P A M P H L E T KO. XI 

Tariffs and World Peace 
Reverend Thomas F. Divine, S.J. 

and 
Economic Relations Committee 

I N T R O D U C T I O N : ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR 
T H E TARIFF: N A T U R E A N D K I N D S 

AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION: T H E 
HAWLEY-SMOOT TARIFF 

LOOKING TO T H E FUTURE—A RAY OF H O P E 
CONCLUSION: H O W T H E REFORM CAN 

BE E F F E C T E D 

A Report of the Economic Relations Committee 

P R I C E 10 C E N T S 

T H E CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L PEACE 

1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 

1933 



f T t H A N K S for the issuance of this Report 
A are due to the Class of 1933 of Mary-
wood College, Scranton, Pennsylvania, in 
response to the H o l y Father's recent ap-
peal, "May they all unite in the peace of 
Christ in a full concord of thoughts and 
emotions, of desires and prayers, of deeds 
and words—the spoken word, the written 
word, the printed word—and then an at-
mosphere of genuine peace, warming and 
beneficent, will envelop all the world." 

efcWfed 



I " " p a i s is a Report of the Committee on Economic 
Relations of the Catholic Association for In-

ternational Peace and is being issued as a Study 
from this Committee. The Report was begun un-
der the direction of Rev. Joseph F. Thorning S J 
chairman of the Europe Committee, and was later 
allocated by the Ways and Means Committee to 
the present Committee. It was presented and dis-
cussed at the regular annual meeting of the or-
ganization. The Committee cooperated in the final 
form of the Report and it was presented to the 
Executive Committee which ordered it published 
As the process indicates, this Report is a statement 
from only a committee, and not from the whole 
Association. 

E C O N O M I C R E L A T I O N S C O M M I T T E E 

Chairman 
P A R K E R T . M O O N 

I L H I ® M M M E S T E I N > B R E V - D O N A " > A . M A C L E A N K E V . J O H N F . COGAN R E V J W R M R S V 

m M O M A S IDmNE> m Da™ a- m"C1 'csy-
m TT* 0 ü*•A- mcgowan 
• » B P Mïss E L I Z A B E T H M . M O R R I S S Y 
J T I A W R R R E V . J O S E P H V . O ' D R I S C O I X r M 
R s v . J O S E P H C . M F | § J F E A N K Q ' H A K A '

 C M 

E D W A R D K E A T I N G R E V . F R E D E R I C S I E D E N B U R G S T 
F R E D E R I C K P . K E N K E L C * ™ , , T

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TARIFFS AND WORLD PEACE 

i 

I N T R O D U C T I O N : ECONOMIC CAUSES O F WAR 
A. Imperialism 

RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL has said that "in nine cases out of ten political war is simply an economic dispute 
that has gone too far." Mr. Buell was speaking of the wars 
of modern times. And, certainly, everyone who is familiar 
with the history of the wars of the past century will admit 
the substantial truth of his assertion. Like a mighty river that 
one sees afar off wending its way through a country teeming 
with vegetation, may be said to run the economic motive 
through the history of the past hundred years. Here and 
there it may escape the eye as it swings behind a towering 
cliff or dips beneath the luxuriance of the forests on its banks. 
But its power is ever there, strong, vital, enduring, giving life 
in abundance to the very factors that tend to obscure its pres-
ence. And though it has undergone something of a transfor-
mation with the turn of the century, the economic motive is 
just as vital in international relations today as when imperial-
ism ran rampant among national policies in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In fact it has been said with truth that the present 
age is not so much an age of politics; it is the age of economics. 

In discussing the causes of war one must distinguish be-
tween apparent and real causes. The former may vary in 
magnitude from a minor theft to the assassination of an arch-
duke. They are the "releasing causes" which give vent to the 
pent-up forces of popular and national, antagonism. This 
smoldering antagonism, on the other hand, is nourished and 
sustained by the real or "root" causes of war, those policies 
and national attitudes which either breed or are the progeny 
of a spirit of intense and narrow nationalism, the greatest 
enemy to international peace and good will. In nature they 
may be religious, dynastic, chauvinistic, "altruistic," economic 
or political. But for all practical purposes we may limit them 
today to economic and political causes. Nor must we imagine 
that these two are entirely separate and independent of each 
other. Arising from a common source, nationalism, and iden-
tified in a common causa, the glorification of one nation even 



at the expense of all others, they are now one in aim and 
method. And the politicians of today turn to the field of 
economics either to seek arguments to justify their national 
policies or to find there a means of putting them int,o execution. 

Recent decades have brought a change in the places of 
importance held by the various economic causes of interna-
tional friction. The first place, undoubtedly, in the past cen-
tury was occupied by imperialism, a form of extreme national-
ism which manifests itself in a frenzied quest for colonial 
expansion and control of markets and supplies of vital raw 
materials. "The American public," writes Professor Parker 
T. Moon, "is barely beginning to realize the significance of 
the present-day imperialism. . . . The realms conquered by 
military emperors of past ages were baubles, trifles compared 
with the far-flung dominions which have been won . . . in our 
own supposedly prosaic generation."1 

As nations increase in population there is a development 
from the agricultural to the industrial stage. If trade restric-
tions close or limit appreciably the markets of foreign coun-
tries, the new industrial state seeks elsewhere an outlet for its 
manufactures. I t turns its eyes to the great expanse of coun-
try beyond the seas inhabited by semi-barbarous or so-called 
"backward" races. On the plea, perhaps, of altruistic motives 
in bringing civilization to these benighted races, it seizes the 
portions of their lands most favored by the prodigality of 
nature and makes of them provinces or protectorates. In 
these newly formed colonies it hopes to find a solution of the 
problem of a home for its nationals who leave the mother coun-
try in search of greater opportunities abroad, a source of raw 
materials to feed the home industries, and a market for the 
finished products of those industries. Then follow trade rival-
ries between the colonizing countries, disputes over colonial 
territories, protection of the vital arteries of trade, the seizure 
and fortification of strategic points, the setting up of ".scientific 
frontiers," construction of naval bases for the protection of 
these arteries of trade, increases in armaments, naval rivalries, 
suspicions, fears, jealousies, and finally the natural climax of 
it all—war. The history of the great colonizing powers and 
the numerous wars that have resulted from their foreign poli-
cies in the past century furnish ample illustrations of this 
process.2 

1Imperialism and World Politics, Parker T. Moon (Macmillan). 
2Economic Causes of War, J. E. Bakeless (Moffat). 



4 Tariffs and World Peace 

B. National Trade Restrictions 
However, imperialism can hardly be said to hold today the 

key position among the economic causes of war that it enjoyed 
in the previous century. Though its power is still strong in 
certain quarters, its appeal is less universal and its attain-
ment less possible. Today it yields the spotlight, temporarily 
at least, to more modern forms of economic disturbances such as 
foreign investments, international loans, war debts, reparation 
payments and government regulation of international trade. 
We are concerned in this report with the last mentioned and 
perhaps most formidable economic cause of international 
enmity today—the entrance of governments into economic 
competition in the sphere of international trade; the use of the 
power of the government to cut off or to restrict the direction or 
intensity of flow of goods between nations, and the often un-
warranted, unwise and highly injurious prohibitions that politi-
cal policies impose upon the normal international exchange of 
products. "Probably half the international disputes," states 
Mr. Buell, "in which the world is perpetually involved would 
be eliminated if it were possible freely to trade between one 
part of the world and the other."3 

This does not necessarily imply the adoption of "free 
trade" in the strict sense of the term with all the implications 
that follow. In pleading here for a greater freedom of trade 
than is now possible among nations, we are not losing sight of 
the indisputable fact that a government has the inherent right 
and the duty to protect its citizens by law in the sphere of in-
ternational trade as well as in the field of domestic relations, 
when the welfare of its citizens demands that it do so. Every 
one knows that serious evils follow in the wake of totally free 
and unrestricted competition between individuals just as in 
that of an exaggerated policy of government interference. 
Who would deny, for example, that a government had failed 
in its duty to its citizens if it refused to protect them against 
the fatal consequences of unjust competition with goods pro-
duced by veritable slave labor, especially when such a means 
is used as an economic weapon of attack by a government 
whose avowed purpose is the destruction of all other forms of 
government? Certainly if governments adhered firmly to this 
policy in their regulation of international trade no nation 
would have just complaint of unfair discrimination. 

3International Relations, Raymond L. Buell (Holt). 



5 Tariffs and World Peace 

But when a government substitutes for the general welfare 
of its citizens the selfish interests of a small group of business 
enterprisers or the worn-out principles of a party system, seri-
ous evils of both a domestic and an international character are 
bound to follow. 

Government interference in international trade may take 
either the aggressive form of actual support of its exporters 
and trade carriers by way of tax exemption, favored banking 
facilities, preferential railway rates, subsidies, etc., or the de-
fensive form of the protective tariff. 

I I 

T H E T A R I F F : N A T U R E A N D K I N D S 

A tariff is a form of taxation. I t is a tax levied by the 
government on goods entering or leaving a country. With the 
import tariff as the most prevalent form of tariff today and as 
the only one permitted by the Constitution of the" United 
States, we are chiefly concerned in this report. A tariff is for 
revenue or for protection accordingly as its purpose is to raise 
funds for the public treasury or to reserve the home market 
for the industries within the nation. In the strict sense the 
two are mutually exclusive. Revenue is collected from the 
goods that enter a country; protection is afforded by those 
which are kept out. And yet, in spite of the fact that the two 
tend to pull in opposite directions, we find them teamed to-
gether in the tariff systems of the majority of the nations of 
the world today. The tariff system of the United States is a 
classic example. Hence we find the anomalous situation of 
the Democratic and Republican parties in one presidential 
campaign promising to add to the national revenue, the one by 
lowering the tariff rates, the other by raising' them. 

In its common form, the revenue tariff grants some little . 
protection to the home producer of the taxed article by raising 
the price of the imported article by the amount of the tax 
levied. In its more rigid form, where an internal excise tax 
is levied on the corresponding products of home industry, it 
grants no protection whatever. Great Britain, the great ex-
ponent of "free trade" from the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury to the World War, adopted during that period this system 
of strict revenue tariff, applying in many cases the internal 
excise tax to articles of domestic production and in general 



6 Tariffs and World Peace 

limiting her schedules to such articles as could not profitably 
be produced at home. The revenue tariff, if not carried to 
excess, is an accepted and agreeable form of collecting income 
for the national treasury and causes little friction in interna-
tional relations. 

A. The Protective T a r i f f : I t s Domestic Implications 
This, however, cannot be said of the protective tariff. 

Widely as it is used and much as it appeals to present-day 
nationalists, it finds, in the form it has assumed today, neither 
economic nor political justification even from a domestic point 
of view; and it has wrought great havoc in its international 
implications. Protective tariff today usually means a prohibi-
tory tariff. I t is Neo-Mercantilistic in stamp and design, a 
part of the driftwood of the old Mercantilistic doctrine that 
one nation, as one individual, can gain in trade only at the 
expense of another. I t is the favored offspring of economic 
and political nationalism which advocates for "patriotic" rea-
sons the patronage of home industries even though the articles 
of such production be higher in price and inferior in quality 
to those of foreign stamp. These arguments nationalism has 
"bolstered up with appeals to self-interest. If foreign competi-
tion is rigorously excluded, domestic business men may auto-
matically increase their prices—a fact explaining why many 
capitalists have been strong nationalists. Although the domes-
tic consumer, of course, foots the bill, he is mollified by the 
argument that the importation of foreign goods manufactured 
by cheap labor would injure his own high standard and would 
mean cheap wages at home. I n other words, economic self-
sufficiency means the full dinner pail."4 

A recent article depicts among the bitter fruits of the new 
nationalism the shrinkage of international trade, the collapse 
of currency, unemployment of tens of millions, the miles of 
idle shipping in great harbors of Europe and America, etc. 
"And by the way of remedying the universal disorder," it 
states, "the sovereign states of the world, great and small, 
strike new blows at trade by means of exchange restrictions, 
tariffs and import quotas and delve more feverishly into the' 
traveler's bag."5 Despite the warnings of the World Economic 
Conference in Geneva, 1927, and of individual economists, it 

4Buell, op. cit. 
*New York Times Magazine, June 26, 1932, p. 3. 



7 Tariffs and World Peace 

continues, "tariffs remained high, blocking trade, drawing gold 
to the protected creditor countries . . . and then to save their 
threatened moneys and what gold they had left, nation after 
nation put up new barriers to trade by rationing imports and 
limiting international payments." 

i. What Economists Say 
It is not surprising, then, that many economists today are 

at swords' points with the politicians in their stand against a 
high protective tariff. The World Economic Conference—a 
gathering of representatives and economic experts of some 
fifty states, members and non-members of the League of Na-
tions, men who had no political axes to grind, whose sole aim 
was to promote by concerted action the prosperity and peace 
of their own nations and of the world at large—left in its reso-
lutions the solemn declaration that "the time has come to put 
an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite 
direction." This group of leaders with representatives from 
both the United States and Russia saw clearly the threat to 
world harmony and prosperity in unrestrained national eco-
nomic rivalries. 

We might mention here the response of the economists, all 
members of the American Economic Association, to whom 
questionnaires were sent by the Bureau of Business Research 
of New York University, September 28, 1929, for the purpose 
of ascertaining their opinion of the Hawley-Smoot bill then 
pending. Of the 196 replies that could be tabulated, 90 per 
cent were opposed to the bill, stating that in addition to the 
fact that there was no justification for the increased rates 
which would add to the burden of the domestic consumer, the 
bill would result in increased friction with foreign nations 
and unfavorably affect the peace and welfare of the world. 
And have the results not given us ample proof of the wisdom 
of their prophecies? 

2. Two Extreme Views: Mercantilism and Liberalism 
The Mercantilist would have us believe that the protective 

tariff is absolutely essential to the' well-being of the state. In 
his eyes the prosperity of a nation is measured by the so-called 
"favorable balance of trade." Exports which bring gold into a 
country and so promote a favorable balance of trade are to be 
encouraged in every way; while imports which take gold out 



8 Tariffs and World Peace 

of the country are to be rigidly curtailed. Hence the neces-
sity to him of the protective tariff. On the other hand, to the 
Liberalist, the protective tariff is a priori wrong in so far as 
it is a form of state interference in freedom of competition 
among individuals. For him individual "liberty" is the su-
preme goal to be attained. The state must refrain from all 
interference in matters economic except where such interven-
tion is necessary to protect individual "liberty." Both schools 
are extremists and are obviously in error. Mercantilism stands 
condemned on four major charges: 1. The favorable balance 
of trade is never a criterion of the genuine welfare of a coun-
try; nor is it in all cases a certain criterion even of material 
prosperity. An excess of exports may, for example, be but 
a means of paying off previously contracted debts. 2. A coun-
try cannot, under ordinary circumstances, hope to maintain a 
very appreciable favorable balance of trade for a considerable 
length of time. For the flow of gold into a country, other 
conditions remaining the same, will cause prices to rise, and 
so automatically check excess of exports by rendering the mar-
kets of that country uninviting to foreign purchasers.6 3. The 
very curtailing of imports has an adverse effect upon the ex-
ports of a nation. I t reduces foreign purchasing power and 
often induces retaliation on the part of foreign nations. 4. The 
ultimate purpose of international trade is not the amassing of 
gold, which is but a medium or means to an end and not an 
end in itself, but the more effective satisfaction of human 
wants. And when gold that is received in exchange for ex-
ports has to be spent within the country on protected ar-
ticles that are often inferior in quality and higher in price 
than foreign products, the advantages of international trade 
are thereby totally destroyed. 

Nor is the doctrine to be tolerated that the State has under 
no condition the right to interfere with what the Individualist 
is pleased to call "liberty" in matters economic. Here the 

»Though the principle on which this second argument is based is 
correct in theory and is in fact but a corollary of the quantity theory 
of money, we must add here the qualification that in our complex 
economic system the application of the principle noted above is more 
often impeded than experienced. This is due to the prevention of in-
crease of gold from reaching domestic circulation, as happens in the 
case of a debtor country, or of a country which "sterilizes" surplus 
gold by banking control, or offsets its trade balance by foreign invest-
ments. The same is true when the increase in gold is offset by a 
corresponding increase of national production. 



9 Tariffs and World Peace 

error arises from a distorted concept of liberty. In the words 
of Lacordaire, "Between the strong and the weak it is liberty 
that enslaves and the law that liberates." When the common 
welfare demands such intervention the State has not only the 
right but the duty to interfere. And so the protective tariff 
cannot be labeled as a thing of evil merely because it bears 
the mark of State intervention and restriction of individual 
"liberty." 

3. The Case Against Protection 
The protective tariff means economic loss. On the grounds 

of economic principles the protective tariff, certainly in its 
present prohibitory form, is open to most serious objections. I t 
does not fit into the present economic picture. I t cannot be 
reconciled with our present universally accepted system of 
large scale production. In fact by placing unnecessary restric-
tions upon the natural exchange of goods it retards the pro-
gress of and destroys for many the advantages of regional and 
national specialization. 

As Mr. James A. Farrell, of the United States Steel Cor-
poration, recently pointed out, the day "when our forefathers 
and mothers could and did produce with their own hands and 
their own toil most of the food and clothing and shelter they 
required is gone forever. In its place is established per-
manently a dependence upon the resources of the world, which 
renders the steady maintenance of our foreign trade absolutely 
essential to our continued well-being." We are making no 
comparison here between the old system and the new. I t is 
not altogether improbable that civilization was in a better way 
in the days when, in accordance with Mr. Yeats' criterion of 
culture, even the kitchen utensils were a thing of beauty and 
the pardonable pride of their domestic producer. But granted 
the permanence of the present system, is it not illogical to 
impede it by unnecessary barriers and restrictions from attain-
ing its natural and most profitable stage of development? 

The theory of regional specialization is but a natural de-
velopment of the simple division of labor whereby a man will 
profit most by confining his efforts to the production of those 
utilities, for which he is best adapted either by natural or ac-
quired ability. The cobbler will profit by directing all his 
efforts to the production of shoes. For the satisfaction of all 
his other human wants, individual and social, he must rely 
upon the specialists in other fields. The surplus of his own 



10 Tariffs and World Peace 

produce he will exchange with the farmer for food, with the 
carpenter for shelter, with the tailor for raiment, with the 
merchant for place and time utilities, with the doctor and 
lawyer for their professional services. And in the end he will 
find that he is richer in the goods he has obtained from the ex-
change than if he had endeavored to produce them all. 

What is true of individual is true on a larger scale of re-
gional and national specialization. If the people of the Mid-
dle States find themselves most favorably adapted, either 
through natural or induced advantages, to the extensive culti-
vation of wheat and corn or the manufacture of shoes or auto-
mobiles, it is a waste of capital and human effort to attempt 
to compete with the South in the cultivation of cotton or sugar 
cane, or with the West in the cultivation of tropical fruits, or 
with the states of the Northwest in lumbering, or with the 
Eastern states in textile manufactures. Fortunately, the pos-
sibility of such a waste of capital and labor was minimized by 
the constitutional prohibition of interstate tariffs. Conse-
quently, there has developed in the United States a great diver-
sity of industries, each built upon the advantages afforded by 
a prodigal nature, and all allowed to profit, within the limits 
of the national boundaries, by the advantages of production 
on a large scale which come only from the free interchange of 
goods. This, more than anything else, is responsible for the 
rapid ascendance of America among the foremost industrial 
nations of the world and the prosperity that has resulted there-
from. Contrast this with the situation in Europe which is 
honeycombed with tariff walls and where production is in 
many cases limited to markets narrower in territory than some 
of our own individual states. 

National is but a step higher, a natural development of 
regional specialization. It implies the extension of the ad-
vantages of regional specialization, unimpeded by national bar-
riers, from local and national consumption to the demands of 
a world market. And with the further application of decreas-
ing costs, the advantages of such an extension are highly de-
sirable both to producer and consumer. But when world mar-
kets are closed or restricted by tariff barriers the effect is both 
to check the full growth of these advantageous industries and 
to give rise to a host of unprofitable industries within the 
countries affording the "protection." Economically there is no 
more justification for the international than there would be 
for the interstate tariff. 



11 Tariffs and World Peace 

Finally, "protection" impedes the full attainment of eco-
nomic prosperity that would result from the complete develop-
ment of regional specialization. I t sacrifices the interests of 
exporting or advantageous industries and places a premium 
upon those industries whose products could be more profitably 
imported from abroad. I t diverts capital and labor from pro-
ductive into unproductive channels. I t creates a host of eco-
nomic parasites that prey upon national industrial life. I t sac-
rifices the common economic welfare of a country for the good 
of a few rich and influential enterprisers, the so-called "vested 
interests." I t destroys all the advantages of international 
trade which is the necessary corollary of regional and national 
specialization on a large scale. 

The desire for economic independence, political national-
ism and military preparedness is given as the cause of protec-
tion, but the real underlying cause of the almost universal ac-
ceptance of the policy of protection by national leaders (out-
side of pressure exerted by "vested interests") is the belief in 
the doctrine of economic independence or self-sufficiency. "In 
a world controlled by purely economic considerations, in which 
there was neither war nor preparation for war, protection 
would in the long run almost certainly represent a losing policy. 
But the World War has supplied another illustration on a 
gigantic scale of the historic truth that the tariff problem can-
not be regarded as a purely economic question. Protectionism, 
which before the war played a material part in generating the 
international friction which brought on that conflict, has since 
the war rapidly gained ground, as indeed it has been doing 
for half a century preceding the outbreak of hostilities in 
1914."7 

In its political form this argument states that without 
economic independence, political independence or political na-
tionalism, is an impossibility. Its military form is this: a 
nation that is not economically self-sufficient is at the mercy 
of an enemy in time of war. Preparedness must be economic 
as well as military. And the nation will profit in the end, 
contends the militarist, even* if the cost of that preparedness 
is a sacrifice of the economic advantages of international trade. 

Obviously, the first answer to this argument is that eco-
nomic independence in the strict sense is incapable of attain-
ment by any single nation. The nature of the distribution of 
natural resources practically precludes such a possibility. Eco-

7Outlines of Economics, Richard T. Ely (Macmillan). 



12 Tariffs and World Peace 

nomic and political boundaries can by no manner of wizardry 
be made to coincide. America, because of her variety of cli-
mate, her wide range of natural resources and the personal 
initiative of her people, is, perhaps, better qualified than any 
other single nation to attain this end. And yet, as Professor 
Moon points out, "even she must rely on the rest of the world 
for some thirty important commodities."8 

But is a nation justified in striving to attain at least that 
degree of economic independence which lies within her power? 
Certainly to acquire thereby that degree of nationalism which 
is the goal of the majority of the political nationalists who 
use this argument, she would not. International trade and all 
forms of international cooperation are perfectly consistent with 
that wholesome form of nationalism which consists of a true 
and genuinely patriotic love of country. This love, based on 
real intrinsic merit, does not exclude a recognition of the 
merits as well as the rights of other countries. 

I t is encouraging at this point to listen to the warning 
given by our present Holy Father, Pope Pius X I , regarding 
"the ultimate consequences of this Individualistic spirit in eco-
nomic affairs." He says: "The whole economic life has be-
come hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly manner. . . . As 
regards the relations of peoples among themselves, a double 
stream has issued forth from this one fountainhead: on the one 
hand, economic nationalism or even economic imperialism; on 
the other, a not less noxious and detestable internationalism 
or international imperialism in financial affairs, which holds 
that where a man's fortune is, there is his country."9 

The only nationalism with which the relations consequent 
to international trade are inconsistent is that narrow, selfish, 
Mercantilistic attitude which looks with contempt upon all 
things "foreign," which considers national standards as the 
sole standards of value, and which seeks the glorification of 
one's own nation at the expense of all others. Again let us 
turn to the words of Pope Pius X I uttered a short time ago: 
"If, however, egoism, abusing this love of country and exag-
gerating this sentiment of nationalism, insinuates itself into 
the relations between people and people, there is no excess that 
will not seem justified; and that which between individuals 
would be judged blameworthy by all, is now considered law-

8Moon, op cit. 
^Forty Years After—Encyclical Letter, 1931 (National Catholic 

Welfare Conference, Washington). 



13 Tariffs and World Peace 

ful and praiseworthy if it is done in the name of this exag-
gerated nationalism."10 

Earlier this same Supreme Pontiff states: "Love of coun-
try becomes merely an occasion, an added incentive to grave 
injustice when true love of country is debased to the condition 
of an extreme nationalism, when we forget that all men are 
our brothers and members of the same great human family, 
that other nations have an equal right with us both to life and 
to prosperity."11 Pope Leo X I I I in discussing " a system of 
jealous egoism in consequence of which the nations now watch 
each other, if not with hate, at least with the suspicion of 
rivals," points out that "in their great undertakings they lose 
sight of the lofty principles of morality and justice and forget 
the protection which the feeble and the oppressed have a right 
to demand."12 

"Two specific duties of international charity require par-
ticular emphasis in our time," states the report on Interna-
tional Ethics. "The first is that of curbing nationalism and 
excessive patriotism. The obverse side of the duty is to de-
velop and promote a reasonable and moderate international-
ism."13 The distinguishing note of nationalism, according to 
Professor Carlton J. H . Hayes, is "a proud and boastful habit 
of mind about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious 
or hostile attitude toward other nations; it admits that indi-
vidual citizens of one's country may do wrong, but insists that 
one's own nationality or national state is always right."14  
M. le Fur declares that "the conflict of nationalism and inter-
nationalism constitutes the gravest problem of international 
law, affecting its very existence."15 

May the economic good of a country be sacrificed for a 
militaristic end? The answer to this question rests on the 
determination of the rights and duties of the state. That it 
is within the power of the state to bring this about everyone 
must admit. But only on this condition, viz., that it is more 

10The Sacred Heart and World Distress>—Encyclical Letter, 1932 
(National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington). 

uUbi Arcano Dei—Encyclical Letter of Pius XI, 1922. 
^Review of His Pontificate—Leo XIII, 1893. 
18International Ethics, Dr. John A. Ryan and Ethics Committee 

(Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington). 
léEssays on Nationalism, Carlton J . H. Hayes (Macmillan). 
15Le Problème de la Vie Internationale, p. 227 (French Catholic So-

cial Week, 1926). 



14 Tariffs and World Peace 

conducive to the general welfare of the nation that the militaris-
tic interests be promoted rather than the economic. I s such 
the case? Professor Ely, in commenting on this situation, 
draws the following conclusion: "A sufficient diversification of 
industry to prevent industrial paralysis and to insure a prompt 
supply of the necessaries of life in time of war is manifestly 
desirable."16. T o that extent economic self-sufficiency remains 
rational and is undoubtedly conducive to the general welfare 
of the nation. And it might be effected by a moderate degree 
of protection that would entail neither domestic nor interna-
tional loss. But when this economic preparedness is carried 
to such extremes as economic independence in the strict mili-
taristic sense demands, then it not only saps the vitality of a 
nation but becomes one of the causes rather than a preven-
tive of war. 

Present conditions in Germany afford us a striking example 
of the sacrifices that a nation is willing to (and of necessity 
must) make to attain even a semblance of economic independ-
ence. "Because our economic policy is governed by the idea 
of producing as much as possible at home," states the Deutsche 
Volkswirt, "we pay three times the world price for wheat, 
double the world price for iron, four times the world price for 
sugar, from five to seven times the world price for fuel, and 
have relatively the highest unemployment of any country in 
the world."17 Yet a noteworthy achievement in the eyes of 
Minister of Agriculture, Baron von Braun, is the economic self-
sufficiency purchased at so costly a price; for "nobody in the 
world can force us to our knees by hunger today, as happened 
yearfe ago." 

Realizing the futility as well as the economic waste of com-
petitive armaments on sea and land, world leaders are striving 
valiantly today to reduce our excessive preparedness programs 
of naval construction to reasonable limits. The unmistakable 
words contained in the Apostolic Letter on Unemployment is-
sued by Pius X I , October 2, 1931, need no explanation: "And 
since the unbridled race for armaments is on the one hand the 
effect of the rivalry among nations, and on the other the cause 
of the withdrawal of enormous sums from the public wealth and 
hence not the smallest of contributors to the current extra-
ordinary crisis, We can not refrain from renewing on this 

18Ely, op. cit. 
""Fiercer Grows the Battle of the Tariffs," Harold Callender. New 

York Times Magazine. October 16, 1932. 



17 Tariffs and World Peace 

subject the wise admonitions of Our Predecessors which thus 
far have not been heard." 

But the full benefit of this laudable plan to promote inter-
national peace and prosperity will be reaped only when, with 
naval and military disarmament, economic disarmament falls 
into step. Why set up an expensive machinery of attempted 
economic self-sufficiency which preys upon the economic life 
of a nation and not only professedly prepares for war but even 
hastens its coming, when the same effort can be expended in 
pacific policies that will tend to avert the dangers of war and 
that prove at the same time more rational and more advan-
tageous to the nation and to the world in general? 

4. Why We Have Tariffs Today 
In addition to these two outstanding causes, the influence 

of vested interests and the desire of economic independence, 
protective tariffs are inspired by various other motives of 
greater or lesser importance. Here we shall endeavor to em-
phasize only those which today play a prominent role in check-
ing the natural and wholesome flow of international trade. 

a. Creation of New Frontiers 
The readjustment of the political boundaries of Europe af-

fected by the Treaty of Versailles was destined to rock to its 
very foundations the economic as well as the political structure 
of that continent. The latter does not interest us here. But 
we are concerned with the grave dislocation that has followed 
in the wake of the repartition of Europe. 

The unification of large areas under centralized political 
control and the consequent formation of the great monarchies 
in Europe in the nineteenth century—England, Germany, Rus-
sia, the Hapsburg Monarchy, Italy, Spain—offered a favorable 
field for the application of the principles of the Industrial 
Revolution. Tariffs, too, were of comparatively slow growth 
and production was allowed to enjoy in large measure the ad-
vantages of international as well as national expansion. Came 
the war and the Treaty of Paris. Old monarchies were broken 
down or shorn of much of their territory. New national fron-
tiers were created. New nations sprang into being. And from 
the process of fixation of national boundaries often grew the 
wierdest of economic anomalies. Hinterlands were separated 
from the seaports that carried their commerce, agricultural 
regions from their city markets, mines from industrial cities, 



16 Tariffs and World Peace 

towns from navigable rivers—even the farmhouse from the 
field.18 

Even then the economic life of Europe might have been 
preserved had not economic hopes been joined to political 
aspirations. And in the blind fury of unbridled nationalism 
that swept over post-war Europe economic advantages were 
sacrificed to political interests, regional assets to ethnic ambi-
tions. Tariff walls rose higher and higher along the political 
boundaries of the new Europe, old nations aiming at an eco-
nomic self-sufficiency that would prevent a repetition of the 
indignities suffered in the World War, new ones adding to this 
motive a desire to protect their infant industries. To add to 
the confusion political alliances (such as those between France, 
Poland, and the Little Entente) have been formed which are 
scarcely in harmony with the economic interests of the parties 
concerned. And here again the tariff is often used as a means 
of reprisal against a country with whom geographical necessity 
and economic welfare would dictate a wholesome cooperation. 
Speaking of these lamentable effects which the creation of new 
national units has had upon the multiplication of tariff barriers 
in Europe, Harold Callender says: "Centuries of racial hatred 
conspired to produce suspicion of economic ties which might 
lead to political ties; a network of formidable tariff barriers 
soon marked the frontiers drawn at Versailles; and when the 
Layton-Rist report to the League of Nations diagnosed the 
economic anemia of Austria it estimated that trade among 
the Austrian succession states had dropped about 60 per cent 
below the pre-war level."19 

b. Retaliation 
T o strike back, sharply and decisively, when one is or 

fancies that one is attacked, is a most common human failing. 
This is true of the wounding of national as well as individual 
sensibilities. And so when a nation finds its exports vitally 
affected by a rise in alien tariff schedules, it not uncommonly 
parries by legislating against the exports of the original of-
fender. The experience that America has had of foreign tariff 
reprisals will be pointed out later in this report. Here it is 
sufficient to mention that retaliation has assumed a role of 
ever-increasing prominence in the tariff wars of recent years. 
Naturally enough, nations, for diplomatic reasons, are loath 

lsCan Europe Keep the Peace? Frank Simonds (Harpers). 
19Callender, op. cit. 



17 Tariffs and World Peace 

to make admission of such a motive in increasing their duties. 
But all too often the ugly fact is there, which no amount of 
mellifluous language or proffered excuses will suffice to con-
ceal. 

c. Protection of Gold Reserves and Unstable Currencies 
The present financial insecurity of many nations, due in 

large measure to the stifling of international trade, has added 
another motive for tariffs of recent date., Deprived by foreign 
tariffs of the possibility of paying in terms of goods, debtor 
nations have relied in the past decade chiefly upon tourist ex-
penditures, immigrant remittances and new loans and invest-
ments of foreign origin to make payments to their creditors 
on public and private loans and unfavorable trade balances. 
But these three items have declined sharply since 1929. The 
figures of the Department of Commerce, for example, show 
that immigrant remittances from America have fallen (owing 
chiefly to restriction of immigration) from $223,000,000 in 
1929 to $163,000,000 in 1931. American tourist expenditures 
abroad have showed a decline in the same period from $685,-
000,000 to $458,000,000; and the figures for 1932 are expected 
to manifest even a sharper descent. American investments 
abroad, i. e., in excess of foreign investments in the United 
States have likewise tapered off from $944,000,000 in 1928 to 
$547,000,000 in 1931; and in 1932 foreign lending virtually 
came to a standstill. In fact not a new long-term foreign 
issue was offered in the New York market in the first eleven 
months of 1932 as opposed to a volume of $1,251,000,000 of-
fered in 1928.20 

The consequent drain upon gold reserves (over 50 per cent 
of which are concentrated in the hands of the United States 
and France) has undermined the stability of the currencies of 
perhaps a score of debtor nations, adversely affected their rates 
of exchange, and even forced some to abandon the gold stand-
ard. T o protect these threatened currencies and conserve their 
dwindling gold reserves such nations have resorted to higher 
tariffs and import quotas designed to decrease their unfavor-
able balance of trade. Some too, have defaulted in their pay-
ment of foreign obligation of a public and private nature. 
The protection of her currency was in great part responsible 
for England's abandonment of her traditional policy of free 

20"The Larger Issues Behind the War Debts," Charles Merz. New 
York Times, December 18, 1932. 



18 Tariffs and World Peace 

trade and enlistment in the ranks of the protectionists. On the 
other hand the fall in prices of commodities in countries which 
have abandoned the gold standard may prompt "gold" nations 
(as it did France) to impose special tariff rates or the more 
deadly import "quotas" to protect their producers against the 
cheapened goods of the "sterling area." 

d. The Bargaining Tariff 
Tariffs are also used for bargaining purposes. In this sense 

they are called "bargaining tariffs" or "fighting tariffs" or 
"tarijs de combat." They are used to put a nation in a place 
of vantage to bargain or barter with other nations. They are 
erected with the purpose of being torn down in exchange for a 
reciprocal concession, particularly the lowering of foreign du-
ties against the exports of the bargaining nation. Within limits 
they may serve a useful purpose and even bring about a reduc-
tion of existing tariff schedules, provided the nations that em-
ploy them do not make their additions for bargaining purposes 
to tariff rates that are already excessive. If the reverse is the 
case, i. e., if rates are increased purely for bargaining purposes, 
they will not only accomplish nothing of value in the amelio-
ration of world trade, but may even add to the confusion and 
intensify the bitterness of existing evils. 

The recent change of front in English tariff policy has again 
brought the bargaining tariff into the foreground of the tariff 
picture. We have already alluded in the previous section to 
one important motive that has prompted England to amplify 
her tariff schedules both in scope and intensity. At the same 
time the British leaders, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald 
and Mr. Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, 
were emphatic in declaring from the very beginning that their 
new policy had been formed with a view to tariff bargaining, 
i. e., to prevail only so long as other nations would continue 
measures of excessive and unreasonable protection. And even 
today, in spite of the pacts of the Ottawa Conference, wherein 
England united her tariff policy with that of her high-tariff 
dominions and agreed neither to alter her basic 10 per cent 
duties for a period of five years nor to change certain specific 
duties without the consent of her dominions, the contention is 
still vigorously made that one of the important objects of the 
tariff is to bargain for advantages for British exports hitherto 
barred from foreign markets. I t has been pointed out that 
the British proposed import quota on meat will induce on the 



19 Tariffs and World Peace 

part of Argentina a greater eagerness for British manufactures; 
that Denmark has already expressed her desire to purchase 
more coal and cotton products from England and more wheat 
from Canada in the hope of favorable treatment of her dairy 
products in England who has been forced by her dominions 
to raise her schedules on those articles. 

"Thus Britain, her currency driven off gold and her trade 
choked by growing tariff barriers, has herself turned to pro-
tection as a means of gaining a fair deal for her commerce 
and perhaps contributing to general revision of tariffs. In the 
field of currency the so-called 'sterling area' of non-gold coun-
tries, led by Britain, manages to carry on without the gold re-
serves which the high tariff creditor countries have drained 
away. In the field of tariffs the 'sterling area' is going to try 
to do a little mutual reduction through bargaining; and if the 
high protection countries would like to join in they would be 
cordially welcomed. If they prefer to stay out, while claim-
ing nevertheless the benefits of the most-favored-nation clause, 
all that is possible will be done to proceed without them—even 
to the extent, possibly, of terminating the most-favored-nation 
privileges."21 

This is an optimistic view of the British change of front. 
But there is a darker side of the picture, to which Sir Arthur 
Salter points with great concern in a recent discussion of "Ot-
tawa's Aftermath."22 I t is mentioned here because it serves 
to illustrate another development in modern tariff policies. 

e. Empire-Prejerence Tariff 
Imperial preference is not an innovation either in tariff 

history or in that of the relations of mother countries and 
dominions, colonies and dependencies. With two notable ex-
ceptions it has held a prominent place in the policies of coloniz-
ing nations of modern times. England and Holland have 
hitherto proved the exceptions. As late as 1922 only five per 
cent of the total volume of British colonial trade was subject 
to preferential duties. All other colonial powers adopted the 
policy either of assimilation of their colonies with the national 
customs area or of application of preferential duties. In some 
systems the two were combined. The policy of the United 
States, too, relative to its dependencies, was that of assimila-
tion of Hawaii and preferential duties for the Philippines. 

21Callender, op. cit. 
22"Ottawa's Aftermath: A Fateful Issue Arises," Sir Arthur Salter. 

New York Times, October 2, 1932. 



20 Tariffs and World Peace 

This is the story prior to the Ottawa Conference. In all 
these cases preferences were granted on tariffs already in ex-
istence and dictated by other national interests. But in the 
Ottawa agreements we find a new development of this principle 
whereby England binds herself to extend her tariff schedules 
and to maintain existing duties for the express purpose of 
granting dominion and colonial preference. "This is an inno-
vation in tariff negotiations," laments Sir Arthur Salter, "and 
a very unfortunate one. We have had in recent history every 
sort of tariff monstrosity, due to the clamor of national indus-
tries for higher protection and to mistaken views of what is 
in the national interest. We have had many conferences which 
have attempted vainly to secure reductions of those tariffs, and 
on their failure have been followed by new increases under na-
tional pressure. But it is a new experience for a conference 
to result in one country's engaging itself to other countries to 
impose duties which, whether rightly or even wrongly, it does 
not want on behalf of its own producers, and to retain duties 
even if it considers them in the light of experience to be in-
jurious to its own national interests."23 

Commenting upon the possible consequences of such an in-
novation, he continues: " I t is not only of the utmost im-
portance to the British colonies themselves; it is also (to adopt 
phrasing from the report of the United States Commission of 
1922) a matter of serious concern to the rest of the world if, 
in the greatest empire, the old mercantile principle of the reser-
vation of colonial products and colonial markets to the mother 
country is reintroduced. . . . We thus see that Great Britain 
has recently made a substantial, though still partial and in-
complete, change in her domestic policy from free trade to pro-
tection. She has made some tentative but hesitating steps 
toward the goal of an integrated imperial economic unit by 
negotiations with the self-governing dominions. She has simul-
taneously taken a few steps toward a closed Colonial Empire." 

B. The Protective T a r i f f : I t s International Aspect 

1. World Peace 

Contrary, then, to the assertions of the advocates of our 
present tariff systems, tariffs are not a matter of mere domestic 
concern. They vitally influence the peace and prosperity of 

23Salter, op. cit. 



21 Tariffs and World Peace 

the world as a whole. As long as industries and commerce are 
carried on by the individual, competition between industrialists 
and traders is individual; and whatever friction may arise re-
mains within the sphere of private economic interests. But 
once a government begins to put unwarranted restrictions upon 
international trade, whether by bounties, subsidies, discrimi-
natory rates or prohibitive tariff laws, then the economic 
competition becomes national in character, and the enmity, 
antagonism and quarrels that ensue are international in mag-
nitude. Instead of the mutual interdependence so conducive 
to the promotion of the interests common to all nations, there 
arise economic rivalries and jealousies among nation? which 
only too often lead to open hostility and armed conflict. 

For historical confirmation of this fact we need but re-
view the Russo-German "tariff war" of 1893, the German-
Spanish tariff war of 1894, the Franco-Italian tariff war of 
1888-1899 and the Franco-Swiss tariff war, 1893-1895. The 
Austro-Hungarian tariff barriers to Serbian exports aggra-
vated the nationalistic conflict between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary and precipitated the World War. 

"Economic conflicts and divergence of economic! interest," 
stated M. Theunis of Belgium, President of the International 
Economic Conference, in his memorable and stirring appeal to 
his colleagues at the close of the Conference, "are perhaps the 
most serious and the most permanent of all dangers which are 
likely to threaten the peace of the world. No machinery for 
the settlement of international disputes can be relied upon to 
maintain peace if the economic policies of the world so de-
velop as to create not only deep divergencies of economic in-
terest between different masses of the world's population, but a 
sense of intolerable injury and injustice. No task is more 
urgent or more vital than that of securing agreement on cer-
tain principles of policy which are necessary in the interests 
of future peace. And there is perhaps no question which, in 
comparison with its intrinsic importance, has had so little 
careful and collective deliberation." 

2. World Prosperity 

That these unwarranted restrictions affect,the prosperity 
as well as the peace of the world is clearly illustrated by the 
tragic part which competitive tariffs have played in aggravating 
and prolonging the present international economic depression. 



22 Tariffs and World Peace 

The creation of new national frontiers by the World War raised 
the number of separate economic units in Europe from twenty 
to twenty-seven, each striving to attain national economic in-
dependence behind newly strengthened or newly erected tariff 
fortifications. Industries abnormally stimulated by the war 
clamored for protection. Infant industries within the newly 
erected national frontiers joined in the cry. Depleted public 
treasuries had to be replenished, war debts and reparations to 
be paid. In consequence we find Europe honeycombed with 
tariff walls such as she has never known before, each country 
almost hermetically sealed against the marketable surplus of 
her neighbors. What wonder, then, that the period of post-war 
recovery has been indefinitely prolonged, that industrial na-
tions find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, that pro-
duction among the various nations is curtailed by lack of 
markets, that currencies are rendered unstable or driven off 
a gold basis, and that unemployment is increasing daily with 
hundreds of thousands on the verge of starvation? 

It is quite obvious that international trade, with a few ex-
ceptions, may be destroyed by the dangerous national economic 
policies now followed by a large percentage of the nations of 
the world. With modern science making world intercourse pos-
sible and nations dependent upon one another, we find that 
world trade has declined by more than SO per cent. Pros-
perity even in the United States has followed increased foreign 
commerce and when, as now, due to restrictive trade policies, 
the latter has declined, millions'have been added to the ranks 
of the unemployed. It is estimated that in 1928 our total 
volume of exports furnished employment for 2,400,000 fami-
lies and that, at the same rate of increase, 500,000 families 
would have been added during the five succeeding years. 

Summing up, in an article to which we have already al-
luded, regarding the origins, growth, and domestic, and inter-
national consequences of present-day tariffs, we read: "Thus 
tariffs begin as defensive measures, to stimulate industries in-
dispensable in wartime, to protect the nation's social institu-
tions against unwelcome cosmopolitan influences, to establish 
a diversified and balanced economy by creating industries that 
could not survive competition; and they finish, perhaps in-
evitably, by raising up a host of vested interests ever prone 
to demand just a bit more protection by sharpening interna-
tional antagonism if not provoking economic warfare, by ham-
pering the interchange of goods and services upon which the 



23 Tariffs and World Peace 

prosperity and the high standards of living of the more ad-
vanced nations depend."24 

And Sir Arthur Salter, pointing out that the dominant and 
ultimate motive of England's abandonment of her low tariff 
policy was the political impossibility of one nation's maintain-
ing such a position in the midst of a tariff-crazed world, con-
cludes with the dire warning: "The world as a whole will either 
move toward a system in which each country can exchange the 
products which it is best qualified to produce for those in re-
spect of which other countries have corresponding advantages, 
or it will move toward an organization, national, imperial or 
regional, in which each unit will pursue the ideal of self-suffi-
ciency, with their standards of living poorer for the loss of 
world trade, but, it may be thought, less precarious (so long 
as peace is preserved) than when their markets are always un-
der the Damocles' sword of possible new tariffs."25 

The interrelation of tariffs, nationalism and world conflict 
is well delineated in the report, "Europe and the United 
States": "If what others say is true that a federalized industry 
is a prerequisite of much tariff reduction, to say nothing of free 
trade within the European continent; and if free trade is neces-
sary before a United States of Europe is created, then indeed 
a federalized Europe is distant. Here again the search for a 
united Europe is hampered by the very nationalism and capi-
talism of some who speak in its favor; for they wish a united 
Europe on terms that would prevent much industrialization in 
other countries as well as much freedom of trade in their own 
markets for the agricultural products of other countries."2® 

I l l 

A M E R I C A ' S C O N T R I B U T I O N — T H E H A W L E Y -
S M O O T T A R I F F 

A. Neither Necessary Nor Beneficial 

Let us take an example nearer home. America emerged 
from the World War a creditor nation and the industrial and 
financial leader of the world. Of the sum of $35,000,000,000 
worth of commodities exchanged by the nations of the world 

24Callender, op. cit. 25SaIter, op. cit. 
2eEurope and the United States: Elements in Their Relationship, 

Rev. R. A. McGowan and Europe Committee, pp. 20-21 (Catholic 
Association for International Peace, Washington). 



24 Tariffs and World Peace 

in 1929 the United States supplied exports to the amount of 
over $5,000,000,000, while her imports totaled about $4,500,-
000,000. The value of her export surplus in the same year 
was $648,000,000, and in the previous year $865,000,000. She 
held first place as an exporter of goods and ranked second only 
to the United Kingdom as an import market. I t was to the 
future economic advantage of America to facilitate and hasten 
the economic recovery of Europe, her chief foreign customer, 
by admitting as much of her goods as our existing economic 
system would allow. For her high level of exports could be 
maintained only by taking a large quantity of imports in re-
turn. Again there were the war debts to the value of about 
$7,500,000,000 owed by Europe to America; and private 
American investments in Europe totaled about $4,800,000,000. 
The foreign loans of a public and private nature made by the 
government and citizens of the United States within the past 
decade had reached a staggering total of more than $20,000,-
000,000. In the absence of gold (almost half of which was 
then concentrated in the United States) the payments of these 
obligations could be made only by an exchange of goods or 
services. Payments for the latter by American tourists, though 
once a very considerable item of foreign credit, have declined 
rapidly since 1929. The only alternatives were payment in ex-
port goods or the fatal policy of debtor nations, their recovery 
stifled by the closure or restriction of foreign markets, meeting 
their obligations by a further pyramiding of debts. 

The summary prepared by Charles Merz of the totals of 
debit and credit items on our international ledger for the 
decade of years 1922 up to and including 1931 (taken from 
figures of the Department of Commerce) clearly illustrates the 
manner in which our debtors met their obligations to us in that 
period.27 The credit side of our ledger shows a total of $12,-
907,000,000 in payments made to us by debtor nations. Of 
this sum $5,967,000,000 was due for our export surplus. In-
terest on foreign investments ranked second with $4,985,000,-
000, while payment on war debts amounted to $1,955,000,000. 
How did our debtors balance these obligations? Their two 
most important credit items were American tourist expendi-
tures which totaled $5,063,000,000 and new American loans 
or investments to the amount of $4,936,000,000. Immigrant 
remittances from America ranked third, adding a revenue of 
$2,142,000,000. Only $509,000,000 was paid in gold. Mis-

27New York Times, December 18, 1932. 



25 Tariffs and World Peace 

cellaneous items to the value of $257,000,000 made up the 
balance. 

We have already alluded to the fact that the first and 
third of these items have suffered a rapid decline, that the 
flow of new American loans to foreign countries has almost 
completely dried up, and that in view of their inability to use 
the only other alternative of payment of obligations in terms 
of export goods a heavy drain has been put on the gold re-
serves of the debtor nations. 

I t was, then, both conducive to America's economic inter-
ests as well as necessary for the maintenance of international 
good will and the recovery of world prosperity that we should 
accept as much of the export surplus of foreign countries as 
our true economic welfare would allow. How different was the 
policy that America adopted. Hardly had the new administra-
tion of 1929 begun when a special session of Congress was pre-
sented with the task of raising protection for farm products 
and for "certain industries which cannot now successfully com-
pete with foreign producers." Ex-President Hoover recom-
mended a limited revision. Congress, promptly ignoring the 
suggestion, began work upon a general revision of schedules. 
Lobbying and log-rolling showed their familiar faces. Bargains 
were made and votes traded by Congressmen from various lo-
calities to obtain increases for the interests they represented. 
After thirteen months of debate the bill was passed and sent 
to the President for his signature. 

Earnest protests had already been made to the President by 
economists, exporters' and consumers' organizations that he 
veto the act on the score that it "flatly repudiated his original 
proposal; that a further increase in protection duties was in-
consistent with our new position as a creditor nation; that the 
effect of a broad upward revision of rates would be to deepen 
the business depression which had begun with the stock mar-, 
ket panic, some eight months before."28 But to no avail. 
On June 17, 1930, the President affixed his signature and the 
Hawley-Smoot tariff act became a law. 

Under the new tariff law, rates were increased on 887 arti-
cles and reduced on 235. The most important changes were 
effected in the schedules of agricultural products. Among 
other commodities profiting by the increase of rates were: 
sugar, tobacco, wool, silk and embroidered goods, chemicals, 

28"Again the Tariff Becomes a Dominant Issue," Charles Merz New 
York Times, October 16, 1932. 



26 Tariffs and World Peace 

optical and surgical instruments, earthenware, glass, watches, 
paper, wood manufactures, hats, gloves, shoe upper leather, 
etc. In general the rates of the Hawley-Smoot tariff may be 
estimated at about 20 per cent in excess of those of its prede-
cessor, the Fordney-McCumber act/itself labeled by the Man-
chester Guardian "the most extreme protectionist measure ever 
undertaken by any country," and under the application of 
whose rates a committee of the League of Nations declared, 
after diligent investigation, that the American tariff was higher 
than that of any other nation with the single exception of 
Spain. 

A generation ago such a rise in American tariff schedules 
might have passed in foreign councils without comment. But 
the day had passed when American tariff policy was merely 
a domestic issue. The emergence of America as an outstand-
ing leader in the industry, finance and commerce qf the world 
has brought an enormous increase of prestige and power; and 
with it has come a corresponding increase of responsibility. 
A piece of legislation of such far-reaching consequences as an 
upward revision of tariff schedules is no longer a matter of 
mere domestic interest but, in the words of Lewis W. Jones, 
"an event of the greatest international concern which may 
mean the difference between prosperity and bankruptcy in cer-
tain foreign communities largely dependent upon the American 
market."29 

B. W h a t I t H a s Meant f o r America 

Foreign nations, then, were not slow in protesting against 
the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill while it was being debated be-
fore Congress. Protests ranging from mild remonstrances to 
threats of severe reprisals were received from thirty nations 
regarding some two hundred important commodities. Retali-

a t i o n was swift when the protests failed. Partial or general 
increases of import duties were levied by approximately eighty 
countries and colonies. Spain, Australia, Cuba, Canada and 
New Zealand retaliated with, sweeping tariff revisions sufficient 
to discourage imports from the United States; France, Italy, 
Mexico and Argentina increased their duties on certain lead-
ing imports from this country. Some of the economic results 
have been mentioned above. 

It is true that the general rise in American tariff was not 
29Tarifis and American Foreign Trade (Foreign Policy Association, 

June 12, 1929). 



27 Tariffs and World Peace 

solely responsible for all the trade evils that followed in its 
wake. The past two years have witnessed the world's business 
growing steadily worse. "To the ordinary motives for increas-
ing tariffs . . . were then added other and seemingly com-
pelling considerations," declares The Foreign Policy Associa-
tion.30 "As a result, the nations resorted to new and more 
drastic means of restricting imports. But every nation's im-
port is some other nation's export. Hence every national act 
of self-defense was a blow at some other nation. In this way 
the vicious circle of trade restriction and retaliation was set 
in motion. I t caught in its grip the last great upholder of free 
trade when Great Britain recently enacted its first general tariff 
legislation." 

1. Loss of International Good Will 
As a result of her stubborn persistence in this unfortunate 

policy America sacrificed whatever prestige and kindly feeling 
may have existed toward her in foreign circles and deepened 
the bitterness and antagonism in other quarters. Uncle Sam, 
instead of a rich and benevolent uncle, became in the eyes 
of European nations an ungrateful son, a miser, a conqueror 
crushing out beneath an iron heel the very life of the con-
quered, a shirker of his duty to cooperate in the restoration 
of world peace and world prosperity. How, Europe has been 
asking, can she be expected to pay even the interest on her 
debts to America with treasuries depleted and her goods barred 
from the American market? Not long ago we read of France's 
decision to purchase 20,000,000 bushels of wheat from Canada. 
The news account that carried the story added the naive com-
ment that, since the quality of American and Canadian wheat 
was practically the same, it must have been a difference of 
price that influenced France in making the decision. But is it 
not just possible that such memories as the public demonstra-
tions of workers against the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill in the 
streets of Lille and other manufacturing centers were hovering 
in the minds that were responsible for the decision? 

2. Loss of Foreign Trade Retaliation 
But much as this may injure our national pride, the swift 

retaliation of other nations to our rise of tariff levels has 
touched a more sensitive and vital spot—our national pros-
perity. Canada, without waiting for the new American tariff 

30Shall International Trade be Stifled? (Foreign Policy Association, 
June 2, 1932). 



28 Tariffs and World Peace 

act to become law, enacted a new tariff of its own on May 19, 
1930, which seriously affected many imports from the United 
States. Italy followed by increasing, by a royal proclamation 
of June 27, 1930, import duties on automobiles, about 80 per 
cent of the total imports of which come from the United 
States. The new Spanish tariff of July 23 of the same year 
affected such American exports as automobiles, motorcycles, 
sewing machines, pneumatic tires and safety-razor blades. Sim-
ilar revisions have been brought about in the tariff of some-
45 other nations. Retaliation was, of course, in all cases 
denied to be a motivating cause; national defense, protection 
of home industries, or defense of threatened currencies was the 
plea. But surely it was not with a troubled heart that those 
nations realized the disastrous effect that such measures would 
have upon American export trade. 

Contrary to the predictions of the advocates of the Hawley-
Smoot tariff, American exports have continued to maintain a 
sharp and steady decline that had already begun in November 
of 1929. In June of 1929 exports totaled approximately $390,-
000,000. By the end of October of that year they had reached 
the peak total of over $520,000,000. Between June, 1930, the 
month of the passage of the Hawley-Smoot tariff bill, and July, 
1932, they fell from $294,000,000 to $106,764,576. For the 
first nine months of 1932, exports from the United States 
amounted to only $1,188,894,000 as compared with $3,844,-
404,000 for the same period of 1929. And during the first 
ten months of 1932 they totaled in value less than one-fourth 
that of the exports of the same period in 1929, and reached 
the lowest level of any year since 1910. 

Consulting the figures for the total volume of American 
foreign trade, we find that this surpassed the sum of $9,000,-
000,000 in 1929. In 1930 it dropped to less than $7,000,000,-
000, and in 1931 to about $4,500,000,000. The exact per-
centage of decline during those two years (1930 and 1931) was 
53.2, as compared with 36.2 suffered by the United Kingdom. 
And in 1932 the fall was even more abrupt. At the same 
time American export surplus was falling in value from $801,-
000,000 in 1930 to $369,000,000 in 1931. 

In Canada the elections that followed the passage of the 
Hawley-Smoot law were fought and won on protectionist prin-
ciples. And when the new Premier made good his pre-election 
promises, exports from the United States to Canada fell off in 
one month from $70,044,000 to $45,092,000. And while ex-



29 Tariffs and World Peace 

ports from the United States to Switzerland (whose watch in-
dustry was badly crippled by the prohibitive rates of the new 
tariff) were falling from a value of about 11,648,000 in 1929 
to 8,192,000 pounds in 1930, England was increasing her ex-
port trade with that country by approximately the same 
amount.31 

Many will consider it a far cry from the Hawley-Smoot 
tariff to the Ottawa agreements. But a study of the sentiments 
and motives that inspired the chief promoters of the confer-
ence and the principles that guided it will show that between 
the two there is more than a mere semblance of causal rela-
tion. Illustrative of this fact, a United Press dispatch issued 
from Ottawa, October 13, 1932, carries the following dis-
heartening story: "Drastic tariff changes expected to eliminate 
from $75,000,000 to $150,000,000 in sales by the United States 
to this country went into effect today. They affect agricul-
tural and manufactured product exports from all sections of 
the United States and, accordingly, all wage earners dependent 
upon such exports. Industrial and steel centers such as Cleve-
land, Youngstown, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Birmingham and Gary 
will lose millions in trade. The business, it is contended, will 
be transferred to members of the British commonwealth of 
nations. The new rates, including some of the most radical 
schedule changes in this country's history, were drawn up dur-
ing the Ottawa imperial economic conference. They are the 
result of agitation which became widespread with passage of 
the Hawley-Smoot tariff act in the United States more than 
two years ago, which Canadians and others said reduced their 
market. . . . Premier Bennett said he hoped the preferences 
given Canadian metals would result in Canadian copper re-
placing that formerly sold to Britain by producers in the 
United States, up to the value of that formerly sold in the 
United States by Canadian producers, and now barred by a 
duty. He also pointed out that the Hawley-Smoot tariff act 
had closed the market for Canadian farm products in the 
United States, and that the preferences to be given Canadian 
agriculture by Britain would make up for much of the loss." 

3. Increase in Unemployment 
This sharp decline of export trade has contributed in no 

small measure to the disastrous increase of unemployment in 
s l"Tariffs and Economic Recovery," Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., 

America, May 30, 1931. 



30 Tariffs and World Peace 

the United States. Loss or restriction of foreign markets 
means curtailing of production in the exporting industries and 
consequent decrease of employment in the exporting and sub-
sidiary industries. Employment is also indirectly affected by 
the establishment of American factories, branches or "as-
sembling plants" abroad to evade the rates of foreign tariffs 
on American exports. This means a substitution of foreign 
for American labor. The Department of Commerce recently 
estimated in a report to Congress that by the end of 1929 
Americans had invested $1,534,351,000 in manufacturing es-
tablishments abroad. 

While foreign tariffs increased and export trade suffered a 
steady decline, unemployment figures in the United States have 
continued to rise, reaching, according to Mr. William Green, 
President of the American Federation of Labor, the all-time 
record of 11,590,000 persons. 

4. Defaulting of Debtor Nations 
In the course of the debate of the Hawley-Smoot tariff 

bill, national leaders were warned that an increase in tariff 
policy was inconsistent with our position as a creditor nation. 
Has the truth of this statement been established? In this re-
port we have pointed out that the drying up of former sources 
of revenue has threatened the gold reserves of debtor nations 
and undermined the stability of many national currencies. 
Despairing of effecting a breach in our tariff policy and un-
able to pay off these obligations at least partly in terms of 
goods, these nations have endeavored to scale down their debit 
items by further restricting imports to protect their trade bal-
ances while pleading for revision or deferment of payments on 
foreign loans. 

The moratorium granted in answer to this plea reduced 
payment on war debts received by America from $241,000,000 
in 1930 to $113,000,000 in 1931, and to approximately $98,-
500,000 in 1932 (France, Belgium, Poland, Esthonia and Hun-
gary defaulting their December 15 payments). Defaulting has 
also occurred on payments due on loans and investment of pri-
vate foreign creditors. Great Britain made it known that her 
December 15, 1932, payments would be the last she could make 
under the present funding agreements. France refused to 
make her payments due on December 15, not because she was 
unable to do so (the gold was already earmarked for ship-
ment), but because she considered it impossible for her to 



31 Tariffs and World Peace 

•"make over the next 56 years her total due payments of $6,-
500,000,000 and might as well balk now as later."32 

Hence debtor nations present a solid front in demanding 
a revision of the present terms of war debt payments. They 
protest that their "capacity to pay," which forms the basis 
of the present agreements, has been greatly reduced by existing 
economic conditions; that as payments must, in the long run, 
be made largely in goods and services, the debtor's "capacity 
to pay" depends in great measure upon the creditor's willing-
ness to receive. We are thus faced with the alternatives either 
of revising our tariff policy in the interests of our debtor na-
tions (which would be to our own interest as well) or of ac-
ceding to a reduction of the war debts and private American 
investments abroad. 

The United States in 1929 failed to learn her lesson from 
the losses suffered among European nations resulting from 
trade restrictions and adhered blindly to the principle "that 
nations have an absolute right to determine their own tariff 
and other foreign trade policies 'without regard to whether 
those policies prove immediately disastrous to other peoples 
and ultimately disastrous to those who launch them.' " s s 

I V 

L O O K I N G T O T H E F U T U R E 

Such is a brief story of the past. Does the future hold no 
promise of a saner attitude? In recent years a reaction to this 
narrow, selfish, nationalistic policy has taken place, led chiefly 
by international organizations and societies and by far-seeing 
statesmen, economists, industrialists and financiers who are 
coming to realize more and more the truth of the interde-
pendence of nations and the need of international cooperation 
and good will or, as Owen D. Young expresses it, "that men 
help themselves the most by helping others, too." An out-
standing manifestation of this attitude is found in the reso-
lutions of the International Economic Conference of 1927 
which summed up its final sentiments on the world tariff situ-
ation in the following general conclusions: 

32Time, December 26, 1932. 
33Shall International Trade Be Stifled? (Foreign Policy Association, 

June 2, 1932). 



32 Tariffs and World Peace 

A. Resolutions of the World Economic Conference 

" I n view of the fact that harmful effects upon production 
and trade result from the high and constantly changing tariffs 
which are applied in many countries; 

"And since substantial improvement in the economic condi-
tions can be obtained by increased facilities for international 
trade and commerce; 

"And in view of the fact that tariffs, though within the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the separate states, are not a matter 
of purely domestic interest but greatly influence the trade of 
the world; 

"And in view of the fact that some of the causes which 
have resulted in the increase of tariffs and in other trade bar-
riers since the war have largely disappeared and others are di-
minishing; 

"The Conference declares that the time has come to put an 
end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite di-
rection. . . . 

"This should be affected by an effort made along three lines: 
(1) Individual action by States with regard to their own 
tariffs; (2) Bilateral action through the conclusion of suitable 
commercial treaties; (3) Collective action, by means of an 
enquiry, with a view to encouraging the expansion of inter-
national trade on an equitable basis by removing or lowering 
the barriers to international trade which are set up by exces-
sive customs tariffs." 

Promptly and with perseverance the nations proceeded to 
ignore the first recommendation of the conference. Little Bel-
gium and Holland have profited by the second by agreeing to 
a mutual reduction of their tariffs in favor of each other with 
an open invitation to other countries to join in the agreements. 
I t has already been intimated that the new British tariff policy 
may result in bargaining and reciprocal agreements between 
England and the countries that are anxious to sell in her mar-
kets. Still greater prominence did this method of tariff reduc-
tion attain in recent months when it found a champion in the 
person of the new President of the United States. 

Realizing that without a change in our present tariff policy 
"there is no hope for full economic recovery or for true pros-
perity in the United States," President Roosevelt declared in 
one of his pre-election speeches that "trade barriers of all 
kinds ought to be lowered . . . as quickly and as definitely as 



33 Tariffs and World Peace 

possible." This he proposed to accomplish by "reciprocal 
agreements with other nations." In his opinion "more realis-
tic mutual agreements for trade, substituted for the present 
system in which each nation attempts to exploit the markets 
of every other, giving nothing in return, will do more for the 
peace of the world and will contribute more to supplement the 
eventual reduction of armaments than any other policy which 
could be devised." 

The merits of this method of tariff reduction are still open 
to debate. Sir Arthur Salter believes that "reduction of tariffs 
by regional agreements is now the most promising method of 
reduction in sight." Others point to the possibility of compli-
cations arising fromi demands of most-favored-nation treat-
ment, and the dangers of international jealousies and protests 
of discrimination. The fact that nations which employ this 
method are assured of fair treatment in return for their own 
tariff reductions is a point in its favor. At the very least it 
would form a breach in the present tariff defenses and, if 
sufficiently comprehensive in purpose and execution, should 
lead to the general reduction of trade restrictions that is essen-
tial to world prosperity. 

An opportunity to apply the principles of the third and 
most important recommendation of the conference will pre-
sent itself with the convocation of the World Economic Con-
ference. Provided the nations are genuinely sincere in their 
desire to cooperate in the promotion of their common inter-
ests and abide by the decisions of the conference, this is the 
quickest and most effective means of placing the regulation of 
international trade on an equitable basis "by removing or 
lowering the barriers to international trade which are set up 
by excessive customs tariffs." I t is likewise in accord with 
the appeal of our Holy Father, Pope Pius X I , that "various 
nations in common counsel and endeavor" should strive "to 
promote a healthy economic cooperation by prudent pacts 
and institutions, since in economic matters they are largely 
dependent one upon the other."34 

B. A Lesson F r o m the Depression 
The disciplinary value of hardships and suffering is a mat-

ter of universal experience. And one of the lessons that the 
world might learn from the present economic depression is the 

3iForty Years After—Encyclical Letter, 1931 (National Catholic Wel-
fare Conference, Washington). 



34 Tariffs and World Peace 

fact of international interdependence and the necessity of in-
ternational cooperation. Attention was called to this fact by 
William T . Stone at-the time of the passage of the Hawley-
Smoot tariff bill when the depression was as yet in its infancy. 
"As a result of the financial depression," he wrote, "indus-
trialists, bankers and business men who in the past have ac-
cepted the protectionist doctrine as synonymous with 'pros-
perity' have joined the academic economist in pointing to the 
dangers inherent in trade barriers. The statements of Henry 
P. Ford, Alfred P. Sloan, the president of General Motors and 
the president of the American Bankers' Association, have been 
heard where the voices of the professors of economics have 
been unheeded in the past."35 As the depression has plodded 
along through weary weeks, months and years to a seemingly 
hardy and tireless old age, that same section of opinion has 
grown in strength of conviction and numbers. But as far as 
practical results are concerned, it is as yet but a voice crying 
in the wilderness against the great international sin of sacri-
ficing the peace and prosperity of the world to selfish indi-
vidual interests. In other words these principles have not yet 
become part of the guiding force of the leadership that is di-
recting the destinies of some of the nations today. 

C. Need of New Leadership 

Honest educators are beginning to admit that the leader-
ship which has been responsible for the direction of the busi-
ness and political activities of America and of the world at 
large has been sadly deficient both in principles and in the 
results achieved. In its place must arise a new type of leader-
ship capable of restoring order and tranquillity to the state of 
turmoil of the present international scene. These men must 
be leaders whose chief aim is not, to use the phrase of D r . 
Nicholas Murray Butler, "trying to keep their seats like 
jockeys," but men trained to a proper sense of values; men 
who realize that the welfare of civilization depends upon the 
proper adjudication and maintenance of those values; men 
whose chief object in life is not the amassing of fabulous sums 
of wealth—whether in the form of private fortunes or favor-
able balances of trade; men who realize that wealth alone does 
not constitute the measure of man's temporal welfare and hap-
piness, and that beyond that temporal welfare there is yet a 

35News Bulletin (Foreign Policy Association, June 29, 1930). 



35 Tariffs and World Peace 

higher and eternal goal to be attained; men who realize that 
national leadership means national responsibility—responsi-
bility to God from Whom that authority is ultimately derived 
and responsibility to the people for whose welfare it is exer-
cised; men who are sublimely conscious of the fact that the 
common good of the community cannot be sacrificed for indi-
vidual gain nor can the national policy be shaped without due 
consideration of the fact that nations, like individuals, have 
rights that must be respected and obligations that must be 
met; and, finally, that the determinants of these international, 
as well again as individual, relations are t o ' b e based not upon 
mere economic or material advantage but upon the unchanging 
norms of moral rights and obligations as well as upon those 
Christian principles of justice, charity and equity without 
which the maintenance of world peace and prosperity is utterly 
impossible. 

D. Justice and Charity 
''The general principles of ethics," says Dr. John A. Ryan, 

"which govern economic intercourse between States are the 
same as those which apply to other international relations. 
They are identical with the ethical principles that govern the 
relations between different groups of persons within the same 
country. As a rule, actions which are wrong when performed 
by one domestic corporation in relation to another are like-
wise immoral when perpetrated by one State against another 
State. In their economic attitudes toward and dealings with 
one another, nations are bound by the precepts of charity, 
justice, veracity, and all the other virtues which are binding 
upon neighbors."36 

Justice and charity are words that are too little understood 
and virtues too little practiced in the varied and complex rela-
tions of modern society. Justice is not a word to be conjured 
with, a term to furnish sport for idle jurists, but beyond the 
comprehension of the lay mind. I t is a very difficult, a very 
real and objective thing—a law that binds all men to recognize 
and respect the rights of others, to give to others what is their 
due. I t is not the mere creation of any given legislature or 
any given state at any given time. Nor does it depend upon 
the changing feelings or passing whims and fancies of the hu-
man mind, prone to selfishness and greed if allowed to follow 
the dictates of a perverted nature. Man, in possession of a 

36America, May 6, 1933. 



36 Tariffs and World Peace 

rational nature essentially different from all other forms of ani-
mal life and of a soul that is not only destined never to die, 
but to live after death a life that is incomparably higher than 
that of its present existence, has certain inviolable rights that 
his fellow men are morally bound to respect. He has the right 
to life which is an end in itself, and the right to all means that 
are necessary for the proper attainment of that end. I t is the 
function of justice to protect these rights, to hedge them about 
with moral sanctions, to render them inviolable against attack, 
to impose upon others the obligation, the duty of respecting 
these rights under pain of violation of the objective moral law 
and the subjective reflection of that law in the individual 
conscience. In that sense justice is the bond of society. I t 
maintains order in society by protecting individual rights. 
And as these rights are just as objective and unchangeable as 
the very nature of man, justice whose purpose is the protec-
tion of those rights is no less objective and immutable. Jus-
tice is also universal. It binds all men, singly and collectively. 
The just man is he who habitually respects the rights of his 
fellow men. A just state is that which bases its laws upon the 
immutable laws of justice and that recognizes and respects the 
rights of other nations in its international policies and conduct. 

But as the maintenance of justice is the very foundation of 
social welfare, the observance of charity is its necessary com-
plement. Justice and charity are both necessary for social 
welfare. Justice is the skeleton, the backbone of society, that 
which gives strength and durability; charity is the flesh, the 
blood, the sinews, that which gives cohesion and warmth and 
beauty. Justice is negative; it commands us to do nothing 
that would be a violation of the rights of others. Charity is 
positive; it commands us to go beyond the mere respect of the 
rights of others and to give of our own bounty that of which 
they are in need. St. Thomas says: " I t is not enough for peace 
and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of jus-
tice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. 
Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get 
in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping 
another in his need."37 And one may sin just as gravely by 
failing to meet his obligations of charity as he would by tres-
passing upon the just rights of others. These natural princi-
ples of justice and charity Christianity has done much to de-
fine and clarify. All law to be effective must have an official 

37Man and Society, Rev. Francis J . Haas (Century). 



37 Tariffs and World Peace 

interpreter. And this office Christ, Who as God was the Au-
thor of the natural law, gave to the Church which He came to 
found and which He ordained should never err in her authori-
tative interpretation of the principles of the moral law. 

All nations, then, as all individuals, are morally bound to 
observe these principles in their relations with one another. 
The full implication of this fact in the varied and complex 
problems of international relations is beyond the limited scope 
of this study to examine. But we might ask one or two ques-
tions pertinent to the subject of this report. When as a re-
sult of the economic interdependence of nations and of the 
demand for a certain commodity on the world market an in-
dustry grows up within a certain nation which effectively and 
efficiently meets that demand, and when in the course of time 
the livelihood of perhaps hundreds of thousands of workers 
comes to depend upon that industry, and when later another 
nation, jealous of the success of that foreign industry in its 
home market and wishing to give preference to a few favored 
but incompetent nationals clamoring for the trade, enacts a 
tariff law that partially ruins that foreign industry and throws 
a very large percentage of its workers out of employment—is 
that nation observing the principles of justice and charity? 
And again, would one say that a creditor nation is meeting 
her obligations of charity when, while demanding of debtor na-
tions full payment of staggering obligations, she enacts at the 
same time a tariff law, dictated by a few vested interests, which 
renders the debtor nations incapable of meeting those obliga-
tions without reduction to a state of human misery and desti-
tution? Such questions should not rest lightly upon the con-
sciences of legislators. 

V 
C O N C L U S I O N : H O W T H E R E F O R M CAN 

B E E F F E C T E D 

Under a leadership which recognizes the principles of jus-
tice and charity will develop a proper sense of mutual inter-
national interdependence and responsibility to the exclusion of 
individual greed and extreme nationalistic selfishness which 
prove so disturbing to world peace and prosperity. But the 
actual reduction of tariff barriers must not be too sudden or 
violent. No one with any appreciation of present economic 
conditions in the United States would advise her adoption of 



38 Tariffs and World Peace 

"free trade." So drastic a modification of American tariff 
policy would be an egregious blunder. Changes of custom of 
such long standing must be accomplished slowly and with cau-
tion and moderation, with due warning to those who will be 
affected by the change. But we can and must begin to correct 
the excesses and abuses of our present tariff system by effect-
ing " a reasonable reduction of the excessive schedules of the 
Hawley-Smoot tariff, a reduction that, without failing to pro-
tect home industries, will nevertheless allow other countries to 
sell goods here."38 That this can easily be done will be ad-
mitted by anyone who compares the duties on many of the 
articles of the Hawley-Smoot schedules with the duties pro-
posed by the United States Tariff Commission after a lengthy 
study of comparative domestic and foreign costs of production. 

This might well serve as a starting point of tariff reform. 
I t would affect only "a minute fraction of the people, and they 
would be hurt only to the extent of their excess profits above 
a reasonable return on investment."39 I t would, by increasing 
the buying power of and promoting friendly relations with for-
eign nations, create an expansion of markets for American 
goods with increased production and greater employment in 
our exporting industries. This would be an important step for-
ward in the recovery of economic prosperity. 

But to profit in full measure from the benefits of inter-
national trade, tariff reduction must go still further. Moderate 
protection is, indeed, justified, and at times necessary for the 
genuine welfare of the State, when used for such ends as the 
relief of industries necessary for the development of natural 
resources, the promotion of diversification of industry and na-
tional defense within rational limits, or the safeguarding of na-
tional production against manifestly unjust foreign competi-
tion. But if the so-called "scientific" principle of equaliza-
tion of costs of production is made the basis of tariff policy 
and applied to all industries, irrespective of their chances of 
success in open and fair competition, the result will be the 
increasing of protection in proportion to the incompetency of 
industries unsuited to national conditions and the well-nigh 
complete destruction of the advantages of international trade. 
"If countries throughout the world would withdraw protec-
tion from those forms of production for which they are least 

s8Thorning, op. cit. 
38"The Country's Plight," Charles G. Ross. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 

November 29, 1931. 



39 Tariffs and World Peace 

suited, they would do a great deal of good both to themselves 
and to others."40 

"The general conclusion about existing tariffs," writes Dr. 
Ryan, "particularly those of Europe, is that they greatly in-
crease international ill-will and misunderstanding and that with 
few exceptions they ought to be abolished as rapidly as is 
practicable and equitable. All authorities on international con-
ditions and relations are agreed that the necessity for immedi-
ate reduction of tariffs has become extremely urgent. A be-
ginning should be made immediately. At the forthcoming 
International Economic Conference an agreement should be 
reached for a universal reduction of ten per cent on tariff du-
ties in all countries. In the absence of such agreement, the 
United States ought immediately to lower its tariff rates by 
this percentage. This action would not only be of great bene-
fit to our own country but would provide a powerful example 
for the other countries. Moreover, and regardless of the 
course taken by the European nations, the United States ought 
to make the ten-per-cent reduction an annual affair until our 
entire tariff structure disappears."41 

Truly, in the face of domestic and international condi-
tions, never was there a more acceptable time for America to 
"put an end to the increase in tariffs and move in the opposite 
direction." And she is now accused of being the greatest 
sinner in prolonging the depression, so can she, by a sincere 
repentance which is manifesting itself, become the world leader 
in economic recovery. At the same time she will be laying a 
firm foundation for genuine and lasting peace. "Peace," says 
Mr. Buell, "cannot be secured without a price; and that price 
is a revision of the commercial policy of the United States 
and of other nations so as to cut the Gordian knot in which 
the economic life of the world is now tied. . . . I t does little 
good to wrestle with the problem of political war, when at the 
same time we insist upon following economic policies which 
make economic warfare between nations inevitable."42 

The fate of this reform hangs upon a realization of the 
inconsistency of, on the one hand, declaring ourselves staunch 
advocates of peace and devising schemes for the outlawing of 
war, while, on the other, we follow a policy of hard and cruel 
economic isolation that breeds antagonism and renders con-
flicts between nations inevitable. It demands a realization 

"Salter, op. cit. «America, May 6, 1933. 
""Economic Imperialism," Forum, October, 1930. 



40 Tariffs and World Peace 

of the compelling truth of the economic interdependence of na-
tions as well as a recognition of the Divine Will that all share 
the goods of this world on equitable terms. This would be to 
substitute for a spirit of narrow, selfish and disastrous egotism, 
one of wholesome international cooperation, based as well on 
principles of equity as on the demands of enlightened self-in-
terest. 

In fact, some form even of organized international coopera-
tion seems to have become today a natural obligation. Speed 
of modern communication and travel breaking down the bar-
riers that isolated nation from nation, modern developments 
of specialization in all fields and quantity production, and 
the rise of common interests of an industrial, commercial, 
scientific, cultural and religious nature point to its necessity. 
Natural law which governs the conduct and promotes the wel-
fare, individual and social, of man, and is the basis of all hu-
man law would seem to demand it. 

The world today is at the crossroads; two paths lie before 
it. One is the way of isolation, of narrow aims, of futile pur-
poses. The other is the way of organized international co-
operation whereby nations, while continuing to exercise su-
preme dominion over matters of purely national concern, will 
unite in common council to protect and promote the interests 
that are common to all nations. "We shall move as a whole 
to a world order in which each national unit will be a unit in 
a general commonwealth, or to a system of closed and, it may 
be feared, increasingly hostile units which will add immensely 
and incalculably to the risks of further wars."43 The one is 
the way of selfish interests, of timid fears and stubborn folly, 
of lower standards, of impeded advancement, of increasing 
friction and hostility. The other is the way of progress, of 
greater achievement, of mutual advantages, of genuine love, of 
enduring peace. 

International cooperation along economic lines implies, as 
has been pointed out by our present Pontiff, Pius X I , the es-
tablishment of sound economic policies by prudent pacts and 
institutions, based in turn upon the realization of the economic 
dependence of nations and the application by all nations of the 
Christian principles of justice and charity to national policies. 
T o quote again from the Encyclical: "All those versed in so-
cial matters demand a rationalization of economic life which 
will introduce sound and true order. But this order, which 

«Salter, op. cit. 



41 Tariffs and World Peace 

We ourselves desire and make every effort to promote,, will 
necessarily be quite faulty and imperfect, unless all man's ac-
tivities harmoniously unite to imitate and, as far as is humanly 
possible, attain the marvelous unity of the divine plan."44 
This unity is to be attained not merely in the domestic eco-
nomic and social relations of the individual nation, but in 
international relations as well. I t is to be promoted by a 
genuine love and mutual cooperation between nations, without 
which cannot be attained that only true peace which is the 
"peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ." For Christ is 
King not of any one nation or of nations separately. He is 
King of kings, and His Kingdom is the world. 

No effort, be it ever so laudable, will avail aught to secure 
international harmony and peace until "human beings, banded 
together in governments, recognize that they and their gov-
ernments are bound by laws of right and wrong toward other 
peoples and other governments, and that these laws include 
the laws of justice and the laws of charity and kindness. . . . 
If right and wrong, justice and charity are denied in inter-
national relations, the quest for peace is futile."45 But on the 
other hand, once these principles are made the basis of the 
tariff policies of nations the world will find that it has rid 
itself of one of the most formidable obstacles to enduring peace 
and prosperity. The golden opportunity of leading the way 
to the attainment of this goal lies with America. 

"Forty Years After—Encyclical Letter, 1931 (National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, Washington). 

i5The Christian Way to Peace, N. C. W. C. Joint Committee on 
Peace, 1929 (National-Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington). 

APPENDIX A 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Ashley, P.: Modern Tariff History. New York: Dutton, 1920. 
Ashley, W. J.: The Tariff Problem. London: King, 1911. 
Buell, R. L.: International Relations, Ch. V, "Economic Nationalism," 

and Ch. VI, "Economic Internationalism." New York: Holt, 1929. 
Culbertson, W. S.: International Economic Policies. New York: Apple-

ton, 192S. 
Fisk, G. M., and Pierce, P. S.: International Commercial Policies. New 

York: Macmillan, 1923. 
Gregory, T. E.: Foreign Exchange Before, During and After the War. 

New York: Oxford, 1925. 
Haas, F. J.: Man and Society, Ch. XII, "The State in Its Relation to 

Other States." New York: Century, 1930. 
Hayes, C. J. H.: Essays on Nationalism. New York: Macmillan, 1926. 



42 Tariffs and World Peace 

Husslein, J. C.: The Christian Social Manifesto, Ch. VIII, "The New 
Economic Dictatorship." Milwaukee: Bruce, 1932. 

Keynes, J. M.: The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1920. 

Lippincott, I.: Economic Resources and Industries of the World. New 
York: Appleton, 1929. 

Lippmann, W.: The United Stales in World Affairs. New York-
Harpers, 1931. 

McGowan, R. A.: Europe and the United States (Pamphlet No, 8). 
Washington, D. C.: Catholic Association for International Peace. 
1932. 

Moon, P. T.: Causes of War (Pamphlet No. 3). Washington, D. C.: 
Catholic Association for International Peace, 1931. 

t—: Imperialism and World Politics. New York: 
Macmillan, 1926. 

— : Syllabus on InternaiioiiaX Relations, Part VIII, 
"Economic Problems of International Relations." New York- Mac-
millan, 1926. 

Taussig, F. W.: Free Trade, the Tariff and Reciprocity. New York-
Macmillan, 1920. 

——s : Selected Readings in International Trade and 
Tariff Problems. Boston: Ginn, 1921. 

• — : Some Aspects of the Tariff Question. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1915. 

* : Tariff History in the United States. New York: 
Putnam, 1923. 

Salter, A.: Recovery, the Second Effort. New York: Century, 1932. 
Swisher, I. G.: Introduction to a Study of the Tariff. Washington, 

D. C.: National League of Women Voters, 1931. 
Walsh, E. A.: History and Nature of International Relations. New 

York: Macmillan, 1922. 
Cf. also publications of the U. S. Tariff Commission and of the U. S. 

Department of Commerce: Commerce Yearbook, Commerce Reports, 
Trade Information Bulletins; monographs on tariff, on iron and steel, 
wool, etc., published for Brooking's Institution; publications of the 
League of Nations and of the World Peace Foundation. On the domes-
tic aspect of the tariff confer such standard texts of economic principles 
and problems as: Taussig, Ely, Seligman, Seager, Fetter, Hamilton, etc. 
America, Jan. 3, 1931: "The International Scene," Rev. Joseph F. 

Thorning, S. J. 
May 30, 1931: "Tariffs and Economic Recovery," Rev. Joseph F. 

Thorning, S.J. 
Jan. 24, 1931: "War Dangers in Europe," Gerhard Hirschfeld. 

I—The Economic Background. 
Jan. 31, 1931: n—Political Consequences. 
Feb. 7, 1931: III—The International Aspect. 

American Economic Review, September, 1930: "The Tariff Act of 1930 " 
Abraham Berglund. 

Annalist, June 27, 1930: "The Hawley-Smoot Tariff and Its Influence 
on America's Export Trade," Percy W. Bidwell. 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 
CXLIV: "Present Day Causes of International Friction and Their 
Elimination." 



43 Tariffs and World Peace 

July, 1930: "American Economic Policy," A. P. Dennis. 
Business Week, Nov. 12, 1930: "France Accumulates Ammunition to 

Shoot at Our Tariff Policy." 
Commonweal, Oct. 23, 1929: "Economic Disarmament," John Carter. 

July 2, 1930: "On the Dotted Line." 
Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1930: "The New American Tariff, Europe's An-

swer," Percy W. Bidwell. 
"The Economic Organization of Peace," Sir Arthur Salter. 

Foreign Policy Association Information Service, May 29, 1929: "Sugar 
and the Tariff," Raymond Leslie Buell. 

June 12, 1929: "Tariff and American Foreign Trade," Lewis Web-
ster Jones. 

Oct. 1, 1930: "Foreign Reactions to the American Tariff Act, L. B. 
Mann. 

June 2, 1932: "Shall International Trade Be Stifled?" 
Forum, Oct., 1930: "Economic Imperialism: The Makings of the Next 

War," Raymond Leslie Buell. 
Literary Digest, June 28, 1930: "Uncle Sam's Tariff Unpopularity." 

July S, 1930: "Germany's Ire at Our Tariff."' 
Living Age, July IS, 1930: "European Opinion of the New American 

Tariff." 
Aug. 1, 1930: "Protection Run Wild: European Symposium. 

National Republic, July, 1930: "Protection and Peace." 
New York Times, Oct. 2, 1932: "Ottawa's Aftermath," Sir Arthur Salter. 

Oct. 16, 1932: "Again the Tariff Becomes a Dominant Issue," Charles 
Merz. 

"Fiercer Grows the Battle of Tariffs," Harold Callender (New York 
Times Magazine, p. 3). 

Dec. 19, 1932: "The Larger Issues Behind the War Debts," Charles 
Merz. 

North American Review, July, 1930: "Revolt Against the Tariff," W. O. 
Scroggs. 

Outlook, June 18, 1930: "Tragedy of the Tariff: Its Economic and 
Moral Implications," Paul M. Mazur. 

July 12, 1930: "Protests from Abroad." 
APPENDIX B 

N . C . W . C . S T U D Y C L U B O U T L I N E 
ON 

TARIFFS AND WORLD PEACE 
(Printed by Permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee) 

Lesson I 
E C O N O M I C C A U S E S OF W A R (Text—Section I ) , 

T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. "Releasing causes" of war vs. "root causes" of war. 
2. National trade restrictions, reprisals, and resulting national ani-

mosities. 
3. "Vital interests" and territorial expansion. 
4. Limitations of the theory of the economic determination of his-

tory. Q U E S T I O N S 
1. What are the principal causes of war? What wars in recent times 



44 Tariffs and World Peace 

have been due to the desire to exploit new markets and sources of raw 
materials ? 

2. What is Imperialism? Has the United States ever shown impe-
rialistic tendencies? What is the origin of Latin American distrust of 
so-called "Yankee Imperialism?" 

3. What were the remote or "root" causes of the World War? Do 
these causes, in whole or part, still exist? 

4. Is the friction between the United States and Japan in the Far 
East fundamentally a question of national prestige or economic advan-
tage? What interests are at stake? How are China and Soviet Russia 
involved in this dispute? 

5. What place have armaments, particularly large navies, in the de-
velopment of imperialistic policies? How is the "freedom of the seas" 
involved? How are naval bases and stations located with respect to 
"spheres of influence," protectorates, colonies, trade routes, and mar-
kets? (Use maps.) 

6. Were economic motives involved in the Spanish-American war? 
P A P E R S 

1. The Foundations of Modem Imperialism: 
"Imperialism and World Politics," Parker Thomas Moon. 

2. Does Imperialism Inevitably Lead to War?: 
''Economic Causes of War," J . Bakeless. 

3. Review of the Occupation of Nicaragua by United States Marines 
and Reasons Leading to Subsequent Withdrawal: 

"Latin America and the United States," R. A. McGowan, 
C. A. I. P., p. 34. 

4. Manchukuo is the "life-line" of Japan. (One paper from Chinese, 
the other from the Japanese viewpoint.) Discuss the place and influ-
ence of treaty obligations on the development of this conflict. 

Lesson 11 
T H E T A R I F F : N A T U R E AJTO K I N D S (Text—Section I I ) 

T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 
1. Define tariff, its nature and varieties. Outline the chief advan-

tages claimed for the protective tariff, its effect on the domestic market, 
export trade, standards of living, wages, and development of home in-
dustries. Show how it operates when applied to agricultural produce. 
Give a brief summary of the best economic opinion on the subject. 

2. Show how each of the arguments used to justify the protective 
theory would or would not be valid, if applied to each of the States of 
the Union or to great sections of the country. 

3. Outline the main arguments against Protection. 
4. Point out its relation to current arguments drawn from the desire 

of economic independence, political nationalism and military prepared-
ness. 

5. Discuss the argument of protectionists that the tariff has been 
responsible for high wages in America. (Cf. Taussig: "Principle of 
Economics.") 

Q U E S T I O N S 
1. Has the tariff been a fruitful source of revenue? What part did 

it play in the expansion of industry in the United States? Was Alex-
ander Hamilton the "Father of the Protective Tariff?" 



45 Tariffs and World Peace 

2. Do the majority of economists oppose the protective tariff as 
such, or merely its extreme forms? Can their reasons be backed by 
facts? All in all has the protective tariff policy of the United States 
been of benefit to industry, to financial interests, to agricultural pro-
ducers, to business men generally, to the factory workers, to farm 
laborers? 

3. How has "log-rolling" in Congress affected tariff schedules? Has 
either of the great political parties in this country shown itself immune 
from influence of this type? 

4. Has the desire for gain, stigmatized in the Papal Encyclicals, 
played a major part in the development of tariff policies? 

5. What important raw materials have to be imported into and ex-
ported from the United States? How does this affect the doctrine of 
economic independence and military preparedness? 

P A P E R S 
gj The Tariff and Taxation: 

"Principles of Economics," F. W. Taussig. 
2. The Happy Medium Between Extreme Mercantilism and Extreme 

Liberalism: 
"Between War and Peace," F. B. Boeckel, Ch. on Tariffs. 

3. Tariffs and the "Profits" Motive in Economic Life: 
"Forty Years After," Pius XI. National Catholic Welfare 

Conference. 
4. Pre-War Tariff Policy and the Outbreak of Hostilities: 

"Outlines of Economics," R. T. Ely, p. 371. 
5. Application of Ethical Principles to Tariff Problems. 

"International Ethics," John A. Ryan, C. A. I. P., p. 17. 
6. Relation of the Tariff to Agriculture. 

Lesson III 
THE TARIFF IN THE POST-WAR WORLD AND ITS 

INTERNATIONAL ASPECT (Text—Section n , 4-5) 
T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. Secure two maps, one of Europe before the war and the other 
of Europe after the Peace Treaties. Note: (a) Changes in national 
boundary lines; (b) New relation of industrial to agricultural areas. 

2. With the aid of statistical tables impinge on this map walls, in 
the shape of building blocks, to represent the number and intensity of 
customs barriers. Note how the movement has been accelerated in the 
past three years. 

3. The psychology of tariff retaliation. 
4. The value of the tariff as a bargaining instrument. 
5. The effect of tariffs on the world price level. 

Q U E S T I O N S 

1. Why has Czechoslovakia weathered the economic depression bet-
ter than the other Succession States of Central Europe? 

2. Did the findings of the World Economic Conference, 1927, influ-
ence subsequent tariff legislation? 

3. How has the trade of Spain, France and Italy been affected by 
tariff reprisals? 

4. Is the peace of the world seriously jeopardized by extreme tariff 
policies? 



46 Tariffs and World Peace 

5. Do the nations, as has been stated, actually "grow rich together" 
or "grow poor together?" In what sense? 

P A P E R S 

1. "Interests Do Not Unite Men; They Divide Them" (Woodrow 
Wilson): 

"Can Europe Keep the Peace?" F. Simonds. 
2. Relation of the Tariff to World Peace: 

"Causes of War," Parker T. Moon, p. 8. C. A. I. P. 
3. How Do "Import Quotas" Differ from Ordinary Tariff Sched-

ules?: 
"Shall International Trade Be Stifled?" Foreign Policy Asso-

ciation Information Service, June 2, 1932. 

Lesson IV 
AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION: THE HAWLEY-SMOOT TARIFF 

(Text—Section III) 
T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. Goods and services vs. gold payments. 
2. Increase in unemployment and the tariff. ! 
3. Default: Its repercussions on foreign trade. 

Q U E S T I O N S 
1. How many nations lodged formal protests against the proposed 

changes? How many adapted their own tariff policy to the new rates? 
With what effects on the export trade of the United States? 

2. What are the mlore important "invisible items" in the balance of 
trade? Were these in any way affected by the Hawley-Smoot tariff? 

3. Can the Ottawa Agreements be traced, in part, to the tariff policy 
of the United States? 

4. What are the pertinent counsels of Pius X I with respect to "the 
barriers to international trade?" 

P A P E R S 

1. The Depression, Aggravated by Tariff Policy, Becomes World-
wide: 

"Protection Run Wild; European Symposium," The Living 
Age, Aug. 1, 1930. 

"Tariffs and Economic Recovery," Joseph F. Thorning, S.J. 
America, May 30, 1931. 

2. Foreign Investments and the Tariff: 
"Recovery, the Second Effort," Sir Arthur Salter. 

3. Unemployment and the Tariff: 
"The Hawley-Smoot Tariff," Percy W. Bidwell, Annalist, 

June 27, 1930. 
Lesson V 

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE (Text—Section IV) 

T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. Background of the World Economic Conference (1927). 



47 Tariffs and World Peace 

2. Types of tariff agreements. 
3. Lessons of the industrial crisis and financial panic. 
4. The need of new leadership. 
5. Paramount Christian principles. 

Q U E S T I O N S 

1. Are the resolutions of the World Economic Conference (1927) 
still valid ? How may they be put into operation ? 

2. Have tariff wars accelerated or retarded the forces of depression? 
3. Why do politicians in the various countries pay only lip-service to 

the need of tariff revision? 
PAPERS 

1. Economic Justice and Leadership: 
"Economic Disarmament," John Carter, Commonweal, October 

23, 1929. 
"The United States in World Affairs," Walter Lippmann. 

2. Lessons of the Depression: 
"Recovery: The Second Effort," Sir Arthur Salter. 

3. An Ethical Interpretation: 
"The Christian Social Manifesto," Joseph Husslein, S.J., 

Ch. VIII. 
Lesson VI 

METHODS OF REFORM (Text—Section V) 

T O P I C S FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. The "new deal" in world tariff policy. 
2. The elimination of embargoes and "quotas." 
3. America's opportunity and obligation. 
4. The world at the crossroads. 

Q U E S T I O N S 

1. Is the method of bargaining with each country independently 
sufficient ? 

2. How would international wage and working-hour agreements 
help the scheme? 

3. How can "log-rolling" be obviated in drawing up the next tariff 
bill? 

4. Are certain groups and interests bound to suffer in the change? 

P A P E R S 

I . Economic Isolation: 
"International Relations," R. L. Buell, Ch. VI, Economic In-

ternationalism. 
2. Program of the Forthcoming World Economic Conference: 

"The Larger Issues," Charles Merz, N. Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1932. 
3. Reform: A Matter of the Educated Conscience: 

"The Christian Way to Peace," N. C. W. C. Joint Committee 
oh Peace, 1929. 



T h e Catholic A s s o c i a t i o n f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e 

Honorary President 
M O S T R E V . T H O M A S F . L I L L I S , D . D . 

P A R K E R T . M O O N , President 

Vice Presidents 

M R S . W I L L I A M J . B U S H E A 

M A R I E J . CARROLL 

M I C H A E L F . D O Y L E 

A N N A D I L L GAMBLE 

FREDERICK P . K E N K E L 

R E V . J O H N LAFARGE, S . J . 

R E V . L I N U S A . L I L L Y , S J . 

R E V . ROBERT E . L U C E Y 

HERBERT W R I G H T 

R E V . FRANCIS J . HAAS, Ex-Officio 
M A R I E R . MADDEN, Treasurer 
ELIZABETH B . S W E E N E Y , Executive Secretary 

C O M M I T T E E S 

Ethics—REV. J O H N A . R Y A N , Chairman 
Law and Organization^-CHARLES G . F E N W I C K , Chairman 
Economic Relations—PARKER T . M O O N , Chairman 
Agriculture—REV. EDGAR SCHMIEDELER, O . S . B . , Chairman 
Historical—WILLIAM. F . R O E M E R , Chairman 
Education—REV. J O H N R . HACAN, Chairman 
National Attitudes—CARLTON J . H . H A Y E S , Chairman 
U. S. Dependencies—WILLIAM F . MONTAVON, Chairman 
Latin America—REV. R . A . M C G O W A N , Chairman 
Europe—REV. J O S E P H F . T H O R N I N G , S . J . , Chairman 
Asia—ELIZABETH M . L Y N S K E Y , Chairman 



THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNA-TIONAL PEACE has grown out of a series of meetings 
during 1926-1927. Following the Eucharistic Congress in Chi-
cago in 1926, representatives of a dozen nations met with 
Americans for discussion. In October of the same year a 
meeting was held in Cleveland where a temporary organization 
called the Catholic Committee on International Relations was 
formed. The permanent name, The Catholic Association for 
International Peace, was adopted at a two-day Conference in 
Washington in 1927. Annual Conferences were held in the 
same city in 1928, 1929, 1930 and 1933; in New York City, 
1931; and in Cleveland, 1932. All-day regional Conferences 
took place in Chicago on Armistice Day, 1930, and in St. Louis 
on Washington's Birthday, 1932. I t is a membership organiza-
tion. Its objects and purposes are: 

To study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and 
Christian charity to international problems of the day; 

To consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may 
be proposed or advocated in the international sphere; 

To examine and consider issues which bear upon international 
goodwill; y 

To encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study 
circles; 

To issue reports on questions of international importance; _ 
To further, in cooperation with similar Catholic organizations in 

other countries, in accord with the teachings of the1,Church, the 
object and purposes of world peace and happiness. 

The ultimate purpose is to promote, in conformity with the mind 
of the Church, "the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ." 

The Association works through the preparation of com-
mittee reports. Following careful preparation, these are dis-
cussed both publicly and privately in order to secure able re-
vision and they are then published by the organization. Ad-
ditional committees will be created from time to time. The 
Association solicits the membership and cooperation of Cath-
olics of like mind. I t is seeking especially the membership and 
cooperation of those whose experience and studies are such 
that they can take part in the preparation of committee re-
ports. 

The Committees on Ethics, Law and Organization, and 
Economic Relations serve as a guiding committee on the par-
ticular questions for all other committees. Questions involving 
moral judgments must be submitted to the Committee on 
Ethics. 



Publications of the Catholic Associa-
tion for International Peace 

P a m p h l e t Series-— 
No. 1—International Ethics. 
No. 2—Latin America and the United States. 
No. 3—Causes of War, and Security, Old and New. 
No. 4—Haiti, Past and Present. 
No. 5—Francis de Vitoria. 
No. 6—American Agriculture and International Affairs. 
No. 7—Porto Rico and the United States. 
No. 8—Europe and the United States—Elements in Their 

Relationship. 
No. 9—The Ethics of War. 
No. 10—National Attitudes in Children. 
No. 11—Tariffs and World Peace. 

M i s c e l l a n e o u s S e r i e s — 
League of Nations in Its First Decade. 
The World State. 
Permanent Peace Program of Pope Benedict XV. 
Appeals for Peace of Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI. 
Peace Trends. 

R e p o r t s i n P r e p a r a t i o n — 
American Intervention in Santo Domingo. 
Manchuria—The Problem in the Far East. 
Is War Justifiable Today? 
Disarmament. 
The Church and Peace Efforts. 
The World Court. 
International Cultural Relations. 
Peace Education. 
So-called "Over-Population." 
Catholicism—the Keynote of Pan-Americanism. 
French-Italian Relations. 

N. C. W . C. J o i n t C o m m i t t e e o n P e a c e -
The Christian Way to Peace. 
Peace Statements of Recent Popes.