key: cord-0944981-mg9niojy
authors: Bellazzi, Francesca; Boyneburgk, Konrad v
title: COVID-19 calls for virtue ethics
date: 2020-07-07
journal: J Law Biosci
DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsaa056
sha: 7358e2f905f5154c7324e92a05da5804213c8fee
doc_id: 944981
cord_uid: mg9niojy

The global spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof. In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3 we argue that considerations of virtue should guide the individual and public response to the emergency.

The global spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or

Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) has led to the imposition of severely restrictive measures by governments in the Western hemisphere. We feel a contrast between these measures and our freedom. This contrast, we argue, is a false perception. It only appears to us because we look at the issue through our contemporary moral philosophy of utilitarianism and an understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. Both these views can be substituted with more sophisticated alternatives, namely an ethics of virtue and a notion of freedom of the will. These offer a fuller picture of morality and enable us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. We ask whether we should collaborate with the restrictions and argue that considerations of virtue will lead to an affirmative answer. More broadly, virtue ethics permits to deal with the practical concerns about how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof.

In section 1, we present how utilitarianism and a notion of freedom as negative liberty support the opposition to restrictive measures. In section 2, we outline an alternative based on an ethics of virtue and a more elaborated notion of free will. In the concluding section 3 we

We currently feel a tension between governments that lock down entire countries to delay the We provide a philosophical analysis able to answer these questions. In particular, the aim of the paper is to illustrate an ethical framework that enables the individual to rationally cooperate with current restrictions because it is morally justified given the circumstances. We are dealing with the live question of practical concern how an individual should behave during this pandemic, given the current lockdown measures or lack thereof . 2 In the first section, we argue that the resistance felt towards restrictive measures can be explained by two major ethical convictions: utilitarianism and freedom as the absence of constrains. However, these two frameworks cannot account for why it seems ethical to the general public to collaborate with the restrictions. In the second section, we offer an alternative perspective:

virtue ethics and a more elaborated notion of freedom. In the concluding third section we argue that these offer a fuller picture of morality and human actions that enables us to cooperate with the current restrictions by consciously choosing to adhere to them instead of perceiving them as draconian and immoral. 

We live in a society permeated by two major ethical convictions: utilitarianism and the understanding of freedom as absence of constraints. The former holds that actions are morally evaluated on the basis of their consequences and that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good; the latter sees freedom as mere lack of external restrictions to one's actions.

Utilitarianism is a special case of consequentialism 3 and regards as right only those actions that maximise the total net amount of pleasure for all sentient beings. This view is associated with Bentham and Mill 4 and deeply inserted into our society: Most of our actions follow such principles. Utilitarianism has dominated the recent debate on government responses to the outbreak. Many have claimed that overall, the anticipated death toll is not too high (not higher than that of a seasonal flu, say), that allegedly only (or predominantly) old and weak people will require hospitalisation and that the adverse impact that a lockdown will have on the economy will damage many more people than the ones physically affected by this disease. Hence, young and strong people should not worry and should go on with their activities as normal.

Freedom is generally taken to be the absence of external restrictions. 

prevent us from doing all the activities that provide us with pleasure, but they inflict pain on us. Self-isolation is difficult. Again, the number of people expected to suffer from the disease is relatively low compared to the total population, such that extended containment measures seem not to be worth the cost.

In sum, utilitarianism is the current most common moral theory that explains both the reaction and the resistance of people to renouncing their freedom in order to protect someone else.

However, the dramatic situation we are dealing with appears to point to something more. A global pandemic is, within living memory, a novel situation that affects everyone without distinction. A virus does not care about laws or government actions, or about social differences: it simply reproduces. The current situation calls everyone, with or without governments reactions, to act morally in actions and intentions. This pandemic makes us wonder whether the collaboration with the restrictive measures imposed by different European countries is really that immoral. The stories coming from hospitals of nurses or the sick make us ask whether the utilitarian account is really is what we want from our morality.

Is this really what we want from our freedom? 7 We are ready to accept that our actions will have (potentially detrimental) consequences on the weak part of the population when that -weak part‖ is just a label, an abstract entity without face or substantiality. Things turn dramatically as soon as the -weak part‖ of the population turns out to be our parents, our grandparents, our friends with diseases, our neighbour who is expecting a baby. Then, we feel ready to force constraints upon us, even at the price of personal pain. We strive for more than the picture of humanity painted by utilitarianism and negative liberty. What seems clear is that the utilitarian picture is missing something and cannot offer a simple solution to the problem. A richer notion of ethics to which individuals can attain when acting or choosing how to act is required.

Among contemporary approaches, utilitarianism is not the only moral theory. An alternative is offered by an ethics of virtue together with a more elaborated notion of freedom. Virtue ethics, inspired by Aristotle 10 and re-proposed by Anscombe, 11 Foot 12 and MacIntyre, 13 

there is a lockdown such as the common European one, then one, once the reasons are understood, should exercise mainly generosity and collaborate with the restrictions. If we consider the Swedish lockdown, then one is predominantly called to prudence, being aware that one can be constantly spreading the virus. This also suggests that, according to the role one currently possesses in one's community, some virtues become more pertinent than others: medical professionals require perseverance, policy makers prudence, parents patience but all of us should exercise generosity in our daily dealings with others. 18 Hence, virtue ethics provides us with a systematic account of how to behave in certain actual circumstances that currently differ vastly across the world.

Let us look more precisely at the virtues relevant for the current situation. Among them are generosity, prudence, courage as well as patience, perseverance and obedience to reasonable government action. 19 For the purposes of this paper, we will here elucidate the first three in detail.

The virtue of generosity concerns giving and sharing one's possessions for the good of others. Assisting others will leave less for oneself, 20 indicating some sacrificial dimension of this virtue, relevant in the current context of COVID-19. But generosity is not something obtained merely by acting generously or by the consequences of such actions. Granted, consequences follow from the act, but virtue ethics puts the focus on the underlying cause of 18 Some virtues are (predominantly) role-specific in their application, but still apply to human beings generally: -the species man, regarded not just biologically, but from the point of view of the activity of thought and choice in regard to the various departments of life-powers and faculties and use of things needed -"has" such-and-such virtues‖, Gertrude E. M. Anscombe 

Courage or bravery concerns our appropriate feelings regarding frightening things such as contracting COVID-19 and ending up in hospital, infecting other, losing one's job or having to endure boredom or domestic stress. Aristotle discusses it at length and also treats the -bravery of citizens‖ caused by a desire to avoid public reproach or legal punishment. 24 This virtue illustrates that our emotions play an important role in our actions, especially given the current pandemic: an excessively fearless person will risk reckless exposure to the virus while someone too cowardly will never leave her house. Such emotional considerations are not accounted for by other ethical theories.

Virtue ethics claims that in our decisions, even in difficult context (maybe even more so)

such as a pandemic, we should evaluate all aspects of human beings and their circumstances in order to reach a fulfilling happiness, not only regarding our pleasure, but in respecting the dignity of each human being.

For an action to be virtuous, the agent has to voluntarily decide on it, to rationally choose it. 25 We are able to decide on what we can achieve through our agency, on what is up to us. 26 This is possible only if the action becomes the object of the will. However, given the crucial role that virtues have in discerning which action should be done, this cannot simply happen when one has a desire and directs one's will towards it. It rather happens when one chooses to accept as an object of the will the desire in question to act virtuously. 

presents two orders of will relevant for the discussion: 27 The first-order will accounts for us wanting (to do) something in the immediate time; for instance, you are cold and having a tea is the object of your will. The second-order will decides whether we want that object, having a tea for instance, to be the object of our (first-order) will. Actual freedom lies in this secondorder will: Even if you were deprived of your freedom to do certain things, you remain free to decide what it is you want. Human beings do not exercise their will and their freedom only when having certain desires and fulfilling them, but when they want and choose to be moved by something in particular. In order to act virtuously, it is not sufficient to hold a virtuous action as object of one's will since this can be obtained by imposition that forces you to act:

For example, your government requires you to stay indoors, something you (reluctantly) accept. 28 But you only want to stay indoors because you would face hefty fines if you did not.

In addition, we need to want the way in which our will is directed. Relevant for this is the virtue of temperance that can be construed as concerning whether our desires are reasonable. 29 In the moment in which we want our will to be directed towards staying indoors, we are exercising the freedom of our will and acting in an actually generous, prudent and temperate way.

Such a notion of freedom of the will is significantly richer than the mere absence of external constraints to our actions. Following Frankfurt, it is only thanks to the second order will that one can suffer or enjoy negative liberty: second order will is a precondition to negative liberty. This freedom cannot be limited by external constriction: the question of freedom is not about -translating his first-order desires into actions. That is the question of whether he is free to do as he pleases. Rather, it concerns his desires themselves‖. 30 The real problem of

freedom is about how the will is directed. In the context of virtue ethics, an agent is really free when her will has as an object the virtuous action and she wants her will to be so directed. Accordingly, despite the limitations that the pandemic will force upon us, from collaborating with lockdowns measures to wearing masks, no freedom can be threated when one acts virtuously and wants to act so.

Finally, should we collaborate with the restrictions? What is the moral position that we should hold as individuals equally affected by the COVID-19 pandemic? We have argued here that the individual (and public) response to the outbreak should be guided by considerations of virtue instead of utilitarianism and by freedom of the second-order will instead of the narrower notion of liberty from constraints. We should move towards a fuller picture of human actions and morality. Once we embrace the virtues of generosity, courage and prudence and want that our will is directed towards acting in a way that is virtuous, then even imposed restrictions, wearing masks when going outside and keeping social distancing do not look as immoral actions anymore (that diminish pleasure and inflict pain) or as a threat to our freedom, but rather as the virtuously right actions we should pursue. Our freedom is no more threatened by limitations, but augmented and dignified in the moment in which our second-order will wants to willingly respect the restrictions and the recommendations because this is what a virtuous person does in such circumstances; because the relevant virtues have become part of who we are (or perhaps has always been present, untrained, forgotten) and we merely need to give it the right space. Our generosity, courage and prudence prevent us from forgetting the most vulnerable, the old and the weak, because a 

Even -normal‖ conditions allow for debate around numerical trade-offs. Cf. John M. Taurek, Should the numbers count? 6 Philos. Public Aff

Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 Philosophy

PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68

Aristotle illustrates this case with reference to courage: The person that holds firm in battle because of external compulsion does not, strictly speaking, possess the virtue of courage