St. Thomas and today : comments on the economic views of Aquinas


/
^AVgi! Geo;

• TV>ovwo.s a^d ”J
Asv 343T ]

ST. THOMAS
AND TODAY

Comments on the Economic

Views of Aquinas

By Dom Virgil Michel, O.S.B., Ph.D.

1935

Wanderer Printing Company
St. Paul, Minn.





THE BOOK SHELF

VEST POCKET BOOKLETS ON
THE SOCIAL QUESTION, by
Dom Virgil Michel, O.S.B., Ph.D.,
of St. John’s Abbey, Collegeville.

(Wanderer Printing Co., 128 E.
Tenth St., St. Paul, Minnesota.
St. Thomas and Today, 63 pp.
$.15; Human Rights, 48 pp. .15;
Ownership, 48 pp., .15; Labor and
Industry, 48 pp., 15; The Nature
of Capitalism, 48 pp., .15; Cri-

tique of Capitalism, 48 pp., .15;

Ideals of Reconstruction, 56 pp.,
.15. The entire set of 7, Price $1.00
net.

The above pamphlets by Dom
Virgil Michel, O.S.B., are studies of

fundamental Christian principles
in their relation to the various as-

pects of the social problem of our
own day. The first on the list ex-
amines the viewpoints of St. Tho-
mas as gathered from the various
writings of the Angelic Doctor,
most of which are not easily ac-
cessible to the general reader. The
fundamental viewpoints of Thomas
Aquinas are as applicable to our
day as they were to his, since they
embody the basic principles as
Christian tradition has developed
them in the light of the Gospel and
of sound human thought of all
times.



The other pamphlets form a se-
ries on the Social Question. They
discuss the general topics indicat-
ed in the different titles by taking
the fundamental Christian princi-
ples as their basis and then apply-
ing them to the conditions of our
own time and to the many differ-
ent ideas and schemes that are
afloat in our day. All of the arti-
cles in these pamphlets were first
printed serially in the Wanderer .
Since their appearance in pamphlet
form they have met with a most
welcome reception in many circles
ranging from university professors
to the ordinary man of the street.
They have been commended in par-
ticular for their clear development
of fundamental principles and for
their succinct form of presentation.
They can be read profitably in the
many brief intervals of time that
so often are frittered away just be-
cause pamphlets such as these are
not ready to hand. Many persons
interested in social problems have
been carrying these pamphlets
with them for ready discussion and
reference, and they have also been
put to good use as basic materials
by many study club groups.



1. Economics and Ethics

All the views and teachings of St. Thomas
were permeated by Christian thought and prin-

ciples. It could not be otherwise for a mind that
grappled with all the known problems of life,
and that ever sought to lead back all things to

their basic relations to God according to the
teaching of Christ. Since the world was cre-

ated by God, it was impossible for Thomas
to consider the study of the world final and
complete, unless it also took into account the

world's relation to God.

This was true whether he happened to treat
a matter from the standpoint of theology or
from that of philosophy. Theological treatment
was based on the word of God; the philosophi-
cal study of a subject aimed at whatever knowl-
edge could be attained by human reason and
experience. In regard to the former there was
the certainty of divine Truthfulness. In regard

to the latter there were different degrees of cer-

tainty. Less certain, among matters of philo-
sophical knowledge, were certain questions of

ethics; that is, the knowledge of right and
wrong human conduct as gained by natural hu-
man reason.

Still, ethics gave us the best knowledge about
human conduct that the mind could attain with-
out the aid of revelation; and it had its proper
application whenever any question of human ac-

1



tion was under discussion. For Thomas it was
pure nonsense to discuss questions of proper po-

litical or economic conduct except in the light of

the ethical principles of right and wrong.

In that regard, a vast change has taken place

in the course of history.
‘

‘All's fair in war and
love,” says an old slogan. To the strange bed-
fellows of war and love, a third must be added
today. "All's fair in business” is at least a very

widely accepted practical motto today.

There are several historical factors that
brought about the vast change of attitude from
the times of St. Thomas to our own day. I shall
mention a few of them here in very brief form.

It is now acknowledged generally that Calvin-
ism gave great impetus to the drive for economic

success that has characterized the modern world
of Europe and America. Since God had chosen
His elect from all eternity, and predestined them
for everlasting bliss, there was nothing left for
these predestined souls to do about it. All they
could do was to try to find out. Fortunately
there was a way: success in amassing the goods
of this world. The more they succeeded in the
economic enterprises of this life, the more sure
could they be that they were among the chosen
ones of God for all eternity. What an incentive
to a tireless pursuit of worldly goods, and what
a joyous gospel for the fortunate of this world!

The modern theory of economics developed
more definitely in the eighteenth century. It is
closely linked up with the name of Adam
Smith (1723-1790). Smith was a disciple of

2



Hutcheson, and both belong to the so-called

moral sense school of ethical philosophers. These

philosophers taught that ethical conduct was
not something that could strictly be reasoned

out; it was guided rather by a natural moral
sense. Some spoke of a two-fold instinct in
man, egoistic and altruistic. Proper conduct con-

sists in a balancing up of the egoistic and the
altruistic instincts; and the moral sense takes

care of this balancing.

Now because of the double aspect of all hu-
man nature, all that is necessary, some taught,
is for each one to look out for his own self.
Thereby the best good of all will be automati-
cally attained. That Smith held such ethical
views is quite certain. And he set forth a very
similar platform for the economic life. In order

that the best economic good of all men be at-
tained, he said, it is but necessary for each man
to strive after his own best interests. The good
of society will then take care of itself. So true
is this, that the government should keep its
hands entirely out of business and let well
enough alone. Calvinism furnished a religious
incentive for the endless pursuit of individual

gain of material goods; now a defense of such
activity was furnished in terms of natural mo-
rality.

In the nineteenth century, human life and
society came to be viewed under the ascending

star of materialistic evolution. The law of self-
ishness was applied to the life of men as it was
to that of nations. The deism of the previous

3



century had still held to the notion of God.
But it was a God far removed from the earth,
who was little concerned with the actions or
problems of men on earth. It took little effort
to displace such remote religious ideas from the
hearts of men. The “new knowledge” had easy
work.

It taught us that all through the history of
the world the natural Taw of struggle for exist-
ence and survival of the fittest had been domi-
nant. There was no other law than that, just
as there was no other religion than that of nature
and its brute strength. The Christian laws of
mercy and charity, of sympathy for the weak,
were explained away as defenses set up by the
weal against the strong in the inevitable strug-
gle for fife.

No wonder that in our own generation the
practice of cut-throat competition, of business

combinations for greater profit, of sweat-shop

oppression and war-profiteering have reached
their height. Why not, if there is no God, nc>
higher law for man than man himself?

As a remedy against the pagan naturalism of
today, both in economics and elsewhere, we of-
ten hear the proposal: Get back to the observ-

ance of Christian rules of conduct, and all will
be well. That may be so, simple as it sounds.
All fundamental truths are simple. Yet, can we
be satisfied with this answer, when it implies off-
hand that there is nothing wrong with our eco-
nomic structure as such, but only with the
hearts of men?

4



The march of history has for centuries been
progressively under the inspiration of a denial

of the Church of Christ, then of Christ, and

finally of God, The full and final development
of our present economic structure is coincident

with the full devlopment of this trend unto a

pagan naturalism that is worse than the pagan-

ism of old since it is based on a rejection of the
Christian dispensation. Can it be, that in the
economic structure thus developed there are no
elements that are basically un-Christian?

Before we can answer that question smugly
in the negative, surely there should be some
study of it in the light of Christian economic

views. And the latter will best be studied as
they existed in a time when men were still un-
touched by the de-Christianizing trend that was
born so shortly after the days of St. Thomas.

2. Purpose- of Material Goods and Riches

A fundamental principle in the social philos-
ophy of St. Thomas is that of the general pur-
pose of material goods in this world of ours.
Why are the external or material goods in this
world at all? Certainly not for themselves.

Ultimately, Aquinas would say, everything in
this world is for the two-fold purpose of the
glory of God and the sanctification of man.
Leaving theological views and expressions aside,
and limiting ourselves to the philosophical ap-
proach, we should express the purpose of ma-
terial goods as follows: It is that of serving

unto the happiness of man .

5



The term man in such instances always means
the whole human race, all of mankind. There
is no exception to this as far as the natural law
goes. For in terms of the natural law all men
are equal; all possess the same human nature.
As persons endowed with understanding and
free will all men, both in dignity and nature,
rank high above the brute or irrational animals

and the inanimate things of this world.
So much for the term man in this connection.

Now for the term happiness . For St. Thomas
human happiness did not at all exclude the right
to a proper degree of worldly joy and pleasure.
On the contrary, a proper degree of natural joy
and satisfaction was a legitimate object of desire
for the average man. Happiness without the lat-
ter was reserved for those souls, who out of
higher love for God could practice even here
on earth a heavenly detachment from that earth.
The privation of happiness here below could not
be imposed on the vast majority of men, least
of all in the name of natural human reason.

Still, the happiness pf man here below was
something quite distinct from pleasure sought
for its own sake. Real happiness for man can
only be such as satisfies the entire man.
Now, the whole man is a very complex thing.

There is the biological aspect of human nature,
on the level of which man's functions are like
those of the ordinary plant; i.e„ in regard to cell
production, nourishment, and growth.

Then there is the level of sense-life, in which
man functions like the other higher animals; e.

6



g. t blood circulation, glandular activities, nerve

reactions, all the activities of ordinary animal

sense-perception and instincts.

Finally, there is the rational level of human
nature, in which man exercises the functions of
understanding and free will. They include pur-
posive action, foresight, deliberation, thoughtful

decision, etc. These are the highest activities of

human nature, and are the best expression, the
only full expression of the true nature of man.

Any happiness, to be genuine for man, must
be happiness on this higher level. Only thus
does it harmonize with and answer to the dig-
nity of human personality. But this higher level
of man's life necessarily includes the lower levels.
For the three levels mentioned are not so many
separate sections or divisions of human nature.
The latter can indeed function on the biological
level while there is unconsciousness on the sen-
sory and rational levels. But the reverse is not
true. Man exercises his higher functions only in
and through the sensory activities; and the lat-
ter only in and through proper biological activ-
ity. Stop or impede any lower level of activity,
and any higher level will cease functioning or
functioning properly.

This brief analysis will help us to under-
stand better what St. Thomas has in mind when
he says that the purpose of material goods is to
serve unto the happiness of mankind. And it is
in this light that statements like the following

are always meant by him: “Man has natural
dominion over external goods, because by his

V



reason and will he can use external goods for
his own benefit, as if they were made for him.
For the less perfect things are always for the
sake of the more perfect/'

Man is not really using a thing for his own
benefit, if the latter is not a benefit, either di-

rectly or indirectly, to the whole human per-
sonality. There is no real human benefit, in the
mind of Aquinas, unless it accords with man's
whole nature, physical, intellectual, and especial-
ly moral. In particular is the latter aspect of in-

tellectual life always included in this, as it is
in any full meaning of the term happiness.

In fact, regarding the moral question one can

well say in this connection: Not only is it true
that the moral perfection of man ordinarily in-
cludes benefit to the entire man, but also: What-
ever is of benefit to the whole man, to the in-
tegral human personality, is just in so far forth
also moral.

It is now time to get back to our original
point at issue: The purpose of material goods
is to serve the happiness of man. This means,
as we have seen, all mankind . From the eco-
nomic standpoint we have a Thomistic principle
here that is absolutely fundamental.

"Community of goods," says St. Thomas,
"is attributed to the natural law, not because

the natural law demands that all goods be pos-
sessed in common, and that nothing be possessed
as one's own; but because the natural law makes
no distinction of possessions."

8



The natural law does not point out that this
or that particular goods must be possessed by this

or that man. As far as the goods as such are
concerned, the natural law does not even say

directly that the goods must be privately owned
and may not be held in common.

What natural law does say as its most basic
principle is, that the material goods are for the

benefit of mankind; that is of all men to the
exclusion of none. Whatever makes it impossible

for some men to have this service of necessary
material goods, offends fundamentally against

the law of nature.

3. Private Ownership of Goods

In speaking of the relation of man to the
material goods of this world, St. Thomas makes
several distinctions that must be kept in mind.
To forget these, means not only to misunder-
stand the views of St. Thomas but also to fail
to avoid the confusion that so easily follows

from a hasty study or discussion of a complex
question.

St. Thomas distinguished clearly between the
general purpose of material goods that we dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, and the private
ownership of goods by particular persons. The
natural law tells us definitely, as we have seen,
that the general purpose of material goods in
this world is to subserve the happiness of all
mankind without exception.
BuU he says, the natural law as such does not

determine which particular persons should own

9



certain goods, or which particular goods should
be privately owned. The determination of that
rests with man. In other words private owner-
ship is a human institution, which is determined
at least in its definite characteristics by human
reason or by human convention.

4

'Ownership

of goods is not contrary to the natural law, but

is superadded to natural law by determination
of human reason.”

This view, however, by no means implies
that private ownership is not in some way de-
rived from the natural law. If private owner-
ship were an essential demand of the natural
law, no one would be allowed to renounce such
ownership and live a life, in union with others,
of common ownership of all possessions. The
conditions under which the latter is practiced
are, however, the exception rather than the rule.

Under all ordinary conditions of life, the
natural law does point out, at least indirectly,
that there should be some distinction of owner-
ship between different persons. This is due in
part to the imperfection of human nature, rath-
er than to any other reason. Were human nature
ideal, one may argue properly, the natural law
would not point to the need of private owner-
ship. The latter is under existing conditions, a
derivation, not an essential demand, of the nat-
ural law.

First of all, man as a person endowed with
understanding and free will is capable of own-
ing goods. He has the ability both to acquire
and to dispose of goods. Hence there is no justi-

10



fication for denying the right of ownership of

goods to any man. Secondly, there is under the
average conditions of life and of human nature
a need for private ownership of goods. Things
being as they are, it is impossible for men to be
happy unless the right of private ownership be
allowed.

Several reasons are given by St. Thomas why
private ownership is necessary for a happy hu-
man life.
The first of these is that only if private own-

ership be allowed will there be sufficient incen-

tive for man to work properly. Man is by nature
more solicitous for what he can regard as his
own than for what is not his own in any way.
Man will work harder and more steadily, if he
can get something out of his labor that he can

consider as his own. If the fruits of his work
never belong to him, if his personal efforts do
not entitle him to personal share in these fruits,
his efforts will become half-hearted and listless.
Again, only on the condition of private owner-
ship, will there by any incentive for man to
provide by his labor for his dear ones, both for
the present and the future.

The second reason for private ownership is
that there will be better order in life. Order
there must be. It can exist only when there is a
place for everything and everything is in its
place. In reference to our question one might

say that order can exist in life only when every-
thing has its acknowledged owner, and every
owner possesses what is his own. When a thing

11



does not rightfully belong to any single owner,
when things belong to all, then St. Thomas,
following Aristotle, visualizes a general dis-

orderly scramble for things, and a resulting
social chaos.

A third reason for the institution of private
ownership is that thus alone will there be social

peace. This reason is but another aspect of the
previous one. There can be no social peace where
there is confusion and disorder. Moreover, man
is content only with what he can call his own.
If he can call nothing really his own, he will
be dissatisfied and restless. The acquisitive in-
stinct in him, we should say today, demands
an object to satisfy it; and it can be satisfied
only by actual acquisition of things, i.e., by
possession of them as his own.

All three reasons given for the justification

of private ownership of goods are rooted on last
analysis in the imperfection of man. Individual
possession of goods is indeed necessary for man,
but only because man is not more perfect.

On the basis of the argument for private
ownership advanced by St. Thomas, one may
well conclude that, were human nature more
perfect, there would be no need of distinction
of possessions. A further conclusion from this
might in turn be: If ever in the progress of hu-
man life and civilization, man arrives at a stage
where he is no longer so subject to the weak-
nesses of his nature as he has been throughout all

history—there will be no reason for maintain-
ing the institution of private property.

12



There was a further distinction made by
Thomas in regard to our present subject. We
shall be content with a mere mention of it here.

In modern times the right to ownership is
taken to imply the right to do with one's prop-

erty as one pleases. The right to own goods,
putting it in plain words, is equivalent to the

right to use or misuse the goods at will. Private

ownership is absolute.

This was not the mind of Thomas. For him
there was a distinction between the right to own
a thing and the right to its use; and the latter

right was less absolute than the former.

4. Material Goods and Happiness

The whole argument for right of ownership
of material goods gets its basic value from the
fact that material goods are indispensable to
man. The latter cannot be happy without them,
conditions on this earth being as they are. St.
Thomas says this very explicitly.

'Tor imperfect happiness, such as can be at-
tained in this life, external goods are necessary;

not as being of the essence of happiness, but as

serving as instruments towards this happiness,
which consists in a virtuous life. . . . For in this
life man needs the things required by the body
both for the pursuit of contemplative virtue,
and for that of active virtue.”

St. Thomas in this quotation is speaking of
the average man. Human happiness, to be true
and lasting rather than fleeting and deceptive, is

13



obtainable only in a life of virtue—not only
the contemplative virtue of souls who have
chosen a special service of God, but as well the
practical virtue that must characterize the life
of every Christian. Just as truly as happiness is

possible only for the virtuous man, so true is
it that for the average person a virtuous life is

not feasible without some material goods. The
latter are needed as instruments in the pursuit of

a happiness conducive to a virtuous life.

If a man is to pursue a life of happiness, he
must be free to consider the nature and the
means of such a life, and to devote both effort
and attention to its attainment. Now if a man
has no external goods, or no ordinary reliable
means of attaining the necessary external goods,
he must needs be wholly preoccupied with the
problem of attaining the latter. He must be en-
tirely concerned about and engaged in the pur-
suit of such goods, however discouraging his

efforts may prove to be. The more unsuccessful
he is in this, the more must the pursuit of neces-
sary material goods become a constant object in
his life. Thus, what should actually be a ready-
to-hand means for a better life, in reality turns
out to be an elusive object of futile but all-ab-
sorbing effort.

The instrumental function of external goods,
their place in life as a means to a further end,
happiness, contains other implications. Since the

function of material goods is merely instrumen-
tal, the amount of material goods to be owned
by anyone need not be excessively large at all.

14



Only so much of it, and no more, is necessary
as will function properly as a means to the good
life, i.e., to happiness. Any other view is as un-
intelligible and nonsensical as it would be to de-
fend the necessity of sledge-hammers for the

cracking open of almonds or even peanuts.

Man is indeed not happy without the external
goods necessary to life. This is a fundamental
principle for Aquinas. But man does not need
a great abundance of them. Proper judgement,

both in the realm of ideas and of practical life,
as well as external virtuous action, he says al-

most naively, are possible without an abundance
of riches or material goods. In fact, a super-

abundance of the latter makes man less sufficient
unto himself, insofar as he needs the help of
others in guarding and administering his super-
abundant riches.

It would be an idle speculation to try to guess
which of two extremes in regard to material
goods Aquinas considered the more reprehensi-
ble, extreme riches or extreme poverty; or which
condition he would have considered the more
immoral.

"Superabundance of riches and beggarly in-
digence must, it seems, be avoided by those who
wish to live a life of virtue, insofar as both are
occasions of sin. For an abundance of riches is
the occasion of haughtiness, while indigence

gives the occasion for theft, and lying, even per-
jury. . . . Still not all poverty is an occasion
for theft and perjury . . . but only that which

15



is involuntary, for the escaping of which man
steals and perjures himself. Voluntary poverty

is free from this danger, and such poverty
Christ himself chose.”

For anyone, therefore, who has not chosen
voluntary poverty for the sake of Christ, some
concern with material goods is necessary; but it

should always be in a proper measure that ac-

cords with the status of riches as a means and
not as an end in themselves.

"External goods have the status of utility

for an end, as was said; whence the good of man
must consist in a certain measured use of them.
That occurs when, for example, man seeks to
have external goods according to a certain meas-

ure, insofar as they are necessary for living in

accordance with his status. Sin consists in an

excess beyond measure; i.e., when someone
wishes to acquire or retain them in excess of
the proper measure—which is of the nature of
avarice, defined as the immoderate love of pos-
sessing.”

What St. Thomas would say today of the
accepted aim in life of "getting rich,” in the
sense in which that is ordinarily meant, needs
no elaboration. Nor need we emphasize the vast
difference, the antithesis, between his views and
a civilization that is dominated by the economic
attitudes of our own day.
Thomas could as little subscribe to the view

that acquiring riches is the purpose of social

life, as that men live together for the sake of
the biological function of living.

16



"For if men congregated for the sole purpose
of living, then animals and slaves would be a
part of the civil community* But if it were for
the sake of acquiring riches, then those doing

business together would thereby constitute a
single state; in matter of fact, we do see those
alone reckoned as forming a civic group who
are directed toward the good life by the same
laws and the same authority."

Aiming at the acquiring of riches is not aim-
ing at the "good life" that alone brings happi-
ness to man. St. Thomas never seems to tire of
stressing the subservient role of material goods
in human life, however indispensable that role
is.

"For the good life of any man two things
are needed: One, primary, is that of virtuous
conduct (for virtue is the means of good life) ;
the other, secondary and as it were instrumen-
tal, is a sufficiency of corporeal goods, such as is
necessary for a virtuous life."

5. Misuse of Riches

WHEN speaking of "riches" St. Thomas dis-
tinguishes two kinds, natural and artificial. Nat-
ural riches are such as serve in themselves to sat-

isfy the needs of man, for example, food, cloth-
ing, and shelter. Riches are artificial if they do
not administer as such to man's natural needs;

"but if human art has invented them for the
sake of facility in trade, so that they may be a
measure of saleable things." The chief type of
artificial riches is money.

17



“Now it is manifest/' says St. Thomas, and
this has been discussed in previous articles, “that

the happiness of man cannot consist in natural
riches; these are sought for the sustenance of

man's nature, whence they cannot be his ulti-
mate end."

Much less can money be the ultimate end or
goal of human life. “The artificial riches are
sought only for the sake of the natural. They
are sought only because with them can the
things be bought that are necessary in life;
whence still less are they man's ultimate end.
It is therefore impossible to find happiness,

which is man's end, in riches," whether they be
natural or artificial.

With this We come to a source of great trag-
edy in many human lives. Though men can not
find true happiness in earthly riches, many may
yet look upon riches as their ultimate end or
goal in life, and thus strive inordinately after
what is in the very nature of things incapable
of giving final satisfaction.

The satisfaction of natural needs of man by
means of natural riches is not infinite, says St.
Thomas, “for nature is satisfied with a certain
measure." Man cannot eat indefinitely, there is
a definite limit to his hunger and to his capacity
for food. Again, he cannot wear more and more
clothes without end; there is a definite limit set
to possibilities by his nature.

Moreover, the ordinary satisfaction of natural

appetites by the temporal goods adapted to such
appetites is limited for the very reason that the



excessive attempts at satisfaction defeat them-
selves. The more a man has set his heart on the
acquisition of certain temporal goods and pleas-
ures, the more is he disappointed in their at-
tainment.

“For when they are attained, they are de-
spised, and others are sought, and that because
their insufficiency is noticed the more they are
attained/'

It is otherwise with the inordinate desire for

money; “the appetite for artificial riches may be
infinite, since it serves inordinate concupiscence,

which is not moderated." Hence we have the
situation of the miser, who seeks his ultimate
end in the possession of money. The purpose
of money is that of an instrument for acquiring
the means of a good life. The miser “seeks mon-
ey only in order to possess it"—a double per-
version of the right order of things.

All inordinate love of riches, as we have seen,
is a perversion of the natural status of things,

and therefore it naturally leads to results con-
trary to the good of man, and fosters evil.

“An abundant possession of riches leads to
more abundant solicitude, by which man is very
much distracted, and hindered from fully serv-
ing God. Two other things follow only upon
abundance of riches; namely, a love of riches,
and elation over or glorying in riches,"—all
of which help to turn a means into an end, and
to divert man's efforts from his true end, the
better perfection of his moral personality.

19



The inordinate solicitude a man shows for his
own riches,

4

‘springs from the personal love
wherewith he loves himself in a temporal or

worldly way.” This is always an inordinate
love of self; and with that we are at the root
of all real evil; for “it is evident that inordi-

nate love of self is the cause of all sin.”

The truth of this statement is immediately
seen from the actions to which this inordinate
love of self and of riches leads. Persons possessed
of this vice “superabound in the acceptance (of

money) , not caring what they accept, or whence
they accept or make profit. Some of them make
gain by vile and servile actions; some by im-
moral and forbidden actions. . . . Some make
gain by dishonest exactions, like usurers. . . .
All of the aforesaid receive where they should
not.”

It is thus that inordinate love of money leads
men to receive money where they should not, or
receive more than they should.

In one respect the avaricious man and the
man who spends his riches recklessly are alike.
Both sin against themselves; the one by stint-
ing himself too much, and the other by using
up what he should be saving. Again, St. Tho-
mas goes on, both sin against their neighbors;
the one by failing to give to his neighbors in
charity, and the other by using up on himself
what he should use in providing for others.

Avarice is indeed more than just a sin against
those who are dependent upon one. The goods
of the earth are for the support and comfort

20



of all men. Whence the avaricious man, in ac-
cepting and storing up more than is proper, sins
directly against all those who are in want.

'Tor in external riches one man cannot have
in superabundance without another's suffering

want; since temporal goods cannot at the same

time be possessed by many."

The above views of Aquinas need no special
comment. The conditions prevalent in the world
today emphasize their wisdom, yet they could
not be enunciated more clearly than was done
long ago by Thomas.

6. Proper Use* of Riches

CONFUSION of ideas occurs when we neglect
to distinguish between things that are really

quite distinct. St. Thomas always sought for
clearness, and never failed to make the distinc-
tions that were necessary for the avoidance of

confusion.

He often emphasized the fact that material
goods are necessary for man. In regard to this
necessity he made a clear distinction. "With
regard to external goods," he says, "we can call
something necessary from two standpoints.
First, that without which it is impossible for
anyone to live. Secondly, something is said to
be necessary for us, if we need it for an honest
living, or for living decently according to our
state."

In this division into two grades or degrees
of material goods that are necessary to man, we

21



see the implied acknowledgment, that all men
have a right not only to the material goods,

needed to support life, but also to whatever

external goods they need to live decently and
properly according to their state of life.

Here again we are in touch with a basic
ethical economic principle of Aquinas. The value
and force of the principle is not minimized by
the evident difficulty of determining just how
much material goods is needed to satisfy the
second type of necessity.

St. Thomas himself says that the latter goods
could ordinarily be increased somewhat without
exceeding the amount needed for one's state in
life; or, on the other hand, some could be taken
away without making a decent living impossible.
He does point out, however, that also "so much
can be added as to exceed the requirements of

decent living, and so much taken away as to have
a remainder insufficient for the decent preserva-

tion of our condition." In regard to this no
hard and fast rule can be established. "The judg-
ment of prudence must here be applied, which
guides us in all things"; that is, the judgment
of prudent men.

In regard to these two grades of riches or
earthly goods, a further distinction may be
made. The necessity of each grade of riches may
be taken: "First, in relation to ourselves alone

—

that which is necessary for an individual; sec-

ondly, with regard to those of whom one has
charge, and then we speak of that which is

22



necessary to a person insofar as he has care

of others/'

Summarizing the above, we may speak, as
Thomas does in his practical applications, of
three grades of material possessions: (1) That
which is necessary .for the bare support of life

for oneself and one's dependents, sometimes

called absolute necessity. (2) That which is
necessary for the decent living of oneself and

one's dependents, sometimes called conditioned

necessity. (3) That which is over and above,
which is superfluous in regard to any real need

—

wealth that is luxury. These three grades are

all important in regard to the practical rules

of life Thomas bases on them.

The practical rules regarding the proper use
of riches are thus tersely put down: "Since the
use of riches must be directed towards the sub-
vention of the necessities of the present life,

which subvention must be properly ordered, it
is evident that anyone not using riches for sup-
plying the needs of present life, or using them
inordinately, departs from the path of virtue.
In this, however, two things must be kept in
mind. First that the owner first of all supply
himself, then those dependent on him, and then
others. Secondly, as to the necessity, the follow-

ing order holds: the absolute necessity of any-

one takes precedence over any conditioned ne-
cessity which occurs when anyone needs some-
thing for the decent preservation of his state

in life."

23



From this statement one can see both what
use a man way make of his riches, and what use
he must make. We shall develop this in the
form of a series of practical rules expressed in
the words of St. Thomas himself.

1) "That without which an individual him-
self, or those for whom he must provide, cannot
live, need not be given away as alms."

2) "That which cannot be subtracted with-
out taking away the decency of one's state in
some manner, or of the state of one's dependents,
need not be given in alms . . . unless some other
necessity outweighs the above, that of some
special person in extremest need, or of the

Church, or of the State, for the good of the
race is above that of the individual."

3 "That which can be added or taken away
without diminishing the decency of one's state

can be given in alms, though there is no special
precept, but only a counsel in regard to it."

4) "Giving something that is not needed for

the first grade of necessity but is needed for the

second, and thereby relieving someone's greater

necessity, even if the latter be not absolute, is

doing good, but is not obligatory by precept."

5) "Whatever exceeds the demands of decent
living according to one's state, must be given in

alms—and this is strictly a precept."
6) "The law obliges that a person first min-

ister to the absolute necessity of strangers (oth-

24



ers) before ministering to the conditioned ne-

cessity of himself or his dependents/'

7) “When someone is in extreme necessity,
all goods for him become common, so that, even
if he obtains goods by violence or theft, he does

not sin/'

8) Finally there is the strict precept of giving

“when a person has many things which he does
not need either for the support of his life or for

that of his dependents, nor for the decent preser-

vation of his life—and that even if the poor in
question are not in extreme necessity/'

To the writer the above rules and ideas are
too portentous and at the same time too clear-

cut to need any comment. The latter would only
tak,e away from their forceful precision and
their telling denunciation of our thoroughly un-

Christian civilization.

What further could St. Thomas himself say,
were he with us today, and witnessed on the
one hand the vast multitudes of those who are
through no fault of their own deprived of the
bare necessaries of life, and on the other hand
the immoral unconcern of those who in the face
of such conditions cling tenaciously to goods

that are superfluous, not needed either for the

subvention of their life or for the preservation

of a decent status on earth.

Let the curtain fall in silence and hide the
scene.

25



7. The Economic Life

FROM the manner in which St. Thomas
stresses the fundamental principle that the goods

of this world are to serve the needs of all men,
the distinction he made between this general
purpose of goods and the private ownership of
goods is seen to have its obvious importance.

Private ownership does not mechanically, as

it were, fulfil the general function of material

goods. On the contrary, any particular case of
private ownership must still justify itself before
the tribunal of the moral law by the degree in
which it fulfils the primary purpose of material
goods. So fundamental is the latter principle,
that in extreme cases of necessity private owner-

ship of goods ceases.

The same attitude underlies the other dis-
tinction referred to at the end of Article Three.

This is the distinction that Thomas makes be-
tween the ownership of goods, and the use made
of his goods by the owner. From the moral
standpoint St. Thomas considers the function
of ownership and that of use as two quite dis-
tinct things, that are by no means interchange-
able.

The owner may only in part determine at
will the use to which his goods may be put;
in part this is to be determined by the common
function of material goods.

How St. Thomas meant this is clear from
the excerpts and practical rules given in the pre-

26



ceding chapter. What is not so clear at first
sight is perhaps best asked in the form of a
question: '‘Why does Thomas permit the pos-
session of superfluous goods, if the owners may
not use them on themselves, but are morally
obliged to use them to relieve the needs of oth-
ers?”

The answer to this question must be found
in the fact that proprietorship may be exercised
till the needs of others become obvious in speci-
fic cases.

When Thomas speaks of economic life and
its activities, he at once compares it with other
alternative professions. It is a constant charac-

teristic of his to go to the very bottom of things.

Judging from the standpoint of supernatural
merit, Thomas always accorded the primacy to
the contemplative life over the active; the former

is the more perfect fulfillment of the Gospel
counsel of perfection. Yet, further considerations

enter into the adjudgment of any single in-
stance.

“It may happen that one gains greater merit
in the active life than in the contemplative, and
vice versa, according as one has greater charity.”

It is not true, as some have tried to say, that St.
Thomas despised and condemned the active life
in general, and the economic life in particular.

Man's holiness, he asserts, is not at all in-
compatible with a reasonable pursuit of the cares

of the body and of the earth; in fact, even in a

27



life of voluntary poverty, it would be unnatural
to withhold the necessities of ordinary life.

Were Thomas of the opinion that economic
activity as such is immoral, he would have made
short work of it. As it is, he is at pains to out-
line the various activities of the economic life

of his time, and to call the attention of rulers

to the importance of being concerned about

them

:

"There are several ways of acquiring wealth,

chief among which, as far as a community is
concerned, are its natural riches, fertility of

ground, and then trade with other countries."

To the natural resources also belongs mining.
To trade or exchange in the wider sense belong
all negotiations by which goods and money are
transferred from person to person. Among these
are commerce in the stricter sense, including navi-

gation and land transport, and the investing of

money with a merchant; then also usury or in-
terest, and wages or work for hire.

Far from condemning commerce, St. Thomas
shows a prudent appreciation of what is neces-
sary for its success. It is necessary "that he who
wishes to make gain therefrom know well which
things are dearest and in which places, because

these abound differently in different regions, so
that he buy in a place where they abound and
sell in a place where they are dear."

28



8. Commerce for Needs

The true purpose of commerce or exchange of
goods is not gain as such, St. Thomas always
views a particular object or action in the light of

its wider setting.

“It seems that buying and selling were in-

troduced for the common advantage of both
parties; namely, when one needs what another
has, and vice versa/' In the same way business
in a state takes place for the exchange of things

necessary for a good life. “Hence exchange is to
be sought in a state to the extent that it supply

the necessaries of life for it, and no farther;
just as the means toward an end are sought in
so far as they are proper to that end."

The proper kind of trade, therefore, is that
which exchanges one thing for another, or for
money, in order that the necessities of life may
be had. But St. Thomas, even in his time, knew
of another kind of business, “which exchanges
things or money for other money for the sake
of gain" as such. And his strictures of that kind
of business have a distinctively modern ring
to them.

“Business considered without qualification

has something shameful about it, insofar as of
itself it does not imply a good or necessary end."

“For by the practise of business, cupidity is
fostered in the hearts of the citizens, and from
this it comes that all things in the state are for
sale; and faith being abandoned, the way is open

29



for all sorts- of deceit; the public good being
despised, each one will serve his own private
advantage; the striving for virtue will cease,

while the honor of virtue will be pushed aside
by all. Whence the civil intercourse in such a
state will necessarily be corrupt/'

Yet, it is not the mere acceptance of gain, or

the conducting of business with the intention

of accepting some gain, that is immoral. All-
important is the question of what lies behind
the whole thing. To seek gain for gain's sake
sets no limits to one's avarice; seeking gain with
a proper end in view always implies proper

limits and is not immoral.

"Nothing forbids one to strive for gain for
some necessary end or for an honest one. Thus
business transactions are rendered lawful; as

when someone, seeking a moderate gain through
business negotiations, uses it for the support of

his household, or else for supporting the needy;

or again when someone engages in business pur-
suits for public utility, so that the country be

not lacking in what it needs; thus seeking some
gain, not as an end in itself, but as a wage for
his labor."

Again, in the above quotation, it is strikingly

evident, how the principle of "material goods
for human needs" is the fundamental guide for
Thomas in his judgments on all aspects of eco-
nomic life. Hence it will not cause surprise to
hear that Aquinas condemns as immoral all
monopolies that are constituted for the purpose

30



of greater gain by cornering a market; or that
he says expressly: the exchange value of a thing

is not to be reckoned by the utmost price a
person can extort from a buyer, nor even by its
intrinsic value, but by the needs of men.

St. Thomas develops the latter point in a
manner that might almost seem naive to some,
yet the reasoning is cogent.

"All things can be measured according to one

norm, as was said. And this norm which meas-
ures all things is need, which embraces all ex-
changeable goods insofar as all are referred to

human needs. For they are not appraised ac-
cording to the dignity of their natures, else a

mouse, which is a living sentient animal, would
be more precious than a pearl, which is a lifeless
thing. But a price is put on things according
as men have need of them for their use. And
the evidence of this is found in the fact that
if men needed nothing, exchange would cease."

Since human needs are the guiding factor in
economic life, it follows that the latter must
be organized and directed with a view to the
needs of man. In the mind of St. Thomas, this
always means the needs of a natural group or
community of men, and not that of an individ-
ual. As soon as one looks only to the good of
oneself, he says, the true inspiration for economic

action is no longer human need but inordinate
self-love.

St. Thomas follows Aristotle on this point
and is in perfect agreement with him. The lat-

si



ter mentions the fact that there are men who
from inordinate self-love pursue only that which
is good for their own selves, whence arises the
theory that those alone are prudent who look
to their own profit.

Aristotle mentions the theory only to reject

the error. And St. Thomas, in pointing this out,
agrees with him on the reason why the theory
is false. Every individual is also a member of
social groups; and the good of the individual
is dependent on the good of the social groups to
which he belongs; the two stand or fall together.

“The individual good of each single person
is unattainable without economy, that is, with-
out a right regulation of family affairs; nor is

it attainable without urbanity, that is, without

a right regulation of the state, even as the good
of a part cannot exist without the good of the
whole.”

This leads over directly to the question of
the relation of the economic life to the state.

9. The State and Economics

ST. THOMAS frequently ctressed the fact that
the good of individual man is unattainable apart
from the good of the social groups of which
he is necessarily a member. For Aquinas it would
have been impossible to countenance anything

like the personal selfishness that has characterized

our civilization and its basic social forms.
The good of man, therefore, demands com-

munication or social bonds between human in-

32



dividuals; it rests on considerations that go be-
yond the individual as such. Aquinas mentioned
a four-fold social relationship between men: 1)
That of family—"There is a natural intercourse
between men, according as they share a common
natural origin; and in this is based the friend-

ship between father and son, and other relatives
by blood." 2) Economic society

—"Another
type of intercourse is economic, according to

which men communicate in domestic (economic,
household) services." 3) The state

—"Another
is political, according to which men communi-
cate with their fellowmen living about." 4) The
Church—"A fourth is divine, according to
which men share in the one ecclesiastical body,
either actually or potentially, and this is the
friendship of love, which is exercised towards

alb even enemies."

The chief aim of economic life, in the mind
of St. Thomas, could only be the welfare of
the family. Basic to his views is the principle

that the economic life is by nature ordained to
the social welfare of men living in society of the
family rather than to the personal gain of iso-
lated individuals. This principle, in turn, is
closely linked up with that of the general pur-
pose of all material goods as subserving the
needs of all men.

In the light of the close interrelation between
economic and political life, it is not surprising
to find Thomas giving the different divisions of
the body politic in terms of occupations. In this

33



Thomas in part follows Aristotle, whose views
he at times explains without criticism even when
he does not agree with “the Philosopher” ; and
in part he echoes the condition of society at his

time, which was made up of rather fixed social
strata.

In the state, says Aquinas, quoting Aristotle,

there are food providers, like the farmers, who
are on the lowest scale; and those who hire out
for work. Then there are the merchants who
engage in buying and selling, commerce and the
handling of money. Above these in rank are the
warriors and judges, counsellors, the wealthy,
and the rulers. The wealthy are mentioned here
because the state must be self-sufficient—an in-
teresting sidelight on the function of wealth in
the body politic! “It is necessary that there be
riches in the state, else the latter could not exist.

Hence the opulent are necessary in a state, who
have such riches,”

Sometimes Thomas follows Aristotle in
speaking of the state, not as the totality of those

living in it, but as the political organism insofar

as it is the mechanism for actively promoting
social peace and welfare. It is in this sense that

we must understand the assertion, for instance,
that farmers and workers are not a real part of

the state, but are necessary for the state. Such

statements must always be understood in terms

of their background.

This is also true of the position of warriors

in the state, or of assertions that certain things

34



are necessary “for war expeditions/' Such asser-
tions are given their true meaning only when
one remembers that for Thomas war is never
justified in itself and can be waged only for the
preservation of peace and tranquility in the state

—and is in itself never a “good" at all.
Commerce, as we have seen above, is always

fraught with the possibilities of moral evil, ava-

rice, and the like. Wherefore St. Thomas says
that the ruler of the state and his officials should

not be obliged to enter into commercial trans-

actions with their fellow-citizens.

They should not be obliged to enter into
business transactions! What satire is not con-
tained in this innocent statement for our own
day, when the intimate connection of public
state officials with all forms of graft and corrupt
business deals is a matter of great scandal.

The possibilities of moral evil latent in busi-
ness seem to have been constantly in the mind
of Thomas. One gets the impression often that
he should have liked to exclude at least foreign

merchants from a state, if possible; and that he
allows them to enter only by way of a conces-
sion arising out of the necessities of the case.

It is impossible, he says, “to exclude mer-

chants entirely from a state, since it is not easy
to find a place so abounding in all the neces-
saries of life as to need nothing gotten from
elsewhere. Then, too, the oversupply of things
in one place would result in harmful overabund-
ance, if they could not be transferred elsewhere

35



by merchants. Hence a perfect state should make
moderate use of merchants/'

10. Laissez-Faire

St. Thomas never for a moment doubted the
need and the right of state surveillance over com-

merce and trade. This he acknowledged on prin-

ciple, insofar as the object of commerce was
really the same as that of a state—social good
of the community. His words often have a strik-
ingly modern ring. Witness, e.g ., his views on
city congestion in relation to our present-day

suburban movement.

Because the frequent gathering of people, es-

pecially for trade and barter, gives occasion for
quarrels and sedition, Thomas follows Aristotle
in speaking up for the greater advantage of hav-
ing merchants reside outside the cities rather than

within the walls of the latter.

"Now, if a state is given over to commerce,
it is very necessary that the citizens reside in the

city to exercise their profession there. Hence it
is better that a state derive its victuals from its
own fields, than that a state be given over com-
pletely to commerce."

But just as a ruler of a state cannot produce
men or territories out of the air, so he cannot
produce the necessaries for support of life by
sheer will. He must use things as nature sup-
plies them. Hence it is a first care of the ruler

to see that there be in the state an abundance of

36



natural riches, such as are necessary for the peace

and comfort of the citizens. (Note: Natural

riches, for Thomas, are such things as food,
clothing, shelter, and the like.)

This means, for Thomas, that the ruler is
bound to take an active hand in the regulation
of economic life. For the attainment of pur-
poses of the state, that is, the promotion of the
good and virtuous life among all citizens, a
certain share of economic goods is not only gen-

erally necessary but entirely indispensable.

Let us recall the succinct way in which Tho-
mas states this; for it is the expression of a
basic Thomistic principle.

'Tor the good of a man two things are neces-
sary: one, which is primary, is the exercise of
virtue (for virtue is that by which men live
well) ; another, which is necessary and as it
were instrumental is a sufficiency of corporal

goods, the use of which is needed for virtuous
conduct/'

The latter is the ultimate purpose of human
society; and therein lies the supreme duty of
the ruler.

The true good of the citizens is not some-
thing that can really be attained by a momentary
sufficiency of the necessaries of life. It is some-

thing more than that; and the duty of the ruler
is to provide the security essential to permit each

citizen to work out his destiny.

37



Men are mortal, and cannot live forever. Nor
are they always of the same strength, but subject

to many vicissitudes of life. Hence they must
be able to look ahead, and provide for the fu-

ture. The institutions of economic life must
therefore look to more than any mere momen-
tary relief of needs; but must be so organized as
to enable men to provide themselves against
sickness, old age, and the like.

In fact, the state has the duty of promoting
the good of its citizens in all possible ways.
The ruler must be universally solicitous for the
welfare of the citizens; and must set to work,
wherever any deficiences exist in the social or
economic life of the state. “If there is anything

inordinate in the conditions of this life, it must
be corrected; if anything is wanting it must be
supplied; if anything could be done better, the
ruler must strive to bring it about/'

Finally the state must also take a hand in
economic activities from the standpoint of safe-
guarding justice and equality of rights among
its citizens. To this end the judicial power of
the state must be exercised with great vigilance.
“Two things pertain to the judge: one is that

he establish equality among others, and this is
done by positive law; another is that he punish
those promoting inequality/'

This brings us to the question of justice,

which must regulate the relations of man to
man, of subjects to civil authority. It is as fun-

damental a matter in the economic life as it is in

that of the state.

38



11. Justice

THE question of justice arises only in con-
nection with the actions of men in relation to
other men. There is no question of justice unless

there is question of actions between men, either

actions already performed or about to be per-

formed.
‘

'Justice is the giving to each one what is his
own." Hence the question of justice as such is
preceded by that of right; that is, of a moral
claim to call a thing one's own. Unless men
have such moral rights, there is no basis for
speaking of justice between them. "The act of
justice is preceded by another by which a thing
is made one's own, as is evident in human life.
For by working a man merits what another
gives him, and that, as a matter of justice."

Justice has to do with persons, in the sense
that only human persons are the strict possessors
of rights here on earth, or of a rightful claim
on things. It is the same action of a man, by
which he acquires a claim to some thing as his
own, that also gives rise to a question of justice.
By the very definition, of justice (as given
above) , a rightful claim to a thing as one's own
is a claim in justice, and gives rise to the ques-
tion of justice.

Justice therefore also has to do very much
with things, and it is measured in terms of the
things to which one has claim. Hence these
things are also called the remote matter of jus-

89



tice; whereas the actions regarding those things

are called the proximate matter.

“The proper matter of justice consists in the
external actions of men in their relation to one
another; the external things, such as money and
the like, are matters of justice insofar as they

are used by men; and therefore they are the
remote matter/'

Ordinarily the persons in question do not as
such come into consideration in estimating a
case of justice. As long as justice arises out of
claims that are fundamental rights of all men,

the character or individuality of the persons in

question should be ignored; in such matters the

rights of all men are equal, regardless of per-
sonal differences. In that sense justice makes no
distinction of persons.

But when different rights arise by virtue of
different circumstances and conditions surround-

ing certain persons by reason of official positions
in the community or in a society, then a dis-
tinction of persons in their representative capa-

city does not enter into the question of jus-

tice. Such official conditions and circumstances
do make an objective, not an imaginary, dif-
ference. “For striking a person in authority is
deserving of greater punishment, since it is a
greater offense"—not against the person per se
but on account of his official character.

All justice centers about the notion of equal-
ity. The latter is two-fold, and so gives rise to
two distinct types of justice. It is very im-

40



portant to distinguish properly between these,

and to keep them well apart in deciding any

cases of justice.

First, equality may be absolute. This is the
equality between two things that stand on the
same footing, one in relation to the other. This
equality exists where two things or persons are
viewed from an angle that gives neither of the
two any prominence or superiority over the
other.

As soon as judgment between two things is
concerned with the relative values of two things
in reference to something higher or lower, and
the relative values are different for each of the

two things, the equality between them is no
longer of the first kind, or absolute. It is then

proportional, or relative.

An example given by Thomas to illustrate
this second kind of equality is that of the fingers

of the human hand. In one sense the fingers of
the hand may all be said to be equal as fingers.
Yet they have not only different positions on
the hand, but are also of different sizes and abili-
ties, and they have different functions to per-
form in relation to the hand or the whole per-
son. Moreover, one finger under the circum-

stances could not at all perform the functions

done so well by another. Hence the equality that
undoubtedly exists between the fingers belongs

to the second and not to the first type of equal-
ity. “The fingers are not absolutely equal, but
are proportionately or relatively so, since in

41



quantity each finger suffices for performing it&

duty/'

According to these two types of equality there
are also two chief kinds of justice between men.

One of these has to do with the relations of
two persons when they meet, so to say, as man
to man. This kind of justice "consists in mutual
giving and receiving, as in buying and selling,
and in other exchanges of this kind; and this
the Philosopher calls commutative justice. . . ^
The other consists in distributing, and is called
distributive justice. According to it the governor

or dispenser of goods gives to each one accord-

ing to his dignity" or relative merit.

In commutative justice there is equality be-

tween the giver and the receiver, the latter get-
ting what is due him by reason of what he has
previously given the former. Now, since anyone
should receive from another exactly as much as
he has in turn given, this type of justice strictly

follows arithmetical proportion. As far as hu-
manly possible, it should attain absolute equal-
ity of justice between the two persons.

In distributive justice different quantities are

distributed to different persons in accordance

with each one's desert. In this there is no re-
quirement for strict quantitative equality, but

merely equality of proportion of shares. The
basis of distributive justice is "geometrical pro-

portion, in which the same proportion is pre-
served, but not the same quantity."

This lies in the very nature of human life.
Persons are equal fundamentally as men or per-

42



sons, but they often differ greatly as to per-

sonal abilities, spirit, or services rendered. Where
several contribute to a common enterprise, their
contributions will differ because of these differ-

ences, and again because in any cooperative work
the several men must needs perform different
functions. Each one is strictly entitled to his
own share of the common result; that is, each
one according to his contribution. Since the con-

tributions differ, the rights of all can be satisfied

only by distributive justice.

12. Buying and Selling

The question of justice has one of its most
frequent applications in the universal practice

of buying and selling. This is an action in which
the two parties objectively stand on an equal
footing; it is a matter of absolute equality be-

tween them, as far as such equality is ascertain-
able.

At all events, the general conditions of a just
or an unjust transaction can be laid down very
definitely in theory, even if in practice it may
be hard to determine the exact status of a par-

ticular instance.

There is injustice in the mutual action of
buying and selling whenever a thing is not
bought or sold for its right price. “That is, eith-
er if the price exceeds the quantitative value of

the thing, or if on the other hand the thing
exceeds the price—hence to sell dearer or to buy
cheaper than the thing is worth, is itself an in-

justice/'

43



Here we again have an opinion that seems
extremely naive to the man of today. We are so
accustomed to paying as little as possible for
the things we purchase, to buy them at the low-
est price possible, nay, to rejoice whenever we
think we had to pay less for a thing than it is
worth—that we forget altogether to inquire
about the morality of the action. This in un-
doubtedly greatly due to the fact that there is no
bartering today, but only sale on the basis of
take-it-or-leave-it fixed prices. Then the prac-
tice in our day of monopoly prices or of con-
certed raising of prices gives the advantage so

greatly to the seller that people in general feel

they usually overpay for goods rather than not.

St. Thomas drew the full consequences of
his view. Underpaying for goods bought, or
receiving overpay for goods sold is a violation

of justice. In either case there is an unjust loss

inflicted by one party on the other, and every
case of such injustice calls for restitution. “He
who receives more”than his just due in the trans-
action, “must recompense him who has suffered
the loss, if there be a notable loss.”

St. Thomas well recognizes the difficulty or
impossibility of determining a just price exactly.

Hence “it must be judged by a type of estima-
tion in which a small addition or diminution
does not take away the quality of justice.” Ac-
cording to his general practical rule, the indi-

vidual must guide himself in such instances by
the judgment of prudent men.

44



But how then must the latter go about the
matter of determining a just price? What are
the general factors that enter into such a judg-

ment? Thomas mentions several, which have
been considered such from time immemorial.
And they still hold today, even if they do not
give us a definite, quantitative handrule for the

measurement of prices.

The value that goods have for men is general-
ly something more than, or other than, a mere
quantitative value objectively determined as far

as possible. For instance, one man may be in
possession of a thing that he needs, whereas an-

other man may desire it still more than the
owner. For the latter to sell it under the cir-

cumstances, is to undergo a loss by depriving
himself of a thing of which he has need.

"In such a case the just price will look not

only to the objective value of the thing, but to

the loss sustained by the seller in selling it. Thus
it may be lawful to sell a thing dearer than it is
worth in itself, although it may not be sold for
more than it is worth to the one who owns it/'

As soon as the circumstances are altered, the
case is also different. "If the buyer is greatly

helped by the thing he receives, but if he who
sells it suffers no deprivation by getting rid of
it, the seller may not charge more. For the use-
fulness that accrues to the buyer does not come
from the seller but from the condition (need or
desire) of the buyer, and no one should sell to
another what is not his own, although he may

45



charge up to the other any loss he himself suf-
fers/'

In simple but forceful words Thomas here
analyzes one of the commonest injustices in
business. As soon as a price is added to, merely
because a buyer has need of a certain thing,

then the seller is charging extra for something

that is not his own, something to which he has
no claim. Such an additional price is unjust!

It is therefore not the intrinsic value of things

as such that decides their price, but the use-value.
‘

'The chief consideration is the utility of the

thing for man. Hence it is not necessary for the
seller or buyer to know the hidden qualities of
the thing, but only those by which the thing
acquires its usefulness. E.g whether a horse is

strong, and runs well, and the like."

Prices, moreover, depend on the abundance
of the goods to be sold; hence they will be dif-

ferent in different localities for the same kind

of goods. Who is to determine this matter?
Those most interested in the financial transac-
tions?

"In every place it is up to the directors of
the state to determine what are the just prices
of things, both the condition of the place and

that of the goods being taken into consideration.

Hence it is not lawful to step beyond the prices

thus installed by public authority or by cus-
tom."

Prices may therefore not be artificially raised
for the sake of gain. For every selling of a thing

46



dearer than it was bought, some good reason

must obtain,
“If one buys a thing, not for the sake of re-

selling it, but to keep it, and later sells it for

some reason or other, it is not a (disreputable)

business transaction even if he sell it dearer.

He can lawfully do this, either because he im-
proved the thing in some way, or because the

price of the thing is different by reason of a dif-
ferent locality, or of time, or of risk assumed by
carrying the thing from place to place, or ship-
ping it. And in all these cases, neither buying
nor the selling is unjust.”

The whole theory of Thomas, as of Aris-
totle, on this matter has been summed up as
follows: “In the determination of value the fol-

lowing factors are distinguished: Need, Utility,

Work, Expense, Rareness. The basic concept
among these is need. To have economic value
means to be able to satisfy social needs.”

13. Distributive Justice

The economic theorists of the Middle Ages,
says Brant, an authoritative student of the sub-

ject, did not work out a definite theory of the
distribution of goods. The spirit of the times,
however, did not look with favor upon situa-
tions such as are so familiar to us; that is, “sit-

uations of opulency that could not be related

to public and social service.” The medieval
spirit of the time of St. Thomas was distinctly
“hostile to an indolent and delicate life; it
preached the duty of work, the proper use of

47



goods; it is desirous of seeing the common good
attained; but a theory of the better distribution

of goods is nowhere unfolded from the eco-
nomic point of view/'

Distributive justice, as we have seen, treats
different persons differently, but always with

good reason. Hence there is in it no "acceptation
of persons," such as St. Thomas declared to run
counter to true justice.

Acceptation of persons, he says, takes place

when persons receive privileged treatment out of
relation altogether to the conditions of service

that might give them special dignity. Some
persons are then given special benefits for the

mere reason that they were able to have them-

selves considered as so privileged, and without
having given the added service, either in quan-

tity or kind, that ’would justify such privileged

treatment.

In such treatment, Aquinas says simply, there

is real inequality "insofar as we give something
to a person out of all proportion (to his de-

serts) , in which proportion the equality of jus-

tice consists." Thomas would have made short
shrift of some of the absurd salaries that have
been paid to "accepted persons" in the economic

life of our own day.
It is in distributive justice that a distinction

of persons is in place. In all human society,
made up of many different members and sup-
ported and sustained only by the different serv-
ices contributed by the different members, true

48



justice must take these differences into account*

There is no sense in speaking of an absolute

equality between men in this regard, since the
real situation is that of differences in both abil-

ities and importance of functions and of con-

tributions. Here true justice and equality can

only be observed, if the proportionate relation

of all the contributions to the whole social un-
dertaking is kept in mind. True justice, which
is distributive in the nature of the case, must
needs rest on a proper distinction of persons.
The recompense of the wage earner is today

often treated only from the standpoint of dis-
tributive justice. St. Thomas knew nothing of
the relation of wage-earners to the gigantic in-

dustrial enterprise of our day, in regard to which
the question of distributive justice is all-im-

portant.

Nor was he seemingly acquainted with a labor
contract theory, according to which it is held
just to give to the laborer any recompense he
can be made willing to work for.
The paying of a laborer for the work he has

done is distinctly a case of commutative justice
for Aquinas. Employer and employee are both
obliged to observe equality of exchange insofar

as that can be humanly determined. Anything
else is unjust.

“When one man works in the vineyard of
another, the latter is made debtor to the former
in accordance with the value of the former's
labor. . . . That is called just in our work,
which answers to the equality with another/*

49



And that equality is satisfied only when "the
recompense of a salary" truly measures up to
the "services rendered."

St. Thomas knew little of the application of
distributive justice within the field of economic

life as such. The most recurrent application for
him was in the relation of the ruler to his sub-
jects. Had the complex type of economic enter-
prise of our own day existed at his time, he
would have found few instances where it does
not have its direct application.

Yet even in his time, there were forms of
economic activity in which the principle of just
distribution was necessarily called into play. In
such instances there was never a wavering, but
always a clearcut application of the principles of

distributive justice. Thus "in mercantile enter-
prises undertaken by a common fund those who
gave more receive more."

It is such an application of the principle that

Aquinas would undoubtedly have made to every
type of complex collective enterprise of our own
day. To each one according to his contribution
to the entire project, no more than that to any
so-called privileged parties, and no less than
that to any so-called underdogs! And for him
such application would have been made, not as
a concession to Christian charity, but as a basic

demand of justice.

There is another factor, outside the domain
of commutative justice, that has to do with

the amount of recompense given to labor. It is

50



the matter of size of family, to which we refer
today in terms of a living family wage.

Today we base the demand for a larger wage
to be given to the head of a family on the greater
needs of such a man (and his dependents)

.

Not so long ago the question could not have been
discussed without sneers at or lamentations over

the existence of large families. But white civili-
zation has already arrived at a point where some
states offer a bonus, not so much as a reward
but as an inducement, for producing larger

families.

From the notes of Thomas, as completed after
his death by one of his disciples, we have the
following statement of the family wage:

“Families do not always increase equally,
since it happens that one father has many chil-
dren and another none. It is impossible for these
to have the same possessions, since then one
family would lack victuals while the other
would abound in them. This would be against
the order of nature, since the family that is

larger adds more to the stability of the state
than the other, and so by a sort of natural right
merits to be better provided for by the public
law.”

14. The Position of Labor

It WILL surprise many persons to know that
St. Thomas mentions slaves and slavery without
condemning the latter institution outright. But
he comes in contact with the subject chiefly

51



in his commentaries on Aristotle. There he is
satisfied to repeat and to explain further the
views of that Greek philosopher.

In the times of St. Thomas, the institution of
serfdom was still a recognized part of the social
structure. But the serf, although tied to the soil,
was already far removed from the condition
of the pagan slave.

Thomas speaks of servants (most likely
bond-servants) as necessary to mankind for the
administration of the necessaries of life. But he
does not fail to speak up for allowing them the
use of free will and of a certain power of self-
determination in obeying those who command
them. While this still seems very unsatisfactory
for us today, he does come out clearly on the
rights of all men, including slaves.

“In those things which pertain to interior
decisions of will, man need not obey man, but
God alone. Man must obey man in those things
which are to be done externally through the
body. But man need not obey man, but God
alone, in things which pertain to the nature
of the body. For all men are by nature equal;
that is, in regard to those things which pertain
to the support of the body, and the generation

of offspring. Hence in the question of contract-

ing marriage, or of preserving virginity, or other

similar things, slaves need not obey their mas-

ters, nor children their parents. But in matters
pertaining to the ordering of human activities
and human affairs, the subject must obey his

52



superior in accordance with the latter's rank of

superiority; . . . the slave (or servant) must

obey his master in those things which pertain

to the performance of servile work/'

The society of the Middle Ages was still
definitely divided into strata. This must be kept

in mind constantly. From the standpoint of
Christian principles it may have had this ad-
vantage: Everyone was aware that some men
were favored by social rank, while others were
not and were moreover relatively unable to keep

themselves; as a consequence the duty of the

more favored to help the less fortunate was an
accepted principle at the time.

Today there are in practice social strata among
us, based on the possession of wealth. But in
principle we acknowledge no such division, and
adhere to the view that, since all are equal, they

are equally able to help themselves. The conse-
quence is often a most unfeeling disregard for
the condition of the less favored on the part of
those who are more favored and who could
easily help the others.

Next to the slaves in rank, according to St.
Thomas, are those “who hired ,out their labor
for the reward of money." These are ordinarily
poor, “seeking their daily food by their labor;
whence the law properly orders that their wage
be given them without delay, lest they be want-
ing in food."

In a similar way other workers, who ply
various trades, are still spoken of by Thomas as

53



being on a low status, and as usually quite
needy. But this is due, in his mind, not so much
to the intrinsic nature of labor, as to the condi-

tion of poverty that accompanies some types of
labor.

In the eyes of the old Greeks, who were
distinctly children of their own day—as we all
are—it was considered menial, and disgraceful
to work for a livelihood. Their civilization
rested in fact on a social division in which the
vast majority of men were the slaves of the
minority, and in which work was considered
the proper function of slaves, hence degrading

for the true citizen.

St. Thomas is, of course, not of this mind.
He bases the general duty of work on the need
of a livelihood, it is true. But the position of
work as a means of livelihood, and as an ele-
ment of human life, is applied to all men and
is shared by all professions.

If the technical arts, he asks, are a means to
livelihood, how much more should not the lib-
eral arts and professions assure a man his living?
Again, each man is not at all sufficient unto
himself, he is greatly dependent on others and
on society for many things. There must conse-
quently be a differentiation of labor in society,

for which there are different inclinations and
different abilities in men.

From this Thomas draws the conclusion that
the ordinary duty of work binds all men, and
arises out of the general duty of cooperating in

54



the maintenance and furthering of social life.

In this scheme of life indolence has no place.

He would countenance no class of
*

"idle rich.”

Far from finding moral justification for idle-
ness, where men do not need to work for liveli-
hood, Aquinas mentions even personal moral
reasons for the general duty to work, over and

above the social reason just referred to.

“Manual labor is ordained towards four ends.
First of all and principally, for obtaining vic-
tuals; . . . secondly, for avoiding indolence,

from which many evils arise; . . . thirdly, for
checking concupiscence insofar as labor disci-

plines the body; . . . fourthly, for giving

alms. . .

The dignity of work and the natural right of
equitable recompense for one's work both derive
from the same principle, the intimate relation
of the work to the person of the worker. A
man's labor is not something merely incidental

to his person, it is the very expression of the

latter, flesh of its flesh, bone of its bone, so to
say. Hence labor derives its dignity from the
person, and the treatment we accord the labor is
in reality treatment accorded the man.

“It is in the nature of a being to live, and
consequently to exercise activity. There is no
life without some exercise of vital powers. . . .
He who performs actually is in some way the
very thing he makes . For the action of the mover
or doer is in the thing moved or receiving this
action. Hence the artificers as well as the poets

55



and the benefactors love their work, because
they love themselves/'

Were it possible to tell Thomas that today
many workers really hate their work, he would
simply reply: There must be something very
unnatural either about the workers, or about

the work itself or the conditions surrounding it.

15. Factors in Production

If ALL labor were of one and the same kind,
the world might be intolerably monotonous and
dull, but all work would then be measurable
by a single common standard, and it would be
easy to decide the question of relative recom-

pense for each man's labor. Or again, if in any
more complex business undertaking, all the men
would in turn perform every type of work, so
that there would be no permanent division of
labor among the different cooperators, the mat-
ter of a just recompense for each one's contri-

bution to the whole would not be the com-
plicated problem it is in fact.

In our own day specialization and division of
labor in any large industry seem to have reached

the highest point possible. One may well doubt
whether the Value of individual contributions

to the whole enterprise can be determined even

approximately.

In the time of St. Thomas there was some
division of labor in common enterprises, as we
shall see later. In regard to other factors that

56



enter into the making of things, there are some
that existed in his day just as they do today,

for instance that of the raw materials. All the
ordinary kinds of productive work are performed
with the aid and use of various types of ma-
terial goods. These also contribute their share

to the entire product and cannot be ignored as
factors contributing to the being and the value

of the finished product, even if some labor theo-
ries of our own day seem to hold the contrary.

Thus “the builder is the cause of the house
in regard to its coming into existence, but not
directly of its total being. For evidently the

being of the house follows the form, and the
form is a certain order and composition depend-
ent also on the nature of certain materials. For
as the cook cooks food by employing some pow-
ers of nature, namely fire; so the builder oper-
ates by using cement, stones, and wood, which
are capable of receiving a form and composi-
tion, and of retaining them. Hence the being
of the house depends on the nature of these
things; while its coming into existence depends
on the action of the builder/'
The human action is paramount in giving

existence to the new product, and therefore to
the new economic value deriving from the ex-
istence of new useful products. But insofar as
the raw materials are indispensable prerequisites
for production, there is a first contribution to

the general product made by nature prior to all
human activity, without which the latter could
do nothing.

57



'Tor whoever makes something out of any-
thing, his action presupposes that out of which
he makes the thing, and the latter is itself not
produced by that action. Thus the artificer works
on natural things, like wood, metal, which are
not produced by his action but by the action
of nature. And nature itself causes these things
only as to the form they have, presupposing
the existence of the matter/'

In speaking more definitely of the different
factors of production, St. Thomas presupposes
knowledge of what one might call the philoso-
phy or the doctrine of causes. In general there
are four factors, called by him as by Aristotle
causes, that enter into the making of some new
article:

First, there is the material cause

,

the raw ma-
terials, or matter, out of which the new thing
is made.

Secondly, there is the formal cause, that is,

the thing added to or done to the raw materials
in order to make them into a new product.
Thus, when a statue is made out of wood or
marble, the latter is the material cause; and the

form (the word is used in a wider sense) that
is added to the raw material to make it the
exact statue it is, constitutes the formal cause

in thomistic language.

Thirdly, there is the efficient cause . That is
the action of the agent or worker who produces
the new article, or effects the change from the
raw materials to the finished new product. So

58



in a loose sense the sculptor can be called the

efficient cause of the statue; more strictly it is

the action of the sculptor in making the statue
or the sculptor in the act of carving or chiselling.

Fourthly, there is the final cause. This is often

called the end, that is, the end in view, or the

aim in mind. In the above instance it would be
the sculptor's idea or mental pattern according

to which he
.

guided his action of sculptoring.

Strictly it is the idea, not as a mere picture in

mind, but insofar as the idea is actively guiding

or influencing the action of the sculptor in mak-
ing his statue.

From this outline of the thomistic theory
of causes, one can see more readily what the
contributing value of each is in the production

of the total result. It shows us in particular the
position of the material cause spoken of above.

''Since there are four kinds of causes, the

material cause is not the source of action, but

is rather the subject receiving the effect of the

action. It is the end, and the agent, and the form,
that are the sources of action, but again in a

definite order. For the first source of action is
the end, which moves the man to action. Sec-
ond is the agent himself. Third is the form,
which is produced by the action of the agent/'

In this quotation, Thomas is describing the
temporal sequence of the factors, rather than

their intrinsic importance, or their proportional

contribution to the whole activity and the re-
sultant product.

59



16. Distributive Recompense

St. THOMAS places much importance on the
relative amount of labor expended in the pro-
duction of things, when there is question of
the value of finished products. It is to a great

extent the amount of labor expended on different
products that determines the relative exchange

value of one product over against another.

He uses as an illustration of his principle two
things economically as far apart as a pair of

shoes and a house. In order to have a just ex-
change, he says, the number of shoes given for
one house must be proportionate to the labor
and expenses undergone by the builder of the
house over against that of the shoemaker.

'Tor if this be not observed/' he continues,
"there would be no exchange, and men would
not trade with one another." This conclusion
may have held in the simple economic days of
Thomas when tradesmen and workers were rela-
tively much more independent and self-sufficient.
In our day of complex economic life, prices can
be adjusted almost entirely in proportion to the

need either for the article, or for the selling of

one's labor. And the man who does not agree to
paying the high price demanded, or to working
at the low wage offered, is only free to starve.
Thomas mentions another consequence that

would occur, if amount and value of labor are
not decisive in determining the price of a prod-

uct. Here, too, he may give us pause to think.
"For it would destroy the arts if he who makes

60



something would not receive for it as much as
he put into it. Hence we must measure the work
of one artificer by that of another in such a way
as to have a just exchange/'

Yet not all human work is on a par. We
cannot simply measure the labor of one man
against that of another in terms of quantity,

or of amount of time spent on it. The quality
of mind enters into all human work, not only
to differentiate it from all non-human action,
but also to distinguish the labor contribution of

one man from that of another.
The feature distinguishing man's work from

that of brute animals, Thomas will aways in-
sist, is that man uses his reason. While it is the
instinct of nature that leads brute animals to

action, men proceed under the impetus of rea-
son .which guides their actions.

Reason plays its part in man's work in vari-
ous ways. In the production of anything “we
must consider two things: The action of the
artificer which is directed by his art, and the
work itself that is produced by it. Now the ac-
tion itself is threefold. First there is the consid-

eration of how a thing is to be made; then there
is the work to be done on the external materials;
and finally the production of the work itself."

In the making of a thing an artificer tries
to produce the best, not the best in itself, but

the best according to the purpose of the thing.

Thus he will make a saw out of iron, not out of
glass although the latter would look more beau-

61



tiful, since such beauty would impede the pur-
pose of the saw.

All of this shows us the important role
of brain in work. '‘To know the aptitudes of
things, and their relation to one another, is pos-
sible only for the possessor of intellect. ... It
is necessary that all directing occur through the

use of intelligence; whence also in mechanical
operations those who direct any kind of activi-
ties are called wise in those activities/'

This should indicate the relative values of
different kinds of labor in a common enterprise:
of labor that is chiefly directive, or brain work,

and labor that is chiefly the execution of orders,

or brawn work. In cooperative work, there is
a natural scale of values for the appraisal of the

parts played by the different kinds of work.

“In craftwork we have the artificer who
works only with his hand, executing the com-
mands of another and himself not command-
ing; for example, the one who prepares the raw
materials ; then the one who commands the
worker preparing the materials and who himself
gives the form to the work; furthermore there
is the one who himself does no (manual) la-
bor, but only commands, having in mind the
ideas regarding the work as these exist in the
end or plan which he has projected." The lat-
ter is the highest man in the work. The artificer
who gives the final form or finish is higher than
the others, since he does what they cannot do,
and in turn directs the work of the mere pre-

6£



parers, telling them how to prepare the materials.
The above ideas are from the earliest writ-

ings of St. Thomas. In one of his latest works
he comes back to the same point, mentioning

the same threefold general division and hier-

archy of labor as a basis for distributive recom-

pense. Of highest importance, he says again, is
the guiding mind, then next are the intermedi-

aries who do the finishing touches of the work,
the finer part of it and the more skillful, and
finally those who do the preparatory rough
work.

From the principles mentioned above, it is
at once evident that the recompense for labor

should range in scale between the different work-
ers according to the value and importance of
their contributions to the entire enterprise. Of
contributions of money as such to the enterprise,
Thomas knew nothing in this connection. But
there is no doubt and some of his views on
investing money with merchants bear this out

—

that it would have been deemed by him con
trary to all reason to give a minimum fixed re-
compense to active labor, brain and brawn, and
the real profits to the passive contributors of

money.

Nihil Obstat: William Busch,
Censor Deputatus

.

IMPRIMATUR: JOHN GREGORY MURRAY,
Archbishop of St. Paul. September 12, 1934 .

63







".
. . it is a pleasure to commend “Der Wan-

derer” and "The Wanderer,” two publications
which are issued within the territory of our arch-
diocese with our cordial approval. The place which
they have gained in the field of Catholic journalism
is a guarantee of their fitness to be welcomed in every
Catholic home.”

+ John Gregory Murray,
Archbishop of St. Paul.

4,
The Catholics who read "The Wanderer” reg-

ularly will find it a most reliable guide in all re-
ligious and social questions that today puzzle so
many of our people. I hope and trust that the
pastors of our diocese will do all they can to secure
readers for your very thorough and thoroughly
Catholic paper.”

Joseph F. Busch,
Bishop of St. Cloud.

“.
. . All things considered, “The Wanderer

0
is

the best weekly that comes to my desk. To me its
weekly visit is a real joy.”

Rev. F. X. LASANCE, Cincinnati, O.
*

The WANDERER is a modern Catholic political
and economic review. It presents the informed
Catholic viewpoint on all matters of public in-
terest. The news of the week is covered in a well
rounded-out survey combining the news recorded
with editorial comment. There are, in addition, sev-
en columns per week of editorials on the views and
trends of the day. A page is devoted to articles of
interest to the family; there is a literary page; local
news and ecclesiastical news is treated briefly on the
last page.

In no other Catholic publication in America will
you find a greater variety of interesting reading and
informative matter. You owe it to yourself to in-
vestigate The Wanderer.

For Sample Copies write to:

WANDERER PRINTING COMPANY
128 East Tenth Street, St. Paul, Minn.