key: cord-0856128-6l34paa0
authors: Anyanwu, John C.; Salami, Adeleke O.
title: The impact of COVID‐19 on African economies: An introduction
date: 2021-05-05
journal: Afr Dev Rev
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8268.12531
sha: 334d9523494d930cc559141a0c0fb220691662c5
doc_id: 856128
cord_uid: 6l34paa0

nan

Over the last 14 months, Africa and the entire world experienced the worst Socioeconomic challenges of alarming proportion. Specifically, on 30 December 2019, an epidemiological alert was issued by the Chinese Wuhan local health authority of the emergence of a new strand of the coronavirus-severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-which causes what has come to be known as coronavirus disease 2019 . Africa's first case of COVID-19 was recorded in Egypt on 14 February 2020, followed by Nigeria on 27 February 2020. Early in March 2020, Algeria, Cameroon, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia reported positive cases. From then, the virus spread to all over Africa as in other parts of the globe.

With the exception of a few, most governments all over the world initially downplayed the pandemic until it turned to sustained community-level transmission. Once governments noticed cases getting out of hand, the first response became mask mandates, closure of the international borders, with more stringent social distancing measures, and subsequent physical restrictions (lockdowns and shutdowns) of the Socioeconomic activities to restrict human movements, excepting those on essential services like medical and security personnel. Testing, tracking, therapeutic management of those infected as well as quarantines and isolation of positive cases became the norm.

Governments' economic responses included fiscal (budget support for the health sector, through either reprioritization or expansionary policy), expansionary monetary and macro-financial policies, as well as exchange rate/ balance of payments adjustments. These responses were adjusted according to local country conditions as the pandemic progressed. Following the approval of some vaccines for emergency use in developed countries, vaccination is gradually progressing in Africa-after what was dubbed 'vaccine nationalism' in parts of Europe, preventing the exportation of vaccines to Africa, and thus prompting the intervention of Covax (the GAVI Vaccine Alliance) to help procure vaccines for African countries.

International financial institutions (including the African Development Bank) collectively mobilized a global response package of US$230 billion between 2020 and 2021, to aid the global response to the coronavirus pandemic. The funds were raised to reduce the pandemic's impact, of which US$75 billion were to be directed to the world's poorest countries in 2020. The African Development Bank (AfDB) in April 2020 created the US$10 billion COVID-19 Rapid Response Facility (CRF), and launched a US$3 billion 'Fight COVID-19 Social Bond', the largest of its kind at the time to combat the crisis. Also, AfDB approved a grant of US$27.33 million to the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) meant to support the continental strategy on COVID-19. There is also the African Union (AU) COVID-19 Response Fund, aimed at raising resources to strengthen the continental response to COVID-19 by supporting pool procurement of diagnostics and other medical commodities by Africa CDC for distribution to the Member States, and mitigating the pandemic's Socioeconomic and humanitarian impact on African populations. All entities and individuals can contribute to the fund, provided that the objectives and purpose of these are not inconsistent with the AU's purpose and objectives.

We note that highly contagious mutants of the SARS-Cov-2 variants have emerged in the United Kingdom (B.1.1.7), South Africa (B.1.351), Brazil (P.1, which causes the E484K mutation), California (L452R), New York (B.1.526) and India (new 'double mutant' variant-L452R and E484Q mutations coming together), among others. These have engaged experts to determine their impacts, especially their impact on the effectiveness of vaccines approved so far for emergency use-Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson & Johnson (mostly deployed in the United States and a few developed countries) and AstraZeneca (mostly being used in the United Kingdom, parts of Europe and Africa).

The rest of this introduction to the special issue can be adumbrated as follows. Section 2 examines COVID-19 confirmed and active cases in Africa. Section 3 discusses the Socioeconomic effects of COVID-19 on African economies, and Section 4 summarizes the papers selected for this special issue. Section 5 presents a brief conclusion.

As the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated, Socioeconomic damage was increasing in Africa and all over the world. However, the curve of the pandemic within and outside the continent is flattening gradually in some individual countries while rising in others. Accordingly, as of 7 March 2021, about a year after the first coronavirus was detected in Africa, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases had reached 116,830,061 globally, the majority of which (30.2%) occurred in Europe, followed by North America (28.6%), Asia (21.9%), South America (15.9%) and Africa (3,964,055 or 3.4%). It must be noted that though Africa's reported confirmed cases (see Figure 1 ) are the lowest globally, testing has been extremely low in the continent. From a regional perspective, confirmed cases were highest in Southern Africa (47.4%), followed by North Africa (29.8%), West Africa (10.13%), East Africa (10.12%), and central Africa (2.6%) (see also Figure 2 ). On a country basis, 78.7% of confirmed cases were in nine countries, namely South Africa (38.4%), Morocco (12.3%), Tunisia (6.0%), Egypt (4.7%), Ethiopia (4.2%), Nigeria (4.0%), Libya (3.5%), Algeria (2.9%) and Kenya (2.7%).

The number of global active cases reached 40,250,009 as of 7 March 2021 against Africa's 317,794. Active cases in Africa showed a downward trend from the end of December 2020 (see Figure 1 ). From a regional perspective, North Africa accounted for 33.6% of active cases in Africa, followed by East Africa (27.7%), Southern Africa (23.3%), West Africa (12.2%), and Central Africa (3.2%) (see also Figure 3 ). On a country basis, six countries account for 53.7% of the active cases in Africa as of this date. These countries are Algeria (32,157), Egypt (31,489), South Africa (29,516), Tunisia (27, 104), Ethiopia (25, 209) and Uganda (25, 065) .

In terms of new cases, a clear case of two-wave periods-June/July/August 2020 and December 2021/January 2021-can be noticed in Africa, as demonstrated in Figure 4 . Unfortunately, a third wave is underway.

As with previous pandemics-H1N1 in 1918 -1919 (Spanish flu), H2N2 in 1957 -58 (Asian flu), H3N2 in 1968 -1969 , and H1N1 in 2009-2010 (swine flu), and HIV/AIDS (1980s)-COVID-19′s channels of economic impacts include demand-side and supply-side channels. Demand-side channels capture the effects on consumption, investment, trade, and travel (working through avoidance, fear, and uncertainty), while supply-side channels capture workforce and supply-chain disruptions, business closures, and rising costs of doing business (World Bank, 2020). The F I G U R E 2 Regional distribution of total confirmed COVID-19 cases as of 7 effects have been amplified by demographic profiles (especially the young vs. the old), poor health care systems, poor or lack of social safety nets, cross-country spillovers due to travels, and governments' macroeconomic responses (including their credibility).

The COVID-19 pandemic and the measures deployed by governments and private sector institutions to contain its spread-lockdowns, quarantines, social distancing, travel bans and restrictions, masking requirements, shutdowns of non-essential activities-have caused severe socioeconomic dislocations on African economies. Many African governments responded with programs to mitigate personal hardship and disruptions to economic life. At the same time, central banks have cut policy rates and injected liquidity on an extraordinary scale in the economies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the pandemic and the actions taken to contain it have exacted substantial costs on African economies, including deep economic contractions. Specifically, some of the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are enumerated below.

The human cost of COVID-19 has been enormous. Apart from the human suffering of the confirmed cases, loss of human capital has been devastating. The number of global deaths due to coronavirus reached 2,593,210 by 7 March 2021, with Africa accounting for 4.1% at 105,713 (see Figure 1 as well). Southern Africa accounted for 54.6% of African deaths at that date, followed by North Africa (31.8%), East Africa (7.1%), West Africa (4.9%), and Central Africa (1.7%) (see Figure 5 also). On country basis, five countries with the highest number of reported deaths due to COVID-19 since the start of the pandemic, were South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, ranging from 50,678 in South Africa to 3013 in Algeria.

The case fatality rate (CFR) or deaths per confirmed cases for Africa stood at 2.7% by 7 March 2021. This was higher than the global CFR rate of 2.2%. From a regional perspective, West Africa had the lowest CFR at 1.3%, followed by Central Africa at 1.7%, East Africa at 1.9%, North Africa at 2.8%, and Southern Africa at 3.1%, which was higher than the African average. From a country perspective, as of 7 March 2021, 16 African countries, namely Sudan (6.2%), Egypt (5.9%), Liberia (4.2%), Mali (4.2%), Zimbabwe (4.1%), Comoros (4.1%), Eswatini (3.8%), Niger (3.7%), Somalia (3.6%), Tunisia (3.5%), Chad (3.4%), Malawi (3.3%), South Africa (3.3%), The Gambia (3.2%), Lesotho (2.9%) and DRC (2.7%), recorded case fatality rates higher than or equal to the African average. As Figure 6 shows, daily deaths followed the two waves of daily confirmed cases shown in Figure 4 .

In terms of vaccinations, 10,109,006 vaccinations had been administered in Africa, representing just 1.9% of total global vaccinations, as of 28 March 2021. Out of the African total to date, Morocco accounts for 75.5% of the vaccinations. However, with respect to the vaccines proportionate to population size, Seychelles has administered vaccines to 98.1% of its population, taking second place globally after Israel, which has achieved 100% coverage (African Development Bank, 2021b).

Africa has been hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the African Development Bank (2021c) estimating that economic growth in the continent shrank by 2.1% in 2020. Economic growth is forecast to resume at a moderate average pace of 3.4% in 2021 before leaping to 4.6% in 2022 (see Figure 7) , underpinned by an expected rebound in F I G U R E 5 Regional distribution of total COVID-19 deaths as of 7 March 2021. Note: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019. Source: Authors, using African Development Bank (2021a) commodity prices, resumption of tourism, a rollback of pandemic-induced restrictions, widespread roll-out of COVID-19 vaccinations, and barring persistent outbreaks in several countries, both in the continent and its trading partners. However, the overall African average masks regional differences. Among Africa's sub-regions, the hardest hit in terms of economic growth is Southern Africa, whose growth is estimated to have fallen by 7.0% in 2020. It is followed by Central Africa (−2.7%), West Africa (−1.5%), and North Africa (−1.1%). East Africa, which is least dependent on natural resources, managed an estimated 0.7% growth in 2020 ( Figure 8 ).

The overall African average masks marked differences with respect to key natural resources-dependent economies. As shown in Figure 9 , among oil-exporting countries, Libya was the hardest hit with a steep fall in estimated GDP growth in 2020 at 60.3%, followed by Equatorial Guinea (−6.1%), Algeria (−4.7%), Angola (−4.5%), and Nigeria (−3%).

Among key metals and mineral-dependent economies, Botswana's economy was estimated to have contracted by 8.9%, followed by South Africa (−8.2%), Zambia (−4.9%), and Liberia (−3.1%) (Figure 9 ). Key tourism-dependent economies were not spared either, due to travel restrictions: the Mauritian economy was estimated to have declined by 15%, followed by Seychelles (-12%), and Cabo Verde (−8.9%) ( Figure 10 ). F I G U R E 8 Africa's key oil-dependent economies: growth estimates and projections F I G U R E 9 Africa's key metals and minerals-dependent economies: growth estimates and projections. Source: Authors, using African Development Bank (2021c) data F I G U R E 10 Africa's key tourism-dependent economies: growth estimates and projections 3.3 | COVID-19 pandemic, exchange rates, inflation and debt Apart from the 2.1% decline in economic growth in Africa, other macroeconomic fundamentals have weakened as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, as African Development Bank (2021c) has observed, large exchange rate depreciations occurred in Africa partly as a result of the disruptions in external financial flows, including remittances, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and official development assistance. Indeed, exchange rates across the continent remained about 5% weaker than levels before the pandemic, on average, following sharp depreciation in the first half of 2020. Also, according to the African Development Bank (2021c), counterbalancing forces in Africa kept average headline inflation stable at 10.4% in 2020, core inflation (in food and energy prices) has risen in many countries. Inflation trends were uneven in 2020 in African countries, as persistently soft demand helped contain inflationary pressures in some countries such as Kenya and South Africa. However, inflation (especially food prices) remained elevated or even accelerated in response to weaker currencies and food price pressures in others, including Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. Indeed, in some countries, rising food prices adversely affected household incomes and consumption, prompting some governments to implement policy measures to improve food provision, support the agriculture sector, and provide cash transfers to the poor.

The COVID-19 shock triggered a new round of cuts in central bank policy rates such that in most countries, the inflation rate has far outstripped the return on both short-term and long-term investment instruments. The pace of monetary policy easing across a number of countries in the continent slowed somewhat in the second half of 2020, particularly in countries experiencing inflationary pressures. Many countries, despite rising inflation, have maintained the monetary policy ease.

The year 2020 witnessed a huge increase in government indebtedness, as economic activity and government revenues sharply fell, whereas pandemic-related spending rose appreciably. Global public debt is estimated to have reached 98% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2020 compared with 84% in 2019 (International Monetary Fund, 2021a). Preliminary estimates put government debt in SSA, for example, as having jumped on average 8 percentage points to 70% of GDP (International Monetary Fund,). In cash-strapped economies, governments (including Angola and Zambia) faced severe difficulties paying their sovereign debts hence seeking debt restructuring.

Africa's fiscal deficits have been estimated to have doubled in 2020 to a historical high of 8.4% of GDP, resulting in increased debt burdens, though a gradual consolidation process is expected in 2021 and beyond (African Development Bank, 2021c). With the huge financial resources required to contain the spread of the virus and its impact on African economies, many countries resorted to large-scale external and domestic borrowing, hence the fear of an imminent future debt crisis. The growing debt emanated from requirements for emergency funds to support the health responses to the pandemic, as available resources then were insufficient to deal with the magnitude of the problem.

Many governments adopted additional discretionary monetary, financial and fiscal initiatives to soften the adverse effects on income, employment, and private balance sheets. Huge resources were also required to provide COVID-19 palliatives to vulnerable households and later purchase and distribute COVID-10 vaccines. The African Development Bank (2021c) estimates that African governments would need additional gross financing of about U $154 billion in 2020/21 to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the average debt-to-GDP ratio, a standard measure of debt sustainability, has stabilized at around 60% of GDP, it is expected to rise significantly in the short to medium term.

Estimates by the African Development Bank (2021c) indicate that international remittances to Africa fell from U$85.8 billion in 2019 to U$78.3 billion in 2020, with Lesotho, Mozambique, and Seychelles having the most significant fall. According to World Bank (2020b) projections, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are expected to decrease significantly by around 8.8% between 2019 and 2020, from U$48 billion to U$44 billion due to the COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions in movement, and their devastating impacts on the global economy. This declining trend is expected to continue in 2021 when remittances are projected to decrease by around 5.8% to reach $41 billion (World Bank, 2020b).

The decline in remittance inflows to SSA is due to a combination of factors, all driven by the COVID-19 crisis in major destination countries of the African diaspora, including EU countries, the United States, China, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: (a) SSA migrants are disproportionately affected in host countries as many are in precarious working conditions and informal jobs, with high vulnerability to contagion and loss of employment; and (b) SSA migrants are often excluded from social protection systems, health care, and government stimulus measures.

Projections for the top five SSA recipients of remittances in 2020 include Nigeria (US$21.1 billion), Ghana (US$3.2 billion), Kenya (US$2.9 billion), Senegal (US$2.3 billion) and DRC (US$1.9 billion).

Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are projected to fall by about 8.5% in 2020 (falling from an estimated US$60 billion in 2019 to US$55 billion in 2020), and 7.7% (to about US$50 billion) in 2021. The projected decline in remittances to the region can be attributed to the projected persistence of the global slowdown due to the novel coronavirus. In 2020, Egypt is projected to see around −9% growth in remittance inflows, Lebanon −7%, Jordan −12%, Morocco −5%, and Tunisia −15%. Projected 2020 top recipients in North Africa are Egypt (US$24.4 billion), Morocco (US$6.4 billion), Tunisia (US$1.7 billion), and Algeria (US$1.6 billion) (World Bank, 2020c).

The fall in remittance inflows to African countries has led to a further decline in these countries' foreign exchange revenues, an increase in food insecurity and poverty, and a decline in the overall GDP and its growth, as seen earlier.

These are jeopardizing the hard-won development gains of the past few decades. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on ODA outcomes for 2020 is uncertain, especially with increased domestic fiscal pressure in donor countries consequent upon increased government spending to contain the spread of the pandemic and to support businesses and households to reduce the adverse effect of the crisis.

With respect to foreign direct investment, it is projected by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2021) that the COVID-19 pandemic caused a dramatic drop in FDI globally in 2020. The pandemic is projected to have an immediate negative impact in 2020, with a further deterioration in 2021. UNCTAD estimates that global FDI flows fell by up to 42% in 2020, from their 2019 value of US$1.54 trillion to US$859 billion, thus bringing FDI below US$1 trillion for the first time since 2005. In 2019, FDI flows to Africa declined by 10% from US$51 billion to $46 billion (UNCTAD, 2020a), but estimated to have fallen to US$38 billion in 2020, representing a fall of 18% in 2020. The factors driving this fall include the direct impact of the pandemic, the consequent health emergency as well as the damage of extraordinary measures that governments around the world are implementing to support businesses and households. The negative impacts were worsened by low commodity prices experienced in much of 2020. It was also estimated that for Africa, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) fell by 45%, while Greenfield projects and international project financing, respectively, fell by 63% (from US$77 billion in 2019 to just US$28 billion in 2020) and 40%.

North Africa received an estimated FDI of US$9.4 billion in 2020, falling from US$14 billion in 2019. It is important to observe that Egypt remained the largest recipient of FDI in 2020 at an estimated US$5.5 billion, in spite of a significant fall of 39%. In North Africa, only Morocco's inflow was robust at an unchanged estimate of US$1.6 billion, given its relatively diversified FDI-attracting sectors. SSA, on the other hand, attracted an estimated FDI inflow of US $28 billion, representing a fall of 11% from 2019. Due to low crude oil prices in much of 2020, coupled with the closure of oil development sites at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic as a result of restrictions of movements, FDI inflows to Nigeria declined from US$3.3 billion in 2019 to US$2.6 billion in 2020. FDI inflows to South Africa almost halved to US$2.5 billion in 2020 from US$4.6 billion in 2019, though a number of large projects were announced. Although inflows to Ethiopia and Mozambique declined by 17% (to US$2.1 billion) and 6% (to US$2 billion), respectively, Senegal was one of the few countries with higher FDI inflows in 2020 as it attracted US$1.5 billion, representing a 39% increase over the previous year (UNCTAD, 2021).

Overall, the African equity capital market (ECM) activity in 2020 was the lowest in the last decade, recording a significant decline in both value and volume by 2% and 23%, respectively, compared with 2019 (PriceWatersCoppers Incorporated, 2021). The value in further offers (FOs) activity increased by 16% in 2020 compared to 2019. US$4.1 billion was raised from 50 FO transactions compared to US$3.5 billion raised from 62 transactions in 2019. Initial public offering (IPO) activity continued on the downward trend observed in the previous 4 years, with five IPOs recorded in 2020, the lowest in 10 years. Only US$0.6 billion was raised through the five IPOs in 2020 compared with US$1.25 billion raised in 2019. In 2020, data from African Markets Online (2021) 

As a result of the sharp decline of global commodity demand consequent upon travel bans and restrictions to curtail the spread of the coronavirus, most commodities' prices fell steeply (Figures 11 and 12 ). This was particularly so for those commodities used in the transport industry. Indeed, the outbreak of COVID-19 and the wide-ranging measures needed to slow its advance precipitated an unprecedented collapse in oil demand and a surge in oil inventories.

As Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate, benchmark oil prices were most affected, with the European Brent spot price plunging by 85% between late January 2020-when the first human-to-human transmissions of the virus were announced-and its trough in late April 2020. The WTI price briefly traded at negative levels, before a gradual recovery in May 2020. March 2020 featured the single largest one-month drop in oil prices on record since 1970. The price plunges also represent the largest cumulative 3-month decline in oil prices since 1970. The restrictions implemented to control the outbreak have resulted in sharp declines in travel and transport, which account for two-thirds of oil consumption and other energy-using economic activities. Africa's oil-dependent nations faced an unprecedented decline in their domestic revenues and foreign exchange earnings, thus resulting in sharp currency depreciation and drawn down on foreign reserves. In effect, the overall effect was a worsening of their fiscal positions, which were already strained even before the COVID-19 pandemic-induced collapse in oil revenues.

Metal prices declined by 24% between late January 2020 and late April 2020, representing more than one-quarter as much as they did at the peak of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. However, the prices for metals picked up quickly, driven mainly by strong demand from China. Food prices, contrary to expectations, experienced only minor declines since January 2020, reflecting their less direct relationship with economic activity (African Development F I G U R E 11 Crude oil prices (US$ monthly). Source: Authors, using data from the IMF's, (2021b) online commodity prices database F I G U R E 12 Price indices (2016 = 100)-monthly. Source: Authors, using IMF online commodity prices database ANYANWU AND SALAMI | S9 Bank, 2020; World Bank, 2021a). However, some African countries experienced localized food price spikes (due to supply shortages emanating from transport restrictions), which exceeded the rise at the global level.

As Figures 11 and 12 show, most commodity prices rebounded over the second half of 2020. Oil prices partially recovered as production fell sharply, particularly among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+). However, this rebound was more modest than the broader recovery in other commodity prices as oil demand disappointed. A much faster recovery in oil prices has been witnessed since January 2021.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2020a) estimates that global merchandise export values and volumes fell significantly in the first half of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Quarter three of 2020 saw a robust recovery in values, which grew by 20.1% from the bleak second quarter. It also projects that values and volumes of global merchandise exports are to grow in the fourth quarter by 11.6% and 3.3% quarter-over-quarter, respectively. Global merchandise export values and volumes for 2020 are projected to be −5.6% and −8.7% lower than levels seen in 2019, respectively. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2020b) therefore projects that this would be the lowest growth for merchandise export volumes since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and the second-lowest since then for merchandise export values.

The latest data from UNCTAD indicate that the export growth rate (year-on-year) fell by 2.8%, 21.8%, and 13.6% in 2020-quarter-1, 2020-quarter-2, and 2020-quarter-3, respectively. The export volume index (2005 = 100) declined from 112.8 in the last quarter of 2019 to 107.3 in quarter-1 of 2020, and to 89.2 in quarter-2 of 2020 before edging up to 97.4 in the previous quarter of 2020. On the other hand, the import growth rate (year-on-year) fell by 1.5%, 16.8%, and 8.4% in 2020-quarter-1, 2020-quarter-2, and 2020-quarter-3, respectively. Also, the import volume index (2005 = 100) declined from 215.5 in the last quarter of 2019 to 192.3 in quarter-1 of 2020, and to 170.6 in quarter-2 of 2020 before edging up to 185 in the previous quarter of 2020.

The African Development Bank (2021c) estimates that Africa's GDP per capita contracted by 10% in nominal terms in 2020, signifying sharp deterioration in the living standards of the people. As a result of the deterioration in living standards, extreme poverty headcounts among low-income countries globally are projected to increase by tens of millions of people cumulatively in 2020 and 2021, while the share of the population living in extreme poverty could rise by as much as 4 percentage points-reversing 5 years of progress in poverty reduction. Lakner et al.'s (2021) new estimates indicate that under the COVID-19-baseline scenario, 6.7% of the global population will live under the international poverty line in 2030, compared with the target level of 3%. A more dampening picture emerges when starting from the downside scenario: an extreme poverty headcount rate of 7% in 2030 would emerge. These new forecasts confirm that the 2030 target will likely not be reached under either of these two COVID-19 scenarios. Though COVID-19′s future effects carry high degrees of uncertainty, achieving the target would require that all economies grow at 8.0% (baseline) or 8.5% (downside) per capita per year, equivalent to about five times the historical growth rates for sub-Saharan Africa.

Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the decline in per capita income occasioned by the pandemic will likely spur one of the largest increases in extreme poverty: some 27 million to 40 million new poor, reflecting the large number of people who were living on the edge of poverty (Lakner et al., 2021) . Thus, the impacts of COVID-19 are expected to set back progress toward ending extreme poverty by at least 3 years in sub-Saharan Africa. Estimates by African Development Bank (2021c) indicate that about 30 million Africans were pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 as a result of the pandemic. It is also estimated that about 39 million Africans could fall into extreme poverty in 2021. Unfortunately, those with lower levels of education, few assets, and working in informal jobs are most affected. African Development Bank (2021c) projects that the monetary cost of lifting the newly extreme poor to the US$1.90 per day poverty line could be US$4.5 billion for 2021, representing about US$90.7 million on average per country. In addition, inequality (income and multidimensional) is projected to increase as a result of the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on vulnerable groups such as women, youth, and low-skilled informal sector workers.

According to the World Bank (2021b), COVID-19 has created the worst crisis to education and learning globally in a century. It states that COVID-19 is wreaking havoc on the lives of young children, students, and youth. Worse still, the disruption of societies and economies caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is aggravating the pre-existing global education crisis and is impacting education in unprecedented ways. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the learning poverty rate was closer to 90%-meaning that about 90% of all 10-year-old children in SSA could not read and understand a simple text. The African Development Bank (2021b) supports the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has long-term implications for human capital development in Africa, as almost all African countries closed schools for a protracted period because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It estimates that during the 2020 academic year, schools in Africa were closed for more than 100 days on average, representing a full semester's worth of education. In some African regions, such as East Africa and North Africa, schools were closed for much longer-an average of 140 days in East Africa and 106 days in North Africa. These average figures even mask individual country differences. For example, in some countries, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Sudan, schools were closed for more than 200 days in the 2020 academic year. In most cases, virtual or hybrid classes were not options.

Undoubtedly, protracted school closures are bound to exacerbate learning poverty and inequality and increase dropout rates, which was already at crisis levels before the COVID-19 pandemic. More unfortunately, as girls are more likely to drop out of school and are also more vulnerable to violence and face child marriage and adolescent fertility, the COVID-19 pandemic poses an even higher risk to girls' education and well-being. Unfortunately, both technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and tertiary education system are equally in deep crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The ILO (2020) reports that as of 15 May 2020, around 90% of respondents reported complete closure of TVET centers and centers in their countries to respond to the spread of the pandemic. In 114 countries (out of 126), complete closure was reported by the majority of the respondents. Almost 96% reported complete closure in Africa. Among African countries that reported partial closure are Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa. Most of the respondents from Africa reported no online or offline distance learning was provided due to cancellations related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, in Africa, during the pandemic, less than 25% of the surveyed respondents reported providing full remote (online and/or offline distance learning, no face-to-face contact) training against nearly 90% in Europe and Central Asia and over 85% in the Americas.

Global tourism has been one of the most affected sectors during the COVID-19 crisis. According to UN World Tourism Organization (2021a), 2020 was the worst year in tourism history with one billion fewer international arrivals-a drop of 74%-resulting from the unprecedented fall in demand and widespread travel restrictions following the pandemic (UN World Tourism Organization, 2021b). This compares with the 4% decline recorded during the 2007-2009 global economic crisis. The collapse in international travel represents an estimated loss of US$1.3 trillion in export revenues-more than 11 times the loss recorded during the 2007-2009 global economic crisis. Worse still, the pandemic has put between 100 and 120 million direct tourism jobs at risk, many of whom are in small and medium-sized enterprises. Binggeli et al. (2020) forecast a cumulative global drop of US$3 trillion to US$8 trillion before tourism expenditure returns to pre-COVID-19 levels.

Africa recorded a 75% decline in international tourist arrivals, which fell from 70 million in 2019 to just 18 million in 2020. Africa's decline is second only to Asia and the Pacific's fall of 84%. Africa's largest drop (−98%) was in April 2020, followed by May 2020 (−96%). Unfortunately, the overall prospects of a rebound in 2021 seem to have worsened as experts foresee growing demand for open-air and nature-based tourism activities, with domestic tourism and 'slow travel' experiences gaining increasing interest.

Data from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, online) Air Traffic Dashboards show that African airports experienced a revenue loss of US$2.84 billion in 2020 while airline carriers lost US$10.42 billion during the same period. In addition, Africa's navigational losses stood at US$570.76 million, while the operation impact on air transport (losses) in 2020 relative to 2019 was −510,265, representing a decline of 53.35%.

Given the policy importance of the impacts of COVID-19 on African economies, the African Development Review is publishing this special issue titled 'The Impact of COVID-19 on African Economies'. The issue analyzes the impact of COVID-19 on African economies with an emphasis on papers that address the socioeconomic impacts of this and other pandemics, as well as policy implications. The papers summarized below are the papers that scaled through the submission and painstaking review processes. This issue includes 16 papers bringing together conceptual, national, regional, comparative and empirical analyses and policy issues on the theme of the impact of COVID-19 on African economies. Below we provide an overview of the papers selected for this volume.

The paper by Hanan Morsy, Lacina Balma, and Adamon N. Mukasa is entitled '"Not a Good Time": Assessing the Economic Impact of COVID-19 in Africa Using a Macro-Micro Simulation Approach'. The authors examine the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on African economies and household welfare using a top-down sequential macro-micro simulation approach. The pandemic is modeled as a supply shock that disrupts African countries' economic activities and then affects households' consumption behavior, the level of their welfare, and businesses' investment decisions. The macroeconomic dynamic general equilibrium model is calibrated to account for informality, a key feature of African economies. The paper finds that COVID-19 could diminish employment in the formal and informal sectors and contract consumption of non-savers and, especially, savers. These contractions would lead to an economic recession in Africa and widen both fiscal and current account deficits. Extreme poverty is expected to increase further in Africa, in particular, if the welfare of the poorest households grows at lower rates. The paper also uses the macroeconomic model to analyze the effects of different fiscal policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Yannick Fosso Djoumessi's paper looks at 'The Adverse Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Labor Market in Cameroon'. In particular, this paper analyzes the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment in Cameroon, using data collected from a rapid survey led by the National Institute of Statistics on a sample of 1310 respondents from April to May 2020. The data show that a large proportion of workers suffer from wage cuts (60.93%), temporary job suspension (31.6%), and the smallest proportion suffers because of job loss (7.47%). Empirical results indicate that the reduction in the frequency of outgoings to work, difficulties in accessing transport services, and the loss of customer confidence have a strong negative impact on both wage cuts and temporary suspensions of work. The closure (total or partial) of activities has increasingly enhanced job loss during this period of the analysis. In addition, workers in private firms are more affected than their peers in public firms, while middle age is the most affected group. The paper recommends revamping the old systems of activity into a new digital innovation that allows less physical touch while finding ways to support those who lost their jobs, especially in the private sector.

The paper by Nicholas Ngepah's is entitled 'What Lessons Can Africa Learn from the Social Determinants of COVID-19 Spread to Better Prepare for the Current and Future Pandemics in the Continent'? The author, applying PPML and quantile regressions to panel and country-specific socioeconomic background data from 53 African countries, finds that enhancing early testing capacity helps for timeous uncovering of cases, early isolation, and contact tracing for effective control of the spread. Other factors such as managing of international movements through reduction of international exposure and ensuring better sanitation and hygiene were found to be relevant in diminishing COVID-19 spread, whereas alcohol consumption and population density heighten the spread. The paper also highlights that stringent measures will be counter-productive unless they are coupled with measures to create and preserve livelihoods, together with humanitarian relief assistance to the poorest segments of the population. The paper recommends that African governments promote sustainable livelihoods and social safety nets to accompany stringent lockdowns and good sanitation programs to become a lifestyle of citizens, among others.

Kwami Ossadzifo Wonyra, Tomgouani Lanie, Yacobou Sanoussi look at 'Effets Potentiels de Court-terme de la Pandémie de la COVID-19 sur la Pauvreté dans les Pays de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA)'. The authors aim to investigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on poverty to inform policymakers of an evidence-based policy implementation in WAEMU countries. They estimate the short-run potential impact of COVID-19 on poverty by assuming contractions in households' income by 5%, 10%, and 25%, respectively, and employ the World Bank's PovcalNet computational tool. They find that poverty headcount could increase significantly in WAEMU member countries, and there is a risk of reversal of the dynamic of poverty reduction observed since the 2000s due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the number of new poor is estimated to average between 4 and 21 million at the US$1.90 poverty line. The authors indicate that the situation is more pronounced in some countries such as Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin. They recommend that WAEMU policymakers take advantage of these results to ensure effective responses to the consequences of this health crisis.

'Household Food Security and COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria' is the title of the paper by Cleopatra Oluseye Ibukun and Abayomi Ayinla Adebayo. The authors examine the food security status of households during the pandemic and investigate its determinants using the COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey (COVID-19 NLPS). They find that only 12% of the households were food secure, 5% were mildly food insecure, 24.5% were moderately food insecure, and over half of the households (58.5%) experienced severe food insecurity, indicating that over two-thirds of households were threatened by food insecurity in Nigeria. They also find that socioeconomic variables (education, income and wealth status) are the main determinants of food security during the pandemic. With the inadequacy of government palliative support and their poor distribution, they recommend that interventions and palliatives should be well planned and consistent with household size and needs.

Ali Madai Boukar, Olivier Mbock, and Jean-Marc Malambwe Kilolo examine 'The Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Employment in Cameroon: A General Equilibrium Analysis'. The authors present a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that assesses the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment in the different economic sectors in Cameroon, specially accounting for the importance of the informal sector (about 80% of the employed) in the country. Simulation results suggest that economic sectors such as construction, education, hotels and restaurants, and commerce should receive special attention, as they have experienced the most severe employment losses. The authors recommend differentiated support from the government to protect employment in these sectors.

'COVID-19 and Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa' is the title of the paper by Samuel Kwaku Agyei, Zangina Mohammed M. Ishaq, Siaw Frimpong, Anokye Mohammed Adam, Ahmed Bossman, and Oliver Asiamah. The paper investigates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prices of maize, sorghum, imported rice and local rice in SSA. The authors estimate dynamic panel data models with controls for a macroeconomic setting using general methods of moments (GMM) estimation and find that the COVID-19 pandemic led to increases in food prices in the sampled countries. In particular, restrictions on movements or lockdowns in the wake of COVID-19 were associated with an increase in the price of maize only. However, exchange rate, inflation, and crude oil prices exerted a detrimental effect on food prices. The authors recommend that governments of SSA countries should invest in infrastructure that improves efficiencies in the food supply chain during pandemics. According to them, providing adequate support to industries in the value chain will also improve food availability and food price stability post-COVID-19.

Carolyn Chisadza, Matthew Clance, Thulani Mthembu, Nicky Nicholls and Eleni Yitbarek examine 'Online and Face-to-Face Learning: Evidence from Students' Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic'. In particular, the authors investigate the factors that predict students' performance after transitioning from face-to-face to online learning as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. They use students' responses from survey questions and the difference in the average assessment grades between pre-lockdown and post-lockdown at a South African University. They find that students' performance was positively associated with good wifi access, relative to using mobile internet data, and lower academic performance for students who found transitioning to online difficult and who expressed a preference for self-study (i.e., reading through class slides and notes) over assisted study (i.e., joining live lectures or watching recorded lectures). Their findings suggest that improving digital infrastructure and reducing the cost of internet access may be necessary for mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on education outcomes.

Donald Kemajou Njatang's paper is entitled 'Impact économique de la COVID-19 au Cameroun: les résultats du modèle SIR-macro'. Njatang uses two extensions of the SIR (Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered)-macro model proposed by Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) . The first extension places the SIR-macro model in the neoclassical framework with the monopolistic competition, and the second, in the neo-Keynesian framework with nominal price rigidities as does Calvo (1983) . According to Njatang, unlike the DSGE or CGE models widely used so far to assess the economic impact of COVID-19 on African economies, these two extensions of the SIR-macro model combine McKendrick and Kermack's (1927) SIR epidemiology model and the Real Cycle Model (RCM) to take into account the economic decisions of the uninfected, the infected and the cured of the disease as explanatory factors of the pandemic's spread. The author explores three scenarios: (i) negative shock on aggregate consumption demand; (ii) negative shock on aggregate labour supply; and (iii) negative shock on supply and demand. Njatang indicates that, for all the scenarios, the shock of COVID-19 will lead to a recession in Cameroon over the two following quarters whereas the magnitude of the recession would be slightly more pronounced over this period in the neo-Keynesian SIR-macro model than in the neoclassical SIR-macro model. As a result, the author recommends that policymakers in Cameroon should continue to implement policies aimed not only at limiting the spread of the virus, but also at maintaining GDP, consumption and investment at steady state levels.

The paper by Seydou Coulibaly is on 'COVID-19 Policy Responses, Inflation and Spillover Effects in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)'. It uses a panel fixed effects model for estimating the impact of government policy responses to the pandemic and their spillover effects on the consumer price index for WAEMU countries over the period January 2019-July 2020. Across various robustness checks, the OLS and IV regressions provide three major indicative findings. First, the COVID-19 confirmed cases positively affect the consumer price index while the overall government policy responses index has a negative impact on the consumer price index. Second, government's accommodative policies to COVID-19 in other countries have a positive and statistically significant impact on the host country's consumer price index. Finally, world food prices and oil prices positively affect consumer price index. These results suggest that policymakers may consider intensifying the implementation of public policies in response to the pandemic for preserving the stability of prices when the sanitary situation of COVID-19 deteriorates. While confirming that international prices are among the key drivers of inflation in WAEMU countries, the author's findings also reiterate the importance of regional cooperation and coordination in fighting the adverse socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Emerta Aragie, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse and James Thurlow examine 'The Short-term Economy-wide Impacts of COVID in Africa: Insights from Ethiopia'. Using the social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier model, built on the most up-to-date SAM (2017) for Ethiopia, they show that the country suffers a 14.3% loss in GDP (Birr 43.5 billion or US$1.9 billion) during the lockdown period compared to the no-COVID case during the same period. Nearly two-thirds of the losses come from the services sector. Although no direct restrictions were imposed on the agriculture sector, which is the primary means of livelihood for most, the sector faces a 4.7% loss in output due to its linkages with the rest of the economy. The authors find dissimilar income and poverty effects across households by income quintile and level of urbanization. The paper also considers two recovery scenarios and generates relevant insights on the potential impacts of COVID-19 by the end of 2020. The earmarked relief and recovery plan resources can only help the economy to recover if targeted in an efficient way towards sectors most affected by COVID-19, and further resources are mobilized to support strategic sectors-those with the highest economy-wide multiplier effects-and vulnerable communities.

Walid Gani examines 'The Causal Relationship between Corruption and Irresponsible Behavior in the Time of COVID-19: Evidence from Tunisia'. The author uses the abuse of power as a proxy for corruption, while lockdown breaches are used as a proxy for irresponsible behavior. Based on the vector error-correction model, the Granger causality test is performed to identify the direction of the causal relationship. The results reveal the existence of a unidirectional Granger causal relationship running from lockdown breaches to the abuse of power. These findings imply that the irresponsible behavior of Tunisians may constitute in itself a factor that can exacerbate their exposure to corruption in the period of crises, especially in the absence of well-established corporate social responsibility. The policy implications of the findings are discussed.

'COVID-19 Impact on SADC Labour Markets: Evidence from High-frequency Data and other Sources' is the title of the paper by Josh Rosenberg, Ilan Strauss, and Gilad Isaacs. In particular, the authors assess the impact of COVID-19 on the labour markets and economies of 16 SADC member states using a qualitative risk assessment on the basis of high-frequency Google Mobility data, monthly commodity price data, annual national accounts, and households' survey labour market data. They find that Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are at greatest risk across several labor market dimensions from the COVID-19 shock, followed by a second group of countries consisting of Comoros, DRC, Madagascar, and Mauritius. Angola faces relatively less general employment risk than South Africa and Zimbabwe due to more muted decreases in mobility, though it faces large pressure in its primary sector. All these countries face high risk in their youth populations, with Angola and Zimbabwe seeing high risks for women. South Africa faces more sector-specific risks in its secondary and tertiary sectors, as does Mauritius. Comoros, DRC, and Madagascar face high risks of employment loss for women and youth, with Comoros and Mauritius facing severe general employment risks.

Yevessé Dandonougbo, Yaovi Tossou, Esso-Hanam Atake, Didier Koumavi Kouevi examine the 'Effets de la COVID-19 sur la variation du revenu et la sécurité alimentaire des ménages au Togo'. The authors use probit and multinomial logit models based on data collected from 1405 households in 44 districts of the 6 health regions. The authors find that households in which the head has lost their job are more exposed to a drop in income and, therefore to a reduction in their food consumption. Their results indicate that cash transfers to vulnerable people have a positive but insignificant effect on the change in their income. They also find that households receiving social benefits in which the head has a higher level of education are more likely to withstand the effects of the pandemic. For households that have experienced a moderate or severe effect of the crisis, the authors find a high probability that they will reduce their food consumption. Based on their results, they recommend extending social benefits to informal sector actors and to accelerate the implementation of the single social register for better targeting of vulnerable households.

Yaya Koloma's paper is on 'COVID-19, financing and sales decline of MSME in the informal sector in Senegal'. Koloma uses survey data collected on MSMEs in the informal sector in Senegal and performs logit and propensity score matching (PSM) estimates to examine both the determinants of access to credit, the decline in sales, and the business sales growth prospect for the next 12 months following the COVID-19 pandemic and to assess the impact of credit on the sales decline of MSMEs. The results indicate that being a male manager and aged 46-55 years old reduces the likelihood of a decline in sales, whereas those who are 25-35 years old present a high probability of experiencing a decrease in sales due to COVID-19. Being between 25 and 35 and 36-45 years old with a formalized MSMEs increases the probability of having access to loans. MSMEs that undertake manufacturing businesses tend to be more pessimistic about the future. The PSM findings show that credit-receiving MSMEs have a higher average treatment effect of sales decline than their counterparts. This suggests the greater the access to credit, the greater the probability of falling sales. The policy implications indicate the importance of extended maturities and direct government-not debt-financialsupport to help the most affected and pessimistic informal MSMEs to recover from the COVID impact.

Finally, Ilan Strauss, Gilad Isaacs, and Joshua Rosenberg examine 'The Effect of Shocks to GDP on Employment in the SADC Member States during COVID-19 using a Bayesian Hierarchical Model'. Using a simple Bayesian 'mixed effects' hierarchical model, the authors provide econometric estimates of annual 2020 employment losses in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic for 15 SADC member states on the basis of historical GDP data between 2000 and 2019 and 2020 forecasts. Their mixed-effects model consists of country-varying coefficients, as well as 'fixed' (pooled) coefficients, permitting the full exploration of the variation between countries. The model provides estimates for losses in total employment and women's employment, from which the authors infer income losses. They find that roughly half of estimated SADC countries have total employment losses below or approaching 25% of all jobs, while the other half have total losses exceeding 25%. Around one-third of all jobs for women risk being lost during 2020 for Madagascar, Comoros, Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. The authors' results indicate that most SADC countries will experience an equivalent loss of wage income in excess of 10% of GDP (whether through pure job losses and/or reductions in wages and working hours). The policy implications are briefly discussed.

A number of lessons can be taken away from the papers selected for this special issue of the African Development Review. First, there is a common recognition that the COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected African countries, collectively and individually, as shown by the decrease in GDP and GDP growth, the loss in employment, increase in poverty, price increases and food insecurity, and the likely increase in exposure to corruption, and so forth. Regarding the GDP and its growth, returning to the same or higher levels as before the crisis is both highly desirable and challenging, especially in a context where countries are expected to face rising debt burdens. That said, finding ways to accelerate African economies' structural change-agriculture transformation, industrialization, digitalization, and so forth-can have a highly desirable impact in terms of growth, employment, poverty reduction, and human development more generally. Second, the articles confirm the diversity of contexts and, at times, the depth of the potential impacts of the health crisis. Therefore, the ability to emerge from the crisis will depend on the timing and willingness of governments to better understand their magnitude and to propose appropriate complementary responses. Third, the economic models and methodological, statistical, and econometric tools used are diverse, and are based on assumptions that are sometimes specific, sometimes broad. This diversity makes it possible to come with relatively objective results. However, it is useful to understand their limitations, so as not to systematically generalize the results described and analyzed in the various articles. Fourth, it is interesting to observe that most of the papers were co-authored by two or more experts, thus bringing their individual and multi-dimensional expertise to bear on the quality of the papers.

We note that with or without good vaccines, most people globally and in Africa will live in an acutely changed world in the medium to long term-wearing masks, avoiding crowded places and limiting travel, at least if they wish to avoid getting or spreading the coronavirus. Thus, enterprises are emerging from the crisis into a workplace world of physical distancing and major changes in customer behaviors and preferences. Recovery is forcing organizations to reimagine their operations. Manufacturing companies are reconfiguring their supply chains and their production lines for the next normal. This has called for the balancing of on-site working and remote working. Industries may have to increasingly adopt shift (2 to 3 shifts per day to reduce person-person contact on the production floor) operations. This is leading to the adoption of new technologies (such as remote-working technologies and virtual meeting decision tools) to survive the new normal. There is an ongoing metamorphosis of demand as purchasers and consumers are accelerating the adoption of digital platforms/channels. The workforce is altering: Demand for labor is shifting, calling for strong needs for re-skilling for example, digital marketers, who are currently scarce. Also, with the disruption of supply chains, industries need to leverage several tools relating to automation and other ICT (including digital health and tele-care) to achieve resilience. Indeed, African countries, along with the rest of the world, are in the long haul for the 'next normal'. Recovery and progress will depend on how these economies harness advanced technology and innovations, combined with new and appropriate regulatory framework and measures in all sectors of the economy.

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