To the Right Reverend Father in God, and his singular good Lord, Edmund, Bishop of London, Lewis Euans wisheth much health, long life, with increase of all right godly honour. WHEN I CONsider, which thing I oftentimes do with myself, right Honourable, of what knowledge, sharpness of wit, and industry, the learned and wise philosophers of ancient times were, I see cause both to rejoice, and to be sorry: rejoice we may, for that through their most excellent labours, it hath pleased almighty God, such is his goodness, so to open unto us the secret workings of nature, and knowledge of sundry things, which from many, were of a long time before secret and hidden: again, sorry we may be, to see such singular instruments provided for our wealth and benefits, not only to be utterly ignorant in the most comfortable, most high, and infallible doctrine, in the knowledge of their Creator, of our Redeemer and Maker, but also (whereat needs must we lament) to be so dotingly wedded unto their own wills, as wilfully, or rather willingly, and that (alas) without any reason to yield themselves bond slaves and wretched captives unto the detestable servitude, and most execrable bondage that ever sithence the creation of man reigned, unto the embracing, I will not say of the evil, but of the most wicked, horrible, and monstrous Idolatry of the heathens: that is, to worship the Sun, to adore the Moon, to reverence the Stars, to honour the fire, to take for their Gods the brute beasts of the earth, to esteem for their saviours, some Ravening Fowl of the air, and (if all that be not madness and abomination enough) further to pray unto most venomous snakes, to seek help of ugly serpents, to account them for Gods, to keep, seed, and honour them. O blind hearts! o darkness palpable! o learning to no purpose available! we may therefore well say unto such, yea, be he otherwise never so perfect an Orator, never so profound a Philosopher, Sapientia tua, & scientia tua, haec est quae decepit te: thy worldly wisdom, thy over curious knowledge, his, this, is it that hath blinded, beguiled, deceived thee. For touching the excellency of learning, and worthiness of eloquence, if we weigh well, but the flowing style of the incomparable Cicero, what can be more pleasant? what may with greater vehemency persuade? what can with more efficacy dissuade? who, to be brief, may but with much admiration embrace it? likewise, if we consider the great wisdom of Socrates, who is to be accounted (this of the heathens I speak) so worthy? so excellent? so perfect as he? Plato also was very famous, so were both the Cato's, Pythagoras, Sophocles, and Demosthenes, with many more: and yet how frowardly, nay how frantikly these wandered from the right way, from the acknowledging of one God, and the same of a divine essence, living, understanding, of an infinite power, wisdom and goodness, true, bounteous, just, chaste, and merciful, which is the father, the son, and the holy ghost, three persons, and one God, how far I say, and how wickedly, from this they have strayed, so evident it is, that for their sakes how should we but be sorry? for ours, how can we but rejoice? but what? have they erred in nothing, but in the doctrine (which thing is very all) of our creation, and redemption? have they not in their own doings oftentimes so foolishly reasoned, as, if we favoured them not much, we might seem justly to say, that almost they had no reason? and not to speak of Protagoras folly, nor of Diagoras his impiety, De nat. deo. lib. 1. to let all others pass, what if we ripped up the doings but of him whom amongst them all, I favour most, of eloquent Cicero I mean? might we not therein sometimes see, very small proofs? espy slender reasons? and find such childish shifts? as better in my judgement it were, to deny in some places the work, than to acknowledge it for the doings, in other things of so incomparable a man? for to prove his divination, what I pray you among other things allegeth he? De divin. lib. 1. two Snakes forsooth (so he saith) were taken in the house of a noble and wise man, one Ti. Gracchus, unto whom the wise men (for so I name them, whom the Persians call Magos: the Egyptians Prophetas: the Assyrians Chaldaeos: and the Indians Gymnosophistas) they being asked what these Snakes signified, did say: that if he did let the Male escape, than should his wife shortly after die: if the Female, then should he. The Female was let gone (for, loath a God's name he was, that P. Affricanus his daughter, being a young gentlewoman should die) so he himself in few days after accordingly died. A worthy proof of a thing never able to be proved Well, if any of the twain, saith he, should escape, by that mean, the man, or the wife must needs die. But as he had choice to keep which he would, so was he bound by no necessity to let go any. Why then kept he not both? he was a wise man, why saved he not thereby as well his own life, as his wives? after the same manner might we easily confute (were it not to long) the famous Oracle at Delphi, the cutting of a whetstone with the razor by Tarqvinius, the dream of Aeneas, and all such incredible, lewd and whetstone lies. But let Cicero hereunto (for so he doth) make this answer. What subtlety is this, by trifling to condemn things, confirmed by years and antiquity of time? nay, what folly is it, without any reason, to receive dreams and fond fables, found out we know not how, why, nor by whom? yet it is contained in blind chronicles, it is of authority. Yea, but ipse dixit (were the authority better than of those, qui sui quaestus causa, fictas suscitant sententias) hindereth the learner, letting him from adjudging what in each thing is right. In reasoning (as Cicero himself saith) the authority is not so much, as is the weight of the reason to be sought for, & required. What? is this, will some say the opinion of Cicero? is not his first book of Divination written in the name of his brother Quintus? that I grant. And yet, it is the doings of Tully, it is his own work, and (though it pleaseth him therein to try his wit) his very and full mind, as the same may well appear aswell in other of his works, as specially in his writing unto A. Caecinna, wherein he affirmeth, that no signs can be surer, that none may be more certain, than Divination. But let his first pass, and come unto the second. Denieth he not therein, not only dreams, whereof I speak not, but also visions? not only Φαντάσματα, as therein the difference is pretty, Suidas: but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and yet we read that in the very book of God, how Daniel, S. Peter, S. john, with others saw visions, regarded, esteemed and expounded them. But here a while to omit the heathens, I would that we likewise, even we that are Christians, should not trust overmuch unto authorities, unto the writings, I mean, and conjectures of man, it is modesty to be allowed, and prudency to be praised, if we so read them, as S. Aug. did the writings of S. Cyprian: that is, Aug. lib. 2 contra quendam Donatist. Quod in eyes divinarum scripturarum authoritati congruit, cum laud eius accipio: quod autem non congruit, cum pace eius respuo, that which agreeth in the same with the authority of divine scriptures, to his praise I receive: but which agreeth not, that with his favour I forsake, & leave. Where let none think, that I contemn authorities, but only wish, Sine ratione ut non valeret authoritas, that authority without reason or scripture, should not take place, and prevail. For to say the troth, some received of many as authorities, be so fond, ut aures à commemoratione abhorreant. Peter (saith some) denied Christ, that he might follow him, and not for fear. O folly! o madness! the scripture is plain. A far off followed Peter, he feared, yea, he was greatly afraid. Some also affirm that S. john died not, but was carried alive, as Enoch, and Elias into paradise, and yet at his sepulchre is Manna, say they, as it were bubbling up, even until this day, a sepulchre he had, he was buried, and notwithstanding all this, he died not. Alas, what weak authorities be these? nay, what foolish, and intolerable dreaming is this, about the scriptures of God? again, such as childishly do understand, that the Lord will descend into a valley, upon the side of the mount Olivet, there to judge the world, is not therein their wisdom so small, and their writings so fond, as whether is most foolish, it is hard to tell? Further, there be which allege, that our Saviour in no respect feared death, and that he was nothing afraid of his passion. But the scriptures be altogether otherwise. For he himself saith, My soul is heavy, even unto death. Of whom likewise the Evangelist thus speaketh, Marc. 14. Christ began to fear, and to be sorrowful. Ibidem. Let them therefore be ashamed, which think that our Saviour, in respect of his manhood, feared not death, and that he did not through fear of his passion say Transeat à me calix iste, Math. 26. let this cup pass from me. There is moreover, which writ, that though our saviour suffered, yet he felt no pain, though he were scourged, and wounded, yet he felt no smart, no grief, no dolour, that all his passion was sine sensu poenae, without feeling of pain. What? when he cried, Math. 27 Eli, Eli, lamasabachthani? Lord, Lord, why hast thou forsaken me? Were not then his pains great? his dolours unspeakable? his grief exceeding? Oh, our infirmities he bore, Esa. 54. and our sorrows did he sustain. Wherefore, may we not see, how slender sometimes, are the writings, and authority of man? how far from the purpose they estray? and how plainly in some places they differ, from the Prophets, Apostles, Evangelists, and holy Ghost? And to return unto the heathens again, in whose works although many things be found untrue, superstitious and lewd, yet thorough them, as means, we have attained the right entry into Arts, the ready way how to understand liberal sciences, and the plain path into the pleasant park of all laudable studies. And amongst all such benefits, which we thus at their hands have received, no one seemeth more excellent, so profitable, and so to be accepted, as is the Art of reasoning, which only (as the Prince of Orators De leg. lib. 2. saith) doth contain the whole skill of thoroughly seeing and adjudging, what both is, and aught to be in every matter. Yea, and that man, as sayeth the divine Philosopher Plato, which utterly in this Art is ignorant, seeth nothing else, were he otherwise never so rich and renowned, but the very shadows, and hollow bare images of things. Therefore have I thought it (my singular good Lord) worth the labour, if we in our tongue, as the Latins have done in theirs, should some briefly, & some at large, so set forth this Art (which I may worthily term the very treasure house of sciences, the Casket of jewels, the ground of all good studies, and the very nurse of right perfect knowledge) as it may at the length appear, that like as the Latin is nothing inferior unto the Greek, so our tongue may in time, either be comparable with both, or at the least (somewhat to grant them) not much inferior unto the second. Which my small labour howsoever done, although in value little above the apple given by the poor man, unto Artaxerxes Memor, I have yet been bold to dedicate, and offer unto your honour. First, as a token and pledge of the unfeigned good will which (not to speak of your great clemency) for sundry good causes, I am bound to bear during life, towards your good Lordship: then, that under your protection, the same being published, the malice of Momus might be weakened, and the spite of Zoilus abated. For it cannot be but Logic hath enemies, but reason hath foes, but one industrious sometimes shall have adversaries. Thus humbly I crave that your honour would, with such heart and countenance receive it, as thereby I may be encouraged (if it shall please God, so to aid me) to begin, and go forward with greater things. Your humble Orator Lewis Euans. Ludovicus Euans, optimarum artium studiosissimis. S. D. QVoniam cum omni utilitate, quam dij hominibus, doctissimi viri, dederunt, ars aliqua (Ciceronianis enim quam saepissimè, & libenter utimur) coniuncta est, per quam illa utilitas subinde percipi, tradique possit: non possum non saepè multumque admirari, quibusdam quid venire possit in mentem, eorum ut industriam, & studia reprehendant, eorum labores, & ingenia contemnant, qui dialecticam anglicè aedendam esse, atque eam vel illiteratis in sua cuiusque lingua tradendam, quàm autem praeclare vestrum esto judicium, censuerunt. Mihi profectò multùm, diuque cogitanti, quanam re nostris possem hominibus prodesse, nulla impraesentiarum maior, nulla praeclarior occurrebat, quàm si dialecticae artis, hoc est dicere, rationis viam traderem meis conterraneis. Est nanque eiusmodi hominibus utilitati ratio, ea ut illis nihil à deo utilius, nihil praestantius, nihil pulchrius dari posse videatur. Qua cum, quod est etiam ars quaedam coniuncta, & ea quidem longè omnium clarissima, quae Logica dicitur, & quae quasi disserendi quaedam magistra est, quis usquam adeò immanis, quis unquam tam barbarus extitit, ea ut suos privari desyderet? ea ut suos ornari, vel ex animo non optet? Hoc fuit in causa, clari, praestantesque viri, quod ego magnificam hanc artem, anglicis iam literis, & succinctè illustrandam putarem. Cui sententiae vos si nihil praevertendum putatis, erit tum reliquum, ut lucubratiunculam hanc qualemcunque meam, iniquorum contra morsus, acerbitatem, & calunniam, candide defendatis. Hoc si feceritis, erit cum id mihi tam gratum, quàm quod gratissimum: tum à vestra arte, humanitate, ingenio, & literis non alienum. valet. The Abridgement of Logic. Logic is an Art to define the nature of things, What Logic is. to divide them into parts, to knit true arguments, and to detect the false. This Art consisteth of two parts: Logic divided. th'one in finding out matter, and showing the places, whence all Arguments do spring: the other in adjudging and framing of such matter found, aptly together, and for the purpose. The end of Logic is probably to reason of any matter set forth. This Art (being only reason) naturally is engrafted in us, To wha end Logic serveth. but yet now so darkened, as we have much need of the precepts thereof, and that to instruct, and remember us, of such things, as by nature we have. Now in this Art are invented five common words, serving to show forth, Five common words. how far other words do extend, and how much they contain in them. Neither is there any word, which is not comprehended under one of these common words: and they be these, the General, the Special, the Difference, the Property, the Accident, & hereunto is also added every proper name, or that which supplieth the room thereof. General. The General is a word which is spoken of many, that differ in their specials, as a living creature comprehendeth a man, a horse, a dog. etc. and every General hath divers Specials, & is spoken evermore of them all: as a tree comprehendeth in itself, a Pear tree, an Apple tree, a fig tree. etc. The Special is a word whereof the sort or kind is conceived in mind: Special. as a man, a horse. etc. Difference The Difference is a word which serveth to discern one Special from another, as to be endued with reason, is the difference between man, and a beast. property The Property is a word which declareth a natural proneness, and manner of doing, which agreeth unto one Special, and to the same only, and that always: as the property of Grammar is to speak and write truly: of Logic to teach aptly, and by a natural mean: of Music to sing: of Arithmetic to number. etc. The Accident is that, Accident. which may both be present and also absent, without any detriment unto the substance, wherein it is: as a man may be merry and sorry. etc. And here you must note, that the Accident is two ways to be considered: either separable from the substance, as mirth from man, or else unseparable, as heat from fire. But yet in thought, heat may be separated from the fire. The special use of these five common words is, The use of the .v. common words. that we use not the General for the Special, nor the Special for the General. There are also in this Art certain words called the most general, Most general. which do chief serve to this purpose, that we confound not the substances, or inward nature of things with the Accidents: and they be in number ten, the Substance, the Quantity, the Quality, the Relation, the manner of doing, the suffering, When, Where, the Seatling, and the apparayling. A substance is the inward nature of a Substance thing, only in mind separated from the Accidents, as God, Man, a Lion. etc. A substance. Without body God, Angels, The soul of man. with body Without mixture Fire. Air. Water. Earth. compounded of divers elements. A living thing as a creature. Having the sense of feeling, Endued with reason, as man. Socrates Plato. Without reason: as beasts. cattle. Fish. Fowl. Without sense of feeling, as A tree. A shrub. Without life. Stones. Metals. ¶ This table showeth the order of every substance and kind: and also teacheth how ye may define any thing, as if you will know what man is. Man is a substance with body, compound of diverse elements, living, having the sense of feeling, & endued with reason. A Quantity is the greatness of a thing, Quantity. and it is by two means perceived, by sight, and by feeling, and his property is to be divided, as an Ell into quarters, a shilling into pence, an Oration into sentences. etc. Quantity is two ways considered, Quantity divided. the one as by ask how great, long, or broad a thing is: the other, by ask how many things there be. Quality is all (except Quantity) which is subject unto the senses of man, Quality. and they be two ways to be considered: either of the body: as colours, sounds, smellings, tasting, feeling: or of the mind, as sciences, virtues and affections. The Relation is a name given unto things not by nature, but in the respect of an other: Relation. as when I say a master, I must understand servants or scholars that he hath, in respect of whom he is so called. And there are two things here to be marked the ground of every thing, and the end whereunto it hath respect: as a master is the ground in that he teacheth, and hath respect unto his scholar which is taught: again, the Scholar is the ground in that he is taught, and hath respect unto his master which teacheth him. The manner of doing. The manner of doing, is a relation unto that which is done, or suffered: as to love, is a relation or action, towards the thing which is loved. And hereunto may we refer the duty of every man: as to teach, to write, to play the lawyer or merchant. etc. Suffering. The suffering, is a relation of the sufferer unto the doer, or the effect of the manner of doing: as to be loved, taught, written. etc. Where. Where, is a word which comprehendeth the description of places, or showeth where any thing is done: as in England, at home, at London, at Cambridge, in the school, in the church. etc. When. When, is a word, showing at what time a thing is done: as this day, to morrow. etc. Settling. The Settling, is the disposition, gesture, or order of the body, as when it lieth, sitteth, standeth. etc. Apparayling. The Apparayling, either showeth with what thing any body is covered, as with a cloak, coat, gown, chain, sceptre, mace, or that which one possesseth, as gold, lands, wife. etc. or that which containeth any thing, as the ship holdeth or containeth wares, men. etc. Further, whereas at the beginning, I said, that Logic was an Art to define the nature of things: as thus you may define or express what man is, man is a living creature endued with reason. A definition divided. Now you shall note that a definition is four ways to be considered: for either it is Essential, which consisteth of the General and Difference, as in the aforesaid definition of man: or it is causal, when the causes be expressed, as Beer is a drink made of water, Hops, and Malt: or else it consisteth of the parts, as Matrimony is the coupling together of man and wife: or else it consisteth of the Accidents, as the Evening is a time wherein shadows be most long. Thus as a definition declareth what a thing is, so showeth a division how many things are comprehended in the same: and it is also four ways to be considered, that is, the division of a word, A division divided. as time signifieth an herb, and also this instant: the division of the General into his Special: as a living creature is divided into a man, a Lion, an Ass. etc. The division of the whole into his parts, as a body into an head, breast, belly, feet, and hands: the division of the substance into his Accidents: as Cicero was a philosopher, an Orator and an Astronomer. After that we have so showed what Logic is, what the common words, and the most general are, what a definition, and what a division is, we will briefly speak of the knitting of words together in a Proposition. Proposition. A Proposition is a perfect sentence: showing a reason true or false: as Man is a living creature. And every Proposition doth consist of two parts, the one whereof somewhat is spoken, the other which is spoken of any thing: as in this sentence, Man is a living creature, a living creature is spoken of man, so that man is that whereof it is spoken. Every perfect sentence is two ways divided, Proposition divided. either it is single, as modesty is a virtue: or else it is double, as if modesty be a virtue: it is praise worthy. Again, a Proposition is either true or false: true, as, all men are mortal: false, as, no men are mortal. Also it is either affirmative or negative: as, virtue is good, virtue is not good: it is further either universal, as, all men are honest, or particular, as, some men are honest, or indefinite, as, virtue is the chief good thing: or singular, as, Cicero is a perfect Orator. The universal proposition hath general signs, as these, all, none. etc. The particular hath particular signs, as, some one, the most part, oftentimes. The indefinite hath no sign. And the singular hath to the one part a noun proper. The use of a proposition, The use of a proposition. or perfect sentence, is briefly to comprehend, and to couch together in one sentence, the full sum of a long and large discourse: as in the second book of the Aeneides of Virgil. Troy was destroyed by the Grecians. The repugnancy of propsitions, The repugnancy of a proposition. is the diversity of two perfect sentences, consisting of two, and the self same parts. And of these repugnant propositions there be four: A proposition repugnant divided. the one altogether contrary, as all men are liars, no men are liars: the other particular contrary, as some men are liars, some men are no liars: the third contradictory, as all men are liars, some men are no liars: the fourth (so to speak it) is subaltern, as all virtues are to be praised, some virtue is to be praised. A table of the repugnant propositions. All men are good. Altogether contrary. No men are good. Subaltern. contradictory. contradictory. Subaltern. Some men are good. Particular contrary. Some men are not good. The use of the repugnancy. The diversity of these perfect sentences, is most necessary to discern the truth from that which is false: for as black and white being joined together, the difference is soon espied: so if you join two dissonant propositions, you shall easily discern the true, and find out the false. Then followeth the turning of propositions, The use of the turning of a proposition which serveth for the evident opening of them, for the making of short arguments, and for the reducing of the second, and third figure into the first. The turning of a proposition, The turning of a proposition. is when the first part, and latter of the same, are turned, the one into the others room: as, some priests are good men, some good men are priests. A plain turning of a proposition, is, A plain turning. when the parts of the same, do supply th'one the others place, the same signs always unchanged: as, no good man is an usurer, no usurer is a good man. An accidental turning, An accidental turning. is when the same signs do not remain: and by this are the particulars gathered of the universals: as all men are living creatures, some living creatures are men. Hitherto having briefly set forth all single words, and their nature, we will now show how to frame an Argument. An argument. An argument is the proving of a perfect sentence set forth, whereof before it was, or might be doubted. An argument divided. An argument is divided four ways, into a perfect argument, an unperfect, an induction, and an example. A pefrect argument. A perfect argument consisteth of three propositions, whereof the first is called the proposition at large, the second is named, the less, and the third is termed the conclusion: as for example. At large. Every virtue is to be praised: The less. Modesty is a virtue, Conclusion. Therefore modesty is to be praised: And here you must well note one word, called the double repeat, contained in the two first propositions, which in the aforesaid argument is this word virtue, for it knitteth together the two first propositions, proving the thing, and never entereth into the conclusion. As for rules concerning a perfect argument to be observed, to one marking well, though only his figures and moods they are not so needful. The figures appertaining unto a perfect argument are three: the first, the second, 3. figures. the third. The first figure is when the double repeat is placed in the former part of the first proposition, and in the latter of the second. 1. figure. And unto this first figure there doth belong four moods, which be nothing else, than words invented, 4. modes that only by the vowels of the same, the quality and quantity of the proposition may be known, that is, whether it be universal affirmative, or universal negative, particular affirmative, or particular negative: the moods or the words are these: Barbara, Celarent, Darij, Ferio: the vowels whereof are thus to be considered. A signifieth A proposition universal affirmative E signifieth An universal negative. I signifieth A particular affirmative. O signifieth A particular negative. These things thus being well marked, you may by every one of the said four moods frame an argument, which evermore must be made from the general bnto the special, as thus. Bar- All living creatures are of God's creation: ba- All men are living creatures, ra. Therefore all men are of God's creation. Ce- No justice is a vice: lafoy- All piety is justice, rent. Therefore no piety is a vice. Da- All filthiness is to be avoided: ri- Some pleasure is a filthiness, j Therefore, some pleasure is to be avoided. Fe- No Art is to be contemned: ri- Logic is an Art, o Therefore Logic is not to be contemned. The second figure hath the double repeat in the last rehearsed part of both propositions, 2. figure. and it hath also four moods, 4. Modes which be these: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, the vowels whereof as before, are most to be considered. Ce- No good men do rob their neighbours: sa- All thieves do rob their neighbours, re. Therefore no thieves are good men. Ca- All drunkards do hate good diet: mes- No good men do hate good diet, tres. Therefore no good men are drunkards. Fes- No wisemen do boast themselves: ti- Thraso doth boast himself, no. Therefore, Thraso is not wise. Basilius- All good men are thankful to their benefactors ro- Nero was unthankful to his benefactor, co. Therefore, Nero was no good man. The third figure hath the double repeat in the former part of both propositions, 3. figure. and there be six moods, appertaining unto the same: Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, 6. Moods. Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison, the vowels likewise whereof, are as afore, specially to be considered. Da- All drunkards are to be punished, rap- All drunkards are excessive drinkers, ti. therefore, excessive drinkers are to be punished Fe- No lawful matrimony is to be rebuked, lap- All lawful matrimony have dissensions, ton. therefore, some dissensions are not to be rebuked Di- Some learned men be heretics: sa- All learned men have knowledge, mis. therefore some having knowledge, are heretics Da- All knowledge is necessary unto a Divine, ti- Some knowledge is Philosophy: si. Philosophy is necessary unto a Divine. Bornwell- Some man is no drunkard. car- Every man is a living creature, do. therefore, some living creature is no drunkard Fe- No man is an ass, ri- Some man is a living creature: son. Therefore, some living creature is no ass. Here I have showed the three figures, what they are, and their examples, and yet sufficient it is, that we use the first, and the second, for the third (as in that Melancthon, and others do very well write) you may refuse. An argument of a noun proper. There is further an other argument unto this third figure referred, in the which the double repeat, in the first part of both propositions, is a noun proper, as David in possessing his own, did not offend: David was a christian, Therefore, a christian in possessing his own doth not offend. An unperfect argument, is where one proposition is omitted, An unperfect argument. and that either for brevity, or else, for that the part omitted, is otherwise undoubtedly known well enough: as: Drunkenness is an evil thing, Therefore, it is to be avoided. Whereunto if you add the Proposition at large, which is wanting, that is, every evil thing is to be avoided, than your argument shall be perfect, in the mood Darij, of the first figure. This unperfect argument consisteth partly of likelihoods, Note. and partly of infallible reasons, therefore it must be foreseen, that likelihoods be not taken for necessary reasons. An Induction, is, An Induction. when we make an universal conclusion, upon a sufficient number of proper names: as thus, Red Wine maketh one warm: Hippocras maketh one warm: Spanish Wine maketh one warm: French Wine maketh one warm: Tire maketh one warm: Neither is there any unlike example, Therefore, all wines maketh one warm. An Example, An example. is the applying of a like thing, or reason, from one person, to an other: as, Thy father against King Priamus was not so cruel, Therefore, you ought not, against this man to be so cruel. Here unto are referred the Fables of Poets, Proverbs, and Parables. A heaping argument. There is an other kind of reasoning, called a heaped argument, which is when the last word of the one proposition is, and that throughout the argument, repeated in the first part of the second, and that also when voices necessarily agreeing thereunto, that is, when the general, special, causes, and effect, are joined together: as, Idleness breedeth riotousness, Riotousness breedeth poverty, Poverty breedeth theft, Therefore idleness, breedeth theft. Now it remaineth (where as I showed before, that of perfect Sentences, some be single and some double, and having spoken as briefly, so sufficiently of the single) that we speak somewhat of a double proposition, and that before I do set forth the places, whence all arguments do spring. A double proposition consisteth of two single, knit together with some conjunction, either conditional, A double proposition. as if justice be a virtue, it is praise worthy: or disjunctive, as, either it is day, or else it is night: or else Copulative, as love being unlawful, is not to be praised. A conditional proposition is evermore true when the parts are so knit together, that the latter must needs follow upon the first. A disjunctive is then true, when one of the parts is true. A copulative is only then true, when both the parts are true. Of the second part of Logic, which is, of the finding out of an Argument. A Place is the seat, A place. or resting corner of an Argument, and whence we are warned, how to ground or talk, and to lay the foundation of our reason, of which places some are appertaining unto persons, and some unto things, but unto the persons do belong these which follow, and from thence we thus do reason: as from, The Country, He is a Grecian: therefore, light, inconstant, and deceitful. The kind, She is a Woman: therefore, unapt for wars. The Parents, He is king Henry the eights son: therefore valiant. The Age, He is old: therefore to be asked counsel of. Bringing up, He was Lucius Scholar: therefore an Heretic. Art, or trade of life, He is a shoemaker: therefore no lover of liberal Sciences. Fellowship, He lived always with drunkards: therefore, what marvel, if he be a drunkard? Manner of doing, I did it not through anger, envy, rashness, but being thought upon, & of a long time considered: therefore, it was well done, and perfect. Manner of dying. Enoch, and Elias were taken a live up into Heaven: therefore, they are become blessed. Signs, She is brought to bed: therefore, no maid. Antecedent, He sought a good while a gone to rob me: therefore it is possible, that he rob me now. Consequent, He fled: therefore, it is probable that he committed this offence. The places of things are all such, as be not of the persons, and from them we reason thus: as from, Definition, Fortitude is a virtue, fight in the quarrel of right: therefore it is praise worthy. General, He is no living creature: therefore no man. Special, He is a man: therefore, a living creature. Difference, He is endued with reason: therefore, a man. property, He barketh: therefore, he is a Dog. Hole, It is a house: therefore, walls, a roof. etc. Yoked words, He doth wisely: therefore, he is a wise man. Efficient cause, God hath ordained the Magistrate: therefore we ought to obey him. Matter, He wanteth clothe: therefore, he can have no coat. Form, This Table is well preporcioned, therefore, it had a good workman. End, Public Schools do cause men to be civil: therefore they are to be erected. Effect, or event, They of India do hear the word of God: therefore, they are of God. Relation, He is Constancius father: therefore, not his son. Contrary, The water is hot: therefore, not cold. Privation, It is dark: therefore, not light. contradictory, john writeth: therefore, that john should now not write, it is impossible. Greater, Hector could not overcome Achilles: therefore Paris might less do it. Lesser, It is lawful upon the Sabbaoth day to save an Ox: therefore it is more lawful to save a man. Now it remaineth, that we speak somewhat, of the discerning, and understanding of untrue arguments, which two ways are specially considered, for either is, the fault in the form only, that is in the consequence: or else in the matter, or things. And if the fault be in the consequence, you may then reject the whole argument, showing the fault of the consequence: as, In all holy men now living there is sin: Adultery is sin. Therefore in all holy men living, there is adultery. Here may you deny the consequence, and so reject the argument. And the reason thereof is, that in the second figure of mere adfirmatives (as the moods there teach you) there can nothing follow. Mark therefore diligently your figures, and moods, and then is the fault of the consequence soon espied. But if the fault be in the matter, or things, then have we three ways to reject, and confute the same, either by denying the untrue proposition, showing the untruth thereof, out of the place, or seat of things, as out of the definition, division, causes, and such others: as, A flattering, and a dissembling kind of speech, doth not become Philosophers: Eloquence is a flattering, and a dissembling kind of speech. Therefore Eloquence doth not become Philosophers. Here may you deny the less proposition, showing that the definition of Eloquence is not right, for Eloquence is an Art to set forth things well and plainly, and in a meet, and perfect kind of speech. Or else by distinguishing of the things ambigous, and doubtful: as, john. IX.. No sinner is heard of God: All men here living are sinners: Therefore no man here living, is heard of God. Here are the proposition at large, and the less to be distinguished, for of sinners, some do repent, some do not, therefore of such only as repent not, the first proposition is true, also the less proposition is to be distinguished, for as all men are sinners, so are some without repentance, and some have repent, in whom notwithstanding yet remaineth naughty affections, and lewd desires. Or else in reproving the false proposition, by showing a contrary example: as, No Legates ought in their journeys to be hindered: Therefore, this ought not be hindered. Here we may answer unto the antecedent thus: that if a Legate going from Flaunders through France: into Hispaine, do carry with him Letters, or any thing hurtful unto the realm of France: he may be hindered, taken, and punished: as they of Athens, took the Legates of the Lacedæmonians, going to the king of Persia: and as the Romans took the Legates of Hannibal, going to the king of Macedonia. And thus I adjudge to be enough, for the understanding of arguments, and for the discerning of the faults of the same, whether it be in the form, or matter. Thus having most briefly considered over, both the parts of reason, that is, how to frame an argument, and how to adjudge of the same, the labour being small, and the commodity great, let none therein omit such diligence, but that he thereby at the length, may understand the truth, find not falsehood, conceive the certainty of things, and so shake off fond opinions, self will, obstinacy, childish brawlings, and errors, for than the sight of truth, what can be more excellent? on the other side, what is so to be hated, as the wallowing in the foul mire of ignorance? What therein is so to be abhorred as the opinion of Pyrro? or as in that the judgement of the Academics? who do allege all things to be uncertain, & doubtful, this foolishness, I might well say, this madness, seeketh to overthrow the most singular gift of God, that is, truth, it endeavoureth to abolish all arts, and stay of life, it laboureth to bereave us of the knowledge of God, which being, howsoever engraffed in the nature of man, is (all being God's gifts) by true arguments to be made manifest, by good reasons to be opened, and by sure conclusions to be confirmed. But where as some arguments grounded upon many of the places aforesaid, may seem right weak, and of small force, therein it shall be the part of the discrete, and wise reader, so to weigh, and consider them, as he, discerning likelihoods from truth, probality from plain proofs, may only embrace the verity, and following the same, may be always thankful unto God, whose worthy praise (as Plato saith) doth most at large in all Arts and Sciences appear. Epitomes dialecticae finis, Ludovico Euans, Brytanno autore. Aug: THe knowledge of reasoning is of a great force to all kind of questions, which are in the holy Scriptures to be weighed, and made manifest. Hieron. What perverse doctrine soever is in the world, and smelling out of worldly wisdom, is thought strong, the same by Logic is overthrown, and as sparks of 〈◊〉 is dashed in pieces. Rodolph Agricola. It is certain that Logic is profitable, if to be deceived, & to take falsehood for truth, and truth for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 adjudge unprofitable.