key: cord-1049345-rtzce76r
authors: Park, June; Chung, Eunbin
title: Learning from Past Pandemic Governance: Early Response and Public-Private Partnerships in Testing of COVID-19 in South Korea
date: 2020-09-18
journal: World Dev
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105198
sha: 0a42725444346ce4d0ca9d60d6465cddf39b8c99
doc_id: 1049345
cord_uid: rtzce76r

How can political elites learn from the past to enhance sustainability of their leadership in a pandemic situation? In this article, we develop a theoretical framework of policy implementation that combines collaboration from public and private sectors (“Public-Private Partnership,” or PPP) to efficiently deal with urgent crises such as COVID-19. We explain the role of new institutions prompted by policy failure precedence (Time 1) that at a later time period (Time 2) allow for the activation of PPPs with the aim to extend the political life of incumbent leaderships. Specifically, we examine the case of South Korea, a country in which a prior case of MERS in 2015 (Time 1) had established new policies for pandemic governance. In 2020, such policies were activated by the incumbent leadership in order to contain COVID-19 (Time 2). In particular, for swift and effective management of the pandemic, the South Korean government utilized partnerships with the private sector to exponentially increase the amount of Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) testing. We apply Policy Feedback Theory to demonstrate the political effects of failed policy precedents and how the political outcomes again shape new policies in a dynamic and cyclical manner. Empirically, we conduct a content analysis of South Korea’s pharmaceutical sector in government procurement and exports of test-kits during the COVID-19 pandemic. We show that as the pandemic situation progressed, South Korea’s leader, who had been in danger of plummeting support to the extent that impeachment was discussed as a viable option, drastically shifted public opinion to achieve a landslide victory in general elections in April 2020. Our findings suggest that democratic governments, aware of precedents and wary of their fate in elections, are pressured to perform well in crisis management, and thus turn to rapidly mobilizing public and private means for survival. Such means are evidenced by the case of emergency use authorization (EUA) process for test-kits, in which “leapfrogging players” – up-and-coming innovators – that contribute to turning a pandemic crisis into an opportunity for sustainable leadership and for themselves.

How do political elites learn from the past to enhance sustainability of their leadership in a pandemic situation? We examine the case of South Korea, We develop a theoretical framework of policy implementation that combines a) policy feedback theory, to demonstrate the political effects of failed policy precedents and how the political outcomes again shape new policies in a dynamic and cyclical manner; and b) PPP, to examine how public and private sectors collaborated to control COVID-19. Our findings suggest that democratic governments, aware of precedents and mindful of elections, are pressured to perform well in crisis management, and thus turn to rapidly mobilizing public and private means for survival. As the COVID-19 crisis continues, while specific policy agenda in rapid response may vary across jurisdictions and South Korea's model may not be easy to emulate, our analysis of South Korea's early response and results may provide insights for other countries Majeed et al. 2020) .

In April and May 2020, South Korea's governmental response to the COVID-19 pandemic was considered a general success by many international sources. 1 2 3 4 While contact tracing received much of the policy attention, scholarly explanations on the underlying mechanisms of the South Korean model in fighting COVID-19 remained scarce, incomplete, and even misunderstood. The determinants of success were often explained through the lenses of bigger government and 'authoritarian residue,' 5 6 whereby South Korea was perceived to have citizens with relatively higher degrees of obedience who yield to government power due to the remnants of authoritarianism the country underwent in the 1970s and 1980s. The real reasons the system worked are quite different; moreover, checks and balances on the government by citizens were at the core of this success 7 and the model relied heavily on voluntary participation by South Korean citizens. 8 The interactions between public and government are evidenced by the institutions that 1 Fisher, Max and Choe Sang-Hun. 'How South Korea Flattened the Curve,' The New York Times, Printed March 23, 2020 and updated April 10, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/world/asia/coronavirus-south-koreaflatten-curve.html 2 Yoon, Dasl and Timothy W. Martin. 'How South Korea Put Into Place the World's Most Aggressive Coronavirus Test Program,' The Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-south-korea-put-intoplace-the-worlds-most-aggressive-coronavirus-testing-11584377217 3 Brazinsky, Gregg A. 'South Korea is Winning the Fight Against COVID-19. The U.S. is Failing.' The Washington Post, April 10, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/10/south-korea-is-winning-fight-againstcovid-19-us-is-failing/ 4 Ahn, Michael. 'How South Korea Flattened the Coronavirus Curve with Technology,' The Conversation, April 21, 2020. https://theconversation.com/how-south-korea-flattened-the-coronavirus-curve-with-technology-136202 5 Kundnani, Hans. ' Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe,' Chatham House Expert Comment, March 31, 2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/coronavirus-and-future-democracy-europe 6 Brazinsky, Gregg A. ibid. 7 Kim, Tae-hoon. 'Why is South Korea beating coronavirus? Its citizens hold the state to account,' The Guardian, April 11, 2020 . https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/11/south-korea-beating-coronavirus-citizensstate-testing 8 Campbell, Charlie. 'South Korea's Health Minister on How His Country Is Beating Coronavirus Without a Lockdown,' Time, April 30, 2020. https://time.com/5830594/south-korea-covid19-coronavirus/ have evolved at the demand of efficient governance and transparency, and the government has been compelled to respond to such requests in the form of policy implementation. 9 10 Observing the views from abroad, a clear-cut explanation of the inner workings of South Korean bureaucratic policymaking may be missing. Detailed country-specific expertise is required to effectively explain this model for future application by other countries. Contextually, such a research task would be difficult to undertake without looking into the formulation of the policy process with a longer timeline of observation by comparing the current responses to with previous responses to precedence-that is, comparing the traumatic experience of the MERS in 2015 under an incompetent government with the present-and by a thorough examination of how the policy actually was activated and implemented. The MERS infection toll of 186 in South Korea was the highest of anywhere outside the Middle East, and resulted in 38 deaths. 11 In an attempt to better explain the South Korean model of its responses to COVID-19, this article examines in depth the South Korean government's political motivations underlying one significant aspect, testing. The technology for RT-PCR test-kits to test MERS-CoV had already been developed by leapfroggers of the South Korean IVD industry, but they were not readily available at private medical facilities and were only utilized by the KCDC during the MERS 9 Rogin, Josh. 'South Korea shows that democracies can succeed against the coronavirus,' The Washington Post, March 11, 2020 . https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/11/south-korea-shows-that-democracies-cansucceed-against-coronavirus/ 10 Song, Ho-chang. 'How History Informed South Korea's Battle with COVID-19,' Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-history-informed-south-koreas-battle-covid-19 11 Hwang Ji-hye and Hong Sung-jin, 'Alteration of Quarantine System since MERS outbreak in Korea,' Division of Quarantine Support, Center for Infectious Disease Control, Korea Centers for Diseases Control, August 11, 2016. https://www.cdc.go.kr/board/board.es?mid=a20602010000&bid=0034&list_no=70432&act=view outbreak in 2015, as EUA for enabling large-scale testing at private medical facilities did not exist then. 12 After MERS, EUA was installed by the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) but lacked the large-scale testing component. Due to the unavailability of widespread testing sites during MERS, the long wait times of the test results from the KCDC, and the lack of information and transparency, impatient patients had gone to and from hospitals to be tested, causing cluster infections centered on hospitals.

RT-PCR test-kits began to be made by South Korean IVD firms right after the COVID-19 outbreak in China towards the end of 2019, and the leapfroggers were able to contribute with their technology because of soaring demand for tests nationwide at private medical facilities through the EUA process for large-scale testing. Testing has since been proven to be an essential process that enables tracking the virus and is the first component of the 3Ts (testing, tracing, treatment) in fighting COVID-19. 13 South Korean health authorities learned from MERS that they must install an EUA process for RT-PCR test sites nationwide as the KCDC alone cannot handle the all the tests in cases of cluster infections.

We conduct our analysis of government performance with thorough examinations on how the prerequisite environment of testing was created in a speedy manner in partnership with the private sector, by assessing and verifying quality reagents for testing at the early stage of To set the background of the rationale for large-scale testing, we focus on how the institutional and legal changes have come about post-MERS, as well as PPPs in the policy process and implementation at the time of COVID-19. We apply policy feedback theory, which highlights how precedence (Time 1) reshapes policy and politics, followed by a subsequent crisis (Time 2), and how the new political environment created as a result 'feeds' back into the creation of future policies (Mettler and SoRelle 2014) . We present our theoretical framework built on policy feedback theory and the grounds for PPPs, whereby many private actors are leapfrogging South Korean players in innovation. 15 We test our theoretical framework by content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Zaidman-Zait 2014; Erlingsson and Brysiewicz 2017) 16 of the PPP on assessing RT-PCR (a molecular technology that detects and extracts the gene of Coronavirus, which is a single-stranded RNA from a patient sample, then uses a reverse transcriptase process to synthesize cDNA, or complementary DNA, which is amplified to check whether the patient has been infected by the Coronavirus) test-kits from leapfrogging industry players (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole 1983) in the IVD field (whereby a molecular technology that analyzes key DNA, RNA, or protein biomarkers [analytes] is used to identify a disease, determine its course, evaluate response to therapy, or predict individual predisposition to a disease) (Debnath et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2016) in South Korea. We concentrate on the South Korean health authorities' activation of EUA of the kits in a timely manner for an early response to COVID-19. We analyze data from "Our World in Data," an open-source that provides up-to-date figures on COVID-19 by country, to compare South Korea's early response in testing that helped contain the coronavirus in the country.

To closely examine how policy feedback theory works in our cases, we trail citizens' demand for government performance in pandemic governance using Gallup Korea opinion polls during Time At the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, pushed to the edge with mounting petitions to impeach Moon Jae-in for not blocking the borders to Chinese citizens 18 , the Moon administration was fully aware that its own performance results in pandemic governance would be critical to the general election on April 15, 2020. Moon's awareness is built on precedence: the vivid memories of failed measures to contain MERS by Park in 2015 and eventual impeachment of Park on other charges of corruption and inaction remained amongst the public. The Moon administration was 17 Choe, Sang-hun. 'South Korea Removes President Park Geun-hye,' The New York Times, March 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-hye-impeached-south-korea.html 18 ''Call for the impeachment of President Moon Jae-in' (translated), Blue House Petition -March 5, 2020 indeed the byproduct of the impeachment, and thus chose to take early action to avoid what could have been the biggest jeopardy to the maintenance of power. We find in our analysis that, learning from the past and distancing itself from the damages of Park's sluggish policy reactions to MERS, the Moon administration bet entirely on fighting COVID-19 to win the general election on April 15, 2020, and the incumbent won by a landslide.

This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature upon which our theoretical framework is built. We explain why combining policy feedback theory with elements of PPP provides a more accurate and explanatory framework for analyzing the South Korean case. The third section lays out the research design, where we explain our methodology in institutional and content analyses and the data used. The fourth section contains a series of our findings from the analyses. The fifth section concludes with policy recommendations and future avenues for research.

Leapfroggers in Public-Private Partnerships

While political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have researched a great deal about policies as results of political processes (Bobo et al. 1997 , Carmines and Huckfeldt 1996 , Dennis 1991 , Verba et al. 1995 , far less has been said about the ways policies influence politics. Policy feedback theory highlights the dynamic and cyclical characteristics of policy and politics (Campbell 2018) . According to the theory, previous policies shape and reshape the political environment, which in turn contributes to future policymaking processes. In this manner, extant policies become inputs to the design and direction of new policies, having large and varied consequences for mass politics.

Much of extant scholarship in political behavior assumes a linear political process that runs from mass preferences and demands through elected intermediaries to policy outputs (see Milbrath and Goel 1977 , Verba and Nie 1972 , Yeric and Todd 1996 . These approaches treat citizens' individual decisions and actions as fundamental units of political input, and public policies as system outputs (Easton 1953 , Edelman 1983 . In this manner, politics came to be defined as "a sequence of reified processes that culminates in the authoritative allocation of values" (Easton 1957 ). Mettler and Soss (2004) refer to these approaches as following a "standard framework" of social inquiry, where citizens become background actors in politics that exert indirect influence on public policy through elections (Pitkin 1969 , Pateman 1970 , Hardy-Fanta 1993 .

However, policies should not be understood as the ultimate product concluding a string of political events, disjointed from subsequent political procedures and new policies that follow.

Once policies are enacted, they influence political thought and action among leaders and the public. In this way, public policy outcomes have important consequences for democratic citizenship. We identify the cases of pandemic governance across the Park and Moon governments as examples that show how public policy affects leaders' and citizens' goals, beliefs, and identities, opening or limiting possibilities for future political action (Mettler and Soss 2004) . In particular, both the broad policy environment at large as well specific public programs of pandemic governance (or the lack thereof) during Park's time became highlighted as critical weaknesses in governing competence and capacity, drawing citizens into active public life and leading to Moon's reorientation of governing priorities and identity as an effective administrator during COVID-19.

In an exemplary work incorporating policy feedback theory, Theda Skocpol (1992) Specifically, we suggest that former South Korean president Park Geun-hye's policy approach to MERS in 2015 (Time 1), which many consider a failure in capably containing the virus Fifield 2015, Salmon 2015) , not only shaped views about what constitutes effective policies in a pandemic situation but also brought about political turmoil that drastically rearranged the milieu of government (Lim and Sziarto 2020) . After the MERS virus rocked the country, South Korea set in stone a new form of social consensus via the IDPCA in 2016 that prioritizes public health safety to fight a pandemic. 19 The lessons learned from MERS built legal precedence and formulated new institutional measures to avoid repetitive failures in the future. 20 Eventually, when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in 2020 (Time 2), the new political environment created as an aftermath of Park's governance enabled a completely different policy approach by the next president, Moon Jae-in , Ryan 2020 . The lessons learned from the past also raised the bar for Moon, with expectations of better performance than Park (Yi and Lee 2020) .

Policy feedback theorists argue that the design and implementation of policy feeds back into construction of the political system, as it affects the interests of various political actors including leaders-such as elected political elites, public officials, bureaucrats, and agencies-and the public. Leadership is developed and sustained through government policies, which critically influence political preferences and beliefs, how elites view themselves and others, and how they understand and act in the political system (Mettler and Soss 2004) . Among the citizenry, policy outcomes can influence public attitudes about the role of government, potentially enhancing or undermining political participation (Campbell 2012) . Policies and political behavior are thus socially constructed outcomes that arise through the interaction of institutions, organizations, and actors (Stone 2012) .

The institutional changes on pandemic governance following MERS were not disassociated from the global discourse on disaster risk management. Just before the MERS outbreak in South support. Moon held contrasting political views to Park, and three years into office he began facing criticism for decaying South Korean democracy (Shin, 2020) .

In early March 2020, as the virus spread quickly with a cluster infection in Daegu, citizens demanded that the pandemic governance be led by public health officials with expertise on the pandemic rather than by the president himself, indicating their memory of Park's policies on MERS. Compelled by the citizens and pressured by impeachment petitions, Moon's party pledged to elevate the KCDC from 'Center' to 'Office' if elected. This became their main focus for the general election, and to demonstrate that they actually meant it, they immediately gave way to the KCDC to serve more independently as a control tower on behalf of the president. 23 The early response to the pandemic that had been absent in Time 1 under Park was activated in Time 2 under Moon by enabling large-scale testing via EUA by the KCDC in consultation with the MFDS to procure massive amounts of RT-PCR test-kits from South Korea's pharmaceutical industry through PPP (a mechanism that is explained in the following section). To ensure transparency that it lacked and had been criticized for in Time 1, the KCDC would hold daily briefings on COVID-19 followed by Q&A sessions from the press to be televised and streamed online through Facebook and YouTube in Time 2 to deliver correct and updated information and to prevent misinformation. This indicates that, congruent to policy feedback theory, the outcomes and legacies of Park's policies in Time 1 compelled new institutional actions under Moon in Time 2, and shifted budgets and resources to interest groups that support efficient pandemic-battling (Pierson 1993) .

In April 2020, shortly after many domestic and international sources agreed that Moon's government had successfully flattened the curve in South Korea, the country became the first to hold a nationwide election during the pandemic, at a time when other countries with upcoming elections announced postponements. The general election revealed a landslide victory for Moon's party, the Democratic Party of Korea, winning 163 seats along with a satellite party's 17 seats in the National Assembly (which has 300 total seats), restructuring the political environment and granting Moon further political capital based on the highest public support rate to date during his term in office. 24 In this manner, consistent with the tenets of policy feedback theory, once policies were developed they affected crucial aspects of governance, reshaping politics, and earlier policies guided the prospect and probability of future policy creation (Béland 2010 ).

In a nutshell, because South Korea had the opportunity to learn from the past and undergo institutional transformation from Time 1 to Time 2, it performed relatively efficiently compared to countries that lacked such a precedence. During the COVID-19 outbreak, many developed economies are experiencing Time 1, and policy feedback theory hints at the prospect that their governments might be expected to perform better at Time 2 if political feedback and policy learning occur from Time 1. In the case of South Korea, it just so happened that Time 1 arrived at an earlier point, and the government chose to learn from it. Even for the absolute monarchy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was the epicenter of MERS, institutional changes occurred 24 'South Korea's governing party wins election by a landslide,' Al Jazeera, April 15, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/south-korea-ruling-party-wins-election-landslide-200416000355845.html. post-MERS affected its performance in pandemic governance during COVID-19 (Algaissi, Alharbi, Hassanain and Hashem 2020).

It is crucial to note that the main reason why policy feedback theory must be complemented with PPP and leapfrogging in order to best explicate the South Korean case is that policy feedback theory in and of itself does not guarantee improvement in policy or the yield of positive results from policy change. The institutional changes and the augmentation of transparency in policy delivery were the core elements of South Korea's early response to COVID-19, and incorporating these components require the deployment of PPP and leapfrogging to best explain how it was realized.

PPPs are long-term agreements between the government and a private partner whereby the private partner delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks. 25 In the international development literature, the necessity of PPPs in global health has frequently been subject to debate. The main criticisms range from the negative externalities of PPPs at the global level to the empowerment of private entities and economic interests centered in the Global North rather than the Global South (Buse and Harmer 2004; Nishtar 2004) .

The main criticisms of PPPs had centered on the unequal distribution of power among the public, private entities, and global citizens, with the lion's share of interests yielded to the private sector.

In the global health industrial domain, the criticisms of PPPs had a lot to do with the exercise of power by global pharmaceutical companies known for their rent-seeking behavior through pharmaceutical patents, although they have yielded their interests in small part by efforts through compulsory licensing of patented medicines for manufacturing in developed economies (Sell 2003) . In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the reshaping of the private and public realm inherent to PPPs suggested a further deepening of the neoliberal management of individuals and populations, and allowed for private interest to become more embedded within the public sphere and to influence global and national health policymaking (Ruckert and Lambonté 2014) .

Nonetheless, the positive effects of PPPs remained (Buse 2004) , and in pushing the envelope further, different political strategies with regard to PPPs were emphasized for a reconfigured power dynamic between the relevant actors (Keane and Weersinghe 2008) . In the case of global epidemics and pandemics, there is a compelling case for PPP, as governments may find it harder to deliver on their goals to protect public health without sufficient procurement of medical and pharmaceutical equipment from the private sector. This is becoming increasingly the case in a world in which the mutation of infectious viruses occurs at a rapid pace, without certainties on the delivery of a vaccine. For instance, in a rapidly unwinding pandemic situation such as COVID-19, in which expertise and knowledge are still being accumulated, government engagement with academic and private entities for the common goal of fighting infectious diseases-through funding for research and development, auditing, and assessing product quality assessment for immediate deployment-has become more or less inevitable ( 

In the past decade, much of the research on latecomers in innovation have focused on China's innovation trajectories (Kennedy 2018) , with comparative assessments vis-a-vis other BRICS nations such as India (Kennedy 2016) . However, academic assessments on the case of South instead of being simply a 'fast follower', South Korea's proactive performance in these industries in recent years has much to do with the acceleration of technology and the industrial bind. 26 As life expectancy is extended, new trends of consumerism and elevated economic living standards encompassing expectations of better health conditions and medical technology have occurred in tandem with technological growth. 27 As we will discover in the findings section, South Korea's newly emerged pharmaceutical SMEs in the IVD industry were established post-Asian Financial Crisis in the early 2000s, as the South Korean economy was recovering from its economic rubble, indicating that they started from scratch.

The leapfrogging industries in South Korea's post-developmental state are different from previous state-supported entrepreneurship (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Wade 2004) . These industries promote an ecosystem that can support start-up companies that can grow and make business decisions independently from the government (Pacheco Pardo and Klingler-Vidra 2019). In connecting leapfroggers to PPP, the fundamental rationale for collaboration by various entities derives from the stark realization that one actor is not enough to accomplish the technology required in the future due to the speed of development and competition. Furthermore, as the post-developmental state in South Korea evolves, there are new industries that the extant big players do not have a niche strategy for, and cooperation can be a better option than mere mergers and acquisitions in this regard. On January 27, 2020 -only one week after Patient Zero -the Infectious Diseases Analytics Center at KCDC, the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine, and the leapfrogging RT-PCR test-kit producers of the IVD industry had a meeting. It was decided at the meeting that the leapfroggers were keen on an EUA for the RT-PCR test-kits 26 Dayton, Leigh. 'How South Korea made itself a global innovation leader: Systemic reform backed by strong investment has brought rapid and long-lasting results,' Nature, May 27, 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01466-7 27 Zastrow, Mark. 'Boosting South Korea's basic research: By redirecting funding to small teams, the country is betting on the creativity of its scientists,' Nature, May 27, 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01464-9 for COVID-19. Chaebols were not at the meeting-not even Samsung Biologics, as RT-PCR test-kit production is not their forte. The leapfrogging SMEs in IVD had been working only on RT-PCR technology for the past two decades while Samsung had been churning out chips and cellphones. Months later, Samsung became instrumental in constructing a smart factory system for RT-PCR test-kits by IVD leapfroggers Solgent, Kogenebiotech, and SD Biosensor, as well as masks for COVID-19-a system established with the initiative by the Ministry of SMEs and Startups. 28 As such, Samsung Electronics contributed to expediting the production process for mass production for the leapfroggers but did not provide the main RT-PCR technology.

In the past decade, the alignment between government policy direction and industries became salient in South Korea, particularly in the energy sector (Park, 2013) . New approaches aim to partnerships for patent collaborations (Cho, 2014; Yoon, 2015; Sohn and Kang 2016) . Certain caveats of the current innovation trends have been raised, whereby government funding for business R&D is crucial (Kim and Lee 2011) and university-industry collaboration fares the strongest trend (Yoon 2015) , indicating the tightness of cash in academia. 28 The augmented rate of productivity at the smart factory is largely owing to the adoption of barcodes, optimized logistics, domestic production of tubes for RT-PCR test-kits, and the automation of packaging and labeling. Press release, '73% increase in productivity due to the introduction of K-Diagnostic Kit (Solgent) and smart factory (translated),' Ministry of SMEs and Startups, June 10, 2020. https://www.mss.go.kr/site/smba/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=86&bcIdx=1019317&parentSeq=1019317

The gradual transition from the statist model to leapfrogging with the forge of trilateral partnerships among government, industry, and universities in South Korea indicates how the aforementioned PPPs can naturally come into the picture for public health crisis management. Public discontent is evidenced by poll ratings and official petitions for impeachment registered beginning early February. 29 30 31 An existential crisis for the incumbents arises amid anti-Chinese sentiments, as the danger of potential policy failure looms. Only 10 days after discovery of 

We first conduct content analyses in institutional change by thorough observations of the South Korean case, focusing on the legal foundations that were altered between Time 1 and Time 2 for implementation. We then conduct content analysis of PPP implementation focusing on the EUA process for RT-PCR test-kits, from decision to call for application, vetting and evaluation, and quality RT-PCR test-kits from the pharmaceutical sector, and as we will see in the following section, most of them were up-and-coming, small-scale innovators that had R&D support from both public and private sectors. In addition, with the delegation of power to govern the pandemic to the MOHW, the KCDC placed under the MOHW acted as the apparent and authoritative main headquarters and control tower for COVID-19, avoiding confusion in guidance delivery to the public. Such efforts were compounded by the election campaign agenda to elevate KCDC status from center to office, while the president took a step back and left the crucial specific matters related to pandemic governance to the specialists KCDC authorities. The institutional memory is crucial to governing pandemics. 43 44 The key factors to take into consideration in terms of institutional change are laid out in Table 1 . extracting the sample from the patient through the nasal area using cotton swabs, b) selecting 45 Terhune, Chad, Dan Levine, Hyunjoo Jin, Jane Lanhee Lee. 'Special Report: How Korea trounced U.S. in race to test people for coronavirus,' Reuters, March 19, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirustesting-specialrep/special-report-how-korea-trounced-u-s-in-race-to-test-people-for-coronavirus-idUSKBN2153BW 46 Press Release, 'Approved for emergency use of new coronavirus diagnostic reagents, expanded testing to medical institutions: testing available at private medical institutions from February 7 th ' (translated), Ministry of Health and Welfare, February 4, 2020. 'http://www.mohw.go.kr/react/al/sal0301vw.jsp? PAR_MENU_ID=04&MENU_ID=0403&page=1&CONT_SEQ=3 52683 RNAs from the sample in a negative pressurized room setting to prevent infection, c) synthesizing complementary DNA (cDNA) using reverse transcriptase on the RNA and amplifying the cDNA, which is then verified in a real-time graphic imagery by time. 47 There are other methods based on antibody testing (serological testing), but antibody tests have been under criticism for not ensuring complete accuracy. 48 (2) and enforcement decree 13(2) of the Medical Devices Act amended in 2019 (as mentioned in Table 1 ), South Korean public health authorities moved quickly to call for applications for EUA in RT-PCR test-kits on January 28. 53 The first call would entail a vetting and evaluation process of the kits for one month until February 28, during which qualifying kits would be granted EUA in the order of application. As early as January 30, the KCDC (inclusive of the National Incheon Airport Quarantine) as well as 18 other public health institutions nationwide announced extended testing service to private hospitals throughout the country on independently to public and private hospitals and treatment centers where large-scale testing is being conducted nationwide ( Figure 2 ). As of May 29, 2020, there are seven South Korean RT-PCR test-kit manufacturers that have passed the KCDC-MFDS vetting process ( Table 2) As seen in Table 2 , with the exception of BioSewoom, six out of seven "leapfrogger" companies that were issued EUAs as of May 29, 2020, were established from the year 2000 and onwards, which means that they are relatively young companies with strong research caliber, considering the growth period involving extensive R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. They are leapfroggers also in the sense that they are SMEs, as only Seegene and Biocore are sizeable companies listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX), with SolGent on course to be listed in 2021, whereby being listed for trading shares on the KOSDAQ market requires company capital of 30 billion Korean won. 56 The PPP process provided them with the opportunity to showcase their quality and prospects in the biopharmaceutical sector. Among them, six out of the seven companies have been issued EUA by the United States by the USFDA as of July 31, 2020, through a vetting process that South Korean manufacturers of test-kits had also applied for in the U.S. in tandem with the domestic process by the KCDC and MFDS (Table 3) . 60 Kim, Ji-eun. '" Until we export of diagnostic kits"…KOTRA to support local marketing for companies struggling with emergency entry restrictions' (translated), Newsis, May 11, 2020. https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20200511_0001020000&cid=13000

In an attempt to contain COVID-19, Moon's government acted quickly to secure a large number of test-kits and make them accessible to the public. Data on testing statistics by country from 'Our World in Data' shows that testing in South Korea was at 0 on January 28, 2020, and started the following day at 0.001 tests per thousand people, i.e. 1 test a day. That number exponentially grew over the following days, doubling on February 6 and doubling again on February 8. By Moreover, this second reason referred more to a general attitude of Park's governance than her policies toward a direct incident. Thus, Park's inefficiency in coping with MERS was the dominant cause for growing public discontent.

Similarly, when MERS was mentioned as the largest reason for a negative evaluation of Park at 33% in the 3 rd week of June, the highest throughout the whole pandemic, the second most mentioned cause was only at 12% ("Dysfunctional state administration"), and the third was "Lack of leadership / avoidance of responsibility" at 12%. Both the second and third reasons hint at Park's attitude in governing the MERS situation rather than a separate event. In other words, MERS was the primary reason for the dissatisfied public.

As weeks went by and the threat of MERS gradually subsided, MERS was mentioned less as the prime reason for negative opinions of Park, yet public evaluations still did not recover to pre-MERS levels. The 4 th week of June saw a slight recovery of positive support for Park, but the top reason for positive views of "hard-working (27%)" was vague, and the second largest reason for negative views of Park was still attributed to "Lack of communication / not open to the public / not transparent," suggesting that the public had not changed their negative views of Park's MERS policies as a major problem.

In July MERS finally slid to 2 nd place among the public's reasons for negative opinions of Park, but as can be observed in Figure 7 , support for Park still hovered around 35-37%. In the following weeks, even when respondents were ranking MERS as only the 3 rd or lower cause for negative views of Park (from mid-July onward), support for Park only further diminished. In fact, even when MERS left the top ten list of reasons for negative opinion in the 3 rd week of August-implying that the prominence of MERS had decreased-support for Park was at a mere 37.7%. This can be seen in the last data points on the far right of Figure 7 . In such cases, when the president has been given a specific duty to serve, the president's duty to perform his duties is not merely a moral or political duty, but a legal duty, and its failure to comply is subject to judicial review. The fact that this point is highlighted in the impeachment decision indicates that Park's handling of national crises was a major contributing factor that led to her impeachment. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Park's misgovernment of MERS was what the Constitutional Court was mainly alluding to, as it was specified in the decision that the Sewol Ferry Disaster was not a direct cause of impeachment. The decision specifies that: In sum, it can be inferred that MERS was indeed one of the main causes of Park's impeachment.

In the decision for impeachment, the constitutional court stated that it is the legal duty of the president to take action in a disaster situation, and foregoing the legal duty is deemed unconstitutional. While both the Sewol incident and MERS were primary examples of Park's failure to govern a national disaster situation, both of which contributed to diminishing public support toward Park, the constitutional court specified that in terms of direct causes for impeachment at least from a legal perspective, the Sewol incident was not included. Therefore, although the Constitutional Court did not specifically mention the term "MERS" in their decision, it can be presumed that mismanagement of MERS was one of the major causes of Park's impeachment.

A couple of years in, Moon's government was suffering from low support rates due to public fatigue of his foreign policy vis-a-vis North Korea and economic downturn. 62 Moon had positioned himself as more pro-North Korea and closer to China than his predecessor, while taking a stronger stance against the U.S. and Japan, compared to many earlier South Korean leaders who represented the more conservative party (Pak 2020) . In the wake of COVID-19, 62 Public opinion polls reveal caution and unease toward Moon's drive and willingness to strengthen inter-Korean cooperation through family reunions, the establishment of inter-Korean liaison offices in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and railroad connections. In a 2018 poll conducted by Hankook Research, 36% of participants responded that the national economy will worsen if aid is given to North Korea in full scale, with just 27% responding that the national economy will improve. Regarding the impact of aid to North Korea on the domestic economy, 27% answered that it would worsen the domestic economy while only 10% said aid would improve it (Jeong 2018) . These views represent the controversy and public concern that Moon's unilateral aid to North Korea will negatively impact national security and the economy. Moon has consistently emphasized the importance of cooperation with North Korea, as is observable from his official policy keynotes published by the President's Office, which includes "Inter-Korean relations: Peace on the Korean Peninsula is the path we must pursue" (President's Office 2020).

Moon had run out of political capital prior to a general election and deemed it absolutely crucial to efficiently and effectively contain the pandemic in order to sustain his leadership. Learning from past criticism on Park regarding the absence of an effective control tower in the MERS outbreak, Moon's party fully delegated the role of control tower to MOHW and KCDC to handle COVID-19 (Pak 2020 ). In addition, in order to break from Park's precedence, Moon took a hands-on approach, swiftly signing presidential decrees to be passed via fast-track in the National Assembly to enable widespread testing and sufficient supply of medical. 63 

As can be seen in Figure 8 , when COVID-19 first hit South Korea in mid-January, the public's view of Moon was evenly split, with slightly more people holding negative views of him (50.4%) than positive views (49.6%). This occurred when support for Moon's government was slipping due to the fear Moon's pro-North Korean foreign policy was causing for some older generations in South Korea with conservative views on security issues. In the Gallup weekly opinion polls for the 4 th week of January, COVID-19 was first mentioned as a cause for opinions for or against Moon. Seven percent of respondents noted Moon's coping with COVID-19 as a main reason for support for Moon, whereas 5% stated it was a reason for negative views against Moon. In contrast to Park's case in 2015, where her dealing of MERS was only noted as a reason for negative opinion and never for positive, in the 2020 polls for Moon, his COVID-19 policies were mentioned as both a reason for positive (indicated in yellow bars in Figure 8 ) and negative evaluations of him (indicated in gray bars in Figure 8 ). It is noteworthy, however, that from March to May, Moon's handling of COVID-19 is mentioned as the primary cause for support, to the extent that in May a massive 53% of respondents note it as a reason for positive evaluations, whereas only 8% say it is a reason for their negative views of him. week of May COVID-19 was ranked at only the 4 th biggest reason to support Moon, but this was in fact when support for Moon peaked, with a substantial 77.4% evaluating Moon positively, and just 22.6% rating him negatively.

An analysis of Moon's public speeches adds further evidence that Moon held the lessons of the past in mind. We examine 76 official presidential speeches listed on the Blue House website from January 30, when Moon made his first speech that mentioned COVID-19, to May 8, which is the latest record available. Our sources were "Moon Jae-in's speech collection," Volume 2, which covers November 1, 2019, to May 9, 2020, "Chief and Aide Conference of the State 

Victims' Memorial Ceremony, April 3, 2020, the 60th Anniversary April 19th Revolution Ceremony, April 19, 2020, and the World's largest container ship naming ceremony, April 23, 2020. 68 In comparison, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was only mentioned twice. Considering that SARS was an issue in South Korea in 2003, many years and 3 presidents ago, lessons from SARS would presumably have an indirect effect compared to MERS. Moon was the president directly borne out of Park's failed leadership, one of the main causes being Park's neglect to manage MERS early, among others. In addition, the president at the time of SARS (Rho Moo Hyun) was generally considered to have done an effective job in containing SARS (there were no domestic deaths and only 3 infected from SARS) and ideologically closer to Moon than Park, so less was to be noted from the SARS case in terms of the possible political downturn following failure in pandemic governance compared to Park's governance of MERS (Yeom 2020 MERS, and forest fires in Gangwon-province. "Now, we want to go one step further and increase the national disaster management system and response capabilities to deal with large-scale complex disasters that occur in series. I hope that this exercise will strengthen the country's crisis management capabilities and fulfill the nation's responsibility to protect national safety" (Chief and Aide Conference of the State Council May 10, 2019 ~ May 5, 2020, Book 3).

To contrast himself with Park, who was criticized for her slow response to MERS, reducing or denying the scope of the pandemic as a threat, Moon frequently emphasized a "speedy" response as crucial in fighting COVID-19. Across Moon's speeches from February 1 to May 8, 2020, the word "speed(속도)" appeared 13 times, and both "urgent/emergency(긴급)" and "quickly (빠르게/빨리)" each appeared 25, times with regard to response to COVID-19. The words "quick (빠른)" and "quickness(신속)" were mentioned 12 and 36 times, respectively. Examples that highlight Moon's emphasis for a speedy response in his speeches are provided below. In addition to urgent countermeasures, we hope that you will be interested in your midto long-term countermeasures and gather wisdom…. We will promptly execute emergency budgets including special grant taxes and reserves, and seek strong support measures that go beyond proclaiming special disaster areas. … In order to fully support various necessary supports with a budget, an emergency supplementary budget will be prepared and submitted to the National Assembly as soon as possible.

Speed is the key. During the 2015 MERS Situation, I first proposed an additional economic budget as the opposition leader to pass it quickly. As it is an emergency, we would like to discuss it promptly and take care of it at this temporary session.

-[Corona 19-Related Speech] Dialogue with representatives of the opposition parties, February 28, 2020

In addition to strengthening the ability to respond to infectious diseases, we will accelerate economic stability …. Above all, we will try to ensure that the necessary support is reached in a timely manner by prompt execution. Moon's publicly stated goals of national governance suggest that his overall approach is to clearly distinguish his government from Park's. The Blue House lists Moon's "five goals of national government," each of which has 4 sub-categories, leading to 20 "national political strategies." The terms used in these goals and strategies are opposite to common descriptions of Park's ruling style. The first of the five goals are "a government of the people." The four strategies included in this goal use words that emphasize differentiation and improvement from Commentators have criticized Park for concealing the scope of MERS infections and underplaying its significance (Choe 2015) .

Taken together, our analyses suggest that in a democratic system whereby leadership is constantly questioned by the public, pandemic governance results may impact the life expectancy of political leaderships for better or worse. As the cycle of outbreaks become shorter and second waves of COVID-19 occur in unexpected time frames, political leaderships in democratic societies risk being tossed out of office if they do not deliver on pandemic governance.

To enhance promptness and efficiency in pandemic governance and to deliver an early response, the perusal of institutions that were changed between Time 1 and Time 2 to outpace the spread of COVID-19 was essential. The activation of PPP on EUA by KCDC and MFDS to enable largescale RT-PCR testing nationwide as early as possible in South Korea and the delegation of power in pandemic governance to the specialists (MOHW and KCDC) to act as control tower were means to Moon's end of urgently containing the virus when pressured by the petitions for impeachment in the run-up to the general election date to secure incumbency. We argue that such reasoning and action by Moon (Time 2) can be viewed as a result of policy feedback and learning from the precedent of Park's unsuccessful governance (Time 1).

Our analysis suggests that leaderships must be institutionally prepared by change and open to PPP for better pandemic governance. In order to do so, in the context of policy feedback, substantial institutional changes must be made after Time 1, while incorporating transparency by installing a clear and present control tower of competent public health authorities. Such policy moves assure the public that science is not overridden by politics even when there is are political motivations by the leadership in the background. It also reveals that voluntary civic participation in large-scale RT-PCR testing and mask-wearing as well as democratic checks-and-balances of the government are crucial to flatten the curve, and that pandemics can turn into opportunities for innovation ripe with R&D . However, there is room for progress for the IVD industry in South Korea, and in the future it should develop and manufacture the ingredients for reagents domestically to ensure independence and guarantee supply. 69 Ensuring quality and accuracy of the test-kits is critical not only for flattening the curve, but also for positive responses and continued growth. 70 

Difficulty may arise in application of our conceptual framework to non-democratic governments, or states where a pharmaceutical industry is either nonexistent or so strong that it can override the government's initiatives. Ideally, pharmaceutical industries must be robust enough to serve as a platform for fast-tracked measures by the government to swiftly act against pandemics.

Similarly, PPP may be less efficient or less successful in cases where the private sector could overpower the public realm, and thus public and private sectors must be open to collaboration. Additionally, the citizenry by a social consensus must be willing to participate in government initiatives in large-scale testing for such policies to be effective.

The currency of COVID-19 presents some uncertainty in the evaluation of governmental effectiveness and political consequences that might follow. The timeframe of this project spans up to May 2020. Although Moon's political party may have been successful in the legislative elections of April 2020 largely due to the public's satisfaction regarding Moon's handling of COVID-19, it remains to be seen how he and his party will be evaluated in the long term in the run-up to the 2022 Presidential election. While the COVID-19 pandemic situation is not completely over in South Korea or in any other part of the world, our analysis has concentrated South Korea's early response to COVID-19 and the South Korean public's perception of Moon's 70 Liu, Roxanne and Alexandra Harney, 'China clamps down on coronavirus test kit exports after accuracy questioned,' Reuters, April 1, 2020. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-testkits/china-clampsdown-on-coronavirus-test-kit-exports-after-accuracy-questioned-idUKKBN21J51S governance to date. The fact that unprecedented pursuit of South Korean RT-PCR test-kits by some 103 countries reveals that large-scale testing is becoming a choice for countries around the world to fight COVID-19. The applicability of our conceptual framework based on South Korea's early response to COVID-19 would be viable for countries that have democratic leaderships with checks-and-balances on government performance, and capable public health authorities, and a pharmaceutical industry with a possible citizenry participation in large-scale testing.

Many democracies are grappling with COVID-19 in an unexpected manner. Among them, of particular concern is the performance in pandemic governance by major democracies such as the U.S., Brazil and India (The Lancet, 2020), where the pandemic continues to extract a major toll amid insufficient government efforts. Their lackluster performance on tackling COVID-19 cast doubts on whether they would respond differently in future pandemics. The common denominators in their performance include politics overriding science in the absence of transparency, the blurred presence of health authorities that can serve as a clear and present control tower and overwhelming populism (McKee et al. 2020 ).

In the U.S., the role of the CDC and the health authorities led by Dr. Anthony Fauci were often undermined by political elites, and the president continued to appear in the briefings although he himself was not an expert the pandemic situation nor the virus itself. In India, where the healthcare system is in development, extensive lockdown and curfews were implemented to control the virus (Paital, Das and Parida 2020, Chaurasiya et al. 2020 ) amid rising anxieties (Roy et al. 2020; Das & Dutta 2020) . Amid criticisms on transparency of the COVID-19 fund, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has come to stress the need for increased testing 71 , he has not stepped aside for the India Centers for Disease Control (ICDC) to act as control tower and has remained in the spotlight. 72 In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro's speech in Miami in March 2020 disinformed the public on COVID-19 (Barberia and Gómez 2020) and led them to discredit the lethal power of the virus (Tavares et al. 2020) , himself getting affected by COVID-19. Brazil's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was not a clear control tower in controlling COVID-19, and non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing and contact tracing by the Brazilian government fell short of implementation (Candido et al. 2020) , causing mobility to further mutate the virus in different forms (Baqui et al. 2020) . Similar policy missteps in lack of transparency and unclear policy guidance were witnessed in the democratic governments of the United Kingdom and Japan.

In order for the current democratic governments' experience of COVID-19 to feed back into future pandemic governance as a result of policy learning in Time 2, governments must be willing to provide transparency and deliver clear guidelines based on science. Mistakes can be made in Time 1, but only by acknowledging the missteps and changing the approach toward efficient and transparent pandemic governance based on science would enable policy learning feedback. 71 'PM Modi urges states to ramp up testing, says their role is crucial in Covid-19 fight,' Hindustan Times, August 11, 2020 . https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-modi-urges-states-to-ramp-up-testing-says-their-role-iscrucial-in-fight-against-covid-19/story-JWgEi35lzZ30WScJgvSbtI.html 72 'Coronavirus: Secrecy surrounds India PM Narendra Modi's '$1bn' Covid-19 fund,' BBC, June 30, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53151308 (2): Enables the health minister and the KCDC head to require "medical institutions, pharmacies, corporations, organizations, and individuals" to provide "information concerning patients...and persons feared to be infected." -Article 6 and 34-2: Invokes the public's right to know and requires the Minister of Health and Welfare to "promptly disclose information" regarding the spread of virus to the public.

-Article 47 (1): Empowers authorities to shut down any location "deemed contaminated".

Revision of the enforcement decree of the existing Medical Devices Act (MDA) of 2018 (in effect since January 23, 2019) -Article 46 (2): Allows for medical equipment producers without manufacturing licenses to produce, or importers without licenses of to import -Article 13 (2): Empowers the MFDS to allow for testing of infectious diseases under the IDPCA based on Article 46 (2) Promulgation of the enforcement decree of the IDPCA was passed by the National Assembly on February 26, 2020. 73 Amendment on March 3, 2020: -Article 6: Stipulates that all citizens have a "right to receive the diagnosis and medical treatment of any infectious disease" and the "State and local governments shall bear expenses incurred within." -Enforces a punitive measure for breaking self-quarantine at up to 1,000,000 South Korean won or 1 year in prison. 74 -Grants officials the legal authority to make "necessary means to make masks available to children and the elderly in a public health crisis involving any respiratory virus." -Articles 50-56: Mandates "disinfection duty" for the government.

Preparedness and Response to COVID-19 in Saudi Arabia: Building on MERS Experience

Asia's next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in Disaster Management in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework

Ethnic and Regional Variations in Hospital Mortality from COVID-19 in Brazil: A Cross-Sectional Observational Study

Political and Institutional Perils of Brazil's COVID-19 Crisis

Reconsidering Policy Feedback: How Policies Affect Politics

Laissez-faire racism: The crystallization of a kinder, gentler, antiblack ideology

Chips and Change: How Crisis Reshapes the Semiconductor Industry

Governing Public-Private Infectious Disease Partnerships

Power to the Partners?: The Politics of Public-Private Health Partnerships

Evolution and Epidemic Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Brazil

Policy Feedback

Policy Makes Mass Politics

Political behavior: An overview

Epidemic and Challenges of Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19): India Response

In-Vitro Diagnostic Devices: Introduction to Current Point-of-Care Diagnostic Devices

Technological Catch-up and the Role of Universities: South Korea's Innovation-Based Growth Explained through the Corporate Helix Model

Transitions of Innovation Activities in Latecomer Countries: An Exploratory Case Study of South Korea

A Ground-up 'Quaternary' Innovation Strategy for South Korea Using Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Platforms

Characterizing Public Emotions and Sentiments in COVID-19 Environment: A Case Study of India

Molecular Diagnostics: Promises and Possibilities

The study of electoral behavior

Decoding the Twitter Sentiments towards the Leadership in the Times of COVID-19: A Case of USA and India

The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science

Systematic confusions in the evaluation of implementing decisions

A Hands-on Guide to Doing Content Analysis

Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton Paperbacks

Public and Private Partnership in Disaster Risk Management

Forum on Public-Private Partnerships for Global Health and Safety, Board on Global Health, Institute of Medicine, and National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Health Systems Strengthening: Workshop Summary

Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races

Structure of the RNA-Dependent RNA Polymerase from COVID-19 Virus

The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-Hye's Leadership and South Korean Democracy

Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political Participation in Boston

Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis

Public/Private Mix in Health Systems

China's Innovation Trajectories

Slouching Tiger, Roaring Dragon: Comparing India and China as Late Innovators

The First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Imported into Korea from Wuhan, China: Implication for Infection Prevention and Control Measures

The Effects of Government Financial Support on Business Innovation in South Korea

Politics in North and South Korea: Political Development, Economy, and Foreign Relations

Strengthening epidemiologic investigation of infectious diseases in Korea: lessons from the Middle East respiratory syndrome outbreak

COVID-19 in South Korea: Lessons for Developing Countries

Legislative and Administrative Responses to COVID-19 Virus in the Republic of Korea

Economic Catch-up and Technological Leapfrogging: The Path to Development and Macroeconomic Stability in Korea

Catch-up Cycles and Changes in Industrial Leadership: Windows of Opportunity and Responses of Firms and Countries in the Evolution of Sectoral Systems

When the Illiberal and the Neoliberal Meet around Infectious Diseases: An Examination of the MERS Response in South Korea

Dynamic Change Process of Target Genes by RT-PCR Testing of SARS-Cov-2 during the Course of a Coronavirus Disease 2019 Patient

Innovation and Technology in Korea: Challenges of a Newly Advanced Economy. Heidelberg

Can the UK Emulate the South Korean Approach to Covid-19?

Are Populist Leaders Creating the Conditions for the Spread of COVID-19? Comment on "A Scoping Review of Populist Radical Right Parties' Influence on Welfare Policy and Its Implications for Population Health in Europe

Policy Feedback Theory

Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?

The Strategy for Korea's Economic Success

Public -Private 'partnerships' in Health -a Global Call to Action

National response to COVID-19 in the Republic of Korea and lessons learned for other countries

The Entrepreneurial Developmental State: What Is the Perceived Impact of South Korea's Creative Economy Action Plan on Entrepreneurial Activity?

Inter Nation Social Lockdown versus Medical Care against COVID-19, a Mild Environmental Insight with Special Reference to India

The Country-Dependent Shaping of 'Hydrogen Niche' Formation: A Comparative Case Study of the UK and South Korea from the Innovation System Perspective

Virus Isolation from the First Patient with SARS-CoV-2 in Korea

Promoting Population Health with Public-Private Partnerships: Where's the Evidence?

Participation and Democratic Theory

Differential Effects of Intervention Timing on COVID-19 Spread in the United States

Managing the Innovators: Organizational and Professional Commitment among Scientists and Engineers

When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change

Representation

Public Private Partnerships: A Marriage of Necessity

Study of Knowledge, Attitude, Anxiety & Perceived Mental Healthcare Need in Indian Population during COVID-19 Pandemic

Public-Private Partnerships in Global Health: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

In defence of digital contact-tracing: human rights, South Korea and Covid-19

Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. 1. Aufl., 4. Druck

Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights

South Korea's Democratic Decay

South Korea After Impeachment

Importance of Public-Private Partnerships: Strengthening Laboratory Medicine Systems and Clinical Practice in Africa

Bureaucratic Rationale and Use of an Academic Concept in Policy-Making: The Rise and Fall of the Regional Innovation System in South Korea

Exploring the Ambiguous Consensus on Public-Private Partnerships in Collective Risk Preparation: Public-Private Partnerships in Collective Risk Preparation

Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making

Análise Dos Discursos Do Presidente Jair Bolsonaro Em Meio à Pandemia: O Coronavírus é Só Uma 'Gripezinha

COVID-19: Learning from Experience

Making Integrity Institutions Work in South Korea: The Role of People Power in the Impeachment of President Park in 2016

Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality

Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics

A Pancoronavirus RT-PCR Assay for Detection of All Known Coronaviruses

Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization; with a New Introduction by the Author

Public Opinion: The Visible Politics

Pandemic Nationalism in South Korea

The Evolution of South Korea's Innovation System: Moving towards the Triple Helix Model?

Content Analysis

Perceptions of Security vis-à-vis North Korea after the US-North Korea Summit

Preventing the Next Pandemic: Lessons from East Asia

COVID-19: The CIDRAP Viewpoint: Part 3, Smart Testing for COVID Virus and Antibodies

The Korea Society for Infectious Diseases (KSID), KSID White Paper on Chronicles of MERS (대한감염학회 백서: 메르스 연대기), the Korea Society of Infectious Diseases

Calling for Impeachment of President Moon Jae

President's Office "President Moon Jae-in's Speeches and Writings: Definite change with the people

Flattening the Curve on COVID-19: How Korea responded to a pandemic using ICT,' Office of the Spokesperson, Ministry of Justice, the Republic of Korea

Ministry of Health and Welfare

Public-Private Partnership accelerates Coronavirus Diagnosis (민·관 협력으로 신종 코로나바이러스 진단이 빨라진다),' Ministry of Health and Welfare

Ministry of Health and Welfare

Medical Equipment Policy Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare

List of COVID-19 IN Vitro Diagnostics Device,' Ministry of Health and Welfare

Republic of Korea

Division of Quarantine Support, Center for Infectious Disease Control, Korea Centers for Diseases Control

Press Release

Ministry of Food and Drug Safety

Infrastructure and Transport

The First Meeting of the Inter Ministerial Task Force on COVID-19 Related Quarantine Equipment Export Abroad (코로나19 방역물품 해외진출 지원 관계부처 TF 제 1차 회의)

Enforcement Decree of the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Presidential Decree No. 29180

Act No. 14286

Act No. 14286

Requirements for Listing on the KOSDAQ market

?seqNo=1106 Opinions and News Reports '(5th LD) Tentative voter turnout at 28-year high of 66.2 pct despite coronavirus

South Korea's governing party wins election by a landslide

How South Korea Flattened the Coronavirus Curve with Technology

Coronavirus in South Korea: How 'trace, test and treat' may be saving lives

South Korea is Winning the Fight Against COVID-19. The U.S. is Failing

South Korea's Health Minister on How His Country Is Beating Coronavirus Without a Lockdown

MERS Tarnishes Korean President's Image as Leader

How South Korea made itself a global innovation leader: Systemic reform backed by strong investment has brought rapid and long-lasting results

Private inspection, which was not possible during MERS, was different for Corona 19

How South Korea Flattened the Curve

Coronavirus testing is 'a mess' in the US, report says,' CNN Health

How is the COVID-19 Virus Detected using Real Time RT-PCR?

Lessons for America: How South Korean Authorities Used Law to Fight the Coronavirus

Moon Jae-in's Approval Rating Soars on COVID-19 Response

How South Korea Lost Control of its Coronavirus Outbreak

Why is South Korea beating coronavirus? Its citizens hold the state to account

The Republic of Korea produces, and Korean Air delivers (대한민국이 만들고, 대한항공이 수송합니다),' Korean Air

Success Fighting the Virus Brings Success at the Ballot Box

Coronavirus and the Future of Democracy in Europe

China clamps down on coronavirus test kit exports after accuracy questioned

South Korea's COVID-19 Success: The Role of Advance Preparations

Order from Chaos: Moon's moment in the sun. The Brookings Institution

South Korea's coronavirus response is the opposite of China and Italy -and it's working

Viral Polymerases

South Korea shows that democracies can succeed against the coronavirus

Park Geun-hye under fire over handling of MERS crisis

South Koreans blame government in spiraling MERS outbreak

Moon's Ruling DP wins landslide in legislative polls

How History Informed South Korea's Battle with COVID-19

Hate China Virus' puts South Korea's Moon under pressure

Special Report: How Korea trounced U.S. in race to test people for coronavirus

Thank God for Calm, Competent Deputies

SARS" to "From SARS to the New Coronavirus… How was the response to pandemics of previous regimes?

How South Korea Put into Place the World's Most Aggressive Coronavirus Test Program

Boosting South Korea's basic research: By redirecting funding to small teams, the country is betting on the creativity of its scientists

Figure 2. PPP Implementation 1 in Early Response to COVID-19: EUA Process by KCDC and MFDS Source: Developed and updated based on Press Release

Figure 3. PPP Implementation 2 in Early Response to COVID-19: Exports of Excess RT-PCR Test-Kits by South Korea from

Weight (tons) Amount ($mn)

Source

PPP Implementation 2 in Early Response to COVID-19: Exports of Excess RT-PCR Test-Kits by Destination from

Source

Flattening the Curve on COVID-19: How Korea responded to a pandemic using ICT

2020) from Wuhan, China, detected at Incheon International Airport and immediately hospitalized in a designated isolation hospital via PCR testing

Clear Presence of Control Tower Unclear, with several overlapping public entities with varied channels in place: Acting Prime Minister

Ministry of Public Safety and Security

Ministry of Health and Welfare Clear and present. Ministry of Health and Welfare (under which KCDC is placed)

Empowering KCDC as Independent Control Power Bipartisan bills raised by politicians (Chung Choun-sook

Elevation of KCDC becomes election campaign slogan for incumbent party toward election. Post-election, bipartisan effort for elevation of KCDC in the 21st National Assembly based on the 2017 bill drafts.

Authorization ( Political elites learn from the past to enhance sustainability of their leadership Public and private sectors collaborated to efficiently combat COVID-19 in South Korea Pandemic governance boosted public support for the incumbent government in elections Democratic governments are pressured to perform well in crisis management Large-scale RT-PCR testing is required for effective early response to COVID-19