in losing , thou art lest defeated ; and conquering , thou becomest their prisoner . And however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught ; yet will I not part from this of Pope Julius the second , which is as yet fresh : whose course could not have been more inconsiderate , for the desire he had to get Ferrara , putting himself wholly into strangers hands : but his good fortune caused another cause to arise , that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice ; for his Auxiliaries being broken at Ravenna , and the Swissers thereupon arriving , who put the Conquerors to flight beyond all opinion , even their own and others , he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner , they being put to flight , nor prisoner to his Auxiliaries , having vanquished by other forces than theirs . The Florentines being wholly disarmed , brought ten thousand French to Pisa for to take it , by which course they ran more hazzard , than in any time of their troubles . The Emperor of Constantinople , to oppress his neighbors , brought into Greece ten thousand Turks , who when the war was ended , could not be got out thence , which was the beginning of Greeces fervitude under the Infidels . He then that will in no case be able to overcome , let him serve himself of these armes ; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries ; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed ; for they are all united , and all bent to the obedience of another . But for the mercenaries to hurt thee , when they have vanquished , there is no more need of time , and greater occasion , they not being all united in a body , and being found out and paid by thee , wherein a third that thou mak'st their head , cannot suddenly gaine so great authority , that he can endammage thee . Insumme , in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous : in the auxiliaries their valonr . Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes , and betaken himself to his owne , and desired rather to loss with his owne , than conquer with anothers , accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes . I will not doubt to alleadge Caesar Bargia , and his actions . This Duke entred into Romania with auxiliarie armes s bringing with him all French souldiers : but afterwards not accounting those armes secure , bent hinselfe to mercenaries , judging lesse danger to be in those , and tooke in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli , which afterwards in the proof of them , finding wavering , unfaithful , and dangerous , he extinguishd , and betook himselfe to his owne ; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes , confidering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation , when he had the French men alone , and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli ; but when he remaind with his own , and stood of himselfe , we shall find it was much augmented : nor ever was it of grate esteeme , but when every one saw , that he wholly possessed his owne a mes . I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory ; but that I must not let passe that of Hiero the Siracusan , being one of those I formerly nam'd . This man ( as I said before ) being made general of the Siracusans forces , knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings , as our Italians are ; and finding no way either to hold , or cashier them , made them all bee cut to peeces , and afterwards waged warre with his owne men , and none others . I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose . When David presented himselfe before Saul to goe to fight with Goliah the Philistims Champion , Saul to encourage him , clad him with his owne armes , which David when he had them upon his back , refus'd , saying , he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein , and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword . In summe , others armes either fall from thy shoulders , or cumber or streighten thee . Charls the seventh , Father of Lewis the eleventh , having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English , knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes , and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes , and infantry . Afterwards King Lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry , and began to take the Swissers to pay ; which errour follow'd by the others , is ( as now indeed it appeares ) the cause of that Kingdomes dangers . For having given reputation to the Swissers , they have renderd all their own armes contemptible ; for this hath wholly ruind their foot , and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes : for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers , they think they are not able to overcome without them . From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers , and without them also against others they use not to adventure . Therefore are the French armies mixt , part more naries , and part natives , which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries , and much inferiour to the natives ; and let the said example suffice for that : for the Kingdome of France would have been unconquerable , if Charles his order had been augmented and maintaind but men in their small wisdome begin a thing , which then because it hath some favour of good , discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder , as I before said of the h●ctick feavers . Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes , but as they grow up , is not truely wise ; and this is given but to few : and if we consider the first ruine of the Romane Empire , we shall find it was from taking the Goths first into their pay ; for from that beginning the forces of the Romane Empire began to grow weak , and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them . I conclude then that without having armes of their owne , no Principality can be secure , or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune , not having valour to shelter it in adversity . And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men , that nothing is so weak and unsetled , as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces : which are those that are composed of thy subjects , or Citizens , or servants ; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary ; and the manner how to order those well , is easie to find out , if those orders above nam'd by me , shall be but run over , and if it shall be but consider'd , how Philip Alexander the Great his Father , and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have armd and appointed themselves , to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly . CHAP. XIV . What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline . A Prince then ought to have no other ayme , nor other thought , nor take any thing else for his proper art , but warr , and the orders and discipline thereof : for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands , and is of so great excellency , that not only those that are borne Princes , it maintains so ; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity . And it is seene by the contrary , that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights , than to the warres , they have lost their States ; and the first cause that makes thee lose it , is the neglect of that arte ; and the cause that makes thee gaine it , is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte . Francis Sforza by being a man at , armes , of a private man became Duke of Milan ; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of Princes , became private-men . For among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee , it causes thee to be contemnd , which is one of those disgraces , from which a Prince ought to keepe himselfe , as hereafter shall be sayd : for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion ; and reason will not , that he who is in armes , should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them , and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls ; for there being disdaine in the one , and suspicion in the other , it is impossible these should ever well co-operate . And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre , besides the other infelicities belonging to him , as is said , cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers , nor yet trust in them . Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre , and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre ; which he may be able to doe two wayes ; the one practically , and in his labours and recreations of his body , the other theorically . And touching the practick part , he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes , give himselfe much to the chase , whereby to accustome his body to paines , and partly to understand the manner of situations , and to know how the mountaines arise , which way the vallyes open themselves , and how the plaines ars distended flat abroad , and to conceive well the nature of the rivers , and marrish ground , and herein to bestow very much care , which knowledge is profitable in two kinds : first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey , and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof , and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in , these situations , easily comprehend any other situation , which a new he hath need to view , for the little hillocks . vallies , plaines , rivers , and marrish places . For example , they in Tuscany are like unto those of other countries : so that from the knowledge of the site of one country , it is easie to attain to know that of others . And that Prince that wants this skill , failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht with ; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy , to pitch the camp , to lead their armies , to order their battells , and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage . Philopomenes Prince of the Achayans , among other praises Writers give him , they say , that in time of peace , he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre ; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends , would often stand still , and discourse with them , in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill , and we here with our army , whether of us two should have the advantage , and how might we safely goe to find them , keeping still our orders ; and if we would retire our selves , what course should we take if they retir'd , how should we follow them ? & thus on the way , propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army ; would heare their opinions , and tell his owne , and confirme it by argument ; so that by his continuall thought hereupon , when ever he led any army no chance could happen , for which he had not a remedy . But touching the exercise of the mind , a Prince ought to read Histories , and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men , marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs , examine the occasions of their victories , and their losses ; wherby they may be able to avoyd these , and obtaine those ; and above all , doe as formerly some excellent man hath done , who hath taken upon him to imitate , if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious ; the course he took , and kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds : as it is said , that Alexander the great imitated Achilles ; Caesar Alexander , and Scipio Cyrus . And whoever reads the life of Cyrus , written by Xenophon , may easily perceive afterwards in Scipio's life how much glory his imitation gaind him , and how much Scipio did conforme himselfe in his chastity , affability , humanity , and liberality with those things , that are written by Xenophon of Cyrus . Such like wayes ought a wise Prince to take , nor ever be idle in quiet times , but by his paines then , as it were provide himself of store , whereof he may make some use in his adversity , the end that when the times change , he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune . CHAP. XV. Of those things , in respect whereof , men , and especially Princes , are praised , or dispraised . IT now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a Prince ought to be , and his termes of government over his subjects , and towards his friends . And because I know that many have written hereupon ; I doubt , left I venturing also to treat thereof , may be branded with presumption , especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others . But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me , I thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter , than the imagination thereof ; And many Principalities and Republiques , have been in imagination , which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed : for there is such a distance between how men doe live , and how men ought to live ; that he who leaves that which is done , for that which ought to be done , learnes sooner his ruine than his preservation ; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions , must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest . Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince , desiring to preserve himselfe , to be able to make use of that honestie , and to lay it aside againe , as need shall require . Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a Prince , to discourse upon those that are really true ; I lay that all men , whensover mention is made of them , and especially Princes , because they are placed aloft in the view of all , are taken notice of for some of these qualities , which procure them either commendations or blame : and this is that some one is held liberal , some miserable , ( miserable I say , nor covetous ; for the covetous desire to have , though it were by rapine ; but a miserable man is he , that too much for bears to make use of his owne ) some free givers , others extortioners ; some cruell , others pitious ; the one a Leaguebreaker , another faithfull ; the one effeminate and of small courage , the other fierce and couragieus ; the one courteous , the other proud ; the one lascivious , the other chaste ; the one of faire dealing , the other wily and crafty ; the one hard , the other easie ; the one grave , the other light ; the one religious , the other incredulous , and such like . I know that every one will confesse , it were exceedingly praise worthy for a Prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good : but because this is not possible , nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues , it is necessary for him to be so discret , that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his State ; and if it be possible , beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence ; but where it cannot be , let them passe with lesse regard . And yet , let him not stand much upon it , though he incurre the infamie of those vices , without which he can very hardly save his State : for if all be throughly considered , some things we shall find which will have the colour and very face of Vertue , and following them , they will lead the to thy destruction ; whereas some others that shall ●s much seeme vice , if we take the course they lead us , shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being . The second blemish in this our Authours book , I find in his fifteenth Chapter : where he instructs his Prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue , or vice , according to his advnatage , which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the Principality nor in securing it when it is attaind . For Politicks , presuppose Ethiques , which will never allow this rule : as that a man might make this small difference between vertue , and vice , that he may indifferently lay aside , or take up the , one or the other , and put it in prastise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe . I doubt our Authour would have blamd Davids regard to Saul , when 1 Sam. 24. in the cave he cut off the lap of Sauls garment , and spared his head ; and afterwards in the 26. when he forbad Abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping . Worthy of a Princes consideration is that saying of Abigal to David 1 Sam. 25. 30. It shall come to passe when the Lord shall have done to my Lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee , & shall have appointed thee Ruler over Israel , that this shall be no grief to thee , nor offence of heart unto my Lord , that thou hast forborne to shed blood &c. For surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built , or underpropped their tyranny , causes men , as well metus as spes in longum projicere , which sets them a work on further mischiefe . CHAP. XVI . Of Liberality , and Miserablenesse . BEginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities , I say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall : neverthelesse , liberality used in such a manner , as to make thee be accounted so , wrongs thee : for in case it be used vertuously , and as it ought to he , it shall never come to be taken notice of , so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary . And therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men , it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality , insomuch that a Prince alwayes so dispos'd , shall waste all his revenues , and at the end shall be forc'd , if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality , heavily to burthen his subjects , and become a great exactour ; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony : which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects , and fall into every ones contempt , growing necessitous : so that having with this liberality wrong'd many , and imparted of his bounty but to a few ; he feels every first mischance , and runs a hazard of every first danger . Which he knowing , and desiring to withdraw himself from , incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable . A Prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality , without his own damage , in such a sort , that it may be taken notice of , ought , if he be wise , not to regard the name of Miserable ; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal , seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him ; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him , and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects : so that he comes to use his liberality to all those , from whom he takes nothing , who are infinite in number ; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing , who are but a few . In our dayes we have not seen any , but those who have been held miserable , do any great matters ; but the others all quite ruind . Pope Julius the second , however he serv'd himself of the name of Liberal , to get the Papacy , yet never intended he to continue it , to the end he might be able to make war against the King of France : and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax , because his long thrift supplyed his large expences . This present King of Spain could never have undertaken , nor gone through with so many exploits , had he been accounted liberal . Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard ( that he may not be driven to pillage his subiects , that he may be able to defend himself , that he may not fall into poverty and contempt , that he be not forced to become an extortioner ) though he incurre the name of miserable ; for this is one of those vices , which does not pluck him from his throne . And if any one should say , Caesar by his liberality obtained the Empire , and many others ( because they both were , and were esteemd liberal ) attaind to exceeding great dignities . I answer , either thou art already come to be a Prince , or thou art in the way to it ; in the first case , this liberality is hurtful ; in the second , it is necessary to be accounted so ; and Caesar was one of those that aspired to the Principality of Rome . But if after he had gotten it , he had survived , and not forborne those expences , he would quite have ruined that Empire . And if any one should reply ; many have been Princes , and with their armies have done great exploits , who have been held very liberal . I answer , either the Prince spends of his own and his subjects , or that which belongs to others : in the first , he ought to be sparing ; in the second , he should not omitany part of liberality . And that Prince that goes abroad with his army , and feeds upon prey , and spoyle , and tributes , and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others , necessarily should use this liberality ; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him ; and of that which is neither thine , nor thy subjects , thou mayest well be a free giver , as were Cyrus , Caesar and Alexander ; for the spending of that which is anothers , takes not away thy reputation , but rather adds to it , only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee ; nor is there any thing consumes it self so much as liberality , which whilest thou usest , thou losest the means to make use of it , and becomest poore and abject ; or to avoid this poverty , an extortioner and hatefull person . And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of , is , to be dispised , and odious ; to one and the other of which , liberality brings thee . Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable , which begets an infamy without hatred , than to desire that of Liberal , whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner , which procures an infamy with hatred . CHAP. XVII . Of Cruelty , and Clemency , and whether it is better to be belov'd , or feard . DEscending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities , I say , that every Prince should desire to be held pitiful , and not cruel . Nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty . Caesar Borgia was accounted cruel , yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in Romania , setled it in union , and restored it to peace , and fidelity : which , if it be well weighed , we shall see was an act of more pitty , than that of the people of Florence , who to avoyd the terme of cruelty , suffered Pistoya to fall to destruction . Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty , for to hold his subjects united and fai●hfull : for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way , he shall be hold more pittiful than they , who through their too much pitty , suffer disorders to follow , from whence arise murthers and rapines : for these are wont to hurt an intire universality , whereas the executions practised by a Prince , hurt only some particular . And among all sorts of Princes , it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruel , because all new States are full of dangers : Whereupon Virgil by the mouth of Dido excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdom , saying , Res dura & Regni novitas me talia cogunt Moliri & latè fines custode tenere . My hard plight and new State force me to guard . My confines all about with watch and ward . Nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving beleif to any thing , or moving himself thereat , nor make his people extreamly afraid of him ; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome , and humanity , that his too much confidence make him not unwary , and his too much distrust intolerable ; from hence arises a dispute , whether it is better to be belov'd or feard : I answer , a man would wish he might be the one and the other : but because hardly can they subsist both together , it is much safer to be feard , than be loved ; being that one of the two must needs fail ; for touching men , we may say this in general , they are unthankful , unconstant , dissemblers , they avoyd dangers , and are covetous of gain ; and whilest thou doest them good , they are wholly thine ; their blood , their fortunes , lives and children are at thy service , as is said before , when the danger is remote ; but when it approaches , they revolt . And that Prince who wholly relies upon their words , unfurnished of all other preparations , goes to wrack : for the friendships that are gotten with rewards , and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind , are dearly bought indeed ; but they will neither keep long , nor serve well in time of need : and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love , than by fear . For love is held by a certainty of obligation , which because men are mischievous , is broken upon any occasion of their own profit . But fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner , that if he gains not love , he may avoid hatred : for it may well stand together , that a man may be feard and not hated ; which shall never fail , if he abstain from his subjects goods , and their wives ; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives , do it when it is to be done upon a just cause , and apparent conviction ; but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods ; for men forget sooner the death of their father , than the loss of their patrimony . Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods , do never fail : and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine , finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods : but against mens lives , they are seldome found , and sooner fail . But where a Prince is abroad in the field with his army , and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government , then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it , though he be termed cruel : for unless he be so , he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another , nor ever well disposed to any brave peice of service . Among Hannibals actions of mervail , this is reckoned for one , that having a very huge army , gathered out of several nations , and all led to serve in a strange countrey , there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves , nor against their General , as well in their bad fortune as their good . Which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his , which together with his exceeding many vertues , rendred him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible ; without which , to that ●ff●ct his other vertues had served him to little purpose : and some writers though not of the best advised , on one side admire these his worthy actions , and on the otherside , condemn the principal causes thereof . And that it is true , that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him , we may consider in Scipio , the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv●d , but even in the memory of man ; from whom his army rebel'd in Spain : which grew only upon his too much clemency , which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious , than was well tollerable by military discipline : for which he was reprov'd by Fabius Maximus in the Senate , who termed him the corrupter of the Roman soldiery . The Locrensians having been destroyed by a Lieutenant of Scipio's , were never reveng'd by him , nor the insolence of that Lieutenant punisht ; all this arising from his easie nature : so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate , said , that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults , than to correct the faults of other men : which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd Scipio's reputation and gloory , had he therewith continu'd in his commands : but living under the government of the Senate , this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd , but prov'd to the advancement of his glory . I conclude then , returning to the purpose of being feard , and belov'd ; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure , and to serve their own turne , and their fear depends upon the Princes pleasure , every wise Prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself , and not upon that which is of another : only this , he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred , as was said . CHAP. XVIII . In what manner Princes ought to keep their words . HOw commendable in a Prince it is to keep his word , and live with integrity , not making use of cunning and subtlety , every one knows well : yet we see by experience in these our dayes , that those Princes have effected great matters , who have made small reckoning of keeping their words , and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about , and in the end , have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth . You must then know , there are two kinds of combating or fighting ; the one by right of the laws , the other meerly by force . That first way is proper to men , the other is also common to beasts : but because the first many times suffices not , there is a necessity to make recourse to the second ; wherefore it behooves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast , as well as that which is proper to a man. This part hath been covertly shew'd to Princes by ancient writers ; who say that Achilles and many others of those ancient Princes were intrusted to Chiron the Senator , to be brought up under his discipline : the moral of this , having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man , was nothing else , but that it was needful for a Prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature , because neither could subsist without the other . A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast , ought to serve himself of the conditions of the Fox and the Lion ; for the Lion cannot keep himself from snares , nor the Fox defend himself against the Wolves . He had need then be a Fox , that he may beware of the snares , and a Lion that he may scare the wolves . Those that stand wholly upon the Lion , understand not well themselves . And therefore a wise Prince cannot , nor ought not keep his faith given , when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage , and the occasions that made him promise , are past . For if men were all good , this rule would not be allowable ; but being they are full of mischief , and would not make it good to thee , neither art thou tyed to keep it with them : nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach . Very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd , wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded , and how many promises made , have been violated and broken by the infidelity of Princes ; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the Fox in condition . But it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition , and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly ; and men are so simple , and yeeld so much to the present necessities , that he who hath a mind to deceive , shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd . I will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late . Alexander the sixth , never did any thing else than deceive men , and never meant otherwise , and alwaies found whom to work upon ; yet never was there man would protest more effectually , nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths , and observe them less than he ; nevertheless , his cousenages all thriv'd well with him ; for he knew how to play this part cunningly . Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to be endued with all above written qualities , but it behooveth well that he seem to be so ; or rather I will boldly say this , that having these qualities , and alwaies regulating himself by them , they are hurtfull ; but seeming to have them , they are advantageous ; as to seem pittiful , faithful , mild , religious , and of integrity , and indeed to be so ; provided withall thou beest of such a composition , that if need require to use the contrary , thou canst , and knowest how to apply thy self thereto . And it suffices to conceive this , that a Prince , and especially a new Prince , cannot observe all those things , for which men are held good ; he being often forc'd , for the maintenance of his State , to do contrary to his faith , charity , humanity , and religion : and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so disposd , as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes ; and as formerly I said , not forsake the good , while he can ; but to know how to make use of 〈◊〉 evil upon necessity . A Prince then ought to have a special care , that he never let fall any words , but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities , and let him seem to him that sees and hears him , all pitty , all faith , all integrity , all humanity , all religion ; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have , than this last quality : for all men in general judge thereof , rather by the sight , than by the touch ; for every man may come to the sight of him , few come to the touch and feeling of him ; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest , few come to perceive and understand what thou art ; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many , who have the majesty of State to protect them : And in all mens actions , especially those of Princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men , forbeare to give their censures , till the events and ends of things . Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and State : the means shall alwaies be thought honorable , and commended by every one ; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing : & for the most part of people , they are but the vulgar : the others that are but few , take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance . A Prince there is in these dayes , whom I shall not do well to name , that preaches nothing else but peace and faith ; but had he kept the one and the other , several times had they taken from him his state and reputation . In the sixteenth , seventeenth , and eighteenth Chap. our Author descends to particulars , perswading his Prince in his sixteenth to such a suppleness of disposition , as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserabley ness , as need shall require . But that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe : which if he well weigh , is not really a reward of vertue , how ere it seems ; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net . In the seventeenth Chap. he treats of clemency and cruelty , neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice ; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes . And lest the Prince should incline too much to clemnecy , our Author allows rather the restraint by fear , than by love . The contrary to which all stories shew us . I will say this only , cruelty may cut of the power of some , but causes the hatred of all , and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge . In the eighteenth Chap. our Author discourses how Princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made : whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning , as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about , whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes . To this I would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal . v. 5. He that sweareth to his neighbor , and disappointeth him not , though it were to his own hindrance . It was a King that writ it , and me thinks the rule he gave , should well befit both King and Subject : and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages . A man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads . One may be , because he that promised , had no intention to keep his word ; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing . A second may bee , because hee that promisd , repents of his promise made ; and that is grounded on unconstancy , and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant . The third may be , when it so falls out , that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to performe it . In which case a man ought to imitate the good debter , who having not wherewithall to pay , hides not himself , but presents his person to his creditor , willingly suffering imprisonment . The first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a Prince : in the third , men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous Romans , Regulus and Posthumius . I shall close this with the answer of Charles the fifth , when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for his safe return from Wormes ; Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet , tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet . Though truth be banisht out of the whole world , yet should it alwaies find harbour in an Emperors beast . CHAP. XIX . That Princes should take a care , not to incurre contempt or batred . BUt because among the qualities , whereof formerly mention is made , I have spoken of those of most importance , I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a Prince is to beware , as in part is abovesaid , and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile : and when ever he shall avoid this , he shall fully have plaid his part , and in the other disgrace , he shall find no danger at all . There is nothing makes him so odious , as I said , as his extortion of his subjects goods , and abuse of their women , from which he ought to forbear : and so long as he wrongs not his whole people , neither in their goods , nor honors , they live content , and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some sew : which many waies and easily too , is restrain'd . To be held various , light , effeminate , faint-hearted , unresolv'd , these make him be contemnd and thought base , which a Prince should shun like rocks , and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity , courage , gravity , and valor ; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects , he orders it so , that his word stand irrevocable : and maintain himself in such repute , that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about : that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself , is much esteemed , and against him who is so well esteemed , hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects , or by forreiners any invasion , when once notice is taken of his worth , and how much he is reverenced by his subjects : For a Prince ought to have two fears , the one from within , in regard of his subjects ; the other from abroad , in regard of his mighty neighbors ; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends ; and alwayes he shall have good friends , if he have good armes ; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home , when those abroad are firme , in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them ; and however the forrein masters stand but ticklishly ; yet if he have taken such courses at home , and liv'd as we have prescribed , he shall never be able ( in case he forsake not himself ) to resist all possibility , force and violence , as I said Nabis the Spartan did : but touching his subjects , even when his affairs abroad are setled , it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily ; from which a Prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned , and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion , which it is necessary for him to compass , as formerly we treated at large . And one of the powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies , is , net to be hated nor dispised by the universality ; for alwaies he that conspires , beleeves the Princes death is acceptable to the subject : but when he thinks it displeases them , he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter ; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side , are infinite . By experience it is plain , that many times plots have been laid , but few of them have succeeded luckily ; for he that conspires , cannot be alone , nor can he take the company of any , but of those , who he beleeves are malecontents ; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent , thou givest him means to work his own content : for by revealing thy treason , he may well hope for all manner of favour : so that seeing his gain certain of one side ; and on the other , finding only doubt and danger , either he had need be a rare friend , or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince , if he keeps his word with thee . And to reduce this matter into short termes : I say , there is nothing but jealousie , fear , and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him ; but on the Princes part , there is the majesty of the principality , he laws , the defences of his friends and the State , which do so guard him ; that to all these things the peoples good wills being added , it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire ; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe , in this case he is also to feare afterwards , having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited , and therefore for this cause , not being able to hope for any refuge . Touching this matter , many examples might be brought ; but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers . Annibal Bentivolii , grand Father of this Annibal who now lives , that was Prince in Bolonia , being slaine by the Canneschi that conspir'd against him , none of his race being lest , but this John , who was then in swadling clouts ; presently the people rose upon this murder , and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection , which the family of the Bentivolii held then in Bolonia : which was so great , that being there remain'd not any , now Anniball was dead , that was able to manage the State ; and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivolii , who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne : the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him , and gave the government of their City to him , which was rul'd by him , untill John was of fit yeares to governe . I conclude then , that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons , whiles he hath the people to friend : but if they be his enemies and hate him , he may well feare every thing , and every one . And well ordered States , and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence , not to cause their great men to fall into desperation , and to content the people , and so to maintaine them : for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince . Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes , is that of France , and therein are found exceeding many good orders , whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends : of which the chiefe is the Parliament , and the authority thereof : for he that founded that Kingdome , knowing the great mens ambition and insolence ; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them ; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones , grounded upon feare , intending to secure them , would not lay this care wholly upon the King , but take this trouble from him , which he might have with the great men , in case he favourd the Commonalty ; or with the Commonalty , in case he favourd the great men : and thereupon set up a third judge , which was that , to the end it should keep under the great ones , and favour the meaner sort , without any imputation to the King. It was not possible to take a better , nor wiser course then this ; nor a surer way to secure the King , and the Kingdome . From whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note , that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation ; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour . Here againe I conclude , that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility , but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred : It would seeme perhaps to many , considering the life & death of many Romane Emperours , that they were examples contrary to my opinion , finding that some have liv'd worthily , and shewd many rare vertues of the minde , and yet have lost the Empire , and been put to death by their owne subjects , conspiring against them . Intending then to answer these objections , I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours , declaring the occasions of their ruine , not disagreeing from that which I have alledgd ; and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things , which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times : and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus , who were Mercus and Commodus his sonne , Pertinax , Julian , Severus , Antonius , Caracalla his sonne , Macrinus , Heliogabalus , Alexander , and Maximin . And first it is to be noted , that where in the other Principalities , they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles , and the insolence of the people ; the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty , having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers , which was so hard a thing , that it caused the ruine of many , being hard to satisfy the souldiers , and the people ; for the people love their quiet , and therefore affect modest Princes ; and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage , that is insolent , cruell , and plucking from every one : which things they would have them exercise upon the people , whereby they might be able to double their stipends , and satisfie their avarice and cruelty : whence it proceeds , that those Emperous who either by Nature or by Art , had not such a reputation , as therewith they could curbe the one and the other , were alwayes ruind : and the most of them , specially those who as new men came to the principality , finding the difficulty of those two different humours , applyed themselves to content the sholdiers , making small account of wronging the people , which was a course then necessary ; for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one , ought first endeavour that they incurse not the hatred of any whole universality ; and when they cannot attaine thereunto , they are to provide with all industry , to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty . And therefore those Emperors , who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire , had need of extraordinary favours , more willingly stuck to the soldiers , than to the people ; which neverthelesse turned to their advantage , or otherwise , according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them . From these causes aforesayd proceeded it , that Marcus Pertinax , and Alexander , though all living modestly , being lovers of justice , and enemies of cruelty , courteous and bountifull , had all from Marcus on ward , miserable ends ; Marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured : for he came to the Empire by inheritance , and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers , nor from the people : afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues , which made him venerable , he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits , and was never either hated , or contemnd . But Pertinax was created Emperour against the soldiers wills , who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus , could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to : whereupon having gotten himself hatred , and to this hatred added contempt , in that he was old , was ruind in the very beginning of his government . Whence it ought to be observed , that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad ; and therefore as I formerly said , when a Prince would maintaine the State ; he is often forced not to be good : for when that generality , whether it be the people , or soldiers , or Nobility , whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee , is corrupted , it behoves thee to follow their humour , and content them , and then all good deeds are thy adversaries . But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodnesse , that among the prayses given him , had this for one , that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire , he never put any man to death , but by course of justice ; neverthelesse being held effeminate , and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother , and thereupon fallen into contempt , the army conspird against him . Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus , Severus , Antonius , Caracalla , and Maximinus , you shall find them exceeding cruell , and ravinous , who to satisfie their soldiers , forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people ; and all of them , except Severus , came to evill en●s : for in Severus , there was such extraordinary valour , that while he held the soldiers his freinds , however the people were much burthend by him , he might alwayes reigne happily : for his valour rendred him so admirable in the soldiers and peoples sights ; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd , and those others reverencing and honoring him . And because the actions of this man were exceeding great , being in a new Prince , I will briefly shew how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts ; the conditions of which two , I say , as before , are very necessary for a Prince to imitate . Severus having had experience of Iulian the Emperours sloth , perswaded his army ( whereof he was commander in Solavonia ) that they should doe well to goe to Rome to revenge Portinax his death , who was put to death by the Imperiall guard ; and under this pretence , not making any shew that he aspird unto the Empire , set his army in march directly towards Rome , and was sooner come into Italy , than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station . Being ariv'd at Rome , he was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare , and Julian slaine . After this beginning , two difficulties yet remaind to Severus , before he could make himselfe Lord of the whole State ; the one in Asia , where Niger the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour , the other in the West with Albinus , who also aspird to the Empire : and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both , he purposed to set upon Niger , and cozen Albinas , to whom he writ , that being elected Emperour by the Senate , he would willingly communicate it with him ; and thereupon sent him the title of Caesar , and by resolution of the Senate , tooke him to him for his Colleague ; which things were taken by Albinks in true meaning . But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slaine Niger , and pacified the affaires and in the East , being returned to Rome , he complaind in the Senate of Albinus , how little weighing the benefits received from him , he had sought to slay him by treason , and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude : afterwards he went into France , where he bereft him both of his State and life , whoever then shall in particular examine his actions , shall finde he was a very cruell Lion , and as crafty a Fox : and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one , and by the armies not hated ; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man , was able to hold together such a great Empire : for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred , which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him . But Antonius his sonne , was also an exceeding brave man , and endued with most excellent qualities , which causd him to be admird by the people , and acceptable to the souldiers , because he was a warlike man , enduring all kind of travell and paines , despising all delicate food , and all kinde of effeminacy , which gaind him the love of all the armies : neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such , and so hideous , having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome , and all those of Alexandria , that he grew odious to the world , and began to be feard by those also that were neare about him ; so that he was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army . Where it is to be noted , that these kinde of deaths , which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde , cannot by a Prince be avoyded : for every one that feares not to dye , is able to doe it ; but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it , because it very seldome falls our . Only should he beware not to doe any extreamd injury to any of those of whom he serves himself , or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality , as Antonius did : who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion ; also threatned him every day , & neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body , which was a rash course taken , and the way to destruction , as befell him . But let us come to Commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire , by reason it descended upon him by inheritance , being Marcus his sonne , and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps , and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers : but being of a cruell and savage desposition , whereby to exercise his actions upon the people , he gave himselfe to entertaine armies , and those in all licentionsnesse . On the other part not maintaining his dignity , but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers , and doing such other like base things , little worthy of the Imperiall majesty , he became contemptible in the soldiers sight ; and being hated of one part , and despisd of the other , he was conspird against , and slaine . It remaines now , that we declare Maximinus his conditions , who was a very warlike man ; and the armies loathing Alexanders effeminacy , whereof I spake before , when they had slain him , chose this man Emperour , who not long continu'd so , because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt ; the one because he was very base , having kept cattell in Thrace , which was well knowne to every one , and made them to scorne him ; the other , because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to Rome , and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne , he had gaind the insamy of being thought exceeding cruell , having by his Prefects in Rome , and in every place of the Empire , exercisd many cruelties , insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood ; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty ; first Affrica , afterwards the Senate , with all the people of Rome and all Italy , conspired against him , with whom his own army took part ; which incamping before Aquileya , and finding some difficulty to take the town , being weary of his cruelties , and because they saw he had so many enemies , fearing him the lesse , slew him . I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus , Macrinus , or Itlian , who because they were throughly base , were sudenly extinguish ; but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse ; and I say , that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government ; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them , yet presently are those armies dissolv'd , because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any armies together , which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces , as were the armies of the Romane Empire . And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people , it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people : now is it more necessary for all Princes , ( except the Turk and the Souldan ) to satisfie their people than their soldiers , because the people are more mighty than they ; wherein I except the Turk , he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot , and 15000 horse , upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome ; and it is necessary that laying afide all other regard of his people , he maintaine these his friends . The Souldans Kingdome is like hereunto , which being wholy in the souldiers power , he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends . And you are to consider , that this State of the Souldans differs much from all the other Principalities : For it is very like the Papacy , which cannot be termd an hereditary Principality : nor a new Principality : for the sons of the deceasd Prince are not heires and Lords thereof , but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them . And this order being of antiquity , cannot be termd a new Principality , because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones : for though the Prince be new , yet are the orders of that state ancient , and ordaind to receive him , as if he were their hereditary Prince . But let us returne to our matter ; whosoever shall consider our discourse before , shall perceive that either hatred , or contempt haye caus'd the ruine of the afore-named Emperors ; and shall know also , from it came that part of them proceeding one way , and part a contrary ; yet in any of them the one had a happy success , and the others unhappy : for it was of no availe , but rather hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander , because they were new Princes , to desire to imitate Marcus , who by inheritance came to the Principality : and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla , Commodus , and Maximus , to imitate Severus , because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein . Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions ; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus : but he ought make choyce of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State ; and to take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State which is already established and setled . CHAP. XX. Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of , are profitable or dammageable . SOme Princes , whereby they might safely keep their State , have disarmed their subjects ; some others have held the towns under their dominion , divided into factions ; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves ; others have appli'd themselves to gain them , where they have suspected at their entrance into the government ; others have built Fortresses ; and others again have ruined and demolished them : and however that upon all these things , a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence , unless one comes to the particulars of these States , where some such like determinations were to be taken ; yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner , as the master of it self will bear . It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects ; but rather when he hath found them disarm'd , he hath alwaies arm'd them . For being belov'd , those armes become thine ; those become faithful , which thou hadst in suspicion ; and those which were faithful , are maintaind so ; and thy subjects are made thy parrisans ; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes , when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest , with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety ; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them , obliges them to thee ; those others excuse thee , judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more , who have undergone more danger , and so have greater obligation : but when thou disarmst them , thou beginst to offend them , that thou distrustest them , either for cowardise , or small faith ; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred agaist thee ; and because thou canst not stand disarmed , thou must thenturn thy self to mercenary Soldiery , whereof we have formerly spoken what it is , and when it is good ; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies , and suspected subjects ; therefore as I have said , a new Prince in a new Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes . Of examples to this purpose , Histories are full . But when Prince gains a new State , which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions , then it is necessary to disarme that State , unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof ; and these also in time and upon occasions , it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate , and so order them , that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers , who live in thy ancient State near unto thee . Our ancestors and they that were accounted Sages , were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions , and Pisa with Fortresses ; and for this cause maintaind some town ssubject to them in differences , whereby to hold it more easily . This , at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner , might be well done ; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept ; for I do not beleeve , that divisions made can do any good ; rather it must needs be , that when the enemy approaches them , Cities divided are presently lost ; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power , and the other not be able to subsist . The Venetians ( as I think ) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons , maintaind the factions of the Guelfes and Gibellins , in their townes ; and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood , yet they nourish'd these differences among them , to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels , should not plot any thing against them : which as it prov'd , never serv'd them to any great purpose : for being defeated at Vayla , presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole State. Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness ; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions ; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace , being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects : but war comming , such like orders discover their fallacy . Without doubt , Princes become great , when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them ; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great , who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary Prince , causes enemies to rise against him , and him to undertake against them : to the end he may have occasion to master them , and know that ladder , which his enemies have set him upon , whereby to rise yet higher . And therefore many think , that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion , ought cunningly to nourish some enmity , that by the suppressing thereof , his greatness may grow thereupon . Princes , especially those that are new , have found more faith and profit in those men , who in the beginning of their State , have been held suspected , than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents . Pandulphus Petrucci , Prince of Siena , governd his State , more with them that had been suspected by him , than with the others . But of this matter we cannot speak at large , because it varies according to the subject ; I will only say this , that those men , who in the beginning of a Principality were once enemies , if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support , the Prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his ; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully , insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion , which was once held of them ; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage , than from those , who serving him too supinely , neglect his affairs . And seing the matter requires it , I will not omit to put a Prince in mind , who hath a new made himself master of a State ; by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him , if it be not a natural affection towards him ; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government , with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends , because it will be impossible for him to content them . By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires , searching into the cause hereof , we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends , who formerly were contented with the State , and therefore were his enemies : than those , who because they were not contented therewith , became his friends , and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it . It hath been the custome of Princes , whereby to hold their States more securely , to build Citadels , which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them , and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences . I commend this course , because it hath been used of old ; notwithstanding Nicholas Vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two Citadel in the town of Castello , the better to keep the State ; Guidubaldo Duke of Vrbin being to return into his State , out of which he was driven by Caesar Borgia , raz'd all the Fortresses , of that Countrey , and thought he should hardlyer lose that State again without them . The Bentivodi returning into Bolonia , used the like courses . Citadels then are profitable , or not , according to the times ; and if they advantage thee in one part , they do thee harme in another , and this part may be argued thus . That Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers , ought to build Fortresses : but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people , should let them alone . Against the house of Sforza , the Castle of Milan , which Francis Sforza built , hath and will make more war , than any other disorder in that State : and therefore the best Citadel that may be , is not to incurre the peoples hatred ; for however thou holdest a Fortress , and the people hate thee , thou canst hardly scape them ; for people , when once they have taken armes , never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts . In our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any Prince , unless it were the Countess of Furli , when Count Hieronymo of Furli her husband was slain ; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage , and attended aid from Milan , and so recover'd her State : and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people : but afterwards they serv'd her to little purposes when Caesar Borgia assaild her , & that the people which was her enemy , sided with the stranger . Therefore both then , and at first , it would have been more for her safety , not to have been odious to the people , than to have held the Fortresses . These things being well weigh'd then , I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses , and him also that shall not ; and I will blame him , howsoever he be , that relying upon those , shall make small account of being hated by his people . CHAP. XXI , How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation . THere is nothing gains a Prince such repute as great exploi●s , and rare tryals of himself in Heroick actions . We have now in our dayes Ferdinand King of Arragon the present King of Spain : he in a manner may be termed a new Prince ; for from a very weak King , he is now become for fame and glory , the first King of Christendome , and if you shall wel consider his actions , you shall find them all illustrious , and every one of them extraordinary . He in the beginning of his reign assaild Granada , and that exploit was the ground of his State. At first he made that war in security , and without suspicion he should be any waies hindred , and therein held the Barons of Castiglias minds busied , who thinking upon that war , rever minded any innovation ; in this while he gaind credit and authority with them , they not being aware of it ; was able to maintain with the Church and the peoples money all his soldiers , and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war , which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honor . Besides this , to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters , serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion , he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty , chasing and dispoyling those Jewes out of the Kindome ; nor can this example be more admirable and rare : under the same cloke he invaded Affrick and went through with his exploit in Italy : and last of all hath he assaild France , and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters , which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration , and busied in attending the event , what it should be : and these his actions have thus grown , one upon another , that they have never given leisure to men so to rest , as they might ever plot any thing against them . Moreover it much avails a Prince to give extraordinary proofes of himself touching the government within , such as those we have heard of Bernard of Milan , whensoever occasion is given by any one , that may off ctuate some great thing either of good or evil , in the civil government ; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it , whereof in the wolud much notice may be taken . And above all things a Prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness . A Prince also is well esteemed , when he is a true friend , or a true enemy ; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another ; which course shall be alwaies more profit , than to stand neuter : for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors , come to fall out , or are of such quality , that one of them vanquishing , thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher , or not ; in either of these two cases , it will ever prove more for thy profit , to discover thy self , and make a good war of it : for in the first case , if thou discoverest not thy selfe , thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him that overcomes , to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht ; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side , nor any thing else to defend or receive thee . For he that overcomes , will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity : and he that loses , receives thee not , because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazzard of his fortune . Antiochus passed into Greece , thereunto induc'd by the Etolians , to chace the Romans thence : and sent his Ambassadors to the Achayans , who were the Romans friends , to perswade them to stand neuters ; on the other side the Romans moved them to joyne armes with theirs : this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the Achayans , where Antiochus his Ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters , whereunto the Romans Ambassador answerd ; Touching the course , that is commended to you , as best and profitablest for your State , to wit , not to intermeddle in the war between us , nothing can be more against you : because , not taking either part , you shall remain without thanks , and without reputation a prey to the conqueror . And it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend , will requite thy neutrality ; and he that is thy friend , will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him : and evil advised Princes , to avoyd the present dangers , folow often times that way of neutrality , and most commonly go to ruine : but when a Prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party , if he to whom thou cleavest , overcomes , however that he be puissant , and thou remainest at his disposing , he is oblig'd to thee , and there is a contract of friendship made ; and men are never so openly dishonest , as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee . Besides victories are never so prosperous , that the conqueror is like neglect all respects , and especially of justice . But if he to whom thou stickst , loses , thou art received by him ; and , while he is able , he aydes thee , and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again ; the second case , when they that enter into the lists together , are of such quality , that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth , so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him ; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance , who ought to do the best he could to save him , if he were well advised ; and he overcomming , is left at thy discretion , and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome . And here it is to be noted , that a Prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself , to offend another , unless upon necessity , as formerly is said . For when he overcomes , thou art left at his discretion , and Princes ought avoid as much as they are able , to stand at anothers discretion . The Venetians took part with France against the Duke of Milan , and yet could have avoided that partaking , from which proceeded their ruine . But when it cannot be avoyded , as in befel the Florentines when the Pope and the King of Spain went both with their armies to Lombardy , there the Prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid . Nor let any State think they are able to make such sure parties , but rather that they are all doubtfull ; for in the order of things we find it alwaies , that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient , he incurs another . But the principal point of judgement , is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients , and not taking the bad for the good . Moreover a Prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue , and that he honors those that excel in every Art. Afterwards ought he encourage his Citizens , whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise , and husbandry , as in any other kind of traffick , to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them ; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions : but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot , or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his City or State. Besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with Feasts and Maskes ; and because every City is devided into Companies , and arts , and Tribes , he ought to take special notice of those bodies , and some times afford them a meeting , and give them some proof of his humanity , and magnificence ; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his State ; for this must never fail in any case . CHAP. XXII . Touching Princes Secretaries . IT is no small importance to a Prince , the choyce he makes , of servants being ordinarily good or bad , as his wisdome is , And first conjecture one gives of a great man , and of his understanding , is , upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him , when they prove able and faithful , and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able , and to keep them true to him . But when they are otherwise , there can be no good conjecture made of him ; for the first error he commits , is in this choyce . There was no man that had any knowledge of Antony of Vanafro , the servant of Pandulfus Petrucci Prince of Siena , who did not esteem Pandulfus for a very discreet man , having him for his servant . And because there are three kinds of understandings ; the one that is advised by it self ; the other that understands when it is informed by another ; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another ; the first is best , the second is good , and the last quite unprofitable . Therefore it was of necessity , that if Pandulfus attaind not the first degree , yet he got to the second ; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evil , that any one does and sayes , however that he hath not his invention from himself , yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant ; and those he cherishes , and these he suppresses ; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master , keeps himself upright and honest . But how a Prince may throughly understand his servant , here is the way that never fails . When thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine , and that in all his actions , he searches most after his own profit ; this man thus qualified , shall never prove good servant , nor canst thou ever relie upon him : for he that holds the Sterne of the State in hand , ought never call home his cares to his own particular , but give himself wholly over to his Princes service , nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him . And on the other side the Prince to keep him good to him , ought to take a care for his servant , honoring him , enriching , and obliging him to him , giving him part both of dignities and offices , to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him , may restrain his desires from other honors , and other wealth , and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall , knowing he is not able to stand without his master . And when both the Princes and the servants are thus disposed , they may rely the one upon the other : when otherwise , the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other . CHAP. XXIII . That Flatterers are to be avoyded . I Will not omit one principle of great inportance , being an errour from which Princes with much difficulty defend themselves , unlesse they be very discreet , and make a very good choice ; and this is concerning flatterors ; whereof all writings are full : and that because men please themselves so much in their own things , and therein cozen themselves , that very hardly can they escape this pestilence ; and desiring to escape it , there is danger of falling into contempt ; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery , but to let men know , that they displease thee not in telling thee truth : but when every one hath this leave , thou losest thy reverence . Therefore ought a wise Prince take a third course , making choyce of some understanding men in his State , and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth ; and touching those things only which he inquires of , and nothing else ; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing , and hear their opinions , and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner ; and in these deliberations , and with every one of them so carrie himself , that they all know , that the more freely they shall speak , the better they shall be liked of : and besides those , not give eare to any one ; and thus pursue the thing resolved on , and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken . He who does otherwise , either falls upon flatterers , or often changes upon the varying of opinions , from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him . To this purpose I will alledge you a moderne example . Peter Lucas a servant of Maximilians the present Emperor , speaking of his Majesty , said that he never advised with any body , nor never did any thing after his own way : which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said : for the Emperor is a close man , who communicates his secrets to none , nor takes counsel of any one ; but as they come to be put in practise , they begin to be discovered & known , and so contradicted by those that are near about him ; and he as being an easy man , is quickly wrought from them . Whence it comes that what he does to day , he undoes on the morrow ; and that he never understands himself what he would , nor what he purposes , & that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions . A Prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell , but at his owne pleasure , & not at other mens ; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing , but what he askes : but he ought well to aske at larger and then touching the things inquird of , be a patient heare , of the truth ; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him , be displeased thereat . And because some men have thought that a Prince that gaines the opinion to bee wise , may bee held so , not by his owne naturall indowments , but by the good counsells he hath about him ; without question they are deceivd ; for this is a generall rule and never failes , that a Prince who of himselfe is not wise , can never be well advised , unlesse he should light upon one alone , wholly to direct and govern him , who himself were a very wise man. In this case it is possible he may be well governd : but this would last but little : for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his State ; but a Prince not having any parts of nature , being advised of more then one , shall never be able to unite these counsels : of himself shall he never know how to unite them ; and each one of the Counsellers , probably will follow that which is most properly his owne ; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discerne these things ; nor can they fall out otherwise , because men alwayes prove mischievous , unlesse upon some necessity they be force'd to become good : we conclude therefore , that counsells from whencesoever they proceed , must needs take their beginning from the Princes wisdome , and not the wisdome of the Prince from good counsells . In this Chapter our Authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery , and not to fall into contempt . The extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides , that there is left hut a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both : and happy were that Prince , who could light on so good a Pilote as to bring him to Port between those rocks and these quicksands . Where Majesty becomes familiar , unlesse endued with a supereminent vertue , it loses all awfull regards : as the light of the Sunne , because so ordinary , because so common , we should little value , were it not that all Creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof . On the other side , Omnis insipien arrogantiâ & plausibus capitur , Every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes : and this foole keeps company so much with all great wise men , that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discernd betwixt . The greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries ; and especially the greatest of men , who are Kings and Princes : for many seek the Rulers favour . Prov. 28. 26. For there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed ; Princes have not that good hap : but they whose instruction is of most importance , so soone as they have taken the government upon them , no longer suffer any reproovers : for but few have accesse unto them , and they who familiary converse with them , doe and say all for favour . Isocrat . to Nicocles , All are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure , though by telling him truth . To this purpose therefore sayes one ; a Prince excells in learning to ride the great horse , rather than in any other exercise , because his horse being no flatterer , will shew him he makes no difference between him and another man , and unlesse he keepe his seate well , will lay him on the ground . This is plaine dealing . Men are more subtile , more double-heatred , they have a heart and a heart , netiher is their tongue their hearts true interpreter . Counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters ; but a man of understanding will draw is out . Prov. 20. 5. This understanding is most requisite in a Prince , in as much as the whole Globe is in his hand , and the inferiour Orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest . And therefore surely it is the honour of a King to search out such a secret : Prov. 25. 2. His counsellours are his eyes and eares ; as they ought to be dear to him , so they ought to be true to him , and make him the true report of things without disguise . If they prove false eyes , let him pluck them out ; he may as they use glasse eyes , take them forth without paine , and see never a whit the worse for it . The wisdome of a Princes Counsellours is a great argument of the Princes wisdome . And being the choyce of them imports the Princes credit and safety , our Authour will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his 22. Chap. whether I referre him . CHAP. XXIV . Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States . WHen these things above said are well observ'd , they make a new Prince seeme as if he had been of old , and presently render him more secure and firme in the State , than if he had already grown ancient therein : for a new Prince is much more observd in his action , than a Prince by inheritance ; and when they are known to bee vertuous , men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby , than by the antiquity of their blood : for men are much more taken by things present , than by things past , and when in the present they find good , they content themselves therein , and seeke no further ; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost , when the Prince is not wanting in other matters to himself ; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality , adornd , and strengthnd it with good lawes , good arms , good friends , and good examples ; as he shall have double shame , that is born a Prince , and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it . And if we shall consider those Lords , that in Italy have lost their States in our dayes , as the King of Naples , the Duke of Milan , and others ; first we shall find in them a common defect , touching their armes , for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length . Afterwards we shall see some of them , that either shall have had the people for their enemies ; or be it they had the people to friend , could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones : for without such defects as these , States are not lost , which have so many nerves , that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld . Philip of Macedon , not the father of Alexander the Great , but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius , had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the Romanes and of Greece that assail'd him ; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people , and assure himself of the Nobles , for many yeares he made the warre good against them : and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him , yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still . Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities , for having afterwards lost them , let them not blame Fortune , but their own sloth ; because they never having thought during the time of quiet , that they could suffer a change ( which is the common fault of men , while faire weather losts , not to provide for the tempest ) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them , thought rather upon flying from them , than upon their defence , and hop'd that the people , weary of the vanquishers insolence , would recall them : which course when the others faile , is good : but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that : for a man wou'd never go to fall , beleeving another would come to take him up : which may either not come to passe , or if it does , it is not for thy security , because that defence of his is vile , and depends nor upon thee ; but those defences only are good , certaine , and durable , which depend upon thy owne selfe , and thy owne vertues . CHAP. XXV . How great power Fortune hath in humane , affaires , and what meanes there is to resist it . IT is not unknown unto me , how that many have held opinion , and still hold it , that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune , and by God , that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them ; or rather that there is no remedy for them : and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing , but leave all to be governd by chance . This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes , by reason of the great alteration of things , which we have of late seen , and do every day see , beyond all humane conjecture : upon which , I sometimes thinking , am in some paret inclind to their opinion : neverthelesse not to extingush quite our owne free will , I think it may be true , that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions ; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half , or little lesse . And I liken her to a precipitous torrent , which when it rages , over-flows the plaines , overthrowes the trees , and buildings , removes the earth from one side , and laies it on another , every one flyes before it , every one yeelds to the fury thereof , as unable to withstand it ; and yet however it be thus , when the times are calmer , men are able to make provision against these excesses , with banks and fences so , that afterwards when it swels again , it shall all passe smoothly along , within its channell , or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull . In like manner befals it us with fortune , which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her , and thither turnes she all her forces , where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her . And if you shall consider Italy , which is the seat of these changes , and that which hath given them their motions , you shall see it to be a plaine field , without any trench or bank ; which had it been fenc'd with convenienent vertue as was Germany , Spain or France ; this inundation would never heave causd these great alterations it hath , or else would it not have reach'd to us : and this shall suffice to have said , touching the opposing of fortune in generall . But restraining my selfe more to particulars , I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine ; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality ; which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long fince run over , that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune , runnes as her wheele turnes . I beleeve also , that he proves the fortunate man , whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time ; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ : for we see that men , in the things that induce them to the end , ( which every one propounds to himselfe , as glory and riches ) proceed therein diversly ; some with respects , others more bold , and rashly ; one with violence , and the other with cunning ; the one with patience , th' other with its contrary ; and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto ; we see also two veby respective and wary men , the one come to his purpose , and th' other not ; and in like maner two equally prosper , taking divers course ; the one being wary the other headstrong ; which proceeds from nothing else , but from the quality of the times , which agree , or not , with their proceedings . From hence arises that which I said , that two working diversly , produce the same effects & two equaly working , the one attains his end , the other not . Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good ; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience , times and affaires turne so favourably , that the carriage of his businesse prove well , he prospers ; but if the times and affaires chance , he is ruind , because he changes not his manner of proceeding : not is there any man so wise , that can frame himselfe hereunto ; as well because he cannot go out of the way , from that whereunto Nature inclines him : as also , for that one having alwayes prosperd , walking such a way , cannot be perswaded to leave it ; and therefore the respective and wary man , when it is fit time for him to use violence and force , knows not how to put it in practice , whereupon he is ruind : but if he could change hi disposition with the times and the affaires , he should not change his fortune . Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence , and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe . Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia , even while John Bentivolio lived : the Venetians were not well contented therewith ; the King of Spain likewise with the French , had treated of that enterprises ; and nowithstanding al this , he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse , personally undertook that expedition : which action of his put in suspence and stopt Spaine and the Venetians ; those for feare , and the others for desire to recover the Kingdome of Naples ; and on the other part drew after him the King of France ; for that King seeing him already in motion , and desiring to hold him his friend , whereby to humble the Venetians , thought he could no way deny him his souldiers , without doing him an open injury . Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion , which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done ; for it he had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled , and all his affaires ordered before hand , as any other Pope would have done , he had never brought it to passe : For the King of France would have devised a thousand excuses , and others would have put him in as many feares . I will let passe his other actions , for all of them were alike , and all of them prov'd lucky to him ; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary : for had he litt upon such times afterwards , that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects , there had been his utter ruine ; for he would never have left those wayes , to which he had been naturally inclind . I conclude then , fortune varying , and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes , prove happy , while these accord together : and as they disagree , prove unhappy : and I think it true , that it is better to be heady than wary ; because Fortune is a mistresse ; and it is necessary , to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her : and we see , that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those , than by others that proceed coldly . And therefore , as a mistresse , shee is a friend to young men , because they are lesse respective , more rough , and command her with more boldnesse . I have considered the 25 Chapter , as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning : yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things . The life of man is like a game at Tables ; skill availes much I grant , but that 's not all : play thy game well , but that will not winne : the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play . Examine this ; play never so surely , play never so probably , unlesse the chance thoucastest , lead thee forward to advantage , all hazards are losses , and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch . The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap , 9. v. 11. The race is not to the swift , nor the battell to the strong ; neither yet bread to the wise , nor yet riches to men of understanding , nor yet favour to men of skill ; but time and chance hapeneth to them all . Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books , could not fence against the despight of Fortune , as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke . Nor that great example of policy , Duke Valentine , whome cur Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master , could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune , that he could keep her in obedience . Man can contribute no more to his actions that vertue and wisdome : but the successe depends upon a power above . Surely there is the finger of god ; or as Prov. 16. v. 33. The lot is cast into the lap , but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was nor Josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand ; but because the Lord was with him , & that which he did , the Lord made it to prosper , Gen 39. Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence , which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes , as that their effects prove answerable , and sometimes ( that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes ) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth , that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes . CHAP. XXVI . An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians . HAving then weigh'd all things above discours'd , and devising with my self , whether at this present in Italy the time might serve to honor a new Prince , & whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince , to introduce such a forme , that might do honor to him , and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey : me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new Prince , that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose . And if as I said , it was necessary , desiring to see Moses his vertue , that the children of Israel should be inthrald in Aegypt ; and to have experience of the magnanimity of Cyrus his mind , that the Persians should be oppress'd by the Medes ; and to set forth the excellency of Theseus , that the Athenians should be dispersed ; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an Italian spirit , it were necessary Italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in , and were in more slavery than the Hebrews were ; more subject than the Persians ; more scatterd than the Athenians ; without head , without order , battered , pillaged , rent asunder , overrun , and had undergone all kind of destruction . And however even in these later dayes , we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one , whereby we might have conjectur'd , that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof , yet it prov'd afterwards , that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune , insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life , attends still for him that shall heal her wounds , give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of Lombardy , to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdome , and of Tuscany , and heal them of their soars , now this long time gangren'd . We see how she makes her prayers to God , that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolencies . We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours , provided there be any one take them up . Nor do we see at this present , that she can look for other , than your Illustrious Family , to become Cheiftain of this deliverance , which hath now by its own vertue and Fortune been so much exalted , and favored by God and the Church , whereof it now holds the Principality : and this shall not be very hard for you to do , if you shall call to mind the former actions , and lives of those that are above named . And though those men were very rare and admirable , yet were they men , and every one of them began upon less occasion than this ; for neither was their enterprize more just than this , nor more easie ; nor was God more their friend , than yours . Here is very great justice : for that war is just , that is necessary ; and those armes are religious , when there is no hope left otherwhere , but in them . Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto : nor can there be , where there is a good disposition , a great difficulty , provided that use be made of those orders , which I propounded for aim and direction to you . Besides this , here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God ; the sea was opened , a cloud guided the way , devotion poured forth the waters , and it rain'd down Manna ; all these things have concurred in your greatness , the rest is left for you to do . God will not do every thing himself , that he may not take from us our free will , and part of that glory that belongs to us . Neither is it a marvel , if any of the aforenamed Italians have not been able to compass that , which we may hope your illustrious family shall : though in so many revolutions of Italy , and so many feats of war , it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht ; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good ; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones . Nothing can so much honor a man rising a new , as new laws and new ordinances devised by him : these things when they have a good foundation given them , and contain in them their due greatness , gain him reverence and admiration ; and in Italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme . Here is great vertue in the members , were it not wanting in the heads . Consider in the single fights that have been , and duels , how much the Italians have excel'd in their strength , activity and address ; but when they come to armies , they appear not , and all proceeds from the weakness of the Chieftaines ; for they that understand the managing of these matters , are not obeyed ; and every one presumes to understand ; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue , as that others would submit unto him . From hence proceeds it , that in so long time , and in so many battels fough for these last past 20 years , when there hath been an army wholly Italian , it alwaies hath had evil success ; whereof the river Tarus first was witness , afterwards Alexandria , Capua , Genua , Vayla , Bolonia , Mestri . Your Illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthyes who redeem'd their countreys , must above all things as the very foundation of the whole sabrick , be furnished with soldiers of your own natives : because you cannot have more faithful , true , nor better soldiers ; and though every one of them be good , all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained , commanded , and honored by their own Prince . Wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes , whereby to be able with the Italian valor to make a defence against forreiners . And however the Swisse infantry and Spanish be accounted terrible ; yet is there defect in both of them , by which a third order might not only oppose them , but may be confident to vanquish them : for the Spaniards are not able to indure the Horse , and the Swisse are to feare the foot , when they incounter with them , as resolute in the fight as they ; whereupon it hath been seen , and upon experience shall be certain , that the Spaniards are not able to beare up against the French Cavalery , and the Swisses have been routed by the Spanish Foot. And though touching this last , there hath not been any entire experience had , yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of Ravenna , when the Spanish Foot affronted the Dutch battalions , which keep the same rank the Swisses do , where the Spaniards with their nimbleness of body , and the help of their targets entred in under their Pikes , and there stood safe to offend them , the Dutch men having no remedy : and had it not been for the Cavalery that rusht in upon them , they had quite defeated them . There may then ( the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd ) another kind of them be a new ordained , which may be able to make resistance against the Horse , and not fear the Foot , which shall not be a new sort of armes , but change of orders . And these are some of those things which ordained a new , gain reputation and greatness to a new Prince . Therefore this occasion should not be let pass , to the end that Italy after so long a time may see some one redeemed of hers appear . Nor can I express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums , with what thirst of revenge , with what resolution of fidelity , with what piety , with what tears . Would any gates be shut again him ? Any people deny him obedience ? Any envy oppose him ? Would not every Italian fully consent with him ? This government of the Barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils . Let your Illustrious Family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted ; to the end that under your colours , this countrey may be enabled , and under the protection of your fortune that saying of Petrarch be verifyed . Vertu contr'ul fuore Prendera l'arme , & fia il combatter corto : Che l'antico valore Ne gli Italici cor noné anchor morto . The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca , composed by Nicholas Machiavelli , and presented to Zanobiglioudilmonti and Lingi Alomanni his very good friends . ZANOBI and LINGI , my very good friends , it seems a matter of great mervail to those that take it into consideration , how that all they , or the greater part of them , who have effected great things n● this world , and borne up their heads above others contemporaries , have taken their rises and births from obscure and base beginnings , or such as have been by fortune extraordinarily afflicted . For all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures , or had such base Sires , that as ashamed of them , they have feigned themselves sons to Jupiter , or some other Diety ; who these have been , every one having knowledge of many of them , we shall omit to relate , as superfluous , yeelding rather distaste than delight to the Reader . I am indeed of opinion that it proceeds from hence , viz in that fortune willing to demonstrate unto the world , that she , and not wisdome , gives men their greatness , therefore begins to shew her strength at such a time , when wisdome can challenge no interest , but all rather is to be attributed as due to her alone . Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was then one of those , who in regard of the times he liv'd in , and the City where he was borne , effected very great matters , and had , as others in this kind , neither a very fortunate nor known birth , as in my further discourse of his life it shall appear : which I thought fit to bring to memory , as having found therein a subject of very great example , as well in regard of valor , as fortune . And I thought I might the better direct this discourse unto you two , who of all that I know most delight in such glorious atchievements . I say then , that the Family of the Castracani is reckoned among the noble Families of the City of Lucca , however that in these daies it be much decayed , according to the course of all other worldly things . Of this there was one Antony borne , who took upon him religious orders , and was a Canon of S. Michaels at Lucca , and in honor thereof was entituled Master Antony . He had but one sister , who was married to Buonaccorso Cennami ; but Bnonaccorso being dead , and she remaining a widow , betook her self to live with her brother , with intention not to marry any more . Mr. Antony had behind his house where he dwelt , a vinyard , whereinto by reason of divers gardens bordering thereupon on several sides , the passage was very ordinary . It happened that one morning a little after the Sun rise , Dame Dionora , for so was Master Antonies sister called , walking out into the vineyard , as she was gathering some herbs , after the manner of women , to make a sallet withall ; she heard somekind of russeling under a vine amongst the leaves , and casting her eye that way , she perceived some little cry there , whereupon drawing near to the noise , she discoverd the hands and face of an infant wrapt in the vine leaves , which seemed as if it asked her assistance : so that she partly marvailing , partly frighted , full of pitty and amazement , took it up in her armes , and having carried it home , and wash'd it , and swadled it in clean clouts , as they use children , at her return presented it to Master Antony : who considering the accident , and seeing the child , was as much amaz'd and compassionate as was his sister : and advising together what they should do in this case , resolved to bring it up , he being a Priest , and she not having any children . Having then taken a nurse into the house , they nourished it with as much tenderness as if it had been their own child ; and causing it to be baptized , named it Castruccio after the name of their own father . Castruccio as he increased in years , so he grew in person and feature , and in every thing he shewed wit and discretion : and quickly , according to his age , he learned whatsoever his Master Antony taught him : who purposing to make him a Priest , and to turne over unto him his Canonicate , and his other benifices , instructed him in that way : but he found him not a subject fit for that regular life : For so soon as Castruccio came to 14 years of age , he began to grow a little masterfull towards Master Antony and Dame Dionora , so that he stood no longer in fear of them , laying aside all Church books , he began to handle armes , and took not delight in any thing more than to mannage them , or with others his equals to run , leap , or wrastle , and such other like exercises : wherein he shewed such courage and strength , that he far surpassed all others of his age ; and if any time he gave himself to reading , he took pleasure in nothing else than discourses of wars , and the actions of most famous men : for which cause Master Antony was much greived at heart . In the Citty of Lucca there happened to dwell a Gentleman of the Family of the Guinigi , call'd Master Francis , who for fortunes , esteem , and valour , out-went all others the Citizens of Lucca : who was alwaies traind up in bearing of armes , and who had a long time serv'd under the Vlscounts of Milan ; and because he was a Gibelline , he was accounted of a-above all that followed that faction in Lucca . This man being then in Lucca , and assembling morning and evening with the rest of the citizens under the Governors Palace , which is in the head of the Palace of S. Michael , being the prime place of Lucca , oftentimes saw Castruccio using of those exercises with other lads of the town , wherein I formerly said he took delight ; and perceiving that besides the mastring of them , he held over them a kind of Princely authority , and that they again lov'd and reverenc'd him , he became very desirous to know what he was , whereof being inform'd by some there present , he became the more desirous to take him home to him ; and calling him one day to him , ask'd him , where he had rather live , either in a Cavaliers house , where he might learn to ride and use his armes , or abide in a Priests house , where nothing else were to be heard but their Offices and Masses ? Master Francis perceiv'd how much Castruccio was cheared upon the mention of horses and armes ; yet he standing a little out of countenance , Master Francis again encouraging him to speak , he answered , that if his Patron would therewith be content , he could not have a greater pleasure than to quit this calling of Priest , and betake himself to that of a soldier . Master Francis was much satisfied with this reply : and in a short time so negotiated in this matter , that Master Antony gave him up to his charge , whereunto he was the rather moved by the lads inclination , judging thereby that he could not hold him much longer in his former course . Castruccio then being prefer'd from Mr. Antony Castracani the Priests house to the Palace of Mr. Francis Guinigi the Commander , it was a marvail to think in how short a time he attaind to those vertues and good qualities , which are required in a compleat Cavaliere . First he became an excellent horseman : for he was able to mannage the roughest horse at ease ; and , though but a youth , in jousts and tournaments he was of prime remarque ; so that in any action of strength or activity , none could exceed him . These perfections besides were season'd with such manners , and good qualities , as that touching modesty , it was incredible how that either in word or deed he gave no distast to any ; to his superiors he yeelded reverence ; he was modest with his equals , and pleasant with his inferiors ; which gain'd him favor , not only in the whole Family of Guinigi , but also in the whole City of Lucca . It chanced in those times , Castru●cio being now arrived to eighteen years of age , that the Gibellins were chased by the Gulfes from Pavia , in favor of whom Master Francis Guinigi was sent for by the Viscounty of Milan , with whom went Castruccio , as he on whose shoulders lay the charge of the whole troops : in which imployment , Castruccio gave such proofs of his judgement and courage , that not one in this expedition gaind so much esteem as he , and his name became honorable , not only in Pavia , but throughout all Lombardy . Castruccio being then returnd to Lucca of far greater esteem than before his departure he was ; failed not ( to his power ) to gain himself friends , practising means to win them . But Master Francis Guinigi now chancing to dye , and having left behind him a son named Paul of 13 years of age , appointed Castruccio his Tutor , and the Governor of his estate ; having first caused him to be called to him before his death , and intreated him , that he would take upon him the eare to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself ; and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father , he would requite to the son . And now at length Master Francis Guinigi being dead , Castruccio left Tutor and Governor to Paul , grew in such credit and power , that the favor he was wont to find in Lucca , in some part was turned into envy , and he was calumniated by many , as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny . Among whom the Principal was M. George Opizi , head of the Guelfes faction . This man hoping by the death of Mr Francis to remain without competitor in Lucca , thought that Castruccio , being left with that trust , by the grace & favor of his discreet carriage gaind him , had bereav'd him of all means to attain thereto ; and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him , whereby to choak his well grown credit . Which at first Castruccio disdained , but afterwards grew jealous of it : for he thought that Master George would never rest , till he had so far disgrac'd him with King Robert of Naples his Lieuftenant , as to cause him to chase him out of Lucca . At that time there was one Vguccion of Fagginolo of Arezo , then Lord of Pisa , who by the Pisans was first chosen for their commander , and afterwards made himself their Lord. Divers out-lawed Luccheses of the Gibellin faction abode with Vguccion , whom Castruccio practised to restore again with Vguccions aid ; and this design he communicated also with his friends at home , who could no way endure the Opizies authority . Having therefore given order , as was requisite , to this purpose , Castruccio fortified the tower of the Honesti , and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time : and the night being come , which was agreed of with Vguccion , he gave the signe to him , who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and Lucca ; and having seen the signal , he came close to Saint Peters gate , and fired the antiport : Castruccio on the other side raised a great cry , calling the people to armes , and forced the gate on the other side within : so that Vguccion entring with his men , forced the town , and slew Master George with all those of his family , and many others his friends and partisans , and chased out the governor , and changed the State of the City , as Vguccion liked best , to the great dammage thereof ; for it appeard then , that there were above a hundred families chased out of Lucca . Those that fled , part went to Florence , and part to Pistoya , which Cities were then governed by the Guelfes faction ; and hereupon they became enemies to Vguccion and the Lucheses . And upon this the Florentines and the rest of the Guelfes thinking the Gibellines faction grown too mighty in Tuscany , accorded together to restore again these exiled Luccheses , and having Levyed a huge army , they came to the vale of Nievole , and seizing upon Mount Catino , from hence they went to incampe at Mount Carlo , whereby to have the passage open to Lucca . Whereupon Vguccion having gathered a good army of Pisans and Luccheses besides many Dutch horse which he drew out of Lombardy , went to find the Florentines camp , which perceiving the enemies approach was removed from Mount Carlo , and setled between Mount Catino and Pescia ; and Vguccion sat down under Mount Carlo about some two miles of the enemy , where for some daies between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes : for Vguccion being faln sick , the Pisans and Luccheses refused to come to battel with the enemy . But Vguccions malady augmenting , he retired to mount Carlo for his recovery , and committed the charge of the army to Castruccio , which was the Guelfes destruction : for hereupon they took courage , esteeming the enemies armies as left without a head : which Castruccio understood , and lay still some few dayes , the more to confirm this their opinion , making shew of feare , and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches : and on the other side the Guelfes the more they saw this feare , the more insolent they became , and every day being orderd for fight , they presented themselves before Castruccios army , who thinking he had now enough , emboldned them , and having had full notice of what order they kept , resolved to come to the tryall of a day : and first with his speeches he confirmd his soldiers courage , and shewd them the victory certaine , if they would follow his directious . Castruccio had seene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army , & the weak●r sort in the wings thereof : whereupon he did the cleane contrary ; for he put his best soldiers in his wings , and his slightest people in the body : and issuing out of his trenches with this order , so soone as ever he came within view of the enemy , which solently , as before they had wont , came to find them out , he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should goe on leisurely , but that the rest should move with speed , insomuch that when they came to ioyne battell with the enemy , onely the wings of each army fought , and the troops in the middle stood unimployd , because the middle part of Castruccio's army had lagguerd so much behind , that the enemyes body had not yet reach'd to them : and thus the ablest of Castruccio's army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies , and the enemies strength lay idle , not able to endammage those they were to encounter with , nor could they ayd any of their owne party : so that without much difficulty , the enemies two wings were both put to flight , and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flanke , without having whereupon to shew their valour , fled likewise . The rout and the slaughter were great : for there were slaine above ten thousand men , with many Officers , and great Cavaliers of the Guelfes faction throughout all Tuscany , and many Princes who came thither in favour of them : to wit , Peter , King Roberts Brother , and Charles his nephew , and Philip Lord of Taranto : but of Castruccio's side they came not to above three hundred : among which Francis Vguccions sonne was slaine : who being young and over-venturous , was killd at the first onset . This overthrow much augmented Castruccio's credit , so that Vguccion grew so jealous and suspitious of his owne State , that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction ; thinking with himselfe that that victory had rather taken his power from him , than setled it : and being in this thought , while he awaited some fair colour to effect his designes , it happned that Pieragnolo Michaeli was slaine in Lucca , a man of good worth and esteeme , and the Assassine fled into Castruccio's house : where the Captaines and Serjeants going to apprehend him , were affronted , and hindred by Castruccio , so that the murtherer by his ayd escaped , which thing Vguccion , who was then at Pisa , hearing , and deeming then he had just occasion to punish him , calld unto his owne sonne Neri , to whom he had now given the command of Lucca , and chargd him , that under colour of inviting Castruccio , he should lay hold on him , and put him to death . Whereupon Castruccio going familiarly into the commanders pallaces , not fearing any injury , was first by Neri entertaind at supper , and afterwards seised on . And Neri doubting , lest by putting him to death , without any publick justification the people might bee inraged , kept him alive , till he were better informd by Vguccion what was farther to be done in that case : who blaming his sonnes slownesse and cowardise , for the dispatching hereof went out of Pisa with four hundred Horse towards Lucca : and hardly yet was he arriv'd at the Baths , but the Pisans took armes , and slew Vguccions Lieutenant , and the rest of his family , that remaind at Pisa , and made Count Gaddo of Gerardesca their Lord : Vguccion before he came to Lucca , had notice of this accident befalne in Pisa ; yet thought he it not fit to turne back , left the Luccheses , like as the Pisans , should also shot their gates against him . But the Luccheses understanding the chance at Pisa notwithstanding that Vguccion was enterd Lucca , taking this occasion to free Castruccio , first began at their meetings in the Piazze to speake slightly of him , afterwards to make some hub-bub , and from thence came to armes , demanding Castruccio to be set free ; insomuch that Vguccion for feare of worse , drew him out of prison : Whereupon Castruccio suddenly rallying his friends , with the peoples favour made an assault upon Vguccion who finding no other remedy , fled thence with his friends , and so went into Lombardy to the Lords of Scala , where afterwards he dy'd poorly . But Castruccio being of a prisoner become as Prince of Lucca , prevaild so by his friends , and with this fresh gale of the peoples , favour that he was made Generall of their Forces for a yeare ; which being compassed , to gaine himselfe further credit in armes , he purposd to recover for the Luccheses severall towne ; which rebelld after Vguccions departue , and went also by the Pisans favour , with whom he had enterd into league at the campe , to Serezana ; and to winne that he had built over it a fort , which , being afterwards changed by the Florentines , is now calld Serezanello , and in two monthes space tooke the towne , and afterwards in strength of this credit , he wonne Massa , Carrara , and Lavenza , and in short time all Lunigiana : and to stop the passage that comes from Lombarby into Luginiana , he tooke Pontremoli and drew out thence Mr. Anastasia Palivicini , who was Lord thereof . Returning then to Lucca with this victory , he was met by the whole people : whereupon Castruccio resolving not to deferre longer to make himselfe Prince , by meanes of Pazzino of Poggio Puccinello of Porcico , Francisco Boccansecehi , and Cecco Guinigi at that time of great repute in Lucca , but corrupted by him , made himself Lord thereof , and so solemnely and by resolution of the people was elected their Prince . At this time Frederck of Baviere King of the Romans came into Italy to take the Imperiall crown , whom Castruccio made his friend , and went to him with five hundred Horse , having left for his Lieutenant at Lucca Paulo Guinigi , whom in remembrance of his father , he made account of as his owne child . Castruccio was entertaind very honourably by Frederick , who gave him many priviledges , and made him his Deputy in Tuseany , and because the Pisans had expelld Gaddo of Gerardesca , and for feare of him askd succours of Frederick , he made Castruccio their Lord , whom the Pisans accepted for feare of the Guelfes faction , and in particular because of the Florentines . Frederick then being returned into Germany , and having left at Rome a governour for his affairs in Italy , all the Gibellins as well Tuscans as Lomdarbs that followd the Imperial faction , had their recourse to Castruccio , and each promisd him the Principality of their native country ; provided that by his meanes they might be restord : among whom was Mattheo Guidi , Nardo Scolare , Lapo Vberti , Gerozzi Nardi and Piero Buonacorsi , all Gibellins , and outlawd Florentines : and Castruccio plotting by helpe of these , and with his owne forces to become Lord of all Tuscany , to gaine himselfe credit the more , entred into amity with Mr. Metthem Viscoti Prince of Milan : and traind up all the men ofhis owne city and country to armes : and because Lucca had five gates , he divided the country into five parts , armd them , and distributed them under Captaines and colours , so that on a sudden he was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the field , besides the help he might have from Pisa . He then being environd with these forces and freinds , it fortun'd that Mr. Mattheo Visconti was assayled by the Guelfes of Piacuza ; who had driven out the Gibellins , in whose behalfe the Florentines and King Robert had sent their troopes . Whereupon Mr. Mattheo intreated Castruccio to affaile the Florentines , that they being constraind to defend their owne homes , should call back their men out of Londarby . So Castruccio with a good army entred the Vale Arno , took Fucachio , and St. Miniato with great dammage of the country ; and upon this occasion the Florentines were forc'd to call back their troopes : who were hardly returnd into Tuscany , but Castruccio was compeld upon another necessity to haste back to Lucca . And in that City the Family of Poggio being of such power and authority as that it had made Castruccio not only great , but Prince also , and not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deservd , agreed with other Families of Lucca to move the city to rebellion , and to chace Castruccio thence ; whereupon taking occasion one morning they came armd upon the Deputy , whom Castruccio had there ordaind over Justice , and slew him , and further purposing to raise the people to commotion ; Steven of Poggio an arcient and peaceable man , who had no hand at all in this conspiracy , came before them , constrain'd his friends by his autority amongst them , to lay aside their arms offering himselfe to mediate with Castruccio for them , that he should satisfie their desires . Thus they layd down their armes , but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up ; for Castruccio having had notice of these novelties befalne in Lucca , without making any delay , with part of his troops , leaving Paul Guinigi Commander of the residue , came thence to Lucca , where having found the tumult appeasd beyond his expectation , deeming he might with the more ease secure himselfe , disposed those of his party in severall places , as best was for his turne . Steven of Poggio thinking with himselfe , that Castruccio was beholding to him , went to him , and intreated , not for himselfe , because he thought it no way needfull for him , but for the others of his Family , praying that many things he would pardon , in respect of their youth , and many things in regard of the ancient amity , and obligation he had to the whole kindred . Wherunto Castruccio answered courteously , and bid him be of good cheere , and told him that he received more content the tumult was appeased , than he had had trouble that it was raysed , and perswaded Steven to cause them all to come to him , saying , that he thank'd God he had given him opportunity to make a shew of his clemency , and bounty . They all then presenting themselves upon Stevens word and Castruccios , were together with Steven imprisond , and put to death . In this meane while the Florentines had recoverd S. Miniato ; whereupon Castruccio thought fit to stay that war : considering that as yet he was not secure of Lucca , being that he could not safely part from home ; and haveing causd the Florentines to be felt whether they would admit of a truce , he found them easily yeelding thereto ; for they also were weary of the charge , and desirous to stop the expence . Whereupon they made a truce , of two yeares , and that every one should keep what they had gotten . In the meane while Castruccio being freed from the war , that he might not again incurre those dangers and hazards which formerly he had run , under divers colours and pretences , cut off all those in Lucca , who could have any ambition to to aspire to the Principality , and pardoned not one of them , depriving them of their Country and Fortunes , and those he could get in his clutches , of their lives : affirming that he had found it by experience , that none of them would abide true ; and for his better safeguard , built a Fortresse in Lucca , and made use of the materials of their Towers , whom he had banish'd and murdred . While Castruccio was thus quiet with the Florentines , and that he strengthened himselfe in Lucca , he fail'd not to do all that he could , without entring into open hostility to increase his greatnesse : and having a great desire to take Pistoya , thinking with himselfe that by the possessiou of that City , he had gotten one foot into Florence , gain'd himselfe by divers wayes the whole mountaine to friend , and by the factions he made in Pistoya , so behav'd himselfe , that every one rely'd much on him . At that time the City was divided ( as always it was ) into the Bianchi and Neri ; head of the Bianchi was Bastiano of Possente ; and of the Neri , James of Gia : each of which held streight correspondence with Castrucio , & one desir'd to expell the other , so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blowes ; James made himselfe strong at the gate towards Florence . Bastiano at that towards Lucca , and the one and the other of them relying more upon Castruccio , than upon the Florentines , judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the warre , each of them sent to him secretly for ayd : which Castruccio promis'd to them both , letting James know that he would come in person , and telling Bastiano , he would send Paul Guinigi his Foster son : and appointing a set time , sent Paul by way of Pescia , and himselfe went straight on to Pistoya ; so that about midnight , for thus was it agreed between Castruccio and Paul , they both arrived at Pistoya and there receiv'd as friends : being both entred , when Castruccio found his time , he gave the watchword to Paul , whereupon he slew James of Gia , and the other Bastiano of Possente ; and all their partakers were partly taken , partly slaine , whereupon they forced Pistoya without resistance ; and for the government of the towne , Castruccio constrained the people to yeeld him obedience , remitting to them many old debts and dutyes , and thus did he to the whole Country there abouts , who all flock't together : partly to see the new Prince , so that every one fraught with hopes , or admiring his valour , set his heart at rest . It happened about this time , that the people of Rome mutinyed upon the extreame dearth of provision there , which was caused by the Popes absence , who was then at Avignon , and they blamed the Germane government , insomuch that every day murders and other disorders were committed , which Henry the Emperours Deputy could no way remedy ; whereupon he had a great suspicion that the Romanes would call in King Robert of Naples , and chace him from Rome , and so restore it to the Pope : And having no nearer Allie , whom he could make recourse unto , than Castruccio , he sent to intreat him , that he would be pleased , not only to send him aid , but to come himself also in person . Castruccio thought this voyage was no way to be put off , as well to render some service of merit to the Emperour , as because now the Emperour was absent from Rome , there was some necessity of it : leaving Paul Guinigi at Lucca , he went thence with two hundred horse to Rome , where he was entertain'd by Henry , with very much honour ; and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the Imperials , that without blood or other violence , all things were wel quieted : for Castruccio having caused a good quantity of corne to be brought by sea out of the Countey about Pisa , took away all occasion of offence . Afterwards , partly by admonishing , partly by chastsing the cheif Officers of Rome , he reduc'd them freely under Henries government ; & Castruccio was created a Roman Senator , besides many other honors he received of the people , and that Order he took with very great pomp , putting on a gown of cloth of tissue with great letters before to this purpose , This man is what it pleases God ; and again behind , And shall be what God will. In this mean while the Florentines , who were displeased that Castruccio during the truce , had made himself Lord of Pistoya , devis'd which way they might make it rebel , which by reason of his absence , they thought might easily be effected . Amongst the banished Pistoyeses , who were then at Florence , there was Baldo Cocchi , and James Baldini , both men of authority , and ready for any hazard . These men held correspondence with some friends they had within ; so that with the Florentines helpe they entred by night into Pistoya , and chaced thence Castruccios friends and officers , and some of them they slew , and restored the City her liberty , which news much displeased Castruccio ; so that having taken leave of Henry , he came with his men by great dayes journeys to Lucca . The Florentines when they had word of Castruccios return , thinking he would not take much rest , resolv'd to prevent him , and with their forces to enter first into the Vale of Nievola , before him : supposing , that if they first made themselves masters of that valley , they should cut off from him all means of possibility to recover Pistoya ; and so having put in order a great army of all the friends of the Guelfes faction , they came into the territory of Pistoya . On the other side , Castruccio came with his troops to Mount Carlo , and having learned where the Florentines army was , determined not to meet them in the plain of Pistoya , nor to attend them in the plain of Psecia , but if it might be , to encounter them in the straight of Saravalla ; deeming that by bringing his designe to pass , he should surely gain the victory ; for he understood the Florentines had got together some forty thousand men , and he had made choyce of some twelve thousand out of all his ; and however he was confident of his own industry , and their valor , yet doubted he , lest if he set on them in a large place , he might be environ'd by the multitude of the enemies . Saravalla is a Castle between Pescia and Pistoya , plac't upon a hill that shuts in the Vale of Nievole , not upon the very passage , but above to that some two bow-shots of the place , by which a man passes , is more straight than on the sudden ; for of every side it rises gently but in a straight manner , especially upon the hill , where the waters are divided ; so that twenty men on the one side and the other would wholly possess it . In this place Castruccio had a designe to encounter with the enemy , as well because his small troops should have the advantage , as not to discover the enemy but just upon the skirmish , fearing lest his men seeing the number of the enemies , should be startled . Mr. Manfredi of the German nation , was then Lord of the Castle of Saravalla , who before that Castruccio was Lord of Pistoya , had been lest in that Castle , as in a place that was neuter between the Luccheses and Pistoyeses : nor afterward befel it either of them to offend him , he promising to abide neuter , and not to apply himself to the one or the other : So that for this cause , and for that the situation was strong , he had kept himself thus : but upon this accident Castruccio became desirous to possess this place . And having very near acquaintance with one of the inhabitants of the place , he so appointed his business with him , that the night before the skirmish was to begin , he should take into the town 400 m●n of his , and slay the commander ; and abiding thus prepared , he stirred not his army from Mount Carlo , the more to encourage the Florentines to pass , who , because they desired to carry the war far of from Pistoya , and to bring it into the Vale of Nievole , encamped under Saravalla , with intintion the day following to pass the hill , but Castruccio having without any noyse taken the Castle in the might , p●rted from Mount Carlo about mid-night , and quietly arrived in the morning at the foot of Saravalla , so that at the same instant both the Florentines and he began to ascend the side of the hill . Castruccio had sent his infantry by the rode way , & a troop of 400 Horse he had sent upon the left hand towards the Castle : on the other side the Florentines had sent 400 horse before them , and after those their foot moved , not any way thinking they should find Castruccio upon the top of the hill ; for they knew nothing of that he had made himself master of the Castle . Thus at unawares the Florentine Horse having got to the top of the hill discovered Castruccios Foot , and were so near approached them , that they had hardly time to lace on their helmets . These men then that were unprovided , being assaild by the others that were prepared , and in order , were fiercely set upon , and with much adoe made resistance and indeed some few of them made head a while : but so soon as the noyse hereof desended into the Florentines camp , all was full of confusion . The Horse were oppressed by the Foot ; the Foot by the Horse , and their carriages ; the Commanders because of the straifness of the place could neither advance nor retire : so that no man in this confusion knew what could or should be done : insomuch , that the Horse which were at blowes with the enemies Foot , were cut to pieces , and they not able to defend themselves because the malignity of the scite did not suffer them , yet made they resistance more of necessity than of valor ; for being hemmed in by the mountains on both sides behind by their friends , and before by their enemies , they had to way open for flight . Hereupon Castruccio having perceived that his troops were not able to break the enemy , sent a thousand Foot by way of the Castle , causing them to desend with the 400 Horse which he had sent before , who struck them so rudely upon the flank that the Florentines unable longer to resist that violence , vanquisht rather by the place than by the enemy , all took them to flight ; and the flight began from those who were behind towards Pistoya , who dispersing themselves all along the plain , every one where he best could , provided for his safeguard . This defeat was very great and bloody ; many Commanders were taken , among which was Bandino of Rossi , Francesco Brunnelleschi , and John of Tosa , all noble Florentines , and many other Tuscans , besides divers of the Kingdom of Naples , who being sent by King Robert in favor of the Guelfes , served under the Florentines . The Pistoyeses hearing of this rout , without delay chasing out the faction of the Guelfes , yeelded themselves to Castruccio . Who not contented herewith , took Piato , and all the Castles of the plain , as well on this as on the other side of Arno , and set himself down with his army in the plain of Perettola some two miles off from Florence , where he abode many dayes to divide the spoyle , and to feast for joy of the victory gotten , causing moneys to be stamped in scorn of the Florentines , and races to be run by horse-men and queans : neither faild he to endeavor to corrupt some noble Citizens , to open to him in the night the gates of Florence ; but the conspiracy being discovered , they were taken and beheaded , among whom was Thomas Lupacco , and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi . Hereupon the Florentines being affrighted upon his defeat , hardly knew any remedy to preserve their liberty ; and to the end they might be sure of ayd , sent Ambassadors to Robert King of Naples , to give him the City , and the Dominion thereof , Which that King accepied of , not so much for the honor the Florentines had done him , as for that he knew well how much it imported his State that the Guelfes faction should maintain the State of Tuscany : and having agreed with the Florentines to have of them two hundred thousand Florentines by the year , he sent Charles his son with four thousand Horse to Florence : so that the Florentines were somewhat eased of Castruccios troops : for they were constraind to leave their territories and to goe to Pisa , there to repress a conspiracy made against him by Benedicto Lanfranschi , one of the cheif of Pisa , who not being able to endure that his native countrey should be enthralled to a Lucchese , conspired against him , plotting to seize upon the Cittadel , and to chase out the garrison , and to slay those of Castruccio's party . But because in such matters , if the small number be fit to keep the secret , yet suffices it not to put it in execution : while he went about to gain more men to this purpose , some there were that be wrayed his plot to Castruccio : neithet passed this discovery without the infamy of Bonifacio Cerchi and Iohn Guidi Florentines , who were near neighbors to Pisa ; whereupon Benedicto being layd hand on , was put to death , and all the rest of that family banisht , and many other Noble Citizens beheaded : and thinking with himself that Pistoya and Pisa were not very faithfull unto him , he took care both by his industry and forces to secure himself thereof : which gave leisure to the Florentines to recover their strength , and to be able to attend the return of Charles : who being arrived , they determined to lose no longer time , and gatherd ae great number of men ; for they called together to their ayd in a manner all the Guelfes in Italy , and made an exceeding great army : of more than 30000 Foot , and 10000 Horse , and having advised , which were first to be assaild , either Pistoya or Pisa , they resolved it were better to set first upon Pisa , being a thing more likely to succeed , by reason of the late conspiracy there , as also of more profit , deeming that if Pisa were once gotten , Pistoya would soon render it self . The Florentines then going forth with this army in the beginning of May 1328 , suddenly took Lastra Signia , Mount Lupo , and Empoli , and came with their army to St. Miniato ; Castruccio on the other part perceiving this great army , which the Florentines had brought againe him , was nothing startled , but rather thought that this was the time , when Fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of Tuscany , beleeving they should have no better success in this of Pisa , than formerly they had in that of Serravalle ; and that now they could not hope to repair themselves again , as then ; whereupon assembling twenty thousand Foot and 4000 Horse , he brought his army to Fucchio , and sent Paul Guinigi with 5000 Foot to Pisa . Fucchio is seated in a stronger place than any other Castle , upon the territory of Pisa , because it is in the midst between the Goseiana and the Arno , and a little raised from the plain ; where he abiding , the enemies were not able , unless they divided their army into two parts ; to hinder his provision either from Lucca , or Pisa ; neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him , or goe towards Pisa : for in one case , they might be inclosed in the midst between Castruccios troops , and those of Pisa ; in the other case , having the Arno to pass , they could not do it with the enemy on their backs , without very great danger . And Castruccio for their encouragement to undertake the passage , had not placed himself with his troops along the bank of Arno , but a little aside near unto the walls of Fucchio , and had left distance enough between the River and him . The Florentines having gotten St. Miniato , advised whether were to be done , either to goe to Pisa , or to find out Castruccio ; and having measured the difficulties of both courses , they resolved to goe and invest him ; the river Arno was so low that a man might wade over it ; but yet not so , but that the infantry was wet to the shoulders , and the Horse even to the saddle . Upon the tenth day then of June in the morning , the Florentines in battel array , caused part of their Cavalery to begin to pass , and a body of ten thousand Foot. Castruccio who stood ready , and intent to what he had in his mind to do , with a battalion of five thousand Foot , and three thousand Horse fell upon them : neither gave he them any time to get out of the water but that he was at blowes with them ; he sent a thousand light armed Foot up by the bank on that part , under the Arno , and a thousand above it , the Florentines Foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their armes , nor had they all yet got over the channel of the river . When some of the Horse had passed , by reason that they had moord the bottom of the Arno , they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them ; for the bottom proving rotten and miry , some of the Horse came over and over on their riders , and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled : whereupon the Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty to pass on that part , caused them to retire and make proof of a higher part of the river , whereby to find a sounder bottom , and the channel more favorable for their passage : against whom those whom Castruccio had sent under the bank , made resistance , who slightly armed with targets and darts , in their hands , with huge outcries , wounded them both in the face and brest , insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cryes and stroaks , would in no wise pass forwards , but fell foule one upon another ; the fight between Castrucio's men and those that were already past , was sharp and terrible , andd of each side there fell many , and every one used all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary . Castruccio's men would force them back into the river ; the Florentines striv'd to put forwards to make place for others , that being come forth of the water , they might be able to stand to the fight , to which obstinacy there was added the Captains encouragements . Castrucio put his men in mind , that these were the same enemies , which but a little while ago they had beaten at Seravalle . The Florentines reproached theirs , that they being many , should suffer a few to overcome them . But Castruccio perceiving that the fight lasted , and that his own and his adversaries were well wearied , and that on each side many were hurt and slain , he sent out another band of five thousond Foot , and when he brought them up to the very back of his own that fought , he gave order that they before should open , and wheele about , one on the right hand , the other on the left , and so retire ; which thing done gave room to the Florentines to advance and gain some ground . But when once they came to handy blowes , the fresh men with those that were tir'd , they staid not long ere they forc'd them back into the river , between the Horse of the one side , and the other , yet there was not much advantage : whereupon Castruccio knowing his own inferior , had given order to the leaders , that they should only maintain fight , as he that hoped to overcome the Foot ; which done , he might be able with more ease to overcome the Horse ; which out as he purposed : for having seen the Foot forc'd back into the river , he sent the rest of his infantry against the enemies Horse , who with lances and darts wounding them , and the Cavalery also pressing them with greater fury , put them to flight . The Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty that their Horse had to pass , strove to make their Foot pass on that part beneath the river , to fight with the flank of Castruccio's troops . But the channel being deep , and all above already possest by his men , all this prov'd vain . Whereupon the whole army was put to rout , to Castruccio's great glory and honor , and of so great a multitude there escap'd not a third . Many Chieftains were taken , and Charles son of King Robert , together with Michaelangelo Falconi ; and Taddeo of the Albizi Florentine Commissaries , fled thence to Empoli . The spoyl taken was great , the slaughter exceeding great , as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict : for of the Florentine army 20231 , & of Castruccio's part 1570 were left dead upon the place . But Fortune being enemy to his glory , when as she should have given him life , took it from him , and interrupted those designes which he a long time before had purposed to put in effect : neither could any thing but death hinder him . Castruccio had toyld himself all that day in the battel , when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty , he stayd about the port of Fucchio , to attend the soldiers , as they should return from the victory , and in person receive and thank them , and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemies , that they had made head in any place , he might be ready to give order thereto : judgeing it the office of a good Commander , to be the first to get a horse-back , and the last to light off . Whereupon he standing exposed to a wind , which ordinarily about mid-day rise ; upon the Arno , and uses to be pestiferous , he was all over chil'd . Which thing not being made account of by him , was the occasion of his death : for the night following he was taken with a dangerous feaver , which continually augmenting , and the sickness being judged mortal by all the Physitians , and Castruccio perceiving of it , called Paul Guinigi , and spake to him these words ; Had I beleeved , my son , that Fortune would have cut of my course in the midst of the way , to arrive unto that glory which I by my so many good suce cesses had promis'd my self , I should have less wearied my self ; and to thee as I should have left a smaller estate , so also fewer enemies , and less envy : for I would have been content with the dominion of Lucca & Pisa , and never subdu'd the Pistoyeses , nor with so many injuries provoked the Florentines ; but by making the one and the other of these people my friends , I should have led a life , though not longer , yet surely more quiet ; and to thee should I have left an estate , though less , without doubt more secure and firm ; but Fortune , who will dispose of all human affairs , gave me not so much judgement , that I was able first to know it , or so much time , that I was able to overcome it . Thou hast heard , for many have told thee , and I never denyed it to thee , how I came into thy fathers house , being yet a young lad , and voyd of all those hopes which every generous spirit ought to conceive , and how I was by him brought up , and beloved by him as much as if I had been of his own blood ; whereupon under his government I became valorous and grew capable of that fortune in which thou hast and dost see mee : and because at his death , he committed thee and all this fortunes to my fidelity , I have brought thee up with that affection , and increased them with that fidelity , that I was and am bound to . And because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father , but that also which my fortune and valor got , were thine , I never would marry , to the end that the love of children should never take me off , from shewing in any part that thankfulness towards thy fathers blood , which I thought I was obliged to shew . I leave thee therefore a very fair State , whereat I am much pleased : but for that I leave it thee weak and unsetled , I am exceedingly grieved there remains to thee the City of Lucca , wich will never be content to live under thy government : Pisa is also thine : wherein there ere men naturally inconstant , and full of treachery : which , however it be divers times accustomed to serve , yet will it alwaies disdain to have a Lucchese for its Lord. Pistoya likewise is left to thee , very little faithfull to thee , because it is divided , and by fresh injuries provok'd against our Family . Thou hast the Florentines for thy neighbors , and those offended , and divers waies injuryed by us , and not extinguisht , to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the Conquest of all Tuscany . Thou canst not rely upon the Princes of Milan , nor upon the Emperor , because they are far hence , lazy , and very slow with their succors : wherefore thou oughtst not to hope in any thing , but in thy own industry , and the remembrance of my valor , and in the reputation which this present victory gains thee : which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of , will ayd thee to make an accord with the Florentines , who being affrighted at this present defeat , ought with desire to condiscend thereto : whom though I sought to make them mine enemies , and thought it would procure me both power and glory , yet thou art by all means to seek to gain for thy friends ; for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage . It is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his own self , and to know how to measure the forces of his own courage and State ; and he that finds himself unfit for war , should endeavor to settle his government by the rules of peace , whereunto thou shalt do well if by my advice thou address thy self , and strive by this way to enjoy my pains and dangers , which shall easily prove successful to thee , when thou shalt account these my advertisements true : and herewithall thou shalt be doubly oblig'd to me , first that I have left thee this State , and secondly that I have taught thee how to keep it . Afterwards having caused those Citizens to come to him , who of Lucca , Pisa , and Pistoya , served in the wars under him ; and having recommended Paul Guinigi to them , and made them swear obedience to him , he died ; leaving to all those , that ever knew him , a happy remembrance of him ; and to those that had been his friends , so great a desire of him , that never any Prince , that died at any time , left more . His funerals were most honorably solemnized , and he was buried at St. Francesco in Lucca . But neither valor , norfortune were so favorable to Paul Gninigi , as to Castruccio ; for not long after , he lost Pistoya , and after Pisa ; and with much adoe held he the government of Lucca : which continued in his family till Paul the grand-child . Castruccio then was , by what is here shewed , a man of rare note , not only for those times he lived in , but for many ages that had past long before . He was of a stature higher than ordinary , and his limb were well answerable each to other ; & of such a grace he was in his aspect , and entertain'd all men with that humanity , that he never spake with any that he sent from him discontent ; his hair inclin'd to a reddish colour , and he wore it always cut above his ears ; and alwaies in all seasons , whether it raind or snew , he went with his head uncover'd ; he was very pleasing to his friends ; and terrible to his enemies , just among his subjects , treacherous with forreiners : nor where he could vanquish by fraud , did he everstrive to do it by force : for he said the victory , and not the manner how it was got , gaind a man glory ; no man enter'd more boldly into dangers , nor was more wary to get out of them : and he was wont to say , that men ought to prove every thing , but to be astonish'd at nothing , and that God favors valiant men , who alwaies chastises the feeble with the mighty . He was also very admirable in replying or biting sharply or gentily ; and as in this kind he spared not any , so likewise , he was nothing mov'd , when himself was not spared : so that we have many things he said wittily , and heard patiently , as these : Having caus'd a Duckat to be given for a Starling , and a friend of his reproving him for it , said Castruccio Thou wouldst not have given above a peny for it , and his friend saying it was true , he reply'd , a Duckat is les● to mée . Having a flatterer about him , and in scorn having spat upon him , the flatterer said , that Fisher men to take a little Fish suffer themselves to be all moyl'd in the Sea ; I will let my self be daub'd by a little spittle , to catch a Whale : which Castruccio not only heard patiently , but rewarded . When one told him , that he liv'd too sumptuonsly ; said Castruccio , if this were a vice , there would not be so splendid entertainments at the Saints Feasts . Passing through a street , & seeing a young man comming out of a whore-house all blushing because he had been seen by him , he said to him , Be not asham'd when thou goest out , but when thou entrest in . A friend of his giving him a knot to loose , that was curiously tyed , said , O foole , dest thou think I will loosen such a thing , which being tyed gives me so much trouble ? Castruccio saying to one that profest himself a Philosopher , You are of the condition of dogs , that alwaies go about those who can best give them meat ; No says the party , we are like Phyfitians , who visit the houses that have most need of them . Going from Pisa to Ligorne by water , and a dangerous storme there arising , and thereupon being much preplex'd , was reprehended by one of his company as pusillanimons , saying himself was not afraid of any thing ; to whom Castruccio reply'd , that he nothing marvayl'd thereat ; for every one valu'd his life , according to its worth . Being ask'd by onu , what he should do to gaine a good esteeme ? answered him ; See when thou goest to a Feast , that a blocke sit not upon a blocke . When one blasted that he had read many things , said Castruccio , It were better thou couldst brag thou hadst remembred much . Another bragging though he had tipled much , he was not drunk ; he reply'd , and Oxe does the same . Castruccio kept a young losse , which he lay with ordinarily , and thereupon being reprov'd by a friend , telling him that it was a great wrong to him that he had suffer'd himselfe to be so taken by a Wench ; Thou art mistaken , quoth Cactruccio , I took her , not she me . Also when one blam'd him that he was too delicious in his dy●● , he said to him , I warrant thou woul● si● not spend herein so much as I doe ; That is true , quoth the other ; then reply'd he Toou 〈◊〉 more covetous than I am gluttonou . Being invited to supper by Tadeo Cernardi a ●uc●hese , a rich and magnificent citizen ; and in the hou● . Tadeo shewing him a chamber all furnish'd with cloth of gold , and that it was all ●a●'d with curious stones , which were diversty wrought with sundry colours , and represented flowers , leaves , and such like green things : Castruccio having got together a great deale of spettle in his mouth , spat it full in Tadeos face ; at which he shewing himselfe much troubled , says Castruccio ; I knew not where to spet that I might offend thee lesse . Being ask'd how Caesar dyed ? saith he , Would to God I might dye like him . Being one night in a house of one of his Gentlemen , where there were divers Ladyes invited to a Feast , and he dancing , and sporting with them , more than befitted his condition , was reprovd by a friend , answered , He that is held a wise man in the day time , will never be thought a foole in the night . One comming to aske a favour at his hands , and Castruccio seeming as if he heard not , sell down upon his knees before him , whereat Castruccio chiding him , he answered , Thou art the cause thereof , who carryest thine cares in thy feet : and thereby he gaind double the favour he asked . He used to say , that the way to Hell was easie , because men went thither downwards , and blindfold . When one askd him a favour with many and supperfluous worrds , Castruccio said to him , Hereafter when thou wouldst any thing with me , send another . Such another man having wearied him with a tedious speech , and telling him in the latter end , Perhaps I may have tir'd you with my long speaking ; No , thou hast not , said he , for I heard not one word of all that thou hast spoken . He was wont to say of one who had been a handsome boy , and afterwards became a comely man , that he was too injurious , haveing first distracted the husbands from their wives , and afterwards the wives from their husbands . To an envious man that laughd , he said , Laughst thou because thou art well , or because another suffers evill ? When he was also under the rule of Master Francis Guinigi , one of his playfellows saying to him , What wilt thou that I shall give thee , for a blow on the mouth ? Castruccio answered him , a Helmet . Having causd a citizen of Lucca to dye , who had helpd him in his rising to his greatnesse , when it was said to him , He had ill done to put to death one of his old friends ; he reply'd ; You are deceivd , I have put to death a new enemy . Castruccio commended much those that betrothd wives , but never married them , like men that say they will go to Sea , but never do . He said he wondred much at men , that when they bought any vessell of earth or glasse , they found it first whether it be good ; but in taking a wife they are content only to see her . When he was neare death , one asking him , how he would be buried ? he answered , with my face downwards : for I know , that as soon as I am dead , this Country shall go upside down . Being asked , whether he never thought to become a Fryer to save his Soule ? he said No , for it was strange to him , that Lazarus should go to Paradise , and Vguccion of Faggivola to Hell. Being asked , when it was best to eate , to preserve the health ? he answered , if a man be rich when he is hungry ; if he be poore , when he may . Seeing a Gentleman a friend of his , that made his servant trusse his points , he said , I hope one day too thou wiltmake his feed thee . Seeing that one had writen upon his house in Latine , God keep the wicked hence ; said , The master then must not enter here . Passing by a way where there was a little house with a great gate , he said , This house will run out of doores . Treating with an Ambassadour of the King of Naples touching some good of the borderers , whereat he was some What angry , when the Ambassadour said , Feare you not the King then ? Castruccio said , Is this your King good or bad ? and he answering that he was good , Castruccio reply'd , Wherefore then should I be afraid of those that are good ? We might relate many others of his sayings , wherein he shewd both acurosse of wit , and gravity ; but these shall suffice in testimony of his worthy qualities . He liv'd forty four yeares , and behavd himselfe like a Prince in all his fortunes : and as of his good for●●nes there are enough monunments left , so likewise would he there should be seene some of his evill fortunes ; for the manacles wherewith he was chain'd in prison , are yet to be seene fastned in the tower of his dwelling house , where they were put by him , that they might beare witnesse of his adversity . And because he was no way inseriour to Philip of Macedon , Alexanders father , nor to Scipio of Rome , he dy'd in the same age they two did ; and doubtlesse he would have exceeded the one and the other , if in exchange of Lucca he had had Macedon , or Rome for his Countrey . A Relation of the course taken by Duke Valentine in the murdering of Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliverotio of Fermo , Paul , and the Duke of Gravina , all of them of the Family of the Orisini ; composd by Nicholas Machiavelli . DUke Valentine was return'd from Lombardy , whither he had gone to excuse himselfe to King Lewis of France , touching those many calumnies which the Florentines charg'd him with , for the rebellion of Arezo and the other Townes of the Vale of Clicana , and was thence come to Imola ; where he plotted his enterprise against Iohn Bentivogh tyrant of Bolonia : for he had a mind to reduce that City into his subjection , and make it head of his Duchy of Romania : which thing being knowne to the Vitelli and Orsini , and their other complices , they thought the Duke would grow too powerfull and that it was to be feard , lest that takeing Balonia , he should seeke their utter ruine , that he might remaine the only Champion of Italy : and hereupon they made a diet at the Magione , in the trritories of Perusia : where there met Cardinal Paulo , and the Duke of Gravina of the Family of the Orsini ; Vitellozzo Vitelli , Oliverotti of Fermo , John Paulo Baglioni tyrant of Perusia , and Master Antonio of Venofro , sent by Pandulfo Petrucci head of Siena : where it was argued amongst them touching the Dukes greatness , and touching what his further intentions were : and that it was necessary to bridle his appetite : otherwise they ran hazard together with others , all to goe to ruine : and they determined not to abandon the Bentivoli , and to seek to gain the Florentines ; to one and the other of which places they dispatch'd men , promising ayd to the one , and encouraging the other to unite with them , against the common enemy . This Diet was suddenly known throughout all Italy , and those people that under the Dukes government were discontented , among whom were the Vrbinates , began to hope they might be able to inovate some things from whence it proceeded , that their minds being thus held in suspence by some of Vrbino , it was plotted to take the Rock of Lea , which held for the Duke , and these took occasion from hence . The governor fortifi'd the Castle , and causing timber to be carried thither , they of the conspiracy contrived that some great peices of timber , which they were drawing into the Castle , should be brought upon the bridge , to the end that being thus clogged , it could not be lift up by them within : which occasion being taken , they leapd upon the bridge , and thence into the Rock , by which surprisal , so soon as it was understood , all that State rebelled , and called home again their old Duke . Hope now being laid hold on , not so much by the taking of the Rock , as for the Diet held at the Magione , by means whereof they thought to be assisted : who having heard the rebellion of Vrbin , imagined it not fit to lose the occasion : and getting their men together , they put forward , intending if there were any town of all that State remaining in the Dukes hands , to assail it : and they sent afresh again to Florence to sollicite that Commonwealth to joyne with them in extinguishing this common calamity : shewing the party already gained , and such an occasion offered as the like was not to be expected . But the Florentines for the hate they bare to the Vitelli and the Orsini upon divers occasions , not onely clave not to them , but sent Nicholas Machiavelli their Secretary , to offer receipt to the Duke , and aid against these his new enemies , who was then in Imola full of fear , because of a sudden and beyond his opinion , his soldiers being become his enemies , he unarmd met with a war at hand : but having taken heart upon the Florentines profers , he purposed to temporise , and hold off the war with those few people which he had , and with treaties of agreement , and partly to prepare aides , which he provided two waies , by sending to the King of France for men , and partly by taking into his pay all men at armes , and what others else made profession to serve a Horse-back , and to all he gave money . Notwithstanding all this , the enemies advanc'd , and thence came towards Fossombrone ; where some of the Dukes troops had made head : which by the Vitelli and Orsini were broken : which thing caused the Duke to turn himself wholly to see if he with treaties of accord could stop this humor : and being an exceeding great dissembler , he faild not of any means to give them to understand who had taken armes against him , that what he had gotten he was willing should be theirs : and that it suffic'd him to enjoy the title of Prince , but he was content the Principality should be theirs , and so effectually perswaded he them , that they sent Paul to the Duke to treat of peace , and so stayed their armes : but now the Duke staid not his preparations , and with a great deal of case increased both his Horse and Foot , and to the end these provisions should not appear , he went and scattered all his soldiers in several places throughout Romans . In this while also came there to him five hundred French lances : and however he was now so strong , that with open force he was able to right himself upon his enemies ; yet thought he it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them , and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace : and this matter was so far labored in , that he made a peace with them , and assured to them their old pays , gave them four thousand Duckats in hand , promised not to molest the Bentivolii , and made alliance with John , and moreover that he could not constrain any of them to come in person to him , more than he thought good himself . On the other side they promised to restore unto him the Dutchy of Vrbiu , and all the other places taken by them , and to serve him in any expedition he should undertake ; nor without his permission to war with any one , or take pay of any one . This accord being made , Guidubaldo Duke of Vrbin sled again to Venice , having first caused all the fortresses of that State to be demolished : for relying upon the people he would not that those sorts , which he thought he could not defend , should fall into the enemies hands , whereby to bridle his friends . But Duke Valentine having made this agreement , and divided all his troops throughout all Romania , with the Frenchmen at armes , at the end of November departed from Imola , and from thence went to Cesena , where he abode many dayes to contriye with those that were sent by the Vitelli and the Orsini , who were ready then with their forces in the Dutchy of Vrbin , what action they should then anew enter in , but not concluding any thing , Oliverotto of Fermo was sent to offer him that if he would adventure an ●expedition against Tuscany they were at his service ; in case he would not , they would be ready to serve him against Sinigallia ; to whom the Duke answered , that in Tuscany he would not make any war , because the Florentines were his friends : but he was well content they should goe to Sinigallia : whence it came to pass that not long after , advice was brought , that the town was yeelded to them , but the Fort would not : for the Governor would render it to the Duke in person , and to none else ; and thereupon they perswad'd him to comebefore it , the Duke thought this occasion very good , and that it would not any way skare them , being he was called by them , and not going of himself : and the more to secure them , he dismis'd all his French forces , which returned thence into Lombardy , save only a hundred lances of Mounsieur Candi●les his kinsman , and parting about the middle of December from Cesena , he went thence to Fano ; where withall his wiles and craft he could , he perswaded the Vitelli and the Orsini , to expect him at Sinigallia ; shewing them that such strangenesse would make their accord to be neither faithfull nor durable ; and that he was a man that desird he might availe himselfe both of the forces and advice of his friends : and however Vitellozzo was very unwilling , and that his brothers death had taught him , that he should not offend a Prince and afterwards trust him ; neverthelesse , being wrought to it by Paulo Orfino who had been corrupted by the Duke with gifts and faire promises , he agreed to attend him : whereupon the Duke before the 30 day of December , 1502 , that he was to goe from Fano , communicated his purpose to eight of his cheife confidents , among whom were Don Michael , and the Lord of Enna who was afterwards Cardinal : and gave them charge , that presently as soone as Vitellozzo , Paulo Orsino , the Duke of Gravina , and Oliverotto had met them , each two of them should get one of them between them : consigning each one by name to certaine two , who should traine them along even into Sinigallia , nor suffer them to part , till they had brought them to the Dukes lodging , and that they were there taken . He afterwards tooke order that all his Horse and Foot , which were better than two thousand Horse and ten thousand Foot , should be in the morning at breake of day upon the Metaure , a River some five miles from Fano , where they should attend him ; being then the last day of Deucmber , pon the Metaure with those troops , he causd some two hundred Horse to go before him , afterwards the Foot mov'd , and after them himselfe in person , with the rest of his men at armes . Fano and Sinigallia are two Cities of the Matches , seituate upon the bank of the Adriatick Sea fifteen miles distant the one from the other : So that he who goes towards Sinigallia hath the Mountaines on his right hand , the feet whereof sometimes are so bounded by the Sea , that between them and the water there remaines but a very small distance , and where they are most extended , there is not above two miles distance . The City of Sinigallia from the foot of these Mountaines is not much further than a bow-shot , and from the Sea not above a mile distant : along the side hereof runs alittle river , which washeth that part of the wals which is toward Fano , looking towards the high way , so that till it come neare unto Sinigallia , it runs for a good part of the way along the Mountaines : and being come neare up to the river that passes alongst by Sinigallia , it turnes upon the left hand alongst the banke thereof : So that running on for the space of a bow-shot , it reaches to a bridge , which passes that river , and stands in front with the gate that enters into Sinigallia ; not by a right line , but athwart : before the gate there is a bourg of houses , with a broad place before them , which the bank of the river shoulders upon one side . So that the Vitelli and Orsini having given order to attend the Duke , and personally to honour him , the better to give way to his men , they retir'd their own into certaine Castles , some six miles from Sinigallia , and had left only Oliverotto in Sinigallia with his band , which was some thousand Foot , and a hundred and fifty Horse , which were lodg'd in the bourg before nam'd . Things being thus ordered , Duke Valentine came thence towards Sinigallia , & when the first head of the Horse troops came up to the bridge , they pass'd it not , but making stand , they turnd their horse , the one part towards the river , the other to the open field , and so left a way in the midst , whereby the infantry passd , which without stop entred the Town . Vitellozzo , Paulo , and the Duke of Gravina upon their mules , accompanied with a few horse , went to meet the Duke : & Vitellozzo disarmed having a cloak all lined with green , being exceeding melancholy , as presaging his own death near at hand , caused a certain admiration of himself in all , the valor of the man being well known , and the fortune he had passd ; and it is said , that when he left his soldiers to come into Sinigallia , there to meet the Duke , that he did in a manner take his last leave of them ; to his Captains he recommended his house , and the welfare thereof , and admonishd his Nephews , that they should not so much mind the great fortunes of their Family , as the valor of their Ancestors . These three then being come up to the Duke , and done their obeisance , were receivd by him with a chearfull countenance , and presently by those , who had charge to look to them , taken between them . But when the Duke saw that Oliverotto was wanting , who had staid with his men at Sinigallia , and attended before at the broad place by his lodging , above the river , to keep them in order , and exercise them : he wink'd upon Don Michael , to whom the care of Oliverotto was commited , that he should take such order that Oliverotto should not escape him . Whereupon Don Michael rode before , and being come to Oliverotto , to told him , that now it was not a time to hold his men together out of their lodgings ; because then they would be taken from them by the Dukes soldiers , and therefore perswaded him to send them to their lodgings , and goe with him to meet the Duke : which when Oliverotto had done , the Duke came , and having seen seen him , called him ; to whom Oliverotto having made reverence , he joyn'd in troop with the rest , and entred into Sinigallia , where all dismounting at the Dukes Lodging , enterd with him into a private chamber , they were held prisoners to the Duke , who presently got a horseback , and commanded that Oliverotto and the Orsinies Souldiers should be all rifled . Oliveroto's were all pillag'd , by reason they were near at hand ; those that belong'd to the Orsini and the Vitelli , being more remote having before heard of the ruine of their Masters , had time to get together , where calling to mind the valor and discipline of the Families of the Orsini and Vitelli , joyntly all in one body , in despight of the countrey , and their enemies power , they sav'd themselves . But the Dukes soldiers not satisfied with the pillage of of Oliverotto's soldiers , began to sack Sinigallia . And had not the Duke by the death of many stopped their insolence , they would utterly have sackt it . But night being come , and all stirs quiet , the Duke thought fit to put Vitellozzo and Oliverotto to death , and having brought them together , caused them to be strangled . Where neither of them spake any thing worthy of their life past ; for Vitelozzo prayed , that supplication should be made to the Pope , to grant him a plenary Indulgence of all his fins ; Oliverotto much lamenting himself , cast all the fault of the injuries against the Duke on Vitelozzo's back . Paul , and the Duke of Gravina were kept alive , til the Duke had word , that at Rome , the Pope had laid hold on the Cardinal Orsino , the Archbishop of Florence , and Master James of the Holy Cross . After which news upon the 18 of January , at the Castle of Pieve , they also were strangled in the like manner . The Table of the Chapters in the Prince . Chap. 1. HOw many sorts of Principalities there are , and how many wayes they are attained to . Pag. 1 Chap. 2. Of hereditary Principalities . p. 2 Chap. 3. Of mixt Principalities . p 3 Chap. 4. Wherefore Darius his Kingdome , taken by Alexander , rebelled not against his successors after Alexanders death . p. 13 Chap. 5. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be governed , which before they were conquered , lived under their own laws . p. 17 Chap. 6. Of new Principalities that are conquerd by ones own armes and valor . p. 19 Chap. 7. Of new Principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forces . p. 23 Chap. 8. Concerning those who by wicked means have attaind to a Principality . p. 34 Chap. 9. Of the Civil Principality . p. 40 Chap. 10. In what manner the forces of all Principalities ought to be measured . p. 45 Chap. 11. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities . p. 47 Chap. 12. How many sorts of Military discipline there be ; and touching mercenary soldiers . p. 51 Chap. 13. Of Auxiliary Soldiers , mixt and natives . p. 57 Chap. 14. What belongs to the Prince touching military discipline . p. 62 Chap. 15. Of those things in respect whereof men , and especially Princes are prais'd or disprais'd . p. 65 Chap. 16. Of Liherality and Miserableness . p. 68 Chap. 17. Of Cruelty and Clemency , and whether it is better to be belov'd or feared . p. 70 Chap. 18. In what manner Princes ought to keep their word . p. 75 Chap. 19. That Princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred . p. 80 Chap. 20. Whether the Citadels and many other things , which Princes make use of , are profitable or dammageable . p. 93 Chap. 21. How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation . p. 99 Chap. 22. Touching Princes Secretaries . p. 103 Chap. 23. That Flatterers are to be avoyded . p. 105 Chap. 24. Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States . p. 110 Chap. 25. How great power Fortune hath in humane affairs , and what means there is to resist it . p. 112 Chap. 26. An exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarions . p. 117 The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca . p. 123 A Relation of the course taken by the Duke Valentine , in the murdering of Vitelozzo Vitelli , Olverotto of Fermo , Paul , and the Duke of Gravita , all of the Family of the Orsini . p. 159 FNIS. Notes, typically marginal, from the original text Notes for div A50322-e3390 * Without question the end was ambition , Royalty admitting no companion . Of whom to free himself , it seems that Romulus stood not much upon how lawful meanes he used , for Cain-like he slew his brother , and consented to Titus Tatius his death , without doubt , for venturing to take part in the Authority . And touching this , it may be Machiavel will speak truer neare the latter end of his 18. Chapt. Where hee saies , Because the restoring of a City to a civil and politick Government presupposes a good man , and by violence to become a Prince of a Common-wealth presupposes an evil man , for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass , that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mischievous waies , although his ends therein be all good ; nor will a wicked man , by wicked meanes , attaining to be Prince do good , nor ever comes it into his heart to use that Authority well , which by evil meanes he came to . And so at the very end of the same 18. Chap. he concludes , that though the intent were not good , there might be a faire colour set upon it by a good success . Whereby our Polititian , however he windes and turns , comes at length to discover his evil ground he took , that Jus regnandi gratia violandum est ; aliis in rebus pietatem colas , as is that of Euripides . Vertues continue seldome by descent . And this to shew their spring , the government . And that his gifts best term'd , and by him sent . * Ammiratus taxes him , saying , it was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man , then of one that had either any religion or morality in him , whose plain and simple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falshood ; and however the Romans were deceiv'd herein , which cannot be deny'd , yet without doubt they never did this , thinking to deceive themselves , or with intention to deceive others . Thus Ammi . And indeed it savours of Atheisme , bringing the mistress to serve the hand-maid , religion to serve policy ; as if the seasons of the year ought to accommodate themselves to men , rather then men accommodate themselves to the seasons ; not considering that Religion propounds to a man a further end then policy points at . A Prince therefore should be well aware of such evill devices , beleeving constantly that the Religion hath no need of helpe from falshood , nor can gain any strength by lies . Nondum haec quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Deum venerat , nec interpretando sibi quisque jus jurandum & leges apras faciebat . Nec suls nec externis viribus jam stare potcrant , tamen bello non abstinebant adeo ne infeliciter quidem de fensae libertatis taedebat , & vinci quam non tentare victoriam malebant . Non enim cristas vulnera facere , & picta atque aurata scuta transire Romanum palum . Qui esu●ienre imp 〈…〉 it b 〈…〉 & 〈…〉 vites 〈…〉 isit inanes . Proclivius est injuriae quod beneficio vicem exsolvere , quia gratia oneri , ultio quaestui habetur . Videat Consul ne Respquid detrimenti capiat . Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia comitetem fore . Illeverò impedimentum pro occasione arripuit . Appius finem fecit ferendae alienae persc 〈…〉 . Et inde libertatis captare auram , unde ser vitutem timendo in eum statum Remp. adduxerát . Vt ipsi taedio praesentium consules desiderarent . Quibus donis juventus corrum pebatur , & malebat licentiam suam , quam omnium libertatem . Crudelitatem damnatis , crudelitatem initis . Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt . Quorum co●i●orum eventus docuit , alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris alios secundum deposita certamina incorrup to judicio esse . Hanc modestiam equitatemque Realitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris , quae tunc populi universi fuit . If then by chance some reverent man they spie , They all grow silent , and their ears ap 〈…〉 Ex ferocibus universis singt , metu suo obedientes fuere . Populus brevi , poste ●quam ab eo periculum 〈…〉 rat , desiderium 〈◊〉 Haec natura multitudinis est ; aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur . ☞ But this is such a remedy as hath no warrant from divine or humane lawes , especially when that a Tyrant is the true and lawfull Prince of the country , however that by his evill government and administration of the affaires he deservedly be term'd a Tyrant . That of David none is ignorant of , Sam. 1. 24. and 5. Erat praemium virtutis , non sanguinis . Notes for div A50322-e16330 * How this will hold with the general and most received tenent , I cannot see ; being that the Prince and the people are said to make onely one politique body ; and the welfare of the part cannot be separated from the good of the whole . Famous is that fable of Aesops , which Menenius Agrippa made use of , to reconcile the Commons of Rome , upon distaste against the Senate , gone a part in the holy mount : On a time that in man all things accorded well together , each particular member advis'd , and complaind that by their care and pains all things necessary were sought after , and provided for the belly , and that the belly onely remaind idle amongst them , injoying , those delicates which their labor had prepar'd : and thereupon conspir'd together that the hands should not put meat to the mouth , nor the mouth receive it , nor the teeth chaw it : but thus while in this choler they thought by famine to subdue the belly , the whole body fainted . Whereby it came to appear that the belly afforded its service too , and as well gave as receiv'd nourishment , distributing by the veins , throughout the whole body , out of this meat which it had disgested , the blood well concocted , whereby each part was nourish'd . Who is it that feels not , when any part fails , the whole is in disorder ? and who sees not likewise , when any part of the body drawes unto it more then its proportionable nutriture , that the whole pines thereupon ? as from the swelling of the spleen , the health of the whole body is disturb'd , and therefore by some Politiques not unfitly compared to a Princes exchequer , which when it excessively abounds beggers the whole countrey . And it is a folly to think ( saith a Spauish author ) that the poverty of the Comminalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies , nor can great revenues continue there , where the Commonwealth is rack'd to the very bones . All these things serve to argue the mutual sympathy , as between the head and the members , so between the Prince and his subjects ; and to divide the interest of the Prince from that of the people , cannot agree with good policy ; for as in the natural body it breeds diseases , so in the politique it produces disorder and destruction . * Here Machia . falsely imputes the cause of mens cowardlinesse to Christian Religion . I need not alleadge any battells fought by the Christians , to proove him a lyar ; histories frequently affoard us examples , as well ancient as moderne , where they have bin as resolutely fought by the Christians , as ever were any by the Pagans : nay our owne memories may well supply us with some if we want . If we marke from whence Machiavell takes his argument , it is from that the Pagans slew a multitude of sacrifices , the sight of which being terrible made men of thesame disposition . By the same reason must it follow that our butchers and surgeons are more valiant then other men , as who customarily have their hands imbrued in bloud : I may well allow them to be more cruell , and therefore our lawes exclude them from being of the Iury of life and death : but of being more valiant I never heard they had the reputation . Creseit in terea Roma Albae ruinis Crescit in terea Roma Albae ruinis . * This is all calumny ; for we find not that any have preserv'd the records of learning more than the Christians , however much intermixt with Paganisine . I take it that that these memorials were last in the vast deluges of the Vandals , Goths , and Hunns , who themselves being barbarous and ignorant , envyed others learning ; and therefore destroyd all the registers of antiquity they could find : which our Author injuriously imputes to the Christians , being that they time out of minde , have caus'd those books to be taught the youth in their schools and we find that the most esteemd Fathers in the Church were adorn'd with that learning , which they are raxed to have persecuted ; which serves also very necessarily for the better understanding and illustrating of Theology , and affords good arguments many times to our Divines for the conviction of the Gentiles out of their own writers . Nor do I find there was any other restraint in those studies , than that men were advis'd to apply themselves soberly thereunto , as not being studies to dwell in , but tending rather to the service of Theology . Terna jugera & septunnces viritim divise●ant Nos Maurusij , qui fugimus a facie Iesu latronis filij Navae . Campani magis nomen in auxilium sidiciorum , quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt . * Because this whole Chapter tends to shew how necessary for a Princes advantage guile is , and it is again recommended by precept in Machiavels Treaty of a Prince , I cannot but take notice that here he is blameable . Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requir it , is not meant De dolo Malo : supposed by Machiavel in his Prince Chap. 19. where he perswades a Prince to use the Lyons force , and the Foxes craft . To be able in all Military stratagems and slights to circumvent the enemy , is one of the most requisite and not able parts in a Commander : provided there be no breach of Faith , nor Oath violated : for as Tully sayes , Est jusjurandum affirmatio Religiosa : quod autem affirmate , quasi Deo teste promiseris , id tenendum est . It is much unworthy of a Prince ( sayes a worthy late Author ) to falsifie his word , either to enemy or subject that it be ; and the more villanie is it to use covert fraud , than open violence , because the enemy lies more open by giving credit to his faith : And fraus distringit , non dissolvit perjurium . And with how much more solemnity Princes Oaths are ordinarily taken , mee thinks , so much the more sincerity ought they to carry with them , having drawn together many eyes & ears as witnesses of their truth or falshood . I shall conclude then with Tacitus , in the 4. of his Annal . Caereris mortalibus in constant confilia quod sibi conducere putant ; principum diversa sors est , quibus praecipua rerum ad samam dirigenda . Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi servitutem pati possumus , &c. Tentastis patientiam , negando militem ; quis dubitat exarsisse eos ? Pertulerunt tamen hunc doloren ; exercitus nos parare adversus Samnites faeritos suos audierunt nec moy erunt 〈◊〉 ab● urbe ; unde laec illi● nanra modestia nisi conscientia virium & nostrarum & suarum ? Ad summa rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror , ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid loquendum sit ; facile erit explicatis consillis , accommodate ●ebs verba . Res redacta est ad Triatios . Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites . Jam tunc minime sal bris militari disciplinae Capua , instrun entum omnium voluptatum , delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriae . Gula & Luxuris incubuit , ●ictunique ulci 〈…〉 orbem . Quod jam non solum arma , sed jura Romana pollebant . 〈◊〉 Jam Latio is status erat rerum , ut neque pecem , neque bellum pati possent . Dij mortales ita vos potentes hujus consilit fecerunt , ut , sit Latium , an non fit , in vestra manu posuerint . Itaque pacem vobis ( quò ad Latinos attinet ) parere in perpetuum , vel saeviendo vel ignoscendo potestis . Vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victosque , licet delere nomen Latinum . Vultis exemplo majorum augere re●n Romanam , victos in civitatem accipiendo , materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat . Certe id firmissimum imperium est , quo obedientes gaudent . Illorum igitur animos , dum expectatione stupent , seu paena seu beneficio praeoccupari oporcet . Quam poenam meritos Privernates censeret . Eas inquam merentur , qui se libertate dignos censent . Quid si poenam remittimus vobis , qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros● spere mus ? Si ●onam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam ; sin malam , haud diuturnam . Se audivisse vocem & liberi & viri , nec credi posse ullum populum , aut hominem denique in ea conditione , cu●us eum poenite at diutius quam necesse sit mansurum ; ibi pacem ; isse fidam , ubi voluntarij pacatisint , neque eo loco , ubi servitutem esse velint , fidem sperandam esse . Eos demum , qui nihil praeserquam del ibertate cogitant , dignos ; esse qui Romanifiant . Spoliatis arma supersunt . ●●●or arma ministrat . Facetiae asperae quae nimium ex vero traxerunt , acrem sui memoriam reliquunt . Adeò obcaecat animos fortuna , cum vim suam refringi non vult . Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent Agred urbem coronâ Notes for div A50322-e24580 ●tidie aggregatur ali●● , quod quandoque get curatione . Ad generum Cereris sine caede & sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges & sic ca morre Tiranni . Colligit & ipse animum confusum tantae cogitatione rei . Hunc exitum habuit vir , nisi in libera civitate natus esset , memorabilis . Cneus Sulpitius Dictator adversus Gallos bellum trahebat , nolens le fortunae committere adversus hostem , quem tempus deteriorem in dies , & locus alienus faceret . Nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem , quem tempus deteriorem indies , & locus alienus faceret . Justum est bellum , quibus necessarium ; & pia arma , quibus nisi in armis spes non est . Ite mecum ; non murus nec vallum ; armati armatis obstant , virtute pates ; quod ultimum & maximum telum est , necessitate superiores estis . Ibat ad exerci um sine da 〈…〉 . Vado ad ducem sine exercitu . Suis flammis delete Fidenas , quas vestris beneficijs placare non potuistis . Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari documento fuere , quam plurium imperium bello in utile esset : tendendo ad sua quisque consilia , cum alij aliud videretur , apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti . Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est , summam Imperij apud unum esse . In multitudine regenda , plus paena quam obsequium valet . Injussu tuo adversus hastem nunquam pugnabo , non si certam victoriam videam . Non alius militi familiatior dux fuit , inter infimos militum omnia baud gravatè munia obeun do ; in ludo praeterea militari cum velocitatis , viriumque inter se aequales certamina incunt ; comiter facilis vincere , ac vinci vultu eodem , nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret ; factis benignus ; pro redactis , haudminus libertatis alienae , quam suae dignitatis memor ; & quo nihil popularius est , quibus artibus petierat magistratus , iisdem gerebat . Eius virtutem milites oderant , & mirabantur . Operae pretium est audire qui iomnia bumana prae divitiis spernunt , re●ue honori magno locum , neque virtuti putant esse , nisi effusae affluant opes . Timasitheus multitudinem religinne implevit , quae semper regenti est similis . Et quel che sail Signor famopoi molti , Che nel Signor son tulti li octri volti . Nec quicquam de majestate sua detractum credebant quod majestati ejus concessissent . I deubt that the understanding which he advises others of , he wants himself : not knowing the meaning of , or not believing the holy writ ; whereby he puts men past suspition of his Atheisme . For what he alledges of Moses , he must needs take originally from Moses his books , being we have not any author of that antiquity , as could write any thing of his own knowledge touching those times . But those Mach. seems not to believe further then served his own humor , reading the Scriptures onely to a politicke end , not so much for the strengthening of his belief , as the bettering of his discourse . Yet however Machiavel did not , I hope others will believe that Moses delivered to the Israelites the true Oracles of GOD ; and that it was not Moses that punished the delinquents among them , but GOD sending his immediate judgements . As in the rebellion of Corah and his complices , Numbers the 16. Moses did but citie them as to appearance : but GOD immediately sent his vengeance : For the earth under them opened , vers . 31. And when that wretched fellow gathered sticks on the Sabboth , Numb 15. Moses awaited till GOD passed● the sentence upon him for his death ; and the manner thereof , vers . 35. Therefore Machiavell may justly be taxed for traducing Moses here of more then he hath warrant for , making no other esteem of Moses his bringing the Israelites out of Egypt , and his leading them through the wilderness , then of Romulus his gathering together a●scattered multitude , and laying the foundation of that Common-wealth , which action his courage and ambition of rule and glory thrust him upon ; not seeming to take notice , that Moses was immediately called by GOD , and sent to shew his wonders and judgements against the Egyptians , and to conduct the Israelites into Canaan ( according to GODS promises formerly made to their forefathers ) wherein he behaved not himself either ambitiously or insolently , nor was any thing done by his own prowess or policy , but meerly by the ordinance of GOD. Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit , nec exilium ademit . Quod quisque didicit , aut consuevit , faciat Eludant nunc licet Religionem ; quid enim est , si pulli non pascentur , fi ex cavea tardius exierint , 〈◊〉 occinuerit avis ? parva sunt haec : sed parva ista non contemnendo , Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt . Vides tu fortunâ illos fretos ad Alliam consedisse . At tu fretus armis animisque invade mediam aciem . Militum etiam sine rec●ore stabilis virrus putata est . Nemo hominum , nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat , non edicta Imperatotun ; non auspicia observentur ; sine commeatu vagi milites in pacato & in hostico errent , immemores sacramenti , licentia sola exauctorentur ; infrequentia deserantur signa , neque conveniatur ad edictum , nec discernatur interdiu , nocte , aequo an iniquo loco , injussu Imperatoris pugnent ; non signa , non ordines servent . Iatrocinij modo caeca & fortuita pro solenni & sacrata militia sit . Tanti ea dimicatio ad universi bellieventum fuit , ut Gallorum exercitus , relictis trep dè Castris , in Tiburtinum agrum , mox in Campaniam transierint . Ne eos novum bellum , ne noves hostis terre . et . Qui ob rem . parvi ponderis , trepidi in Tiburtem agrum , & in Campaniam transie●unt . Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu , auspicioque incunda sit pugna ; utrum audiendus duntaxat magnificus ad hor tator sit verbis tantum ferox , operum militarium expers , an qui & ip a tela tractare , procedere ante signa , versari media in mole pugnae sciat : facta mea , non dicta vos milites sequi volo : nec disciplinam modo , sed exemplum etiam a me petere , qui hac dextrà mihi tres consulatus , summamque laudem peperi . Vides tu Aule Corneli cacumen illud supra hostem ? arx illa est spei salutisque nestrae , si eam ( qucniam caeci reliquere Samnites ) impigrè capimus . Publius Decius tribunus militum unum editum in saltu collem imminentem hostium castris osten dit , aditu arduum impedito agmini , expeditis haud difficilem . Ite mecum , ut dum lucis aliquid superest , quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant , qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus . Haec omnia sagulo militari amictus ne ducem circuire hostes notarent per lustravit . Quae neque amicos parat , neque inimicos tollit . Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset . Notes for div A50322-e38980 〈◊〉 Xenocarus i● vit . Car. Quinti . Plutarch . de adulatore & amico ciscernendo . Vertue ' against fury shall advance the fight , And it i' th' combate soon shall put to slight : For th' old Roman valor is not dead , Nor in th' Italians brests extinguished .