CATHolic 4isociftn oiJ 
-foiz. í m t a j u p e f t c e 

M ^ M C + t ü i e . t / 1 - P A M P H L E T N O . 12 

M a n c h u r i a 
T H E P R O B L E M I N T H E F A R E A S T 

Elizabeth M. Lynskey, Ph.D. 
and 

Asia Committee 

I — I N T R O D U C T I O N 

I I — T H E M A N C H U R I A N P R O B L E M 
1. G E O G R A P H I C A L B A C K G R O U N D 
2. H I S T O R I C A L B A C K G R O U N D 
3. M A N C H U K U O 
4. W O R L D I N T E R E S T 
5. T H E E X P L A N A T I O N S 
6. E C O N O M I C I S S U E S 
7. N A T I O N A L P O L I C I E S 
8. E V E N T S O F 1 9 3 2 A N D 1 9 3 3 

I I I — C O N C L U S I O N 
1. G E N E R A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S 
2. T H E L Y T T O N R E P O R T 
3. I N T E R N A T I O N A L E C O N O M I C S A N C T I O N S 

A Report of the Asia Committee 
P R I C E 10 C E N T S 

T H E C A T H O L I C A S S O C I A T I O N F O R 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E 

1312 M a s s a c h u s e t t s A v e n u e N . W . 
W a s h i n g t o n , D . C. 

1934 



J 1 H A N K S for the issuance of this R e p o r t 
are due to Seton H i l l College, Greens-

burg, Pennsylvania, in response t o the H o l y 
Father's appeal, "May t h e y all unite in the 
peace of Christ in a full concord of t h o u g h t s 
and emotions, of desires and prayers of 
d e e d s and w o r d s — t h e spoken word, the 
written word, the printed word—and then an 
a t m o s p h e r e of g e n u i n e peace, w a r m i n g and 
beneficent, will e n v e l o o all the world " 



MANCHURIA 

THE PROBLEM IN THE FAR EAST 

Study Presented 

to 

The Catholic Association for International Peace 

by 

The Asia Committee 

P B I C E 1 0 C E N T S 

T H E C A T H O L I C A S S O C I A T I O N F O R 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E 

1312 M a s s a c h u s e t t s A v e n u e N . W . 

W a s h i n g t o n , D . C. 

T h e Paulist Press 
401 West 59th Street 

New York City 



+ 

' I 'HIS is a Report of the Committee on Asia of 
The Catholic Association for International Peace 

and is being issued as a Study from this Commit-
tee. It was presented and discussed at the regular 
annual meeting of the organization. The Commit-
tee cooperated in the final form of the Report and 
the passages involving moral judgments were pre-
sented to the members of the Ethics Committee for 
its consideration. It was presented to the Execu-
tive Committee which ordered it published. As the 
process indicates, this Report, being the report only 
of a Committee, is not a statement from the whole 
Association. 

A S I A C O M M I T T E E 

Chairman 
E L I Z A B E T H M . L Y N S K E Y , P H . D . 

R E V . GREGORY FEIGE 

D . L . MAYNARD GRAY 

R E V . W I L L I A M S . KRESS, M . M . 

M A R Y T . LOUGHLIN 

R E V . C . E . L Y N C H , S . J . 

R E V . CHARLES H . M C K E N N A , O . P . 

R I G H T R E V . J O H N A . R Y A N 

R E V . E D M U N D A . W A L S H , S J . 
M A R Y J . W O R K M A N 

Deaeftfiffed 



T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 

P A G E 

I—INTRODUCTION — - — - — - — 5 

II—THE MANCHURIAN PROBLEM r ~_ 7 
1. Geographical Background 1 — 7 
2. Historical Background =e 8 

3. Manchukuo — — " 
4. World Interest — : — 2 0 

5. The Explanations —— 22 
6. Economic Issues _ | 24 

a. Banditry ^ | — | — 24 
b. Weak Government —. , 25 
c. Boycott —i— 28 
d. Trade _ — - — - 3 1 

1. China and Japan — 31 
2. Manchuria — —* 33 

e. Railroads ——— 35 
f. Land Ownership :— 38 
g. Population k : —— 39 

7. National Policies 40 
a. General ^ : — 4 0 

b. The United States 41 
c. Russia ^ — 43 
d. Japan —-— : — 45 
e. Collective Agreements — 47 

8. Events of 1932 and 1933 -, — 49 
III—CONCLUSION 51 

1. General Considerations 51 
2. The Lytton Report S -—— 54 
3. International Economic Sanctions — 57 

IV—BIBLIOGRAPHY — 64 

V—N. C. W. C. STUDY OUTLINE 67 





Criecfem 

INTRODUCTION 
I N the late spring of 1931 a group of Chinese soldiers came 

upon several Japanese soldiers traveling in one of the unex-
plored portions of Inner Mongolia under false passports. Their 
leader, Captain Nakamura, was ostensibly an agricultural ex-
pert. Actually it is believed he and his companions were en-
gaged in exploring the country for signs of mineral wealth or 
for strategic war information. Soon, when he did not return, 
a search was instigated, resulting in the finding of his mutilated 
body and those of his attendants. The government of Japan 
promptly asked an explanation of the Mukden government of 
Manchuria.1 

Manchurian authorities investigated and reported that the 
officer had been shot by regular Manchurian army forces. By 
this time, the Japanese army, discovering that the travelers be-
longed to their military forces, insisted that this fact made the 
Chinese attack more indefensible and that the Japanese gov-
ernment must publish the real identity of the victims. This at 
once revealed the subterfuge of the falsified passports.2 The 
Japanese newspapers began to magnify the "offense" of the 
Manchurian forces. When Japan asked Manchuria for satis-
faction, its government under Chang Hsueh-liang expressed its 
regret and its willingness to make redress. On September 18, 
1931, the Chinese government in Mukden so notified the Japan-
ese consul there. 

That very night of September, 1931, came a much disputed 
"raid" which began the present strife. It may be mere coinci-
dence that the "attack" came when it did, after the Manchurian 
government had accepted full responsibility for the Nakamura 
incident; but there is real significance in the fact that Captain 
Nakamura was employed in some mysterious study of the inte-
rior of Inner Mongolia. 

1The Chinese have a theory of responsibility similar to that of the 
American government, Where redress for injury to foreigners must be 
sought from provincial governors rather than from the central govern-
ment, so that Japan was merely following customary procedure in 
asking information and, later, redress from Mukden rather than from 
Nanking. It is, however, clear that such a request can also mean that 
Japan did not recognize China's authority in the matter, which would 
be tantamount to saying that Manchuria was politically independent of 
China. This was not said, however, at that time. 

2Under treaty terms educators and business men are entitled to travel 
where this officer, traveling in his true capacity, would not have been 
permitted to go. 

S 



6 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 6 

Behind this incident and behind all the trouble between 
China, Japan and Russia in the Far East lies rivalry for control 
of economic riches, together with a fundamental difference in 
attitude on land policies and opposing methods of meeting the 
differences. To explain further, some analysis of the geography 
and past history of Manchuria and of economic issues is neces-
sary. 

T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N , 1 9 3 3 



I I 
T H E M A N C H U R I A N P R O B L E M 

1. GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 

Manchuria, the "Northeastern Provinces" of China, borders 
on Russian Siberia, lies to the north of Korea and is a short sea 
away from Japan. It embraces an area of about one-twelfth 
the extent of the entire United States. Northwest, north and 
southeast lie mountain ranges. To its southwest, an open plain 
permits relatively easy access into China. More than 28 mil-
lion or nearly 97 per cent of its 29 to 30 million persons are 
Chinese of various origins. About 800,000 are Koreans, and 
about 250,000 are Japanese. The majority live in little village 
communities and many in small organized colonies. There are, 
however, several large cities (Mukden, with a population of 
about 250,000; Kirin, with 80,000; Tsitsihar, with between 
25,000 and 30,000; Harbin, in North Manchuria, with a large 
Russian population, of 365,000) and three growing seacoast 
cities. Altogether for the three provinces, Kirin, Liaoning 
(Fengtien) and Heilungkiang, there is an average of 76 per-
sons per square mile, about the population density of Russia.3 

A number of rivers are used for navigation in summer and 
for sleds in winter. One system ends in the north Pacific at the 
seasonally ice-bound Siberian port of Nicolaevsk; another is 
part of the same system. The Tumen, emptying into the Sea of 
Japan at a point halfway between the Russian port of Vladi-
vostok and Korea's growing port of Seishin, is Manchuria's 
border and outlet to the sea on the east. The chief southerly 
flowing streams drain the southern Manchurian plains and flow 
into the Gulf of Pechili. 

The outstanding seacoast towns are Antung, at the mouth 
of the river Yalu, and Hulutao, a port which Chinese capital-
ists have recently been trying to develop into a rival of Dairen. 
This latter city, though not technically in Manchuria, is, by 
virtue of its excellent harbor and shipping facilities, its major 
outlet and its chief import center.4 Manchurian trade has in-

8In the United States as a whole, including the desert spaces, there 
is a density of about 35 per square mile; but there is nothing in Man-
churia proper to compare with American cities unless it be Dairen, 
with a population of 298,667, which is, however, not in Manchuria, 
but in the Japanese leased zone. 

Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930, published by the 
South Manchuria Railway, Dairen, April, 1931, p. S. 

7 



8 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 8 

creased in the last twenty-odd years until in 1929 it amounted 
to one-fifth of the value of the entire trade of China.5 

Manchuria has great agricultural and mineral wealth. Al-
though even its southern climate is cold and the cold increases 
as one travels into the interior, the country raises large cereal 
crops during its short summers. Over half of its agricultural 
export consists of soya beans and bean products, which go prin-
cipally to Japan and China, but also to Italy, Belgium, Holland 
and the Balkan States. Millet and rice are also grown. The 
mineral assets, though valuable, are still unknown, principally 
because the mountain terrain has not been explored or ex-
ploited. 

The actual amount, however uncertain, of the natural 
wealth, in or near Manchuria, is without question immense. 
Eighty per cent of the world's known supply of antimony is 
concentrated in North China and Manchuria; and 90 per cent 
of the antimony output is used in the United States. More 
than half of the world's supply of tungsten, used for steel 
manufacture, is found in Inner Mongolia and Western China; 
and of this supply the United States uses more than half. Man-
churia has the largest single coal deposit in the world and the 
collieries there of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Rail-
way produced almost eight million tons of coal and coal by-
products in 1929, at a profit of 16 per cent on their investment.6 
In a shale oil bed above these coal reserves lie an estimated 
5,300,000,000 tons of oil. There are probably vast reserves of 
iron, copper and gold undiscovered in Manchuria and many 
known sources of wealth as yet undeveloped. 

2 . HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

Manchuria is of considerable importance in the history of 
the Far East. Early migrations brought nomad tribes into 
Manchuria and through Manchuria into China; and from the 
Manchus who settled in this northern area came the conquerors 
who ruled China from 1644-1911. Their leaders retained their 

6IncIuding domestic trade, according to the same source. Accounts 
vary somewhat. Manchurian customs dues formed over 13 per cent of 
the customs revenue of China in 1931. Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry, p. 104. 

«See Second Report on Manchwrim Progress, to 1930 cit DD 
118-121. » • w -



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 9 

own organization in the home provinces. Manchuria was loose-
ly organized into what was called the Three Eastern Provinces, 
each under a provincial governor, who exercised great personal 
power and joined in a weak but legal union with the Manchu 
dynasty at the Chinese capital. 

Western states first showed their interest in the unexplored 
wealth of Manchuria at the end of the Sino-Japanese war. 
Japan secured from China the cession of the Liaotung penin-
sula, Formosa and the Pescadores islands, as well as the ac-
knowledgment of the independence of Korea. Russia, Ger-
many and France thereupon sent letters "recommending" that 
the Liaotung peninsula be returned to China, theoretically be-
cause this cession raised doubt over the nature of Korean inde-
pendence and presaged Japanese opposition to China within 
striking distance of the capital, but actually because it inter-
fered with their own plans for contracts and concessions. Japan 
followed the "advice" but did not forget the setback. 

Russia soon made a treaty of alliance with China directed 
against Japan (the Li-Lobanov convention). In return, in a 
separate railway agreement, China awarded a Russian bank, in 
which French capital was interested, a contract to construct a 
railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok (1896). State lands 
necessary for the line were to be freely turned over to the rail-
way, and private lands (likewise necessary) rented or else freed 
from individual ownership by a single payment. A railway zone 
was created which Russia might guard. The company lands 
were exempted from taxation; but it was provided that the 
Chinese government might buy the railroad at the end of 36 
years by repaying the "capital involved," debts, and interest 
on debts. There was, however, in the same article of the agree-
ment a provision whose meaning is contested by Russia, China 
and Japan: "The Company will have the absolute and exclu-
sive right of administration of this land."7 

In the spring of 1898, China further granted Russia a 25-
year lease of the Liaotung peninsula, together with the right to 
build, fortify and defend a harbor; and for the next six years 
Russia pursued a shifting, dubious and intricate policy in Man-
churia and Korea. Trouble soon arose between Russia and 
Japan over timber contracts in Korea and over Russian delay 

7See C. W. Young, The International Relations of Manchuria, pp. 
17-24. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 10 

in withdrawing troops from Manchurian regions after the Boxer 
Rebellion in China.8 Japan promptly disputed the growth of 
Russian interests in the Liaotung peninsula and the valleys of 
Manchuria, and by the treaties with Russia and with China at 
the close of that war obtained most of the Russian concessions, 
somewhat enlarged, and shared others. Under the treaties of 
1915 resulting from the Twenty-one Demands,9 Japan extended 
the time limits of all her major concessions and obtained fur-
ther rights. From that day to this, all three powers have had 
an active interest in Manchuria. That of other Occidental 
powers has steadily increased. 

Since the fall of the Chinese Empire in 1911, the Man-
churian provinces, though recognized as part of China, have 
had little formal connection with the republican governments. 
A loose union between them was symbolized by the fact that 
the Manchurian war-lord, Chang Tso-lin, and his son, Chang 
Hsueh-liang, who succeeded him, bore the title of Marshal of 
Chinese armies and spent their time between Peiping and Muk-
den; they also collected and administered some revenues of 
these territories. The customs and postal dues were collected 
by national officers and transmitted to Nanking. Of the funds 
collected by the Salt Administration, the greater part was re-
tained by Chang Hsueh-liang. Meanwhile, the interests of 
both China and Japan in the area increased apace. There was 
much jockeying for power and prestige, recurrent violence, and 
on several occasions, imminent danger of extended warfare. . 

This smouldering resentment flared out on September 18, 
1931. It is not yet clear how or why the first incident took 
place. The Japanese say that Chinese "irregular" army forces 
attacked the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway line, 
i. e., that an irresponsible Chinese force tore up several feet of 
rails. The Chinese assert the "attack" was instigated or 
"fabricated" by the Japanese army as an excuse for resort-
ing to force. Whatever the immediate cause may have been, 
later events are clear. Within 24 hours of the outbreak, 
a small Japanese force, almost without bloodshed, had cap-
tured Mukden, the capital city of the province of Liaoning 
(Fengtien), Manchuria, and with it an arsenal containing arms 

8See Morse and MacNair, cit., passim, or any modern history of the 
Far East. 

8See p. 22, footnote 30, and p. 39. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 11 

and ammunition of a value estimated variously at between one 
and two hundred million dollars. Shortly thereafter, similar 
small forces of Japanese took over control of cities, towns or 
bridges at points on the railway which they said were in danger 
of attack and sent armed detachments into the territory be-
yond the "railway zone." Thereafter they also invested 
Newchwang, Changchun, the northernmost end of the Japa-
nese-owned railway, and also on November 18, 1931, Tsitsihar, 
an industrial town and railway center northwest of Harbin. 
Operations were further extended east and west of the railway 
in the face of increasing question and protest from China, 
Great Britain, the United States of America, and the League 
of Nations. In the last week of 1931 and the first of 1932, 
Japanese forces invested Chinchow, a city not technically in 
Manchuria, but close to the old Chinese Wall, and perilously 
close to Peiping, the old capital, and Tientsin, the northern 
center of commerce in China. Both Great Britain and the 
League of Nations had asked them not to enter Chinchow. 
Since that time, additional Japanese forces have consolidated 
these gains, have occupied Harbin, and have moved, more 
slowly because of the absence of railways, eastward to the 
Gulf of Tartary and the Sea of Japan. Japanese armies, in-
creased from 12,000 to an estimated force of 45,000 or more, 
are now in possession of the major cities and railway lines of 
the whole region.10 

The earliest explanations for the violence of Japanese action 
were those of the military officers of Japan in Manchuria. 
These officers are politically responsible not to the civil arm of 
the Japanese government, but solely to the Emperor. They 
first charged the Chinese with violation of treaty rights and 
alleged the necessity of protecting the Japanese Railway Zone 
from the raids of irresponsible Chinese soldiers, not properly 
disciplined by their commanders. . Before long it became visible 
that the chief Chinese commander at whom the Japanese were 
aiming their charges was the Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang (who 
recently changed his name to Chang H s i a o - l i a n g ) l i k e his 
father, the real governor of Manchuria. There has been much 
discussion of his part in the subsequent difficulties. 

He succeeded his father when the latter was assassinated by 
i°See p. 37. Also Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 77-83. 
^New York Times, July 17, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 12 

an unknown assailant in June, 1928. This act was attributed 
by the Japanese to Chinese patriots, as vengeance for his "pro-
Japanese" policy. Chinese sources maintain that the assassina-
tion was at the hands of Japanese agents for turning toward a 
"pro-Chinese" policy. Between these two diametrically op-
posed statements it will probably be impossible to determine 
the truth. 

The young Marshal was commonly believed to have stronger 
Chinese sympathies than had his father. Yet when it became 
certain that Japanese forces would invest Chinchow, he re-
tired from the command of the remaining Chinese forces north 
of the Great Wall and turned over his right of control to his 
uncle, his father's brother, Chang Tso-hsiang, with whom the 
Japanese seemed to arrive at a rapid understanding. By so 
doing, young Marshal Chang saved himself and his uncle from 
the "loss of face" attending a defeat, and at the same time could 
be interpreted to be Japanese in sympathy. Such action has 
many precedents in Chinese military history; commanders have 
often without bloodshed transferred large bodies of troops from 
one side to the other to obtain power and vantage. In China 
such tactics are often considered wise and a credit to the 
warrior. 

Meanwhile, the Japanese cabinet was having a difficult time 
explaining to the League of Nations, the United States and 
other powers, why force was being used. Russia, though tak-
ing no open interest, was thought to be acting secretly, but on 
which side it was not clear. The League of Nations was first 
to act. 

Within 24 hours after the outbreak of violence on the 
South Manchuria Railway, the Japanese representative on 
the Council of the League reported that his government had 
taken "all possible measures to insure that this local incident 
should not lead to any more serious complications." There is 
some evidence of a difference in opinion between the Japanese 
civil leaders in Tokyo and the Japanese military heads in Man-
churia, although both groups would readily include Japanese 
seizure of Manchurian towns and railway points as among the 
"possible measures." Three days later (September 21, 1931), 
the Chinese government invoked the aid of the League. 

The League was uninformed of the attitude of the United 
States, the state most affected by this crisis because of its ex-



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 13 

tensive trade and financial relations with Japan and its long 
tradition of supporting the national integrity of China and 
equality of trading rights. For a few days the League Council 
contented itself with "hearing with satisfaction" the Japanese 
assurance that efforts were being made to maintain peace. The 
aid China invoked of the League could be, for example, an in-
quiry by the Council or its agents, or an invitation to submit 
the dispute to the Hague Arbitral Tribunal or to settlement 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice. The League, 
at that time, rejected the Chinese demand for a commission 
of inquiry, probably because it was uncertain of the American 
attitude. As time passed, however, with China repeating her 
demands, the Japanese denying that any "war" existed and 
American opinion clarifying, the League became more active. 
A resolution of September 30, 1931, asked the two parties, 
China and Japan, to settled the matter between themselves and 
this was followed by a request on October 22nd from the Coun-
cil to Japan to withdraw within the railway zone by the middle 
of November, when the Council would again meet. 

Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, consul-general of the United States 
at Geneva, participated informally with the League in the pro-
ceedings in the October meetings on the Far Eastern problem, 
and Secretary Stimson announced that the United States "act-
ing independently, . . . will endeavor to reinforce what the 
League does." While this formal isolation from League action 
was criticized by many who wished to see the United States 
take part in the discussion, it satisfied the opponents of the 
League in America and attained the end of common action. 
After exhausting debates and quibbles, the neutral members 
of the Council reaffirmed their earlier resolutions and "noted" 
that "both powers undertake to adopt all measures necessary 
to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to re-
frain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting 
and loss of life." It asked further information from all inter-
ested parties. 

Most important of all, the League created the commission 
of inquiry which it had earlier refused. This commission, ap-
pointed by the Council, consisted of five men, of whom the 
Earl of Lytton was elected chairman. The other members 
were Count Luigi Aldrovandi of Italy, Major General Frank R. 
McCoy of the United States, General Henri Claudel of France, 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 14 

and Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany. It was accompanied by 
Isaburo Yoshida of Japan and Dr. Wellington Koo of China 
as assessors and also by a number of men of wide experience 
in Far Eastern legal and economic affairs. After long debate, it 
was finally given authority sufficient to permit it to inquire 
into the events of the preceding and intervening months in 
Manchuria, and it was ordered to report back to the Council. 
Its work was, however, limited in scope, because any possible 
agreement arrived at independently between China and Japan 
was not within its powers of review. Japan, in consenting to 
the creation of this commission, made a definite reservation 
that the Imperial Army might be obliged to "start military 
operation against bandits . . . for the purpose of restoring peace 
and order." 

After some delay in appointing the commission and open 
Japanese opposition to its arrival via Russia or by airplane, 
this body set sail for Japan via the United States the last week 
in January, 1932. I t arrived in Japan the 29th of February, 
remained there twelve days, and visited high Imperial offi-
cials and industrial leaders in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka. It 
arrived in Shanghai March 14th, in time to get a direct view of 
the destruction wrought in that city by the Shanghai affair 
of February and March.12 From Shanghai it went north by 
slow stages, visiting Nanking en route. The new regime in 
Manchuria threatened to refuse admission to the Chinese ad-
viser, Dr. Koo, but Japanese officials nullified this decision, 
and promised that wherever Japanese troops were stationed, 
Dr. Koo would be safe. Members of the .commission pro-
ceeded from Peiping to Mukden by varying routes April 17th 
to 21st, and subsequently visited Changchun, early in May.' 
Here they met further obstacles; Russia refused to cooperate 
with information or facilities because Russia had not partici-
pated in its earlier activities; furthermore, the authorities of 
the Manchurian government wished to arrest Dr. Koo as a po-
litical agent of China. Again at Harbin, where the commis-
sion arrived May 9th, an access of police and military guard 
made the process of getting evidence difficult. After visiting 
many Manchurian cities, the commission revisited Japan early 
in June and returned thence to China, where its report was 
written. 

12See p. 49. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East IS 

3 . M A N C H U K U O 

Before the League commission had reached Tokyo, the face 
of matters in Manchuria had changed. Even before Chinchow 
was entered, interviews were given out by Japanese officers in 
Manchuria concerning the creation of a "separate state." As 
early as November 10, 1931, Japanese officials announced the 
erection of a new civilian administration at Mukden. During 
the following months, plans were formed and put into effect for 
changes in the regimes of the three provinces. Conferences of 
war-lords from the three Manchurian provinces took place in 
Mukden during January with representatives present from 
Jehol and other parts of Inner Mongolia. February 13th (the 
day the League commission sailed from San Francisco), the 
new minister of war in the Japanese cabinet gave an interview 
in Tokyo outlining the new state to be created under the "posi-
tive support" of Japan. Four days later, reporters learned 
from "semi-official Japanese sources" (members of the diplo-
matic corps at Shanghai) that the governors of all the provinces 
were to confer to found a. new state, which would have, it was 
said, a written democratic constitution, a perfected judicial 
system, a policy of friendly political relations and an Open 
Door to commercial relations.13 

Four days later the deed was done. Though the personnel 
of the new governments in the provinces was not complete, the 
"big five" of Mukden,14 with other "Manchurian leaders," at-
tended a banquet with Japanese generals in celebration of the 
erection of a new Manchurian regime. A Northeastern Execu-
tive Council consisting of leaders of the four provinces came 
into existence to act as a Manchurian central government. It 
created a flag from a combination of Chinese bars and the 
Japanese rising run. It laid down five fundamental principles: 
" ( a ) a popular sovereignty; (b) the autonomy of the State; 
(c) equality of races; (d) cooperation among racial elements; 
and (e) maintenance of the Open Door policy of equality of 
opportunity to all."15 

The first name considered for the new state was "Ankuo," 
1 3 The Open Door as here used should not be confused with the orig-

inal meaning of the "Open Door" in American policy. See below, p. 41. 
14Tsang Shih-yi, Hsi, Hsia, Chang Ching-hui, Chao Hsin-po, Ma 

Chan-shan. 
15Neu/ York Times, February 18, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 16 

which signifies "land of peace," but Manchukuo, "land of the 
Manchus" soon took the place of the more idyllic term.16 The 
announcement of the formation of Manchukuo was drafted by 
the mayor of Mukden, believed to be a loyal friend of Japan. 
The declaration of independence was signed by the Governor 
of Fengtien, the Governor of Kirin, the Governor of Heilung-
kiang, the Governor of Jehol, together with two Mongolian 
princes and General Ma Chan-shan, the chief remaining war-
lord of Manchuria, who had supported the Chinese cause in 
1931." Meeting on February 20th, the same committee selected 
Henry Pu Yi, "the boy Emperor of China," a Manchu prince 
deposed as emperor since 1911, with the ambiguous title of 
Gensu, or chief officer of the new state, and at the same time 
declared that Changchun should be the new capital. That all 
these arrangements were simply the fulfillment of old plans be-
came clear when on the same day, Japanese officials in Shang-
hai, many miles away, declared that Manchukuo would assume 
its share of China's debt, but would immediately establish a 
new and independent customs service and tariff system.18 

The committee postponed for a few days a meeting at 
Changchun to elect the members of the new government. Many 
minor officials, already appointed, albeit informally, were al-
ready acting in official capacities. On February 24th, General 
Ma Chan-shan took over the chairmanship of the Heilungkiang 
Provincial Government as an agent of the new regime. The 
Japanese commanders who had banqueted in Mukden witnessed 
an exclusive inauguration March 9, 1932, when Henry Pu Yi 
was inducted into the duties of his new office at Changchun, 
henceforth named Hsinching. Japanese soldiers lined thé 
streets for the ceremonies. While the installation ceremonies 
were under way, Mukden witnessed an outbreak of rioting. 
Chinese insurgent soldiers in small groups continued to attack 
the South Manchuria Railway line at various points. 

The government of Manchukuo was organized into legis-
lative, executive, inspection, and judicial branches. The execu-
tive, however, consisted of two separate bodies. One, the cabi-
net, also called Council of State, was to have a premier and 
nine other members, heads of departments. These officers, 

la"Tatung"—the Great Unity—was discussed. 
™New York Times, February 19, 1932. About two months later 

General Ma withdrew. 
1 8 No attempt was made to fulfill this prophecy for several weeks. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 17 

however, were purely administrative and could make no exer-
cise of "discretionary power."19 The second body of the execu-
tive department was to be the Board of General Affairs, which 
alone had power to make decisions on matters of policy, per-
sonnel, or the budget. This board was to consist of a presi-
dent and six bureau chiefs, none of them Manchurian or Chi-
nese but all of them Japanese.20 Inasmuch as almost all mat-
ters of any importance in government can be brought under 
policy, personnel, and the budget, it is obvious that Japan con-
trols Manchukuo directly. By the last of April, more than 
600 Japanese "advisers" were at work in Manchukuo and 
Japanese interpreters attended every interview given by major 
officials. 

The new government under its seven Japanese guides 
promptly tried to secure recognition of its so-called "inde-
pendence." It formally notified the Chinese authorities,21 the 
League of Nations, and the states of the world, of its new 
position, and formally asked recognition, which so far it has 
not received except from Japan. I t enlarged its staff of Japa-
nese officers. I t set about negotiating a loan of 20,000,000 
yen (about $10,000,000 at normal exchange rates) from Japan; 
and almost the first act of its new chief was to ask the assist-
ance of Japan in "suppressing irregular forces" of the Chinese 
army in his new domain. Manchukuo has further been con-
sidering a variety of plans for bringing Japanese colonists in 
well-organized groups, a form of mass immigration. The new 
government at once began to examine currency and tariff ques-
tions, preparatory to disestablishing the Chinese customs service 
at Manchurian harbors, and to confiscating its revenues, par-
ticularly those from the Salt Gabelle, for the public purposes 
of Manchukuo. This at once brought it into open conflict with 
the government at Nanking. 

The government of China has flatly refused from the be-
19The details given above are taken from a review by Hugh Byas 

in the New York Times, May 8, 1932, of an article by Major Tadashi 
Hanaya, an officer of the Japanese General Staff, in the Japanese eco-
nomic journal, the Diamond. They are supported by the Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry, pp. 97-107, in greater detail, particularly in 
regard to policy. 

20The titles of the six bureaus may reveal the nature of Japanese 
dominance; they are accounts, personnel, purchasing, legislative, statistics, 
and secretariat. 21Both the governments at Loyang and in Nanking then at odds. 



18 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 18 

ginning to recognize the validity of these proceedings Japan 
waited. In the middle of June, 1932, the Manchukuo govern-
ment announced that it would assume the "Manchurian share" 
of China's debt to foreign powers and that it would henceforth 
collect the customs revenue at Dairen, a Japanese territory 
leased from China, whose customs revenues had hitherto un-
der treaty terms, been sent to Shanghai. One purpose in Man-
chukuo s announcement became apparent a few days later 
Manchukuo dismissed the Salt tax, postal and customs officers 
of China, and also erected its own office at Dairen; whereupon 
the Japanese said this action was of no inteiest to Japan The 
Japanese Chargé d'Affaires in Peiping suggested to the repre-
sentatives of the foreign powers that the Manchurian customs 
could be used to meet the Manchurian share of Chinese debt 
services. The Japanese hinted that this plan might not be "en-
tirely consonant with Manchurian claims to independence "22 
whereas the fact is that entirely the contrary is plausible. For 
if Manchukuo were legally permitted to take over Chinese cus-
toms and debt services, it would seem that she would have es-
tablished a good claim to an independent legal existence as a 
recognized and functioning economic entity, a free and separate 
state. From beginning to end, the manner of creatin g Manchu-
kuo is strongly reminiscent of how Japan obtained by force 
and diplomacy the independence of Korea, which she later 
annexed.23 

Manchukuo was finally recognized as a separate state by 
Japan m a protocol" signed by Japanese and local representa-
tives in Changchun on September IS, 1932. The signing was 
preceded by a formal parade of Japanese armies, and the cere-
monies themselves were marked by such details of Japanese 
precedence as to indicate markedly the vassalage of Manchukuo 
to Japan. In the "protocol," which is to be followed by an "ex-
tensive ' economic treaty, the two "governments" agreed that-
(a) Manchukuo was to confirm all Japanese rights and inter-
ests, public or private, possessed "by virtue of Sino-Japanese 
treaties, agreements, or other arrangements, or through Sino-
Japanese contracts." This agreement goes far beyond the 

treaty rights oyer which Japan is quarreling with China. 
(b) Japan and Manchukuo would "cooperate in the mainte-

2-New York Times, June 23, 1932. 

, " F o r corroboration of this statement readers need only examine any 
detailed history of Korea, widely obtainable today. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 19 

nance of their national security, it being understood that such 
Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be 
stationed in Manchukuo." The Commander-in-Chief of the 
Japanese armies in Manchukuo said that henceforth Japan and 
Manchukuo "are bound to stand or fall together, never 
alienated."24 

Manchukuo promptly sent telegrams in its own name to the 
League of Nations, which ignored their arrival. Although its 
boundaries had not been declared, it was assumed in Tokyo 
that the recognition included Jehol with the Three Eastern 
Provinces, giving Manchukuo an area equal to almost 16 per 
cent of that of the continental United States. Of all nations 
invited to do so, only Russia accepted consuls from Manchu-
kuo, and a dispatch, significantly from Tokyo, on September 24, 
1932, asserts that such acceptance is de facto recognition. 

The establishment of the new state was not and is not at 
the present a peaceful proceeding, nor one tending to create an 
impression of local support. The Commission of Enquiry be-
lieved the independence movement not to be "genuine and 
spontaneous" and also to be lacking in local Chinese support.25 
There has been friction among the cabinet members, and be-
tween Henry Pu Yi and his Japanese advisers. There has been 
open revolt. Large remnants of the armies of Chang Hsiao-
liang, under capable heads, carried on sporadic attacks on the 
Japanese military defenders of Manchukuo. The only province 
which retained even comparative peace was that of Fengtien. 
Revolts broke out at many points in Kirin province during 
February and March, 1932. The subsequent guerilla warfare 
hindered the Japanese advance in that area, which lies directly 
north and northwest of Korea. Russia took an active interest 
in the eastward and northward movement of Japanese troops, 
and there have been many conflicting rumors concerning mass 
concentration of armies along the Siberian frontier. 

Meanwhile, the Japanese battle fleet began strange ma-
noeuvers in the Sea of Japan, and new Japanese troops "re-
placed" those which had hitherto borne the brunt of Man-
churian fighting. Foreign observers repeated to their govern-
ments that the strength of these new "brigades" was sufficient 
to rank them as "divisions."26 This information, combined 

24Hugh Byas, New York Times, September 16, 1932. 
25Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 97 and 111. 
™New York Times, March 11, 1932. 



20 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 20 

with the difficulty of getting any uncensored news while Japan 
controlled the available cable and radio lines, caused increased 
concern over Japan's purpose in the Far East; concern which 
the simultaneous heavy warfare at Shanghai only confirmed 
and magnified. Lieutenants of Chang Tso-hsiang, brother of 
Chang Tso-lin, joined the insurgents. Further revolts in Heil-
ungkiang province called General Ma Chan-shan, then Minister 
of War, back to Tsitsihar, and by March 23rd, Manchurian 
forces rose in revolt in Southwestern Kirin within 35 miles 
of Changchun. The Manchukuo government had already in-
vested and occupied the seaport of Hulutao, which China had 
been developing as a rival to the Japanese port of Dairen; but 
it had not assumed complete control of Inner Mongolia, where 
Chinese-Manchurian forces were restive. Japanese army lead-
ers used the word "bandits" for all these insurgent or "irreg-
ular forces," without distinguishing between them and the 
smaller groups of individuals outlawed for a variety of reasons, 
and living by occasional forays upon the settlements.27 Thé 
troubles have continued. 

4 . WORLD INTEREST 

- Fifty years ago such events in the Far East would have 
evoked little attention outside of the greater European powers, 
who would have sympathized with the professed motives of 
Japan and been eager to share in the fruits of territorial divi-
sion They had themselves taken under pressure of force a 
number of concessions in China, and were then rapidly divid-
ing Africa. Today is a different matter. Any modern power 
and especially the United States, must be interested in any 
matter which brings China and Japan to blows. Many states 
trade with both of the parties to the dispute and with Man-
churia, the contested area. Many powers have Asiatic pos-
sessions whose interests are tangled with those of the dis-
putants. Any conflict in the Far East inevitably drags in ques-
tions which vitally affect every other modern state.28 Ever 
since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 this fact has been 
corroborated by the conduct of the diplomats of all states. In 
the past twenty years, the world has also experienced a world-
wide war and witnessed the stress, disaster and suffering that 

2 7 For a discussion of "bandits" see p. 24. 
28See below, pp.. 40 ff. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 21 

follow the use of force in international disputes. World-wide 
attention was therefore at once awakened. In 24 hours after 
the outbreak, the Manchurian situation made the front page 
headlines. 

Any matter of common interest rising out of a quarrel be-
tween two parties can be settled in two. ways; by themselves 
or by the two interested parties with the support of others af-
fected by the dispute. Where force has been used by either 
party or both, and both are important countries, the participa-
tion of others is usually necessary to effect any settlement other 
than a fight to the finish. In this dispute force of a highly 
military character was already being used, and the only possi-
bility of avoiding general war lay in exercising international 
pressure to end the fighting, and to establish a diplomatic 
rather than a forced peace. 

To effect this diplomatic peace, the heads of modern states 
have an instrument lacking 20 years ago—the League of 
Nations, a body for settling international grievances without 
war, a body of which both China and Japan were members. 
The Covenant of the League does not outlaw war, nor even 
make its outbreak impossible. Under it, however, members are 
pledged "to respect and preserve as against external aggression 
the territorial integrity . . . " of all members of the League. If 
war or threat of war arises, three methods of settlement are 
possible: an inquiry by the Council; an arbitration procedure; 
or submission of a dispute to the World Court. In this case, 
China volunteered to submit to an international arbitration but 
Japan refused.29 The subject matter of the dispute may lie 
within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, of which both parties are also members, but to use 
this means of settlement both sides must voluntarily accept 
the jurisdiction of the Court. As this is a step further than 
simple arbitration, it has not been suggested for the present 
case. Under these circumstances a commission of inquiry was 
the only remaining means by which any agreement could be 
reached, and this commission was created under the League 
resolution of December 10,. 1931. The United States sup-
ported this move of the League, and had a member on the 

20Japan is one state which has never accepted an arbitration treaty 
of any sort, although there has recently been mention of negotiations to 
effect one between Japan and the Netherlands. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 22 

commission. Under the constitution of the League this com-
mission had to report within six months of the time of the sub-
mission of the dispute—by the summer of 1932. 

S. The Explanations 

Japan's explanation, which follows, is simple. China is un-
able to maintain order in Manchuria. She deliberately encour-
aged a boycott campaign against all Japanese activities and this 
violated the treaty rights of Japan, especially those gained after 
the Russo-Japanese War when China transferred to Japan the 
legal rights of Russia to railway leases and administration 
Furthermore, the "banditry" and boycott violate Japan's "spe-
cial position" of privilege in Manchuria, secured during the 
World War, as a result of the Twenty-one Demands.30 In 
these circumstances, Japan holds that she must defend her citi-
zens in the interest of the "sanctity of treaties." 

The specific terms of the Sino-Japanese treaties cover a 
number of economic questions. Article 5 of the contract for 
the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
in 1896 (later transferred to Japan) in part reads: "The Chi-
nese Government will take measures to assure the safety of the 
Railway and of the persons in its service against any attack." 
This, Japan asserts, has not been fulfilled. In supposedly "se-
cret protocols" connected with the Treaty of Peking between 
Japan and China, December 22, 1905, the Chinese government 
was "not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said 
railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to 
that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to 
the interest of the above-mentioned railway."31 These obliga-
tions, Japanese speakers declare, have been violated by the 

30For the circumstances surrounding these demands, readers may turn 
to any modem history of the Far East, preferably to more than one 
as they are written from .controversial points of view. 

3 ,These terms are quoted from the treaty published in the South 
Manchuria Railway Company's Second Report on Progress in Man-
churta to 1930 pp. 2S1-2. They are also to be found in MacMurray, 
ireaties, etc. It is interesting and illuminating to compare the accounts 
of the negotiations of this treaty in the Railway Report cited above 
pp. 39-46, with those of C. W. Young, The International Relations o'f 
Manchuria (1929), pp. 67-76, and Appendix B., pp. 2S8-26S The actual 
form of this agreement, oral "minutes" during the discussion of treaty 
terms, is revealed in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry p 44 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 23 

Chinese construction of the port of Hulutao and connecting rail-
way lines. The validity of these contentions will be discussed 
below.32 

China's answer to the Japanese assertions is that the inter-
pretation of treaties, rather than their "sanctity," is at stake. 
Some Chinese go further and say that a question of validity 
might be raised. The "secret protocols" were not in form a 
treaty.33 The Chinese further declare that a treaty obtained 
under duress, like that after the Twenty-one Demands, has rio 
moral validity. The signature of China to this document was 
obtained only under the threat of immediate war. This is an 
old Chinese argument and one recognized as valid in Catholic 
moral theology, but not generally recognized in international 
law. It is, however, considerably weakened by the Japanese 
counterclaim that the Japanese ultimatum was issued at the 
request of Chinese leaders, who reported they could not other-
wise accept the Japanese demands.34 Some Chinese leaders point 
out that even if these treaties were valid at their beginning, 
they were subject to prior international agreements concerning 
the Open Door, and modified by later ones; and that the Jap-
anese method of procedure by force is contrary to a number of 
international obligations also secured by treaty, to wit, her obli-
gations under the Covenant of the League, the Nine-Power and 
the Four-Power Treaties of the Disarmament Conference of 

32See p. 35 ff. 
33See C. W. Young, The International Relations of Manchuria, pp. 

18-25. ' ' 
34This 'assertion is found in the memoirs of Admiral Baron Kato, 

who conducted the Japanese negotiations. The author is now dead, and 
his assertion may be taken at its face value, or dismissed as propaganda. 
It is only fair to say that the use of force has frequently been a deciding 
factor in international dealings with China and that the desire to "save 
face" on one side or both has frequently led to misrepresentations and 
recriminations in negotiation with Oriental states. It is a factor which 
must be considered. It fundamentally affects the Chinese and also the 
Japanese concept of a treaty, making it an agreement between the groups 
temporarily in power rather than a binding agreement between perma-
nent political units. See Lattimore, op. cit., pp. 148-177. But thé 
Japanese have learned to use Occidental methods and phraseology even 
while the contents of their phrases are ambiguous, whereas the Chinese 
are still using the words and to some degree the methods of their Oriental 
past. Mr. Lattimore says these concepts are the result of historical and 
political age, and predicts that eventually when the Occidental world is 
sufficiently aged, these may become the methods of the West as well as 
of the East. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 24 

1921-1922, and the Keilogg-Briand Pact. This also is the at-
titude of the League of Nations and the United States.35 

To say the treaties are the cause of the conflict is to stop 
short of the truth. The contents of the treaties, the economic 
issues, are in dispute. 

6. Economic Issues 
a. Banditry. 

T h e first Japanese explanation for the use of force was 
Chinese failure to maintain civil order in Manchuria against 
bandits. Bandits are an old phenomenon in China, where 
refugees from flood and civil war as well as from the law have 
often sought the hills and lived by plunder and where, more re-
cently, soldier bands have wandered without responsible lead-
ers. These freebooters have usually traveled in groups of from 
five to twenty men. Some few larger units have had almost a 
military character. In China, where the police power lies in the 
local government rather than in the central government the 
local authorities have dealt with these "bandits" in two ways 
They have taken them into the local police force or paid them 
not to trouble the community. 
, There are many reasons for recent increases in banditry 
The greater part of the population of Manchuria consists of 
comparatively new immigrants from various provinces of China. 
Formerly, Manchurian bandits were native frontiersmen en-
gaged in forbidden occupations, hunting ginseng or rare furs 
or in the opium trade. Then banditry became the means of 
livelihood for numbers, of the agricultural population. Some 
were discouraged homesteaders who had deserted their hold-
ings. Others continued to work the land during the summer 
and turned bandit during the winter. Still others were small 
farmers dispossessed during periods of racial antagonism be-
tween Manchurians and Mongols, or Chinese, Koreans, and 
Japanese. Many thousands have become "bandits" during the 
present conflict. Many lived by being paid not to interfere 
rather than by interfering. Without doubt they were and are 
a great drain on trade. 

The term "bandits" as used officially by the Japanese might 
easily include members of the armies of Chang Hsueh-liang and 

3"See the policy of the United States and the League of Nations be-
low, p. 41 if. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 25 

his cooperating generals. Undoubtedly the internal struggle 
between leaders to govern China still further disarranged the 
orderly life of Manchuria, because more ex-soldiers had drifted 
with the large migration in that direction. But for at least ten 
years Manchuria was governed by one of the strongest of the 
Chinese war-lords, Chang Tso-lin, whose well-stocked arsenal 
and enormous army maintained a disciplined order within his 
jurisdiction. The Japanese, however, claim that the only real 
order in Manchuria was along their railway line. Chang 
Hsueh-liang, who succeeded to his father's wealth and military 
forces, differed from his father by being interested in the 
growth of a strong central government at Nanking. "Bandit 
raids" increased under his régime.86 There is some reason to 
question whether these raids were due to the inability of the 
Manchurian army to restrain its own men and maintain order, 
or to growing anti-Japanese feeling and a boycott, or whether 
they were fomented by the Japanese army to strengthen its 
charges of disorder. 

Japan has grounds for her charges of banditry. But exactly 
what damage can be credited to these activities is uncertain. 
Before deciding between Japan and China, the interested na-
tions wish to know the gravity of the offense, and the proof for 
the charges. Was it only since Chang Hsueh-liang showed 
some willingness to cooperate with the Nanking government 
that "disorder" was charged against his troops? Is Japan 
counting soldiers of the regular army as bandits, and on what 
grounds? Since all forces which are now in agreement with the 
"puppet government" of Manchukuo are by the Japanese 
termed "irregular," are they also to be called bandits? If so, 
international law is being reversed, and-an insurgent govern-
ment, though unrecognized, is assuming the authority legally 
belonging only to a de jure state. 

b. Weak Government. 
The question of ridding China of bandits is closely con-

nected with the character of the government. For a long time 
3aThe Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930 of the South 

Manchuria Railway Company, pp. 16-19, records an annual average 
of about one a day, but also shows that a preponderant number of such 
attacks were perpetrated by groups of less than ten men. It also fails 
to define "raid," which leaves the figures ambiguous. See Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry, pp. 82-83. Also pp. 19-20 thereof. 







26 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 26 

past the modern powers have realized that China could not 
truly be called a modern state. Only after great pressure had 
been applied did China consent to have any dealings with other 
countries. Long a civilized country with barbarian neighbors 
to the north and west, China early adopted an attitude of supe-
riority toward others, exacting official tribute in return for Im-
perial gifts to tribal chieftains, and refusing all recognition of 
others equality. In the early days of trade with her, foreign-
ers were permitted very narrow privileges, and could deal with 
the Chinese only through a league of merchants, who, however 
wealthy they might become, were not of a high social standing 
They constituted the lowest of the five social classes of the 
J^mpire. If any trouble arose, the merchants as a group were 
held responsible, and whether or not involved, one was made a 
scapegoat. None of the provincial authorities ever troubled 
the Emperor over the treatment, of merchants or the adminis-
tration of justice. To do so would be to admit his own in-
capacity for governing in a highly decentralized country Not 
until 1860 did the Western Powers first establish direct connec-
tion with the central government. Since that time China has 
had the name of a modern state but hardly the reality. Some 
of her citizens have assumed a few of the surface features of a 
Western way of life, and adopted a number of Western eco-
nomic processes such as machine manufacture and railways but 
there are large regions still unopened to any permanent settle-
ment, or even to foreign trade except through Chinese agents. 
I he^e is a seacoast fringe of Western living, and little more. 

By dint of threat of war and ever present naval detach-
ments, the Western Powers succeeded in forcing the central 
government to protect foreigners, although occasional anti-
toreign riots continued to occur. By the same means they 
forced from Chinese officers special territorial "spheres of in-
terest for Western enterprise, leaseholds, residential sections, 
and some political privileges such as special "extraterritorial" 
courts and foreign postoffices." Japan shared in the fruits of 
these actions. 
• After 1898, the central government, never an effective rul-
ing agency, grew steadily weaker, and in 1911 gave place to a 
republic, governed by a supposedly representative legislature. 

"Many of these privileges passed with or following the Chinese ar-
rangements at the Washington Conference, but the foreign powers still 
require China, by treaty, to maintain a low tariff level. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 27 

The first president, who held office only till 1914, was the fa-
mous Chinese nationalist, Sun Yat Sen. From 1914 to 1918, 
the new government, a combination of conflicting interests, al-
most merited the title of dictatorship under Yuan-Shih-kai. In 
1918 it passed under the control of a number of military lead-
ers. Finally, in 192S it became a party dictatorship, under the 
Chinese Nationalist, or Kuomintang party, whose outstanding 
military leader was Chiang Kai-shek, brother-in-law of Sun Yat 
Sen. First Canton, then Nanking became the capital of the 
new China, from whence Peking (now Peiping) was controlled. 
By 1928 the Nanking government gained the effective .alle-
giance of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and had the shell of 
unity. 

The government of China is not a representative democracy 
as it purports to be, but virtually a military dictatorship, under 
a number of indifferently cooperating war-lords. Since 1927 
there has been a southern Chinese government of a communis-
tic bias at Canton, which occasionally cooperates, but usually 
does not, with Nanking policies.38 The Nanking government 
consists of a central assembly made of party delegates from the 
provinces, and a council of state, the real government, made up 
largely of military commanders with a few diplomats. 

Public finance was and is the greatest problem of China. 
The main sources of national revenue are the customs duties, 
collected by a customs service under a foreign chief, the postal 
duties, the Salt Gabelle, and the more or less customary contri-
butions of provincial governors who are in sympathy with the 
nationalist cause. The central government must first of all pay 
its soldiers and maintain order in China. It cannot support 
any extensive movement for education; it cannot supply arms 
and ammunition for any extended warfare; it has so far been 
unable to find revenues sufficient to pay the public debts for 
railroads, harbors and roads contracted by preceding govern-
ments, debts now long unpaid and overdue. Under these cir-
cumstances foreign bankers are unwilling to lend without great-
er security, and some knowledge of where the money is to be 
spent. Thus the leaders must finance their activities partially 
by their personal profits from whatever source, and they have 
neither the time nor the means to supervise the various local 
governments. There is considerable justification for the Jap-

38See the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 20-24. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 28 

anese complaint that the Chinese government is a fiction, a 
power unable and possibly unwilling to keep the peace within 
its jurisdiction. • 

Although the rest of the world is willing to concede the 
Japanese argument about Chinese governmental weakness, and 
even to sympathize with Japan's irritation and desire to have 
China exhibit some national stability, it believes neither that 
violence will bring peace, nor that warfare will make the Chi-
nese more friendly to the Japanese. It has furthermore begun 
to suspect the sincerity of Japanese protests. 

Japanese bankers and diplomats have steadily approved 
loans to China in the face of the very conditions they complain 
about, and have moreover tried to dominate or monopolize 
loans to China, especially in Manchuria.39 Moreover, the pres-
ent functioning of the Japanese government, in its trend to 
army control, highly resembles that of China itself. In Man-
churia the Japanese army and in Shanghai the Japanese navy 
have not taken orders from the civil administration, but from 
their own military heads. At present the strongest member of 
the Japanese cabinet, Count Uchida, former head of the South 
Manchuria Railway, is sympathetic to the military policy. 

In Japan, as in China, a very strong censorship of news ex-
ists so that the people did not know for some time that their 
soldiers were engaged in any extraordinary struggle.40 One of 
the reasons for this undemocratic censorship of news by both 
nations is that the illiterate public becomes wrought up over 
defeat, and it is easier to settle matters, and to save face, when 
the public has not heard details. 

c. Boycott. 
The second major avowed purpose of Japanese spokesmen 

is to stop the Chinese boycott against Japanese trade and in-
dustry. The boycott, usually sponsored by private associa-

30See any modern history oi the Far East. 
4"This is a usual occurrence. A Mukden letter from Hallett Abend 

to the New York Times, sent November IS, 1931, describes the censor-
ship exercised by both Chinese and Japanese officials in Manchuria. A 
later Tokyo dispatch reported that the Japanese people first learned of 
the Japanese attack on Shanghai on February 7, 1932, when the Japanese 
army had already landed in China, and a full seven to ten days after 
Occidental newspapers had published Japan's action. Some time passed 
after Japan withdrew from the League of Nations before that fact was 
published in Japan. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 29 

tions, is a peculiarly Chinese weapon of opposition, a form of 
passive resistance which is their best method of defense, ag-
gression or evasion. The Chinese are not a warlike people. 
For possible 2,000 years their highest ideal has been that of 
philosopher-statesman. They have looked upon soldiers as a 
necessary evil. In Japan, on the contrary, in the old samurai 
tradition, the highest concept of manhood is the warrior. In 
Manchuria, therefore, a nation imbued with the tradition of 
military honor is at odds with a nation without any military 
tradition whatsoever. 

An anti-Japanese boycott arising from a dispute over 
Korean settlers was rapidly spreading in Manchuria in the sum-
mer of 1931, taking many forms, among them the use, wherever 
possible, of Chinese-owned railways and shipping.41 After the 
Japanese used force, the boycott, furthered by the Kuomintang 
party, spread like wildfire into China, too. How effective it 
was may be gathered from these facts: British mills at once 
began to run busily with orders formerly filled by Japanese-
owned mills in Shanghai; the American Trade Commissioner in 
Shanghai reported that the boycott on sending Chinese goods 
in Japanese ships resulted in 400,000 tons of idle Japanese 
shipping by December 1st' and later that the boycott in 1931 
reduced Japanese industrial activities by SO per cent in the 
North, and in the South China to 15 per cent of their original 
extent.42 

When Japanese voices assail the "boycott," however, their 
meaning is not quite clear. The boycott is not defined any 
more clearly than the term "bandits." Are Japanese officers 
protesting the 1931 case? If so its causes, too, must be ex-
amined. Are they protesting the Manchurian boycott only, or 
is that in Shanghai in some degree connected with Manchuria 
in its origins?43 Do they wish to stop the use of any boycott 
at any time? 

The Japanese authorities in this crisis have steadily refused 
to use the word "war" to describe their activities. They have 

4 1 Incidentally, these were cheaper. See p. 38. 
42See reviews of Department of Commerce advices, New York Times, 

December 13, 1931, and the Department's Fortnightly Bulletin, passim. 
43Throughout the Shanghai affair, January 28 to May S, 1932, Japa-

nese officers consistently blamed the Chinese boycott, as well as other 
immediate causes, for Japanese force there, and with equal persistency 
refused t o connect the Shanghai case with that of Manchuria. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 30 

taken the position that a war must be openly declared to be 
legally war. At the same time they have frequently asserted 
that the Chinese bandit raids, but more particularly the boy-
cott are an act of war, which would lay the blame on the 
Chinese for the present state of affairs.44 This is inconsistent. 

The word boycott is capable of at least three legal mean-
ings. An economic boycott may be the result of the acts of 
thousands of individuals, without government sanction or ap-
proval. Governments are expected to restrain their citizens 
from such acts against inoffensive non-nationals. 

In its other two meanings, the boycott is a recognized in-
strument of governmental policy in international law. In one 
sense it may be, as the Japanese say it is, an act of war, that 
is, a method of action used in war; but it is not always or 
necessarily an act of war when used. It is usually classified 
by international lawyers as "force short of war," a means of 
offense or defense whose use does not, as a matter of course, 
involve states in war. That it is force is clear; that it may 
lead to war is also clear; but not that it must be an act of 
war. The methods by which the Japanese are opposing the 
boycott are, however, war; for contrary to their contention, 
it is not necessary that war be declared in order to be war. 
Since war can now be declared only under certain circum-
stances by members of the League, it is probable that wars 
will be waged without declaration, unless by collective action 
of interested parties. The hope and wish for peace on the 
part of the Great Powers is all that prevents Japanese action 
in Manchuria from being called "war." 

Boycott, in its final sense, is an international instrument 
44A New York Times dispatch, February 26, 1932, from Hugh Byas, 

quotes a Tokyo Foreign Office spokesman as follows: "People speak 
lightly of an economic boycott, but it is tantamount to war and will 
eventually lead to actual war—and war with the whole world is too 
staggering a proposition for Japan to be able to form any conception of 
its effects. 

"We consider an economic blockade impossible because Japan has not 
been guilty of an act justifying such a measure. If those 'bloodthirsty 
pacifists' who threaten an economic blockade understood what they were 
saying they would realize it was a very dangerous game." 

See also Quincy Wright: "When Does War Exist?," American Journal 
of International Law, April, 1932, and the same author, "Collective 
Rights and Duties for the Enforcement of Treaty Obligations." Proc. 
American Society of International Law, April 28-30, 1932, pp. 101-119. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 31 

fully recognized in international law as a method of control 
in questions of international dispute. Article XVI of the 
League of Nations, whose Covenant Japan has ratified, ex-
pressly permits the Council of the League, unanimously agreed, 
to recommend an economic boycott against a state which fails 
to fulfill its international agreements;—which, for example, 
goes to war before the required period of delay is over. After 
hearing the report of the Commission of Enquiry, it will be 
within the power, although not the duty, of the members of 
the League Council, excepting Japan and China, to recom-
mend further action, including a boycott, against either state 
which refuses to accept a unanimous international settlement. 
Like the others, Japan, in the League, has accepted legally the 
possibility of a boycott; she has accepted it by treaties later 
than and equal to the treaties whose "sanctity" she is asking 
China to maintain; and furthermore, she has agreed in the 
same international agreement that treaties contrary to her obli-
gations under that Covenant shall be void. 

Behind the banditry and the boycott are matters more 
vital to Japan—her economic interest in both China and Man-
churia. It is very large, and greater than that of any other 
power, or of other powers combined; and it consists chiefly 
of three elements—an interest in trade, in railroads, and in 
land. 

d. Trade. 
(1) China and Japan. 
All the Great Powers have a capitalistic interest in all 

three of the regions—China, her Manchurian Provinces and 
Japan—and inevitably the three are interested in one another. 
Japan has a key position. She imports much raw material 
from Manchuria, the United States and elsewhere, and sells 
textile goods, steel and iron products, kerosene, etc., to China 
and Manchuria; almost four-fifths of Japanese raw silk ex-
ports have gone, in recent years, to the United States. The 
Japanese make up the difference in their normally adverse bal-
ance of trade (thirty-one millions out of a two-billion total in 
1929) from the profits of manufacturing raw materials into 
finished products by cheap Japanese labor in Japan, and also 
from their investments of capital, employment of cheap Chinese 
labor in Shanghai and other Chinese mills, and in Manchurian 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 32 

mines. Where as China has been Japan's best eastern market, 
the United States has been Japan's best customer, purchasing 
41.S per cent of Japan's total exports in 1929; while China, 
including the Kwantung Leased Area and Hongkong, absorbed 
26.7 per cent. In the same year Japan purchased from the 
United States almost one-tenth (9.8 per cent) of all our for-
eign exports, of which cotton was the major single product.45 
The entire volume of the trade between Japan and the United 
States alone in 1931 was over 360 million dollars, but even 
that represented a drop of more than 82 million, or almost 
20 per cent of the trade of 1930, due to the falling off in the 
demand for silk.46. Cotton, spun and woven in Japan into low 
grade cotton goods, is sold in China. On the average, between 
IS and 20 per cent of Japan's exports to China are textiles. 
In addition Japanese capital controls 43 of the best cotton 
mills, chiefly in or near Shanghai, and thereby 39 per cent of 
the spindles. Mills secretly mortgaged to Japanese capital 
might account for another 30 per cent of Chinese spindles. 
The labor in these mills is Chinese, the management Japanese. 
Almost one-tenth of the entire Japanese investment in China, 
or about 120 million dollars, is in cotton mills alone, and there 
are several associations of cotton mill owners united to carry 
on activities in protest against the boycott. Japan has a real 
"stake" in China, and will suffer keenly as a result of opposi-
tion to her Manchurian policy.47 

Japan is like Western Powers in that surplus capital of her 
investors is invested abroad. All the major powers have in-
vestments of capital in China. One reputable estimate of for-
eign investments in China gives Great Britain and Japan in 
dollars each a billion and a quarter; Soviet Russia about 300 
million; the United States 2S0 million, of which one-fifth is in 
Christian and philanthropic institutions.48 The actual number 

45The Japanese figures vary but slightly from American estimates. 
For further details see Orchard, J. E., Japan's Economic Position (1931), 
pp. 122-28, 

46Review of U. S. Department of Commerce advices. New York 
Times, February 29, 1932. A short analysis of trade relationships ap-
pears in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 112-114; and in 
Special Study No. 8 of the annexes thereto. 

47Report of the Commission of Enquiry, chapter VIII, pp. 121-126. 
48Quoted by George E. Sokolsky, from George H. Blakeslee, Far East-

ern adviser to the State Department, in the New York Times February 
7, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 33 

of foreign residents in China is variously counted, but one esti-
mate credits Japan with over 500,000, including the Leased 
Area; Russia with about 100,000; and indicates 40,000 others, 
of whom Great Britain could claim 13,000, the United States, 
7,000, France, 8,000, and Germany, 3,000. 

(2) Manchuria. 
The economic situation in Manchuria differs from that in 

China. There are far fewer European nationals, and more 
Koreans and Japanese in proportion to the territorial extent. 
Here also the foreign capital investment is predominantly 
Japanese, concentrated largely in the holdings and activities 
of the South Manchuria Railway. The Japanese have also 
developed an interest in the fishing and whaling grounds off 
the eastern coast, and are at present pushing this industry; 
but Russians have a treaty regulating Japan's Siberian fish-
ing.49 There is, of course, no estimate of the vast amount of 
weath in land holdings in the hands of Chinese, and little of 
the personal fortunes of individual Chinese in this region. 

Few accurate figures can be found for the foreign trade 
of Manchuria, but the records of the South Manchuria Rail-
way offer reasonable estimates. The region has normally a 
favorable balance of trade which goes largely into the expan-
sion of Japanese industry, or into Japanese profit. For the 
year 1929, a prosperous one, the total export trade of Man-
churia came to more than 425 million taels, of which soya 
beans and bean products, sold principally to Japan, amounted 
to 255 million taels. Coal shipped almost exclusively to Japan, 
was another large item (over 37 million taels) and crude iron 
products formed a large part of the remainder.60 

Manchurian imports for the same year amounted to 329,-
603,869 taels. Of this over 24 per cent was cotton goods, 
imported from Japan, and cotton yarn, imported mainly from 
China. Kerosene and oils, steel, machinery and other manu-
factured products, were among the imports. About one-fourth 

49Morse and MacNair, op. tit., pp. 686 and 781. Also Hallett Abend 
in New York Times, May IS, 1932, letter of April 17, 1932. 

50Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930, pp. 135-46. The 
tael is worth about fifty cents at normal rates of exchange. 



34 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 34 

of the 12 per cent of imports which were 'steel products came 
from the United States directly.51 

The Japanese wish to retain their supremacy in the for-
eign trade of Manchuria. In spite of their professed adher-
ence to the "Open Door" policy, they have for more than 
25 years been developing a policy of supremacy for which 
they are using the less revealing term, "special interest."52 
This policy met with reasonable success as long as it had a 
monopoly with which to work its will; but during the present 
"depression" the Chinese industries on a silver basis have 
gained rather than the Japanese, and Japanese enterprise is 
feeling the pinch. When, on top of these ills, the depression 
almost entirely destroyed the market for Japanese silk, the 
buying power of the Japanese was reduced both in Japan and 
in Manchuria; and the fall in prices did not improve feel-
ing. Unable to distinguish the percentage of fall due to the 
depression from that due to the boycott, they were inflamed 
at. the Chinese laborers they employed, and the Chinese farm-
ers who drove their carts to the Chinese-owned lines. There 
have been anti-Japanese boycotts before, and there may be 
again; but this one came at a bad time in the affairs of the 
Japanese farmers and industrialists. 

The result of Japanese policy was, as might be expected 
a strengthening of the boycott, and further loss for Japan' 
Although figures are incomplete, it is clear that Japan's share 
in the trade of both China and her Manchurian provinces fell 
and that the trade of other states profited by Japan's loss' 
There was an immediate curtailment of Chinese orders for 
Japanese textiles.53 Some of the Japanese mills in Shanghai 
were forced to close down because their Chinese employees 
would not come to work.54 Though the total trade of the 
United States fell for the year 1931, her exports to the Far 
East increased during the same period.55 Cotton showed the 

"Ibid. 
52See works of C. W. Young, and also W. W. Willoughby, Foreign 

Rights and Interests in China (1927), Chapter X I V 
^New York Times, December 13, 1931. See also Report of the Com-

mission of Enquiry, pp. 116-118. 
" S o m e of those factories which closed reopened later 
55Shipments from the United States in October, 1931, increased bv 

more than $760,000 to Japan and by more than $1,485,000 to China over 
the shipments of the preceding month. See New York Times December 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 35 

greatest increase.56 Japan's loss during the same period, in 
the trade of China alone, is estimated to be 36 per cent of 
her Chinese export trade, and 16 per cent of her import trade 
from China.57 
e. Railroads. 

The railroads of Manchuria are a most significant factor in 
the present disturbances. Not only are they the principal 
means for transporting Manchuria's produce, but they also 
offer opportunity for commercial profits in other activities— 
banking, mining, and the services of middlemen. 

When, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan took over the 
Russian concession of the Liaotung peninsula, she also took 
over the Russian railway zone in South Manchuria up to 
Changchun, while the spur from Changchun to Harbin, which 
connected with the Chinese Eastern, remained Russian. Japan 
took this railway lease under the terms on which Russia had 
obtained it from China (see page 22), subject to almost the 
same conditions. 

The South Manchuria Railway was the only railway of im-
portance in the region when Japan obtained control of it. The 
Japanese at once secured the right to appoint its president and 
they policed it with Japanese guards. It received help from 
the Japanese government, and absorbed in 25 years an 
investment of 1,687,601,531 yen, or about 843 million dollars. 
If the private investments by Japanese in Manchuria are added 
to this, the total interest of Japanese capital in that region in 
1930 amounted to about 1,070 million dollars.58 

nsA statement of the National Foreign Trade Council, New York 
Times, February 28, 1932, reports that the only important gain in our 
commerce during 1931 was with China, where our trade rose from 90 
to 98 million during the year; and China rose from tenth to seventh 
place on our list of customers. 

57George F. Sokolsky, New York Times, January 27, 1932. At normal 
exchange the total trade of Japan with China in 1931 was worth about 
129 million dollars in spite of this loss. 

58Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930, pp. 55-56. Of 
this amount almost SO millions represented Japanese government loans 
to the Chinese government; over 55 millions represented coal mine de-
velopment by the railway company; over 70 millions had been used in 
urban development. Only about 130 millions were directly invested in 
the road bed and rolling stock. On p. 7 of the same report the Japanese 
authors contend that the chief benefits of the road went into the pockets 
of Chinese laborers or merchants; but when the figures of expense are 
analyzed, one finds that the company employed 20,000 Japanese, chiefly 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 36 

But Japanese capital, eager to find new opportunity for 
investment, was not satisfied with the leases of the South 
Manchuria Railway and of the Liaotung peninsula. Both 
leases were for short terms; that of the railway would expire 
in 1928, that of the peninsula in 1923. Moreover, it was pos-
sible that a nationalistic Chinese government might create com-
petition for these roads, or that Russia might attempt to ex-
tend her interests. Japan proceeded to destroy these possibili-
ties. 

In the "secret protocols" of December 22, 190S, mentioned 
above, published by the Foreign Office at Tokyo in February, 
1932, but described to all major governments in 1906 and 
1907, China agreed not to construct railroads "parallel" to the 
South Manchuria road. By the treaties forced on China in 
1915 after Japan made the Twenty-one Demands, China 
agreed to the extension of the time of the railway and penin-
sular leases for seventy-five years beyond their original term.60 
Still more important concessions were embodied in the final 
terms: Japanese citizens had the right to open mines in South 
Manchuria, subject to the consent of China and Japan; 
Japanese citizens might travel or reside, engage in business, or 
in any kind of manufacture in Eastern Inner Mongolia and 
South Manchuria, and most important of all, might lease land 
for these purpose in the same area. If the Japanese could only 
manage to own the South Manchuria Railway, many of them 
would be entirely happy; but many wish to exploit North 
Manchuria. By an exchange of notes with the Peking govern-
ment, also in 1915, the Japanese government secured the in-
formal promise that China would finance any further railroad 
building with Chinese capital, or in the event of borrowing, 
would first request a loan from Japan. Later, in September, 
1924, the "autonomous" government of Chang Tso-lin at 
officers and technical advisers, guards, etc.; 13,000 Chinese employees, 
and about 60,000 coolie day laborers. The shareholders received about 
IS million dollars dividends from March, 1929, to March, 1930, and of 
the more than 14 million dollars in wages, the Chinese coolies received 
in annual wages between two and one-half and three. million dollars, or 
an average of about 25 dollars a year. How this wage scale compares 
with that of China is not clear. Under this analysis, the optimistic esti-
mate of the amount of Chinese benefit from railway private expenditure 
in Manchuria is questionable; many of the engineers, etc., leave their 
families in Japan when they go to improve their lot in the north. B9A third railway lease from Mukden to Antung was also extended. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 37 

Peking permitted further construction of five large new 
branches of the South Manchuria Railway. These agreements 
were never accepted by the Nanking government, and Chang 
Tso-lin postponed their fulfillment. In the meantime, from 
190S to 1930 Chinese capital, balked in its plans to build a 
straight railroad north from Hulutao, proceeded to build 1,800 
miles of road, curving through Manchuria in a rough letter S, 
and 140 miles, financed by loans from Japanese banks. Thus 
in September,. 1931, Japanese interests owned about 700 miles 
of railroad in Manchuria, and shared ownership in 140 miles 
of railroad with Chinese interests; Russian capital owned 1,096 
miles; and Chinese capital, 1,800 miles. 

Since September, 1931, Japan has taken over the control 
of all the Chinese railroad lines in Manchuria, has dismissed 
the manager of the Russian road and interfered with subordi-
nate officers; has used Russian roads to transport her troops; 
and has begun to rush construction on the five roads planned, 
particularly those connecting with the port of Seishin. The 
Chinese roads have been connected at strategic points with 
the South Manchuria Railway, and the government-owned 
Chinese telegraph, telephone and radio systems, together with 
the banks in which their accounts were kept, have been seized 
and reorganized under officials of Manchukuo. In some cases 
the Chinese and Japanese systems of communication have been 
united.60 Japanese interests have secured a monopoly of all 
railway lines in Manchuria, and with it a monopoly of strate-
gic advantage.61 

A further factor should be taken into consideration, the 
current international crisis in finance. The- "depression," 
which reduced Japanese trade with the United States, also 
affected Japanese buying power and the markets of Manchuria 

r'°See the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 100-103. 
B1See also the article by George E. Sokolsky, New York Times, May 

13, 1932. The same author indicates the rumor that the Japanese are 
seeking to buy from the French successors to the Russo-Asiatic bank the 
Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern, New York Times, May 22, 1932. 
This>'is corroborated by a Paris dispatch from P. J. Philip, New York 
Times, May 26, 1932, and by interviews with the Japanese delegate to 
the League öf Nations, Ambassador Matsuoka, in 1933. Cf. article by 
Herbert L. Matthews, New York Times, March 1, 1933. Mr. Matsuoka's 
plan seemed to be for Russia and Manchukuo each to own one-fourth, 
and France one-half, of the Chinese Eastern stock. See also New York 
Times, April 20, 1933. 



38 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 38 

as early as the summer of 1930. The Chinese railways were 
run on a silver basis, the Japanese on a gold basis till the last 
month of 1931; the Chinese rates were, in addition, some-
what lower. The result of the difference in these rates was not 
as noticeable in time of prosperity; but in time of poverty, the 
Chinese railroads continued their trade while the Japanese lost. 
f. Land Ownership. 

This history of railroads in Manchuria brings to light 
another major Manchurian problem, seldom mentioned by the 
Japanese except under the generalization of "special interests 
or "racial equality." It is the problem of land ownership 
The Chinese theory of land ownership differs from that of 
most countries. The concept of private ownership in land 
was recognized both in China and in Manchuria. But the 
concept of public interest in land also remained, with a strong 
sense of social solidarity. The administration of mineral land 
is subject to the officers of the state, who are expected to pro-
tect the public interest in these lands by leasing them for the 
public benefit on terms subject to change under varying con-
ditions. . . 

The Chinese approach to new business enterprise is also 
different from that of the Occidental. While there has been 
capital in China sufficient to develop some of these resources, 
the Chinese manner of approach is always to deal with known 
elements and seldom with strangers. Chinese officers per-
mitted their acquaintances rather than Japanese to exploit re-
sources.62 The Manchus were more interested in prospects in 
China, than were Chinese interested in Manchuria. As a re-
sult, Manchurian land holdings were of little account as long 
as the major opportunity for family advancement was in 
Peking or South China, and the means of transportation so 
slow and inconvenient that Manchuria remained a frontier. 
With the development of railroads after the Boxer Rebellion, 
however, and particularly with the building of the Peking-
Mukden line by Chinese and British capital, a rapid flow of 
immigrants turned Chinese interest toward the area where 

R2To support the foregoing statement, the reader must wade through 
a number of books, making inferences and fitting his conclusions together 
from incidental evidence. The best discussion, though without evidence, 
is that of Owen Lattimore, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (1932), pp. 
118-148. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 39 

the South Manchuria Railway was eager to encourage coloniza-
tion as a source of future patronage. 

These colonists squatted on and later paid rent for land 
owned by Manchurian or other North Chinese. As Chinese 
they had the privilege of purchase, not possessed by any alien. 
In one respect the old Chinese tradition had resisted all the 
pressure of the West. Only Chinese subjects can own economi-
cally productive land; and the Koreans are among the few 
who can acquire Chinese citizenship,, although the Japanese 
government steadily refuses to recognize Korean expatriation. 
In the treaty of 19IS, following the Twenty-one Demands, 
Japan won for her own citizens the right to lease agricultural 
and industrial land in South Manchuria (on thirty-year leases 
which Japanese claim must be renewed at the option of the 
lessee) but Chinese landowners steadily evaded leasing land 
to Japanese. Koreans were used as an advance guard for Jap-
anese and a confused situation arose.83 

Japanese "advisers" have already announced that the new 
state of Manchukuo will make legal the sale as well as the 
rental of land to non-nationals—by which are meant Japanese. 
In this manner will Manchukuo fulfill its principles of "racial 
equality" and "full racial cooperation." Whatever may be 
the eventual result, some agreement must be reached on the 
question of land ownership. In passing it should be noted 
that the restrictions placed by the Chinese on owning land in 
Manchuria are in some features parallel to those placed by 
Western states on ownership by resident Orientals; and also 
that the concept of public interest in land is implicit in the 
right of eminent domain, the classification of property taxes 
and the laws regulating subsoil rights in the modern consti-
tution^ of several powerful states, 
g. Population. 

There is a deeper economic problem beneath Japan's 
action: the problem of filling the need of an industrial nation 
for sources of raw materials and for markets, which she finds 
close at hand in Manchuria. Room for the Japanese popula-
tion to expand is not the primary factor in Manchuria, 
alth6ugh at present failure, poverty and unemployment in 
Japan might seem to make it so. Japan has passed through 
an industrial and economic as well as a social and political 

08Report of the Commission of Enquiry, pp. 55-61. 



40 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 40 

revolution in the less than 70 years since she opened her ports 
and life to Western influence. In the past SO years there has 
been a rapid drift of her population to cities where it has lived 
under very congested conditions. 

The farming population, whose chief products are rice and 
silk worms, and to a small extent tea, is extremely poor also. 
The main diet of the Japanese is rice and fish. In spite of this 
meager standard of living, the Japanese love their country-
side and its invigorating climate, and do not wish to leave it for 
a climate of steadier cold, and a frontier life. They therefore 
make poor colonists. As managers, some of them must follow 
Japanese capital, but even many of these have no intention of 
making a permanent residence either in China or in her north-
ern provinces.64 

Both the birth rate and the death rate are comparatively 
high. The excess of births over deaths means that if Japanese 
cannot find areas for colonization or emigration, Japan must 
find employment for a crowded population. Manchuria and 
the Philippines are the only adjacent territories which might 
interest her, unless she chose to conquer all of China. There 
would be no profit in that adventure. China also is undergoing 
vast change; and with no room for expansion there, with the 
great expense involved in subduing it and keeping it subdued, 
the final result would probably be what has happened before, 
the absorption of the conquerors by the conquered. 

7. National Policies 
a. General. 

Each of the major Western Powers has an individual policy 
toward the Far East. Until about 1900, the European Powers 
pursued toward China a policy of commercial pressure followed 
up by requests for concessions, backed up by the strong arm, 
justified by exponents of Western culture on the ground of 
"moral necessity," arising from China's failure to assume the 
responsibility for the amenities of international intercourse. 
Chinese isolation in a modern world is so impossible that it 
cannot be justified as a governmental policy; but this fact does 
not exonerate the conduct of the Western Powers before 1900. 
It merely strengthens their responsibility for today. 

a4The Japanese willingly go to Australia, the Philippine Islands, or 
the United States; but here restrictions exist. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 41 

Since 1900, however, though national interests remained 
strong, an international consciousness in regard to the Far East 
has been gaining way. England, Japan, France and Germany 
had by that time spheres of interest and special territorial con-
cessions; Russia had a sphere of interest and advisory rights in 
parts of Mongolia; the United States, without any territorial 
grants, had trade, to a lesser degree than most of the others. 
France, moreover, had for a long period held a semi-proprietary 
interest in the large religious and charitable foundations of the 
Catholic Church in China; and the United States was vitally 
concerned in the interests of Protestant missionaries, their 
schools and hospitals.65 The interests of these foreigners 
touched one another at so many points that on various occa-
sions the governments took joint action. Their attitude of co-
operation arose from two considerations stronger than their 
own selfish interests. Neither singly nor in combination were 
they willing to undertake the government of China, which 
would be necessary if conquest took place. None of them was 
willing to take a further slice of Chinese territory in the face 
of the growing distrust and jealousy of the others, when the 
result of that act might mean a general war and certainly the 
opposition of the United States. 

b. The United States. 
The policy of the United States toward China is unusual 

both in the history of international relations and in the history 
of our own affairs. From the beginning, with comparatively 
few exceptions, public relations with China have been on a 
plane of dignity and fair play on both sides. More than once 
the United States has returned to China the funds left over 
after payment of indemnities; the United States consistently 
refused territorial concessions. It is, however, true that 
through the most-favored-nation clause in American treaties, 
we profited from all trade gains made in China as a result of 
other states' violence.66. An American naval detachment has 

RSThere were few Catholic missionaries from the United States in the 
Far East before 1910. The mission fathers of Maryknoll were among 
the American pioneers in China and in Korea. Benedictines, Re-
demptorists and others are also interested. 

e6See Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia; also S. K. Hornbeck, 
The Most Favored Nation Clause, etc. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 42 

been assigned to Chinese waters since 1900. Long before the 
Open Door policy was formally proclaimed, however, it was the 
recognized idea of the United States; equal trade opportunities 
to all those interested—a policy which should be more widely 
maintained throughout the world. 

The first formal declaration of this policy was in the notes 
sent by Secretary of State John Hay to the major powers, in 
the fall of 1899 asking their consent to a number of propo-
sitions. The gist of these was that no state should interfere 
within its sphere of influence with treaty ports or vested inter-
ests, or permit preferential harbor dues or railway charges to 
benefit its own subjects, and that only China should collect 
duty and that duty according to the Chinese treaty tariff. 
France and Germany accepted these terms as a description of 
their existing policy and desires; Russia and Great Britain as-
sented to them with minor reservations. No nation, however, 
in its reply, mentioned prior claims to exclusive rights. 

Since that time, this policy, simplified to the phrase, "equal 
opportunity for all," has been recognized in almost every major-
commitment of the powers in regard to the Far East. It can-
not be honestly alleged that it refers only to agreements and 
concessions made prior to 1899. It has been reasserted without 
any such restriction over and over again. It was expressed in 
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, and in the 
Treaty of Portsmouth of the same year. The phrase "terri-
torial integrity of China," has often been connected with it. 
Planned to stop unfair trade practices and discriminatory laws 
within areas of special influence,67 it is in conflict with the 
policy of "special interests" of both Russia and Japan in Man-
churia. The Chinese aver that the secret protocols of 190S and 
the rebates to Japanese firms on the South Manchuria Railway, 
among a number of other competitive practices, are in violation 
of these statements of principle. 

During the World War, Japan joined the cause of the allies 
and secured secret promises regarding her claims to the Ger-
man concession of Shantung and German Islands in the South 
Pacific. She capped these secret agreements with the Lansing-
Ishn agreement of November 2, 1917, with the United States 
in which the United States recognized the "special influence" 

246-2S06 C ' W ' Y ° U n g ' ^ International Relati°™ of Manchuria, pp. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 43 

of Japan in territories contiguous to her own territory; in other 
words, in Manchuria, contiguous to Korea. Even this agree-
ment, however, reasserted adherence to the "so-called 'Open 
Door policy' of equal opportunities." Japan proceeded to act 
upon this agreement as though it permitted her a monopoly in 
Manchuria. For a time many wondered whether the United 
States had renounced friendship for China. A few months be-
fore the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the United States in a note to 
China, said plainly, " . . . in the maintenance of China of one 
central, united and alone responsible government the United 
States is deeply interested,"68 and expressed the hope that 
China would soon become a major power and a fully self-sus-
taining nation. 

c. Russia. 
Many observers explain Japan's present policy in the Far 

East by her fear of Russian aggression there. This opinion is 
confirmed by Count Uchida's speech to the peers of Japan in 
January, 1933, and Ambassador Matsuoka's discussion of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway in Paris. 

Russia's original interest in Manchuria arose from her de-
sire to acquire an ice-free port for all-year-round commercial 
activity. She first gained access by rail through North Man-
churia to the port of Vladivostok in return for financial aid to 
China at the close of the Sino-Japanese War (1895). The 
cession of the Liaotung peninsula followed, in 1898, together 
with the rights to connect the Chinese Eastern Railway with 
the port of Dalny (now Dairen) and to construct a naval base 
at Port Arthur. At the end of the Boxer Rebellion, Russia oc-
cupied Manchuria by force on the ground of danger to her na-
tionals, and made demands less extensive, but similar to those 
of Japan in 1915, as a price for evacuating the area. These 
activities of Russia, together with her monopolistic behavior 
in Manchuria and near Korea, gave rise to the Russo-Japanese 
War, as a result of which Japan succeeded to Russia's conces-
sions. Russian influence was by treaty restricted to North 
Manchuria; the southern terminus of the Chinese Eastern was 
fixed at Changchun. 

From 1907-1924, when Russia and China signed agree-
**Ibid., p. 596. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 44 

ments modifying the position of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
Russia's policy in the Far East seemed to one of cooperation 
with Japan rather than with China. As a result of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, however, the special rights of Russia in 
North Manchuria were relinquished, as were also the extra-
territorial rights of Russia in China. In 1924, by treaties 
signed separately with Nanking and with Chang Tso-lin, Russia 
conceded to China a share in the ownership of the Chinese 
Eastern, and reduced the term of its lease from eighty to sixty 
years. Although the relations of Chang-Tso-lin with the Chinese 
Eastern were by no means steadily amicable, the close coopera-
tion of Russian Communists with the southern Chinese at Can-
ton, and recent Russian interest in Outer Mongolia, have 
again aroused in the Japanese the nationalist suspicion of Rus-
sian intrigue. Japanese industrialists and railway men are 
eager to extend Japanese rights to engage in business to North 
Manchuria, which has been a Russian sphere of interest; it is 
significant that "Manchukuo" includes this area, and that its 
"capital" is at Changchun, the meeting point of the Chinese 
Eastern and the South Manchuria Railways. 

Russia's policy today (1933) is as incalculable as hereto-
fore. Some Russians are interested in internal revolts against 
China in the western province of Sinkiang. Russian officials 
have repeatedly expressed opposition to Japanese and Man-
churian interference with the operation of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. In 1929 there were diffculties between Russia and 
China because the Chinese accused the Russians of using the 
personnel of the railway to foment a Communistic revolt in 
Manchuria. Russian influence is strong in Canton. A large 
Russian army was for some months in 1932 close to the Man-
churian frontier; and Japanese advices spoke of a recently 
signed Sino-Russian alliance, which was, however, denied by 
both parties. Russia has refused to cooperate with the League 
of Nations in the present trouble, and refused also to co-
operate with the newly created Committee of Twenty-one to 
study the problem of sanctions. The Manchurian problem 
cannot be settled without Russia; it is clear what would happen 
to Japanese investments in Manchuria if that region, like Can-
ton, were to come under Communist influence. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 45 

d. Japan. 
The policy of Japan has received mention heretofore. The 

outstanding features of it are the acquisition of island posses-
sions of China, the freeing and annexation of Korea, the wrest-
ing away of the Russian concessions, and the Twenty-one De-
mands, many of them granted, made on China in 1915 when 
the rest of the major powers, with the exception of the United 
States, were at war. 

There is considerable controversy over Japan's attitude to-
ward Chinese participation in the Great War. One account 
credits the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Ishii, with say-
ing to the foreign ministers of the Allies that "an efficient 
Chinese army" and "liberation of the economic activities of 
China" were contrary to Japanese interest.69 

Recently, there has been talk in Japan of the Washington 
treaties, signed in 1922, as "obsolete" and "out-worn" agree-
ments. This, while Japan says treaties of 1905 and 1915 have 
"sanctity." 

Perhaps the most revealing statements of the policy of 
Japan in Manchuria are contained in the address of Count 
Uchida to the Japanese peers, January 21, 1933, and the ad-
dresses of Ambassador Matsuoka in Paris, London and New 
York in the spring of 1933. Cfc>unt Uchida's speech, fore-
shadowing and justifying Japanese participation in the military 
advance on Jehol, declares that Japan is bound to aid by her 
protocol recognizing the "independence" of Manchukuo. Inci-
dentally, Manchukuo has not yet officially defined its territorial 
boundaries. Count Uchida commends the Soviet Union for a 
policy "so cautious that nothing unpleasant has occurred to 
mar their relations with Japan," even while he admits that 
understanding between Japan, Russia and Manchukuo is es-
sential to peace. Among other things he says are the following: 

"The fundamental principle of Japan's foreign policy is to 
secure the peace of the Orient and, as corollary, that of the 
world . . . 

" . . . our government believes that any plan for erecting 
the edifice of peace in the Far East should be based upon 
recognition that the constructive force of Japan is the main-
stay of tranquillity in this part of the world." This as an 
explanation for the use of increased force! 

69Morse and MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, p. 590. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 46 

"She (Japan) only desires to insure her national exist-
ence by such means as will accord with international justice 
and to work hand in hand with neighbor nations for the peace 
of the Orient and of the world."70 On this basis he specifically 
justifies Japan's use of force in Manchuria, her attitude to-
ward the League of Nations, toward Russia, and her demand 
for naval parity with England and the United States. 

This speech is very much of a kind with numerous utter-
ances by Lieut. Gen. Araki, the Japanese Minister of War, one 
of which is quoted elsewhere.71 On March 17, 1933, he in-
formed the Japanese peers that unless the Chinese ceased re-
sistance at the Great Wall, and sought peace, there would be 
further military steps to secure that end. By this time the 
Japanese armies were already within China proper, and the 
question of Manchuria's boundaries supposedly did not enter 
the situation. 

The statements of Ambassador Matsuoka are more varied 
and numerous. After the Japanese delegation took a dramatic 
departure from the Assembly of the League of Nations on 
February 24, 1933, Mr. Matsuoka visited France, England 
and the United States en route home to Tokyo. In each 
country he visited not only the Foreign Office, but also the ex-
porters of oil, cotton and munitions, as well as the importers 
of Japanese products.72 In the United States he made several 
speeches, largely to business and commercial organizations. 
His final speech was broadcast from San Francisco, on the 
eve of his sailing. In these speeches he emphasized three 
things: (a) that Japanese policy in Manchuria resembled the 
past policy of the United States in the Caribbean area; 
(b) that Japan is a good customer for the United States; 
(c) that China was a governmental fiction, not worth quarrel-
ing about. The implication of possible war between the 
United States and Japan was in the back of his mind, for he 
said that Japan would not change its policy in the Far East, 
but that war between Japan and us would not come unless we 

70The full text is in the New York Times, January 21, 1933, as given 
out by the Japanese embassy in Washington. 

",1New York Times, March 18, 1933, and magazine section, March 12, 
1933. Articles by Hugh Byas. 

72See New York Times, February 26, 27; March 10, 18, 25, 29, 31; 
April 2, 1933. Particularly of interest are the statements of his com-
mercial and war activities in the issues of March 10th and 29th. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 47 

made it; he ended by saying that it would be an expensive 
process for any country or group of countries which tried to 
create or supervise the creation of Chinese governmental order 
and unity. 

It is to be observed that these clever speeches make their 
appeal to motives of greed, fear and gross materialism. Like 
the arguments of recent lecturers, they stress cash utilitarian-
ism.73 It needs no great acumen to discover that all these 
arguments direct attention from the issue of Japanese action 
in Manchuria by setting up straw men about which to argue. 
We make no effort here to defend the policy of the United 
States in the Caribbean; even though it was not governed by 
any Covenant, Pact of Paris, or Nine-Power Treaty, it was 
precisely of the stuff of which wars are made. But to use 
it as precedent is to justify a present wrong by an unrelated 
past one. The trade of China as well as of Japan is important 
to the United States, and indeed to Japan; and no one denies 
that the lack of orderly government in China is one of the 
major problems in this situation. 

e. Collective Agreements. 
In the Versailles Conference one of China's hopes was ful-

filled. Japan retained Shantung only temporarily, and finally 
gave it back as a result of the Sino-Japanese settlement at the 
Washington Conference of 1922 under the watchful eye of the 
United States and Great Britain. At the same conference the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was permanently ended, and two 
treaties were signed concerning the Far East, the Four-Power 
and Nine-Power Pacts. It is these treaties which the United 
States says Japan violated in 1931 and 1932, even while 
Japan asks China to adhere to extended interpretations of 
the terms of treaties of 1905 and 1915. 

Under the Four-Power Pact, the governments promised to 
"George E. Sokolsky, speaking at a luncheon of the Foreign Policy 

Association, March 25, 1933, argued that American Far Eastern policy 
should be based on "utility" rather than "morality," because a policy 
based on morality would require enforcement. It is notable that in the 
years 1932 and 1933 many Japanese lecturers, such as Messieurs Nitobe, 
Debuchi, Akagi, Matsuoka, the Ishii mission, and others, have traveled 
through the United States, stressing this same materialism. Many arti-
cles describing public works in Manchukuo from the Japanese viewpoint 
have appeared in the daily papers, and in the Journal oj Commerce. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 48 

"communicate with each other fully and frankly," if any of 
their rights were threatened in the Pacific. This Japan has 
not done. Under the Nine-Power Pact, the signatories agreed 
to "respect the sovereignty, the independence and the terri-
torial and administrative integrity of China." Some Japanese 
today say that Manchuria is not part of China, but the Jap-
anese delegate to the Washington Conference in 1922, Admiral 
Baron Kato, formally so recognized it.74 Under the Nine-
Power Treaty, the signatories further promised China a "most 
unembarrassed opportunity" to develop and maintain a stable 
government, and "to refrain from taking advantage of condi-
tions in China to seek special rights or privileges," etc.75 The 
United States now maintains that any attempt to erect a sepa-
rate state in Manchuria without China's consent is a violation 
of China's territorial and administrative integrity. 

There are are two other treaties which Japan is now 
accused of violating. The signatories of the League Covenant 
are bound by Articles X, X I and XV to consult and confer in 
case of war or a "situation which may lead to war"; and if 
that method fails, China may, under Article XVI, ask consid-
eration of an economic boycott, which requires the unanimous 
consent of the members of the Council to be effective. China 
has invoked aid under Articles X, X I and XV, but the League 
will not proceed under Article XVI until all other conciliatory 
measures have been exhausted. Japan did not consult and 
confer, on the questionable ground that she was not waging 
war. She was nevertheless in a "situation which may lead to 
war.'' 

The United States, though not a member of the League, 
is, with Japan and China, a signatory of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, as well as of the Washington treaties. Under the Kellogg-
Briand Pact the nations promise to avoid war as a means of 
settlement, and to exhaust other means before resorting to it. 
Japanese authorities, in the face of twenty-one months' mili-
tary campaign involving a mined harbor, the confiscation of 
over 2,000 miles of railway lines, an expedition into Jehol that 

74He was liter closely associated with Baron Shidehara and Premier 
Wakatsuki, who have been ousted from the government. Other evidence 
of Japan's recognition exists in formal documents of 1904. 

75For understandings not written into the treaty see C. W. Young 
The International Relations of Manchuria, pp. 197-209, 216-219 240-24l' 
244-246. ' ' 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 49 

brought them to Peiping and Tientsin, and the continuous em-
ployment of almost 50,000 soldiers, still assert that they are 
not resorting to war! But Japan has not exhausted other 
means. 

8. Events of 1932 and 1933 

On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson notified Japan and 
China that the American government "cannot admit the legal-
ity of any situation de facto" nor does it intend to recognize 
any treaty or agreement entered into between those govern-
ments or agents thereof, which "may impair the treaty rights 
of the United States or its citizens in China"—and that "it 
does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agree-
ment which may be brought about by means contrary to the 
covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 
1898." Ten days later the Council of the League of Nations 
sent a note to Japan in which it called attention to Article X, 
and said it appeared "to follow that no infringement of the 
territorial integrity and no change in the political independ-
ence of China brought about in disregard of this Article ought 
to be recognized as valid and effectual by members of the 
League of Nations." The Assembly of the League, convoked 
at the request of China, still further elaborated this principle 
in its resolution of March 10, 1932. It also created a stand-
ing Committee of Nineteen, to keep in touch with the Far 
East. The United States has continued to repeat its attitude 
in almost identical words whenever occasion arose. 

Late in January, 1932, Japan engaged in a belligerent 
attack on Shanghai, during which valuable educational estab-
lishments were razed, and China's foremost printing press de-
stroyed, Chinese cotton mills ruined, 600,000 people rendered 
homeless and damage estimated at between 25 and 100 mil-
lion dollars done to property, all in one month.76 The avowed 
reason was the city's refusal to assume responsibility for an 
attack on a Japanese priest and a few civilians. Another ex-
pressed reason was the boycott which, due to the Manchurian 
situation, was effectively hindering Japanese efforts at trade. 

76New York Times, February 26, 1932. American trade with Shang-
hai fell five and one-half million dollars in one month, New York Times, 
March 4, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 50 

Many foreign observers have expressed a belief that an un-
explained reason of Japan was a desire, by show of force, to 
secure Nanking's consent to the new order in Manchuria be-
fore the Lytton Commission should arrive, which would have 
legally prevented its inquiry. The settlement of the Shanghai 
affair was finally left under the supervision of an international 
group of twelve. On the eve of withdrawal, the Japanese 
General Yoshinori Shirakawa warned the departing troops: 
"Upon returning home you must train yourselves sufficiently to 
be ready to rally to the call immediately when things happen." 

There were many rumors throughout 1932 to the effect 
that Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations, a pro-
cedure which requires two years' notice, and would be inter-
preted by Western nations as an admission of her inability 
to keep her promises of consultation, tantamount to a declara-
tion of her intention to conquer Manchuria for herself. Her 
withdrawal would also cause dispute over her mandate over 
some of the colonies once German. Late in April, 1932, Ad-
miral Hirata, of the Japanese Navy, criticized the American 
Asiatic fleet as of "low fighting value," and said that the great-
est interest of the Americans at Shanghai was "to keep out of a 
possible collision with the Japanese Navy."77 But a more sig-
nificant voice is that of Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, the former 
Ambassador, now Privy Councillor, at a dinner given June 22, 
1932, in honor of Ambassador Joseph Grew, newly arrived at 
Tokyo. His words merit exact repetition: 

"In my opinion, an armed conflict between our countries 
is possible only in two extremely improbable contingencies. In 
the first place if Japan were foolish enough to attempt unduly 
to interfere with the matter of the Western hemisphere, then 
a war would be inevitable. But the Japanese government and 
people know their own business and are firmly determined 
to refrain from doing anything on the other side of the Pacific 
which might give rise to a shadow of suspicion." 

The statement continues: "In the second place if the 
United States ever attempted to dominate the Asiatic contin-
ent and prevented Japan from her pacific and natural expan-
sion in this part of the world, then indeed a grave situation 
would be created, for it is obvious that a nation with a popula-

"Special correspondence eated April 23, in New York Times of 
May 8, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East SI 

tion overcrowded to the breaking point could not be shut up 
indefinitely in a narrow strip of land." The statement ended 
with a reiteration of the principle of the Open Door, and a 
belief in America's desire for peace. Ambassador Grew replied 
in his speech that what concerned the American people most 
today was the efforts of the nations to build up a durable struc-
ture of international peace.78 That the ambassador had the 
Kellogg Pact and the League of Nations in mind is plain. But 
does the pacific expansion of Japan include the forcible con-
quest of Manchuria and does the natural expansion mean the 
denial of the Open Door in Manchukuo? If so, the two na-
tions are diametrically opposed, and a way of adjustment must 
be found. 

I l l 

CONCLUSION 

1. General Considerations. 

The ethical problems arising out of these complicated mat-
ters are not simple, but they are simpler than they at first 
seem. Both the parties to the conflict are in the wrong, as 
the Report of the Commission of Enquiry indicates; and some 
of the responsibility for the present situation lies on the 
shoulders of the Occidental nations, which have given bad 
example. 

China and Japan are both guilty of intense nationalism, 
which they have learned from that of the Western nations a 
century ago. Both of them are also guilty of distorting the 
facts to their own advantage, with great emphasis on the "sav-
ing of face," rather than on the merits of the points at issue. 
This behavior has been distressingly familiar in the West, 
also. China is to blame for not suppressing banditry, and for 
official encouragement of the boycott; for the latter, how-
ever unjustifiable, she has had some provocation at the hands 
of the Japanese. China is also to blame for refusing to settle 
and keep settled old agreements, particularly financial con-
tracts, whose proceeds have been mishandled; some of these 

78New York Times, July 17, 1932, Letter of June 23, 1932. The 
italics are ours. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 52 

contracts were, however, originally made in unjustifiable im-
perialistic speculation. China is to blame for the refusal of 
her public officials to assume responsibility for the acts of 
Chinese citizens and for the refusal of her war-lords to co-
operate either in war or peace for the unity of China.79 If 
no one Chinese group will be responsible, it is possible that 
China must be recognized as more than one unit. If this be the 
case, there is no reason why Manchuria could not be consid-
ered one unit. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
recognizes this possibility. However, this does not mean that 
Japan should be permitted to do with Manchuria as she wishes. 
Since 1914 the time has passed when the acts of a world 
power do not affect all the others to some degree. If Man-
churia is to be a separate entity, then the League might turn 
it into a mandate. How far China is willing to unify herself 
to modify this result is a question of justice, a problem for 
Chinese leaders. 

Japan has valid grounds for irritation over the behavior 
of Chinese nationals both in China and in Manchuria. She 
is guilty, however, of a policy of greed, selfishness and the 
use of duress to obtain these ends over a period of years in 
both these areas; she has made China's weakness a tool for her 
own economic gain, and has more than once resorted to intrigue 
in the effort to create favorable evidence. In forcing valuable 
concessions in North Manchuria from the officers of the new. 
"state" of Manchukuo, in obtaining economic preference in 
railway and communications facilities, in confiscating the prop-
erty of Chinese officials and using it, together with loans, for 
military purposes as a means of further subordinating Man-
chukuo to her purposes of self-aggrandisement, Japan is pur-
suing an irresponsible and materialistic policy. Preeminently, 
she has hurt the justice of her case, such as it may be, by her 
unjustifiable use of force when she has bound herself to use 
pacific means of settlement and those means are available. 

When the use of force ceases, ethical problems must be 
79See refusal of Nanking government to strive for union, New York 

Times, May 8, 1932. Both Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek 
have resigned during crises of the past year, rather than accept responsi-
bility for the leadership of unintegrated Chinese armies or government. 
An explanation for this shirking of leadership lies in the report of the 
execution of Governor Lang Yu-lin of Jehol, upon his flight from the 
Japanese armies in Jehol, early in March, 1933. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 3 

weighed in each of the economic questions at issue behind the 
treaties; but in each of them, before justice can be done, the 
primary necessity must be to determine the facts upon which 
the issue may be settled. After this will come the evaluation 
of the policy. For example, how many bandits are there, and 
what, if any, connection exists between them and the army of 
either disputant? Who is behind the boycott? Is it ethically 
defensible, or is it a more indefensible method of opposition 
than the Japanese procedure in Manchuria? Are there moral 
reasons why banditry and boycott should be particularly 
directed against Japan? Has Japan maintained the policy of 
"equal opportunity" or is her continual mention of these words 
purely lip service? Can China morally justify her land policy? 
Or Japan hers? Is the Japanese government actually aiding 
her citizens in acquiring railway rebates, and by this and 
other secret advantages driving out the legitimate trade of 
other nations? 

Taken as a whole, what treaties still are effective, or should 
be effective, in the Far East? "Treaty" arguments complicate 
matters. Japan points to a number of unfulfilled treaty obli-
gations as a justification for her action in Manchuria. At the 
same time her action is contrary to her obligations under 
other treaties, which provide a pacific method of settlement, 
and admit recourse to force only after pacific means have been 
exhausted. Obviously the treaties need going over. Japan's 
major moral justification for her acts in Manchuria is "moral 
necessity," a strong argument; but this might also be argued 
for China, and in this case the common interest of all the world 
in the peace of the Far East weakens the argument of moral 
necessity for any one state. If Japan is under the moral neces-
sity to chastise China, this argument moreover requires that 
she use morally justifiable methods. While the argument of 
"moral necessity" permits the use of force under very rare 
circumstances, it should not be used to justify the use of force 
when rational and moral instruments, provided for in treaties, 
have not been tried. 

China and Japan are not isolated states. They may have 
promised each other certain concrete things; the fact remains 
that by later promises of equal worth they also promised a 
number of other states to use reasonable methods of adjust-
ment instead of force, and indicated what methods are reason-



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 54 

able: conference and consultation, arbitration, and court deci-
sion or adjudication. Japan and China are at odds; the ethical 
choice of the interested states does not now include the terms 
of the final settlement, but rests on the question of means 
to stop the spread of force and to obtain that settlement. A 
reasonable and peaceful mode of settlement is the only choice 
possible. 

Japan refused arbitration and adjudication; she grudgingly 
accepted a commission of inquiry, but objected to giving it 
effective jurisdiction. It could find facts, though guards ham-
pered its efforts to do so. It could reports facts; it has made 
its report. 

2. The Lytton Report. 

The Lytton report, expected almost daily throughout 
August and September, was released to the world press simul-
taneously in Geneva and Tokyo, October 2, 1932. Japan 
promptly asked and obtained from the League of Nations a 
six weeks' period in which to perfect her reply. The official 
hearing began November 14. 

The Commissioners found that China was and is in a state 
of aggravated disorder and disunion, though there is in China 
a wish for national unity; and that in Manchuria also some of 
this disorder exists. They found that there was in China and 
Manchuria a strong anti-foreign policy, of which the boycott 
is one example, and that the policy and the boycott both were 
encouraged by the Nanking government. 

The report also found that the Japanese had not suffi-
cient cause for the use of force against China; that her use 
of arms in Manchuria on September 18, 1931, was not a ' 
measure of "legitimate self-defense." I t held that the majority 
of residents of Manchuria would prefer being under Chinese 
control to being under that of the present government. The 
report further held that this present "new state" is, to all 
intents and purposes, the creature and agent of Japan and 
not independent. 

The Commission suggested ten major principles to govern 
any settlement, and also a method of settlement. According 
to the principles, any adequate settlement must: (1) bring 
the interests of Japan and China into accord; (2) have re-



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 55 

gard for Russian interests; (3) conform to existing multiple-
party treaties; (4) recognize Japan's unusual interest; (5) re-
state the rights and "obligations" as well as the interests of the 
parties in Manchuria in new treaties; (6) provide a pacific 
method for settling future differences; (7) afford Manchuria a 
large measure of local self-government; (8) establish an effec-
tive local police force; (9) arrange for a new commercial treaty 
between the disputants; (10) permit "temporary" international 
cooperation in reconstructing the Chinese national state. 

Point three is of major interest to the rest of the world, 
as the treaties are expressly declared to include the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Nine-
Power Treaty of Washington. So is point ten. 

The method proposed to effect a settlement is that the 
League of Nations invite the governments of China and Japan 
to sift out their differences over Manchuria in an international 
advisory conference under League auspices, along with repre-
sentatives of pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese factions in Man-
churia and any such neutrals as may be agreed upon. The 
report also advoctes that the results of such a conference be 
embodied in (a) a declaration by China creating an autono-
mous government for the Manchurian provinces, (b) a Sino-
Japanese treaty defining Japanese interests, (c) a Sino-
Japanese treaty of conciliation and arbitration, non-aggression 
and mutual guarantees (similar to the Locamo Pact), and 
(d) a Sino-Japanese commercial treaty. 

Briefly stated, this report recognizes the just bases for 
Japanese discontent in Manchuria, and at the same time ex-
presses the belief that right and reason would assign the sov-
ereignty of that area to China, where the growth of a national 
state should be encouraged. The report rebukes Japan for 
her methods of aggression and recognizes the simple fact that 
although outside witnesses may be necessary to secure reason-
able adjustments, the major results must depend upon the 
agreement of China, Japan, and, to a large degree, of Russia. 

The gravity of the Far Eastern conflict and the importance 
of the trial of a new method of international settlement have 
surrounded the Lytton Commission report with great solemn-
ity. In the first week of the Geneva discussion, Japan rested 
her entire defense on the argument of self-defense, objected to 
discussion of Manchurian matters in detail, said Manchukuo 



56 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 56 

was a state created of its own volition rather than by Japanese 
action, and reasserted its position that only Japan and China 
together could arrive at an answer. Many unofficial repre-
sentatives of Japan have declared "Japan and China alone." 
It is significant, however, that although Japan made these 
statements, she made them in the Council of the League of 
Nations, an international forum, and her representative con-
sented to the transfer of the report to the Assembly and its 
Committee of Nineteen which has acted on the Far Eastern 
question with directness and authority. There was, soon, 
moreover, a direct international telephone and radio connec-
tion between the Japanese Foreign Office and its representa-
tive in Geneva. 

The Assembly of the League, after hearing the report of 
the Commission of Enquiry, and the Chinese and Japanese 
observations thereon, turned the documents over to the Com-
mittee of Nineteen, which subsequently tried to effect a settle-
ment between China and Japan. Not succeeding in this, the 
Committee of Nineteen drafted its own report to the Assembly 
and submitted it February 14, 1933. It was broadcast for 
ten hours from Geneva, February 17th. This report included 
the facts found by the Lytton Commission and by the con-
sular commission which reported on the Shanghai affair of the 
spring of 1932. It added a brief history of the events in Man-
churia between the submission of the Lytton report and Feb-
ruary, 1933. It accepted the ten principles for settlement in 
the Lytton report, after listing the Covenant of the League 
the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty among the prin-
ciples it must observe; it also accepted again the principle of 
non-recignition as stated by the United States, January 7 
1932, and by the Assembly of the League, March 11, 1932' 
It recommended the return of Japanese troops to the Railway 
Zone; the continuance of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria 
with self-government; the creation of an International Com-
mittee to arrange negotiations between Japan and China; the 
continuance of the policy of non-recognition of Manchukuo. 

The representatives of forty-four states were present in the 
Assembly when the vote was taken. Forty-two of them voted 
affirmatively to accept the report of the Committee of Nine-
teen; the effect of Siam's abstention from voting was affirma-
tive; Japan alone, her vote not counting, voted "no." The 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 57 

Japanese delegates had been left to themselves that day; and 
they filed out of the silent Assembly at the conclusion of the 
vote, while the other delegates remained in their seats, and 
offered no farewells. 

On February 24, the Committee of Nineteen was enlarged 
to Twenty-one, by the addition of Canada and the Nether-
lands; the next day the United States formally accepted an 
official invitation to cooperate with the reorganized committee 
to determine future policy. 

On June 14, 1933, this committee issued a circular letter 
of suggestions for the maintenance of the non-recognition 
policy, to the governments interested. The details of these 
recommendations involve, it is said, matters such as an em-
bargo on arms, the position of consular officers accredited to 
China, and the postal services of Manchukuo. 

Altogether, what has happened? As a distinguished 
American authority on international law points out, the League 
of Nations had successively five objectives: to halt hostilities, 
to restore the status quo ante, to obtain the fullest possible 
information, to conciliate Japan and China, and to crystallize 
world opinion.80 It was successful only in obtaining informa-
tion and in crystallizing opinion. The states of the world, by 
their vote in the Assembly of February 24, 1933, have actually 
named an aggressor—Japan. 

3. International Economic Sanctions. 

The major powers, whom peace will enable to readjust rela-
tions still strained from the last war, are pinning their hopes 
to the League of Nations. The League, formed as a means 
of obviating forcible settlement of international differences, in 
addition to providing machinery for preventing war, affords 
also a method for settling differences after conflict has begun, 
the method of consultation; it also permits the eventual use 
of a number of economic sanctions against an aggressor, among 
them the boycott, which Japan now says is itself war. From 
the beginning, France has urged that the League be given an 
actual military force of its own, to force acceptance of a Coun-
cil decision, but to this the powers have been unwilling to 

S0The Verdict of the League, Introduction by Manley O. Hudson, 
World Peace Foundation, 1933. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 58 

agree. Neither have they as yet applied any boycott. Inter-
national society has progressed beyond the point where force 
or threat of force could justify or vindicate the acts of a strong 
power, but has not yet reached the point where there is an 
automatic application of sanctions when a lawbreaker appears. 
Hitherto, conference and consultation have settled or delayed 
all disturbances which have not been submitted to arbitration 
or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 

What if no method of diplomatic settlement ends Japan's 
action in Manchuria? What if she persists in her present plan 
of action? There will then be three possible courses for the 
interested powers: (a) permitting Japan to thwart the legiti-
mate activities of all other nations and separate Manchuria 
from China by force, (b) going to war with Japan, (c) apply-
ing sanctions, such as an economic boycott. What will the 
League do? And the United States? 

It is quite evident that the affair is still in its early stages. 
Disorder is prevalent throughout the three Northeastern Prov-
inces, as well as in Jehol, Hopei, and other parts of North 
China. An unconnected revolt of Mohammedans and White 
Russians is spreading in the province of Sinkiang, bordering on 
Outer Mongolia. Chinese armies are disorganized, Chinese 
newspapers are beseeching action from their Nanking govern-
ment, and Chinese leaders, seemingly not knowing what policy 
to adopt in the medley of discordant advice, shrink from the 
responsibility for possible defeat in a war for which their 
armies are ill prepared and organized. The Advisory Com-
mittee of Twenty-one has been discussing measures for 
making the policy of non-recognition effective, and has re-
quested immediate response to its circular letter making such 
recommendations. Japan shows no sign of halting her military 
measures. The question now is what sanctions, if any, should 
be applied against a defined aggressor? 

A number of sanctions are possible; to wit, an embargo on 
arms and ammunition, the recall of diplomatic and consular 
agents, the refusal to permit the passage of mail stamped 
with the stamps of Manchukuo, a general embargo on ship-
ping exports to Japan, and a general boycott on imports from 
Japan. The education of public opinion in the two countries 
to see that of the world is another. Any one of these measures 
must receive general consent before being applied, because 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 59 

otherwise the state applying the sanctions would suffer rather 
than Tapan. An embargo on arms and ammunition, sucn as 
Great Britain applied without waiting for general consent 
would in the long run, harm China rather than Japan, which 
is better able to make its own ammunition. An embargo on 
arms must, moreover, include all material useful in making 
ammunition or war materials, such as copper, iron and cot-
ton. Recalling diplomatic representatives, if generally agreed 
to would isolate Japan but would also create a further barrier 
to'ultimate settlement, where the main consideration now is 
an immediately effective sanction. Refusal to accept the mail 
of Manchukuo would be far too mild and ineffective and would 
at the same time only tend to confuse matters Manchukuo, 
though it has applied for membership in the Universal Postal 
Union, has been ignored by that body. 

The education of public opinion within the disputing na-
tions obviously cannot be undertaken by other governments. 
Public opinion is now highly inflamed in each of them against 
the other. In neither Japan nor China, under effective censor-
ship, can the public be expected to have an opinion based on 
the consideration of real issues.81 , , , 

Many Japanese spokesmen for their country have declared 
she will never submit her Manchurian policy to any interna-
tional inspection. "To Japan this is a fighting matter, said 
one. "Is the United States willing to make it a fighting mat-
ter?'i>82 The correct answer is that it is not the province of the 
United States, but rather of the world community, to deter-
mine what measures will bring Japan to desist from her use 
of violence in defiance of her obligations. No one doubts now, 
in the face of the disorganization of Northeast Asia, that the 
Manchurian problem will have a long history unless the West-
ern nations make a drastic effort to settle it. That such effort 
should take the form of a boycott is indicated both by the 
effect upon Japan of the Chinese boycotts, and by the reaction 
in Japanese official circles to the bare threat of a world boycott. 

Nothing but a boycott by all would suffice. Without com-
mon consent a boycott would be a joke. The preponderance 
of opposition to Japanese policy in the Council and the Assem-

81 Russell, James T., and Wright, Quincy: National Attitudes on the 
Far Eastern Controversy. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., August, 1933, pp. 555-577. 

»2New York Times, February 26, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 60 

bly of the League, the vote of February 24, 1933, and the 
close approach of the United States to the League of Nations 
would seem to indicate that any sanctions recommended would 
be generally accepted. To make a sanction effective, the 
League of Nations, Russia and the United States should accept 
it. Russia is the most uncertain quantity, an important one. 
With our cooperation, however, the League seems to be ap-
proaching the question of a boycott; but only in the event that 
Japan continues to refuse other procedure, and that the policy 
of non-recognition proves ineffective. 

How extensive a boycott would be necessary? It should 
certainly include financial transactions, and the ordinary trade 
relationships. It would seem that a boycott on everything 
except possibly the sale of food might be necessary if the 
boycott is to be applied at this time. At this advanced stage 
in the military program, a simple boycott on military sup-
plies would not be enough, even though applied to Japan and 
not to China. 

There are a number of arguments against the boycott," 
which are here listed: 

(1) Some hold that a boycott against Japan would hurt the 
United States more than any other country. We get from 
her nearly all of our silk. We ship her nearly half of our 
cotton. Our silk workers and merchants and our cotton 
planters and merchants would be injured very much.83 Their 
injury would make the general depression worse. 

(2) Others believe that to make a boycott effective, the 
nations would have to blockade Japan, and a blockade would 
be fought by the Japanese navy and so we should have a world 
war anyway.84 

(3) Another argument is that the Japanese aggression and 
the seizure of Manchuria might be ended by less drastic inter-
national action than boycott, through the international deter-
mination not to recognize Japan's seizure of Manchuria as 
just, through negotiation with Japan and through a storm of 
public opinion against Japan, which Japan in her need of 
friends in Europe and the United States fears greatly. 

8SSee Figures of United States Department of Commerce, reviewed in 
New York Times, March 1, 1932. 

84See Hugh Byas, New York Times, February 26, 1932; Arthur 
Krock, New York Times, February 21, 1932. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 61 

(4) And an ethical argument against boycott is that it is 
a more dreadful weapon than war itself, against a people like 
the Japanese who rely so extensively upon importation of food 
and raw materials for manufactures; and therefore that a boy-
cott must be a weapon more remotely used than war itself. 
This asks indirectly the ethical question: Is a boycott a mor-
ally just instrument of action? 

In answer to the objections: (1) If a boycott would hurt 
the United States more than any other country, a future great 
war or even wholesale injustice without war in the Far East, 
and certainly the failure of the means of keeping the peace, 
would also hurt us more than any other country. Factually, 
the trade of Great Britain and of Russia is very important in 
China and Manchuria. (2) A blockade of Japan might not 
be needed to make a boycott effective. International closing 
of ports to Japanese imports and exports would not stop illicit 
shipments to and from Japan but it would stop enough of them 
to be effective. International refusal to carry on financial 
transactions would probably work faster still. (3) A simple 
warning to Japan that no one will recognize the new Man-
churian status does not seem to be enough. Long historical 
example has proved that simple non-recognition is not enough 
to remove an international difficulty. An example is Russia. 
For non-recognition to be successful, it must have some method 
of enforcement, some means of affecting the theoretically un-
known state; and the only important sanction short of war is 
a boycott.86 It is hard to see how Japan can be brought to 
end her Manchurian advance without greater pressure than the 
public opinion of foreign states, unless that public opinion has 
an instrument to make pressure felt. (4) As for the state-
ment that boycott is worse than war, it is enough to remem-
ber that war involves boycott, and that one of them could not 
be worse than both of them. 

Of the justice of a boycott as one of the steps to prevent 
an unjust war there can be no doubt. As a sanction and a 
method of retaliatory action it is recognized in international 

85The movement for a boycott has for a year been advocated by 
groups in the United States. It became extensive after a speech of Presi-
dent A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard, February 17, 1932. See New York 
Times, February 10th, 18th, 20th, 21st, 28th, March 1st, 2nd, and later, 
1932. There are also in the United States many advocates of non-
recognition. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 62 

law. It is one of the sanctions which the Covenant of the 
League of Nations contemplates using against recalcitrants to 
prevent any war and end injustice without fighting; or to 
compel settlement of an international difficulty in which fight-
ing has already begun. The report on International Ethics 
of our Association lists it among the measures which must be 
tried and found inadequate to effect justice before a nation 
can resort to the greater force of war. 

The Boycott Statement recently issued by the Ethics, Eco-
nomic Relations, and International Law and Organization 
Committees of the Catholic Association for International 
Peace states that ' 'a penalty short of war is necessary to pre-
vent war." The penalty that is "immediately effective in case 
war threatens or has been declared is the economic penalty of 
boycotting the nation which refuses arbitration or arbitral 
decision." 

The Statement urges also "that the United States lead in 
the agreement to consult with all other nations at the moment 
war threatens and then jointly with them boycott a warring 
nation" as "an important part of a process to change this 
world from a warring to a peaceful world." 

This affirms the truth that a boycott is allowable, by one 
nation against another or by one group of nations against 
another group or by all nations against one, when it is certain 
that it is applied against those who are acting unjustly in a 
matter of seriousness proportionate to the moral cost of the 
sanction, and when less grave measures of curing or preventing 
the injustice are inadequate. And as a lesser evil must be 
preferred to a greater one, it is obligatory to use the boycott 
if at all feasible as a means of keeping the peace before 
making war. 

Several assumptions underline this judgment that a bovcott 
is applicable in this case. One is that Japan is committing a 
crime not only against China but against international society, 
against world solidarity. Another is the deadly fear that 
every war nowadays may end in a world war; that the Jap-
anese-Chinese war may become a Japanese-Chinese-Russian 
war, and then, with who knows what alignments, a world war. 
Still a third is the belief that Japanese control of Manchuria 
will mean Japanese commercial monopoly of this area, which 
will give China over to international exploitation, which, in 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 63 

spite of similar American and European practice, is held to 
be wrong. 

The boycott against Japan is advocated to stop her deti-
nitely and surely in the injustice she is doing. I t was pos-
sible at the beginning of the Manchurian aggression for the 
League and the United States to have firmly and unwaveringly 
made up their minds to take two steps following each other 
quickly. The first would have been to tell Japan that she was 
the unjust aggressor and in violation of the Kellogg Pact, the 
Pacific treaties and morally rational international law, and that 
she must stop her aggression immediately. And they could 
have jointly agreed, failing the quick success of diplomatic 
sanction, to declare a world boycott against Japan. In these 
circumstances, the boycott would have been used quickly 
enough to have proved their determination to enforce interna-
tional obligations to keep the peace. 

That swiftness was probably impossible in the present con-
dition of the states of the world when their selfish national in-
terests pulled them apart, and their ability to act promptly 
was hampered by their extraordinary economic problems. The 
time that has passed has served to clarify the issue and to 
magnify the complexity of the Manchurian problem. I t is 
not too late, however, collectively to apply sanctions. I t is to 
be hoped that when and if a collective sanction is applied, an 
informed public opinion in the United States will insist on the 
recognition of moral values. 



APPENDIX A 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A — D O C U M E N T S AND ORIGINAL SOURCES 

X, The Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League 
of Nations. Washington, United States Government Printing 
Office. 1933. 

2. The Appeal of the Chinese Government, Supplementary Documents 
to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. Geneva, The 
League of Nations. 1932. 

3. Obesrvations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry. Geneva, The League of Nations. 1932 

4. Memoranda, presented to the Lytton Commission by V. K Welling-
ton Kao, assessor. 3 Vols. New York, The Chinese Cultural 
Society of New York. 1933. 

5. The League and Manchuria: The First Phase of the Chinese-
Japanese Conflict, September 18-30, 1931. Geneva Special Stud-
ies: Vol. 2, No. 10. (October, 1931.) 

. 6- ~ The Second Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict, Oc-
tober 1-24, 1931. Geneva Special Studies: Vol. 2, N o 11 
(November, 1931.) 

7- The Third Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict, October 
25-December 31, 1931. Geneva Special Studies: Vol. 2. No 12 
(December, 1931.) 

8. The Verdict of the League: China and Japan in Manchuria. Offi-
cial Documents with nates and an introduction by Manley O 
Hudson. Boston, World Peace Foundation. 1933. 

9. Japan's Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute, as presented before the 
special session of the Assembly of the League of Nations 

„T £ e n e v a ' Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations. 1933. 
10. MacMurray, John Van Antwerp: Treaties and Agreements with and 

Concermg China. New York, Oxford University Press. 1921 
11. Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1930. Dairen, The 

South Manchuria Railway Co. 1931. 
12. Public Opinion Towards the Report of the League Enquiry Com-

mission on Sino-Japanese Disputes. Issued by the International 
Relations Committee, No. S Moa-tan Street, Nanking, China. 

B—SECONDARY W O R K S 

Arnold, Julian, Norton, H. H„ and Woodhead, H. G. W.: Occidental In-
terpretations of the Far Eastern Problem. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 1925. 

Blakeslee George H.: The Pacific Area, an International Survey. Boston, 
World Peace Foundation. 1929. 

Clark, Grover: Economic Rivalries in China. New Haven Yale Uni 
versity Press. 1932. 

Condliffe, J. B.: China Today, Economic. Boston, World Peace Founda-

64 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 65 

Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia. New York, Macmillan. 
1922. 

Feis, Herbert: The International Trade of Manchuria. New York, 
Carnegie Endowment. 1931. 

Foster, John W.: American Policy in the Orient. New York, Houghton 
Mifflin. 1926. 

Holcombe, R. N.: The Chinese Revolution. Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 1930. 

Hornbeck, Stanley K.: China Today: Political. Boston, World Peace 
Foundation. 1927. 

Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl: Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis. 
New York, Macmillan. 1932. 

: Manchukuo, Child of Conflict. New York, Macmillan. 1933. 
Kuo, P. W. and Soyejima, Count Michimasa: Oriental Interpretation of 

the Far Eastern Problem. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
192S. 

Lattimore, Owen: Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict. New York, Macmillan. 
1932. 

Latourette, K. S.: A History of Christian Missions in China. New 
York, Macmillan. 1929. 

Mears, Eliot Grinnel: Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 1928. 

Morse, Hosea B., and MacNair, H. F.: Far Eastern International Rela-
tions. New York, Houghton Mifflin. 1931. 

Moulton, Harold G.: Japan. Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution. 
1931. 

Orchard, John E.: Japan's Economic Position. New York, McGraw 
Hill. 1931. 

Remer. C. F.: Foreign Investments in China. New York, Macmillan. 
1933. 

Sokolsky, Gèorge E.: The Tinder Box of Asia. New York, Doubleday 
Doran. 1932. 

Vinacke, Harold M.: History of the Far East in Modern Times. New 
York, Knopf. 1928. 

Ware, Edith E.: Business and Politics in the Far East. New Haven, 
Yale University Press. 1932. 

Willoughby, W. W.: Foreign Rights and Interests in the Far East. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. 1927. (Rev. ed.) 

Wright, Philip G.: The American Tariff and Oriental Trade. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 1931. 

Wu, Chao Wang: The International Aspects of the Missionary Move-
ment in China. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. 1930. 

Young, C. Walter: The International Relations of Manchuria. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 1929. 

: Japan's Special Position in Manchuria. (3 Vols.) 
Vol. 1. Title of Series. 
Vol. 2. The International Legal Status of the Kwantung Leased 

Territory. 
Vol. 3. Japanese Jurisdiction in the South Manchurian Rail-

way Area. 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. 1928. 



66 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 66 

FOREIGN POX-ICY REPORTS 

Bisson, T. A.: Basic Treaty Issues in Manchuria Between Japan and 
China. F. P. R. VII, No. 21, December 23, 1931. 

: Railway Rivalries in Manchuria Between China and Japan. 
F. P. R. VIII, No. 3, part 1, April 13, 1932. 

: Japan and Manchukuo. F. P. R. VIII, No. 8, June 22, 1932. 
: The Rise of Fascism in Japan. F. P. R. VIII, No. 17, Oc-

tober 26, 1932. 
Buell, Raymond Leslie: The Weakness of Peace Machinery, F. P. R. 

VIII, No. 14, September 14, 1932. 
*—: International Action on the Lytton Report. F. P. R. VIII, 

No. 18, November 9, 1932. 
• •: American Policy Toward the Sino-Japanese Dispute. F. P. R. 

VIII, No. 24, February 1, 1933. 
de Wilde, J. C.: The League and the Sino-Japanese Dispute. F. P. R. 

VIII, No. 10, July 20, 1932. 
Dean, Vera Micheles: The Soviet Union and Japan in the Far East. 

F. P. R. VIII, No. 12. August 17, 1932. 

PERIODICAL ARTICLES 

Symposium: The Far East. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. Vol. CXXII, No. 211, November," 
1925. 

Symposium: American Policy in the Pacific. The Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 168, July, 1933. 

Dennett, Tyler: Japan Defies the World. Current History, April, 1933. 
Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro: The Permanent Bases of Japanese Foreign 

Policy. Foreign Affairs, January, 1933. 
Russell, James T. and Wright, Quincy: National Attitudes on the Far 

Eastern Controversy. American Political Science Review. Vol. 
XXVII, No. 4, August, 1933. 

Wright, Quincy: The Manchurian Crisis. American Political Science Re-
view. Vol. XXVI, No. 1, February, 1932. 

The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932. American Journal of 
International Law. Vol, XXVI, No. 2, April, 1932. 

: Collective Rights and Duties for the Enforcement of Treaty 
Obligations. Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 
April 28-30, 1932. 

: The Meaning of the Pact of Paris. American Journal of In-
ternational Law. Vol. X X V n , No. 1, January, 1933. 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 67 

APPENDIX B 

N. C. W. C. Study Club Outline 

M A N C H U R I A , T H E P R O B L E M I N T H E F A R E A S T 

(Printed by Permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee) 

Lesson I 

G E N E R A L A S P E C T S O F T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N 

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. The Beginning of the Present Trouble. (1) Relation of Nakamura incident to present Sino-Japanese 
difficulties. 

(2) Stability of settlement of Manchuria. 
(3) Resources of Manchuria. 
(4) Countries interested in Manchuria. 
(5) Origin of present trouble. 

2. The Creation of Manchukuo. (See map.) 
• (1) Creation, status and government of Manchukuo. 

(2) Its relations with China, with Japan. 
(3) Evidences of its independence, its popularity. 
(4) Findings in the report of the Lytton Commission. 

QUESTIONS 

1. How did the present trouble begin? 
2. How soon, and in what way, did other states become interested? 

The League of Nations? . 
3. How does Japan explain her action? What is the Chinese point 

of view? 
4. What international action was taken to clear up the trouble? 

PAPERS 

1. The Economic Resources of Manchuria. 
2. The Geographical Background of Manchuria. 
3. 'The Incidents of September 18, 1931. 

4. The Creation and Character of Manchukuo. 

Lesson II 

P O L I T I C A L A S P E C T S O F T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N 

TOPICS FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. The Governments of China and Japan. 
(1) Importance of banditry as a cause of the conflict. 
(2) Causes and recent developments of banditry in China and 

Manchuria. 
(3) Character and strength of government of China. 
(4) Comparison with government of Japan. 
(5) Character of Chinese boycott. 



68 Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 68 

2. The National Policies of the European States. 
(1) Comparison of the national policies of the European coun-

tries, the United States, and Japan in the Far East. 
(2) Russia as a factor in the solution of the difficulty. 
(3).Recent relationship between Russia and Japan. 

QUESTIONS 

1. When and how was the Chinese boycott applied in this case? 
By whom? 

2. How long has the "Open Door" policy been important? Why? 
3. Who are the major advocates of the aggressive policy in Japan ? 
4. Study from map proximity and comparative sizes of countries 

surrounding Manchukuo. What are population and strength of each? 

PAPERS 

1. The Weakness of China as a Factor in the Manchurian Situation. 
2. The National Policy of Russia in the Far East. 
3. The "Open Door"—Its Importance in Far Eastern Diplomacy. 
4. Banditry and Boycott in Manchuria. 

Lesson III 

E C O N O M I C A S P E C T S O F T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N • 

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 

and Trade Questions. 
Summary of restrictions on land ownership in Manchuria 

to 1931. 
Effect of these on position of the Japanese. Their new po-

sition. 
Origin of settlers of Manchuria. Date of their coming. 
Importance of trade question in present situation. 

QUESTIONS 

1. To what degree is the prospect of Japanese immigration part of 
the problem? 

2. Explain the part played by trade conditions in the present Far 
Eastern controversy. 

3. What are the differences in the trade of China and of Manchuria? 
The likenesses? 

4. Compare the interests of the European powers and of the United 
States in the trade of China, Japan and Manchuria. 

5. What is the present trend of the Japanese campaign for markets? 
For what .purposes? 

PAPERS 

1. Trade as a Factor in the Manchurian Situation. 
2. Summary of Economic Issues and Major Points Under Each One 
3. Immigration since the Manchurian Troubles. 
4. Effects on Land Ownership. 

1. Land 
( 1 ) 

(2) 

(3) 
(4) 



Manchuria—The Problem, in the Far East 69 

Lesson IV 
E C O N O M I C A S P E C T S O F T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N 

(Continued) 
TOPICS FOR D I S C U S S I O N 

1. Railroad Questions. (See map.) 
(1) Previous ownership of railroads in Manchuria. 
(2) Terms under which railroads were originally built. Financ-

ing of railroad building. 
• (3) Relation between railroads and the boycott. 

(4) Position of Russia regarding recent developments in Chinese 
Eastern Railway. 

QUESTIONS 

1. In what degree were the railroads in Manchuria competitive? 
2. What changes have the years 1931-33 made in the running of these 

railroads ? 
3. Why is the Chinese Eastern Railway of particular importance just 

now? 
4. Relation of present railway situation to world problems. 

PAPERS 

1. The Importance of the South Manchuria Railway to Japan. 
2. The Construction and Operation of the Chinese Eastern Railways. 
3. Railroad Rivalry as a Factor in the Manchurian Situation. 

Lesson V 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L A S P E C T S O F T H E M A N C H U R I A N S I T U A T I O N 

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. Japanese present policy in Manchuria—its conflict or accord with 
her rights and duties under collective agreements. 

2. Major points in Report of Lytton Commission. Official authority 
of Commission. 

3. Moral and ethical questions involved in Manchurian situation. 
Rights and wrongs of both parties. 

QUESTIONS 

1. What did the Commission consider to be the rights and wrongs of 
the situation ? 

2. Summarize its suggestions for improving conditions in the Far 
East. 

3. What is the present position of the interested powers? Of China 
and Japan? Of the League of Nations? 

4. What, if anything, can yet be done to secure justice, or a greater 
measure of justice, in the Far East? 

PAPERS 

1. The Lytton Commission—Its Creation, Its Powers, Its Methods. 
2. The Lytton Report—Its Conclusions and Its Adoption. 
3. The Question of International Boycott—Its Merits and Defects. 



The Catholic Association f o r International Peace 

Honorary President 

M O S T R E V . T H O M A S F . L I L L I S , D . D . 

P A R K E R T . M O O N , President 

Vice-Presidents 

M R S . GEORGE E . BRENNAN 

M R S . W I L L I A M J . B U S H E A 

MARIE J . CARROLL 

R E V . FRANCIS J . HAAS, Ex-Officio 

FREDERICK P . K E N K E L 

R E V . J O H N LAFARGE, S . J . 

REV. L I N U S A . LILLY, S . J . 

REV. ROBERT E . LUCEY 

REV. CHARLES C . MILTNER, C . S . C . 

HERBERT WRIGHT 

MARIE R . MADDEN, Treasurer 

ELIZABETH B . SWEENEY, Executive Secretary 

Ethics—RIGHT REV. J O H N A . R Y A N , Chairman 

Law and Organization—CHARLES G . F E N W I C K , Chairman 

Economic Relations—PARKER T . M O O N , Chairtnan 

Agriculture—REV. EDGAR SCHMIEDELER, O . S . B . , Chairman 

History—JOHN TRACY ELLIS, Chairman 

Peace Education—RIGHT REV. J . M . WOLFE, Chairman 

National Attitudes—CARLTON J . H . HAYES, Chairman 

Disarmament—REV. DONALD A . MACLEAN, Chairman 

V. S. Dependencies—WILLIAM F . MONTAVON, Chairman 

Latin America—ANNA D I L L GAMBLE, Chairman 

Europe—REV. JOSEPH F . THORNING, S . J . , Chairman 

Asia—ELIZABETH M . L Y N S K E Y , Chairman 

Ktissia—REV. R . A . M C G O W A N , Chairman 

Canada—REV. MAURICE S . S H E E H Y , Chairman 







THE Catholic Association for International Peace has grown 
out of a series of meetings during 1926-1927. Following 

the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago in 1926, representatives of 
a dozen nations met with Americans for discussion. In October 
of the same year a meeting was held in Cleveland where a 
temporary organization called The Catholic Committee on In-
ternational Relations was formed. The permanent name, The 
Catholic Association for International Peace, was adopted at a 
two-day Conference in Washington in 1927. Annual Con-
ferences were held in the same city in 1928, 1929, 1930 and 
1933; in New York City, 1931; and in Cleveland, 1932. All-
day regional Conferences took place in Chicago on Armistice 
Day, 1930, in St. Louis on Washington's Birthday, 1932, and 
at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, on 
November 19, 1933. It is a membership organization. Its 
objects and purposes are: 

To study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and 
Christian charity to international problems of the day; 

To consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may 
be proposed or advocated in the international sphere; 

To examine and consider issues which bear upon international 
goodwill; 

To encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study 
circles; 

To issue reports on questions of international importance; 
To further, in cooperation with similar Catholic organizations in 

other countries, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the 
object and purposes of world peace and happiness. 

The ultimate purpose is to promote, in conformity with the mind 
of the Church, "the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ." 

The Association works through the preparation of com-
mittee reports. Following careful preparation, these are dis-
cussed both publicly and privately in order to secure able re-
vision and they are then published by the organization. Ad-
ditional committees will be created from time to time. The 
Association solicits the membership and cooperation of Cath-
olics of like mind. It is seeking especially the membership and 
cooperation of those whose experience and studies are such that 
they can take part in the preparation of committee reports. 

The Committees on Ethics, Law and Organization, and 
Economic Relations serve as a guiding committee on the par-
ticular questions for all other committees. Questions involving 
moral judgments must be submitted to the Committee on 
Ethics. 



Publications of the Catholic Associa-
tion for International Peace 

P a m p h l e t S e r i e s — 
N o . 1—International Ethics. 
N o . 2—Latin America and the U n i t e d States. 
N o . 3—Causes of W a r , and Security, Old and N e w . 
N o . A—Haiti, P a s t and P r e s e n t [out of print]. 
N o . 5—Francis de Vitoria. 
No. 6 — A m e r i c a n Agriculture and International Affairs. 
N o . 7 — P o r t o Rico and the U n i t e d States. 
No. 8 — E u r o p e and the U n i t e d S t a t e s — E l e m e n t s in Their 

Relationship. 
N o . 9 — T h e E t h i c s of W a r . 
N o . 10—National A t t i t u d e s in Children. 
N o . 11—Tariffs and W o r l d Peace. 
N o . 12—Manchuria—The P r o b l e m in the Far East. 
N o . 13—International E c o n o m i c Life. 
N o . 14—The Church and P e a c e Efforts. 

M i s c e l l a n e o u s S e r i e s — 
T h e W o r l d State. 
Permanent Peace P r o g r a m of P o p e B e n e d i c t X V . 
A p p e a l s for P e a c e of P o p e B e n e d i c t X V and P o p e P i u s X I . 
P e a c e Trends. 

R e p o r t s i n P r e p a r a t i o n — 
A m e r i c a n Intervention in S a n t o D o m i n g o . 
Nationalism. 
I s W a r Justifiable T o d a y ? 
Disarmament and Catholic Doctrine. 
T h e W o r l d Court. 
T h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . 
International Cultural Relations. 
P e a c e Education. 
S o - c a l l e d "Over-Population." 
Catholicism-r-the K e y n o t e of P a n - A m e r i c a n i s m . 
French-Italian Relations. 
W o r l d C o o p e r a t i o n — S y m p o s i u m . 

N. C. W. C. J o i n t C o m m i t t e e o n P e a c e — 
P e a c e S t a t e m e n t s of R e c e n t P o p e s .