Problems of the age


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PROBLEMS
OF THE AGE
Very R^v. A. F. HEWIT, D.D., Paulist

NEW YORK

THE PAULIST PRESS
120 West 6oth Street



THE MASS AND T
CHRISTIAN LIFE
Adapted from the French of Mgr. de Gibergues.

A most admirable work by the Bishop of Vale
on the nature, the meaning, the scope, the pov

and the influence of the Mass.

Excellent spiritual reading.

“A volume of just ioo pages, it contains a wealth of solid
struction and spiritual nutriment which cannot fail of deeper,
the appreciation of the faithful for the Holy Sacrifice and of
tensifying their devotion.”—Ecclesiastical Review.

“This little volume makes excellent spiritual reading, attejil
ing as it does to bring home in full to the Catholic mind what
Mass is and what place it should have in our life.”—Ave Mam

A small sized volume of 104 pages.

Bound in cloth, 60 cents.

Postage, 8 cents.

THE PAULIST PRESS
120 WEST 60TH STREET NEW YO











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Problems of the Age

BY THE

Very Rev. Augustine F. Hewit, D.D.
Ofthe Congregation of St. Paul

“Fides qucerens intellectual ”

S. Anselm.

SIXTH EDITION

NEW YORK

THE PAULIST PRESS
120 WEST 6oth STREET

1920





PREFACE.

1 he volume herewith presented to the pub-

lic contains two distinct essays, treating, how-

ever, of identical or closely connected topics
;

each of which has been already separately pub-

lished in the pages of a periodical. The first

essay is republished from The Catholic World.

It is entitled as it is, because it professes to dis-

cuss questions of difficulty and moment which

are subjects of much interest and inquiry in

our own time. The special problems discussed

relate to the harmony and analogy between

natural or rational theology and certain doc-

trines of revealed or supernatural theology.

After waiting for some time in order to reex-

amine what I have written, and to profit by the



2 Preface.

criticisms of others, I have deemed it to be

suitable for publication in a permanent form,

with some few alterations from the original

text. I have subtracted from the beginning of

the essay that portion which treated of the pure

philosophy of the idea, because the statements

contained in it were too succinct and concise to

be satisfactory in regard to a topic so important

and so much controverted. I have also added

to the chapter which treats of original sin some

further explanations of the exposition I have

given, derived from the works of standard theo-

logians. With these exceptions, the alterations

are but trivial. I have spared no pains to con-

form my explication of theological and philoso-
phical doctrines to the authoritative standard

of Catholic teaching. In regard to open ques-

tions, I have avoided all that might provoke

controversy, except in so far as I have thought

it necessary to my purpose to propose the opi-
nions of a specific school

;
and in all cases I

have endeavored to observe due respect toward

those who maintain different opinions.

The essay on the doctrine of St. Augustine,

originally published in The New- York Tablet,



Preface. 3

is added to the Problems of the Age in this
volume, on account of the intimate connection

of the topics treated in it with those discussed

in the latter. An explanation of its scope and
design is given in the introductory chapter, and

need not be repeated here. Some portions of

it are a repetition of what has been said in an-

other form in the Problems of the Age, a cir-

cumstance due to the fact that it was written

as an independent essay. These subjects are,

however, so abstruse in themselves, that I have

not thought this repetition of the same ideas in

a distinct connection a fault requiring to be

corrected, but rather, perhaps, an advantage.

In my translations I have aimed only at a lite-
ral and intelligible rendering, without attempt-

ing elegance, and I have abstained from swell-

ing the size of the volume with the Latin text,

because it is so easily accessible to scholars. I

have brought the most ancient and the most

modern school of Catholic theology into jux-

taposition in these two essays, in order to show

both the identity of the dogmas of faith in all

ages, from the remotest to the one actually pre-

sent; and also the progress made in the evolu-



4 Preface.

tion of the philosophy of the dogmas as time

goes on. Having completed my task, I leave
what I have written in the hands of the Author

of all wisdom, hoping that it may promote the

intellectual and spiritual profit of that class of

readers for whose benefit it is intended.

A. F. H.

St. Paul’s, New York, May 20, 1868.



PROBLEMS OF THE AGE.

CONTENTS.
%

CHAPTER I.

Introductory,

CHAPTER II.

Relation of the Credible Object to the Creditive Subject, -

CHAPTER III.

The Being of God the first article of the Creed, -

CHAPTER IV.

The Revelation of the Supernatural Order, and its relation to the

primitive idea of Reason, - - - - •

CHAPTER V.

The Trinity of Persons included in the One Divine Essence,

CHAPTER VI.

The dogma of Creation—The Principle, Archetype, and End of
the Creative Act,

CHAPTER VII.

The End of Creation metaphysically final—The ascending series
of grades in existence—The summit of this series is a nature
hypostatically united to the Divine Nature of the Word—The
Incarnation, the creative act carried to the apex of possibility

—The supernatural end to which the universe is destined com-
pleted in the Incarnation,

PAGH

9

14

23

45

76

101

112



6 Contents.

chapter ym.
PACK

A further explanation of the Supernatural Order, • - - 134

CHAPTER IX.

The State of Probation, Its reason and nature—The Trial of the
Angels, - -- -- 168

CPIAPTER X.

The Original State of the First Parents of Mankind—The rela-
tion of Adam to his posterity—The Fall of Man—Original Sin, 203

CHAPTER XI.

The Mystery of Redemption, 250

CHAPTER XII.

The Catholic Church, as the instrument of the Sanctification of
the Human Race, 257

CHAPTER XIII.

The Final Destination of Angels and Men—Condition of the Un-
regenerate in the Future Life—Eternity of the Penalty of Sin
—The State of Final Beatitude, 268



Problems of the Age.

HE object of this work is to present a solution,
derived from the principles of the Catholic faith,

of certain problems with which the minds of many per-
sons in the present age are occupied and perplexed.

Those who are destitute of Catholic faith evidently
possess no solution of these problems which satisfies

themselves, wherefore they are always in a state of

intellectual unrest, ever seeking and never able to

come to a knowledge of the truth. On the contrary,
those who have received the principles of Catholic
faith in their early education, and have preserved

them uncorrupted by scepticism, possess in these

principles a solution for all these problems which is

perfectly tranquillizing to the mind, and prevents it

from being disquieted by an anxious and ineffectual

search after a solution.* If they desire to investi-

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

* Vide Questions of the Soul. By Rev. I. T. Hecker.



io Problems of lhe Age.

gate these problems in a more scientific manner, the
same principles of faith enable them to obtain results
which satisfy the intellect and increase the limits of
rational knowledge. If these principles are objec-

tively true and certain, that is, founded in the order

of being and eternal reality, they can be justified on
rational grounds, they can be proved to have a root

in the constitutive rational principles of the human
mind, and they can, therefore, be so presented to a

mind destitute of them that it will be logically able
to accept them, and strictly bound by its own intrin-
sic laws to do so. In order to do this completely, it

is necessary to exhibit both the extrinsic and intrinsic

credibility and reasonableness of the Catholic faith.

The first is done by a formal demonstration, begin-
ning from the first principles of natural theology and

proceeding through the evidences of revelation to

the proof of the authority of the church, and of the

fact that all the dogmas she proposes are actually

revealed by God to be received as true on the divine

veracity. There are many admirable works present-
ing these extrinsic evidences of the Catholic faith in

the most complete manner. We do not propose to
attempt the task of adding another to the number,

nor do we cherish the smallest intention of attempt-
ing to supplant the method which they follow. We
desire to present the intrinsic credibility and reason-

ableness of the Catholic faith, in order to remove

certain difficulties in the way of apprehending and

believing its extrinsic evidences. In doing so, we fol-

low a method which seems to us the best suited to



Problems of the Age. 1

1

our special purpose. We begin by taking the Catholic
believer or creditive subject, as he really is from the

first dawn of reason, in actual contact with the credi-

ble object or the Catholic faith. If his undoubting

certitude respecting that which the church proposes

t) his belief is a rational certitude based on rational

aid real objective verity, and not a mere subjective

mode of his own mind, the rationality of this certi-
tude can be made evident from principles of reason.

The child truly and infallibly knows something, which
is a sufficient motive and ground of his truly and in-

fallibly believing something else. Therefore, if he

grows up into a philosopher and theologian, the ulti-

matum of his knowledge and faith must be a mere
explication of that which he knew and believed as
a child. Its root must be in his reason itself, as

elevated and enlightened by the gift of faith. The
first complete act of his reason on divine truth,

evoked and perfected by divine grace, must contain

implicitly all that is evolved in the last and highest

act of the same reason. If he were capable of ex-

plaining this first act at the time he made it, he
would be able to justify it on rational grounds and

prove its infallibility or unerring certitude, just as

clearly as he justifies that which he affirms to be di-

vine truth when he becomes a consummate theolo-

gian. The child cannot do it while he is a child, but
we may attempt to do it for him

;
that is, to go back

to the first constitutive principles of reason, to its

most incipient and elementary acts, to find there

the ground of the rationality of faith, and follow



12 Problems of the Age.

up its growth into the stage of complete develop-

ment.

We invite the really earnest and candid reader,
therefore, to permit us to propose to him the Catho-

lic faith as a hypothesis supposed to be known from

the beginning
;
and we will endeavor to prove to him

that, this hypothesis being given, it is in accordance

with reason. We invite him to take the viewing
point of a Catholic believer, and endeavor to get the

perspective of one brought up in the church. We
do not ask him to take anything for granted of

which he is not already convinced. We will endea-
vor to show the internal coherence and symmetry of

the Catholic doctrines, and their correspondence or

analogy with rational truths. For extrinsic evidences

of Christianity and the church we refer him else-
where, or suppose him already partially or completely

informed. If he is a Protestant, less or more con-

formed in his belief to the standard of Catholic or-

thodoxy, he will proceed with us a certain distance

without questioning, and may find some considerations
not without weight presented to his mind to induce

him to go further
;
if he is an unbeliever, he will find

that the rational formula, out of whose charmed cir-

cle he cannot think, is made the basis of demonstra-

tion for the revealed or Christian formula, and a syn-

thesis constructed which binds the two into one co-

herent whole. The Catholic reader will find that
idea which he already possesses presented to his in-

tellect, it is hoped, in such a way as to aid him in

apprehending its conformity with all that is true and



Problems of the Age. 13

sublime in the conceptions of reason and the deduc-

tions of philosophy
;

to aid him not in believing

more firmly, but in understanding more clearly the

truths of the Catholic faith which are the precious

heritage of his baptism.



CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF THE CREDIBLE OBJECT TO THE
CREDITIVE SUBJECT.

I
ET us begin with a child, or a simple, unedu-
cated adult, who is in a state of perpetual child-

hood as regards scientific knowledge. Let us take

him as a creditive subject or Christian believer, with

the credible object or Catholic faith in contact with

his reason from its earliest dawn. Before proceeding

formally to analyze his creditive act, we will illustrate
it by a supposed case.

Let us suppose that, when our Lord Jesus Christ
was upon earth, he went to visit a pagan in order to

instruct him in the truths of religion. We will sup-
pose him to be intelligent, upright, and sincere, with

as much knowledge of religious truth as was ordina-
rily attainable through the heathen tradition. Let

us suppose him to receive the instructions of -Christ

with faith, to.be baptized, and to remain ever after a

firm and undoubting believer in the Christian doc-

trine. Now, by what process does he attain a ration-

al certitude of the truth of the revelation made by

the lips of Christ ?

In the first place, the human wisdom and virtue ci



Problems of the Age. 15

our Lord are intelligible to him by the human nature
common to both, and in proportion to his own per-
sonal wisdom and goodness. Having in himself, by

virtue of his human nature, the essential type of
human goodness, he is able to recognize the excel-
lence of one in whom it is carried to its highest pos-
sible perfection. The human perfection visible in

Jesus Christ predisposes him to believe his testimony.

The testimony that Jesus Christ bears of himself is
that he is the Son of God. This declaration includes

two propositions. The chief term of the first propo-
sition is “ God.” The chief term of the second pro-
position is “ Jesus Christ.” The first term includes
all that can be understood by the light of reason con-

cerning the Creator and his creative act. The second
term includes all that can be apprehended by the

light of faith concerning the interior relations of God,

the incarnation of the Son or Word, the entire super-

natural order included in it, and the entire doctrine

revealed by Christ. The idea expressed by the first
term is already in the mind of the pagan, as the first

and constitutive principle of his reason. His reflec-

tive consciousness of this idea and his ability to make
a correct and complete explication of its contents

are very imperfect. But, when the distinct affirma-
tion and explication of the idea of God are made
to him by one who possesses a perfect knowledge of
God, he has an immediate and certain perception of

the truth of the conception thus acquired by his in-

telligence. God has already affirmed himself to his
reason, and Christ, in affirming God to his intellect,



t6 Problems of the Age.

has onh repealed and manifested by sensible images,
and in distinct, unerring language, this original af-

firmation.

It is otherwise with the affirmation which Christ

makes respecting the second term. God does not af-
firm to his reason by the creative act the internal re-

lations of Father and Son, completed by the third, or

Holy Spirit, and therefore, although the Trinity is a ne-

cessary truth, and in itself intelligible as such, it is not

intelligible as a necessary truth to his intellect. The
incarnation, redemption, and other mysteries affirmed

to him by Christ are not in themselves necessary

truths, but only necessary on the supposition that

they have been decreed by God. The certitude of
belief in all this second order of truths rests, there-

fore, entirely on the veracity of God, authenticating

the affirmation of his own divine mission made by

Jesus Christ. We must, therefore, suppose that this
affirmation is made to the mind of the pagan with

such clear and unmistakable evidence of the fact that

the veracity of God is pledged to its truth, that it
would be irrational to doubt it. Catholic doctrine

also requires us to suppose that Christ imparts to him

a supernatural grace, as the principle of a divine faith

and a divine life based upon it. The nature and effect

of this grace must be left for future consideration.

These truths received on the faith of the testimony

of the Son of God by the pagan are not, however,
entirely unintelligible to his natural reason. We can
suppose our Lord removing his difficulties and mis-

apprehensions, showing him that these truths do not



Problems of the Age. 17

contradict reason, but harmonize with it as far as it

goes, and pointing out to him certain analogies in the

natural order which render them partially apprehen-

sible by his intellect. Thus, while his mind cannot

penetrate into the substance of these mysteries, or

grasp the intrinsic reason of them after the mode of
natural knowledge, it can nevertheless see them in-

directly, as reflected in the natural order, and by re-

semblance, and rests its undoubting belief of them

on the revelation made by Jesus Christ, attested by
the veracity of God.

In this supposed case, the pagan has the Son of

God actually before his eyes, and with his own ears
can hear his words. This is the credible object. He
is made inwardly certain that he is the Son of God
by convincing evidence and the illustration of divine

grace. This is the creditive subject, in contact with
,

the credible object. It exemplifies the process by

which God has instructed the human race from the
beginning, a process carried on in the most perfect

and successful manner in the instance we are about
to examine of a child brought up in the Catholic

Church.

The mind of the child has no prejudices and no
imperfect conceptions derived from a perverted and

defective instruction to be rectified. Its soul is in

the normal and natural condition. The grace of faith
is imparted to it in baptism, so that the rational fa-

culties unfold under its elevating and strengthening

influence with a full capacity to elicit the creditive

act as soon as they are brought in contact with the



1 8 Problems of the Age.

credible object. This credible object, in the case of

the child, a.s in that of the pagan, is Christ revealing

himself and the Father. He reveals himself, how-
ever, not by his visible form to the eye, or his audible

word to the ear, but by his mystical body the church,

which is a continuation and amplification of his incar-

nation. The church is visible and audible to the
child as soon as his faculties begin to open. At first
this is only in an imperfect way, as Jesus Christ was

at first only known in an imperfect way to the pagan
above described. As he merely knew Christ at first
as a man, and in a purely human way, so the child
receives the instruction of his parents, teachers, and

pastors, in whom the church is represented, in regard
to the truths of faith, just as he does in regard to

common matters. He begins with a human faith,
founded in the trusting instincts of nature, which in-

cline the young to believe and obey their superiors.

As soon as his reason is capable of understanding
the instruction given him, he is able to discover the

strong probability of its truth. He sees this dimly
at first, but more and more clearly as his mind unfolds,

and the conception of the Catholic Church comes be-

fore it more distinctly. Some will admit that even a
probability furnishes a sufficient motive for eliciting

an act of perfect faith. According to their theory,

the undoubting firmness of the act of faith is caused

by an imperate act of the will determining the intel-

lect to adhere firmly to the doctrine proposed, as re-

vealed by God. There are many, however, who will

not be satisfied with this, and we acknowledge that



Problems of the Age. *9

we are of the number. It appears to us that the
mind must have indubitable certitude that God has

revealed the truth in order to a perfect act of faith.

Therefore we believe that the mind of the child pro-
ceeds from the first apprehension of the probability

that God has revealed the doctrines of faith to a cer-
titude of the fact, and that, until it reaches that point,

its faith is a human faith, or an inchoate faith, merely.
The ground and nature of that certitude will be dis-

cussed hereafter. In the meantime, it is sufficient to

remark that the child or other ignorant person appre-

hends the very same ground of certitude in faith with

the mature and educated adult, only more impli-

citly and obscurely, and with less power to reflect

on his own acts. Just as the child has the same cer-
tainty of facts in the natural order with an adult, so

it has the same certainty of facts in the supernatural

order. When we have once established the proper
ground of human faith in testimony in general, and
of the certitude of our rational judgments, we have
no need of a particular application to the case of

children. It is plain enough that, so soon as their ra-

tional powers are sufficiently developed, they must

act according to this universal law. So in regard to
faith. When we have established in general its con-
stitutive principles, it is plain that the mind of the
child, just as soon as it is capable of eliciting an act

of faith, must do it according to these principles.

We do not, however, deny that grace may enable the
mind to apprehend that motives of assent which are

merely probable to unaided reason are really certain.



20 Problems of the Age.

The length of time, and the number of preparatory
acts requisite, before the mind of a child is fully capa-

ble of eliciting a perfect act of faith, cannot be accu-

rately determined, and may vary indefinitely. It may
require years, months, or only a few weeks, days, or

hours. Whenever it does elicit this perfect act, the
intelligible basis of the creditive act may be expressed
by the formula, Christus creat ecclesiam

*

In the

church, which is the work of Christ and his medium
or instrument for manifesting himself, the person and

the doctrine of Christ are disclosed. In the first term

of the formula, Christus, is included another proposi-

tion, namely, Christus est Filius Dei.\ Finally, in the

last term of the second proposition is included a third,

Dens est creator mundi.% The whole may be combined
into one formula, which is only the first one expli-

cated, Christus
,
Filius Dei

,
qui est creator mundi

,
creat

ecclesiam.§ In this formula we have the synthesis of

reason and faith, of philosophy and theology, of nature

and grace. It is the formula of the natural and su-

pernatural worlds, or rather of the natural universe,

elevated into a supernatural order and directed to a

supernatural end. In the order of instruction, Eccle-

sia comes first, as the medium of teaching correct

conceptions concerning God, Christ, and the relations

in which they stand toward the human race. These

* Christ creates the church,

t Christ is the Son of God.

t God is the creator of the world.

§ Christ, the Son of God, who is the creator of the world, creates

the church.



Problems of the Age. 21

conceptions may be communicated in positive instruc-

tion in any order that is convenient. When they are
arranged in their proper logical relation, the first in

order is Deas creat mundum
,
including all our rational

knowledge concerning God. The second is Christus
est Filins Dei, which discloses God in a relation above

our natural cognition, revealing himself in his Son, as

the supernatural author and the term of final beati-

tude. Lastly comes Christus creat ecclesiam
,
in which

the church, at first simply a medium for communicat-
ing the conceptions of God and Christ, is reflexively
considered and explained, embracing all the means

and institutions ordained by Christ for the instruc-

tion and sanctification of the human race, in order to
the attainment of its final end. In the conception of

God the Creator, we have the natural or intelligible or-
der and the rational basis of revelation. In the con-

ception of the Son, or Word, we have the superintel-
ligible order in its connection with the intelligible, in

which alone we can apprehend it. God reveals him-
self and his purposes by his Word, and we believe on
the sole ground of his veracity. The remaining con-
ceptions are but the complement of the second.

All this is expressed in the Apostles’ Creed. In the

first place, by its very nature, it is a symbol of instruc-

tion, presupposing a teacher. The same is expressed
in the first word, “Credo,” explicitly declaring the

credence given to a message sent from God. The
first article is a confession of God the Father, followed
by the confession of the Son and the Holy Ghost

After this comes “ Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam,”



22 Problems of the Age.

with the other articles depending on it, and lastly the

ultimate term of all the relations of God to man, ex-
pressed in the words “ Vitam aeternam.”

Having described the actual attitude of the mind to-

ward the Creed at the time when its reasoning faculty
is developed, and the method by which instruction in

religious doctrines is communicated to it, we will go
over these doctrines in detail, in order to explain and

verify them singly and as a whole. The doctrine first

in order is that which relates to God. and this will ac-

cordingly be first treated of



CHAPTER III.

THE BEING OF GOD—THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE
CREED.

HE first article of the Creed is, “ Credo in Deum,”
“ I believe in God.” The Christian child re-

ceives this belief through instruction, and a natural

faith in the word of its teachers, before it is capable of

exercising a complete act of reason or divine faith.

Afterward, when it is capable of apprehending the
rational evidence of the being of God, and attains a

more perfect conception of his attributes, it still re-

ceives the form of its conception from Christian theo-

logy, which is itself the offspring of a tradition dat-

ing from the original creation of man. The same is
true of all the conceptions of God existing among
mankind universally. All are received by a tradi-

tional instruction purporting to come originally from
a divine revelation. This revelation, originally given

to the founders of the race, has come down pure and
uncorrupted through the line of patriarchs and pro-

phets to Jesus Christ, who has promulgated it anew,
in such a manner as to secure its preservation to the

end of time. Indirectly, and subject to many cor-
ruptions and counterfeit additions, it has descended



24 Problems of the Age.

through human language, mythology, and literature
No doubt, reason has always been capable of correc*
ing the false conceptions of heathen tradition, and a?

taining a more correct notion of God. The Greek
philosophy did, in fact, by a purely rational method,

evolve some very sublime conceptions in natural theo-

logy
;
nevertheless, it still fell short of the perfect no-

tion of the divine being and attributes which is pre-

sented by revealed theology, and failed to indoctrinate

the masses of the population with its pure mono-

theistic principles. The only way in which pure
theistic conceptions have ever been made the common
belief of the people has been through a sacred tradi-

tional instruction based on a divine revelation. Nev-

ertheless, the criterion of the truth of these concep-

tions cannot be either the authority of the teachers

who transmit and explain the traditional doctrine, or
the common sense of mankind. The perfect formula
expressing with precise exactitude the explicit concep-

tion of God and his attributes is derived from reve-
lation, and presented before the mind by the instruct-

or. But the criterion is in the mind itself, that is, in

pure reason. The doctrines of natural theology, al-
though proposed by revelation, are within the sphere

of reason, and are accepted by reason only because

they are either self-evident or deduced from self-evi-

dent principles
;
just as the truths of mathematics are

proposed by the teacher, but become really known to
the pupil only so far as he perceives their intrinsic

certitude. What w-e desire to do, therefore, is to de-
scribe and demonstrate the circle of the divine at-



Problems of the Age. 25

tributes : to propose the theistic conception of the

first article of the Creed, as contained in Christian

theology, and show its objective reality by the first

principles of pure reason.

It is evident that we have no immediate vision of
God as he is in his essence. There is an infinite

and impassable abyss between us and him. In the

words of St. Augustine, “ Videri autem divinitas hu-

mano visu nullo modo potest
;
sed eo visu videtur,

quo jam qui vident, non homines sed ultra homines

sunt.” “ The Godhead can in no way be seen by hu-
man vision

;
but it is seen by a vision of such a kind,

that they who see by it are not men, but are more
than men.”* Moreover, that intellectual cognition of

God by which reason is capable of knowing, not what
God is, but that God is, non quid sit Deus

y
sed ut Deus

sit
y
is not an immediate intuition in the sense of be-

ing the constitutive principle or intellectual light or

primitive a priori judgment of reason. If it were, it

would be in all minds, without exception
;
everywhere,

and under all circumstances the same
;
and would pre-

sent itself to the reason as soon as it came into exer-

cise, without any need of argumentation
;

in the same

way that any self-evident truth, such as this, that the
whole is greater than a part, presents itself, or, as it

were, affirms itself, to the intellect. The reason why
this truth, that God is, which is the a priori truth in it-
self, and in itself in the most absolute sense self-evi-

dent, is not self-evident to the human intellect, is be-

* De Ttin. lib. ii. c. 11.



26 Problems of the Age.

cause everything is known by its essence, and we have
no intuition of the essence of God. This is the ar-

gument of St. Thomas. We cannot know by intui-
tion that God is, unless we intuitively know what is
meant by the word God, or what God is. But we
have no immediate intuition of what God is

;
we can-

not directly behold by our intellectual vision his es-

sence as it is itself. We know what is contained in
the conception expressed by the name God only by a
process of discursive reasoning and a species of men-

tal composition or construction. That is, we know
what God is mediately, indirectly, in a reflective and
analogical manner. We do not know that he is un-
til we know what he is, or what are his essential at-
tributes

;
until the complex, composite conception of

God as the subject of certain predicates is present to
our reflective consciousness. This is an act of discur-

sive reason, and consequently the knowledge of God
is and always remains an act of the discursive, and

not of the intuitive, intellect. Reason attains only to

a speculative contemplation of the being or essence of

God
;
that is, to a contemplation of God as most per-

fect being in the creation which is the mirror reflect-

ing his essential attributes.

This doctrine is clearly stated by the great father of

the fathers and founder of Christian theology, St.

Paul

:

“ Quis enim hominum scit quae sunt hominis, nisi

spiritus hominis qui in ipso est ? Ita, et quae Dei sunt,

nemo cognovit, nisi Spiritus Dei.” “ For what man

knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of man



Problems of the Age. 27

which is in him ? So the things also that are of God

no on-e knoweth, but the Spirit of God.”*

We understand this to mean, that just as the human
spirit apprehends itself as an intellectual subject, and

apprehends the spiritual nature of other similar sub-

jects, by its self-consciousness, s© God alone has, by

nature, the knowledge of his own essence and in-

terior activity, as being infinitely above all other spi-

ritual essences.
a Quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis. Deus

enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim ipsius, a

creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta, con-

spiciuntur : sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divi-

nitas.” “ That which is known of God is manifest in
them. For God hath manifested it to them. For the
invisible things of him, from the creation of the

world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things

that are made : his eternal power also and divinity.”!

That is, God affirms himself to reason by the cre-
ative act.

“ Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate.” “We
see now by means of a mirror in an enigma.”! That
is, we understand the attributes and perfections of God
as these are made intelligible to us by analogies de-
rived from created things, in which, as in a mirror, the

image of God is reflected.
The doctrine of St. Paul is all comprised in this

brief formula: that human reason, when its eye is ful-
ly open, and its intellectual vision is fully exercised,

* I Cor. ii. 11. t Rom. i. 19, 2a J I Cor. xin. 12.



28 Problems of the Age.

becomes a spectator of the creation. The word cre-
ation is here used in its strict sense as denoting the

terminus of the creative act, or the effect proceeding

from the supreme and absolute cause—causa altis-
sima. In the language of St. John of the Cross :
“ Creatures are, as it were, traces of the passage of

God, revealing his greatness, power, and wisdom, and

his other divine attributes.”* Sensible objects, the

intellect itself, which is the subject perceiving, other

similar intelligent existences, internal and external

metaphysical truths, are present to the developed and

active reason, and are apprehended by it as objectively

real. They are also apprehended, in so far as they
are particular things or actual existences, as finite,

limited, included in the relations of definite time and

of definite space, or something equivalent to space
;

that is, of something which limits their extent or

quantity of being. They are consequently appre-
hended as not possessing in themselves the cause or

reason of their existing at all or existing as they are.

They have a beginning, and, therefore, the reason of
their existence is not in themselves, but out of them-

selves, in being which is without beginning, and, there-

fore, eternal
;
which has in itself the reason of all be-

ing, and is, therefore, ens a se, or self-existing, and the

cause of everything which is ens ab alio
,
or mere de-

rived existence. Moreover, as finite or limited in ex-

tent, they have not the reason of their limits or the

cause of their definite quantity of being in themselves.

* Spir. Cant, stanza v.



Problems of the Age. 29

Because that which has being in itself is what it is by

necessity of nature, and to conceive it greater or less

than it is would imply a contradiction, which is not

the case with any particular finite thing, since it may
be conceived without contradiction as greater or less

than it is, or as not existing at all. Contingent finite

existences, therefore, must receive their being with its

definite limits from necessary being, or that which is

being in plenitude and infinite.

The notions of space and time give the same result.
Space is the relation existing between things coex-

isting as coexisting. Real space, as being a definite

relation between definite, really existing things, is a

finite relation, contingent on the. existence of the re-

lated objects, which would cease to exist if they were

annihilated, and had no existence before they began to

be. It has no entity in itself, either created or un-

created, and is neither identical with God or a neces-
sary effect of God’s existence, nor something distinct

from the universe which God has created. Leibnitz
has fully shown the absurdity of all these notions in

his controversy with Clarke. Ideal space is the possi-

bility of relations between possible existences. It

cannot be limited in thought by any possible effort of

the mind. Knowing, as we do, actual existences, and
apprehending, as we must, that they have origin from
infinite, necessary being as first cause, we are incapable
of fixing any necessary limit to the possible number
or extent of existences in the finite order, and there-

fore are unable to confine the notion of ideal space

within any necessary limits. We cannot think of



30 Problems of the Age.

ideal space without thinking of the infinite. This in-

finite is the infinite possibility of creation, or the in-

finite creative fecundity of being, the infinite causative

power of the first cause.

Time is the relation of things successive as suc-
cessive. The first instant of real time corresponds
to the beginning of contingent existence, and the

whole extent of real time corresponds to the actual

succession of events that have really taken place.

Annihilate the contingent, finite universe, and time

goes with it. Nevertheless, the notion of possible

time, or of a relation of order and succession among
possible finite events and acts, cannot be eliminated

from the reason or included within any definite, ne-

cessary limits. Look backward or look forward, the

line is interminable. That is to say, the notion of

eternity presents itself as one that cannot be dissoci-

ated from the notion c«f time. There is a duration

which is eternal, not capable of measurement by suc-

cession, but which is capable of coexisting to unli-

mited periods of succession. Knowing, as we do, that
things existing in time have their origin from being

which is not in time or is without beginning, we ap-

prehend that this eternity which we conceive is an

attribute of being, or that being is eternal.

Our notions of space and time have a sensible

form, because they are suggested to us, like all other

notions, by the sensible. Nevertheless, they are in

the order of the intelligible, and must necessarily ter-

minate at last in the idea of pure, infinite, and eternal

being. They force us to make a continual effort



b yobterns of the Age. 31

o £Yavjl h.huUy and eternity under an adequate men-
tal' representation, although we can never succeed in

do>,g it. We imagine ideal time as a succession of
moments, and ideal space as a kind of atmosphere, to

neither of which any limits can be given. It is im-

possible, however, that actual infinity should be com-

posed of coexisting points, or actual eternity of suc-

cessive moments. We must necessarily, therefore,
recognize behind these conc eptions the idea of the

infinite and eternal, and we can never really explicate
them into an adequate form until we affirm infinite

and eternal being as the cause and origin of all that

is limited by space and time, with a power to be the

cause and origin of existences limited by space and

time which is itself not limited by either. The same
idea of the infinite lies behind the notion that mathe-

matical quantities are divisible without end. We can
never reach the boundary of divisibility, which is

only another form of the endless multiplicability of

mathematical lines. The conception of ideal number
and quantity is rooted in the idea of the infinite pos-

sibility of creating thmgs which have mathematical

relations, that is, in the idea of being as infinite cause.

All mathematical truths, and all metaphysical

truths which are self-evident or demonstrated from

self-evident principles, present themselves as true by

necessity, true in eternity, true in all parts of the real

or possible universe to all existing or possible intelli-

gences. The intelligible, or the idea, is eternal, self-
subsisting, and is what it is by its own absolute, in-
trinsic necessity. The mind, as intelligent subject,



32 Problems of the Age.

when it contemplates the intelligible, that is, necessary

and eternal truths, by a reflex act of consciousness

perceives that it is intelligent It gains the concep-

tion of intelligent spirit. Reflecting that the first

cause of its existence is the first cause of its mode of

existence as intelligent spirit, and has given it the

light of the intelligible, it sees clearly that the intelli-

gible, or the idea, is in the first cause as the adequate

object of intelligence. Eternal truth is the idea of

eternal, infinite intelligence, the origin and cause of

all created intelligence. First cause, infinite and

eternal being, supreme reason, self-subsisting, intelli-

gent spirit, are all one.

The order of the universe is a further manifesta-

tion of the infinite intelligence of its first cause, as

is most amply and lucidly shown by the numerous

and excellent works and treatises in which the argu-

ments a posteriori for the existence and attributes of

God are developed.
The beauty of the particular objects of the uni-

verse, and of the universe as a whole, is referred by

reason to a standard of absolute beauty, an infinite,

eternal principle of harmony, fitness, and order, an

eternal ideal of that which is beauty by its own in-
trinsic being, and an adequate object of the infinite

intelligence considered as contemplating the idea of

beauty, or absolutely beautiful being. From that which
is being in itself all existences receive their being,

and therefore their beauty, from which we infer that
all creation is only a copy after the ideal in the mind

of the creator. All particular notions respecting



Problems of the Age. 33

those things which are good, respecting moral quali-

ties, obligation, duty, virtue, merit, sanctity, law, re-

sponsibility, have invariably the idea as existing in the

infinite mind behind them. Everything which is in

the effect must be in the cause in a more eminent

mode
;
therefore, everything which the mind can ap-

prehend in creation as contingent and finite must

exist in the creator as infinite, necessary, uncaused,

self-subsisting, eternal. That is, the rational con-

ception of the first cause is the conception of the

most perfect possible being, or the conception of

God.

The explication of the conception of God as most
perfect being proceeds by analysis of the contents of

necessary being, or e/is a se, as possessing the pleni-

tude of being. God is ens simplicissimum
,
most sim-

ple being, to the exclusion of every negation or limi-

tation of being, and of all composition of being with

that which is separable from it, or of modes of being

which in themselves singly are incomplete, condi-

tioned, or relative, in the sense of being essential com-

ponent parts of a composite essence. The human
intellect, being incapable of grasping the idea of being

in its totality under one conception, is obliged to dis-

criminate and distinguish notes, attributes, or quali-

ties of being in God. This is not by the way of ad-
dition or the composition of attributes with the es-

sence of God, but by the way of identification. The
affirmation of most pure and simple being is the af-

firmation of the subject of every possible predicate

which predicates that which is real or is perfection,



34 Problems of the Age.

that is, something included in the plenitude or infini-

tude of being.

That which is most radical and first in the logical

order in the conception of God is, according to some
of the best theologians, intelligence

;
although it

matters little which note is taken as primary. The
infinite intelligence is identical with the infinite intel-

ligible, because, as it is intelligent in itself, by its own
nature or intrinsic necessary being, it must have all

that is necessary to intelligence in itself, or contain

the infinite idea as the innate principle and object of

intelligence. The infinite intelligence and the infi-
nite intelligible are, therefore, identical, and we may
call God either the self-comprehending intelligence, or
the self-comprehended intelligible essence.

It follows from this that God is pure spirit. The
idea which is the intelligible object of intellect is by

its nature the most remote of all things from matter,

and the intellect or intelligent subject is of the same

nature. The infinite intelligence is also removed be-
yond all potentiality, or inert capacity reducible to

act, which is an imperfection iit finite intellects by

which they are, in so far as they have in their essence

anything not evolved into act, non-intelligent, or si-

milar to material substance. God alone is in the
most absolute sense most pure spirit, and is infinitely

more spiritual than the highest created spirit. In

the language of the schools, he is actus purissimus
,

most pure act
;
that is, intelligence in act, comprehend-

ing by one simple intuition his own infinite essence as
the intelligible in its infinite intelligibility. He is not



Problems of the Age. 35

das Werden
,
or the becoming, as pantheists say, but

das Seyn
,
the Eternal Being. There is no process,

no increase, no endless movement toward the evolu-
tion of intelligence in the direction of the infinite,

but the eternally explicated actual intelligence of the

intelligible object also actually infinite. This is what

is meant by actus purissimus. It is also the explica-

tion of ens simplicissimum. It is actual being in eter-

nity, the total, simultaneous, perfect possession of in-

terminable being to the utmost limit of the possibility

of being which can be thought by infinite intelligence.

It exhausts in one indivisible act the total compre-

hensibility of being as it is in the idea of the divine

intellect.

The unity of God is demonstrated as included in
the idea of most simple being and most pure act.

Intelligence and idea cannot be divided or enter into

composition. All the intelligent power that can pos-

sibly be actually is by an eternal necessity in one in-

finite intelligence to constitute it infinite, and make it

equal to and identical with necessary being. Its

unity is, therefore, a necessary note of its infinity.

The infinite intelligence has its sole, adequate, infi-
nite object within its own being, and in the identity

of the same indivisible essence. There is, there-

fore, nothing intelligible beyond one most simple

being subsisting in one most pure act or as one

most perfect spiritual essence, at the same time self-

comprehensible and self-comprehending.

God is infinitely good. For will and volition are
in the essence of intelligent spirit, and in God must



36 Problems of the Age.

terminate upon his own being as the infinite, neces-
sary, and adequate object of his infinite volition.

But this is the very idea of good, namely, being as

the adequate object of volition, if we consider good
objectively, and volition considered as terminating in

its adequate object, if we consider good subjectively.
God is all-powerful. That is, he is infinite cause,

able to produce those effects which are contained in

the idea of the intelligible, without limitation from

any other power, or from defect of any degree of

power in himself which is conceivable or possible.

God is infinitely holy. That is, his intelligence
and will terminate upon the same object, infinite

good, which is his own being, and therefore agree to-
gether; which is the definition of the divine sanctity.

God is unchangeable. For change implies increase

or diminution in being, which is' contradictory of the

very conception of eternal plenitude of being.

God is infinite and eternal. He is without physi-
cal extension in space, yet omnipresent by his most

simple being to every point of real space, and capable

of being present to every point of ideal space with-

out limit. He is, moreover, infinite in every attribute
or perfection, as possessing being which corresponds

to a series of finite existences ascending upward with-

out end toward the perfect, and yet transcending all

possible existences in such a way that no conceivable

quantity of being in them is an aliquot part of his

infinitude. He is without succession or duration
measurable by epochs, yet corresponding equally in

the same relation to all epochs of actual time, and to



37Problems of the Age.

infinite periods of ideal time a parte ante and a parte

post.* His eternity is tota
,
sitnul, ac perfecta possessio

vita interminabilis

;

total, insuccessive, and perfect

possession of illimitable life. This is merely saying,

in other words, that he is actus purissimus.

God is absolute truth. Truth is identical with his
essence. It is not an abstraction, an external, inde-

pendent idea, seen by God as extrinsic to his being
;

it is concrete and identical with the being of God.

Prescinding God as ens in actu
,
there is no truth, and

no possibility for a thought. For we have already
identified the intelligible with intelligence, and both

with being, in the essence of God. He is eternally
self-contemplating, and is to himself his own adequate
object of thought, all finite things being eminently

contained in the idea of the divine intellect, which is

identical with the divine essence.

God is absolute beauty. For beauty is the splen-
dor of truth, and the essence of God being truth, it
is also its splendor. His essence is the infinite idea,

by conformity to which all beautiful things have their

beauty in a degree corresponding to their conformity.

“Created things exhibit the impress of his beauty

and magnificence.”!

God is infinite love. That is, the subject and object
of an infinite, eternal act of love or complacency in

his own being as the sum of perfection, the amor entis
f

from which the love of created existences proceeds.

* In the past and future,

t St. John of the Cross, Spir. Cant. stanza vi.



38 Problems of the Age.

He is, therefore, infinitely lovable, deserving, to be
loved supremely by all intelligent creatures, and ne-

cessarily loved by them in so far as he is known or
truly apprehended by their intelligence.

For the same reason he is infinite beatitude in him-

self, and the source from which all beatitude pro-

ceeds
;
for this is the same as to say that he possesses

the plenitude of being, truth, goodness, beauty, intel-

ligence, love, life, perfection, in himself, and is the in-

finite term of his own intelligence and will.
God is, moreover, distinct from all contingent exist-

ence, and is its cause as creator by his own volition.
For, as he is most perfect spirit, most simple being,

most pure act, all that is potential, imperfect, compo-

site, or contingent, all that is not essential to consti-

tute the idea of necessary being, must be excluded

from the category of that which has being in itself.

Existence is, by its very essential note, ens ab alio
,

and not ens a se. It proceeds from God as cause, and
that not as necessary cause

;
for necessity has no

place except in that which constitutes the essence of

God. Moreover, the limits of the creation are not

fixed by any eternal necessity, and may be conceived
as greater or less

;
and any or every creature may be

conceived as not existing
;
wherefore, there is no ul-

timate cause assignable for the actual existence of

the creation with its actual extent except the voli'

tion of God. The volition of God can only place

a reality outside of his own being, or extrinsicate his

creative act, by causing something to exist in time

which has not existed from eternity, or making the pas-



Problems of the Age. 39

sage from nothing to existence, which is the proper

notion of creation, and which alone distinguishes the

contingent from the necessary, the finite from the in-

finite, the temporal from the eternal, ens ab alio or

existentia from ens a se or ens simpliciter.

God is an ocean of boundless, unfathomable good

and perfection, to whom everything must be attributed
that can increase our conception of him as most per-

fect being. We can explicate indefinitely this con-
ception of most perfect being, and every proposition

we can make which contains any real intelligible af-
firmation is evident from its own terms, requiring no
proof except verification as truly identifying some-

thing with the idea of being. “ We shall say much,
and yet shall want words : but the sum of our words
is, He is All.”* All that we see in the created uni-
verse is but a radiation of being, light, life, truth,

beauty, happiness, from God the source of being.
We see the architecture constructed from his eternal
designs

;
we behold the infinitely varied and shifting

sculptures and pictures in which he embodies the

typical forms copied from the infinite ideal of beauty

in his own mind. We hear the harmonies that echo
the rhythm of his own eternal blessedness

;
a col-

ossal machinery plays regularly, silently, and resist-

lessly around us by the force of his creative impact

;

his signs, emblems, and hieroglyphics are presented

to our senses
;
the perpetual affirmation of his being

is making itself always heard in the depth of our

* Ecclus. xliii. 29.



40 Problems of the Age.

reason. The influx of his creative force is continually
creating our body and giving life to our soul. We
breathe in it, and see by it, and move by its energy.

By its virtue we think and are conscious. It concurs
with every intellectual act. “ In God we live, and
move, and have our being.” The divine idea surrounds
us like an atmosphere, and encompasses us on every

side like an ocean. We cannot soar above it, dive be-
neath it, or sail in sight of its coasts. It is the rational

element in which we were made to live, and its nega-
tion is our rational death.

The Creed, therefore, when it proposes its first ar-
ticle to a child who is capable of a complete rational
act, only brings him face to face with himself, or with

the idea of his own reason. It gives him a distinct
image or reflection of that idea, a sign of it, a verbal

expression for it, a formula by which his reflective

faculty can work it out into a distinct conception. As
soon as it is fairly apprehended, he perceives its truth

with a rational certitude which reposes in the intimate

depths of his own consciousness. It is true that he
cannot arrange and express his conceptions, or dis-

tinctly analyze for himself the operations of his own
mind, in the manner given above. This can only be

done by one who is instructed in theology. But al-
though he is no theologian or philosopher, he has

nevertheless the substance of philosophy or sapientia>

and of theology, in his intellect
;
deeper, broader, and

more sublime than all the measurements and signs of

metaphysicians can express. We have taken the
child as creditive subject in this exposition, in order



Problems of tne Age. 4i

to exhibit the ultimate rational basis of faith in its

simplest act, and, so to speak, to show its genesis.

But we do not profess to stop with this simple act
which initiates the reason in its childhood into the or-

der of rational intelligence and faith
;
rather we take

it as only the terminus of starting in the prosecution

of a thorough investigation of the complete develop-

f

ment which intelligent faith unfolds in the adult and

instructed reason of a Christian fully educated in

theological science. Hence we have given the con-
ception of God in its scientific form, but as the scien-
tific form of that which is certainly and indubitably

apprehended in its essential substance by every mind

capable of making an explicit and complete act of

rational faith in God as the creator of the world. In
the language of Wordsworth, “ The child is father of
the man.” A complete rational act in a child has in
it the germ of all science. He is as certain that two
and two make four, as is the consummate mathema-

tician. Acomplete act of faith in a child is as infalli-
ble as the faith of a theologian, and -has in it the germ

of all theology. He is able to say, “ Credo in Deum,”
with a perfect rational certitude

;
and this conclusion

is the goal toward which the whole preceding argu-

ment has been tending.

But here we are met with a difficulty. The princi-
ple of faith cannot itself fall under the dominion of

faith, or be classed with the credenda
,
which we be-

lieved on the veracity of God. How then can Credo
' govern Deum ? The necessity for an intelligible basis
for faith has been established, and this basis located



4 2 Problems of the Age.

in the idea of God evolved into a conception derv.n-
strable to reason from its own constitutive principles
It would therefore seem that, instead of saying, “ I be^

lieve in God,” we ought to say, “ I know that God is,
and is the infinite truth in himself, therefore I be-

lieve,” etc.

This formula does really express a process of

thought contained in the act of faith, and implied in

the signification of Credo. Credo includes in itself

intelligo. Divine faith presupposes, and incorporates

into itself, human intelligence and human faith, on
that side of them which is an inchoate capacity for

receiving its divine, elevating influence. Hence the

propriety of using the word Credo
,
leaving intelligo

understood, but not expressed. The symbol of faith
is not intended to express any object of our know-

ledge, except as united to the object of faith. Foi

this reason it does not discriminate in the proposition

of the verity of the being of God that which is the
direct object of intelligence, but presents it under

one term with those propositions concerning God

which are only the indirect object of intelligence

through the medium of divine revelation. When we
say, Credo in Deinn

>
if we consider in Deum only that

which is demonstrable by reason concerning God, the

full sense of Credo is suspended, until the revelation

of the superintelligible is introduced in the succeeding

articles. The term Deinn terminates Credo
,
only inas-

much as it is qualified by the succeeding terms ; that

is, inasmuch as we profess our belief in God as the



Problems of the Age. 43

revealer of the truths contained in the subsequent

articles.

The foregoing statement applies to the use of the
word Credo in relation with Dcum in the first article
of the Creed, taking Credo in its strictest and most

exclusive sense of belief in revealed truths which are

above the sphere of natural reason. In addition to

this,* it can be shown that there is a secondary and

subordinate reason on account of which the mental

apprehension of that which is naturally intelligible in

God is included under the term faith, taken in a wider
and more extensive sense.

This intelligible order of truth, or natural theology,

was actually communicated to mankind in the be-

ginning, together with the primitive revelation. We
are, therefore, instructed in it, by the way of faith.
The conception of God, and the words which commu-
nicate to us that conception, and enable us to grasp it,

come to us through tradition, and are received by the
mind before its faculties are fully developed. We be-
lieve first, and understand afterward

;
and the greater

part of men never actually attain to the full under-
standing of that which is in itself intelligible, but hold

it confusedly, accepting with implicit trust in author-

ity many truths which the wise possess as science.
Moreover, the term faith is often used to denote be-

lief in any reality which lies in an order superior to

nature and removed from the sphere of the sensible,

although that reality may be demonstrable from ra-
tional principles. In a certain sense, we may say that



44 Problems of the Age.

this region of truth is a common domain of faith and
reason. But we have now approached that boundary
line where the proper and peculiar empire of faith be-

gins, and, like Dante, left by his human guide on the
coasts of the celestial world, we must endeavor under

heavenly protection to ascend to this higher sphere of

thought.



CHAPTER IV.

THE REVELATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER,
AND ITS RELATION TO THE PRIMITIVE IDEA OF
REASON.

OUR reason in apprehending the intelligible isadvertised at the same time of the existence of
the superintelligible. It is necessary to explain here

the sense in which this latter term is used. It is evi-

dent that it can be used only in a relative and not in

an absolute sense. That which is absolutely without

the domain of the intelligible is absolutely unintelli-

gible, and therefore a nonentity. The superintelli-
gible must therefore be something which is intelligi-

ble to God, but above the range either of all created

reason, or of human reason in its present condition.
It will suffice for the present to consider it under the

latter category.

Our reason undoubtedly apprehends in its intelligi-
ble object the existence of something which is above

the range of human intelligence in its present state.
The intimate nature of material and spiritual sub-
stances is incomprehensible. Much more, the inti-
mate nature or essence of the infinite divine being.



4 6 Problems of the Age.

All science begins from and conducts to the incon^

prehensible. Any one who wishes to satisfy himself
of this may peruse thNe first few chapters of Mr.
Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Philosophy. That

portion of the first article of the Creed which reason

can demonstrate
;
namely, the being of God, the cre-

ator of the world, in which is included also the im-

mortality of the soul, and the principle of moral obli-

gation
;
advertises, therefore, of an infinite sphere of

truth which is above our comprehension. The natu-
ral suggests the supernatural, in which it has its first

and final cause, its origin and ultimate end. The
knowledge of the natural, therefore, gives us a kind of

negative knowledge of the supernatural, by advertis-

ing us of its own incompleteness, and of the want of
any principle of self-origination or metaphysical final-

ity in itself. A system of pure naturalism which re-
presents the idea of reason under a form which satisfies

completely the intelligence without introducing the

supernatural is impossible. What is nature, and
what do we mean by the natural ? Nature is simply
the aggregate of finite entities, and the natural is

what may be predicated of these entities. A system
of pure naturalism would therefore give a complete

account of this aggregate of finite entities, without

going beyond the entities themselves, that is, without

transcending the limits of space, time, the finite, and

the contingent. Such a system is not only incapable

of rational demonstration, but utterly unthinkable
;

for, when the mind has gone to its utmost length in

denying or excluding every positive affirmation of



Problems of the Age. 47

anything except nature, there remains always the

abyss of the unknown from which nature came and to

which it tends, even though the unknown may be de-
clared to be unknowable. Those who deny the super-
intelligible and the supernatural, therefore, are mere

sceptics, and cannot construct a philosophy. Those

who affirm a first cause, in which second causes and
their effects are intelligible, affirm the supernatural

;

for the first and absolute cause cannot be included

under the same generic term with the second causes

and finite forces of nature. The more perfectly and
clearly they evolve the full theistic conception of pure

reason, the more distinctly do they affirm the super-

natural, because the idea of God as the infinite, intel-
ligible object of his own infinite intelligence is pro-
portionately explicated and apprehended. It is expli-

cated and apprehended by means of analogies derived

from finite objects
;
but these analogies suggest that

there is an infinite something behind them which they

represent. By these analogies we learn in a measure
the meaning of the affirmation Ut Dens sit. We do
not learn Quid sit Dens

;

but still we cannot help ask-

ing the question, What is God, what k his essence ?
We know that he is the adequate object of his own in-
telligence and will, and therefore we cannot help ask-

ing the question, What is that object, what does God
see and love in himself, in what does his most pure

and infinite act consist, what is his beatitude ? Our

reason is advertised of an infinite truth, reality, or be-

ing, which it cannot comprehend, that is, of the super-

intelligible. Those who base their philosophy on pure



48 Problems of the Age.

theism, or a modified rationalistic Christianity, are

therefore entirely mistaken when they profess to be
anti-supernaturalists, and to draw a distinctly marked

line between themselves and the supernaturalists.

The distinction is only between more or less consist-
ent supernaturalists. Those who are at the remotest
point from the Catholic idea, see that those who are a
little nearer have no tenable standing-point, and these

see it of those who are nearer than they are, and so
on, ryntil we come to the Anglicans and the Orien-
tals. But the extremists themselves have no better

standing-point than the intermediaries, and in their

theistic conception have admitted a principle from

which they can be driven by irresistible and invincible

logic to the Catholic Church. For the present, we
merely aim to show that they are compelled to admit

the supernatural when they affirm God as the first
and final cause of the world. In affirming this, they

affirm that nature has its origin and final reason in the

supernatural, or in an infinite object above itself,

which human reason cannot comprehend
;

that is,

they affirm superintelligible and supernatural rela-

tions, of man and the universe. These relations must
be regulated and adjusted by some law. This law is

either the simple continuity of the original creative

act which explicates itself through concreative sec-

ond causes in time and space, or it is this, and in ad-

dition to this, an immediate act of the creator com-

pleting his original creative act by subsequent acts of

an equal or superior order, which concur with the first

toward the final cause of the creation. Whoever takes



Problems of the Age. 49

the first horn of this dilemma is a pure naturalist in

the only sense of the word which is intelligible
;
that

is, while he is a supernaturalist in maintaining that

nature has its first and final cause in the supernatural,

or in God, he is a naturalist in maintaining that man
has no other tendency to his final cause except that

given in the creative act which is essential to nature,

and no other mode prescribed for returning to his
final cause than the explication of this natural ten-

dency, according to natural law. Consequently, rea-

son is sufficient, without revelation
;
the will, without

grace
;
humanity, without the incarnation

;
society, or

the race organized under law, without the church. It

is precisely in the method of treating this thesis of

naturalism that the divarication takes place between

the great schools of Catholic theology and between

the various systems of philosophy, whether orthodox

or heterodox, which profess to base themselves on the

Christian idea, or to ally themselves with it. It is

not easy to find the clew which will lead us safely

through this labyrinth, and preserve us from deviating

either to the right hand or to the left, by denying too

much on the one hand to the naturalists, or conceding
too much to them on the other. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to search for it, or to give up all effort

to discuss the question before us, and to prove from

principles furnished by nature and reason the neces-

sity of accepting a supernatural revelation.

The true thesis of pure naturalism or rationalism
is, that God, in educating the human race for the des-
tiny in view of which he created it, merely explicates



50

*

Problems of the Age.

that which is contained in nature by virtue of the

original creative act, without any subsequent inter-

ference of the divine, creative power. He develops
nature by natural laws alone, in one invariable mode.

The physical universe evolves by a rigid sequence
the force of all the second causes which it contains.

The rational world is governed by the same law, and
so also is the moral and spiritual world. The intel-
lectual and spiritual education of the human race de-
velops nothing except natural reason, and the natu-

ral, spiritual capacity of the soul. Reason extends

its conquests by a continjual progress in the super-

intelligible realm, reducing it to the intelligible, and

eternally approaching to the comprehension of the

infinite and absolute truth. The spiritual capacity
advances constantly in the supernatural realm, reduc-

ing it to the natural, and eternally approaching the

infinite and absolute good or being. All nature, all

creation, is on the march, and its momentum is the
impulsive force given it by the creative impact that

launched it into existence and activity.

Planting themselves on this thesis, its advocates

profess to have an a priori principle by which they

prove the all-sufficiency of nature for the fulfilment

of its own destiny, and reject as an unnecessary or
even inconceivable intrusion the affirmation of an-

other divine creative act, giving a new impact to na-

ture, superadding a new force to natural law, subor-

dinating the physical universe to a higher end, im-

planting a superior principle of intelligence and will

in the human soul, and giving to the race a destina



Problems of the Age. 51

tion above that to which it tends by its own proper

momentum. They refuse to entertain the question

of a supernatural order, or an order which educates

the race according to a law superior to that of the

evolution of the mere forces of nature
;
and in con-

sequence of this refusal, they logically refuse to en-

tertain the question of a supernatural revelation dis-

closing this order, and of a supernatural religion in

which the doctrines, laws, institutions, forces, and in-

struments of this order are organized, for the purpose

of drawing the human race into itself.
This is the last fortress into which heterodox phi-

losophy has fled. The open plains are no longer

tenable. The only conflict of magnitude now rag-
ing in Christendom is between the champions of the

Catholic faith and the tenants of this stronghold. It

is a great advantage for the cause of truth that it is

so. The controversy is simplified, the issues are
clearly marked, the opportunity is favorable for an

unimpeded and decisive collision between the forces

of faith and unbelief, and the triumph of faith will

open the way for Christianity to gain a new and
mighty sway over the mind, the heart, and the life

of the civilized world. This stronghold is no more

tenable than any of the others which have been suc-

cessively occupied and abandoned. Its tenants have

gained only a momentary advantage by retreating to

it. They escape certain of the inconsistencies of
other parties, and evade the Catholic arguments lev-

elled against these inconsistencies. But they can be

driven by the irresistible force of reason from their



52 Problems of the Age.

position, and made to draw the Catholic conclusion
from their own premises.
We do not say this in a boastful spirit, or as vaunt-

ing our own ability to effect a logical demolition of
rationalism. Rather, we desire to express our confi-
dence that the reason of its advocates themselves

will drive them out of it, and that the common judg-
ment of an age more enlightened than the present
will demolish it. It is our opinion, formed after hear-

ing the language used by a great number of men of
all parties, and reading a still greater number of their
published utterances, that the most enlightened in-

telligence of this age in Protestant Christendom has

reached two conclusions : the first is, that the Catho-

lic Church is the true and genuine church of Chris-

tianity
;
and the second, that it is necessary to have

a positive religion which will embody the same idea
that produced Christianity. The combination and
evolution of these two intellectual convictions pro-

mise to result in a return to. Catholicism. And there
are to be seen even already* in the writings of those

who have given up the positive Christianity of ortho-
dox Protestantism, indications of the workings of a

philosophy which tends to bring them round to the

positive supernatural faith of the Catholic Church.

It is by these grand, intellectual currents moving the

general mind of an age that individual minds are

chiefly influenced, more than by the thoughts of other

individual minds. Individual thinkers can scarcely

do more than to detect the subtle element which the

common intellectual atmosphere holds in solution, to



Problems of the Age. 53

interpret to other thinkers their own thoughts, or
give them a direction which will help them to disco-

ver for themselves some truth more integral and uni-

versal than they now possess. Therefore, while con-
fiding in the power of the integral and universal truth

embodied in the Catholic Creed to bear dov/n all op-

position and vanquish every philosophy which rises

up against it, we do not arrogate the ability to grasp
and wield this power, or to exhibit the Catholic idea

in its full evidence as the integrating, all-embracing

form of universal truth. This idea is proposed in an

honorable and conciliatory spirit to those who love
truth and are able to investigate it for themselves.

Many things must necessarily be affirmed.or suggested
in a brief, unpretending series of essays, which admit

of and require minute and elaborate proof, such as

can only be given in an extensive work, but are mere-

ly sketched here after the manner of an outline en-

graving, which leaves out the filling up belonging to

a finished picture.

To return from this digression. We have begun
the task of indicating how that naturalism or pure
rationalism which affirms the theistic conception logi-

cally demonstrable by pure reason, can only integrate

itself and expand itself to a universal Theodicy, or

doctrine of God, in a supernatural revelation.

If the opposite theory of pure naturalism were

true, it ought to verify itself in the actual history of

the human race, and in the actual process of its edu-
cation. The idea of the supernatural ought to be
entirely absent from the consciousness of the race.



54 Problems of the Age.

For, on the supposition of that theory, it has no place

in the human mind—and no business in the world.
If unassisted nature and reason suffice for themselves,

they ought to do their work alone, and to do it so tho-

roughly that there would be no room for any pretend-

ed supernatural revelation to creep in. The history
of mankind ought to be a continuous, regular evolu-

tion of reason and nature, like the movements of the

planets
;
the human race ought to have been con-

scious of this law from the beginning, and never to

have dreamed of the supernatural, never to have de-

sired it. Philosophy ought to have been, from the

first, master of the situation, and to have domineered

over the whole domain of thought.

The reverse of this is the fact. The history of the
human race, and the whole world of human thought,
is filled with the idea of the supernatural. The phi-
losophy of naturalism is either a modification and

recombination of principles learned from revelation,

or a protest against revelation and an attempt to de-

throne it from its sway. It has no pretence of being

original and universal, but always presupposes reve-

lation as having prior possession, and dating from

time immemorial. Now, human nature and human
reason are certainly competent to fulfil whatever

task God has assigned them. They act according to

fixed laws, and tend infallibly to the end for which

they were created. The judgments of human rea-
son and of the human race are valid in their proper

sphere. And therefore the judgment of mankind
that its law of evolution is in the line of the super-



Problems of the Age. 55

natural is a valid judgment. Revelation has the

claim of prescription and of universal tradition. Natu-

ralism must set aside this claim and establish a posi-

tive claim for itself based on demonstration, before it

has any right even to a hearing. It can do neither.

It cannot bring any conclusive argument against re-

velation, nor can it establish itself on any basis of

demonstration which does not presuppose the instruc-

tion of reason by revelation.

It cannot conclusively object to revelation. The

very principle of law, that is, of the invariable nexus

between cause and effect, which is the ultimate axiom

of naturalism, is based on the perpetual concurrence

of the first cause with all secondary causes, that is,

the perpetuity of the creative act by which God per-
petually creates the creature. There is no reason

why this creative act should explicate all its effects
at once or merely conserve the existences it has pro-

duced, and not explicate successively in space and

time the effects of its creative energy. The hypothe-
sis that the creative power can never act directly in

nature except at its origin, and must afterward mere-

ly act through the medium of previously created
causes in a direct line, is the sheerest assumption.

Some of the most eminent men in modern physical
science maintain the theory of successive creations.

There may be the same direct intervention of crea-
tive power in the moral and spiritual world. Mira-

cles, revelations, supernatural interventions for the

regeneration and elevation of the human race, are not
improbable on any a priori principle. The artifice



56 Problems of the Age.

by which the entire tradition of the human race is
set aside, and a demand made to prove the super-
natural de novo

,
is unwarrantable and unfair. The

supernatural has the title of prescription, and the

burden of proof lies only upon particulai systems,

to show that they are genuine manifestations of it,

and not its counterfeits. The existence of a reality
which may be counterfeited is a fair postulate of rea-
son, until the contrary is demonstrated, and something

positive of a prior and more universal order is logi-

cally established from the first principles of reason.

We are not to be put off with assurances, like a frau-
dulent debtor’s promises of payment, that our doubts

and uncertainties will be satisfied after two thousand

or two hundred thousand years. Exclude the super-

natural, and natural reason will have, and can have,

nothing in the future, beyond the universal data and

principles which we have now, and have had from the
beginning, with which to solve its problems. The
connection between mind and matter, the origin and

destination of the soul, the future life, the state of

other orders of intelligent beings, the condition of

other worlds, will be as abstruse and incapable of

satisfactory settlement then as now. If we are to
gain any certain knowledge concerning them, it must

be in a supernatural way. And what conclusive rea-
son is there for deciding that we may not ? Who
can prove that some of that infinite truth which sur-

rounds us may not break through the veil—that some
of the intelligent spirits of other spheres may not be
sent to enlighten and instruct us ?



Problems of the Age. 57

One of the ablest advocates of naturalism, Mr,.

William R. Alger, has admitted that it is possible,

and even maintains that it has already taken place.

In his erudite work on the History of the Doctrine

of a Future Life, he maintains the opinion that

Jesus Christ is a most perfect and exalted being, who

was sent into this world by God to teach mankind,

who wrought miracles, and really raised his body to

life in attestation of his doctrine, although he sup-

poses that he laid it aside again when he left the

earth. He distinctly asserts the infallibility of Christ
as a teacher, and of the doctrine which he actually

taught with his own lips. Here is a most distinct

and explicit concession of the principle of supernatu-

ral revelation. To those who heard him he was a
supernatural and infallible teacher. In so far as his

doctrine is really apprehended, it is for all generations

a supernatural and infallible truth. It has regene-

rated mankind, and Mr. Alger believes it is destined,

when better understood, to carry the work of regene-
ration to a higher point in the future. It is true, he

does not acknowledge that the apostles were infallible

in apprehending and teaching the doctrine of Christ.

But he must admit that, in so far as they have appre-

hended and perpetuated it, and in so far as he him-

self and others of his school now apprehend it more
perfectly than they did, they apprehend supernatural

truth and appropriate a supernatural power. Besides,

once admitting that Christ was an infallible teacher,

it is impossible to show why he could not do what so
many philosophers have done—communicate his doc-



58 Problems of the Age.

trine in clear and intelligible terms, so that the sub-

stance of it would be correctly understood and perpetu-

ated. Miss Frances Cobbe—admitted to be the best
expositor of the doctrine of the celebrated Theodore

Parker—in her Broken Lights
,
and other similar wri-

ters, give to the doctrine and institutions of Christ a

power that is superhuman and that denotes the action

of a superhuman intelligence. Those who prognos-

ticate a new church, a new religion, a realization of
ideal humanity on earth, cannot integrate their hy-

pothesis in anything except the supernatural, and

must suppose either a new outburst of supernatural
life from the germ which Christ planted on the earth,

or the advent of another superhuman Redeemer.

Dr. Brownson, while yet only a transcendental phi-

losopher on his road to the church, exhibited this

thought with great power and beauty, in a little book

entitled New Viezvs. The dream of a new re-
demption of mankind in the order of temporal per-

fection and felicity was never presented with greater

argumentative ability or portrayed in more charming

colors, at least in the English language
;
and never

was anything made more clear than the necessity of

supernatural powers for the actual fulfilment of this

bewitching dream.*

Whether we look backward or forward, we confront
the idea of the supernatural. This is enough to

* That is, bewitching to those who do not believe in something far

more sublime, the restoration of all things in Christ, foretold in the

Scriptures.



Problems of the Age. 59

prove its reality. There are no universal pseudo-

ideas, deceits, or illusions. That which is universal

is true. We have therefore only to inspect the idea
of the supernatural, to examine and explicate its con-

tents, to interrogate the universal belief and tradition

of mankind, to study the history of the race, and un-

fold the wisdom of the ancients, and the result will

be truth. We shall obtain true and just conceptions
of the original, universal, eternal idea, in which all

particular forms of science, belief, law, and human
evolution in all directions, coalesce and integrate

themselves, as in a complete whole including all the

relations of the universe to God as first and final
cause.

We must now go back to the point where we left
off, after establishing as the first principle of all sci-

ence and faith the pure theistic doctrine respecting

the first and final cause, or the origin and end of

all things in necessary being, that is, God. We have
to show the position of this doctrine in the concep-

tion of supernatural revelation, and its connection

with the other doctrines which express the super-

natural relation of the human race and the universe
to God.

The conception of the supernatural in its most
simple and universal form, is the conception of some-

what distinct from and superior to the complete ag-

gregate of created forces, or second causes. In this

sense, it is identical with the conception of first and

final cause. It may be proper here to explain the
term final cause, which is not in common use among



6o Problems of the Age.

English writers. It expresses the ultimate motive

or reason for which the universe was created, the end

to which aU things are tending. When we say that
God is necessarily the final cause, as well as the first
cause, of all existing things, we mean that he could
have had no motive or end in creating, extrinsic to

his own being. All that proceeds from him as first
cause must return to him as final cause. From this
it appears that the conception of nature in any theis-

tic system implies the supernatural
;
because it im-

plies a cause and end for nature above itself. The
supernatural can only be denied by the atheist, who
maintains that there is nothing superior to what the

theist calls second causes
;
or by the pantheist, who

either identifies God with nature, or nature with God.
A theist cannot form any conception of pure nature
or a purely natural order, except as included in a su-

pernatural plan, because his natural order originates

in a cause and tends toward an end above and beyond

itself, and is not, therefore, its own adequate reason.
As we have already seen, reason, by virtue of its origi-
nal intuition of the infinite, is advertised of something

infinitely beyond all finite comprehension. By appre-
hending its own limitation, and the finite, relative,
contingent existence of all things which are, it is ad-

vertised of an infinite unknown, and thus has a nega-

tive knowledge of the supernatural. By the light of
the creative act in itself and in the universe, it appre-

hends the being of God as reflected in his works and
made intelligible by the similitude of created exist-
ences to the creator. It apprehends that there is an



Problems of the Age. 61

infinite being, whose created similitude is in itself and

in all things
;
a primal uncreated light, the cause of the

reflected light in which nature is intelligible. There-

fore it apprehends the supernatural. But it does not

directly and immediately perceive what this infinite

being or uncreated light is, and cannot do so. That

is, by explicating its own primitive idea, and bringing
it more and clearly into the reflective consciousness,

and by learning more and more of the universe of

created existences, it may go on indefinitely, appre-
hending God by the reflected light of similitudes,
i(per speculum

,
in cenigmate but it must progress

always in the same line : it has no tendency toward

an immediate vision of God as he is intelligible in his

own essence and by uncreated light. Therefore, it

has only a negative and not a positive apprehension

of the supernatural. God dwells in a light inaccessi-
ble to created intelligence, as such. There is an infi-

nite abyss between him and all finite reason, which

cannot be crossed by any movement of reason, how-
ever accelerated or prolonged. Therefore, although

there is no science or philosophy possible which does

not proceed from the affirmation of the supernatural,

that is, of the infinite first and final cause of nature,

yet it is not properly called supernatural science so

long as it is confined to the limits of that knowledge

of causes above nature which is gained only through

nature. Its domain is restricted to that intelligibility

which God has given to second causes and created
existences, and which only reflects himself indirectly.

Therefore, theologians usually call it natural know-



62 Problems of the Age.

ledge, and in its highest form natural theology, as

being limited within the bounds above described.

They call that the natural order, in which the mind is
limited to the explication of that capacity of appre-

hending God, or of that intuitive idea, which consti-

tutes it rational
;
and is therefore limited to a relation

to God corresponding to the mode of apprehending
him. The term supernatural is restricted to an order
in which God reveals to the human mind the possi-
bility of apprehending him by the uncreated light in

which he is intelligible to himself, and coming into a

relation to him corresponding therewith
;
giving at

the same time an elevation to the power of intelli-

gence and volition which enables it to realize that

possibility. This elevation includes the disclosure of

truths not discoverable otherwise, as well as the fac-

ulty of apprehending them in such a vivid manner

that they can have an efficacious action on the will,

and give it a supernatural direction.

In this sense, rationalists have no conception of

the supernatural. None have it, except Catholics, or
those who have retained it from Catholic tradition.

When we ascribe to rationalists a recognition of the
supernatural, we merely intend to say that they re-

cognize in part that immediate interference of God to
instruct mankind and lead it to its destiny which is

really and ultimately, although not in their apprehen-

sion, directed to the elevation of man to a sphere
above that which is naturally possible. Therefore

they cannot object to revelation on the ground of its

being an interference with the course of nature or



Problems of the Age. 63

not in harmony with it, and cannot make an a priori

principle by virtue of which they can prejudge and

condemn the contents of revelation. But we do not

mean to say that they possess the conception of that

which constitutes the supernaturalness of the revela-

tion, in the scientific sense of the term as used by

Catholic theologians. Even orthodox Protestants

possess it very confusedly. And here lies the source
of most of the misconceptions of several abstruse

Catholic dogmas.

It is in the restricted sense that we shall use the

term supernatural hereafter, unless we make it plain

that we use it in the general signification.

We are now prepared to state in a few words the
relation of the conception of God which is intelligible

to reason, to the revealed truths concerning his interior

relations which are received by faith on the authority

of his divine veracity. How does the mind pass
through the knowledge of God to belief in God

;

through Cognosco Deinn to Credo in Denm ?*

We have already said that Cognosco is included in
Credo. The Creed begins by setting before the
mind that which is self-evident and demonstrable

concerning God, in which is included his veracity.

It then discloses certain truths concerning God
which are not self-evident or demonstrable from their

own intrinsic reason, but which are proposed as cre-
dible, on the authority of God. The word Credo
expresses this. “ I believe in God,” means not

* “I know God.” “ I believe in God. :



64 Problems of the Age.

merely, “ I affirm the being of God,” but also, “ I be-

lieve certain truths regarding God (whose being is
made known to me by the light of reason) on the
authority of his Word.” These truths must have in

them a certain obscurity impervious to the intellec-

tual vision
;
otherwise, they would take their place

among evident and known truths, and would no long-
er be believed on the simple motive of the veracity

of God revealing them. That is, they are mysteri-
ous, intelligible so far as to enable the mind to appre-

«hend what are the propositions to which it is required

to assent, but superintelligible as to their intrinsic

reason and ground in the necessary and eternal truth

or the being of God.

In the Creed, these mysteries, foreshadowed by the

word “ Credo,” and by the word “ Deum” considered
in its relation to “ Credo,” which indicates a revelation

of mysterious truths concerning the Divine Being to

follow in order after the affirmation of the being and

unity of God, begin to be formally expressed by the

word “ Patrem.” In this word there is implicitly

contained the interior, personal relation of the Father

to the Son and Holy Ghost in the blessed Trinity,

and his exterior relation to man as the author of the
supernatural order of grace, or the order in which

man is affiliated to him in the Son, through the opera-
tion of the Holy Spirit. These relations of the three

persons of the blessed Trinity to each other, and to

man, include the entire substance of that which is

strictly and properly the supernatural revelation of

the Creed, and the direct object of faith. Before pro-



Problems of the Age. 65

ceeding, however, to the consideration of the myste-

ries of faith in their order, it is necessary to inquire

more closely into the process by which the intellect

is brought to face its supernatural object, and made
capable of eliciting an act of faith.

The chief difficulty in the case is to find the con-
nection between the last act of reason and the first

act of faith, the medium of transit from the natural
to the supernatural. The Catholic doctrine teaches
that the act of faith is above the natural power of the

human mind. It is strictly supernatural, and possible
only by the aid of supernatural grace. Yet it is a ra-

tional act, for the virtue of faith is seated in the intel-

lect as its subject, according to the teaching of St.

Thomas. It is justifiable and explicable on rational

grounds, and even required by right reason. The
truths of revelation are not only objectively certain,

but the intellect has a subjective certitude of them

which is absolute, and excludes all suspicion or fear

of the contrary. Now, then, unless we adopt the hy-
pothesis that we have lost our natural capacity for
discerning divine truth by the fall, and are merely re-

stored by divine grace to the natural use of reason,

there are several very perplexing questions on this

point which press for an answer. Rejecting this hy-

pothesis of the total corruption of reason, which will

hereafter be proved to be false and absurd, how can
faith give the mind absolute certitude of the truth of

its object, when that truth is neither self-evident nor
demonstrable to reason from its own self-evident prin-
ciples ? Given, that the intellect has this certitude.



66 Problems of the Age.

how is it that we cannot attain to it by the natu-
ral operation of reason ? Once more, what is the
evidence of the fact of revelation to ordinary minds ?

Is it a demonstration founded on the arguments for

credibility ? If so, how are they capable of compre-
hending them, and what are they to do before they

have gone through with the process of examination ?

If not, how have they a rational and certain ground
for the judgment that God has really revealed the
truths of Christianity ? Suppose now the fact of re-
velation established, and that the mind apprehends

that God requires its assent to certain truths on the
virtue of his own veracity. The veracity of God be-
ing apprehended as one logical premise, and the re-

velation of certain truths as another, can reason draw

the certain conclusion that the truth of these propo-

sitions is necessarily contained in the veracity of God

or not ? If it can, why is not the mind capable of
giving them the firm, unwavering assent of faith by

its own natural power, without the aid of grace ? If
not, how is it that the assent of the intellect to the
truth of revealed propositions does not always neces-

sarily contain in it a metaphysical doubt or a judg-

ment that the contrary is more or less probable, or at

least possible ? If it is said that the will, inclined by

the grace of God, determines to adhere positively to

the proposed revelation as true, what is meant by

this ? Does the will merely determine to act prac-

tically as if these proposed truths were evident, in

spite of the lesser probability of the contrary ? Then

the assent of the intellect is merely a judgment that



Problems of the Age. 67

revelation is probably true, and that it is safest to fol-

low it, which does not satisfy the demand of faith ;
for faith excludes all fear or suspicion that the arti-

cles of faith may possibly be false. Does the will force
the intellect to judge that those propositions are cer-

tain which it apprehends only as probable ? How is
this possible ? The will is a blind faculty, which is

directed by the intellect. “ Nil %volitum nisi prius

cognitum There is no act of will without a previ-

ous act of knowledge. The will cannot lawfully de-
termine the intellect to give any stronger assent to a

proposition than the evidence warrants.! In a word,

it is difficult to show how the intellect has an abso-
lute certitude of the object of faith, without repre-

senting the object of faith as coincident with the ob-

ject of knowledge, or the intuitive idea of reason,

and thus naturally apprehensible. It is also difficult

to show that faith is not coincident with knowledge,

and thus to bring out the conception of its super-

naturalness, without destroying the connection be-

tween faith and reason, subverting its rational basis,

and representing the grace of faith as either restoring

a destroyed faculty, or adding a new one to the soul,
whose object is completely invisible and unintelligi-

ble to the human understanding before it is elevated
to the supernatural state. The difficulty lies, how-
ever, merely in a defective statement, or a defective

* “ Nothing is willed unless previously known.’*

t This is the statement of an objection, not a proposition affirmed

by the author.



68 Problems of the Age.

apprehension of the statement of the Catholic doc-

trine, and not in the doctrine itself. In order to make
this plain, it will be necessary to make one or two
preliminary remarks concerning certitude and proba-

bility.

There is, first, a metaphysical certitude excluding

all possibility to the contrary. Such is the certitude

of mathematical truths. Such, also, is the certitude

of self-evident and demonstrable truths of every kind.

The sphere of this kind of certitude is diminished or
extended accordingly as the mind has before it a

greater or lesser number of truths of this order.

Some of these truths present themselves to every
mind so immediately and irresistibly that it cannot

help regarding them just as they are, and thus seeing

their truth-; for instance, that two and two make

four. Others require the mind to be in a certain

state of aptitude for seeing them as they are, and to

make an effort to bring them before it. There are

some truths self-evident or demonstrably certain to

some minds which are not so to others
;
yet these truths

have all an intrinsic, metaphysical certitude which

reason as such is capable of apprehending, and the

failure of reason to apprehend them is due in indi-

vidual cases merely to the defective operation of rea-

son in the particular subject. The operation of rea-

son can never be altogether deficient while it acts at

all, for it acts only while contemplating its object or

primitive idea. But its operation can be partially de-

fective, inasmuch as the primitive idea or objective

truth may be imperfectly brought into the reflective



Problems of the Age. 69

consciousness. And thus the intellect in individuals
may fail to apprehend truths which can be demon-
strated with metaphysical certitude, and which the

intellect infallibly judges to be absolutely certain in

those individuals who are capable of making a right
judgment. In this operation of apprehending meta-

physical truths there is no criterion taken from expe-

rience, or from the concurrent assent of all men, but

the truth shines with its own intrinsic light, and rea-
son judges by its inherent infallibility.

Next to metaphysical certitude comes moral de-

monstration, resulting from an accumulation of pro-

babilities so great that no probability which can pru-

dently be allowed any weight is left to the other side,

but merely a metaphysical possibility. For instance,

the Copernican theory.

Then comes moral certainty in a wider sense
;

where there is probable evidence on one side without

any prudent reason to the contrary, but not such a

complete knowledge of all the facts as to warrant the

positive judgment that there is really no probability

on the other side. This kind of certainty warrants a

prudent, positive judgment, and furnishes a safe, prac-

tical motion for action
;
but it varies indefinitely ac-

cording as the data on which the judgment is based

are more or less complete, and the importance of the

case is greater or less.

Then come the grades of probability, where there
are reasons balancing each other on both sides, which

the mind must weigh and estimate.

To apply these principles to the question in hand.



70 Problems of the Age.

First, we affirm that the being and attributes of
God are apprehended with a metaphysical certitude.
Second, that the motives of credibility proving the

Christian revelation are apprehended, when that re-
velation is sufficiently proposed, with a vary ing degree

of probability, according to varying circumstances in

which the mind may be placed, but capable of being
increased to the highest kind of moral demonstration.

Third, that the logical conclusion which reason can

draw from these two premises, although hypotheti-

cally necessary and a perfect demonstration—that is,
a necessary deduction from the veracity of God, on

the supposition that he has really made the revela-
tion—is really not above the order of probability, on
account of the second premise. It is not above the

order of probability, although, as we have already ar-
gued, it is capable of being brought to a moral de-

monstration by such an accumulation of proofs with-

in that order, that reason is bound to judge that the

opposite is altogether destitute of probability.

From this it appears, both how far reason with its
own principles can go in denying, and how far it can
go in assenting to, revealed truth. We see, first, how
it is that the truth of revelation does not compel the

assent of all minds by an overwhelming and irresisti-

ble evidence. The first premise, which affirms the

being of God, although undeniable and indubitable

in its ultimate idea, may be, in its distinct conception,
so far denied or doubted by those whose reason is

perverted by their own fault, or their misfortune, as

to destroy all basis for a revelation. The second



Problems of the Age. V

premise, much more, may be partially or completely
swept away, by plausible explanations of its compo-

nent probabilities in detail. And thus, revelation
may be denied. The influence of the will on the
judgment which is made by the mind on revealed
truth is explicable in this relation, and must be

taken into the account. It is certain that the moral

dispositions by which voluntary acts are biassed, bias

also the judgment. The self-determining power
of the will which decides positively which of its dif-

i ferent inclinations to follow, controls the judgment as

well as the volition. This is an indirect control,

which is exerted, not by imperiously commanding the

judgment in a capricious manner to make a blind,

irrational decision, but by turning it toward the con-

sideration of that side toward which the volition of

choice is inclined. This influence and control of vo-

lition over judgment increases as we descend in the
order of truth from primary and self-evident princi-

ples, and diminishes as we approach to them. In the
case of truth which is morally or physically demon-

strable, its control is exerted by turning the intellect

partially away from the consideration of the truth

and hindering it from giving it that attention which

is necessary in order to its apprehension. In the

case of divine revelation, various passions, prejudices,

interests, or at least intellectual impediments to a

right operation of reason, act powerfully upon a mul-

titude of minds in such a way that the mirror of the

soul is too much obscured to receive the image of
truth.



72 Problems of the Age.

But, supposing that reason and will both operate

with all the rectitude possible to them, without super-

natural grace, how far can the mind proceed in as-
senting to divine revelation ? As far as a moral
demonstration can take it. It can assent to divine

truth, and act upon it, so far as this truth is adapted

to the perfecting of the intellect and will in the natu-

ral order. But it lacks capacity to apprehend the

supernatural verities proposed to it, as they are related

to its supernatural destiny.

The revelation contains an unknown quantity.

The will cannot be moved toward an object which

the intellect does not apprehend. Therefore, a su-

pernatural grace must enlighten the intellect and ele-

vate the will, in order that the revealed truth may
come in contact with the soul. This supernatural

grace gives a certain connaturality to the soul with

the revealed object of faith, by virtue of which it ap-

prehends that God speaks to it in a whisper, distinct
from his whisper to reason, and catches the meaning

of what he says in this whisper. It is this super-

natural light, illuminating the probable evidence

apprehended by the natural understanding, which

makes the assent in the act of faith absolute, and

gives the mind absolute certitude. It is, however,

the certitude of God revealing, and not the certitude
of science concerning the intrinsic reason of that

which he reveals. This remains always inevident and

obscure in itself, and the decisive motive of assent is

always the veracity of God. It is not, however, alto-

gether inevident and obscure, for, if it were, the terms



73Problems of the Age.

in which it is conveyed would be unintelligible. It

is so far inevident that the intellect cannot appre-

hend its certainty, aside from the declaration of God.

But it is partially and obscurely evident, by its analo-

gy with the known truth of the rational, order. It is
so far evident that it can be demonstrated from ra-

tional principles that it does not contradict the truths

of reason. Further, that no other hypothesis can ex-

plain and account for that which is known concerning
the universe. And, finally, that, so far as the analogy

between the natural and the supernatural is appre-

hensible, there is a positive harmony and agreement

between them. This is all that we intend to affirm,
when we speak of demonstrating Christianity from

the same principles from which scientific truths are

demonstrated.

Let us now revert once more to Jesus Christ and
the pagan philosopher. The pagan first perceives
strong, probable reasons, which increase by degrees

to a moral demonstration, for believing that Christ is

the Son of God, and his doctrine the revelation of

God. The supernatural grace which Christ im-
parts to him enables him to apprehend this with a

permanent and infallible certitude as a fixed principle

both of judgment and volition. He accepts as abso-
lutely true all the mysteries which Christ teaches

him, on the faith of his divine mission and the divine

veracity. We may now suppose that Christ .goes on
to instruct him in the harmony of these divine veri-

ties with all scientific truths, so far, that he appre-

hends all the analogies which human reason is capa-



74 Problems of the Age.

ble of discerning between the two. He will then
have attained the ultimatum possible for human rea-
son elevated and enlightened by faith, in this present

state. Science and faith will be coincident in his

mind, as far as they can be. That is, faith will be

coincident with science until it rises above its sphere

of vision, and will then lose itself in an indirect and

obscure apprehension of the mysteries, in the veraci-

ty of God.

In the case of the child brought up in the Catholic

Church, the church, which is the medium of Christ,
instructs the child through its various agents. The
child’s reason apprehends, through the same probable

evidence by which it learns other facts and truths,

that the truth presented to him comes through the

church, and through Christ, from God, who is imme-
diately apprehended in his primitive idea. The light
of faith which precedes in him the development of

reason, illuminates his mind from the beginning to

apprehend with infallible certitude that divine truth

which is proposed to him through the medium of pro-

bable evidence. This faith is a fixed principle of

conscience, proceeding from an illuminated intellect,

inclining him to submit his mind unreservedly to the

instruction of the Catholic Church on the faith of the

divine veracity. It rests there unwaveringly, without

ever admitting a doubt to the contrary, or postponing

a certain judgment until the evidence of revelation

and the proofs of the divine commission of the church

have been critically examined. It may rest there

during life, and does so, with the greater number, to



Problems of the Age. 75

a greater or lesser degree
;

or, it may afterward pro-
ceed to investigate to the utmost limits the ration*alc

of the divine revelation, not in order to establish faith

on a surer basis, but in order to apprehend more dis-

tinctly what it believes, and to advance in theological

science.

Some one may say : “ Y ou admit that it is impossi-
ble to attain to a saving faith in supernatural truth with-

out supernatural light
;
why, then, do you attempt to

convince unbelievers that the Catholic doctrine is the

absolute truth by rational arguments ?” To this we
reply, that we do not endeavor to lead them to faith
by mere argument

;
but to the “ preamble of faith.”

We aim at removing difficulties and impediments
which hinder them from attending to the rational

evidence of the faith
;
at removing its apparent in-

credibility. We rely on the grace of the Holy Spi-
rit alone to make the effort successful, and to lead
those who are worthy of grace beyond the preamble
of faith to faith itself. This grace is in every human
mind to which faith is proposed, in its initial stage

;

it is increased in proportion to the sincerity with

which truth is sought for
;
and is given in fulness to

all who do not voluntarily turn their minds away from
it. If we did not believe this, we would lay down
our pen at once.



CHAPTER V.

THE TRINITY OF PERSONS INCLUDED IN THE ONE
DIVINE ESSENCE.

HE full explication of the first article of the
Creed requires us to anticipate two others,

which are its complement and supply the two terms

expressing distinctly the relations of the Second and

Third Persons to the First Person or the Father, in

the Trinity. “ Credo in Unum Deum Patrem,” gives
us the doctrine of the Divine Unity, and the first

term of the Trinity, namely : the person of the Fa-

ther. “ Et in Unum Dominum Jesum Christum Fi-
lium Dei Unigenitum, et ex Patre natum ante omnia

saecula
;
Deum de Deo, Lumen de Lumine

;
Deum

Verurn de Deo Vero
;
Genitum non Factum, consub-

stantialem Patri, per quoin omnia facta sunt,” gives

us the second term or the person of the Son. “ Et

in Spiritum Sanctum, Dominum et Vivificantem, qui
ex Patre Filioque procedit, qui cum Patre et Filio
simul adoratur et conglorificatur,” gives us the third

term or the person of the Holy Spirit. Both these

are necessary to the explanation of the term “ Pa-

trem.” The proper order is, therefore, to begin with



77Problems of the Age.

the eternal, necessary relations of the Three Persons

to each other in the unity of the Divine Essence, and

then to proceed with the operations of each of the

Three Persons in the creation and consummation of

the Universe.

Our purpose is not to make a directly theological
explanation of all that is contained in this mystery,

but only of so much of it as relates to its credibility,
and its position in regard to the sphere of intelligible

truth. With this mystery begins that which is pro-

perly the objective matter of revelation, or the series

of truths belonging to a superintelligible order
;
that

is, above the reach of our natural intelligence, proposed

to our belief on the veracity of God. It is usually

considered the most abstruse, mysterious, and incom-

prehensible of all the Christian dogmas, even by be-

lievers
;
though we may perhaps find that the dogma

of the Incarnation is really further removed than it

from the grasp of our understanding. Be that as it

may, the fact that it relates to the very first principle

and the primary truth of all religion, and appears to

confuse our apprehension of it—namely, the Unity
of God—causes us to reflect more distinctly upon its
incomprehensibility. Many persons, both nominal
Christians and avowed unbelievers, declare openly,

that in their view it is an absurdity so manifestly

contrary to reason that it is absolutely unthinkable,

and, of course, utterly incredible. How, then, is the
relation between this mystery and the self-evident or

demonstrable truths of reason adjusted in the act of

faith elicited by the believer ? What answer can be



78 Problems of the Age.

made to the rational objections of the unbeliever?

If the doctrine be really unthinkable, it is just as

really incredible, and there can be no act of faith ter-

minated upon it as a revealed object. Of course,
then, no inquiry could be made as to its relation with
our knowledge

;
for that which is absurd and incapa-

ble of being intellectually conceived and apprehended

cannot have any relation to knowledge. It is impos-

sible for the human mind to believe at one and the
same time that a proposition is directly contrary to

reason and also revealed by God. No amount of ex-
trinsic evidence will ever convince it. Human rea-
son cannot say beforehand what the truths of revela-

tion are or ought to be
;
but it can say in certain re-

spects what they cannot be. They cannot be contra-
dictory to known truths and first principles of reason
and knowledge. Therefore, when they are presented
in such a way tft the mind, or are by it apprehended

in such a way, as to involve a contradiction to these

first truths and principles, they cannot be received

until they are differently presented or apprehended,

so that this apparent contradiction is removed. This

is so constantly and clearly asserted by the ablest

Catholic writers, men above all suspicion for sound-
ness in the faith, that we will not waste time in prov-

ing it to be sound Catholic doctrine.* Of course
all rationalists, and most Protestants, hold it as an

axiom already. If there are some Protestants who

* See among others, Archbishop Manning t>n the Temporal Mis-

non of the Holy Ghost.



Problems of the Age. . 79

hold the contrary, they are beyond the reach of

argument.

The Catholic believer in the Trinity apprehends

the dogma in such a way that it presents no contra-

diction to his intellect between itself and the first

principles of reason or the primary doctrine of the

unity of the divine nature. God, who is the Creator

and the Light of reason, as well as the author of re-

velation, is bound by his own attributes of truth and

justied, when he proposes a doctrine as obligatory

on faith, to propose it in such a way that the mind is

able to apprehend and accept it in a reasonable man-

ner. This is done by the instruction given by the

Catholic Church, with which the supernatural illumi-

nation of the Holy Spirit concurs. The Catholic be-
liever is therefore free from those crude misappre-

hensions and misconceptions which create the diffi-

culty in the unbelieving mind. He apprehends in
some degree, although it may be implicitly and con-
fusedly, the real sense and meaning of the mystery,

as it is apprehensible by analogy with truths of the

natural order. What it is he apprehends, and what
are the analogies by which it can be made intelligi-

ble, will be explained more fully hereafter. It is

enough here to note the fact. This apprehension

makes the mystery to him thinkable, or capable of

being thought. That is, it causes the proposition of

the mystery in certain definite terms to convey a

meaning to his mind, and not to be a mere colloca-

tion of words without any sense to him. It makes

him apprehend what he is required to assent to, and



8o
.
Problems of the Age.

puts before him an object of thought upon which an
intellectual act can be elicited. It presents no con-

tradiction to reason, and therefore there is no obsta-
cle to his giving the full assent of faith on the au-

thority of God.

It is otherwise with one who has been brought up
in Judaism, Unitarianism, or mere Rationalism

;
or

whose merely traditional and imperfect apprehension

of Christian dogmas has been so mixed up with here-
tical perversions that his mature reason has rejected

it as absurd. There is an impediment in the way of
his receiving the mystery of the Trinity as proposed

by the Catholic Church, and believing, it possible that

God can have revealed it. He may conceive of the
doctrine of the Trinity as affirming that an object

can be one and three in the same identical sense,
which destroys all mathematical truth. Or he may
conceive of it, as dividing the divine substance into

three parts, forming a unity of composition, and not

a unity of simplicity. Or he may conceive of it as
multiplying the divine essence, or making three coor-

dinate deities, who concur and cooperate with each
other by mutual agreement. These conceptions are

equally absurd with the first, although it requires

more thought to discern their absurdity. It is neces-

sary, then, to remove the apparent absurdity of the

doctrine, before any evidence of its being a revealed

truth is admissible. The first misconception is so

extremely crude, that it is easily removed by the sim-

ple explanation that unity and trinity are predicated

of God in distinct and not identical senses. The se-



Problems vf the Age. 81

cond, which is hardly less crude, is disposed of by

pointing out the explicit statements in which the sim-

plicity and indivisibility of the divine substance in

all of the Three Persons is invariably affirmed. The
third is the only real difficulty, the only one which

can remain long in an educated and instructed mind.

The objection urged on theological or philosophical

grounds by really learned men against the dogma of
the Trinity is, that it implies Tritheism. The sim-

plest and most ordinary method of removing this ob-

jection, is by presenting the explicit and positive af-

firmation of the church that there is but one eternal

principle of self-existent, necessary being, one first

cause, one infinite substance possessing all perfections.

This is sufficient to show that the church denies and

condemns Tritheism, and affirms the strict unity ofGod.

But, the Unitarian replies, you hold a doctrine incom-

patible with this affirmation, namely, that there are

three Divine Persons, really distinct and equal. This

is met by putting forward the terms in which the

church affirms that it is the one, eternal, and infinite

essence of God which is in each of the Three Per-
sons. The Unitarian is then obliged to demonstrate
that this distinction of persons in the Godhead is un-

thinkable, and that unity of nature cannot be thought

in connection with triplicity of person. This he can-

not do. The relation of personality to nature is too
abstruse—especially when we are reasoning about the
infinite, which transcends all the analogies of our

finite self-consciousness—to admit of a demonstration
proving absolutely that unity of nature supposes



8 ? Problems of the Age.

unity of person, and vice versa
,
as its necessary cor-

relative. The church affirms the unity of substance
in the Godhead in the clearest manner, sweeping

away all ground for gross misconceptions of a divided

or multiplied deity
;
but affirms also trinity in the

mode of subsistence, or the distinction of Three Per-
sons, in each one of whom the same divine substance
subsists 'completely. This affirmation is above the

comprehension of reason, but not contrary to reason.

Even Unitarians, in some instances, find no difficulty

in accepting the statement of the doctrine of the tri-

nity made by our great theologians, when it is dis-
tinctly presented to them

;
and in the beautiful Litur-

gical Book used in some Unitarian congregations, the

orthodox doxology, “ Glory be to the Father, and to

the Son, and to the Holy Ghost,” has been restored.

The absurd misconception of what the church v
means by the word Trinity being once removed, the

evidence that her doctrine is revealed, or that God
affirms to us the eternal, necessary distinction of

three subsistences in his infinite being, becomes intel-

ligible and credible. Reason cannot affirm the intrin-

sic incompatibility of the proposition, God reveals
himself as subsisting in three persons, with the pro-

position, There is one God
;
and therefore cannot re-

ject conclusive evidence that he does so reveal him-

self through the Catholic Church. For aught reason

can say, he may have so revealed himself. If satis-
factory evidence is presented that he has done so,

reason is obliged, in consistency with its principles,

to examine and judge of the evidence, and assent to



Problems of the Age. 83

the conclusion that the Trinity is a revealed truth.

This is enough for all practical purposes, and as much
as the majority of persons are capable of. But is this

the ultimatum of reason ? Is it not possible to go

further in showing the conformity of the revealed

truth with rational truths ? Several eminent theolo-

gians have endeavored to take this further step, and

to construct a metaphysical argument for the doctrine

of the Trinity. Some of the great contemplatives
of the church, who are really the most profound and

sublime of her theologians and philosophers, have

also through divine illumination appeared to gain an

insight into the depths of this mystery. For in-

stance, St. Ignatius and St. Francis de Sales both af-

firm that the truth and the mutual harmony of all the

divine mysteries were made evident to their intelli-
gence in contemplation. In modern times, Bossuet,

Lacordaire, and Dr. Brownson have reasoned pro-

foundly on the rational evidence of the Trinity, and

a Roman priest, the Abbate Mastrofini, h„as published
a work entitled Metaphysica Sublimior

,
in which he

proposes as his thesis, Given divine revelation, to

prove the truth of all its dogmas by reason. The
learned and excellent German priest Gunther at-
tempted the same thing, but went too far, and fell

into certain errors which were censured by the Roman
tribunals, and which he himself retracted. It is ne-

cessary to tread cautiously and reverently, like Moses,

for we are on holy ground, and near the burning
bush. We will endeavor to do so, and, taking for our
guide the decisions of the church and the judgment



84 Problems of the Age.

of her greatest and wisest men, to do our best to

state briefly what has been attempted in the way of
eliciting an eminent act of reason on this great mys-

tery, without trenching on the domain of faith.

First, then, it is certain that reason cannot disco-

ver the Trinity of itself. It must be first proposed

to it by revelation, before it can apprehend its terms

or gain anything to reason upon. Secondly, when

proposed, its intrinsic necessity or reason cannot be

directly or immediately apprehended. If it can be

apprehended at all, it must be mediately, or through

analogies existing in the created universe. Are there

such analogies, that is, are there any reflections or

representations of this divine truth in the physical or

intellectual world from which reason can construct a

theorem parallel in its own order with this divine
theorem ? Creation is a copy of the divine idea. It

represents God as a mirror. Does it represent him,
that is, so far as the human intellect is capable of
viewing it, no-t merely as he is one in essence, but

also as he is three in persons ? Assuming the Tri-

nity as a hypothesis, which is all we can do in argu-
ing with an unbeliever, can we point out analogies or

representations in creation of which the Trinity is the

ultimate reason and the infinite original ? If we

can, do these analogies simply accord and harmonize

with the hypothesis that God must subsist in three
persons, or do they indicate that this is the most ade-

quate or the only conceivable hypothesis, or that it

is the necessary, self-evident truth, without which the

existence of these analogies would be unthinkable and



Problems of the Age. 85

impossible ? Do these analogies, as we are able to
discover them, represent an adequate image of the

complete Catholic dogma of the Trinity, or only an
inadequate image of a portion of it ?

It is evident, in the first place, that some analogi-

cal representation of the Trinity must be made in
order to give the mind any apprehension whatever of

a real object of thought on which it can elicit an act

of faith. The terms in which the doctrine is stated,

as, for instance, Father, Son, Holy Spirit, eternal ge-

neration, procession or spiration, person, etc., are

analogical terms, representing ideas, which are other-

wise unspeakable, by images or symbols. It is im-

possible for the mind to perceive that a proposed idea

is simply not absurd, without apprehending confused-

ly what the idea is, and possessing some positive ap-

prehension of its conformity to the logical, that is,

the real order. Every distinct act of belief in the

Trinity, therefore, however rudimental and imperfect-

ly evolved into reflective cognition, contains in it an

apprehension of the analogy between it and creation.

If we proceed, therefore, to explicate this confused,

inchoate conception, we necessarily proceed by way of
explicating the analogy spoken of, because we must
proceed by explaining the terms in which the doctrine

is stated, which are analogical
;
and by pointing out

what the analogy is which the terms designate.

What is meant by calling God Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit ? Why is the relation of the Son to the Fa-
ther called filiation ? Why is the relation of the
Holy Spirit to both called procession ? The Niceno-



86 Problems of the Age.

Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds, all the
other definitions of the church respecting the Trinity

and all Catholic theology deduced from these defini-

tions and from Scripture and tradition by rational

methods, are an explication of the significance of

these analogical terms. The only question which
can be raised, then, is in regard to the extent of the

capacity of human reason to discern the analogy be-
tween inward necessary relations of the Godhead,

and the outward manifestation of these relations in

the creation. The hypothesis of the Trinity assumes
that this analogy exists, and is to some extent appre-
hensible. We will now proceed to indicate the pro-
cess by which Catholic theologians show this analogy,

beginning with those terms of analogy which lie in

the material order, and ascending to those which lie

in the order of spirit and intelligence.

First, then, it is argued that the law of generation

in the physical world, by which like produces like,

represents some divine and eternal principle. As-

cending from the lower manifestations of this law to

man, we find this physical relation of generation the

basis of a higher filiation in which the soul partici-

pates. Man generates the image of himself, in his.
son, who is not merely his bodily offspring, but simi-

lar and equal to himself in his rational nature. A<*

St. Paul says, the principle of this paternity must be

in God, and must therefore be in him essential and

eternal. But this principle of eternal, essential pa-

ternity, within the necessary being of God, is the

very principle of distinct personal relations.



Problems of the Age. 87

Again, the multiplicity of creation indicates that

there is some principle in the Divine Nature, corre-

sponding in an eminent sense and mode to this mul-
tiplicity. The relations of number are eternal truths,
and have some infinite transcendental type in God.

Jf there were no principle in the Divine Nature ex-

cept pure, abstract unity, there would be no original

idea, from which God could proceed to create a uni-
verse

;
which is necessarily multiplex and constituted

in an infinitude of distinct relations, yet all radically

one, as proceeding from one principle and tending to

one end. Here is an analogy indicating that unity

and multiplicity imply and presuppose one the other.

These two arguments combine when we consider
the law of generation and the principle of multiplici-

ty as constituting human society and building up the
human race. Society, love, mutual communion, reci-
procal relations, kind offices, diversity in equality,

constitute the happiness and well-being of man

;

they are an image and a participation of the divine

beatitude. All the good of the creature, all the per-

fections of derived, contingent existences, have an

eminent, transcendental type in God. Love, friend-

ship, society, represent something in the divine na-

ture. If there were no personal relations in God, but

a mere solitude of being existing in a unity and sin-

gularity exclusive of all plurality and society, it would

seem that, supposing creation possible, the rational

creature would copy his archetype, be single of his

kind, and find his happiness in absolute solitude. It
;

s otherwise, however, with the human race. The



88 Problems of the Age.

human individual is not single and solitary. Human
nature is one in respect of origin and kind, derived

from one principle which is communicated by gene-
ration and exists in plurality of persons. Society is

necessary to the perpetuation, perfection, and happi-

ness of the human race. This society is constituted
primarily in a threefold relation between the father,

the mother, and the child, which makes the family
;
and

the family repeated and multiplied makes the tribe,
the nation, and the race. Taking now the hypothe-
sis of three persons in one nature as constituting the

Godhead, it is plain that we have a clearer idea of
that in God which is represented and imitated in hu-
man society, and which is the archetype of the life,
the happiness, the love, existing in the communion of
distinct persons in one common nature, than we can
have in the hypothesis of an absolute singularity of

person in the deity. That good which man enjoys by
fellowship with his equal and his like, is a participa-

tion in the supreme good, that is in God. In that

supreme good, this participated good must exist in

an eminent manner. God must have in himself infi-
nite, all-sufficing society, fellowship, love. He must
have it in his necessary and eternal being, for he can-

not be dependent on that which is contingent and

created. Supposing therefore that it is consistent

with the unity of his nature to exist in three distinct

and equal persons, not only is the analogy of his crea-

tion to himself more manifest, but the conception we

can form of the perfection of his being is more com-

plete and intelligible.



Problems of the Age. 89

There is another analogy in the intellectual opera-

tion of the human mind. The intellective faculty
generates what may be called the interior word, or
image of the mind, the archetype of that which is

outwardly expressed in a philosophical theory, a poem,

a picture, a statue, or a work of architecture. Through

this word, the great creative mind lives and attains to

the completion and happiness of intellectual exist-

ence. It loves it as proceeding from and identical

with itself. Through it, it acts upon other minds,

controls and influences their thought and life
;
and

thus the spirit proceeding from the creative mind,

through its generated word, is the completion of its

inward and outward operation. Thus, argue the theo-

logians, the Father contemplating the infinitude of

his divine essence generates by an infinite thought,

the Word, or Son. Being infinite and uncreated, his

necessary act is infinite and uncreated, in all respects

equal to himself, and therefore the Word is equal to
the Father

;
possesses the plenitude of the divine

essence, intelligence and personality. The divine act
of generation is not a purely intellectual cognition,

but a contemplation in which love is joined with

knowledge. The Father beholds the Son, and the
Son looks back upon the Father, with infinite love,

which is the spiration of the divine life. This spira-

tion or Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the

Son, is the consummating, completing term of their

unity, and contains the divine being which is in the

Father and the Son in all its plenitude
;
constituting

a third person, equal to the first and second. The



go Problems of the Age.

operation of a limited, finite, created soul, presents

only a faint, imperfect analogy of the Trinity, because

it is itself limited, 'as being the operation of a soul

participating in being only to a limited extent. Indi-

vidual existences possess each one a limited partici-

pation in being. But in God, it is not so. There is

no division in his nature, because the eternal, self-

existing cause and principle of its unity is a simulta-

neous cause of the absolute plenitude, by which it

exhausts all possible being. This plenitude of being

is in the eternal generation of the second person, and

the eternal spiration of the third person, in the God-

head, on account of the necessary perfection of the

most pure act in which the being of God consists
;

wherefore personality is predicable, as one of the per-

fections of being, of each of the three terms of rela-

tion in God. The word of human reason and its spi-
rit, are not equal to itself, or personal, because of the

limited and imperfect nature of human reason and its

operations. The Word or Son of the Eternal Fa-
ther, and the Holy Spirit, are equal to him and per-

sonal, because the Father is God, and his act is infi-

nite.

This prepares the way for a different method of

piesenting the argument from analogy, based on the

conception of God as actus purissitnus, or most pure

act. This is clearly and succinctly stated by Dr.

Brownson as follows :
“ The one, or naked and empty unity, even in the

Unitarian mind, is not the equivalent of God. When
he says one, he still asks, one what? The answer is,



Problems of the Age. 91

one God. which implies even with him something more

than unity. It implies unity and its real and neces-

saiy contents as living or actual being. Unity is an

abstract conception formed by the mind operating on

the intuition of the concrete, and as abstract, has no

existence out of the mind conceiving. Like all ab-

stractions, it is in itself dead, unreal, null. God is
not an abstraction, not a mere generalization, a crea-

ture, or a theorem of the human mind, but one living
and true God, existing from and in himself, a se et in

se. He is real being, being in its plenitude, eternal,
independent, self-living, and complete in himself. To
live is to act. To be eternally and infinitely living is
to be eternally and infinitely acting, is to be all act

;

and hence philosophers and theologians term God,

in scholastic language, most pure act, actus purissi-

mus. But act, all act demands, as its essential condi-

tions, principle, medium, and end. Unity, then, to

be actual being, to be eternally and purely act in it-

self, must have in itself the three relations of princi-

ple, medium, and end, precisely the three relations

termed in Christian theology Father, Son, and Holy

Ghost—the Father as principle, the Son as medium,
and the Holy Ghost as end or consummation of the

divine life. These three interior relations are essen-

tial to the conception of unity as one living and true

God. Hence the radical conception of God as triune
is essential to the conception of God as one God, 01
real, self-living, self-sufficing unity. There is no-

thing in this view of the Trinity that asserts thal

one is three, or that three are one
;
nor is there any



92 Problems of the Age

.

thing that breaks the divine unity, for the triplicity

asserted is not three Gods, or three divine beings,

but a threefold interior relation in the interioressence

of the one God, by virtue of which he is one actual,

living God. The relations are in the essence of the
one God, and are, so to speak, the living contents of

his unity, without which he would be an empty, un-

real abstraction
;
one—nothing.”*

There is still another way of stating the argument,
founded on the necessary relation between subject

and object. In the rational order, subject is that

which apprehends and object that which is appre-

hended. Intelligence is subject and the intelligible

is object. The mere power or capacity of intelligence,
if it is conceived of in an abstract manner as existing

alone without relation to its object, must be conceived

of as not in actual exercise. Intelligence in act im-

plies something intelligible which terminates the act

of intelligence. Even supposing that the object of

the intelligence is identical with the subject, that is,

that the rational mind contemplates itself as a really

existing substance, nevertheless there is a distinction

between the mind considered as the subject which

contemplates, and the mind considered as the object

which is contemplated. The reason contemplated
must be projected before itself and regarded as an

object distinct from the contemplating reason in the

act of contemplation. The eye which sees objects
external to itself, does not actually see or bring its

* Brownson's Review, July, 1863, pp. 2-66, 267.



Problems of the Age. 93

visual power into act until an object is presented be-

fore it
;
and the individual does not become conscious

that he can see or is possessed of a visual faculty, ex-

cept in the act of seeing an object. The eye cannot
see itself immediately by the mere fact that it is a

visual organ, but only sees itself as reflected in a

mirror and made objective to itself. God is the abso-
lute intelligence and ths absolute intelligible, as has

been proved in a previous chapter. He contemplates
and comprehends himself, and in this consists his ac-

tive being and life. Thus in the divine being there

is the distinction of subject and object. God con-

sidered as infinite intelligence is subject, and consi-

dered as the infinite intelligible is his own adequate
object. The hypothesis of the Trinity presents to
us God as subject, or intelligence, in the person of the
Father, as object, or the intelligible, in the person of

the Son. The Son is the image of the Father, as the
reflection of a man's form in the mirror is the image

of himself. The eternal generation of the Son-is the
eternal act of the Father contemplating his own
being, and is terminated .upon the person of the Son

as its object. As this act is within the divine being,
the image of the Father is not a merely phenomenal,

apparent, unsubstantial reflection of his being, but

real, living, and substantial. The Son is consubstan-
tial with the Father. The being of God is in the act
of intelligence or contemplation, whether we consider
God as the subject or the object in this infinite act,
that is, as intelligent and contemplating, or as intelli-

gible and contemplated. The consummating princi-



94 Problems of the Age.

pie of love, complacency, or beatitude, which com-

pletes this act, vivifies it, and unites the person of

the Father with the person of the Son in one indivi-

sible being, is the Holy Spirit, equal to the Father

and the Son, and identical in being, because a neces-

sary term of the most pure act in which the divine

life and being consists. All that is within the circle

of the necessary, essential 'being of Gad, as most

pure, intelligent, living act, is uncaused, self-existent,

infinite, eternal. By the hypothesis, we must con-
ceive of God as subsisting in the three persons, Fa-
ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, in order to conceive of

him as ens in actu
,
or in the state of actual, living,

concrete being, and not as a mere abstraction or pos-

sibility existing in thought only
;
as infinite intelli-

gence, and the adequate object of his. own intelli-

gence, self-sufficing and infinitely blessed in himself.

Therefore the Father is God, the Son is God, and the

Holy Ghost is God. It is only by this triplicity of

personal relations that the unity of God as a living,

concrete unity, or the unity of one, absolute, perfect,

infinite being, containing in himself the actual pleni-

tude of alb that is conceivable or possible, can subsist

or be vividly apprehended. Therefore there cannot

be, by the hypothesis, a separate and distinct God-

head in each of the three persons, since triplicity of

person enters into the very essential idea of God-

head. The hypothesis of the Trinity, therefore, ab-
solutely compels the mind to believe in the unity of

God, and shuts out all possibility that there should

be more Gods than one, because it shuts out all pos-



Problems of the Ape.
*/ o 95

sibility of imagining any mode or form of necessary
being which is not included in the three personal re-

lations of the one God. Unity and plurality, singu-

larity and society, capacity of knowing, loving, and

enjoying the true, the beautiful, and the good, and the

adequate object of this capacity, or the true, beautiful,

and good in se
y
the subject and the object of intelli-

gent and spiritual life and activity, intelligence and

the intelligible, love and the loved, blessedness and

beatitude, subsist in him in actual being, which is in-

finite and exhausts in its most pure act all that is in

the uncreated, necessary, self-existent principle of

being and first cause. The adequate reason and

type of all contingent and created existences is de-

monstrated also to be in the three personal relations

of the one divine essence, in such a way, that the

hypothesis of the Trinity, as a theorem, satisfactorily

takes up, accounts for, and explains all discoverable

truths as well in regard to the universe as in regard

to God.

This last statement indicates the answer which we
think is the most correct one to the question pro-

posed in the beginning of this chapter, as to the full

logical force of the rational argument for the Trinity.

That is, we regard it as a hypothesis which in the
first place is completely insusceptible of rational re-

futation. In the second place, contains certain truths

which are established by very strong probable argu-

ments and analogies. In the third place, suggests a

conception of God which harmonizes with all the
truth we know, or can see to be probable, and at the



96 Problems of the Age.

same time is more perfect and sublime than any

which can be made, excluding the hypothesis. We
do not claim for it the character of a strict demon-

stration. To certain minds it seems to approach very
near a demonstration, probably because their intellec-

tual power of vision is unusually acute. Toothers

it appears nearly or quite unintelligible. Probably

but few persons comparatively can grasp it in such a

way as to attain a true intellectual insight into the
relation between the doctrine of the Trinity and phi-

losophy. Yet all those who have thought much on
the doctrine, and who find their great difficulty in be-
lieving it to consist in a want of apparent connection

with other truths, ought to be able to appreciate the

philosophical argument by which the connection^ is

shown. They must have an aptitude for apprehend-
ing arguments of this nature, otherwise they would

not think on the subject so intently. All they can

justly expect is that the impediment in their minds

against believing that the doctrine is credible, or not

incredible, supposing it revealed, should be removed.

This is done by the arguments of Catholic theolo-

gians. If the doctrine be revealed, it is credible
;

that is, an intelligent person can in perfect consistency

with the dictates of reason assent to the proposition

that God has revealed it, and that it is therefore cre-
dible on his veracity. The ground of the positive
and unwavering assent of the mind is in the veracity

of God, and remains there, no matter how far the
reasoning process may be carried

;
for, without the

revelation of God* the conception of the Trinity, sup-



Problems of the Age. 97

posing it once obtained, would for ever remain a mere

hypothesis, though the most probable of all which

could be conceived.

As already explained, it is only by a supernatural
grace that the mind is elevated to a state in which it

clearly and habitually contemplates the object of faith

as revealed by God. By divine faith, the intellect
believes without doubting the mystery of the three

persons in one divine nature, and incorporates this

belief into its life, as a vivifying truth, and not a dead,

inert, abstract speculation or theorem. When it is
thus believed, and taken as a certain truth, the intel-

lect, ,if it is capable of apprehending the argument

from analogy, may be able to see that the Trinity is
really that truth which is the archetype that has been

copied in creation, and is indicated in the analogies

already pointed out. It may see that one cannot
think logically unless he is first instructed in the doc-

trine of the Trinity and proceeds from it as a given

truth or datum of reasoning. Thus, he may by the
light of faith attain an elevated kind of science, or

eminent act of reason, which really rests on indubita-

ble principles. Yet it will not be properly science or

knowledge of the revealed mysteries, since one of

these indubitable principles on which all the conse-

quences depend, is revelation itself, which really con-

stitutes the mind in a certitude of that which on

merely rational principles remains always inevident.

Probably this is what is meant by those who main-
tain that the Trinity can be rationally demonstrated.

Given, that the Trinity is a revealed truth, it explains



98 Problems of the Age.

and harmonizes in the sphere of reason what is other-

wise inexplicable. It is the same with other revealed

truths, and to prove that it is so is the principal ob-

ject of this essay. Presented in this light, the Ca-

tholic dogma of the Trinity vindicates its claim to
be a necessary part of religious belief

;
an essential

dogma of Christianity, revealed and made obligatory
for an intelligible reason, and essential to the forma-

tion of a complete and adequate theology and philo-

sophy. It is no longer regarded as a naked, specula-

tive, isolated proposition, to which a merely intellec-

tual assent is required by a precept of authority, and

which has no living relation to other truths or to the

practical, spiritual life of the soul. It is shown to be

a universal and fundamental truth, the basis of all

truth and of the entire real and logical order of the

universe.

This can be shown much more easily, and to the
majority of minds more intelligibly, in relation to the

other truths of Christianity, than to those truths

which are more recondite and metaphysical. It is

necessary to an adequate explication of the creation,

of the destiny of rational existences, of the super-

natural order, of the character and mission of Christ,

of the regeneration of man through him, and of his
final end or supreme and eternal beatitude and glori-

fication in the future life, as will be shown hereafter.

Deprived of this dogma, Christianity is baseless, un-

meaning, and worthless
;
and is infallibly disintegrated

and reduced to nihilism, by the necessary laws of

thought This is true also of theism, or natural



Problems of the Age. 99

theology. And this suggests a powerful subsidiary

argument in a different line of reasoning, proving that

the doctrine of the Trinity is necessary to the per-

fection and perpetuity of the doctrine of the unity of

God.

The same universal tradition which has handed

down the pure, theistic conception, and has instructed

mankind in the true, adequate knowledge of God, has

handed down the Trinity
;
and traces of it are even

found in heathen theosophy and the more profound

heathen philosophy. Wherever the doctrine of the

Trinity has been preserved, there the clear concep-

tion of the one God and his attributes has been pre-
served. And where this doctrine has been corrupted
or lost, the conception of God as one living being of
infinite perfection, the first and final cause of all

things, has passed away into polytheism or panthe-

ism or scepticism. Wherever God is apprehended
as the supreme creator and sovereign, the supreme

object of worship, obedience, and love, in intimate

personal relations to man, he is apprehended in the

personal relations which subsist in himself, that is,

in the Trinity. His interior personal relations are the

foundation of all external, personal relations to his

creatures. This is even true of Unitarians, so long

as they retain the Christian ethical and spiritual tem-

per which connects them with the Christian world of

thought and life, and do not slide into some form of

infidelity. They retain some imperfect conception of
the relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and in

proportion as they become more positive in religion,



IOO Problems of the Age.

they revive and renew this conception. The effort to
make a system of living, practical theistic religion is
feeble and futile

;
and what little consistency and force

it has is derived from the conception of the fatherhood

of God borrowed from Christian theology but im-
perfect without the two additional terms which con-

stitute the complete conception of the Trinity. All

this is a powerful argument for a theist or a Unitarian

in favor of the divine origin and authority of the Ca-

tholic dogma. The instruction which completes the
inward affirmation of God in the idea of reason, and
is the complement of the creative act constituting

the soul rational, must be from the creator. He alone
can complete his own work. It is contrary to all ra-
tional conceptions of the wisdom of God to suppose
that he has permitted that the same instruction which

teaches mankind to know, to worship, to love, and to

aspire after himself, should hand down in inseparable

connection with the eternal truth of the unity of his

essence, the doctrine of the threefold personal rela-

tions within this unity, if this were an error diame-

trically its opposite, and not a truth equally necessary

and eternal.



CHAPTER VI.

THE DOGMA OF CREATION—THE PRINCIPLE, ARCHE-
TYPE, AND END OF THE CREATIVE ACT.

THE next article of the Creed is, “ Creatorem coeliet terrce “ Creator of heaven and earth.”
The mystery of the Trinity exhausts the idea of

the activity of God within his own interior being, or
aa mtra. The dogma of the creation expresses the
idea of the activity of God without his own interior
being, or ad extra. It is an explication of the primi-
tive idea of reason, which presents simultaneously to

intelligence the absolute and the contingent in their

necessary relation of the dependence of the contin-

gent upon the absolute. Being an explication of the

rational idea, it is rationally demonstrable, and does

not, therefore, belong to the superintelligible part of

the revelation, of that which is believed simply on

the veracity of God. That portion of the dogma of
creation which is superintelligible, or revealed truth

in the highest sense, relates to the supernatural end

to which the creation is determined by the decree of

God. Nevertheless, although the idea of creation,



102 . Problems of the Age.

once proposed, is demonstrable on purely rational

principles, it is fairly and fully proposed to reason

under an adequate and explicit conception adequately

expressed, only by divine revelation. Wherever this

adequate formula of revelation has been lost, the con-

ception has been lost with it, and not even the high-

est philosophy has restored it. Plato’s conception of

the formation of the universe went no higher than

the impression of divine ideas upon matter eternally

self-existent. In all philosophy which is not regu-

lated by the principles of revelation, the ideas of ne-

cessary being and contingent existence and of the

relation between them are more or less confused, and

the dogma of creation is corrupted.
The pure theistic conception gives at once the

pure conception of creation.

Not that the idea of creation can be immediately

perceived in the idea of God, which can be shown

to be impossible
;
but that it can be perceived in the

idea of God by the medium of the knowledge of finite
existences given to the intellect together with the

knowledge of infinite being, in the primitive intui-

tion. When the idea of infinite being is fully expli-
cated and demonstrated in the perfect conception of

God
;
the existence of real entities which are not

God, and therefore not included in^necessary being,

being known
;
the relation of these things extrinsic

to the being of God, to the being of God itself, be-

comes evident in the idea of God. It is evident that

they have no necessary self-existence either out of

the divine being or in the divine being, and therefore



Problems of the Age. 103

have been brought out of nonentity into entity by

the act of God.

This creative act of God is that by which he re-
duces possibility to actuality. It is evident that this

possibility of creation, or creability of finite exist-

ences extrinsic to the divine essence, is necessary

and eternal. For God could not think of doing that
which he does not think as possible, and his thoughts

are eternal. The thought or idea of creation is
therefore eternal in the divine mind. It is a divine

and eternal archetype or ideal, which the externized,

concrete reality copies and represents.

The divine essence is the complete and ade-
quate object of the divine contemplation. It is,

therefore, in his own essence that God must have

beheld the eternal possibility of creation and the

ground or reason of creability. It is the divine

essence itself, therefore, which contains the arche-

type or ideal of a possible creation. God’s eternal

knowledge of the possibility of creation is, therefore,

his knowledge of his own essence as an archetype of
existences, which he is capable of enduing with real-

ity extrinsic to the reality of his own being by his
omnipotent power. The eternal possibility of crea-
tion, therefore, exists necessarily in the being and

omnipotence of God. It is the imitability of the di-

vine essence as archetype, by finite essences which

are its real and extrinsic similitudes, and which are

extrinsicated by an act of the divine will. The ideal
or archetype of creation is evidently as necessary, as

eternal, as unchangeable, as God himself. God can-



104 Problems of the Age.

not create except according to this archetype
;
and

in creating must necessarily copy himself, or give ex-
trinsic existence to something which is a concrete

expression of the divine ideal in his own intelligence.
This ideal which creation copies being, therefore,

eternal in the divine intelligence
;
and the interior

activity of the divine intelligence, or its interior ideal

life, not being explicable except in the relation of the

three persons in God
;
creation is likewise inexplica-

ble, except in relation to the distinct persons of the

Trinity.

The Son, or Word, proceeds from the contempla-
tion of the divine essence by the Father, who thus re-
produces the perfect and coequal image of himself. In

this act of contemplation, the knowledge of the arche-

type of creation, or of the creability of essences re-

sembling the divine essence, is necessarily included.

The expressed idea or archetype of all possible exist-
ences is therefore in the Word, as the personal image

of the Father
;
and he contains, in himself, in an emi-

nent and equivalent manner, infinite similitudes or

images capable of being reduced to act, and made to
reflect himself in a countless variety of ways. The
Son thus communicates with the Father in creative

omnipotence. The spiration of the Holy Spirit from
the Father and the Son, consummating the act of

contemplation by which the Son is generated, in love
;

and thus completing the interior, intelligent, or spi-

ritual life of God within himself
;

is perfectly corre-

lated to the eternal generation of the Son. The
complete essence of God is communicated by the



Problems of the Age. io5

Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, and with it

creative omnipotence as necessarily included in it.

The object of volition in God is identical with the
object of intelligence. The essence of God as being
the archetype of a possible creation, that is, the ideal

of creation, or the idea which creation copies, being

included in the term of the divine intelligence, or in

the Word, is also included in the term of the divine

love, or the Holy Spirit. The idea of creation is
therefore included in the object of the eternal, intel-

ligent, living contemplation in which the three per-

sons of the blessed Trinity are united. The power of
illimitable creation according to the divine archetype

in God is a necessary and eternal predicate of his di-
vine being, which he contemplates with complacency.

The idea of creation is therefore as eternal as God
;

it is coeval with him, and the object of the ineffable

communications of the divine persons with each other

from eternity. God has always been pleased with
this idea, as the artist delights himself in the ideal

of beauty to which he feels himself capable of giving

outward form and expression, in sculpture, painting,

or architecture.

The decree of God to reduce this possibility of
creation to act, or the creative purpose, is likewise

eternal
;
since all divine acts are in eternity, and

there is no process of deliberation or progress from

equilibrium to determination possible in the un-

changeable God. God is actus purissimus
,
most pure

act, and there is in him nothing potential or reduci-

ble to act which is not in act from eternity
;
since in



106 Problems of the Age.

him there is no past or future, and no succession, but

tota
,
simul ac perfecta possessio vitce intcnninabilis

,
a

complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of in-

terminable life.

The necessity of his own self-existent being does
not determine him to the creative act, but merely to the

exercise of supreme omnipotence in choosing freely

between the contemplation of creation in its ideal ar-

chetype alone, and of creation in its ideal archetype

determined to outward actual expression. The in-
ward life of God is necessary, and the interior act of
beatific contemplation is of the essence of the divine

being. Nothing beyond this, or outside of the inte-

rior essence of God, can be necessary, and the crea-

tion cannot therefore be necessary, or it would be in-

cluded in the idea of God, and be identical with the

essence of God. God does not create, therefore, by

necessity of nature, but by voluntary choice. It is

the only exercise of voluntary choice possible to

him. It is a choice, however, which though free is

determined from eternity. He might have eternally
chosen the contrary, that is, to leave the possible

creation unactualized, in its ideal archetype. He did
eternally choose, however, to create.

The learned expositor of St. Thomas, F. Billuart,
says that the purpose to create is communicated by

the Father to the Word, concomitantly with the in-

telligence of the divine essence by which he is gene-

rated.* Creation is no afterthought, no capricious or

* Tract. De Trin., Diss. V., Art. III.



Problems of the Age. 107

sportive play of omnipotence, like the jcu d'esprit

which a poet throws off from a sudden impulse of

fancy. The creative purpose has been the theme of

the mysterious communications of the three persons

of the blessed Trinity, from all eternity. In God,

purpose and act, consultation and decree, are one.

The decree of creation and the creative act are iden-
tical. The creative act, therefore, a parte Dei

,
is eter-

nal. It is an illusion of the imagination to conceive

of time as having existed before creation. “ In the

beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.”
That beginning was the first moment of time, which
St. Thomas says God created when he created the
universe. Time is a mere relation of finite entities
to each other and to infinite being, arising from their

limitation. The procession of created existences is
necessarily in time, and could not have begun ab

ceterno without a series actually infinite, which is im-

possible. Nevertheless, the first instant of created

time had no created time behind it, and no series of

instants behind it, intervening between it and eterni-

ty, but touched immediately on eternity.

The procession of created existences from God is
a finite similitude of the procession of the Son and

Holy Spirit from the Father. Creation is an expres-

sion in finite form of that archetype which is express-

ed in the infinite image of the Word. He is “ the
splendor of the glory, and the express image of the

substance”* of the Father
;
and creation is a reflec-

* Heb. i. 3.



108 Problems of the Age.

tion of this splendor, a reduplication in miniature of

this image. It is an act of the same infinite intelli-

gence by which the infinite Word is generated. For
although finite itself, it is the similitude of an infinite

archetype such as only infinite intelligence can possess

within itself. It is also an act of the same infinite

love whose spiration is the Holy Spirit. The sanc-
tity of the divine nature consists in a perfect confor-

* mity of intelligence and volition. Volition is love, a

complacency in good. Love must therefore concur

with intelligence in every divine act, that it may be
holy. The Holy Spirit, or impersonated love, must
concur with the Father and the Son, as principle and

medium, to consummate or bring to its final end the

creative act. Creation is therefore essentially an act

of love
;
proceeding from intelligence and ordained

for beatitude
;
proceeding from God as first cause,

and returning to him as final cause.

The final cause of creation must be God, just as
necessarily as its first cause must be God. The crea-
tive decree being eternal, all that constitutes its per-

fection, including its end and consummation, must

be eternal, and must therefore be in God. He is the
principle and consummation of his own act ad intra

,

and of his act ad extra, which imitates it perfectly.
God creates, because he freely chooses to please him-
self by conferring the good of existence through the

creative act on subjects distinct from himself. The
adequate object of this volition of God is himself as
the author of created good, or the term of the relation

which created existences have to him as their crea-



Problems of the Age. 109

tor. The possession of good by the creature is inse-

parable in the volition of God from the complacency
which he has in the exercise of the power of bestow-

ing good by creation. Although he is necessarily his

own final end in creating, yet this does not prevent

creation from being an act of pure and free love
;
but,

on the contrary, makes it to be so
;
because it is as

infinite love that God is the end of his creative act.
A charitable man, who confers good upon another, is
moved by a principle of love in himself, which causes

him to take delight in the happiness of his fellow-

creatures. This movement originates in himself, and

returns back to himself, being consummated in the

pure happiness which the exercise of love produces.

Yet the possession of good by another is the real ob-

ject which elicits the act of love, and it is therefore

pure, disinterested charity. Love makes the good as

given, and the good as received, one identical object,

and unites the giver and receiver in one good. Sel-

fishness is inordinate self-love, or a love of others

merely so far as they serve as instruments of our own

pleasure and advantage, and not as themselves sub-

jects of happiness. But the just love of self and of

others is identical in principle, proceeding from the

amor entis
,
or love of being. The benignant father,

prelate, or sovereign, the generous benefactor of his

fellow-men, is not less disinterested in his acts on ac-

count of the effect they produce in himself, filling his

heart with the purest happiness of which it is capa-

ble. Thus in God
;
his complacency in his creative

act, or sovereign pleasure in creating, is the purest



I IO Problems of the Age.

and most perfect love to the creature. That which

he delights in as creator is the bestowal of existence

which participates in the infinite good of his own
being.

The mode and degree in which existences partici-
pate in this infinite good which God distributes from
the plenitude of his own being, specificates and de-
termines their relation to him as final cause, and con-

stitutes the ultimate term to which their creation

is directed. This ultimate term or final end of crea-

tion as a whole, includes the ends for which each part

taken singly is intended, and the common end to
which these minor and less principal ends are all sub-

ordinated in the universal creative design. The end
of a particular portion of the creation, taken singly,

is attained, when it makes the final and complete ex-
plication of that similitude to the divine perfections

which constitutes it in its own particular grade of

existence. The end of the universe of existences is
attained when they collectively reach the maximum
of excellence which God proposed to himself in cre-
ating. That is, when the similitude of the perfections

of God is expressed in the universe in that variety of

distinct grades, and raised to that altitude in the se-

ries of possible states of existence, which God pre-

fixed in the beginning as the ultimate term of the

creative act. Whatever the maximum of created
good may be, whatever may be the predetermined
limits of the universe of existence, whatever may be
the highest point of elevation to which it is destined,

it is evident that the accomplishment of the creative



Problems of the Age. in

act brings the creation back to God as final cause.
It has its final end in God, wherever that finality may
have been fixed by the eternal will of God. This is

very plain and obvious. But it leads into one of the

most abstruse, and, at the same time, one of the most

unavoidable questions of philosophy, that which re-

lates to the end of creation metaphysically final.

What is the end of creation, or the relation of the
universe of created existences to the final cause,

which is metaphysically final ? How far ought the
actual end of created existences to coincide, and how
far does it really coincide, with the end metaphysi-

cally final ?



CHAPTER VII.

THE END OF CREATION METAPHYSICALLY FINAL—THE
ASCENDING SERIES OF GRADES IN EXISTENCE—THE
SUMMIT OF THIS SERIES IS A NATURE HYPOSTATI-

CALLY UNITED TO THE DIVINE NATURE OF THE

WORD THE INCARNATION, THE CREATIVE ACT CAR-
RIED TO THE APEX OF POSSIBILITY—THE SUPERNA-
TURAL END TO WHICH THE UNIVERSE IS DESTINED
COMPLETED IN THE INCARNATION.

BY the end of creation metaphysically final, ismeant a relation of. thje universe to God as final
cause, which is final in the divine idea, or the one

which God beholds in his own infinite intelligence as
' he ultimatum to which his omnipotence can carry

he creative act. It is a relation which brings the

creature to the closest union and similitude to the

creator in the good of being which the nature of the

infinite and of the finite will admit.

We have already established the doctrine that God
is by nature free to create or not to create, and eter-

nally determines himself to creation by his own sove-

reign will to confer the pure boon of existence. We



Problems of the Age. 1 1

3

have also established that, since God determines him-
self from eternity to create, he necessarily creates in

accordance with his own nature or essence, in accord-
ance with the eternal archetype and idea reflected in

the person of the Word
;
and for his own glory, or

for an end in himself to which the creature is related,

and which he must attain if he accomplishes his des-

tiny. But we must inquire further, whether in deter-
mining himself to create according to the archetype

contained in his own essence, he necessarily carries
out this idea to the most perfect and complete actu-

alization in the real universe ? That is, does he ne-

cessarily create for an end metaphysically final, and

carry the creative act to its apex, or the summit of

possibility ? Or is there any degree of existence or
grade of resemblance and relation to God as arche-

type which must be supposed in order to conceive of

an end accomplished by creation which is worthy of

the divine wisdom and goodness ? Or, on the con-

trary, is it just as free to God to determine any limit^
however low, as the term of creation, as it is to ab-

stain from creating ? For instance, can we suppose
it consistent with the divine wisdom to create only a

grain of sand ? On the one hand, it may be said
that creation being a free act, the creation of a grain

of sand does not take away the liberty of the divine

will to abstain from creating anything else. On the
other hand, God, as being in his very essence the in-

finite wisdom, must have an adequate end in view,

even in creating a grain of sand. It may be said
that the creation of a grain of sand is truly an infi-



1
1 4 Problems of Ike Age.

nite act, and that a grain of sand represents the om-

nipotence of God as truly as the universe itself. Yet,-
it is difficult to see any reason why Almighty God
should make such a representation merely for his
own contemplation. For the same reason, it is equal-
ly difficult to suppose any adequate motive for the

creation of a merely material universe, however ex-

tensive. The wisdom and power of God are mani-
fested, but manifested to himself alone. The very end
of such a manifestation appears to be to manifest the

attributes of God to intelligent minds capable of ap-
prehending it. Suppose the material universe filled

with sentient creatures, and, although its end is thus

partially fulfilled, by the enjoyment which they are

capable of receiving from it, its adaptation to the

manifestation of the divine attributes to intelligence

is still apparently without an object. The sentient
creation itself manifests the wisdom and goodness of

God in such a way that it seems to require an intelli-
gent nature to apprehend it, in order that God may
be glorified in his works, and that the love which is

the essential consummating principle of the creative

act may be reflected back from the creation to the
creator, and thus furnish an adequate term of the

divine complacency. This complacency of God in
himself as creator, as we have seen, is complacency
in the communication of good, or pure, disinterested

love delighting in the distribution of its own infinite
plenitude. The material creation can only be the re-
cipient of this love in transitu or as the instrument

and means of conveying it to a subject capable of



Problems of the Age. 1 1

5

apprehending it. The sentient creation can only be

the recipient of it as its most imperfect term, and as

an enl most inadequate to the means employed.

Thre wisdom and goodness of God in the creative act
cannot therefore be made intelligible to us, except as

we consider it as including the creation of intelligent

natures, capable of sharing in the intelligent life of

God. As soon as the mind makes this point, it is
able to perceive an adequate motive for the creation,

for it apprehends a good in the finite order resembling

the infinite good which is necessary and uncreated.

It is approaching to a finality, for it apprehends that

the rational nature is that nature in which the finality

must be situated, or in which the ultimate relation of

the universe to the final cause must exist. In other

words, it apprehends that God has created a universe
,

including all generic grades of existence explicated

into a vast extent and variety of subordinate genera

and species multiplied in a countless number of indi-

viduals, all subordinate to a common order, and cul-
minating in intelligent life. It apprehends the corre-

spondence of the actual creation to’ its ideal arche-

type
;
or the realization in act of the highest possible

nature which omnipotence can create after the resem-

blance of his own essence impersonated in the Word,
and of every inferior nature necessary to the consti-

tution of a universe
,
or a world of composite order

and harmony comprising all the essential forms of ex-

istence whose infinite equivalent is in the divine idea.

It is evidently befitting the wisdom and grandeur

of Almighty God, that the created universe should



1 1

6

Problems of the Age.

represent to created intelligence an adequate and uni-
versal similitude of his being and perfections

;
that

its vast extent and variety, the multiplicity of distinct
existences which it contains, its complicated relations

and harmonies, the sublimity and beauty of its forms,

the superabundance of its sentient life and enjoy-
ment, the excellence and perfection of its intelligent

creatures, should be adapted to overwhelm the mind
with admiration of the might and majesty, the wis-

dom and glory, the goodness and love of the Crea-
tor

;
that, as far as possible, the procession of the di-

vine persons within the essence of God should be
copied in the procession of created existences

;
that

the ineffable object of the divine contemplation, or

the Word going forth from the infinite intelligence
of the Father, and returning to him in the Holy Spi-

rit, should be represented in created similitudes by

the communication of being, life, and intelligence, in

every possible grade, and the completion of these in

the most sublime manner of union to God of which

finite nature is capable. This consummation of the

creative act is worthy of the wisdom of God
;
for it

is the most perfect act of the divine intelligence ad

extra
,
or extrinsic to the actus purissimus, by which

the Word is generated in the unity of his eternal
being, which is possible. It is worthy of the goodness

of God
;
for it is the most perfect act of love ad extra

,

or extrinsic to the actus purissimus of the spiration

of the Holy Spirit, consummating the interior life of

God in eternal, self-sufficing beatitude, which omni-

potence can produce.



Problems of the Age. 1 17

Let us now analyze the composite order of the uni-

verse, and examine its component parts singly, in

reference to the final end to which this order is deter-

mined. We will then proceed to examine more close-
ly the mode by which the end of the universe is at-
tained in the rational nature, and the relation of this

rational nature to the end metaphysically final.

Theologians distinguish in the divine nature esse
,

vivere
,
and intelligere

,
or being, life, and intelligence,

as constituting the archetype of the inanimate, ani-

mated, and rational orders of creation respectively.

The inanimate order, composed of the aggregate

of material substances, imitates the divine esse
,
con-

sidered as concrete and real, simply
;
prescinding the

idea of vital movement. It imitates the divine being

in the lowest and most imperfect manner. The good
that is in it can only be apprehended and made to

contribute to the happiness of conscious existence

when a higher order of existence is created. God
loves it only as an artist loves an aqueduct, a build-

ing, or a statue, as the medium of contributing to the
well-being or pleasure of his creatures. Its hidden

essence is impervious to our intelligence. The ut-
most that we can distinctly conceive of its nature is
that it is a vis activa

,
an active force, producing sen-

sible effects or phenomena. This appears to be the

opinion which is more common and gaining ground
both among physical and metaphysical philosophers.*

* The philosophical works of Leibnitz may be consulted for a tho-
rough exposition of this doctrine. The philosophical articles of Dr.



r 1 8 Problems of the Age.

By active force is meant a simple, indivisible sub-
stance, which exists in perpetual activity. It is ma-

terial substance, because its activity is blind, uncon-

scious, and wholly mechanical, producing by physical

necessity sensible effects, such as extension, resist-

ance, etc. Though not manifest to intelligence in its
hidden nature and operation, it is apprehensible by

the intelligence through the effects which it operates,

as something intelligible. Its sensible phenomena

are not illusions, or mere subjective forms of the sen-

sibility, but are objectively real. Nevertheless, our

conception of them must be corrected and sublimated

by pure reason, in order to correspond to the reality

or substance which stands under them. Our imagi-

nary conceptions* represent only the complex of phe-

nomena presented to the senses. They represent

matter as composite, because it is only through com-

position, or the interaction of distinct material sub-

stances upon each other, that the effects and pheno-

mena are produced which the senses present to the
imagination. The substance, or active force which

stands under them, is concluded by a judgment of the

reason. Reason cannot arrest itself at the composite

as something ultimate. The common, crude concep-

Brownson in his Review contain some incidental arguments of great

value on the same topic. F. Dalgairns, of the London Oratory, also

treats, with the ability and clearness which characterize all his writ-

ings, of this subject, at considerable length, in his work on the Holy

Communion.
* By “ imaginary conceptions” is not meant fanciful, unreal concep-

tions, but conceptions of the imagination as an intellectual faculty

which reflects the real.



Problems of the Age. 1 1

9

tion of extended bulk as the ultimate material reality,

is like the child’s conception of the surface of the

earth as the floor of the universe having nothing

below it, and of the sky as its roof
;
or like the Indian

I

conception of an elephant supporting- the world, who
stands himself on the back of a tortoise, who is on
the absolute mud lying at the bottom of all things.
It is the essential operation of reason to penetrate to

the altissima causa
,
or deepest cause of things, and

not to stop at anything as its term which implies

something else as the reason or principle of its exist-

ence. It cannot therefore stop at anything short of

the altissima causa
,
in the order of material second

causes, any more than it can stop short of the cause

of all causes, or the absolute first cause. That which

is ultimate in the composite must be simple and indi-

visible in itself, and divided from everything else, or

it cannot be an original and primary component.

For, however far the analysis of a composite may be
carried, it may be carried further, unless it has been
analyzed to its simple constituent parts which are not

themselves composite, and therefore simple. It is of

no avail to take refuge in the notion of the infinite

divisibility of matter. For, apart from the absurdity

of the infinite series contained in this notion, one of

these infinitesimal entities could certainly be divided

from all others by the power of God and made intel-
ligible to the human understanding. And the very
question under discussion is, What is the intelligible
essence of this ultimate entity ?

Another proof that material substance is something



120 Problems of ike Age.

intelligible and not something sensible, is that it has

a relation to spiritual substance, and therefore some-

thing cognate to spirit in its essence. The Abbe
Branchereau defines relation : “ Proprietatem qua

duo aut plura entia ita se habent ad invicem, ut unius

conceptus conceptum alterius includat aut supponat.”
“ A property by which two or more entities are so
constituted in reference to one another, that the con-

ception of one includes or supposes the conception of

the other.”*

The conception of spirit must contain the equiva-
lent of the conception of matter, and the conception

of matter must contain something the equivalent of

which is contained in spirit. Else, they must be re-

lated as total opposites, which leads to the absurd

conclusion that in the essence of God, which is the

equivalent of all finite essences, total opposites and

contradictions are contained. The same is affirmed

by F. Billuart after the scholastic principles of the

Thomists. “ Supremum autem naturae inferioris
attingitur a natura superiori.” “ The summit of the

inferior nature is touched by the superior nature.”!

Everything copies the essence of God and exists by
its participation in his being. There is no reason

therefore for any other distinction in creatures except

the distinction of gradation in a series, or the distinc-

tion of a more or less intense grade of participation

in being. God cannot create anything totally dissi-

* Pralect. Philos. De Rclat. Entis. Num. 103, 3.
t De Angelis. Diss. II. Art. I.



Problems of the Age. 121

milar to himself, because the sole archetype imitable

in the creative act, whose similitude is externized in

creation, is himself. All things therefore being simi-

lar to his essence are similar to the essence of one

another, each to each, each grade in the ascending

series containing the equivalent of all below it.

The material creation represents the real being of

God, as distinguishable in thought from his life and

intelligence, in an express and distinct manner. The

being of God is the archetype of the material crea-

tion, and contains a reason why the material order
was necessary to perfect the universe. All geome-

trical principles are intuitively seen by the reason to

be eternal truths. As eternal and necessary they are
included in the object of the divine contemplation.

The complete and adequate object of the divine con-
templation is the divine essence. It is therefore in

his own essence that God sees these necessary geo-
metrical truths, not as we see them, but as identical
with the truth of his own being in some way above
our human understanding. These eternal geometri-
cal principles are the principles which lie at the basis

of the structure of the material universe, which there-

fore represents something in the divine essence not

immediately and distinctly represented by the spiri-

tual world.

Without pretending to define precisely what the

material universe represents as equivalently and emi-

nently contained in the divine essence, we are only
uttering a truism when we affirm that what man in
his present state principally apprehends through it,



I 22 Problems of the Age.

is the idea of the immensity of the divine being.

The material universe, which has a quasi infinitude
to our feeble and limited imagination, is an image of

God as possessing boundless infinitude, and including
an immeasurable ocean of perfections. It is only

when the mind becomes so overwhelmed with the
magnitude of the creation as to forget its relation to

the creator, that its judgment is erroneous. And the
error of judgment does not consist in appreciating the

material universe too highly, but in appreciating it

too little, that is, in not appreciating its highest rela-

tion to the spiritual order, with which it is cognate

in its essence. The physical, visible world is not to
be despised. It is no illusion, no temporary phase of

reality, no perishable substance, but real, indestructi-

ble, and of endless duration. Its essence and its re-

lation to the final cause are incomprehensible. Its

essence is, however, so far intelligible that we can

understand it to be a real entity, bearing a similitude

to the divine nature, endued with active iorce as a

physical second cause, through which wonderful phe-

nomena are produced in which the divine perfections
are manifested. Its end is also intelligible as subor-

dinated to the higher grades of existence and to the

grand composite order of the universe.

The next grade of existence is that which repre-
sents the vivere of the divine essence, or presents an

animated and living similitude of the life of God. The
distinct type of this grade is in the animal world, but

it is connected with the inanimate creation by an in-

termediate link, namely, that which is constituted by



Problems of the Age. 123

the world of vegetative life.r This world of vegetative

life represents the principle of life in an inchoate form,

and ministers to the higher life of sentient existences,

by furnishing them with the sustenance and food of

their physical life, and contributing to their enjoy-

ment by the beauty of its forms.

Thus far the creation is merely good as means to

an end, or as the substratum 6f that order of exist-

ence which is capable of apprehending and enjoying

good. In the sentient creation, existence becomes a

good in itself, or a good capable of terminating the

divine v will. The countless multitudes of sentient
creatures are created that they may enjoy life, and
attain their particular end in this enjoyment. Never-

theless this particular end is a minor and less princi-

pal end in reference to the general end of the created

universe. To this more general end the sentient
order contributes, by increasing the beauty and per-

fection of the whole, and ministering to the happiness

of the higher, intelligent order.

This third and highest grade of existence repre-

sents the divine intelligere. It includes all rational

natures, or intelligent spirits, created after the simili-

tude of that in the divine essence which is the high-

est archetype imitable in finite existences. Accord-

ing to the regular series of gradation, man comes
next in order above the animal world, and should be

first considered. There is a particular reason, how-

ever, which will appear hereafter, for considering the

angels first.

The angels represent most perfectly the order of



124 Problems of the Age.

pure intelligence, as distinct from the irrational crea-

tion. By their nature they are at the summit of
existence, and participate in the most immediate and

elevated mode which can be connatural to any cre-
ated essence, in the divine perfections. The perfec-
tion of the universe requires that it should contain

a grade of existence imitating that which is highest

in the essence of God so far as it is an archetype of
a possible creation. There is nothing conceivable in

the divine essence higher than its intelligence or

pure spirituality. The divine life is consummated in
the most pure act of intelligent spirit, which is the

procession of the Word and Holy Spirit from the Fa-
ther. This divine procession within the divine es-

sence being the archetype of the procession of cre-

ated existences without it, the latter ought to imitate

the former by producing that which represents the

intelligent act of God as closely as possible. This in-
telligent act of God being consummated in love, or
complacency in that infinite good which is the object

of intelligence, creation, which imitates and repre-

sents it, ought to contain existences which are the

recipients of love and are capable of its exercise in

the highest possible manner which can be essential

to a created nature. The creative act would there-
fore be most imperfect and incomplete if it stopped

short with the material or even the sentient creation.

Supposing that God determines to carry out his crea-
tive act by creating a universe or a world in which

the potential is actualized in a universal manner by

representing the esse, vivere
,
and intelligere of the di-



Problems of the Age. 125

vine essence in every generic mode, this universe

must evidently contain intelligent spirits. Intelligent

spirit alone can apprehend the image of God in
creation, apprehend itself as made in the image of
God, apprehend the infinite attributes of God by the
intuition of reason, and become fully conscious of the

good of existence, capable of enjoying it, and of re*

turning to the creator an_act of love, worship, and

glorification, for his great boon of goodness conferred

in creation. Creation is an overflow of the plenitude

of good in the divine being proceeding from the com-

placency of God in the communication of this good.
This communication can be made in a manner which

appears to our reason in any way adequate to termi-

nate the divine complacency, only by the commu-

nication of intelligence.

The type of intelligent nature is most perfectly
actualized in the angels

;
whose essence and operation

are purely spiritual, so far as created, finite nature

and operation can be purely spiritual. Whatever is

intelligible or conceivable of finite, intellectual activity

as connatural, or intrinsically included in the essence

of created spirit, is to be attributed to them.

The notion of any composition of nature in the

angels, or hypostatic union of their pure, spiritual

substance, with another material substance distinct

from it, is wholly gratuitous. It destroys the distinc-

tive type of the angelic nature and the specific differ-

ence between it and human nature. It has no foun-
dation in reason except the baseless supposition that

a distinct corporeal organization is necessary to the



126 Problems of the Age.

exercise of created intelligence. Nor has it any solid
support from tradition or extrinsic authority.

Some of the fathers are cited as maintaining it.
Their language is, however, for the most part explain-

ed by the best theologians as indicating, not the union

of the angelic spirit to a distinct, subtle corporeity,

but the existence of something analogous to matter

in the angelic spirit itself. The angels are called cor-
poreal existences, because their essence is extrinsic

to the divine essence, and extrinsication attains its

extreme limit in matter
;
also because their poten-

tiality is not completely reduced to act, and their

operation is limited by time and space. This appears

to be also the notion advocated by Leibnitz, and the

exposition of the nature of material substance given

above, in accordance with his philosophy, removes all

difficulty from the subject.

The conception of the angelic essence as complete-
ly free from all composition with a distinct material

substance, is also at least more evidently in harmony

with the decree Firmiter of the Fourth Council of

Lateran, than any other. “ Firmiter credimus et

simpliciter confitemur, quod unus est solus verus

Deus aeternus .... qui sua omnipotenti virtute
simul ab initio temporis, utramque de nihilo condidit

creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam vide-

licet et mundanam : ac deinde humanam quasi com-
munem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam.”

“ We firmly believe and confess with simplicity,
that there is one only true eternal God . . . who

by his own almighty power simultaneously from the



Problems of the Age. 127

beginning of time made out of nothing both parts

of the creation, the spiritual and the corporeal, that

is, the angelical and the mundane : and afterward the

human creature, as it were of a nature in common
with both, constituted from spirit and body.”

Nevertheless, by the principle of the Thomist phi-

losophy above cited, that the lowest point of any na-

ture touches the highest of the nature beneath it,

there may be something even in the spiritual opera-
tion of the angels cognate to material operation, and

coming within the sphere of the sensible. We will
venture to give a little sample of scholastic theology

on this head from Billuart.
“ It may be said with reason that the angels ope-

rate two things in the celestial empyrean. The first
is the illumination by which the intrinsic splendor of

the empyrean is perfected, according to St. Thomas
and various testimonies of Holy Scripture in which

certain places are said to have been sensibly illumi-

nated by the angels. For although an angel cannot

immediately produce alterative qualities, as heat or

cold, he can produce light, because light is a celestial

quality and the highest of corporeal qualities, and the

summit of the inferior nature is touched by the su-

perior nature.

“ In the second place, the angels operate on the

empyrean heaven, so that it may more perfectly and
efficaciously communicate a suitable perpetuity and

stability to all inferior things. For- as the supreme

angels who are permanently stationed there have an
influence over the intermediate and lowest angels



128 Problems of the Age.

who are sent forth, although they themselves are not
sent forth, so the empyrean heaven, although it is itself
motionless, communicates to those things which are
in motion the requisite stability and permanence in
their being. And that this may be done more effica-
ciously and permanently the angels aid by their

operation in it. For, the whole universe is one in

unity of order
;
and this unity of order consists in

this : that by a certain arrangement corporeal things

are regulated by those which are spiritual, and infe-

rior bodies by the superior
;
therefore, as this order

demands that the empyrean sphere influence the in-

ferior ones, it demands also that the angels influence

the empyrean sphere.”*

Whatever may be thought of this as philosophy, it
is certainly brilliantly poetical, as is the whole treatise

of the learned Dominican from which it is extracted.

The physical theory of the universe maintained by
the scholastics was a magnificent conception, although

it has been supplanted by a sounder scientific hypo-

thesis. There appears to be no reason, however, for

rejecting the notion of angelic influence over the

movement of the universe. The modern hypothesis

of a central point of revolution for the universe being

substituted for the ancient one of the empyrean, the

entire scholastic theory of the influence of the angels

upon the exterior order of the universe may remain

untouched in its intrinsic probability.

The consideration of man has been reserved, be-

De Angelis. Diss. II.- Art. I.



129Problems of the Are.

cause, although he is inferior to the angels in intelli-

gence, he sums up in himself the three grades of

existence
;
and therefore the consideration of the

three as distinct ought to precede the consideration

of their composition in the complex human nature.

The human nature includes in itself the material,

vegetative, animal, and intelligent natures, which re-

present respectively the divine esse, vivere, and Intel*

ligere. For this reason man is called a microcosm, or
universe in miniature. In certain special perfections

of the material, sentient, and intelligent natures, he

is inferior to each
;
but the combination of all gives

him a peculiar excellence and completeness, and qua-

lifies him to stand in the most immediate relation to

the final cause of the universe, or to the consumma-

tion of its end.

What this end is, we must now more closely exa^-
mine. It is plain at first sight that this end must be

attained by creation through its intelligent portion,

or through the angelic and human natures. As God
is final cause as well as first cause

;
of necessity,

these intelligent natures in themselves, and all infe-

rior natures through them, must, in some way, termi-
nate in God as their ultimate end. God is final cause
as the supreme good participated in and attained to

by the creation, through the overflow of the plenitude
of the divine being. The divine complacency in this
voluntary overflow of the fount of being and good

was the ultimate and determining motive to ttie crea-

tive act. The good of being thus given is a simili-
tude of the divine esse, vivere, and intelligere. As it



130 Problems of the Age.

is real, or existence in act, it must copy, as far as its

grade of existence permits, the most pure act of God
in the blessed Trinity. That is, the creature must

reflect from its own essence an image of the divine
essence, or a created similitude of the uncreated

Word, in which its existence is completed and its act

consummated. In the material world this is a mere

dead image, like the representation of a living form

made by a statue or picture. In the sentient world,
so far as we can understand this most inscrutable and
baffling of all parts of the creation, there is an appre-

hension by the sensitive soul of a kind of shadow of

the intelligible object in sensible forms, and an im-

perfect resemblance of the life and felicity of an intel-

ligent nature which corresponds to this imperfect ap-

prehension. In the intelligent creature, its spiritual

essence
;
by virtue of the rationality in which it is

created, and which is its constitutive principle
;

re-

flects an image of the divine Word in the contem-
plation of which its intelligent life is completed. So

far as intelligent nature is merely potential, it is po-

tential to this act of intelligent life
;
and when its

potentiality is reduced to act, so as to produce the

nearest similitude to the divine intelligence in act

which God has determined to create
;
intelligent na-

ture, and in it all nature, has attained its finality.

Intelligent nature has attained the highest good at-

tainable
;
and, the different intelligent species and

individuals existing together in due order and har-

mony in the participation of the common good, with
all inferior grades of existence subordinated to them,



Problems of the Age. 131

the universe has unity and is determined to a com-

mon final end.
Thus, creation returns back to the principle from

which it proceeded, by the consummation of the crea-

tive act. As the Father is united to the Word in the
Holy Spirit, or in love and complacency, so the crea-

tion is united to God by the possession of good and
the complacency of God in this good. This is ac-
tualized in the intelligent nature capable of knowing

and loving God, and therefore having a similitude to

the Son or Word. When it is ascertained what the
highest union to the Father, or that approaching

nearest to the union of the Son to him of which

created nature is capable, is, it will be ascertained

what is the end metaphysically final to which created

nature can attain, if God wills to bring it to the sum-
mit of possibility. When it is ascertained what this
summit of possibility is, it is ascertained what the

end of creation is which is metaphysically final
;
and

when it is ascertained how far toward this summit
God has actually determined to elevate his creation,
it is ascertained what is the end of creation actually

final, and how far it coincides with the end metaphy-
sically final.

This knowledge cannot be deduced from any first

principle given to reason. It is communicated by

revelation, and by this revelation we learn that God
has determined to bring the creation to the end me-

taphysically final in the incarnation o^ the Word.

The revelation of the mystery of the Incarnation
is concomitant with the revelation o.f the mystery of



i3 2 Problems of the Age.

the Trinity
;
therefore, in the Creed, the same terms

which propose the dogma that the Word is of God
and is God, propose the dogma that the Word is in-
carnate in human nature. The name given to the
Second Person in the Trinity, in the Creed, Jesus

Christ, is the name which he assumed with his
human nature. “ Et in unurn Dominum, Jesum
Christum, Filium Dei unigenitum, Deum de Deo,
Lumen de Lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero, geni-
tum, non factum, consubstantialem Patri

:
per quern

omnia facta sunt. Qui, propter nos homines, et prop-

ter nostram salutem, descendit de coelis, et incarnatus

est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, et homo fac-
tus est.”

“ And in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begot-
ten Son of God, God of God, Light of Light, very
God of very God, begotten, not made, consubstantial
with the Father

;
by whom all things were made.

Who, for us men, and for our salvation, descended
from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost

of the Virgin Mary, and was made man.”
The mystery of the incarnation presents to us the

idea, that the Word has assumed human nature
;
not

by assuming all the individuals of the race, but by

assuming humanity individuated in one perfect soul

and body into a union with his divine nature/ in which

it terminates upon his divine person as the final com-

plement of its existence, without any confusion of its

distinct essence with the divine essence to which it

is united. By this union, the Word is a theandric
person, or one divine person in two natures, divine



Problems of the Age. 133

and human, really distinct from each other in essence

and existence, but with one common principle of im-
putability to which their attributes and operation are

to be ascribed. This is the union, called in theologi-

cal language hypostatic, of the creature to the crea-

tor, which is metaphysically final, or final to the di-

vine intelligence and power
;
beyond which there is

no idea in God of a possible act ad extra
,
and which

is next in order to the procession of the divine per-

sons ad intra. Through this hypostatic union, created
nature participates with the uncreated nature imper-

sonated in the Son in the relation to the Father as

principle, and the Holy Spirit as consummation, of

intelligence and love
;
that is, in the divine life and

beatitude. The incarnation having been in the view
and purpose of Almighty God from eternity, as the
ultimatum of his wisdom and omnipotence, is the

apex of the creative act, or the terminus at which the

creative act reaches the summit of possibility. In it

the creation returns to God as final cause, from whom
it proceeds as first cause, in a mode which is meta-
physically final. It is therefore certain that God, in

his eternal, creative purpose, determined the universe

to an end metaphysically final
;
and that this end is

attained in the incarnation, or the union of created

with uncreated nature in the person of the Word.

\



CHAPTER VIII.

A FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL
ORDER.

I
T has been already remarked, that the Incarnation
is a more profound and inscrutable mystery than

even the Trinity. The reason is that the trinity is a
necessary truth, included in the very idea of God as
most simple being and most pure act. The incarna-
tion is not a truth necessary in itself, but only neces-

sary on the supposition that it has been decreed by

God. The trinity of persons proceeds from a neces-
sity of nature in God, the incarnation from an act of

free will. But the acts of the divine free will are more

mysterious and inexplicable than those which proceed

from necessity of nature.

Without revelation the incarnation would be in-

conceivable, and even when it is disclosed by revela-
• *

p #

J

tion, the analogies by which it can be illustrated are

faint and imperfect. The union between soul and

body in animal nature and between the animal and



Problems of the Age. 1 35

spiritual natures in man furnish the only analogies of
anything like a hypostatic union in the natural world.

But these analogies do not illustrate the dark point

in the mystery, to wit : the union of two intelligent

natures in one subsistence
,
or one common personal

principle of imputability to which the acts of both are

referable. We have but little difficulty in apprehend-
ing that acts proceeding from two distinct natures in

man, the animal and the spiritual, should be referred

to one principle of imputability or one personality.

These acts are so very distinct and different from

each other, that they evidently have no tendency to

become blended or confused, by the absorption of

one nature into the other*. But if we should try to
conceive of a hypostatic union between the angelic and

human natures in one person, it would be impossible

to avoid imagining that one intelligent nature would

be absorbed in the other. If there is but one princi-

ple of imputability, how can there be two distinct in-
telligent voluntary operations ? Our opinion is, that

a union of this kind between two finite natures is im-

possible. The possibility of assuming a distinct in-
telligent nature must then belong to a divine person

only, and be included in the infinitude of the divine

essence. The difficulty of understanding it lies then
in the incomprehensibility of the divine essence.

We apprehend nothing in the divine essence distinct-
ly, except that which is apprehensible through the

analogy which created essences bear to it. Evident-

ly that in the divine essence which renders it totally

dissimilar from all created essences cannot be repre-



136 Problems of the Age.

seated by a similitude in created essences. And as
the divine essence subsisting in the Second Person

renders it capable of assuming human nature by an
attribute which renders it totally dissimilar from all

finite personality, there can be no analogy to it in

finite things. In order to understand this it is neces-

sary to recall to mind a principle laid down by St.
Thomas, that we cannot affirm anything, whether
being, intelligence, will, personality, or whatever

other term of thought we may propose, of God and
a creature, univocally, that is, in the same identical

sense. The essence of God differs as really from the
spiritual essence of angels and human souls as it
does from the essence of animal souls and of matter.

We apprehend what the intelligence and the will of
God are only through the analogy of human intelli-
gence and will, in a most imperfect and inadequate

manner. In themselves they are* incomprehensible

to the human understanding. In the very essence
of God as incomprehensible, or superintelligible, is
situated that capacity of being the personality of

created intelligent nature which constitutes the mys-

tery of the hypostatic union. The only analogy
therefore in created things which is appreciable by

the human mind, is an analogy derived from the
union of natures whose difference is intelligible to us,

as the spiritual and animal. This analogy enables

us to understand that the divine and human natures,
not being intelligent natures in a univocal sense, but

being dissimilar not only in degree of intelligence

but in the very essence of intelligence, are capable



Problems of the Age. 1 37

of union in one personality. There is no analogy,

however, which enables us to understand what this

difference is, because it would be a contradiction in

terms to suppose in the creature any analogy to that

which is above all analogies and is peculiar to the

divine nature as divine. The utmost that reason can
do is to apprehend, when the mystery of the incarna-

tion is proposed by revelation, that the incomprehen-

sibility of the divine essence renders it impossible to

judge that it cannot be hypostatically united to a

created intelligent nature, and that it increases our

conception of its infinitude or plenitude of being to

suppose that a divine person can terminate a created

nature as well as the nature which is self-existing.

All that reason can do then is to demonstrate, after

the mystery of the incarnation is proposed, that the

impossibility of the incarnation cannot be demon-

strated on the principles of reason, and that it is

therefore credible on the authority of revelation ;
and, by the illumination of faith, to apprehend a cer-

tain degree of probability or verisimilitude in the

mystery itself.

Once established, however, as a dogma or funda-
mental principle in theology, its reason and fitness in

reference to the final cause of the universe, the har-

mony of all other facts and doctrines with it, and the
grandeur which it gives to the divine economy, can

be conclusively and abundantly proved by rational

arguments.

We know that it must be fitting and worthy of the
divine majesty to decree the incarnation, because he



1 38 Problems of the Age.

has done it. But we can also see that it is so, and

why. We can see that it befits Almighty God to ex-
haust his omnipotence in producing a work which is

the masterpiece of his intelligence and the equivalent

of the archetype contained in his Word. To show
his royal magnificence in bestowing the greatest pos-

sible boon on created nature. To pour forth his love
in such a manner as to astound the intelligence of hi&

rational creatures, by communicating all that is con-

tained in filiation and the procession of the Spirit, so

far as that is in itself possible. To glorify and deify
the creature, by raising it as nearly as possible to an

equality with himself in knowledge and beatitude.

The reason for selecting the human rather than
the angelic nature for the hypostatic union is obvious

from all that has preceded. Human nature is a mi-
crocosm, in which all grades of existence are summed
lip and represented. In taking human nature the
Word assumes all created nature, from the lowest to
the highest. For, although the angelic nature is su-

perior to the human, it is only superior to it in cer-

tain respects, and not as a rational essence. More-'

over, this superiority is in part only temporary, en-

during while the human nature is in the process of
explication

;
and as to the rest, the inferiority of the

human nature is counterbalanced by the supernatural

;
elevation given to it in the hypostatic union, which

raises the natural, human operation of the soul of our
Lord Jesus Christ far above that of the angelic na-

ture. Although, therefore, in the series of grades in

the natural order of existence, the angelic nature is



Problems of the Age. 139

above the human, it is subordinated to it in the su-

pernatural order, or the order of the incarnation, and

in relation to the final cause. For it is through the

human nature united to the divine nature in the
person of the Word that the angelic nature completes
its return to God and union with him.
The elevation of created nature to the hypostatic

union with God in the person of the Word introduces
an entirely new principle of life into the intelligent
universe. Hitherto, we have considered in the crea-
tive act a regular gradation in the nature of created

existences, from the lowest to the highest. Each

grade is determined to a certain participation in being

superior in intensity to that of the one below it, and

to a mode of activity corresponding to its essence.
There can be no grade of existence in its essence

superior to the rational or intelligent nature, which is

created in the similitude of that which is highest in

the divine essence. No doubt, the specific and minor
grades included under the universal generic grade of

rationality might be indefinitely multiplied. As the
angels differ from man, and the various orders of the

angelic hierarchy differ from each other, so God might
continue to create ad infinitum new individuals or
new species, each differing from all others, an^ all ar-
ranged in an ascending series, in which each grade

should be superior in certain particulars to all below

it. It is evidently possible that a created intelligence

should be made to progress from the lowest stage of
development continuously and for ever. Let us fix

our thought upon the most distant and advanced limit



140 Problems of the Age.

in this progression which we are able to conceive. It
is evident that God might have created an intelligent
spirit in the beginning at that point, as the starting-

point of his progression, and might have created nt

the same time other intelligent spirits at various dis-

tances from this point in a descending series. Sup-

pose now that this is the case, and that the lowest in
the scale progresses until he reaches the starting-

point of the most advanced. The one who began at
this advanced point will have progressed meanwhile

to another point equally distant, and will preserve his

relative superiority. But even at this point, God
might have created him at first, with another series

of intervening grades at all the intermediate points

which he has passed over in his progressive move-

ment. We may carry on this process as long as we
please, without ever coming to a limit at which we
are obliged to stop. For the creation being of ne-

cessity limited, and the creative power of God unli-
mited, it is impossible to equalize the two terms, or

to conceive of a creation which is equal to God as
creator. Nevertheless, all possible grades of ration-

ality are like and equal to each other as respects the

essential propriety of rationality, and never rise to a

grade which is essentially higher than that of rational

nature. The only difference possible is a difference

in the mode in which the active force of the intellect

is exercised, and in the number of objects to which

it is applicable, or some other specific quality of the

same kind. Whatever may be the increase which

rational nature can be supposed to receive, it is only



Problems of the Age. 14

1

the evolution of the essential principle which consti-

tutes it rational, and is therefore common to all spe-
cies and individuals of the rational order. Although,

therefore, God cannot create a spirit so perfect that

it cannot be conceived to be more perfect in certain

particulars, yet it is nevertheless true that God can-
not create anything which is generically more per-

fect than spirit or intelligent substance. From this
it follows as a necessary consequence, that God can-

not create a nature which by its essential principles

demands its last complement of being in a divine

person, or naturally exists in a hypostatic union with

the divine nature. For rational nature, which is the

highest created genus, and the nearest possible to

the nature of God, Ipsius enim et genus sumus,* de-

veloped to all eternity, would never rise above itself,

or elicit an act which would cause it to terminate

upon a divine person, and bring it into a hypostatic

union with God. Produce a line, parallel to an infi-

nite straight line, to infinity, and it will never meet it

or come any nearer to it. The very essence of created
spirit requires that it should be determined to a mode
of apprehending God by an image reflected in the
creation. The activity of the created intelligence
must proceed for ever in this line, and has no tenden-

cy to coincide with the act of the divine intelligence

in which God contemplates immediately his own es-
sence. Increase as much as you will the perfection
of the created image, it remains always infinitely dis-

* “ For we are also his offspring,” Acts xvii. 28.



142 Problems of the Age.

tant from the uncreated, personal image of himself

which the Father contemplates in the Word, and

loves in the Holy Spirit, within the circle of the

blessed Trinity. It has been proved in a previous

chapter that infinite intelligence is identical with the

infinite intelligible in God. If a being could be

created which by its essence should be intelligent by

the immediate vision of the divine essence, it would

be intelligent in se, and therefore possess within its

own essence its immediate, intelligible object, which,
by the terms of the supposition, is the divine essence.

It would possess in itself sanctity, immutability, and

beatitude. It would be, in other words, beatified pre-

cisely because existing, that is, incapable of existing

in any defective state, and therefore incapable of

error, sin, or suffering. And as, by the terms, it is
what it is, by its essence, its essence and existence

are identical
;

it is essentially most pure act, essen-

tially existing, therefore self-existent, necessary being,

or identical with God. It is therefore impossible for

God to create a rational nature which is constituted
rational by the immediate intuition of the divine es-

sence. For by the very terms it would be a creature

and God at the same time. It would be one of the
persons in the unity of the divine nature, and yet

have a nature totally distinct. In the natural order,

then, it is impossible that a created nature should

either at its beginning, or in the progress of its evo-

lution, demand as its due and necessary complement

of being a divine personality. Personality is the last

complement of rational nature. Divine nature de-



Problems of the Age. *43

mands divine personality. Finite nature demands

only finite personality. It is evident, therefore, that

there cannot be a finite nature, however exalted,

which cannot come to its complete evolution within

its own essence, or which can explicate out of the
contents of its being an act which necessarily termi-

nates upon a divine person, so as to bring it into a

hypostatic union with the divine nature.

Let us go back a little in the scale of being, in

order to develop this principle more fully. Lifeless

matter is capable of indefinite increase in its own
order, but this increase has no tendency to elevate it

to the grade of vegetative life, A new and different
principle of organization' must be introduced, in order

to construct from its simply elements a vegetative

form, as, for instance, a flower. So, also', the explica-

tion of vegetative life has no tendency to generate a

sentient principle. The plant may go on producing
foliage, flowering, germinating, and reproducing its

species for ever, but its vital activity can never produce

a sentient soul, or proceed to that degree of perfection

that it requires a sentient soul as its last complement

or the proper form of its organic life. Suppose a

plant or flower to receive a sentient soul
;
this soul

must be immediately created by God, and it would be

the principle or form of a new life, which, in relation
to the natural, vegetative life of the flower, would be

super-natural, elevating it to an order of lifer above

that which constitutes it a flower.

A sentient creature, as a dog or a bird, has no ten-
dency to explicate from the constitutive principle of



144 Problems of the Age.

its animal soul intelligence, or to attain a state

of existence in which an intelligent personality is

due to it as its last complement. If the animal soul

could have an intelligent personality, it must be by a

hypostatic union with an intelligent nature distinct

from itself, which would then become the stippositum
,

or principle of iinputability to the animal nature.

The animal would then be elevated to a state which
would be super-natural, relatively to the animal nature,

or entirely above the plane of its natural develop-

ment.

In like manner, the rational nature has no tendency

or power to rise above itself, or to do more than ex-

plicate that principle which constitutes it rational

If it is elevated to a higher order, it must be by a

direct act of omnipotence, an immediate intervention

of the creator, producing in it an act which could

never be produced by the explication of its rational-

ity, even though it should progress to all eternity.

This act is supernatural in the absolute sense. That

is, it lies in an order above created nature as a total-

ity, and above all nature which might be created
;

supra ornnem naturam creatam atque ereahitem.

It is beyond the power even of divine omnipotence

to create a rational nature which, by its intrinsic,

constitutive principle of intelligence, is affiliated to

the Father through the Holy Spirit. Such a nature

would be equal to the Word and another Word, and
therefore equal to the Father, or, in other words,

would be a divine nature although created ; which

would be absurd. The Father can have but one Son,



Problems of the Age. H5

eternally begotten, not made
;
and the only possible

way in which a created nature can be elevated to a
strictly filial relation to the Father, is by a hypostatic

union with the divine nature of the Son in one per-

son, so that there is a communication of properties

between the two natures, and but one principle of

imputability to which all the divine and human attri-
butes and acts can be referred. This union can be

effected only by a direct intervention of God, or by

the Word assuming to himself a created nature. For
rational nature finds its last complement of personal-

ity, its subsistentia
,
or principle of imputability, with-

in its own limits, which it never tends to transcend,
even by infinite progression. The human nature in-
dividuated in the person of Jesus Christ, by its own
intrinsic principles was capable of being completed

in a finite personality, like every other individual

human nature. The fact that the place of the human
personality is supplied by a divine person, and the

human nature thus completed only in the divine, is
due to the direct, divine act of the Word, and is

therefore supernatural. In this supernatural relation

it becomes the recipient, so to speak, of the divine

vital current, and participates in the act in which the

divine life is consummated, which is the procession

of the Son and Holy Spirit from the Father. This

act consists radically and essentially in the immedi-

ate contemplation of the divine essence. Created in-

telligence, therefore, elevated to the hypostatic union,

contemplates the essence of God directly, without



146 Problems of the Age.

any intervening medium, by the immediate intuition

or beatific vision of God.

Thus, in the incarnation, the creation returns back

to God and is united to him in the most perfect man-
ner, by participating in the good of being in a way
sublime above all human conception, exhausting even
the infinite idea of God. Created intelligence is be

atified, glorified, and deified. In Jesus Christ, man,

in whose essence is included the equivalent of all

creation, and God, meet in the unity of one person.

The nature of God becomes the nature of man in the
Second Person, who is truly man

;
and the nature of

man becomes the nature of God in the same Person,
who is truly God. Creation, therefore, attains its final
end and returns to God as final cause in the incarna-
tion which is the most perfect work of God, the

crown of the acts of his omnipotence, the sutnmit of

the creative act, the completion of all grades of exist-

ence, and the full realization of the divine archetype.

In Jesus Christ, the creative act is carried to the

apex of possibility. In his human nature, therefore,
he is the most preeminent of all creatures, and sur-

passes them all, not only singly but collectively. He
has the primogeniture, and the dominion over all

things, the entire universe of existences being subor-

dinated to him. Nevertheless, his perfection is not

completed merely by that which he possesses within

the limits of his individual humanity. He is the
summit of creation, the head of the intelligent uni-

verse, the link nearest to God in the chain of created

existences. The universe, therefore, by virtue of the



Problems of the Age. 147

principle of order and unity which pervades it, ought

to communioate with him through a supernatural

order, so that the gradation in the works of God may

be regular and perfect. The chasm between rational
nature in its natural state and the same nature raised

to the hypostatic union is too great, and demands to

be filled up by some intermediate grades. Having

taken created nature, which is by its very constitution

adapted to fellowship between individuals of the same

kind
;
and, specifically, human nature, which is con-

stituted in relations of race and family, the Son of

God ought, in all congruity, to have brethren and
companions capable of sharing with him in beatitude

and glory. Being specifically human and of one
blood with all mankind, it is fitting that he should

elevate his own race to a share in his glory. Being
generically of the same intellectual nature with the

angels, it is also fitting that he should elevate them

to the same glory. This can only be done by grant-

ing them a participation in that supernatural order

of intelligence and life which he possesses by virtue

of the hypostatic union
;
that is, a participation in

the immediate, beatific vision of the divine essence.

This supernatural order is denominated the order

of regeneration and grace. It is cognate with the

order of the hypostatic union, but not identical with

it. The personality of the divine Word is commu-
nicated only to the individual human nature of Jesus
Christ, who is not only the first-born but the only-
begotten Son of God. God is incarnate in Christ
alone. The union of his created substance with the



148 Problems of the Age.

divine substance, without any permixture or confusion,

in one person, is something inscrutable to reason.

The knowledge, sanctity, beatitude, and glory of his
human nature are effects of this union, but are not
it. These effects, which are due to the humanity of

Christ as being the nature of a divine person, and

are its rightful and necessary prerogatives, are com-

municable, as a matter of grace, to other individuals,

personally distinct from Christ That is to say, sanc-

tity, beatitude, and glory do not require as the neces-

sary condition of their communicability the commu-
nication of a divine personality, but are compatible

with the existence of an indefinite number of dis-

tinct, finite personalities. All those rational creatures,

however, who are the subject of this communicated
grace, are thereby assimilated to the Son of God, and

made partakers of an adoptive sonship. This adop-
tive sonship is an inchoate and imperfect state of co-

filiation with the Son of God, which is completed and

made perfect in the hypostatic union. The order of
grace, therefore, though capable of subsisting without

the incarnation, and not depending on it as a physical

cause, can only subsist without it as an imperfect order,

and cannot have in itself a metaphysical finality. The
incarnation being absent, the universe does not attain

an end metaphysically final, or actualize the perfection

of the ideal archetype. The highest mode of the
communication of the good of being, the most per-

fect reproduction of the operation of God ad intra,
ill his operation ad extra

,
which the Father contem-

plates in the Word as possible, remains unfulfilled.



Problems of the Age. 149

Those who hold, therefore, that the incarnation was

not included in the original creative decree of God

must maintain that in that decree God did not con-
template an end in creating metaphysically final.

They are obliged suppose another decree logically

subsequent to the first, by virtue of which the uni-

verse is brought to an end metaphysically fii>al in

order to repair the partial failure of the angelic na-

ture and the total failure of human nature to attain
the inferior, prefixed end of the first decree. Never-

theless, as the decrees of God are eternal, God al-
ways had in view, even on this hypothesis, the incar-

nation as the completion of his creative act
;
and

only took the occasion which the failure of his first

plan through sin presented to introduce one more

perfect. Billuart, therefore, as the interpreter of the

Thomist school, maintains that God revealed the in-
carnation to Adam before his fall, though not the
connection which the fulfilment of the divine purpose

had with his sin as its conditio sine qua non . If this

latter view is adopted, it cannot be held that the an-

gelic and human natures were created and endowed
with supernatural grace in the express vievv of the

incarnation, or that the angels hold, and that man
originally held, the title to glorification from Jesus

Christ as their head, and the meritorious cause of

original grace. Nevertheless, as the incarnation in-

troduces a new and higher order into the universe,
elevating it to an end metaphysically final of which

it previously fell short, all angels and all creatures of

every grade are subordinated to Jesus Christ, who is



150 Problems of the Age.

the head of the creation, reuniting all things to the

Father in his person.

This explanation is made in deference to the com-
mon opinion, although the author does not hold this
opinion, and in order that those who do hold it may
not feel themselves bound to reject the whole argu-

ment respecting the relation of the creative act to the

incarnation.

It is in regard to the doctrine of original grace, or

the elevation of the rational nature to that superna-

tural order whose apex is the hypostatic union, that

Catholic theology comes into an irreconcilable conflict

with Pelagianism, Calvinism, and Jansenism. These

three systems agree in denying the doctrine of origi-

nal grace. They maintain that rational nature con-
tains in its own constituent principles the germ of
development into the state which is the ultimatum of

the creature, and the end for which God created it,
and was bound to create it, if he created at all. They

differ, however, fundamentally as to the principles

actually constitutive of rational nature. The Pelagian
takes human nature in its present condition as his
type. The advocates of the other two systems take
an ideal human nature, which has become essentially
corrupted by the fall, as their type. Therefore the

Pelagian says that human nature, as it now is, has in
itself the principle of perfectibility by the explication

and development of its essence. But the Calvinist

and Jansenist say that human nature as it was first

created, or as it is restored by grace to its primal con-

dition, has the principle of perfectibility
;
but as it



Problems of the Age. 15 1

now is in those who have not been restored by grace,

is entirely destitute of it. The conception which

these opponents of Catholic doctrine have of the en-

tity of that highest ideal state to which rational nature

is determined, varies as the ratio of their distance from

the Catholic idea. Those who are nearest to it retain

the conception of the beatific union with God, which

fades away in those who recede further, until it be-

comes changed into a mere conception of an idealized

earthly felicity.

The Catholic doctrine takes as its point of depar-

ture the postulate, that rational nature of itself is in-

capable of attaining, or even initiating a movement

toward that final end, which has been actually pre

fixed to it as its terminus. It needs, therefore, from

the beginning, a superadded gift or grace, to place it

in the plane of its destiny ; which is supernatural, or

above all that is possible to mere nature, explicated to

any conceivable limit. At this point, however, two

great schools of theology diverge from each other,

each one of which is further subdivided as they pro-

ceed.

The radical conception of one school is, that nature

is in itself an incomplete thing, constituted in the or-

der of its genesis in a merely inchoate capacity for

receiving regeneration in the supernatural order. Re-

maining in the order of genesis, it is in a state of

merely inchoate, undeveloped, inexplicable existence,

and therefore incapable of attaining its destination.

There is, therefore, no end for which God could create

rational existence, except a supernatural end. The na-



l 5 2 Problems of the Age.

turai demands the supernatural, the order of genesis'

demands the order of regeneration, and the wisdom

and goodness of God -require him to bestow on all
rational creatures the grace cognate to the beatific

vision and enabling them to attain it.

The radical conception of the other school is, that
rational nature, per se, requires only the explication

and perfection of its own constituent principles, and
may be left to attain its finality in a purely natural
order. The elevation of angels and men to the plane
of a supernatural destiny was, therefore, a purely gra-

tuitous concession of the supreme goodness of God,

in view, as some would add, of the merit of the Incar-

nate Word.

These different theories are entangled and inter-

laced with each other, and with many difficult and in-
tricate questions related to them, in such a way as to

make a thicket through which it is not always easy to

find a sure path. It is necessary, however, to try, or

else to avoid the subject altogether.

The obscurity of the whole question is situated in
the relation of created intelligence to the object which

constitutes it in the intelligent or rational order. It

is evident that a created substance is constituted an

intelligent principle by receiving potentiality to the

act connoted by this relation of the subject to its ob-

ject, and is explicated by the reduction of this poten-

tiality into act. The end of intelligent spirit is to at-
tain to its intelligible object, by the act of intelligence.

In the foresight of this, the exposition of the relation



Problems of the Age. x 53

between intelligence and the intelligible, has been

placed first in this discussion.

It is agreed among all Catholic theologians : i. That

created intelligence can, by the explication of its own

constitutive principles, attain to the knowledge of God

as causa altissima

;

or, that God is, per se, the ulti-

mate object of reason. 2. That there is a mode of

the relation of intelligence to its ultimate object, or to

God, a permanent state of the intuition of God by a

created spirit, called the intuitive, beatific vision of

the divine essence, which can be attained only by a

supernatural elevation and illumination of the intel-

ligence.

The point of difference among theologians relates
to the identity or difference of the relations just

noted. Is that relation which intelligence has per se

to God, as its ultimate object, the relation which is

completed by supernatural elevation, or not ? If not,

what is the distinction between them ? Establish

their identity, and you have established the theory

which was mentioned in the first place above. Es-

tablish their difference, and you have established the

second theory.

If the first theory is established, rational creatures

are ipso facto in a supernatural order. The natural
order is merely the inchoation of the supernatural,

cannot be completed without it, and cannot attain its
end without a second immediate intervention of God,
equal to the act of creation, by which God brings back
to himself, as final cause, the creature which proceed-
ed from him as first cause. This second act is regene-



*54 Problems of the Age.

ration
;
and creation, therefore, implies and demands

regeneration. It follows from this, that reason is in-

capable of being developed or explicated by the mere

concurrence of God with its principle of activity, or
his concurrence with second causes acting upon it,

that is, by the continuance and consummation of the

creative, generative influx which originally gave

it and other second causes existence. A regenera-
tive influx is necessary, in order to bring its latent

capacity into action, and make it capable of contem-
plating its proper object, which is God, as seen by an

intuitive vision.

One great advantage of this theory is supposed to
be, that it leaves the naturalists no ground to stand

upon, by demonstrating the absolute necessity of the

supernatural, that is, of revelation, grace, the church,

etc. This presupposes that the theory can be demon-

strated. If it cannot be, the attempt to do too much
recoils upon the one who makes it, and injures his

cause. Besides this, it may be said that the proposed

advantage can be as effectually secured by proving

that the natural order is actually subordinated in the

scheme of divine Providence, as it really exists, to a

supernatural end, without professing to prove that it

must be so necessarily.

The great positive argument in favor of this hypo-
thesis is, that rational nature necessarily seeks God

as its ultimate object, and therefore longs for that

clear, intellectual vision of him called the beatific. If

this be true, the question is settled for ever. Those

who seek to establish its truth state it under various



Problems of the Age. iS5

forms. One way of stating it is, that reason seeks
the universal, or the explanation of all particular ef-

fects, in the catisa altissima . This is the doctrine of

St. Thomas. God is the causa altissima, the univer-

sal principle, and therefore reason seeks for God.

Again, it is affirmed that there is a certain faculty

of superintelligence, which apprehends the super-

intelligible order of being, not positively, but nega-

tively, by apprehending the limitation of everything

intelligible. Intelligence is therefore sensible of a

want, a vacuum, an aimless, objectless yearning for

something unknown and unattainable
;
showing that

God has created it for the purpose of satisfying this
want, and filling this void, by bringing intelligence

into relation to himself as its immediate object, in a

supernatural mode.

In a more popular mode, this same idea is present-

ed under a countless variety of forms and expressions,

in sermons, spiritual treatises, and poems, as a dissa-

tisfaction of the soul with every kind of good attain-

able in this life, vague longing for an infinite and

supreme good, a plaintive cry of human nature for the
beatitude of the intuitive vision of God. “Irrequietum

est cor nostrum donee requiescat in te” “ Our heart is

unrestful until it finds repose in thee,” is the language

of St. Augustine, which is echoed and reechoed on

every side.

These considerations are not without great weight

;

nevertheless, they do not appear to us sufficient to

prove conclusively the hypothesis in support of which



Problems of the Age.*56

they are adduced, or to overbalance other weighty

considerations on the opposite side.

Reason seeks for the causa altissima
,
but it remains

to be proved that it seeks for any other knowledge

of it but that which is attainable by a mode connatu-
ral to the created spirit.

Reason is conscious of its own limitation. But

this does not prove that it aspires to transcend this

limitation. Beatified spirits are conscious of their

own limitation. Those who are in the lowest grade
are aware of numerous grades above them, and the

highest are aware of their inferiority to the exalted

humanity of Jesus Christ, united to the divine nature

in his person. All together, including Jesus Christ

himself, as man, are aware of an infinite incompre-

hensibility in the divine nature. In the words of the

greatest of all mystic theologians, St. John of the

Cross :
“ They who know him most perfectly, per-

ceive most clearly that he is infinitely incomprehensi-

ble. To know God best, is to know he is incompre-

hensible
;
for those who have the less clear vision do

not perceive so distinctly as the others how greatly

he transcends their vision.”*

Beatified spirits do not feel any void within them-

selves, or any unsatisfied longing for the comprehen-

sion of the superintelligible. Neither do they aspire

even to those degrees of clearer vision which are ac-

tually conceded to spirits of a higher order than their

own. Why then should a rational creature necessa-

* Spiritual Canticle
,
stanza vii. Oblate Ed. vol. ii. p. 44.



Problems of the Age. *57

rily desire to transcend its own proper and connatu-
ral mode of intelligence ? The apprehension of the
superintelligible shows that the intellect cannot be

satisfied with a limitation of itself to a mere know-

ledge of second causes and the contingent—that it
must think about God, and apprehend in some way

the infinite, eternal, necessary being and attributes

of the creator and first cause of all things. But it does

not show that it must apprehend God in the most
perfect way possible, much less in such a way that
he does not remain always infinitely beyond its com-

prehension.

The dissatisfaction of the human heart may proceed
in great measure from the fact that God purposely
disquiets it by withholding from it the good it natu-

rally seeks, in order to compel it to seek for superna-

tural good. Another cause of it is, that most per-

sons have committed so many sins themselves, and
are so much involved in the consequences of the sins
of others, that they cannot possess the full measure

even of that natural enjoyment of which human na-
ture is capable. That the human heartHn its misery
and unhappiness turns longingly toward the hope of

a supreme beatitude in the contemplation of God as
he is revealed to the saints in heaven, may be owing
to the fact that God, who proposes this beatitude to
men, stirs up a longing for it in their souls by a su-

pernatural grace.

The question, therefore, reverts to this, as has been
repeatedly said already, What is the principle consti-
tutive of the intelligent life and activity of a created



158 Problems of the Age.

spirit ? When this principle is evolved into act, the
created spirit fulfils its type, and realizes its ideal per-

fection in its own order. Now, according to the pre-
liminary doctrine we have laid down, this is an active
power to apprehend the image of God in the creation,
or to contemplate a created image of God which is a
finite similitude of the infinite, uncreated image of

God, that is to say, the Word. Beatific contempla-

tion is a contemplation of this infinite, uncreated

image without any intervening medium. It is an in-

tellectual operation of which God is both the object
and the medium. It is not therefore the operation

which perfects created intelligence in its own proper
order, but one which elevates it above that order, giv-

ing it a participation in the divine intelligence itself.

Created intelligence is perfected in its own proper or-

der by its own natural operation
;
and although the

intervention of God is necessary in order to conduct

it to that perfection, so that it is strictly true that a

supernatural force is necessary to the initiation, expli-

cation, and consummation of the natural order of

intelligence, yet this does not elevate it to a superna-

tural mode and state of activity in the strict and theo-

logical sense of the word. Created intelligence is per-

fected by the contemplation of the creator through

the creation, and has no tendency or aspiration to rise

any higher. True, it has an essential capacity to be-

come the subject of a divine operation elevating it to

the immediate intuition of God, or it never could be

so elevated. This is the really strong argument in

favor of the hypothesis'that God, if he creates at all,



Problems of the Age. 159

must create an intelligent order determined to the

beatific union. It is equally strong in favor of the

hypothesis, that he must complete his creative act in

the incarnation, because created nature is essentially

capable of the hypostatic union. For what purpose

is this capacity ? Does it not indicate a demand for
the order of regeneration, and the completion of this

order in the incarnation ? It is not our purpose to

answer this question definitely, but to leave it open, as

it has no practical bearing upon the result we are de-
sirous of obtaining. Presupposing, however, that God
determines to adopt the system of absolute optimism

in creating, and to bring the universe to an end meta-

physically final, as he actually has determined to do,

this question, as we have previously stated, must be
answered in the affirmative. There is no metaphy-

sical finality short of the hypostatic union of the cre-

ated with the uncreated nature, which alone is the

adequate, objective externization of the eternal idea in

the mind of God. The metaphysical, generic perfec-
tion of the universe demands the incarnation, with its

appropriate concomitants. But this demand is satis-

fied by the elevation of one individual nature to the

hypostatic union, and the communication of the privi-

leges due to this elevated nature to one or more orders

of intelligent creatures containing each an adequate

number of individuals. It does not require the ele-
vation of all intelligent orders or all individuals, but

admits of a selection from the entire number of cre-
ated intelligences of a certain privileged class. It is

)nly on the supposition that God cannot give an in-



160 Problems of the Age.

telligent nature its due perfection and felicity without

conceding to it the beatific vision, that we are com-
pelled to believe that God cannot create intelligent
spirits without giving them the opportunity of attain-

ing supernatural beatitude. And it is merely this
last supposition against which we have been con-
tending.

The view we have taken, that rational nature, pre-
cisely as such, is not necessarily created merely in or-

der to become the subject of elevating grace, but may
be determined to an end which does not require it to

transcend its natural condition, comports fully with

the Catholic dogma of sanctifying grace. The church

teaches that affiliation to God by grace is a pure boon

or favor gratuitously conferred by God according to
his good pleasure and sovereign will. It is not due to

nature, or a necessary consequence of creation. The
beginning, progress, and consummation of this adop-

tive affiliation, is from the grace of God, both in refer-

ence to angels and men. It was by grace that the

angels and Adam were placed in the way of attaining
the beatific vision, just as much as it is by grace that
men are redeemed and saved since the fall. If ration-
al nature cannot be explicated and brought to a term

suitable for it which satisfies all its exigencies, with-

out this grace, it is not easy to see how it can be
called a grace at all, since grace signifies gratuitous

favor. Rather it would be something due to nature,

which the goodness of God bound him to confer when
he had created it. It would be the mere complement

of creation, and an essential part of the continuity of



Problems of the Age. 16

the creative act as much as the act of conservation, I /
virtue of which the soul is constituted immortal. In

this case, it would be very difficult to reconcile the doc-

trine of original sin, and the doom of those who die in

it before the use of reason, with the justice and good-

ness of God. It would be difficult also to explain the

whole series of doctrinal decisions which have ema-

nated from the Holy See, and have been accepted by

the universal church, in relation to the Jansenist

errors, all of which easily harmonize with the view we
have taken.

Moreover, the plain dogmatic teaching ofthe church,

that man, as he is now born, is saltern negativl aver-

satns a Deo, “ at least negatively averted from God,”

and absolutely incapable of even the first movement

of the will to turn back to him without prevenient

grace, cannot be explained on the theory we are op-

posing without resorting to the notion of a positive

depravation of human nature by the fall, a notion com-
pletely irreconcilable with rational principles. If

rational nature, as such, is borne by a certain impetus

toward God as possessed in the beatific vision, it will
spring toward him of itself and by its own intrinsic
principles, as soon as he is extrinsically revealed to it,

without grace. To say that it does so, is precisely
the error of the Semipelagians, which is condemned
by the church. It is certain that it does not

;
and

therefore we must explain its inability to do so, either
with the Calvinists and Jansenists by maintaining

that its intrinsic principles are totally perverted and

depraved, or by maintaining that rational nature, as



1 62 Problems of the Age.

sudi, is determined by its intrinsic impetus to an

inferior mode of apprehending and loving God as

its last end, which is below the plane of the super-

natural.

This view accords fully with the teachings of the

great mystic writers, who are the most profound of

all philosophers and theologians. They all teach most
distinctly, that, when God leads a soul into a state of
supernatural contemplation, it has an almost uncon-

querable repugnance and reluctance to follow him,

and is thrown into an obscure night, in which it un-

dergoes untold struggles and sufferings, before it can

become fit for even that dim and imperfect light of

contemplation which it is capable of receiving in this

life. Why is it that the human soul turns toward the
supernatural good only when excited, illuminated, and

attracted by the grace of God, and even then with so

much difficulty ? Why does it so easily and of prefe-
rence turn away from it, unless it is that it naturally

seeks to attain its object by a mode more connatural
to its own intrinsic and constitutive principles ?

The conclusion we draw is, that rational nature of
itself is capable of attaining its proper perfection and

'elicity, without being elevated above its own order,

by the mere explication of its rationality, and aspires

no higher, but even prefers to remain where it is.

The fact that it is in a state which in comparison
with the state of elevation is merely inchoate exis-

tence, and is in potentia to a state not realized in actn ,

does not show that its felicity or the good order of

the universe requires it to be elevated any higher, un-



Problems of the Age. 163

less it is elected as a subject of elevating grace.* God
alone is actus purissimus without any admixture of

potentiality. The finite is always inchoate and poten-
tial, because finite. Its very nature implies what is

called metaphysical evil, or a limitation of the posses-

sion of good in act. Every finite nature except that

of the Incarnate Word is limited, not only in respect
to the infinite, but also in respect to some other finite

nature superior to itself. Its proper perfection con-

sists in the possession of good, with that limitation

which the will of God has prefixed to it as its term.

The perfection and order of the universe, as a whole,

are constituted by the subordination and harmony of

all its parts in reference to the predetermined end.

The individual felicity of a rational creature, and his
due relation to the final cause of the universe, do not

require his being elevated to the utmost summit of

existence of which he is capable, unless God has pre-
determined him to that place. The mere inert capa-
city of receiving an augmentation or elevation of his

intellectual and voluntary operation does not give him

any tendency to exceed his actual limit, unless that

inert capacity begins to be actualized, or unless the

principle of a new development is^implanted and
vitalized. The inert capacity of being united to the

* This does not mean that any human being is at liberty to choose
to decline proffered grace. The human race en masse is elected to
grace, and at least all those to whom the faith is proposed have the
proffer of grace, with a precept to accept it. Moreover, God has not
provided any order except the supernatural for mankind in which the
race can attain its proper perfection and felicity.



1 64 Problevts of the Age.

divine nature by the hypostatic union, is actualized

only in Christ. If, therefore, rational nature could not

attain its proper end and completion without the ut-

most actualization of its passive capacity, Christ alone

would attain his final end. We must certainly admit,
however, that the blessed in heaven all attain their

final end and a perfect beatitude, each one in his own
degree. We are not to understand, therefore, that
the relation of the creation to God as final cause con-
sists solely and purely in the return of the creature

to God in the most sublime manner possible, and that
everything which exists is created solely as a means

to that end. If this were so, the hypostatic union of

the human to the divine nature in the person of Jesus
Christ would be the sole terminus of the creative act,

the only end proposed by God in creating. Nothing

else could or would have been created, except as a

means to that end. The rest of creation, however,

cannot contribute to that end. The union of the hu-

man nature to the divine in Christ, and its filiation to
God, by which it is beatified, glorified, and deified, is

completely fulfilled, within itself
;
and the rest of cre-

ation adds nothing to it. If God had no other end

in view, in the reproduction of the immanent act

within himself by a communication of himself ad

extra
,
except the hypostatic union, he would have cre-

ated only one perfect nature for that purpose. The

beatification and glorification of the adopted brethren

of Christ must be therefore included in the end of

creation.

This is not all, however, that is included in it. The



Problems of the Age. 165

supernatural order includes in itself a natural order

which is not absorbed into it, but which has its own

distinct existence. Gratia supponit naturam
,
grace

supposes nature, but does not supersede or extinguish

it. The inferior intellectual operations of our Lord

are not superseded by his beatific contemplation, nor

do they contribute to its clearness of intuition. The
operation of his animal soul—that is, of the principle
within his rational soul which contains in an eminent

mode all the perfection that is in a soul purely ani-

mal, and adapts his rational soul to be the form of a

body—continues also, together with the activity of
the senses and of the active bodily life. This opera-

tion does not conduce to the perfection of the act of

beatific contemplation, which does not require the

mediation of the senses. The same is true of the
inferior, natural operations of all beatified angels and

men. If supernatural beatitude were the exclusive

end of the creation, there would be no reason why
these inferior operations should continue, any more

than the exercise of faith, hope, patience, fortitude,

or works of merit, which, being exclusively ordained

as means for attaining beatitude, cease /When the end
is gained. The beatific act would swallow up the
entire activity of the beatified, and all inferior life
would cease. For the same reason, all corporeal and
material organization would be swept out of the way
as a useless scaffolding, and only beatified spirits, ex-
clusively occupied in the immediate contemplation

of God, would continue to exist for ever.

This is not so, however. The body is to rise again



1 66 Problems of the Age.

and live for ever. The universe is to remain for ever,
with all its various grades of existence, including

even the lowest, or those which are purely material.

There is therefore a natural order coexisting with the

supernatural in a subordinate relation to it—a minor
and less principal part, but still an integral part of

the divine, creative plan. There is a cognitio mcitu-

tina and a cognitio vespertina
,
a matutinal and vespe-

ral knowledge, in the blessed
;
the one being the im-

mediate intuition of the Trinity in unity, the other

the mediate intuition of the idea or infinite archetype

of creation in God, through his creative act. There

is a natural intellectual life in the angels, and a natu-

ral intellectual and physical life in man, in the beati-

fic state. The natural order is preserved and perfect-
ed in the supernatural order, with all its beauty and

felicity—with its science, virtue, love, friendship, and
society. The material world is everlasting, together
with the spiritual. All orders together make up the
universe

;
and it is the whole complex of diverse and

multitudinous existences which completely expresses

the divine idea and fulfils the divine purpose of the

creator. The metaphysical finality or apex of the
creative act is in the Incarnate Word, but the rela-

tion to the final cause exists in everything, and is ful-

filled in the universe as a totality, which embraces in

one harmonious plan all things that have been cre-

ated, and culminates in Jesus Christ, through the hy-

postatic union of the divine and human natures in

his person.

In this universe there may be an order of intelli-



Problems of the Age. 167

gent existences, touching at its lowest point the high-

est point of irrational existence, and at its highest

point the lowest in the grade of the beatified spirits.

That inferior order of knowledge and felicity may
exist distinctly and separately which exists conjointly

with supernatural beatitude in the kingdom of hea-

ven. The perfection of the universe requires that
there should be a beatified, glorified order at its sum-

mit. It may even be maintained that this consum-
mation of created nature in the highest possible end

is the only one which the divine wisdom could pro-

pose in creating. Yet this does not exclude the possi-

bility of an inferior order of intelligence, upon which

the grace elevating it to a supernatural state is not

conferred.

We are prepared, therefore, to proceed to the con-
sideration of the nature and conditions of that grace,

as a pure, gratuitous gift of God, conferred upon

angels and upon the human race through his free and
sovereign goodness. From the point of view to
which the previous reasoning has conducted us, the

angels and mankind appear to us, not as mere species

of rational creatures conducted by their creator along

the path of rational development by natural law, but

as the elect heirs of an entirely gratuitous inheritance

of glory—candidates for a destiny entirely superna-
tural. The relation which they sustain to God in this
supernatural scheme of grace will therefore be our

topic next in order.



CHAPTER IX.

THE STATE OF PROBATION ITS REASON AND NATURE
-THE TRIAL OF THE ANGELS.

I
N the- preceding chapter we have endeavored to
show what is that order of regeneration or super-

natural grace, in which rational nature, and through it

all nature, attains the end of creation metaphysically

final. The position we have taken is, that the crea-
tion returns to God as final cause through the hypo-

static union of created nature with the divine nature

in the person of the Incarnate Word, and the partici-

pation in this union by angels and men who are ele-
vated through grace to the rank of sons of God.

We have now another problem to deal with. The
Catholic doctrine teaches that angels and men are not
brought to their destined end, in view of which they

were created, by an immediate, indefectible operation

of divine power alone
;
but by a concurrence of this

divine operation with the spontaneous, contingent,

and def< ctible operation of their own free-will. More-



Problems of the Age. 169

over, that, ir consequence of the contingent, defect-

ible operation of the second cause which is concur-

rent with the first cause, a multitude of angels and

men finally and irremediably fail to reach their desti-
nation.

This statement of the relation of the rational crea-

ture to God as final cause, involves a number of the
most difficult and perplexing questions. The reason
for placing creatures in a state of probation by which

their eternal destiny is decided, the relation of divine

foreknowledge to contingent events, the conciliation

of the efficacy of grace with the liberty of the will,

the nature of free-will itself, the reason for permitting

the existence of evil, predestination, and similar vexed

questions, start up at once to trouble and confound

the feeble human intellect.
They are all summed up in the problem of proba-

tion. The creature is placed in a state where be is to
decide in a certain brief space of time, by his own vo-
luntary choice, his eternal destiny

;
this destiny in-

cluding the alternative of the attainment or the for-

feiture of supreme beatitude. What reason can be
given for this ? Why is the rational creature defect-
ive or liable to fail of reaching his destination ?^~Why

does God place him in a state of probation, knowing
his defectibility ? Why is it that some fail and others
do not fail to attain their destination ?

A dechristianized and decatholicized philosophy
cannot give even a plausible solution of this great

problem, and the problems arising out of it. It must

either deny the problem, or throw out some ingenious



170 Problems of the Age.

guesses which satisfy no one. It is wholly at fault,

always has been, and always will be. With those who
deny the whole problem, by denying the whole super-

natural order, we have nothing to do at present
;
for

we can not raise anew questions already discussed.
We are concerned only with those who admit the
moral order of the universe

;
and these admit the

existence of a period of probation, although some of

them may extend the limits of this probation indefi-
nitely, and doubt or deny some of its consequences.

The very notion of probation springs from the
notion of a free-will, permitted and even compelled to

choose between good and evil. Now, why is the cre-
ated will permitted and even compelled to exercise

this prerogative which is too often the occasion of

the greatest injury to its possessor?

A certain class of philosophers answer this ques-
tion by asserting that it could not possibly be other-

wise. They exaggerate beyond all measure this liber-

ty of choice as something essential to all voluntary

operation. They have no conception of any moral

goodness, virtue, or sanctity, except that which is the

product of this continual striving to make a right

choice between two rival objects of desire, the good

and the evil. They even extend their notion so far

as to include God
;
as if he were in a kind of infinite

state of moral probation, amenable to a standard or

law above himself, and only preserving his holiness

by a continual effort of will to choose among various

possible determinations that which is most perfectly

conformed to this standard. Of course, then, when he



Problems of the Age. 171

created Intelligent spirits like himself, be was obliged

to leave them to their liberty of choice. They could

not beome holy or happy in any other way. Indeed,
according to this system, they must remain in this

state of moral probation for ever. There is no con-

ceivable way of determining them to good without

destroying the liberty of will which is essential to a

rational nature. The only immutability of will pos-
sible, is that which arises from a confirmed, long-cor

tinued habit of choice. Therefore God has not absc
lutely determined the wills of his rational creature^

to good, because he could not. He has left them with
the power and exposed to the risks of wrong choices

because he could not help it.

This solution of the problem must be rejected as

completely unsatisfactory. God is good, and is bless-
ed, by his nature. The human nature of Christ is
holy, impeccable, and beatified by its hypostatic union

with the divine nature. The Blessed Virgin was im-
peccable from the instant of her immaculate concep-

tion. The holy angels and just men made perfect
have finished their moral probation, and are in an

unchangeable state. The perfection of intelligent na-
ture, therefore, so far from implying, excludes liberty

of choice between good and evil. If this be so, this

liberty of choice is an imperfection. Why, therefore,
did God create rational existences with this imperfec-
tion ? Without doubt he could have given them im-

peccability. He could have elevated them to a state
of perfection without requiring them to pass through

any probation. He could have placed all rational crea-



172 Problems of the Age.

tures at once in the state of beatitude, and kept all

sin and evil out of the universe. Why, then, is evil
allowed to enter?

Moreover, whence and zvhat is evil ? How is it pos-
sible that there should be any evil ? Extrinsic to the

being of God which is the absolute good, nothing
does or can exist, except that which God has created
after the similitude of his own being, and which, there-
fore, participates according to its measure in his good-

ness. Besides, God has created all things in view
of an end. Being infinitely wise, he knows how to
attain this end through his works, and being infinitely

powerful, he is able to do it. Being also infinitely

good, only good can terminate his volition. There-

fore, if evil were possible, he could not will to actual-

ize it
;
and if, by an impossible supposition, it could

come into actual existence without him, he must will

to destroy it. The superficial theology and philoso-
phy which dates from the Reformation, is tied up

here in a Gordian knot which no skill can unravel.

It contains two dogmas which are absolute contra-

dictions : creation, and the substantive essence of

evil. These two can never coexist in harmony. One
or the other must be modified or given up. Either

the dogma of creation must be so far given up as to

admit of some eternal self-existent materia in which

lies the essential principle of evil, or the substantive

existence of evil must be denied. Those who deny

or impair the first, have ceased to be theists in the

strict and proper sense of the word, and are already

moving toward pantheism. Those who deny the



Problems of the Age. 1 73

second, throw up with it the conception of a moral

order in .the universe, of a state of probation, strictly

so called. There is no theistic, Christian philosophy

of any depth or comprehensiveness on these topics,

except that which is included in the theology of St.

Augustine, St. Thomas, and other great Catholic

wi iters.

It is well known how completely the ancient philo-
sophers were befogged in regard to the nature and

origin of evil. Plato taught that the materia out of

which God formed the universe is eternal, and that,
from an inherent intractability in its essence, it is

incapable of perfectly receiving the impress of the

divine ideas. The constructor of the universe was,
therefore, hindered from realizing his ideal and fully

executing his design by the defectiveness of his mate-

rial. He was like an architect who has only soft,
crumbling stone, or a sculptor with veined marble.

From this source, according to Plato, is all the evil
existing in the universe.

The Persians, whose great master was Zoroaster,
resorted to the theory of two subordinate creators,

both the offspring of the Supreme Being, one Or-
musd, being good, and the other Ahriman, being evil.

All that is good in the creation comes from the first,

and all the evil from the second of these great master

mechanics. Ahriman is destined, however, to be
eventually converted, with all his liege subjects, his

botched workmanship will be repaired, and the uni-

verse will come all right in the end. This ingenious

theory left out, however, one essential point ; name-



174 Problems of the Age.

ly, how Ahriman came to have an evil nature, since
he was created by the good God as well as Ormusd,
and how he and his works could become good, if they
were essentially evil.

Manes and the Manichseans carried their dualism
to a point of more complete consistency, and more

absolute absurdity. They taught the existence of
two eternal, self-existing principles, one good, the

other bad, who are engaged in perpetual warfare.
Spiritual existences proceed from the good principle,

corporeal existences from the evil one. Human souls,
having been in some way allured into corporeal forms,
are polluted by them and involved in evil. It is ne-

cessary for the soul to disengage itself from matter,

and it will then be fit to return to the supremely good

being from whom it proceeded.
Any system which teaches that evil has anything

essential or substantive, must give up the pure dogma
of creation. For it is inconsistent with that dogma to

suppose that God can create anything essentially evil,
or that any creature can create anything, or that any

substance essentially good can become essentially

evil by corruption
;

since corruption produces no

new substance, but modifies substance already exist-
ing.

Whence
,
then, and what is evil ? What can there

be as an alternative of good before the intelligence

and will of a rational creature to form the material

for a dilemma, and oblige him to exercise a faculty of

choice ? Where is the substratum of a state of pro-
bation ?



Problems of the Age. 175

Metaphysical evil, or that evil which is included in

the metaphysical essence of all created things, is

merely the limitation of their possible good. Simple

being, ens simpliciter
,
is alone the absolute good in

possibility and in act. Jesus Christ has said, “There

is one good, God.”* In actual existences, evil is

merely a recession from God. It is only relative, and

negative, therefore, and expresses the absence of that

good which exists in some other creature, or in God.

In created existences, good is relative and positive,

and evil, or the absence of good, is relative and pri-

vative. It is a mere deficiency, but nothing substan-

tive, any more than darkness, cold, or vacuity is

substantive.

If we can suppose, therefore, a certain good pro-
posed to a rational creature as attainable by his free

volition, with a power to the contrary, we have the
necessary conditions of a state of moral probation.

That is, the possibility is proved of a certain good

being made contingent on the voluntary choice of
rational creatures

;
and with it, the possibility of this

good being forfeited by the deficiency of this choice.

This answers the question whence and what is the

possibility of evil as the concomitant risk annexed to

a state of probation. It is only necessary, therefore,

to show that we can make this supposition, by ex-
plaining how the will can be constituted in an equi-
librium between this proffered good and some other
object, with complete liberty to incline itself to

either.

* St. Matt. xix. 17.



1 76 Problems of the Age.

That other object cannot be an essentially evil ob-
ject, for there is no such thing in existence. It must
be, then, an inferior good. In the state of probation

the will is inclined to all kinds of good indifferently,

and capable of choosing any which the intellect judges
to be best or most desirable. It is capable of making
a false choice, because the intellect is capable of mak-
ing a false judgment. Intelligent spirit has self-do-

minion where it is not determined by intrinsic neces-
sity. It is lord over its own acts. It can determine
its own judgments and volitions. And this makes it
a proper subject of precept and moral obligation,

capable of being placed in a state of probation.

It may appear very difficult to understand how this
can be, but our own consciousness and practical ex-
perience give us an intimate sense of its truth. Let

us take, then, a familiar example in illustration.

A child is capable of appreciating the good of de-
licious fruit, the good of approbation and reward, the

good of play and amusement, and the good of know-

ledge. His parents allow him to eat peaches under

certain restrictions, and forbid him to eat them with-

out their permission. They allow him to play at cer-
tain times and under certain conditions, and forbid

him all other amusement and recreation. They re-
quire him to devote a certain time to study, and to

apply himself to this study with diligence. It is

plain that the will of the child- is in equilibrium

toward all the various kinds of good in respect to

which he receives precepts from his parents, and is

thus placed in a state of probation, the issue of which



Problems of the Age. 177

is in great measure left to the arbitration of his own

free choice. He can determine himself to obey his
parents for the sake of their approbation and rewards,

or to disobey them for the sake of eating forbidden

fruit. He can determine himself to study for the
sake of knowledge, or to neglect it for the sake of

play. When he determines himself to the inferior,
sensible good, he does so by a false judgment, that in

the particular instance the present sensible enjoyment

is best for him or most desirable. Yet he has power

to the contrary, and both can and ought to make a
right judgment. He is determined to neither side
by any intrinsic necessity, but determines himself and

destroys the equilibrium of his will by a free choice,

by virtue of his self-dominion. The necessity of ex-
ercising this self-dominion proceeds from imperfec-

tion of nature. It is easily conceivable that his na-

ture, if it were rendered more perfect, would deter-

mine him always to prefer the approbation of parents,

and of his own conscience, to the pleasure of eating
fruit, and the pleasure of knowledge to that of play.

This illustrates our present point, and shows how
the imperfection of an intelligent creature, which

makes him capable of false judgments in regard to
the eligibility of different objects of volition, renders

him a fit subject of probation.

But why is he created in this imperfect state, and
obliged to run the risks of a difficult and dangerous

probation ? It is evident that God might easily pour
such a flood of light upon his intelligence that he
would be incapable of making a false judgment, and



1 78 Problems of the Age.

communicate to him such a degree of felicity in the

enjoyment of the true good, that his will would be

rapt away without effort beyond all possibility of at-

traction from any inferior objects. He might com-
municate the beatific vision simultaneously with the

first act of reason, as he does to those infants who
are translated to heaven in their infancy. Thus he
might secure the eternal beatitude of all intelligent

creatures without placing any of them in probation.

It is evident that God must have a reason for es-
tablishing a state of probation, and that this reason

must involve some great good to be attained by it.

This reason is, also, in part intelligible to us. So far

as we can understand it, it is, that God and the crea-

ture are more glorified through the elevation of cre-

ated nature to supernatural beatitude, when the cre-

ated nature concurs with God as first cause, by its
own activity, as second, concreative cause, in the
highest manner possible. It is the will of God that
beatitude should be the prize of merit, and merit im-

plies liberty of choice. Supernatural beatitude is a

pure boon from God to the creature, not due to him
as simply existing. Therefore, God may bestow it
on whom he pleases, and upon any conditions he
pleases to establish. As probation implies imperfec-
tion, and the creature is created for his proper perfec-

tion, when he attains it probation must cease. The

period of probation must therefore be limited. It

must be also a real, bond fide probation ; that is, the

attainment of beatitude must really depend on the

right use of the term of probation Consequently.



Problems of the Age. 179

when the term of probation has expired, those who
have failed in it must be left to the eternal conse-

quences of their own voluntary error. That species
of virtue which makes an intelligent creature capable

of attaining supernatural beatitude is itself superna-

tural, and therefore impossible without divine grace.

When this grace is lost, there is no natural power to
regain it. Sin is therefore in itself irreparable. It

can be repaired only by a second supernatural grace.

If this grace is not conceded, there is no second pro-

bation, but the sinner must remain perpetually in

that state to which his sin has reduced him. If this

grace is conceded, and the limits of probation are

extended, those who fail finally and pass out of the
fixed period of probation must also remain perpetu-

ally in that state to which they have reduced them-

selves by their own free and voluntary election.
Another great difficulty here presents itself, name-

ly : it appears that the fulfilment of the divine pur-

pose is left to the contingencies of second causes,

and at the mercy of the arbitrary wills of creatures.

God >appears to be like one who makes his plans in

the dark, without being able to know what their suc-

cess will be, or to take efficacious measures for secur-

ing their success. For how can he foresee future
events that are purely contingent on the free choice

of created wills ? How can he predetermine an
end, to be infallibly accomplished, when this accom-

plishment is contingent on the free arbitration of the

creature ? The Catholic doctrine teaches that a mul-
titude of angels and men destined to supernatural



i8o Problems of the Age.

beatitude finally fail of their destination. Does not

this failure partially thwart the divine plan, mar the
work of God, and deprive his universe of its perfec-

tion ? Although the divine plan has a partial suc-

cess, through the concurrence of a certain number
of angels and men with the divine will, is not this
success even due to hap-hazard ? Must we n<3t sup-
pose that the divine plan ran the risk of a complete

failure, so far as the cooperation of free-will is con-

cerned ?

It is evident that these suppositions are all incom-

patible with the essential attributes of God. He
must necessarily have a perfect foreknowledge of all

things that will ever come to pass. He must also
have supreme dominion over his entire creation, and

be able to accomplish all his purposes without any

liability to be thwarted by his own creatures. He
must have decreed from eternity whatsoever he does

in time through his creative act.

Therefore some, overwhelmed by the difficulties

which encompass the doctrine of the freedom of the

created will, in its relation to the divine, have adopted

the part of denying it altogether. The denial of free-
will, however, makes the state of probation, and the

entire moral order of the universe, with its retribu-

tions, completely illusory and fantastic. It is a de-

nial of a fact of universal human consciousness.
Whoever makes it ought to become a pantheist at

once, and maintain that all individual existences are

mere emanations of the divine substance.

The Catholic doctrine distinctly proclaims both the



Problems of the Age. 1 8

1

divine foreknowledge and decrees, and also the liber-

ty of choice in the created intelligent nature. A
Catholic theologian, therefore, cannot dispose of the

difficulty in the case, by summarily denying either

side of the dogmatic truth. The school of St. Tho-
mas Aquinas endeavor to resolve the difficulty by

the hypothesis of a physical premovement of the will,

or an efficacious grace, which has an infallible con-

nection with a right choice, but yet leaves the will

to make this choice freely and with power to the con-
trary. God has therefore predestined, by an infal-
lible decree, all those to whom he gives this effica-
cious grace, to the attainment of beatitude. His

foreknowledge is also explained as the knowledge of

his own determination through which all events, even
contingent, are made certain.

This system has a certain hypothetical finish and

completeness about it, and it appears to vindicate the

supreme dominion of God over all contingent exist-
ences, second causes, and events taking place in time,

more effectually than any other. It fails, however, to

reconcile with the attributes of God the freedom of
the created will and the state of probation. For, ac-

cording to this system, the will, although in equili-

brium, and intrinsically capable of motion to either

side, cannot put itself out of equilibrium by its own
self-determining power, but needs a previous, effica-

cious concurrence of the divine will, in order to pass

from the potentiality of choice to the act of choice.

All acts of the created will are, therefore, determined

by the will of God as efficient cause. If this is con-



182 Problems of the Age.

sistent with the liberty which is necessary to the cre-

ated will, that it may be second and concreative cause
in concurrence with the first cause to the effect of

its own beatitude, God could infallibly determine all
rational creatures to beatitude without infringing on

their liberty. The creature could evolve into act all
its causative activity, free-will could receive its fullest

scope, the principle of merit and reward could be

fully exemplified in the universe, without risking the

eternal destiny of a single individual, or permitting

even the smallest sin to be committed. It becomes

very difficult, then, on this hypothesis, to explain the

permission of sin, and the eternal loss of so many
millions of rational creatures. The reason usually
given, that sin is an evil incidentally necessary to a

system of probation, permitted on account of the

greater good attained through the probation of free-

will, falls to the ground, and we have never yet seen
any other satisfactory reason substituted for it.

It may be true that, without this hypothesis, the
foreknowledge of God and his supreme dominion

over his creation are more incomprehensible. This

is no decisive argument, however, provided that these

divine attributes can be shown to be intelligible with-

out the said hypothesis.

First, in regard to the divine foreknowledge, it is

argued that God cannot foresee that which is purely

dependent on the created will, unless there is some

cause or ground of certainty that the will shall actu-

ally place the effect which is foreseen. This cause

or ground of certainty can only be the divine deter-



Problems of the Age. 183

mination to concur efficaciously with the will, that it

may infallibly place the foreseen act.
To this it is replied, that God foresees all contin-

gent, future events, by a kind of knowledge called the

supercomprehension of cause. Knowing completely
all causes, he knows all their effects in them. This

does not explain, however, his knowledge of the self-

determining acts of the will, since in these the same

cause is in equilibrium to opposite effects. It is bet-

ter explained, we think, by the theory of Suarez, that

God sees all things in their objective verity. He
knows with certainty all that depends on the self-

determining action of free-will, because he directly

beholds the free-will determining itself. There is no

succession in God. He coexists from eternity and
in eternity to all the successive periods of created

duration. What we call future is equally visible to
God in eternity with the past. There is no more
difficulty, therefore, in his knowing from all eternity

all future contingent events, than there is in our

knowing any one of these events in the time of its

taking place, or after it has happened.

But, it is further argued, if God knows the acts of
his creatures by an immediate vision of them in their

objective verity, he is perfected by the creature,

which is incompatible with his essence. God is the
adequate object of his own intelligence

;
therefore, he

knows all things in himself.

God is the adequate and sole object of his own in-
telligence in the act of simple intelligence in which

his essential being in the Three Persons is consti-



i 84 Problems of the Age.

cuted. Created existences are not included in this

act, and the knowledge of them is not perfective of
the being of God. God knows them in himself by
the knowledge of vision, scientia visionis

,
and sees

them in himself as in a mirror. This perfection of

vision, by which God sees and knows all things which
exist, is a perfection proceeding from his infinite

intelligence, not given to him by the creature. The
creature is its terminus, but the changes of the ter-

minus affect itself alone, and do not make the essen-
tial attribute of God less immutable or infinite. The
same objection might be made to the statement, that
created existences are the terminus of the divine

volition or love. The essential act of volition or love
is completed in the act of God ad intra

,
or his infi-

nite love of himself. Yet God loves the creature,
delights in the love of the creature, wills the beati-

tude of the creature. That he may do this, the exist-
ence of the creature as the terminus of his volition

is necessary as the conditio sine qita non. It might

be said, then, that the existence of the creature, and

his act in loving God, is perfective of God. It is not.

For it is altogether distinct from that which is the

terminus of the divine act of love, in which the per-

fection of the being of God is constituted, namely,

from the essence of God itself. God has the pleni-

tude of love in himself, and it remains the same whe-

ther more or fewer created existences are its recipients,

So the infinite power of vision in God is the same, whe-
ther more or fewer created existences or acts of exist-

ing agents come within its scope. There is no objec-



Problems of the Age. 185

tion, therefore, to the theory respecting the science

of God, which maintains that he knows all future con-

tingents which depend entirely on his divine decree

in that decree, all that depend on second causes de-

termined of necessity to produce certain effects in

his supercomprehension of cause, and all that depend

on free-will in his foresight of the self-determination

of free-will. The whole incomprehensibility of this
foreknowledge is reduced to an identity with the

essential incomprehensibility of God, as eternal and

yet coexisting to all the successive periods of time.

Secondly, as regards the divine supremacy over

creation, and the ability of the Sovereign Creative

Spirit to bring the universe to an end predetermin-

ed by himself.

It is argued, that, if we reject the Thomist hypo-
thesis, we reduce everything to the hap-hazard of
capricious, eccentric, lawless free-will, which makes

it impossible to suppose any plan regularly and in-

fallibly carried out through the medium of second
causes, in the universe.

This is not so. Free-will is not mere lawless ca-

price, directed by mere accident. It is directed by

intelligence, and acts according to the law of motives.

It must choose the good, and can never choose that

which is evil, ratione mali. Since, by a law of its

probation, the real chief good and the apparent chief

good are presented before it in such a way as to leave
it in equilibrium toward both, without any dominant

or necessitating motive toward either, it makes the

motive on one side preponderant by its exercise of



i be Problems of the Age.

self-dominion. This is not by chance or caprice. It

is by the exercise of intellect, and through the im-

pulse of powerful motives. Its circle of variability

is restricted, and its determination is capable of being

influenced by intellectual and moral considerations.

It is perfectly evident that a man, even without the

slightest power of exercising any determining influ-

ence on the wills of other men, can nevertheless,

without infringing on their perfect liberty, reason

them into a cooperation with himself in carrying out

a plan, or persuade them into it by proving its advan-

tages before them. Much more, then, is God able to
bring a sufficient number of angels and men to a
voluntary cooperation with himself, to secure the suc-

cess of his great design. It is in this way that God
manifests his infinite wisdom and divine art, by ar-

ranging all things with such consummate and com-

plex skill and harmony, and directing all things from

end to end by such a wise, far-reaching Providence,

that he is able to bring out in the end the desired

result, through the concurrence of free, concreative

second causes. It may be said that, since all angels

were free to reject the beatitude proffered to them,

God, in creating them and giving them this freedom,

exposed his plan to the risk of being completely

thwarted by their unanimous refusal to comply with

the terms of their probation. The same might also
be said of mankind.

We must understand, however, that, although Al-
mighty God does not deliberate, change, modify,
watch for results, make experiments, profit by expe-



Problems of the Age. 187

rience, devise new expedients, like a man of creative
genius, and although his creative act is one, simple,

and from eternity, yet it includes in itself in an emi-

nent mode all these operations of the finite intelli-

gence. If, by an impossible supposition, God had
delegated creative wisdom and power to a created

spirit, such as the Arians fancied the Logos, and

others the Demiurgus, to be
;
and this mighty intelli-

gence had proceeded to execute his task in the same

manner, but on a grander scale, that men execute
great undertakings, and we should endeavor to de-
scribe the way in which he accomplished his work,

we should have a correct though imperfect represen-

tation of the actual operation of Almighty God in the
execution of his works ad extra . The conceptions
we are able to form of the operation of God are all
analogical. We cannot transcend these analogies.
And although we know them to be imperfect and in-
adequate, yet we know also that they have all the veri-
similitude necessary to give us true conceptions. In

this way we understand that God knew all the risks
to which his plan was exposed, and made provision
for them. Wherever it was necessary, he protected
his designs from the risk of failure through the non-

concurrence of second causes. For instance, having

determined to create a heaven containing a multitude

of beatified spirits, and foreseeing that a certain num-
ber of those who were destined to this high position
would forfeit it by sin, he took this into the account
in determining the number to be created, and the condi-
tions of the trial through which they were to pass. A



Problems of the Age.

profound theologian who was of the strict Thomist
school, the late Bishop of Philadelphia, expressed to

the author on one occasion the opinion, that only the

lower orders of angels were made liable to sin. He
thought that the higher orders received a grace in-

compatible with sin, though not with merit, and that

Lucifer was therefore the chief, not of the seraphim,

but of the archangels. On this supposition, the risk
of sin was confined within narrow limits, so far as the

angels were concerned. Whether this be a well-
grounded hypothesis or not, it is evident that these

pure and exalted spirits, possessing the highest natu-

ral intelligence, being impelled to good by their na-

ture, having received the gift of supernatural grace,

and having the prospect of a still greater glory be-

fore them, were very likely, speaking after a human
mode of thought, to make the requisite act of concur-
rence with the divine will and thus secure their con-

firmation in grace. In other words, there appears

to be an a priori probability that at least a great

number of them would do so. We know that, in
point of fact, a great number of them did, and, ac-
cording to the common opinion, much the largest por-
tion of the whole number who were tried. Now, this
to us apparent probability was a certainty to God, as

clearly known before as after the fact. In view of
this certainty, he created them and placed them in

the state of probation. He foreknew, also, how many
would fail, and therefore, if his purposes required it,

could easily create such a multitude that the angels who
fell would not be missed from their ranks. Those who



Problems of the Age. 189

fell did indeed thwart the benevolent designs of God,

so far as their own particular persons were concerned.

But these designs were conditional, as respecting

individuals, and were made in full view of the actual

event. God could not be thwarted or disappointed

in regard to his grand design, because this did not

depend on any particular individuals.

So in regard to men. Jesus Christ as man, and

the Blessed Virgin, on whom the fulfilment of the
divine plan absolutely depended, were absolutely

predestined, and rendered impeccable
;
Jesus Christ

by nature, and the Blessed Virgin by grace. If any

other particular individuals were placed in a position

which required it, they too received a grace which

gave them immunity from any liability to fail in their

necessary concurrence with the divine will as second

causes. A vast multitude of human beings are ele-
vated to beatitude without running any of the risks

of probation. Adam, it is true, was able to thwart
the first design of God in regard to the mode of
bringing the race to its destination. But he could

not thwart God’s ultimate design, because he was

able to accomplish it by another mode. Particular

men, in vast numbers, are able to thwart the designs

of God toward themselves. But they cannot thwart
his designs toward the race. For he is able to regulate

and order times, events, and circumstances, and to con-

tinue creating generation after generation, until, by
moral means alone, he has completed the number of
his saints and peopled heaven sufficiently to fulfil

his purpose. Moreover, if necessary, he can always



i go Problems of the Age.

touch the springs of the will directly, and determine

it to any act which he has positively decreed must

be performed. He can also modify, restrict, allevi-
ate, set aside, or shorten the risks of probation, ac-

cording to his own good pleasure, in regard to any
or all of men, with an infinite and infallible wisdom.

But it is again argued, that according to this view,

God is not the absolute cause of all things, nor the
absolute sovereign over all things. The created will
has an independent sovereignty of its own, and God
is dependent in certain things on his creatures, obliged

to modify his plans and to condition his decrees to

suit their determinations.
*

This is not a conclusive argument. It is a maxim
of philosophy, that causa causce est causa causati

;

the

cause of a cause is the cause of that which is caused
;

that is, caused by this second cause. God is the
creator of free-wfll, and his perpetual influx gives it

always the power of choosing and acting. Free-will

is not, therefore, an independent, but a delegated and

dependent sovereign. God can deprive it of the op-
portunity of choosing, or frustrate its determinations.

It is sovereign within a limited sphere, because God
has chosen to create it and give it sovereignty.

If God is absolute sovereign, can he not concede

to a creature the power to do his own will within a

certain sphere, if it is his sovereign pleasure to do

so ? Can he not determine to do certain things on

the condition that the creature uses his free-will in a

certain way, if he pleases ? He has pleased to do it.



Problems of the Age. 191

all that his creatures would do, before him. All the

incidental and partial evil resulting from the misuse

of free-will in the universe he has foreseen, and de-

termined to permit. He has decided on his great
plan, notwithstanding the incidental evil, in view of a

greater universal good. Not that sin and evil are

necessary means of the greatest good, or directly

conduce to a greater good than that which could

exist in a universe without sin
;
but that the conces-

sion of liberty on a grand scale, the particular and

incidental misuse of which occasions sin and evil, is

the necessary means to that greater good. The
greater good itself is the obedience, homage, love,

service, and fidelity given to God by a multitude of
creatures who have been left free to sin, and who
have not sinned, or not sinned irremediably and

finally.

We conclude, therefore, pace tantorum virorum who
have maintained it, that the theory of the strict Tho-

mists on this point is not conclusively established.

To our mind, the theory which is in accordance with
the philosophy of the great fathers before St. Thomas,

with that of the Scotists in the middle ages, and with

that of the most prevalent Catholic schools since the

Jansenist controversy, is the more probable one. Ac-

cording to this theory, in a system of strict proba-

tion, a physical premovement or a grace efficacious

in se and ab intrinseco
,
is not metaphysically necessary

in order that free-will may actually concur with the
divine will to secure the permanence of the creature

in a supernatural state. Nothing is necessary beyond



192 Problems of the Age.

#
liberty of choice and the grace which gives power to

elicit supernatural acts. Wnen the angels passed
through their probation, therefore, we cannot go be-

hind the exercise of their liberty in choosing or re-

jecting the proffered boon of celestial glory, to seek

a deeper cause, determining some to choose and not

determining others. They were free to choose
;
and

being free, some chose wisely and well, others fool-

ishly and ill. So, also, with Adam. He might have
stood, but he did not. He had the power to choose,
and he chose wrongly. By the very same power he
might have chosen rightly, without any additional

grace. The arbitrium mentis
,
the exercise of free

self-dominion, is the only reason that can be given.

This prerogative is indeed mysterious and inscrutable.

We do not pretend to have removed all difficulty of
comprehending it. But it is incomprehensible to 11s

in our present state of imperfect intelligence, because

the soul itself is an inscrutable mystery. Its relation

to the divine will and operation is a mystery full of

inexplicable difficulties. But it is because of that

grand mystery of mysteries, the coexistence of God

and the creation, which was the insoluble enigma of

all ancient philosophy. The great Aristotle saw the
difficulty so clearly which is involved in the relation

of a con tingent world to the necessary being of God,

that, unable to find an ideal formula which could unite

the tv/o terms by a dialectic relation, he denied all

relation between them. He affirmed the existence of
God and of the world. But he affirmed also, that the
world exists independently of God, as self-existent,



Problems of tire Age. 193

eternal, and necessary. Moreover, that God has oi
can have no knowledge of the world. For, he argued

God can have no knowledge of the world unless tin
world is the object or terminus of the divine intelli-

gence. But if the world is the object of the divine

intelligence, God is not perfect as intelligence in him-
self alone, but is conditioned and perfected by that

which is inferior to his own being. Thus we see that
the objection to the divine foreknowledge of the con-

tingent in its objective verity which is found in scho-

lastic theology, is one derived from Aristotle, and that

the extremely subtle and acute reasonings of St.

Thomas and the Thomists were directed toward a
reconciliation of the Aristotelian philosophy with the

Catholic dogmas. The difficulty lies in the creative
act of God, which is a mystery not fully comprehen-

sible by human reason, and, therefore, not fully to be
explained by any hypothesis or theory of philosophy.

The activity of free-will as concurrent, concreative
cause with God, approaches the nearest of anything

in creation to the creative act of God, and, therefore,

is the most mysterious and incomprehensible fact of

psychology. It is incomprehensible in itself, and it

complicates still further the incomprehensibility of the

creative act of God. It is not strange, therefore, that

there should have been such a long and still unsettled

controversy in the Catholic schools respecting this

topic, since the church has hitherto abstained from

deciding it. Still less can we wonder that non-Catho-
lic schools, having no fixed dogmas or authoritative

formulas of doctrine to check the spirit of private



i 94 Problems of the Age.

speculation, go round and round continually, involving

themselves more hopelessly every day in entangle-

ments from which they can never extricate them-

selves.

The explanation we have endeavored to set forth
as the more probable will, we think, commend itself
to the minds of most of our readers as the most intel-

ligible and satisfactory which can be given. If a bet-

ter one can be furnished by some one more competent

to the task, we shall welcome it. Meanwhile, we leave
what we have written to find what acceptance it may.

It will be seen at once, by those who are at all
versed in these matters, that, according to the theory

we have proposed, the predestination of those who
attain eternal life as the term of a period of probation

is consequent on the foresight of their fidelity and

merit, at least as a general rule. It does not follow

from this, however, that we reject the doctrine of effi-
cacious grace. As this doctrine is immediately con-
nected with the points we have been examining, we
will give it a brief consideration now, in order to

avoid returning to it hereafter.

In the Thomist theology, efficacious grace means

a grace distinct in its own nature from sufficient

grace. Sufficient grace gives the power to elicit a

supernatural act : efficacious grace gives the act itself.

It is, therefore, efficacious in se and ab intrinseco. This

notion of efficacious grace is derived from the philo-

sophical notion of the previous and efficacious con-

currence of the will of God with every act of free-will,

in the exercise of the fa-culty of choice. According to



Problems of the Age. 195

this philosophy, it is impossible for this faculty, as it

is for every second cause in potentid to its proper act,

to pass from potentiality into act without a special

movement from the first cause.

The contrary hypothesis, sustained by Molina, the

great body of the Jesuit theologians, Thomassinus,

and the generality of modern Catholic authors, is, that

the grace which is auxiliary to the will in eliciting free

supernatural acts, is not efficacious ab intrinseco
,
but

is made efficacious by the concurrence of free-will.

This implies a different notion of divine concurrence

from the one just stated, according to which the influx

of divine power into free, spontaneous, active second

causes gives merely an aid which is indeterminate,

leaving free-will to its own election among two or more
terms upon which it can direct this indeterminate aid.

When an artilleryman sights his gun, the divine power
which supports and gives efficiency to all natural laws

and forces must propel the ball. But this divine

power stands ready at his disposal, and will propel the

ball in whatever direction, toward whatever point,

he selects. So it is with the choice of free-will.

We have already indicated our adhesion to the
latter hypothesis. It is far more in accordance with

the doctrine of the fathers, Latin as well as Greek,

including St. Augustine himself, than the other. The
former one was wholly unknown to the Greek fathers,
and does not appear in the Latin fathers before the

Pelagian controversy. Even after this period it ap-
pears, in the writings of St. Augustine and others of

his school, in an entirely different foim from that



196 Problems of the Age.

which was given to it by St. Thomas. That is to say,

it is applied to the case of fallen man, who is supposed
to need an efficacious grace on account of the weak-

ness of his will, and to receive it as a special gift of

mercy through Christ. The perseverance of those
angels who stood their trial successfully is attributed,
not to a grace efficacious ab intrinseco

,
which was

withheld from the other angels, but to a right use of

the same grace which was equally conceded to all, and

abused by some. So, also, the fall of Adam is attri-
buted simply to his failure of concurrence with a

grace which needed only his concurrence in order to

become efficacious, but was frustrated of its effect by

his abuse of his own free-will. Moreover, all that
St. Augustine says about efficacious grace in fallen

man is reconcilable with the doctrine of congruity,
and sometimes directly favors it, as is proved by

Antoine and others who have written in vindication
of his theology from Jansenist perversions. This doc-

trine of congruity has been introduced in order to

explain more satisfactorily the perfect liberty of the

will, without denying the existence of efficacious

grace differing in actu primo
,
or antecedently to the

consent of the will, from grace merely sufficient.

Although the opinion that the actual efficacy of divine

grace is to be sought exclusively in the consent of the

will has not been condemned, it has nevertheless been

received with disfavor and generally rejected. It is

commonly taught that God confers, whenever he
pleases, upon men, a grace which infallibly secures

their cooperation, and their final perseverance. In



Problems oj the Age. 197

our view, this doctrine can be sus-tained by ample and

certain proofs from Scripture and Tradition, and is

the only one which can be completely developed in

consonance with the decisions of the church, espe-

cially those of the Council of Trent respecting final

perseverance.* The reason why certain graces are
actually infallible in their effects is to be found in

their congruity to the character, disposition, and cir-

cumstances of the subject, and in their multitude.

The necessity for them is not a metaphysical but a
moral necessity. The fragility of our nature is such,
that, although a grace merely sufficient makes us

metaphysically capable of persevering without sin,

we are sure to become wearied, and through fickle-

ness, weakness of purpose, changeableness, etc., to

break down somewhere. Our own consciousness
and experience teach us that we need a divine and

protecting arm to encompass us continually and se-

cure us against ourselves, and they incline us to utter

that prayer of the divine Liturgy : “ Compelle
,
Do-

mine, rebelles voluntates nostras

“

Compel, O Lord !
our rebellious wills.” God, who knows human na-
ture perfectly, can, in a thousand ways, by order-

* Si quis magnum tilud usque in finem perseverantice donum se -certo
habiturum, absoluta et infallibili certitudine dixerit, etc., anathema sit.

If any one shall say that he will certainly have that great gift ofper-

severance to the end
\
with an absolute and infallible certitude, etc.

Si quis dixerit, justificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta

justitia perseverare posse, vel cum eo non posse, anathema sit.

If any one shall say that the justified man either can, without a
special aid of God, persevere in the justice he has received, or cannot

persevere with it, let him be under the ban.

—

De Justif Can. 16-22.



198 Problems of the Age.

ing the circumstances of life, shortening or prolong-

ing it, regulating the influences which act on the

character, alluring or terrifying the heart, illuminat-

ing the mind, impelling without coercing the will,

and adapting his influences with infinite wisdom to
the special state of the soul, convert whom he will,
sanctify whom he will, give perseverance to whom
he will, and still gain his point with the free consent

and concurrence of the creature. “ Non est volentis
neque cttrrentiSy sed miserentis est Dei:' “ It is not

of him who willeth or of him who runneth, but of
God who showeth mercy.” The difficulty may still
be raised, that God withholds these graces of con-
gruity and the gift of perseverance from those who
do not ih the first instance accept the proffered grace,

or who do not finally persevere. But this is removed

by the doctrine so ably and strenuously advocated by

St. Alphonsus Liguori, that common grace is suffi-
cient to enable one to pray fervently and do ordinary

good acts
;
and that by prayer, with the use of other

facile means, efficacious graces and the gift of perse-

verance may be infallibly obtained from God.
We may now return to our theme of the state of

probation originally established by God for those who
were made candidates for supernatural glory. We
have endeavored to clear our track of difficulties im-

peding the clear view of the truth that God estab-

lished this probation through goodness and love, or

with the simple view of communicating the greatest

good to the creature.

The principal questions respecting probation hav-



Problems of the Age. 199

ing been already discussed, there remains now but
one, namely : what was the precise and specific nature

of the trial to which rational nature was subjected ?

This divides itself again into two, one respecting the

trial of the angels, and the other respecting the trial

of man.

The angels, according to the doctrine of St. Tho-
mas and theologians generally, were created at the

summit of intelligent being, incapable of error or

false judgment in their natural, intellectual operation,

and therefore impeccable in the natural order. Su-

pernatural grace was conferred upon them simulta-

neously with their creation, although, as F. Billuart

holds, they may have concurred actively to the recep-
tion of this grace, by a spontaneous act preceding all

deliberation. Grace made them capable of eliciting
supernatural acts, but did not determine them to

those acts without the free concurrence of their will.

Their intelligence must have been, therefore, left in

a certain obscurity as regards the supernatural object,

in order that an error of judgment should be possible,

or even an act of deliberation terminating in a free

volition. What the precise object of deliberation and
choice was cannot be certainly and precisely deter-

mined. It must in some way have presented the
alternative of either eliciting a supernatural act by

the aid of the obscure supernatural light, or of falling

back on the free, natura operation of intelligence.

God must have exacted some act of homage to his
sovereign will, disclosed some condition as the indis-
pensable prerequisite to obtaining the crown of super-



200 Problems of the Age.

natural glory, which the natural intelligence of the

angels could not see to be just and right without the

aid of a supernatural light. This light was given,

clear enough to enable the will, by a strong voluntary

effort, to determine itself to act by this light, in pre-

ference to its natural light
;
dim enough to allow the

will to turn from it voluntarily, and find in its natural

light a plausible reason for withholding its submission

to the supreme will. Certain passages of Scripture,

and the common traditional Catholic doctrine, indi-
cate that the angels who fell, fell through pride, and
that Lucifer, in particular, their chief spirit, in some

way aspired to a resemblance with God. Some have
thought that he desired to become God. St. Thomas,

however, says that this is impossible, because his in-

telligence was too perfect to permit him to conceive

such a thought. He explains the sin of the angels
to have consisted in a refusal to accept supernatural

glory as a pure boon from God, and a wish to attain

beatitude by the exertion of their own natural powers.

The most plausible supposition, in our view, is one
that may be said to be contained under the more
generic statement just given. It is, namely, that the

angels were tried by the revelation of the Incarna-

tion. The union of the Second Person of the Trinity

with human nature, the elevation of human nature to

divine glory and honor, the obligation of doing ho-

mage to Jesus Christ as King, and to the Blessed

Virgin, his mother, as Queen of Angels, was revealed,

as the crucial test of the absolute obedience of the

celestial spirits. According to their natural reason,



Problems of the Age. 201

and natural love of their own nature and kind, it
would appear to them a violation of order and justice

to pass them by, in order to assume an inferior nature

partly corporeal and animal, into a hypostatic union

with the Godhead
;
elevating this nature above their

own, which was the highest in the natural order.

Supernatural light suggested to them that Gad, as

sovereign, had a right to bestow his supernatural gifts

according to his own will, and, as infinitely wise,

must have a secret reason for apparently inverting

the order of nature in establishing the supernatural

order of the universe. Those who voluntarily sub-
mitted themselves to the decree of God were rewarded
by an illumination which disclosed to them the wis

dom and goodness of the decree of the Incarnation,
and the glory which they themselves as well as the

whole universe would receive from it
;
and thus be-

came incapable for ever of erring in their judgment

respecting the highest good, and consequently of

swerving from it through sin. Those who fell turned
their minds away from the supernatural light toward

the consideration of their own private good, and the
glory of their own persons and their own order.
They revolted at the idea of being subordinated to
human nature, and desired that the angelic nature
should be the subject of the hypostatic union. Luci-

fer, in particular, as their chief, desired that he him-

self might be assumed into union with the Word,

exalted to the throne of the universe, and deified.

He and his associates demanded this from God as a
right due to their natural dignity, and thus rebelled



202 Problems of the Age.

against his sovereign majesty, were cast out of the

celestial sphere, and forfeited for ever the crown of

supernatural glory. Hence their enmity to the In-
carnate Word, to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and to

the human race. Hence their efforts to establish
their own supremacy over man, and the continual
conflict which the holy angels and the children of

God, on earth must wage against them in the sacred

warfare for the triumph of Christ’s kingdom upon

earth. This brings us to the consideration of human
probation.



CHAPTER X.

THE ORIGINAL STATE OF THE FIRST PARENTS OF
MANKIND—THE RELATION OF ADAM TO HIS POS-
TERITY—THE FALL OF MAN—ORIGINAL SIN.

THE grand theatre of probation is this earth, andits chief subject the human race. The proba-
tion of the angels was completed almost instantane-

ously, and their transit to an immutable state followed

almost immediately on their creation. The probation
of the human race is long and complicated, diversi-
fied and extensive

;
and by it the most magnificent

exhibition is made of the principle of merit. It has

also this peculiarity, that mankind were created, not

merely as individuals, each with his distinct proba-

tion, but also as a race
;
and that the whole race had

a probation at its origin, in . the person of its progeni-

tor. It is our present task to unfold the Catholic

doctrine concerning the nature and results of this

original probation of the collective human race in the
first epoch of its creation.

The Catholic doctrine teaches, in the first place.



204 Problems of the Age.

that the entire human race, at present inhabiting the
globe, is one

;
not merely in being conformed to one

archetype, but also in being descended by generation

from one common progenitor, that is, from Adam.
That this is distinctly affirmed in the book of Genesis

which the Catholic Church receives as a portion of

the inspired Scripture, according to the obvious and

literal sense of the words, is not questioned by any

one. It is only necessary, therefore, to show that

this obvious and literal sense is proposed by the

authority of the Catholic Church as the true sense.

That is, that it is an essential portion of Catholic

doctrine, that God created at first one pair of human
beings, Adam and Eve, from whom all mankind are
descended.

It seems evident enough that the archaic records,

in which the history of the creation of man is con-
tained, were understood in this sense by those who
transmitted them from the beginning of human his-
tory, and who first committed them to writing

;
and

by Moses, who incorporated them into the book of
Genesis. This was the traditional sense universally

received among the Jews, as is manifest from all the
monuments of tradition. It is also the sense which

is reaffirmed in the other sacred and canonical books

which follow those of Moses, wherever they allude to

the subject. For instance: “Who knoweth if the
spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward ?”*
“ Seth and Sem obtained glory among men : and

* Eccles. iii. 21.



Problems of the Age. 205

above every soul Adam in the beginning The simi-
lar traditions of heathen nations are well known.

The sacred writers of the New Testament use the
same explicit language. The genealogy of Jesus in

St. Luke’s gospel closes thus : “Who was of Henos,
who was of Seth, who zvas of Adam, who was of God
St. Paul affirms repeatedly and emphatically : “ By
one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death
“ by the offence of one many have died “ the judg-
ment indeed was by one unto condemnation “ by one

mans offence death reigned through one

“

by the

offence of one, unto all men to condemnation “for
as by the disobedie?ice of one man, many were made
sinners ; so also, by the obedience of one, many shall
be made just.”f These passages are plainly dogma-

tic, and teach the relation of all men to Adam, as an
essential portion of the dogma of original sin. The
whole force of the parallel between Adam and Christ
depends, also, on the individual personality of the for-

mer, and his relation to all mankind without excep-

tion, as their head and representative. The same
parallel reappears in another epistle : “ For by a man
came death, and by a man the resurrection of the
dead. And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all
shall be made alive.” “ The first man Adam was
made a living soul

;
the last Adam a quickening spi-

rit. But not first that which is spiritual, but that

which is animal
;
afterward that which is spiritual.

The first man was of the earth, earthly
;
the second

* Ecclus. xlix. 19. t St. Luke, iii. 38 ; Rom. v. 12-19.



206 Problems of the Age.

man from heaven, heavenly. Such as is the earthly,
such also are the earthly

;
and such as is the hea-

venly, such also are they that are heavenly. There-

fore as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us
bear also the image of the heavenly.”*

These passages all present the fact of the original

creation of mankind in one pair from whom all men
are descended, in an intimate and essential relation

with Christian doctrine, especially with the dogma of
original sin. It is, therefore, necessary to regard it

as a dogmatic fact, or a fact pertaining to the essence

of the revealed truth, which the sacred writers taught

with infallibility under the influence of divine inspira-

tion. So it has been always regarded in the church,

and is now held by the unanimous consent of theolo-
gians. It is also incorporated into the solemn defini-

tions of faith.

The canons of the second Council of Milevis, and
of the Plenary Council of Carthage, a.d. 418, against

the Pelagians, contain the following definitions :

“ Can. I. Placuit, ut quicunque dicit, Adam primnm
homine7n mortalem factum, ita, ut sive peccaret, sive

non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est de cor-

pore exiret, non peccati merito, sed necessitate na-

turae, anathema sit.
“ Can. 2. Item placuit, ut quicumque parvulos re-

centes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit

in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari,

sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod

* 1 Cor, xv. 21, 22, 45-49.



Problems of the Age. 207

regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde sit consequens,

ut in eis forma baptismatis in remissionem peccato-

rum non vera, sed falsa intelligatur, anathema sit ;

quoniam non aliter intelligendum est quod ait apos-

tolus : ‘ Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mun-
dum, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines

pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt nisi quemad-

modum Ecclesia Catholica ubique diffusa semper ir-
tellexit.”

“ Can . 1. It was decreed, that whosoever says that

Adam
,
the first man, was made mortal, so that, whe-

ther he sinned or did not sin, he should die in the

body, that is, depart from the body, not by the merit

of sin, but by the necessity of nature, should be under

the ban.

“ Can. 2. It was also decreed, that whosoever de-

nies that new-born infants are to be baptized, or

says that they are to be indeed baptized, for the

remission of sins, but derive no original sin from
Adam

,
which can be expiated in the laver of regene-

ration, whence it follows that in them the form of bap-

tism is understood to be not true, but false, should

be under the ban
;
since that is not otherwise to be

understood which the apostle says : ‘ By one man sin
entered into the world, and death by sin, and so it

passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned
\

ex-

cept as the Catholic Church everywhere diffused has

always understood it!'

These canons, although not enacted by ecumenical

councils, were nevertheless approved by Popes Inno-

cent I. and Zosimus, by them promulgated to the



208 Problems of the Age.

universal church, and ratified by the consent of the

whole body of bishops
;
so that they are justly in-

cluded among the final and irreversible decisions of
the Catholic Church. The second of these canons
was also reenacted by the Council of Trent, which

defined in the clearest terms the dogma of original
sin as derived from the sin of Adam, the head of the
human race.

“ i. Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam
,

cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus,
statim sanctitatem, etc., amisisse: A. S.

“ 2. Si quis Adae prevaricationem sibi soli, et non

ejus propagini, asserit nocuisse .... aut inquinatum

ilium per inobedientiae peccatum, mortem et poenas

corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfix-
disse, non autem et peccatum, quod est mors animae

;

A. S. cum contradicit apostolo dicenti : ‘ Per unurr
hominem peccatum intravit in mundum/ etc.

“ 3. Si quis hoc Adce peccatum, quod origine unum
est

,
et propagation e, non imitatione, transfusum omni-

bus
,
inest cuique proprium .... per aliud remedium

asserit tolli, etc. : A. S.”
“ 1. If any one does not confess that the first man

Adam
,
when he had transgressed the commandment

of God in paradise, immediately lost sanctity, etc., let

him be under the ban.
“ 2. If any one asserts that the prevarication of

Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity
.... or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobe-

dience, transmitted death and the pains of the body

only to the whole human race, but not also sin, which



Problems of the Age. 209

is the death of the soul, let him be under the ban

:

since he contradicts the apostle, who says : ‘ By one
man sin entered into the world/ etc.

“ 3. If any one asserts that this sin of Adam, which

in origin is one
,
and being transferred into all by pro-

pagation, not by imitation, exists in each one as nis

own .... is taken away by any other remedy, etc., let
him be under the ban.”

All these decrees affirm positively that the whole

human race without exception are involved in one
common original sin, springing from one transgres-
sion committed by the first man Adam, and trans-
mitted from him by generation. The dogma of origi-
nal sin rests, therefore, on the fact that all mankind

are descended from one first man Adam, and is sub-
verted, if this fact is denied. An allegorical interpre-
tation of the sacred history of Genesis, according to

which Adam and Eve are taken to symbolize the
progenitors of several distinct human species, cannot
be admitted as tenable, in accordance with the Catho-

lic faith. For, on this hypothesis, the different human
races had each a distinct probation, a separate destiny,

a separate fall, and are therefore not involved in one

common original sin, but each one in the sin of its
own progenitor. This doctrine of original sin, namely,
that a number of Adams sinned, and that each one
transmitted his sin to his own progeny, so that every
man is born in an original sin derived from some one
of the various primeval men, is essentially different

from the Catholic doctrine as clearly taught by Scrip-

ture and tradition, and defined by the authority of



210 Problems of the Age.

the church. Moreover, the unity and individuality of

Adam, as the sole progenitor of the human race, is
distinctly affirmed in the decrees just cited, and in all

the subsequent decrees concerning the primitive

state of man which have emanated from the Holy See,
and are received by the universal church. We must
consider, therefore, the doctrine of the unity of the

human race as pertaining to the faith. Perrone affirms
this, in these words: “ Prop. II. Universum huma-

num genus ab Adam omnium protoparente propaga-
turn est. Plaec propositio spectat ad fidem

;
huic enim

innititur dogma de propagatione peccati originalis.”
“ The entire human race has been propagated from
Adam the first parent of all. This proposition per-
tains to faith

;
for upon it rests the dogma of the

propagation of original sin.”*

Bishop Lynch, of Charleston, who is not only one
of the most learned of our theologians, but a man pro-
foundly versed in the physical sciences, in a very able

and interesting lecture recently delivered in New
York, thus speaks on this matter :

“ Some, nowadays, disregarding all that Holy Scrip-

ture teaches us concerning the origin of man, or treat-

ing it as a myth and fable, referring at most only to the

Caucasian race, pretend that America had her own

special Adam and Eve, or, as they think more pro-
bable, quite a number of them contemporaneously or

successively in different localities.

“ I shall not here undertake to discuss this last

* Perrone, Prcel. Theol. De Horn. Creat.



Problems of the Age. 21 I

opinion, iventured certainly against the teachings of

divine revelation
,
and, as I conceive, no less against

the soundest principles of philosophy, of comparative

anatomy, of philology, and of natural history. I will

assume it as an established and accepted truth, that

God ma,de all nations of one blood. ”*

The only point we have been endeavoring to make,
that the doctrine of the unity of the race pertains to

essential Catholic doctrine, is, we think, fairly made.
The scientific refutation of the contrary hypothesis is
a work most desirable, in our opinion, but one requir-

ing a degree of scientific knowledge which the author

does not possess. It is a work, also, which could be

accomplished only by an extensive treatise. The
judgment of the distinguished author just cited may
be taken, however, as a summing up of the verdict of
a great body of scientific men, given on scientific

grounds, in favor of the doctrine of the unity of the

race. The contrary doctrine is mere hypothesis,
which no man can possibly pretend to demonstrate.
It cannot, therefore, be brought out to oppose the

revealed Catholic doctrine. Hypothesis, even when
supported by a certain amount of scientific probabi-
lity, is not science. Real science is indubitably cer-

tain. There cannot, therefore, ever arise a real con-

tradiction between science and revelation. Science

will never contradict revelation, and revelation does

not contradict any part of science which is already

* Lecture by the Rt. Rev. P. N. Lynch, D.D., on America before
Columbus . Reported in the New York Tablet



212 Problems of the Age.

known or ever will become known. We are not,
however, to hold our belief in revealed truths in

abeyance, until their perfect agreement with scientific

truths is demonstrated. Nor are we to tolerate mere
hypotheses and probable opinions in science, when
they are contrary to truths known by revelation, be-
cause they cannot be demonstrated to be false on

purely scientific grounds.

There are only two real difficulties to be encoun-

tered in the solution of the scientific problem. One
is, the difficulty of accounting for the variations in

type, language, etc., between different families of the

human race within the commonly received historic
period. The other is the difficulty of explaining cer-
tain discoveries in the historical monuments of Egypt,
and certain geological discoveries of the remains of

man or human works, in accordance with the same
period. It has been justly and acutely remarked by a

recent British writer on this subject, that the objec-

tions made under this second head, if they are suffi-
cient to establish the necessity of admitting a longer

chronology, destroy the objections under the first

head. Given a longer time for these changes, and the

difficulty of supposing them to be real variations from

a unique type vanishes. The chronological difficulties
under the second head are of two classes. One class
relates to the history of well-known post-diluvian na-

tions, whose historical records have been discovered,

indicating a longer period than the one commonly

reckoned between the age of Noah and that of Moses.
The other relates to tribes or individuals about whom



Problems of the Age. 213

nothing is known historically, but to whom geolo-
gical evidence assigns a higher antiquity than that

commonly allowed to the epoch of the creation of

man. Now, these difficulties in no way tend to im-

pugn the doctrine of the unity of the race, but merely

the chronology of the history of the race from the

epoch of the creation of the first man, which has been

commonly supposed to be established by the authori-

ty of Scripture. If this last supposition may be
classed among theological opinions not pertaining to
essential Catholic doctrine, and we may be permit-
ted, salva fide et auctoritate ecclesice, to admit a chro-

nology long enough to satisfy these claims of a higher

antiquity for man, all difficulty vanishes. One thing
is certain, that if the inspired books of Moses did

originally contain an exact chronology of human his-
tory from Adam to the Exodus of Israel, we cannot
now ascertain within fifteen hundred years what it
was, since there is that amount of variation between

the Hebrew and Greek copies. There is some
probability in favor of the Septuagint, which gives

the longer chronology. Yet, it is impossible to ex-

plain how the variation between the Septuagint
and the Hebrew, and the variation of the Sama-

ritan version from both, arose. The great essential
facts pertaining to religious doctrine have been

handed down by Scripture and tradition in their un-
impaired integrity. We are bound to believe that
the providence of God watched over their transmis-
sion, and protected them from any designed or acci-
dental alteration. Some general principles and data



214 Problems of the Age.

of chronology are included in this essential history,

which is guaranteed to us by inspiration and the au-
thority of the church. Nevertheless, these chrono-

logical data are manifestly so incomplete and imper-

fect, that a precise and accurate chronological system

cannot be deduced from them. So far as it is possi-

ble to form a chronological system at all, it must be

done by the help of all the collateral evidence we can
find. This evidence, so far as we are aware, does not
tend to establish, with a high degree of probability,

an epoch of creation more than a few thousand years

earlier than the common one of 4000 years before
Christ. This is certainly true of the historical re-

cords of Egypt, the principal source of ne„w light on

the ancient historical epochs. We are warranted by
the Septuagint in adding fifteen hundred years to the

common period. It is only, however, on critical and
historical grounds that the Septuagint has greater

authority on this point than the Hebrew, and not as

having a higher sanction. For the Hebrew is the
original and authentic Scripture, and the authorized

Latin Version follows it, and not the Greek. If we

can admit, then, a chronology longer by fifteen hun-

dred years than the one contained in the received

text, on historical grounds, why not one still longer,
if sound historical evidence demands it ? Supposing

that the Scripture originally did contain a complete

and infallible system of chronology, it is evident that

the key to it was lost many ages ago
;
and we can

just as easily suppose that the discrepancy between

the Mosaic chronology a ; it now stands and the chro-



Problems of the Age. 215

nology of the Egyptian records has arisen by the

same causes which produced the discrepancy of the
Hebrew and Greek texts, as we can assign causes
why so great a discrepancy should arise at all, and
reconcile this with the reverence due to the sacred

books,* This is a matter which needs to be more
thoroughly dis-cussed than it has been, by theologians

who are fully acquainted with the subject, before we
can lay down positively a principle upon which to
solve the difficulty. We reject, however, as improva-
ble and untenable, all theories which throw the an-

tiquity of man back to an epoch of vast remoteness,
and assign hundreds or thousands of centuries to a

prehistoric period, of which no records remain. It is

on geological discoveries solely that this hypothesis

is based. At present it is only a conjecture, founded
on the fact that human remains have been found of a
greater antiquity than those formerly known, whence

it is concluded that they may hereafter be discovered
of a greater antiquity still. We may safely wait for geo-
logy itself to clear up the obscurity at present existing

in regard to this matter, and to set right, as science

invariably does, the early and hasty conjectures of its

own votaiies.f Whichever way the matter may be

* Archbishop Manning says : “No system of chronology is laid
down in the sacred books. There are at least three chronologies, pro-
bable and admissible, apparently given by Holy Scripture. It cannot

be said, therefore, that there are chronological faults in Holy Scrip-

ture, forasmuch as no ascertained chronology is there declared,”

—

Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost, p. 171, American edition.

t See an article on the Scientific Congress ofParis, in 1867, in The

Catholic World for February, 1868.



216 Problems of the Age.

settled, the fossil remains of human skeletons or
human works will be assignable either to a period not

too remote to be included in the historic period, or

to one so remote that it must be excluded from it.

In the first case, there is no difficulty. In the second,

nothing is established from which the falsity of our

thesis can be demonstrated. Our thesis is, that the

present human race now inhabiting the earth is de-
scended from one man, Adam. When there is any
very probable evidence presented that another and

distinct species, having a physical organization like

that of the human race, once existed on the earth,
from which it has become extinct, it will be time to

examine that theory. For the present we are con-
cerned with Adam only and his race

;
to which both

our readers and ourselves have but too conclusive

evidence that we all belong.*

* The Gentle Skeptic
,
by Rev. C. A. Walworth, now pastor of St.

Mary’s church, Albany, treats of several topics, here noticed in a

cursory manner. This work is the result of several years’ close and

accurate study in theology and science. It has, therefore, the solidity

and elaborate finish of a work executed with care and diligence by

one who is both a strong thinker and a sound scholar. In style it is
a model of classic elegance and purity, and in every respect it deserves

a place among the best works of English Catholic literature. The
author has broke ground in a field of investigation which it is impera-

tive on Catholic scientific men to work up thoroughly. The entire
change which has taken place in the attitude of science toward re-

vealed religion within a few years, and in the doctrines of science

themselves, makes the old works written on the connection between

religion and science to a great degree useless. The subject needs
to be taken up afresh, and handled in a manner adequate to the present

intellectual wants of the age.



Problems of Ike Age. 217

We have now to consider what Catholic doctrine
teaches of that state in which the first parents of the

human race were constituted at their creation. Brief-
ly, it is this : that this was a supernatural state of

sanctity and justice, in which were contained, or with

which were connected, the gift of integrity, or immu-

nity from concupiscence, the gift of science, and the

gift of corporeal immortality.

That man was constituted in sanctity and justice
is affirmed as de fide by the decree of the Council of

Trent, a part of which is cited above, in which Adam
is declared “ to have lost immediately the sanctity

and justice in which he had been constituted “ sta-

tim sanctitatem et justitiam in quo constitutus fuerat

amisisse.” That he possessed integrity is proved by

the same decree, which declares that by the fall he

was “ changed as to his body and soul into something

worse:” “ secundum corpus et animam in deterius
commutatum fuisse.” That he possessed science is
proved by the declaration of the book of Ecclesiasti-

cus : “ Discipline intellectus replevit illos. Creavit

illis scientiam spiritus “ He filled them with the
knowledge of understanding. He created in them
the science of the spirit.”* This is explained and

corroborated by the traditional teaching of all the

fathers and great theologians of the church. His

immunity from death is proved by the decrees above

cited and others familiar to all.

It is shown to be the Catholic doctrine that these

* Ecclus. xvii. 5, 6.



2 I 8 Problems of the Age.

gifts were supernatural, by the condemnation of the

contrary doctrine by the Holy See. The following
theses of Baius, one of the precursors of Jansenism,

were condemned by Pius V. and Gregory XIII.:
“21. Humanae naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in

consortium divinae naturae, debita fuit integritati

primae conditionis, et proinde naturalis dicenda est,

et non supernaturalis
;

26. Integritas primae crea-

tionis non fuit indebita humanae naturae exaltatio,

sed naturalis ejus conditio
; 55. Deus non potuisset

ab initio talem creare hominem qualis nunc nascitur
;

78. Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae benefi-

cium, sed naturalis ejus conditio
; 79. Falsa est docto-

rum sententiaprimum hominem potuisse a Deo creari

et institui sine justitia naturali.” Clement XI., in

the Bull Unigenitus
,
also condemned the following

proposition, the 33d of Quesnel : “Gratia Adami es*
sequela creationis et erat debita naturae sanae et inte-

grae.”

“2i. The elevation and exaltation of human nature

into the fellowship of the divine nature was due to

the integrity of its first condition, and is therefore to

be called natural and not supernatural ; 26. The in-

tegrity of the primal creation was not an exaltation

of the human nature which was not due to it, but its

natural condition
; 55. God could not have created

man from the beginning such as he is now born ; 78.
The immortality of the first man was not a benefit

of grace, but his natural condition ; 79. The opinion

of doctors is false, that the first man could have been

created and instituted by God without natural jus



Problems of the Age. 219

tice, (righteousness.)” 33d of Quesnel : “ The grace

of Adam is a sequel of creation, and was due to
sound and integral nature.”

It is plain from the decisions which have been

quoted, and from the consentient doctrine of all Ca-

tholic doctors, that the Catholic doctrine is : that the

state of original sanctity and integrity did not flow

from the intrinsic, essential principles of human
nature, and was not due to it, but was a free gift of

grace superadded to nature, that is, supernatural.

We do not, however, censure the opinion held by
some sound Catholic writers, that congruity, order,

or the fitness of things, exacts that supernatural

grace be always given to rational nature. It is our

own opinion, already clearly enough insinuated, that,
although the completion and perfection of the uni-

verse does exact that a supernatural order should be

constituted, it does not exact the elevation of all ra-

tional species or individuals to this order. This opin-

ion appears to be more in accordance with the obvi-

ous sense of the decrees just cited. It is also the opin-

ion of St. Thomas, and, after him, of the more pre-
valent school of theology. St. Thomas thus expresses
himself upon this point : “ Poterat Deus, a principio

quando hominem condidit, etiam alium hominem ex
limo terrae formare, quern in conditione suae naturae

relinqueret, ut scilicet mortalis et passibilis esset et

pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens, in quo
nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia hoc ex prin-

cipiis naturae consequitur
;
non tamen iste defectus

in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia non



220 Problems of the Age.

per voluntatem iste defectus causatus esset.” “ God
could have formed, from the beginning when he cre-
ated man, also another man from the dust of the
earth, whom he might have left in the condition of
his own nature, that is, so that he would have been
mortal and passible, and would have felt the conflict

of concupiscence against reason, in which there

would have been nothing derogatory to human nature,
because this follows from the principles of nature

;

nevertheless this defect in him would not have had

the quality of sin and punishment, because this de-

fect would not have been caused by the will.”*

The sanctifying grace conferred upon Adam is
very clearly shown, according to this view, to have

been a pure and perfectly gratuitous boon from God,

to which human nature, as such, could have no claim
whatever, even of congruity.

The nature of the probation of the father of man-
kind is now easily explained. He received a gratui-
tous gift on conditions, and these conditions were the

matter of his probation. Our scope and limits do

not admit of a minute discussion of the particular

circumstances of the trial and fall of Adam in Para-
dise. The point to be considered is the relation in
which Adam stood to all mankind his posterity in
his trial, transgression, and condemnation. The Ca-
tholic dogma of faith on this head is clearly defined
and unmistakable. The whole human race was tried,
fell, and was condemned, in the trial, fall, and con-

* 2 Sentent.y Dist. 31, qu. 1, art. 2 ad 3.



Problems of the Age. 221

demnation of Adam. It is needless to cite again the
passages of Holy Scripture and the decisions of the

church which establish this fundamental doctrine of

Christianity. The only question to be discussed is,
What is the real sense and meaning of the doctrine ?
How did all mankind sin in Adam, and by his trans-
gression incur the condemnation of death ? What is
the nature of that original sin in which we are born ?
One theory is, that the sin of Adam is arbitrarily

imputed to his posterity. As a punishment for this
imputed sin, they are born depraved, with an irre-

sistible propensity to sin, and under the doom of eter-
nal misery. The statement of this theory is its best
refutation. Very few hold it now, and we may safely
leave to Protestant writers the task of demonstrating

its absurdity.

Another theory is, that all human wills were in-
cluded in the will of Adam, so that they all concurred
with his will in the original transgression.* We find
some difficulty in comprehending this statement.

Did we all have a distinct existence, and enjoy a deli-

berative and decisive vote when the important ques-
tion of human destiny was decided ? If so, the una-
nimity of the judgment, and the total oblivion which

has fallen upon us all, respecting our share in it and

our whole subsequent existence until a very recent

period, are very remarkable phenomena which we

* We refer the reader to the arguments of Candace in Mrs. Stowe’s
Minister's Wooing

\

for a humorous but unanswerable refutation of the

ancient Calvinistic doctrine of original sin.



222 Problems of the Age.

have never seen adequately accounted for. The only
other alternative is that of indistinct existence or vir-

tual existence. That is, that the power of generating

souls was in Adam, and that all human souls are
actually derived from his soul by generation. Sup-

pose they are. A father who has lost an organ or a
limb does not necessarily transmit this defect to his

posterity. Even if he does transmit some defect

which he has contracted by his own fault to his son,
that son is not to blame for it. If the principle of all

souls was in Adam, virtually, their personality, which

is the principle of imputability, commences only with

their distinct existence. Personality is incommuni-

cable. An individual soul cannot communicate with
another in the principle of identity, from which all

imputability of acts, all accountability, all possibility

of moral relations, proceeds. This notion of the de-

rivation of souls, one from another, or from a common
soul-reservoir, is, however, one perfectly inconceiva-

ble, and contrary to the plainest principles of philoso-

phy. Substance is simple and indivisible. Spirit,

which is the most perfect substance, contains, there-

fore, in its essence the most manifest contradiction

to all notion of composition, resolution, division, or

separation of parts. The substance of Adam's soul
was completely in his own individual intelligence and
will. The notion of any other souls deriving their
substance from his soul is therefore wholly without

meaning. There is no conceivable way in which a
spirit can produce spirit, except by creation, an act

to which created spirit is incompetent.



Problems of the Age. 223

There remains, therefore, only the doctrine, which

is that of Catholic theology, that the human species
is corporeally propagated by means of generation,

and was, therefore, in this respect only, virtually in

Adam
;
but that each individual soul is immediately

created by God, and comes into the generic and spe-

cific relations of humanity through its union in one

integral personality with the body.* How, then, can

each individual soul become involved in original sin ?

Does God create it sinful ? This cannot be
;
and

if it could it would not be the sin of Adam, or the

sin of the race, but its own personal sin. The soul
as it comes from the hand of God cannot be sinful in

act. The only possible supposition remaining is,

that the soul contracts sin from contact or union with

the body. Here the Calvinist, the Jansenist, or any

other who maintains that original sin consists in po-
sitive depravation of the soul's essence, or in habitual

moral perversity, or determination of the will to sin,

is in a position where he cannot move a step forward.
How can soul be corrupted by body ? How has the
innocent soul deserved to be thrust into a body by

which it must be polluted ? These questions will

never receive an answer. Nor will any credible or

rational method of vindicating the doctrine that all

men are born totally and positively depraved, or with
a nature in any respect essentially evil, on account

* “ Cum sit anima immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per
generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo.”

—

St. Thom. p. 1. qu*
xi 8. art. 2 .



224 Problems of the Age.

of Adam’s sin, ever be discovered. The doctrine is
utterly incredible and unthinkable, and will no doubt

ere long have a place only in the history of past

errors.

The way is now clear for the exposition of th*e Ca-
tholic doctrine respecting the mutual relations of

Adam and his posterity in the original probation,
trial, and fall of the human race immediately after its
creation. That probation of Adam, in which the hu-
man race was included, must not be understood as
including the entire personal probation either of

himself or of his descendants. His own probation
lasted during his lifetime, and so does that of each

individual man. Had he been faithful in that par-
ticular trial which is related in the first chapter of

Genesis, it is probable that, although the special pri-

vileges whose perpetuation depended on it would

certainly have been secured to the race, he himself

would have had a longer personal trial. So, also, if

the progeny of Adam had been confirmed in the per-
petual possession of the privileges of the primeval

state, each individual of the human race would have
had a probation of his own, affecting his own personal
destiny alone. Although each one of us would have

been conceived and born in the state of original

grace an*d integrity, as the Blessed Virgin was by a

special privilege
;
as soon as the actual exercise of

reason became completely developed, a period of pro-

bation would have commenced, in which we should
have been liable to fail, as we are now after receiving
grace through baptism.



Problems of Ike Age. 225

The probation of the human race in Adam was,
therefore, a special probation, on which the posses-

sion in perpetuity of certain supernatural privileges,

freely and gratuitously conceded to the race, was

alone dependent. The merely personal consequences
of the sin of Adam and Eve affected themselves
alone individually. That is, the guilt of an actual

transgression with the necessary personal conse-

quences following from it attached to them alone,

and we have nothing to do with it, any more than with

any other sins committed by our intermediate pro-

genitors. The father of the human race did not act,
however, in a merely individual capacity in this trans-

action. A trust was committed to him in behalf of
all mankind, and this trust was the great gift of origi-

nal sanctity and justice, the high dignity of superna-

tural affiliation to God, and the glorious title of the

kingdom of heaven. By his sin he forfeited this gift
in trust, both for himself as an individual, and also

for his descendants who were to have inherited it
from him. There is no ground for asking the ques-

tion, why it followed that Adam, having fallen, should
transmit a fallen nature by generation to his poster-

ity. This question is only asked on the supposition

that fallen nature is a nature essentially changed and

depraved, whereas it is really a nature which has

fallen from a supernatural height back to its own
proper condition. With all due respect to the emi-
nent writers who have attempted to answer this ques-
tion, we must be allowed to say that we cannot at-
tach any definite meaning to their answer. Adam.



226 Problems of the Age.

they say, having a fallen nature, could only transmit

the nature which he had. All humanity was in him
when he sinned, and therefore humanity as generic
having fallen into sin, each individual who partici-
pates by conception in generic humanity participates

in its sin, or is conceived in original sin. This lan-

guage may be used and understood in a true sense
;

but in its literal sense, and as it is very generally

understood, it has no meaning. It is derived from

the extravagant and unintelligible realism of William

of Champeaux,* and some other schoolmen, accord-

ing to which humanity as a genus has a real and po-

sitive entity distinct from the individuals of the race,

like the great animal in se of Plato, from whom all
particular animals receive their entity. These no-

tions have long since become obsolete, and it is useless

to refute them. The human genus was completely
in Adam, but it was not separate from his individual-

ity
;
rather it was completely in his individuality, con-

stituting it in its own generic grade of existence, as

the individuality of a man. Humanity is also com-

pletely in every other human individual. This hu-

manity, constituting the specific essence of Adam,

as a man, was identical with his existence, for exist-

ence is only metaphysical essence reduced to. act. It

could not be essentially changed without destroying

his human existence. Whatever is contained in hu-

* What is said supposes the account generally received of this au-

thor’s philosophy to be correct. The author accepts the realism of

St. Thomas, who defines universals to be mental conceptions with a

foundation in reality.



Problems of the Age. 227

manitas must have remained in him after the fall,

otherwise he would no longer have remained a man,

or indeed have continued to exist at all. It is only

this humanitas
,
or specific essence of human nature,

that Adam had any natural power to reproduce by
generation. He could not have lost the power of
transmitting it by the fall, except by losing a* together

the power of reproducing his species. The immedi-
ate, physical effect of generation is merely the pro-

duction of the life-germ, from which the body is de-

veloped under the formative action of a soul created

immediately by God. The only depravation or cor-
ruption of nature, therefore, which is physically pos-

sible, or which can be supposed to follow by a neces-

sary law from the corruption of nature in Adam, is a
corruption or degeneracy in this life-germ, through

which a defective or degenerate body is produced.

This opinion has been long ago condemned by the

church. It is, moreover, contrary to science. The
human animal is perfect as an animal, and although
there is accidental degeneracy in individuals, there

is no generic degeneracy of the race from its essen-

tial type. But supposing that a defective body were

the necessary consequence of Adam’s sin, a defective

soul could not be. The parent does not concur to
the creation of the soul of his offspring, except as an

occasional cause. God creates the soul, and he can-
not create a human soul without creating it in con-
formity to the metaphysical archetype of soul in his

own idea, and therefore having the essence of soul
completely in itself. How, then, can the infusion of



228 Problems of the Age.

this soul into a body which is physically degenerate

make it unworthy of that degree of the love of God
and of that felicity, which it is worthy of intrinsically,

and apart from its union with the body ?

There is no law in nature by virtue of which Adam
must or could transmit anything essentially more

than human nature before the fall, or essentially less
after the fall. The law by which he was entitled to
transmit privileges or gifts additional to nature on

condition of his fulfilling the terms of God’s cove-

nant with him was therefore a positive law
;

like

those human laws which enable men to transmit with
their blood property, titles of nobility, or the heredi-

tary right to a crown. These privileges may be for-
feited, by the crime of an individual in whom they
are vested, for himself and for his posterity. They
may be forfeited for posterity, because they are not
natural rights. In the same manner, the supernatu-

ral gifts conferred on Adam were forfeited for the
human race by his sin, because they were not natural
rights or debita natures

,
but gratuitous gifts to which

Adam’s posterity had no hereditary right, exceot that

derived from the sovereign concession of God, and

conceded only in a conditional manner. This condi-

tional right could only be perfected by the obedience

of Adam to the precept of the Almighty forbidding
him to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of

good and evil. As he failed to obey this precept, his
posterity never acquired a perfect right to the gifts

of supernatural grace through him. By virtue, there-
fore, of our descent from feim, we possess nothing



Problems of the Age. 229

but human nature and those things which naturally
belong to it

;
we are born in the state in which Adam

would have been placed at the beginning if God had
created him in the state of pure nature.

We do not stand, therefore, before God, by virtue
of our conception and birth from the first parents of

mankind, in the attitude of personal offenders, or vo-

luntary transgressors of his law. Our essential rela-
tion to God as rational creatures is not broken. Our
nature is essentially good, and capable of attaining

all the good which can be evolved from its intrinsic

principles
;
that is, all natural knowledge, virtue, and

felicity. That which is immediately created by God
must be essentially good. A spirit is essentially intel-
ligence and will, and therefore good in respect to

both, or capable of thinking the truth and willing the

good. Moreover, it is a certain philosophical truth

that when God creates a spirit he must create it in

act, or that the activity of the spirit is coeval with its

existence. The first act or state of a spirit, as it pre-
cedes all reflection, deliberation, or choice, and flows

necessarily from the creative act of God himself, is

determined by him, and must therefore be good.

The acts which follow, either follow necessarily from
the first, or are the product of free deliberation. In

the first case they are necessarily good
;
and in the

second they may be good, otherwise they would be
necessarily evil, which is contrary to the supposition

that they are free. The human soul being in its es-
sence spirit, and incapable of being corrupted by the

body, must therefore be essentially good at the mo-



230 Problems of the Age.

ment when it attains the full exercise of reason and

of the faculty of free choice. If so, it is capable of

apprehending by its intelligence and choosing by its

will that which is good, and cannot, therefore, come

into the state of actual sin or become a personal

transgressor except by a free and deliberate purpose

to violate the eternal law, with full power to the con-

trary. It may exercise this power to the contrary by
a correct judgment, a right volition, and thus attain

the felicity which is the necessary consequence of act-

ing rationally and conscientiously. So far as this is

possible to mere unassisted nature, it may continue
to put forth a series of acts of this kind during the

whole period of its earthly existence.* That is to

say, it is capable of attaining all the good which can

be evolved from its intrinsic principles, or all natural

knowledge, virtue, and felicity. This is equivalent to

saying, that it can have a natural knowledge and love

of God, as is affirmed by the best theologians with

the sanction of the churoh. For Pius V. has con-

demned the following proposition, the 34th of Baius :
“
Distinctio ilia duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet

quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti quo

Deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commenti-

tia et ad illudendum sacris litteris et plurimis vete-

rum testimoniis excogitata.” “ The distinction of a
twofold love, namely, natural, by which God is loved
as the author of nature, and gratuitous, by which

* It is understood, of course, that this cannot be done without the

special aid of God.



Problems of the Age. 231

God is loved as the beatiner, is vain and futile, and

invented for the purpose of evading that which is

taught by the Holy Scriptures and by many testimo-

nies of the ancient writers.”* It would be easy to

multiply proofs that the doctrine of man's capability

of moral virtue, from the intrinsic principles of his

nature, is the genuine Catholic doctrine.f This is

not necessary, however, at present

We proceed to another point, namely, How it is
that mankind can be said to be born in original sin,

when they are innocent of all personal and actual sin

at the time of birth ? The state in which Adam’s
posterity are born, and which is denominated the

state of original sin, considered subjectively, is a

state of privation of supernatural grace and integrity.

If man had been created for a natural destiny, this
state of inhability to the supernatural would not

have been a state of sin. If he had been created in

the state in which he is now born, as a preparatory
state to the state of grace, to be endowed at a subse-

quent period with supernatural gifts, it would not

have been a state of sin. Entitively it would have

been the same state as that in which he is now born.
It would not have been a state of sin, because the

state of sin receives its denomination from a volun-

tary transgression which produces it. The particular
notion of sin is an aversion from God as the supreme

* Denziger’s Enchirid., p. 305.

t See Aspirations of Nature, by Rev. I. T. Heekev, passim. That

portion of this work which relates to original sin was read in manu-

script to the late Archbishop Kenrick and approved by him.



23 2 Problems of the Age.

good produced by the voluntary election of an infe-

rior good in his place. The posterity of Adam are
born in a state of habitual aversion from God as the
supreme good in the supernatural order, which is the

consequence of the original sin of Adam. Since

they virtually possessed a right to be born in the

state of grace and integrity, which was forfeited by

his sin, the state of privation in which they are born,

relatively to their original ideal condition and to the

transgression by which they were degraded from it,

is properly denominated a state of sin. This is in-

curred by each individual soul through its connection

with the body which descends from our first parents

by generation, because it is this infusion into a hu-

man body which constitutes it a member of the hu-
man race. As a member of the human race, and by
virtue of his descent from Adam, each individual
man participates in all the generic relations of the
race. If Adam had not sinned, he would have re-
ceived by inheritance from him a high dignity and

great possessions, transmitted to him through the

blood
;
as the case is, he is born disinherited. There

is no injustice or unkindness in this
;
because the

rights which have been forfeited were not rights in-

volved in the concession of rational existence itself,

but rights gratuitously conceded on certain condi-

tions, and because no personal blame is imputed

where none exists. The illustration so often em-
ployed by theologians of a nobleman who has suffered
attainder is perfectly apt to the case. His posterity

are born under an attainder, which in human law cor-



Problems of the Age. 233

responds to original sin undei the divine law, and are

thus placed in a state of privation
;
relatively to that

condition of nobility which was formerly hereditary

in the family
;
but which in itself is an honest condi-

tion. In the eye of the law, their fathers crime

makes them incapable of the privileges of nobility,

but it does not deprive them of the common rights
of private subjects.

So the children of Adam, on account of his sin,
inherit a disability to possess the nobility of the state

of grace, and to inherit the kingdom of heaven. This

disability is inherent in the person of each one, and

therefore “ inest cuiqu-e proprium
”

It is a separation

from, God incurred by the transgression of Adam,
who represented the human race in his trial, and
therefore is truly and properly sin. It is a privation

of grace which is the supernatural life of the soul,

and is therefore properly called death, or “ mors ani-

mce.” The “ reatus ciilpce ’ is the obligation of being
born in a state of relative degradation, and the “ rea-

tus poence” the obligation of undergoing the conflicts,

sufferings, and death which belong to the state of de-

spoiled nature, as well as submitting to the sentence

of exclusion from the kingdom of God. By it, hu-
man nature has been changed into something worse
as to soul and body, “ in deterius mutatar quoad cor-

pus et animam,” because it is now deprived of integ-
rity, immortality, and sanctifying grace. Neverthe-

less, this state is essentially the same with that which

would have been the state of man if he had been cre-
ated in the state of pure nature. Man in the state



2 34 Problems of the Age.

of lapsed nature differs from man in the state of pure
nature, as Perrone says, only as nudatus from undo,

one denuded from one always nude. This is original

sin, which consists formally, as St. Thomas teaches,
in the privation of sanctifying grace and the other

gratuitous gifts perfecting nature which depended on

it. Mankind, therefore, by the sin of Adam, have
simply fallen back on the state of pure nature, and

are born with those attributes and qualities only

which are contained in human nature by virtue of its
intrinsic principles. To understand, therefore, the
condition, capabilities, and ultimate destiny of man,

apart from the grace which comes through the Re-

deemer, we have simply to inquire into the essence

of these intrinsic principles, and ascertain what man
is, simply as man, what he can do, and what is the

end he can attain by his earthly life.

Man, as to his rational nature, is in the lowest

grade of rational creatures. Except under very favor-

able circumstances, his intelligence is very imperfectly

developed, and, so far as it is developed, it is chiefly

employed in perfecting his merely exterior and soci ll

life. Under the most favorable circumstances his

progress is slow, his capacity of contemplating purely

intellectual and spiritual objects weak and limited.

As to his body, he is also frail and delicate, and natu-
rally liable to death. Moreover, there is in his con-

stitution, as a being composed of soul and body, a

certain contrariety of natural impulses, one set of in-

fluences inclining him to rational good, the other to

sensible or animal good. Like the inferior animals,



Problems of the Age. 235

he is capable of an improvement of his species up to

a certain point which cannot be fixed, and also liable

to a degeneracy which brings him down to a state
little above that of the brutes, and even to idiocy.

There are indications enough in his soul of a latent

capacity for a much higher and more exalted state,
to make it certain that his present condition is one
of merely inchoate existence, and that he is destined

to a future life in which these latent capacities will be

developed in a more perfect corporeal organization.

The great difficulty of forming an ideal conception
of the state in which he would have been constituted,

had he been left to his merely natural development,

consists in the fact that we have no human subject
to study except man as he actually is, that is, under a
supernatural providence from the beginning. The
actual development of human nature has taken place
under the influence of supernatural grace, and we
cannot discriminate in human history the operation
of natural causes from those which are supernatural.

There are three principal hypotheses respecting the

possible development of pure nature which may be
sustained with more or less plausibility. The first is,
that the human race, beginning in its perfection of
type as a species, but without any revelation of lan-

guage, or any instruction in natural theology, morals,

or science, would have remained always in the same

state in which it was created, without any intellectual

or moral progress. According to this view, the pre-

sent state of man on earth would have been a mere
state of existence, which could have no ulterior end,



236 Problems of the Age.

except the production of a species destined to begin

its higher life in a future state. The second hypothe-
sis is, that the human race, beginning from the same
point of departure, might have progressed slowly,

through very long periods of time, to a high limit of

civilization, knowledge, virtue, and natural religion.

The third is, that a kind of natural revelation, includ-
ing a positive system of religion, morals, and science,

would have been requisite
;

in a word, that hu-

man society must have been placed at first, by the 1

immediate intervention of the creator, in the state of

civilization, and conducted in its course by a continu-

ance of the same intervention. We have little room,
however, for anything beyond conjecture in this mat-

ter The only point we are anxious to establish is,
that the state in which we are now born is not one
intrinsically evil

;
that it is not one derogatory to hu-

man nature as such
;
that it is not one in which God

might not create man in consistency with his sanctity
and goodness.

This point is established on sound theological and

philosophical principles
;
and from these principles it

follows that all the phenomena of man which are
referable to his original fall are the natural conse-

quences of his human constitution, and not evidences

of a positive, innate depravity. He is a weak, frail,
inconstant creature, easily led away by the senses

and passions, liable to fall into many errors and sins,

but he is not an object of loathing and abhorrence to

his creator, or an outcast from his love. He has in
him all the primary elements of natural virtue, the



Problems of the Age. 237

germ from which a noble creature can be developed.

Nevertheless, although his natural condition is one

which is not derogatory to himself or his creator, it

seems to cry out for the supernatural. Its actual

weakness and imperfection, coupled with its latent

capacities for a high development, mark it as being,

what it is, the most fitting subject for the grace of

God
;
and indicate that it was created chiefly to exem-

plify in the most signal manner the gratuitous love

and bounty of the creator. It is only in the idea of

the supernatural order that we can find the adequate
explication and solution of all the problems relating

to the destiny of man. For that order he was cre-

ated by an absolute, not a conditional decree of God.

The fulfilment of that decree was not risked on the
issue of Adam’s probation. According to our view, the

creation of man was only the inchoation of the incarna-
tion of the Eternal Word in human nature

;
and the de-

cree of the incarnation being absolute, the elevation of

human nature was necessary and must be efficacious-
ly secured. The fall of man from original grace could
not therefore hinder it. After the sin of Adam, the
human race had still a supernatural destiny, and was
under the supernatural order of Providence. The
divine decree to confer grace on man was not abro-
gated, but only the form and mode under which the
grace was to be conferred were changed. Moreover,

by this change, the human race was, on the whole, a
gainer, and came into a better and more favorable
position for attaining its destiny. There was a rea-

son both for the original constitution of man in the



*38 Problems of the Age

.

grace of Adam, and also for the change of that con-
stitution which followed upon Adam’s sin. By the
original grant of grace, God showed to mankind his
magnificent liberality and good-will. He gave them
also an ideal which has remained imperishably in

their memory of the state of perfection, and left a
sweet odor of paradise to cheer them along their rug-

ged road of labor and trial. By the withdrawal of
that grace he brought them under a dispensation of

mercy, in which their condition is more humble and

painful, but safer and more advantageous for gaining

the highest merit.

St. Francis de Sales says : “ L’etat de la redemp-

tion vaut cent fois plus que letat de la justice origi-

nelle

“

The state of redemption is a hundred times
preferable to the state of original justice.”* The
church herself, in her sublime hymn Exultet

,
breaks

out into the exclamation : “O certe necessarium Adae
peccatum

;
O felix culpa

!
quae tantum et talem ha-

bere meruit Redemptorem !” “ O certainly necessary
sin of Adam

;
O happy fault ! which merited to know

such and so great a Redeemer !” We have no reason
to lament oi r lost paradise, or to mourn over the fall

of our first parents. Our new birth in Christ is far

better than that ancient inheritance forfeited in Eden.

To the foregoing exposition of the doctrine of origi-
nal sin we have thought it proper to add some brief

statements of the theology of the question, in order

* This thought has been beautifully developed by Mr. Simpson in

some Essays on Original Sin, published in The Rambler.



Problems of the Age. 239

to elucidate and corroborate more fully the view we
have advanced. We have not presented it as being
throughout of a dogmatic character, or as in all re-

spects the only theory either tenable or actually

defended by orthodox writers. It is our aim through-

out this treatise to propose a theory or philosophy

which includes and justifies every Catholic dogma,

rather than to define precisely the limits separating

dogma from opinion, or to advocate the particular
tenets of any school purely in a controversial spirit.

The Augustinians and some others hold that man is
not only despoiled of supernatural gifts through the

fall, but also injured in his natural powers. We do
not question the orthodoxy of those who follow either
theory, or desire to stretch the censures of the Holy

See against the Baian or Jansenistic propositions be-

yond the sense in which they are understood by a

common consent of all respectable theologians. The
doctrinal exposition we have given is presented as
orthodox, but not as orthodox to the exclusion of

every other
;
and as, in our opinion, both more mani-

festly consonant to the mind of the church and the

spirit of her latest decisions, and also more rational

and intelligible. As to the last points, we leave every
one to form his opinion, with a perfect willingness

that he should differ from ours if he sees cause to do

so. The first point we think is unquestionable, and
has been made sufficiently manifest already

;
but we

will, nevertheless, endeavor to cite some proofs which
may make it still more evident.

Archbishop Kenrick defines the limits of the dog-



240 Problems of the Age.

matic and theoretical portions of the doctrine in

these words : “ De theoria enim statuenda haud agi-
tur, sed de re ipsa : utrum scilicet, peccante Adamo,

universi homines constituti sint peccatores, et idcirco

morti obnoxii : non adhuc quaeritur quomodo id con-
tigerit, qua ratione reatus ille transfundatur, quave in

re peccati hujus natura sit posita. Has quaestiones
ad theorias relegari patimur libenter

;
sed dogma,

rem, factum
,
negat, qui dicit homines Adae posteros

tunc primum peccatores constitui quando suis actibus '

deliquerunt
;

apostolus quippe docet omnes Adae

peccato peccatores constitutos.
,, <( We are not at

present concerned with establishing a theory, but with

the thing itself
;
to wit, whether, Adam sinning, all

men are constituted sinners, and therefore obnoxious
to death : it is not the question how that occurred, in
what manner that guilt is transmitted, or in what the

nature of this sin is constituted. These questions we
freely permit to be classed as theories ; but the dogma,

the reality, the fact
,
is denied by one who says that

men descended from Adam are then first constituted
sinners when they have offended by their own acts

;

since the apostle teaches that all are constituted

sinners by the-sin of Adam.”*

Cardinal Bellarmine states the common doctrine
of the ancient and modern schools respecting the

change or privation which human nature underwent
through the fall, in these words :

“Non magis differt status hominis post lapsum

* TheoL Dogrn. Ed. Mechl. De Pecc. Orig. § 98.



Problems of the Age. 241

Adae a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differt

spoliatus a nudo
;
neque deterior est humana natura,

si culpam naturalem detrahas, neque magis ignoran-

tia et infirmitate laborat, quam esset atque laboraret
in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio na-

turae non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex

alicuj is malae qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni

supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit.

Quae sententia communis est doctorum scholastico-

rum veterum et recentiorum
”

“ The state of man after the fall of Adam does not
differ any more from the state of the same in a purely

natural condition, than one who has been stripped
differs from one who is naked

;
nor is human nature

worse, if you subtract the natural fault, nor does it

any more labor under ignorance and infirmity, than

would have been the case if it had been created in a

state of pure nature. Wherefore, the corruption

flowed not from the want of any natural gift, nor from

the accession of any evil quality, but from the sole

loss of a supernatural gift on account of the sin of

Adam, which is the common opinion of the ancient
and modern scholastic doctors.”*

It is, therefore, a certain and Catholic doctrine, as

we have above most conclusively proved, that the
original sanctity and justice, with the other gifts

flowing from them for the perfecting of nature, in

which Adam was constituted, were supernatural, and
were forfeited by the whole human race when Adam
sinned. St. Thomas, with the whole Thqmist school,

* De Grat. Prim. Horn. c. v. Contrav. t. iv.



242 Problems of the Age.

both ancient and modern, and the majority of theo

logians, maintain further, that the state of pure nature

is possible, and that in that state man might have
been destined to attain his final end without being

elevated to the supernatural order. In the essay on

St. Augustine’s doctrine, we have shown that this
idea is contained in the writings of this great doctor

himself. In the sense of strict possibility, all Catholic

theologians are obliged to admit this as a part of Cath-

olic doctrine, a small number only denying that such

a state could have been established in congruity with

that perfection which is demanded in the works of

God by his infinite wisdom. The distinction between
the state of pure nature and of elevated nature being

thus established, and the common scholastic doctrine
shown to be that the state of original sin is the state

of nature denuded or despoiled of gratuitous grace, it

remains to inquire what is the ratio peccati
,
or sin,

distinguishing fallen nature from the same nature

unelevated. Archbishop Kenrick says upon this

point : “ De ejus natura variae sunt theol^gorum sen-
tentiae, inter quas ea nobis arriclet, quae peccatum illud

in privatione justitiae originalis constituit
;
haec enim

quum sit animae vita, ejus privatio mors est.” “ Con-
cerning its nature, there are various opinions of theo-

logians, among which we prefer the one which con-

stitutes it in the privation of original justice; for as

that is the life of the soul, the privation of it is

death.”* Ferrone says : “ Homo laesus est in natu-

* Ubi mprd
, § IOO.



Problems of the Age. 243

rabhus, id est gratuitis et respective ad statum na-

turae integrae, concede ; in essentialibus et naturae hu-

manae propriis, nego. Neque alia est mens Conrilii

Tridentini. Magna tamen inter theologos contentio
viget, num deterior nunc homo sit, quam foret in puris
naturalibus

;
hue quidam, quidam alio in diversas

sententias distrahuntur. S. Thomas, Bellarminus,

Suarez, et communis scholasticorum sententia ne-

gant.”* “I concede that man was injured in his
natural gifts, that is, in those which were gratuitous,

and relatively to the state of integral nature
;

I deny

it in regard to things essential and proper to human
nature. Nor is the judgment of the Council of Trent

otherwise. There exists, however, a great contention

among theologians whether man is now worse than
he would have been in the state of pure nature

;
and

they are divided among various opinions. St. Thomas,
Bellarmine, Suarez, and the common sentiment of the
scholastics are on the side of the negative.”

It being, then, an orthodox and common opinion
that the state of man as he is now born is no worse
than the state in which God might have originally
created him, it remains to be seen why this is called
a state of sin. Archbishop Kenrick says : “ Peccatum

originis, quod Adae posteris commune est, longe dif-
ferre a peccato actuali, quod scilicet quisque patra-

verit, in confesso est.” “ It is an admitted fact that

the sin of origin, which is common to the posterity
of Adam, differs widely from actual sin, to wit, that

* PrcelecU De Protopar. Gratia, 367.



244 Problems of the Age.
'

which any one has committed.” Once more : “Ob-
jicitur. Lex noquit obligare eos qui nondum exis-
tunt. Peccare nequit quis antequam nascatur. Re-

spondeo. Nemo certe vel lege ligari, vel peccare potest
antequam existat, directe scilicet, et suo actu. Sed

legis datae capiti humani generis sequelae possunt ad

omnes ejus posteros pertingere, ipsa vi sua et ordi-

natione divina. Peccare idcirco hi dicuntur in latiori

sensu
,
nec enim suo peccarunt actu et voluntate

;
sed

noxa communi, quam unus admisit, omnium pater,
tenentur.” “ It is objected that a law cannot bind

those who do not yet exist, that one cannot sin before
he is born. I answer, No one certainly can either be
bound by a law, or sin, before he exists, that is, di-

rectly and by his own act. But the consequences of
a law given to the head of the human race can ex-
tend to all his descendants, by its own inherent force
and the divine ordination. Therefore these are said

to sin in a wider sense
,
for they have not sinned by

their own act and will
;
but they are held by a com-

mon fault which one, the father of all, admitted.”*
What is this wider sense in which we are all consti-

tuted sinners by the sin of Adam ? This is explain-
j

ed by Perrone in these words : “ Quod si status ille,
qui in alia hypothesi fuisset conditio puree naturce

nunc habet rationem naturce peccatricis
,
lapsee et de-

pravatee
,
ideo est, quia a peccato personali Adae sen

* Ubi supra
, §§ ioo, 120, 121. St. Thomas affirms and proves that we

cannot have contrition for original sin, because it does not proceed

from our own will. (Supplem. qu. 2, art. 2.)



Problems of the Age. 2 45

primi parentis inductus est. Hinc in iis, qui nascun-

tur ex Adam, defectus gratiae habet, ut diximus, ra-
tionem privationis rei debits, seu peccati, defectus

vero integritatis habet rationem poenae, seu effectus

peccati. Quare in praesenti conditione, nomina peccati

et poenae sunt relativa ad statum elevationis et inte-

gritatis, et ideo sunt peccatum et poena non in se,

sed quia relationem habent ad peccatum Adami
;
con-

trarium autem damnatum fuit in proposition e 47 Bail,
quae ita se habet : ‘ Peccatum originis vere habet ra-

tionem peccati sine ulla ratione et respectu ad volun-

tatem, a qua originem habuit/
” “ If that state, which,

in another hypothesis, would have been the condition

ofpure nature, now has the character of a nature sin-

ful, fallen, and depraved, it is so for this reason, be-
cause it was brought in by the personal sin of Adam,

the first parent. Therefore, in those who are born
of Adam the defect of grace has, as we have said, the
character of a privation of something due, that is, of

sin
;
moreover, the defect of integrity has the charac-

ter of a punishment, that is, of an effect of sin. Where-

fore, in the present condition of things, the denomi-

nations of sin and punishment are relative to the

state of integrity and elevation, and are therefore sin

and punishment not in themselves, but because they

have relation to the sin of Adam
;
and the contrary

statement was condemned in the 47th proposition of

Baius, which is as follows : ‘ The sin of origin has
truly the character of sin, without any relation or re-

gard to the will from which it had its origin/
”*

* De Peccat. Orig. Propag . 467.



246 Problems of the Age.

In accordance with this idea, Kenrick, Perrone,

and a host of other standard authors answer the ob-

jection that it is unjust to condemn the whole human
race for the sin of one. Kenrick says : “ Rationi

autem certe non repugnat, ut Deus homini rebelli

dona gratis concessa subducat, ej usque posteros iis

carere velit, quae nullo suo jure possent sibi vindi-

care
;

. . . . nec enim illis denegabantur debita, sed

quae gratis concessa sunt ex summa donantis munifi-
centia.” “ It is certainly not repugnant to reason, that

God should withdraw from a rebellious man gifts gra-
tuitously granted, and should will that his descend-

ants should lack these gifts which they could not

claim for themselves by any right of their own
;

. . . . 1

for the things which were due to them were not denied

to them, but those which were gratuitously conceded

by the supreme munificence of the giver.”* The de-
finition of the sin of human nature as privation of a
habit due to it must, therefore, be understood as pre-

supposing that this habit is due to it only by the

grant made to Adam on condition of his obedience.
So, also, this privation is called a macula

,
stain, as de-

priving the soul of supernatural lustre, as Perrone

says : “ Privat ipsa prasterea hominem seu animam

candore et fulgore
;
unde macula est et labes ani-

j

mae.” “ It deprives, moreover, man or the soul of
lustre and splendor

;
whence it is a stain and defor-

mity of the soul.”f In the same merely privative

sense the expression, “ children of wrath,” is to be

* Ubi supra

,

§ 139. t Ubi supra, § 460, not. 3



Problems of the Age. 247

understood as denoting that we are born destitute of

the special gifts belonging to the state of children of

predilection
;
just as the phrase, “ Jacob have I loved,

Esau have I hated,” is interpreted to mean, “ I have

loved Jacob more and Esau less.”

Thus Kenrick explains it : “ Filii quidem irae nas-

cimur, iis donis spoliati, quae filiis dilectionis conces-

surum se decreverat Pater beneficus
;
sed non constat

ultionem aliquam eos manere qui decesserint solo pec-

cato originis maculati.” “ We are indeed born child-
ren of wrath, despoiled of those gifts which the be-

neficent Father had decreed to bestow upon the child-

ren of predilection
;
but it is not evident that any

vengeance awaits those who depart this life stained
with original sin alone.”* In the same sense, we are
said to be “enemies of God ;” that is, excluded from
that special friendship of God to which no creature
has a natural right. The culpa and reatus, fault and
guilt of original sin, are, as the sin itself, relative to

supernatural perfection and sanctity, denoting that

human nature denuded of grace is unworthy in the
divine judgment of celestial glory, and therefore

doomed to remain excluded from it until restored

through Christ. What Perrone says of the word sin
is equally applicable to all these cognate words and

phrases. “ Sedulo est animadvertendum, duplicem

subesse peccati nomini notionem seu acceptionem
;

altera est vulgaris, ut ita dicam
;
altera vero theologi-

ca.” “It must be carefully observed that a twofold

* § 139.



248 Problems of the Age.

notion or acceptation lies under the word sin
;
one is

what may be called popular ; the other, theological
The misapprehensions of the doctrine of original
sin, and the objections to it which are so common,

arise chiefly from the confusion of the popular and theo-

logical sense of terms, and the confusion of the Catho-

lic sense of terms with the Calvinistic sense, which

has become so closely associated with the same terms

in the minds of Protestants. Hence the necessity
of explaining fully and carefully the theological sense

of the term sin, and similar terms used in reference

to the lapsed state of the human race, when we are
writing in the vernacular on the subject, for the bene-

fit of the general reader. The penalty of neglecting
to do so. is, that we are inevitably misunderstood, and.
strengthen, instead of lessening, the prejudices of non-

Catholic readers as well as perplex the minds of some

Catholics.

If there are some who think that we have attempt-

ed to make this doctrine more intelligible than its
mysteriousness permits, and that it would be better

to acknowledge with St. Augustine that, while no

doctrine is more manifestly revealed, none is more

hidden from the intelligence, we reply : The doctrine
is indeed abstruse, and in the days of St. Augustine

had received no adequate explanation, as we have
proved in the essay on the doctrines of the saint. But

it is no wonder if, after the labors of the scholastics,

and the controversies with Calvinists and Jansenists

* § 460, not. 3.



Problems of the Age. 24

g

on one side, and rationalists on the other, the doctrine

should now be so fully developed that its conformity
with reason can be clearly shown. This is the judg-

ment of Perrone
;
who declares boldly that all the diffi-

culties which rationalists can bring against the doc-

trine of original sin,
“ ex data explicatione ita evanes-

cunt, ut nullum amplius locum habeant “ vanish and

disappear completely before the explication which has

been given.”*

* Ubi supra
, § 480.



CHAPTER XI.

THE MYSTERY OF REDEMPTION.

HE next article of the Creed, in order, is that
which expresses the Mystery of Redemption :

“ Crucifixus etiam pro nobis sub Pontio Pilato,

passus, et sepultus est.” “Who was also crucified
for us under Pontius Pilate, who suffered, and was
buried.” The redemption implies the incarnation,

and is based on it. The incarnation having been
already treated of, in immediate connection with

the trinity, we have only to proceed with the expo-

sition of the doctrine of satisfaction for sin and re-

storation to grace through the sufferings and death

of the Divine Redeemer.

It is no part of the Catholic doctrine that it was

necessary for the second person of the Trinity to

take upon himself human nature and suffer an infi-
nite penalty, in order that God might be able to par-
don sin without violating his justice. All Catholic

theologians, from St. Augustine down, teach that

God is free to show mercy and to pardon, according



Problems of the Age. 251

to his own good pleasure. The reason and end of
the incarnation has been shown already to be some-

thing far above this order of ideas. The incarnation
does not of itself, however, imply suffering or death.

We have to inquire, then, why it was that in point
of fact the Incarnate Word was manifested as a suf-
fering Redeemer

;
and why his death on the cross

was constituted the meritorious cause of the remis-

sion of sin and restoration of grace.

The church has never made any formal definition
of her doctrine on this point, and it is well known
how various have been the theories regarding it main-
tained at different times. We shall endeavor to pre-
sent a view which appears to us adequate and intelli-

gible
;
without, however, claiming for it any certainty

beyond that of the reasons on which it is based.

The original gift of grace not having been due to
Adam, or to any one of his ordinary descendants, in
justice, the restoration of that gift, when lost, was

not due. Aside from the incarnation, there was no

imperative reason why Adam and his race should
not have been left in the state to which they were

reduced by the original transgression. God, having

determined to accomplish the incarnation in the hu-

man race, owed it to himself to complete this deter-
mination, in spite of all the sins which he foresaw

would be committed by men. The foreseen merits
of Christ furnished an adequate mode for conferring
any degree of grace upon any or all men, he might

see to be fitting and necessary for the fulfilment of

his eternal purposes. It was not necessary, however,



252 Problems of the Age.

that the Son of God should suffer or die in order to
merit grace for mankind. By the divine decree, in-

deed, the shedding of his blood and his death was

made the special meritorious act in view of which

remission of sins and grace are conferred. But all

the acts of his life had the same intrinsic worth and

excellence,,which was simply infinite on account of

the divine principle of imputability to which they

must be referred. There must have been some rea-

sons, therefore, of fitness, on account of which it was

determined that Jesus Christ should suffer death for

the human race.
We may find one of these reasons in the law of

suffering and death which God has imposed, out of a
motive of pure love, on the whole human race. This
law was, indeed, promulgated under the form of a

penalty, but in its substance it was a real blessing.

The way to heaven through the path of penance and
by the gate of death is a surer and safer way than

the one in which Adam was first placed; it is one,
also, affording higher and more extensive scope for

virtue, heroism, and merit. It was, therefore, fitting

that the chief and prince of the human race should go
before his brethren in this way of sufferings. “ For
it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom
are all things, who brought many sons to glory, to
perfect, by suffering, the author of their salvation.”*

As a particular consequence of this general law,
heroes, patriots, reformers, prophets, and saints have

* Heb. ii. io.



Problems of the Age. 253

always been specially exposed to suffering and to

violent modes of death. They have been obliged to
sacrifice themselves to their own fidelity to con-

science and to the sacred cause to which they have

been devoted. And this sacrifice of life has conse-
crated their memories in the hearts of their fellow-

men more than any other acts of intellectual or moral
virtue, however brilliant. It was fitting, therefore,

that the Saint of saints, the Saviour of the world,

should not exempt himself from the peril of death, to

which the very character of his mission exposed him.

Another reason for the suffering of the Divine

Mediator is found in the manifestation thereby made
of the love of God in Christ to the human race.
There is no need of dwelling on this, or of noticing

other reasons of a similar kind which have been so

frequently and so fully developed by others.

We pass on, therefore, to the consideration of the
final and highest reason for the death of Jesus Christ,

the expiation of sin.

The true and only possible notion of expiation or
satisfaction is that which apprehends it as a compen-

sation for the failure to perform some obligatory act,
by performing another act of at least equal value in

the place of it. Every noble soul, when conscious of
having been delinquent, desires to repair the injury

which has been done, as well as to redeem its own
honor, by some act which shall, if possible, far exceed
the one which it failed to perform. The same prin-
ciple impels those who have a high sense of honor to
make reparation for the delinquencies of others with



254 Problems of the Age.

whom they are closely related in the same family, the
same society, or the same nation. Now, the human
race has been delinquent in making a proper return
to God for the infinite boon of grace. The fall of
man and the innumerable sins of the individuals of
the human race have deprived Almighty God of a
tribute of glory which was due to him, and have

brought ignominy upon mankind as a race. Al-
though, therefore, Almighty God might provide for
the glorification of the elect who are to share with
the Incarnate Word in his divine privileges, by an
act of pure mercy

;
it is far more glorious both to God

and man that a superabundant satisfaction should be
made for the injury which has been done to the

\

creator by the marring of his creation, and a super-

abundant expiation accomplished of the disgrace

which man has incurred. It was, therefore, an act of
divine wisdom and love in God to determine that this
satisfaction and expiation should be made by the se-

cond person of the Trinity in his human nature. The
Incarnate Word, being truly man, identified with the

human race, and its chief, necessarily made its honor
and its disgrace his own. Although he could redeem

his brethren without any cost to himself, his solici-

tude for their honor and glory would not permit him

to do it. He desired that they should enter heaven
on the most honorable terms, without any of the

humiliation of the delinquency of the race attaching

to them, but, on the contrary, with the exulting con-

sciousness that every stain of dishonor had been

effaced. Therefore, as their king and chief, he ful-



Problems of the Age. 255

filled the most sublime work of obedience to the

divine law which was possible
;
he made the most

perfect possible oblation to God, as an equivalent fof*

his boon of grace which had been abused by sin. In

lieu of that glory which God would have received
from the perfect obedience of Adam and all his pos-
terity, and that glory which would have been also

reflected upon the human race, he substituted the
infinitely greater glory of his own obedience unto
death, even the death of the cross. By this obedience

Jesus Christ merited for the human race the conces-
sion of a new grant of grace, more perfect than the
first, by virtue of which not only the original sin

which is common to all men was made remissible to
each individual, but all actual sins were made also
pardonable on certain conditions.

That this statement completely exhausts the true

idea of the satisfaction of Christ, we will not pretend
to affirm. It appears to us, however, sufficient to

give a clear and definite meaning to the language of

Scripture and the fathers, and to include all that

Catholic faith requires a Christian to believe.

Jesus Christ having merited by his death the right

of conferring grace without stint or limit upon man-
kind, and all the grace given after the fall and before

the redemption having been bestowed in the fore-

sight of his death, every spiritual blessing enjoyed by

men is referred to the death of Jesus Christ as its
cause and source. Strictly speaking, it is only the

meritorious cause. By giving himself up to die, he
merited the right to communicate the grace contained



*56 Problems of the Age.

in the incarnation to men, notwithstanding the failure

of the father and head of the race to fulfil the proba-

tion on which the transmission of the grace to his

descendants depended. He merited also the right to
renew this grace in those individuals who should lose
it after having once received it, as often as he pleased,

without regard to the number or grievousness of their
sins, or the frequency of their lapses. It is, however,

the Holy Spirit
;
dwelling in the Incarnate Word in

the plenitude of his being, and communicating to his

human nature the fulness of grace, not for itself alone,
but for all men

;
which is the ultimate and efficient

cause of all spiritual life. It is the grace of the Holy

Spirit which actually removes all guilt and stain of

sin from the soul, and constitutes it in the state of

justice and sanctity. The Holy Spirit is, therefore,

the efficient cause of justification. The formal cause
is the personal sanctity of each individual. That is,

this personal sanctity is that which makes each one

worthy of the complacency of God, of fellowship with

him, and of everlasting life. The work of the incar-

nation and redemption must, therefore, produce its

results and attain its consummation through the Holy

Spirit as the sanctifier of the human race. Conse-
quently, the Creed, after finishing its expression of the

Catholic faith so far as the person of Christ is con-

cerned, proceeds to enunciate it as regards the person

and operation of the Holy Spirit, who is sent by Christ

to complete his work. The articles containing this

enunciation complete the Creed, and bring man to his
final destination.



CHAPTER XII.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE
SANCTIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RACE.

HE next articles of the Creed are : “ Et in Spi-
ritum Sanctum, Dominum et Vivificantem, qui

ex Patre Filioque procedit, qui cum Patre et Filio
sirriul adoratur et conglorificatur, qui locutus est per

prophetas
;
et in unafh sanctam, catholicam, et apos-

tolicam ecclesiam
;
confiteor unum baptisma in remis-

sionem peccatorum.” “ And in the Holy Ghost, the
Lord and Lifegiver, who proceedeth from the Father
and the Son, who with the Father and the Son to-
gether is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the
prophets

;
and in one holy, catholic, and apostolic

church
;

I confess one baptism for the remission of

The relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and
the Son in the Trinity has been already considered.

The temporal mission of the Holy Spirit as the con-
summation of the divine work ad extra is exercised
through the Catholic Church

;
and, therefore, the ar-

sins.



258 Problems of the Age.

tide concerning the church follows immediately in

the Creed the one concerning the Holy Spirit.*

The organic unity of the Catholic Church follows
necessarily from the principles laid down in the fore-
going essays. It is an immediate consequence of the

unity of the race, and of the incarnation, which are

two distinct facts, but which have one principle. The
order of regeneration must follow the order of gene-

ration. Mankind exist essentially as a race
;
as a

race they received the original gift of supernatural

grace
;
as a race they lost it. All human life and

development is generic. The redemption of man-
kind must, therefore, reestablish the generic relations

which were disturbed by the fall. Jesus Christ, the

second Adam, must become the head of a redeemed
and regenerated race of men, organized in a superna-

tural society. Continuity and perpetuity of life are,

therefore, the essential notes of the divine society, or

human race regenerated, in which true spiritual life
is communicated to the individual. The sole posses-

sion of these notes demonstrates the divine authority

of the Catholic Church.f The continuity of life, em-
bracing, integrity of doctrine and law and the faculty

of conferring grace, descended from the patriarchal

church through the Jewish, with the increment added

by the immediate intervention of the divine Lord of

the world in person, to the Catholic Church.

* Vide Archbishop Manning’s Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost

t Vide Leo, Univ. Hist., vol. i., Lacordaire’s Conferences, and the

Works of Dr. Brownson, passim

.



Problems of the Age. 259

The Catholic Church is, therefore, the human race,

in the highest sense. In early times, one nation after

another broke away from the unity of the race, carry-

ing a fragment of the integral, ideal humanity with it.

Integrity, continuity, and perpetuity of life were,

therefore, rendered for them impossible. The same
phenomena are exhibited at the present time in all

nations and societies outside of the Catholic Church.

Partial and temporary developments only can be

made of that integral, universal, perpetual life, whose

seat is in the bosom of the church
;
and which is suffi-

cient to vivify the whole human race, if the impedi-
ments were removed. The proof a posteriori, or by
induction, of the Catholic Church, must be sought

for in those works which treat professedly of the sub-

ject. Our object is merely to show the conformity

of the idea of the Catholic Church with the idea of

reason, by deduction from primary, ontological princi-

ples. The attributes of the church follow so immedi
ately from its primary note, as the human race re-
stored to unity in the fellowship of God in Christ,
that they require no special elucidation

;
especially as

this particular branch of theology has been so repeat-

edly and so amply treated by authors.

In regard to special dogmas of the church, most,
of those which present any great difficulty to the

understanding have already been discussed in the

former part of this essay
;
and the remainder find

an easy explication from the same principles.
The doctrine of the sacraments is explicated from

the principle that the church is the instrument of



260 Problems of the Age.

sanctification. The sacraments are the particular
acts by which the church communicates the spiritual

vitality which resides in her to individuals. They
have an outward, sensible form, because the nature

of man is corporeal, and all human acts are composed
of a synthesis of the sensible and the spiritual.

They contain an inward, spiritual grace, because the
nature of man is spiritual, and receives life only from
a spiritual principle. The only one of the sacraments
which presents any special difficulty to the under-

standing is the holy eucharist
;
on account of the

mystery of transubstantiation which is included in

its essence. The ground of this difficulty, which lies
in crude, philosophical notions, and is, therefore,

purely a spectre of the imagination, has been already

removed by the doctrine we have laid down respect-

ing the nature of substance and the proper concep-

tion of space and extension. The senses transmit to
the soul nothing more than the impressions of the

phenomena, which the soul, by an intellectual judg-

ment, refers to a real, intelligible substance, or active

force, as their productive cause. The substance it-

self is not sensible, but intelligible
;

is not seen, as

an essence, by the eye, but concluded by a judgment

of the mind. By divine revelation it is disclosed to
us, that the substance of bread and wine in the eu-

charist is succeeded by the substance of the body and

blood of Jesus Christ ; the phenomena or sensible ef-

fects ofthe former substances till continuing to be pro-

duced in an extraordinary manner. There is a mys-

tery here, it is true
;
but it is only the mystery which



Problems of the Age. 261

belongs to the inscrutable nature of the essence of

matter as active force, and the mode in which this

active force produces various sensible phenomena.

The definitions of the church do not furnish a com-

plete explanation of the Catholic dogma, which is left

to theologians
;
and even theologians do not precisely

coincide in their conceptions or expressions. All we
can do then, after stating the Catholic dogma, is to

give the explanation which appears to be the most

probable, according to the judgment of the best au-

thors and the most weighty intrinsic reasons. This

is enough, however, for our purpose
;
for all that is

required is to furnish a conception which is, on the

one hand, theologically tenable, and, on the other,

rationally intelligible.

We may separate the synthetic judgment pro-
nounced by the church, in the definition of the dog-

ma, into four analytic judgments. First, the absence

of the substance of bread and wine after the conse-

cration. Second, the presence of the substance of

the body of Christ. Third, the absence of the natu-

ral phenomena of the body ^of Christ. Fourth, the

presence of the natural phenomena of bread and
wine. In order to reconstruct these elements of the

church’s dogmatic judgment into a more perfect syn-

thesis, it is necessary to analyze further these sepa-

rate propositions. There are three principal, distinct

conceptions contained in them : the conception of

substance
;
the conception of presence, or relation in

space
;
and the conception of phenomena, or, to use

the precise term employed by the schoolmen, of acci*



1 62 Problems of the Age.

dents. There is, also, the conception of the mode in
which the phenomena of bread and wine subsist out

of relation to their proper productive substances, or,

the conception of the immediate, efficient cause to

which they must be referred. These first three con-

ceptions have been sufficiently analyzed in a former

part of this treatise. The absence of the substance
of bread and wine after consecration may be explain-
ed, in accordance with the conception of substance,

by annihilation, removal, or identification with the

substance of the body of Christ. The senses can-
not take cognizance of its presence before consecra-

tion, it being their office merely to report phenome-

na
;
they cannot, consequently, take cognizance of

its absence. They are not, therefore, deceived in

reporting the phenomena as unchanged after the

consecration, since they really remain unchanged
;

nor is the mind qualified to pronounce, on the report

of the senses, that the substance is unchanged, by

an intellectual judgment
;
since the judgment which

would otherwise be validly made is superseded by a
divine judgment, made known through revelation,
that in this instance the substance has been changed

for another by the creative power of God. The sim-
plest mode of conceiving the effect of consecration
on the substances of the bread and wine is to sup-

pose their annihilation. St. Thomas, however, denies

that they are annihilated, because the terminus of

annihilation is nothing, whereas the terminus of the

act of transubstantiation is the body of Christ. In

p'ain words, the argument is : if the substances were



Problems of the Age. 263

annihilated, the effect of consecration would be pro*

perly expressed by saying that they are reduced to

nothing, whereas the language of the church is, that

they are converted into the body and blood of Christ.

The same argument applies to the notion of their

removal elsewhere. Nevertheless, since they are not

supposed to be annihilated or removed simply for the

sake of getting rid of them, and their destruction or

removal is not the end or final term of the act of di-

vine power, but only its proximate term, in order to

the substitution of the body of Christ, this argument

is not decisive. It is proper to say that the sub*

stance of bread is changed into the body of Christ,

if the body of Christ is substituted for it
;
the natu-

ral phenomena which formerly indicated the pre-

sence of the one substance remaining the same, and

Indicating the presence of the other substance in-

stead of that of the former substance.

Another explanation is based on the notion of one

generic substance individualized in all distinct, ma-

terial existences. According to this explanation, the

bread and wine, being deprived of their individual

existence, are not thereby destroyed
;
but, as it were,

withdrawn into the generic substance, which is iden-

tical with the substance individualized in the body of

Christ
;
and therefore properly said to be converted

into the substance of his body. We are unable to
understand how the notion on which this explanation
is based, which appears to require us to accept the

realism of William de Champeaux and the school-
men, can be made intelligible

;
and, therefore, prefer



2 64 Problems of the Age.

the former, which, we believe, is the one more com-
monly adopted.

The presence ot the body ot Christ, without its
natural phenomena, and under the phenomena of

bread and wine
;
which presents usually much the

greatest difficulty to the understanding
;

is really

capable of a much more easy and certain explana-
tion. It is present not by its extension, but by its

pure substance, .or vis activa
y
that is, as Perrone says,

“per modum spiriths” “ after the manner of spirit.”
Spirit, as all Catholic philosophers teach, is related

to objects in space, by the application of its intrinsic

force to them. The presence of the body of Christ
in the eucharist is, therefore, the application of its vis

activa ; which is, indeed, finite, but, by virtue of its

supreme excellence in the created order, through the

hypostatic union, commensurate with the whole cre-

ated universe and all its particular parts. The body
of Christ, therefore, while it is circumscribed as to its

extension
;
and, according to the ordinary sense of

the word, is present only in one place
;

is, in a differ-

ent but real sense, present everywhere where the

species of the eucharist are present. These species

or phenomena of bread and wine in the eucharist are
the signs indicating its presence by its substantial

force, or vis activa. They may be produced, as every
one will admit they can be, by the immediate act of

God
;
or by the vis activa of the body of Christ

;

which, as a perfect body containing eminently all the

perfection of inferior material substances, can produce

their proper effects. The body and blood‘of Christ



Problems of the Age. 265

contain substantially and essentially the virtue of

bread and wine, and, being in hypostatic union with

the divine nature, may be capable of producing the
phenomena and effects proceeding naturally from

this virtue in many places at once. It appears to us
more in accordance with the language of Scripture and

the church to make this latter supposition. We sum
up, therefore, the explanation of the mystery which

appears to us the most probable and rational, in this

short formula. By the effect of the divine power, ex-
ercised through the act of consecrating the eucharist

;

the sensible phenomena, indicating before the act the

presence of the vis activa of bread and wine, cease to

indicate it
;
?nd indicate, instead of it, the presence

of the vis activa of the body and blood of Christ.

The language of the definition pronounced by the
church is thus exactly verified. There is a change of

substance, without any change of phenomena. There

is a transition of the substance of the bread and

wine
;
which ceases either altogether as a distinct

existence, or, at least, as the cause of the phenomena
;

in order to give way to the substance of the body of
Christ

;
which is properly called a transubstantiation.

The mystery still remains, and must remain, incom-
prehensible by the human understanding, however
clear the explanation of the difficulties which beset

it may be made. Neither the senses nor the intellect
can perceive the presence of Jesus Christ in the eu-

charist. It is believed by an act of faith in the word

of Jesus Christ. The mode of this substantial pre-
sence and of its action on the soul is, moreover, but



2 bb Problems of the Age.

dimly apprehended
;
because substance itself, as a

vis activa
,
and the mode of its activity, are impene-

trable to reason. The rational argument respecting
the dogma of faith, therefore, merely proves that it is
not contrary to reason

;
and that it is partially intel-

ligible by analogy with other known truths and facts.
We thus understand that the presence of Jesus Christ
in the species of the eucharist is possible. And, the

revelation of its reality once made, we see also its fit-
ness. It is most fitting and congruous that Jesus

Christ should unite himself in the most perfect man-

ner which is consistent with the condition of man in
this life, with his human brethren

;
and that this

union should be manifested to the senses. This is

accomplished in the eucharist in such a way that the
intellect, the imagination, or the heart of man cannot
conceive or desire anything more perfect and admir-

able.*

We shall simply note with the greatest brevity the
remaining doctrines whose consideration falls undei

the present head.

The absolute necessity of grace for works worthy

of eternal life, and the inability of man to perform
them by his natural strength, is explained by the

supernatural principle of which we have already given

the exposition.

The merit of good works is explained by the doc-

trine of probation
;
and the distinction between this

* Vide F. Dalgairns’s work on the Holy Communion for a more

complete elucidation of the philosophy of substance and accidents



Problems of the Age. 267

kind of merit and the merits of Christ, as well as their

mutua'j relation and harmony, is obvious from the

exposition which has been made of the latter.

The Catholic doctrine respecting the Blessed Vir-
gin and the saints is explained by the doctrine already

laid down of the glorification and deification of human
nature through the incarnation.

The whole exterior and visible cultus of Catholic
worship is explained by the doctrine, of sensible

things as signs and representations of the invisible,

and of the essentially corporeal constitution of man.

These, and all other particulars of Catholic doctrine,

are contained in the universal or Catholic idea, which

shines by its own light, and proves itself by its sub-
limity, integrity, symmetry, and correspondence with

all the analogies of the natural world.



CHAPTER XIII.

THE FINAL DESTINATION OF ANGELS AND MEN—CON-
DITION OF THE UNREGENERATE IN THE FUTURE
LIFE—ETERNITY OF THE PENALTY OF SIN THE
STATE OF FINAL BEATITUDE.

THE closing articles of the Creed are : “ Expectoresurrectionem mortuorum, et vitam venturi sae-
culi, Amen.” “ I look for the resurrection of the

dead, and the life of the world to come, Amen.”

Thus, the creation, which proceeds from God as
first cause, is shown to have returned to him as final

cause. This is especially accomplished in the beati-

fication of the elect
;
and consequently it is the glory

and blessedness of heaven which is immediately and

explicitly affirmed in the Creed. The entire Creed,
however, implies, what the Catholic Church in her

exposition of the Creed teaches dogmatically, that

only a portion of the angelic hierarchy and the human
race attain heaven. The doctrine of hell, or the place



Problems of the Age. 269

and state of those who are excluded from heaven, is,

therefore, the necessary correlate of the doctrine of

heaven. So far as the human race is concerned, we

have to consider, first, what is the condition in eter-

nity of those who are subject to the consequences of

original sin only.

It follows from the doctrine already laid down,

namely, that the state to which man is reduced by
original sin is entitively the same with that in which

consists the state of pure nature, that the condition

of this class of human beings in eternity is the same
that it would be if they had never been constituted

in the order of the supernatural. They are destitute
of supernatural beatitude, but attain to all the felicity

of which they are capable in the natural order. They
are elevated in the due course of nature to that inte-

grity and perfection of soul and body which, in the

case of Adam, was anticipated by a gratuitous gift.
Their felicity consists in a perfect exemption from all

liability to sin, in the complete evolution of their na-

tural capacities, and in the possession of the proper

object of their intelligence and will, that is, in the

knowledge and fruition of the works of God, and of

God himself by abstractive contemplation. This
last expression needs some explanation in order
to show its conformity with the doctrine that the

original intuition of reason is the intuition of that

idea which is afterward demonstrated by reflection to

be identical with the being of God. Some, rejecting

this doctrine of the idea, object to it that it leads to

a confusion of the act of intelligence constitutive of



270 Problems of the Age.

rational nature with the act proper only to beatified

nature, that is, the intuitive vision of God. Others,

who accept it, endeavor to rebut this objection, and
to show the distinction between the knowledge of

God derived from rational intuition and that which is
communicated by the light of glory. But in doing

this they make the first to be only the inchoation of

the second, and the second the completion or full

evolution of the first. It would follow, then, that a

rational creature cannot attain to the proper object

of his intelligence and will, consequently cannot attain

perfect felicity, without the beatific vision. We can-
not admit either that the objection is a valid one or

that the explanation which is made in order to do

away with it is sufficient. We venture, therefore, to
suggest another.

It is real and concrete being, not possible and ab-

stract being, which is the intelligible object of reason.

Reason, however, does not, by an intrinsic perceptive

power, actively elicit the intuition of its intelligible

object. In other words, it is not by its virtue as in-

telligence that real being, or the intelligible, becomes

intelligible to it. The intelligible has the precedence
and the superiority in the act of intelligence. The
presence of the object makes the subject intelligent

in the first act, and this first act is one in which the

creative spirit is the agent and the created spirit the

terminus of the act. The original, immediate contact
of the intellect with real, concrete being, that is, with

God, is, therefore, a contact in which the soul is pas-

sive, because this contact precedes and is the cause



271Problems of the Age.

of its activity. It is only by reflection, or bending

backward upon itself, that the intellect can have dis-

tinct self-consciousness and elicit thought. When it
does so, it takes always the affirmation of real, neces-

sary being, by which God created it rational, as the
first and absolute element of its thoughts. But this

affirmation, as soon as it enters into reflection, and

becomes an element of the spontaneous activity of

the soul, becomes abstract. It is not a pure abstrae

tion, or an act which terminates on the abstract or

possible as its ultimate object, but an abstraction

formed from the concrete object as apprehended by

the passive intelligence, or an abstract conception of

the concrete idea. It would require too much time
to develop this statement fully. But it is plain at a

single glance that it is justified by the facts of con-

sciousness. All our judgments respecting necessary

and universal truth are abstract. The judgment re-
specting necessary cause, that respecting the infinite

and the eternal, that respecting ideal space and time,

those which respect mathematical relations, and those

which form the data of logic, are all of this kind.

There is no direct, immediate intuition of God to be
found in our consciousness

;
as we have previously

proved in our demonstration of the being of God.

The necessity of using the term intuition in reference
to our apprehension of the idea is, therefore, an un-

fortunate one, and gives rise to a confusion of the act

in which we conclude the existence and attributes of
God by a rational, deductive judgment, with the act
in which the soul immediately beholds him by an



2J2 Problems of the Age.

intellectual vision. Intuition and vision are, strictly

speaking, identical. Experience teaches us that our

first distinct vision is the vision of sensible objects,

and that we refer constantly to this as the standard
of clear vision, since there is nothing which appears to

us equally clear and distinct. By the aid of our per-
ception of the sensible, we attain to the perception
of ourselves as existing, thinking spirit, and of other

spirits like our own. But we never attain a similar
intuition of God by the mere, exercise of our intellec-

tual activity. It is of the essence of a created spirit

that its active intuition or intellective vision is limit-

ed to finite objects as its immediate terminus, com- :

mensurate to its finite visual power. It sees God only
mediately, as his being and attributes are reflected

and imaged in finite things, and therefore its highest

contemplation of God is merely abstractive. The
natural felicity of created spirits is, therefore, at its

maximum, when they attain the most perfect exercise
of their faculties in this mode of action which is con-
natural to them. It is the fruition of God mediately
through his creation.

We now proceed to show that the Catholic doctrine
permits us to believe that this perfect felicity, which

is possible without supernatural grace, is actually

conceded to those who die in original sin only. It is
reasonable to believe that any felicity which these

souls can attain, consistently with their position as

liable to the eternal consequences of original sin, will

be actually attained by them. For God has created
them for good : and to what end has he made them



Problems of the Age. 273

capable of this felicity, unless it be that they may
possess and enjoy it ? We shall quote from a treatise
written in the seventeenth century by F. Maria Ga-

brielli, in defence of the doctrine of Cardinal Sfon-

drati, a very thorougdi summary of the opinions of

theologians on this point :*

“ Joseph Maria de Requesensf enumerates in his

little book on the state of infants many theologians
of great name who concede to these infants a cer-
tain kind of imperfect natural beatitude. He says
that Richard (of St. Victor) teaches that these chil-

dren will have more goods and greater joy in their

possession than sinners have who possess created
goods in this life. Lyra says, that according to the

opinion of all doctors they will enjoy a happier life

than would be naturally possible in this present

world. Almost in the same way speak Origen,
Marsilius, St. Buonaventure, Cajetan, and others

cited by Cornelius a Lapide, who all teach that chil-
dren dying without baptism lead a happier life than

those who are living on the earth. Lessius writes,
that although they may be said to be damned because
eternally deprived of the celestial glory for which

they were created, it is nevertheless credible that

their state is far happier and more joyful than that
of any mortal man in this life. Salmeron says, these
children will rise again through Christ and above this

natural order, where they will daily advance in the

* Dispunctio Notarum, 40, etc. Colon. 1699.
t De Statu Parvul. Rom. 1684.



274 Problems of the Age.

knowledge of the works of God and of separate sub-
stances, will have angelic visits

,
and will be like our

rustics living in the country, so that, as they are in a

medium between glory and punishment, they will also
occupy an intermediate place. Suarez says, that

children will remain in their natural good and will be

content with their lot
;
and, together with Marsilius

as quoted by Azor, he ascribes to them a knowledge

and love of God above all things, and the other natu-
ral virtues. Didacus Ruiz, a theologian of extensive

reading, lays down this conclusion : Great mercy will

be mingled with the punishment of infants dying in

original sin, although not in diminution of the punish-

ment of loss, since that is incapable of diminution
;

yet in the remission of death which was the punish-

ment directly due to original sin, and would naturally

have endured to eternity, so that in spite of this

infants will be resuscitated at the day of judgment

nevermore to die, endowed with supernatural incor-

ruptibility and impassibility, and they will also super-

naturally receive accidental, infused sciences, and

will be liberated from all pain, sadness, sickness,

temptations, and personal sins, which are naturally

wont to arise from original sin. Consequently, they

are liberated from the punishment of hell which they

might have incurred. Albert, (the Great,) Alexander,

(de Hales,) and St. Thomas agree with this doctrine.
Suarez shows that these children obtain some benefit,

in a certain way, from the merits of Christ
;
and says

that it pertains to the glory of Christ that he should

be adored and acknowledged as prince and supreme



Problems of the Age. 2 75

judge on the day of universal judgment even by in-

fants who died without grace. He also considers it
more probable that they will understand that they

have done neither good nor evil, and therefore receive

neither glory nor pain of sense, and also that they are

deprived of glory on account of sin, (that is, original.)

He adds the reason of this, to wit, that they may
understand the benefit which they received, first in

Adam and afterward in Christ, and on this account
may worship and adore him. Martinonus adds : When
even the demons love God in a certain way even
more than themselves as the common good of all, ac-
cording to St. Thomas, why shall not these children
love Christ as their benefactor and the author of their

resurrection, and of the benefits which they receive

with it through Christ, who is the destroyer of corpo-

real as well as spiritual death ? He cites also what
Suarez says, that although one who should speak of

the bodies of infants in the same way as of the other

damned would say nothing improbable, since St.

Thomas speaks of all indifferently, nevertheless since
those bodies will have a greater perfection and some

gifts or benefits which are not at all due to nature,

therefore, in regard to these gifts, Christ may be said
to be their model. The same Martinonus subjoins:
Although those words of the apostle, ‘ In Christ all

shall be made alive,’ Suarez affirms, must be properly
and principally understood of the predestined, never-

theless they can probably be applied to a certain ex-

tent to these children, inasmuch as they will have in

their risen bodies a certain special conformity and



276 Problems of the Age.

relation to Chifist, which will be much less and more
imperfect in the damned than in the predestined.
Nicholas de Lyra affirms that ‘ infants dying with-

out baptism do not endure any sensible punishment,

but have a more delightful life than can be had in

this present life, according to all the doctors* who
speak concerning those who die in original sin
alone.’

”

Those who die in actual sin, and the fallen angels,
although in the same state of existence with those

who die in original sin only, that is, in the Infernum,
or sphere below the supernatural sphere of the elect

angels and men, have to undergo a punishment cor-

responding to their individual demerits. This truth,

which is clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures and

defined by the church, is confirmed by the analogies

of this present life. The transgression of law is
punished in this world in accordance with the sense

of justice which is universal among men. There is
no reason, therefore, for supposing that the same

principle of retribution is not continued in the future

life. Moreover, there is positive proof from reason

that it must continue. There has never been a more

absurd doctrine broached than that of the Univer-

salists. To suppose that all men are saved on ac-
count of the merits of Christ, without regard to their

moral state or personal merits, is most unreasonable ;
and subversive of the moral order as well as destruc-

tive of the idea of a state of probation. It is equally

%
* This is true of the great majority, but not of all.



Problems of the Age. 277

absurd to imagine that the mere fact of death can

make any change in the state of the soul, or that

separation from the body causes the soul to make a
mechanical rebound from a state of sin to a state of

holiness. The soul can be made happy only from
its own intrinsic principles, and not by a mere arbi-
trary appointment of God, or a bestowal of extrinsic

means ofenjoyment. Sin brings its own punishment,
and the state of sin is in itself a state of misery.

Plato and other heathen sages taught the doctrine

of future punishment. Mr. Alger, who has written
the most elaborate work on the subject of the history

of the doctrine of a future life which has appeared in

recent times, has fully proved the universality of the

doctrine of future punishment. Other rationalistic

writers of ability, have also of late years seen the im-

possibility of removing this doctrine from the teach-

ing of Christianity and from universal tradition. We
have already fully proved, that God does not deprive
any of his rational creatures of the felicity which is

proper to their nature by his own act. It follows
from this that it is the creature himself who is the
author of his own misery. Existence is in itself a
good, a boon conceded from love by the creator. So

far as this good is turned into an evil, it is by a

voluntary perversion of the gift of a benevolent sov-

ereign by the subject himself. The punishment
which he must undergo in eternity is, therefore, the

necessary consequence of his own acts, together with
such positive penalties as are required by the ends

of justice and the universal good. This doctrine,



278 Problems of the Age.

which is the doctrine of the Catholic Church, based

on the clear evidence of Scripture and ecclesiastical

tradition,* is also the doctrine of cairn, unbiassed rea-

son, and of the common sense of mankind. The
probation of the angels having been finished with

their first trial, and the probation of men ending for
individuals at death, and for mankind generically at

the day of judgment, the epoch of grace is closed for

ever with the completion of this present cycle of pro-

vidence
;
and consequently the state of all angels and

men is fixed for eternity. Hell is, therefore, an eter-
nal state out of which there is no possibility of tran-

sition into heaven.

Heaven, or life everlasting, is the eternal state of

supreme, supernatural beatitude, to which the elect

angels and men are elevated by the grace of God,
and in which they participate in the glorified and

deific state of the Incarnate Word, through an ineffa- .

ble fellowship with the three persons of the Blessed

Trinity.

Man being integrally composed by the union of
soul and body, and his corporeal nature being hypo-

statically united with the divine nature in the person

of the Word, the resurrection of the body must ne-

cessarily precede his complete glorification. The only

difficulty which the doctrine of the resurrection of the

* It is now considered by the best authorities as fully proved that

Grigen and St. Gregory Nyssen, who have been so often cited by the

advocates of the doctrine of universal salvation, did not teach any-

thing contrary to the Catholic doctrine of eternal punishment.



Problems of the Age. 279

body presents to the understanding relates to the prin-

ciple of identity between the earthly and the celestial

body. This principle of identity, or unity and continu-

ity of life, must be the same with that which constitutes

the unity of the body in all the stages of its natural

growth
;
and through all the changes of its material

particles, from the instant of its conception to its dis-

integration by dearh. It is the soul which is the

form of the body, its vivifying principle. The soul
and body have an innate correspondence with each

other, not only in the generic sense, but in the sense

of an individual aptitude of each separate soul for its

own body, and each separate body for its own soul.
The soul and body act and react upon each other
perpetually while the development of both is going

on, producing a specific type in each individual which

is a modification of the generic type of manhood.

The determination of the active force of the soul to
the production of this type remains with it after the

separation from the body. At the resurrection, it
forms anew its own proper body in accordance with
this type which is the product of the conjoint action

of the soul and body during the earthly life. There

is, therefore, the same continuity and identity be-

tween the earthly body and the celestial body that

there is between the body of the embryo and that of

the full-grown man. The celestial body is the same
that it would have been if there had been no death

intervening between the two corporeal states, but a

transformation of the earthly body into the celestial

perfection and glorification of its proper type. If this



2 So Problems of the Age.

is not all which is included in the definition of the

church respecting the identity of the body into the

two states, we may suppose, in addition to what has
been stated already, that there is a material monad
which forms the nucleus of the corporeal organiza-

tion and is a physical principle of identity. This

physical principle must contain virtually the whole

body, as the germ does the plant
;

it must be pre-

served when the body is disintegrated
;
and reunited

to the soul at the resurrection, in order to become

the physical germ from which the celestial body is

developed.

The natural beatitude of the glorified angels and
saints, which is only a more exalted grade of that fe-

licity which is accorded to the inferior intelligent

creation, need not be specially noticed. It is the

essential and supreme beatitude consisting in the

clear, intuitive vision of God, which is the principal

subject of the divine revelation proposed by the Creed

as the object of faith.

The possibility of this divine vision will not be
called in question by any who are properly speaking
theists and rationalists, and with others we have no-
thing to do at present. Much less will it be ques-
tioned by any class of believers in the divine inspira-

tion of the Scriptures. We have not, then, the task
of laboring to show the intrinsic reasonableness and

credibility of the doctrine, but merely of setting forth

that which can be made intelligible respecting the
relation between ourpresent state in which we are un-
able to see God

,
and thefuture state in which we may



Problems of the Age. 281

be enabled to see hint. The examination of this rela-

tion includes that of fhe means and method by which

the soul is elevated to an immediate intuition of that

which constitutes the divine essence and personality.

It requires a statement which shall show what is the

nexus between the act which constitutes the soul in

the power to exercise intelligence, and that which

constitutes it in the power to behold God immediate-
ly. It may be said, that the essence of the soul is
transformed or enlarged in such a way that it becomes

able, per se, to see God as it now perceives the crea-
tion. But this would be equivalent to the creation

of a new essence with a new personality
;
which

would destroy the identity of the subject who is sup-
posed to be elevated to this new grade of existence.
Moreover, according to the doctrine we have laid
down, that supernatural grace elevates the soul super

omnem naturam creatam atque creabilem, the supposi-
tion is impossible. We cannot go over again the
principles already discussed, but merely endeavor to

state such a theory of the mode of the beatific vision
as shall be in harmony with these principles. We
therefore dismiss this first supposition without fur-

ther discussion. Another supposition may be made,
that the complete evolution of the idea of God which
the soul possesses in the present state in an obvolute

manner would bring it to that relation vis-a-vis to God
as its intelligible object, which corresponds to the rela-

tion of the visual faculty to the visible, material object.

We cannot accept this supposition any more than
the other. It contradicts the principles we have pre-



2 82 Problems of the Age.

viously laid down, and the generally accepted maxims
of Catholic theology respecting the supernatural qua-

lity of the power conceded by God to the creature
of beholding his intimate essence, just as palpably as

the first one. We do not deny that the reason of
man is to a great degree in an obvolute condition
in this life, and that it is capable of evolution in

another and higher life. In this higher life the

soul may be capable of perceiving immediately the
essence of things, and spiritual substances, after

the mode of intelligence which is proper to the
angels. But the angels themselves, according to Ca-

tholic theology, though created at the summit of the

intelligent order, with the complete exercise of intel-

ligence in the highest possible grade, have no natu-

ral power to see God immediately
;
and their natural

knowledge of him, though very perfect, is merely ab-

stractive contemplation like that of men. The power
of seeing spiritual substances, and the perfect evolu-

tion of the idea of God in the soul, therefore, do not
give the intuition of the essence of God which con-
stitutes the beatific vision. The beatific vision is
supernatural, by means of an immediate light com-

municated by God to the intelligence, called by theo-

logians lumen glorice
,
the light of glory. By means

of this light the intelligence perceives God by an ac-
tive intuition, or a clear, distinct act of reflective con-

sciousness, as immediately present to it in the crea-

tive act, the cause of its existence, the source of its

active power, the light of its reason, in whom it lives
and moves and has its being. God presents himself



Problems of the Age. 283

to the intelligence immediately in his concrete being,

as the visible world is presented to the eye by the

light of the sun. This is not accomplished by the

creation of any new essential faculty in the soul or
the addition of anything to its substance. The very
same intelligent, thinking principle, or subject, which

in this present state of existence affirms to itself the

existence of God by an intellectual judgment, be-
holds him in the beatific state by an intuitive vision.

It must be, then, by a concurrence of God with the
same faculties of the mind by which we think and
reason and perceive, and are self-conscious, in our

natural mode of rational activity, that the intelligence
is raised to this higher power of supernatural intui-

tion. That act which constitutes it rational in the

natural order, must be the basis and substratum of

its supernatural intuition of the divine essence. It

has already been proved that a created spirit cannot

be constituted rational in the first instance by the

beatific vision of God
;
that is, cannot have an essence

whose intrinsic, necessary act is a clear intuition of

the divine essence, like that act in which God has the
eternal, necessary intelligence of himself. The cre-
ated spirit must first be constituted a rational, intel-

ligent subject, before it can be capable of a superna-

tural illumination. It must be extrinsicated fiom

God
;
made a distinct, thinking substance, and consti-

tuted in its own finite, rational activity
;
before there

can be any subject, or really existing active force,

with which God can concur, with which he can
unite himself, and to which he can communicate the



284 Problems of the Age.

power of looking back upon himself by a distinct in-

tuition. The created spirit must be, therefore, in a
certain sense, self-subsisting, or containing in itself

its own rational principle. It must have its own
separate self-consciousness as a thinking substance,

containing within itself all the necessary principles

of thought. The necessary, the universal, the eter-
nal, or, in a word, the idea, cannot be contained in a

created spirit in its concrete being, but only in an

abstract form, an image, or a created word. This is

identical with the intelligence itself
;

it is what con-

stitutes its intellective force and principle of activity.

In man, as we have already seen, this intellective
activity needs the concurrence of exterior, sensible

objects, acting on it through the senses and occasion-

ing perceptions and reflections, before it can attain

distinct reflective consciousness of itself, and evolve

its own ideal formula. This reflective consciousness
cannot go back of the soul itself, where it finds the

abstractive idea passively received from concrete

being. The contact of being, or of God who is alone
being, gives the apprehension of being to the soul by

creating it. The creative act and the being who
produces the creative act lie back of its existence,

which is the terminus of the creative act. The soufs

separate activity begins at the terminus of God’s ac-

tivity, and is projected forward to its own proper ter-

minus, which is the sensible world. Its natural ac

tivity would never bring it face to face with its creator,

God, or enable it to contemplate him in any other

way than it is now able to do so, by a vividly apprehended



Problems of the Age. 2 *5

demonstration of his being from its own first princi-

ples and the exterior works of his hand. In order

that the soul, in its reflective acts, may see God con-
tinually and clearly, it is necessary that he should

unite himself in a new and ineffable, manner to its
substance and its faculties, and concur with them in

such a way that they can look beyond their natural

limit of vision into the infinitude of the being of

God which surrounds the creation like an ocean on

every side. The soul, which is, so to speak, project-
ed from God by creation, must receive a movement
.of return, which does not arrest itself at the mere

fact of self-consciousness, but brings the soul to a

consciousness of God as immediately and personally
producing its self-consciousness. This act is most

perfect in the human soul of Jesus Christ, the Incar-
nate Word. The personality of the human and di-
vine natures in him being one, there is but one Ego.

The human soul, therefore, terminates its act of self-
consciousness, not upon itself, as its own subsistentia,
but upon the divine Ego or person. It is conscious
of itself as a distinct substance, but not a substance

completed and brought to distinct subsistence in it-

self. Its consciousness terminates in the divine per-

son, and is referred to it, so that Jesus Christ, in

every human act, affirms himself by self-conscious-
ness as both God and man in one person. The union
of glorified spirits to God is similar to this hypostatic
union, though not so perfect, and not implying per-

sonal identity. The nature and mode of this union
of. the created spiiit with God, by which it is glori



2 86 Problems of the Age.

fied, beatified, and even deified—as the doctors of the
church fear not to affirm, in accordance with the de-

claration of the Holy Scripture—is impenetrable to
the human understanding. The Indian philosophers,
having retained a confused idea of it from the primi-

tive revelation, have expressed this idea in their sub-

lime mysticism with all the superb imagery of their

luxuriant imaginations. With them, it is an absorp-
tion of all individual souls in the infinite fount of

being. Nearly all their language may, however, be

adopted, in a good sense, as expressing the Christian

dogma, if clear, philosophical conceptions are substi-

tuted for their obscure and unscientific notions of the

creative act. Without these clear conceptions and

definitions, it is impossible to escape running into

pantheism. The language of Christian mystic wri-
ters, even, is liable to misapprehension as expressing

the pantheistic notion of the identity of God and the
creature, unless their terms are properly explained.

In point of fact, Eckhart did give expression to some

propositions which implied pantheism and were con-

demned by the Holy See. The mystic writers con-

tinually affirm that the soul is made una res cum Deo,
and becomes God by participation. By this, however,

they do not mean that the soul loses its distinct sub-

stance or becomes identified with the divine nature.

They intend to signify an ineffable union between

the soul and God, in which, each remaining distinct

m its own proper essence, God communicates his
own knowledge, sanctity, glory, and beatitude to the

soul, and admits it into the fellowship of the Blessed

.



Problems of the Age. 287

Trinity. This is the vanishing point of all theology,

and of all science, beyond which even the most illu-

minated eye cannot penetrate. The return of all
things which proceed from God as first cause to God
as final cause, consummated in this beatific union,

solves all the problems of time
;
there remains only

the problem of eternity, which eternity alone can

solve.





3ACK TO CHRIST
BY REV. CUTHBERT LATTEY, S.J.

Editor of the Westminster Version of the Scriptures.

living, inspiring appeal for the faithful union
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