THE COUNSELLOR A Treatise of Counsels and Counsellors of Princes, written in Spanish by Bartholomew Philip, Doctor of the Civil and Cannon law. Englished by I. T. Graduate in Oxford. LONDON Printed by john Wolse. 1589. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE M. JOHN FORtescue Esquire, Master of her majesties great Garderobe, and one of her most honourable prinie Counsel, john Thorius wisheth health and honour, with accomplishment of all Heroical desires. I Present unto your honour the very Idea of a Counsellor not shadowed (in truth) with curious eloquence of words, but in his kind absolute and perfit. Such an Orator Tully, such a king Patritius, such a wise man Solomon commendeth unto us: as, fit and needful to be propounded, like a masterpiece for example, though hard to be expressed in full perfection. The book written in the Castilian tongue by Barthol. philippus D. of the laws, was commended by many my good friends, men of great judgement, and thought worthy for desert, and profitable for use thereof, to be imparted to our Nation: and diverse of them (whose will is sufficient commandment, and request persuasion for me) earnestly entreated me to employ some time in translating thereof, for the service of such Noblemen and Gentlemen (whereof they said there is no small number) as not well seen in the Castilian language, are desirous to understand, what this Spaniard doth bring under so glorious a title for the direction or furniture of their estate. Which, undertaken and ended, I was soon resolved to whom I should and ought to address it. For the book entreating of Counsel & Counsellors (which, Plato worthily calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) could not more properly be submitted to any than your honour, whom her Majesty, a Prince of so excellent judgement, hath after her long experience of your rare perfections called to her honourable privy Counsel, in this time which requireth extraordinary ability and wisdom. And to whom might I without just note of great ingratitude, offer my labour in this kind, before him to whose honourable favour both my parents and myself have been and are infinitely beholding? For although I am not ignorant that your honour understandeth the Author in his own tongue, and need not to be indebted to any Spaniard for precepts or directions in your estate, yet I trust you will not be displeased, that under your favour and protection he may inform those young Gentlemen, whose unexperienced years and want of knowledge in this language will be content to confer with him, and serve themselves of me for an interpreter. To your honour therefore I leave this book as yours (if you please to avow it) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 theirs to whom such helps be not superfluous. The Method which the author useth, hath received contrary censures of diverse judgements: but I mean not here to defend him, who in truth hath no need of so mean a Patron, for that my end only is faithfully to deliver his meaning in such order as himself had digested it. Which my labour I shall think abundantly rewarded, and besides myself much bound unto your honour, if you shall accept it as a sign of my thankful mind, which honnourable courtesy, your former favours make me hope for at your hands. Thus I leave your honour, to your affairs of greater moment, with my prayers to God, to direct all your counsels and advices to the maintenance of the Church without schism, and the commonwealth without trouble. A Catalogue of such authors as are alleged in this Treatise. A Abbas Panormitanus. Accursius. Aelius Spartianus. Aelius Lampridius, Aesopus. Albericus Albertus Pighius Alexander d'Imola Alexander ab Alexandro S. Ambrose Ambrose de Morais Ammianus Marcelinus Andrea's Alciatus Angelus de Perusio Angelus de Aretio Angelus Clavasio Antonius Sabellicus F. Antonius de Guevara. S. Antoninus Archiepiscopus Florentinus Antonius Gerardus. Archidiaconus Aristeas Aristoteles Athenaeus Auerrois S. Augustinus Aulus Gelius Ausonius. B Baldus Baltesar Cossa. Bartolus de Bartholinis Bartholomaeus Cassaneus Bartholomaeus Socinus Bartholomaeus Cavalcanti Bartholomaeus de Albornos S. Basilius S. Bernardus Bernardus Mendes Boëcius Brisonius Brunellus C Caelius Rodoginus Cassiodori Tripartita Chronica Petri Regis Castellae Chronica johannis secundi, Regis Portugaliae Chronica Ducis Xlunnaluares Pereira. Claudius' Cotoreus Cornelius Tacitus Cujacius Contarenus D Demosthenes Didacus' de Covas Rubias Diego Garejan. Diogenes Laërtius Dion Dionysius Areopagita. E Egesippus Emanuel Soars Erasmus Roterodamus Euripides Eustachius F Filinus Flavius Vopiscus Franciscus Fiontanus Franciscus Sansovinus Franciscus Patritius Franciscus Poletus Franciscus de Villalobos Franciscus Conanus Franciscus Balduinus Francus de Euzinas Francus Tamara Franciscus Aluares Fredericus Furius G galenus Gaspar Contarenus Gaspar de Cruse Giofranciscus Lotinus Gaginus Gregorius Alëander S. Gregorius Guido Papa Guillihelmus Postellus Guilihelmus Mainerius Guilihelmus Budaeus H Hadrianus junius Hermolaus Barbarus Hernando Nunnez Hernando de Pulgar Herodotus Hesiodus Homerus Honcalla Horatius S. Hyeronimus Hieronymus Francus Hieronymus Angest Hieronymus Gigas Hieronymus Cagnolus Hieronymus Garimbertus Hypocrates Hippolytus I jacobus Faber jacobus Papiensis jacobus Ispiager jacobus Philippus Bergomensis jacobatius jason jodocus Clichtoveus johannes Gerson johannes Bocatius johannes Andreas johannes Franciscus de Ripa S. johannes Chrysostomus johannes Montalonius johannes Montagnus johannes Broideus johannes Bodinus johannes Igneus johannes Monachus johannes Montana johannes Eckius johannes de Mena johannes de Bairios josephus S. Isidorus Isocrates julius Clarus julius Capitolinus justinus juvenalis. L Lactantius Firmianus Latinus Pacatus Laurentius Sylvanus Laurentius Grimaldus Libanus Sophista Lambertus 3. Hortensius Lucius Florus Ludovicus Gomesius Ludovicus Granatensis Ludovicus Dulcis M Macrobius Mambrinus Roseus Marcus Mantua Marsilius Ficinus Mainerius Martialis Martinus Laudensis Martinus ab Azpilcoëta Martinus Goringius Melchior Canus Mimus Publianus N Nicolaus de Lira Nicolaus Bocrius Nicolaus Leonicus Nicolaus Machiavellus O ovidius P Paleotus Paulus Emilius Paulus Castrensis Paulus jovius Persius Petrus justinianus Petrus Bembus Petrus Fontidonius Petrus Cremensis Petrus Rebufus Petrus Galatinus Petrus Loriotus Petrus de Apono Petrus Calefactus Petrus de Labrid philippus Probus philippus Decius philippus Deroaldus philippus de la Torre Philostratus Philippus Bergomates Plato Plinius Senior Plinius junior Pierius Valerius Pius secundus P. M. Plutarch Polidorus Virgilius Polienus Postellus Q Quadraginta cantionum author Quinquaginta Cantionum author. Quintus Curtius Quintinus Quintilianus R Raphael Fulgosius Restauras Castaldus Reginaldus Polus Robertus Brittannus S Salustius Sebastianus Herizo Seneca Speculator Speculum tristium Speculum consolationis Stanislaus Osius Strabo Stephanus Garivai Suetonius Tranquillus T Tabiana summa Terentius Theophrastus Thucydides S. Thomas Thomas de Ʋio Titus Livius Tullius V Valerius de historiis Ecclesiasticis Valerius Maximus Virgilius Wolphangus Lazius Vlticus Zanzius X Xenophon FINIS In this treatise of Counsellors of Princes, there be eighteen discourses, the contents whereof here followeth: THe first discourse, from whence Counsellors do proceed, and of the execution of that which is determined in Counsels. Fol. 1. The second discourse, what Counsel is, and upon what matters men ought to consult. 9 The third discourse, how needful and necessary it is, that Princes should have in their service, such Counsellors as freely would tell them what they think to be profitable to the commonwealth. 11. The fourth discourse, what Counsels are expedient for the government of a commonwealth that is well instituted. 16. The fift discourse, how that in all Counsels the means and ends of those things which are in counsel ought to be inquired and examined. 19 The sixth discourse, what qualities Counsellors ought to have. 22. The seventh discourse, of privileges, prerogatives, and exemptions which the law and right, doth grant to the Counsellors of Princes. 57 The eight discourse, what punishment they deserve, that do not counsel their Princes sincerely and faithfully without deceit. 68 The ninth discourse, whether it be better for the commonwealth, that the Counsellors of the Prince should be learned or unlearned. 79 The 10. discourse, whether it be more profitable to the commonwealth, to have a good Prince and ill Counsellors, or an ill Prince and good Counsellors. 85. The 11. discourse, Of the Counsellors, and of that which the Counsellors ought to do, before they begin to consult 90. The 12. discourse, what Counsellors of Princes ought to do, when they be assembled to consult. 97. The 13. discourse, Of the Counsel of estate, and of the ordinances and laws that appertain to the same Counsel. 127. The 14. discourse touching war. 147. The 15. discourse, concerning peace. 156. The 16. discourse, how, and wherewith commonweals be augmented, and wherewith they do decay. 161. The 17. discourse, how, and wherewith commonweals be increased. 166. The 18. discourse, from whence it doth proceed, that the commonweals are changed out of one estate of government into an other. 171. The printer to the Reader. GEntle Reader, whereas some small faults remain (perhaps) uncorrected; if thou light of any such, I beseech thee with thy pen to amend them, and especially such as are contained in the Errata, which are general faults through the impression. And if chance any of the author's names in this book alleged have escaped correction, thou shalt find them in the Catalogue, as they be commonly written in other books. Errata. The first number signifieth the page, the second, the line: this lettern. betokeneth the marginal note, and this word, Item before a number betokeneth the same page, and without a number, the same line. 4, 2. read▪ Vencejo. Item. 4. to pass. 6, 2. error. Item, 2. note Lotinus, Item, the fift note, Antonium. 10. 33. Clichtoveus. 12. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Item, 12. would. 14. n. 5. digestorum. Item, §. Itaque. 19 ●. inquired. 25. 29. en platica. Item, n. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 27, 3. toss. Item, 6, quiereiss. Item, Pied lo. Item. 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Item, 32. then. 29. 11. blindeth. item, 29. And then that friend. 31. 1. ought to be. 34. n. 3. discursu. 5. Petrus: etc. 35. n. 1. Petrus. 38. 12. & 14. Thucydides. 43, n. 1. §. 6. 48. n. 1. Men●. 57 36. Counsellor. 58. n. the last. locum in summi. 59 n. 9 §. Plebei. 60. note the last. pristinae. 63. 12. Conanus. Item, 23. Mittendarij. Item, note the first. accidere. 64. 12. they ought to. item, n. 1. §. hoc. 81. 7. serve. 85, ●0. and moving of their bodies, marvel at their subtlety of wit and greatdesse of judgement, and that, etc. 88 9 so accustomed. 94, 30. no● can deceive. 131. 34. oppose. 140. 10. share them▪ 151. n. 4. timere. 152. 33. y un dia. 155. 29. axletree▪ 167 4. Aquei. and Etholi. ❧ A Treatise of counsel, and Counsellors of Princes. (●) The first discourse from whence Counsels do proceed, and of the execution of that which is determined in counsels. THE holy ghost, who is light unto them that follow him, mercy unto them that fear him, joy unto them that love him, visiteth our souls, (as the Prophet Esay Esay. 11. 2. saith) with seven divine gifts, which are: The spirit of wisdom: of understanding: of counsel: of fortitude: of knowledge: of piety: and of the fear of the Lord. These seven gifts of the holy Ghost, are the seven eyes, which the Prophet Zacharie saw Zacharie. 3. 9 set upon a stone. The stone whereon Zacharie saw the seven eyes placed, is our Redeemer, and Lord Jesus Christ, as the glorious Saint Jerome declareth. For in the holy Scripture, the stone signifieth our Redeemer and Lord, as he himself Matth. 21. 42 taught, when he declared that which king David said: That Psalm. 118. 22. the stone which the builders refused, is become the head stone of the corner: which closeth all the whole work, and giveth perfection to the building. Saint Paul following this interpretation, 1. Corin. 10. 4. Exodus. 17. saith: That the stone out of the which the Water did spring, of the which the people of Israel did drink in the desert, signified our Redeemer and Lord. The Prophet Zacharie Zacharie. 3. saith, that he saw seven eyes placed in a stone, for to show, that the blessed soul of our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ, was most perfectly endued with the seven gifts of the holy Ghost, as well in the moral virtues as intellectual, and in all the other graces, which through the union with the divine Nic. de lira. supra. 3. Zacha. essence, are communicated with the soul of our Redeemer and Lord, as I more at large have showed in the Treatise which I wrote upon the creed of the Apostles. 2 Among those gifts with which the holy Ghost doth lighten our souls, the Prophet Esay putteth the spirit of Counsel and Fortitude. The spirit of Counsel (as Saint Thomas declareth it) is a certain light, wherewith the holy ghost illuminateth our understanding, that so we may be able to choose that which we ought to do in human affairs. For the wisdom of man faileth in many things, which it cannot reach nor attain unto: especially if they be particular things, which in sundry places, & at divers times may fall out diversly; and when we follow our own human wisdom, we run into great danger of our life. And therefore Solomon saith: That the discourses of men are weak, and their providence very uncertain, Wisdom. 9 and that to assure ourselves in this life wherein we live so full of danger and darkness, we ought in no case to trust unto our own wisdom, but desire God to lighten our understanding. For (as the Prophet Esay saith) GOD is a marvelous Esay, 3. Proverb. 3. Counsellor. This doth king Solomon teach us when he saith: Trust in the Lord with all thy heart, and trust not to thine own wisdom: and set God before thee in all thy ways, and he will direct thy steps, etc. And because the wisdom of man is not sufficient, to attain to the truth of each thing in matters concerning counsel, it is commonly said that God is he which showeth that which is to be done. 3 Well did king David understand this, when in the war which he waged against his son Absalon, he prayed to God, that the counsel of Achitophel might not be believed. Achitophel 2. Regum. 15. was so wise in those counsels which he gave, (as well when he served David as when he followed Absalon) that they rather seemed to be prophecies revealed by GOD then human counsels. And for this cause, king David much more feared the counsels of Achitophel, than the battles and ambushes of Absalon. ●. Regum. 16. And to the end he might make frustrate the counsel which Achitophel gave to Absalon, he said unto Chusai the Archite (who came to serve him) that he should follow Absalon, and say unto him: I will be thy servant O king, and I will serve thee as in times past I have served thy father: that if Absalon did admit him to his counsel, he should cross all that ever Achitophel counseled Absalon. By the means of the Priests who were called Sadoch and Abiathar, Chusai did the same which king David commanded him, and presented himself before Absalon, who ask him why he followed not his friend David: he answered, Lord I follow thee, and will serve thee, because GOD and the people have chosen thee to be the King. Absalon believed that to be true which Chusai said. And whereas Achitophel counseled that he might be suffered to choose out twelve thousand men, and so set upon king David, and easily overcome him, and those who followed him, because they were all of them very weary and full of fear: Chusai crossed his counsel, and urged Absalon to the contrary. So that Absalon and those that were with him, liked and approved Chusai his counsel. Then Achitophel seeing that Absalon would not follow the counsel that he gave him, hanged himself. Herein is it manifestly seen, that it is an ordinary rule of God's providence, always when through his secret judgements, he will punish the faults and sins of men: that first they lose their understanding, to the end that they may not understand nor judge of the truth: and besides (to make those whom he will correct and punish, the more miserable and wretched) he suffereth (as Velleyus Paterculus saith) the ill success of the matter, to be attributed and imputed unto the fault and error of those whom he will punish: and he blindeth the understanding of men, to the end they should not oppose themselves against him: and seeketh all means that are necessarily required, to bring that to pass which he will have. And as it is commonly said, to shun that which fortune and chance will have, is the ready way to Gene. 41. find it: as it is seen in that which happened to joseph and his brethren. 4 The Prophet Esay did not without great cause join the spirit of Fortitude, with the spirit of Counsel: for little profiteth counsel, if virtue and strength be wanting, to execute that which by counsel is determined. And because of those that neither can, nor know how to execute, Cornelius Tacitus saith: That when matters go to wrack, every man commands, but no man taketh in hand to bring that to effect which is commanded. Polienus s●ratage. 19 Iphicrates being asked why he would not encounter with the enemy: he answered, because he saw many command, but few obey. And because of these that cannot tell how to bring such matters to effect, as is by counsel concluded: the holy Scripture saith: That the time of childbed draweth near, and the▪ mother hath no strength to be brought to bed. And this is understood by the Fable of the Rats, which were in counsel, which of them should hang the bell on the Cat. And by our Spanish proverb. Qui en da el conseio, de el vencerio. He that doth counsel give to any thing, Means let him show compass the same to bring. Sallust saith, that first we ought to consult of matters, and afterward In proaemio Catelin. execute the same, which is decreed with a sesonable and ripe haste. He would have that those things which are counseled, should be executed after such an order, that the execution be done in due time and place. And this is it that Sallust calleth Mature facere, to wit: that it be neither green nor rotten. And after this order, do Aulus Gellius and Macrobius declare that Lib. 10. cap. 11. Saturnal. lib. 6 Lib. 1. Aeneid. of Virgil, Maturate fugam: as if Neptune had said to the winds, that they should so get them gone: that neither rushing away with too much haste, nor with too much slowness, staying on the Seas too long, they should not hurt or indomage the Trojan ships. The Emperor Charles the fift used to say, that the affairs of Princes, did consist in two things: in counsel and execution. Sansovinus de dictis & fac. Imprat. Car. 5. Whereof the first required good judgement, but the latter, great fidelity: and that slowness was the soul of counsel, and haste the soul of execution: and that both of them together, were the Quintessence of wise Princes. And that counsel required a singular wit and rare judgement, and the putting of matters in execution, demanded fit opportunity, with occasion proportionable, and much fidelity. 5 It chanceth very seldom, that both wit to discourse of those things which are in counsel, & judgement to put the same in execution which is decreed, do both together concur in one person. Captain Picinino was of very weak & small judgement Garim prob. 99 in counseling, but very ready in executing of those things which in the counsels were determined: and seemed rather to be carried with force and fury, then moved by reason or judgement. He was also most fortunate in all things which he took in hand. Francis the first of that name, king of France, in counseling went beyond all his Counsellors, especially in matters touching war: but in executing was nothing comparable unto them. Clement the seventh Pope, exceeded every one in counsel, but in execution was inferior to all those that were of his Counsel. The holy Scripture mentioneth, that king David ●. Regum. ●●. was wise in that he spoke, and strong in that which he did, and that he was fair, and that God favoured him. To be able to discourse well upon matters which are in counsel, and not to know how to put the same in execution, proceedeth from a brave wit, but simple wisdom. And execution without counsel Garim. prob. 99 or judgement, cometh of great wisdom and small wit: because he that putteth any thing in execution, aught to be endued with singular wisdom, to execute the same well which is determined. There have been many Princes, who (as I have written more at large in the Treatise which I entitled, Of the institution of Princes.) were very apt and witty, in all Arts and Sciences, but yet of small judgement in governing their kingdoms: and albeit they were very ingenious and prompt, yet were they nothing wise. And many because they cannot tell how to resolve themselves in such things as they consult upon: they conclude not, but (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) Lib. 5. con●ilium cui impar est, ●ato permittere. they leave such things as they cannot nor know not how to resolve themselves in, unto Fortune, staying and expecting the success and event of them. 6 Because the holy Ghost is he that guideth and helpeth us in our counsels, God saith by the Prophet Esay, meaning to Cap. 3. punish the people of Israel, that they should have no Counsellors to counsel them. When judith went about to deliver the City of Bethulia from the imminent danger in which it was when Olophernes besieged it, she said unto those that were judith. 8. besieged, that they should humbly with praying & fasting, desire of God that it would please him to confirm the same which she had resolved and determined. Tobias said unto his Son, Tob. 3. that his counsel was not in the power of men, but of God. And the Captain Nehemias saith, that God destroyeth the counsel Esdras. 4. of men: and the Prophet David, that God overthroweth the P●●l●●. 32. counsel of the Heathen, and reproveth that which the people imagineth, and the counsels of Princes. After the same manner, as God divideth the waters, so inclineth he the hearts of Proverb. 21. kings to do the same which he will have, & bringeth to nought the counsels of the wicked. And because counsels depend upon Esay▪ 8. ●●b. 5▪ Tob. 4. Psalm▪ 54. the divine providence, it is necessarily required, that we should guide and direct them unto the service of God, as Tobias counseled his Son: because God maintaineth and upholdeth them, that put all their trust in him. We ought also not to trust to that little which we know and understand, that we commit not an infinite number of faults, falling out of one rigour into another, and so at the length into extreme misery: and (as the holy Scripture mentioneth) till the measure of the Amorites Genesis. 15. be filled. 7 They that consult upon any matter, must put that counsel Franciscus Lotimus. Considerate. 319. in execution, which seemeth to be less dangerous, and to have fewer inconveniences: for it is well near a thing impossible, to be delivered from all the inconveniences and dangers which hap to fall out in the execution of matters, and especially in great enterprises. And therefore it is commonly said, that Cornelius Tacit. Lib. 18. Publius Mimius: nunquam periculum sine periculo vincitur. he that ventureth not, neither looseth nor winneth. And one danger is saved by the other, and after the danger cometh the profit. If any man think that he can put any thing which in counsel is concluded, in execution without adventure, he shall never be able to bring that to pass which he wisheth. For it is the property of Fortune, to cross, not only great and heroical enterprises, but also small and particular things. They ought not then to linger, but straightways to put the same which in the counsel is concluded, in practice, though there be danger in the execution of it: if so be that the profit which is to follow the execution, be greater than the danger which is incurred in not executing it. 8 It is the property of wise men, to consult upon all matters which they take in hand, with great deliberation: and Sallust in Catelin. then (as Sallust saith) speedily with a proportioned diligence, to execute the same which is concluded: and not imitate that which is said of the Maquedana, who spoke without consideration of the time and place, where and with whom she spoke. Therefore it is convenient to consider well of every thing: for by how much the more things be deeply pondered, by so much the more profitable are the counsels unto the Common wealth, not only in matters of peace, but also of war. And therefore in ancient Polidorus Virgilius in adagiis. times passed, it was wont to be said, that the Romans did overcome sitting: and that counsel is taken on the pillow, and that many counsels amend all matters. 9 It falleth out very seldom, that they which have determined to do any thing, leave and give over the doing of it, Proverb. 11. though the execution thereof be difficult and dangerous: and many because they would not be hindered, and kept from putting the same in execution which they purpose to do, will ask no advise, nor admit any one to counsel them: who (as they know) will not allow that which they will have. For it seemeth Lotimus considerate. 330. unto them, that their minds that should help them to execute the same which they pretend, saint: and they fear, that if they should consult with them, upon that which they have before already determined, it would be an occasion to them, not to execute the same which they wish. Such men are very hurtful unto the Commonwealth. And if that before they had determined with themselves to follow their pretences, they had consulted upon that which they ought to do: they might easily be brought from doing that, which they pretended: dashing (as the royal Prophet saith) the children of Babylon on the stones, not suffering naughty and perverse pretences to grow. These be the children of Babylon, which the kingly Prophet saith, that Psalm. 136. they ought to be broken on the stone. The stone whereon they should be broken, is our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ, by whose favour and grace, all naughty and wicked imaginations are broken. 10 After that the same is begun to be executed, which in Lotimus considerate. 331. the counsel was determined, the Counsellors must not remember or think of that counsel, which they forsook, that the execution of the same be not hindered, which is already determined. For they must hold that firm and stable, which in counsel is agreed upon, and think it to be most profitable to the Commonwealth: for it is very hurtful to the execution, to think that those counsels which they would not follow, were better than those which they approved. And indeed it is the property of unfortunate persons, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) Cornelius Tacitus. Lib. 1. to think that, that counsel which they followed not, was better and safer then that which they allowed and approved. 11 When the matters which are in counsel, are of such condition and quality, that they may be redressed at all times, then may the Counsellors spend much time in deliberating what may be done: for that thing is not said to be done out of time, which may be done in any time. But contrariwise, if the matters require haste, and a speedy conclusion, then ought the Counsellors to make much of the time, and with as great celerity and speed as may be, conclude and determine. For it is very hurtful to those things which the Counsellors sit upon, Lucan. Lib. 1. Cor. Tacitus. Liber. 17. to waste time: and sit long in consultation, when the danger is at hand. For whilst the Counsellors are consulting what is to be done, the occasion passeth which was offered, to put the same in execution which was determined. Titus Livius saith, Dec. 3. lib. 3. that in mean space, while the Romans consulted what succour they should send, to the Town Saguntia being besieged with Hanibals Army: it might have been taken, destroyed, and razed to the ground. And in a certain City in Spain, whilst they were long consulting, what super-scription they should write on a Letter, which they sent unto those of whom they asked aid: the City was taken by the enemies, and spoiled. In ancient Frasmus in adages. times passed, the Image of opportunity was set up in many places, that men might remember to let no occasion slip, which might be to their commodity when opportunity was offered. And that all men might understand, of how great importance it was, to let occasion pass, they painted her on a wheel, because she never standeth still, nor remaineth in one place, with wings on her feet, because she passeth away swiftly, her face covered with the hair of her forehead, because she lets none know her, but such as be very attentine to look on her: with a razor in her hand, because she cuts of their hope that take no heed of her but let her pass: with the hinder part of her head bald, because if she once be gone, no man can catth hold on her, and with a Maid that waits upon her which is called Poenitentia, for repentance doth accompany them that cannot tell how to reap profit by occasion. This which we say of execution holds, unless the matters are such as require no haste, but may rather be delayed without danger then done. For in the dispatch of them, they may be done with deliberation, & though they be deferred, yet they may be done to good purpose: and Hernam. de Pulga. Epist. 2. therefore in such things much is done, though some thing be left undone. For time itself healeth many diseases without any medicines, whereas the Physician with a medicine often times cannot. And many things in man's life are marred, not for that they ought not to be done, but because they be not done in Antonius de Gavara. 1. part. Epistol. time and place. Therefore every thing should be thoroughly sifted, that in due season it may be dispatched, as the Garden which is to be sowed. 12 They therefore that give not their resolutions in every thing at the first, are not to be found fault with all, if the matrers which are in consultation be hard & difficult and require long deliberation. But if they defer their resolution, because they will not adventure a little, to obtain a great deal, or because by the sharpness of their wits, they can allege and bring reasons to contrary every thing that is proposed: then may Franciscus Lotinus 336. consideratione. they well be blamed: for such fellows will never conclude, unless they be forced unto it. Because they have no heart, to do according to the reasons which they invent: and yet they never want reasons, to hide and cloak their natural weakness, which at all times prevaileth more with them, than reason or experience. Which nevertheless oftentimes showeth thr, that they had no cause to fear. Hereby may clearly he séene● that subtlety and wit make not a valiant man, neither is he to be thought so well of, that can see far into a matter, but rather he that hath a heart to execute the same, which the subtitle of his wit showeth unto him. Yet because men most commonly follow their own inclmation▪ it is convenient that he which is to give counsel unto others, have wit to invent, and judgement to dispose, as well as heart, to perform that which is counseled. And for because that these three things, are very seldom found together in one person, there ought to be many Counsellors, and so some to supply the same which is wanting in others. This meant Homer, when he said that Ulysses and Diomedes In illiad. ovid. in Metamorph. Libro. 1. A●ncid. went together to do that which king A gamemnon commanded them. And Virgil when he said, that Achates accompanied Aeneas, understanding by Achates counsel, & by Aeneas execution. The second discourse what counsel is and upon what matters men ought to consult. Counsel (as the private Laws of Spain say) is Lib. 1. & ●. tit. 2. p●●ti. 3. good advise, which a man taketh upon doubtful things, to the end he might not fall into any error. Besides, this aught to be considered, what he is of whom men ask counsel, whether he be a man sufficient to give counsel to the purpose, and such as he needeth who demandeth it: lastly, counsel ought so be asked before the thing be done. ●●●●lerious Furius saith; that the counsel In tractatu de 〈…〉 princip●…. Cap. 1. of Princes, is a congregation, or an assembly of elected and chosen persons, to consult upon all accidents both of peace and war. By which means, they better and more easily remember the same which is pa●●, understand that which is present, and provide for that which is to come: and so in all their enterprises, obtain good success, and shun all inconveniences, or at least wise if they cannot, yet they find means whereby the danger is made less. And this assembly is of many called the counsel, taking the name of the end for which it was invented. And the company or congregation of the Counsellors, is 〈…〉 the council. Where ●●●ent difference betwixt counsel and council as Fran●… saith for counsel is where Eth. 3. & m●gnorum morahum. Lib. 2. Lib. 5. cap. 13. Histor. Rom. honourable men, and the cheese of the Realm meet together, to treat of matters 〈…〉 and the council is, when men of mean condition make ●n assembly. This difference betwixt council, and council; is not commonly observed (as Bruides saith. In annotationibus add. cap. 13. 2 Counsel is taken (saith Aristotle) upon things which are not in man's power, but may fall out 〈…〉. And not upon matters which are not doubted o●, whether they ought to be done or no▪ for these have more neéd to be put in execution, then to be had in counsel. Neither is counsel to be demanded for things which are most certain, as whether the Sun will Plat●r. de virtut. mor. rise to morrow, or no▪ nor for things that are impossible, nor for things belonging to all the world, nor for things present, nor for things past, for such things cannot be amended: because those things that are present, or already past, stand upon no advise, as I In tract●● conditionum impossibilium, ●at quasi. declare more at large in another place. And if happily counsel be taken upon some matter which is present or past, that is done, to seek some remedy, lest it should do harm hereafter in time to come. jodocus Clichtoreus saith, that these be the properties In tract. Epit. mor. jacob. Fabr. i● 〈…〉 Arist. lib. in cap. de pradentia. of Counsellors. First, they ought to have judgement & understanding: Secondly, when they assemble & meet together to consult, they ought to premeditate upon that, of which they are to consult: as they that travel cast with themselves, which way thy will take to come to their journeys end. For unless they do premeditate, their counsel shall be in vain. Thirdly, they ought not to consult upon matters that are present. Fourthly, Arist. bb. 1. Rhet. & 3. Eth. lodoc. Cli. ubi sup. Arist vbis●p. that they ought not to consult upon matters that are impossible. Sixtly, they ought not to consult upon such things, which necessarily must happen, and cannot be shunned or declined. Seventhly, they ought in their counsels, to seek cut means, how to bring the same to pass which they pretend. Eightly, they ought to consult of things which are limited, and are not infinite. Ninthly, upon things that both may be, and may not be. Tenthly, upon things that be doubtful, and may fall out diversly. Those things which concern the Commonwealth, Arist. Eth. 3. Author 40. cantronum ponit●o. regulas quas sequi debet qui sit futurus prudens. P. 2. cant. 4. are to be considered of with long deliberation: because there lieth more upon the venturing of them, then of private and particular matters, which every one can more easily, and with less hurt judge of, and choose that which he best liketh. The third discourse, how needful and necessary it is, that Princes should, have in their service, such Counsellors, as freely would tell them what they think to be profitable to the Commonwealth. OF how great importance it is unto all Common wealths that are, that Princes should have such Counsellors, who freely would let them understand what they think to be most convenient: the Poets in their works sufficiently declare unto us. Who (as Plato. saith) writ, that Princes are vnd●one, Plato. Epist. 1. because they want faithful friends to counsel them. Cornelius Tacitus agreeing with them, saith: that a Prince Lib. 20. ● can have no greater, better, nor fit instrument, to keep and conserve his estate, then good friends. The Emperor Augustus Seneca de beneficiis. lib. 6. ca 13 Caesar, said: into these troubles had I not fallen, if Maecenas and Agrippa had lived, whose counsel I was went to enjoy. Augustus Caesar did much miss them, and marked that he bade no friends to counsel him. For Princes have need of nothing more, then of friends that may give them counsel. The greatest and best guard that a Prince can have (as Aristeus Lib. 10. interpre. saith) is to be accompanied with a great number of just and expart counsel who through 〈…〉, sefting their own commodity aside, regard the profit and welfare of the Common wealth. For no Armies, no battles, no squadrons of fight men, and no treasures that a Prince hath, can so well conserve and defend the Prince his estate, as good and loyal Friends, who would freely show him, what they take to be most profitable for the Common wealth. And as a certain Poet saith: Plutarch in libro, quo pacto possis adulatorem ab amito cognoseere. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 O that some poor man Irus like there were, That all my faults mislike weighed without fear, And true friend-like tell how myself I bear. Merope in the Tragedy doth admonish us, saying. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Take those to friends, that from thy will in words do disagree, But all such as with flattery, thy humour seek to feed, That none such e●●tor 〈…〉 door, see that thou take good heed. 2 For Princes lose not their authority at all, in following that which their Counsellors advise them, but rather increase and augment it: for if Counsellors diminished it, than would no Princes have any Counsellors, of whom they might learn what were most profitable for the Commonwealth. In the war which the Grecians waged against the Trojans, the counsels of Nestor and Ulysses, were far more profitable than the forces of Achilles and Ajax: as Agamemnon showed, when he said, that if he had had ten Nestor's to have given him counsel, the siege of Troy should not have continued so long. Henry the third Garivai. lib. 15. Capit. 4. of that name, king of Castille, said: that the counsels of wise men, did the Princes more good than the Arms of valiant soldiers, Because braver and more notable acts are wrought by men of counsel then by Arms. He was also wont to allege that which Tully said, to this purpose: to wit, that the counsels of Solon Lib. 1. Officio. had been no less profitable unto the City of Athens, than the victory of Themissocles. Sallust affirmeth; that counsel is not Sallust in principio Catelin. only profitable for the consernation and maintenance of peace, but also for the achieving of victory: because good counsel always prevaileth much in war. 3 And Princes to the end they may be well counseled, should command their Counsellors to speak freely in their consultations, and show their minds what they think aught to be determined to do the Commonwealth good. For (as Artabanus said to king Xerxes) if there be not divers minds and Herodorus. lib. 7. opinions in their consultations, how can the Prince choose that which is best. After the same order as we know which is the better gold, by laying of one piece of gold to the other: even so, comparing one counsel with the other, the Princes discern which of them is most profitable for the Commonwealth. And (as Paulus de Castro saith) even as perfumes, the better they Consilio 13. lib. 1 Consilio. be beaten, the sweeter they smell: so likewise, the sentences, minds, and opinions of Counsellors, the more they be debated and discussed, the surer and better they be. True it is, that the rarest and greatest wits, being of singular judgement, are able to enter deeper into matters, than they that are not so witty, but of the simple sort. And they that are fully experienced, can better discern what is necessaire in every matter, than they which have no skill in it. Yet nevertheless, it is the duty of every wise man, to hear the minds of many, for one man only, cannot see and know all things. And oftentimes one of simple Saepe est olitor opportuna locutus. Lib. 3. de institut. princip. learning and small knowledge, adviseth a wiser person, of such things which he never did hear or see before. Dion saith, that a Prince seeth with as many eyes, and heareth with as many ears, as he hath friends that counsel him sincerely. 4 It is a thing very hurtful to the Commonwealth, that the Counsellors before hand should know their Prince's inclination, for than they seek all means possible how to find out reasons, which may justify and prove that which their King or Prince desireth. And for this cause, of all hurtful Counsellors, Franciscus Sansovinus. de dictis & fact. Car. v. looper. learned men are most noyous to the Commonwealth, if they abuse their learning. The Emperor Charles the fift, was wont to say, that it became Princes very well, to be accompanied with learned men: and that the society and use of learned men, was very expedient and profitable unto virtuous Princes: and contrarily, very dangerous and hurtful to wicked and lewd Princes. For to evevy thing which the Prince will do, they find either n Law or an History to allow and approve the same. And if so be that the Prince be of weak judgement, he will not be able to determine and choose, what is most profitable to the Commonwealth. It is manifest, that the Emperor said true, seeing that there never wanted men of great learning, who contrary to all reason and justice, justified and approved that which their Prince purposed and appointed to do. As also the Emperors which persecuted our Christian Religion, wanted not learned Counsellors to allow and approve their wicked enterprises. Ulpian the Lawyer, wrote the manner how Lactantius Tirmianus lib. 5. cap. 10. they should torment and punish the Christians. Neither wanted the Emperor Frederick, & the other Emperors which persecuted Baldovinus ad edicta principium de Christianis. the Catholic Church, learned men to justify their pretences, though they were unjust and erroneous. Moreover, many learned men did justify unto Don Pedro king of Castille, that he might marry with Lady Marie of Castro, though notwithstanding Marsilius Patavinus & alii quibus respondit Albertus Tigurius lib. Hierar. Ecclesiast. his lawful wife and Queen, Lady Blanch was yet living. Such Counsellors are not to be termed jurisperiti, and Jurisconsulti, but rather Jureperditi, and jurestulti. Certes, they that glory, and vaunt that they be Christians, aught to be ashamed to do that which Papinian being a Pagan would not Cagnolus in procemio digastorum, 9, Itaque. in 131. do, although he was commanded by the Emperor Caracalla, (whose Steward and familiar he was) to do it: which was, to defend an unjust cause. Wherefore by the emperors command, he was slain and put to death. Rather would he die, Aelius Spattianus in vita Antoni. (though he was not a Christian) then defend an unjust cause. And he esteemed more (as our Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus Matth. 10. teacheth us) not to offend God, than he did of those that kill the body, but not the soul. Those learned men that justify false things unto their Princes, discharge not their duties as they are bound to do: for they persuade them to do many things that redound to the commonwealths utter destruction. 5 A Prince than ought to select such Counsellors, as do not approve all that which be saith: for that is the chief and principal trick of flattery, to allow all that is said, and still to sing, Et cum spiritu tuo. Such men (as the Italians say) journey still betwixt Lodi & Placentia: they never go to Verona. They rehearse continually the Psalm of Placebo Domino, but they Psalm. 114. reach not (as Gerson saith) to the verse In regione vi●orum! because their sin is deadly, in deceiving their Princes with flattery: counterfeiting and masking those counsels which they give, with a false show of Religion and justice, regarding more their own particular profit, than the common welfare. These counsels have no justice at all in them, but only the name of justice, which they give them to colour and mask the unjustice and wickedness which in them lurketh. And when such Counsellors come with show of justice and Religion, the harm which they do unto the Commonwealth, cannot be repaired: because in their own defence they make a show of justice, with which otherwise they might have been suppressed. Capi. 4. de inre in●ando. These are rather (as Innocentius the third Pope saith) cosenners than Counsellors of Princes. 6 That Counsellors may freely speak their minds in their consultations, Princes ought to imitate the Emperor Augustus Caesar, who (as Seneca saith) being desired by Tacitus Lib. 1. de Clementia. cap. 16. to come to his house, to judge of the offence which one of his Sons had committed, did as Tacitus requested him: and because he should not move them that should hear the matter debated to follow that which he said, and say as Prince's Counsellors commonly do, Et cum spiritu tuo: he commanded that every one that was to determine of the matter, should set down his mind in writing, and when as every man had said what he thought best to be done, the Emperor told them his opinion and liking. The Emperor Caesar Augustus never asked his Suetonius Tran. in vita Augusti. Counsellors after the order as they sat, but here one, and there another, that they should all of them be attentive and ready to answer, and show their minds what they thought was to be done, without addicting themselves unto that which the others said. In ancient times passed, when they proposed Laws unto the people of Rome, concerning the Commonwealth: they began Dion. Lib. 3. to propose the ordinances to them which bore no Offices, to the end that they might boldly show their minds, what they thought to be most profitable to the Commonwealth: and not keep back their opinions, for fear lest they should offend those that bare office in the Commonwealth, if they erst had said to the contrary. Aulus Gellius saith, that in the Senate house sometimes Aulus Gellius lib. 4. cap. 11. In titulo de controversia ●e●●h apud par. cap. 1. Eccle. cap. 3●. they asked him that was chosen to be the head of the Senate, & sometimes those that were elected to be Consuls. And Baldus saith, that the most ancient men, aught to be asked first, conformable to the which king Solomon saith: speak the elder first. The fourth discourse, what counsels are expedient for the government of a Commonwealth that is well instituted. THE counsels are the foundation, whereon all Commonwealths be grounded. For whatsoever is convenient to be done for the profit of the Commonwealth, is decided in them. And according to Aristotle, there be five counsels which every Rhet. lib. 1. Commonwealth that is well governed aught to have. The first is of revenues: in this counsel they consult upon rents, as well ordinary as extraordinary: and upon superfluous expenses, how the rents are spent and consumed. This counsel is very necessary in a Commonwealth, for substance is the Quintessence as well in public as private affairs, without which, neither men nor Commonwealths can fitly be maintained. For little profit the four Elements, and all other mixtures whatsoever, if men have not wherewithal to buy such things, as are necessary to their maintenance and sustentation: as I wrote more at large, in the Treatise which I made, of the crafts and fetches wherewith men attain to riches. The second counsel is of peace: and this commonly is called the counsel of estate, on which the whole government of the Commonwealth is grounded: as I writ more at large beneath. The third counsel is of war: unto this counsel it belongeth to look to the fortifying of places, and maintenance of men, and what Soldiers are necessary for wars, and the defence of the Commonwealth, and many other matters concerning the same. The fourth counsel is, of such provision and maintenance as is necessary to the Commonwealth. This hath charge to provide & furnish the Commonwealth, with maintenance and other things necessary to life, in time of peace or war. The fift counsel is for the Laws and justice. In this counsel all things are handled that pertain and belong to the Prince, as well in civil as in criminal matters: that the same may be there determined, which the Prince according to right In tractatu de consilio & consiliariis principum. and justice, (if he were present) should ordain by what order of justice soever. Fredericus Furius calleth this the counsel of punishments: unto this is that referred which is determined in the Chaunceries: if the parties pleading complain, that the Judges of the Chaunceries do not judge well and conformable unto justice. To which also, it belongeth to have a regard, what Offices, charges, Magistrates and Governors are necessary for the government of the Commonwealth: and what, and how much authority and power they ought to have: this counsel shall add such Officers as are wanting, and put down such as are superfluous. It pertaineth also unto this, to declare and expound such Laws as have a doubtful sense, and take away such as are hurtful to the Commonwealth, and make such new as are necessary. 2 Unto these five counsels which Aristotle sets down, Fredericus Furius addeth the sixth: of gifts and rewards. This counsel hath charge to hear, and learn, the merits & deserts generally of all: being informed of the life, manners, and ability and deeds of those, that not ask any reward, deserve to be rewarded for their virtues. And particularly of those that ask some rewards. A reward is properly called that, which is given to do good unto him to whom it is given. For that which is given, to get and obtain some thing of him, unto whom it Seneca lib. 1. de benefici. cap. 6. is given, is not properly a reward, but a contract or bargain: seeing it is between two parties that have to do with debt and receipt. And such reward, is rather to be set in reckoning books, which Merchants call books of account, then in the book of rewards. The Commonwealth that is well governed, hath great need of this counsel of rewards: that each one may labour and do his best, to conserve and augment it: for the reward enticeth, and stirreth up men to labour, whereas no man (as Sallust saith) would be good, if he hoped not for some reward. Nemo gratis bonus est. King Nabuchadnezzor had books, in which he commanded the service that was done him to be written, to reward them that served him. 3 Although Aristotle and Fredericus Furius set down the counsels which are necessary in a Commonwealth, after that order as we have said: yet it seemeth that the principal counsel, and on which the Commonwealth doth chiefly depend, is the counsel of estate. For in that counsel, that, is appointed and ordained, which is to be done in all the other counsels. This did the Senate of Rome commend unto the Consuls, that they should have a regard that the Commonwealth should take no harm. The power which the Dictator had, differed from the power which was given to the Consuls: in this, that the Dictator, was superior to all the Magistrates, and as long as Sallust in Catelin Videant consuls, nequid detrimenti respub. capiat: et potestas per Senatum more Romano magistratui max ima permittitur. his dictatorship continued, he was absolute King. But the Consuls could not command any Citizen to be put to death, unless the Senate approved it. Besides also these counsels, which Aristotle and Fredericus Furius set down, two others are necessary to have the Commonwealth well governed. The one of Censure or Manners, as the Romans had, that none might be suffered in the Commonwealth to offend publicly, and so disquiet and slander her: and that all such as do commit any offence openly, might not remain unpunished: as I wrote more at large in the Treatise of decrees concerning manners. The other of Religion, or Inquisition: for no Commonwealth can be maintained or augmented, if there be not a special regard of Religion and worshipping of God had in it, to maintain and uphold it: as I show more at large in the small discourse of this book. 4 All these Counsels are reduced (as philippus de la Torre saith) unto slew: viz. The first, unto the counsel of war. Cap. 9 de Institutione Christiani principis. The second, unto the counsel of justice. The third, unto the counsel of estate. The fourth, unto the counsel of mechanical or handicrafts Officers: and the fift, to the counsel of Religion. This is gathered out of that, which the Prophet Esay saith: That God might punish the people of Israel for the sins which they committed, by taking away the valiant and hardy men, that are experienced in matters concerning war: the Judges that minister justice: the Prophets and Elders, that have authority to give counsel: the handicrafts men, that are skilful in that which they profess: and the learned men that can declare the mysteries of God. In this, God showeth unto us, how necessary these counsels are to every Commonwealth. For if they have not these counsels, & be not governed as they ought, great confusion and discord must necessarily follow after. It is therefore required, that the Counsellors of Princes, use all the diligence they possibly can, in looking to the public and common profit: seeing that they be the very gates and doors, through which all good & ill entereth into the Commonwealth. The fift discourse, how that in all Counsels, the means and ends of those things which are in counsel, aught to be required and examined. IN all Counsels (as Aristotle saith) ought not Rhet. Lib. 1. only to be examined and inquired, whither that which is in consultation, be necessary and profitable to the Commonwealth: but also the means and ends of that which is in deliberation ought to be considered. The means are the ways, by which that which in the counsels is determined, may and aught to be put in execution. The end is, that which chiefly is inquired and sought: if the means be nought, the counsel must be nought: if they be good, the counsel is good also. The Greeks call good counsel Lib. 6. Moral. Lib. 6. capit. 31. Antiq. lect. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and naughty counsel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristotle doth finely handle, and Celius Rodiginus declare, wherein 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth differ from science, opinion, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to divine and conjecture out of hand what may be done, without spending much time in discoursing upon that which is consulted. But I mean not hear to repeat it, seeing that such subtleties are fit to be disputed of in Schools, then to be treated of, in counsels of Princes. 2 Those counsels are nought, in which is consulted, how to bring wicked and unlawful things to pass: and those are bad counsels also, in which unlawful means are sought, to put that in practise which is lawful and honest. Therefore it is meet and convenient, that they who deliberate and consult upon matters, do inquire, not only whether the beginning and means, wherewith they will accomplish that which in the counsel is determined, but also, whether the end of it be good and lawful. Following this rule: they that go about some matter, which of itself is contentious and slanderous, ought not to regard the present occasion which is offered to advance it, but to consider, whether the end be like to be good or nought. Besides, they ought not to allow any bad and dishonest thing, though of it come good and lawful things. According to that, Non sunt procuranda mala, ut eveniant bona. King Solomon saith: Ecclesiast. 19 That he that is hasty to give credit, is lightly minded, and shall never prosper. For he that rashly takes a thing in hand, before he have thoroughly considered it, is an enemy to good counsel. The glorious Apostle S. john, doth exhort us, that we should not believe every spirit, nor be moved with every wind: but 1. john. 4. try the spirit whether it be of God. This is known either by the end unto which it tendeth, or by the means by which it is advanced, or by the affections which move us to do it. If it be clear, that neither the glory of God, nor the edifying of the Dempst. Epist. 1. Praeferri debet consilium quod cum Dei voluntate congruit. holy Catholic Church, nor the spiritual profit of our next Neighbour, but some human pretence be in it respected and regarded: then is it not the counsel of God, seeing it is not directed unto the service of the Lord. For (as Saint Jerome saith) that voice that persuadeth any thing that offendeth God, is the Super. Math. 4. voice of the devil. As it is seen by the temptations wherewith he tempted our Redeemer & Lord Jesus Christ in the Deserts, saying: that he should worship him, and cast himself down from the Pinnacle. But the voice of God is that, which encourageth and persuadeth us to the same which he commandeth us. 3 Although sometimes those things, which with great prudence are deliberated and consulted upon, and in which lawful means are used to put them in practice, have not the same success and event which was hoped for, (for the counsels of Fortune as Latinus Paccatus saith, are very secret: or rather, to say better, because the judgements of God as S. Paul saith: are unsearchable, & no man knoweth nor understandeth them.) Roma. 11. Psalm. 35. Yet many things happen well which never were had in counsel: and though they are practised by naughty means, yet the event and end of them is good. As Atheneus saith of the Athenians: whose counsels and judgements, void of all prudence and wisdom, fell out very prosperously unto them: and they overcame their enemies, making election of Captains for the wars, which no man would choose to make ready a banquet. Good counsel (as Artabanus said to King Xerxes) is not to be He●odot. lib. 7. less valued and esteemed, though it be overcome by Fortune: whereas contrariwise, though ill counsel have good success, yet doth the counsel remain ill. When Photion saw that the matter fell out contrary to that which he had counseled, he said Erasmus in Apothek●●a. that he was heartily glad, that it happened well, but that his counsel was nevertheless very good. Giving thereby to understand, that for a matter to fall out well, is but a chance, but to counsel well, cometh by reason that he who giveth the counsel, is endued with judgement and wisdom. 4 Wise men ought not to trust to the prosperous success of things: for Fortune often favoureth (as Valerius Maximus Ple●umque omnium temiretati. etc. saith) to hurt them the more that trust to fortunate events. The carthaginians commanded their Captains to be hanged, that got the victory without consulting, but punished them not, that Titus Liui●s. Lib. 38. In o●a●. Ma. having consulted were overcome. For they thought that to overcome without counsel, was a good turn that God would do them, (for as Amianus Marcellinus saith, the events of things are not in man's power:) and that not to consult, was the negligence and fault of the Captains. Cleanges the Philosopher compareth them whose business fall out happily without consulting, Seneca de beneficiis. lib. 6. Capitulo. 11. unto a Gentleman that sent two Pages to find out one of his friends, one of the Pages went to play, and by a chance, he, whom he went to look for, happened to pass by the place where the boy was playing: the other Page went about all day to seek, and at length returned home without finding of him. Now he that did his endeavour to find out the man, whom his Master sent him to call, deserved praise, and he that by chance as he played, met with the party, aught to have been punished. Tullius in o●●t. pro Rabbit. p●sth. & in Epistl. ad Lentul. Boaetius quem citat. Accuitius, in L. sed an ultra in sine ●●. 5 Men commonly judge of every counsel by the event of it, and according as it falls out, they account it good or bad. The divine providence (as Boaetius saith) to the greater punishment & misery of men, suffereth counsels commonly to be judged of, according as they speed, and that the counsels of the prudent be not believed, as it chanced unto Achitophel with Absalon. These, say the Greeks, are crossed with the destiny of Cassandra, in that they be never believed when they counsel. There be many examples of wise men, who if they had been believed, many public and private harms and dangers, might have been shunned: which because I have set down in my book of crafty and prudent counsels, I mean not to repeat. GOD doth oftentimes permit (as Boaetius saith) that their affairs that do account themselves very wise, happen quite contrary to their imagination, to the end that they may understand and know, that all things must fall out according to his pleasure. For except the Lord keep the City (as the kingly Prophet saith) the Keeper watcheth in vain. And oftentimes humans Psalm. 126. prudence serveth them that think themselves to be wise, to no other use, than to perceive the miseries and calamities, which they neither can nor know how to remedy, neither when they chance, nor yet before or after they happen: that the misfortunes may have, (as the proverb in Spain is used) Bysperas y octavas. The sixth discourse, what qualities Counsellors ought to have. THE qualities which king Solomon would have Counsellors to have, are these: The first, that Ecclesiast. 18. they should be prudent, not rash and headdie, as following their own fancy, for such men think nothing to be well, but that which they like: and for this cause no man ought to have conference with an impatient or furious man about any secrets, no nor yet trust him with any thing that is secret, for such a one in giving counsel, is obstmate, and in secrets, wide-mouthed. To be wise, consisteth in consideration both of things past, and of things to come, and (as Seneca saith) he that is prudent, considereth In libro. 4. Virtut. that which may follow afterward, disposeth that which is present, foreseeth that which is to come, and remembreth that which is past: and if he forget that which is past, he looseth Aristo. lib. 1. cap. 8. magn. moral. his life: and if he think not of that which is to come, he falleth unawares into many dangers. Therefore Prudence is called Discretio matter est omnium virtutum. Aristo. Eth. Libro. 6. the guide and mother of all other virtues: and as (Aristotle saith, Rectarerum agibilium ratio: that is to say, the strait and ready rule of all things that may be done. Without her, no man can counsel well, and she is the most excellent & surest path to heaven. Prudence is divided into five parts: which are, Seneca. lib. 9 Epistl. 68 Seneca. lib. 1. Epistol. 86. Prudentia particularis, which concerneth every particular man. Prudentia Oeconomica, which belongeth to housekeeping. Prudentia politica, which pertaineth to the government of Cities and Commonweals. Prudentia quae in ratione regendi est sita, which belongeth to Kings, and to the government of Realms. And Prudentia militaris, touching warlike policy, as Antoninus Anton. in sum. part. 4. tit. cap. 14 the Bishop of Florence declareth. All these kinds of prudence, as much as they concern counseling, consist: First in forecasting the end of that which is consulted, after that order jodoc. Clichtouc' in Introduc. tionc. jacob. Fabii. in Ethic. Arist. as he that travaileth, fore-casteth the place whether he is going. secondly, in seeking out means, how to attain to the end of that which is consulted: as a travailer inquireth the way to the place whether he travaileth. Thirdly, in choosing out the best, among all the means which he findeth: and in picking out that in which there is least danger. As for example, if some King consulted to conclude upon peace with his enemy, whether it were best to do it, by rendering of some place or City in his Realm, or by paying money, or by way of marriage: even as he that travaileth, when he cometh to a place where be many ways, taketh the best. Fourthly, in considering how to execute the same which is determined in the counsel, with less trouble and charges: as he that taketh a journey in hand, provideth for that which he shall have need of by the way. 2 The second quality which King Solomon would have Ecclesiast. 21. Counsellors for to have, is that they should be wise: for the counsel of the wise remaineth for ever, and is like a pure Capitulo. 4. Fountain of life. Tobias counseleth his son, always to demand counsel of the wisest: and that with great reason: for no doubt he that will do all according to his own liking, and without taking counsel of them that know more than himself, doth go most astray. And for this cause said king Solomon: My Ecclesiast. 33. Son, do nothing of importance without advisement, so shall it not repent thee after the deed. That men might understand Claud. Cotor. Lib, 1. cap 2. de discipline. milit. how necessary it is unto a Prince to be counseled of wise men, the Poets feigned that jupiter took counsel of Prometheus. For they that govern Commonwealths, cannot rule them well, if they take not advisement with persons, that know and understand what is convenient to be done, for the welfare of the Commonwealth. How much men ought to esteem of that which wise men say, Aristotle sufficiently showeth, affirming In 6. Ethic. al●isque in cocis. that we ought not to ask account of the sayings of wise men: for the eyes of their understanding are clean, pure, and clear, by reason of their knowledge and learning, and they discern the truth in every matter which we cannot see: for as Eustacius saith, the Sciences take away the rust from the eyes of the soul, the senses and the body: as Vinegar scoureth the rust from the steel, being rubbed till it be clean and shining. Claudius' Cottereus makes mention of certain Princes that governed Vbi supra. their Commonwealths well by the counsel of wise men. 3 The third quality that a Counsellor ought to have, is age: that he be of ancient years, because old men have seen much. The Laws of Statutes say, that in tract of time, prudence, Tit. 3. Lib. 2. in prolo. statut. Politic. Lib. 5. Capitul. 8. In tractatu de constlio & consiliariis princip. authority, and experience of all things that are to be done, is gotten. Aristotle saith, boys are not able and sufficient to give counsel, because their wit and judgement beginneth to take force and vigour. Fredericus Furius will have that the Counsellors of Princes be not under thirty years of age, nor above threescore, for from the thirtieth year downwards, men's understanding is not yet settled, their experience is small, their presumption much, their heat great, their thoughts lofty, their natural weakness much, neither can they keep due gravity: and besides all this, the people trusteth them not, but murmureth against them. Let them lie at Schools, let them travail to see Countries, manners and governments, let them learn tongues, let them follow the Camp and haunt the Court, let them take pains in learning: all such things are convenient to be known unto the Counsellor of a Prince. Though young men commonly be not endued with perfect judgement, and for this cause the Law granteth them the benefit Derestitutione Ff. de minorib. 25. annis. in integrum: the Lacedæmonians would not admit them to sit in public counsel: neither came they to common places where Courts were kept, and the Senators assembled together: nor Plutarch in vita Licurgi. yet were they present in the Congregation of the Elders, till they were thirty years old: and what ever they had to do in such assemblies, they followed it by their▪ Friends and Kinsmen. Fredericus Furius denieth not, that many young men have better judgement & clearer understanding than many old men, and that the ability and wisdom aught more to be regarded then the age. As may be seen by Papirius Praetextatus, unto whom (being but a youth) it was granted, that he might were the garment, which men of full years did were, and was called Aulus Gellius. Lib. 1. cap. 23 Praetexta or togapraetexta, the rob which the chief Officers and Senators wore. And this honour was done unto the youth, because coming with his Father into the Senate, he would not discover and reveal those matters, that he heard there discussed. 4 As touching old men, Fredericus Furius would have, Vbi supra. that those which are above threescore years of age, should return home unto their houses, live in rest & quietness, discharge their consciences, and think how they may die well. He would also have, that the Princes should according to the custom of Rome, give them honours, privileges, preferments, pre-eminences, pensions, and rents, according to every one's deserts: as unto them that are discharged from public affairs, not admitting them to their counsels. For when they be once past the sixtith year, their memory faileth, their understanding wavereth, their experience turneth into stubbornness and obstinacy, their natural heat is but little, and therefore they let occasions slip being offered, their thoughts be wearied, they cannot travel, and to conclude, such men are an impediment and charge to the Court. But to return to the purpose, seeing that the virtue and gift of counseling well, cometh not from age, but from wit, judgement, and wisdom that every one hath: we ought not so much to respect the age of men, as their ability, which is known by their words and deeds. For the words (as our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ saith) represent that which Luke. 6. is in the heart. Socrates being asked what he thought of a certain Erasmus in Apothegma. 1. Co●nt. 13 man, answered, that after he had heard him speak, he would tell his mind of him. S. Paul calleth them that speak without judgement, tingling bells. When john de Mena would praise Don Aluara de luna, high Constable of Castille, he said: Tentalo, Tenta lo, ex platica alguna. Try him, try him, with some talk or communication: and that with great reason. For words (saith Aristotle) show that which is in the mind. And In Libro. ●● 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. though old men be above threescore years of age, yet want they not understanding, & they be more wise than young men. This Homer showeth, where he saith: that King Agamemnon wished rather for ten ancient men as Nestor was, to be his Counsellors at the winning of Troy, than ten young men like to Achilles. And that Agamemnon said true, it is seen by the most excellent Don Hernando de Toledo, Duke Dalva, who in wisdom & experience of many affairs, supplied the turns of ten Nestor's, in counseling the great Monarch of Spain▪ the Catholic king Philip. 5 We may see how necessary old men are to give counsel, by this that the Laws of Greece ordained: that those should be admitted to be Counsellors that were passed fifty years of age. Solon seeing that the flattery of Pisistratus, wherewith he abused the people of Athens, was openly discovered and known, to pretend no other thing then to usurp the Empire, and to Plutarch num seni gerenda sit Respublica. bring the government of the Commonwealth unto the rule of one man, only himself: and that no man durst take upon him to resist and hinder him: he himself fetching his weapons out, and laying them in the street before his door, called all the Citizens to help him. And Pisistratus sending unto him to know upon what assurance he durst be so bold to do such things, he answered, upon old age: which always is most ready to give counsel in matters of weight and importance. For it is free (as Plato saith) from those affections and passions, which trouble and molest youth. King Agis being in Arcadia with his Army, and readio to pitch the field with his enemies, there was an ancient Lacedaemonian that cried out a loud; that he should consider that one sore, was not to be cured by another. Signifying by this, that he might have gone away from the Argives and saved himself, without putting himself to the worst, by that his determined boldness out of time and season. Agis hearing this, did according to the old man's words, and altering his mind, went from the Argives, and afterward overcome them without danger. For this old man, every day they did set a Chair at the door of the Senate-house (this was a custom among them) and many times, the chiefest Senators arose and came unto him, to ask him, and consult with him about hard and difficult matters of importance. 6▪ That men might understand, that to counsel well, consisteth rather in the vigour of the mind, then in the forces of the body: in ancient times passed, they painted the Image of Mercury in the disposition and form of an old man, without hands and feet, his members being only stretched out. For force, strength, and those parts that move the body, are nothing necessary, so that their reason and understanding be fruitful and fertile. Plutarch by many other examples, proveth that it is Vbi supra. convenient for an old man to govern, because it is proper unto jacobus Gracianus in prologo & declaratione omnium Plutarchi operum Moral. Cicero in Catone Maiore. old men to give good counsel. It is a common saying in Spain, Con mal esta, ●l coral a do boy vieio non corpse: with the Oxehouse it goeth ill enough, where the old Ox doth not cough. Again, Quando el perro vieio ladra, a conseia. When the old dog barketh, he counseleth. Again, Si quieris buen conseio, prides●o all vicio: If that thou wilt good counsel have, Of the old man see thou it crave. job saith, that wisdom is in old men. And Ecclesiasticus, that wisdom becometh old men well, and their counsels ought to be had in account. Plato counseleth, that old men of approved experience, prudence, wisdom, and love towards their Country▪ should be chosen to govern the Commonwealth. In Homer, ancient Nestor's speech is praised as the most worthiest of all: and Nestor speaking of himself, saith: — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Midst the horsemen will I ride, with counsel them to aid, Iliad. 4. For of old ancient men to be the duty this is said. And the same Homer in his Odissea, praiseth Aegiptius the ancient, because he always spoke first, saying this verse of him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Because of age, whose weary limbs did crooked grow, Odissi. 2. And by experience who much did know. Euripides in his Tragedies bringeth in jocasta an ancient Matron, speaking to her Son after this manner. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Euripides. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. O son Eteocles, old age with evils is not freight, But by experience the youth can speak of greater weight. Seneca saith, that it is the duty of young men to obey: and of old men to counsel and command. Aristotle affirmeth, that In Menalipe vetus hoc dictum est▪ opera quidem juniorum consilia autem senio●ū vim habert. we ought not to commend the affairs of the Commonwealth to all manner of men, but according to every one's age and prudence. For young men by the law of Nature, have strength to execute, and old men wisdom to counsel. Euripides saith: That we ought to commit the execution of matters to young men, and the consultation unto old men, because it is given unto divus Ambrose officiorum. Lib. 2. cap. 2. Seniores consilio praeualeu●, iuniores ministerio. philippus de la Torre. in Libro. de institutione regis Christiani. 1. Regum. 18. old men to counsel well: the houses in which they assemble to consult, are in Latin called Senatus, but if young men commonly meet together in them, than they ought not to be called Senatus, but Iwenatus: as Boaetius saith. 7 Every Prince ought to consider, that there happened much harm, & great tumults arose among the Isralites, because Roboam their king, leaving the counsel of old and expert men in the government of the Commonwealth, followed the minds of young and unskilful Counsellors. And strait after that overthwart counsel, followed the separation of the twelve Tribes, the division of the people, the destruction of the Commonwealth of Israel, and contempt of God. Then began Idolatry, and the condemnation of the ten Tribes, for withdrawing themselves from the union and true worshipping of the Lord. All these heavy and grievous harms befell unto Israel, because the King knew not what counsels he should choose, and because he would not join with the counsel of the wisest, and most experienced men, which in his days and with his own eyes he saw. On the otherside may we see and consider, how prosperously those kings governed, that were guided and led by the counsels of wise men, and especially of such as feared God. We may behold how well king Pharaoh governed, Genesis, 14, when joseph was with him: and king Saul when he followed the counsel of Samuel. And the king of Syria when he had Naaman 1. Regum. 13. 4. Regum. 5. 4. Regum, 12. at his elbow: and joas when he did according to joyadas his mind: and Nabuchadnezzor when he did as the Prophet Daniel counseled him: and Nehemias, when he did according 2. Esdras, 8. to the counsel of Esdras. Happy are those Commonweals, which God blesseth with such Priests as Esdras, to show and teach them, how they ought to serve our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ: and upon which he bestoweth such Princes as Nehemias, to bind those that are committed to his charge, to do 2 ●sdras, 5. according to God's commandments: and jointly of his own liberality, to succour and relieve the people that is afflicted, destroyed, and impoverished, through war, pestilence & famine, Luke. 10. Nicolaus de Lora in caput. 10. Lucae. joining mercy with justice, as our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ teacheth in the Parable of the Samaritane, that cured him that was hurt, with Oil and Wine: signifying mercy by the Oil, and justice by the Wine. 8 The fourth quality which King Solomon would have a Ecclesiast. 30. Counsellor to have, is, that when he counseleth he should not be sorrowful: for a troubled and grieved mind, drieth the bones (as king Solomon saith) and therefore much more the Proverb, 17. flesh, and the blood. And a man's mind being vexed with grief, is obfuscated and darkened with the passions which he suffereth, so that he cannot understand and judge well of that which is counseled. The people of Parthia, to shun this inconvenience, did consult of that they had to do, in banquets. For sorrow bindeth man's understanding, and for this cause this is used in Spain for a common proverb: Mal se cura de suentura contristura: that is, sorrow cannot lance away our mischance. For after that some misfortune is happened, all the sorrow that a man can have will not remedy it. 9 The fift quality is, that the counsel ought to be well Proverb, 11. thought of, and as it is said, upon the pillow. For that counsel Seneca in Libro de benefi. velox consilium sequitur paenitentia. which is not well tossed and tumbled in our mind, bringeth repentance with it: for the more matters are considered & weighed, the better they be understood: and both haste and anger, are contrary to deliberation and consultation. And therefore it is Secundae curae sapientiores. Noverca consilij praecipitatio. Lib. 22. Festinatio improvida est. & caeca. said, that haste is a Mother in law unto counsel. Titus Livius termeth hastiness, blind and without providence. The natural Philosophers say, that dogs be borne blind, because the dam maketh haste to whelp them. It falleth out sometimes that men ask counsel of their friends, concerning matters which require such speed, that it lieth upon their lives, credit, Canis festinans caecos parit catulos Erasmus in Adagijs. Anton. de Guevara. in Episto. and substance, yea and their conscience also, to have some counsel or other: and that the friend of whom counsel is demanded, ought without any delay at all, so readily show his mind what he thinketh aught to be done in this case, as if he found it ready in the holy Scripture. King Solomon counseleth us, to let our eyes behold the right, and let our eye lids direct our prover. 4, 25 way before us: and so shall we not go unadvisedly about that which we do, before we have consulted and deliberated upon In lib. cui titul▪ Dux itinerant. it. And unto this (as the reverend Father Ludovicus Granatensis saith) five things are necessarily required. First, to commit all matters unto our Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus. secondly, to perpend them with great attention and discretion, not only marking the substance of the matter, but also considering all the circumstances that belong unto it. For if only one thing be wanting, that one thing is sufficient to mar all: and though it be thoroughly pondered, fully concluded, and altogether perfect: yet only the doing of it out of time, is enough to make a foul blemish in it. Thirdly, to take counsel. For those things that are done without counsel, very seldom have good success: also to talk and confer with others about it, but not with many, only with such as be of sufficient wisdom and experience. For though it be profitable to hear the opinion and minds of many, to know the matter thoroughly: yet it ought to be committed but to sew, and those very select and chosen men, to be determined and concluded. For if there were too many, they might easily err by reason of the diversity of opinions. Fourthly, to take time in deliberating upon the matter, and let the counsel ripen a few days. For as by continuance of time we are better acquainted with men's manners, so are we also with counsels and determinations: and that which at the beginning liked us very well, afterward being well considered, is altogether misliked. Fiftly and lastly, to take heed of four Mothers in Law which the virtue Prudence hath. Which are, overmuch rashness, affection, obstinacy or stiffness in opinion, and show of vanity: for overmuch rashness blindeth: obstinacy, shutteth the door against good counsel: and show of vanity, doth soil and spot each thing that cometh near it. Franciscus de Vallalobos saith, that into the Chamber In problemat. of man's understanding, four perturbations enter to counsel. First Pride, which showeth and presenteth matters of honour. Then Covetousness, which doth forecast what may be gotten by the victory, and what profit may be reaped thereby. Afterward Anger and hatred. And by reason of the opinions and thoughts of these four perturbations, reason is not heard, and if it be heard, yet it is not believed. 10 The sixth quality which king Solomon would have proverb. 12. Counsellors to have, is, that they ought not to be wicked and vicious: for the counsels of the wicked are full of deceit. And seeing that the holy Ghost doth lighten the understanding of men in their counsels, it is a thing to be believed, that he assisteth and helpeth virtuous and good men, showing them what they ought to do. Counsellors (saith S. Ambrose) to be men Lib. 2. capit, 2. de officijs. of such doctrine and life, that they might be an example to all them that take counsel of them: for so, they may have authority and credit in the Commonwealth, and their life & manners will agree with the counsels which they give. For no man will take the water which he meaneth to drink, out of an unclean vessel. And hardly can he give good counsel to others, that taketh none for himself: and whereas he might be virtuous and honest, he is vicious and wicked. 11 The seventh quality that a Counsellor ought to have, Ecclesiast. 8. Proverb. 27. is, that he be no Stranger but a Friend, and one that is well known. Alcibiades, willing to know who was his friend, that Polienus libro 1. stratage. he might confer with him about his affairs, caused an Image to be made of stone, or some other thing, and set it in his chamber: but it was made in such order, that one would have thought it had been some dead body. And then he called unto him those that professed themselves to be his Friends, and told them each one a part in secrecy, that he had killed a man, and that he had him at home in his house, and bringing them unto the Chamber where the Image was, he showed it unto them, requesting them to favour him so much, as to take away the dead body and to hide it in their houses: that if he had been suspected for killing of the man, and the Officers had come to make search for the dead body, it might not be found in his house: but they all excused themselves, and refused to do that which Alcibiades requested of them▪ fearing lest if the dead body had been found in their houses, they should have been brought in trouble, as accessaries in that offence unto Alcibiades. Only Callias said unto him, that he would take the dead body, and keep it secretly in some part of his house, and that for his sake, he would adventure what danger soever. And from that time forward, Alcibiades took Callias for a right true Friend, and said unto him, that the same which he thought to be a dead body, was but an Image which he had commanded to be made to try his friends. In adversity, a man may easily know who be his true and loyal friends. julius Caesar said, that a man's friends become Libro. ●. enemies, if Fortune pursue him. And justine said, that where Fortune doth favour, there men do fancy. 12 The eight quality that a Counsellor ought to have, is, to be faithful in counseling, & not to counsel any thing which Ecclesiast. 27 is not good. Fredericus Furius saith, that a Prince may learn Fredericus Furi▪ vb● supra. Erasm. in Panegir, ad Phil. Reg. whether that his Counsellors be faithful or no, if he feign to ask counsel in things that are quite contrary to the welfare of the Commonwealth, saying that though they were such, yet for certain causes it concerned his person to have them put in practice. As for example: if he would have them to break some important Law, or to weaken and diminish the liberty of some Privilege: or to ordain some excessive tributes or tolls, or some such other like things. And by their answer and determination, may he in some sort gather how they be affected towards the Commonwealth. The Emperor Constantine, desirous to know whether his Noble men and Counsellors were faithful, Tripe●tit. libro 1. cap. 7. he published, that all those that would leave the Christian faith, and turn again to the worshipping of Idols, they might freely do it, and that he would nevertheless maintain them in his Court, and make account of them, as of his friends. hereupon, some of them did forsake the faith of our Redeemer, and Lord Jesus Christ, and of Christians became idolaters: which the Emperor Constantine perceiving, would not any longer suffer them to remain in his Court that turned from the Christian Tullius. lib. 2. de officijs. Paulus ●ouius Libro, 43. faith, saying: That sith they were not faithful unto God, much less they would prove faithful unto him. Paul the third, Pope, used the same diligence, to know the affection and inclination of men, & many times proposed matters unto his Cardinals, (no necessity at all urging him unto it) which might offer them occasion to strive and contend in opinions, and willed them to tell him their minds, and by their alteration, learned what answer he should give to the Ambassadors that were sent unto him from other Countries. 13 There are many other policies, whereby a Prince Frederie▪ Furius ubi supra. Erasm. in Panegir, ad Phil. Reg. may know whether his Counsellors respect their private commodity more, than the welfare of the Commonwealth: for if there be any that be hypocrites and covetous persons: if there be any that say all is the Kings, and that the King may do his will and pleasure, or that the King may ordain as many tolls and tributes as he will, or that the King cannot do amiss, or that all which the King will have is a Law, and aught to be kept as a Law, or that a King is not bound to give account of that which he commandeth: all such Counsellors are enemies to the welfare of the Commonwealth, for the King neither aught, nor may do any thing, that may do the Commonwealth any notable harm. No Prince yet even until this present day, attained to great forces, and defended himself there withal, but through means of men, that esteemed more the public profit then their own private commodity. And contrariwise, whensoever it shall happen that the Princes be counseled of those, that little regard the welfare of the Commonwealth, so they lose nothing themselves: even at that time shall the Princes begin to decay, and nothing shall be brought to effect, that may redound to the welfare and profit of the Commonwealth. After that Solon had determined to moderate the debts which Plutarch in vita Solon. the City was owing, and to bring in an equality, which was a certain diminution of the debts, and public acquittance which was given to the City, that no man might come and ask that which was owing them there: he communicated his intent with some of his near friends. They hearing of it, presently took up great sums of money, and indebted themselves before the Law was proclaimed: and within a little while after that the Law was published, they had bought them great houses, and purchased large possessions with that money which they had borrowed. 14 The ninth quality, that King Solomon saith a Counsellor Proverb, 1. ought to have, is, to keep close and secret that which is consulted, and not to disclose or open it unto any man. Seneca saith, that a Counsellor ought to talk much with himself, but very little with others: for in speaking much with others, he incurreth danger to disclose that which is in secret. There is nothing that destroyeth and spoileth all public and private affairs more▪ then to have that known, which is consulted and In 4. par. in sermon. ad r●gem. Franciae, consideratione, 2. determined in the Counsel. john Gerson saith, that in his time all the King's affairs went to wrack, because some vile & base persons that served the King, published all whatsoever was determined in his counsel. The very same befell unto Henry King of Portugal, unto whom (because he was somewhat deaf, and could not hear very well) his Counsellors were fain to speak very loud: in so much that every one knew what was said unto him, this is very dangerous and hurtful to the Commonwealth. For to be delivered from dangers and adversities, which many times happen to chance in public matters: Valerius maxim de institut. antiq. it is very necessary to keep the same close & secret, which is consulted, as the Romans did. 15 The Signory of Venice, in their counsel use great secricie, whereby they have magnificently augmented & maintained their estate, and brought it to that perfection and greatness as all men know. And chiefly, because they admit not any Garimbertus problem. 117. base men of the Commonalty into their counsel. And the Noble men are so bridled, that they cannot possible exercise any tyranny upon the Commonwealth: and all men do their endeavour to procure the public commodity. The great secrecy that is used among the Venetians, may clearly be seen, in that they being informed, that Carmignola their general Captain Bartol. discuss. S. Petrus justinia. in histor▪ venet. discharged not his Office according to his duty, determined to send for him, as if they would have communicated with him about certain affairs touching the war at that time: that after he was come, they might have executed due punishment on him, according to that he had deserved. This thing being concluded amongst them, and determined in the Senate: was kept secret eight months long, whereas notwithstanding, there were two hundred persons present at the conclusion of the same matter. And though that Captain had many friends in Venice that favoured him: yet was not this counsel disclosed in all that space. But Carmignola at that length came to Venice, and was most honourably received. But when he had been presented to the Senate, they led him feignedly to a certain place, as if he should have there rested, where being come, he remained prisoner, & after thirty days (in which space they consulted upon his cause) they commanded him to be beheaded with a gag in his mouth. Paulus iovius saith, that they condemned him, to confiscate and seize, as forfeit unto them, three hundredth thousand Ducats which he had: as I wrote more at large, in my Book of the Office and duty of the Captain General. But to turn back to our latter purpose. Because there be many (as I said) that when they see the Counsellors assembled together, begin to imagine what it might be that they consult of, and many times they conjecture what the Counsellors go about to determine: in Venice it was ordained, that they which were of the Counsel, should upon certain days every month, meet together in the Chamber of Lect●us Bemb●s in histor, venet. Counsel: but the day and hour of their assembly, should not be limited or set down, and that though there were no matters to consult of, yet they should spend the time (at which the Counsellors are wont to be there) in matters concerning the Commonwealth, and by this they procured, that the Common people did not any more inquire, why they assembled together. The Venetians in this, and many other policies concerning the Contarenus de repub▪ veneto●ū. government of their Commonwealth, did imitate the Lacedæmonians, who when they gathered themselves together, to consult upon matters which belonged to the Commonwealth, if Plutarch in vita Licurgj. it happened so, that they had no public affairs to employ themselves in: then they spent the time in praising the good sayings, and worthy deeds of the Citizens, exhorting and encouraging them, still to continue in laudable exercises, and in rebuking and blaming the vices of others. The Signory of Quomodo venet● suffragia fe●ant in eligendis magistrat●bus prosequitur post●llus. Venice, ordained also, that those who gave their voices in election, should cast them in a box that had a partition in the middle, which was so covered, that no man could perceive in which place of the box the voices were cast, because they would not have any one to know, to whom they gave their voices in election of Officers. 16 Plutarch asketh why Pythagoras did forbid, that any In opusculo de notis Pythag. man should keep Swallows in his house: and he answereth, because they be very unthankful birds, and will not become tame, how much soever a man maketh of them. But Pi●rius Libro 2. Hyerogliphic. Valerius saith, because they bring no profit at all unto those houses in which they build their nests. And the Author Ad Herennium Dum fueris faelix multos nube●abis amicos. affirmeth, because after the same order as feigned and false Friends in time of adversity, forsake them, whose friends they professed themselves to be in time of prosperity: so the Swallows come in the beginning of the Summer, & as soon as the Winter draweth on, they leave us, and fly unto other Countries. But I think that the same which Pythagoras said, may be understood as Aristotle took it: because it is good for no man to have talkitive persons in his house. Many other examples could I show both of men and women, that smothered in silence, such things as were committed to their secrecy: but because they be known unto all men, and I have set them down in the Book which I wrote of wise and crafty counsels, I will not hear stand upon them. 17 The tenth quality which king Solomon would have Ecclesiast. 37 a Counsellor to have, is, that he be not envious, or own any man ill will: for how is it possible that he should give good counsel to a man, whom he hateth and cannot abide? Of the envious, this proverb in Spain is used: El cauallo Argel ni en el ni cabe el: The envious Horse called Argel, none Will let on him to ride: Nor any near him for to come The same Horse can abide. for the conversation of the envious is so contagious and infectious, that the Spaniards used this old saying, Ni el embidioso medro, ni el que cabe el bivio: An envious man could never prosper well, Nor any one that near by him doth dwell. And to be brief, hatred is a vice that came forth of hell, and it was the cause wherefore the devil deceived Adam and Eve, Gen. 3. de fructu ligni. counciling them to eat of the fruit of that Tree, which God forbade them to touch. King Solomon saith, that we ought to choose one Counsellor out of a thousand: he would have only to Ecclesiast, 6. take counsel but of one man, for that among a thousand we should choose one. For that is far better understood, which is Gloss. in libro. 1. de legate. 3. inquired of by many, then by a few: and in deed it is thought, that four are many. It lieth and dependeth upon every Prince his pleasure, to Elius Lampridius in vita Alexan. Se●er. imper. have more or fewer Counsellors. The Emperor Alexander Severus, (as we have said) before he published or proclaimed any Laws, which he had ordained to be kept, he delivered them to twenty most learned Lawyers, and fifty most excellent men, to consult of them. This cannot in any case be denied, that it is safer to consult with a great many, then with a few: for (as Aristotle saith) when many gather together, (if they be not rude and gross fellows) the one doth confer with the other, and that Polit 3. & Eth. ●tiam saepe. which one knoweth, is joined with that which the other knoweth. For GOD did put a light in every man's understanding, whereby he might know the truth. Psalm. 4. The qualities which Plato would have a Counsellor to have. PLato saith, that Counsellors which will Dial. ●. de legib. consult well, aught to be free from affections and passions. For delight and grief, are two contrary and foolish Counsellors. And (as Virgil saith) love and anger overthrow Aeneid. 2. In Catal. in Oratione julij Caesaris. man's understanding. Sallust affirmeth, that all men that deliberate upon doubtful matters, ought not to be moved with friendship, anger or mercy: for in those matters where they vary and contend, the mind can hardly perceive the truth. Neither was there ever any one that did attend both his own disordered will, and the public profit also, for whereunto a man's will is most inclined, to that doth his wit most apply itself: & if the will overcome, it ruleth, and reason hath no power: for the desire that a man hath to attain unto that which he pretendeth, blindeth his understanding. And so doth fear also, (as Cornelius Tacitus affirmeth) Lib. 3. Pavidis consilia incerta sunt. so that fearful men cannot govern well, nor counsel that which is profitable to the Commonwealth, for fear doth not let them judge freely. And as those that stand by and see others play, can better judge of the Game than they that Lotinus consideratione, 326, play themselves, for as the gain which they that play hope to get by their game, blindeth them not: even so they that judge and counsel, aught to be free from passions, which trouble the understanding, and suffereth it not to pick and choose out that which is best. When the Areopagites in Athens, assembled together Quintil. libro 6. cap. 1. to judge, the Crier called unto them with a loud voice, that they should judge without any respect of affection at all. The Emperor Charles the fift, wished that his Counsellors Fran. Sansou. de dict. & factis Imp. Car. v. should lay aside all dissimulation, & respects which might move them, before they entered to consult: that they might freely understand & judge, what were most profitable for the Commonwealth. Plato writing unto the friends of Dion, affirmeth, that In Episto. 7. they which use themselves to eat much, cannot be wise, though they be never so ingenious and witty. King Solomon saith: A Ecclesiast. 10. woeful kingdom is the same, where he that ruleth it is a child, and the Princes that are with him, are belly-maisters: or as some interpret it. Sorrowful is that Country, where he that ruleth it is a child, and they that govern it are drunkards. The reason is, because Gluttons and drunkards are not wise: and that (as Plutarch saith) they that accustom themselves to In vita Lycurgi. have their bodies filled with meat, corrupt & mar their judgement in such manner: that they are profitable, neither to govern the affairs of the Commonwealth, nor yet to do any other good thing, but (even as brute beasts) to lose the use of reason, and abuse the gifts of GOD, which ought to be taken with great devotion and reverence. The qualities which Thucidites said that a Counsellor ought to have. THucidites ascribeth four things unto Counsellors, which they ought to have, to be able to give Lotinus consideratione, 343. good counsel in matters concerning the Commonwealth. The first is, that they understand 1 that which is consulted. For hardly can blind Plato in Phaedr. men (as Aristotle saith) judge of colours. Plato saith, that this is the most important thing that a Counsellor ought to have. Socrates' said, that every man was eloquent in the A●te which he knew. And king Solomon affirmeth, that every man is skilful Ecclesiast. 38. in the Art which he understandeth. The second quality 2 which Thucidites saith that a Counsellor ought to have, is, that he be not overcome, either with money which is given him, or promises which are made him. The third is, that he be able to 3 propose the same, which he understandeth and knoweth to be profitable for the Commonwealth. For if he understand what is convenient to be done, and knoweth not how to utter it, it is as much as if he understood it not. Therefore all Counsellors of Princes, (as Fredericus Furius saith) ought to be well seen Vbi supra. in the Art of Rhetoric, or Science of good utterance. For even as man differeth from all other living creatures, in understanding, and in the gift of speech: so among men, they are accounted to be the most excellent and rarest, that can reason and discourse with most grace and judgement. The fourth quality is, that he be a greater friend to the 4 Commonwealth. then to his own particular profit and reputation. In so much, that where he can do the Commonwealth any good, or stand her in any steed, he ought to employ himself with all power and diligence therein: though he should incur great danger both of his credit, life and goods. O the unhappy Commonwealths, that have unto their Counsellors such men as Midas and Glaucus: for they in giving counsel, never regarded the welfare of the Commonwealth, but only how they might themselves attain to great store of riches, and augment their own substance with the damage and loss of the Commonwealth. These men (as Petrus Cremensis saith) counsel In rapsodia de recta reg●i administratione. and persuade their Princes to ordain new tributes, to seize upon their subjects goods, and confiscate the possessions and substance of their vassals: that they themselves might enjoy the profit and commodities of other men's goods. Therefore a good Fredericus Furius ubi supra. Counsellor, aught to rob and pill himself of all interest of friendship, kindred, partiality, faction, and all other respects whatsoever: and to deck, adorn, and apparel himself, with right and prudent verity, which neither can nor will favour any thing but justice & truth. And this aught every good Counsellor to stick unto, as to his friend, Cousin, faction, and commodity: and to respect this and no other thing whatsoever. In so much that a Counsellor ought to be affected towards all men alike, without any difference at all, but in such order, that he regard them most, that incline most unto virtue. And to conclude, all Prince's Counsellors, ought when they give counsel, not to procure thereby any profit for their kinsmen & friends, with the loss and hurt of the Commonwealth. But as Lucan saith: Non sibi, sed toti genitum se credere mundo. He ought to think, that he was not borne to do for himself only, but also to further and help all men: and always to have a regard of the welfare and commodity of the whole Commonwealth. The qualities which Aristotle saith that all Counsellors ought to have, that consult upon matters concerning the Commonwealth. ARistotle would have, that all Counsellors should be exercised in all such virtues and points of justice, Rhet. 1. which are necessary to be known of those that consult upon matters, belonging to the whole estate of the Commonwealth. He would also have them to be well practised both in government of peace and Fredericus Furius ubi supra. war, and all other things thereto pertaining. For seeing that the office and duty of a Prince consisteth in these two things, Government & Defence, both of them are referred unto peace and war. The Romans admitted unto those counsels which the Senators Aulus Gelli▪ li. 3. cap. 18. noctium attic. gave, upon things belonging to the Commonwealth, some men that had borne honourable Offices in the City: not that they should show their minds touching that which was consulted, but that they should follow those whom they thought counseled best: and because they went towards those persons whose sentence they allowed, they were called Pedarii, thus doing, they spent not much time in counseling. The Commonwealth of Rome, admitted no men unto their counsels, but such as had erst been present at many counsels. The Emperor Charles the fift said, that that counsel which was given by loyal Fran. San. de dic. & fac. imp. Car. v. and trusty men, and such as did understand the matters upon which they consulted, was good: because faith and prudence, did profit much against disloyalty and ignorance. And that they were good Counsellors that had skill and experience in those L. 1. C. de offi. vicarij. cap. stote. 1, quest, I. Gloss. in cap. q. sit de elect. quae citat Aristotelé. matters which were in counsel, & that easily gave their resolutions touching that which was convenient to be done: for practice and experience (as Aristotle saith) doth quicken man's understanding, and make it more prompt and ready to resolve in that which is consulted. The second thing which Aristotle doth require, in those that consult upon matters touching the Commonwealth, is wit to put the same in practice, which in counsel is determined: for for as we have said, counsel is to no end, if that be not put in Lotinus consideratio●e, 34●. execution which is concluded. And in this Aristotle agreeth with Thucydides. For whereas Thucydides requireth, that a Counsellor should know how to propose that which he in his mind conceiveth, it is to be noted, that he fitted himself conformable to the time in which he wrote. At which instant the Athenians lingered much time, in proposing that in their counsels, which they thought to be most profitable to the Commonwealth, without any resolution at all for the performing of any thing. For it is proper (as we have said) unto the Democratia, or popular estate, not to grow to any resolution in all their counsels, unless necessity compel them to it. Therefore if they depart Machiauellu●. out of the counsel, having concluded, it is more by chance, then by skill or wit. Demosthenes affirmeth, that the Athenians were in their consultations as Pilots, which consulted what they should do, and after they were arrived in the Haven, they were discharged, and the ships were cast away. The reason why in those weals which are governed by the Common-people, they part without conclusion unless they be forced unto it, is, because their weakness suffereth them not to determine in those things in which there is some doubt: and if they do not (as it were) overthrow it with some violent onset, they always perplexed, hang in suspense without determining. 18 Aristotle saith, that the faculty of the mind, in which Politic. libro 1. cap. 3. counseling consisteth, is not perfect in bondmen, and also that it is but weak and small in women. But this is to be taken generally and not particularly: for though it be most true, that servitude doth oppress the faculties of the mind, and that they be perfect in the same man when he is delivered from bondage, Dialog. 6. de Respubli. (for as Plato and Homer say, servitude causeth a man to lose his understanding) yet nevertheless, there be many bondmen that are endued with singular and perfect wit: as may be seen in many counsels which divers servants have given to their Lords: which I have set down in my Book of crafty and prudent counsels. Quintus Curtius saith, that it is safer and better Libro, 7. for servants to obey, then to counsel: for in counseling, if the matter fall out contrary, they incur danger, and in obeying they be faultless howsoever matters fall out, for it is their duty to obey and not to give counsel: especially if their Lords suspect that servants counsel them in matters concerning their own profit, little regarding that which is convenient for their Persius' mill hominum species. etc. Lords. No man can deny, but that seeing men's wits are very unlike and divers, some of them be purified in adversity, as gold in the fire, (for virtue as S. Paul saith, is made perfect by adversity,) and others contrarily, by misadventure and calamities 1. Corin. 12. lose their wit and understanding. And not only men have more judgement and understanding when they be favoured, than they have being persecuted and pursued: but also in brute beasts we may see the difference which they have being much made of, and when they be misliked of by their Lords: yea and in one self same man if he fall into captivity. For bondage and captivity do so vex and disturb their wits that are crossed with misfortune, that he which was free being brought into servitude, seemeth not to be the same man. The civil * laws determine, that fortune many times maketh them L. quod attinet. ff. de regulis juris, quod attinet ad ius civil seruj pro nullis habentur. bondmen, whom nature made free, and maketh them free whom nature made slaves and bondmen: but according to the law of nature, he that knoweth and understandeth least, aught to serve and obey him that understandeth most. Plato, Diogenes and joseph, though they were brought in captivity and made bondmen, yet lost they not their understanding. But rather (as S. Jerome saith) Plato, though he was a Captive, yet was 1. Epistol. ad. Paulinum. he greater than his Lord that bought him, for he that bought him was an Idiot, and Plato was a Philosopher. Diogenes when he was led to the market place for to be sold, said to the Crier that sold him, that he should cry whether any man would buy a Lord to rule and govern him. As I wrote more at large in the Treatise which I made of good education & bringing up of youth. Though the Laws of nature command, that ignorant and unskilful men, should obey and serve those that are learned and skilful, and they that can do less unto them that can do more: yet we see commonly, that cowards rule & command valiant men: ignorant and unskilful men, have the mastery over learned men: and virtuous and good men, are subject to lewd and wicked persons: as Appollonius Thianeus answered, unto one that asked him what he had seen in travailing through the world. 19 As concerning that which Aristotle saith of women: that, that part of the mind in which the virtue of counsel consisteth, L. 1. vers. viro●●. ff. de legibus, doctores in lib. 1. 9 sex. ff. depostula. & in li. 1. ff. de regulis juris. is not perfect in them: it seemeth that Aristotle had a respect unto that which the Romans and Lacedæmonians used, in not admitting Women to their consultations. For they be commonly given to telling of news, and chatting among their Gossips, of that which is committed unto their secricle, although it be never so dangerous unto those that trust them with their Erasm. in Apoth. counsel. Cato the greater said, that he was heartily sorry, that he had ever discovered any secret unto a woman. Lactantius Lib. 3. cap. 22. Firmianus doth reprehend Plato, because in that Commonwealth which he suiteth and ordaineth, he would have women to be present at the counsels, that are holden upon matters concerning the Commonwealth. But not to slide from the matter, we may observe, that, that which Aristotle saith of women, is not so generally to be taken, that it may be said of all women without acception: for there have been, and now are many famous and renowned Noble women, whose counsels have done, and yet do, the Commonwealth much good. Phil. Bargo. in lib. de illustrib. mulieribus. Cassan. in Cata. Gloriae mundi, part. 2. consi. 10. Pet. Rebuf. in concordantijs. As after john Bocace, Philip Bargomate, and Cassaneus, I have written in the Treatise of wise & subtle counsels. They that make such a general rule touching woman's wit and understanding, seem not (as Peter Rebuffo saith) to address themselves unto the parable in the Gospel of the * Math. 13. ten Virgins, that five of them were wise, and five of them were fools, neither was the number of the fools greater than the number of the wise. Out of that which we have hitherto said, is gathered, that to affirm that universally (as Aristotle doth) which ought to be verified and proved particularly, is rather to take occasion to dispute and seek reasons to argue, then to show how a man may know whither they that are to give counsel, have those qualities which in Counsellors are required. For Counsellors for the most part, depend upon the occasions and circumstances, and are as remedies that are applied unto diseases, which are not cured in the abstract, but in the subject in which they be: (as Aristotle himself saith) and the Counsellors be Medicina non curat hominem sed Socratem. August. Epist. 5. ad Mercellium. Physicians, who in those matters upon which they do consult, seek remedies to apply unto them: and in the applicative (as they term it) consisteth the profit which the medicines do. And for this cause it is said, that the hands of the Physician and Surgeon, are ointments. And as the applicative doth depend upon the judgement and skill that every one hath: so in matters touching counsel, the ability which every one hath, is to be considered. For (as Eustachius saith) the general and universal rules are not sufficient enough, to have each particular thing governed by them: and much less Commonweals, in which commonly concur many very divers & contrary circumstances, which cannot be comprehended under the universal rules. 20 Fredericus Furius saith, that the Counsellors of Princes Vbi supra. ought to be skilful in many things, but especially in those languages that are spoken in those Provinces that are under their Prince's government, or be their confederates or friends. For very seldom shall one meet with an Interpreter, that declareth and expoundeth the interpretation of a thing perfectly, without wresting, turning, taking away, adding, changing and altering the sense, after many and divers manners. It falleth out sometimes, that there cometh a Spy, upon whose relation, perchance the safety and honour of the whole Realm dependeth, and which suffereth no delay, and then it is a great inconvenience at such a pinch to seek an Interpreter: for either none can be found so soon, or though one be had, yet the Spy dareth not to tell it unto such a man, or the Interpreter may discover it, or some such other inconvenience may happen. How much this importeh, may be learned by Themistocles, who fleeing Plutarch in vita Themistoclis. from Greece to the King of Persia, and being demanded of the King to tell him what he would have, answered, that speech was like unto painted and wrought tapistry: for as that being extended and spread abroad, doth show the painted Images that are in it, and when it is folded up it doth cover & hide them, even so is it with speech also. And therefore he desired of the King, to grant him one years space, that he might in the mean time learn the Persian tongue, which Themistocles did, because he would not show his mind unto the King by any third person. Philip, who interpreted that which Atabalipa King of Cusco answered, unto that which was asked of him when he was accused, did play the Interpreter in such sort, that the king was condemned to die. The Judges of Israel should have been skilful Lib● 4. cap 6. de a●canis Catholicae fidej. (as Petrus Galatinus saith) in threescore and ten languages, if they spoke not by Interpreters unto those that were at variance before them. The Emperor Charles the fourth of that Anton. Ge●a●●● bulla aurea. name, commanded in the golden Bull which he ordained concerning the Electors of the Empery, that the Electors of the sacred Empery, their Sons and others that should be Electors, should employ all their years from seven upward until the fourteenth year of their age, in the study of Grammar, and learn the Latin and the Esclavonian tongues, because of the great necessity and use which they have of them. To conclude, it is most expedient for Counsellors, to be acquainted with the tongues, which are spoken in those Regions that are under their Valerius Maxi. Libro 8. tit. de study & industria. King's subjection: and so to imitate King Mithridates, which spoke unto twenty Nations which he governed, without an Interpreter. 21 The Counsellors of Princes, aught to have attentively read, both ancient and new Histories, thoroughly sifting & examining Fredericus Furius ubi supra. them: but especially all such Histories, as have been written of their own Commonwealth, and of their confederates, neighbours and enemies. Aristotle counseleth all those that govern Common-welths, to give themselves unto continual reading of Histories, that occasion being offered, they may know how to turn that to their profit, which in times past they have read. Moreover, Counsellors of Princes, aught to know the end, matter and circumstances, how, when, and how far each virtue is extended. For by reason that this is not known, almost all men are miscalled. He that loveth quietness and shunneth quarrels and brawls, is termed a coward. He that is crafty, a Traitor. He that is rude and rustic, good. He that is dull-headed and blockish, mild & gentle. He that studieth not witty and subtle Arts and Sciences, either for want of capacity, or because he will not take pains: is taken to be one that chooseth the plain and right way. He that is wrathful, hasty, and furious, valiant and strong. He that is prodigal, liberal. He that is covetous, thrifty, provident, and circumspect. He that is superstitious, holy. He that is learned, curious. And as Cato Vticensis said in an Oration which he pronounced in the Sallust in Ca●●lina. Senate house: it is long since we lost the right names and titles of things, and by reason of that, neither Commonweals nor yet men, can be well ruled and governed. Furthermore, Vbi supra. Counsellors of Princes, (as Fredericus Furius saith) ought to have seen and viewed many strange Countries, but above all others, those that are belonging to their Princes, enemies and neighbours. And this their being abroad in far Countries and unknown Kingdoms, aught to be circumspect and prudent, not careless and negligent, as the voyages of idle and wandering persons commonly be: not unlike to men that walk through a Fair only to feed their eyes. It is required in Counsellors that travail in foreign Regions, to be well informed both of the government of peace & war in every Country: of ordinary things, and extraordinary things: of the love the King bears unto his Subjects, and how his vassals are affected among themselves: of the strong Forts & Castles: and of the humours and qualities of the men. Many are of opinion, that by great travailing from home, they can attain to wisdom & human prudence, but that is nothing so: for that is not gotten by running into far Countries, or by living an exile far from home, but by communication and conversation with wise men. For it is not enough to have been in strange Countries, and seen many Regions, and manners of divers Nations, if he that travaileth have not the wit to reap profit by his being abroad. Concerning this matter, the Castilians have an old saying: Quien Sevilla the chief Town in Spain. ruin es en sum villa, ruin es tambien en Sevilla: he that is nought in his Town and Village, will also be nought in Sevil, Meaning Horat. Caelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currant. by this, that the change of place doth not mend men's manners. Homer and Virgil to form and make an heroical man, and one adorned with all virtues, feigned that Ulysses and Aeneas had travailed through all the world: and not contenting themselves with this, they feigned that they descended into hell, and went into the Elysian fields, and knew those that were in them. Thus ought Counsellors of Princes to travail, imagining with themselves what punishment they abide in hell for their wickedness, that counsel their Princes and others naughtily, and the glory which they deserve that counsel well. This doth the royal Prophet David give us to understand, when he saith, Psalm. 54. Descendant ad infernum viventes. Anton. de Ge●●●a. In Episto. that living men should go down to hell: as if he should more plainly have said, that while men yet lived, they should ponder & weigh with themselves, what torments they suffer that are in hell: that while they think upon the infernal punishment, they may endeavour how to keep and deliver themselves from them. 22 Fredericus Furius would have, that Counsellors of Princes should know, what forces and power their Princes have, and their Confederates, Friends, and Neighbours: for as the Physician, the first thing he considereth in man's body, is, what virtue and strength it hath, and how much it is able to take, even so a Prince his Counsellor, aught to know what forces, and how great power his Prince hath, and those that are his Friends and Confederates, that he may be able to cure the whole body of the Commonwealth: and that in curing the one part, he hurt not the other, as if a Physician to heal one member, should harm the other. Fredericus Furius saith, that the Counsellor of a Prince, aught to be a virtuous, upright, and just man: for such a man loveth to give every man according to his deserts. Which is, to punish those that offend, and reward those that do well, and in all things he observeth due moderation: for in punishing he is not cruel or slack, or in rewarding scarce or excessive, or vain and to no purpose. Neither doth he punish men more than their faults deserve, nor make all faults equal, as the Stoics do, nor dissemble with men's offences, to turn the punishment with which the Laws punish the offendourr, to their own profit by taking bribes, as Dionysius King of Sicil did, and they now a days do, the ordain Laws with which they may rob and spoil the people. These men are like unto the herb Lumbricaria, which killeth the worms called Lumbrici, and if there come no worms near it, it breedeth worms of itself to kill them afterwards. These men also, to show themselves very diligent and zealous in executing justice, either punish them that have not offended at all, or in punishing them that have done amiss, they use more cruelty than the fault deserveth. A Prince's Counsellor ought to be frank & liberal, for the people is greatly pleased with francknes, and loveth liberality, yea and admireth it. But the covetous man, is always detested, and abhorred: for he doth all for money, and to fulfil his greediness, setteth all things to sale, nay, he doth not so much as speak without interest, and is ready to commit any treason whatsoever, so he be no loser by it. Sallust writeth, that jugurtha going out of Rome, said: O City, thou wouldst soon be sold, if thou hadst a Chapman. The Counsellors of Princes, aught to take a pleasure in doing well. This virtue consisteth not in giving of money, or bestowing any of their substance or riches as liberality doth: but in helping the Commonwealth, and aiding each member of it, with good counsel: admonishing, warning, advertising, praising and dispraising, and favouring by their authority and protection, not only those that crave favour, aid, help, or succour of them, but those also that deserve it without ask. Counsellors ought also to be meek and gentle, gracious in words, courteous and sweet in language, gentle in hearing of all men great and small, rich and poor, and not to use slanderous speeches and ill words unto them that speak unto them. For many men are sooner moved to cast away themselves, and lose life and goods for a reproachful answer, then for some heavier and greater injury offered in other sort. Moreover, a Counsellor ought as it were to set open his door, for all men to enter, of what condition or kind soever. And he ought also to be of great sufferance and patience in hearing, and give no man occasion to fall in desperation. 23 The Counsellors of Princes ought to be valiant, this valiantness is not meant of strength and forces of the body, but of the inward fortitude, and of the courage of the mind, by reason of which, men be called noble and heroical, that is, more than men. As for the other corporal strength, that, is common johannes de Orrena. to many, as to swash bucklers, Roisters, and other rascal fellows that care not for their lives, and pass not if they sell it for a button. A ●aliant man loveth the truth, he is an enemy unto leasings, he cannot away with saucy fellows and scurrility: he is grave & constant: he is always of one temperature: he hateth the comiersation of babbling and talkative persons: he speaketh freely: he speaketh graue●●: he showeth his mind unto his Prince with as great liberty, as he would do to any private person: he cannot▪ nor will not dissemble. It is not enough that a Counsellor be valiant, but it is also necessary, thate his valiantness be accompanied with prudence, for even as fear hindereth one from choosing that which is most honourable to his Prince and profitable to his Country: so valiantness or courage of the mind, if it be not moderated with prudence and judgement, it doth not permit a man to shun and eschew any danger. And if Princes have any need or necessity of men of good understanding and expert judgement, to give counsel in matters concerning the profit of the Realm: it is a great deal Cornelius Ta citus. lib. 11. more profitable, and far more expedient for the Commonwealth, that the Prince have wary and circumspect Counsellors, Vbi supra. than such as be strong & valiant. Fredericus Furius saith, that the Counsellor of a Prince, aught to be of a Choleric or sanguine complexion, and not of any other. For they that are of this mixture and temperature, are witty, they have a notable memory, they can discourse bravely, they have an excellent judgement, they are just and upright, they are loving, gentle in talk, loyal, beneficial and liberal, honourable and sumptuous, valiant, and of noble courage: their bodies be light and nimble, and of a good temperature. They that are Melancholic, as they are by nature sorrowful, and of the self same complexion as the earth: so they be rustical, base, and heavy, scarce able to lift themselves one handful above the ground, vain, and delighting in trifles, enemies to noble thoughts, malicious, superstitious: in so much that men of this complexion, have wasted and utterly spoiled all the Regions of the world, with their dreams, foolish imaginations, and vain visions. They are wonderful superstitious, and the more they grow in age, the less they know: they are very hatred itself, and when they are angered, strait without any occasion, either they fall to blows, or rattle out a thousand curses, using all the injurious and slanderous words that ever were heard among men. Finally, it is a strange thing to see, how wonderfully all Philosophers, and such as study the speculations of Astronomy, detest and fly from those that be borne under the Planet of Saturn. In so much that it is thought to be most certain, that the Philostratus 〈…〉 vita Apollo 〈…〉 Tya●…. great Appolonius Tyaneus, found a melancholic person in the City of Ephesus, who with his presence only, had corrupted the whole City, and infected it with a great plague. To conclude, they that are of a melancholic complexion, be dull and drowsy, heavy, unskilful, unlearned, and they have no one virtue in them that excelleth, and all their qualities are less than mean. 24 Although the Mellancholicke complexion, be not so good as the Choleric and sanguine, yet it is by many called Lib. cui titulus examen ingeniorum. the heroical complexion, because they that are of that complexion, refuse not to tell the truth, making no account of any danger at all: and after the same manner, as wine causeth them that be drunk, to utter all what ever they think, even so melancholy, maketh them that are full of black choler, to speak the truth, and oftentimes they divine & tell of things to come. There have been many excellent men (as Aristotle saith) that In problemat. partic. 30. pro. 1. were melancholic. And though those inclinations be natural that cause the complexions in men, yet be they not (as those that study Astrology say) ordinances and decrees of Praetors. Inclinationes non sunt edicta praetorum: and therefore it is commonly said, Vir sapiens dominabitur astris, Every wise man may command the stars, and bear rule over them. For though the stars and Planets incline to one thing or other, yet can they not force men to it that be wise and circumspect, and of judgement how to govern themselves. No inclination of star or Planet; can force such men to do that which they will not, nor take away from them & deprive them of the free-will that God hath given them, as I have in more ample manner declared in my Books. De Amore divino, humano, & Casto. Plutarch writeth, In Apotheg. that Socrates was showed to one, that affirmed he could judge of any man's conditions and wit, by the physiognomy of his face: who when he saw Socrates, he said, that he was dull-headed, and that he had a very rude wit, and that he was a great friend unto women, and that he did men great injury, and that he was much given to wine, and that he was very incontinent. When Socrates his friends heard this, they became very angry with the physiognomer, for they knew the contrary by Socrates, that he was a very honest man, and well thought of among all men: but Socrates said unto them, that the Phisiognomere said the truth, and that he verily had been such a one, if Philosophy had not taught him to be virtuous. Fredericus Furius would have, that the Counsellor of a Prince should be of mean stature and thickness, for extremity in the proportion or bigness of the body, seemeth ill in a Counsellor, and diminisheth his authority. For of overmuch greatness, all Philosophers and Astronomers conclude, that knowledge and wisdom, be seldom seen in a man that is very high, especially, if he be very weak: and therefore it is said, that a long weak man, is lazy and ignorant. As for them that be very short and low, there is not so much want of government in them, as in over-tall men, but only this, that they be angry and presumptuous: and the people mocketh them, and maketh no account of them. Therefore a Counsellor ought not to be, neither too long, nor too thick, for there is no body but he will laugh, when he doth see one man like a Barrel, and another like a Conger. To conclude, talenes or shortness, so the mean proportion that all men commonly are of, be not notably exceeded, hinder not the judgement & prudence which is required in Counsellors. Little men (as the Author of the fifty Sonnets saith) often times are endued with braver gifts than others, as touching the mind. Virgil speaking of Tideus saith, that he was little of body, but yet very valiant. Mayor in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus. Finally, it is well known, that men measure not their length by spans, to know by the measure of their bodies, what wit, judgement and ability they have. 25 The sufficiency of a Counsellor, as concerning his body (as Fredericus Furius writeth) is the natural proportion, conformity, & perfection of his members, that nothing be wanting or superfluous: for either of these two faults, show very ill tokens of the mind, and also offendeth the sight of those that look upon him. The proportion of all the parts of the body, is an agreeing and equality of each member, the one with the other. The deformity is quite contrary, when the members of a man's body are unequal, one arm longer than the other, one hand small and the other thick, one shoulder high and the other low, and so other members some greater than the other. The perfections of the parts in man's body, is, when he is borne wanting never a part or member, and without any fault in any of them. As to grow crooked, to have a crooked back, lame, or without some arm or foot, by reason of the scarcity or superfluity of the matter. For (according as all natural Philosophers prove, and especially Galen) they that be so borne, always have ten thousand lacks and defects in their understanding, manners, and life. It is said, that Aristotle commonly used this Poesy, God deliver me from a man marked by nature. To have one foot, arm, or eye less, or one member bigger than the other, doth not (as we have said) hinder the wit, judgement and wisdom which is required in Counsellors, for we observe not those qualities in a Counsellor, which we do in a bondslave when we buy one: but the ability which he hath to give counsel, & the discourse which he is able to make in the counsels. Fredericus Furius would have also, that a Counsellor should be fair and well favoured, for they that are endued with that grace, for that gift only they are beloved and honoured. Therefore it is necessary, that a Counsellors head be well fashioned, round, not sharp in the upper end, nor very big, nor In problemat. particula, 10 problem. 3. Conciliator de prob. 3. deff. 76. very little. Aristotle saith, that they which have little heads, are more prudent than they that have great heads: if their heads be little in such sort, that the inward parts of the head be not wanting or diminished. As for the proportion of the face, that aught to be something flatter then round, not great, nor round, nor laden with flesh, nor little: the forehead large or meanly, not little, nor representing grief or sorrow: the eyes of mean bigness, not too big, nor too little, clear, not rolling, steadfast, not heavy, nor without rest: the nose large and thin, not short nor turned upwards: the lips, something thick, not very small, falling something downwards. Finally, Fredericus Furius would have, that a Counsellor should be comely, well favoured, civil, and of good behaviour. No man can deny, but that the beauty of the face, is a rare and marvelous gift of nature, and in which she worketh most artificially: as I wrote more at large in my books of Divine, human, & chaste love. Where I set down the qualities which a Gentlewoman ought to have to be fair. And much less can any man deny, but that those counsels that are accompanied with comeliness and beauty, are more acceptable than those counsels, which are given by an uncomely man, and such an ill favoured fellow as hath no grace. For if he that counseleth be fair, his beauty doth procure, that his reasons persuade with more speed and celereity, as Lucan saith: Vultus adest verbis, faciesque-incensa perorat. And virtue is most acceptable when it proceedeth from a fair person. Gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus. But because counseling consisteth chiefly in the wit, judgement, and wisdom which the Counsellor hath: we ought more to regard the Counsellors prudence than his beauty: for commonly the fairer men be, the lesser wit and judgement they be thought to have: therefore they be called fair beasts or fine pictures, that be carried in show on solemn days. Experience teacheth us, that nature often times supplieth the want of beauty, with an excellent judgement and subtlety of wit. As the witty Sappho saith: Ingenio formae damna rependo meae. The Emperor Frederick riding forth a hunting, went to mass in a place, where he found a Priest that was very ill favoured, at whom he marveled greatly, looking upon him: but the Priest perceiving that the Emperor marveled to see him so ill favoured, said unto him as the royal Prophet David said: Psalm. 99 Deus nos fecit, & non ipsi nos, God made us, & not we ourselves. And the Emperor talking with him, marked that he was a sage and discreet man, and loved him so well, that he made him high Chancellor of all his Empire. 26 Counsellors, as Fredericus Furius saith, aught to have an excellent and rare wit: for a ready and brave wit, is the beginning, means, and end, of haughty and heroical enterprises. Yet wit only (as we have said) is not enough to judge which Plato dialogo. 6. de Repub. of those things that are consulted aught to be done, and which to be omitted, for this is belonging to wisdom, and we ought more to respect, that the Counsellors of Princes be wise, then witty, rich, or noble. For (as Plato saith) it is the point of In Alcibiad. 1. wise men to give good counsel, & not of those that be wealthy. And the Angel being demanded by Tobias of what Tribe he Tobit. 5. 11. was, answered unto him: Dost thou seek a stock or family, or an hired man to go with thy Son? Though the virtue of counseling well, consisteth more in wisdom then in wealth, or nobility: yet it is supposed, that Gentlemen and rich men, are commonly better brought up and instructed than others, and that they do better understand and know, what is belonging to the government of the Commonwealth, than men of base lineage and small substance. And to put the counsel and government of the Commonwealth, in the power of the Commonalty, were to take the eyes out of the head, and place them in the tail: as it is said that the Snak● did, whereby he burst his head. For, because the eyes look over the whole body, God Lactantius Firmianus de opisicio Dej. cap. 8. placed them in the head, and not in the other inferior members: seeing than that the Rich men & Noble men, are the head of the Commonwealth, they ought to have a regard over her, counseling what is most profitable for the conservation of the whole Commonwealth, and government of the same, even as the eyes look to the whole body. The Venetians admit not any of the common sort of people into their counsels, nor yet to the government of their Commonwealth, neither do they suffer any bastards to become Counsellors unto the Duke, though they Fulgosius' consil. 62. be made legitimate, neither may they be created Cardinals, for these be the Pope his Counsellors. Yet Princes commonly Gometius in reg. t●ien. q. 2. n. 2. admit them unto their counsels, and commit the administration of public affairs unto thenr for in that they be bastards, that taketh not from them the judgement and understanding which God hath given them: and there hath been a great company of bastards, that have been very excellent men, and very profitable In fine tractatus de spurijs. to their Commonweals, as Polietus largely proveth by many examples. No man ought to take counsel of those that may command him, for than he is bound to do that which they counsel him to do. Neither ought any man to take counsel of Plin. Epist. li. 8. such men as take it in displeasure, if men follow not their counsel, thinking that he despiseth and contemneth them, that will Cap. quisquis praecep. 14. q. 1. & Cagnolus 11. L. Consilij. ff▪ de regulis juris. Cono●us libro 7. Commentario. not do as they counsel him. But these are rather to be termed Masters then Counsellors, for it is the property of counsel, that he who asketh it, may take it or leave it: and of dominion or signory, to obey and do that which is commanded. 27 Princes ought to make election of Counsellors out of those nations which they govern: for they that be naturally borne in those Provinces, are better acquainted with the estate of their Country, than Strangers be. And for this cause S. In libro de consideratione ad Eugenium. L. 1. cod. si curiales relicta ciui●ate libro. 10. In regula de Dioma●e, qu 1. n. 5. Politic. lib. 7. cap. 20. Bernard saith, that the Cardinals who be Counsellors unto the Pope, aught to be chosen out of all Nations. The Civil laws ordain, that they which are of the Counsel-house, should not leave their own Countries: for they (as Gometius saith) know and understand the affairs of their Country better than strangers. Aristotle saith, that some Commonweals ordained and decreed, that none such as had their livings and possessions in the borders of their enemy's Countries, should be admitted to the Counsel. For such persons, fearing to lose their goods, would not counsel that which were profitable for the Commonwealth. Some will have that the Counsellors of a Prince, should have all their livings, within the territory and Lordship of the Prince whom they serve: for then, they fearing lest they should lose them if they counsel ill, or otherwise offend their Prince, and having no foreign place to flee to, they are more careful of their charge and duty towards their Prince. It concerneth every Prince to have such persons in his service, as put all their hope in him, and altogether depend upon him: that even as those which pass over the Seas in some ship, look unto the same ship lest they should lose their own lives and substance, so they that counsel Princes, if their life and all their livings consist in the Prince his welfare, they will give him counsel with greater diligence & care. For the Commonwealths are like ships and vessels of the Sea, in which they be carried that live in them. And by this means will the Counsellors take more heed of the public profit, and counsel that which is most convenient for the Commonwealth, seeing that their life and substance, dependeth upon that Prince his safety whose Counsellors they be, and that if the Prince decay, they must fall to decay also. If the Counsellors of Princes have any lands or livings in those Countries against which their Lords will wage war, they ought to renounce them, imitating the great Captain Goncalo Hernando de Cordova, who before he Paulus lovius in vita magn● du●● Goncali Hernan. made war against the King of Naples, (being commanded by the Catholic king Don Hernando to do it) resigned all the lands, titles, and estates he had, in the kingdom of Naples. Some brave and noble Captains gave their goods unto the Common wealth, because the enemies commanded, that it should be cried through all their Camp, that no one should do any hurt or damage to the possessions of those Captains against whom they warred: by this means to make, that the Commonweals unto whom those Captains served, should not trust them, as I wrote more at large, in the books which I compiled of Military Discipline. L. 5 Tit. 9 part. 2. & tit. 3. lib. 2. statutorum. 28 The private Laws of the Kingdom of Spayne ●aie, that the Counsellors of the Prince ought to be of good wit and judgement, and learned and ancient men. For prudence, wisdom and authority, and experience of all matters, consist in continuance of time. They ought to be such men as fear God, and are alienated from all covetousness and greediness: and such as love to serve their Prince, and seek▪ by all means possible, how to further their Country. Each Prince that maketh choice of Counsellors to be counseled by them, aught to consider, that nature bringeth forth three sorts of men, (as Hesiodus saith) Aristo. lib. 3. Eth, ubi adducit authoritatem Hesiodj. Whereof the one sort is of them, that through their own natural inclination, perceive and know what ought to be done, in the administration and government of matters: and that which they judge, they put it in ure, without the advisement, teaching, or help of any other person at all. This state of men, is the chief & principal among all others, and such men seem to be sent by the providence of God, to the profit, welfare, and conservation of man's estate. The other sort of men, is of such persons, as of their own natural inclinations, cannot themselves judge what is convenient for them, to order and dispose those affairs well, that are committed to their government: but they be endued with such a natural kind of goodness, that they willingly learn of others that are wiser than themselves, and obey them that give them good counsel. The third sort is, of those persons, that neither know of themselves what is best, nor yet will learn of others, nor submit themselves unto the judgement of those that be more wise, refusing to follow good counsel when it is given unto them. These fellows do more harm then good in the counsels of Princes, for their intent is only to gainsay that which passeth their capacity. The Emperor Charles the sift, said: that the first step Bartolus de B●●●●linj discurs. 10. unto wisdom, was the purpose and intent which a man doth set before him, that he will not err, or be deceived: and the second, willingly and patiently to hearken to the truth, especially when it redoundeth unto his profit that heareth it. For little doth it profit that he is wise and faithful who counseleth, if he unto whom counsel is given, have not the wit to do himself good with it. Although all these qualities which writers require in Counsellors, be not found in any one man, yet they serve to show an Idea or pattern of a good Counsellor. And for that all these qualities, never concur in one person, Princes have many Counsellors, that some may supply that which is wanting in others. For it is thought that a great many shall Cap, in Canonicis, distincti. 19 Cap de quibus. distint. 20. L. vlt. cod. de sidej commissis, cap▪ prudentia de officio, Gloss. in cap. 2. q. 7. 3. decad libio▪ 1. Episto▪ 2. sooner find out the truth of that which is inquired, and judge better and surer of a matter, than but a few. Titus Livius saith, that for the most part, when many assemble to consult, the greater part overcometh the better. The reason is (as Pliny affirmeth) because the judgement and wisdom of those that counsel, being unequal, their opinions nevertheless and sentences are equal, and their wisdom is not regarded, but the number of those that give their voices; and though their prudence be unequal, yet the opinions of the prudent and unskilful together are equal. Finally, one only quality sufficeth for all Counsellors to do that which they ought to do, viz. To be a good and true Christian: for in this point, all whatsoever is written▪ touching the virtues with which each Counsellor ought to be endued, is contained and included. For the purity and sincerity of Christian Religion, alloweth no vice, and suffereth not any person to profess that Art and Science, which he knoweth or understandeth not, and unto which he is nothing fit: to the hurt of his next Neighbour, and damage of the Commonwealth Especially, seeing that the Art which the Counsellors of Princes do profess, is the noblest of all Arts, which is, to rule and govern Nations. And for this cause is this Art called of Plato and Aristotle, Architectonica: because she ruleth and governeth all other Arts and Sciences. The seventh discourse, of the Privileges, prerogatives, and exemptions, which the Law and right doth grant to the Counsellors of Princes. SEeing that the counsels proceed (as we have said) from the holy Ghost, not only the counsels, In Theage. dicitur, consultorum ●em esse sacrum. but also the Counsellors (as Plato saith) are an holy thing. Plato termeth Counsellors an holy thing, because if they counsel well, they be ministers of God: who (as the Prophet Cap. 9 Plin▪ li, ●, cap, 7. Matth. 5. Esay saith) is a marvelous counsel, and in giving good counsel, they imitate God, who doth good unto all men. For good counsel profiteth the party much unto whom it is given, and it hurteth him nought at all that giveth it. ignorant and unskilful persons say, Give us money, keep your counsel to yourself. But they that so say, perceive not (as S. Ambrose Lib. 2. cap. 2. de Officijs. affirmeth) that money is spent and consumed, whereas counsel lasteth for ever: and that money, the more it is given, and among the more persons it is distributed, the less he hath that giveth it: but counsels, the more they be given and communicated, the more good do they do, both unto him that counseleth, and unto them also that take advice: and lastly, that a little wise and faithful counsel in matters of importance, aught to be bought (as Demosthenes saith) with a great sum of money. In Olynthiaca. 1, If they that counsel well, be ministers of God, no doubt the Counsellors of Princes (who regard the welfare of the Common Cicero in some. Scip. wealth) do one of the most notable services unto GOD, that men in this life can do, and therefore doth God reward Cap. bon. 2. q. 2. them that give good counsel, both in this life, and in the life to come. 1 The Counsellors of Princes (whom the Laws call Silentiarij, 1. Privilegium. Titulus de silentiarijs & de curionibus. lib. 12. codicis. Cagnolus in L. diom functo ff. de officio assessoris, n. 16. either because the Princes communicate their secrets unto them, or because they ought to conceal that which their Princes trust them withal) enjoy those Privileges which the Law granteth to the assistants of Magistrates who show them what they ought to do for to judge well, and are called Assessores. 2 They do also enjoy those Privileges, which the Law granteth to Rulers of Towns and Cities, which in Latin 2. Privilegium. Martinus Lauden. in tractatu de consilia●ijs principum. Martinus Gronin. in Epist. ad maximilianun. Quod si hoc●decurionibus, idest confiliari●s ciuitatum st●t●i●ur, quanto magi● sibilo cum in so●ni principis consiliario vindi●abit. are called Decuriones; who be the Counsellors, Aldermen, and Senators that rule and govern them: and that stands upon great reason. For it is a thing more important to the Commonwealth, to give the Prince good counsel (who is the head of the Commonwealth) then to rule and govern some City well: for they that counsel the Prince, have a care of the profit of the whole Commonwealth, and of all those that live in the same, but they that bear rule over some Town or City, regard no other thing than the commodity of the same place which they govern. By reason of the necessity that Princes have of counsel in all matters concerning the Commonwealth, the laws grant many Privileges and exemptions to all Counsellors of Princes: to the end the Commonwealth might be well governed by their counsel, as well in time of peace as of war. Libr. 1. officio. For little (as Tully saith) profit Arms, if they unto whom the government of the Commonwealth is committed, consult not what ought to be done. 3 The Counsellors of Princes, are in great honour and dignity, 3. P●iuilegium. Cagnolus, ubi supra. n. 17. 4. Privilegium. L. Quisquis codic. ad legem. julian, ●ecius tam● L. 1. n. 15. ff. de officio eius, negat. Petrus vero Cal●●actus, ind. L. 1. n. 35. dicit procedere dictam legem, quisquis & in consilia●ijs supremi consilij. 5. Privilegium. 6 Privilegium. Filius Famil. Institu. quotque modis ius patrae potestatis soluatur. & johan. Monactus in cap unic. de scis. Li. 6. L. 3. ff. de adoptionibus. L. honour 9 Plebei, ff. de inumeri. etc. L. 1. cod. de conl●li. et novella const. iust●●iani. 81. L. Ius senatorum cod. de dignitatibus Libro. 11. et in. L. 1. cod. de prepas. laborum, Lib, 1, 2, though they have no jurisdiction which ministereth any dignity unto them. 4 They be noble, & enjoy those Privileges which be granted unto Noble personages: which are, to defend and plead for themselves in criminal causes, by a Proctor or Solicitor: and also to command the sentences which they do give, to be recited by others. 5 The Counsellors of Princes be Patritij, and Senators, and they be exempted a patria potestate; but not because they be Patritij, or Senators, but by reason of the Office which they bear. 6 And those Sons that be Counsellors of Princes, Bishops, chief Officers, Precedents of some Chancery, or Generals of some Army, though they be exempt á patria potestate because of their Office, yet they enjoy those rights and Privileges which appertain unto those that are as yet sub patria potestate. The Prince is placed in the number of his Counsellors, and they be as members of the Prince (who is the head of the Commonwealth) and ( * Gigas de crimine lesae maiestatis, Libro, 1. Capit, 14, L. quisquis cod. ad L. julian. L, 6. 1. de institutione principis. as Dion saith) the Counsellors be the eyes and ears with which the Prince doth see and hear. And for this cause ought every Prince to take good heed, and to inquire and examine very diligently, what men he maketh choice of to be his Counsellors: and they ought not to admit any one unto their counsel, that hath no wit or judgement: for this were also (as we have before said of base & common persons) to take the eyes from the head, & place them in the feet, as the snake, etc. Furthermore, a Prince ought not to admit any Idiots and unlearned men, who know not how a Commonwealth ought to be governed, unto the Counsel: for this were no less to take the eyes out of the head, and place them in the feet than the other. And the Counsellors of Princes, seeing they be the eyes of the Commonwealth, aught to procure the public benefit of the same, and love those that live in it, as their own natural sons and brethren. 7 The Civil Laws ordain, that the Counsellors of Princes 7 P●iuilegium L. defence. cap. de defensorib. civit. shall be guarded, and had in great account of every one, to the end that no injury may be offered unto them: for otherwise, they dare not to show their minds freely, & counsel that which they deem to be most profitable for the Commonwealth. 8 They that kill Counsellors of Princes, yea they that but 8 Privilegium intent to slay them, though they kill them not, commit high treason against the majesty of the Prince, and their goods are Gigas ubi supra lib, 1, cap, 4, Boetius in addit. ad tractatum de authoritate mag ●● consilij, n, 2. Gravit, consi. 6. n, 79. Gigas ubi supra, n, 9 9 Privilegium L. severam, cod, de dignit. Martin, Laud. in tractat, de consi. principum. 10 Privilegium. Martin Laud. ubi supra, q. 24. 11 Privilegium. L. 1. & ibidem Bald. ff. de colleg. illicit, Martin. Laud. ubi su. q. 18 12 Privilegium. Guido Papa. dis. 37 per, L. can. cod, de excusat, muner, lib, 10. confiscate. And this is to be understood if they kill them for some cause pertaining to their O●●●ce, for if they kill them upon some other private grudge, they commit no treason: but in the kingdom of Naples, they commit high treason upon what occasion soever they kill them. And this Law was ordained by the Lady jane, Queen of Naples, because one of her Counsel called Andreas de Isernia was slain. 9 The Counsellors of Princes may not be put to any torment, but the counsellors of Cities, are commonly racked, and otherwise tormented. 10 The Counsellors of the Prince, may not procure any Office out of the Court, without the Prince his leave. 11 If the College of the Prince his Counsellors be dissolved, the goods which the College hath, are to be given to the Counsellors: and this is understood, of those goods that are given by them that founded the College, and not of those which the College had of the Prince: for such goods, (the College being broke up) return again to the Prince who gave them. 12 If the Counsellors of the Prince give over their Office, either because the Prince doth licence them to do it, or because he chooseth other Counsellors in their steed, yet whilst they live, they do not lose their Privileges, exemptions and prerogatives which the Law granteth to Counsellors of Princes. This Privilege is granted unto them by reason of their dignity, and Office which they have borne: for which cause many things are permitted in Law. But if the Prince expel them out of his counsel, because they be vicious and wicked, not content with such rewards and pensions which are allowed them, but augmenting their stipend by bribery and other unlawful means, and so (as johannes Andrea's a famous Lawyer counseleth) be put beside their Office, that the Prince may make In cap, quanto jure jurando. choice of virtuous, just, and upright men, which will regard the public commodity more than they, than they that are so put out of their Office, enjoy not any of the Privileges or oxemptions, which the Law granteth unto the Counsellors of Princes. 13 The Counsellors of Princes are not bound to bring that 13 Privilegium. Martin, Laud. ubi sup. q, 22. money (wherewith their Fathers bought them that dignity) in account, at the distribution of the children's portions: for that money which was given for their Office, is of the same nature as goods gotten in war, termed Bonacastrentia, which are not reckoned (as the Lawyers say) In legitima, that is, as part of the Child's portion. 14 If any Counsellor die without an heir, his goods shall not 14 Privilegium Doctores in li. 1, cod, unde vir & uxor. Martin, Laud, ubi supra, q, 5, 15 Privilegium. Bartol. ind, L, 2, per seg. Si quis presbyter, cod, de Epis, & cler. L, 1, cod, in col. li, 10, Martin Laud, vb, su. q, 28. L. Si quis decur. cod, decurionibus Lib, 10. L, hac leg, vers, ut qui liberam, cod, de prox, li, 11, ut qui liberam proficiscendi licentiam, pronunciatione commeactus adopti fuerint, sine qualibet stipeudiorum aut emolumentorun de ductione peregre degerit. L, Reipub, ff, ex quibus ausis m●●●res, Reip. causa abbess eos intelligimus, qui non sui commodi causa sed coacti ab sunt. accrue fisco, that is, unto the King's Treasury, but unto the College of the Counsellors: and not only the College, but also the Counsellors wives exclude the King's Treasury. 15 Although Counsellors ordinarily may not renounce the habitation of their birth, yet the Counsellors of Princes may, because they have their house and abiding place in the Court, neither may they departed thence without they get leave of the Prince. And if so be they do leave the Court, without licence from the Prince, then ought they to be rebuked, and the stipend to be paid unto them, is to be kept back for the time that they be, or have been so absent. For he cannot be said: to be from the Court in the behalf of the Commonwealth, who is not sent by the Prince, but departeth without leave▪ This (as john Igneus * In lib. 3 9, de his. n, 24. ff. de Senatus consul, Silhan. 16, Privilegium. saith) belongeth to the honistie of a Counsellor, and servire of the Prince, not to departed. from the Court, or cease to counsel the Prince, according as in duty he is bound to do. 16 If the Prince command any thing centrary to that which the Law ordaineth, his Counsellors are not bound to put the same in execution, and they ought to let the Prince understand why they obey not his command. The Civil Laws ordain * L. vindicarjs. cod, de penis, c. apud thessal. 11, q, 3, that the Prince his servants and ministers; shall not execute any thing which their Prince willeth them to do, if it be contrary to Law and justice, and that they shall let thirty days pass before they go in hand with the execution of it: that in the mean time, the Prince his anger or passion may cease, which moved him to enjoin that which was unjust. For all delaying, all lingering, and all prolonging of time, which is done to save a man's life, cannot those but be good, as Juvenal saith: Iu●enalis. Nulla unquam de morte hominis cunctatio sera est. Athenodorus the Philosopher, counseled Augustus Caesar, Erasm, in Apoth, that he should never say nor do any thing when he was angry, unless he had first rehearsed the Greek Alphabet, α. β. γ. etc. King Erasm. in panegyrico ad regem Phil: et Gigas de crimine lesae mayest: in titulo qualiter in crimine lesae mai●●statis, proceda●ur, q, 16, n. 16. Antiochus wrote unto all the Cities of his kingdom, that they should not execute any of his commands, which were against the right of the Laws, so they did make him acquainted why they delayed the execution thereof. I his which we say of Counsellors of Princes, that they be not bound to put any of their Prince his Commissions in practice, if they agree not with the sense of the Law, taketh place, except (as some Doctors writ) this clause Motu proprio be added thereunto: for that seemeth Gigas ubi supra q, 16, n, 16 to be as forcible, as if he should command it again. Nevertheless, because these clauses, Motu proprio, de certa scientia, & plennitudine potestatis, are so ordinarily, and that without the Prince's command, specified and set down in all rescripts and Letters of Princes: they prove not that it is the Princes will and pleasure, that that thing should be executed, which is repugnant to the Law, especially if it ●end to the hurt of some other. For such clauses are to be understood, according to that which the Laws dispose and ordain. And though such ●●●●ses are of as great virtue, as if the Prince should iterate his former command: yet are they not sufficient to prove, that the Prince at the writing of those his Letters was not (as it might have been) angry, or troubled with some other affection, or L. digna vox, cod. de legibus. moved with some passion, or ill informed. For it is supposed and thought, that it is the Princes will & pleasure, that laws should be duly observed and executed. And for this cause, if a Bald▪ in league ad dictos, cod, de Episco. audi. Cap, resist, 11, q, 2 da veniam ò imperator, tu carcerem ille Gehennam minatur. Tulli●ib, Epistolarum vlt, Epist. T●bi persuade praeter culpam, et peccatum homini nihil avidere posse, quod sit horribile aut pertimessendun. 17. Privilegium L, final cod, de rescin, vendit. Mart. laud. ubi supra, q, 4. L, principal ff, si certum petatur. In verrem acti, 6. L, 7. c. 7. commenta: juris cibilis. D. L. principali. L, non licet ff. de contrahe. Epist. & L, 1, cod, de contract, Indi. Prince command or will any thing to be done which is notoriously unjust, or against God's commandments, his Counsellors ought not to obey him, nor conceal that which he willeth, answering him as the Christian Soldiers did julius Apostata, when he commanded them to do a thing that was contrary to God's commandments: Lord, your majesty may command us to prison, but our Saviour & Lord Jesus Christ, whom we serve, will send us to hell if in this we fulfil your pleasure. 17 The Counsellors of Princes, may not buy any clothes, gold, silver, or bondmen that belong to the Prince his Subjects. This (as Baldus & the Doctors say) holds in those Counsellors of Princes that govern and rule Cities. For it is supposed, that by reason of the Office which they bear, they will not give as much as the things are worth: and (as Tully saith) they had rather take them without paying for them, them to buy them. Franciscus Conomus affirmeth, that the Law which forbiddeth to buy gold, silver, clothes or bondmen, toucheth not those Officers and Magistrates, whom the Civil Laws forbidden to buy any thing in the Provinces which they govern, for these have a greater punishment appointed them, and the Law which we speak of, doth only require, that the price which was paid for things bought, should be given to the king's Treasure: and because he for whose cause the Law was made and ordained, had charge of certain particular things of the Prince, (as we may gather by the Title and superscription of the same Law,) and because it forbiddeth to buy clothes, gold, silver or bondmen, it speaketh of things particular belonging to the Ind. L. final. ubi. á privatis nostrisea contige●it venundare. Prince. So that understanding that which the Law ordaineth after this manner, it holdeth not in those which govern any provinces, but in those that accompany them: and it holdeth in all the Palatines or Courtiers, whither they dwell within the Prince's Palace, or whither they attend upon him only. Alciatus In L. serinis cod. de palatin. sacr. largitionun li. 12. saith, that those which dwell within the Prince his Palace, be called Comitatenses, & Palatinj: (for those be the Courtiers that accompany the Prince) and they that go to rule or govern some place, are called Mittendarijs. According to that which Alciat affirmeth: that which the Law ordaineth, holds in those Courtiers that dwell in the Prince's Palace, and attend upon him. And being so that the Law was written of those that dwelled within the Prince's Palace, the Law is to be understood, of those Courtiers which dwell within the Court, and not of all other Courtiers: for it is thought, that those that dwell within the King's Palace, will buy such things as belong to the Prince, for a lesser price than they be worth. The Law may also be understood, of those which buy things, which especially belong to the Prince himself, and not of those which buy things that appertain to Fisco, that is, to his Treasury. If it be so that the Prince have his wealth separated from the goods of the Treasury, as the Emperors of Rome had in times past. The substance of the Emperor was termed Aerarium, and L, 1. 9 hoc inter dictum ib●res enim fiscales quasi propriae & privatae principis sunt, ff, ncqaid in loco publico. L, ibid., habitis, bostis cod, de fidej i●stru. the commonwealths substance was called Fiscus. But after that the Emperors took the goods of the Commonwealth to themselves, the same which was disposed of the emperors goods doth also hold in the goods that belong to the Commonwealth, and that the goods of the. Treasury may be sold, if they be brought to a public place where they may be bought. For being sold after this manner, every one may without danger of the Law buy thereof. 18 The Counsellors of Princes, may licence any one, willing 18 Privilegium to build in public place, for to do it. And this is understood, of those Counsellors that are present in the counsel of rewards● for this being one of the special rewards that the Prince giveth, it appertaineth unto no other Counsel. 19 The whole years wages or stipend, is due unto the 19 Privilegium Cagnolus in L, diem functo. n. 17, ff, de officio assesso. Rebufus in concordam, in titulo de electione egregj advocate. 20 Privilegium Martin, Laud. ubi sup. q, 3, Cagno. & Mainerius in L. con. sil. n, 19, ff, de regulis juris. 21 Privilegium. Martin, Laud. ubi sup. q, 23, 22 Privilegium Martin, Laud, ubi supra q, 25. Counsellors of Princes, if the Prince die before the years end. The same is to be understood, of the Prince his Attorneys, if he die before they do serve out their year. And it taketh place, if the Prince which succeedeth, retain the same Counsellors and Attorneys in his service. 20 Prelates and Ecclesiastical persons, that be Counsellors of Princes, are not irregular, if they counsel their Prince to make or constitute Laws which may punish those that offend, with pain of death. 21 The Counsellors of Princes, cannot neither in judgement, or out of judgement, plead one for another. 22 The Counsellors of Princes, may not sell any goods immovable, without the leave of the Judge: before whom they ought to justify, what necessity compelleth or urgeth them to sell such goods: albeit that Counsellors of Princes, enjoy the very same Privileges, dignities and pre-eminences, which the Law giveth to those Governors of Towns and Cities, which in Latin are called Decuriones. For the tenth man of those that were sent to inhabit some place, was chosen to govern and rule it. These Decurions, are called Counsellors and Cap. statuimus 11, q, 1, & á cap. qui in §. quo. 51, d. defenders of those Countries which they rule. The other Decurions, are called Decuriones Curiales: because they were bound to serve in that Court or Session, where the Judges that governed the place which they inhabited did frequent & assemble, and where the Priests or Curates did sacrifice to their Idols. These are the Courts of which the canon-law maketh Wolfangus jazius, lib, 3, de Repub. Roma. often mention. And those that were called Decuriones Curiales, might not sell or do away their goods immovable, neither might they leave those Countries wherein they served. And because they were bound to gather and recover the public revenues, it was their charge to provide maintenance for the Cities and Towns, and to appoint Tutors and overseers to all pupils, that should guide and look unto them. And moreover, ordain such as should keep & maintain their portions▪ and if those men, whom they had ordained to defend and keep Orphans goods, dealt not well, they were bound themselves to pay for them. They then being oftentimes much troubled, and very hardly dealt withal, refuse their Office, and are unwilling to serve the Commonwealth any longer: and these be the Decurions which may not sell their goods. So that it is manifest, that this cannot be fitly concluded of the Counsellors of Princes, because the Decurions are bound unto it: for the Counsellors of Princes have no jurisdiction, in such manner as the Decurions have, and are not bound to be resident in those Towns and places which they govern. 23 The Counsellors of Princes which stand their Prince 23 Privilegium in great steed, may enjoy the fruits of their livings, though they Boetius decisione, 17. be not resident in them, for than they be absent for the commonwealths sake. This holds not in Counsellors that have nothing but the title and name of Counsellors, and serve not the Prince in giving him counsel. 24 The Governors of the City of Norimberge in Germany, 24 Privilegium. Antonius Gerar. in Repub. Norimb. have this Privilege, that those wills and Testaments in which two of them be witnesses, are of force. For it is supposed that those men which are chosen out of the whole Commonwealth, and elected to be the Rulers of it, are persons of such credit, reputation and authority, that the testimony of two of them is sufficient in all such acts as the Laws ordain to be made in presence of a great many witnesses. Xenocrates Cicero in oratione pro Lucio Cornelio Baldo. et Diogenes Laertius, lib. 4. in vita Xenocratis. Cap, cum esses dist. de testam. the Philosopher, was of such credit and reputation in Athens, that when he was brought before the Judges to witness any thing, they would not let him swear. And this seemeth to be the reason, why Pope Alexander the third, commanded that those wills and Testaments of the Parishioners, in which the Priest that had the cure over their parish was a witness, with two or thee more, should be forcible in law. For it is to be thought, that he who hath a cure over the whole Parish, and unto whose charge all the parishioners commit their consciences, aught to be had in such account, and of such credit and authority, that his testimony should be as forcible in any act, as Lib, 8, cap, 4, comment, juris civilis, the witness of a great many others. In so much, that Franciscus Conanus did greatly err, when he said, that Pope Alexander ordained this, because he thought the Priests by this means should easily obtain part of the parishioners substance, and it seemeth rather to be as I have said, then as the interpretations Didacus de Covas' Rwias in d, cap. Cum esses. 25 Privilegium. Brumellus in tracta, de potestat, legate, conclu. 3. Vbi supra. q, 20 show which the Doctors make, upon that which Pope Alexander ordained concerning this matter. 25 Princes may not do any thing of importance touching the Commonwealth, unless they first consult about it with their Counsellors. For as Martinus Laudensis affirmeth, whatsoever the Prince commandeth, without taking advice of his Counsellors, is not accounted to be just & lawful. This which the Doctors say, holds not in such Princes as acknowledge no superior or higher power above them, but in such only as be not supreme Princes. As in ancient times passed, the Emperors of Rome acknowledged the Senate to be in authority above them, and took counsel in the Senate about all such things as they were to ordain and command: and if they did not rule and govern the Commonwealth as they should do, than they In rubric, de constitut. n. 20. In cap, super eo: n, 37, de heretics, lib, 6. were punished. Neither doth it hold (as Ripa and philippus Probus say) in those Princes which ordain and constitute any thing concerning that which dependeth upon the Positive law. For the Prince himself only, without taking any counsel of his Counsellors, may ordain and command any thing, whatsoever seemeth unto him to be profitable unto the Commonwealth. But if he command any thing, which appertaineth unto the Law of God and nature, he may not do it unless he do first take advice of those that be of his Counsel. But because L, 1, ff, de constitu. princip. ibi populus ei & in eum omne imperium suum contulit. such a Prince as doth not acknowledge any superior, hath all that power which the Senate in old times past was wont to have, whatsoever he commandeth, is of force, and aught to be observed, whether it be pertaining unto the Positive Law, or unto the Law of God and nature: which the Prince may expound. For it is supposed to be commanded by him, seeing that he hath all the power to command, and ordains that the Commonwealth had. This doth not hold, if that which the Prince commandeth be notoriously wicked and unjust. For in such Acts. 5. matters, we ought rather to obey GOD, than men. Further, more, although supreme Princes may enjoin any thing to be done, which they suppose to be most profitable for the Commonwealth, & yet not make their Counsellors acquainted with jacobatius ubi supra. it: nevertheless, to the end they may always be obeyed, and that which they command, continually put in practice by their Counsellors, they ought never to do any thing of importance, except they take advice of their Counsellors about it. And it was an ancient custom in Spain, that the Counsellors of the Prince, should be witnesses in those contracts and wills which the Prince made. 26 The Counsellors of Princes, in those contracts, testaments, 26 Privilegium L. Curialis. cod. de decuri. lib. 10. and wills which they make, aught to have a respect unto that which the Laws ordain, though they be exempted in those cases in which they be especially privileged. According Mar. Lau. vb. sup. q, 9, per leg. fi ha bitatio. §. 1. ff. de usu & habitat. ibi si utilitas habitationis sit relicta. 27 Privilegium L, 1, cod. de officio viccarij. D, L. 1. ibi indicationis nostrae soleat representare reverentiam. Wolfangus Jazius, lib, 1, cap, 12 Decad, 3, lib. 3. to this: if a Prince grant any of his Counsellors the profit of the habitation in any of his houses, the use and fruit or property of the house is not due unto him, but only leave is given him to dwell in it. 27 The Counsellors of the counsel of the estate, are to be preferred before Counsellors of other counsels, when counsel is taken upon matters concerning that counsel: for they have a care over the whole Commonwealth, and do more particularly represent the person of the Prince. But if counsel be taken upon matters touching war, than they that sit in the counsel of war, are to be preferred above the others. For (as Titus Livius saith) one College or Senate is preferred before the other, but not men some before others. And it seemeth that by this which we have said, that Question is decided and discussed, about which * In tractatu de authoritate magni concilij. johannes Montagnus, * In additionibus ad tractatum de authorita. magni concilij. Nicolaus Bocrius, and * In Catalogo gloriae mundi, p. 7. conside. 14 Bartholomeus de Cassameus strive and contend. To wit, that the Counsellors of Princes, aught to be some preferred before others: and in what places they which more especially represent the person of the Prince, aught to be preferred, as members more particular of the Prince. For even as they that come nearest to the fire, warm themselves most, because they feel most heat, so the Counsellors that be most familiar with the Prince, are most esteemed of in all places. Esope the Historiographer, said unto Solon, that those which were to be conversant with Kings, should either talk very little with them, or very familiarly. Solon answered, that it was a great deal more safer for them, not to be in their company at all: and that if so be they were, it was necessary for them to be very prudent and wary. For Princes are like to fire, and they that be nearest unto them, incur most danger. The eight discourse, what punishment they deserve, that do not counsel their Princes sincerely and faithfully without deceit. EVen as they that counsel well and give sincere advice, are Ministers of God, and be rewarded by him, both in this life and in the next: so they Cap. bonae, 12, q. 2, bonae rej. Cap. nequitiae distin, 86. that counsel maliciously and deceitfully, are ministers of the devil, and God doth punish them, both in this life and in the life to come, and if they do give maliciously their Prince naughty and wicked counsel, they cast venom and poison (as Plutarch saith) into the common Fountain, In opusculo, cum princip ● maximè philosophum disputare debere. which runneth through all the City, and every man doth use it: and by how much the more harm the Commonwealth taketh by their double counsel, by so much the more deserve they to be punished. And that they be ministers and servants to the devil, may easily be proved, seeing that the Office johan. 8. Quia mendax est & pater eius. 1. Peter. 5. of the devil, is to deceive, to lie, to cousin, and use a thousand setches and crafts to do men harm: for this is his only intent, and his gins and snares, which he useth to entangle men, are such and so many, that men can very hardly escape Apoc cap. 12. them, and with great difficulty be delivered out of them if they be once snared in his nets. Furthermore, the devil (as the holy 3. Regum. 22. Ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium propheta●um. Scripture saith) is even in their mouths that give counsel with malice and deceit. And not only the devil, but also the world and flesh give those persons ill counsel, that take advice of them. For the world (as the famous Doctor Azpilcoeta saith) In repetitj. cap. inter ver. 11. q. 3 doth counsel those that serve Princes, to please their Lords and Kings, though it redounded to the manifest danger of their souls, and utter ruin of the whole Commonwealth. For so doing, they shall obtain honour, quietness and profit: not to themselves only, but to their friends also: if they do the contrary, they shall displease both their Prince and those Peers also which be favoured of the Prince, because they please him, and follow that counsel which the world giveth them. The glorious Cap, Nemo, peri. q, 3, cap, Nolite q, 3. Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, ne forté propter timorem non dicatis libere quod verum est. Matth, 10, john, 8, Math, 16, 17. S. Austen saith, that it is better to suffer torment for speaking the truth, then to receive rewards for flattery. And S. Chrisostome saith. Fear not them that kill the body, lest for fear of them, thou speak not the truth freely. The very same doth our Saviour Christ teach us, saying. And fear ye not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. Furthermore, against them that follow the counsel of the flesh, our Saviour saith: Ye judge after the flesh, and praising S. Peter, he saith: Blessed art thou Simon the Son of jonas, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Libro, 1, de legibus. Father which is in heaven. Plato affirmeth, that every man carrieth two Counsellors about him, that be contrary one to another, and both of them void of reason: to wit, Pleasure and Grief, for delight and passion give ill counsel. And julius Caesar, in a certain Oration which he made in the Senate, said, Omnes homines. P. C. qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet, that is. It becometh all men that consult upon matters which are uncertain and Cap. magnae de voto quid liceat secundum aequitatem, quid deceat secundum honestatem, quid expediat secundum utilitatem. doubtful, to have their minds free from hatred, friendship, anger, and mercy. Therefore Counsellors of Princes, to counsel well and sincerely, without malice or deceit, they ought to consider (as Innocentius the third Pope said) three things. First, whether that which is in consultation, be lawful according to justice: then whether it be comely according to honesty: and lastly, whether it be expedient, according to profit. And Innocent (as the famous Doctor Azpilcoeta saith) did first put down In cap, inter verba, ●, 64, 11, q, 3, that which is lawful, honest, and comely, and afterwards that which is expedient for the profit of the Commonwealth, to show, that though that which is consulted, be lawful according to the world, yet if it do comprehend any sin in it, mortal or venial, it ought in no case to be put in execution: nor also if it be not approved of wise and grave men, although it were never so profitable: after the example of the Athenians, who because Plutarch in vita Themisto. the counsel which Themistocles gave them, was unjust, would not follow it, when as notwithstanding it was very profitable. 2 If the Counsellors of Princes freely utter that, which they deem to be most profitable for the Commonwealth, they are not to be blamed howsoever the matter falleth out: for the success (as we have said) and events of things, consist not in the Discursu, 1, §. 6, power of man: and (as Ulpian the Lawyer saith) he that counseleth L, Consilij, ff, de regulis juris con silij non fraudulenti nulla est obligatio, cap. nullus de regulis juris. L. tua §. final. without malice or deceit, deserveth no punishment, seeing that he unto whom the counsel is given (as the Emperor justinian affirmeth) may choose whether he will put the counsel in practice or not. They that give counsel without malice or falsehood, (according to the Lawyers) differ from them that use guile and fraud in giving counsel, in this: that they which counsel uprightly and sincerely, are not bound to make satisfaction for the damage or loss which any man doth get by following their counsel, whither he that asketh the counsel, be determined to follow the counsel which they give, or be not: and, whether he unto whom the counsel was given, would not have done according unto it, unless it had been given him: or would have done it, though Cagnolus, in d, l. consilij. no such counsel had been given him: and, whether they give counsel to such as ask advice of them, or to such as ask none: Hyeronimus Francus, in d, l. consilij. and lastly, whether they show any reason, why they think that counsel to be good which they give, or show not any reason at all. Again, they that counsel a man to do any thing, and do only show him a reason why they counsel him to do so, differ from them that command and persuade a man to do a thing, in this: that they which give a man counsel, and make him acquainted with the reasons which move them to give such counsel, which the Lawyer's term Exhortari, do ●ot bind, or Arg, L, add hae● verba, lbi non ●nim qui exhortantur mandatoris opera fungitur, ff. de his qui notantur infami. L, Cum, pater, §, Mando siliae, 14 q. L. 1. §. persuadere, ff, deseruo corrupto. In dialogo de oratore. In Gorgia. Lib, 1, cap, 5, by any necessity force him to whom the counsel is given, to follow their counsel: but they that command, will have that done which they command: and they that persuade, urge the execution of that which they persuade. And therefore Ulpian saith, that it is more to persuade one to commit some offence, then to compel or constrain him to do it: for men's minds are more moved by persuasion, then by compulsion or commandment. And therefore Cornelius Tacitus and Plato say, that the Art which teacheth men to persuade, is the most excellent and noble Art of all Arts: for that which by man's force could not be achieved, hath oftentimes been obtained by eloquence: as I writ more at large in my books of Military discipline. 3 Though they that give counsel without malice or fraud, be not bound to make satisfaction for the damage or harm that cometh by their counsel, yet they that profess any Art, or take any Office upon them, are bound in the Court of conscience, Cagnolus in d, L. consilij, n, 4. to make satisfaction for the loss and harm that the parties take by following the counsel which they give: for they are bound to open the truth unto those that ask advisement of them, in such things as appertain unto their Art: as also Assessors, Advocates, interpreters of Laws, Proctors, Solicitors, Physicians, & all others are, the being ignorant of the Art which In L, quidam existimaverunt, ff. si cert petatur, á. In titulo de requirendis consilijs §. 1. versiculo consilia●ij. L. in peritia, ff, de regulis juris In L, ex malesicijs. §, si index ff. de actiombus & obligationibus L. in te stipulantem, §. 1. ff. de verbo obligat. D. L. imperitia culpae enumeratur, §. Imperitia instituta, de lege Aquilia. they profess, use it to the great hurt and damage of their neighbours, and of those that take their counsel: and (as Socinus saith) Advocates and Counsellors in Law, are bound in the Court of conscience, to make satisfaction for all the loss and damage that ensueth by their counsel, in those causes which they defend. Speculator will have, that Advocates or Patrons that defend the poor, or them that be falsely accused, shall not be bound to make satisfaction of the damage that cometh by their counsel, so they use no covin or deceit therein: albeit that ignorance is counted a fault. For this doth hold, as Bartholus saith, in Judges, whose duty is of necessity, and not in Counsellors, whose duty is voluntary. Against this opinion of Bartholus, do they make, which affirm, that the ignorance or want of skill in the Physician, is counted a fault, and that they which profess that Art whereof they have no skill, are fault-worthy: for they deceive them that ask counsel of them, as of men that be learned and skilful in I., si quis domum §. Celsus ff. locatim culpam. etc. In L. quod nerua ff, deposi. in intellectibus. their profession: and this opinion follow Zasius, Alciatus, Alexander de Imola, johannes Montalonius, and Baldovinus. 4 The Emperor * L, rem non novam, §, patroni. justinian ordained, that every Advocate should swear, he will not defend any unjust cause, which can not be defended, but with false allegatiens, and with a bad conscience: and which no Advocate will defend: for it were not good, that they should be more esteemed of, which defend unjust causes, than they which will not defend them. This (if I johan. Eckius in tractatu de materia juramenti ad finem. Probus in cap, ut commissi. n 2. de haereticis, li. 6. per le. 3, §. magis ff, de testibus. L. debetur. be not deceived) doth hold in those causes, which are manifestly known to be unjust: for in those causes which depend upon proofs and witnesses, (which only conclude to the Judge) and in those causes which depend upon expositions of Texts, upon opinions of Doctors, and upon the will and arbitrement of the Judges: (which is as free, that though the causes be just, yet it is very uncertain what sentence the Judges will give,) Patrons and Advocates are not forbidden to defend such causes, (seeing they be not manifestly known to be unjust) but yet they be bound to open the truth unto their Client's, and procure that the strifes and suits in Law, be not immortal, & everlasting, using malicious and crafty fetches to deceive the Cliants or parties pleading. That which we have said of Patrons & Advocates, L. ●i calu●niatur ff, de verborum significatione. Ouid●us. Non est in med●o semper relevetur ut ●ger, interdum docta plus valet arte malum. doth also hold in Physicians, for they are not in fault, if they minister to the sick according to the rules of physic: for it is not in the power of the Physician to give life unto them that be sick: albeit that they are faulty, if they be ignorant in their profession, and understand not the Art which they profess. For this holdeth in those Physicians that be ignorant of those things, which they commonly aught to know, which profess the Art of curing: and this is the ignorance that is counted a L, labeo, ff, de verbor, significatione. fault, for they use deceit and craft in professing that wherein they have no skill. And if the Patient die, through the ignorance of the Physician that undertook his cure, he is bound to make satisfaction for the cost and charges of the Patient. And Mainerius in L. imperitia. ff. de regulis juris. Albericus in d. §. sicut●. as concerning corporal punishment, it lieth in the Judge his pleasure, either to appoint him a moderate and extraordinary punishment, or to punish him according to the offence committed. That which we have said of Patrons and Advocates holdeth, whether they take money for their counsel or no: albeit this holdeth not in those that say without consultation, what in such a matter ought to be done. For those that answer questions Angelus in d. §. praeterea si medicus per leg, idem juris ff, ad legem Aquilian, quem sequitur Mainetius in d, L. Imperitia. demanded of them, are not bound without rewards to resolve doubts which they ask of them in the Art which they profess. And many loath to spend money, propose their doubts to some learned men: who, though they answer conformable to the rules of the Law, which they remember at the time that their counsel is asked: and albeit they answer according to their conscience, yet be they not bound to call to remembrance all which both divine and human law disposeth and entreateth, in matters that may fall out: for this (as the Emperor justinian saith) is a thing more divine than human: and the fault lieth in the L. 2. §. si quid. Clients, who because they should not pay fee unto the learned, are contented with the answer which their Counsel give, without study upon the case. For such answers and counsels, are by the Lawyers termed, Consilia et responsa volatilia; such as are lightly passed, and are not considered and examined, but lightly given, and are like feathers carried away with the wind, having nothing in them like to counsel, but the name only: for it is given without meditation or study, only to satisfy their importunity that ask. Furthermore, if he that giveth a man counsel, persuade the party to follow his advice, because of the profit which he himself may get thereby, and not for that he unto whom he giveth advice, should be the better by it: then is he bound to make satisfaction for the loss which the party taketh by following his counsel. As for example. One knowing Hieronimus Francus, in d, ●, Consilij. that a certain Merchant which owed him a sum of money, was altogether behind hand, and ready (as they say) to make a bankrupt; to recover his money, affirmed to another Merchant (to whom the bankrupt made suit to lend him some money,) and assured him, that the bankrupt who would borrow money of him, was a wealthy man, well moneyed, and sufficient to be trusted with any sums of money that were lent him. This man is bound to pay for him, whose sufficiency he assured to the Merchant that lent the money; for unless he had warranted the bankrupts ability, the Merchant had not trusted him with his goods. Again. One burst not take a Servant, because he doubted of his truth; another told, him that he might trust him with all that ever he committed to his charge Franciscus Conanus, lib. 7. ca 14. Commenta. juris Civilis, & Hieroni Francus in d, l. consilij. or custody. This man is bound to answer for all what soever the servant stole: because his Master would not have taken him into his service, unless he had assured him of his truth. 5 The providence of God, (in whose power the counsels of men be) doth often permit, that those counsels which are given fraudulently and maliciously, become hurtful unto those that give them: according to that of Solomon. Who so diggeth Ecclus. 27. 26, a pit, shall fall therein, and he that layeth a stone in his neighbour's way, shall stumble thereon: and he that layeth a snare for another, shall be taken in it himself. And for this cause saith Hesiodus the Greek Poet, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That man himself doth harm, who seeks another to entrap, Ill counsels to themselves, which men to others give, worst hap. Erasmus in ●●agio consilij. Fran. Conanus ubi sup. l, 7, ca 14 As it happened to the Wolf, that when he counseled the Lion to kill the Fox, he himself was killed by the Lion: and many others are so served, and hurt with their own counsels, as I writ more at large in my books De consilijs astutis et prudentibus. Besides, the divine majesty of God, doth not only permit, that counsels given through malice and deceit, turn to the Counsellors hurt, but they be also bound in the Court of Angelus de Clavaso in summa in verbo consilium D, l, Consilij, si dolus & fraus intercesserit, de dolo actio competit. conscience, to make satisfaction for all the damage men receive by following their counsels: notwithstanding that the success of that which is consulted be not in the power of men: and human laws also punish and chastise all such as counsel with malice and deceit. Euripides saith. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Then counsel ill there is nothing On earth, that danger more doth bring. 6 The Counsellors of Princes, are bound to conceal that which is consulted with them: for all that which is said to one in secret, and committed unto him as a thing to be concealed, ought both by the laws of God and man, to be kept secret by him. Therefore, if Counsellors of Princes discover those counsels which by the Prince are committed to their secrecy, they be perjured: for they do contrary to their oath, which is, to In titulo de forma fidelj. keep secret all what soever their Princes communicate unto them. Yet notwithstanding, this oath doth not bind them to conceal any thing that is contrary to the commandment Archidiac●in cap. de forma 22. q § Filin. in cap. 2. de n●a. et obedi. of God: or notoriously hurtful to the Commonwealth: for it is a more grievous thing to perform such oaths as be unlawful, then to break them. Therefore they that swear, are not bound to conceal any thing which is said unto them if it be unlawful, and hurtful to the Common wealth. As for example. If any man tell his servant, that he will kill some body, the servant ought to dissuade him from so doing: and if he cannot alter his mind, or remedy his purpose any other way, he ought to discover it: but so, that the discovering of the enterprise, be profitable to the one, and not hurtful to the other; & he ought Martin, ab A●pilcoeta, ubi supra, num. 805. not to let his masters purpose be further known, then may suffice to remedy it. Nay, nor to open his intent at all, if his Master be like to take more hurt and loss by the discovering of it, then the other party, if the enterprise were not made known at all. Furthermore, those Counsellors of Princes, that discover their Prince his counsel, be not only forsworn, but they divus Thomas in 4, destinct, 1, q. 2, art. 3. be also falsifiers, and they deserve punishment according to the offence which they commit, and the hurt which the Prince and the Commonwealth take, by the discovering of that counsel Gigas lib, 1, q. 21 n, 8, de crimi ●e laesae mayest. Boecius ubi supra. L. aliud in princ. ff, de paenis ibi. Bart. et Boecius ubi supra, 155. Gigas ubi sup. n, 10, per leg, 1, §, 15 qui deposita ff, ad leg. Cornel. de fa sis. which they disclosed. Again. If the Counsellors discover their Prince his secrets not to hurt the Prince, but to harm some other person: and if the Prince do take any loss by the disclosing of his secrets, the Counsellors lose their fees which they receive of the Prince; for they do not perform that which they swore, to wit, that they would help and aid the Prince both in word and deed. They aid and assist the Prince in words, in giving of him faithful and sincere counsel, without malice or deceit: and they assist him, in deed, by executing that which he commandeth. Moreover, if they that discover their Prince his secrets, be neither Counsellors nor Secretaries unto the Prince, they ought to be put to death, if any hurt befall unto the Prince by the discovery of his secrets: but if they discover it, not intending to hurt the Prince, but commending him for some thing, Hippolytus de Marsiliis consil, 1. wherewith they do him harm: then they ought to be extraordinarily and moderately punished: for they intended not to L. cuius dolo ff, ad l, juli, mayest, & leg, si quis aliquid, §. transfugae. ff, de paenis, ibi, transfugae ad hostes vel nostrorum consiliorum renunciatore, aut vivi exurantur aut furca suspendantur. hurt the Prince, and that offence which is committed without malice or deceit, ought not to be punished. But if they wittingly discover any of the Prince his secrets, the disclosing of which, may do the enemy good, they ought either to be burned quick, or to be hanged. 7 The ancient Poets, because men should know how necessary it is for Princes, to have such Counsellors, as conceal those secrets which are committed unto them, feigned that Tantalus was in hell, and had both water and pleasant fruits by him, but though he greatly desired to drink of the water, and taste of the Apples, yet he could not: for when he stooped to Lotinus consideratione. 460. drink, or reached to the fruit, both the water and the tree did move from him; and this torment was appointed him, because he did disclose that which the Gods had in their counsel determined. They feigned also, that Sisyphus was tormented in hell, Bocacius de genialogia Deorum. lib, 13. cap. 56. Erasmus in ada. Saxum volvere. for discovering the counsel of the Gods: and that this punishment was allotted him, that he should turn a stone up to the top of an huge and mighty Hill, on his shoulders, but when it was at the top, it should fall down again and renew his labour. These punishments were fit rewards for their offences: for as the counsels of the Gods took no effect, because they were disclosed by Tantalus and Sisyphus, so it was very well appointed, that Tantalus should never eat nor drink when he greedily desired: and that Sisyphus should continually labour carrying the stone on his shoulders, without bringing that to pass which he so earnestly endeavoured. The Kings of Persia, Quintus Curtius, lib. 4, lingua apud Persas gra●●●s castigatur, qu●●● ullum problem. did punish them with pain of death, that disclosed any thing, which in their counsel was concluded. For they thought that he, which would not bridle so small a member as the tongue, could much less refrain the other greater members. And in deed, greater secrecy ought to be used in the counsels of Princes, then in any other thing, and great care ought to be taken, that no man understand what is consulted, or know what is at the Counsel-table determined. King Lysimachus demanded of the Poet Philipides, of Plutarch in tractatu de curiositate, which of his matters he should make him partaker: he answered, that of which he pleased, upon condition it were not of his secrets: because of the danger which they incur, that discover the secrets of Princes. john the second of that name, King of Portugal, was very Chronica regis johannis. wary in concealing such things as were told him: whereby he delivered himself out of many great dangers, which because they be known unto all men, I will not make mention of them. 8 The Doctors ask what punishment they deserve, which counsel one to commit some offence: and some affirm, In d, l. consilij & in cap, 1. de officio de legate. Filin, & Mant. in d, cap, 1. that if the offence be grievous and outrageous, as Treason against GOD or their Prince, than they that give the counsel, and they that commit the offence, are to be punished with the like punishment. This holds not, when he that giveth counsel to have any offence committed, doth nothing else but counsel, and show the reasons which move him thereunto: for than he that giveth the counsel, and he that committeth the offence, are not to be punished a like: for he that juxta cap, Solitae In versiculo. Non causam sed occasionem de maioritate & obedientia. L. 5. §. Persuadereff, deserui. Persuadere plus est quam compelli & cogi. D. §. Pesuadere, N● enim op●rtet laudamdo augeri malitiam. Lotiotus et Hieron. Francus in d, l, consilij. Maine. in d l consilij, 〈…〉 in summa in verbo consilij, Emanuel Xuarez in thesauro communium opiniorum in thesauro communium opinionum in verbo. consi. Et julius Clarus in commun. opin. In verb. consil. Et promptuarium juris in verb. consil ●t Glos, in cap, Nullus, de regulis juris. n 6. Laurentius▪ Sil●●nus. in tractatu de recognitione feudi, ca 109 Loriotus in d, l. consilij. Et Decius in d, ca, 1, n, 9 de officio legate▪ Erancisc, Conanus, li, 7, cap, 14. Commentariorum juris Civilis. Maineri. in d, l. consilij. n, 7. giveth the counsel, is not the cause of the offence, though he gave counsel to commit it: but he that persuadeth to offend, deserveth the like punishment as is due to the offender. For it is a greater matter (as Ulpian the Lawyer saith) to persuade one to commit some offence, then to force or compel him to do it. For it is not tolerable, (as the same Ulpian affirmeth) that an ill deed should be either praised or approved. Others distinguish, that each offence either is of such quality, that it is not punished, unless it be committed, or it is pnnished after the same manner, as if it had been committed, though he that doth intend to offend, do not commit the offence: and in such kind of faults, that holds not, which we have before said, of him that doth only give the counsel. For in such causes, the attempt is punished as much, as if it had been committed. Others distinguish, that either those counsels which be given with malice & deceit, are about contracts, and near contracts, or about offences. Others distinguish of them that give counsel unto those, which unless they had been counseled, would not have committed it: and of them that give counsel unto those, that would have committed it though they had not been counseled. Others distinguish, of those counsels that be given, to do him good unto whom they be given, or to profit others. Others distinguish, of those that give counsel before the offence is committed, and those that give counsel after it is committed: counseling and exhorting the offender, to persevere and go forward in the execution of the offence. According to that which we in Spain do commonly use to say. Las baraias, O no començarlas, O acabarlas. that is, Broils either not at all begin, Or through to go with them not linne. Others distinguish between those that counsel maliciously, for love of the profit and gain which they hope to get by their fraudulent counsel, and those which never look for any profit or commodity by they counsel which the give. Others distinguish those offences that are committed concerning substance, and those that are committed concerning persons. But leaving aside the distinctions of Doctors, and their ampliations, faliacies, and additions, which Decius Filinus, Cagnolus, Hieronimus Francus, Loriotus, and other Interpreters of the Law assign, conformable to the distinctions which they set down: all which I have largely written in my Book, entitled Rapsodia etc. two rules only (which Ulpian giveth) suffice. In verbo consiliorum. The first is, that he which counseleth without malice, deserveth no punishment. For it is supposed, that he who so giveth D▪ l, consil. consilij non fraudulenti nulla est obligatio. counsel, is a good man: and by reason of this supposition, he that chargeth him that he counseled fraudulently, is to prove it: and to reduce his intent ad actum. * L. merito, ff, pro socio cap, final. de praesumptionibus. Et Alciatus in tractatu de praesump. regula 3, jason in rubric. cod. qui admit. Et Filin. in cap▪ In presentia de probat. Which act, to be an offence or crime, requireth that it should have been done with malice, & according to the rule of Law, he that intendeth to charge a man with any quality or circumstance, is to prove Bart. in l. Non solum sed ut probari, ●●, non aper. nunce. jason ubi supra. Bernardus Diaz. in tractatu doctrinatum doctrina, 208. Incipient. probati. quando. Cap, 1, de praesumptiombus. Matth, 4, Vox diabolj, quae semper homines cadere deoisum desiderat, sic Christum his verbis. Mittete inquit deorsum. Persuadere potest at precipitate non potest. In l. quemadmodum cod, de Agricolis, et censit. l. 11. L. Quisquis & ibi Bart. ff. de furtis. Lauren. Sylu. ubi supra. L. qua actione §. Celsus ff, ad l. Aquiliam, L, qui occidit, §. Penult. ff, ad L. Corneliam de sicarijs. it. And this which we have said, holds, when counsel is given concerning acts that are indifferent or good. But if counsel be given to commit any offence, or to execute any unlawful act, or to put any thing in practice which is contrary to the Laws of GOD or man: then is he supposed and thought to be faulty, that in such a case giveth counsel. For it is the voice of the devil (as Saint Jerome writeth) which doth persuade men to do such things, as be clean contrary to the divine and human Laws, and which offend God. Unto this rule, Lucas de Pena reduceth two hundredth and twenty three cases. The other rule which Ulpian giveth, is; That if he unto whom counsel is given to commit any offence, may not be punished, by reason of some privilege, by which he is exempted: then he which giveth the counsel, aught to be punished in such sort, as he that putteth a weapon into the hand of a mad man to kill some body with it. The ninth discourse, whether it be better for the Commonwealth, that the Counsellors of the Prince should be learned, or unlearned. THey that affirm, that it is more profitable for the Commonwealth, that the Counsellors of the Prince, should be learned then unlearned, allege that which Agesilaus King of the Lacedæmonians said: that it did not become the Lotinus consideratione, 74 estate and royal dignity of a Prince, to have unlearned men to his Counsellors: for though rude and ignorant men are subtle and watchful, and look to the public commodity: yet much greater is the harm which the Prince taketh, for want of learned men's company, than the profit which cometh by the craftiness and subtlety of the unlearned: for no man maketh account of that profit, which is not accompanied with honesty and virtue. For, this is it, for which all Princes be esteemed, honoured, and reverenced. Elius Lampridius saith, that the Emperor Alexander Severus, In vita Alexan. Severi. had many excellent Lawyers in his Counsel, with whom he consulted upon all matters concerning the Commonwealth. And because he ruled himself, by the counsel of wise and learned men, which did not only regard the emperors service, but also the public commodity of the whole Empire: he commanded nothing, but that which was most just and lawful. Hernando the third of that name, King of Castille, imitating Garivai, lib, ●●. cap. 4, de compendio Histori. the example of the Emperor Alexander, did choose twelve men singularly well learned, to govern his Country. These men began in their time, to establish the Laws, called Lasleyes' de siete partidas; which were so termed, because they were divided into seven parts: and afterward they were abolished in the time of King Alonso. The private Laws of L, 5, Tit, 9, partit. 2. Spain say, that Kings ought to make choice of such Counselsels, as were friends, learned, etc. 2 They that affirm it to be better, that the Counsellors of a Prince should be unlearned, subtle, crafty, witty, and watchful then learned: say, that subtlety and watchfulness, are very necessary for them that govern Commonweals: for all they that deal with Princes, go about to deceive and cousin them. The Emperor Dioclesian, said, that Princes could very hardly hit the mark in that which they do, and Flavius Vopiscus in vita Aurelij. imperatoris. command; because all they that be conversant with them, do their best to deceive them, who being always occupied, know no more of matters than they are informed, by them with whom they speak. Apelles, in the portraiture of Princes, Lucianus de Calumnia. which he presented to King Prolomie, painted a Prince sitting in a Chair of estate, with great hands and large ears, and by him were two Damosels, the one called Ignorance, the other Suspicion: and Calumnia accempanied with her Sister Lady Flattery. As I have written more at large, in my Treatise of the institution of a Christian Prince. 3 Seeing that Princes must necessarililie use the conversation of many men, and very divers persons, it is no less necessary for them, to reap profit by the subtlety and craftiness of the unlearned; then by the skill and learning of those that be highly learned. For as they say, half the year men live by art and deceit, and the other part of the year▪ by deceit & art. The learned strive for matters concerning conscience and justice: and the crafty unlearned, to recover Rents, and to dispatch such business as pertain to the substance of the Commonwealth: neither (as Plato saith) do subtle unskilful men suffice Dialogo, 7▪ de repub. to govern the Commonwealth well, nor they that spend their life time in study. And experience teacheth, that Princes further their estate no less with the subtlety of the unlearned, then with the learning of Scholars: for they that apply themselves to learning, are but little skilled in action and practice, and know not how to contrive the affairs of the Commonwealth. And (as Quintilian and Pliny say) more profiteth practise Lib. 12 cap. 6. without science, than science without practice. Learned men be very doubtful, and perplexed in giving their resolutions of those matters upon which they consult: for they find many difficulties and ambiguities, and many inconveniences, which make them to stand in great perplexity, full of imaginations, and respects which do not profit at all. Homer going about to describe a wise, prudent, expert, and an absolute Prince, (such an one as he feigned Ulysses to be) saith not that he delivered himself out of so many troubles and dangers, in which he oft found himself: because he was learned, or brought up in good literature at schools, or because he had spent much time in haunting those Universities that flourished in his time: but for that he was very witty, watchful and subtle, & could quickly and readily perceive and foresee how things would fall out. 4 The Governors of the City of Norimberge, admit no Antoni. Gerard. in gubernation ci●●tatis Norimberg. learned men to enter in the counsel, to consult upon matters concerning the Commonwealth: but they have some excellent men, that be very well learned, and great Scholars, of whom they take advise, upon such matters as are moved in the counsel. And the Vrsins in Italy, do not permit that any learned men should govern the Commonwealth. This statute (as Papa Pius in descriptione As●… minoris, cap▪ ●● Pope Pius saith) is like to that statute in the City Ephesus, which did not consent, that any virtuous man brought up in learning should live there, and for this cause they banished Hermodorus Strabo. libro. 14. the Philosopher, who being sent into exile, left Ephesus and came to Rome, and caused the Romans to establish the Laws of the twelve Tables. And Pope Pius saith, that those L, 2, §. Exactis. ff. de Origine juris. Princes that expel learned men from their counsels, resemble the Governors of Ephesus. To be short, no man can deny, but that Princes have great necessity to use the service of learned men and Scholars, to help and assist them in the government of the people which is committed to their charge, as jethro counseled Moses to do: for by reason of the great and manifold Exodus. 18. business which they have, they are not able to minister justice themselves unto their Subjects, without the help and service of wise and learned men, that understand and know what is profitable and necessary for the Commonwealth, conformable to the Laws & ordinances by which it is governed. And that the Counsellors of Princes may perform their duty accordingly, it is convenient they should give themselves to the reading of many Histories and Chronicles, that when they consult, they may turn that to their profit, which hath in like matters succeeded and fallen out at divers times, and in sundry places. For they that have seen little, and know no more than they Cicero in Oratore ad Brutum. Cap. 8. have seen, are but children in respect of them that have read much, and (as job saith) they that have only experience of themselves, & are not confirmed by the example of others that went before them, are but of yesterday. Plato reporteth, that a certain In Timaeo. Egyptian Philosopher said unto Solon, that the Philosophers of Greece, were as children in comparison to them of Egypt, because the Egyptian Philosophers were very ancient, and had long time before, given themselves to the contemplation & consideration of divine and natural things. The difference between them that have seen, and also read and heard many things, and those that know no more than they have seen (which for the most part is but little) is this: that they which have seen, read, and heard many things, may freely speak in all places, concerning all matters. And for this cause it is commonly said, that three sorts of men may discourse freely; Old men at home: young men abroad: and men of great reading every where. 5 My intent is not to prove, that it is not necessary for Princes to have learned men to give them counsel, seeing that they have such great need of men, that can examine and weigh, whether that which is consulted be conformable to justice and reason, but that which I say, tendeth to this end, that men may well enough be learned, without haunting many Universities, or continuing long in Schools to take degrees, & become Masters, Licentiats, Bachelors and Doctors: for there have been many men in the world, that have been excellent fine Scholars, and wonderful well learned, that were not either Bachelors, Licentiats, Masters, or Doctors, created in the Universities of their time: for the degrees which now a days are given in Universities, unto them that study in them, took beginning but seven hundred years ago: and in deed, many labour more to be Doctors and Graduates, then learned: as I writ more at large in my treatise of Schools and Readers. Therefore men may very well become learned, and be good Scholars, without being Bachelors, Masters, Licentiates, or Doctors▪ if in steed of spending the time in such exercises and passetemps, as be but little profitable to the Commonwealth, they did read Histories and Treatises concerning Princes and Commonweals: but especially such Books and discourses that treat of things touching the Princes of their own Country, and those Princes whom they serve: seeing they ought to counsel them according to that which they find and read in such discourses, Histories, and Chronicles: for neither Acurtius nor Bernard teach them any such thing. Men may also be learned, (as Euripides and Plato say) by being conversant with men of In fine Dialogi. 8. de Republica. understanding and literature: for thereby of rude and unlearned men, they become skilful and prudent, and by this means they come to be acquainted with the Laws, by which the Commonwealth is ruled, & to give counsel according as the Laws ordain and command, in so much, that though men be subtle crafty, and watchful, yet be they no whit the better for that to rule Countries: for government doth not proceed from wiliness and subtlety, but from virtue and justice. 6 Isocrates counseleth Princes to inquire, whether the In parenesi. Counsellors of whom they take advice, were good Husbands, and had the wit and wisdom how to use their thrift, and how to bestow their own substance: for he that cannot rule and govern matters pertaining to his own substance, will never be able well to rule other men's things. There was once a certain Gentleman, which being very unthrifty, yet thinking his deserts great, requested the Emperor Charles the fift, to pleasure him with an Office in his Treasury, that he might have the oversight & government of such matters as did belong unto the rents, revenues and substance of his Majesty. The Emperor answered, that he knew he well deserved to have him do him a pleasure, but yet nevertheless, if he should grant him that request, he should give all the world occasion to talk: for seeing he knew not how to use his own substance, he should much less know how to rule & govern the store of the whole Commonwealth. But to return to the purpose: that the Counsellors of Princes may according to their duty, serve their Princes well and faithfully: it is convenient, that as well those▪ that be learned and lettered, as they that be crafty & subtle, should have a good, a pure, a sound, and a sincere conscience, and that they should be (as our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ teacheth) Math, 10. wise as Serpents, and innocent as doves: for it is not profitable for the Commonwealth, that Princes should have such men to their Counsellors, as be subtle & malicious. And if this be manifest, that all Common weals be conserved by Religion and true worshipping of God, no doubt but they will be better conserved (as Laurentius Grimaldus saith) if Princes admit Lib. 1. de optimo senatore. learned and virtuous Prelates to their counsels, unto whom our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ committed the charge of Christian souls, the administration of his holy Sacraments, and the delivering and preaching of his word, that they might with their zealous prayers, and supplications, continually request and beseech the Lord, to augment and conserve the Commonweal public. And if the Romans, Grecians, Egyptians, and all other Nations, which served the devil and worshipped Idols, did admit their Priests unto their counsels, and government of their▪ Commonweals: by what great reason then, ought Christian Princes in the government of the Commonwealth, to take counsel and advise of the Priests of God, and the Ministers Sansovinus de dict●s & ●actis, Caroli. v. of his holy word. The Emperor Charles the fift said, that learned and virtuous Prelates seemed very well in the counsels of Princes, because they did represent the Ecclesiastical estate, which was the foundation of all Commonweals: and because that (the Prelates being in the counsels of Princes) all matters which in them were handled, might be dispatched to the service and glory of God. The tenth discourse, whether it be more profitable to the Commonwealth, to have a good Prince, and ill Counsellors, or an ill Prince, and good Counsellors. ELius Lampridius affirmeth, that it is better for the Commonwealth, that the Prince should be nought, & the Counsellors good, than the Prince good, and the Counsellors nought. For a great deal sooner is one changed by the example and counsel of a great many, than a great many by the example and counsel of one. And for this cause the Counsellors of Princes ought to be virtuous, of good behaviour, honest in life, and estranged from all covetousness, and human pretences: loving the Commonwealth and their King, whose authority and estimation they ought to make account of, above all other worldly things. This which Elius Lampridius saith, holds in those Princes, that follow that, which their Counsellors advise them to do: and not in those, who will have that their Counsellors shall approve and allow all whatsoever they say, o● like, though the same be manifestly hurtful, and prejudicial to the Commonwealth. These (as King Antiochus said) are so nice, wanton, arrogant, and proud, that they will never hear any true tale, nor take any counsel: but will have, that all men shall like with their actions, and allow all their sayings● and by gestures, demeanours, and moving of their bodies, their subtlety of wit, and greatness of judgement, were marvelous, & that every one should say, Et cum spiritu tuo. Demetrius Phalerius to shun this inconueniente, counseleth Erasmus in Apothegmatis. Ptolemey the King of Egypt, that he should read Books which treated of Kings and Commonweals. For in reading of such books, he should find many things, which his Counsellors and familiars durst not tell him. Isocrates exhorteth and De regno. counseleth Kings to choose virtuous and faithful Counsellors, and that they should many times request them, not to favour or praise that which they said, but to tell them the truth, and freely show them what they ought to do, concerning that about which they consult. And by this means, every Prince should have Counsellors, that would have a regard of his estate, and public profit of the Commonwealth. john the second, King of Portugal, would not bestow a certain dignity, unto some Garcia de resende in Chronica regis johan. that requested it of him, saying: that he would give it unto one of his Subjects, that never spoke any thing unto him in all his life which pleased his humour, but that which he knew to be profitable, both unto him, and to the Commonwealth. Don Garivai lib, 14 cap. 15. de compendio Historia. Alonso the twelfth of that name, King of Castille, entering into the house of counsel, sat in his Chair of estate, holding in his right hand the sword wherewith he was dubbed Knight, and in his left hand the royal crown: and being thus set, he requested those of his Counsel, that they should freely tell him what they thought, and in such order counsel him, that the majesty and honour of his crown, might ever remain inviolable: and the power of his sword, might daily rather increase then diminish. 2 Don Francisco de Almeida, Viceroy of the Eastern Indies, johan. de Bayros decad, 2, lib. 3. cap. 5. (being informed that some of his Captains which he admitted to his counsel, had given forth speeches, how that they did not freely open their minds unto him, because they feared, lest if they should have uttered any thing contrary to his humour, he would have been offended with them) took occasion to talk with those of his Counsel, & among many other things which he mentioned unto them, told them that one of the greatest sins which men might commit against God, and their Prince, was▪ not to make him acquainted with their opinions, and not freely to show him what they think concerning that, about which they consult. For so, they offend the Lord, in that they deny the judgement and understanding, wherewith it pleased his divine majesty, to endue & enrich them: and against their Prince undoubtedly they commit a kind of treason. And because men err more often through malice then ignorance: those clean, unspotted, and free counsels, which God inspireth, are better, safer, and surer, than those that are given unto hope of gain, or some other ungodly pretence, and respect of fear, love, or anger. For men commonly, by reason of some perturbation, or indignation and wrath, wherewith they be moved against others, know not what they do, and like men distracted and ravished of all their senses, do all things over-thwartlie, and otherwise then they ought. Isocrates counseleth those that will In 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. take advise about some thing, to break the matter unto those of whom they take counsel, as if it were concerning some other body, and not pertaining unto them themselves. For so by this means, they shall understand, what is best and safest for them to do, and that secret which they would not have to be discovered, shall be concealed. This which Isocrates counseleth aught to be done by those that are noted & reprehended in some thing, if the quality of the matter so permit: proposing it unto them that find fault with them, as if they asked counsel of them about johan, de Bayros decad. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7. it. This counsel was used by Don Francisco de Almeida, knowing that his Gentlemen▪ found fault with him, because he would not assault the City of Aden, after that he had overcome the Armies of Camori, of calicut, and Melique ayas. 3 Of this which we have briefly noted, followeth necessarily, that it is far better and more profitable for the Commonwealth, that the Prince should be good, and the Counsellors nought, then that the Counsellors should be good, and the Prince wicked. For all men endeavour to imitate the Prince. Plato with great judgement and prudence (as Tully saith) writeth, Dialog, 4. de legibus. Lib. 1. Epist. fam. that as the Princes be, so the Subjects prove. If the Prince be virtuous, every man doth his best to become virtuous, and if the Prince be vicious, they be all vicious. If the Prince be an hypocrite and superstitious, they ●e all hypocrites, and superstitious. Cap, finali. de consilio & consiliarijs principum. Fredericus Furius saith, that when the Prince is given to Poetry, all his Courtiers fall to versifying: and when the Prince taketh pleasure in Music, they be all busy with descanting, and tuning their Instruments: when he is a warrior, they all exercise themselves in feats of Chivalry: when he is delighted with jests, than every one playeth the Jester. And when he is a friend unto Astronomers, and those that study the speculations of Astrology, than every one disputeth of Spheres. If, because the Music altereth (as Plato saith) the Dialogo, 4. de Republica. customs of the City be changed: much more easily will they be changed by imitating the Princes, who hurt all them that follow their example, with which they d●● a great deal more harm, than they do with the sin which they commit, for no man dareth to tell them the truth. For which thing, we are much beholding to Dame Flattery, who prevaileth so greatly with Princes, that the same which out of all question is good, is misliked, and the same which is notoriously known to be nought and wicked, is allowed and approved. Princes are now of long time accustomed to hear false tales, and to be flattered, and to have all, whatsoever they say and do, allowed and praised: that the greatest Monster which can be showed to a Prince, is to tell him some true thing which offendeth him, as if he had never seen or heard any such thing. And this is the cause wherefore Monsters offend, for if they had been seen, they had never offended. 4 Princes then, seeing how necessary it is, that they should have virtuous and learned men in their service, which might counsel and show them, how they ought to rule and govern the people which is committed to their charge: ought to consider, that both the credit and discredit of their own person, and of all their Subjects also, dependeth upon the election of their Counsellors. We see commonly that men judge of the Prince & his ability, according to the reputation of his Counsel. For if his Counsellors be wise, and in all points sufficient men, then is he always accounted wise. For it is no small argument of wisdom in a Prince, to be able to know and discern wise and sufficient men from others, and to choose them that are faithful & loyal, to be his Counsellors, leaving those that be unskilful and rude. But when the Counsellors are not learned, prudent, and rare men, it is impossible that the Prince have a good reputation. For he erreth in the principal point, if he choose insufficient and bad men to be his Counsellors. And it is in a manner necessary, that he who erreth in a matter of most great importance, must also err in all other things whatsoever. For if the Fountain be infected, all the water must necessarily be also infected: even so, if the counsel be corrupted, all the government of the Commonwealth goeth to wrack. If a Prince have good Counsellors, though he do amiss, yet will no man believe it: but if his Counsel be not good, though we see the Prince do well, yet can we not believe it, or we think that it was done by chance. By this may we perceive, that a Prince who hath trusty and loyal Counsellors, doth thereby not only obtain good success in his enterprises, but also great credit and reputation, both among his own Subjects, and also among strangers. His own subjects love and obey him, strangers fear him, and all men jointly with one voice singularly commend him. 5 Every Prince ought to think, that a learned Counsel is more necessary for him, than the bread which he eateth: to the end he may hear the truth. For Princes cannot abide to hear the simple and naked truth, by reason of the multitude of flatterers, which compass & environ them on every side. Neither is it good that every man should be so bold as to tell the Prince the truth: for so they might incur danger, to lose their kingdoms and authority, and be had in no account. The royal Prophet David, to show that all men honoured Psalm. 17. and reverenced him, said, that they all lied unto him. For they that are of power and authority, no man dareth to tell them the truth: but to poor men that are of small power, every one speaketh freely and boldly. If a Prince have many Provinces under his government, he ought (as we have said) to choose Counsellors out of every one of the places that are under his subjection, and not out of one or two only: for the people taketh it very impatiently, to see that they be, as it were excluded, and cast off from the administration and government of the Commonwealth, seeing not one of their Countrymen to be of the Counsel: and they think (and that with great reason) that the Prince maketh but small account of them: or that he taketh them to be slaves & bondmen, or that he thinketh them not worthy to be trusted. The first engendereth hatred. The second seeketh liberty, and therefore they conspire against the Prince, and confederate with strange Kings. The third emboldeneth them to admit any kind of treason against their natural Prince. When a Prince chooseth a Counsellor, he ought not to be contented with those only that dwell in his Palace or Court, nor of those that are his own Countrymen, nor of those which he knoweth by sight or by hearsay, although they be never so wise and prudent: but he ought to be well informed of all such as live in any of those Provinces which he ruleth, and among them all, to make election of him that is well known, and sufficiently proved to be the best of them all. Neither ought a Prince to make too much haste in choosing of his Counsellors, but to take leisure and time enough, in considering and learning the sufficiency of all such as shall be named unto him. Willingly hearing, and attentively weighing all informations given unto him: some favouring those that are named, some making against them. To conclude, he ought not to elect or choose any one Counsellor, before he have throughlie examined his ability and sufficiency: making choice of singular Lawyers to govern the Cuj at observat. lib, 7. cap. 12. Commonwealth, as the Emperors of Rome were accustomed to do. The eleventh discourse, of the Counsel house, and of that which the Counsellors ought to do, before they begin to consult. WHen the Romans served and worshipped Idols, and Images of Heathen Gods, they built the Temple which they consecrated to the God of counsel: in such order, that they which went to worship him, should go down a certain pair of stairs, to desire him that it would please him to vouchsafe and set them in their way, and guide them in that they would do. And this was done after this manner, to let men know, how necessary it is for him that asketh counsel, to submit himself unto the judgement and opinion of those, of whom he demandeth counsel. The Church was not very clear, to show that counsel ought to be kept very secret: and that no man ought to know what is handled or treated of in it. For oftentimes men conjecture what is determined in the Counsel, if they know about what the Counsellors consulted. So that men commonly use to say: tell me what Counsellors there were, and upon what matters they sat, and I will tell thee what was concluded. 2 Lycurgus would not have, that the houses wherein they Plutarch in vita Lycurgj. of the Counsel entered to consult within Lacedaemonia, should be magnificently and sumptuously builded. For he thought, that these exterior and outward shows of magnificence and bravery, were nothing necessary unto Counsellors for to use prudence and judgement: but that they did rather hurt & endamage the most excellent gifts of the mind, making men either abject and effeminate, debasing their courage, or else proud and arrogant, and moved with such vain and superfluous buildings. For continual experience teacheth us, that when men meet or assemble together in some gorgeous place or stately Hall, most sumptuously and costly built and set forth: then they spend the time in looking upon the comely building, or in beholding the Images engraven and carved in the walls, the cunning pictures artificially painted on the entries and doors, the stately Pillars erected up a marvelous height, and of wonderful thickness, and in viewing the curious workmanship of the Roof. And so, as well they that come into such stately places to give counsel, as they that come to take counsel, busy their brains, and employ all their senses in those frivolous things, losing that which is worth a great deal, for that which is worth little or nothing. This which Lycurgus ordained in Lacedamonia, (which Plato in Alcybiade, 1. Commonwealth was not adorned and decked with many magnificent ornaments, and gorgeous furniture, though it was very wealthy and puissant,) taketh no place in those famous and Xenophon de Cyri minoris expendi, lib, 6. rich Common-welths, in which such magnificence is used. For it beseemeth such Commonwealths, that the houses in which the Senators and chief Governors enter, to consult upon matters concerning the estate of the Realm, be answerable to the magnificence and greatness of the same Commonwealths. They that cause Schools to be builded for those that learn, aught to follow Lycurgus his saying: erecting them in places that be not delightful or pleasant, so that there be nothing in them, to allure and withdraw the eyes of the Scholars from their Books, which maketh them nothing attentive to hear that which their Masters read unto them. Plato (as S. Jerome and S. Basil affirmeth) did choose out Maisilius Fiscinus in vita Platonis. a place in Athens to teach, which was neither delectable nor wholesome: because he being hard, & of a strong temperature, the place should not hinder his imaginations and thoughts, which necessarily ought to be free, and not occupied in such recreations, delights and pastimes, which would have hindered him from contemplation and study. The great Turk hath a window covered with a green vail, or Curtain of silk, forth of which window, he seeth and heareth all that the Bassas say and do, when they assemble together in the house of Counsel. And thus being neither seen nor heard of the Bassas, he hearkeneth to all what they speak, and heareth the moans of those that complain. And the Bassas and Turkish Counsellors, not knowing whether the Turk be hearkening behind the window, or no, dare not but deal justly with those that come thither for justice, or spend the time in vain talk, which tendeth not to the service of their Lord. Some Counsellors were wont to command, that the door of the Counsel-chamber should be left open, because no man should stand behind the door and hearken what they said. 3 In old times passed, no man might in France speak anything Tamara. lib, 1. cap, 7. de moribus gentium. which concerned the Commonwealth, unless he pronounced it publicly, and he that came last into the place of counsel, was put to death. So did the Cranes (as Pliny saith) in Asia, when they assembled together in the night time in the Lib. 1, cap. 23. place from which they should departed, out of that Country into another, killing the Crane that came last of all. In France also Idem Tamara ubi supra. in ancient times passed, if any man made any stur in the place of counsel, there came incontinently a Sergeant unto him, with a naked sword in his hand ready drawn, who menaced him to strike if he held not his peace. And if he left not talking at the third threatening, the Sergeant cut his cloak in such order, that the rest that was left did him but little service. 4 As often as the Emperor Frederick called his Counsellors, Papa Pius lib. 3 de dictis et factis Alfonsi regis. to confer with them about matters concerning the Commonwealth, he used to say. I would to God that it would please him to do me so good a turn, that when my Counsellors enter into the Counsel house, they should cast of counterfeiting and dissimulation, and all feigned pretences at the very gates and doors of the Chamber, in which they enter to counsel. And if I am not deceived, it is sufficient if they leave but only one thing, to wit, their own private commodity: for this is it which overthroweth and destroyeth all counsels: and for love of this, men feign and dissemble: which deceitful practices, undoubtedly L, 30. Tantum nimirum ex publicis malis sentimus quantum ad privatas res pertinet, nec. in eyes quicquam acrius quam pecuniae damnum stimulat. they would not so much use, if they more regarded the public commodity and welfare of the Commonwealth, than their own particular profit. But (as Titus Livius saith) the loss of the Commonwealth never grieveth us, but so far as it toucheth the hurt and damage of our own goods and substance. 5 When the men of Galacia would consult upon matters of great weight and importance, they used a most abominable cruel, and devilish sacrifice. They ripped up some one man's Idem Tamara, ubi supra. breast with a sharp sword, and by the spilling of the blood, or the tearing and unlacing of his members, they guessed and divined of that which should happen, concerning those things about which they consulted. In a certain part of the kingdom of Persia, they use this. When they that dwell in that Country go to ask counsel of the Priests, upon that which they determine to do: the Priests hold in their hands the book, which is commonly called the book of Lots or Fortune, and according to that which they find written in that book, they answer them that come to consult with them. It seemeth that the Book of Lots or Fortune, wherewith they deceive the ignorant Commonalty, was brought out of Persia: wherefore the Inquisitors did with great reason forbidden the same Book of Fortunes to be read, that they which are of little understanding, might not be deceived by it. 6 Seeing that counsels, and the success of those things which are consulted, proceed, (as we have said) from the holy Ghost: it is convenient, that all Counsellors before they begin to consult, should humbly request and beseech the holy Ghost, with great devotion and humility, to direct them in their way, and lead them in their consultations, saying that service which is properly belonging unto the holy Ghost. And if the shortness of the time permit it not, they ought to sing the Hymn of the holy Ghost, as it is rehearsed in the Church, Come holy? Ghost etc. And unitating King David, Veni Creator spiritus. etc. Psalm, 24. Psalm. 123. say, Lord mine eyes look up and trust in thee, thou shalt deliver me out of the snares etc. King David saith not, that he looked to his feet, to deliver them from the snares, but that he lifted his eyes up to the Lord, that he should deliver him, and found himself not deceived, as he afterward mentioneth. O Lord, my soul hath escaped as the bird out of the snares of the Hunters, and the snares were broken in pieces. Plato doth Marsilius Fiscinus in argum. Dialog. Plato. qui inscribitur Theag. counsel us, that we should continually beseech God, that it would please him to direct that which we shall do, unto his holy service. For it is he, that by the means of the Angels, showeth unto us what we ought to do. For this is an everlasting truth, confirmed with perpetual experience, that in the most hard and difficult things of all man's life, where the wit of man is most blind, and doth most want counsel and forces: there doth the divine wisdom of the Lord, show itself most clearly & wonderfully. That great judith, with a noble and excellent mind, said unto those that were besieged in the City of Bethulia. And now who are you that have tempted GOD this day, and will Capitulo, 8. bind the counsels of the Lord our God? And so she rebuked the faintness of the Governors of Bethulia. For it is a token & sign of great weakness and ignorance in a man, to do all matters according to his own wisdom and human counsels. It were better and safer, to desire the Lord that he would be our guide in all our actions and counsels: for he will direct us in the ready path, & show us which way is best, seeing that he never faileth to aid those that power forth their prayers unto him. Those Angels, that by the commandment of God, aid and help men in their ways, and rule the actions of virtuous Princes, are comprehended under those companies, which are called Dominions Marsil. Fiscinus ubi supra. and Principalities, as Dionysius Arcopagita saith. 7 And the better to bring this to pass which we say, we ought to do according to the commandments of our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ, who neither deceiveth himself nor can not deceive them unto whom he giveth counsel. For from him floweth the spring of understanding and knowledge, and he is the author and cause of all goodness. From him doth it proceed that Counsellors be good, & he is the cause why Kings govern their kingdoms well, and minister justice. And this did King Proverb, 8. Solomon, ask of the Lord, saying: Lord send me thy wisdom down out of thy holy heavens, and send her from the throne of thy Majesty, that she may be with me, and labour, that I may know what is acceptable in thy sight. If those that in old times passed worshipped Idols, asked counsel of them, and the devil to deceive them used many kinds of Oracles and prophecies, (as I wrote more at large in my Books of policies and Commonwealths) it is more than reason, that we, which serve and worship Christ the redeemer of the world, should humbly offer our prayers to his holiness, and request him, that it would please him of his goodness, to favour & help us in all our counsels. And no doubt, seeing the holy Ghost is he that beadeth us in all our actions: he will choose that for us, which shall best please his holiness. And that counsel which we choose through his inspiration, is the best, and which most appertaineth unto us. 8 The night time is very fit to consult. And for this cause did the Grecians call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. that is to be wise. For Plutar. in lib. de curiositate. when the Counsellors assemble together, to confer about matters in the night time, those things in which men be commonly occupied by day, do not hinder or trouble them: and with the stillness of the night (as Virgil saith) all things are quiet. Homer, Aeneid, lib, 4. Cum tacet omnis ager pecudes, pictaeque volucres. Iliad. Lib. 2. to she we that the silent night time was most commodious to consult, said, that it did not become Princes to sleep all the night, who ought to consult upon matters concerning the Commonwealth. And for because that when a man is not withdrawn from his book, neither by his business, nor by any other means, it greatly confirmeth his memory, and profiteth him much for the invention and contemplation of that which he searcheth and learneth: no doubt, but the quiet & still night, which cutteth of all occasions that may hinder a man, is the fittest, and best time to study in: especially, because the mind at that tune is more free, and readier to muse and consider of every thing. 9 First of all before the Counsellors begin to consult, they ought to see that no man be in place, that may hear that which is spoken off in their consultations. After that the Ambassadors of King Tarqvinius, had conspired with the Sons Plutarch in ●●ta Romulj. of Brutus and other young Gentlemen, to restore Tarqvinius to his kingdom, they solemnized their conspiration with the death of a man, whose blood they drank, and touched his enentrailes: that they might by that ceremony, bind themselves to keep counsel, and help one another. And to do this, they assembled together in a desert house, where no body did dwell. But as it fell out by chance, a certain. Servant called Vindicius, was in the same house, who seeing them enter in on the sudden in great haste, could not get ●ut: but spying a large Larget in one of the corners of the Chamber, presently fell to the ground, and covered himself with its and so he lay very secretly, and saw all what passed between them? and heard how they determined to slay both the Consuls, and cast down the City gates for the Tarquinians to enter; and take possession of the kingdom, which he presently revealed unto Publicola being one of the Consuls. Don Alfonso King of Castille, being in the Court of Almenon Garivai, lib, 11. cap, 12, de compend. histo. King of Tolido, Went into the King's Orchard, and espying the King coming thither to walk and enjoy the pleasure of the Garden, being accompanied with his Noble men and Counsellors, he hide himself behind the Arbour where the king was wont to walk in, that he might hear what talk there should be had between the King and his Counsellors. The king being come, and having his Counsellors by him, he asked them whether they thought, that the same City of Toledo being so great, and so strongly built, might be taken of the Christians, or no. All of them answered, that it was impossible, that such a strong City should be overcome by Christians: except one, that was of opinion that it might be taken, if the Christians should burn their Corn, and bar them from receiving any fruit of the lands about them, for the space of seven years: and so they should be compelled to render up their City into the hands of the Christians, unless they would sustain hunger and famine. And after the King of Tole do had ended his talk, he chanced to look on the other side of the Arbour, where he espied Don Alfonso the King of Castille, lying▪ on the grass, as if he had been a sleep. Which thing he took very grievously, fearing left he had heard all their talk: and to try whether he slept, they cast melted lead in his hand, which pierced quite through: and for this cause he was called, El de lamano horadada, that is, he of the hand-bored through. He was also called so, because he was very frank and liberal. Many other examples might I allege, of counsels that were discovered by such as were secretly in place, where the matter was handled, and heard all what was said: but because they be all well night known unto all men, I mean not to stand upon them. This may suffice, that it is a common proverb with us in Castille. Tras' parred o soto, no digas tu secreto a otro: Behind a hedge, a mound or wall, No secret see thou say at all. The twelfth discourse, what Counsellors of Princes ought to do, when they be assembled to consult. PAulus jurisconsultus saith: that those contracts L. Naturalis ff. de praesc●ip. ver. which are called Contractus immominati, depend upon giving and doing. After the same manner may we say, that all human affairs, depend upon saying and doing. These are the two balances of deed and word, which S. Isidorus saith that all C. omnis, 45. d. men carry about them. This, (as Homer writeth) did Phoenix Master to Achilles, teach his Scholar. Our Saviour and Act. cap, r. caepit jesus sacere et do●●re. Lord Jesus Christ, (as S. Luke saith) began to do and teach his most holy doctrine. Therefore if those matters which are in consultation, depend upon doing and saying: it is necessaire that all Counsellors before they determine, consider that s●me things ought to be said and done, and some aught neither to be said nor done: other some aught to be said, but not done: and some aught to be done, but not said. Metrodorus said unto Sextus Pompeius, that if he would be Plutarch in vita Mar. Anto. Lord, not only over all Sicil, but over the whole world also: he should let him cut the gables of the Ankers of that ship, in which he himself was, & Mar. Antonius. Pompey answered, thou mightest have done this without I had known of it. But now since I know it, I am content with that which I have, and I will not break my oath & promise made unto Anthony, that he should come safe to my ship without any danger. 2 Those Counsellors whom Princes take to give them counsel, aught to do as Aristotle counseled * Valerius Max. li. 7. de sapienter dict. & fact. monuit ut cum co, aut quā●a●●ssimé loqueretur quo scilicet apud regias au●es vel siletio tutior vel sermoue esset acceptior. Calisthenes his Cousin to do, viz. that when he spoke to great Alexander, he should be short, and speak to the kings contentment. But Calisthenes not regarding his counsel, openly rebuked Alexander for his folly, in embracing the pride of the Persians, and Plutarch in vita Alexan. Mag. & justinus. lib, 15. commanding the Macedons to worship and honour him, and to call him the son of jupiter. Wherefore Alexander being incensed with anger against Calisthenes, because he reprehended him in the face of all the world, and thereby incited & stirred up others to despise him, and set nothing by him: and because he provoked many to kill him, he commanded his hands and feet to be cut off, and his ears, nose, and lips also, and to be thrown into a Dungeon, where every one might look upon him: whose grievous pains and deformity, one Lysimachus a valiant Gentleman pitying, sent a cup of poison unto him, that he might drink of it and die. Which thing being told unto Alexander, he commanded that Lysimachus should be cast without a weapon, to be devoured of a fierce lion. But he like a noble and courageous Knight, wrapped his cloak about his arm, and without any fear at all stepped to the Lion, and thrusting his hand into his mouth, caught hold of his tongue, and pulling it out of the roaring lions head, killed him. For which act, Alexander esteemed much of him, and did not only pardon him, but also largely rewarded him, advancing him to great honour. 3 Out of that which happened to Calisthenes, may clearly be seen, that the same is true which Euripides the Greek Poet saith. I set little by that wise man, that hath no wit for himself. These be they that take upon them to give counsel to every one, and can give themselves none: not much unlike Horatius Fungar vice cotis acutum redere quae ferrum valet, expers ipsa secandj. Hernan. Nunes. the Signs of Inns, which show the way into the house unto all men, but they never enter themselves: and Whetstones which sharpen knives, but remain blunt themselves and cannot cut: and the Hearneshawe that can give counsel to every one, and for himself he can give none. This is said of the Hearneshaw, because the Pigeon having built her nest upon a tree, and being threatened by the subtle Fox that he would eat her, if she would not consent to give him part of her young ones, the Hearneshawe took pity on her, and counseled her to give the Fox none, saying: that she should not discourage herself, nor fear the Fox, for he could not climb up to the tree where she was. So that the pigeon after that time, would give the Fox nothing: who ask why? she answered, because the Heronshaw had told her, that he could not climb up to the Tree, and therefore counseled her to give him no more. The Fox understanding this, went to that Hearnshawe, and began to praise his wisdom, saying, that of all birds, none could govern their lives, and live so wisely as he: and among other matters, he asked him how he was wont to do when he would sleep? The Hearneshaw answered, that he laid his head close to his body, and covered it with his wing, and saying so, showed him the manner how, and put his head under his wing: then the Fox stepped near, and on the sudden took him, and did eat him. And so the Fox did verily according to Euripides the Greek Poet, his saying: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is, Such wise men I despise, That for themselves be nothing wise. 4 That which Aristotle taught his Cousin and Scholar Calisthenes, aught to be observed of all such as be conversant with kings, speaking unto them & giving them counsel: which was, that they should be very wary, in all their speeches and actions: imitating and following the example of the Prophet Nathan, who though he was sent from GOD, to rebuke king 2. Regum, 12. David for his sin committed with Bethsaba, commanding her husband to be slain: yet would he not tell it him plainly, but used a figurative kind of speech, and proposed the matter so unto him, that he could not choose but confess his fault, and repent himself of his offence committed against the Lord. joab 2, Regum, 14. used the same slynes and subtlety, sending a subtle Woman, which feigned herself to mourn, and putting on mourning apparel, went to King David, and falling down to the ground on her face, said, that she was a widow, and her husband was dead, and that she had two Sons, and that they two strove in the field, and none being there to part them, the one smote the other and slew him. And that the whole family was risen against her, and would have her deliver him that smote his brother, to destroy the heir also: and so they should quench her sparkle that was left, and should not leave to her husband neither name, nor posterity upon the earth. And the King knowing that the hand of joab was with the widow in all this, he pardoned his son Absalon, and commanded him to be brought again. Erisistratus, Physician to King Antiochus, used the same Lucianus in Dea ●yria. policy: and because the King should not be offended, he said unto him, Lord your son is sick for love, and she whom he loveth, is my wife: then the King requested him, to let his wife do according to his sons desire: affirming, that if he had been in love with his own wife, he would suffer her to deliver him out of the danger of his disease. Then Erisistratus answered. Lord, it is thine own wife whom thy son loveth. The Catholic King, Don Hernando the fift, King of Castille, in like manner, because he would not have the Lady Blanch his Ga●iuai. lib, 19 capit. 6. de compend. Histor. Queen grieved, for the death of the young Prince, Don ivan her son, commanded his Gentlemen to tell her, that he was dead himself, and that the young Prince lived: and anon after he entered in unto her, and comforted her with his presence. 5 Many subtleties and crafty policies must be used by them that will say the truth, unto one that is not willing to hear it. And as the Physicians prepare their purgations with syrups, and gild their pills, lest the Patient should be moved and offended with the bitterness of them, even so it is necessary, that his mind should be prepared unto whom we mean to tell the truth. For the truth doth no less move and offend where it is told, if he unto whom it is told be not prepared, them any medicine whatsoever, if it be given out of time and season. And therefore the truth may not be told unto all men, nor at all times, nor in every place. And when the truth is told, we Hypocrat, Aphorism. ought to consider, who, where, when, how, and unto whom he telleth it: (as the physicians regard & perpend all the circumstances of the disease, to cure their Patients,) and if it be not so done, in steed of doing them good unto whom it is told, it maketh them worse, and causeth them to abhor and detest those that tell it. The truth ought to be told unto Princes, with due honour and reverence, as the Prophet Nathan did unto King David: and the Prophet Daniel, when he declared the Dream of the Cap. 4. Tree unto King Nabuchadnezzar, saying unto him: My Lord, the Dream be to them that hate thee, and the interpretation thereof unto thine enemies. johannes Franciscus Lotinus (whom Considera. 319. we follow in this discourse) saith: that when Counsellors doubt upon any thing, and their opinions be divers, they ought not to cross or gainsay them that are of a contrary mind, lest they should seem more curious in defending their own opinion, then careful for the common profit. It is therefore convenient for Counsellors to accustom themselves, patiently to hear all that which in the Counsel is said or spoken: and not to spend the time in declaring and expounding their own opinions, and contrarying that which other Counsellors allege. For many men in consultations, are more like to Masters, that read and dispute in Schools, than Counsellors that consult what ought to be done. 6 If the counsel which is given, be manifestly known to be good, no man ought to care whether he that giveth it be virtuous or vicious: for that counsel which without doubt is proved to be good, ought always to be preferred. But this aught in all counsels to be considered, whether he that giveth the counsel, regard more his own particular profit, than the commodity of the Commonwealth: for by how much the more counsels are free from all respects of private commodity, by so much the more are they profitable unto the Commonwealth. Niceas, to make the Athenians to assent unto him, when he persuaded them that they should not wage war against Si●il, told them that he should reap no profit by it, if they did as he counseled. For he well knew, that if they enjoyed peace and lived in quietness, there were a great many that would take upon them to govern the Commonwealth: but if they warred, there was not one Citizen, that might either be his superior or equal. 7 If it happen that in counsels, some Counsellors gainsay that which others say, and allege the contrary, than they whose opinions are crossed, ought not to think that they do it because they hate them, or make no account of them: but because L. Item ●inus §. principaliter ibi preter naturalem hominum ad dissentiendum facilitatem, ff, de receptis arbitr. they think their own opinions to be the best. For (as Ulpian the Lawyer saith) men be naturally inclined to be contrary in opinions, and not to agree one with another. And (as the Emperor justinian saith) there is nothing in all human affairs so just, nothing so clear, and nothing so manifest, which is not called in question, and of which there be not sundry and divers opinions: and, (as it is commonly said) men differ far more in understanding and judgement, than they do in favour. Horat, lib, 2, sermon, Saty. 1. Quot capita, tot sententiae, so many heads, so many minds. 8 Many Counsellors regard not what is spoken in the counsel, concerning that upon which they consult, but rather what he is that speaketh, and if he be their friend, they allow all what he saith: and if he be their fo●, they disallow it, though it be never so profitable for the Commonwealth▪ and though they know not or understand not, what he saith, nor what they gainsay. As one did who chanced to sleep in the Counsaile-house, Bal●az●● Cossa in Aulico. when the Counsellors should give their voices: and being awaked by the other Counsellors, & asked what he thought of that upon which they consulted: rose up being half a sleep, and not knowing what he said, uttered these words. My Lords, I say the contrary unto all what soever Alimani hath said, (for he was his adversary.) But Alimani answered, I have said nothing. Why then replied the other, I gainsay all what ever thou shalt say. Such men are very hurtful to the Commonwealth. 9 Though in witnesses, the person that beareth witness, is more regarded than the testimony which he giveth, yet in L. 3▪ §. Eiusdem ibi de testibus non testimonijs creditorum ff, de testibus. counsel, we ought not so much to regard the Counsellor, as his counsel: for the persons be in authority by reason of the counsels, and not the counsels by reason of the persons. And though it be true, that they which are more experienced, know better what is necessary in every thing, than they which have no skill at all: yet ought every prudent and wise man to hear the opinion and liking of many. For no one man (as we have said) can know all that is required: and oftentimes a simple fellow his advice, is as good as ever any was heard. As I writ more at large, in my book of crafty & prudent counsels. And for this cause it is said of old among us in Spain: So elsayal, ay al. that is, Oft a ragged cloak, Doth hide a silken coat. And Athenaeus saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And often simple men we see, Speak things that to the purpose be. There was a certain Prince, that devised how he might enter into Italy to make war, and a Fool said unto him, Lord I beseech your majesty, to look how you shall get out again, if need force you to come back out of the Country; for there be many ways to get into it. If Charles king of France, had considered this, he had not been so troubled in fleeing out of Italy, when his Army was overthrown in the River of Tarro. The counsel which the Fool gave, was like unto that of the Fox, who would not enter into the lions Den, because he saw the steps of many that went in, but of none that came forth again: Horace — Quia me vestigia terrent, Epist, libro, 1. Epistola prima. Omnia te advorsum spectantia▪ nulla retrorsum. Because I fear these footsteps what they mean, All tending towards thee, none back do turn again. 10 The Lacedæmonians consulting upon a matter of great Plutarch in Politiis. importance, a certain Citizen called Demosthenes, being a wicked and vicious man, gave an advice which was very convenient and much to the purpose: but they rejected it, and elected one of the Elders to pronounce the same opinion in the very same words, (as if one should power out the liquor that was in a foul vessel, into a pure and clean vessel) because it Aulus Gelliu●, 18, cap. 3. should be the better liked of the people. And that they which were to give their voices after him, should allow and approve that counsel, seeing it was given by a sage and virtuous man. 11 Counsellors ought to show their minds freely, concerning that which is consulted, though they know that the other Counsellors will not approve the counsel which they give, for (as Tully saith) counsels ought not to be rebuked for the Phillippica, 2. success, but for the reasons which are alleged to have them followed. And they ought not to excuse themselves, saying: that they shall lose their credit, if they counsel any thing which will not be approved: so that it is more profitable, and better for the Commonwealth, to have them accounted prudent and wise, then mighty and puissant: and they that will have their counsels followed, seem not so much to counsel as to command. 12 Many things, though they do no harm at the beginning, nevertheless at the end they become very hurtful and dangerous to the Commonwealth, if they be suffered to take root, (as Ca●o Censorius said) in one of his Orations Tit, Liu. Lib. 34 which he made in the Senate, against the superfluous expenses of the women of Rome. For there is no estate of men, who if they be suffered to assemble and consult together secretly, but they will shrewdly endamage the Commonwealth. And (as the same Ca●o said in an Oration, which he pronounced against those that were assembled together in Rome, to celebrate the Feasts which they called Bac●hanalia,) those secret meetings Nullas ad huc vires coniuratio, cae●e●●m incrementum ingens virium habe●, quod ind●es plu●●s ●iunt. and congregations, which when they begin have no forces, and are very weak, if they be dissembled and not looked to in time, increase and grow in strength more and more, and in such order augment daily, that it is a very difficult and hard matter ●● repair the harm which they do, especially in matters concerning Religion. This is manifestly seen in those which bring in new sects: which if they be not extinguished and quenched at the first beginning, as the fire when it beginneth to burn: in time will gather so great forces, that they quite disturb and disquiet the whole Commonwealth. Therefore it is necessary, that before they take root, great care and diligence be taken to ra●● them out quite, and not suffer them to take root. For they be easily remedied when they begin, but with much ado when they grow daily, and increase. As Ovid affirmeth, saying. Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur, Cum mala per longas conual●ere moras. At first resist, or else in vain, thy medicine comes too late, When mischiefs gotten have, by long delays a perfect state, 13 Young men, because their natural complexion is hot, and have had but small experience of Fortunes gutles (as Hannibal said to Scipio) in consultation easily incline to that which is more magnificent than sure, not regarding what may succeed and follow. But old men, because their natural complexion is cold, and have oftentimes been crossed with events Tit. Liu. lib. 2. decad, 3. caeteris omnibus in consilio salutaria magis quam specio●a suadentibus. contrary to their expectation, follow surer counsels then magnificent or honourable. We ought therefore to temperate the vehemency of youth, with the wisdom of old men, and consider and examine what is said both of old and young, choosing that counsel which is safest, and most profitable for the Com-wealth: and when there is any doubt, which counsel ought to be allowed, then ought the old men's advice be approved and put in practice. Roboam King of jerusalem, lost the kingdom 3. Regum. 12. and dominion which he had over the twelve Tribes of Israel, and only two of them obeyed him, the Tribe of juda, and the Tribe of Benjamin, and that, because he had refused the counsel of the ancient. Francis the King of France, because he followed the counsel of his Admiral, (who was a young man) refusing Ma●bri●us ●oseus part, 3, cap. 2, historiae mu●. the advice which his aged Counsellors gave him, was overthrown and taken prisoner, in the battle of Pavia, by the soldiers of the Emperor Charles the fift his Army. 14 They which consult about any matter, aught to follow that counsel which is least hurtful to the Commonwealth. for it is impossible in great enterprises to be delivered from all dangers that are like to fall. And for this cause it is commonly said: Periculum periculo vincitur. One danger is won by the other. As we have in the beginning of this Treatise in more ample manner declared. And he that never doth adventure, can never lose nor gain. For after the danger cometh the profit: and cowards because they greatly fear the events of matters, never achieve haughty enterprises. If a man think that he may execute a thing without adventuring, he shall never bring any thing to pass. For many times the success faileth, not only of those things which we confidently, and not without good reason hope for: but also of those things which we think to have well provided for, as well in great and honourable enterprises, as in small and particular actions. They therefore that consult, ought not to delay the execution of the same which is concluded, because there is danger in it: if the profit be greater than the danger which is like to follow after the execution thereof. 15 The Persians used to consult upon all matters in their Tamara de moribus gentium. banquets, when they did ca●e and drink: and after they had ended their banquet, they determined what they would have put in execution. And this they did because the Counsellors should freely show their minds, concerning that whereon they consulted. For wine causeth men to speak the truth, according to that, In Vino veritas. Alexander the great, commanded Plin. lib, 14, cap, 22. that those Ambassadors which came unto him, should be welcomed with great banquets, & made drunk, because he might learn or sift out the right cause of their coming, and about what matters they were sent unto him. The Germans assemble together to consult being all Armed, Cornel. Tacitus de moribus Germanorun, de pace atque de bello plaerumque in convivijs, consultant. and if they approve that which was determined, they shaked their Pikes and Lances: (for this was a token of agreement and consent,) and contrariwise, if that which was consulted liked them not, than they murmured and made a noise, and a confused cry. Besides, they consulted in banquets upon matters concerning peace and war: because they thought that at such times they were not troubled with other cares, & they thought that at such times, they were hotter and readier to take any enterprise in hand. The people were not crafty nor malicious, and the next day after they turned again to consult upon their affairs, that they might conclude and determine what they should do, when as they could not feign or invent. They that live in the Country of Phrigia, eat and drink together Tamara ubi supr. Bernardus mend de Sale, libro. 3. §, 17. upon the cost and charges of the Commonwealth, before they begin to consult: for they are of opinion, that eating and drinking in public assemblies, doth reconcile them together, that are at discord one with another, and that it doth take away severity, pride, arrogancy, and melancholy, as things Caelius Rodoginus li, 15, ca 18 estranged from the end for which banquets and feasts were ordained. The County Ribadeo answered a certain Captain, Hernando de pulga in lib. de viris illustribus. (which came unto him from his enemies, to entreat him that they might eat and drink together, before the day which was appointed for the field) that if he did eat and drink with him, the desire which he had to buckle with him, would he taken from him. 16 They that think that men ought in consultation, to deliberate upon on only matter, are greatly deceived. For oftentimes, matters be of this quality, that the one dependeth upon the other: and it is necessary to consider, the inconveniences which may follow that which is determined in the counsel: and if they that consult know what is past, and understand what is present, they may the better conjecture & divine what may fail out▪ Demades said, that the Athenians resembled those that make no account of their health before they be sick. Demades said this, because the Athenians in their deliberations, always varied about that which was past, not endeavouring to prove what was necessary to be done. It is said that they of Genoa in their counsels, dispute upon that which is past: and the Florentines upon that which is past, and that which is present: and the Venetians both upon that which is past, present, and to come. 17 It chanceth many times when men consult, that that thing which seemeth to be profitable for the Commonwealth, doth happen to be very hurtful & prejudicial. As for example: The Emperors of Greece called the Turks to aid, who afterward destroyed them, and took the Empire from them. In the year of our Lord GOD 1513. four monarchs entered Petrus Bembus Lib, 8, Historiae Venetae. league against the Venetians, viz. julius Secundus Pope, the Emperor Maximilian, the Catholic King Don Hernando, and jews King of France. And the Venetians, though they were driven to great necessity, yet would they never accept of the help and aid, which Selim the King of the Turks offered them: who had sent them word, that he would defend them with all the power that he had. But they feared lest if he had once entered into Venice, he would have done, as his predecessors dealt with the Emperors of Constantinople. Francis King of France, in those wars which he made against the Emperor Charles the fift, (who, as he often protested, pretended no other thing, then to conserve those estates & patrimonies which by right and justice were his own) took a great company of Germans to help him, and paid wages to all such as would come to help him against the Emperor, which Soldiers afterward did him wonderful much harm. The same King of France, brought the Army of Soliman King of the Turks to help him in those wars, which he made against the Emperor Charles the fift, and thereby did Christendom far more harm, than he did good to the kingdom of France. Don Alonso King of Naples said, that men were so hot to be revenged on their enemies, that they were like to the birds, which for fight one with another, saw not them that came to take them. 18 The Counsellors of Princes, aught in such manner to say their minds, that they seem not to contend in words, but aught to seek and pick out ways and means, which they suppose to be more fit, and better to persuade that, which they think to be profitable for the Commonwealth. Some upon subtlety, though they know what ought to be done, and what is best and most profitable: yet they propose it after such a manner, as if they doubted of it, to the end that they which hear them, should not cease to inquire and examine what were convenient to be done, and that if they happily say any thing, they might contrary them, and cross that which they allege. Pliny counseleth them that would willingly persuade any Lib. 1. Episto. thing, to imitate the Physicians, who with fine speeches, sweet words, and pleasant reasons, persuade their Patients to take those medicines which they give them. Quintilian admonisheth them that consult, to be courteous, friendly, and tractable, and not to speak too hastily. For those counsels are well given, that are uttered with leisure and judgement. Theophrastus saith, that they which give counsel, ought not to use garnished and adorned reasons, but such as be to the purpose, and applied unto that which they go about to persuade, alleging some examples of matters, that are like unto those things upon which they consult. For it is commonly said. Wilt thou know what shall be? then consider what hath been. And for this cause men say, that experience is a certain kind of proof. 19 Many when they give counsel, utter it after such an intricate and obscure manner, that no man can plainly understand what they say: and this they do to make that which they say, to agree with that which afterwards doth happen and fall out. This guile and subtlety the devil used in old times passed, when he answered them by Oracles, that came to ask counsel of him, answering them after such a manner, that howsoever the matter fell out, yet his Oracle might have been applied unto the event: and with such answers did he deceive men, and doth yet daily more and more. Those Counsellors Cap, 16, Consolatores onero●●omnes vos estis. which show not their minds clearly (as job saith) are troublesome and miserable: and after they see the success and event of the matter, if it be not good, than they cast the fault upon them that would not follow their counsel, saying: I told you well enough what would come of it: but you would give no ear to my words: whereas indeed, their words were such, as could not be understood, and might rather have been termed Oracles than counsels: and so they heap one misfortune upon another, not without their great harm whom they counseled: Lucanus. Erroribus addere culpam. blaming them, and laying the fault in them, when they see that they have had ill success in their affairs: this is to heap on● misfortune on another; to blame men after they have erred. For they find fault with them whereas they be blameless: and counsels (as we have said) ought to be judged whither they be good or bad, by the reasons which are in them alleged, & not by the success & events, which many times are out of all judgement and human understanding: neither is any man bound to divine of that which shall come to pass. 20 If the Counsellors of Princes cannot persuade their Lords, to do that which is profitable for the Commonwealth, yet shall they not cease to do what they can, that the Commonwealth sustain no loss, always having more regard of honesty Lib, 1. cod. de caducis tollendis. De prohibita feudi alienatione. etc. and virtue, and the profit of the Commonwealth, then of their Princes. And they ought (as the two Emperors justinian and Lotharius say) to esteem and set more by the public commodity, then by the private profit of their Princes. And this becometh Prince's best: for the office and duty of a good Prince is, to procure that his Subjects live in peace, & be well governed. And therefore Counsellors shall do better and safer, to present their Princes with that sentence of the two Emperors, L. princeps, ff. de legibus. Princeps legibus solutus est. justinian and Lotharius: then to tell them that Princes are not subject to the Laws, and that they may use their authority, and do what they will, according to those clauses, De plenitudine potestatis, ex certa scientia & motu proprio. They which use these speeches to their Princes, are deadly enemies, not Restaulus Castaldus in tractatu de Imperatore. q. 111. only to the people, whom they hurt with their detestable counsels, but also to the Princes whom they serve. For they being here on earth, as Images or portraitures of God, (whom they ought to imitate in godliness, authority and wisdom,) these Counsellors, not regarding the welfare of the Commonweal Aristoteles. Polit. 5. cap. 10. so much as their private commodity: counsel them to imitate the devil, and to be his Ministers, exercising tyranny and all kind of cruelty, upon those Nations which GOD hath committed to their government. Whereas notwithstanding, L. digna vox est maiestate regnantis legibus alligitū●e principem profiteij. Quintinus in ca● Novit de indici●… §, Fin. Institut. de justitia et iure juris praecepta sunt haec, honest vivere, altrun non laedere: ius suum cuique tribuere. Math. 7. that which most belongeth to the majesty of a Prince (as the Emperor Theodosius saith) is to be subject unto that which the Laws ordain. The King Antigonus said, that no dishonest & unlawful thing, might be lawful and honest to a Prince: for though he be a Prince, yet is he not dispensed withal, but ●●●ht to behave himself according to that laws of nature, which show how men ought to live honestly one with another, without hurting their neighbours, contenting themselves with their own, and not offering any injury unto another, which they would not have others to offer unto them. And within this divine precept (as our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ teacheth us) be the Laws and Prophets included. This rule & doctrine which our Lord and Redéemer gave us, is so plain and clear, that it needeth not any gloss or exposition at all. 21 They that consult upon any matters, judge better of that which others counsel, than they do of that which they counsel themselves. For every man is led by nature, to like well of his own opinion and sentence: because his judgement is not so free to judge of his own matters, as of a stranger's affairs. And for this cause, ought every one that writeth books and pamphlets, to show them to their friends before they commit them to the press: that they may freely show their minds, what they think aught to be changed, and what to be corrected: for no man can judge aright of those works which he maketh himself, because the love which he beareth to himself, and all what he doth, doth blind him, and suffereth him not to mislike with any thing that is of his own doing. And therefore it is commonly said, that the first thing which a Child doth after it is borne, is that it maketh the father fond: for it doth in such manner blind his eyes and judgement, that he thinketh his child to be a great deal fairer than all other children. As the Ape being asked of the fox, how he might know her young ones if he should chance to meet them, that he might spare them, answered: that they were the fairest that he could find. Who going into the field, found them, and did eat them, for they seemed not so fair unto him, because he looked not on them with the same affection which their mother did bear unto them. 22 When one giveth counsel to men of simple understanding, upon a matter concerning the Commonwealth: he ought not to allege many reasons, which may bring them into some confusion, and stay them from giving their resolutions. For when they be (as it were) dulled, with the confusion and multitude of reasons: they be hindered from executing that, unto which their natural inclination doth prick and entice them. The Emperor Charles the fift, said, that the Counsellors of Princes, were spectacles to that Prince that lacked wit & understanding, to judge of such reasons as were alleged unto him: he said furthermore, that those Princes which could not see without those spectacles were not very well: but they were worse, that could not see neither without them nor with them. And the Counsellors of Princes, are not only the spectacles through which they see, but also the looking glasses in which Princes behold what is done in their absence. Every Prince therefore, aught to know and understand, whether they represent the right and true Image of that which they show: for there be certain hollow looking glasses, which show a thing quite contrary, and otherwise then it is in deed: for some glasses make a little thing seem big, and some make a great thing seem little: and again, some glasses make one thing to show as if there were a great many. All these differences and many more, which the perspective Art teacheth us concerning looking glasses, are found in Counsellors of Princes, who inform not their Princes truly of all that is done. And therefore it is most necessary for a Prince, to inquire and learn, whether his Counsellors of whom he taketh counsel upon matters concerning the Commonwealth, be pure and clear looking glasses, or whether they be false glasses representing a thing otherwise than it is, and whether they seek colours, to make that which is black seem white, and white to show as if it were black. For thus Painters do, and those Counsellors that imitate them. 23 There be some Counsellors, that are so proud and arrogant, and that take such delight in their own sayings, and in hearing themselves speak, that they know not how they shall conclude, or with what period they will shut up their speech: often repeating that which they have said: not because they might be the better understood, but to feed their humour with the pleasure which they conceive in their own words, and as S. Gregory saith, to be accounted men of singular eloquence. Lib. 26, cap. 18 In job. But Ecclesiasticus teacheth the contrary, saying, make not many words, when thou art among the Elders, neither repeat a thing often. And King Solomon counseleth us, to comprehend Eccle. cap. 10. many matters in few words, and not to spend a great company of words in uttering a few things. Photion one of the chief Governors of Athens, said, that that was the best kind of speech, which in few words contained much matter: for words are like money, which is accounted so much more precious, as in small quantity it containeth greater price and value. And some men are so enamoured with their own words, that when they think they have spoken bravely, they ask, whether they have not spoken out of the purpose, not because they doubt whether they have or no, but because they would be praised. The best and surest thing that one may do Sanct. Grego. lib. 10. cap. 1. In job. in consultations, is to come with all speed to the very point of the matter itself, and strait ways to resolve what ought to be done, without spending much time, in alleging reasons, which serve to no other purpose, then to show that they be eloquent. It is an easy matter (saith Titus Livius) for one to find Libro. 8. out words and reasons, after he knoweth what ought to be done. 24 They that in consultations consider and forecast but few things▪ shall easily be resolved: and they that revolve many things, shall never be able to determine. We have of old had this proverb in Castille. Quien todo lo miro, Nunca con boys aro. which is to say, He that forecasteth all the storms of th'air, With Ox and plough the land will never care. So that they which consider all doubts, forecast all events, and think upon all the inconveniences that may happen, are never like to conclude and determine: and though they do determine, yet do they very seldom put the same in execution which they have agreed upon. But they that are nothing scrupulous, and pass every thing over lightly, having no regard what inconveniences may fall out, they do easily conclude many matters, but put few in practice. And to shun these two inconveniences, Counsellors ought to choose that, which they think to be most profitable for the Commonwealth: and not, as it is commonly said, of two inconveniences, to choose the least; for there is no choice of good, in ill things: and oftentimes, Hieronimus de an▪ in moralib. when a man shunneth the greater inconvenience, he avoideth both. 25 The time ought not to be spent in counseling, upon that matter which is already dispatched; unless some thing happen concerning the same, which doth require, that the Counsellors should consult upon it again. Cato Vticensis (as Plutarch In politicis. saith) when he knew, that that thing which was handled in the Counsel, would be hurtful to the Commonwealth, he did drive out the time in declaiming: and once prolonged his Oration so long, till that julius Caesar, (who was Consul at that time) asked him when he would make an end, and show what he thought, concerning that about which they consulted. But he spent the time without concluding any thing, touching that which julius Caesar demanded of him. Then julius Caesar commanded him to be put in prison, because he would not make an end, and let him understand his mind & opinion, concerning that which he asked of him; and all the Senators arose out of their places, and accompanied Cato, till he came to the prison. Which thing julius Caesar seeing, caused him to be set at liberty. Many allege all the inconveniences that may happen, concerning that matter which is consulted: to the end, that while they deliberate upon it, the opportunity may pass, which was offered to have it put in execution. The Emperor Charles the fift, said, that the Parliaments in which the Germans Ludovicus dulcis de dictis et factis imperat. Charon. ●. consulted, upon matters concerning the Empire, were like Vipers: for as the young Vipers kill their mothers, so that which was concluded in one Parliament, was recalled and made frustrate in the next. 26 Prosperous events, cause men oftentimes to judge ill of a thing: for when it hath succeeded prosperously once, or twice, they think that it will always fall out after the same manner. The same happeneth unto them, that to revenge some Livius, lib. 30. little injury, or to shun some small danger which they fear, they are so blinded, that without considering the perils which may follow, by doing that which they determine to do, although they be told what were better, yet they will not hear those which counsel them: and one little affection can prevail more with them, than all the reasons that may be offered, be they never so forcible. So that we commonly use this Castilian proverb. Hombre determinado, Nunca bien aconseiado. that is, A man determined, Never well counseled. They therefore that consult, aught to be free from affections, that they might freely without any passion, see and conjecture what may fall out, as if they had it present before them: and if they do this, they shall see whether they have any reason in that which they pretend. Cato Vticensis said, that those men were to be accounted valiant, who seeing the dangers before their eyes, were not any thing molested at all, with any perturbation, or passion of fear. Lucan. — fortissimus ille Est quisquis metuenda pati si cominus instent Et differre potest.—. Things to be feared who can endure, and wisely them defer, (Though hard at hand) for valour him of others I prefer. And Martial. Eortiter ille facit, qui miser esse potest. That man alone doth valiantly, That well can live in misery. 27 When they that are of a contrary faction or partiality, give any counsel worthy of reprehension, their adversaries ought not to rebuke them, lest they which hear them, think they do it more for ill will which they bear them, then for love or affection towards the Commonweal. Moreover, Counsellors, if a matter fall not out according to their expectation, they ought not to reprehend the Princes whom they serve, because they followed the worst counsel; for so doing, they should grieve them worse: and in deed the Princes are blameless; for they do but follow the counsel which their Counsellors Plutarch. in tractatu quo pacto. possis adulatorem ab amico dignoscere. give them. Anctus and Eulus (being two of the King Perseus his very familiar freenos) as long as he lived in prosperity, used no cross speeches against him, but such words as 28 They that give counsel, (as the reverend Father In Lib. cui titulus Dux peccatorum. jews de Grauado saith) ought to be constant in mind: for as gravity and weightiness in matters accompany prudence, so facility and lightness betoken folly: and therefore every one ought to take great heed, he be not too easy and light in these six things: to wit, in believing, in granting, in promising, in determining or concluding, in being easily & lightly conversant among men, and in being angry. For in all these consist manifest danger, if men be over light and easy in them: for he that believeth easily, is light of heart: he that promiseth easily, looseth his liberty: he that doth grant easily, doth often repent: he that doth lightly determine and conclude, putteth himself in danger to err and do amiss: (as King David did in Mephibosheth, 2. Regu●●. 4. his cause) but he that is light in conversation, is little accounted of: and he that is soon angry, showeth a manifest token of foolishness: for he that is patiented, knoweth how to behave himself, and how to lead his life: but he that cannot bridle his anger, cannot choose but commit much folly. 29 Plato exhorteth them that go about to persuade any In Politicis. thing, which is necessary or profitable for the Commonwealth, to imitate the Musicians, who when they finger the strings of their Lutes, to make some harmony or music, they do it softly and smoothly, without any force or violence: he exhorteth them also, not to use cunning & artificious speeches, nor speak sharply or craftily, but sincerely and truly, and that their words be agreeable to honesty and justice, using grave sentences fit to persuade. 30 Such men as have always had prosperous luck, and good success in their affairs, can very seldom give good counsel, as Hannibal told Scipio, in the parley which they had, Tit. Liu. lib. 30. concerning the peace which the carthaginians were about to make with the Romans: & to persuade him to it, Hannibal alleged, that Scipio was a young man, and had always had good luck, and that they which had never been crossed with ill fortune, did very seldom consider, and forecast all unfortunate events which might fall out. For the virtue of counseling well, proceedeth from experience: and they that have tried adversity as well as prosperity, are better able to judge of both, than they which never have been unfortunate: and they which have no experience, cannot give counsel so well, as they that have delivered themselves out of trouble and adversity. 31 Many though they be old in age, yet in manners, behaviour, and prudent, they be but young: and such men are Esay, 65. Puerj ●entum annorum. called in the Scriptures, boys of an hundred years old. Who though their age be sufficient, yet they be not fit to give counsel in matters which require wit & judgement: and we ought more to regard how they live, and what they do, then of what age they be. They that be young in government of life, lightly I●uenis moribus change their minds, and easily pass from one opinion to another: for this trick is proper unto them that want judgement and understanding to examine that which ought to be determined in the Counsel. 32 They that counsel Princes, ought not to use words and reasons, which bear a greater show than they be of force: for he that goeth about to persuade a Prince, must think that he taketh another matter in hand, then if he should persuade the people: for they that persuade the people, seek all means, arguments, and reasons, (though they be never so false) to prove that which they go about, and they use all the figures that Rhetoric teacheth. But to persuade one man (as Quintilian Lib, 1, cap. 3. saith) eloquence little availeth. Antigonus' king of Macedon, said unto one the went about to persuade a certain thing Erasmus in Apo. libro. 4. unto him, with painted words and sophistical reasons: thinkest thou to talk unto me, as if thou spakest with the people? Leonides Psutarch in vita Lycurgj. King of Lacedaemonia, said unto another that spoke too much of a weighty matter: friend, thou speakest of a good purpose, but to no purpose. 33 Counsellors ought to do like the Physicians, and give no counsel, before they know upon what thing counsel is demanded, and what ought to be done concerning the same. For as it is not enough for the Physician to know the disease, unless he also know what medicine ought to be given: so the Counsellor, though he know what is consulted, that sufficeth not, unless he also understand what ought to be done therein. So that it is a thing most necessary for a Counsellor, to have notice of that which is handled in the counsel. For no man can give counsel in any matter, concerning man's life, unless he have both science and experience, touching that which is consulted. But when Counsellors are acquainted with the substance of the matter, and understand it throughlie, then may they easily Facile erit explicatis consilijs accommodare rebus verb a. Matth. cap. 1. Aphorismo, 1. Quintil. li. 2. c. 14 give their resolutions: and (as Ti●●s Liu●us saith) find fit words to deliver their minds: contrariwise, if they understand not the matter which is consulted, they are (as our Lord and Redeemer Jesus Christ saith) like blind men that lead the blind. Neither is it sufficient (as Hypocrates saith) for the Physicians to be acquainted with the infirmities, and know what remedies ought to be applied, but also the time, and other more circumstances ought to be considered. And no less ought Counsellors to regard and consider, that all circumstances of time, place, etc. be accommodated and fitted, to execute the same which shall be determined. Moreover, seeing that all things upon which counsel is taken, are uncertain, and void of all firmness and stableness: counsels ought to be baried and changed, conformable to the time and place, not only every day, but every hour also, and every minute, when necessity shall require it. And for this cause it is said, Sapientis est mutare consilium: it is the point of a wise man to change his counsel. Seneca faith, that counsel ought to be taken whilst the matter is handled. And Ovid saith: — Consilium resque locusque dabunt. The place and thing, Will counsel bring. 34 Some Counsellors are so ambitious, that they will not consent to any counsel but their own: and will not suffer any other man's counsel to be put in practice, though it be never so profitable for the Commonwealth, staying and delaying the execution thereof by all means possible. And whereas they might achieve both honour and glory, by bringing the same to pass which is concluded, they will not: only because it was not done according to their own counsel and liking. But such men know not, that the true glory of heroical enterprises, doth not only consist in knowing what ought to be done, but also in executing that which is determined. 35 They that consult upon matters concerning the Commonwealth, ought not to forego any profit that may be gotten: no not so much as that commodity which may be gotten by such men, as have greatly endamaged the Commonwealth. Chabrias a Citizen of Messala, said unto one Euridanus, (a man chief & principal in the government of the Commonwealth, but very sullen and rigorous in nature. O Euridanus, thou art a necessary evil in the Commonwealth: for they that live in it cannot choose but be conversant with thee, and yet because of thy frowning and lowering countenance, they cannot abide to continue with thee. 36 Plutarch counseleth them that go about to persuade the people to any thing, that they should not all of the at once, sing one note, but that there should be diversity of judgements at the first, but afterwards (as if they were overcome by them that showed better reasons) they should agree all in one opinion, and all jump, as it were, into one mind. For so the people, thinking that they were forced unto that unity of consent, will soon be persuaded, that that which they say, is most profitable for the Commonwealth. But in small matters, and such as cannot greatly endamage the Commonwealth, it were good that the Counsellors should in earnest differ in their censures, one from the other, every one using his own reasons and arguments, that they might afterwards in greater matters of more weight and importance, seem to agree, and be all of one mind. This policy did many Heretics use, suborning some of their friends that should gainsay that which they said, and afterwards when they did dispute with them, they should confess that they had erred in misliking their doctrine, seeing they had with such forcible arguments and necessary conclusions proved and confirmed it unto them. 37 There is much difference betwixt those that in counsels inquire what ought to be done, and those that contrary and cross other men, to show that they only understand all themselves, and that no man else is so fine headed as they be. For they that inquire of all circumstances, concerning that thing about which they consult, consider and sift the matter throughlie without affection, and their judgement is not encumbered with any thing that may hinder them from divining and conjecturing such accidents, as may happen in those matters upon which they deliberate: and these men are very good and necessary in a Commonwealth; for they oftentimes show unto them that govern it, some things, which before that time have lain hidden and secret from them. But contrarily, they that contrary those that propose any thing in counsel, love not the Commonwealth, but hinder and overthrow all affairs both public and private: for whilst they alterate & contend, Nimis altercando veritas amittitur, & Plato, Dialogo, 1. de legibus. Oportet autem non contentiose sed quieté rem inquirere. they cannot find out the truth of any matter, but rather (as Boaecius saith) they go farther from the truth: for it is the property of those that gainsay every thing which others allege, to defend and maintain their own opinion and conceit, thought it be never so false and heretical. Otherwise if men disputed, minding to sift out the truth, and not to overthwart other men in their reasons, they might easily perceive and understand the verity of each matter. And to this end were the Sanctorum Patrum disputationes non erant contentiones sed collationes. disputations of the holy Fathers called, not contentions or differences, but collations and conferencies. For their intent was not to show which of them was wisest, and knew most, but to search out the truth of that which was in question. 39 The Counsellors of Don john Prince of avis, (who Chronica Duci● Nunaluares Pereira, cap, 20. afterward was crowned king of Portugal) perceiving that their Lord always followed the counsel of Don Nunaluares de Pereira, determined all of them jointly together, to stand stiffly against Don Nunaluares, & gainsay all whatsoever he should say. And on a time, as the Prince consulted with his Counsellors upon a matter of great weight, all they that were of his Counsel, misliked that which Don Nunaluares alleged, concerning that which was proposed, which thing, when Don Nunaluares perceived, and marked to what intent they did it, be laughed: and the cause of his laughter being asked of the Prince, he answered: because they have all of them agreed, to disagree from me, and to withstand and contrary what soever I say. But the Prince liking that counsel which Don Nunaluares gave, followed it, nothing respecting that all his other Counsellors were of a contrary judgement. This thing ought to be shunned▪ which is so hurtful and prejudicial to the Commonwealth, as nothing can be more: for what can be worse, then to set more by his own opinion, than the welfare of the Commonwealth▪ Those that assemble together to consult, aught to imitate Aristides, who being wont to contend with Themistocles, when they were both of them sent by the Athenians in Embassage, said: Plutarch, in Apothegma. how now Themistocles, shall we leave our emnities here? and when we return to Athens, we may do as we did before. 39 Some men easily vary and change, when they sit in counsel: others be very obstinate and stiff, and will not vary at all. Certes it were good that a Counsellor should be grounded and settled in his opinion, and follow that which seemeth unto him, to be most profitable for the Commonwealth. But he that will not change his mind, when as his counsel, if it were followed, would do the Commonwealth much harm, is obstinate, self-willed, and stubborn: and is not to be admitted to give advice upon matters concerning the estate of any Commonweal. For wisdom consisteth not in being self-conceited and self-willed, but in knowing how to make choice of that which is best and most profitable: for it is the property of the devil, to persevere still in doing ill: and therefore we use to say. Palabr● de Satanas, No buelue atras. that is, From wicked will we never find, That Satan changeth once his mind. Tully saith, that he doth not change nor alter his counsel, Episto. famil. li. 1. Episto. no. that changeth it to choose a better: and as the Pilot that guideth the ship, moveth the sails from one side to the other side of the ship, to sail the better, and will rather obey the Wind than lose the Ship; so they that consult, aught to vary and change their minds, rather than to endemage or hurt the Commonwealth. And indeed, the end for which counsel was invented, is to have both a great many to show their advice, and each one of them to be of divers opinions, that the best of them all, may be picked out amongst them. 40 Tully affirmeth also, that they which separate, that which is * Lib. 3. officior. Atticae leges Cyrsillū quendam utilia hone stati preferentem lapidibus cum universa familia obrui volebant. honest, from that which is profitable, (honestum ab utili) do the world great harm: for every one now respecteth commodity, nothing regarding virtue. And the same Tully In lib, partit. Consideratio. 355. saith, that in all counsels, that aught to be chosen, which is most profitable for the Commonwealth. This opinion doth johannis Franciscus Lotini follow, because he thinketh that Tully followed it, when he was old, after he had seen the event of many public affairs: and because Aristotle concluded the end of counsel, to be the vitilitie and profit of the Commonwealth. This opinion of Tully, is confirmed with that which the Laws of the twelve Tables ordain, to wit, that the chief end of all Law, tendeth to the conservation of the Commonwealth. The uttermost end and issue of the Law is, the preservation of the Commonwealth. When men deliberate upon the safety of the Commonwealth, they ought not to regard honesty, but setting aside all respects, they ought to follow that which is profitable. They which defend the majesty of their Kings and Lords, will not suffer any one to say, that any thing which the King hath granted or allowed, is ignominious, infamous, or unhonest. For they say, that no insamie, reproach, or dishonour, can fall into any determination which the King approveth. But I take that opinion, to be of more weight and moment, which holdeth, that we ought to make more account of honesty, then of utility: but if that which is honest, depend upon the Civil and positive Laws, and not upon the natural and divine Laws, let all the Civil laws cease, when as the necessity of the Commonwealth is so great, that it can not be remedied unless they be broken. This holds in those Commonweals, which acknowledge no superior: and in those also which do acknowledge one, if they only violate those Laws which they may break, without the hurt or hindrance of their Superior: for all the human and positive Laws, which are instituted and ordained for the conservation of the Commonwealth, cease, if they be hurtful and damageable to the Commonwealth. Titus Livius termeth them mortal Laws, for wars change those that were made for peace, and peace breaketh those that were made for war. 41 Themistocles, in a certain consultation, said, that he Plutarch in vita Th●m●stoclis. had thought upon a thing, which would be very profitable for the Commonwealth, but it was such as might not be pronounced openly, nor known unto all men. They that were of the Counsel, answered, that he should make Aristides acquainted with it, and if he approved it, they would every one like of it: upon this, he showed unto Aristides, how that he had determined to fire their enemy's Ships, that they being consumed with unlooked-for flames, the Athenians might be absolute Lords over all Greece. Aristides hearing this, told the other Counsellors, that Themistocles his counsel, was very profitable, but very unjust; whereupon they would have no more mention made about it, and that with great reason. For whensoever any question is moved concerning the soul & substance, or riches and authority: it is most manifest, that the soul is better than the whole compass of all the world: and it ought not in any case to be permitted, that learned flatterers should Franciscus Villalobos in prob. be admitted to such counsels. For these men are they that use to justify both parts, & by reason of these, each side thinketh that he doth according to justice. Francis King of France, did owe unto the Emperor Charles the sift, two Millions of crowns, and the learned men of his Counsel told him that he ought not to pay them: which counsel the King no doubt had followed, if the Emperor had not had his two sons as pledges for his assurance. On the otherside, the learned men of the Emperor's Counsel, said, that the King of France ought to pay those two Millions of crowns, because he had waged war against him unjustly, and was taken prisoner in the same conflict: and all those crowns were in comparison nothing, to the loss and damage which the Emperor had received by those wars. But the King of France could not be persuaded, but that he had right according to his Counsellors minds, and forthwith, sent a strong and mighty Army towards Naples, where he lost out of his own treasure, above sire millions of crowns, and all the treasure of France, with all the youth of his Nobility, and all their Captains: and at the end nevertheless, he was constrained to pay the two millions of crowns. 42 Silence at all times, and in all places (as Plutarch ●n libro de offi●●● auditoris. saith) is a great Ornament unto a Counsellor: especially when he heareth another speak, he ought not to interrupt his speech, and at every word which he faith, to cut him off and hinder his discourse, but patiently to suffer him that speaketh, to say his mind, and make an end of his speech, though it do overflow with many words which be not very acceptable unto him. And when he hath made an end, than ought not the other too hastily begin, to gainsay or cross that which he hath said: but stay a while (as Eschines saith) and see whether he will recall that which he hath said, or correct it, or add any thing more unto it, or detract some thing from it. They which incontinently interrupt and break another man's discourse, and do so lose their patience, that they cannot stay the hearing of four or five reasons alleged by another, but begin to speak before the other hath done, they do both trouble others, and yet cannot be heard themselves. But they that be accustomed to hear an other give his verdict, patiently with sufferance, and a quiet moderation of mind, admit and allow those words and reasons, that are good, profitable, necessary, and expedient, and keep them in remembrance: but those that are vain, foolish, & false, they sever and discern them from the other: and so they show themselves to be more desirous to search out the truth, then to contend and strive, whereby they be known not to be men without consideration, or over-rashe and headlong hasty, not contentious, or wranglers. Therefore he that will achieve honour and credit, aught to hear him that speaketh, attentively, meekly, willingly, pleasantly, & with great toleration, as if he were at some religious and sacred banquet. 43 Xenophon said, that even as they that be thrifty and Plutarchua ●●i supra. good husbandmen, use to buy as well of their enemies as of their friends: so they that hear others, ought with great vigilancy and watchfulness, always to be attentive to reap profit by that which they hear, whether it be good or bad: and consider whether they that speak, say any thing which tendeth to the matter, or whether they be deceived, and are wide from that which they aim at, whether they allege forcible reasons, or clatter out a heap of vain arguments; and whether they use any good figure or laudable form of speech, ending their periods with some gracious clause, or commit some great absurdity, whereby they thought to get some credit or vainglory: or some such other like thing. And this aught to be noted by the hearers, to the end that they may consider with themselves, and examine their own defects: for they cannot so well mark faults in themselves, as they can easily correct in others: which when they find in others, they ought to consider whether they jar not in that string themselves, before they find it a fault with others. For certes it is an easy matter to rebuke, but a very vain thing, and ignominious unto us, if we be faulty ourselves, and take not heed from falling into the same errors: wherefore when we rebuke any one, we ought to think continually upon that saying of Plato, have not I perhaps committed any such thing? and even as in the eyes of other men, wes see the representation of our own Image: so ought we to imagine our own words in the words of other men, to the end we should not over-rashly despise others, and that we should take more heed and diligence when we speak ourselves. Moreover, it were very profitable and expedient, that Counsellors should compare that which they hear others say, unto that which they say themselves: and attentively consider, whether they hear any thing that is not well followed by him that reasoneth. And if he declare and expound it not, as well and sufficiently as the matter requireth, than they should themselves endeavour to expound, and explain the same more clearly and exactly, or declare it after some other order or manner, or take the same argument, and quite change it from the beginning to the end, uttering and pronouncing it in better words and fit phrases. 44 They that assemble together to consult, ought not to be proud, and puffed up with vain glory, nor lean upon any thing, bending their bodies on neither side, nor hang their heads, but sit bolt upright, having their bodies erected in comely order, and giving ear unto him that speaketh, in so much that he may perceive them which hear him to be attentive: They ought moreover to be constant, sincere, pure, uncorrupted, simple, without dissimulation, not puffed up with pride, hatred, or any other thing: in so much that they ought always to be in a readiness, and not to seek what they should say concerning those things whereof they consult. For as many things are required to make a man perfectly virtuous, like as in Music to make a consort, many notes are requisite which concur altogether in one time within their limited compass: so contrarily, if any one thing be wanting, the whole is blemished: as also in Music one jar brings all out of tune. And therefore Counsellors ought to take great heed, how they behave themselves in consultations, especially when they hear any other to discourse: for than ought they not only, not to knit or hang the brows, nor to cast their countenance downwards, giving show of sorrow, nor to gaze about, nor to turn their bodies, nor to hold their feet undecently: but also, not to make signs, not to whisper with another, not to laugh, not to yaune, not to nod as they that be drowsy, and not to be rude in behaviour: for all such like things are worthy of correction, and require great care & diligence. And note this; that all that which we have said of those that hear, ought also to be observed by those that speak. Furthermore, as in Tennis play, he that receiveth the ball, aught to move and bend his body, cunningly to bandy it back again to him that sent it, so in reasoning and discoursing, as well he that speaketh, as he that heareth, must do his part & duty, and diligently observe what he ought to do. So that Counsellors ought, whether they hear or speak, to behave themselves orderly in all respects; and take heed when they begin to speak or discourse of any thing, that they be not too tedious; for many, when they once begin to talk, they never make an end. 45 The Counsellors of Princes are subject unto two great inconveniences, The first is, that if they counsel not their Princes to do that which they think to be most profitable for the Commonwealth, without having any respect unto their own profit, or any other thing; then they discharge not their duty. The second is, that if they do counsel their Princes, to do that which they will not do, than they incur danger of their lives. And to shun these inconveniences, the best and safest way for them is, to beware of both extremes, and follow a mean in every thing: showing their minds unto their Prince with great modesty, concerning every matter, (as that which toucheth nothing their own persons) in such order, that if the Prince follow their advice, he may do it willingly of his own accord, that it seem not that he is drawn or forced to do it, by the importunity of him that giveth the counsel. And if the Counsellor do thus, there is no reason why the Prince should bear him ill will, or be highly offended with him: and so the Counsellor may avoid that danger, which else he should incur, if in any thing he withstood the Prince his pleasure: or the self-liking and opinion of the other Counsellors. For if the success be infortunate, every one endeavoureth to dispatch him which gave the counsel. So that in this case, when Counsellors counsel their Princes modestly (after the manner which we have showed) though they get not that glory which they obtain when the counsel falleth out prosperously: yet they have two commodities, the one, that they be not subject to any danger, the other, that though their counsel have no prosperous event, yet they get no discredit by it, but be rather in more account. And contrarily, they that will be chief & principal in the Counsel, and will suffer no counsel to be preferred before their own, if their counsel fall out unhappily, & have but had success, than they are rebuked, & bear all the blame: and though it fall out well, yet the discredit and infamy which they procure when the matter doth fall out unfortunately, is greater than the credit or glory which they get when all things succeed prosperously. 46 As they that are invited to some banquet, must be content Plutarch. de officio auditoris. with that which is set on the Table before them, without ask any thing else: even so in counsels, they that hear another man speak, aught to hear him with great attention: and not to move any doubts, or interrupt his speech with vain questions: for all the profit that cometh thereof, is only to trouble him that speaketh, and cause him to err, and digress from the purpose. And therefore they ought not to be troublesome unto them that are in the Counsel, ask them often about one and the self same thing: for such (as Plutarch saith) Vbi supra. are like those little birds, that cannot yet fly, and yet be always gaping at other birds bills, to receive their food already champed and chewed by them. To conclude, it is the point of foolish and simple fellows, and such as have no wit, to be ask of questions at every word, and to be still informed upon every point. 47 They that consult upon matters of great importance, aught to consider, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) whether that Lib, 18, which they determine upon, be profitable unto their Princes, and whether it may be put in execution, without harming or endamaging the Commonwealth. They ought also to consider; whether they that give the counsel, are like to come into into trouble if it fall not out prosperously: and who shall gain the credit and honour if all things succeed happily. And above all, they ought to have a regard, what the people talk, if the Prince do as they counsel him; for though all other men use to follow those counsels, which are most profitable for them, though they be not altogether just: yet Princes ought to do nothing (as the Emperor Tiberius saith) that passeth the bounds of justice: greatly regarding their fame & reputation: and what would be said of them, if they should follow counsels that were hurtful to the Commonwealth. The thirteenth discourse. Of the Counsel of estate, and of the ordinances and laws that appertain to the same Counsel. THe Counsel of estate (as Plato saith) is the anchor Dialogo, 12; whereon dependeth the safety or loss of all the Commonwealth. For this Counsel looketh to the whole Commonwealth: and (as Isocrates saith) it is the soul thereof: and it is In Areopagitico. like to prudence in man, which hath a care of the estate of the whole body. All other counsels depend upon this one Counsel: and it is called the Counsel of peace, because the chief and principal intent of this Counsel is, to procure that every one may live in peace and quietness: for this is the end for which the Counsel of estate was ordained. For (as Plato saith) wars are not made for any other cause, then to Dialog. 1. de legibus. procure peace. This Counsel of estate, doth oftentimes change the governments into tyrannies, and quite destroy the Commonweals: and, (as Hesiodus saith) one ill counsel given by some wicked man, causeth the decay and ruin of many Cities: and therefore it is commonly said, that all the welfare of the Commonwealth, lieth all in all in the counsel of estate. And because in my Books of Commonweals, I writ of all the other Counsels in their proper places; I mean in this place to entreat of the Counsel of estate, which is (as the Emperor Adrianus junius animad vers. lib. 3, cap, 9 Charles the fift said) the knowledge, power, and understanding, yea, the very eyes, hands and feet of every Prince. 2 Fredecicus Furius saith, that the charge of the Counsel of estate, is Civil (as the Laws term it) and whether the In libro de consilio & confiliarijs principum. kingdoms be gotten by force of Arms, or by inheritance, it is pertaining to the Counsel of estate, to see what Viceroys, Governors, and Generals be created, as well for peace as for war: what marriages be contracted, and what Ambassadors be sent into strange Countries, and whither all other Officers discharge their duty or no: and what provision ought to be made and not made. The Counsel of estate ought also to take heed, that no provisions, voyages, and expeditions be made by stealth, to the damage of the Commonwealth, and commodity of the enemy. It appertaineth also to the Counsel of estate, to see that all ordinary expenses & charges, be discharged in due time, as well in peace as in war, and to give bills for the receipt of the money out of the Counsel of substance and Revenues: which Counsel ought to be as a Cosfer to keep the money, which is to be distributed and delivered out, by the Commission and authority of those that are belonging to the Counsel of estate. It is also belonging unto this Counsel, to see with what Nations they ought to make peace, and against what Nations to wage war: with what people they cught to be confederated, and with whom to use fair words and large promises, but accomplish nothing, and such other like things, public or private. This holds in that which generally pertaineth to the other counsels: for if this Counsel of estate, should meddle with every particular thing that belongeth to the other Counsels, it should usurp the Office of them all. 3 The Counsel of estate, hath all jurisdiction both Civil and Criminal. And what ever is determined in it, aught to be put in execution, as if the Prince himself had commanded it. For this counsel above all others, doth chiefly represent the person of the Prince: and for this cause the Prince ought to be Lib. 1. cod. de officio Vicarij. personally in those consultations which are made in the Counsel of estate, to the end, that nothing be ordained, which may harm the Commonwealth. So that every Prince ought to consult with his Counsellors, and with the learned men of his Realm, whether such ordinances as he meaneth to publish be good and profitable for the Commen-wealth. For there is nothing that is more contrary to a good Prince; and proper to a Tyrant, than to say, Sic volo sic i●beo; stat proratione voluntas. Thus I command, thus shall it be, For reason, will, shall stand with me. 4 Seeing that in the Counsel of estate, it is chiefly consulted what ought to be done, for the preserving and maintaining of the Commonwealth it is necessary that the Counsellors of that Counsel, be well practised and experienced in Military discipline, and very skilful and prudent in ruling Commonwealths: so that they ought to know how to inquire, examine, and judge all things concerning policy and government, both in peace and war. Further more, they that consult upon peace, whither it he profitable, it should be established or no: ought to know what is belonging to war, seeing peace and war he two contraries: and the nature of contraries is such, that the one is known by the other. In ancient times passed, many Senators entered into the Senate of Rome to consult, and they that had triumphed for victory over their enemies, sat with the Crowns on their heads (which they wore when they triumphed) as tokens and shows of their virtue and excellency. And this did Cyneas the Ambassador of Pyrrhus declare, when he being asked of Pyrrhus what he thought of the Senate Plutarch in vita Pyrrhj. of Rome, he answered, that it seemed unto him to be a counsel of many Kings, that were assembled together to consult. Livy reporteth, that Cyneas in this answer, showed the greatness and excellency of the Senate of Rome, for in it were not only many noble and famous Captains, with those Crowns on their heads, with which they triumphed, because they had valiantly overcome their enemies, and subdued many Princes to the Empire of Rome: but also many ancient persons of great authority & estimation, wonderfully exercised in the government of the Commonwealth. 5 Those ordinances and Laws, that were made at the Macchiavellus in discursibus. first beginning of the Common-wealthy, when men were good, afterwards whenanen became wicked, served to no purpose: for the Laws vary according to the accidents that happen in the Cities, but the ordinances are very seldom altered. And this is the cause that good Laws suffice not, because the ordinances remaining stable and inviolable, do disannul them. There was in Rome, the ordinance of government, or rather of estate; and after wards the Laws and Offices with which they bridled the Citizens. The ordinance of the ostate, was the authority of the people of the Senate of the Tribunes (for so the Protectors of the Commons were called in Rome) and of the Consuls: and it was the manner and order how the Laws should be ordained. Which ordinance is not change or al●●eb by reason of any accidents that may chance, but she Laws which keep the Citizens in obedience, they be altered: as the Laws which were made for the constraint of adultery, of excessive expenses, and ambition, and many other Laws aceording as the people daily grew to be more & more wiched and vicious. But because the ordinances of the estate, which the people being corrupted) were not good, did remain inviolable: those Laws which were renewed, did not suffice to keep the people from wickedness: but they might have doone-much good, if the ordinances had been renewed with the Laws. 6 We may easily perceive, that it is not good, to have the ordinances remain stable and inviolable, when as the Citizens ware wicked, by two principal things: the one touching the election of Officers, and ordaining of Magistrates: the other touching the establishing of Laws. There was an ordinance in Rome, that none might be Consuls, or bear any other great Office in the City, saving those Citizens that did stand for the Office, and made suit for it. This ordinance at the beginning was very good, for then no Citizens sued or sought to bear Office, but such as thought that they did deserve to be in authority, and they took it for a great diseredit to have the repulse, and therefore every one, because they would be judged and accounted worthy of that dignity, endeavoured to be virtuous. But after ward, this ordinance became very harmful and pernicious: for they that were most mighty, not most virtuous, sued for the dignity, & they that were not mighty, though virtuous, for fear durst not stand for the Offices. To this inconvenience came it, though not in a moment, yet in continuance and tract of time, as all other inconveniences use to happen. For the Romans having subdued all Africa and Asia, and brought almost all Greece under their subjection, assured themselves of liberty, and thought not that they had any enemies whom they needed to fear. With security of theirs, and weakness of their enemies, caused the people of Rome in the election of their Consuls, not to respect virtue, but favour: so that those were placed in that dignity, that witted better how to entertain their friends, then to encounter with their enemies. And after that, they which were most gracious had a pretty while borne the Offices, than they which were mightiest, and could prevail most, were elected to be head Officers, so that honest and virtuous men, by the defect of such an ordinance, were altogether excluded from the dignities, and prebeminences which chiefly appertained unto them. 7 Therefore to the end that a Commonwealth may be maintained in her wont liberty, it is necessary that new ordinances be made, to remedy that which the malice of men bathe corrupted: for little profit the Laws, when the whole subject and body (as it were) of the Commonweal is so much disordered, that they cannot possibly set it in order again. Some say it is well nigh impossible, that all ordinances should be changed: for if they would disannul them by little and little, it is necessary that it should be done by some wise man that foreseeth and perceiveth, what inconveniences might happen by reason of such like ordinances, and those men that are accustomed to live after one manner and order will not alter that ordinance, especially, because they perceive not the discommodity thereof, unless it be showed unto them by apparent conjectures. Moreover, if they would go about to repair the ordinances all in a moment, yet albeit every one esteemed them to be nought that yet would it be very hardly brought to pass. For to use ordinary means, (seeing they be nought) is not enough: but it is necessaire, that he should come at last to extraordinary means, to wit, violence and Arms: and before any other thing, to make himself chief of that City, that he may change all things at his will and pleasure: and to establish his Laws and ordinances, it is necessary he should have authority to suppress them, that through envy propose themselves to gainsay & contrary them: for no man can hope that tract of time may confirm them, and his virtue and honesty that bringeth them in, sufficeth not: and as for the favour of the people, that is variable: and wickedness and mischief will not be appeased by any gifts or good turns, according to that. Improbitas nullo flectitur officio. A knavish minded man Reform, no duty can. Moses slew many men, which for envy and hatred rose up Num. cap. 25. against him, and would not have that the Laws and ordinances which he published should go forwards. To conclude, because it is necessarily required in the mutation, or rather reformation of a Commonwealth, that it should be done by a good man, and because it is presupposed, that he which maketh himself Prince by force & violence, is a wicked man, it chanceth very seldom, that a good man will make himself Prince by ill means, though his intent be good, or that a naughty and Cornel. Tacit. lib. 27. Nemo enim unquam imperium stagitio quesitum bonis attibus exercuit. wicked man, after he is made Prince, will use that authority well, which he hath obtained by ill uteanes: and therefore it is necessary that the Commonweal be reduced to the estate of a kingdom. 8 All this discourse (which is taken out of Machiavelli) is grounded upon this, that in those Commonweals that be ruled and governed by many, they that rule and govern them, do very hardly agree one with another, in keeping and altering the old and ancient custonies: and it seemeth that this holds in those Commonweals, that are weak and governed by the counsel of many: who, though the inconveniences be most manifest and notorious: yet through their natural imbecility, they know not, nor cannot tell how to repair them: But those Commonweals that can renew the old rites and customs, can as well annihilate and disannul those Galen in lib. artis medicae, ca 89 that be both bad and hurtful, and as Physicians when they be acquainted with the causes of the diseases, they take them away first, and afterward very easily cure their Patients, so it is convenient, that they which gonerne Commonweals, should as a necessary remedy, execute punishment on offenders, when men live so corruptly and wickedly, that those ordinances which at the first were good & holy, cannot be innovated without bloodshed and fire: which are the remedies with which God doth cure the vices of men● as Physicians, when purging and letting of blood suffice not, use searing to cure the diseases. They therefore that govern Commonweals, ought diligently to search out, whether the dissoluteness of men's manners springeth hereof, that the accustomed Laws are not good and profitable for the Commonwealth. And it is a great deal better to repair them, by adding, changing, or diminishing, then by altogether destroying them. But if human malice have so corrupted them, that they cannot be bettered, but by banishment, confiscations of goods, killing or burning, then must the verte Hippocrates. lib, 1. aphor. 6. uttermost and last remedies take place. As the Physicians do in those diseases that cannot be otherwise cured. As I have declared more at large, in my Books of policies or Commonweals. 9 A Uenotian Gentleman nanted Bernardus Campellus, Francis. Lotious Considerate. 45. would have had a Law published and proclaimed, that none should have been chosen to bear Office in the Commonweal, which had been in Office the year immediately before, but that some years should have been interiected before he should be elected again: he was moved no doubt to think upon such a Law, because he saw that the same persons, remaining so many years together in their Office, many other Gentlemen that might as well have been serviceable for the Commonwealth, were excluded from the government: and he imagined it not expedient for the safety and commodity thereof, that the Offices belonging thereunto, should be bestowed but upon a few Citizens, which might stand her in steed. But these reasons which Bernard Campellus alleged to persuade the Lords of Venice, to bring in the Law which permitted none to continue in Office, séened not to be so requisite, as that the former ordinauncés should be canceled by reason of them: and they that were of the Counsel of ten, would not consent, that such a Law should be proposed in the Senate: for they thought it would be hurtful for the Commonwealth, to alter and abrogate those Laws, whereby their predecessors, being men of great prudence and singular wisdom, had long time before governed and maintained it: and that it was not expedient to innovate those ordinances which are belonging to the estate: because men being naturally given to innovations, and oftentimes do choose the worst: if that they should once permit the ancient ordinances, to be altered & innovated: the Commonwealth should never be free from factions and dissensions: and because albeit it be dangerous to have the Offices continue still with the self-same persons: yet it is not so when there be many men in the Commonwealth, that are in as great power and authority as those few that bear Office: and for this cause, though they would hurt and endamage the Commonwealth, they can not: and though they that▪ be chosen be but few, yet they be chosen out of many, and the greater company, may more easily withstand the less. 10 Though the Counsel of ten in Venice, permitted not this Law to be proposed in the Senate, which bernard Campello would feign have brought in, yet can no man deny, but that it is more profitable for the Commonwealth, to have Aristot. lib. 4. Politicorun. ca 15. many to bear such Offices, and enjoy such dignities as are in the Commonwealth, then but a few: for when a few have all the authority, and they only are in power and dignity, those few if they continue in Office, may easily tyrannize over the Commonwealth: and there remain many men which do the Commonwealth no service, whereas they might stand her in great steed: so that it were a great deal more expedient, that the Commonwealth should be governed by many, and that every one upon hope to be admitted to the government, should endeavour to be virtuous, and live honestly and decently▪ notwithstanding the danger that may ensue by beginning to innovate and abroagate the Laws of the estate: for when as the profit which is to follow, is manifestly and surely known to be greater than the hurt which is feared that will en●ue: then the Governors of the Commonweal, aught to ●brogate them; and place others in their steed, for the end for which all Laws are made (as we have said) is the public commodity & profit of the Commonwealth: according to the Law of the twelve Tables: Salus publica suprema lex est. And they that do not so, are like unto the Governors in a 1. in rebus ff. de constitut. principum in rebus novis constituendis evidens esse utilitas debet ut recedatur ab eo iure. quod diu aequum visum est. certain place in Spain, who consulting whether they should wall a certain Well about, in which many children had been drowned, the Elders of the Counsel would not consent unto it: because their predecessors had many years used to fetch water out of that Well, though it was not walled about. Therefore the Counsellors of Princes, aught to consider whether it be better for them to change the ordinances, or to let them remain as they be, or altogether to disannul them. And if they do change Seneca. laboramus magis opinione quam ●●. Et Plato. Plu●●nos tenent ●u● pre●●●t. and alter them, they shall▪ do well to attribute the name of the old unto the new, for the people oftentimes, is more moved with the names of things, then with the things themselves. And therefore they that altar, and reform ancient ordinances, aught to keep still the names, shadow and similitude of the old ordinances, that the people perceive not that they be changed, though the new be altogether different from the old. For men are deceived with the show of things, and think it to be s● in deed. And many times they be more moved with that which only seemeth to be, then with the thing itself. Finally, as the Physicians when they cure any disease, they vary and change the diet and physic which they minister unto the sick, according as it doth them good or harm: so they unto whom the government of Commonweals is committed, aught to leave o● change the ordinances and laws, according as they be profitable or hurtful to the Commonwealth. And as the Physicians apply their medicines & remedies to the diseases: so they that govern Commonweals, aught▪ to punish and chastise the offenders and transgressors of the Laws, both with money and corporal pains. And for to remedy the inconveniences and harms that are in a Commonwealth, it is not enough to change the Governors of it, and choose others, if the fault proceed not from them: and as the Ague is not driven away by changing of the Physicians only: unless others be found that are more skilful, and know better how to cure it then the first: so the vices & harms of the Commonwealth, are not taken away by changing the Officers and Magistrates, unless such persons succeed in the Offices, that know how a Commonwealth ought to be governed. 11 If any man obtain the principality in a City or estate, and become chief of the place, when his foundation is weak, and he thinketh that he shall not be able to keep the Commonwealth long in the same estate into which he hath brought it: than that it may not return into the former estate, his best remedy were to change and alter all things: to make new governments, new ordinances, and new Laws, and call them all by new terms and new names: and to take the authority from them that were in dignity, and give it to others: to make new Officers, new Magistrates, and new men, and to make them that were poor, rich: and them that were rich poor: and in a word, to alter and turno all things t●psie turvy: by killing the greatest heads, & those that have most power, Arist. Polit. lib. 5. cap. 10. Periand●● ad Thrasibulum. Lu●ius Florus, lib. 1. Gestorum Romano. cap. 7. as Periander counseled Thrasibulus; and Tarqu●●●us the proud counseled his son, when he took the City of the Gabians. Besides this, he ought to build up new Cities, and pull down some old Cities: and remove the inhabitants of one City into another, and finally, not to leave any thing in that province which is not changed and altered: and that in it there be no degree, no order, no estate, or dignity, which he that hath it do not acknowledge, that he doth enjoy it by the grant or gift of him that made himself Prince. And thus did Philip King of Macedon, Father to Alexander the great, make himself Lord over all Greece, placing the men of one Province into another, as Shepherds drive▪ a flock of Sheep out of one failed into another. But this policy and manner of conservation of arrestate, is properly used by them that tyrannize over the Commonwealth. For having not wherewithal to satisfy them that follow them, and to keep them to their friends that favour them: they rob, spoil, burn, kill; murder, destroy, ransack, and pull down all things, using most cruel remedies, altogether contrary to the purity and sincerity of Christian Religion: which permitteth not that any man should make himself, by endamaging his neighbour, and so commit mortal sin: wherefore every one ought rather to be contented with a private life, then desire a kingdom, by destroying and undoing so many men. 12 If the government of any Commonweal be altered out of one estate into another: as for example out of a democracy into an oligarchy, or out of an oligarchy into a Monarchy, it is expedient, that the Laws and ordinances of the estate be altered also. As Brutus did, when he cast the kings out of Rome, and brought in the government of the Consuls, changing the kingdom into a consulship: and so the Commonwealth was governed by two Consuls, and the choice and election of the Magistrates was given to the people. So like wise the Roman Emperors, after they became Lords over the whole Empire, by little and little altered and changed all the Laws and ordinances by which the Commonwealth was governed, during the consulship: accommodating and fitting the Laws conformable to the estate which they would bring in: and use the Laws as Physicians use medicines; for it properly concerneth Cap● rex pacificus in proaemio decietalium. Laws to cure the vices, naughty customs; and dissolute manners, which disquiet and molest the Commonwealth. And as the Physicians use not to cure all diseases with one medicine, and apply not the same medicine at all times: but according to the strength or feebleness of the sick, and other circumstances considered, vary and alter their remedies and physic which they minister, and in many sicknesses they defer the cure till some other time, rather than they would remedy them with manifest danger of life: so it is a great deal better, and more convenient in government, to dissemble some things, then to go about to mend them with the loss & damage of the whole Commonwealth. This counsel did Pompey the great think to use, in the war which julius Caesar waged against the Commonwealth, and to maintain that war as Fabius Maximus maintained, the war which Hannibal made against Italy. For in such enterprises, and many other affairs, the time doth dissolve and overthrow them: and to go about to dispatch and destroy them in haste, were to spoil the Commonwealth. 13 They err greatly, that think that the mixed bodies Machiauell' lib. 3. in prohemio discursuum. of Commonweals be cured, by reducing them into their first original: for seeing that the mixed bodies, are like to men's bodies, (which because they increase and decrease, Children and babes ought to be cured one way, young folks another way, and old men after another manner, conformable to their age and compl●rion: for as the Physicians say, every day some Quotidie aggregatur aliquid in nobis quod indiget curatione. humour is engendered in man's body, which must be cured no less with preservative medicines then curative;) that which ought to be considered in the rule and government of a Commonweal, is, that great care be had of the public commodity, and welfare of the whole body of the Commonwealth: as the Physicians have of the soundness & wholesomeness of man's whole body, when they cure and heal the sick. It is therefore expedient, that they which govern Commonweals, change and alter the Laws and ordinances, by which the Commonweals were ruled when they began, and square them to the times in which the Commonweals increase, and become greater and larger. For a great Commonwealth cannot be conveniently maintained; with the self same Laws and ordinances, with which it was maintained and governed, when it was but little, though notwithstanding that it be said, that Princes go about to spoil and mar the estate, when they begin to break the old laws and rites, and ancient customs, under which men▪ lived many years: for this holds not, when necessity requireth that the government should be changed, and squared to the present estate of the Commonwealth. And as the Physicians cut or burn off one member of the body, to save the sick man's life: and as the skilful Pilot, casteth the wares & Merchandise over-boorde, to help the ship out of the imminent danger: and as the Shepherd hath the charge over the whole flock to cure it: even so it is convenient, that they which govern the Commonwealth; should consider what vices and disorders, disquiet and trouble it. And even as the diligent and careful Labourer, taketh great pains in weeding his Gardens, and rooting out those herbs which are rather hurtful then wholesome unto his grounds: so they that rule and govern Commonweals, aught to labour, cleansing them from all pernicious weeds of wickedness and naughtiness, which hurt them: for there is nothing more hurtful, and less profitable to the Commonwealth, then to suffer dissoluteness of manners, and pernicious customs to increase and augment daily; which afterwards, molest and vex the Commonwealth. And, to bind every man to live politicly, and according to reason, as well by rewards as by punishment, in every Commonwealth. Parliaments be holden: in which the Estates being assembled together, consult upon all things that necessarily aught to be done, for the commodity, profit, and conservation of the whole Commonwealth. 14 Aristotle is of this mind, that such Laws and ordinances Politicor. lib. 2. cap. 6. as are profitable to the Commonwealth, should not be altered, and that those that are not very harmful, should not be abrogated: for if they should still be changed, altered, and renewed, and have no stableness or firmity in them, they be but little accounted and esteemed of by the people: for they think, that as some of them be changed, so they will all be altered. And therefore they obey not the Laws with such reverence and duty as they ought to do. This which Aristotle saith, aught to be observed▪ in the election of Officers and Magistrates, and all other things pertaining to the Commonwealth: not changing or renewing any Law or ordinance, which endomageth not the D. L. in rebus ff. de constitut. princip. Commonwealth: for the less they be changed or reform, the less they be transgressed. As I writ more at large in my Books of policies and Commonweals, in the Treatise of Laws and Lawmakers. But if the Governors of the Commonweals, change and alter one manner of government into another, they ought to forecast and consider with themselves, whether that people, whose government they go about to abolish, are wont and accustomed to live in liberty, and whether they be privileged, and have gotten the government by succession, or by law of Arms: for those Princes find the people more loving and willing to obey, that continue in succession of some estate, than they that newly begin the inheritance. Cornelius Tacitus saith, that it is expedient, that they which Libro, 20. newly obtain some estate, should use great liberality & mercy, especially, if the people be accustomed to be mercifully and courteously dealt withal. So that if Princes follow that counsel which the Elders gave unto Roboam, despising the advice 3. Reg. 12. which the young men gave him, than they shall govern their people (as Philip de la Torre saith) with love of brotherhood In tractatu d● Institut. principis Christian●. and Christian charity, to the end that the people, with the same love and charity may obey them. For there is no better way for a Prince to be beloved, honoured, reverenced, and obeyed of his Subjects, then to love them first: which, Princes would soon do, if they did enter into themselves, and consider that they are Shepherds, Pastors, and fathers of the multitude, which God hath committed and commended unto them to maintain and defend them, and to aid, relieve, and secure them, when they be wearied with labours, consumed with pestilence, and wasted with wars. But those subjects that be wealthy & well able, aught to aid their Prince in the defence of the Commonwealth, and relief of the poor and needy people, that have been oppressed with the grievous tyranny of war. For, seeing that, part of the commodity that is gotten by defending the Commonwealth; falleth to their share, it is great reason they should assist their Prince to aid the Commonwealth, and deliver it from out the hands of the enemy, putting him to flight and driving him from their borders: and they ought not to excuse themselves, either because they be exempted or privileged: for no such excuses are to be admitted in time of necessity. But the Prince on the otherside, must so moderately, and after such order use them, that he do not (as the Emperor Tiberius Suetonius in Tiberio. saith) flay them, but shave them: and seeing that the causes wherefore we be chastised, ill dealt withal, destroyed, and vexed with wars, famine, dissensions and plagues, are common: (for we are all sinners, and in many things we greatly offend against the Lord: and perchance they that think themselves blameless, are most faulty) it is great reason that every one should join with the King, and bear a part of all the troubles and charges with him: seeing that not so much as our Kedéemer and Lord Jesus Christ, nor all the Apostles, denied to pay their Matth. 17. part unto the Magistrates: if not for right, and because it is due, yet both because the Commonwealth should not be disquieted, and also with their example, to encourage and stir up others that be better able to do the same. 15 Very small faults, and such as are not seen at the first, are more dangerous than great faults: for that danger which Lotinus in considerationibus. is known, causeth men to seek means to avoid it: but that which is not known, groweth so much by little and little, that when it is known, it cannot be remedied: and it is like unto the disease called Febris ethica, which when it beginneth, a man feeleth or perceiveth not any harm: but when it is come so far that he knoweth it, no medicine can cure it. And this doth proceed, by reason that men commonly consider, only that which they see: and that which at the beginning seemeth to be but a small thing, and altogether unlike to become any thing hurtful: growing by little and little, at length waxeth very domagable to the Commonwealth: which may be easily seen in those assemblies and congregations where many meet together in secret, which at the beginning seem not to threaten any great harm: and yet at the length, when they are fully grown and augmented, they wonderfully disquiet the Commonweals, and cause many hurlie-burlies. The Romans Ff. de collegijs et corporibus illicitis late per Brisonium lib. 1. selecta●ū. ca 14. would not permit any great assemblies or companies, to gather together, without they had licence of the Prince, and they ordained, that every company or congregation, should have a Precedent, whom (because of the authority that was given him by the Prince) all they that were of those congregations or assemblies, should obey. And those Precedents should inquire and examine, what men gathered into those companies. For the people being like to the Sea, which by any wind is soon moved, they that assemble together when opportunity serveth, they disquiet the Commonwealth. And as it doth a man much harm to have any one of all his members, to grow bigger than the Aristo. Polit. 5. cap. 3. rest, and to exceed the proportion of all his other members: so great care ought to be had, that no assembly or congregation be suffered to grow so long, that it may bring harm unto the Commonwealth. The Emperor Traianus, wrote unto Pliny, when he governed Plin. in Episto. ad Traianum. the province of Bethynia, that he should not let the company of those that made the Armour & Instruments for war, to increase so much, that they might hurt or endamage the Commonwealth. 16 When the government beginneth to be diminished, because there be more that govern naughtily, then well: them a small thing sufficeth to hinder the execution of that which is determined in the Counsel, and though some counsel well, yet it is to no end, seeing that the greater part beareth it away: and their being in the Counsel, is to no other purpose, then to be partakers of the fault which they commit that counsel ill: these men are very unfortunate: for if they contrary and gainsay that which the other say, they incur manifest danger, that the other ill Counsellors will spoil them and undo them. And if they consent and agree with them, than they lay all the fault of ill government in them: so that their lives, honour, credit and estimation, is subject to the will and pleasure of those, that rule naughtily. And they that govern, being men of small wisdom, and knowing not what is belonging to the Commonwealth, marvel greatly how the matter should fall out infortunately, whereas they might with greater reason marvel; how it should fall out prosperously. The people of Rome was so great and mighty, that the Batani, (a fierce and hardy people) though they were greatly burdened and overcharged by the Romans, yet they durst not rebel. But they that were in authority, and did bear rule over, them: seeing that the Roman Captains offered them great injury, in overcharging them with too much toll and tribute (in the time that the forces of the Roman Empire were divided, by reason that the Emperors of Rome waged wars against divers Nations) and whereas they ought to have been contented with the unreasonable tributes, which according to their own pleasure were paid unto them: they were so unwise, and dealt so unadvisedly, that they did not only more and more continually overcharge them, but also gave them occasion to assemble together, and seek means to revenge the injuries which they offered unto them, by choosing old and feeble men to be Soldiers, that they might pay money to be dismissed, and pressing fair boys to satisfy their execrable beastliness by abusing them: whereupon the Batavi determined to rebel against the Romans, and deliver themselves from the injuries and mischiefs that the Roman Captains did them: and choosing a famous Captain to be their General, they fought against the Romans and did them much harm: and so they did cast off that troublesome yoke of subjection, and recovered their former liberty. The jews had not forces enough to withstand the Lotinus ubi sup. joseph. lib. 1. de bello judaico, & Egesippus de excidio Hyerosolymitano. lib. 2. cap. 9 Romans, as king Agrippa showed in his Oration which he made unto them, to persuade them that they should not rebel. But they, not able to suffer the tyranny & greediness of the Roman Captains, rebelled, and so jerusalem was destroyed: wherein God showed his just judgement upon the jews, that they should receive the punishment deserved by crucifying the Redeemer of the wolrd. 17 Many think that the estate of the government, consisteth in having many Towns, Places, and Cities, and therefore to reserve and keep some place of their kingdom, when their enemies set upon them, they agree to most unreasonable conditions, which are very harmful and prejudicial unto them: which they would not do, if they knew that the preservation of their estate, consisted in the government, authority, and reputation that they have: and that, though they lose some Fortress, Town, or Castle, they may easily recover them again from their enemies, if they can tell how to defend themselves: as the Romans did, when they did drive Hannibal out of Italy, notwithstanding that he had possessed the Country, and had been Lord over it sixteen years long. And they did not only drive him out of Italy, but also waged war against Carthage, and sent fresh Soldiers to their Arm which they had in Spain, and denounced new wars against King Antiochus. And they bought and sold those grounds, lands, and possessions which Hannibal had taken, for the self-same price that they were rated at before. So Charles King of France, recovered Gaginus et Paulus Emilius de rebus Franco●um in vita Caroli septimj Gallorum regis. Petrus Bembus hist. Venaetae, lib. 8. Caelius Rhodoginus in prohemio. lib, 3. antiquar. lectio. his Country from the Englishmen, who had almost taken his whole Kingdom from him. The Venetians defended themselves against julius Secundus Pope, Maximilian the Emperor, Jews King of France, and Hernando King of Castille. They therefore that govern estates, aught to imitate them that playing at Chess, lose some one man or other, thereby to win the Game, and take the check to give the mate. This is to be understood, if the estate have sufficient forces to defend itself; for if it have not, it is better to make some honest agreement, (as our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ teacheth us) then to be quite destroyed, and lose all: as it happened to the renowned City jerusalem, and other famous Cities, which by reason that their Governors did not know their weakness, were overthrown, and levied with the ground. 18 If they that govern any Commonwealth, think that to defend themselves from their enemies, lest they should be subdued by them, consisteth more in the forces that the Commonwealth hath, then in the particular and private goods of those that live in it, they are far deceived. For the goods have their foundation in the Commonwealth, and if they do not help it, both the goods and Commonwealth also goeth to wrack: even as that body, in which each member only procureth the conservation of itself. Therefore it is convenient, that as each member doth put itself into danger to save the head: so those that live in a Commonwealth, should adventure both life and goods to defend her, seeing she is the head of all them that live in her. They ought moreover to consider, that many times Commonweals be overthrown & subdued by the enemy, because the Citizens being rich, and the Commonwealth poor, they will not secure and aid her with their substance: and (as Titus Livius saith) nothing grieveth them, but as far as it toucheth their own particular interest: for that is it that all Juvenalis ploratur lachrimis amissa pecunia veris. men most regard, and we find by experience, that men commonly set more by their substance, then by their credit and reputation: as may be seen in the Noble men of Rome, who always (without any extraordinary displeasure) suffered the profit of the Commonwealth to be preferred before their own honour and credit; but concerning their wealth; they did with great vehemency and stiffness, resist against the Law Agraria, (for the distribution of the Lands among the people) and would not by any means permit, that it should be established: whereby they wrought the ruin and destruction of Rome: which began from the sons of Gracchus, and continued three hundred years, till julius Caesar tyrannized. Some hold opinion, that Commonweals, to the end they might be well governed, aught to be rich and wealthy, but Salu, in Catili. in oratione Catonis publicé opulentiam et privatim aegesta●em, et divus Aug, lib, 5, ca, 12 de civitate Dej. Vt aerarium eseet opulentum, tenues res privatae. the Citizens and people that live in them, poor. The Marquis of Pescara, going about to persuade the Emperor Charles the fift, to take upon him to be Lord over all Italy, told him that he had the King of France in his power, and because the Commonweals of Italy, were but poor, he might easily subdue it, because they that lived in it, would not spend their substance to defend their Country. But the Emperor would not do that which the Marquis requested of him, because he always did more respect the peace of all Christendom, than his own profit: whereof he showed a most lively example in that he rendered the Dukedom of Milan unto Francis Sforcia. To the end that Commonweals may be maintained & defended: they that live in them, must consider, that they cannot be saved, if the Commonwealth perish: and that it were better for them to spend their wealth, to maintain the Commonwealth, then to be overcome, and brought into captivity by the enemy. If they that lived in Constantinople when Mahomet the king of Turks took the City, had aided the City with paying money for things necessary for the defence of it: that famous City had not been taken of the Infidels, to such great loss of Christendom. Also many other excellent Cities have been overthrown, through the execrable covetousness of such miserable Citizens, which deserve to be abhorred and detested of all men, and to be spoiled themselves only, without the harm of others: seeing they care for no man but themselves, and are In vita Pauli Acmilij. (as Plutarch saith) their enemy's Treasurers. 19 When some youth of noble blood, in a Commonweal beginneth to be had in account, that is, endued with some extraordinary virtues: all the Citizens honour him, and have him in great estimation: in so much, that if he be never so little stirred with ambition, among those gifts which nature bestoweth upon him, in short space he doth so climb, that when the Citizens perceive that they have erred in advancing of him: though they would set him down again, yet they cannot hinder him: and to go about any such matter, were only to hasten their own ruin and destruction. Cosme de Medicis, (by whom the House of the Medicis came to that excellency and In discursibus, & in histor●is re●si Florent. lib. 14. greatness), attained to such credit and reputation by his own prudence, and by the ignorance of the other Citizens: that he began to put the whole estate in such fear of him, that many Citizens thought it dangerous to offend him, and a great deal more dangerous to suffer him longer. But Nicolas de Cussano, (who being a man singularly well seen in Civil affairs, lived at that time) seeing that the first fault was committed, in not foreseeing the dangers that might follow, by honouring and esteeming of Cosme de Medicis, he would not suffer (whilst he lived) the second also to be committed; to wit, that the Citizens should intend, to take away the honour from Cosme unto which they had advanced him: judging that such an intent, would be the cause of the destruction and overthrow of the whole estate, as it afterwards fell out: for the Citizens that remained after he was dead, would not follow the counsel which he had before given them, but gathered forces against Cosme de Medicis, and expelled him out of the City, but what followed? A while after, those of the City that were of his side, sent for him, and made him Prince over the whole Commonwealth: unto which state he had never reached, if the Citizens had not publicly opposed themselves against him. The same happened in Rome with julius Caesar, who being favoured of Pompey, and the other Romans for his virtue: afterwards became the destruction of the Roman Commonwealth: of which thing Tully beareth witness, saying, that Pompey began to fear Caesar too late: which fear urged him to procure a remedy, and the remedy hastened the destruction of the Commonwealth. 20 The Athenians, Argives, Milesians and Megarens, used Adrianus junius animadversion. Lib. 5. cap. 18. Aristo. Polit. 5. cap. 11. Ostracismus idem valet ac efficit quodammodo, quod p●ohibere superio●ē atque in exilium mittere. the Ostracisine; which was a kind of banishment of the excellentest man of all the City, for ten years space: that by his authority he should not hurt the Commonwealth. They of Sicily used the same remedy, to the self same effect, and called it Petalismus. This banishment continued ten years: and their goods were not confiscate, nor the fruits of their possessions were not gathered by any of the other Citizens, whilst they were absent. And this kind of banishment was used, because such men as were most rare and excellent among them, should not tyrannize over the Commonwealth, & translate the government unto themselves. We read in the Histories of Venice, that the Galleys which had been abroad, being returned to Venice, and certain contention arising between the people, and the men of the Galleys, the contention did continue so long, till they fell to blows: which hurly-burly, neither the force of the Officers, nor the reverence of the Citizens, nor the fear of those that ministered justice, could appease, until a certain noble Citizen, that had the year before been Captain over those Mariners came in presence: whom as soon as they had espied, they all of them gave over fight, and Machiavellus in discursibus. so parted themselves: which obedience of the Gallie-men, bred such suspicion in the Senate concerning the Gentleman, that in short time they made themselves sure from all evil that might ensue by reason of his authority. 21 They that govern Commonweals, aught to have one special care, that no news be published, which may do harm to the Commonwealth: for such things disquiet the people which (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) loveth still to hear Libro, 17. Petrus justinia. in histo. Vene. Tamara de moribus gentium. li. 1. cap. 7. novelties. The Venetians caused a certain man to be put to death, because he had spread false rumours & new lies through the City, which greatly perturbed and disquieted the Citizens of Venice. It was an ancient custom in France, (in times past) that every one that had heard any thing, which was either profitable or hurtful to the Commonwealth, was bound incentinently to make the Magistrates acquainted therewith, who did publish it, if they thought it would be profitable for the Commonwealth. To be brief, it belongeth to the Counsellors of the Counsel of estate, to see that no seditions, contentions, and hurliburlies arise in the Commonwealth: as the Counsellors of Cayphas admonished, when they did consult how they Matth. 26. might take our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ. The fourteenth discourse, touching war. BEcause the duty, whereby a Prince is bound to rule and maintain the people, which God hath committed to his government, consisteth chiefly in two things; to wit, in governing his subjects, according to the Laws and ordinances of the Realm: and in defending them from their enemies, that they may live in peace: and seeing that I have in the former discourse entreated of the Laws and ordinances of the estate: I mean in this to say some thing concerning the Counsel of war. 1 They that follow wars (as all men know) are always in great danger and troubles, and at no less charges. And for this cause, no Prince ought to make war, unless he cannot otherwise choose: and unless he cannot enjoy peace without the harm of the Commonwealth, the loss of his estate, and impairing of his reputation. Otherwise, if a Prince can obtain an honest peace of his enemy, upon reasonable and just conditions, he ought not to wage war, but conclude that peace, to shun bloody battles, slaughters, spoils, pillings, sacrileges, and all such other wicked actions, which are practised in time of war. And if those Princes that consult, whether they shall wage war or no, considered all the damages and harms that may succeed by waging war, they would never be resolved to make war: whereby they should increase their enemy's forces, and weaken their own. Therefore incontinently after that they that are of the counsel of estate, have concluded, that it is expedient for the profit of the Commonwealth, and safety of the Prince, that war should be made against the enemy. Every one ought to determine fully, either to overcome, or to die in the enterprise: as a Woman of Lacedaemonia said to her Son, when she gave him a Target to go to wars: return my son either with this Target, or else within it. 2 Every Prince that goeth about to make war, ought first to consider whether he be able, and if he be: then whether the profit that is like to ensue, be greater than the harm which may succeed: for if the loss should be greater than the commodity, that would be (as Augustus Caesar said) as if one should fish Suetonius Tranquillus in vita August. Caesaris cap. 25. Imperatorem de bello consultaturum, non ignorare opertet quam magnae sint exercitus facultates etc. with a golden hook. He ought furthermore, diligently & earnestly to inquire, what forces his enemy hath, and whether his own power and strength be sufficient to vanquish the Army of his enemy, and overthrow it. And if he stand in doubt, and can not certainly be informed, whether his enemy's forces or his own be the greater: he ought to think, that his adversaries are better provided, and more strongly guarded: that he may be the more diligent, and the more careful in persecuting his enemies, and infirming their forces and powers: for many Captains, because they respected not their enemies, and made no account of them, were overcome and put to flight. Furthermore, to examine, both his enemies forces, and his own: he ought to know whether of them both, hath the greater store of money, he or his enemy: and how long the wars are like to continue, and how much money is necessary to maintain them. In this, great care and diligence must be taken: for money Claudius' Cotoreus de iure militum in prohemio, libro, 2. (as it is commonly said) is the sinnewe of war: which beginneth and endeth it: and for this cause, the Counsellors of Princes ought to inquire, whence provision of money may be had: and how they may bring to pass, that their enemies should want. And how needful and necessary this is, we may manifestly perceive by this, that many enterprises have been given over for lack of money to supply the charges of war, as happened to Cleomenes, King of Lacedaemonia, with Antigonus' King of Macedon. 3 Princes ought to consider what Captains they choose for the wars: for if the Captain, who is the guide to lead and conduct the Soldiers, be not valiant and prudent, then must all needs go to wrack. Tully in his Oration, pro lege Manilia, setteth down the perfect pattern of a good and In oratione pro lege Manilia. valiant Captain, showing what qualities a good Captain ought to be endued withal, to become famous; of which matter, I have written very largely, in my Book of the Office of Captains and Generals. That the war may in all points have prosperous and good success, all men know how important and necessary it is, that the Captains should be hardy, valiant, courageous, and faithful: for nothing can be more hurtful in wars, then fearful, cowardly, faithless, and unskilful Captains. There ought also great care to be had in the pressing of Soldiers, what men be chosen to serve their Prince in war. For the Soldiers be they that must fight, and get the victory: and therefore, though the Captains, Generals, and all other Officers, be never so perfectly adorned, and endued with all heroical virtues: if the Soldiers be base and cowardlike fellows, the wars cannot be fortunately finished. When julius Caesar went to fight with Perreyus in Spain, he said that he went to seek an Army without a General: and when he went to meet with Pompey, he said: that he Suetonius Tranquillus, in vita julij Caesaris. cap. 34. sought a General without an Army. And therefore in the mustering and training up of Soldiers, great diligence ought to be taken in examining and inquiring, whether those Soldiers that be pressed for the Prince his service, be faithful, or Traitors to their Country and Prince, whether they be constant, or inconstant and variable: whether they be new and freshwater Soldiers, or old and experienced Soldiers, that have long time been practised and trained up in wars: whether they come of their own accord with a willing mind to serve their Prince, or be forced thereunto by compulsion: and whether they come for the love they bear their Country, and obedience they own unto the Prince, or being base and rascal fellows, fetched out of Inns, Tiplinghouses, and other such like places, they come to serve the Prince only for pay: besides these, there are many other things which ought to be carefully considered in the pressing of Soldiers: as I have written more at large in my Books of Military discipline. Furthermore, Princes that determine to set upon their enemies, aught to inquire, what Harness those Soldiers have, that are gathered for service in wars. For Soldiers that be well weaponed, fight with a more valiant mind, than they that are unweaponed and lack their harness. And when soldiers are thoroughly well fenced with Armour of proof, they be the more emboldened to set upon their enemies, to assault Fortresses, & to undertake any kind of service. And many times some kind of weapons, are not so good and so apt to obtain the victory, as others: as may be seen by the difference of weapons, which the Lacedæmonians, Romans, and Parthians used. The Romans often vanquished their enemies: not because they were more valiant, & more strong or courageous than their enemies. but by reason of the odds in fight with better weapons. Therefore Princes ought also to inquire what weapons their enemies use in war, and with what weapons they ought to Arm their own Soldiers, to defend themselves, and endamage their enemies. And also, what places are most fit and convenient to assault their enemies, and surest for their own safety. 4 They that mean to wage war with any Country, aught to know what friends they have to help and assist them, especially, if they have no Countries, Towns, or Provinces, in that Land which they mean to invade. And it is very good in such enterprises, to have some one natural borne man in that Country to their friend, to be helped by him, and informed of the humours, interest, pretences, conditions and customs of the enemies: and whether the places which they inhabit, be plain, or hilly, and full of Mountains: and of what things the Inhabitants of that Country stand in need of, and what things would be most acceptable unto them, to entice them to come to aid and help them: and so they shall diminish their enemy's forces, and augment and increase their own. It were very good also to learn, whether the people of that Country which they mean to assault, make much of their King, or else hate him, for it chanceth oftentimes, that the people rebel against their King, and take part with the enemies, because they hate their King, and would willingly be revenged of him, or because they love the other, and desire greatly to have him to be their King. Certain Cities in Asia did rebel, by reason of the hatred which they bore against Laodice and his son Seleucus, and because of the affection with which they loved Bernice and his Son. This policy Fernandus Cortes used in the Conquest of the Kingdom of Mexico, making war against King Motesuma, with his own Subjects that could not abide him. 5 Many Princes have achieved many famous and excellent victories, through the estimation, credit, and reputation of their own persons. Alexander the great, published that he was Titus Livius decad. 3. lib, 6. Son unto jupiter, (though he knew it was not so) that those Nations upon whom he made war, should yield and give over their Countries unto him. If the Captains and Generals of Armies be valiant and renowned, they procure and obtain friends and alliance, and easily achieve victory: but if they be not famous, they can hardly attain good success in their enterprises, & they are always crossed with unfortunate events. Some counsel Princes to see, whether those Captains which they choose for their wars, be fortunate in those Martial enterprises which they undertake, for it is thought that Fortune (as Sallust saith) prevaileth much in warfare. But seeing that In Catilina. Fortuna in omni redominatur. the people commonly call that fortune, which by chance happeneth well or ill, for which no reason can be given, and this is uncertain and variable: no man can persuade himself that he shall always have prosperous luck: and for this cause was Fortune painted upon a wheel which is ever turning. Many times. Captains have excellent good luck in one thing, and very Tit. livi. No● temere incerta casuum reputat, quem Fortuna nunquam decepit. bad fortune in another, as Hannibal told Scipio, and as Hannibal himself had tried by experience. Seeing that the events of wars are so uncertain and variable, wise and valiant Captains, aught to increase the fame which is bruited abroad of their good luck and prosperity, in their Martial endeavours, that they may encourage their soldiers to fight, and they that are not fortunate, aught to show unto their Soldiers, how inconstant and variable Fortune is, and to persuade them that thence-forwarde, all matters will 2, Reg. 11. succeed more happily, for the adventure of war is uncertain. 6 The first thing that all Princes which make war ought to do, is to justify that war which they take in hand, that all men may know, that they are bound to fight, by the necessity which compelleth them to defend themselves: and although their cause be good, and ground upon reason and justice, yet they ought to accept any honest and lawful condition of peace, which their enemies do offer them. Again, Princes ought to consider, that wars are commonly made, either to recover that which hath been taken from them, or to revenge some injury that hath been offered unto them, or because they desire to achieve glory and renown, or for ambition: the first and second causes are just, the third is unjust, and the fourth is tyranny. The Romans were always very careful, in justifying the wars which they made, with all diligence possible. which may be seen by this, that the Ambassador of the isle of Rhodes, when he went about to praise the people of Rome, said in a certain Oration which he made to the Senate, that the Romans did not so much esteem the conquest, as the equity of their cause: and because in my book of Military discipline, I have largely written how Princes ought to justify their wars, I mean not here to stand upon it. 7 They that consult upon Martial affairs, aught to inquire, when they be overcome with their enemies, whether the fault was in the Captains, or in the common Soldiers, or because it pleased God, that though every man did his duty, yet they should be put to the worse: and after the cause is known, they ought to think upon the remedy, and to do all things that are expedient to achieve victory of their enemies. And if they understand that their enemies are stronger, and that they must continue their wars, it is better for them, to defer the field (as Fabius Maximus did) then to enter battle to the manifest danger of their whole Army. For, with delaying the time, they may overcome, and with giving a rash onset, they shall be put to flight, and as we of old say in Castille: Diez aunos de guerra, y no un dia de pelea, that is; Wars for ten years assay, And battle but one day. And because no Captain how wise soever he be, can imagine and forecast all inconveniences which may fall out in war, it is convenient, that every Captain take counsel with faithful, prudent, and wise men, and well experienced in warfare, which may tell him the truth without any deceit. The Carthagenians Livius. Apud Carthaginense● in crucem tolli imperato●es dicuntur, si prospero eventu p●auo cum consilio ●em ge●serint. did esteem so much of counsel in Military actions, that they hanged those Captains and Generals, which over; came their enemies without taking advise. The Venetians did not permit their. General's to pitch a field with their enemies, unless the Provisors which were sent to the wars with them, did consent unto it. 8 Captains and Generals shall obtain the favour and good will of the people, if they minister justice unto them, and permit not any one to offer them any injury, or to take away their substance unjustly, or to dishonour and discredit them wrongfully. And as for the good will of the Soldiers, the Captains may obtain that, by being valiant and liberal, for these two virtues make a Captain to be beloved. And though it seem a thing impossible, that a Captain should be favoured, both of the people and his Soldiers also: because the people wish to keep their goods and substance, and the Soldiers desire to pill and rob, yet notwithstanding this hindereth not, for they may well enough deal uprightly with the people, that are their own friends and alliance; and the Soldiers may rob pill, slay, and spoil those that dwell in their enemy's Countries. Furthermore, if by chance the Captain be compelled by necessity, to ask some new tribute, to pay the charges of the war, he ought with moeke words and good reasons, first to show (as Tully saith) the necessity which at that instant urgeth him to demand it, and then he ought to let them understand, that it concerneth the whole Commonwealth: and when opportunity served, he would repay that which they do lend him. Generals and Captains of Armies, aught to see that no idle persons, and such as are unapt for war, do loiter in the Camp, & that each soldier employ himself in all such things, as are thought to be necessary for the achieving of victory. 9 The Counsellors of Princes, aught to examine, whether it be more profitable for the Commonwealth, to stay till Lotinus con●ideratione, 500 the enemy come to make war upon them at home, or whether it be better to assail them in their Country. This being disputed upon in the Senate of Rome, Fabius Maximus affirmed, that it was better for them to descend themselves at home, then to invade their enemy's Country. But Scipio said, that it was more convenient for the Commonwealth, to war in Carthage then in Italy. Furthermore, they that consult ere they determine to maintain war, either at home or abroad, aught to consider, whether it be profitable for the estate of the Country to make war at all. For though it lie in the power of men to begin war, yet cannot they obtain victory at their pleasure: and that commonly many things fall out in warfare, which men can neither see nor imagine: and yet the war itself, the enemies and the success, show & teach what ought to be done: and for this cause it is said, that counsel is taken in the field. And though the matters that concern war, may be communicated and talked of among many, yet they ought to be deliberated upon but by a few: for else they would be discovered, before they were determined. Also, they that consult upon matters touching war, aught to consider, whether it be profitable for the Commonwealth, that their Generals & Soldiers should be strangers, or natural borne Subjects. The carthaginians did not only take strange Soldiers into their service, Strabo magnopere pe●●are putat populos qui externis du●bus utuntur in bello. etc. Petrus victorius, variarum lect. lib, 8, cap. 17. Lotinus consideratione, 485. but did also elect strange Captains, as they did in the wars which they waged against the Romans, choosing Xantippus a Lacedaemonian to be the General of their Army. Many Commonweals, after that their Captains were overcome, they vanquished their enemies by the service of strange Captains: as the Chalcedonians did with Brasidas, the Sicilians with Gylippus, the Asians with Lysander, Callicratides, and Agathocles, Captains of Lacedaemonia. And if it chance that any strange Captains do tyrannize over the Commonweals which they aid (as they of the house of Ottoman did) that happeneth hereof, that they which requested them to help them, are not able to withstand their forces, and to defend themselves against them. The Romans to shun this inconvenience, would not consent, that they which came to secure or help them, should be mightier than themselves. 10 Princes ought not to commit the administration of the war unto any person whom they have offended: for such a one, to revenge the inturie offered unto him, would cast away the Army. Marius had after such order compassed hasdrubal Titus Liu. decad, 3. lib. 6. a noble Captain of Carthage, that he was driven either to fight with disadvantage, or die for hunger: but hasdrubal did hold him so cunningly, with certain parleyes of agreement, that he got out of his reach, and so Marius was frustrated of the occasion which was offered him to overthrow his enemy: which thing when it was known in Rome, did redound to his great discredit, both with the Senate and the people, and every one through all the City, spoke very much evil of him. Within a while after, Marius being made Consul, and going to make war upon the enemy, Fabius Maximus said unto him, that Titus. Liu. decad, 3, lib. 7. before he came to the day appointed for the field, he should see what forces the enemies had, and that he should not rashly hazard the Army, and adventure the liberty of Rome. Unto whom Marius answered, that as soon as he came by the enemy, he had fully determined to encounter with him, and being asked Livius ubi sup. why? he said, because he knew, that if he overcame the enemy, he should recover the glory which he had lost in Spain, and if that his own Army were overthrown, dispersed and put to flight, he should be revenged of the injury which was offered him by that City and those Citizens which so unthankfully had offended him. Prince's ought also to consider the necessity which they have to make war, and to understand what provision they ought to make, against occasion be offered them to make war, that if any strangers go about to molest them, they may defend themselves by force of Arms, and not be vanquished: for there is no Prince so great, mighty and strong, but some or other may set upon him. And as our old Castilian proverb goeth, Muchas vezes chicas piedras aballam grandes carreras. Little stones oft times we see: Way down the greatest Apple tree. And if a Prince be of so little understanding, that he must be ruled by that which the Captains say, he is their servant, and putteth himself into danger, either that the Captains know not what they do, or that they do not so faithfully & diligently as they ought. 11 Those Princes that determine to make war, aught to imitate the Catholic King Don Hernando, the first of that name, King of Castille, who as it were standing on high in his Tower a far of, espied and watched the success and event of the wars which the Christian Princes made among themselves, to secure and aid them that were weakest, and not to suffer their power to increase in Italy, that pretended to make themselves Lords over it: neither did he enter league with those Princes that were confederated together, if he could reap no profit thereby: and for this cause he would not wage war with Jews King of France, when Pope julius, the Emperor, and the Zwitcers warred against him: for he thought that he should receive no profit by weakening the Kingdom of France, with the augmentation of those that did persecute it. But when he saw, that the King of France would increase his estate, and enlarge his kingdom by making war against the kingdom of Mambrinus Roseus, lib. 1. Historiae mundi. Naples, he entered league with the Emperor and the King of England, against the King of France. Finally, such Princes as enter league with other Kings, aught to consider whether it be better for them, to maintain that peace which they enjoy, or to wage wars: (as King Mithridates wrote to King Arsaces) and whether the wars be just, and such as thereby they may have profit, and achieve honour, glory, and renown. The In Epistola addita operibus Salustij. Romans (as Appian reporteth) would not accept many Subjects that offered themselves unto them: because they were poor, and if could not any way redound unto their profit to have them under their subjection. Many other examples, precepts, rules, considerations and instructions could I give and allege, but because I writ of them in my books of Military discipline, I willingly here omit them. The fifteenth discourse, concerning peace. WE have said that the Counsel of estate is called the Counsel of peace, because their principal intent that assemble in that Counsel, is to procure that the people may live in peace, and if they make war, if is to defend themselves from the injury of those that trouble & molest them. And to signify this, the Romans accustomed to were the Military ring on the left Plin. li. 33. cap. 1. hand, in which they did bear their shield: and not on the right hand in which they held their sword: for they thought it more necessary for a well instituted Commonwealth, to defend themselves then to offend others. The Spartans demanded of those that returned from wars, whether they had lost their shield: for they thought it more, not to lose their shield, then to save all their other weapons. Epaminondas a noble Captain of Thebes, being grievously wounded and ready to die, Valeri. li. 3, c●. 2. Traiectus h●sta sanguine et spiritu deficien● recreare se con●●tes primum a● clipeus suus sal vus esset, deinte an fusi hostes paenitus fo●ent interrogavit. commanded his shield to be brought unto him, which when he had ombraced, gave up the Ghost: thereby to signify, that if ever he had warred against his enemy, he did it rather to defend his Country, then to offend them. That it is the duty of every Prince, to defend his subjects from the enemy, and govern them in peace & quietness, may be seen in this, that when he taketh his oath at his Coronation, he holdeth his Sceptre, with which he is to rule his people in time of peace, in his right hand, and his sword is borne before him, with which he is to defend his Country, if need be he should make war for the conservation of peace. Seeing therefore that the chief Office of a Prince is, to maintain his Subjects in peace, I mean to treat in this discourse of such things as be belonging to the Counsel of peace. 1 Counsellors of Princes that consult upon the establishing of peace, ought humbly to request God, that it will please him, that the peace may be concluded to his honour and▪ ●●ie, Sempiterne Deus, Da propitus pa●em in Diebus nostris. for he only can give peace, and through him cease all wars, with which God chastiseth the stanes of men. And when they do agree upon any peace, they ought to consider what causes hindered, that the peace which before was established, did not firmly remain unbroken: and they shall clearly see, the Princes make peace, either because they be wasted & destroyed with wars, or because one Prince is subdued by the other, & cannot any longer defend themselves, or because they desire to be friends, and to overcome one another in courtesy: & this last cause is the best to establish a firm and continual peace, if it be done with true amity & perfect love. For if the Prince's wills be different that make the peace, then is their peace (as the Prophet ezekiel Capit. 13. saith) like unto the wall that was built up & daubed with untempered Mortar, which peace may with small violence be overthrown: for because the love and conformity is wanting, it cannot last long or continue. The Senate of Rome asked the men of Pri●ernum, how long the peace which they demanded should endure: and they answered, that it should be continual, if they would grant it upon good and honest conditions, otherwise, it should be but very short. They that will establish a firm & stable peace, that may continue for ever, aught to procure that God be not angry or displeased, but favourable, propice and merciful unto them: that, he being the right author of all peace and true concord, may prosper the peace which they make. And they may easily please and reconcile God, with supplication and earnest prayers, if they humbly with all their heart beseech his holiness to give them judgement and understanding to execute justice: for the work of justice shall be peace: even the work of justice shall be quietness and assurance for ever, Esay, 32, 17. as Esay the Prophet saith. 2 If they that consult upon the making and establishing of peace, cannot conclude, they ought to make a truce for a certain time, that they may have some space to deliberate upon it, and to examine the conditions upon which the peace is to be concluded, and to see and consider, whether it be better for them to prosecute the war, or to give it over, and many times a truce being made for a time, the peace is established, whereas there had none been concluded, if no league had been made for some days. They ought also to perpend & weigh, whether it be better for than to procure peace, by rendering some Castle, town, or City, or by paying a sum of money, or by allowing some tribute, or by concluding some marriage, or by making of alliance or affinity, as we have before showed. They ought also to consider, whether they that demand peace, are persons that use to accomplish that which they promise (as Hannibal told Scipio, when he demanded of him, that he would stablish a Livius decad, 3. Libro. 30. peace with the carthaginians) and whether it be better for than to make the peace, when their enemies be victorious, and may set the conditions according to their pleasure, (as Hannon Livius. decad. 3, lib, 23. counselled the carthaginians) or to stay till necessity compel, them to come and entreat a peace. 3 Seeing that the augmentation of the Commonwealth, dependeth upon peace, and the end for which men take Arms in a Commonwealth well instituted, is to conserve the good estate thereof in peace, it is convenient, that the Counsellors of Princes should persuade their Prince, that it is better to accept an honest peace, then to make a dangerous war. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians made so great account of peace, and desired so earnestly, that no occasion might be offered them to make war, that they continually said in their banquets, would to God our weapons were hanged over with cobwebs. In that peace which the Romans concluded with King Porsenna, they allowed it with this condition, that they should not use any iron saving in tilling of the ground. And because oftentimes, the estate of the whole Commonwealth, dependeth upon the conditions upon which the peace is established, and men cannot in any other thing err so greatly to the hurt & damage of the Commonwealth, it is convenient that they which conclude Valerius Maximus. lib. 7. tit. 3. the peace, should be both wise and wary. Titus Labeo, being urged to make a peace with King Antiochus, at the same King's demand, said that he was contented upon condition, that half of King Antiochus ships should be for the behalf of the people of Rome, which being granted by the King, Titus Labeo commanded half the part of every ship to be cut away: because all the ships should remain for the Romans. Again, the Consuls of Rome agreed to make peace with the carthaginians, so they would yield and render all the ships which they had; over unto them: which as soon as the carthaginians had done: the Romans commanded all the ships to be set on Lucius Florus de gestis Roma. lib, 2, cap. 5. Et Paulus Horosius, lib. 4. ca 22. fire, and told the carthaginians that the Senate of Rome commanded that they should come forth of Carthage, and build a new City in some other place where they would, so it were ten Italian miles distant from the sea. Many other examples very pregnant for this our purpose might I here allege. But seeing I have set them down in my Treatise De juriiurando & promissis, I will not here repeat them. 4 Though all Commonweals labour to maintain peace, and avoid occasions of war: yet the ambition and malice of men is so great, that no man ought to trust to the peace that is established betwixt him and his enemies. For under the colour of peace, they oftentimes practise many subtle devices, whereby they obtain that, which unless some peace had been concluded, they could never have attained unto. Those Princes that are not molested with wars, but rule their Subjects in peace, ought not to suffer their people so to give themselves to ease, that they never be exercised, or trained up in Arms, for an unarmed peace is very weak. Gelon King of Sicily, being Robertus Brittaunus in Encomio Agriculturae. persuaded that those Commonweals in which the people were not exercised in Military practices could not long continue (for peace, vacation from labours, and idleness, spoil and consume them) he commanded that it should be published through all his Country, that great necessity urged him to make war, and there withal commanded, that the people should presently be mustered, and taught how to use their weapons: and after they had been trained and some thing exercised in handling them, he commanded, that they should all of them be placed in order, that they might go with him to seek the enemy, but when they were all gone, and asked where the enemies were with whem they should fight: the King showed the fields, hills, and valleys unto them, saying that if they would achieve victory over their enemies, they should labour in those grounds, felling down the Trees, and digging out the stones that were in them: for so doing, they should vanquish those deadly enemies, Sloth and Idleness, which would overthrow and destroy the whole Commonwealth, if they were not in time expelled: and no Nation durst make war upon them seeing that they were practised in exercises of war, and accustomed to labour. For (as Titus Livius saith) the enemies themselves Decad, 3. lib. 30. do not the Commonwealth so much harm, as delight and wantonness. ancient old men in their time, painted the Goddess Pallas Bocatius de genealogia Deorum, lib, 5. ca 48 Cicero pro Murena. Artes ilico nostrae conticescunt In proaemio institutionum. in Complete harness, because they would have men to understand, that the Arts and Sciences which flourish in peace, little profit unless they be defended by Arms. The Emperor justinian saith, that Princes ought to be adorned with Arms, and armed with Laws, that they may well govern the people that is committed unto them. The sixteenth discourse. How and wherewith Commonweals be augmented, and wherewith they do decay. Counsellors of Princes, especially they of the Counsel of the estate, aught to understand and know, wherewith Commonweals be augmented, and by what means they decay again. The famous S. Augustine saith, that as the Physicians Lib. 1. de civitate Dej. cap. 3. cure sick bodies, by purging, letting of blood, and searing: so God cureth the sins and vices of men, with famine as diets: with plagues as purgations: and with wars as letting of blood and searing. The Prophet Esay saith, God will chastise Cap. 3. the people of jerusalem, with taking away the stay of bread, and the stay of water. The strong man, and the man of war, the Judge, and the Prophet: the prudent and the aged, the Captains of fifty, and the honourable, and the Counsellor, and the cunning Artificer and the eloquent man: and he will appoint children to be their Princes, and babes shall rule over them, and the people shall be oppressed one by an other, and every one by his neighbour: the children shall presume against the ancient, and those that are contemptible, against those that are honourable. God doth also chastise Commonweals, and bringeth them to decay, by suffering Pharaoes', Nabuchadnezers, Ose. cap. ●. Dabo regem in furore meo. Caligula's, Nero's, Dyoclesians, to govern, because of the sins of the people, and they stand him in steed of Tormentors. Attila was called the rod of God, and Tamburlaine the wrath of God. Those Princes which God will have to serve him in steed of Tormentors, to punish the people, who with their heinous sins offend him, are (as Cardinal Reginald Poole saith, in the Oration which he made unto Charles the fift, concerning peace) those that persecute the Church of God. For GOD placeth not Christian Princes in authority, to the end they should serve him in steed of Tormentors, but that they should minister justice equally unto all men, and be (as S. Paul saith) Ministers 2. Cor. ●. of God, imitating him, and following him, in using clemency, and being merciful, to the consolation and comfort of all the people: but because the people repent not themselves of their Gene. 1●. sins, and leave not their wickedness, and because (as the holy Scriptures say) the measure of the Amorites is filled: GOD sendeth them Princes that stand then in steed of Tormentors: but if they amended their lives, and inclined their hearts to repentance, as Niniveh did, he would pardon them. For it is the jonae. cap. 3. property of his divine Majesty, to pardon and show mercy unto those, that from the bottom of their heart do call unto him, and repent themselves of their sins. And unto those people which are just and virtuous, God giveth good Kings, and such as do the Commonwealth much good, and are as Angels sent from heaven, to conserve and defend her. Therefore those Princes that do not this, accomplish not their duty, and cannot be properly called Princes, but equivocally as a painted man is called a man. The holy Scriptures call those Princes that do job. 34. not minister justice, unto every man according to the commandment of God, hypocrites: for they have no princely thing in them, but only the name of Princes, and being most cruel Wolves, they be masked and disguised with tokens only, and shows of most merciful Princes. 2 God doth oftentimes permit, that Princes should suffer many troubles and adversities, to turn them from their wicked lives, and to show them that God doth punish & chastise Princes, Kings, monarchs, and Emperors, when they govern not their people as they ought, according to the will and pleasure of the highest Monarch of the world. After this manner, Cap. 4. saith the Prophet Daniel, that God did show unto Nabuchadnezzar King of Babylon; how that God is Lord of all kingdoms, & giveth them unto whom he will: and even as schoolmasters correct their Scholars, to make them to apply their books, and duly come to school: so GOD doth chastise the Princes of the earth, that they may perform their duty, and understand that the true beginning to govern well, as well in time of peace as war, consisteth in knowing that God Almightic is the Lord of all kingdoms, and that the beginning of all prover. 1. knowledge and wisdom (as King Solomon saith) is the fear of the Lord: and this is the first lesson which they ought to learn that will follow him, and the first show and token which they make in the school of his doctrine. The fear of the Lord is glory and gladness, and rejoicing, and a ioyfall crown. And the fear of the Lord maketh a merry heart, and giveth gladness and joy, and long life, and who so feareth the Lord, it shall go well with him at the last, and he shall find favour in the day of his death. The Prophet David being taught by the holy Psalm. 2. Ghost, saith. Be wise now therefore ye Kings: be learned ye Judges of the earth, serve the Lord in fear, & rejoice in trembling. Kiss the Son lest he be angry, and ye perish in the way, when his wrath shall suddenly burn, blessed are all they that put their trust in him. And those that follow not this doctrine, God visiteth with calamities and adversities, which he sendeth unto them to cause them to turn from their wickedness, and to obey his commandments. That which we say of Christian Princes, is also to be understood of those just and virtuous Princes, whom God doth cross with misfortunes & troubles, that they may be suffering them patiently, deserve that glory which God giveth unto them that serve him. To be pressed with misery, plague, famine, fire and war, is common both to good and wicked men: but only good & virtuous men die in the service of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, bearing his cross on their shoulders: for (as the kingly Prophet Psalm, 115. saith) precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his Saints. 3 God also destroyeth Commonweals by appointing children to rule over them as the Prophet Esay saith, and I will appoint children to be their Princes, and babes shall rule over them. Cap. 3. For sorrowful (as King Solomon saith) is that Kingdom, Ecclesi. 10. in which the Prince that ruleth it is a Child, and they that give him counsel and govern him, are given to their lusts and pleasures▪ and also the Prophet Hoseas saith, that when God is angry, and will punish the people for their sins Cap, 2. which they commit, he appointeth children to be their Princes. The Romans in their processions, beseeched God continually, that it would please him to be so favourable unto them, as not Auertant superi a nobis reges pueros quorum manus tutor regat. Ecclesi. cap. 4. Esay. 5. Esay. 5. 2. Reg 3. to appoint Children that should be governed by Tutors and Protectors, to rule over them. But yet (as King Solomon saith) better is a poor and wise Child, than an old and foolish King which will be no more admonished: for old fools are in the Scriptures called children of an hundred years of age. GOD doth also chastise the Commonweals, giving them base and vile persons, that shall put their hands to the wharf, (as the Scriptures say) & handle the spindle. Which thing is properly belonging unto women as Homer doth give us to understand, when be bringeth Telemachus speaking thus to his Mother. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But home to do your business may you hie, Your spinning and your distaff to apply, And eke your Maids, unto their tasks to tie. And therefore in wars, they were wont to put spindles and distaffs in those soldiers hands, that were cowards and dastards, for such men are rather to be termed women than men. Vt dicitur. lib. 19 de disciplina militarjs. GOD doth also chastise Commonweals, giving them rash Prelates, learned men without hearts, and without courage, unskilful Physicians, unconscionable and unlearned Judges, and unprofitable people that stand the Commonwealth in no steed, but to eat and to drink the food and the sustenance which the earth bringeth forth, as the idle and wandering persons do, which waste and spoil the Commonwealth more than the Fly called Locusta, which burneth Corn with touching, and denoureth the residue, and they do the Commonwealth no good at all, and be less profitable than the labouring beasts, that with drawing and bearing, help to maintain the Commonwealth, and for this cause doth Plato safe, that no City can be Lib. 8. de Repub. termed happy, in which many poor, idle, and loitering persons live, who being able to work, will rather beg, and so commit all kind of wickedness to maintain themselves. Furthermore, God chastiseth Commonweals, if those that live in them use to deceive one another, and for love of money commit Ecclesiast, 10. iniquity, by reason whereof, God translateth the kingdom from one people to another. Again, God doth chastise Commonweals, if they that govern & bear rule over them, permit men to sin publicly, for that were to bring the people Deut. 17. Nec reducet populum in Egiptum. again to Egypt, and for this cause doth God punish Commonweals, with all those curses & plagues, which the Scripture saith shall come on them that will not obey the voice of the Lord, and keep his commandments and ordinances. Besides, Commonweals perish and decay, if any factions and divisions reign in them: for factious and dissensions persons, disquiet the Commonwealth: and taking advantage by the malice of a few, and the ignorance of many, disturb and endamage the Commonwealth, to increase and augment their own commodity, for as our Spanish proverb saith: Rio buelto gananciaes de pescadores. The laded River, gains Yields for the fisher's pains. Factions and divisions were cause of the destruction of the Empire of Rome, as may be seen in the dissensions which grew in Tulli. officior●. Libro. 1. Rome, because of the Laws Agraria, which caused great alterations at every time that the people of Rome did intend to establish it in that City: this Law Agraria had two especial clauses; the one ordained, that no Citizen might possess more than a certain number of Acres of land: the other, that all what soever was gotten from the enemies, should be equally divided among the people of Rome: and this Law was very hurtful to the Noble men, for it deprived them of their goods, and hindered them from increasing their wealth and riches. But the Noble men opposing themselves, sought one remedy or other to put down this Law: and either they brought an Army of man out of the City, or they caused that when one Tribune did propose the Law, another should contrary him: or they granted part of the Law: or they sent people to inhabit that place which should have been distributed among the people of Rome: to be short, how hurtful it is to favour and maintain schisms and partialities in a Commonwealth, may be seen, in that many Common weals have been thereby destroyed and overthrown: and therefore Plato calleth dissensions and factions, In dialogo, 1, & 5. de legibus. poison, that spoileth and destroyeth Commonweals. To make an end, those Commonweals that are governed by the people, perish and decay, if one man continue long in the government, and this was the cause of the destruction of Rome, as may be noted in julius Caesar who tyrannized, though notwithstanding Cato Vticensis (wisely divining and conjecturing the event of the matter) contraried the people of Rome, in that they did appoint julius Caesar to continue in the generalship, livelier than his day before prefixed: saying, that they gave the Arms and weapons unto him, that with them should destroy them, Unto which, Pompey (who at that time favoured julius Caesar) answered, that Cato by saying so, did nothingels, but give them occasion to suspect, that he owed julius Caesar a grudge: and that which he said himself, did proceed of friendship. Again, the people of Rome having appointed the tribunes or Protectors of the Commons, to continue in their Office the second year, because they thought that they were very sufficient to withstand the ambition of the Noble men: and to maintain the liberty and benefit of the Common people, against their power: the Senate, because they would not serme to have less power and authority than the people, would have had Lucius Quintius (who at that time was to give over his Consulship to some other) to continue in his Office, and be Consul an other yeeere: but Lucius Quintius contraried the Senate in that, saying, that naughty examples ought to be shunned, & not multiplied and increased with another far worse example: and Lybanus in argumento ad Olynthiacam primam Demosthenes'. would have them to choose new Consuls. Lastly, Commonweals perish and decay, if they that bear rule over them, be young men, little experienced in government: and the people that live in them is very rich, for it is natural unto them to be careless, negligent, and vicious if they be wealthy: and unless necessity urge them to labour, they will never take pains. Finally, Counsellors of Princes ought to consider, that commonly Chronica Petri. Lussitani regis Lib, 18. cap. 23. six things cause Commonweals to decay. The first and chief cause of the destruction of a Commonwealth, is contempt, when men are little accounted or esteemed of. The second is covetousness, or inordinate desire of other men's goods. The third is, inordinate delectation in worldly things, when men will fulfil their pleasure, and do all things according to their own will. The fourth is disobedience, when men transgress the Laws wilfully. The fift is cruelty, when they Plato Epist. 1. Sallust in jugurtham. that bear rule, exercise tyranny. And the sixth and last, is want of friends, when men have not friends to give them counsel. The seventeenth discourse. How and wherewith Commonweals be increased. COmmon weals are made bigger and greater, three manner Machiavellus, Lib, 1. cap. 4. discurs. of ways. The first is, by manner of league, or alliance, to be in league with divers other Commonweals, which all of them be one as rich, as mighty, and as great as an other, and in all points equal, so that none of them have any advantage of the other: and when any of them conquer any place, they make the rest partakers of the conquest, as the Suicers do in Heluecia, and as the Aguei and Ethoti did in Greece. The second manner to augment Commonweals, is, also by way of alliance: but in such sort, that they have the chief authority, rule, and government, and the title of all the enterprises: this manner is the best, and was used of the Romans: for they keeping the imperial seat, and title of command to themselves, their alliants deprived of all power and authority, of themselves by their own sweat and blood, became subject unto them, seeing they were compassed about, and oppressed on the sudden by such a mighty City as Rome was: and of alliants and companions, became subjects and bondmen, not being able to defend themselves, by reason that they had increased, augmented, and advanced the Roman Empire with their own forces. The third and last manner, for Commonweals to be augmented and enlarged, is, to make them whom they overcome, not fellows, but subjects, as the Spartans did: but of all three, this is least profitable, if they be not able to keep and govern those Cities which they conquer. For it is commonly said, that he that conquereth an Empire and forces withal, becometh mighty: but he that achieveth an Empire without forces, must needs decay. The Romans to augment their Commonwealth, did imitate them that prune Trees, who to make a Tree grow and bring forth fruit in time, do cut off the first boughs, that the virtue of that plant may remain in the stem, and by reason thereof, greener and more fruitful boughs may spring out of it. And that this manner to enlarge an Empire or dominion is good and necessaire, may be proved by the example of Sparta and Athens, which being two Commonweals very strong, mighty, well Armed, and established with most excellent and perfect Laws, could never reach or attain to that greatness, unto which the Empire of Rome was advanced. And yet did Rome seem to be more full of disordered and seditsous troubles and contentions: yea and nothing settled in such good order and fashion, as those two other Commonweals, Sparta and Athens: whereof no other reason can be alleged, then that which is already given: for Rome, (because it had augmented the body of the City by those two ways which we have showed) could gather together eight & twenty thousand men for their defence, and Sparta and Athens, never could go beyond the number of twenty thousand each of them. And this came not because Rome was situated in a better place than Sparta or Athens, but by reason that a different kind of proceeding was used, in the erecting and establishing of those Commonweals: for Lycurgus the first founder of the Spartan Commonwealth, thinking that nothing could so easily innovate or abrogate his Laws, as the mixture and confusion of new Inhabitants, he bethought himself all means possible, how he might bring to pass, that no Strangers should come to dwell in Sparta, or be conversant in it: and therefore he ordained, that in his Commonweal, no money should be used but of Copper, because no man should have any mind to come and dwell in that City, or to bring any Merchandise or wares thither from foreign Countries. And for this cause the company of the Citizens could never be increased. And because all our actions imitate nature, and it is impossible that a little thin stock should support or hold up a great thick branch, therefore a small and weak Commonwealth, cannot overcome and vanquish great and mighty Cities and kingdoms, that are more puissant and stronger than it is: and if it do conquer any, than it fareth with it, as it doth with thin and small siemms, that have gross boughs & branches, so that the smallest wind that is, doth blow them down and overturn them, as it happened with Sparta, which having taken all the Cities of Grecce by force, Thebes no sooner rebelled, but all the other Cities did rise with them against her: and so the stock remained without branches, which thing could not befall on Rome, because the stock was so gross, that it was able to bear up and to support the weight of any branch. 5 Commonweals be also augmented, by favouring the Inhabitans: for when they that dwell in them, may live freely out of bondage, and be Masters and Lords of their own substance, and such goods as they get by their labour and travail, they multiply and increase their riches, as well in husbandry and tillage, as in Arts, handicrafts, trades, and Merchandise, for every one doth with a good will, increase and heap up those goods which he hopeth that he may enjoy after he hath got them. And by this it cometh to pass, that men so earnestly strive and contend one with an other who may best regard, both his own commodity & the public profit also. But contrarily, in those Countries and Provinces, that are oppressed with over many tributes, and overcharged with excessive tolls: the people think upon nothing but how they may live idle, and Franciscus Alu●res in historia 1. Ethiopiae. fol. 205. make good cheer upon the kings cost. The Ethiopians have much fruitful land, which might bring forth a wonderful deal of excellent fruit: but by reason of the excessive tolls, and unreasonable tribute which they pay, they will not take pains to labour and husband more ground, then may suffice for their sustenance. And because the King of China, in the Province of Gaspar de Crus. Chapan, taketh away the substance of the Crafts men if they be rich: and if they will not give it, he doth command them to be imprisoned; none of those Provinces will labour, nor take pains to get more than they need for their maintenance. And on the otherside, because they that live in China, pay but small tribute, they be very industrious, and take wonderful pains to heap up riches, and lose nothing whereby they may reap any profit: in so much, that of the bones of dogs and other beasts, they make little trifles for Children to play with, and pay money for the ordure of the necessaries, to dung and fatten their grounds. Furthermore, Commonweals be augmented and increased, by ministering justice equally unto all men, not suffering any notorious offences to escape unpunished: and by having an especial regard of Religion. For justice & Religion, are the two principal pillars that support all weals public, without which, no Commonwealth can dure long, or continue: and with which, little Commonweals be enlarged & made bigger, and great ones continue in their bigness, as I writ more at large in my books De Politijs et rebus publicis. Lastly, Commonweals be increased and amplified, by not suffering any one of them that provide them of maintenance and Merchandise, to engross things, that no man may sell or gain but they: for these men cause the Commonwealth never to be without famine and dearth. Dionysius King of Sicily, banished a certain Merchant, Aristo. Pol. lib, 2. cap. 7. because he had bought up all the iron that was brought to Sicily, that he might sell it only, and have all the gains to himself. Finally, Commonweals he augmented and amplified, by the carefulness of Princes, if they provide all things necessary for their Subjects: even as Shepherds procure pasturing Xenophon lib. 8 Cyropaediae. and folds for their sheep, shearing them (as the Emperor Tiberius said) and not flaying them. For (as Socrates said) he is not a good Shepherd that diminisheth his sheep, and doth Eras. in Apoth. Xenophon. lib. 1 de dictis & factis Socratis. L. cum ratio. §. si pluribus. ff. de bonis dam. not let them wax fat. Neither is he a good King, who doth not procure that his subjects and vassals live in peace, and become rich and wealthy: and this is the amplification and augmentation, which the Emperor Adrian saith, that Princes ought to procure in those Commonweals which they govern. 6 Even as nature worketh in human bodies, and when it hath gathered much superfluous matter, yet notwithstanding by purging restoreth them to their health again: so in mixed Machiavellꝰ lib. 2. cap. 8. discurs. bodies, when all Provinces are full of Inhabitants, in such manner that they cannot commodiously live so many together, nor go to any other place, because they be all inhabited and possessed: although the Cities & Countries be purged and cleansed, by plagues, famine, dearth, and wars etc. yet always there remain people enough to inhabit them again. The Britan's report of their Country, that it is so fruitful, and their soil so fertile, that unless the plague did visit them sometimes, they would eat one another. To be short, least Commonweals should consume and decay, by reason of the multitude of people that live in them, all the Nations of the world accustoined to scour as it were, and make them clean, sending forth some men to inhabit void places, and such Countries as they had taken from their enemies by war. And so they that did remain in the Commonwealth, might live very commodiduflie, and the idle poor people and straying vagabonds had wherein to employ themselves, and where with to be sufficiently maintained, as I writ more copiously in my Books De Policijs sive Rebuspublicis, in tractatibus de Conlonijs & de pauperibus otiosis ae vagabundis. The eighteenth discourse. From whence it doth proceed that the Commonweals are changed, out of one estate of government into an other. THe alteration of government in a Commonwealth (as Plato saith) proceedeth from those that govern Lib. 8. de Repub. Aristo Polit. 5. Sebastian Frizzo in discursu de administratione civili. Bartholomens' Cavalcante 4. discursu. de Republica. it. For seeing that these inferior things, are in perpetual alteration, they cannot be everlasting, but are changed out of one government into another, after men have had experience of those inconveniences, which were in the government which they had at first, To wit, if the Commonwealth were governed by the people, (which estate of government is called Democracia) after they have made trial of those inconveniences which are in the Democraty, or popular estate, they bring in Aristocratia, (which is, when the Commonwealth is governed by the Noble men or chief persons) and after that they have tried the Aristocracy, they choose some principal person, that may defend, govern and protect them: who oftentimes exerciseth tyranny upon them. And because the end of every Commonwealth Plato. Vbi sup. Arist. Polit. 5. cap. 5. Nam maxima sete ex part veteres tyranni extribunis plebis ex●iterunt. is to be well governed, the government thereof would be perpetual, if they that govern it were just and virtuous, and if all men wished to be ruled according to reason & justice. But because they who have all the authority of the Commen-wealth, exercise tyranny upon the people, the Noble men and chief of the Realm rise against them, and either kill them, or cast them down from their sovereignty, translating the whole government of the Commonwealth unto themselves, and usurping all the authority which the Monarch had, who ruled alone without peer. And if chance these chief Noble men govern tyrannously, than the people, they arise against them, and dispossess them of the government, and will rather be ruled by one King, then by many Peers. And this is the alteration which Commonweals commonly sustain, returning to the beginning from whence they first began. For democracy, changeth into oligarchy, (which is, when a few persons have all the authority) & oligarchy changeth into Monarchy or kingdom, and the government of the Kingdom or Monarchy decaying, it turneth again to the oligarchy or democracy: and because the democracy or popular estate, hath assayed the inconveniences of the oligarchy, it runneth oftentimes into the uttermost of the Monarchy, to be delivered from the oligarchy or government of a few persons that have all the authority. Plato saith, that the commonwealths are very 4. Delegibus. hardly brought out of tyranny unto a Kingdom, and out of a Kingdom into the democracy: and out of the democracy into the oligarchy, but to change the government out of the oligarchy into some other estate, is most hard and difficult, for they which hinder and let it, are many and prevail much. 2 The most difficult reformation of all, is to restore a Commonwealth which is in subjection, into a free estate: for the estate Machiavellus li. 1. cap. 16. de discurs. of the Commonwealth is soon altered, but very hardly reform, and restored to the former government: because people upon small cause arise, but are not so soon appeased, especially if they once be given to live dissoloutlie, as it was seen in Antonius de Gavara in Epistolis. Rome, when Brutus and Cassius went about to restore the City unto freedom: and though they were favoured by many, both of the noblest and chiefest of the City, yet they could not bring it to pass, for the City was quite already marred and spilled, by reason of the dissensions and wars of Sylla and Marius, and of Caesar and Pompey, and the Romans were now as it were accustomed to live in bondage. Besides this, they that labour or endeavour to set any Commonwealth at liberty, find partial enemies, but no partial friends; for all they become to be their partial enemies, that were the better by the Prince his estate, and reaped great profit by him and his substance. For they will be loath to have the Prince deprived of his kingdom, lest they should far the worse by it: or if by hap the Prince be deposed of his government, they seeing the King's authority to be decayed, by reason whereof they are deprived of the commodity which they were wont to have, cannot live contentedly, but continually seek means to attain to the authority and favour which they enjoyed before. And on the otherside, they that endeavour to set any Commonwealth at liberty, find no partial friends: because to live at liberty, seemeth to be nothing else, then to aspire to honour & rewards, by means of some honest and lawful causes, for otherwise no man is either honoured and rewarded. And when any person receiveth those pre-eminences, profits, and commodities, which he thinketh that he deserveth, than he confesseth not that he is bound to him that honoureth and rewardeth him. Moreover, the common profit which is gotten by living in a free Common wealth, is not known by any one, as long as he doth not enjoy it: which is, to enjoy the use and commodity of his own substance, and to dispose of it at his pleasure. And they that will go about to remedy & redress these inconveniences, and dysorders, aught to do as Brutus did, killing all those that oppose themselves against that new government which they will bring in to the Commonwealth. Which, Brutus well might do, for when he expelled the Kings, the people of Rome were not so vicious, nor so full of dissolute manners, nor so wickedly given, as when Brutus & Cassius slew julius Caesar. And when Lib. 1. Quotus quisquis reliquus erat, qui rempub. vidisset. Augustus Caesar usurped the Monarchy of the Roman Empire, there was not one in Rome, (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) that knew what it was to live in a free Commonwealth. 3 Those Princes unto whom the Commonweals are committed, as unto Protectors which should defend them, and yet exercise cruelty upon them, destroying, killing, and seizing upon their goods, that hinder them from being absolute Lords, have much ado, and incur great danger to maintain the tyranny or kingdom which they usurp. For they must destroy all those which may resist them: which they may easily do, Arming themselves with the laws to justify their intention, as all those have done, which have tyrannised over those Commonweals Ari. li. 4. Pol. ca 3, Sed duae esse maxim videntu●: utenim ventus dicituralius Aquilonaris, a ius Australis, ab●eorum mutat●nes: sic Respub. secundae, sunt eaquae est i ●populi et eaquae est ●● pancoi● pocestate. which were committed unto them. The popular Regiment is reform unto the government of a few, and that government in which a few have all the authority, is changed into the Monarchy: and the Monarchy into the tyranny: or out of one extreme into the other, without passing by the mean governments. Even as betwixt the North and the South there be many winds, which take part with the chief and uttermost winds, and as betwixt black and white there be many diversities of colours: so betwixt the democracy and the Tyranny, (which is a cruel or violent rule or government for a private commodity, and not a public weal) there be many diversities of governments, which are mixed with both the two extremes: & to pass out of the one extreme into the other, they need not pass through those governments which have the place in a mean between them. Albeit in natural things, no transinutation can be made out of the one extreme into the other; without passing through the means which are betwixt both the extremes. Yet this doth not hold in those things which depend upon man's will, which easily pass out of Auerrois, in paraph. ad li. Platonis de Repub. Et Melchior canus in tractatu de Sacramentis. one extreme into the other, without passing through the means which are betwixt both the extremes. 4 It were needles to dispute of all the alterations of governments in the Commonwealth, and how easily they be changed out of one form into another. They that are desirous to understand this matter more exactly, let them read Bartholomew In tractatu de Politijs discursu. 4. Cavaleante, who handleto it very largely, examining and sifting the opinions of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, concerning the transformations of Commonweals, which sometimes alter & quite change that kind of government which they had before, sometimes enlarge it, and sometimes diminish it. These alterations are made as Aristotle saith, either out of Pol. lib. 5. ill governments into good, or out of good governments into better, or out of ill governments into worse. This is verified in the democracy, oligarchy, Aristocracy, & Monarchy, which (being in themselves good governments if they be ruled according to reason and justice) may be changed thus. The democracy into the oligarchy, and the oligarchy into the Aristocracy, and the Aristocracy into the Monarchy: and so, one good government, into another government, as good or better. Also a good government is changed into an ill, and that ill government, either into one of the same kind, or into one of an other kind. As for example, into the same kind, as the kingdom into the tyranny: the democracy and Aristocracy, into a good or bad administration: and out of one kind into another, as the Aristocracy and democracy, into any one of the other contrary kinds of governments. Notwithstanding that which some say, Bartholom. Cavalcante ubi sup. that the bad and good governments are contraries, which is proved, because those things are contrary, which being of the self same kind, do much differ the one from the other, and yet are apt and disposed to be produced out of the self same subject according to the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle: but that the Plat. In Phaedone. Ari. In post predicamentis. & 1. physicorom. contrary governments are under the self same kind, considering them according as they be good and bad, and are in disposition to be produced in the same subject, may manifestly be seen in the Monarchy or tyranny, and in all other governments, whose subject is the people in which they be produced, and therefore if such governments be contraries, it seemeth that no trans-formation or alteration can be made, out of a good government into an ill government, without passing through the mean governments that are indifferently betwixt both the extremes. 5 Unto this objection some answer, that contraries are not very distant one from the other, and do not much differ, for they be very near joined, both in the kind under which they be, and in the subject in which they be produced. And those things which any way whatsoever are differing (which are called opposita, diversa, & differentia) are far more distant one from the other, than those things which are contrary: and seeing contraries are joined very near together, the one contrary may easily be changed into the other: hence it followeth that the Monarchy is more easily altered into the tyranny, then into the democracy or oligarchy, though Aristotle notwithstanding say, that Lib. 3. Politicorum cap. vlt. Cumpresertim saepius in contrarias mutentur respub. omnes, quam in finitimas atque vicinas. Aristo. lib. 2. de generat. & corrup. facilis est transitus in symbolizantibus. the government passeth more easily out of the Aristocracy into the democracy, then forth of the Monarchy into the Tyranny: his reason is, because the Tyranny is contrary to the Monarchy, but the Aristocracy is joined near unto the democracy. And those things which are like one to another, and do (as the Philosophers say) symbolizare, be easily transformed and changed out of one into another. But this hindereth not: for it holds in necessary and natural, but not in moral agents, which depend upon the free will, as I have written more at large in my books De amore Divino, humano et casto. Thence it followeth that the people trans-form and change the governments one into the other, as they think will be better and more profitable for them, without following the Vbi supra. order of the natural transformations and alterations. Bartholomewe Cavalcante giveth other solutions for this objection, which are rather to be disputed of in Schools, them to be handled of those which entreat of the government of Commonweals. Polybius affirmeth, that the Monarchies be commonly reform Libro. 6. with the Aristocracies, and the Aristocracies with the Oligarchies, and the Oligarchies with the Democracies. Aristotle 5. Politicorum. examineth and sifteth this matter better than Polybius, who could not read Aristotle's books, for his heirs hid them, and they were found and brought to Rome in the time of Sylla the Dictator, who was long after Polybius: for Polibius was in the Strabo. lib. 13. time of Scipio the African. This which Aristotle and Polybius dispute of, concerning the reformation of Commonweals, which are more easily reform into the contraries, then into those which are next unto them: is to be understood according In lib. 5. Polit. cap. vlt. to that which S. Thomas saith: to wit, that Plato will not have, that the government of Commonweals shall be only changed unto that which is next unto each of them, but that they be transformed and changed, after that manner as we have said, that those things were to be transformed, which do symbolise one with another. And seeing that Plato understandeth it after this manner, there is no reason why Aristotle should reprehend him: for Aristotle himself saith, that those things are easily transformed that do (as the Natural Philosophers term it) symbolise one with the other. 6 Plato affirmeth, that Commonweals are altered out of Dialogo. 8. de Repub. one kind of government into another, because they that govern them, regard their own particular profit, more than the public commodity of the Commonwealth. For because of their own private commodity, they marry Noble men with some of the Commonalty, and will have that some children in the Commonwealth, should not follow the estimation and nobility of their fathers. Plato proveth this, saying, that Nature when she bringeth forth men, she communicateth the properties of Metals unto them: and giveth the property of Gold unto those which are apt to govern Nations: and to those that are valiant and hardy, she communicateth the property of silver, that they may defend the Commonwealth: because she giveth the noblest place in the Commonwealth unto them that govern it. And for this cause, even as Gold is the most excellent of all Metals, so the Art of governing a Commonwealth, is the most excellent and worthiest Art of all. And as silver is esteemed Aristo. lib. 1. cap. 2. Ethico. most worthy of all Metals next unto gold: so they which defend the Commonweal are chief, and pessesse the second place next to them that govern it. But I do not believe that they which follow war, will consent unto that which Plato saith. But seeing that Arms little profit or avail without the counsel of those which govern the Commonwealth, & though Arms be necessarily required for the defence of the same: yet notwithstanding, the science or art of governing & ruling Nations & Countries, is very necessary in a well instituted Commonweal, as I writ more at large in my Books of Military discipline. But to return to Plato, he attributeth the property of Iron and Copper, unto the Mechanical Artificers and handicrafts men: and he saith furthermore, that they which mingle their progenies and lineages, marrying those that are of noble blood, with those that are of the Commonalty, are like unto those which mingle Gold with Silver, Iron, or Copper: and that hence it proceedeth, that the Nobility of th●se which govern the Commonwealth diminish: and that the Nobility diminishing, one government is changed into another. And because they which govern the Commonwealth, should not mingle the property of Gold, with the property of Silver or Iron, Plato would have, that every one should marry with one of his own estate and quality: they that are of Noble blood, with Noble women, and the Common-people with the Commonalty, labouring men with labourers, etc. The Romans did not suffer any of the nobility to marry with any of the Commonalty. And certain of the people of the East Indies, observe this order, that every one marrieth an other that is of the same trade. Plato affirmeth also, that the Commonweals change their Dialo. 8 de repub. ●. 1. Constat ergo in civitate ubi mendicos vides▪ mess fures latrones sacrilegos, omniumque scelerum authores. government, when they be full of poor creatures. For those Commonweals in which many poor people live, are full of thieves and wicked persons, masters and authors of all mischief and ribaldry. That we might shun this inconvenience so hurtful and prejudicial to the Commonwealth, Plato counseleth us, that as the Bees suffer not the Drones which help not to make honey, to eat of it: so ought they which govern the Commonwealth, not to permit idle and vagabond poor folk to corrupt and spoil the Commonwealth, maintaining their idle beggary with the painful citizens thrift. For such people love new reformations, because they have hope through them, to find some remedy for their poverty & misery. They Livius decad. 3. lib. 3. Plebs novarum, ut solet, rerum avida. desire to have seditious laws published of distribution of lands, from the Citizens, portion meal, among all them that are in the City: as Tiberius and Caius sons unto Gracchus would do in Rome, to win the hearts of the Common-people. Indeed Plato, to the end that the government of the Commonweals might not be altered by reason of poverty, would have (that according to the laws of Nature) all goods immovable should be common: and that those which govern the Commonweals should divide and part those goods, conformable to every one his necessity. This Commonwealth which Plato suiteth, is as it were an Idea of all other Commonweals, as I writ more at large, in my book of civil and politic governments of Common▪ weals, in the Treatise of lawful and honest assemblies. 8 Aristotle affirmeth, that rich men do alter and destroy Li. 4. Poli. ca 13 Nam seditiosi non solent esse pauperes, ijque omnes qui ad honores non conscendunt, nisi quis eos violet aut aliquam partem facultatum detrahat. Commonweals more than poor men, because they that are wealthy and ambitious, can prevail much, and they will not, nor know not how to obey the Laws, whereas poor men are constrained-to do otherwise. And herein Aristotle is not against that which Plato saith: for Plato speaketh not of those poor men that can maintain themselves, with that which they get by their own labour, and have wherewithal to secure and help themselves: for these men are not able to change the estate of the Commonweal in which they live, and being accustomed to maintain themselves with a little, and always be occupied and employed in their business, they have no time nor leisure to take so great a matter in hand. But if the people be oppressed, and overcharged with too many tributes, or cannot maintain themselves with that which they get: then they find that which they cannot of themselves do, for want of forces to execute it, in those which are able to disquiet the Commonwealth, and change the government, and so with the help of the wealthy and ambitious people, seeing that they have more forces than their enemies, they hope that they shall easily overcome them, and be delivered from those troubles wherewith they be oppressed. So that the rich and ambitious men disquiet the Commonwealth, because they are able, and the poor men are compelled to alter the government, through the ignorance and small policy of those that govern them. Who because they keep them not still employed, or because they provide not such things for them as be needful to their sustenance, or charge them with over many tolls, give them occasion to assemble together, and seek means by which they may change the gogernment and disquiet the Commonwealth. This needeth not to be declared by examples, seeing it is known unto all men. Moreover, the government is soon changed in that Commonwealth, in which many idle and careless fellows live, though they be not poor. For such fellows disquiet the Common wealth, and suffer none to live quietly that dwell in it. And seeing they be never occupied in lawful practices, and honest exercises, they are always ready to favour and assist all factions and part-takings, that arise in the Commonwealth: they go up and down the streets in all corners of the Town, persuading and alluring men's children and servants, not to obey their fathers and masters, and disquieting married folks, and those that live with that which they gain with the sweat of their brows: lastly, they are instruments of all vices, wickedness, and mischiefs that are committed in the Commonwealth. And for this cause is this Spanish proverb used. No estes ocioso, no biviras deseoso. that is, Otiosus semper vivit in deside●… From idleness betake thee, So wishes will forsake thee. Not much unlike unto the English proverb. Wishers and woulders, In Epist. ad propinquos & amicos Dyonisijs. Nulla legum vllarum potentia quieseere potest, si cuncta in superfluos sumptus eroganda cives existiment etc. E. Tulli. li. 3. de legibus vita vic●uque mu●a●o mores mutari civitatum puto. Are near good householders. Plato saith also, that those Commonweals cannot continue long without alteration of government, in which many live, that spend overmuch in banquets, bravery, and other kind of pleasures and pastimes: for such people suffer not those which govern, to minister justice equally to all men, and make any mention concerning the reformation of dissolute manners Hence it doth proceed, that Civil governments are changed into Tyrannies, and the Tyrannies into Aristocracies or Democracies, according as the state is disposed, to be brought into that government into which it doth change: unto which the people doth easily agree. For as sick bodies take no rest in any place, because they have the disease and sickness which troubleth and disquieteth them, within themselves; so those people which live spending more than they gain, in riotousness and supers●uities▪ without regarding what is belonging to honesty & virtue, and what is most agreeable to their estate and calling, cannot continue without altering and changing the government. 9 Plato following the opinion of Pythagoras, attributeth the mutation of the governments unto numbers, and he saith: Lib, 8. de Repu. that the consonancy and proportion which is in Music, doth cause the government of the Commonwealth, to change out of one estate into another. Aristotle, because he will not leave his old custom in reprehending his Master Plato, saith, that the Pol. 5. cap. 12. In Platonis autem Politia disseritur quidem de mutation▪ bus Rerumpub. á Socrate. Sed non recte disputatur ●um presertim optimae reipub. (quae eadem prima est) non tradit quae sit proptié mutatio. Marsilius Fiscinus in argum. D●alogi. 4. alteration of government, doth not depend upon harmony: for the government at divers times and for divers causes, is altered without respecting the proportions of Music: unto this argument some answer, that Plato did not intend to attribute the change of Regiments, to accords and consorts in Music, but, even as in Music, if the consent of the Diatessaron, and the consent of the Diapente, be joined together, they make the Diapason; so in Commonweals and Empires, after that the principles, beginnings and means, be joined together with the end, (which are the Diatessaron, and Diapente, with the Diapason) they are loosed and dissolved. And although Plato following the opinion of Pythagoras, say, that one may know and divine of things to come by numbers, which (the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for as they that study the speculations of Astrology, divine and foretell by the aspects of the Planets and signs of the Zodiac: so the Pythagorians attributing unto every Planet and Sign, his proper number, do guess & judge of things to come. And this Pythagorical doctrine, doth Plato follow in his Timaeus, and in his Dialogues De republica, as * In somnio scipionis. Macrobius, * In somnio scipionis. Ludovicus vives, * In libro de cō●●ribenda histo. johannes Bodimus, and * In libro. de Divinatione. Gasper Pencerus declare) yet nevertheless, Plato his intention is not, to apply the alteration of the government unto numbers, but to the fertility or sterilite of the bodies: and for this cause, he will have, that they which govern the Commonwealth, shall ordain and declare of what age men ought to be when they marry, respecting the proportion which is between the beginning, middle, and end, for by respecting or not respecting this, doth the want and superfluity of wits and bodies proceed. Plato. Dia. 4. de Repub. In Argument. 4. Dialo. Platonis de Republica. Marsilius Fiscinus saith, that Plato following Pythagoras, apply the number of two and the number of eight unto justice: for as the number of two being reduced in itself, to wit, two times twice two, doth make the number of eight, which on every side is equal: so justice ought to be equal unto all men. The alteration of governments, cometh not by reason of numbers, but of the causes interior and exterior, and which be near and far of: for the numbers neither essentially nor accidentiallie, have any power or property at all, whereby men may know or divine what shall come to pass. But Pythagoras imitating the Astrologians, would persuade those that followed him, that he told of things to come by numbers. The same may be said of Arithmantia, and Geomantia, which in dividing are helped by Astrology. To conclude, no man can August. de civitate Dei. lib. 11. cap. 30. deny, but that numbers are very fit and apt, by them not only to signify human, but also divine things. 10 Moreover, the government of the Commonwealth, is also altered out of one estate into another, if the people be not exercised in warlike exploits: for the estate of Commonweal▪ in which the subjects be not brought up in Military discipline, is subject to be overcome by every enemy who will take it, and Plato. Dialo. 1. de legibus. Omnia bona eorum qui victi sunt▪ ad victores ilico transeunt. it must stand at the will and pleasure of him who overcometh it. A certain Philosopher respecting this, said, that he should wish that our enemies were rich, healthful and fair, and that they had no forces to defend themselves: for if they be not able to withstand our forces, than their substance and riches should serve us, and may be turned to our own uses. After that King Xerxes had taken the great City of Babylon, he brought it not into captivity, nor commanded them Arist. lib. 3. cap. 2. Politic. Quae cum capta esset, fama est, tertio die, quandam partem v●● is non sensisse. that lived in it to be slain: but to be revenged of them he ordained and commanded, that they should not exercise themselves in feats of Arms, or practise any Martial affairs, but that they should employ themselves in playing upon Instruments, singing and dancing: and that they should be Jesters, Taverners, victuallers and pot-companions: and that they should give themselves to all kind of sports & pleasant pastimes, that they could devise: and by this means he made the people of that City, which had been so famous and renowned through out all the world, in short time to become weak, and of no account. 11 Plato affirmeth, that the Laws and ordinances of the Quem eitat Caelius Rhodoginus ●●, ●, cap, ●●. antiqua●● lectionun. Tibiae in disciplin● recipiendae non sunt, nec aliud artificiosum instrumentum, ut est cithara, verum quae auditores effici●ot bones. Pla. Dialo. 2. de legibus. In Egipto iwenes bonis figuris & bonis cantibus assuescunt, quae vero & qualiasint huiusmodi, in sacris ab eis est institutum. 1. Reg. 10. Habebis giegen prophetar● descendē●ium de excelso, & ante eos Psalterium & timpanum et ●biam et citaram ipsosque prophetantes. Psalm, 7. 4. Reg. 3. Quin. lib. 1. cap. 17. ut iidem musici & vates & sapientes iudicarentur. Vbi supra. Musicam Natura ipsa videtur ad tolerandos facilius labores velut mune●i nobis dedisse. Caelius Rhodoginus lib. 5. cap. 22. antiqu. lectionum. Bartholomeus de Albornos in proaemio lib. de contractibus. Commonwealth change and alter, if that the music which is used in them be changed: and that, to shun so dangerous a loss and detriment, they that govern Commonwealths, ought not to suffer any new kind of Music to be brought into them: for the manners and customs of the people change when Music altereth. Aristotle counseleth those that are desirous to be virtuous, not to use any kind of Music or Instruments, which may allure and entice them to wickedness. The Laws of Egypt suffered not, as Plato saith, any thing to be sung within Egypt, unless they which governed the Commonwealth, had first examined the thing to be sung, and with what Music they should sing it. It is likely that it would be very profitable for every Commonwealth, not to allow songs and ballads or Music to be sung in the City, which may entice men to dishonesty, and it were very good that, that diligence which Magistrates take in suffering no books to be printed, or pictures to be drawn, that may endamage or hurt the state of the Realm, were also had, in examining those kinds of Music and ditties, which are used in the Commonwealth: for Music being a divine gift, which easily moveth mortal hearts, if men were accustomed to sing holy Psalms and honest Sonnets, it would no doubt, draw men from following of vanity and wickedness, to embrace virtue and honesty. In ancient times passed, the Priests and Prophets, to apply themselves the better to divine things, used Music, as King David did, and the Prophet Elizeus, and among the Gentiles, Prophets and Philosophers were Musicians. How forcible Music is to move the hearts of men, may be seen in children, who when they cry, are appeased and quieted with Music: and in men also upon whom God bestowed (as Quintilian saith) the benefit of Music, with it the more easily to forget their labours, and by it to be persuaded to do that which is sung unto them. And for this cause divers kinds of Music applied to that which is sung, is used in feasts, plays, banquets, wars, solemnities and funerals. The Poets feigned that Amphion and Orpheus, two great Musicians of Thracia, with the sweet harmony of their Music, builded the walls of their Country, drawing after them stones, trees, & beasts. These feigned fables (which ordinarily betoken some thing mystically contained in them) give us to understand, that the Philosophers which first established the liberal Sciences, policies and precepts for civil behaviour, and learning in their Countries, did with their sweet voice and learned tongues, persuade the rude & rustical people, (which did not much differ from stones, plants, and beasts) to leave their savage kind of life, and reform their wild & brutish customs: & so brought them under Laws and politic government. But not to wade too far from the purpose, let us return unto Plato, who though he affirm that it is a thing very dangerous for the government of each estate, that Music should be altered in the Commonwealth, (for by it the customs be altered, which being altered, the government is soon changed.) Nevertheless, Lib. 2. de legibus. Ego autem nec tam valde id timendum, nec plane contemnendum puto. & lib. 3. Plato ait Musicorum cantib ● mutatis, mutati civitatum status. Dialogo. 2. Delegibus. Vt in civitate iwenes bonis figuris & bonis cantibus assueseant. Plato. Dialo. 8. de Repub. Arist. Poli. 5. Plutarch. In vita Romulj. Dialogo. 5. de legibus. Lucanus. In sua victrices convertunt visce●a dextias. Politic. 3. Tully affirmeth, that this needeth not to be so much feared, (but yet not contemned.) But we must understand, that which Plato saith, after the same order as Aristotle doth, to wit, of that Music which enticeth men to dishonest and vicious actions: as may be gathered out of that which Plato saith, that the Governors and Priests of Egypt, did examine those pictures and Poems, which in Egypt were painted and sung, to the end that honesty and virtue should be greatly regarded in them. 12 The government of a Commonwealth is also changed by factions, divisions of people in sundry opinions, schisms, and partialities: and even as terrestrial bodies grow and perish: and when there is no outward thing that corrupteth them, they consume of themselves by reason of some inward corruption: even so Commonweals, when they have no foreign enemies, they Arm and prepare enemies among themselves at home, to destroy one another. The Emperor Charles the fift, said, that as the rust doth eat up the iron, and the worms the fruit of the earth, so divisions do disquiet and destroy the whole Commonwealth, and alter the government. And this manner of alteration of governments, is the most dangerous of all: for as Plato saith, it is a most grievous sickness, which destroyeth and maketh many fameus cities desolate, which with their own weapons wage war against themselves. factions and divisions grew, as Aristotle saith, either because there are but few, that be partakers of the government & honours Aristo. ubi supra. Cum multitudo animos sustulit quod pari virtute sit praedita. Non nulli magni viti neque inferiores virtute etc. A●j nimium tenues saint, a●j locupletes. Si quis magnus sit, possitque crescere, aut cum aliquis vi●i nomine digous, non adipiscitar honores. in the Commonwealth, whereas there be many that deserve to be admitted to the government, or because they that are honest and virtuous, and deserve to be esteemed, be nothing set by, nor admitted to bear any Office: or because seem be over rich, and other very poor: or because there is seem man in the Commonwealth who is greatly favoured of the people, and hath great authority, whereby he pretendeth to rule and govern all. This manner of changing the government, is commonly seen in those Commonweals, in which there are mighty persons, that take occasion to profit themselves by the weakness of those Princes which be cowards and faint hearted, or but children under protection and custody of Tutors & Governors: for such men procure that place which is nearest to the Princes to usurp their power, and command all. The same manner of alteration is also seen in Commonweals, wherein be many ambition's persons, who against all reason and justice disquiet them, either because they will not pay that which they own, as julius Caesar did, when he tyrannised over the Monarchy of Rome, or because they intend to rob the Commonwealth, whilst the tyranny of those which disquiet it doth continue, as they of Roan did in the time of Guaginus in vita caroli sexti Francorem regis. Charles the sixth of that name, King of France, choosing a Citizen to be a King, that under the colour and pretence they might freely rob and spoil: or because the desire of rule (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) is the greatest desire of all. And it maketh Lib, 15. Cupido Dominandi cunctis affectibus flagrantior est. them that pretend to be Kings (as Euripides saith) not to regard any thing that either the divine or human Laws command: affirming that to obtain a Kingdom, they may violate any Law, according to the Castilian proverb. Por ser rey se quiebra toda ley. To win a crown, All Laws go down. Not much unlike unto that which Euripides saith, Si violandum est ius, imperii causa violandum est. If the Law may he transgressed, it may be trans-gressed for a kingdom. Which sentence of Euripides liked julius Caesar so well, that he repeated it oftentimes, and in tyrannizing the Commonweal did follow it. 13 The ambitious which pretend to govern against reason and justice, do commonly imitate Absalon, when he conspired philippus. de la Torre, in institutione principis Christiant. 2 Regum, 1. 2. Regum, 15. against his father David. Which Absalon, to bring that to pass which he desired, found no better means nor readier way then to hear the complaints of the people, & to provide for their necessities. He received and entertained them very curteoustie that came to speak with him and salute him: and he asked them whence they were, yea he embraced and kissed them. And to reconcile them unto him, and alienate them from his Father, he said unto them, your cause is just, but my Father is so negligent and careless in governing his people, that he hath not yet appointed any man to hear you: he said also, if it pleased God that I should reign in Israel, I would hear all your causes, and decide your controversies, and I would do justice unto every man. Such men take advantage by the ignorance and small skill of the rude people, who are always ready and prompt (as Cornelius Tacitus saith) to follow the worst, and Lib, 15. Vulgus ad dete●●ora promptum. Matth, 27. Quem vultis vobis de duob' dimitti, illi dixetrunt, Barrabam. wish that he should live, who goeth about to kill them; and that he should die, that meaneth to save their lives, as the Jews did, when they cried to Pilate that he should crucify our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and deliver Barabas unto them. These and such like policies are used by the ambitious, when they tyrannously usurp any kingdom, with which wicked sleight they win the favour and hearts of the Common people, that with their help, they may execute that which they wickedly pretend & greedily wish for: for the malice of a few and the ignorance of many, have always disquieted the Commonweals. 14 There is no reason, why Aristotle should reprehend his Master Plato, because in writing how governments are changed, he set not down the especial and particular cause, for the best government of all, is changed into another, and the reason which Plato useth, (to wit, that all created things do alter in time) doth not prove the especial & proper cause of the alteration of the best government into an other. That Aristotle hath no reason in this, may be manifestly seen, in that it was not Plato his intent, in his books De repub. to entreat of the particular and especial causes why governments alter: but of the universal and common causes: for as strong & healthful bodies fall sick for common causes: so Commonweals (which are mixed bodies) are transformed and changed by common causes. The revolutions of the heavens, suffer nothing to continue still without corruption that are under the Orde of the Moon, but all are subject to alteration and corruption: especially because those that rule and govern Commonweals are free agents, though notwithstanding some say, that seeing that those which govern the Commonwealth, are not necessary but free Agents, the natural Agents ought not to be respected: for this doth not hinder that some governments are more easily transformed & changed into others, because they be more ready and more disposed to be transformed into some, then into others, whether the causes for which they be transformed and changed be universal or particular. And that Plato in his Books De Repub did not set down the particular causes why Commonweals were changed: it was, because he imagining and saying a certain Commonwealth (the Idea whereof is that, which he writ in his books De Repub.) he needed not to set down the particular causes why Commonweals do alter, seeing that the universal cause sufficeth. So that as in healthful and sound bodies, the general causes suffice to alter their health and soundness: so in a perfect Commonwealth, the revolutions of the heavens do suffice to alter and change them: and Plato, seeing he entreated not particularly of one especial kind of government, but generally of the Idea or example of all Commonweals: he needed not to set down the especial and particular causes, why the governments change and alter: for seeing, as we have said, that those which change them are free Agents, it sufficed to set down the general and common causes for to show how they are changed, because the particular & special causes of the alteration of governments, though they proceed from free Agents, yet they be reduced unto common and universal causes. By this is concluded, that though the Kingdom and Tyranny be contraries, and (as Aristotle saith) differ greatly, yet nevertheless, a kingdom is sooner Lib. 8. Ethicor. transformed and changed into a Tyranny, then into an Aristocracy, or democracy, for they are more distant and separated from the kingdom, than the Tyranny which is under the same kind, in which the kingdom is. Hereby may we clearly perceive, that Aristotle would rather find salt with his Master Arist ad Plato. accestit annos natus quindecim mansitque in eius schola annos viginti, hoc est usque ad Platonis mortem: teste Ludovico V●ue in Commentar. ad August. de civitate Dei lib. 8. cap. 12. Plato, (as he doth in many other things) then to follow and declare that which he learned of him in the space of twenty years, in which time he was his Scholar. 15 And that all men may understand, that there was no cause why Aristotle should reprehend his Master Plato, touching the kinds and diversities of Commonweals; they ought to presuppose, that Plato in his Books De republica, setteth down the Idea and form of a well instituted Commonwealth, and in his Dialogue De regno, he setteth down an Idea or example of a good and just King: and conformable unto that which he treateth, he doth distinguish the kinds or diversities of the Commonweals: respecting both the subject and the intent of those that govern them. The subject is, that those which govern be one, a few, or many: the end is, that the Commonwealth should be well governed: and the intent is, that thing which they which rule them do principally pretend. And the more these kinds of Commonweals do imitate the Idea which Plato setteth down, the better they be, and the less Bartholo. Cavalcante discursu 4. In tractatu de Republica. they imitate them, the worse they be. Plato saith, that they be the worse, because he speaketh not of corrupt Commonweals, and naughty governments, but of good Commonweals, and those which imitate the Idea which he setteth down: & respecting those Commonweals which are well governed, of which be spoke, he erred not, in saying, that those Commonweals which were most like to his Idea, were the best: and that those which did less resemble it were not so good, though Aristotle 4. Polite. 2. Nec populare genus aliud alio melius esse recté dicitur, sed minus malum dicendum est. reprehending him, saith, that the corrupted Commonweals are not better, some than other, but that they are less nought some then others. But Plato saith well, for he maketh no comparison of corrupted Commonweals (for he accounteth not that a Commonweal, which is corrupted) but of good Commonweals of which he speaketh: and because the kingdom Plato. in Dialo. civili vel de reg. or Monarchy is most like unto his Idea of good government, he saith, that it is the best polity of all, and that the democracy because it is most separated from his Idea of good government, than all the other, it is the worst polity of all: and that of all Plato. ubisupra. Commonweals that are well governed, the democracy is the worst: and of all Commonweals that are naughtily governed it is the best. Plato saith this, because seeing that all Commonweals are ill governed, they which live in that Commonwealth which is governed by the people, are more free, Aristo. Polit lib, 5. cap. 9 Lib. 3, 4, & 5, Politicorum. Plat. In dialo. de Republica, de legibus et in civili vel de regno, et Arist, Polit. lib 3 cap. 5. Mutatur potestas in tyramnidem, ea quae est in optimatum potestate in eam cui p●uci praesunt, et ea quae á populo g●ritur, in eam quam communi omnium nomine R●mpublicam appell●ri diximus. Idem asserit Plutarchus, in lib. detribus generibus Reipublicae. Pro Planctio. Plutar. in vita Demosthenes'. Lib. 8. de Republica. Polit. lib, 5. cap. 6, ut supra, huius eiusdem discursus §. 12. Ex quo Aristote. loco Seb●sti●nes E●zzo hae●ded●cit, in tractatu de discurs. civilibus. and less oppressed by those that rule and govern them. And understanding that which Plato saith after this manner, all Aristotle's arguments and objections which he bringeth against him, concerning the governments, & transformations of Commonweals, are vain: and in effect, Plato said the same which Aristotle, to wit, that the most principal and chiefest kinds or diversities of government are three, the Monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy: and that the Monarchy is the best government, and the democracy the worst, by reason of the unconstancy and small skill of the people. Tully affirmeth, that the Sea hath not so many tempests, dangers & troubles, as the people's election hath, in which they choose, ordain and establish Officers and Magistrates to rule and govern them. Demosthenes' said, that if he had known the malicious defractions, forged crimes, and crafty inventions, unto which they that bear Office in the Commonweals, which are ruled by the people, are subject: and that two ways had been showed him, the one, to be an Officer and Partaker of the government, and the other, to incur present death: that he would rather have chosen that way in which there was danger of death, then to be in Office, in a democracy or Commonwealth governed by the people. 16 The regiments are transformed and changed, some into others according to the opinion of Plato, the Monarchy and Kingdom, into the Aristocracy, (which he calleth the ambitious government, because they that govern, desire and covet honours:) the Aristocracy, is translated into the oligarchy, which is when a few govern, whose principal intent is, to be rich: this estate is not so good as the ambitious government, for honour and glory is preferred before riches: and the oligarchy is changed into the democracy. Aristotle saith, that governments are altered, either because they which prevail most, and are of greatest power, oppress the people, or because they which are rich and of greatest authority, will not suffer others, though they be rich and honoured, to govern the Commonwealth: or because there are factions & partialities among those that govern, which of them shall be the chiefest: or because they that govern, will expel others that do govern, from the government: or because some of those that govern, take advantage by the favour of the people, for to tyrannize over the Commonwealth. Polybius is of that opinion, that men after they assembled together, lived polliticklie in civil government, and choose some that had most credit and authority Plat. ubi supra. EX quo patet tyrannum ex radice tutoris nasci, & Arist. Polit. 5. cap. 5. maxima feré ex part veteres tyranni etc. ut supra. among them, to rule and defend them. And these afterwards of Tutors and defenders, became Traitors and Tyrants, and the chiefest of them not being able to suffer the tyranny of those their naughty Governors, dispossessed them of the government, and translated it unto themselves, making it an Aristocracy, which kind of government was after the same order in time transformed into an oligarchy. This discourse of Polybius, concerning the alteration & transmutation of Common weals, is like to that which some men say of riches and poverty, affirming that poverty maketh men laborious, industrius, & glad to travail and take pains, by which diligence and industry, they attain to riches, by them they become vicious & wicked, and so by reason of their wickedness, at length they fall into poverty again: which constraineth them to take pains and be industrius as they were before. The change of the government, Polit. 5. cap. 6. (as Aristotle saith) cometh by reason that they which govern are very absolute in commanding, nothing regarding Juvenalis, Sic volo, sic ●ubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas. reason or justice: but altogether tendering their own particular and private commodity, and herein differ Kings from Tyrants, and a good regiment from a bad. 17 And to conclude, the government in Commonweals Cor. Tacit. lib. 21, honour sacerdotij firmamentum potentiae assumebatur. are also changed and altered, by sects and new Religions: for nothing doth more maintain the estate of the Commonwealth than Religion, and for this cause they that will usurp any Kingdom or Monarchy, take advantage by Religion, for with it they draw the people to obey them, wherewith they disquiet the Commonweals, and all customs are broken, and factions, seismes, partialities, and dissensions are brought in: as may be seen in those that have brought in new sects, and altered good customs into bad, under pretence of Religion. As Mahomet, Sabel. Aenead. 8. lib. 6. Idem Aennead. 11. lib. 6. who with his wicked sect infected all the Arabians, the Xequi Ishmael, with interpreting the Alcoran after a new manner, brought in the Empire, which the Kings of Persia now hold. In the time of the Emperor Alonso King of Castille, a certain Valerius Historiarum scholast. lib. 3. tit. 4. man in Africa called Aldemon, son unto a Gentleman, did rebel, because an other Moor, that was one of his companions, and a great Astrologian, very well skilled in his Art, had told him that he should once become a mighty man, so that this same Astrologian began throughout all Africa, to preach and declare the Alcoran, praising his fellow and companion Aldemon, and making all the people to believe, that he should be a great Lord, and thereby he gathered such a company together which followed Aldemon, that it was a wonderful matter to behold them: and at length the matter was brought to that pass, that Aldemon with all them that followed him, fought a battle with Alboachi King of Arabia, (who at that time was Lord over Africa,) and overthrew him, and slew him in the conflict: and so Aldemon was made King of Arabia, and Lord of Africa. The anabaptists and such other pestilential Lambertus 3. Hort● nsius in li. tumultuum Anabaptistarum. Heretics, by misconstruing the holy Scripture, and sophistically expounding God's word, have infected many places with their pernicious sect, and caused many alterations and hurlie-burlies in divers Countries, not without the great hurt and loss of many Christians. King jeroboam builded a Temple, and in it set up a golden Calf, making himself high Priest of Idolatry: which he did, because by his own example 3. Regum. 12. he should draw the people to commit Idolatry, that committing Idolatry, the ten Tribes which had rebelled against Roboam King of jerusalem, should not return again unto their Lord to serve him. That new sects and heresies might not disquiet Dion. lib. 54. Religionis novae praetextu multi res novas moliuntur. 10. De legibus. the Commonwealth, Maecenas counseled Augustus Caesar, that he should not permit any new Religion to be brought into the Commonwealth: and Plato said, that they which go about to alter any thing concerning Religion, and think not well of it, aught to be put in prison and severely punished, and no man ought to be suffered to communicate with them. 18 Lastly King Solomon saith, that Commonweals are translated from one people to another, because of unrighteous Ecclesiast. 10. dealing and wrongs, and riches gotten by deceit. He saith also, Proverb. 29. that when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice, but when the wicked beareth rule, the people sigh, and when Proverb. 28. the wicked rise up, men hide themselves, but when they perish the righteous increase. And in the prosperity of the righteous, Proverb. 11. the City rejoiceth, and when the wicked perish, there is joy. If therefore many Princes succeed in the Kingdom either because of the sins of the people, or because they that bear rule, are slow and negligent in ministering justice: that Prince which doth justice equally unto all men, without exception of Deut. 1. Nulla erit distinctio personarum, & actuum. cap. 10. Deus non est acceptor personarum. persons, shall make his inheritance perpetual: for justice is the foundation of every King's throne and royal seat. Finally, GOD doth often permit, that kingdoms be translated out of one government into another by lawful succession, both for his own glory, and augmentation of his holy service, and also for the reparation and amplification of Christian Religion. FINIS.