ATHEOMASTIX: Clearing four Truths, Against Atheists and Infidels: 1. That, There is a God. 2. That, There is but one God. 3. That, jehovah, our God, is that one God. 4. That, The Holy Scripture is the Word of that God. All of them proved, by Natural Reasons, and Secular Authorities; for the reducing of Infidels: and, by Scriptures, and Fathers, for the confirming of Christians. By the R. Reverend Father in God, MARTIN FOTHERBIE, late Bishop of Salisbury. The Contents follows, next after the Preface. Psalm 14. 1. The Fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Romans 1. 20. But, The invisible things of God, that is, his eternal Power, and Godhead, are seen by the Creation of the World, being considered in his works. LONDON, Printed by Nicholas Okes, dwelling in Foster-Lane. 1622. TO THE RIGHT Honourable Knight, Sr. ROBERT NAUNTON, Principal Secretary to the King's Majesty, and of his most Honourable Privy Council; all Happiness, answerable to his Virtue and Worthiness. MOST worthy Syr● you cannot but remember, that, from the first beginning of our old acquaintance, I have always made you the Aristarchus of my writings. The exactness of whole judgement; I have ever found, so pleasingly tempered, with Sharp, and Sweet, that, to the one of these, your sharpness, in discerning the least escapes and errors, there could nothing more be added: of the other, your sweetness, in pardoning the greatest, there could nothing more be required. The recordation of which mixture, hath given me now the boldness (notwithstanding the greatness of your affairs, wherewith I ever find you pressed) yet, to offer unto your censure, this unperfect work, as matter of contemplation, for your more reserved time: wherein, I nothing doubt, but you have your oft returns, to meditations of this kind. The heads which I have projected, in this work to be discussed, are all of them such, as though most needful to be believed; yet lest laboured in by Divines, to further our belief; and therefore the most subject, both to question and doubting: Especially, with men of the sharpest wits, the greatest spirits, and the richest endowments: whom Nature hath prepared, for the search of the highest; and most difficult matters. These men (out of the penetrating and dividing nature of their fiery wits) do trouble themselves with many Quaere's and doubts, in all these four Positions which never creep into the heads of simpler and unlearned persons; framing sometimes such Objections, as to which, they themselves cannot give good and sufficient Answers, but are, ipsi sibi respondentes, inferiores: as it was said of Chrysippus; even for this very cause. For the better help of which men, and to rid them out of the snares of their own curiosities, wherewith they oftentimes entangle themselves; and to prevent, that they do not, ipsi se compungere suis acuminibus, that they wound not themselves, with the sharp needles points of their own pricking wits; I have done the best I could, to join my help with theirs, by answering all Objections, which I could conjecture might any way trouble, their sciences, or Consciences. For this so mean a work, I affect no great Patronage. Satis▪ magnum alter alteri the atrum sumus. Your love is the greatest: which I have ever found ready to cover my greatest: wants. The summitie of my ambition is, that, as you have given a noble testimony unto the world, of the incomparable faithfulness of your love towards me: so I might yield a return of my like fidelity of thankfulness toward you. Your gracious acceptance of this mine imperfect work, shall be a brazen wall unto me, against the malevolous disposition of all detracting spirits. Your Honours eternally obliged friend to serve you: MAR●●N SARUM▪ The Preface to the Reader, expressing the Reason of the whole Worke. IT is not so much of man's own free election, as of God's special disposition, that every man in his writing, is particularly addicted unto the handling of this or that Argument. Not all unto one: for so, all but one, should be left unhandled▪ ●nd the world of many excellent knowledges bereaved: but some unto one, and some unto another; that we might not lack instruction in any profitable matter. Diversis etenim gaudet Natura ministris, Vt fieri diversa queant ornantia Terras. Ne● patitur cunctos ad eandem curreremetam, Sed varias iubet ire vias, variosque labores Suscipere, ut vario cultu sit pulchrior orbis, Saith the Christian Poet: Nature herself delights herself in sundry instruments, ●aling. in Scor. pag. 217. That sundry things be done to deck the Earth with Ornaments. Nor suffers she her servants all should run one single race, But will's the walk of every one frame in a diverse pace: That diverse ways and diverse works the world might better grace. Yea, and even the very Heathen do likewise confess, this to be the proper work of God's gracious providence; calling every man to that wherein he best forseeth him, most able to do good: and yet, not enforcing, but inducing him to do it. Eam enim mentem Dij singulis daunt, ut communes utilitates in medium afferant; saith the Athenian Orator. Is●crat. ●rat. ad Philip. p. 267. Yea, & he illustrateth his position by example of himself there: That God had put into his mind to make that present Oration, for the general good of the whole Greekish Nation: ascribing that his inclination, not unto his own selfe-motion; but unto God's providence disposing his affection. And so likewise doth Plutarch his▪ Intellige non sine efficacitate coe●stium, Plut▪ lib. de Fato Tom. 2. p, 670. vel me nunc scribere isthaec, velte, quic quid agis, eo modo agere quo agis. And so likewise doth Galen of his book De usu partium: Galen lib. 10 de Vsu partium, p, 313. Deus aliqu●s iussit, & primum scribere, & declarationem eius, ille ipse novit me scire: ascribing all his writing unto God's inward commanding: who knew best his ability to write of that argument. Which is indeed, a very true ascription: yea, and much truer in spiritual matters, than it is in any civil. For, therein it is most evident, that, The same Spirit, that hath given to every man his gift, hath also assigned unto every man his task: 1. Cor. 12. 4. 5. etc. calling one unto one Argument, and another to another; and every one to serve his Church, with those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and graces, which he hath bestowed upon him for that purpose. And this we may plainly see, even in those holy Instruments, that have been the writers of the holy Scriptures: how, as God had endowed them with their several gifts, so he likewise appointed them to their several works: calling some of them to the writing a● holy Histories, as Moses, joshua, etc. some, of heavenly Mysteries, as Daniel, john, etc. some, of Hymns, as David in Psalms, and Solomon in his Song: some, of Prophecies, as Isaj, jeremy, etc. and some, of Moral, and Civil Precepts, as Solomon in his Proverbs: every one entertaining both a different matter, and handling the same in a differing manner: yet not by his own election, but by God's direction. For (as S. Peter plamlyteacheth us) There is no Prophecy in Scripture, of any private motion, neither of the will of man: 2. Pet▪ 1. 20▪ 21. but the holy men of God did only speak, as they were inspired by the holy Spirit: who disposed their affections, to serve the Church of God, with all their best endowments and endeavours; and every one of them (according to that Talon, which God hath given unto him) to help to build it up, in true piety and religion. So that, they all of them being joint-laborers together, and all of them working in one common work, under one common master, there could none have any cause to insult over another▪ not the Hymnographer over the Historiographer, nor the Gnomographer over either, nor the Prophet over all, or any of the rest; but every one to acknowledge other, as his own fellow-labourer, apppointed by God himself, with that gift which he had, to help forward the same building that he himself did. And, the very same course hath the holy Ghost observed, as well in the new Testament, as he did in the old: For he hath given unto his Church, some Apostles, some Prophets, some Teachers, 1. Cor. 12. 28. some Workers of Miracles, some Helpers, some Governors, some Speakers with Tongues. For the gathering together of the Saints; for the work of the Ministry, and for the building up of the body of Christ. Not all Apostles, Eph. 4. 11. 12. not all Prophets, not all Teachers, not all Governors, but yet, all fellow-labourers, 1, Cor. 3. 9 and all builders up of the Church, and every one acoadiutor to the work of all the other. We together are Gods labourers, 1 Cor. 3. 9 and the Church his building. Th●odoret. S●r. 6. de Prouide●, To. 2. p, 600. So that, as in the nature all body of a man, no one member can suffice for all his need full uses; but, all of them stand in need of the mutual assistance of all their fellow-members: 1. Cor. 12. 19 21. so that, the eye cannot say to the hand, I have no need of thee; no, nor even the head unto the foot, I have no need of thee: So likewise, in the mysti call body of Christ, those members that are the chiefest, yet do need the coassistance of those that are the meanest. The same Providence (still careful for the good of the Church) hath continually raised up, throughout all succeeding ages, many learned, and wise, and industrious Pastors, to instruct and teach his Church, in true piety and godliness: some by preaching, some by writing, and some by both. But yet, in no Age, hath God shed out all the riches of his blessings, both of Wisdom, and Learning, and all his high Illuminations, more graciously and plentifully, than in this Age of ours. For, what learning, or what knowledge hath God ever bestowed upon any of all the preceding ages, which he hath not greatly amplified and enlarged in this of ours? Yea, and that to high degrees. And, as he hath in this our Age, bestowed upon many men, great variety of Gifts, so hath he also designed them to great variety of works. To some he hath given diversity of Tongues, and those he hath called to examine Translations: to some, skill in disputing, and those he hath called to labour in Controversies: to some, a faculty in Exhortation and Teaching, and those he hath called to instruct men by Preaching. And thus, as God hath dispensed his gifts diversely; so hath he assigned men their Provinces accordingly: to one after one manner, and to another after another; appointing unto every one, that, as he hath received the gift, 1. Cor. 7. 7. so likewise, 1. Pet. 4. 10. he should minister as good dispensers of the manifold graces of God. So that, now (God be praised) the Church of Christ goeth up on all hands, every man labouring in it with his several gift, to repair all the ruins and several bracks of it: some as Architects and skilful Master-builders; some, as Carpenters: some, as Smiths; some, as Masons,; yea, and some other, but as Temperers of Lyme and Mortar: yet these also called Labourers; yea, and more properly than the others. Whose work, though in view, it be less honourable than therest; yet, is it in use, as profitable as the best: yea, and of so great necessity, to the perfecting of the building; that, as in temporal building, the greater Stones cannot be firmly laid, without mixture of the less: so, in this spiritual building too; those other Arts, though superior, yet cannot either perfect or perform their own work, Lapides magos ●ine paruis, benè struinegant Architecti. Plat. li. 10. de Leg. p. 877 without the help and ministry, even of those mean and inferior. Amongst whom, it hath pleased the providence of God, to call me, to make up some decays in the foundations, which, either through tract of time, or through corruption of manners, or through the under-mining of little Foxes, mentioned in the Canticles, are grown by degrees, into the very lowest groundworks. Can●. 2. 15. I am called to under-pinne those four main Corner-stones, which uphold (like four pillars) the whole frame of the Church. I mean, the first, four principles of all Religion: namely, That there is a God. That there is but one God. That jehovah our God, is that one God. And, That the holy Scripture is the word of that God. These under-groundworks, hath it pleased divine providence, to assign me for my task. So that, whilst other men do so are aloft, like Eagles in the air; I must creep here below, like a worm upon the earth. But yet, let no man despise the baseness of this work; because it is about the Basis of the Church. For, the work of the foundation, though it be in sight, the lowest work belonging to the building, yet, is it not the least, but in truth, the very greatest; as being the whole support and stay of all the rest, even of the very highest: A Work which requireth both the skilfullest head, and the cunningest hand, unto the doing of it; if it be done as it ought. And therefore, I could have wished, that some excellent Master-workman, more plentifully abounding, both in leisure, and learning, would have taken it uponhim. The work is due to such: 1. Cor. 3. 10. yea, and our Church hath store of such (Gods name be praised for it.) But yet, no man (that I see) hath set his hand unto it. Many work upon the walls, to make them firm and strong: many upon the roof, to keep it close and tied: many upon the pillars, to erect and straighten them exactly, ad perpendiculum: some pariete and smooth it: some paint and adorn it; some furnish, Cic. Orat. 3. in Verrem. p. 79. and garnish it with beautiful pictures, like apples of gold, in pictures of silver. But yet, no man looketh down into the groundwork of it, Prou. 25. 11. that it be laid so low, as to reach unto the Rock. Whereby there is a space left, for pioneers and underminers, and such like deceitful workers, which are not able to break through the wall, yet do dig under the foundation, and so to evert all. And therefore I have adventured upon this great task, though far unequal to it; hoping that the the same Spirit which hath given me the will, will also assist me in the work, in some measure, to perform it. For, Phil. 2. 13. Sorte divinaid recte efficere quisque potest, ad quod Musa quempiam incitavit. Plato in jonc, p. 171. And so I have followed the advice of the Poet: Quin, hortante Deo, magnis insistere rebus Incipe— Why then, begin, Tibul. leb. 4. p. 150. sith aid from God is sent▪ Proceed, go on, dri●e forth thy great intent. A Work, great indeed: yea, and that of much greater, both Difficulty, and Variety, and Utility, and Necessity, then will easily, at the first, be conceived of many: of all which four, I will give you a little taste, in order. The Difficulty of the work, ariseth from hence, that this Argument now intended to be handled by me, is the most deserted part of all Theology; and wherein the fewest Divines have bestowed their pains. For, whereas there be but two ways, to bring men unto the knowledge and understanding of God (as S. Augustine hath well observed) namely, Creatura, and Seriptura, Aug. lib. 2. de Trin. in proaem. 〈◊〉. 3 p. 260. the Creature, and the Scripture; the World, and the Word: there have so many men laboured in this latter, that, for number, almost they be without number: but, in the former part, so few, that they likewise, in comparison, be numberless too. Some few, I confess, have written before me, of this matter: but none at all in this manner: as I leave it to be judged by the wise and learned. So that, I may truly take up that excuse for all incident errors, which Lucretius doth, even in this very case, that, Auia Pieridum peragro loca, Lucret. l. 1. P. 34. nullius ante Trita solo— I walk a way less way, with uncouth pace, Which yet no former Muse with foot did trace. The natural Difficulty of the Argument, hath deterred the most men from writing upon it: and the paucity of such writers, hath begotten a second difficulty unto me. Those whom I have seen to have written upon this Theme (for I go not beyond the compass of mine own Library) are only these following. Aquinas contra Gentiles; Raymundus de Sabunde, in Theologia naturali; Bradwardinus de Causa Dei; and Valesius de sacra Philosophia. But these four, dealing only Scholastically, by way of Logical Arguments, which do not influere, they cannot affect, nor leave any great impression in the mind of a man but (as the Orator aptly censureth such short and sharp conclusions) Haec spinosiora, prius ut confiteamur nos cogunt, 〈◊〉. 1. Tuse. p. 110. quam ut assentiamur. Such thorny and prickly conclusions of Logic, do rather enforce men to confess them, then induce men to believe them. There is further, Augustinus Eugubinus; who in his Book de perenni Philosophia, hath laboured in this Theme, with singular learning, congesting out of Poets, Philosophers, and Orators, an incredible mass of Authorities and Sentences. But as the forenamed Authors dealt only by argument, without any testimony; so dealeth he mostly by testimony, without any argument. There is yet further, Ludovicus Viues, de veritate Fidej Christianae; and Philippus Mornaeus, of the same both argument and inscription▪ Zanchius also, de Operibus Dej; and the Second Part of the Book of Resolution: all which have done learnedly, in their several kinds. But yet, for those heads, whereupon in this Book, I do principally insist, they pass o●r them so slightly, and perstringe them so briefly, that all of them may be truly affirmed, to have been, by those Authors, rather touched, then handled. It hath been mine endeavour, so to temper my writing, that neither Authorities should lack their arguments; nor arguments their Authorities; nor the Reader store of both. And yet in using the writings of those forenamed Authors, I have entertained this course: that whatsoever any of them hath prolixely handled, that have I either wholly pretermitted, or (at the most) but lightly touched. What they have pretermitted, that have I sought out (so far as I could) and more copiously enlarged. Whereby neither their writings shallbe prejudiced by mine, nor mine thought a Plagium out of theirs: and yet the Reader be enriched by the store of both of us. And this hath also bred a third difficulty unto me. A fourth there groweth likewise from the destinate end, and scope of this work: which is, to compel the Heathens to preach the truth of Christians; and Philosophy to prove the grounds of Divinity: yea and to enforce, by strength of Argument, both Infidels, and Epicures, and Atheists, who will not believe God in his word; yet to believe him without his word. Which every wise man will easily imagine, to be a work not easy to be done. For, as it is truly observed by Tertullian; Tertul. lib. de Testim. 〈◊〉 c. 1. p. 84. Magna curiositate, & maiore longe memoria opus est ad studend●, si quis velit ex literis receptissimis quibusque Philosophorum, vel Poetarum, vel quorumlibet sapientiae secularis Magistrorum, testimonia excerpere Christianae veritatis. It is a piece of business▪ both of great curiosity, and of greater memory, and yet of greatest study, to glean out of the writings of Philosophers, and Poets, and other secular Authors, fit authorities, and testimonies, for the proof of Christian truths. Now secondly, for the Variety of this Work; that is such, and so great, as none other could come near it; if it were handled as it should. For, this Work intreateth both of God, and all his Works; which contain all those varieties, which God and Nature yieldeth. In God there cometh to be considered, all those divine properties, which he hath adumbrated in any of his creatures; his Simplicity, his Immortality, his Immensity, his Eternity, his Strength, his Wisdom, his Goodness, his Dominion, his Omnipotency, his Omniscience, and his Omnipraesence; and such like; things incomprehensible in themselves, but yet such, as may in part be sufficiently understood, by that shadowy resemblance of them, which he hath given unto our souls. In his Creatures, there cometh to be discussed, both the little World, with all the faculties of his body, and all the powers of his mind; and the great World, with all his most excellent and glorious parts; the Heavens, the Earth, the Seas, and all the several creatures contained in all these▪ yea and the admirable working of God's divine providence, both in making, and preserving, and in ruling of all of them. Which (as every simple man may easily see) be matthers of the greatest Variety that can be. In all which points, I have given the Reader so much taste as may delight him, yet not to glut him. For the full handling of them, would both be nauseous unto him, tedious unto me, and supersluous unto both of us; a mere deviation from the scope of this work; and in itself an attempt, not only fond, but also infinite. Now thirdly, for the Utility and profit of this Treatise▪ that may partly be collected from the varieties of it. For it is the Orator's observation, 〈◊〉 3. de. 〈◊〉. pag. 214 That those things which carry with them the greatest delight, do commonly carry likewise the greatest profit▪ Plerisque in rebus, incredibiliter hoc Natura est ipsa fabricata, ut ea, quae maximam utilitatem in se continent, eadem habeant plurimum, vel dignitatis, vel saepe etiam venustatis. And he giveth for an instance, that great beauty and variety which we see in the world: which carrieth also with it, no less utility and profit: the very punctual instance of this our present purpose. But to consider the profit of this our Treatise, absolutely in itself, without any such reference unto his varieties. Can there possibly be any more profitable contemplation, either to excite and stir up a man unto godliness, or to incite him unto thankfulness, then religiously to weigh and ponder with himself, the immensity of God's goodness, who hath made both heaven and earth, and all the several creatures contained in them both, to serve only for his use? This contemplation wrought in the Prophet David so strongly, that it drove him almost into an holy ecstasy; forcing him to break out into that pathetical exclamation; Psa. 8. 1. O Lord our Governor, how excellent is thy Name in all the world. Thou that hast set thy glory above the Heavens. When I consider the Heavens, the work of thy hands, the Moon, and the Stars, which thou hast ordained: What is man (say I then) that thou art so mindful of him, or the son of man, that thou so visitest him? And mark here again, how the Prophet resumeth his first admiration, by a Poetical Epanalepsis or reduplication; O Lord our Governor, how excellent is thy Name in all the world! And indeed, this sensible beholding of the invisible things of God, Rom. 1. 20. by the creation of the world, if it duly be considered and weighed as it ought, it will minister a more effectual instruction unto our eyes, than any that we commonly receive in by our ears. For, Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem, Horat▪ lib. de Art Poet p 170 Quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus, & quae Ipse sibi tradit spectator— Those things more slowly do affect the mind, Which ears do hear, than those which eyes do find. And erefore this work (as I hope) will not be without his profit. Fourthly, as concerning the Necessity of it: Look what absolute necessity the work of the foundation hath, unto all the rest of the building; the same (and no less) hath the proof of these Propositions, unto all the other parts of Religion: For let but these four positions be substantially proved; That there is a God: That there is but one God: That jehovah our God, is that one God: And that the Scripture is the Word of that God: and then all the other parts of Religion, in the whole Scripture contained, are sound supported and upheld. For than it will follow of itself, that whatsoever is in the whole Scripture prescribed, it ought to be obeyed, as the very word of God. But (on the other side) let either all, or any of these positions be disproved; That either there is no God; or, That there is not only one; or, That I●hovah is not that one; or, That the Scripture is not his word: and then all Religion must needs presently fall down, as an house that lacketh his foundation. So that, whether we consider the difficulty of this work in respect of the writer; or the Variety, Utility, and Necessity of it, in respect of the Reader: it will (as I hope) be no labour ill spent, to bestow some time in the reading of it. And yet I doubt not (courteous Reader) but this my labour and endeavour will, of some men, be esteemed to be needless, and redundant: that in this so clear a light and sunshine of the Gospel, I should go about to prove those grounded principles of Religion, which so long have been received without all contradiction: the very seeking to prove the undoubted truth of them, carrying with it (in show) a secret doubting of them; at the least wise, a calling of their truth into question, which hath hitherto been questionless amongst all good and sound Christians. I represent the whole Objection in his true and proper form, as it formerly hath been represented unto me by some, neither ill-learned, nor ill-affected towards me. Whereby I may collect, that from those which are more strange, or more estranged Readers, I may probably expect that scum of Theognetus: Laevas didicisti (o nequam) Literas: Ath●naeus. l. 15. p. 500 Everterunt tuam vitam libri. Dum philosophareris, cum coelo acterra es confabulatus, Quibus tui sermones minime curae sunt. Fond man, thoust spent thy time in vain, Much idle learning thus to gain: Thy bookishness hath been thy bane. With heaven and earth thou talk'st I wis, And yet thy talk by that, nor this, Nor more, nor less, regarded is. This measure (and no better) I but hardly shall escape, from those rash and heady persons, who (like Sannioes') subsanne all things, but only their own follies: not weighing the moment and nature of things. For, as Euripides very truly observeth, Indoctis— nova proferens scita, ●urip. in Medea p. 185. Videberis inutilis, & non sapiens esse. Who broacheth aught that's new, Quicunque canunt pro foribus etiamsi quid Doctum cecinerint, non reputati sapientes, opinionem sub●unt stultitiae. Clem. Alex. lib. Strom p. 136. to fools untaught, Galen. l. 12. de usu partium. p. 358. Himself shall judged be unwise, and good for naught. Against whom I have put on Galens' iron-resolution, as an armour of sure proof: Non ignorantes hunc librum, & calumnijs & convitijs lacessitum iri quam saepissime, cum velut infans orphanus in manus hominum ●briorum prae stultitia & ruditate exciderit: tamen conamur scribere, gratia illorum paucorum, qui dicenda audire recte, & iudicare poterunt. And yet, for the better removing of the forealleged Exception, and divers other of like nature, which might minister any scruple, either unto the curious or incurious Reader, I thought good to praemunite the succeeding Treatise, with this preceding Preface▪ to exempt out of their minds, all those scrupulous exceptions, which (by way of divination) I could forecast would trouble them, touching either the matter, or the manner of my writing. Using in the mean time the same obtestation unto my benevolous Reader, which Lucretius doth to his, in the very like matter: — Vacuas aures mihi, Lucret. lib. 1. p. 2. 3. & te— Semotum a curis adhibe, veram ad rationem: Nemea dona tibi studio disposta fideli, Intellecta prius quam sint, contempta relinquas. To Reason Lend me thine attentive ears, Exempt thyself, from mind-distracting cares, Lest that which I projected for thy good, By thee rejected be, e'er understood. Yea, and the reason, which there is alleged by him, will also not unproperly serve my turn: Name, tibi de summa Coeli ratione Deumque Disserere incipiam: & rerum primordia pandam. My purpose is, to treat of Heavens high Nature, Of All's original, and of All's Maker. First therefore, as concerning the forenamed Exception, That all these four Positions, which are the subject of this Treatise, be already amongst us sufficiently believed; and that therefore it is superfluous to call them now to be proved: Unto this Objection I answer three things. First, that the principal scope and intent of this Book, is, rather to convince those that believe them not, then to confirm those that believe them. Though this also be intended as a secondary end, as it likewise is, in the Creatures of God▪ Rom. 1. 20. But the prime end of this Work, is, to confute all those, which either dispute against God's Essence and being, as the direct Atheist doth; or, against his Providence and governing, as the Epicure doth, who is an indirect Atheist: and to prove both of these to be men, not only destitute a● all Piety and Religion, but also of common sense and reason. And further, to show unto those acute Naturalists, who hold it a servility to be led with brutish-beleeving, and will therefore entertain no more of Religion than they find to be consonant unto Reason; that here they may find reason for their Religion. All which several kinds and degrees of Atheists, it is not more incongruous for me to confute, amongst believing Christians, than it was for the Psalmist to confute the same, Psal. 14. 1. & amongst believing jews. Psal. 53. 1. But secondly, I answer, that my conceit is too shallow to sound the depth of that bottomless reason, That it should not be lawful to prove those Positions, because they be already believed of Christians. For if it were not lawful to prove those points of Religion, which are now already accepted and believed; then (if we will prove any thing) we must every day bring forth a new Creed. For the old may not be proved, because it is approved. And then were the writings of the most Divines, both ancient and recent, to be rejected. For, what point of Divinity doth any of them prove, in all their writings, but that which was before admitted, and approved by all good and sound Christians? Is it not lawful to prove the Articles of our Creed, because they be already believed? or, is it lawful to prove all the rest; and is it not lawful to prove the first? Is it lawful to prove, that our Savionr was conceived by the holy Ghost? borne of the Virgin Mary? suffered under Pontius Pilate? etc. And is it not lawful to prove that There is a God? That he is our Father? That he is Almighty? and, That he is the Maker of heaven and earth? What strange infelicity is fallen upon this one Article (which is the very ground and support of all the rest) that to seek to prove it should deserve reprehension, when to prove all the other deserveth commendation? I cannot reach (I say) the profoundness of this Reason. But, thirdly, I answer: that it is a false position, That either all, or any one of these four forenamed positions, is so generally and constantly believed, as that it hath no need, to be proved and confirmed. For, there be but too too many men that have their belief so unperfect in all of them, that it is mingled with much haesitation, doubting, and wavering: so that, the best of them may say with him in the Gospel, Lord, Mar. 9 24. Plau●. in Mercat. Act. 5. S●c. 4. p. 547. I believe, help my unbelief: And with him in the Comedy, Credo, sed tamen metuo miser. But yet specially, in the first point, of believing That there is a God, that 〈◊〉 of all the rest the most unbelieved. Ovid. l. 3. Amorrum. Eleg. 8. p. 209. For, that which Ovid confesseth of himself, is also true in very many men, if they would confess the truth, as Ovid plainly doth. Solicitor, nullos esse putare Deos. Temptations oft solicit me, To think in heart, That Gods none be. Yea and this solicitation of Satan, Alas sometimes I cannot shun, But some profane thoughts in my mind will runue, 〈◊〉. 7. day, p. 235. as it hath much prevailed with divers of the Heathens: Iust. Mart. Dial. cum Try●hon. p. 153. so hath it no less also, even with divers Christians. Amongst whom, it is but too true an observation which is made by justin Martyr, an ancient learned Father, Dici quidem nonnullos Christianos, esse vero nullius Numinis cultores. That many men be called by the name of Christians, who yet be indeed no better then very Atheists: though not such as Diagoras and Theodorus were, who made (as it were) a profession of their Atheism; yet such as are noted by the Prophet David, which say in their heart, Ps. 14. 1. That there is no God. Theodoret. Serm 1. De Providen ●ia. Tom. 2. p. 576 Yea and sometimes go further too, as is noted by Theodoret. Sunt quidam qui Christianorum quidem nomine gloriantur, veritatis autem dogmata palam oppugnant. There be some that are called by the name of Christians, and yet do not only deny God's Truth in secret, but also defy it, and oppugn it in public, which cometh not much short of the direct and professed Atheist. Therefore it is not the name of a Christian that can free a man from Atheism; nor reciting the Articles of our Christian belief that can make a true Believer. To believe, is with the heart to assent: it is not with the tongue to recite. Isai 29. 13. For, many draw near unto God with their lips, whose hearts be far from him. Therefore, Cord crediture, Ro●. 10. 10. is a Christian man's Character, printed upon his heart, which many men do lack, who have the mark of Christians printed upon their foreheads: notwithstanding both the numberless multitude of preaching, and the clearness of the Gospel, as bright as any Sun shine. For, though it cannot be denied, that there never was in any age, such subtlety of wit, such plenty of learning, and such study of all things, both Divine and Humane: Yet must it also be confessed (if we will confess the truth) that the greatest part of those excellent gifts, wherewith God hath beautified and adorned this our age, are rather the gifts of Illumination, than of Sanctification; and such as have bred with many, rather a verbal Religion in their mouths, than a real in their hearts. We may evidently see this, in the practice of common life: how all the Streets do sound, all Tables and Ordinaries resound, with learned discourses in every kind. The best Schools of Athens were never better able, to dispute de omni scibili, than many men now do almost at every table. But yet this again is very worthy observation; that all this sharpness of wit, and abundance of learning, is oftentimes abused, but only to dispute, and make Objections against God. So that he taketh himself for the ioylliest fellow, that can show himself best able to make some witty Objection against the Bible: thus abusing the great gifts of their wit and understanding, even against God himself, who is the giver of them. Which profaneness so scandalised the Roman Orator Tully, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 237. that is drove him almost into another impiety; Providentiam repr●●ende●d●, quae ration ●n dederit 〈…〉 & improbe usuros. complaining against Providence; that surely in this point it was utterly improvident, in giving so great Gifts and Ornaments unto those men, whom it could not but foresee would so not ably abuse them. Now this is the worst kind of Atheism of all other, when as Atheism is grounded, not so much upon Ignorance, as it is upon the opinion of Knowledge. And yet such is the Atheism of this our time. That which men at the first (like good Christians) received with the simplicity of believing; they now (being grown unto greater knowledge) desire to have proved, with the subtlety of disputing: else, will they believe nothing. The greatness of men's wits sharpeneth many of them on, to see all things proved by arguments, and demonstrated unto sense. The Scriptures (with many) have lost their authority: and are thought only fit for the ignorant, and idiot: The World now swelling with an opinion of learning, though it be indeed, in such men, but only an opinion; yea, and that, a very false one. For (as the Apostle S. Paul hath very truly censured them) Wherein they profess themselves to be wise, Rom. 1. 21. 22. therein they do show themselves to be fools: there being nothing more foolish, then either not to believe that there is a God, who yet may visibly be seen by the creation of the world; Verse 20. or, to believe that the world was never created, because we see not visibly the first creation of it This, though such vain men do conceit and account to be their wisdom: yet is it indeed their palpable folly: yea and that not only in the Apostle Paul's judgement, but also in the judgement of the very Heathen Poet, who calleth such men's doubting, rationis egestatem, the very beggary of reason. Tentat enim dubiam mentem rationis egestas, Lucret. lib. 5. pag. 227. Ecquaenam fuerit mundi genitalis origo. It's want of reason, or its reasons want Which doubts the mind, and judgement so doth daunt, That World's beginning, makes men not to grant. Yea as thick and gross a folly, as if a man looking upon some goodly building, should profess, he would not believe that it ever had been made; because he himself did not see the making of it. For, how differ they? Therefore it is but an erroneous opinion, to think, that either amongst Christians there can be no Atheists; or, that secret Atheists are not to be convinced, as well as the public: or, that the principles of Religion are believed of all, by whom they be confessed: or that they ought not to be proved unto those men, of whom they be already believed. All these (I say) be very great errors, but especially the first. For beside the two forenamed sorts of Atheists, the one both inword, and heart denying God; the other in word confessing him, but in heart renouncing him; there is yet a third sort of them (yea and those even amongst Christians) who though both in word and in heart they confess him, yet do they in their works deny him. They believe there is a God: but they live, as if they believed there were none: which the Apostle Paul perstringeth as a real denying of him. Titus 1. 16. They profess they know God, but by works they deny him. Yea, and his censure is approved, even by the Heathen Poet: who sentenceth all wicked, and licentious livers, to be no better, than a kind of pragmatical Atheists. — Tubulus si Lucius unquam, Si Lupus, aut Carbo, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p 192. aut Neptuni silius, Putasset esse Deos, tam periurus, aut tam impius fuisset? Lucilius asks, if any man can dream, That Lucius, Tubulus. Lupus, Carbo, and their crew, Or Neptun's son, that impious Polypheme, Themselves so perjured, or so vile would sh●w; If they had once, a thought but, that there is, A God in Heaven, who plagues men for their miss? Now all these sorts of Atheists, are to be convinced, and drawn, obtorto collo, will they nill they, unto God. Which, I hope, is performed (I am sure endeavoured) in this Book. Wherein, the first sort of those Atheists, which deny there is a God; are forced, by strength of reason, to confess that, they denied. The second sort of them, which confess there is a God, and yet believe it not; are taught to believe, that which they have confessed. The third sort of them, which both believe, and confess him, and yet have no care to worship, or obey him; are here taught, to live as they do believe. So that, this Book hath great use, towards all those sorts of Atheists, which believe not these positions. Yea, and no less (I hope) likewise, towards those that believe them. For those true and sound Christians, which both confess the truth, and believe as they confess, and live as they believe, it notably confirmeth, both in their true faith, and in their good life. So that it will no way be idle or superfluous, neither towards the Vnbeleevers, nor yet towards the Believers. Not to them, for information; not to these, for confirmation. But yet it may be, that some man will object, that Treatises of Devotion are of much greater profit, and more fitting to the nature and capacity of the Vulgar: and that therefore these our pains might more properly and profitably have been bestowed upon such. Whereunto I briefly answer; That indeed there is nothing more generally wanting, in the practice of our lives, then is the exercise of true Devotion, nothing more defective in the diversity of our writings, than discourses of that kind. So that this may likewise be confessed, too truly, ●o be but a sterile part of Divinity, tilled by very few. But yet, even this present work, which we now have in hand, if it be well considered, Qu●stio de Natura Dcorum, & ad 〈…〉 & ad moderandam Religio●em necessaria. 〈◊〉. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 184. and duly meditated, doth not want his instigation unto true devotion. Item, vide Senecam 〈◊〉 SIXPENCES p. 107. 〈…〉. For what greater motive or incentive can there be, to inflame the godly Soul, with all faithfulness to devote itself, wholly unto God's holy service, then seriously to perpend, and to recount within itself, that God hath made all his several Creatures, to devote them only unto our use and service? Whosoever hath in him any sparkle of goodness, he must needs, by this godly and religious meditation, be greatly accended unto true devoion. Now that point in this Book is prolixly laid open. And certes, how the Reader will be affected in the rea●ing of this Book, I cannot tell: but, myself in writing of it, was no less affected, then was Tully in the writing of 〈◊〉 Book● De Senecture: being oftentimes so lively touched, 〈…〉 that I never found in myself a more quick apprehension, both of God's incomprehensible Majesty and goodness, 〈◊〉 of Man's most contemptible pusillitie & 〈◊〉 then by this contemplation of God in his creatures: finding in myself the verity of that observation of Tully; that Est animorum inge●●●●umque naturale quasipabulum, Cic. lib. 4. Acad. p. 38. consideratio contemplatioq, Naturae▪ Erigimur, latiores fieri videmur, humana despicinus; cogitantesq, supera, atque coelestia, haec nostra, ut exigua & minima contemnimus. As for the capacity of the simpler Readers; all is not written to them; but the most unto the learned, who are in most danger, with many Objections, vpo● these points to be troubled. But yet, there be many passages, through out the whole Book, which may easily be conceived, even of the 〈◊〉 Readers: yea and that even in the highest points, which I have 〈◊〉 endeavoured to stoop and demitte, even to the capacity of the very lowest, so far as the nature of the things would permit. So 〈…〉 may haply be found true even in this discourse also (at the least in respect of the subject matter handled, though not in the form & manner of handling) which S. Gregory affirmeth of the holy Scripture, Greg. Epist▪ ad L●andrum in 〈…〉 that it is, Q●asi Flwius, & planus, & altus; in quo, & Agnus ambuler, & Elephas natet. That though there be some subjects so deep and profound, that the Elephant may swim in them: yet be there 〈◊〉 again, so obvious and shallow, that even the Lamb may wade over them. And therefore the work (as I hope) will not be without his fruit, neither towards the Infidels, nor yet towards Christians; neither towards the Learned, nor towards the Unlearned: which was the doubt of some men (themselves not unlearned) as concerning the Subject and Argument of this Book. It therefore now remaineth, that, having given satisfaction unto such, as have objected against the matter of my writing, I should now likewise endeavour to remove those Exceptions, which some haply may take against the Manner of it. As first, it may be, that some Man, will except; that there is in this Book so much Philosophy, and so little Divinity. Whereunto I briefly answer; that with those Adversaries, against whom I am chiefly to deal in this Book, the Divinity of Christians hath much less authority, than the Philosophy of Heathens; natural Reason a much higher place, then supernatural Religion; and the writings of Philosophers much greater credit, than the holy Scriptures. So that (in respect of the nature of those Adversaries) there is more cause of exception that here is so much Divinity, then that there is so little. And yet even for this also, there is a just Apology: That this is done, ex abundante, rather to confirm those that believe, then to inform those that believe not: that so the Book may not be without his profit, whether it light into the hands of Christians, or of Pagans. Some again (it may be) will except, That such a multitude of Testimonies are congested to one purpose. But that hath many uses, to the profit of the Readers. For first, The Matter questioned, is, by multitude of Testimonies more substantially proved. Secondly, though those Testimonies alleged, be by me often applied, but to mine own present purpose: yet may the learned, Reader make manifold use of them, unto diverse other purposes: and so in their variety, have choice and election to take, or to leave, as will best serve his turn. So that the writer's store, ought not to be accounted the Readers sore: if but in this respect. But thirdly, though many be alleged to one and the same purpose: yet may it be observed, by the indicious Reader, that they do not all proceed by one and the same tenor: but that (for the most part) every one bringeth some thing that the other had not: which may serve the attentive Reader, either for the better confirmation, or the clearer illustration of the point, then in quaestion. Finally, if they will needs have this to be the writer's error; yet may I defend myself, with that same excuse, wherewith Quintil. lib. 10. c. 1. p. 575. Quintilian defendeth Stesicorus: that, Id si est reprehendendum, est tamen nisi Copiae vitium. Which though it hath made the Book some what bigger: yet hath it also (I hope) made it better. Athenaeus. lib. 3. p. 55. So that I am the less fearful of Callimachus his censure, that, Magnus Liber, est magno malo par. A great Book is little better than a great evil. Yea and so much the rather, because in those sentences I have made choice of mine Authors, not corrading out of all promiscue, and sine delectu, but taking only such as are both ancient, and Classical, as well Seculars, as Divines. In citing of whose Testimonies, I have not alleged them all pariter, as they stand in their Author: but (leaving out all exorbitant and heterogeneal Clauses, which ●itted not my purpose) I have taken only so much as was properly incident unto mine own ends, and hindered not the context, and roundness of the speech: yet always, with this care, neither to wrest, nor wrong the sense of the Author. Some again may except, against the citing of mine Authors so particularly; Book, Chapter, and Page; as carrying with it, some touch (or at least, some show) of Vanity. But, unto that I answer that it was not to ostentate, and make show of mine own reading (which it greatly repenteth me to be so little) but to help my Reader with it, such as it is: not envying his profit, but seeking, with all my best endeavour, to promote it. And indeed, I have always esteemed it a great oversight, yea and a kind of unkindness, in any writer, in the citing of his Authors, to send his Reader to seek in an indefinite compass, when as he himself can direct him unto the definite place: by that means also, defeating, the very end and purpose of his own pains in writing▪ which is, only to increase his Reader in all knowledge and understanding. Besides, Whereas in the citing of those Authors, I do oftentimes allude but in a word or two, unto many great Matters, which in the Authors themselves are set down more prolixly: this directing of my Reader unto the plac● so particularly, will oftentimes serve him in stead of a Commentary, storing him to every purpose, with a great deal of more matter, than I have extracted out of the Author. And yet, no man is hereby tied unto the same edition of the Authors that by myself is used. I do but only direct them, which have the same editions, how to make more ready use of them. As for those that have them not, I have noted, not only the Author, but the Book also, and the Chapter: and so come as near them, as I could possibly imagine. Another Exception may perhaps be also taken: That Verses be sometimes cited, and yet not as verses. But this may be defended, Fraz, Poet. pag. 141. Versorum pro versuum. with that excuse of Laberius, that, Versorum non numerorum numero studuimus. I therein followed rather the power of the sense, than the number of the syllables. Senec. Epist. 101. p. 251. And, with another like, of Seneca's, that Animis ista scripsi, non auribus. Some again may except that Greek writers are not cited in their own proper language. Whereunto I answer: First, that the weight of those Testimonies, which I have taken out of them, doth seldom, or never, rest upon the propriety of the Greek word or phrase: but mostly upon the matter, and the sense. Secondly, that if it did: yet the credit of the Translator hath no less authority, than any Nomenclator, or Dictionary maker, but rather much greater: Because, he is led unto his translation; by exactly perpending the true weight of every word as it is in that place used, rendering it most properly out of the congruity of those circumstances that he hath before considered, both in the anteceding and succeeding passages: which are the best directions, and cannot be considered by the bare reciter of the words in their several significations. But thirdly, and lastly (which stoppeth all reply) I have cited those Authors, as I had them: contenting myself with the use of those Book, which were only mine own, and in mine own possession, not affecting to be curious, either in this, or in any thing else which tendeth not directly unto the profit of my Readers. Again it may be objected; that the Sentences alleged are not exactly translated. Aul. G●l. lib. 9 c. 9 p. 124. Whereunto again I answer: that to the sense they be always, Horat. lib. de Art. Poet. p. 169. though, to the words, not always: For, that needs not: in the opinion of an excellent Critic And the Poet telleth us, that he may be a faithful Translator that doth it not. Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus Interpres— It's not his part, that is the best Translator, To render word for word, unto his Author. But, the Orator telleth us, that he cannot be a delightful Translator that doth it. Cie. lib 3. De Fin p. 68 Verbume verbo exprimere, interpretis est indiserti. Again, yet an other, That I have not always cited them to the meaning of the Author. To which I likewise answer: That, whensoever I produce them, as Testimonies for the confirmation of the point then in question, I cite them exactly, unto the Author's meaning. But that is not always my end in alleging them: but, sometimes, to 〈◊〉 their words, by way of 〈◊〉, rather than of allegation, for the more commodious expressing of mine own sense and meaning. A thing very usual and familiar with Plutarch; whose character, and form of style I have (in that point) propounded to imitate. Finally, it may be, that some men will except against the publishing of this first part alone, before the rest be ready: in putting unto me, the incurious error of Curio the Orator. Cic. in. 〈◊〉. p. ●43. Qui, aliquoties tria cum proposuisset, aut quarum adderet, aut tertium quaereret. Who often times, propounding to speak but of three things, commonly, either added to them a fourth, or else forgot to speak of the third. But, for this course of proceeding, I am not without my reason: as namely. First the example of very many learned men; whom we daily observe to practise the same, and to propine unto their Readers an assay of their works, to take a taste of them, how themselves are tasted by them. Secondly, because this first part of the work hath grown exceeding great, and beyond mine expectation, being now come unto the measure and bigness of a Volume. And thirdly, it had no little moment with me, that diverse of my learnedest and best affected Friends, have often importuned me unto the publishing of it, hastening (in their love) this unperfect work, unto the edition; peradventure, as an untimely fruit unto his abortion: but without peradventure, 〈◊〉. Orat▪ ad 〈◊〉 p. 35. unto that common condition, which is observed by Isocrates to be fatal, to many Book. Vt dum adhuc in mentibus Authorum inclusi te●eantur, magnam sui expectationem concitent: sed. perfecti tandem, & aliis oftensi, long tenuiorem, quam pro concepta spe, gloriam consequantur. They stir up a greater expectation, whilst they are in doing, than they are able to maintain, when as they be done. But yet, the principal end and intent of my writing, being only the good, and profit of my Readers; I should greatly wrong, both their courtesy and equity, to make any doubt of their favourable acceptance. Which, if they should not afford, they themselves should wrong them both. For what can be more contrary, both to courtesy, and equity, then either to speak, or but to think evil of those, that have spent so much pains, only to do them good? Mat. 5. 46. 47. Ca●●. ad Corn. Nepo●. p. 7. This were the reward of worse than a Pagan: which I hope to be far, from every good Christian. Quare habe tibi, quic quid hoe Libelli est. Such as it is, I do willingly permit it unto thine equal censure: desiring nothing more, then that the same mind, towards thine own good, may possess thee, in reading it, that did me, in writing it: and then I shall not need to doubt of thy profit by it: Which I will account, mine own exceeding great Reward. And therefore, I conclude this preface with that prayer of Irenaeus: I●enaeus l. 3. c, 6. p. 176. Da (Deus) omni legenti hanc scripturam, cognoscere te quia solus Deus es, & confirmari in't te & absistere ab omni haeretica, quae est sine Deo, & impia sententia. Grant (O Lord) unto all that shall be readers of this Book, to know thee, to be the only true God▪ and in thee more and more to be strengthened and confirmed: and to eschew all the impious opinions, of Heretics, and Atheists▪ Amen. Thine in the Lord, Martin Sarum. The first part of this work Proveth, There is a God. And is contained in eight several Books; enforcing the probation, by eight several Arguments. The First Book proveth it, from the simple and Categorical affirmation of Nature: which cryeth out in all men, that, There is a God. The Second; from certain grounds and consequents, in all manner of Arts, and Sciences. The Third; from the structure of Man's Body. The Fourth; from the Nature of his Soul, The fifth; from the general view of the visible world. The sixth; from a particular survey of the most principal part's of it. viz. The Heaven, The Earth, The Sea. The Seaventh; from certain special works of Providence observed by Cleanthes. The Eight; from the Confutation of the Atheists Objections. A Table of the Chapters contained in this Book. CHAP. 1. TO believe there is a God, is the ground of all Religion. 2. The end and purpose of this book, is to prove that Position. 3. This cannot be believed, but by the help of prayer. 4. It cannot be proved A Priorj. 5. Yet may it be showed A Posteriorj. pag. 1. CHAP. 2. What manner of Authorities be the weightiest in this case. 2. That, they may not here be used. 3. How yet they be here used. 4. What be the most proper, in respect of the Adversaries. 5. Why they be more proper than any other. pag. 8. CHAP. 3. That there is an inbred persuasion in the hearts of all men, That there is a God. 2. That this hath been observed, by many learned men, among the Heathens. 3. That it hath also been observed, by diverse learned Christians. 4. Two notable testimonies out of Tully; asserting this persuasion, both unto all Nations, and unto all Conditions, & unto all persons among men. p. 15 CHAP. 4. That there is not any Nation, but it hath his Religion. 1. Ancient histories insinuate it. 2. New histories affirm it. 3. Travellers confirm it. 4. A general survey of their gods declareth it. 5. A particular survey of their tutelar gods, proveth it. p. 19 & 20. CHA●. 5. That all sorts of men, of all degrees and orders, do believe, There is a God, is particularly declared by instance of Poets. 2. Of Lawgivers'. 3. Of philosophers. 4. And of all other several Arts and professions. pag. 29. CHAP. 6. That there is no particular person in the world, but that (in some degree) he believeth, There is a God. 2. No Swearer. 3. No Blasphemer. 4. No Idolater. p. 39 CHAP. 7. That a great discord may be noted among the Heathens, as concerning the worship of their several gods. 2. Yet that this discord doth not infringe the general opinion, as concerning God. 3. But that it much confirms it. pag. 49, CHAP. 8. Certain Objections touched, impugning the generality of the forenamed consent, as concerning God. 2. The first of those Objections opened, directly denying it. 3. The same Objection answered. p. 55. CHAP. 9 The second Objection against this universality of consent, unfolded: that Religion is no better, but an humane invention. 2. That Objection confuted, by the Aniquity. 3. Universality. 4. Consent. 5. Perpetuity of Religion. p. 58. CHAP. 10. The third Objection against the Universality of Consent in Religion, propounded: viz. That it hath been oppugned by diverse, both wise and learned Philosophers, though called by the name of Atheists. 2. That Objection answered from the smallness of their number. 3. The weakness of their learning. 4. The mistaking of their opinion. 5. And their inconstancy in their assertion. p. 66. CHAP. 11. The two ends of Atheism; Not to serve, and Not to fear. 2. The Atheist in the first of these two ends, is disappointed, becoming a base servant unto all his own vices. 3. But more especially unto his ambition. 4. And his belly. 5. All which service, he referring to himself, he becometh thereby, A god unto himself. p. 112. CHAP. 12. The Atheists second end, is, to free himself from fear. 2. Yet no man feareth more: as he bewrayeth, at three times. 3. When he dreameth. 4. When it thundereth. 5. When he dieth. 6. This his fear, is a clear Argument, that he thinks, There is a God. p. 121. CHAP. 13. That, beside the forenamed direct confessions of Atheists, diverse of them have directly and expressly confessed confessed God. 2. Some of them, unwittingly. 3. Some of them, unwillingly. 4. And some of them, both wittingly, aend willingly. pag. 135. CHAP. 14. That though Atheists should never have confessed, neither directly, nor indirectly; but always most obstinately have denied him: yet, that there is no reckoning to be made of their opinion. 2. Because in the opinion of all wise & learned men, they are esteemed no better than either Fools. 3. Or mad men. 4. Or monsters of men. p. 147. CHAP. 15. That God hath at all times, poured down his just judgements, upon the heads of Atheists: by them sensibly declaring, That there is a God, 2. Examples out of Scriptures. 3. Examples out of Ecclesiastical Histories. 4. Examples out of Heathen writers. 5. An Objection answered, concerning the punishment of those Atheists. p. 153 CHAP. 16. That the general consent of all men, in agreeing so fully, That there is a God, is an infallible argument, That there is one, indeed. 2. That, to this end, it is alleged by those Authors, that have observed it. 3. In making it the Law of Nature. 4. In making consent, a Symptom of truth, in all things. 5. In making it, the chiefest Argument, that can be brought in this cause. p. 163. & 164. The Chapters contained in the second Book. CHAPTER 1. THat all Arts lead to God. 2. The Metaphysics, by two Arguments. 3. The first is, the limiting of all finite things, as of natural Bodies. 4. And of their natural faculties. 5. And yet not by the Sun, which itself is limited. 6. Both in his own working. 7. And in his moving. 8. By the limiting also of all artificial faculties. 9 And finally, by the limiting of all spiritual Graces. pag. 171. CHAP. 2. The immensity of men's appeti●●s, doth she●▪ That there is a ●od. 2. The immensity of natural appetites. 3. The immensity of sensitive appetites. 4. The immensity of intellectual, or spiritual appetites. 5. The immensity of Desire. 6. The immensity of Anger. 7. The immensity of will. 8. And yet God is able to fill them all. p. 197. & 198. CHAP. 3. That, every thing in nature, hath a Cause of his being. 2. That, nothing can be the Cause of his own being. 3. That among the Causes, there is one first, and supreme Cause, which is the Cause of all the rest. 4. That, this first, and supreme Cause, is nothing else, but God. p. 212. CHAP. 4. That these sensible and second motions, direct us unto a first. 2. That a first motion, doth necessarily imply, a first Mover. 3. That this first Mover, is the Cause of all the motions in the world. 4. And, that therefore, this first Mover, is nothing else, but God. pag. 224. CHAP. 5. That the true cause of Sickness, is Sin against God. 2. That God, for this cause, doth threaten, to send Sickness. 3. That he sendeth it according to his threatening. 4. That Physicians observe the stroke of God's Vengeance, to be in many Sicknesses. pag. 234. CHAP. 6. That God is the giver of health unto men. 2. That he is the preserver of it. 3. That he is the restorer of it. 4. Both by giving medicinable herbs unto men. 5. And by teaching them the right uses of them. 6. And by joining his blessing unto their working. p. 244. CHAP. 7. Little Cities do rise to be great. 2. Great Cities do fall to be little. 3. Yet is not this the work, of either Fate, or Fortune. 4. But of Gods own Providence, and Preordination. 5. Who limitteth their powers. 6. Boundeth their Domnions. 7. And prescribeth their continuance. p. 260. CHAP. 8. God is, both the Physician, and ethical last end of all things. 2. He giveth us all virtues, which are the way to perfect Blessedness. 3. He impla●teth in us all good affections, which are the previous dispositions unto virtues. 4. He giveth unto us the true and perfect Blessedness. 5. Nay he himself is, our true and perfect Blessedness. p. 278. CHAP. 9 The Mathematics show, that there is a God. 2. And more particularly, Geometry. 3. Which by a Geometrical prick, doth lead men unto some knowledge of God. 4. Of whom (in diverse powers) it hath a kind of resemblance. p. 492. CHAP. 10. Unity in Arithmetic, doth lead men unto God. 2. Which is affirmed by Philosophers, to be the Original of all things. 3. Yea, directly affirmed to be God himself. 4. With whom it hath indeed a very great resemblance. pag. 298. CHAP. 11. That the motion of the Heavens, and Stars, is not natural. 2. Which yet is so orderly, as if it were artificial. 3. That the order of their motion, hath a resemblance of a 〈◊〉. 4. That the Heavens themselves do make music to this dance. 5. That this orderly motion of the Stars, hath led diverse men to seek for a God, ●boue the Stars. 6. Because their orderly motions, can neither be from chance, nor from their own wills. But only from God's wisdom, who is the maker of them. pag. 309. CHAP. 12. That God hath made all his creatures, in Harmonical proportion, and in a kind of music. 2. That all creatures are naturally delighted with it. 3. That they praise God in their kinds, with their natural musics. 4. That artificial music is the gift of God to men. 5. That the chiefest end of it, is to praise God with it. p. 327. CHAP. 13. The other Liberal Arts, do, all of them, show, That there is a God: they being, all of them, acknowledged, to be the gifts of God. 1. Grammar. 2. Logic, 3. Rhetoric. 4. which three Arts have apparently, an adumbration of the Trinity. p. 345 CHAP. 14. Philosophy leadeth a Man unto God. 2. It hath in it a kind of resemblance of God. 3. It is acknowledged to be the Gift of God. 4. And so likewise is Poetry. 5. And so all other Arts in general. 6. Yea even the Mechanical. pag. 352 ¶ Because I have in this Book cited many authorities, exactly, and particularly, unto the very page; that my labour therein, should not vanish into nothing, but, work unto the benefit and profit of my Readers; I thought good to set down a Catalogue of mine Authors; and, of their several editions: that, such as have the same, may the better help themselves, to find out those things that are alleged out of them. For others, which have them not, I have given what help I could, to satisfy their desire, by directing them unto the Book, and Chapter. A ABdias Babylon. Parisijs 1560. in 8 vo. Aelianus. Tyguri. 1556. in Fol. Aelianus Spartianus, cum Suetonio. Aelius Lampridius, cum Suetonio. Aeschylus. in 16. Aesopi fabulae Lugduni. 1571. in 16. Agapetus in Bibliotheca Patrum. A. Gellius. Venetijs 1515. in 8. Albertus Magnus. Colon. 1536. in fol. Alchymus Auitus in Bib. Patr. Alcoran Turcicus. 1550. in fol. Alexander ab Alex. Franc. 1591. in 8. Ambrose. Basil. 1567. in fol. Anacreon. Paris. 1566. in 12. Anselmus. Colon. 1573. in fol. Apollodorus. Antwerp. 1565. in 8. Apuleius. Lug. Bat. 1594. in 12. Aquinas cont. Gent. Lug. 1586. in fol. Aquinat. Summa. Antwerp. 1585. in fol. A●●stoteles. Lugdun. 1549. in fol. Austophanes. Franc. 1586. in 8. Arnobius. Basil. 1560. in 8. Athanasius. Paris. 1581. in fol. Athenagoras. in Bib. Patr. Athenaeus. Lug. 1583. in fol. Augustinus. Basil. 1543. in fol. Augustinus. Eugub. Lug. 1540 in fol. Aurelius' Victor cum Suetonio. Ausonius. Antwerp. 1568. in 16. Authores Linguae Latinae. 1595. B Bacchiarius. in Bib. Patr. Baptista Egnatius, cum Suetonio. Basilius. Basil. 1565. in fol. Beda. Basil. 1563. in fol. Bernardus. Basil. 1560. in fol. Berosus Babil. Ludg. 1552. in 16. Bibliotheca Patrum. Margarini, Pa●isijs. 1575. in fol. Bion, cum Hesiodo. Boccatius. Venetijs 1511. in fol. Bradwardinus. Londini. 1618. in fol. C Caesaris comment. Lugd. 1560. in 16. Caesarius frat●r Nazianzeni, cum Nazian: in fol. Caelius Rhodiginu●. Fr●nc. 1599 in fol. Catullus. Basil. 1592. in 8. Chrysostomus. Basil. 1547. in fol. Chrysologus: Paris▪ 1585. in 8. Cicero. Paris. 1538. in fol. Claudianus Mamertus. in Bib. Pat. Claudius' Marius Victor. in Bib. Pat. Claudianus Poeta. Lugd. 1606. in 16. Clemens Romanus. Colon. 1563. in fol. Clemens Alexandr. Basil. 1566. in fol. Cornelius Gallus, cum Catullo. Cornelius Agrippa. Lugd. 1531. in 8. Cyprianus. Genevae. 1593. in fol. Cyrillus Alexandrinus. Paris. 1573. in fol. Cyrillus Hierosolym. Antwer. 1564. in 8. D Damascenus. Paris. 1577. in fol. Dares Phrygius: Basil. 1541. in 8. Demosthenes. Venetijs. 1550. in 8. Dictis Cretensis. cum Diodoro Sic. Diodorus Siculus. Basil. 1578. in fol. Dion Nicaeus▪ graece, Lutetiae. 1551. in 4. Dionysius Areopag. Ludg. 1572. in 16. Idem. Colon. 1526. in fol. Dionysius Halicarn: Franc. 1586. in fol. Dioscorides. Lugd. 1550. in 8. Dorotheus. in Bib: Patr. E Elias Cretensis, cum Nazianz. Ephraem Syrus. Colon. 1603. in fol. Epiphanius. Basil. 1545. in fol. Euripides. Basil. 1550. in 8. Eusebius Pamphili. Basil. 1579. in folio. Eiusdem Histor. ibidem. 1587. in folio. Eusebius Emissenus, Paris. 1575. in 8. Eutropius, cum Suetonio. F Fabius Pictor. Lugd. 1552. in 16. Festus. cum Authoribus Linguae Lat. 1595. in 4. Fernelius de lieu Vener●a. Antwerp. 1579. in 8. Flavius Vopiscus cum Suetonio. Fulsbertus in Bib. Patr. Fulgentius. Antwerp. 1574. in 8. G Galenus de usu partiu●●. Pa●is. 1528. in 4. Ge●●adius. in Bib. Patr. Gregoriu● Mag. Antwerp. 1572. in fol. Grego●ius Neo●ae●arien●●s. in Bib. Patr. H Hegesippus. Colon: 1575. in 8. Heraclides▪ come 〈◊〉. Lugd. 15●7. in 16. Hermes. in Bib. Patr. Herodo●●. Basil. 1583. in 8. Hesiodus. 1000. in 16. Hieronymus. Basil. 1537. in fol. Hilarius. Basil. 1570. in fol. Homerus: Latin: 1528. in 8. Gracolat. in 16. Horatius. in 16. Hugo de Scto. Victore. Venet. 1588. in f. I jamblicus. Lugd. 1570. in 16. Ignatius. in Bib. Pa●●. josephus. Franc. 1580. in fol. Irenaeus. Geneu. 1570. in fol. Isidorus. cum Authoribus Ling. Lat. Isocrates. Basil. 1571. in 8. Isychius. Paris. 1581. in 8. julianus Pomerius. in Bib. Pat. julius Capitolinus cum Suetonio. julius Firmicus. in Bib. Patr. julius Obsequens. cum Plinio juniore. junilius. in Bib. Patr. justinus Martyr. Basil. 1565. in fol. justinus Historicus Lug. 1573. in 16. justiniani Instinct. Lug. 1559. in 8. Iwenalis'. cum Horatio. Iwencun. in Bib. Patr. L Lactantius. Antwerp. 1570. in 8. Lae●tius. Paris. 1570. in 8. Leo Magnus. Antwerp. 1583. in 8. Linschot. Lond. in fol. Livius. Franc. 1588. in fol. Lucanus. Paris. 1543. in 16. Lucianus. Franc. 1538. in fol. Lucretius. Paris. 1565. in 16. M Macatius. Franc. 1594. in 8. Macrobius. Colon. 1527. in 8. Maffei Indica Hist. Colon. 1593. in fol. Manilius. Lug. Bat. 1590. in 4. Marius Victorinus. in Bib. Pat. Martialis Poeta, Antwerp. 1579. in 16. Martialis Martyr. in Bib. Pat. Mathias a Michon, cum novo Orb. Maxentius in Bib. Patr. Maximus Tyrius. Paris. 1554. in 16. Mornaeus. Antwerp. 1585. in 8. Moschus. cum Hesiodo. Munsterus. Basil. 1559. in fol. Musaus', cum Hesio●o. N Nazianzenus. Basil. 1571. in fol. Nemesius. in Bib. Patr. Nicephorus▪ Callisti. Franc. 1588. in fol. Nilus. in Bib. Patr. Nonius. cum Authoribus Ling. Lat. Novatianus. cum Tertulliano. Nows Orbis. Basil. 1555. in fol. Nyssenus. Basil. 1571. in fol. O Occu●enius. Paris. 1547. in 8. Olimpiodorus. in Bib. Patr. Origenes. Basil. 1571. in fol. ●Orpheus. cum Hesiodo. Orthodoxographa. Basil. 1569. in fol. Ouidij Metamor. Cantabr. 1584. in 8. Fastorum. Paris. 1563. in 16. Amorum. Antwer. 1583. in 16. * Orosius. Paris. 1583. in fol. P Pacianus. in Bib. Patr. Palingenius. Paris: 1564. in 16. Persius. cum Horatio. Petrarcha. Basil: 1554. in fol. Petronius Arbiter. Paris: 1564. in 8. cum fragmentis Poetarum. Philo judaeus▪ Basil. 1558. in 8. Phocillides. cum Hesiodo. Picus Mirandula. Basil. 1601. in fol. Pisanus. in Orthodoxographis. Plautus. Colon: 1577. in fol. Platina. Colon. 1593. in 4. Plato. Basil 1551. in fol. Plinius Franc. 1582. in fol. Plinius lunier. Lugd. 1539. in 8. Plutar●hi vitae. Basil. 1579. in 8. E●●sdem Moral. ibidem. 1572. in 8. Polycarpus. in Bib. Patr. Pomponius Laetus▪ cum Su●tonie. Primasius. Paris. 1543. in 8. Proclus. cum lamblico. Procopius. Tyguri 1555. in fol. Propertius. cum Catullo. Prosper. Lovanij. 1566. in 4. Prudentius. Antwerp. 1546. in 8. Ptolomaeus. Basil. 1545. in fol. Pub Mimus. cum Seneca. Q Quintilianus. Lugd. 1580. in 8. Quintus Curtius. Lugd. 1551. in 16. R Ruffinus. Paris. 1580. in fol. Raba●●s Maurus. 1534. in fol. S Sabellicus. Basil. 1560. in fol. Saluianus. in Bib. Patr. Salustius. Lugd. 1551. in 16. Sedulius. Basil. 1528. in fol. Seneca Philosophus. Basil. 1590. in 8. Seneca Tragicus. Antwerp. 1588.▪ in 8. Sextus Aurelius Victor. cum Suetonio. Silius Italicus. Paris: 1531. in 8. Solinus Polyhist. Lug. 1552. in 16. Solon. cum Hesiodo. Statius. Argentorati 1612. in 12. Stobaeus. Basil. 1549. in fol. Strabo. Lug. 1559. in 16. Suetonius. Basil. 1546. in fol. Symmachus apud Prudentium. T Tacitus. Antwerp. 1585. in 8. Tacianus. in Bib. Patr. Terentius. Venet. 1553. in fol. Tertnllianus. Framkerae. 1597. in fol. Theocritus. cum Hesiodo. Theodoretus. Colon: 1573. in fol. Theognis. cum Hesiodo. Theophilus Alexandr. in Bib Pat. Theophilus Antiochenus. in Bib. Patr. Theophylactus. Antwerp. 1564. in 8. Thucydides. Wittenberg. 1569. in fol. Tibullus. cum Catullo. Trismegistus, cum jamblico. Tertaeus. cum Hesiodo. V Valerius Flaccus. Paris: 1532. in 8. Valerius Maximus. Lug. 1158. in 16. Velleius Paterculus. cum Suetonio. Varro. cum Authoribus Lingue Lat. Paulu● Venetus. Venetus. cum Novo Orb. Virgilij Aeneid. Franc. 1583. in 8. Reliqua. Colon: 1612. in 16. Lodovicus Viues▪ Viues de Verit. Christia. Religionis: Basil: 1543. in fol. Voyages of the English. London, 1599 Volaterani Commentarij. Basil. 5159. in folio. X Xenophon. Basil. 1534. in fol. Idem, De Aequivocis. Lug. 1552. in 16. Z Zacharias Mytilenensis in Bib: Patr. Reverendissimo in Christo Patri ac Domino, D. Martino Fotherbeo, Episcopo Sarisburiensi, viro docto, prudenti, pio, migranti. CHare mihi ante alios merito, Martin, sodales, Flos hominum, specimen morum, dulcissime rerum, Tu qui me noras, notum constanter amaras, I nimium dilecte Deo, cui cedere soli Noram in amore tui, fruere, O fruere omnibus illis Laetitijs animae emeritae; coeloq, receptus, Quae te dimissum lugent, ne despice terras. Quin saltem hanc animam agnoscis, te, funera amantem Post tua, post mea amaturam. Quin attrahis ad te, Te dignam, indignum te postquam hunc exuis orbem. Eia individuos comites age reddat Olympus Me tibi, teque mihi; cui te sine, caetera, mundus Immundus, terra insuavis, nil dulce relicto est. Interea quem das, luctus solamen, amoris Mnemosynum, ingenij foetum, pietatis asylum, Dum lego, dum verso librum, in quo mentis imago Emicat inspirata tuae tam viva, resolvor Protinus in lacrymas, visus mihi nempe meummet, Dum lego scribentem, Martinum audire loquentem. Mox ubi me falsum video, spe lusus inani, Quae fuerant laetae lacrymae, fiunt modo verae, Falsaque in immensos redeunt mihi gaudia fletus. Flevit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Robertus Martinj relictus. Typographus Lectori benevolo S. HAbes, quicunque legis, Magni Operis, Magni item Author is specimen: immo ne quidem specimen, tam clarae eruditionis, tamque multiplicis lectionis, atque in hoc tam egregio emicuerunt Antistite. Id ipsum nemo, qui eundem in terris degentem novit, non agnoscit. Idemque etiam Tibi liquido constaret, si re●iduatantae Lucubrationis exantlasse, vel ista solum praeludia absolvisse concederetur. Quod si suorum aliquis, hoc praeclarum facinus foeliciter incoeptum, studuer it aliquando prosequi, Lubens curabo, in sequenti chalcographia, ut ●i quid in praesenti erratum sit, & corrigatur; & quicquid in posterum fuerit demandatum, sedulo excudatur. Interea, veniam a quibusdam precabor serio, & eorum donabit clementia; quod haec ipsa tam sero in lucem prodeant, ita iam olim defiderata: quippe qui varie impeditus, non quod volui, sed quod potui, nunc demum praestiti De caeteris, non multum gravabit tua, Lector, aequanimitas, quod multorum Elogijs, in honorem tanti Praesulis, ascribendis supersedeam; & Epitaphium hic super addam, quale nuper in frontispicio Monumenti, in Ecclesia Parochiali Omnium Sanctorum Lumbard-Street London, extructi, insculptum vidi. Quem Charis asseruit sibi, quem sibi Musa, suumque Dixit & Haec, pariter dixit & Illa, suum: Abstulit ambabus Deus Arbiter & Tuus, inquit, Hic erat, atque Tuus▪ Nunc erit ille Meus. Contra Atheos Athleta fuit Mihi, voce, styloque Nunc est Athletae danda corona Meo. Sum cinis, hic qua sum, sed & hic cinis emptio Christi est. Caetera, quae mea pars, Pars mea Christus habet. Vnisti, Deus, ambo semel: Deus, ambo reuni: Sic tecum totus, qui mea Pars es, ero. DEPOSITUM. REverendi in Christo Patris, ac Domini, Doctor is MARTINI FOTHERBEI, olim SARISBURIENSIS EPISCOPI; qui, ex antiqua, & vere generosa, de Grimes by magna, in Comitatu Lincolniensi, familia oriundus; CANTABRIGLAM, inde accitus; & Collegij Sanctaeac Individuae Trinitatis Socius meritissime cooptatus; singulis, atque, ordine, summis Academiae gradibus est insignitus. Hic, postquam celebris, Ecclesiae Cathedralis ac Metropoliticae Christi CANTVARIENSIS, Praebendarius, annos viginti duos perdur asset; tandem, per Serenissimum Regem JACOBUM, (cui & a Sacris erat) ad Episcopatum SARVM evectus est. Vixit, omni Scientiarum Humanarum Divinarum genere, vir instructissimus; Concionator idem disertissimus; Haeresin, & Hypocri●in validissime perosus; Vitaeque ac moruntum gravitate tum suavitate eximius; Exteriori Corporis decore spectabilis; Politiori Sermonis elegantia praestans; Potioribus Animi dotibus adornatus, Memoria nempe fideli, Ingenio foelici, judicio acri, &, in rerum administratione, Prudentia plane admirabili; Omnibus sane numeris, quos Humana capit conditio, ade● consummatus, ut vel primarijs viris facile exaequandus, nullis exuperandus esset. Adversus Atheos doctissimum opus instituit: cuius auspicium, & quasi vestibulun●, Londini, heu moriens, Typis mandandum reliquit. Corpus hic Sepulchro donari petijt, sub beata Resurrectionis spe. Spiritum ipse suum immortalem, Patri Spirituum pie placideque reddidit, Die Martij, 11. Anno AErae Christianae. 1619. AEtatis suae. 60. NOn sibi mellificavit Apis; sed crura tetendit, Corda hominum Sacro melle replere suo▪ Contra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 penna pugnat, vitaque repugnat, Et moriens vivit; sic probat esse Deum. Qui legis, in Propriam Conuertas pabula Carnem▪ (Vivificans vitae est, Spiritus arrha novae) Mortales immortales oracula reddent, Non posse, his Saturos, experiere, mori▪ Esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Libro, Tibi funebre, Carmen Qui fecit, voluit, Frater, Amicus, idem. A Brother, and a Friend, hath made this Verse, To come to thy Books birth, become thy Hearse. T. L. Lectio, materies, ordo, stylus, om nia mira hic. Haud miror tamen haec omnia. Cur? Stupeo. O Praesul, miro mira scribis alite. Stupidus sit hercle oportet, haec qui non stupet. Persequere fausta, quod Libri reliquum est, avi. Sed ocyus T● prodeat superstite. Ego Liberos, Librosque nolim posthumos. R. C. The Prologue to the work. CHAP. I. 1. To believe there is a God, is the ground of all Religion. 2. The end and purpose of this Book, is to prove that Position. 3. This cannot be believed, but by the help of Prayer. 4. It cannot be proved, a Priorj. 5. Yet may it be showed, a Posteriori. THe very first foundation of all piety and Religion, To believe there is a God the foundation of all Religion. is To believe there is a God: as it is generally believed, and confessed by all men, both by Christians, jews, and Heathen, if they hold any religion. The Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Heb. 11. 6. layeth this, as the first ground of all religion and Godliness, to believe, That God is. For, as Lactantius very truly noteth, Lactant▪ lib. De vero cultu. c. 9 p 333 336 Caput est primum Divinae Legis, ipsum Deum nosse: It is the very first head of the law of God, to know and believe, that there is a God. And again, a little after. Hic est Sapientiae primus gradus, ut sciamus, quis sit nobis verus Pater: This is the prime degree of wisdom, Palingen. in Sagit. p. 268. to know who is our true God and Father. Yea and Palingenius, unto the same purpose. — Prima est virtus, prim● est sapientia, Regem Coelicolûm Patremque hominum cognoscere— Its Man's prime virtue, Wisdom's chiefest thing, To know his Father to be heaven's high King. Nay, Theoph. Alex. Pietas in Deum est super omnia, quasi culmen & corona virtutum; saith Theophilus Alexandrinus: Nay, Epist. 2. Virtutum omnium principium, saith Philo judaeus. True piety towards God, Paschal. Bib▪ Pat. is not only the highest, but also the first of all other virtues. Neither do Christians only reckon this, Tom. 1. p. 391. for the first stone in the building of Religion: Phil. jud. lib. but the jews do also confirm the very same. De decalogo p. 1018. Aben Ezra, Aben Ezra apud Iosippu● p. 297. in his Exposition of the ten Commandments, saith of the first of them, that, Hoc primum dictum, est fundamentum omnium novem verborum, quae sequuntur post ipsum. The first of the Commandments, (which prescribeth unto us the having of a God) is the very true foundation of all the other nine. Yea and the same is also confessed even by the very Heathen. Seneca affirmeth (and that very truly) that it is primus Deorum cultus, Senec. Epist. 96. p. 237. Deos credere. It is the first branch of the worship of God, to believe There is a God. Yea and it is primus cultus too, not only Ordine, but also Honore: It is the first in Honour, as well as in Order. For, Maiorem virtutem religione, pietateque in Deum (saith Plato) nullam in humano genere inveniri, quisquam sibi per suadeat. Let no man be persuaded, that there is any greater good in the Society of men, Plato in Epinom. p. 918. then is true piety, and religion towards God. And therefore, it was Chrysippus his opinion that, Cognitio de Deo, principium est cognitionis & bonoru● & malorum. Plut. lib. De Stoic. R● pub. To. ●. Mor. p. 8. The knowledge of this one thing, Phocyl. p. 100 Pythag. p. 12●. that there is a God, is the beginning of all other knowledges, both of good and evil things. Whence both Phocylides and Pythagoras begin their Poems, with, Primùm, coal Deum— Remember first, Fear God thou must. So that, by the confession of all sorts of men, this is the very ground of all Religion, To believe there is a God. And there can be no Religion, Where God is not believed all wickedness is planted. where this is not believed. For how can there be any godliness, where there is no God? If there be no belief, no opinion of God, there cannot be possibly any affection of godliness: no nor any effect of goodness neither. For as concerning godliness, it is the observation of Plutarch, that the ignorance of God, Plut. lib. De Supersti●. Tom▪ 1. Mor. p. 380. is the root of all ungodliness. Deorum ignoratio in duris ingenijs impietatem ingenerat. And as concerning goodness; it is the observation of Silius Italicus, that the ignorance of God is the root of all wickedness. Heu primae sc●lerum causae mortal●bus aegris Naturam nescire Deûm— Alas, the cause of sin, is only this, That Sinners know not, what Gods Nature is. Sil. Italic. lib. 4. p. 56. ●. Which Abraham also, in a manner, confessed, when he thought thus in himself; Gen. 20. 11. Surely the fear of God is not in this place, and therefore will they kill me for my wife. Senec. Epist. 96. p. 23●. For where the fear of God is not, there even, Homo, sacrares, etiam per ludum & iocum occiditur. There even the kill of a man, is but a sport unto them. So that where there groweth not true religion and godliness, there must grow of necessity all kind of sin and wickedness. 2. And therefore the main scope and purpose of this work, To believe there is a God is the sum of all Religion. is, to prove There is a God: and so to lay in men's hearts a foundation of Religion. Which being once well and substantially done, all the other three positions will follow in their order, every one with great ease in the neck of another. For as Socrates collecteth in moral Philosophy, that, Cic. lib. 1. De Orat. p. 147. Quibus id semel persuasum est, nihil ut se malint, quam viros bonos esse, iis reliquam facilem esse doctrinam; That he that once hath entertained but this one resolution, that (come of it what will) he will be a good man, the learning of all other things will be very easy unto him: so is it true likewise, in the doctrine of Divinity; that he who once hath entertained but the first of these positions, in faithfully believing that there is a God; unto him all the rest will be easy to be proved. For, if he once admit, that There is a God, he must admit him to be God under those divine properties, which are natural, & essential unto God: that is, he must yield him to be, both Optimus, jupiter à maio●ibus nostris Optimus Maximus appellatur. Cic. lib. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 210 and Maximus: which, by the common notion, are his proper attributes. From whence it follows, That there can be but one God: which is our second position: because Superlatives are Singulars; & by their singularity, not communicable unto many. Now, this being admitted, that There is but one God: then compare jehovah our God, with all the other Gods of the Heathen, and it will easily appear, that he must needs be that one. For the Works which he doth, they do testify it of him. Now, Io. 5. 36. this once being yielded that our God jehovah is the only true God, it will easily be proved, that The Scriptures are his word, by the divineness of that doctrine, which is contained in them. And, that once being yielded, it will follow of congruity that we must perform those duties, which in the same word are prescribed: unless we will despise, both the will, and word of God. All these points hang together, every one upon another, by an indissoluble Chain. So that the whole consequence of all Religion, dependeth altogether upon the proving, and approving of this first proposition, That there is a God. 3. But this point can never unto any good effect, Prayer must help us unto understanding. Plato in Epin●m p. 918. be either proved by me, Theodoret. Serm 9 de Provide. To▪ 2. p. 615. or approved by you, without God's special grace, and blessing upon us both. For it is very true, which Plato affirmeth, Hoc nemo docebit, nisi Deus adiwerit No man can ever teach it, if God himself do not assist it. And therefore Theodoret in his Sermons De Providentia, beginneth his ninth Sermon, with an holy invocation, Providentia illa, quam impij oppugnant, in auxilium vocata; calling to his assistance, in his fight against Atheists, the same divine providence, which they so fight against. And so likewise doth Epiphanius, Epiph. lib. 1. cont. Haeres. p. 1. in the beginning of his works: Valde time●, ut qui moliar opus non vulgar, et invoco ipsum sanctum Deum, etc. I ●ndertake no vulgar work; and therefore invocate the holy God, to send his heavenly light into my mind etc. And Nazianzen, Nazian. Orat. 21 Apol. f●g. p. 398. in one of his Orations, prescrib's it for a rule, that, Quis quis vel orationem aliquam, vel negotium auspicatur, non alium meliorem, commodior emque ordinem, tenere potest, quam ut a Deo incipiat, et, in Deo conquiescat. Whosoever doth begin any solemn Oration, or any other kind of negotiation, he cannot possibly observe any better order, then both to take his beginning from God, and to make his ending in God. And herein, it is a matter of very worthy observation, to note (in this point) the piety, even of the very Heathen: of their Poets, Orators, The very Heathens used Prayer in the beginning of their works. Cap. 5. Sect▪ 1. Clem. Alex. lib. 5. Strom. p. 277. and Philosophers: Cic. li. 2. De. leg. p. 320. how all of them do auspicate the beginning of their works, Virg. Eclog. 3. p. 8. with prayers and invocations unto their Gods. Let me give you an instance or two, to this purpose. For Poets we see it evidently both in Aratus, among the greeks; and Virgil, among the Latin; that both of them begin their Poems, with Ab jove principium— With jove the Muses must begin, in plain and express terms. And there is nothing more familiar amongst all the rest, than still, with the proposition of their work, to join some invocation unto their Gods, or Muses. For Orators, Pericles (amongst the Greeks) in all his Orations, AElian. lib. 4. de var▪ Hist. c. 10. p. 423. was wont still to make a prayer for good and prosperous success. Demost▪ To. 2. p. 3. And the same we may see likewise in the Orator Demosthenes, how in that weighty cause, his Oration De Corona, he began it with a prayer for a favourable audience. Deos De●sque omnes precor, etc. And Pliny junior, amongst the Latin, in his Panegyrical Oration unto the Emperor Traian, reporteth; that it was not only an ordinary custom, but also a religious institution of the Romans, Plin. in. Pa●egir▪ p. 360. That they should begin with prayer, not only, in all their civil affairs, but also in all their solemn Orations. Yea and Protagoras (though by some esteemed an Atheist) yet he maketh Precationem, cationem, Laert. in vitae Protagorae. p. 321. to be one of the essential parts of an Oration. Yea, and so did also diverse other Orators beside him, as Laertius reporteth: but he maketh prayer to be the first of them in order. And for Philosophers, Plato reporteth the same of the Athenians, which Pliny before did of the Romans, that they ordained a law, to enjoin their Philosophers, to begin all their disputations with prayers. Plato in Tim●o p. 704. 713. Tua interest, o Timae, invocatis (secundùm legem) Dijs, disputationem exordiri. It is your part (o Timaeus) by calling upon the Gods (as is appointed in our Laws) To give a beginning to our intended disputation. And again, in the same Book. Deum nunc disputationis servatorem in primis oremus. God is the true maintainer (and, as it were, the moderator) of this our disputation: and therefore, first of all, let us call upon him. Yea and Tully (among the Latin) in his second Book De Legibus, beginneth there his Treatise with invocation upon the Gods. Cic. lib. 2. De Leg. p. 320. A Dijs immortalibus sunt nobis agenda primordia: citing for his defence, the forecited religious example of Aratus. And this his pious imitation, is, in the same place, very greatly approved, by his Brother Quintus. Yea and Xenophon generally prescribeth Omnem a Dijs actionem auspicari oportere: Xenoph. in Oe. conom. p. 239. That every humane act ought always to make his beginning with God. S●obaeus lib. 1. Eclog. phys. cap. 3. p. 3. Yea and Theodectus likewise; unto the same purpose A Dijs initium sumere omne convenit. It is always fitting, to take from God our beginning. Which Piety of the Heathens, will, out of doubt, condemn the impiety of us Christians, if in our like businesses, we use not the like Godliness. Now, if we ought to sanctify our ingress, with our prayers, in all our other attempts of importance: Prayer must help us to believe, That God is. then ought we, most of all, to call upon God, when we come to dispute of the nature of God: which is an attempt of the greatest importance. And therefore Plato beginneth that his weighty disputation, wherein he sought to prove that there is a God, by invocating the help and assistance of God. Agè igitur, nunc, magis quam unquàm, Deum omni studio invocemus, Plato. lib. 10. De leg▪ p. 873. cum Deos esse diligenter demonstrare conemur. Let us now, most of all, implore the help of God, when we go about to show and to prove, There is a God: because this can never be learned, if God himself do not teach it. Phi. jud. lib. De Monarchia. p. 1102. For, as light (saith Philo judaeus) cannot be shown by any other means, but only by his own natural shining and brightness: so God (who is the true light) can never be known of us, unless he do manifest himself unto us. Plutarch lib. de lside, Tom. 2. p, 611. And therefore (as Plutarch hath very well observed) cum omnia bona sint a Dijs immortalibus petenda, tum maximè Deorum ipsorum cognitio. As all other good things ought only to be begged, by Prayer, at God's hands: so chiefly and principally the knowledge of God: which is the very chiefest & principallest good: quo neque maius Homo accipere, neque dignius homini Deus ipse dare potest. Then which neither man can receive any greater, nor yet God himself bestow any better: as it followeth in the same place. Now it is Aristotle's own collection; Arist. lib. 1. Ethic. c. 9 To. 2. p. 611. that, if God be the Giver of the lesser goods, then must he needs much more be the Giver of the greater. Si quod aliud est munus Deorum hominibus, consentaneum est rationi, & felicitatem a Dijs ipsis dari: et eò quidem magis quò caeteris humanis donis est praestabilius. If God hath given any other good gift unto men, it standeth with all reason that felicity itself must also be of his donation. And that so much the rather because it is more excellent than any other. Plato in Epinom p. 913. Nam ipsum bonorum omn●um Authorem (saith Plato) cur non etiam maximi boni causam arbitrabimur? For why should we not judge, that he, who is the author of all good, should specially be the giver of the greatest good? Which Religious is admonition I thought good to premise unto the Treatise following, to work● thereby, in my Reader some touch of religion: that as well he in reading, as myself in writing, by invocating divine grace, might have Gods holy blessing shed out upon our labours. Without which if any man dispose himself to reading, affying only upon his own wit & understanding; it will be the next way to frustrate and make void, both all my pains, and his. For then, I shall say nothing so consonant unto reason, which (by the conceit of a strange reason) he will not seek to everte; yea and take a pride too in it. But, if in a godly humility, and with a Christian study, he prepare himself to read, seeking only to edifis▪ himself in the truth, and following that good counsel, Hieron. Epist. ad. Laetam. To. 1. p. 57 which S. Herom prescribeth, Orationi lectio, lectioni succedat oratio: Let reading succeed prayer, & prayer succeed reading; then, I doubt not, but by this my poor labour and endeavour, both he may reap great profit, 〈◊〉. li. 1 De Trinit. p. 1127. & myself receive great comfort. For (as Boetius observeth in this very case) Sil ultra se humanitas nequit ascendere; quantum imbecillitas subtrah●t vota suppl bunt. Since humanity cannot possibly ascend above itself, let that which is wanting in our infirmity, be supplied by our piety. 4. So that all the hope of good and prosperout success, That God is, cannot be proue●● Priorj. in the proof of this fi●st position, dependeth especially upon the Readers disposition. It will be a work, to me either easy, or difficult, to prove There is a God, as the Reader is prepared, or unprepared to receive it. To him that is disposed to believe it, there is nothing more easy to be proved: to him it will be Facile, veritatem han● ostendere, Quòd Dijsunt: as Plato truly noteth. Plato. lib. 10. De Leg. p. ●70. But to him that will deny it, Senec. li●. De Provide. c. 1. p. 1. there is nothing more hard and difficult. Seneca indeed, in his Book De Providentia, maketh no great account of difficulty in this Argument. Faciam reni non difficilem (saith he) causam Deorum agenti. I shall undertake a Work of no difficult performance, to prove, that the world is ruled by God's providence. Epieurus, cum Pr●uidentiam su, ●ulit▪ D●u●● ne●av●t esse, cum autem Deum esse professus est, et prouidec●iam esse contess●t▪ Alterun enim c●●m sine altern necesse progress, nec in●ellig● potest. Lactantio in. lib. De ●ra D●. ●. 9 P. 455. And it is true in very deed, as the case then stood with him. For to him that yieldeth, that There is a God; though he deny his Governing of the world, (as the Epicure doth, against whom he there writeth) it is no great mastery, to demonstrate Divine Providence: and so, from that which he granteth, to enforce what he denieth: because Providence (in the order of our understanding) is a Consequent unto divine essence naturally inhering in it, as in his proper subject. Now Consequents are easily proved: because they have their Antecedents. But to him that denyeth, that There is a God (as the Atheist doth, against whom I do write) it is a thing not very easy: but he may justly use a clean contrary Exordium: Fa ci● m rem haud ●acilem▪ Deorum causam agam. For this is not a Conclusion but a Principle: yea, and that the very first of all other Principles. For as God himself is prima veritas: Tri●●eq. Sto●●. Serm. 〈…〉 ●ohan ●u. Mirand. lib De ●nte. p. 204. so this position of him is primum verum, that, There is a God. Now Principles, in all Arts, are most difficult to be proved: because they have not Antecedents, being Prima of themselves; yea and immediate propositions, which have no Media to make them conclusions, Arist. lib 1. ●oster. c. 2. To. 1. p. 175. no not in the most Demonstrative scientifical Syllogisms: but shine only by their own light: 〈…〉 and therefore be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That is, truths of such dignity, estimation, & credit, that even for themselves, they ought to be believed. Such as, in Geometry, that; T●tum est maius qualibet sua parte: in Arithmetic, that; Ab aequalibus si aequalia demas, remanentia erunt aequ li●: in Christianity, that; Christ jesus came into the world, only to save sinners. Of which position, Th'Apostle there affirmeth, that It is both a true saying, and by all means worthy to be received. 1. Tim. 1. 15. It is both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both sermo fidelis, and fide dignus: and so, a true pattern of a Theological axiom. And such is also this our present position, that There is a God. A truth of such clearness, as is worthy to be received: but yet (even for the clearness) the less able to be proved: Clem. ●lex. lib. 5. Strom. p. 273. as Clemens Alexandrinus expressly affirmeth. Est haec de Deo oratio omnino difficillima: quoniam cuiusuis rei principium est inventu difficillimum: Th●s our discourse of God is of all other the most difficult, b●cause the first principle in all things is the hardest to be found out: adding (for this principle, as concerning God) that it is omnino primum & antiquissimum principium, (et ideo) difficillimum ad demonstrandum: the first and most ancient principle, and therefore of all other the most indemonstrable. For all Principles being Prima, and Notissima of themselves, are thereby made in ●emonstrable: because whatsoever can be brought to prove them, must needs be obscure and posteriour unto them. And therefore, for the admitting of Principles in all Arts, if the learner be so dull, as not to perceive the certain truth of them, and so do stragger in believing them, the Teacher yet must beg of him, that he will admit them: because otherwise he cannot go on in his teaching. Whereby (through the dulness of many learners) the first principles of Arts, which in themselves be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet become unto such, but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is, Things granted, but upon courtesy, Cic. lib. 3. De Offic. p. 380. not yielded upon necessity. This the Orator observeth to be true in Geometry. Solent Geometrae, non omni● decere, sed quaedam p●stul●re, ut sibi concedantur, quò faciliùs quae volunt explicent: It is the custom of Geometricians, not to teach all their doctrines, but to entreat that certain of th●m may be yielded unto them, that so they may the better demonstrate the rest. And th'Apostle insinuateth it likewise to be true in Divinity. For in the Epistle to the Hebre●es, Heb. 11. 6. he setteth down these for two Divinitie-principles: That there is a God; and That he is the rewarder of them that seek him. Which two postulata, if they be not, at the first, presumed by the Hearer, and granted to the Teacher, there cannot possibly be any proceeding unto the other grounds and rules of Religion. And therefore he telleth us, that Whosoever will come unto God, he first must both believe, That God is: and that he is a rewarder of those that seek him. And if these two be not granted, all is brought unto a stand: there can then be no proceeding, neither in teaching; nor in learning: as even Tully showeth most plainly in this very Case: Where he is forced to beg this postulatum of Atticus: Cic. lib. 1. 〈◊〉 leg. p. 313. That the world is ●uled and guided by Providence: that so he may lay a ground for the following disputation, which, without yielding of this, could not possibly be done. Dasne igitur hoc nobis, Pomponi, Naturam omnem di●initùs regi? Do sanè si postulas, saith he. O Pomponius, do you then grant thus much unto us, that the nature of all things is ruled by some God? I verily (saith he) will grant it if you will but desire it. 5. But here it may be objected: That God is, may be showed A Posteriori. Why then should I take upon me to prove it, if it be, in nature, such as cannot be proved? This must needs prove all my labour to be clearly lost: especially the Adversary being so hard and refractory, and so utterly obfirmed, to deny it, as it must needs be with the Atheist: who cannot yield unto this our position, without betraying the very fortress of his own Irreligion. But unto this Objection I answer, Arist. l● b. 1. ●oster. c. 10. To. 1. p. 188. out of the Philosopher: That, there be two kinds of Demonstrations, or proofs. The one is a demonstrating of Causes by their effects: which is a proof drawn a posteriori, and is called by Aristotle, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, Only a declaring that such a thing is thus and thus, without rendering any reason, or alleging any cause. The other is a demonstrating of the Effects by their Causes: Which is a proof A priori, and is called, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, a declaring why such a thing is thus and thus, and thus: rendering for it a good reason, and alleging a true cause. By this latter kind of Demonstration, which showeth Propter quid sit, the Principles cannot be proved: they cannot be demonstrated, A causa, and A Priori; because they have no prior or superior cause; being the prime causes themselves. Aquinas 1. Quaest 2. Art. 2. Arist. lib. 1. Poster. c. 2. To. 1. p. 175. But by the former Demonstration, which showeth only Quòd sit, they may well enough be proved: they may be proved, Ab Effectu, and Aposteriori: which is better known to sense, though the other be to Reason; better known to us though the other be to Nature. Scaliger. lib de Subtle. Exerci● 218 p. 697. To make this plain, by a familiar example, for the better information of the simple: That the Fire is hot, Nemini comp●rt●●unt in igne caloris principia is a Physical Principle: Of which though no man can give a true cause or good reason, Why it should be so; yet may every man demonstrate, and make it plain, that it is so. Though no man can tell the cause, Why the Fire is hot, yet may every man show by the effects, that (surely) it is hot; because it warmeth, heateth, burneth. And so it is likewise, in this our present instance. Though no man can prove A caus●, why there should be a God; yet may every man collect Ab Effectu, That there is a God: by that Wisdom, which we see to have been in the Making; that Order, in the Governing; and that Goodness, in the preserving and maintaining of the World. All which argue as effectually, That there needs must be a God, as either Warming or Burning, That the Fire must needs be hot. Now these posterior Arguments, though they be not so strongly concludent, Arist. lib. 2. Metaphys. c. 3. To. 2. p. 1388. as the former; yet are they sufficient to carry the matter. For, as Aristotle himself noteth: Mathematica certitudo non est in omnibus quaerenda: Mathematical certitudes are not required in all matters. And he practiseth according to his rule, Arist. Ethic. lib. 1. c. 3. ●o. 2. p. 604. in his Ethics: holding it sufficient (in matter of Morality) to give Rules, which hold not always upon necessity; but, for the most part, or more commonly. Then much less is it needful, in matter of Divinity, to bring such invincible demonstrations, as reject all haesitations. Especially not in this case: which hath laid his foundation, neither in sense, nor in science but merely in belief. Which (as Clemens Alexandrinus noteth,) being founded but upon the bare authority of God's word; yet begetteth (in this point) a far more clear understanding, then can be wrought in us, by any demonstration. Clem. Alex. lib. 5. Strom. p. 273. Neque scientia accipitur demonstrativa: ea enim ex prioribus constat, et ex notioribus: Nihil autem est ante ingenitum. Restat itaque, ut divina gratia, et solo, quod ab eo proficiscitur, verbo, id, quod est ignotum, intelligamus. There is here no demonstrative knowledge to be had: for that ariseth from those things, which are both before, and better known then that which we demonstrate. But before that, which is itself without all generation, there cannot possibly be any thing. It therefore remaineth, that by the virtue of God's heavenly grace, and of his divine word, we come to know every thing, which before was unknown. So that Demonstrations are here unproper and unprofitable. And therefore, I desire that aequanimitie of my Readers, Cic. lib. De Vniversitate p. 428. Plato, in Timaeo p. which Tully (out of Plato) doth of his; even in this very case: that Si for●è de Deorum natura ortúque mundi disserentes, minùs id quod h●be●●us animo cons●qu●mur; ut tota dilucidè & planè ex●rnata oratio sibi constet, et ex ●mnipar●e secum consentiat; haud sanè erit mirum, contentique esse d●bebitis si probabilia dicentur. Aequum est enim, meminisse et me, qui disseram, hominem esse, e● v●s qui iudicetis: ut si probablilta diceniur, ●e quid ultra requiratis: If haply in speaking of the nature of God, and of the original of the world, I cannot attain that, which I propounded, and desired; that my whole discourse be both familiar, and eloquent, and coherent; it is no great marvel, and you ought to be content, if I write but what is probable. For it is fit you should remember that, I which write, am but a man, and that you who read, are but men yourselves. And therefore, if I bring you but probable reasons, you ought not to exact any more at my hands. For in this case, it is sufficient to obtain the cause, if those Arguments, which we bring to prove There is a God, jod. Viues. lib. 1. De Veritat. Christ. Relig. c. 4. p. 14. be of greater certainty, strength, and consequence, than those which the Atheist bringeth, to prove There is no God. Which, I hope, shall be made evident, in the eight and last Book. CHAP. 2. 1. What manner of Authorities be the weightiest in this case. 2. That, they may not here be used. 3. How yet, they be here used. 4. What be the most proper, in respect of the Adversaries. 5. Why they be more proper than any other. IT is good in all causes, for every man, to understand, not only his advantages, but also his disuantages: lest expecting greater matters than the cause will afford, he be needlessly offended, when his expectation is destituted. The Cause here in quaestion between Atheists, and Christians, hath two great disuantages. The first of them is this; that by the clearness of the Position now called into quaestion, Whether there be a God; we are cut off, from the strongest kind of our Arguments, The best Testimonies, to prove, that There is a God, are the Testimonies of the Scriptures. which contain the causes of their own Conclusions: as I have already showed in the former Chapter. The second, that (by the infidelity of the Adversary) we are likewise cut off, from our weightiest Testimonies: as I purpose to show in this. The weightiest Testimony that can be brought, in this cause, to prove, There is a God, is to produce (for the proof of it) the Testimony of God, speaking in his own word. This is proper, this is natural, this is truly inhaering in the very marrow of the cause. None other in the world can have equal authority. Io: 8. 13. 14. And though the pharisees objected against our Saviour Christ, that his Testimony was not trne; because he testified of himself: yet he answered them truly again unto that, that it was no good consequent: but that, though he testified of himself, yet his testimony was true. For what can possibly be true, if the Testimony of Truth be not? Christ is the truth itself: and so likewise is God: yea and so likewise is his word. john 14. 6. Sanctify them with thy Truth: Thy word is Truth. john 17. 17. It is not true in Concreto, but, Truth itself in Abstracto, without mixture of any thing, but only pure and simple Truth. And therefore (as Saluianus very truly collecteth) Necesse est, Salvian: lib 3. De Providen. Bib. Pat. To: 3. p. 270. quicquid incorrupta veritas loquitur, incorruptum sit Testimonium veritatis: It must needs be a Testimony of uncorrupted Truth, that cometh out of the mouth of Truth. C●em. Alex. li. 5. So that (as Clemens Alexandrinus affirms) Fide dignus est Deus, Strom. p. 273. qui sua annunciet: God is a credible witness, though he testify for himself. Nay (as Philo judaeus addeth) Deus solus est idoneus, Philo jud. lib. de leg. allegor. p. 139. qui de seipso pronunciet; God is the only fit witness, to testify of himself. For, Cui potius quisquam credat, quam Deo? Xenoph. lib. 1. Depact. Socrat. p. 157. saith even the heathen man Xenophon: Is there any man in the world, whom a man ought rather to credit then God? That were utterly absurd. And therefore (as Clemens Alexandrinus addeth, in the fore alleged place) Est ergo hoc credendum, Clem. Alex. ubi. supra. ex Platonis quoque sententia, etiamsi absque probabilibus, aut necessarijs demonstraionib●s, per vetus et per nowm Testamentum praedicetur: We ought to give credit unto this, even by the opinion of Plato himself, not expecting either necessary or probable demonstrations, though it be but only testified by the old and new Testaments. Nay these two be indeed the only fit testimonies, that can be brought in this case. Non enim relictum est hominum eloquijs de rebus Dej, praeterquàm sermo Dej: saith S. Hilary: Hilar. lib. 7. De Trin, p. 95. There is left unto men, none other fit Testimony for the things of God, but only the holy word of God. Reliqua omnia (saith he) & arcta sunt, et conclusa, et impedita, et obscure: All things else, whatsoever, saving only the holy Scripture, are both strait, and scant, and intricate, and obscure. And therefore it is a very good course, Orosius lib. 6. Hist. c. 1. p. 213. ● whereunto Orosius directeth us: Ab ipso audias, ipsique Deo credas, quod verum velis scire de Deo: We must hear, & believe God, if we will know that truth, which belongeth unto God. 2. And yet these weighty and important Testimonies of God, and of his word, Atheists reject the testimonies of the Scriptures. so proper, and natural unto this cause, we may here in no case use: because they be not allowed by the Atheists, our Adversaries. For they, as they deny that There is a God; so do they deny likewise that The Scripture is his word. Nay they must do this, by consequence. For, if they do grant, that The Scripture is God's word; they do contradict themselves, if they say There is a God. And therefore, they do cast God, and his holy word, both together, out of doors, as mere fables and devices: affirming directly of the holy Scriptures, Lactant. lib. De falsa Relig. c. 4. p. 3. that they be not Divinae, sed H●manae voces; (as is affirmed by Lactantius) They be not (say they) the Oracles of God, but the inventions of men. Look Sect 5. following. Macrob. lib. 1. De Some: Scip. c. 2. p. 3. Yea and they have no better opinion even of those Treatises of the Heathen, which are written of God, and of his religion (as Macrobius likewise reporteth of them:) Epicureorum tota factio, aequo semper errore, a vero devia, et illa aestimans ridenda quae nesciunt, Sacrum volumen, et augustissima irrisit Naturae seria: The whole faction of profane and unholy Epicures, erring equally from all truth, and commonly scorning those things which they know not, do usaully deride, both all the holy Scripture, and also the most serious and important works of Nature. Which perverseness of theirs so greatly offended the learned father Saluianus, that he will not vouchsafe to dispute the matter with them: choosing rather to leave them in their own infidelity then to cast away his pains upon them unprofitably. Si cum Christianis ago, probaturum me quod ago, non dubito. Si autem cum Paganis, probare contemno. Non quia de ficiam in probatione; sed quia profuturum, quod loquor, esse, despero. Infructuosus est quip, Salui●n. ubi supra. et inanis labour, ubi non recipit probationem praws auditor. If I have to do with Christians, I shall quickly prove the cause: But if with infidels and Pagans, I scorn to lose my pains. Not that I am in doubt to be defective in my proof, but that I am out of doubt not to speak unto their profit. For it needs must be an idle and unprofitable labour, when the proof is not received by the evil disposed Auditor. This was the resolution of that learned Father. But it is not mine. I purpose not, in this cause, to be so peremptory with them: but to win them as I can, both by disputing, & persuading. And therefore, the best way of prevailing with them, will be, only to urge such Arguments unto them, as have passage amongst them; and such Authorities, as have some credit with them. Now, that hath not the Scripture, as you heard before. And therefore, in this case, we must not prove by Scripture, that That is a God: For that would be but a foolish kind of proof. It would be merely idle, to call upon our Adversaries to hear an Argument, from Authority: and then to cite such Testimonies, as with them have none authority: This would make the cause ridiculous. But if we will prevail either with them, or against them, we must bring only such authorities, as with them have credit and reputation, that is, not the testimony of the holy Scriptures, The Testimonies of the Heathens, are more regarded with Atheists, than the Scriptures Sect. 4. and 5. Lactan. lib. De justitia. cap. 4. p. 268. but rather the testimony of profane and Heathen Writers; whom, they wholly accepting in all other matters, cannot wholly reject in this. And therefore Lactantius reproveth S. Cyprian, as being greatly overseen, that in his disputation with Demetrian, an Heathen, he would seek to confute him by the Authority of Scriptures: whom he should have confuted by Philosophers, and Histories, and by natural Reasons. Qua materia non est usus, ut debuit (saith he:) Non enim Scripturae testimonijs (quam ille utique vanam, fictam, commentitiam putabat) sed argumentis, et ratione fuerat refellendus: Cyprian handled not his matter, as he ought to have done. For he should not have confuted him by the testimony of Scriptures (which he held for vain, and idle, and merely commentitious:) but rather by the strength of Arguments, and Reasons. And again a little after. Huic oportebat quia nondùm potu●t capere divinae, prius humana offerre testimonia, id est, Philosophorum, et Historicorum, ut suis potissimùm refutaretur Authoribus: He ought not, unto him to have alleged any Divine authorities, but only humane: because he was as then uncapable of them: that so he might convince his errors, by the credit and authority of his own proper authors, that is, Philosophers, and Historians. Yea, and this his castigation of the blessed Martyr Cyprian, is approved by S. Hierome, as a just and deserved one. Hieron. Epist. ad Mag. Orat●rem. To. 2. p. 327. Where he proveth by the practice of a cloud of Witnesses, both of Greek and Latin Fathers, that it is more proper and natural, to confute all kind of Heathens, by the testimony of their own writers, then by the authority of the Scriptures: because, with those men, these have small authority, or none. justin. Mart. Orat. ad Gent. To. 1. p. 48. And therefore, saith justin Martyr, even in this very case: Non ex divinis historijs nostris, haec probare aggrediar, quibus vos nondum (propter inveteratum in animis vestris Maiorum vestrorum errorem) fidem adhibere vultis: sed ex vestrarum (nihil ad nostram Religionem pertin●ntium) literarum monumentis. I will not prove these things unto you, out of our own writers, which you do but smally credit (through an error implanted in you by your Ancestors) but I will prove it unto you, out of your own Authors, which are no way partial unto the faith of Christians. And Lactantius likewise, unto the same purpose. Omittamus Testimonia Prophetarum, nè minùs idonea probat●o videatur, ab hijs quibus omninò non creditor. Lactan. lib. De falsa Relig. c. 5. p. 10. Veni●mus ad Authores; & eos ipsos, ad veri probationem, testes citemus, quibus contra n●s uti solent; Poëtas dico, ac Philosophos. Let us leave the Testimonies of the holy Prophets: because they will carry no fit probation, especially unto such as distrust and discredit them. Let us therefore come unto their own Authors; and use those men as witnesses for the Truth, whom they commonly do cite and produce against the truth: I mean, Lact. lib. De Divino praemio. c. 13. p. 414. their Poets, and their Philosophers. And again in an other place. Neque nunc Prophetas in testimonium vocabo: sed eos potius, quibus istos, qui respuunt veritatem, credere sit necesse. I will not, as now, cite the testimony of the Prophets: but rather of such Authors, as those men, which refuse the truth, yet have no power to refuse. So that, neither the testimony of God, nor of his word; though they have in themselves the greatest strength of probation, yea and be most incomparably beyond all exception; yet may be used by us, in this our disputation: unless we would propine, both ourselves, and our cause, unto open and just derision. And therefore, whosoever will either convert, or confute the Atheists, he must use such Authorities, as have some authority with them, not such, as be derided, or rejected by them; such as be, both the Prophets and Apostles, and all other holy Writers, all Christian Divines, and generally, all Christians. For all these, in this cause, are suspected by the Atheists, as partial and inclining witnesses. So that, by the weakness of our Adversaries: we are forced to forbear the strongest of our Authorities: and (after the Apostles practice) to feed them with their own milk, rather than with our strong meat; because, as yet, 1. Cor. 3. ●▪ they be not able to bear it. Not with the strong meat of the Scriptures, though that were better for them: but with the milk of their own writers, because this is fitter for them. Ista quidem meliùs, Divinis edita libris, Prosper lib. De Provident. p. 180 Cognoscenda forent; ubi Legis in aequore aperto, Promptum esset, ventis dare libera vela secundis. Sed quoniam rudibus metus est intrare profundum, In tenui primùm discant procurrere rivo. Saith Prosper. This Subject better seems from sacred writ To spring, and better thence t' have learned it: Where in the Laws broad Sea, with wind and tide, there's happier sail, than any where beside. But cause to ruder Novices, it is, A province full of fearfulness, I wis, Into the great vast deep to venture out; Some shallow River, let them coast about, And by a small Boat, learn they first, and mark, How they may come to man a greater Bark. 3. And yet have I here used them, both frequently, The Testimonies of Scripture why used in this work. and largely: but not so much upon hope to do any great good upon the Atheist with them, by pressing directly their Authority unto him, as indirectly to grow somewhat upon him, by an Artificial circumduction of him: and that by these two reasons following. First, because of my often allegation of the holy Scriptures consenting so fully with other Heathen writers, the Atheist may the better be able to discern; that there is an universal agreement, and a general consent of the whole world, against him; both of Christians, jews, and Pagans: and thereby see more plainly, his own nakedness and poverty; how bare, and weak, yea how desolate he is, and utterly forsaken, both of God, and men: and by that meditation, be more easily drawn, to apprehend the singular folly of that his singular opinion: which hath made him such a spectacle, both to Angels, God, and Men: as it were some uncouth monster. And so indeed he is. A●g. lib. 22. De Ciu. Dei. c. 8. To. ●. p. 13 39 For, Magnum est ipse prodigium, qui, mundo credente, non credit (saith S. Augustine) He is (surely) some great Monster, that will abide in Atheism, when he seeth the whole world to believe, beside him. So that, in this respect, the allegation of the Scriptures, will not be merely idle, towards the very Atheists. No, nor yet in an other: which is the second reason of my so frequent alleging them. And that is, because the holy Scriptures (beside that divine authority, which is naturally inhaerent in them) do ofttimes, carry also great strength of reason with them: which enforce many points more strongly and effectually, against the Atheists, than the acutest reasons, brought by any of the Philosophers. As that of the Psalmist, for the proof of God's omniscience: Psal. 94. 9 and that he needs must (of congruity) both hear, and see all things. He that planted the Ear, shall he not hear? and he that form the Eye, shall he not see? What Philosopher in the world could more necessarily conclude, from the true and proper causes of the conclusion, than the Scripture here hath done? And diverse such places of the holy Scriptures, the Reader shall meet with, throughout this whole Treatise; which press, yea, and even oppress, the Atheists with the weight of their Reason: howsoever the weight of their Authority be elevated by them. For though those sacred Authors have but small authority with Atheists, speaking as mere Witnesses: yet, when their Testimonies carry with them also reasons, those reasons must be answered, if they will defend their cause. And if they cannot answer them, they must then yield unto them: which is the second reason of my so often citing them. Now unto these two reasons, in respect of the Atheists, I may also add a third, in respect of Christians. And that is, that by this allegation of Scriptures, & other the most learned Ecclesiastical Writers, even Christians themselves will be the better confirmed, in those points of Christian Faith, which are by them affirmed. For when they see these doctrines▪ which are chiefly here proved by natural reasons, and by Heathen men's authorities; yet not to rest wholly and only upon them; but to be such, as have both Scriptures, & Fathers to approve them; it must needs much confirm them in their received Faith: yea, and that a great deal more, for the simple authority of the Scriptures themselves, then for the strongest reasons of all the learnedest Philosophers. For this Authority alone, without any reason, Illorum authoritas est omni rationabili facultate validior. Nazian. Orat. 47. p. 770. over-swayeth both all their reasons & authorities together; Salu●a●. l. 3. De Provide. Rib. Pat. To. 3. p. 270. though they were a thousand more: because, Humana dicta argumentis et testibus egent; De● autem sermo est ipse sibi testis (as it is well observed by Saluianus:) The word of a man standeth need to be fortified, both by arguments, and witnesses; but the word of God, is a witness to 〈◊〉. And therefore, as in the same place, he very truly collecteth, Non necesse est, ut argumentis probetur, quod, hoc ipso, quia a Deo dicitur, comprobat●r: That needeth no other arguments to prove it, which is proved sufficiently, because God hath said it. 4 And yet the Authority of God's word, as great as it is, The most proper authorities in respect of the Adversaries. is the little enough with Atheists: in whose foolish opinion, the testimony of the holy Apostles, or Prophets, have a great deal less credit, than the testimony of the Heathen Philosophers, and Poets. And therefore, in our disputation against them, we must omit the former, and only use these latter; Sect. 2. if we will do good upon them: as Claudius' Victor very wisely adviseth; ascribing, by one instance a Rule of proceeding, in every like case. Posse Deum, quicquid fieri non posse putatur, Ipsorum ratione proba, qui credere nolunt. That God can that, Claud. Vict. lib. 1. in Gen. ●ib. Pat. To. 7. p. 345. that's thought it cannot be, Pro●e this by their own saws, that will not see. According to which rule, Eusebius framed his practice. Suis testibus, Gentes, non argumentis nostris, confundere instituimus. Euseb. l. 6. De Praepar. c. 6. p. 125. I will confute the Gentiles, not by the Argument of Christians, but by the testimony of Pagans. Yea, and even the holy Ghost himself, hath taken also the same course, disputing against the Heathens, by the Testimony and Authority of their own Heathen Writers; in three several places: Yea, and in the last of them, he honoureth a Poet, with the name of a Prophet. Act. 17. 28. 1. Cor. 15. 33. Tit. 1. 12. Not that he thought him so; but because they esteemed him so: enforcing so, his testimony, the more strongly against them, from that credit and authority, which themselves ascribe unto him. 5 Then, The Testimonies of the Heathens, why here so much used. the reasons, why in this our disputation against Atheists, we must use the testimony of Heathen-Writers, and not of holy Scriptures, be both many and weighty. First, because in every disputation, both the disputants must consent, in two general agreements: else they can never bring the matter, then in question, unto determination. The first of them, is this: That they must both agree in certain grounds and principles, which are common unto both. For, as two cannot talk together, Qui sermonem invicem communicaturi sunt, oportet ut aliquatenus invicem intelligent. Arist. l. 11. Me●aph●s. c. 4. To. 2. p. 1486. unless they have some one common language, which they both understand: so cannot two dispute together, except they have some one common principle, in which they both consent. Now those principles and grounds, must not be principles of Religion; but of Reason. Not of Religion; because that is proper, but unto the one part: but yet of Reason; because that is common unto them both. The second general agreement, wherein they must consent, is, Who shall be their judge, and unto whom they will submit, and unto whose decision they will refer all their Question, as to a man impartial, and indifferent between them? Now that cannot be the Scripture: but it must be Heathen Writers. To the Scriptures, the Atheist will never submit; because than his cause is lost: but to the Heathens, the Christian may submit; and yet his cause be gained. For, the truth that is spoken by the most heathenish of the Heathens, yet can never be repugnant to the truth of the Scriptures. Two lies and untruths, may contrary one another; but two truths can never. So then, the Heathens being made judges of this cause, and admitted, as indifferent, by consent of both parties; there can no other testimonies be so apt, and so proper, to enforce a conclusion, as those that be produced from the writings of the Heathen. Secondly, because the writings of the Heathens (beside the great credit, and authority which they have with our Adversaries) have also greater store of artificial Arguments, to satisfy both natural reason, and sense: Whereas Scripture, for the most part, presseth rather the Conscience, by virtue of that divine authority, which it hath naturally in it, then leadeth our science, by argument out of it. Sometimes it also argueth, and that very excellently, as before I have instanced: but this very rarely, relying most commonly upon his own native authority. Thirdly, Sect. 2. before. because (if we seek to convert Atheists) the testimony of their own Writers have with them far greater force and power of persuasion, than the Testimony of the Scriptures, be they never so plain. And therefore (saith Tertullian) that De suis instrumentis, Tertul. lib. De Cor●na. Cap. 7. p. 181. secularia pr●bari, necesse est. Yea, and improbari too: Whether we would approve, or reprove the opinion of the Heathens, we shall do it most effectually out of their own writings. For, firmum est genus probationis (saith Novatian) quod ab ipso Aduersario sumitur, ut veritas, Novatian. lib. De Tri●it. cap. 18. Apud Tertul. p. 631. ab ipsis inimicis veritatis, probetur: It is a very forcible kind of proof, which is drawn from the Adversary himself, when the truth is proved by them that oppose the truth. Not that the Atheists do give credit to the Heathens, any more than to us Christians, in their direct assertion and affirmation of God, (for therein they hold us both to be equally unequal unto their cause, and indifferently un-indifferent unto themselves;) but yet in their Axioms, belonging to Philosophy, and to other humane Arts, they will believe them readily, as being Masters in those Sciences. From which (notwithstanding) it will follow as necessarily, that there needs must be A God, as if they had affirmed it, in direct and express words; as I purpose (God willing) to make plain, in the second of these Books. Fourthly, because (if we seek to confute the Atheists) the testimonies of the Heathens are the fittest means; Lactan. l. 1. c. 6. p. 17. that so we may, eos suorum testimonijs revincere, (as Lactantius adviseth us) convince them by their own authorities: which is the strongest conviction, Chrysost. Hom. 3. in Tit. Tom. 4. p. 1614 that can fall upon them: as is truly observed, by S. Chrysostome; Tunc illos maxim revincimus, cum suorum, in eos, dicta retorquemus; we do most forcibly convince them, when we can retort their own saying against them: alleging this for the reason, why the Apostle confuteth them rather by their own Poets, then by the holy Scriptures. And therefore (saith Lactantius, in another place) that it is, satis firmum testimonium, ad probandam veritatem, ●●ctant. lib. De vera Sapientia. c. 12. p. 211. quod ab ipsis perhibetur inimicis: It is a sound argument, for the proving of the truth, which is fetched from the enemies of the truth. Yea, though it were but a weak one, in itself; as the Orator observeth in the very like case; Cic. Orat. Pro. P. Quint. p. 12. Tuum testimonium, quod, in altenare, leave est; id, in tua, quoniam contrate est, gravissimum esse debet. Thy testimony (saith he) which is but light and frivolous, in another man's cause; yet is weighty in thine own, Tertul. li. De Anima cap. 2. p. 262. when it is against thyself. So that (as Tertullian observeth) Ex aemulis nonnunquam testimonium, sumere, necessarium est, si non aemulis prosit. Sometimes to derive a testimony from the mouth of the adversary, is an excellent help when it makes against the Adversary. For to confute Atheists by their own proper Authors, 1. Sam. 17. 51. is to cut off Goliah's head, with his own proper sword: which is of all other the most grievous kind of wound. Whereas, to confute them by the authority of Scripture, were, in effect, no better, then to cast holy things unto Dogs, Mat 7. 6. and precious pearls before Hogs, which tread them under foot. And therefore, I have chosen to fight against the Atheists, the ●ighters against God, not with a chosen company of Apostles, and Prophets (who are too worthy persons to stir their least finger, for such unworthy Adversaries, which so contemn their holy writings) but rather with a company of Infidels, and Heathens. By whom, notwithstanding, I hope (God assisting) to cut in sunder that band of profane and wicked Atheists, which band themselves against heaven and against God himself. For, as God himself once compelled the wicked Egyptians, Muscas, & Ranas illis immisit; ut rebus vilissimis, superbia domeretur. Aug. Tract. 1. in johan. Tom. 9 p. 12. by flies, and frogs, and grasshoppers, and other such like contemptible worms, to confess the power of his divine Majesty; not vouchsafing to adact them by any other of his creatures, more generous and worthy: so will we likewise compel these ungodly Atheists, to confess, There is a God, by the arguments and testimonies of the Heathen Philosophers; not vouchsafing them the writings of the most holy Authors. Which weighty and important reasons, of my so frequent alleging of profane and Heathen Writers, I request the Christian Reader, to carry along with him, throughout this whole Treatise, for my perpetual defence. The cause, you see, requireth it: the Adversary exacteth it. CHAP. 3. That there is an inbred persuasion in the hearts of all men, That there is a God. 2. That this hath been observed, by many learned men, among the Heathens. 3. That it hath also been observed, by diverse learned Christians. 4. Two notable testimonies out of Tully; asserting this persuasion, both unto all Nations, and unto all Conditions, and unto all persons among men. I Have largely unfolded in the two former Chapters, both what manner of Arguments, and what manner of Authorities, are most proper to this cause, and most effectual with our Adversaries, either to bend them, or to break them. Let us therefore now, come on to the laying of them open. Now they be of two sorts: they b● either external or internal Arguments. For as it is true one way, Senec. in prae●at Nat. Quaest p. 3. which is observed by Seneca, that Deus et extra, et intra, ten●t opus suum: that God upholdeth all his works, both without them, and within them: so is it also true another way, that, Deus et extra, et intra, tenetur ab opere suo: that God is beheld of all his works, not only without them, but also within them: Nature herself lending us light, to see the God of Nature, even in the most obscure and interior parts of us. God hath planted in all men a certain persuasion, That there is a God. Cognitio divino ru● suit semper in 〈…〉 p. 7. The first Argument then, to prove There is a God, is an internal Argument: and that is taken from a natural and inbred conclusion, which is generally engrafted into the hearts of all men; that surely There is a God. This is the most ancient and general praenotion, that Nature hath begotten in the mind of a man. Which natural persuasion, though it be both bred and borne together with us; yet must it needs be a science of Gods own planting in us. For if it be true, which is affirmed by Seneca, that, Insita sunt nobis omnium artium semina, sed Magister ex occulto Deus, producit ingenia: That it is God, that hath implanted in the soul of a man, Senec. lib. 4. De Benfi●. c. 6. p. 50. the first seeds and principles of other humane Arts: then must he needs much more have implanted in him this first seed and principle of all religion, which is the proper Art of God's holy worshipping: an Art, of which himself is the true and only Object. For Pietas, is nothing else, Laert. vita Zenonis p. 248. but only scientia Divini cultus: an art of worshipping God aright, as Zeno rightly defineth it. And therefore, it is not probable, that he, which hath replenished the soul of a man, with those notions and conceptions, that are the first seeds of all other Arts and Sciences, should only leave out that which belongeth to himself. But howsoever the Atheist be persuaded in this point, that this inward persuasion is implanted by God, or not; yet can he not deny, but that there is in man's heart such an inward persuasion: because, all the world confesseth it, every man's experience teacheth it; and all learned men, both of Christians and Heathens, do both know, and acknowledge it. 2 Let me give you some instance for the demonstration of it. Testimonies of Heathens, that all men believe There is a God. Plato, in his tenth Book De Leg. taking upon him to prove by force of Argument, that there needs must be A God; he bringeth this, as one principal probation; that there is, Cap. 6. Sect. 1. Plato lib. 10. de. leg. p. 878. et Graecorum et Barbarorum omnium consensus, Deos esse fatentium: that there is in this point, a general consent, both of greeks and Barbarians, that surely, There is a God. And Xenophon, Xenophon lib. 1. De fact. Socrat. p. 166. even in this respect, prefers the soul of a man, before all other creatures: because none of them hath any sense of their Creator; none of them understandeth, either that there is a God; or that he is the maker and Creator of the world, or of those great good things which therein are contained. Cuius alterius animalis animus cognoscit, maximarum optimarúmque rerum conditores esse Deos? Doth the soul of any other thing know God, to be the maker of every good thing, but only the soul of man? No (saith the Egyptian Philosopher) Spiritus, de animalibus cunctis, Thismegist. in Asclep. c. 3. p. 483. humanos tantùm sensus, ad divinae rationis intelligentiam exornat, erigit, atque sustollit. Among all other creatures, the spirit of only man is adorned, & erected by the spirit of God, to the knowledge & understanding of God's divine wisdom. And so saith the Roman Orator. Ex tot generibus, Cic. lib. 1. De leg. p. 313. nullum est animal, praeter hominem, quod habeat notiti●m aliquam Dei: ipsisque in hominibus, n●lla gens est, neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera; quae non, etiam si ignoret qualem ●abere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Among so many kinds of several Cre●tures, there is none, but only man, that hath any sense of God. But, amongst men, there is none so untractable, and savage, but, though they do descent, what, a God they ought to have, yet they fully do consent, that a God they ought to have. There is no other kind of Creature, that knoweth this point: and yet no kind at all of men, that are ignorant of it. For, as even the very Heathen Poet confesseth,— separate haec nos Agrege mutorum; Iu●enal. S●t. 15. p. 69. b. atque ideo venerabile soli Sortiti ingenium, divinor●mque capaces▪ Religion 'tis, that doth distinguish us, From brutish Herd. Men only have to know; And can with understanding argue thus, A God there is; Dumb creatures cannot so. And this general persuasion (as Aristotle affirmeth) hath always, in all ages, been carefully implanted into Children, by their parents: to be held▪ as a most certain, Arist. lib. De Mundo. To. 2. p. 1566. and infallible truth. Vetus est fama, et haereditaria mortalium omnium; Omnia, et a Deo, et per Deum, nobis esse constituta: It is an ancient opinion derived, among all men, from the father to the son, that all things are made and ordained for us men, both by God, and through God: agreeing very well with that of the Apostle, that, Of him, Rom. 11. 36. and through him, and for him, be all things: to him be glory for ever. Amen. And this, he saith, descendeth, as it were an inheritance, from generation to generation: acknowledging both the antiquity, and universality of it, to be exceeding great, that it is both vetus, and haereditaria omnium; ancient, and universally haereditary unto all Men. But yet he restraineth it, to have had his propagation, but only from Tradition. But jamblicus asserteth it to an higher condition; fetching the original of it further, and affirming it to be a mere impression of nature. Ante omnem rationis usum, jamblic. lib. De Myster. c. 1. p. 5. Cap. 9 Sect. 2. inest, naturaliter insita, Deorum notio: Even before all use of reason, the knowledge of God, is naturally engrafted, into the mind of a man. And therefore it cannot be of Institution, or Tradition. Which yet may further be gathered, by an observation of AElian: that though the greeks (of all other men) have been commonly most careful of their children's institution; AElian. lib. 2. De var. Hist. c. 31. p. 395. yet, that more of the Grecians have proved notable Atheists, than could ever yet be found among all other nations, though most Barbarous and savage. Nemo Barbarorum, ad contemptum Deor●m, unquàm excidit: neque in du●ium vocant, Sintne Dij, an non sint? et curentnè res humanas, an non? Nemo, neque Indus, neque Celta, neque AEgyptius, eam cogitationem in animum induxit, quam, vel Euemerus Messenius, vei Dionysius Phryx, vel Hippon, vel Diagoras, vel Socias, vel denique Epicurus. There is none of the Barbarians, that ever yet brake-out, into contempt of the Gods, There is none of them that ever called into quaestion, Whether there be Gods, or no: or whether they regard the things of men, or no? (These be the Grecians problems) No Indian, No Celt, no Egyptian, did ever admit any such cogitation, as either Euemerus the Messenian, or Dionysius the Phrygian, or Hippo, or Diagoras, or Sosias; yea or even as Epicurus. Whereby it appeareth, that the very Barbarians, which lack all good instruction; yet are further from Atheism, than the Grecians, which have all. And therefore, it is neither institution, that giveth; nor lack of institution that depriveth of Religion: which is nothing else, but a natural impression; as immediately given, by God, unto the soul, as the soul is immediately, by God, unto the body. So that (as Caecilius very truly affirmeth) Omnium Gentium, Arnob. lib. 8. cont. gent. p 747 de Dijs immortalibus (quanvis incertasit vel ratio, vel origo) manet tamen firma consensio: There is a strong consent, that there needs must be a God, dispersed through all the nations of the world: and yet we cannot under stand either the reason, whereupon that consent should be grounded; or the original, from whence the same should be raised. But all know, that, so it is: yea, Senec: Epist. 118 p. 295. and that, among all Nations. Insomuch, that Seneca expressly pronounceth, that Nulla gens usquam est, adeò extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat: There is no nation so devoid both of good Laws and manners, but that it entertaineth some or other of the Gods. 3 Which general consent, Testimonies of Christians That all men believe There is a God. and agreement of all men, in believing There is a God; is not only recorded unto us, by the Heathens, but the same hath been also observed, even by Christians. Clemens Alexandrinus directly telleth us, that, Dei manifestatio erat, apud omnes, omnino naturalis: That the knowledge of God, Clem. Alex. lib. 5. s●●om. p. 274 is naturally engrafted into the minds of all men: referring the Original of this general persuasion; not, as Aristotle, unto Tradition: but, as Iambl●●us, unto Nature's information. In which point, Arnobius agreeth fully with him. Arnob. lib. 1. cont. Gent. p 47● Quis quamnè est hominum, qui non, cum istius Principis notione, diem primae nativitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, im●, ipsis poenè in genitalibus matris, non impressum, non insitum; esse Regem ac Dominum, cunctorum, quaecunque sunt, moderatorem? Is there any man, that doth not bring a notion of this great Prince, into the world with him? Is there any man, in whom this is not naturally begotten, to whose breast it is not nailed, nay, in whose heart it is not printed, and (as it were) engrafted, even whilst he is yet in the bowels of his Mother, that surely there is a King, and a Ruler, who is the Governor of all things, all the whole wide world over? Note his earnestness in this point, by the multitude of his words, Ingenitum, Affixum, Macarius' ●om. 12. p. 153. Impressum, Insitum, Inbred, Infixed, Imprinted, Engrafted. Macarius likewise consenteth with both of them. Absque Scriptures, homines, naturali ratione sola, cognoscunt esse Deum. Men do know there is a God, even by natural reason, of itself, though without any testimonies out of the holy Scripture. Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis (saith Beda,) ut Creaturae rationali, iam ratione utenti, Beda. in cap. 17. joh. To. 5. p. 792. non omninò et penitùs possit abscondi. God the Creator, cannot totally be hid, to any reasonable Creature. The same is affirmed likewise by Prosper Aquitanicus. Prosper. lib. De Prou●d. p. 180. Qua iacet extremo Telius circundata Ponto, Et qua gens hominum diffusa est corpore mundi, Seu nostros annos, seu tempora prisca revoluas, Esse omnes sensere Deum, nec defuit ulli Authorem Natura docens.— Where farthest Sea encompasseth the land, Where ever men do dwell in world's great was't; Let our late years, let ancient times be scanned, There is a sense of God still undefac't. This Lesson Nature-selfe hath all men taught, Whereby to know their Author they are brought. And again a little after. Innatum est cunctis, genitorem agnoscere verum. It is innate to all, to own Their father true, by Nature known. So likewise Theodoret. Veram theologiam, Theodoret. lib. de Angelis. Tom. 2. p. 498. ab initio, hominibus Natura tradidit: divina subinde eloquia confirmarunt. True divinity, from the beginning, was first taught to men by Nature; and afterward confirmed unto them by Scripture. By which alleged authorities, both of Christians and Heathen, it doth evidently appear, that there is hardly a greater consent of all men, in believing There is a God; then there is in observing this consent of their belief. And it is also a thing not unworthy the observing, that so many learned men, of so distant times and places, and so different in opinions; yet should utter and express, one and the same sentence, in so many forms of words. 4 Which yet may be made a little more evident, Testimonies of Tully, that all men believe, There is a God. by addition of two other places, out of Tully, that express the whole notion, a great deal more excellently: which I have purposely reserved unto this last place: because they do afford a notable gradation, whereupon I have founded the whole Discourse ensuing. The first of them is in his first Book Of the Nature of the Gods: the second, in the first Book of his Tusculan Questions. His first place is this. Quae est gens, Cic. li. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 190. aut quod genus Hominum, quod non habeat (sine doctrina) anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Epicurus, What Country is there, or what kind of men, which have not in their minds (without any teaching) a certain preconceived opinion of God? Which Epicurus calleth a Presumption, or Praeception. Mark the steps of his gradation, Qu●e gens? Quod genus? What nation of men? or what condition of them? His second place is this. Cic. lib. 1. Tusc. p. 112. Nulla est gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam imm●nis, evils mentem non imbuer it Deorum opinio. There is, neither any nation so barbarous, nor any person so savage, but that his mind is endued, with some opinion of the Gods. Mark here again, Nulla gens, Nemo omnium: No people, nay, no man at all. From whence we may gather, by these two places of Tully compared together, that this praenotion of God, is so generally spread, that there is neither nation, nor condition of men, no nor any singular person; (neither gens, nor genus, nor ullus) but he hath in him this persuasion, That their is a God. Let us tread in his own steps; and see the truth of this his confident assertion; and whether he be deceived in any one of them. And first, as concerning Nations; then, Conditions; and finally, Persons. CHAP. 4. That there is not any Nation, but it hath his Religion. 1. Ancient Histories insinuate it. 2. New Histories affirm it. 3. Travellers confirm it. 4. A general survey of their Gods, declareth it. 5. A particular survey of their tutelar Gods, proveth it. YOu have seen before, All Nations have their Gods, by the Testimonies of Histories. how confidently it is affirmed, both by Heathens, and by Christians; That there is not any Nation but it hath his Religion; not any People in the world, but that they have their God. Let us now come to see, how this saying can be proved. For, it is easy to say any things. But those things that are said, if they be not duly proved, may, with the same facility be rejected, that they be affirmed. So that, we cannot, in equity, exact a belief, where we do not exhibit (if not en exact) yet a competent proof. But in this case now present, easy proof will be competent. For, it requiring nothing of us, but an historical faith, we need exact no more, but an historical proof: because historical positions, are sufficiently proved by historical probations. Why then, the highest proof that we can use in this case, is to confirm it by the testimony, of either such Historiographers as have credibly related it, or else, of such Travellers, as have visibly seen it. They two will be sufficient. For these two in this case be more authentical witnesses, than either Philosophers, Orators, or Poets; yea or then Divines themselves: because, this resteth only upon the credit of History: Wherein we have testimonies in very great plenty. For, look into all the most ancient Historiographers, who have either Geographically described the Regions, or Historically the Nations of the whole world, so far as it was open, and known in their time; & yet you shall find none of them, that have certainly or assertively branded any nation with the mark and stigme of Atheism▪ neither Herodotus, nor Diodorus, nor Strabo, nor Ptolomee, nor Mela, nor Solinus, nor Pliny, nor justine, nor any of the rest. They which have marked, with very great curiosity, the memorable things of every Country; yea and have noted the Atheism of some particular men; would never have left it unnoted upon any general nation, Diodor. Sicul. l. 13. p. 317. if they could have enured any such upon them. It is true that Strabo writeth of the Cala●ci; Strabo. lib. 3. p. 328. a rude and a savage people of Spain; that, Calaicis Deum nullum esse, quidam aiunt; that some affirm, that they have no God. But yet, Cap. 8. Sect. 3. he neither affirmeth so of them; nor yet telleth us, who they were that affirm this of them himself; nor yet subscribeth unto their affirmation: but leaveth all in the uncertainty of, Quidan, & aiunt; which is a very weak proof. For, if such ungrounded reports might go for proofs, Christians themselves should be Atheists: Arnob. l. 8. cont. gent. p. 748. who (as Caecilius reporteth) do, et Templa despicere, et Deos despuere: both despise the Temples, and despite the Gods. The nations that have been most infamed with imputation of this point, C●●lius Rhodigin lib. 18. cap. 28. p. 862. are the Massagetae, and Scythians: who (by the vulgar) in old time, were thought to be destitute of all pieti● and Religion, because they were so far from civility and reason. But, Herodot. l. 4. p. 278. 279. Herodotus expressly freeth them both from that impiety. For, Lucian. lib. De Sacrifici●s, p. 57 b. the Scythians, acknowledged diverse of the Greekish Gods: jupiter, Tellus, Apollo, Venus, Mars, and Hercules. Hos cuncti Scythae Deos arbitrantur, saith he: These all the Scythians hold for Gods. Lucian addeth, Diana; unto whom (as he reporteth) they were wont to offer Men: But, their own peculiar God, whom they chiefly worship, above all the rest, is every man's old Sword: ferreus acinaces, Herod. ubi. supra. qui singulis vetustus est. Idque est Martis simulachrum: cui annuas hostias offerunt, cum aliorumpecorum, tum equorum: et plus huic acinaci quam caeteris Dijs: They call it the image of their great God Mars: and they offer unto it their yearly sacrifices, both of horse, and other beasts; yea and more to this alone, then to all the Gods beside him. This was the religion of the ancient Scythians. And, for the Massagetae their neighbours; he testifieth of them likewise, that though they renounced all other Gods; yet, that they held the Sun, Herodot. l. 1. p. 100 for a God. Ex Dijs unum solemn vener antur, cui equos immolant: Among the other Gods they worship the Sun, and they sacrifice their Horses unto him. So that, in the writings of all the ancient Historiographers, we cannot, as yet, meet with any Nation of Atheists: unless we should believe the fictions of the Poets, in their report of the Cyclopes. 2 And the same may be likewise observed in the neoterics. Munster, All Nations have there Gods, by the testimony of new Histories. in his cosmography, hath notably described the universal world, so far as (in his time) it was known, and inhabited: and Ortelius, in his Theatrum Orbis; hath placed the same, as it were, upon a Stage, to be plainly seen of all men: yea and both of these two writers have delivered unto us, not only a chorographical description of all countries, but also a Morographical description of their manners. In all whose large volumes, yet neither of them (so far as I remember) hath noted any Nation, to be without all Religion; none to be professed in Atheism. So that, we cannot find, by authority of History, either ancient or modern, that ever the sin of Atheism endeavoured any whole Nation: as yet diverse other sins have done. For, if there had ever been any nation of Atheists, throughout the whole world, they should surely have been noted. And, if we can neither see, nor hear, nor read, that there were ever any such; why should we be so light as to believe there should be such? But, because an argument from Authority, doth not follow negatively; let us go one step further, and prove it affirmatively. There be published to the world, two notable Books, of great learning, and good use. The one by Master Samuel Purchas: which he calleth his Pilgrimage: the other by Master Edward Grimestone: which he entitleth, The Estates and Empires of the world. In both which, are excellently described, not only the Geographical site of all Regions, but also the Conditions of all their Inhabitants: their riches, forces, governments, commodities, histories; and (amongst the rest) their Religions, Yea, and before the rest, in the first of those two Authors; who maketh their religions, the very first of his purposes; and all the rest but as seconds and thirds. So that (by the commendable pains of those two industrious writers) the Aheist cannot name unto us any nation, but we can name again unto him their religion and that they be not of his. Or, if any be (haply) omitted by them; it is not, because they have no religion; but, because their Religion is, as yet, not fully known. None are noted, as known, to be without all religion. For all people inhabiting upon the face of the whole Earth, Tres sunt in Mundo Religiones; judaeorum, Paganorum, Christianorum. Athanas. in D●●put. cont. Arium p. 517. But time since his time hafh brought forth a fourth. are either Christians, who worship the holy Trinity; or mahometans and jews, who worship God the Creator; or pure Gentiles, who worship the Stars, and other Creatures; or Idolaters, who worship Images. Into these four sects, the whole world is quartered, and all these to be found, in every quarter of it: though Christians do hold the predominance, in Europe; Mahometans, in Asia; Gentiles, in Africa; and Idolaters, in America. So that all of them be worshippers: and all of them have their Gods. 3 And, Travellers find, that every nation hath a God. that those forenamed Writers do neither abuse us, nor yet have been abused themselves, in their forenamed relations; we find all to be verified, by the report of Travellers, who have seen it with their eyes: which is the surest foundation, and ground of all Histories. Wherein we can have no better testimonies, than those of our own Travellers: who have taken more pains, in searching out the world, than any other people of the world: as we may plainly see, by the commendable, and industrious Travels, of Mr. Richard Hackluyt, in collecting our English Voyages. Amongst which, there is relation of two worthy Gentlemen, of this our own nation: who have compassed the Globe of the whole Earth about. Which notable exploit hath not by any other Nation, as yet, been twice achieved. The first of which, Eng. Voyag. vol. 3. p. 737. 738. was Captain Drake; who, in his furthest travel unto the Northwest, taking land in Nova Albien, he saw there the Savages busied about a Sacrifice: who, when they had tasted of our men's liberality, they supposed them to be Gods, and diverse times offered unto them their sacrifices. Which they never would have done, but that both they were persuaded that There is a God: and that, offering of sacrifice is a part of his worship. The second of those Gentlemen, Ibid. p. 819. was Captain Candish, who, in his furthest travel unto the Southeast, taking land in the Island of Capul, observed the Inhabitants, to be the worshippers of the Devil. And the like may be observed in diverse other of their voyages: who, even in the furthest and most remote parts, could never, as yet, find any Nation of Atheists. They never yet took landing, but if they once found men, they found also some religion: which they never brought with them when they came; nor carried with them when they went; but both found it there before them, and left it there behind them. So that, no Traveller could ever out-travell religion: but, (as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth) Quanvis ad Oceanilitora accesseris, Max. Tyr. Ser. 1. p. 6. ibi quoque Deos invenies. Hos quidem, prope Orientes; illos verò prope Occidentes. Though a man should travel all the skirts of the Ocean, Cap. 6. Sect. 1. he shall still find, There be Gods, both rising in the East, and setting in the West. Which is almost all one with Anaximanders' opinion: Cic. lib. 1. De Nat. D●o. p 187. Nativos esse Deos, longis intervallis, et orientes & occidentes: That there is a kind of native Gods, who in distance of time do sometimes rise up, and sometimes fall again. For, it is Plutarch's observation, that, if a man should travel throughout the whole Earth; though he might haply meet with some people without Governors, yet should he not ever meet with any without Gods. Siterras obeas, invenire possis urbes, Muris, Literis, Regibus, Plut. Cont. Colot. Tim. 3. Mor. p. 532. Domibus, Opibus, Numismate▪ carentes, Gymnasiorum etiam & Theatororum nescias; Vrbem, Templis Dijsque carentem, quae precibus, jureiurando, Oraculo non utatur; non bonorum causa sacrificet, non mala sacris avertere nitatur; nemo unquàm vidit: If thou walkest through the world, thou mayst happen to find, some City without walls, without letters, without Rulers, without Houses, without Riches, without Coins, without Schools for exercise, without theatres for plays: but yet none at all, without Temples for their Gods. None, but they have their Prayers, their Oaths, their Oracles, their Sacrifices, for either the obtaining of such things as are good, or for the declining of those that are evil. A City without these things, was never yet seen with man's eyes. Which observation of his, is likewise confirmed, even by our own Travellers: who in what place soever they set foot upon ground, in any of the inhabited parts of the world; wheresoever they have found Cities, they likewise have found Temples, and Altars, and Priests, and sacrifices, and vows, & invocations, and other the * Nisi Divina sin●, ubique tollitur Sacrificij virtus, lambli. c. 6. P. 15. lib. De Mysterijs. Cic. lib. 1. Offic. p. 358. Essentials of religion. And yet in their voyages, both to the East and West Indies, they have met with diverse people, without Law, without Government, without Order, without Garment, * Pet. Martyr. Decad. 1. lib. 5. p. 30. b. Aug. lib. de Haeres. To. 6. p. 18 walking openly stark naked, Gen. 2. 25. Paul. Venet. lib. 3. c. 14. p. 390. etiam sine subligaculo; and yet are not ashamed: but that, not upon impudency, as the Adamite Heretics, but upon mere simplicity, as Adam himself in the time of his innocence: who, though he then were naked, yet was he not ashamed, nor ever sought this subligaculum, until sin had brought in shame. They meet (I say) in diverse Countries, with many people, without Garments, without Laws, and without all civil orders; but none at all, without Gods: as Paulus Ventus observeth of the people of Ferl●ch: Nullam habent legem, sed bestialiter viwnt: quicquid tamen ill is ma●è primùin occurrit, adorant. They have no Rule of Laws but live like Beasts, religiously adoring what they first meet every morning. They find no people, no Country, no Nation, either so disordered in their affection, or so despoiled of all reason, Eng. Voyages. vol. 1. p. 281. as to be without religion; Alex. ab. Alex. Geneth. Lib. 6. c. 26. p. 321. b. or to be without a God, though never so base, or bad; though but a stick with a nick, as the Samoeds have of the river Ob. Which several Gods of several nations are largely recorded by Alexander ab Alexandro, in the sixth of his Books of Genial days. c. 261. p. 321. b. 4. Which base and vile things, The ridiculous Gods or diverse Nations. no man would ever worship, but that there is a radical and fundamental conclusion, unmoveably grounded in the heart of a man, that he ought to have a God. And so not knowing where to find him, he will rather worship any thing, than he will worship nothing. Hence some of the Heathen do worship the Sun, Cap. 7. Sect. 1. Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 11. the Moon, the Stars: some the Fire, the Water, the Earth, the Air; some unreasonable Beasts; as Oxen, and Horses: some hurtful Serpents; as Crocodiles, and Vipers: Yea and some the very Devil himself, Cacodaemones, as Clemens Alexandrinus there noteth: Daemonem Soradeum, as Athenaeus reporteth of the Indians: Athenaeus. lib. 1. p. 21. nay ipsum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Lact. lib. 2. c. 16. p. 120. in figura sua, sine ulla dissimulatione; as Lactantius speaketh in this very case: They worship the devil, in his own proper form, without any dissembling: Yea and that in the most ugly, that they can possibly imagine. Which idolatry continueth in those Eastern Countries, Munster. lib. 5. Cosmogr. p. 1087 very common and familiar, Masseus, lib. 6. Hist. Indic. p. 118. even to these our own days. A thing almost incredible, that the eye of Man's reason should be so clean put out; but that even the Holy Scriptures do avouch it for a truth, that the Devil heretofore hath so blinded the minds of wicked men, as to make them to worship, even him for their God: as he most impudently attempted it, even with our Saviour Christ, Mat. 4. 9 his Lord & his God; whom yet he would have had to have worshipped him, for his God. And though with our Saviour he could not prevail, but received a foul foil, yet prevailed he with the Heathens, and brought almost all of them to forsake God, and to worship him. For, as the Prophet Moses testifieth: Deut. 32. 17. The Heathens when they worship their Idols, under the name of Gods, worship indeed nothing else, but only the Devil himself. The Heathen (saith he) do offer unto Devils, & not unto God. And, that this is very true, we may evidently see, by comparing the old Testament, with the new. For, that same Idol Beelzebub, 2. King. 1. 2. which in the Old Testament is called the God of Ekron, is called in the New, Luke 11. 15. The chiefest of the Devils. So that it appeareth, that, rather than a man will have no God at all, he will worship the very Devil. He will worship even the meanest of the creatures of God, rather than he will lack a God: AElian. l. 12. De Animal. c. 5. p. 250. A Weasel, as the Thebans; A Mouse, as the Troyans'; yea, even an Onion, or a Leek, as they did once in Egypt. Porrum, Iwenal. Satyr. 15. p. 60. a. et caepe, nefas violare, ac frangere morsu. A Leek, an Onion, O 'tis wickedness! These once to violate; and to eat, no less. Which their notorious folly, he scoffeth and derideth, in the same place wost worthily: O sanctas gents, quibus haec nascunt●r in hortis Numina.— Sweet Saints they are, and holy ones, I trow, To whom their Gods do in their gardens grow. Deos ollares, Aristop. jam Nub. Act. 5. sec. ●. p. 228. as such ridiculous Gods are called in contempt by Aristophanes. Plin. l. 2. c. 7. p. ●. Yet such is the force of Religion in a man, that it will make him worship any thing. He will Monstra quoque colere, as it is noted by Pliny: He will worship the foulest monsters: yea, he will carry his Gods upon his very fingers, as he addeth in the same place: yea, he will fall to worship his own very members: Humerum dextrum, Lucian. In jove Tragaedo, p. 210. a. aut sinistrum, aut Capitis dimidium, as is noted even by Lucian. He will worship his own hand, if he have none other God; yea, or the work of his own hand, or any thing whatsoever cometh next unto his hand. For the Bramenes in the East, Linschot. c. 36. p. ●0. and the Lappones in the North, do both of them worship, P●t. Mar. Dec. p. 284. for the God of that day, the first thing that they meet, when they rise up in the morning, Masseus l. 1. p. 24. Linschot c. 44. p. 81. whatsoever it be, though but a Mouse, a Worm, a Fly. In another Province of the East-India, they adore and worship the Tooth of an Ape: and have made bloody wars to be possessed of it. In another province of the northern Climate, called Baida, they do worship for their God a piece of a red clout, tied unto a cross stick, in the manner of a Banner. Ort●l. Chart. Cosmogr. 104. Neither can they give any good account, why they should worship such a God, but only that it hath been left unto them by an old Tradition, by their Ancestors before them. It may seem in probability, some relic of Christianity, and some remembrance of Christ's Cross; since that region once was Christian; though now the true use of it be corrupted through time: it differing not much in the outward form, from that Banner, which we read to have been made by great Constantine in the representation of our Saviour Christ's crucifying. For we read of a like example, in the Islands of Acusamil, where they do worship a Cross, for the God of the Rain; and yet cannot tell who made it, nor from whence it came. But, it is very likely, to be some monument of Christianity, left there by some Christians, who have heretofore taken landing in that place: for in diverse others they do meet with like signs, which are likewise abused by those simple Indians. Those foolish gods, do those foolish Nation's worship; more foolish indeed, than the gods whom they worship. The Athenians, not much in this point wiser, did consecrate, amongst their Gods, Contumeliam, and Imp●dentiam: which Tully very justly reproveth in them, 〈…〉 that they should, Viti● consecrare: That they should consecrate for their gods, the very vices of Men. But, 〈…〉 above all, the folly of the Romans doth well deserve the Bell. For they worshipped, not only many idle and ridiculous gods; as, Fortunam, Victoriam Volupiam: 〈…〉 but also, diverse Bawdy gods; Floram, Venerem, Faul●m, and Priapam: 〈…〉 Yea and some Beastly gods two; as, Cloacinam, and Sterquilinum: insomuch that (as Clemens Romanus reporteth) they did, Crepitus ventris venerari pro Numinibus.— A filthy Dunghill of stinking gods, 〈…〉 well deserving that reproach, which is cast upon some of them, by Aristophanes, that they be but Dij merdivori. For, so, their Cloacina may be truly said to be. And so the Prophet Moses calleth them, in express and plain words, Dunghill gods, as the Original is rendered by our last Translators. Deut. 29. 17. And diverse other such absurd gods they worshipped, which it is almost a shame but to have named, as Sibylla hath truly noted. — Haec adoratis, 〈…〉 Et alia multa vana, quae sanè turpe fuerit praedicare, Sunt enim Dij hominum deceptores stultorum. These foolish gods, and many more Like vain, Ye worship and adore, Which filthy were to name in Schools, Such filthy gods deceive but Fools. And therefore I ouerpasse them with S. Augustine's transition; Non omnia commemoro, quia me piget, quod illos non puduit: These gods make me half ashamed to name them, Aug. lib 4 de 〈◊〉. De●. c. 8. p. 231 although they themselves were not ashamed to worship them. Which seemeth to me little less than a wonder, that the Romans, so wise and so severe a nation, yet should show themselves so foolish in the use of their Religion. But this sedulity of man's soul about such false gods, must needs import unto us, that it thinks there is a true one. And thus you plainly see by all the former instances, that there is no Nation so Barbarous, but it will have a God, though never so ridiculous. Which evidently proveth, that this one conclusion [That there is a God.] is a general principle, throughout the whole world, wherein all kind of people remain still of one language, even after the general confusion of tongues: conspiring more fully in this one common principle, than they do in any other, either of Art, or Nature. For which I refer you, to the next ensuing Chapter. 5. Let me only here (for the Close of this present) give you but this one note. That I find it observed, The peculiar Gods of diverse Countries and Cities. by diverse of the learned, that, beside those great and most renowned gods, which were called Dij maiorum Gentium, and were worshipped generally throughout the greatest part of the world; every several Country (and almost every City) selected to themselves, Cap. 5. Sect. 4. Cap. 7. Sect 1. their peculiar gods, which they called, Deos Tutelares, that is, the Guardians, and Defendors, and Patrons of their Countries: of whom Tully giveth us some instances, that, the Alabandians, did worship for their Patron, Alabandus; Cic. l. 3. de. Nat. Deor. p. 231. the Tenedians, Tenes; the whole Country of Greece, Hercules, AEsculapius, Castor and Pollux: and these he calleth novos & ascriptitios Cives, in Coelum re●ceptos, that is to say, new gods, taken lately into heaven, as new Citizens are received into their new City. Lucian. lib. De● Sacrific. P. 57 ●. So Lucian. Per Regiones, illos distributos colunt, ●●sque velut in civitatem suam receptant: As the Gods have gratified Men, in receiving some of them amongst themselves into heaven: so Men have regratiated them again, in receiving of them into their Cities upon earth, as their proper and peculiar Gods. And then he giveth some instances: Apollinem, Delphi Delijque Minervam, Athenienses; Argivi, junonem; Migdonij, Rheam; Venerem, Paphij; Cretenses, jovem. And a great many other he reckoneth up in jove Tragaedo. Tertullian, p. 110 Tertul. in. Apo. log c. 24. p 54. he giveth us diverse other instances. Vnicuique Provinciae, & Civitati, Deus suus est: ut Syriae, Astartes; ut Arabiae, Disares; ut Norici, Belenus; ut Africa, Coelestis; ut Mauritaniae, Reguli sui: There is no Country, no City, but it hath his proper God: the Syrians, Astartes; the Arabians, Disares; the Noricians, Belenus; the Africans, Coelestis; and the Mauritanians, their own Kings. And then he proceedeth to declare, that this is not only the general Religion of every Country, but also the particular of every City: whereof he hath also given instances unto us. Crustuminensium, Belventinus; Narni●nsium, Viridianus; Asculanorum, Ancaria; Volsiniensium Nersia; Ocriculanorum, Valentia; Sutrinorum, Nortia; Faliscorum, Curis; etc. naming the neighbour Cities round about Rome itself: who yet, not contented with the general Gods of their Country, would needs have their peculiars, Lactant. l. 1. c. 15 p. 39 every City for itself. Item Isidor. l. 8. orig. c. 11. p. 1023. Lactantius yet addeth other instances unto these. Summa veneratione coluerunt AEgyptij, Isidem; Mauri, jubam; Macedones, Cabyrum; Paeni, Vranum; Latini, Faunum; Sabini, Sancum; Romani, Quirinum; eodem utique modo Athenae Mineruam, Samos junonem, Paphos Venerem, Lemnos Vulcanum, Naxos Liberum, Delphi Apollinem. The Egyptians do worship their Cabyrus: the Carthaginians their Uranus': the Latines their Faunns: the Sabines their Sancus: the Romans their Romulus: and so the Athenians their Minerva: the Samians their juno: the Paphians their Venus: the Lemni ans their Vulcan: the Naxians their Bacchus: the Delphians their Apollo. And the like no doubt they could easily have showed of all the other Nations and Cities of the world, if they had purposely intended a set work upon that point, which here they have touched but lightly by the way, as we may partly see by that rabble of them, which Rabshakeh so rolled out, in his luxurious and Asiaticall Oration unto King Hezechiah. 2. Kin. 18. 34. Where is the God of Hamah, and of Arpad? Where is the God of Sepharuaim, Hevah, and Ivah? But a great deal more plainly in that reprehension of jeremy, wherewith he perstringeth the idolatry of the jews, ●er. 2. 28. that; according to the number of their Cities, was the number of their Gods. Whereby it appeareth, that they contented not themselves with their own God, jehovah, though he were, unto them, Deut. 4. 1. both Deus Patrius, The God of their Fathers, The most ancient God; and Deus Tutelaris, The God of their Country, their most careful God, The Keeper of Israel, Psal. 121. 4. 5 Protecting and defending them, Psal. 127. 1. and watching over them, a great deal more vigilantly, then ever any Watchman doth over his own City: as the Prophet David hath expressly testified. But yet, for all that, they would have (beside him) over every several City, a several God: else could he not have said, that the number of their Gods had equalled the number of their Cities. Which vanity they affected, upon an itching humour, * Ex. 32. 1. 1. Sam. 8. 20. to be like unto their neighbour Nations, as well in this, as in many other things. And this also may be gathered, by those High Places, which Solomon builded for his idolatrous Wives: wherein they worshipped the several Gods, of their several Nations: Ashtareth, the Goddess of the Sidonians; and Milcom, the God of the Amorites; 1. King 11. 5. 7. Chemosh, the God of the Moabites; and Molech, the God of the Ammonites: and so likewise for all the rest of his Outlandish Wives, which burned incense and offered unto their Gods. Whereby it appeareth, that every several Nation had a God of his own. As yet further may be seen by the practice of those Nations, which Salmanezer transplanted into the Samaritan Cities: of whom it is recorded, that, 1. King. 17. though they feared the Lord, yet they worshipped every one his own peculiar God: Vers. 33. Of whom there is a Catalogue in the same place set down; Vers. 29. 30. The Babylonians, Succoth-Benoth; the men of Cuth, Nergal; the men of Hamath, Ashima; the Auites, Nibhaz & Tartak; the Sepharuites, Adrammelech & Anammelech. Neither did Nations and Cities only affect, to have every one unto themselves, their own peculiar and several Gods, The particular Gods of Families. Cap. 5. Sect. 4. as their Patrons and Defenders: but the same was likewise followed, even by all their several families: who still had their Lares, and their Deos Penates, that is, their Household gods; as the Protectors of their families: whom, because they set up in the secret, and most inward parts of their houses, the Poets use to call, Deos Penetrales. And with how great a religion they adored them, we may partly see in Plautus: Cic. l. 2. de. Nat. Deor. p. 210. where, a Lar familiaris expresseth his worship thus. — mihi cotidiè, Aut ture, Plaut. Prologue. in Aulular. p. 103. aut vino, aut aliquî, semper supplicat: Dat mihi coronas.— Or Wine, or incense She lays down: She offer's something every day. Her Garlands do mine Altars crown: And always to me she doth pray. And the same we may likewise collect, by that wonderful perturbation, which is reported to have been, both in Micah, Gen. 31. 30. 33. jud. 18. 24. and Laban, when their Household Gods were stolen from them. Ye have taken away my Gods, and my Priests, and go your ways, and what have I more? Yea, and (as Pliny reporteth) not only several families had their several Gods, but also every several person would adopt a several God of his own: insomuch that he thought th● number of Gods to be multiplied above the number of men. Maior Coelitum populus, etiam quam Hominum in telligi potest, cum singuli quoque, ex semet-ipsis, Plin. l. 2. ●. 7. p. 2. singulos Deos faciant, junones, Geniósque adoptando sibi. We may see greater multitudes of Gods, then of Men: seeing every man adopteth, as he pleaseth, both greater, and smaller Gods, unto himself. And thus, you plainly see, that there is neither Nation, nor City, nor Family, in the world, but that it is persuaded, that There is a God; and that they cannot contain, but that they needs must worship him, at the least in their intention, howsoever there be error or imperfection in their action. So that, for the first branch of Tully's gradation; you see he erred not, That there is not any Nation, but it hath his Religion: None of them all so wicked, but believeth There is a God. Quod quidem non solùm fatetur Graecus, Max. Tyr. Ser. 1. p. 6. sed & Barbarus; sed & Insularum, & Continentis habitator; & ipsi denique, qui sapientiam abnegant: as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth. This (saith he) is confessed both by greeks and Barbarians; both by Islanders, and Continenters, yea, even those which renounce all understanding and wisdom; yet do not remove Religion; but hold that fast within them. And as, in a like case, by Seneca it is observed: Seneca Epist. 116. P. 292. Totus populus in alio discors, in hoc convenit. All the people of the world, though dissenting in all other thing, yet consent, There is a God. Let us therefore now proceed unto Tully's second instance, and see whether, as all Nations, so all conditions of men, be inwardly persuaded, that There is a God. CHAP. 5. That all sorts of men, of all degrees, and orders, do believe, There is a God, is particularly declared by instance of Poets. 2. Of Lawgivers'. 3. Of philosophers. 4. And of all other several Arts and Professions. OF all those general Notions which are begotten in the mind, 〈…〉 and are thought to be the first grounds of the very law of Nature; there is not any one of them, which is either so early bred, or so largely spread, or so deeply rooted in the hearts of all men, as is this one conclusion; That There is a God. Nay, a Conclusion it is not (if we will properly speak) but rather a Principle, yea and that so naturally bred in the soul: that (as Aristotle affirmeth) it needeth not any corporeal instrument, to make it believe it. Anima intelligit Deum scientiâ ●uiusmodi, Arislot. lib. 12. de Theelogia. cap. 8. quae non est per organon corporale. Nay, the name of a Principle is not sufficient for it: It is Ante Principium, rather than Principium: or (as Aquinas calleth it) Praeambula ad Articulos: A Preamble unto the first Articles of Christian belief. 〈…〉 For, many men believe this, that believe none other Article in the body of our Creed. 〈…〉 Nay all men agree, in the belief of this one point, who agree not in any other, either of Art, or Nature: not in Laws: for many men do live without any rule of Law; as in the old time, the Cyclops: yea, and sometime, the very Israelites themselves: Not in marriage: for many have lived as licentiously, 〈…〉 and loosely, as if they were bruit beasts, having only the name of Marriage, as a cover for their lusts: as the 1 Babylonians, and 2 Lacedæmonians, the 3 Gindanes, and 4 Tyrrheniaus. No not in Society itself: for diverse people, in diverse nations, do live, as mere Nomades: that is, Stragglers and Wanderers: Hic non habentes manentem civitatem, as the Apostle speaketh, not having any fixedor certain place of abiding. Only therein do all agree, 〈…〉 in all the corners of the Earth, that they will have a God, such an one as he is. And this we have seen verified, by all the known Nations and Cities of the World. 〈…〉 Let us now go one step further, and see; whether, as we have found the truth of this in all Nations, so we can find it likewise in all Conditions of men: 〈…〉 which was Tully's second instance. For our better & more orderly proceeding wherein, 〈…〉 I will tread in Plutarch's steps: 〈…〉 who hath named unto us three special sorts of men, that are known, of all other, to agree least together: and yet, in this one point, of believing, There is a God, do so notably consent, as if they all were led but by one and the same spirit: that is, Poets, Lawgivers, and Philosophers. Omnes Poetae, Leguml●●or●s, Philosophi, 〈…〉 unoore dicu●t, Deum esse. All Poets, Lawgivers, and Philosophers, do affirm, There is a God, with one consenting voice (saith he.) Let us look into the parts of this Enumeration, and examine the truth of every one of them. And first, concerning Poets: Cap. 1. Sect 3. All Poets believe, There is is a God. 〈…〉 I have showed you before, that all of them, in the beginning of their Poems, do usually call upon, either the Gods, or the Muses: as may easily be demonstrated out of all their writings, especially in their greater and more solemn works: and is generally observed of them, by Lucian, in his book De Sacrificijs. Which evidently proveth, that they had within them a grounded opinion, that There is a God. For no man is so mad, as to invocate any thing, that he thinketh hath no being. But, as concerning Poets, it is commonly believed, both by themselves and others, that their very Art hath a more special and immediate dependence upon a divine influence, than any other of all the Arts beside. In which point let me deliver unto you the opinion of Plato, who handleth it ex professo, in his Dialogue called Io: where he delivereth expressly, these three positions, unto us. First, that, P●ato. In jone. p. 170. 171. Ipsa Musa Poetas divino instinctu concitat, That the Muses themselves do use to stir up Poets, Cic. lib. 2. Epist: ad ● Fra●. Ep. 12. p. 211. Isa. 6. 6. 7. by an inward and a divine instinct: whereupon they be called by Tully, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Musis tacti: or (in some sense) de coelo tacti; as the Prophet Isaiah was, when as one of the Angels had touched his lips. His second position is, that, Omnes Poetae in signs, non arte, sed divino inflatu, praeclara poemata canunt: That all notable Poets make their excellent poems, not by virtue of their own art, or former instruction, but only by means of a divine inspiration. Isidor. lib. 8. Orig. c. 7. p. 1018. Whereupon they are called Vates, à vi mentis (as Isidore observeth) out of Varro: and by Ennius, Theodoret. l. de Principijs. Tom. 2. p. 491. Sancti: because they be divino quodam spiritu afflati. His third, That therefore prius canere non possunt, quam Deo pleni sint: Cic. Ora. pro. Archia Po●ta. p. 365 They be not able to make any poem, before they be even filled with the breath and spirit of God: as Pipes cannot make any musical harmony, if the breath of some Musician be not breathed into them. And thereupon (in another place) he called them, Deorum Prophetas: as S. Paul likewise doth; that is, the Prophets of the Gods, Plato. l. 2. De Repub. p. 548. ●it. 1. 12. or Speakers outwardly of those divine things, which before have inwardly been inspired into their minds: for so the name of a Prophet signifieth. Whereby he insinuateth, that the whole faculty of Poets dependeth much more upon a divine incitation, then either upon any natural gift, or any artificial instruction and teaching. And this he there confirmeth, by two observations. The first whereof is this, that diverse of the Poets, being (at their beginning) but very ignorant Bards; yet have had on a sudden, a notable faculty infused into them, whereby they have made very excellent Poems: as in the same place he instanceth in Tynnichus Chalcidensis. Max▪ Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 264. (And Maximus Tyrius affirmeth the same of Hesiodus.) From whence he there collecteth, Poetas nihil esse aliud quam Deorum interprete: That Poets are nothing else, but only God's Interpreters. The Poems they make are his; and they, but the Reciters. Quod quidem Deus ostendere volens, de industria, per ineptissimum Poetam, pulcherrimam cecinit melodiam (saith he in the same place,) Which God being willing to make known, he purposely in spired the simplest Poet, to make the excellentest poem. The second of his observations, is this: That in all Poesy (if it be good and worthy) there must be, not only an incitation, and commotion; but also an elocation, and emotion of the mind. The Poet must be, extra se positus, & a ment alienatus. Nam quamdiû quis ment valet, neque fingere carmina, neque fundere oracula quis quam potest. As long as a man is in a calm, & settled estate of his mind, he can neither make verses, nor give out oracles. From whence he insinuateth, that it is not he himself, but his inward God that speaketh. Which his two observations, 〈◊〉 Argument. ●n plat jon. p. 168. may further be confirmed, by a third of Ficinus, in his Argument of that Book: That oftentimes, many Poets, when they read their own poems, do hardly understand themselves; or, what they meant, in many verses, apt enough unto the matter, and plain enough unto their reader, yea plainer than to themselves: which could not have fallen out, if those verses had been made, by their own proper spirit, and not by some other, within them; Iust. Martyr. Orat. ad Gent. To. 1. p. 78. yet working far above them. And justin Martyr allegeth this for one reason, why Sibilla'es' verses be not made in true members: because, being spoken in an ecstasy, she knew not what she said, and that motion being ended, she could not amend them, having not the same spirit. Yea, and even the Poets themselves have the very same persuasion, that their whole Art dependeth upon a divine inspiration. From which only opinion, groweth all their forenamed so frequent invocation, to have their Gods to breathe into them: — Dijcoeptis— Ouid. l. 1. Met●m. p. 2. Aspirate meis— The Gods, aspire To my desire. acknowledging expressly, that all their faculty is from them. Ab Ioue principium Musae— Virgil. Eclog. 3. p. 8. — illi mea carmina curae. My Muse begins by Jove's behest: He makes my Verses in request. Yea, and Plato, in the forealleged place, affirmeth, that the Poets hold themselves to be, Pla●●an Io●e. p. 170. as it were, but the Bees of the Muses: a Musarum viridarijs, collibusque, carmina decerpentes; Flori●eris ut apes in saltibus omnia limant. Omnia nos itidem depas●imur aur●a dicta. Lucre. l. 3. p. quemadmodum mel ex floribus apes: Gathering their Verses, out of the hills and meadows of the Muses, as Bees use to do their honey, out of flowers. Which we may see to be true by Lucretius his confession, using the same comparison. Whereby they insinuate, that, as Bees be not the Makers, but the Workers of their honey, which naturally falleth with the dew from heaven: so they be not the makers, but the bringers of their Verses: As Bees their honey seek and suck from every flowery spring: instar apum volantes, ad nos afferunt: (saith Plato) but the verses themselves they do distil from heaven; as Manilius confesseth of them. — Coelo carmen de●cendit ab alto. So Poets do their golden saws from other Authors bring. The golden shower of Poet's sweetest strain, Dropp's down from Heaven, and so it flowe's amain. It it not the work of the Poets, but of the Gods. Yea, Plat●, ubi supra. Manil. lib. 1. As●ronom. p. 4. and Martial also insinuateth the same, even in his scoffing and carping at Tully's versifying. Carmina quòd s●ribis, Martia. 2. Epigr. 89. in Gaurum. p. 68 Musis, & Apolline nullo, Laudari de bs, hoc Ciceronis habes. No spark of Muse's fire shine's in thy strain, That's thy chief praise, for lo, 'tis Tully's vain. Ascribing the cause of his ill success in Verses, to be lack of the assistance of Apollo, and the Muses: who are the proper, and tutelar God of Poets. Now they, that are possessed with this religious opinion, that their own Art proceedeth from an immediate inspiration; and who use, in all their poems, to begin with invocation; how is it possible, that these men should be tainted with Atheism? Nay, Poets are so far from the sin of Atheism, that they have been the chiefest broachers of the sin of Polytheisme. 2 Let us now come to the second of Plutarch's instances; All Lawgivers do believe, That there is a God. that is, unto Lawgivers; and see, whether any of them have been Atheists? or any so ungodly, as to be without a God? For which point, it is a thing that is worthy observation, that, though diverse of the Lawgivers have been so carried, with an inward emulation, that, only upon mere envy, they have oftentimes condemned, what their neighbours have allowed; and oftentimes allowed, what their neighbours have condemned; as we may evidently see, by the contrary Constitutions of the Lacedæmonians, and Athenians: yet, that no envy, no emulation was ever able to work so great a distraction between any of them, as to make them decern, there should be no God, because their neighbours had allowed it. But, Max. Tyr. Serm. 1. p. 5. In tanta pugna, ac dissonantia, nusquàm gentium cernere est, aut leges, aut rationes, non in hoc saltem omnes convenire, Quòd unus Deus, princeps ac pater omnium existat (saith Maximus Tyrius:) In all their great dissension, both about their Laws, and about the reason of their laws; yet they still consent in this, That there is a God, who is both the Ruler, and the father of the World. All of them in this are fully of one mind, that they will have a God; as knowing well enough, that Piteie is the bond of all humane society, and Religion the foundation of every City, both gathering men, and holding them unanimously together; who else would quickly shatter clean asunder. And therefore (saith Plutarch) that, Plut. contr. Col●t To. 3. Mor. p. 532 In constitutione Legum, opinio de Diis et primum est, et maximum: That in the making of Laws, both the first, and the greatest point, is to plant in men's minds an opinion of the Gods: without which, he there affirmeth, Facilius urbem condi, si●e solo, quam civitatem coire, sine opinione de Deo: That it is not more impossible, to build a City without a foundatiou, then to gather Citizens without Religion. And therefore, all wise Lawgivers do place those Laws first, and (as it were) in the front of their Tables, which they have ordained for the honour of God: and then those that belong to the good of the kingdom: Ex. 20. 3. 32. 15. 16. Deut. 10. 4. as we may see, in Moses Laws, whose first law is this; Thou shalt have none other Gods but me. This is God's own method, and that both in speaking, and in writing of his Laws: and the same hath likewise been followed by diverse other Lawgivers, even of the very Heathen. Zaleucus beginneth his Laws with this preface: 〈…〉 Omnes homines, qui urbem & regionem inhabitant, persua●os esse oportet, esse Deos: All the Men in the world, that either inhabit any City or any Country, ought firmly to be persuaded, That there is a God. And then he proceedeth to set down certain Rites and Ceremonies, for the worshipping of the Gods, before he prescribe any, for the society of men. And so likewise Tully in the setting down of his Laws: the first whereof be these. Ad Divos adeunto castè. 〈◊〉. l. 1. de Leg. p. 322. Pietatem adhiben●o. Opens amovento. Qui secùs faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit. If any man do otherwise, God himself will revenge it. Come chastely and purely unto the Gods. Use Piety, when you are come. Do things comely, but not costly. These be his first Laws: which (as you see) directly belong unto God. So, those Fragments of the twelve Tables, which, as yet, are to be found; have the first of them, belonging unto God. Sacra privata perpetuò manento: establishing, not only those holy Constitutions that have been ordained by public Laws; but also, even those likewise, that have been appointed by private families, Ros●●us l 8. De Antiquit. Rom. c. 6. p. 330. for their own proper religions. Yea and even those Laws, which are referred to the ancient Roman Kings, long before those twelve Tables; yet have the first of them belonging to the Gods. Ne quid inauguratò faciunto. Let nothing be done but by sacred divillation. Patres, sacra Magistratúsque soli peragunto, ineuntoque Let only Senators be Magistrates, Idem. l. 8. ●, 5. p. 323. and perform holy actions. Both appointing sacred actions, and who shall be their Actors. Which argueth, that none of them have been without their Gods: * Sive putantes rem divinam esse Leges, sive ut citius Populi Deûm timore legibus obtemperent. Diodor. l. 1. c. 2. p. 43. either upon piety, Gen. 47. 22. Arist. l. 2. Pol. c. 6. To. 2. p. 773. or, Diod. Sicul. l. 1. c. 5. p. 42. at least, upon policy. Pharaoh would not buy the lands of the Priests, though he bought all the rest. Hippodamus gave the third part of the whole land unto them: and both these, in honour of their gods. Yea, and this also is a thing that is very observable, that all the ancient Lawgivers, have given out unto their people; that in the making of their Laws, they have been assisted, by some or other of the gods. By that means, both to bring unto their Laws greater reverence; & to work their people towards them, unto greater obedience, as Diodorus Siculus collecteth, who reckoneth up a whole Catalogue of those Lawgivers', who have fathered their Laws upon the Gods: as namely, Menes, the Lawgiver of the Egyptians; who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the learned god Mercury. So Minos, the Lawgiver of the Cretians; who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the mighty god jupiter. So Lycurgus, the Lawgiver of the Lacedæmonians; who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the wise god Apollo. So Latraystes, the Lawgiver of the Arians (or Arimaspians, for so the Greek is) persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the mighty god jupiter. So Lycurgus, the Lawgiver of the Lacedæmonians; who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the wise god Apollo. So Latraystes, the Lawgiver of the Arians (or Arimaspians, for so the Greek is) persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from a certain god whose name is not expressed. So Zamolxis, the Lawgiver of the Getians; persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the holy goddess Vesta. And he addeth also Moses, the Lawgiver of the jews, who persuaded that people, Iust. Mart. To. 1. p. 50. that he received his Laws from the holy goddess Vesta. And he addeth also Moses, the Lawgiver of the jews, who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the mouth of God joa: Psal. 68 4. Ex. 20. 1. alluding, as it seemeth, to the Hebrew word, jah. Yea and he might well persuade them so: for they themselves heard God himself when he spoke to them with his own mouth. Unto which Lawgivers, thus named by him, I may add diverse other, who are named elsewhere: Ficinus Argum. in Plat. Mino. p. 49. as namely, Numa Pompilius, the Lawgiver of the Romans; who persuaded that people, that he received his Laws from the M●ses, and from a Nymph called Egeria. And so likewise Zaleu●us, the Lawgiver of the Locrians, Plut. in vita Numae, To. 1. p. 138. persuaded that people, Plut. l. de laude sui To. 2. p. 262. that he received his Laws from the goddess Minerva. Homer. l. 1. Iliad. p. 7. a. b. And generally the greeks ascribed their Laws unto the making of jupiter, as to their supreme Lawgiver: as it may be gathered out of Homer: where Achilles swearing by his Sceptre, he saith, it is Insigne Praiorum Principum, in iure populis dicundo, & in custodiendis ex Ioue Legibus. The Ensign of the Grecian Princes, both in judging of their Subjects, and in keeping of their Laws, received from jupiter, the chiefest of their gods. So that they thought a●l their Laws to draw their first original from jupiter, as from their first Author; though conveyed to particular Countries, and Cities, by the ministry of other inferior gods. But unto gods they all ascribe them: the wiser sort, unto the Author; the simpler, unto the Messenger. Whereupon Architas calleth the gods, parents, ac Principes scriptarum Legum: The Lords and parents of the written Laws. Stobaeus Serm. 41. p. 261. And therefore, Stobaeus. Serm. 39 p. 229. saith Hierocles, that we ought to observe the Laws of our Country, as if they had in them a kind of divinity. Oportet Leges Patriae, tanquam alteros Deos obseruare. Plato lib 1. De Leg. p. 746. For, as Plato truly noteth in the very beginning of his Book. De Legibus: It is Deus. et n●n Homo, qui legum condendarum est causa. It is not Man, but God, that is the true cause of the making of good Laws. Which honour is ascribed to God himself, even in the holy Scripture: Pro. 8. 15. By me King's reign, and Princes decree justice, that is, make just Laws. Injustice they may decree of themselves (and there is a woe pronounced against such wicked Lawmakers) but they cannot decree justice, but only by him. So that, it is truly said in job: that Nullus ei similis in Legistatoribus: There is none like unto him, amongst all the Lawgivers. Nay, he is indeed the only true Lawgiver; job. 36. 22. in. vulgata. &, in the whole world, there is not another: as the Apostle S. james plainly testifieth unto us: There is but one Lawgiver, who is able to save, and to destroy, ja. 4. 12 and that is he. So that, all other Nations, as well as the jews, may truly profess; The Lord is our judge, Isa●. 33. 22. and the Lord is our Lawgiver, or (as it is in the Hebrews) Statute-maker: Howsoever the Heathen Lawgivers have robbed the true God of that honour, and ascribed it falsely unto others. But thus you see, that all Lawgivers, as it were, by a compact, have agreed together in this common sense, to ascribe all their laws, unto the making of their Gods. And therefore, none of them could possibly be Atheists, at least in outward profession; no not even by their profession, in that they were Lawgivers. Neither could the people that were under them be of any other disposition: both because of that inward natural instinct, which enforceth every man to worship some God; and because, by nature also, all Subjects are Imitators of their rulers; and because again, all rulers preserve their own Religion by coercive Laws: as josephus instanceth in Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diagoras, joseph l. 2▪ cont. Apion. p. 914. and Protagoras, all of them severally mulcted for the opinion of their impieties against the Gods. So that, if any man would not be religious, for love; yet durst he not be irreligious, for fear. 3 Let us now proceed unto Plutarch's third instance, that is, All Philosophers believe that There is a God. unto Philosophers; and see, whether any of them have been Atheists. Wherein it cannot be denied, but that those infamous persons, who have been noted by their name, to be Atheists; have, all of them, been, by their profession, Philosophers. But yet this again may be truly affirmed of them: that, howsoever some particular men of that profession, may haply have been infected with Atheism; yet that there was never any Sect or Family of them, but that it was of a clean contrary profession. There was never any sect of Philosophers that were professed Atheists: No, nor yet never any, but professed the clean contrary. And yet, it cannot be dissembled, but that all the Philosophers have had so infinite aviditie, and appetite of glory; that none of them could say any thing, though with never so great reason, but that some other would oppose it, and hold the contrary unto it, were it never so absurd. Yea, and this fell out, as well among their whole families, as amongst private persons: the Stoics, perpetually opposing the Epicures; the Peripatetikes, them both; the academics, them all. Insomuch, that their contentions and digladiatious grew to be so notorious, as made them all ridiculous: as that bitter scoff of Seneca very notably declareth; That, Faciliùs inter Philosophos, quam inter horologia convenit: That Philosophers agree together like Clocks. But yet in this grand point of acknowledging a God, Plus diversitatis inu●nias inter Philosophos, quam societatis. Tertul. l. de Anima cap. 2. p. 262. there is amongst them all an incredible agreement. Senec. in Ludo, p. 247. Here, the Clocks strike all together. You may see a Catalogue of all their opinions, in Tully's first Book of the Nature of the Gods, representing unto us so notable a discord, in their particular conceits, What this God should be, that never Clocks iarred more: but yet so great a concord, in their general opinions, That a God there is, as never Clocks agreed better. There, every man venteth his own private conceit, what he thought to be his God: No man denieth him, No man adorneth disputation against him, Nay, no man so much as once doubteth of him: No not, even Protagoras himself, if he be rightly construed: though his words were racked unto it, and for that cause he exiled. For he said not, that he doubted, whether there were gods, or no, but, that he would not, as then, dispute, whether there were any, or no? De Divis, neque ut sint, neque ut non sint, habeo dicere: giving only a reason of his silent praetrition. Cic. l. 1. De. Nat. Deor. p. 192▪ And therefore, Arnob. l. 8. cont. Gent. p. 748. Cap. 8. in sin. Caecilius doth secretly perstringe the Athenians injustice, & excuseth Protagoras, that he did consultè potius, quam prophanè disputare: He spoke more warily, then wickedly. So that, all these recited do affirm, There is a God. There is no man saith of God, as some do of the Soul, Nihil esse omninò Deum, et hoc esse totum inane nomen: Cic. Tusc. p. 111 That God is a thing of nothing, and that the name of God is but an empty name: but they all do acknowledge both the Name and the Thing. Now look into these four several sects of Philosophers, which are the most noted, and noble of them; and you shall see, that they do all notably agree in this, though in very few things else. Plato, the father of the Academikes, Plato lib. 10. De Leg. p. 870. not only affirmeth, Euseb. l. 11. De pr●parat. c. 6. p. 229. that There is a God; Ex. 33. 11. Iust. Mart. Orat. ad Gent. To. 1. p. 45. but he also confirmeth it, by invincible reasons. Yea, and every where almost, he speaketh so divinely, of God's divine Majesty, that (as Eusebius reporteth) he was called Moses Atticus, that is, the Athenian Moses: as if he had seen God face to face, as is reported of the Hebrew Moses, as justin Martyr noteth. Plato perindè atque coelitùs descenderit, atque ea quae sursum sunt accuratè didicerit, ac pervider it omnia; Summum Deum, in ignea essentia esse dicit: Plato, as if he were newly dropped down out of heaven, and had there learned exactly those things that are above; he maketh his God to be of a fiery substance. Yea and even therein also he agreeth in some sort, with Moses: The Lord thy God is a consuming fire. Aristotle, the Father of the Peripatetics, affirmeth, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 1566. not only That there is a God; but also, that he is both the Maker, and the Saviour of the world. Deus, sine dubio, Seruator omnium est, et Parens eorum, quae in mundo conficiuntur: God, without all doubt, is both the Conserver, & Creator of all things in the world. A most divine saying of an Heathen man! And many other the like there be throughout that whole Book. Which hath occasioned some men, Aristotle's Book De Mundo. to doubt of the credit and authority of it, as not being truly his; grounding upon but sleight and very weak conjectures. I may not stand to discuss upon every Authority: whether the Book than alleged be the Authors properly? For than we should have so many, and so great digressions, as would turn to be transgressions. And therefore in all places, I take them, as I find them, without any curious or strict examination: knowing, that even those Books, which are thought to be supposed; yet are, for the most part, both ancient, and learned: and that, if they appeared in the name of their own Authors, they would be no less approved, than they be now in theirs, upon whom they be fathered: as I could plentifully instance. Yea, and Viues conjectureth, Lod. Viues in l. 4. Aug. De. Civit. Dei. c. 2. 10. 5. p. 222. even in this present instance, that though it were not Aristotle's; yet it might be Theophrastus his. But, both Lucius Apuleius, in his Book De Mundo; and Augustinus Eugubinus, asserteth it directly, unto Aristotle himself: Yea, and Eugubinus affirmeth it to have been, Lucius Apul. l. de Mundo. p. 2. as it were, Aug Eugu●. l. 4. De peremi Philosoph. c. 4. p. 176. 177. his Retractation. Wherein he hath both recognized, and epitomised all his own former writings; reforming his own errors: and reporting both the opinions of other Philosophers more truly; and his own more plainly, then in all his other works. But, howsoever this be: though this book were none of his; yet doth he affirm as much in his Metaphysikes, which are, Arist. lib. 1. Metaphys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1372. without all quaestion, his. For there he saith directly, that Deus est rerum omnium, et cause, et principium: That God is both the cause, and the beginning of all things. A direct and plain Confession. So Zeno the Father of the Stoics (as Tully expressly calleth him) doth not only believe, That there is a God; but also, That there is but one only God: and that he is the Maker and Creator of the world, who is sometimes called men's, sometimes Fate, sometimes jove, and by diverse such like names. Vnum Deum esse; Cic. l. 3. de Nat. D●or. p. 229. ipsumque & Mentem, Laert. in vita Zenonis P. 253. 256: & Fatum, & jovem, mult●sque aliis appellari nominibus. And then he proceedeth to declare, in what order, this one God created the world. Yea, and, a little after, he defineth God, to be, Animal immortal, rationale, perfectum, ac beatum; a malo omni remotissimum; providentia sua Mundum, & qu●e sunt in Mundo, administrans omnia. A substance living, everliving, reasonable, perfect, and blessed; far removed from any evil; ruling, only by his providence, both all the whole World, and all the things therein contained. And so likewise Epicurus, Mornaeus lib. De verit. Relig. c. 1. p. 15. the Father of the Epicures: Qu●m nihil pudendum pudet, tamen Deum negare pudet: as one very wittily writeth of him: Though he were not ashamed of any shameful thing, yet was he ashamed to deny There is a God: as reckoning this the greatest shame that can be: because all the whole world affirmeth the contrary. Even he (I say) though he deny, that God ruleth the world; yet doth he not deny, but That there is a God: Nay, he affirmeth that: accounting it a less absurdity to have a God that is idle; then to be so idle, as to have none at all. Their Notion of the gods was, that they were Beati, & Aeterni: sed nec habere ipsos quicquam negotij, nec exhibere alteri: That they were blessed, and eternal: neither having any business to do of themselves, nor yet exhibiting any unto others. Cic. l. 1. de Nat. D●or. p. 190. Thus all the four Patriarches of the chief Philosophers were fully of one mind, that there needs must be a God. And josephus affirmeth the like of all the rest. Et Pythagoras, josephus' l. 2. cont. Apron. p. 907. & Anaxagoras, & Plato, & post illos Philosophi Stoici, & paenè cuncti videntur de Divina sapuisse Natura: Nay, not paenè cuncti, but planè cuncti: Max Tyr. Orat. 29●. 358. as Maximus Tyrtus affirmeth: Opiniones Deorum a cunctis Philosophis receptae sunt. Both Pythagoras, and Anaxagoras, and Plato, and the Stoics▪ and almost all the other (nay altogether all the other) have had some under standing of the Divine Nature. In this point, even the Philosophers themselves are Christians. Tertul●. ●. 2. cont. Marc●on c. 27. p. 382. And therefore Tertullian calleth God Philosophorum Deum: because they did so generally, all the sorts of them, confess him. So that we may truly say with Varro: Ecce, ad nos accedit cana veritas, Attic philosophiae alumna: Behold, the ancient truth cometh now directly to us, even from the Philosophers of Athens: Nonius in voce Canum p. 532. the very Heathens in this point, agreeing with us Christians. Nay, Christians themselves agree not so well about many points, even of their own Religion; as in this point the very Heathens consent and agree with them. Tertul. l. 1. cont. Martion. ●. 21. p. 360. For (as Tertullian observeth) Alij de Idolothyto edendo, alij de mulierum velamento, alij de nuptijs vel repudijs, nonnulli & de spe resurrectionis disceptabant: de Deo, nemo: Even of professed Christians, some have doubted, and disputed, of meat offered unto Idols; some of women's veils and wimples; some, of marriages and divorces; yea, and some of the hope even of the Resurrection: but yet none at all of God. No man here makes any doubt, no man moveth any question, no man adorneth any kind of disputation: not only no Christians amongst themselves; but none of all the Philosophers, Vnus est verus Deus in quem omnis set siex diversis opinienibus) secta concurrit. Oros. 16. Iust. 1●. 213. Ovid Metam. l. 3. p. 100 neither one against another, jaert. in Pro●●. p. 3. nor yet any against Christians. They that in all other things are like Cadmus his men, every one of them killing and striking down another; yet all here agree together, all fully do consent, in admitting of a God. Yea, and not only the Philosophers among the Greeks, but even the Magis, in the extremest East, among the barbarous Indians; and the Druids, in the extreme West, among the barbarous Gauls: as Laertius observeth, Gymnosophistas, ac Druidas, obscurè, ac per sententias philosophari, Colendos Deos— Magos Deorum vacare cultui. The Gymnosophists and Druids do teach in obscure sentences; That we ought to worship God— Yea and so do the Magis too. 4 And the like consent there is also among all other Arts; as Tyrius Maximus observeth. All Arts do hold, That there is a God. Max. Tyr. Serm. 1. p. 5. Si Artes omnes in consilium ucces, iubeasque simul uno decreto, de Substantia Dei sententiam far; censesnè, aut Pictorem, aut statuarium, aut Poetam, aut Philosophum, diversa, intellecturos? Sed nec Scytha, nec Graecus, nec Persu, nec Hyperboreus dissentiet. If thou shouldest call all the Arts unto one general Council, and bid them speak their mind, as concerning God: dost thou think that the Painter would tell thee one tale, and the Carver another, the Poet another, and the Philosopher another? No, they would agree all together. Yea, there would be amongst them so full a consent, that neither Scythian, nor Grecian nor Persian, nor Hyperborean would descent. In the first part of which sentence, you may observe the general consent of all Arts; in the second, of all Natitions, and nominatim of the Scythians▪ who have been held for Atheists: So that in this point, there is an incredible agreement, not only of all Nations, but also of all Conditions, of all Arts and Professions: who yet agree in nothing else, as he observeth in the same place. Alij tamen aliter de rebus aliis, nec idem, sed diversa sentire videntur: ut non modò gens genti, civitas civitati, domus domui, viro vir, sed nec quisquam sibi ipsi demùm consentiens sit. Yet diverse men judge diversely in all other matters, insomuch, that not only no Country agreeth with another, but no City with City; no house with house; no man with man: but in all things almost therebe, Quot homin●s, tot sententy: So many men, so many minds. Nay more minds than men: ●eren, in Pho●m Act. 2. 〈◊〉. 4. p. 218. b. for every man hath many minds almost of every thing: Nec quisquam sibi ipsi demùm consentit: as it followeth in that place of Tyrius. Yea, and Augustinus Eugubinus observeth, even of the wisest and learnedest Philosophers, who have founded their opinions upon the soundest reasons; yet that still they find new reasons, which make them to forsake their old opinions, and entertain new in their steads. As Plutarch observeth, Aug. Eugub. lib. 4 De pe●en. Phi. los. c. 4. p. 177. both in Aristotle, Dem●critus, Plut. lib. de virtute Mora●. To. 2. p. 496. and Chrysippus: Qu● nonnulla prius sibi probata decreta, absque tumultu, doloreque, & quidem libenter, dimiserunt. Who did willingly forsake diverse of those opinions that before were allowed by them, not holding it any disgrace unto them. Insomuch, that it may be observed, in the most of them, that they do not only retract many opinions in their age, which they defended in their youth, but also, that almost every six or seven years, they betake them unto new opinions. Which he ascribeth, not so much unto the imconstancie of their judgement; as to a greater experience, & further parefaction of the truth that reformeth it. But yet, in this one point, of believing there is a God; there is neither difference of opinion between nation & nation, profession and profession, person and person; no, nor change of opinion in any singular man: but, as all men agree in this, in all places; so doth every man agree with himself, at all times; when he is himself, and not, by the violence of inordinate passion, transported out of himself. Only this change we may observe: that some men, who in their youth have denied God, have changed their opinion; and in their age confessed him: as we shall see hereafter, in a several Chapter. Cap. 13. But no man, that in his youth confessed God, did ever change his opinion. So that, though the Philosophers (as it were a kind▪ of Gentile pharisees) desire the pre-eminence, Mat. 23. 6. 7. & priority in all things, and to be the ringleaders into all opinions: Yet in this one Opinion, That there is a God, they are content to be followers, and therein to subscribe, even unto the poorest and ignorantest Artisans: Who, though of infinite diversity in their trades and professions; yet have no diversity at all in their judgements and opinions, as concerning this one point, to believe, There is a God. And this may evidently be seen by this one observation; that there is almost none of them, The Tutela● gods of several Arts. Cap. 4. Sect. 5. no not even the very meanest, but, beside the general gods of their countries, who were worshipped by them all, they had some particular gods of their own, Chp. 4. Sect. 5. whom they worshipped in special, as the Patrons, and Tutelar gods of their Arts. Senators and Counsellors had their Consus▪ Plut. in vit. Romuli. p. 54. who did in consultando iware. Mercurius praeest Sapientiae et eloquio. I●mblic. l. De Myster. c. 1. p. 1. Poets, Arnob. l. 3. co●t. Gent. p. 581. their Muses; Lactant. l. 1. ●. 20 p. 51. 54. Orators, Varro. l 6. p. 52. their Mercury; Horat. l. 1. Epist. 16. p. 114. ●. Physicians, their AEsculapius; diviners, their Apollo; Merchants, their Mercury again; Soldiers, their Mars; Husbandmen, their Pan; smith's, their Vulcan; Mariners, their Portunus; Shepherds, their Pales; gardiner's, their Flora; Bakers, their jupiter Pistor; Costermongers, their Pomona; Yea, and even thieves, their Laverna. — Pulchra Laverna da mihi fallere: Lady Laverna, teach me to steal. And so likewise, in those Arts, that are exercised by women: Midwives, had their Lucina; Nurses, their Cunina; Maidens, their * Festus in voce Ancilla. p. 251. Aug. lib. 4. c. 8. De Civit. Dei. Item c. 11. & ●. Arnol. l. 3. cont. Gent▪ ●. 581. & ● Tertul▪ Apolog. c. 46. p. 76. Aucula. And diverse such like, which it were tedious to reckon up: but yet are reckoned, by S. Augustine; and by Arnobius, who setteth down both their names, and their offices: which, even without his interpretation, might well be gathered by their names. So that, there was no Art or profession, amongst all the Heathen, but they had both their general and their special gods. And therefore none of them could possibly be Atheists. Much less could those Artificers that are professed Christians: of whom Tertullian truly writeth, that, Deum quilibet opifex Christianus et invenit, et ostendit. That every Christian being a Christian, can easily both find out and show forth God. Besides, it is a thing that is worthy the noting, that, of all the Arts in the World (though there be innumerable of them) yet there is not any one that is founded upon Atheism. No Art is grounded upon this supposition, that There is no God; No Art dissolved, by believing, there is a God. But many Arts and professions are grounded upon the contrary supposition; that There is a God: and presently dissolved, by believing, There is no God; as all Priests, and Prophets, Diviners and Sacrificers, and all those other Arts, which either depend upon Temples, or Altars. All which as they have their immediate foundation, in men's believing, That there is a God: So have they their immediate dissolution, 2 King. 10. 25. in believing There is no God. As we may see in Baal's Priests; it being once believed, that Baal was no God; you see how his Priests were all presently destroyed. And so likewise, when by S. Paul's preaching, it began to be believed, Act. 19 24. 25. 26. 27. that Diana was no goddess; in what a fear was Demetrius, and the rest of his Silversmiths, that their Art would be dissolved? So that, there is no Art, which either hath his being, by believing there is no God; or, which loseth his being, by believing there is a God: but there be many Arts, which both have their being, by believing there is a God: and which lose their being, by believing there is none. And therefore no Artist (as an Artist) is fit to be an Atheist: because religion and piety is the very maintainer of many Arts immediately; and of all the rest mediately. For all Arts have their very being, upon the coalition of humane society: which if it were dissolved, all Arts must (by consequent) of necessity perish with it. And perish it surely would, if religion did not hinder it. For the chiefest tye, and bond of all humane society, is neither reason, nor speech, nor indigency; but religion, and piety. Qua sublata, confusio ac perturbatio vitae sequitur (saith Lactantius) Take but away Religion, and there will follow in man's life, great disorder & confusion. Lactant▪ L. De Ira Dei. c. 8 p. 453. Nay the Orator goeth further: Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 184. Haud scio, an pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides etiam, et societas generis humani, et una excellentissima virtus, Iusti●ia tollatur. I know not (saith he) whether if piety, and religion towards God, were removed, both faith and justice, yea, and even society amongst men, would not presently be dissolved. So that, all Arts whatsoever, depending upon society, and society itself depending upon religion; it followeth that no Artificer whatsoever, can fall into Atheism; but he needs must dig up his own foundation. Ficinus Argum. l. 4. Plat. de Legib. p. 782. And therefore Ficinus setteth down this position, that, Nulla ars adversari Deo potest: That there is not any Art, that is opposed unto God. No Art can resist his working; much less refute his being. And thus you see the second branch of Tully's assertion verified; that as there is Nulla Gens; Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 190. so there is nullum genus hominum: There is no sort, no order, no condition of men: neither jews, nor Gentiles, greeks, nor Barbarians, Learned, nor Unlearned, Civil, nor Rude; None at all (I say) from the highest Ruler to the poorest Artificer, but they are inwardly persuaded, that There is a God. So that (as Saint Augustine affirmeth in another like truth) Hoc ita manifestum est, ut nulla huic doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat: Aug. l. de v●ra Relig. c. 14. To. 1. p. 686. This is truth so manifest, that neither the paucity of the learned, nor the multitude of the unlearned doc dissent from it. And therefore, let us now proceed unto his third; that, as there is no sort of men, so there is no Man. CHAP. 6. That there is no particular person in the World, but that (in some degree) he believeth, There is a God. 2. No Swearer. 3. No Blasphemer. 4. No Idolater. AS I find it observed, by diverse of the learned; that it is a common Principle, All several men do believe There is a God. in every people, to believe, There is a God: so is it likewise observed by them; that this Principle hath his force, not only in all Nations, and in all sorts of m●n; but also in all persons, that live amongst them. And this may evidently be seen, Cap. 3. Sect. 2. in the most of those sentences, which before I have alleged, from the generality of this natural impression; that they extend and stretch themselves, not only to all Nations, but also to all persons, upon the face of the earth. Aristotle saith, that it is haereditaria fama, ●ortalium omnium; omnia & a Deo, & per Deum, nobis esse constituta. Arist. l. de Mu●. do To. 2. p. 1566. It is an hereditary tradition which is common amongst all men; that all things are praedecreed unto men by God. Mark, mortalium omnium: common unto All men. Tully saith that Nemo omnium tam immanis, cuius mentem non imbuer it Deorum opinio. Cic. l. 1. Tus●. p. 212. Amongst men there is not any so savage and barbarous, whose soul is not possessed with an opinion of the Gods. And again in the same place: Omnes, esse vim & naturam Divinam, arbitrantur: All men have a persuasion, that there is a certain power and nature Divine. Who can be excepted, out of these two so absolute generalities, of Nemo, and Omnes? of No man, and All men? So Clemens Alexandrinus: Clem. Alex. l. 5. Str●●. p. ●74. Dei manifestatio erat apud omnes, naturalis. There is a natural manifestation of God unto all men. Ar●●b. l. 1. cont. Ge●t. p. 476 So likewise Arnobius: Quisquamnè est hominum, qui non, cum Dei notione, diem primae nativitatis intraverit? Is there any amongst men, that brought not in with him a notion of God even with his first entrance into the world? So Beda: Beda. In Psal. 58. To. 8. p. 741. Naturaliter omnis homo habet cognitionem Dei. Every man hath naturally some knowledge of the Deity. So likewise Prosper: Prosper. l. de. Providen. p. 180. Esse omnes sensere Deum; nec de fuit ulli, Authorem Natura docens.— All men have found a God to be; Nor ever wanted Nature, To teach this Truth; that only He, Of every thing is Author. Now unto these Testimonies, alleged before (though to another purpose) I may add diverse others, as yet not alleged; as namely that of Sibilla: Omnibus en patet is, clarúsque & apertus inerrans. Lo God, so clear▪ so known, so open doth lie, That he doth enter into every eye. And that likewise of Aratus, cited also in the same book, by Clemens Alexandrinus: Clem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 280. P. 277. A jove principium: assiduis quem laudibus omnes Concelebrant homines: for a sunt jovis omnia plena. Compita cum pagis, Cap. 4. Sect. 3. omnes & cum aequore portus. Begin with God, whose praises All Men sing; All Cities, Streets, all Villages of Him Are full; All Seas, Shores, Havens, every thing. MARK: Omnes Concelebrant Homines— All celebrate his praise. So likewise that of Ennius. Cic. l. 2. de Nat. D●or. p. 201. Aspice hoc sublime candens, quem invocant omnes, jovem. Behold this bright and lofty sky; Here all Men pray to jove most high. Mark: Quem invocant Omnes: To whom All men direct their Prayers. Yea, and this he spoke, assensu omnium, as is noted in the same place, that is, with the general assent of all men. And yet he called him there both jovem, and Dominatorem rerum, & omnia motu regentem: & patrem Diuûmque Hominúmque; & praesentem ac praepotentem Deum: Both the great God jupiter, the great Ruler of all matters, the only Mover of all things: the Father both of Gods and Men; yea, and himself, both a present, and a potent God. All which high Titles he ascribeth unto God, with all men's general applause and consent: affirming, in the same place, that God is as clear and as evident as the Sun: and adding, that, Hoc qui dubitet, haud sanè intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit: That he, which doubteth, whether there be a God, may, with as great reason, doubt; whether there be a Sun. So clear doth that Orator make the matter unto all men. Yea, and even profane Lucian, L●c●an. in Iou● Traguses▪ d●. p. 210. though he reprove this general opinion; yet is forced to confess it; Omnes homines & Gentes turpiter decipiuntur, Deos esse existimantes: All persons and nations are foully deceived in believing there be Gods. Reproving it as the error, not only of all Nations, but also of all Persons: but yet confessing, that it is an opinion, which is commou unto all of them: though in 〈◊〉 show, for the present, he would seem to condemn it. 2 And ●et there be three several sorts of men, who may seem (it any other) the most likely to deny him, All Swearers do believe There is a God. because they so little honour him. The first are, Common swearers, who use to rend and to tear him. The second are; Blasp●emers, who use to curse and revile him. And the third, Idolaters, who abase and dishonour him, by ascribing divine honour unto an Idol, their own Creature. These three (except the Atheist, for whom I do reserve a special Treatise by himself) are the most direct enemies that God indeed hath. But yet none of all these, if they duly be considered, can justly be numbered, as deniers of God. For indeed, all their sins are absolutely grounded upon this supposition; that There is a God: without which they were no sins. For, how should either swearing, or blaspheming, or idolatrizing, be sin; if there were not a God, against whom they were committed? Nay, all these several vices, considered of themselves (though not as sins, but as actions) yet are done upon supposal, that There is a God, God is the very object of every one of them: as we may evidently see, if we will severally examine them. For, first, as concerning swearing; it is Plutarch's opinion; that Oaths do as necessarily presuppose There is a God; as either Temples, or Sacrifices, or invocations. Vrbem, Templis, Dijsque▪ carentem; Plut. cont. Colo●. To. 3. Mor. p. 532. quae precibus, jureiurando, or aculo non utatur, n●●o unquam vidit. A City without Temples, without gods, without prayers, without Oaths, without Oracles, was never seen by any man: reckoning all these (even Oaths amongst the rest) as equally belonging unto God: and all of them presuming, that there must needs be one; else should they have no being. And this point, as concerning Oaths, may yet further be confirmed, by diverse other Arguments: as namely, first, by the very definition of an Oath, delivered by Aristotle, Arist. Rheto. ad ●lex. c. 17. To. 2. p. 1038. that jusiurandum est cum divina veneratione dictio probationis expers. That an Oath is, an affirmation above all probation, pronounced with a fear and reverence of God. He maketh an Oath the highest kind of proof: Heb. 6. 16. as the Apostle doth likewise, when he saith, that an oath is an ending of all strife, Secondly, the same appeareth by the form of an Oath: which is, a calling of God himself to witness. So S. Paul, God is my witness, whom I serve: So he again. I witness before God, that I lie not. Yea and this form the Heathans held, as well as the Christians. Rom. 1. 9 Gal. 1. 20. Plaut. Menech. Act. 5. Sce. 2. p. 446. So Plautus. — summum jovem, Plaut. in Cap●. Act. 2. Sce. 3. p. 159. Deósque detestor. Itestifie, The God most high. So again. Id ut scias, lovem supremum, testem laudo. To make thee well assured of this, The highest God my witness is. So Tully. Est jusiurandum affirmatio religiosa. Cic. l. 3. Off 15. p. 390. Quod autem affirm●tur quasi D●o teste promiseris, id tenendum est: An Oath is not a civil, but a religious affirmation. Now, that which we promise, calling God to witness, ought faithfully and religiously to be performed of us. Whereby it appeareth, that the common and usual form of their Oaths, was to call God to witness. Thirdly, the same appeareth by that nuncupative title, wherewith both Heathens and Christians have honoured their Oaths, in calling their swearing, an Oath of God. Cic. ubi supra● So Ennius: O fides alma, ipta pinnace, & iusiurandum jovis: O uncorrupted faith, mounting with heavenly wings: Ioues sacred Oath before his Throne it brings. So Moses: Exod. 22. 11. An Oath of the Lord shall be between them. The one of them calleth it, an Oath of jove; the other of jehovah. Because the Infidels do use to swear by their false gods, the faithful by the true one: as may be evidently seen in the Oaths of jaacob and Laban. Gen. 31 53. 4 But yet, both of them swear by that, which they esteemed for their God. Fourthly, the same appeareth by that Ceremony, which was commonly used, in taking of an Oath; to lay his hand upon the Altar, as acknowledging that he spoke in the presence of God: and that he offered up the inward truth of his soul, upon the Altar of God. This Ceremony Tully mentioneth, in his Oration pro L. Flacco: where he saith of Falcidius Cic. Orat. 〈…〉 Flacco. p. 346. (as if his name had been Falsidicus) that Huic, si aram tenens iurar●t, nemo crederet: That no man would believe him, although he should swear, holding the very Altar. So Plautus: Plaut. in Rudent. Act. 5. Sec. 2. p. 692. Tene Aram hanc-Deiura. Hold th' Altar here, Let's see thee swear. Whereby it appeareth, that it was a common ceremony amongst the Romans, to take hold upon the Altar, when they solemnly swore. Unto which Roman custom there seemeth to be a kind of allusion, in the Gospel of S. Matthew: where our Saviour Christ reproveth the Doctrine of the pharisees, for making it a light matter, to swear by the Altar. Where the Greek Text hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the vulgar Latin, Mat. 23. 18. 5 in Altars: Whosoever sweareth in the Altar, or upon the Altar. Fifthly, the same appeareth, by that great Religion, which even the very Heathens have placed in Oaths: yea, and that both on the part of him that taketh it, and of him that exacteth it. First, for the swearer●: they utterly detested him for a villain, that under the religion of an Oath, ●●nophon l. 2. D● Cyri expedit. p. 293. 1. joh. 1. 10. durst avouch any false thing, as violating, & Deorum & Hominum fidem: both the truth of God and Men: as it is censured by Xenophon: making God himself a liar: as avouching of him, as a witness unto their lie. Yea, and they placed so sacred a Religion in an Oath, that they held it a profaneness, but even to dally with it; as bringing the most holy thing into contempt: insomuch, that they condemned Socrates unto death, nominatim for this (among his other crimes) quia nova iuramenta iuravit (as josephus joseph. l. 2. cont. Apion. p. 914. reporteth) because he used to swear by unlawful Oaths. For their usual swearing was, by jupiter and the Gods: as appeareth in Plautus. Plaut. Menech. Act. 5. Sc● 7 p. 455. Per jovem adiuro patrem: Ibid. Act. 4. S●e. 2. p. 439. I swear by God our father. Plato in Hippia maiore. p. 115. And again: Per jovem, Deosque omnes adiuro: I swear by love and all the other Gods. But Socrates was wont to swear by a Dog: per Canem: as appeareth in Plato. Which profanation of an Oath, they interpreted, as an impiety against their Religion: and therefore, that (in piety) they aught to condemn him. And, as they reposed great Religion in an oath, in 〈…〉 of the Actor: so did they likewise, respect of the Exactor: accounting it a kind of profaneness in any man, Stob●us. serm. 27. p. 194. when an Oath was orderly performed, not to give credit to it: as Stobaeus collecteth out of Antiphanes: — cum aliquis contemnit iurantem▪ Tum ille mihi Deos ipsos contemnere videtur. whosoever he be, contemns a man, when taking solemn Oath: He doth contemn, not man, but God; nor God and man; them both. And therefore, Menechmus, in the forealleged place, when he had taken his Oath: Per jovem, Deosque omnes adiuro, Vxor. I swear by jove and all the Gods, good wife, Plaut. Men●ch. Act. 4. S●e. 2. p. 439. He addeth immediately: Satin' hoc est tibi? Let this suffice, for ending of our strife. Pleading, that having so religiously protested, he ought to be believed. For, as the reverence of God ought to adact the Swearer, to the speaking of the truth: so likewise, the Hearer, to the believing of the truth. Heb. 6. 16. An Oath ought to be the stinting of all strife. Sixtly, the same appeareth by a secret Religion, which entereth into the Swearer himself, even in the taking of his Oath. And that is twofold: the one towards men; the other towards God. Both observed by Soph●cles, in one and the same sentence. Apposito iureiurando, cautior & diligentior Animus fit. Stobaeus ubi s●pra. A duobus enim sibi tum cavet; Et, ne laedat amicos; et, ne peccet in Deos. Man's very soul, by sacred oath adiured, More wary proues, and circumspect by odds: For than he dreads this double forfeiture, T offend his friends, & sin against the gods. Seventhly, the same appeareth, because that every Oath hath a secret execration annexed to it, and a curse against the swearer, if he swear not the truth, For (as Plutarch truly noteth) Omne iusiurandum in ex●crationem peri●rij desinit. Plut. Quest. Rom. 44. Tom. 1. Mor. p. 575. Est autem execratio res tristis, & mali ominis: Every Oath (saith he) doth end in a latent execration against perjury. Now every execration is a very heavy and uncomfortable thing, and f●ll of evil forecasting, and signification. And this we may see in the form of diverse Oaths, recorded both in Scriptures, and in Heathen Writers. We read oftentimes in Scriptures. God do so, and more also: implying a tacit and latent imprecation, 1. Sa. 14. 14. 1. Sa. 25. 22. if they do not thus and thus. So in Plautus: Quid si fallis? Ly. Tum me faciat quod vult magnus jupiter. Plaut. in Aulular. Act. 4. Sce. 10. p. 138. It may well be rendered by that phrase of Scripture; then God do so and more unto me. Yea and the Romans in their solemn Oaths; were wont to use this ceremony, as Rhodiginus observeth out of Servius. They used to throw a stone out of their hand, with this execration: Si sciens fallo, Co●l. Rhodigin. l. 21. c. 15. p. 981. qui me despicit (salua urbe ac arte) bonis eijciat, ut ego hunc lapidem. If I willingly deceive thee; then God that is above me (preserving the City) cast me out from all good men, as I cast out this Stone. And the like execrationis also pronounced by, Abigail, against the enemies of David. The soul of thine enemies shall God cast out, as out of the ●iddle of a sling. 1. Sā●. 25. 29. And so God also did unto impious Capanaeus; who boasting that God himself should not be able to hinder him, he was presently strooken with lightning, and cast from the top of the wall, as it were out of the middle of a sling. For so Euripides expresseth his falling. — à scalis autem Deijciebatur, velut è funda. Eurip. 〈…〉 154. He was cast down the Scale with such a fling, As if a Stone were thrown from out a Sling. By all which weighty Reason, both out of the Heathen writers, and out of Holy Scriptures, it evidently appeareth, that all men in their swearing, both presume, There is a God; and that he truly heareth, whatsoever is spoken; and that he will revenge him, of the impiety of those men, that by their false swearing dishonour his holy name. And therefore, no Swearer can be possibly an Atheist, even by the very nature of his own proper act, if he thinketh as he sweareth. For the very act of swearing, presupposeth there is a God, not only in the inten●ion of the exactor, but also in the extension of the performer, be he whosoever; yea though the veriest Atheist, that ever liu●d in the world. For, though in his heart, he may (haply) believe there is no God: yet, in his act, he would seem to believe, there is one: even by his action of swearing, he would have other men to believe, that he believeth, there is one. Because, the congruity of very Reason requireth, that he, which sweareth by God, should certainly believe, that There is a God, to by sworn by: or else he sweareth vainly. Nay, he that sweareth by God, if he think that there is none, disableth the very force of his own asseveration For, no man would ever swear, but to be the better believed for his Oath. But, he that desireth to be believed for his swearing by God, if he think, There is no God, is as utterly absurd, as if he should desire, that men should believe him, when he professeth before hand, that he sweareth by nothing: and, as impudent, as if he should request them; I pray you to believe me, for I swear (By nothing) that this I say is true. His just reward in swearing by nothing, should be to be believed in nothing. Thus Swearers (as you see) if they properly be Swearers, they cannot properly be Atheists: the very action of swearing, destroying directly the opinion of Atheism. And therefore, Aristoph. in Nubibus. Act. 1. S●e. 3. p. 168. whereas Socrates, in Aristophanes, professed, that he believed not the usual gods: Strepsiades presently replied, Quomodo iuratis igitur? An per numm●s ferreos, si●ut Bizantij? How then dost thou swear, if thou believe not the gods? Dost thou swear, like a Bizantian, by their iron pence? Accounting it most justly, for a very gross absurdity, that any man should outwardly swear by the gods, that inwardly believeth, that there is no God: or, that any man should swear by any thing, but only by God. And therefore, when Toxaris the Scythian swore, Per Ventum, et Acinacem: M●esippus derided him for swearing by such things, Lucian in Toxari. p. 192. as were no gods: but he defended himself, that among the Scythians, those two were held for gods. So that it appeareth by the concurring opinion both of the reprehender, and of the reprehended, that nothing is to be sworn by but only God And consequently that all Swearers must presuppose There is a God. All Blasphemers do believe There is a God. 3 And the like may be also said of Blasphemers, that is, of such as are Revilers or Cursers of God: for unto that use only the word is now restrained: as S. Augustine hath observed: A●g. l. 2. De moribus Manichaeo rum. ●. 11. To. 1. p. 75●. Est blasphemia, cum aliqua mala dicuntur de bonis. Sed iam vulgò Blasphemia non accipitur, nisi mala verba de Deo dicere. De hominibus namque dubitari potest: Deus verò fine controuersia bonus est. Blasphemy is to speak any evil of good. But now commonly, Blasphemy is to speak only evil of God. For of Men, we may doubt, whether they be evil or good: But of God we cannot doubt, but that he must needs be good. So that, the word Blasphemy hath two significations: the one a lardger, which is to speak evil of good: the other a stricter, which is to speak evil of God. Against the first of those Blasphemies, God hath pronounced a woe: Woe unto them that speak good of evil, and evil of good: Isay: 5. 20. Ex. 22. 28. but against the second of them, he hath ordained a Law: Thou shalt not rail upon the gods: no not, upon the earthly gods, much less upon the heavenly. Yea and that under a penalty: Whosoever cu●seth his God, he sh●ll bear his iniquity, that is, He shall be surely punished, Levit. 24 15. 16. for so the Chaldee Paraphrase readeth it: Sustinebit poenam suam: Yea and that severely too. For it followeth, in the next words, He that Blasphemeth the name of the Lord, shall be put to death; the Congregation shall stone him. The execution of which Law, we may read in the same place: where the son of the Isra●litish woman was stoned for blaspheming; giving occasion very justly, of the making of that notable Law against Blasphemy. Wherein we may observe, that the Blasphemer was no Atheist. And that, by two reasons: the one drawn from his person; the other from his action. For first, for his person: he is said to have been the son of an Israelitish woman, and of an Egyptian: by neither of which parents he could be instituted in Atheism. For first, Levit. ●4▪ 10. for the Egyptians; they were so far from being Atheists, that they were of all other the most palpable Polytheists. And for the Israelites; though they were the worshippers of an invisible God; yet had he showed amongst them so many visible signs of his omnipotent power and goodness, as that he was confessed, even by the very Heathens: and therefore could not be denied by any of the Israelites. Blaspheme him they might (as this Israelite in his fury, josh. 2. 10. 11. and impatience did) but deny him they could not; the evidence of his wondrous works was so great. And this is the first reason, why he could not be an Atheist. The second is this: that this Law against Blasphemy, being made by occasion of this Blasphemers fact, and forbidding only that, which he had committed, doth evidently show that he was not an Atheist. For then, the Law would have run against the denying of God: Whosoever denieth God, let him be stoned. But, because this man's sin was not a denying unto God a being (which is the sin of Atheism) but a cursing of that God whom he believed to be; therefore the law was made, not against the denying, but against the cursing of God: He that blasphemeth the name of God, shall be stoned. And therefore, blaspheming doth not suppose a denying, nor the blashemer, upon neccessitie, to be a denier of God. Nay, indeed, it directly supposeth the contrary: it supposeth there is a God: As may plainly be collected, both by the beginning & the end of that irreligious passion, which begetteth in them the sin of blaspheming. For, first, from the beginning of their passion: it is a sudden anger conceived against God, upon a supposition, of either some evil received from him, or of some good denied by him. For blasphemare (as Aquinas defineth it) est contumeliam vel convitium infer, Aquin. 2. 2. quaest. 13. Art. 1. p. 29. ● in iniuriam Creatoris: To blaspheme, is, to offer, either contumely, or obloquy, by way of dishonour, unto the Creator. Which necessarily supposeth, that he needs must have a being. Otherwise, he must needs confess, that he is angry with Nothing: and so might, Homer. l. 9 Odyss. p. 66. as justly be derided, as that foolish Polyphemus, who raved for that wrong that was done to him by Nullus. Again, the same may be collected, from the end of their passion: which is, desperately to provoke God to be angry with them: because they before have been angered by him, and so to quit him with his own. Which likewise must needs infer, that they think he hath a being. For, otherwise, they should be as utterly absurd, as if they should endeavour to move Nothing, unto anger; spending all their railing, as foolishly against him, as the Dogs do their barking, when they howl against the Moon. And therefore it followeth not, that though some men do Blaspheme, and rail against God; that therefore they think that there should he none: but rather, that there is one: Which they manifestly acknowledge, even in their very railing; unless, they will make themselves to be known for noted-fooles. Who would rail upon a thing, which they think to have no being? Yea, and diverse of the Heathens were so far from supposing, that railing and blaspheming should infer, there is no God; that they made it the essential worship of diverse of their gods. For Nazianzen reporteth it of the Lindianes, Nazianz. Orat. 47. p. 770. that they worshipped their Hercules, Plin. l. 2. c. 7. P. 3. only with railings: Deum illum, non alio, quam convitiorum et maledictorum honore, afficientes: And Pliny reporteth the same, of their goddess Fortune: Conuitijs colitur. She is worshipped with railing and blaspheming. And therefore Blasphemy doth not infer impiety: Nor, that he which blasphemeth God, must of necessity deny God. For, of necessity he granteth him, though of impotency he blaspheme him. So that, neither common Swearers, nor yet Blasphemers, be Atheists. That they be great offenders, it cannot be denied: but that they be Atheists, it cannot be affirmed. Their sin is not Atheism: it is of another kind. The Blasphemer, is not Atheus, but rather Antitheus: as Lactantius speaketh. And his fault is not Atheism, Lactant. l. 2. c. 9 p. 103. or lack of religion; but outrage against the true Object of religion. Which yet (in a large acception) may be called Irreligion: though it be not a privation of all religion; because it is an impugning of the true religion. For, as Tertullian affirmeth of the Romans: Non modò n●gligendo, quin insuper expugnando verum Deum, Tertul. Apologet c. 24. p. 54. committitis crimen verae irreligio fitatis: Not only by neglecting, but also by oppugning him that is the true God, you truly incur the crime of Irreligion. 4 Let us now come to Idolaters: which is the third of our instances: and see, All Idolaters do believe, That there is a God. whether they can be numbered as Atheists. But that indeed they cannot, their very profession is against it. For what can be more distant, than Polytheisme, and Atheism? then impiety, and idolatry? I mean privative impiety, which depriveth men wholly, of all sense of Religion. Idolaters be Polytheists and therefore not Atheists. They worship many gods: and therefore they cannot deny, that there is a God. Nay they must needs confess one, that admit many. They cannot exclude one, that confess many. And therefore, (as I said before, of Swearers, and Blasphemers) so may I now, of Idolaters: that they are taught, by their profession to deny and renounce Atheism; and by it strictly tied, to believe There is a God. As we may evidently see, in all the several degrees of Idolatry. For, would a man ever worship, either the Sun, or the M●one, or the Stars; as did the most Nations both of greeks and Barbarians (which diverse of the Heathens have confessed to be but Creatures) but that he is persuaded, Plato in Cratil●. p. 313. that There is a God? Plato in Civili. p. 205. Surely, he never would. But it may be alleged; that haply, the glory and beauty of these Creatures prevailed more with men, Vniversum hoc Deus ipse regit alque rotat. Item Aristoteles. to occasion them to worship them; then did the strength of this inward conclusion. For much is insinuated in the book of Wisdom: where he both reporteth, and reproveth this opinion: Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 215. Haec tanta opera Deorum sun●. and yet partly excuseth those, that were deceived by them; though not a toto, yet a ta●to: that though it be a great fault, to worship any thing but God: yet that it is a less fault, to worship those Creatures, that are of Gods making; t●en to worship those Idols, that are of man's making. But, to take away this excuse, Wis. 13. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10. which is grounded upon their beauty; would a man ever worship the Fire, the Water, the Earth, and the Air (as the Persians did) but upon this persuasion, that, There is a God? These be not of such blazing beauties. But it may be said again: that, though not the beauty; yet the commodity, Strabo. l. 15. p. 525. which men receive by these things, Cic. ●. 1. de Nat. D●or. p. 200. were the chiefest inducements, to consecrate them for gods. For, that was Prodicus his opinion (at the least his relation) That whatsoever thing was profitable unto the life of man, might justly be reckoned, as his God. Therefore to take away this Objection also: Would a man ever worship a Wolf, Plutarch l. de Iside, To. 2. Mor. p. 209. 210. or a Crocodile, as the Egyptians did, but that he is persuaded; That there is a God? These be not things of profit. But yet, even for these things, something may be said: namely, that, though it were not the hope of any profit by them; Plutarch l. 1. de Placitis Philosoph. c. 6. To. 2. Mor. p. 13. yet was it the fear of receiving hurt from them, that caused men to worship them. A. Gellius l. 5. c. 12. p. 82. ●. For I●em Plinius l. 2. c. 7. p. 2. Itaque nomina etc. as they had their good Gods, whom they worshipped for love: so had they their evil gods, whom they worshipped for fear: Deos quosdam ut prodessent, celebrant; quosdam ne obessent, placabant: saith A● Gellius. They did worship some gods, to receive some profit by them; and they served others, to escape evil from them. Well, be it so. Yet hereby it appeareth, that, even the very Heathen, in worshipping things of so diverse natures, were inwardly persuaded in their minds; that the nature of God was glorious, and therefore to be honoured; liberal, and therefore to be loved; powerful, and therefore to be feared: which manifestly argueth, that they believed, there was a God. But, to remove all those Objections at once, wherein those forenamed considerations, may seem to be the ground of their Religions; and, to instance where none of all these can be found, but where only the hidden sense of this inward conclusion, that There is a God, doth carry the whole sway: would a man ever worship a Stock, or a Stone, made by his own hand in some artificial form; but that this is a burning conclusion in his heart, That there is a God? This wooden god, can have neither any glory, to allure him; nor any profit, to persuade him; nor any fear, to constrain him. Wise. 13. 13. For (as the wiseman teacheth) it is but a knotty piece of wood, and indeed the most thri●●les and unprofitable part of all the whole Tree, whereof it is made; yea more unprofitable than the very chips, Isay 44 19 16 10. that are hewed away from it. For by them yet the Carpenter warmeth himself. So that they are good for something: but the Idol itself is good for just nothing, as the Prophet Isay directly affirmeth. But it may yet be objected: that the artificial beauty, and workmanship of the Idol, may haply prevail to make men worship it, as a God; though in itself, Aug. Serm. 2. In Psal. 113. To. 8. it have none other good. For so indeed Saint Augustine collect●th. Ducit, & affectu quodam interno rapit infirma corda mortalium, form similttudo, p. 1305. 1307. & membrorum imitata compago. The likeness of the form, and imitation of the members, which men do see in Idols, doth, with a strong affection, steal away their weak hearts. And again in the same place: Plus valent simulachra, ad curuandam infoelicem animam, quòdos habent, oculos habent, aures habent; quam ad corrigendam, quòd non loquuntur, non vident, non audiunt, non ambulant: An Idol hath greater force, to infect a simple soul, in that it hath a mouth, it hath eyes, it hath ears; then to instruct it, in that it hath no speech, no sight, no hearing, no moving. Therefore, to take away this objection too, as well as all the rest: Would a man ever worship informem, & rudem lapidem; as the Romans did under the name of God Terminus; Luctant. lib. 1. c. 20 p. 55. but that they are persuaded, that a God there is? This God hath neither form, nor beauty, to allure them to worship him. No form; for it is informis. No beauty; for it is rudis, as Lactantius noteth. Whereas every God ought to have such perfect beauty, 〈◊〉 1. de Nat. 〈◊〉 p. 194. that Tully reckoneth it as a foul absurdity, not only that any other thing should be more beautiful than God; but also, that among the gods, any one of them should be more beautiful than another. They ought all so to excel in the highest degree of beauty. And therefore so rude and unformed a god, as this Terminus is, a man would never worship; but that he must needs be worshipping of some God; and so, not knowing what is best to worship, he worshippeth that which is nearest unto hand. Ci●. l. 1. de Nat. Dear p. 200. And therefore (as Tully defineth of Atheists) that it is impossible, for any of them to be superstitious: so it is true in Idolaters (who are all of them superstitious) that it is as impossible, for any of them to be Atheists. For, Idolaters yield two Arguments, which necessarily conclude, that they think there is a God. The first is, the enormous pride of some of them. The second, the abject baseness of other some. For the first. We read of diverse men, who have been so monstrously overswolne with pride and vanity, that they have invented a strange kind of Idolatry; to idolatrize themselves, and to make themselves gods; or rather indeed Idols, under the name of gods; as Nabuchodo●osor, Caligula, judith 3. 8. Sueton●● vita Cal●g. c. 22. p. 61. Aurel. 〈◊〉 vita D●mi●. p. 387. Domitian; and diverse others of the Roman Emperors. Which honour, no man would ever have affected, but that he is both persuaded himself, and would have others too, persuaded, That there is a God. So that, this kind of Idolaters declare by their pride, that they think, There is a God. For Autotheisme cannot possibly be Atheism. The other kind of Idolaters, declare the same, by their baseness. For man, being by nature so proud and ambitious, that no honour can suffice him, but that he wil● affect even the name and place of God: what is it, that can make this gallant so to stoop, and to abject himself so basely unto a Stock, and a Stone, as to creep and kneel unto them; but, that only the force of Religion adacteth him? telling him within his bosom, both that There is a God; and that he is purposely created for his worship: Who, because (through his pride) he giveth it not where it is due; he leaveth him (through his baseness,) to give it where it is not due. So that, even Idolatry itself, though it be both the nurse and mother of lies; yet teacheth it this truth, to believe, There is a God. And though itself dishonour him; yet teacheth it us to honour him. For whatsoever the Idolater worshippeth for his false God, it teacheth us muc● more to worship the true God. Clem. Alex. Stro. l. 5. p. 277. Yea, even jupiter himself (as Clemens Alexandrinus noteth) Etiam ipse jupiter, qui Poetarum ver sibus canitur, in Deum refert cogitationem. Even jupiter himself, whom the Poets make a false god, yet erecteth our thoughts unto the true God. And thus you plainly see, how Tully's observation is perfectly verified in every branc● of it: and that there is no Nation, neither civil, nor rude; no condition of men, neither learned, nor unlearned; no several person; though never so profane, neither Swearer, Blasphemer, nor Idolater, but he is inwardly persuaded That there is a God. And that therefore the Atheist, in seeking to deny it, Plutarch. l. De Iside To. 2. Mor. p. 174. doth (as Plutarch truly censureth him) immobilia movere; & bellum infer, non tan●ùm longo tempori, sed & multis hominibus gentibus, & familijs; quas religiosus D●orum cultus, quasi divino furore correptas, tenuit: He seeketh to shake that, which cannot be moved; and boldly biddeth battle, not only to many men, but also to many Nation, Countries, and Families; whom the religious worship of God hath so deeply possessed, that it hath almost even ravished them: fight so, himself alone, both against all Antiquity, Universality, and Consent, which do make a threefold Cord, Eccles. 4. 12. not easy to be broken. CHAP. 7. That a great discord may be noted among the Heathens, as concerning the worship of their several Gods. 2. Yet that this discord doth not infringe the general opinion, as concerning God. 3. But that it much confirms it. PLutarch, in his first book Of the Opinions of the Philosophers, affirmeth, that the first propagation of Religion among men, and the first spreading of this opinion, as concerning God, hath been brought to pass by some one of these three means: aut naturali forma, Plut. l. 1. De ●lacitis Philosoph. c. 6. To. 2. Mor. p. 13. aut fabulosa, aut legum testimonio. Naturalem Philosophi, fabulosam Poetae, docent; Leges autem suas, singulae habent Civitates: that is, either by means of such natural reasons as have been delivered by the learning of Philosophers; or by such fabulous adumbrations, as have been devised by the wit of Po●ts; or by such political constitutions, as have been enjoined by the authority of Magistrates. And it is true indeed, that (for traditional divinity) it was among the Heathens especially propagated, by some one of these three means. But there was a natural Theology, engrafted in the soul before them all: ante omnem rationis usum (as jamblicus affirmeth) even before all use of reason, jamblic. l. De Myster. c. 1. p. 5. and all capacity to receive instruction: whereby they were disposed, and in a sort prepared, to admit any one of the forenamed instructions, though it came but single of itself. But in the former discourse, Cap. 5. Sect. 1. I have joined them all together: showing, by a general consent of all Philosophers, all Poets, and all Lawgivers, that There is a God. So that there is not so universal an agreement in any one thing in the world, as there is, in believing, that There is a God. But yet, I find it again observed, Great dissection what God i●. that there is not in any thing so great a disagreement; as there is, in defining, what that God should be. Res nullà est (saith Tully) de qua tantoperè, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 184. 177. non solùm indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant: There is nothing, where in there is so great a discord, not only amongst the unlearned, but also among the learned. And he maketh good his assertion, by a particular enumeration of the several opinions, of all the Philosophers. Which are several indeed; yea, and so distantly severed, that no two of them do agree in any one opinion: some worshipping the Heavens, some the Stars some the Elements, some one thing, some another. So that (as one wittily observes of them) Colebat quisque quod volebat: Coe●iu● Rh●di● l. 23. c. 3. p. ●●27. Every man worshipped whatsoever he would. Only, this seemed to be the common study and endeavour of them all, that none would have that god whom any other had. Nay, by and by after, he will have another god, than he himself had before; as we may evidently see, in the forealleged place of Tully; both in Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Cleanthes, and in diverse others. Teren. Phor. Act 2. S●c. 4 p. 218. So that, Te●tul. i● Apol▪ c. 47. p. 77. if any where, the proverb here is verified; that, Quot homines, tot sententiae: So many heads, so many wits; so many men, so many minds. For (as Tertullian observeth by them) Alij incorporalem asseverant, alij corporalem; ut ●am Platonici, quam Stoici: alij ex atomis, alij ex numeris; Cap. 4. Sect. 4. ut Epicurus, et Pythagoras: alij ex igne; qualiter Heraclito visum est. Et Platonici quidem, curantem rerum: contrà, Ep●●urei ociosum et inexercitum, & (ut ita dixerim) neminem humanis rebus. Positum verò extra mundum Stoici, qui, figuli modo, extrinsecus torqueat molem hanc: intra mundum Platonici, qui, gubernatoris exemplo, intra illud maneat quod regat. Some of the Philosophers make God to be spiritual, some other of them, corporal; as the Platonics & Stoics. Some make their god of Atoms, and individual moats; some of dividual numbers; as Epicurus, and Pythagoras. Some make him all of fire; for so it seemed to Heraclitus. The Platonics make God provident, and wonderful careful, that all things may go well. The Epicures make him idle and slothful, and as good as no body in all humane affairs. The Stoics, they place God without the world, turning about the Heavens, as Potter's use to do their wheels: the Platonics within the world, ruling it within it, as Pilots use to rule their ships. And many other like differences are set down between them, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 187. etc. Plu●. l. 1. de Placit. Ph●. c. 7. p. 14. both by Tully, in the forealleged place; and, by Plutarch, in his forealleged Book. So that there is not a more notable consent of all sorts of men, in the general notion, of God's existence and being, then there is a notable dissent amongst them, in the particular notion, what this God should be. Which difference in opinion, profane Lucian snatcheth, as a fit occasion, to deride both God & all his religion: Lucian in love Trag. p. 210. A gentium opinion, quam de diis obtinent, màximè licet intelligere, quam nihil firmum & stabile in se habe●t, quae de Dijs fertur oratio. Multa enim est, & conturbata opinionum confusio: ac planè alij alia opinantur. By the opinion of all Nations as concerning their gods, we may easily conceive how much they are deceived, and how fond they build upon a weak ground: so great a confusion may be seen in their opinions, Cap. 4. Sect. 5. and so great a difference between their defenders. And then he proceedeth to set down the dissension that he finds among them: Scythae, acinaci sacrisicant; Thrace's, Zamolxidi, homini fugiti●o, quem ex Samo ad illos delatum esse constat; Phryges' autem, Lunae; Aethiopes Diei; Cyllenij, Phaleti; Columbae, Assirij; Persae, Igni, Aegytij, Aquae. Caeterùm privatim, Memphitis quide●●, Bos Deus est; Pelu●iotis verò, Cepe: jam, aliis, Ciconia; aut Crocodile; aliis, Cynoeephalus; aut seles, aut Simia. Pra●tereà, vicatim; his quidem, dexter humerus; caeteris verò, eregione habitantibus; sinister: item aliis, dimidia pars capitis; aliis, poculum samium, aut catinus. The Scythians do sacrifice unto their sword; The Thracians, unto a certain fugitive, called Zamolxis, who fled unto them, out of Samos; The Phrygians, to the Moon; The AEthiopians, to the Day; The Cyllenians, to Phaletes; The Assyrians, to a Dove; The Persians, to the fire; the Egyptians, to the Water. Yea, and more privately, for their Cities, The Memphiàns worship an Ox, for their God; the Pelusians, an Onion; others, a Stork; some, a Crocodile; others, a Beast that had an head like a Dog; a Call't, or an Ape. Yea, and yet more particularly, for their several Villages; some, do worship their right shoulder; and some other again, their left: some do worship, the one half of their head: some, an earthen Pot; and some other a Platter. Upon all which he concludeth, Nun haec tibi videntur risu prosequenda? Are not these to be derided? He seeking from this difference and dissension to make but a mock, and a scorn of all Religion: as though this general opinion of God, were but only a matter merely feigned, and devised. 2 But, that Conclusion doth not follow from this dissension. It infringeth neither the generality; The dissension of men about God doth not conclude That there is no God. nor yet the verity of this notion, That there is a God: Nay, indeed it confirms them both. For first, as concerning the generality of it; that followeth, by necessity, upon the affirmation of the particularity. Qui Socratem dicit, Hominem dicit. He that affirmeth Socrates to be, he must needs affirm, a man to be because, Socrates is a man. And so, he that affirmeth either jupiter, or Apollo, or Mars, or the Sun, or Moon, or Stars, or any other particular either Person, or Thing, to be a God; he must needs, by consequence affirm the general, That there is a God. Yea, and though a thousand should descent, as concerning this or that particular God; yet, if every one of them do name some one particular God, though he deny all the rest; yet, even in that one particular, he must needs conclude the general, that There is a God. As for example: if one man should say, that Socrates were no Philosopher, but yet grant that Plato is; another, that Plato were none, but yet that Aristotle is one; another, that not he, but Xenocrates; and so in infinitum: all these agree in the general, that A Philosopher there is: though they disagree in the particular, Who he is. And so it is likewise, in the opinions of the Heathens, as concerning their gods. Though they particularly deny this, or that thing, to be God; yet, in affirming some other particular, they do generally affirm, that there is a divine nature. Their dissent in destroying of this, or that particular, doth not argue a consent, in destroying of the general; no nor a dissent of any one of them from that; but a general consent in it. As well may be observed, both in Tully, and Plutarch: who, in the same sentence and complexion of words, wherein they report the general dissent of all men in their particular gods; yet confess their general consent, in having of some God. So Tully. Multi, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 112. de Diis prava sentiunt: id enim vicioso more effici solet; Omnes tamen, essevim, et Naturam Divinam, arbitrantur: Many men do think many evil things of the Gods: for that they have learned by wicked examples. But yet all men do confess, That a God there is. So Plutarch. Omnes hoc uno ore dicunt, Plutarch l● A●at●rio T●. 3. Mor. p. 416. esse Deos. De Numero eorum, Ordine, Natura, Potestate, maxim sunt inter ipsos dissensiones. All men do confess, as it were with one mouth, that gods (surely) there be: herein they all agree. But, for their Number, their Order, their Nature, their Power, they do utterly disagree. So that their disagreement, as concerning the number, and order of their gods, dissolveth not their agreement, in their being and essence; but that herein they all agree. Omnibus innatum est, et quasi insculptum; Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 203. esse Deos, saith Tully again. Quales sint, varium est: esse, nemo negat: It is naturally engraven into the minds of all men, to believe There is a God; What an one he is, is doubted of many: but that one there is, is not denied of any. And yet again, in another place. Nulla gens est, Cic. l. ●. 〈◊〉. p. 313. neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera: quae non, etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. There is not any people so fierce and uncivil; but, though they may be ignorant, what they ought to make their God, yet they fully are persuaded, that they ought to have a God. Whereby it appeareth; Iust. Mart. lib. Christ. Qu●est. To. 1. p. 3●▪ ●. that (as justin Martyr noteth) Non differunt inter se, in universali Dei cognition, said in speciali opinion: They differ not among themselves, in the general Position of having a God; but in their particular Opinion of having this, or that God. So that, this dissension doth make no opposition against the universality of the former opinion. No more doth it neither, against the verity of it. For, it followeth not, by so much as a colour of consequence, that there should therefore be no God, because men cannot agree about this or that God: as though Gods being, or not being, Non quia assirmatio, 〈◊〉 est aut negatio, ideo res e●it, aut non erit. Arist. l. 1. de Interpret. c. 8. To 1. p. 63. depended upon men's agreeing, Pal●●gen. in Scorp. p. 211. or not agreeing. It is not man's opinion, that either giveth, or destroyeth, or altereth, the being of any thing in the world: and then, much less of God. But, all things are, as they are; whatsoever we think of them: they change not their being, for our change of opinion. For, as it is truly observed by the Poet. Nostrum scire quidem, aut nescire, nihil variat res. Things still persist, and vary ne'er a jot: Whether we know them, or we know them not. And therefore, if there were ten thousand differing opinions as concerning any thing; yet all they could not alter any whit in his being. How many differing opinions are reckoned up by Aristotle, 〈◊〉 l. 1. de Anima. c. 2. To. 1. p. 785. etc. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 1●1 as concerning the soul: and how many more by Tully? yea, and those in great variety. Hath a man therefore no soul; because the Philosophers cannot agree what it is? or, hath the soul no being; because Pherecrates affirmed the Soul to be Nothing? Or, may we believe that a man hath a soul; notwithstanding their dissension about the soul? And may we not believe, There is a God; notwithstanding their dissension and strife about God? This were against all reason. Or, may we not believe, that there be Stars in Heaven; because of their * Plut. l. 2. de Placit. c. 13. To. 2. p. 27. dissension, about the substance of them? Whether they be burning Stones, or shining Clouds, or polished Cristals or such like? This were against all sense. And yet is, neither the former opinion more directly against reason, nor this against sense; than it is against them both, to believe there is no God; because of men's dissension, who, or what should be that God. For, how can either men's souls give greater evidence unto reason, or the stars themselves unto sense, of their true being and existence; then God doth of his, unto them both? If the soul showeth his true being unto the eye of Reason, by those notable operations, which it worketh in our bodies, and in all the parts thereof; doth not God, much more show his, by those glorious operations, which he worketh in the world, and in all the parts thereof? Again, if the Stars do show their being unto the eye of sense, by the glorious brightness and shining of their bodies; doth not God much more show his, by his shining in those bodies? who (as Ecclesiastious testifieth) is ten thousand times brighter than the Sun. Ecclu●. 23. 19 And therefore he that doubteth whether there be a God, or no, may as justly doubt whether there be a Sun, or no: Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 201. as the Oracle collecteth: Quid enim est hoc, illo evidentius. Therefore, neither the generality, nor the verity of this grounded opinion, that There is a God, is any whit impaired by the particular dissension, that is among men about it. Because it may truly be affirmed of them (as Plutarch doth in the very like case) Singulos non recte pronuncia●se: Plut. de ●ide To. 2. p. 189. That though in their particular, they have eu●ry one erred, yet that in their general, they are not deceived. 3. Nay, The dissension of men about God showeth There is one. Chrysos●. Ho●. 1. in Mat. To. 2. p. 11. it is thereby greatly fortified. For, as Saint Chrysostome collecteth in another like case; that the differences of the Evangelists in some smaller matters, proveth their consent in the greater, to be the voice of truth; and that they did not, ex compacto, agree all together, by an excogitated and composed tale, to deceive the world: (For then they would in all points have morefully agreed, polishing and concinning their History, so smoothly, that there should not have been found the least note of diversity) so may we likewise collect, from the dissension of the Heathen, in the particular Hypothesis of this or that God; that their consent in the Thesis, of having some God, must needs be the voice of truth: in that one nation did not borrow their opinion from another; for than they would have accorded better, and that God which one had, the rest would all have followed. But now, there being such a jar and contention among them, as concerning their particular gods, every one of them scorning the gods of another; and yet in the general, agreeing all together, That some God they will have; this showeth (as the Orator very wisely collecteth) that, Hoc non collocutio hominum, aut consensus efficit; Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 112. non institutis ●st opinio confirmata, non legibus: but only, Lege Nature: That this opinion of having a God, is not begotten in the minds of men, either by conference or consent of one Nation with another; not yet implanted ●n them, by the Laws and discipline of their own private Nation; but it is inwardly begotten, by that general Nature, which they have all in common. It is a Principle of Nature, which is equally imprinted into the minds of them all, none following by imitation another's example. For, it cannot be the policy of the greeks, or Romans, or other civiller Nations, that hath so largely diffused this opinion of God: because we see the most barbarous Nations, who never had trade or commerce with them, yet to be possessed with this same opinion. Again, it cannot be the rudeness of the barbarous Nations (abused in their ignorance) that hath dispersed it so wide: because we see the civil learned Nations to be possessed of it likewise; who would scorn to take up their opinion of the barbarous. The learned Nations would not borrow their opinion of the rude, whom they held in such contempt: and the ruder could not borrow their opinion of the learned, from whom they were so distant. For how could the opinions of the greeks, or Romans, pierce into the extremest India's: where their names were never heard? especially into the Western India's? Where yet, they have their gods. Therefore the Orator directly concludeth, that cum non instituto aliquo, aut more, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 190. aut Lege, sit opinio constituta; maneatque ad unum, omnium firma consensio; intelligi necesse est, esse Deos: quoniam insitas corum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus: Seeing this general opinion of God, is not grounded upon any instruction, any custom, any law; but that all men do consent in it, as if they were but one man; we may hereby understand, that surely There is a God: because there is so general a notion of him, not grafted into our minds, but naturally bred in our minds. So that this great variety of idolatrous Nations, in their particular opinions, as concerning their proper and peculiar gods, is rather an argument of the verity of that general conclusion, Plut. l. de Iside. To. 2. p. 190. That there is a God; then of the falsity of it. As Plutarch likewise insinuateth, from the very same grounds: where he saith, that it is vetustissima opinio, a sacrarum rerum professoribus, & legumlatoribus derivata, authore incognito, sed fide firma; non in sermonibus tantùm, & rumoribus, sed & in mysterijs, & sacrificijs, tam Barbaris, quam Graecanicis, extans; non casu ferri, & a Fortuna pendere Vniversum hoc, Mente, & Ratione, & Gubernatore destitutum: That it is a most ancient opinion, derived by Priests and Lawgivers from an uncertain Author, but yet believed with a most certain faith; not founded upon rumours, but upon the general practice both of greeks and Barbarians, in their mysteries and sacrifices; That the world is not ruled by chance, but by Providence. Yea, and Plutarch, in the same book, is so far from concluding, from the dissension of Nations about their several gods, that therefore There is no God; that he rather collecteth from this their dissension, that they all intended, That there was but One: and that all, with joint consent, had a purpose to worship him; though in those diverse Countries he were called by diverse names; as the Sun is, and the Moon: Which yet, in their own nature, are but one and the same, and to all alike in common. Neque verò alij, apud alios, Plut. ibid. p. 205. sunt Dij, aut Graecis quidem sui, Barbaris autem sui: alij Septentrionalibus, alij Austrinis. Sed quemadmodum Sol, Luna, Coelum, Terra, communia sunt omnibus: tantùm, aliter ab aliis appellantur: ita, unius Mentis hoc Vniversum temperantis— alij apud alios honores, alia nomina, legum instituto, habentur: There be not diverse gods among diverse Nations: The greeks have not theirs, and the Barbarians theirs: the Northern men one sort, and the Southern men another. But, as the Sun, the Moon, the Heaven, the Earth, are the same unto all; though they be in diverse places called by diverse names: So likewise it is, with that divine Spirit, which governeth the World: though he be one in himself; yet hath he, in diverse Nations, both differing honours, and differing names, and those appointed by the Laws. And so likewise, Maximus Tyrius. Aliter atque aliter nuncupatus est Deus. Perindè, ut alia atque alia Maris pars, Max. Tyr. Serm. 23. p. 285 dicitur, Aegeum, jonicum, Myrthoum, ac Cretense; cum tamen omnes, Pelagus sint, ●iusdem generis etc. God is diversely called, in diverse Countries; as the Sea itself is; which in one place, is called the Aegean sea; in another place, the Ionian; in another, the Myrthean; in another, the Cretian; and yet all those Seas are but one, and the same. And so likewise is God; though he be called by diverse names. But howsoever this be: whether they all intended to worship but one God, under diverse names (as those Authors insinuate;) or whether they applied the incommunicable name of God, unto diverse things, as the Apostle teacheth, 1. Cor. 8. 5. 6. that though there be indeed but one God, yet were there many, that were called gods: Yet hereby it appeareth, that their dissent in their opinions, as concerning their gods, did not argue a consent in denying of God; but rather, in accepting him. And thus (as Lactantius well observeth) Difficile non est, Lactan. l. 1. c. 2. p. 5. paucorum hominum prauè sentientium, red ●rguere mendacia, testimonio populorum atque Gentium, in hac una re non dissidentium. It is an easy matter, to confound and overthrow, the false opinions of a few wicked Atheists▪ by the Testimonies of so many whole people and Nations; especially consenting and agreeing all together, more fully in this one thing, than they do in any other. For; as Seneca affirmeth in another like matter; Omnes in hoc urbes, Senec. Epist. 81. p. 260. omnes ctiam ex Barbaris regionibus Gentes conclam●bunt. In hoc, bonis malisque conveniet; Omnes hoc uno tibi ore affirmabunt; & in hoc tam discors turba consentiet. All Cities, all Countries, all Nations, even those that are most barbarous, yet do consent in this. In this, both good and bad agree. This all men affirm with one and the same mouth: yea even the rude rabble of the common people do subscribe unto this truth. CHAP. 8. Certain Objections touched, impugning the generality of the forenamed consent, as concerning God. 2. The first of those Objections opened, directly denying it. 3. The same Objection answered. I HAVE showed the generality of this natural praenotion, Cap. 3. & 4. That there is a God, by the uniform consent of all the Nations of the world, both civil and barbarous; both Christians, jews, Mahometans, and Gentiles. By the like consent again, of all sorts of men, both learned and unlearned; Cap. 5. both of Poets and Philosophers, Lawgivers, and Artificers. And finally, by the same consent, of all particular persons; yea, even of those that may seem to be God's directest enemies; namely, Swearers, Blasphemers, and Idolaters. All these consent in this, to believe, That there is a God; as in the short Epitome of our humane Creed. And this I have confirmed by a cloud of witnesses, both Grecians, and Romans; both Christians, and Pagans. So that he, which dare gainsay a thing so generally received, and set himself to stand against so strong a torrent, may justly be censured to be impudent: and that (as Clemens Alexandrinus noteth him) he doth omnem exuere verecundiam adversus veritatem: Clem. Alex. ●. 5. Strom. p. 274. He shaketh off all shamefastness, against the truth. But yet, if we will be equal judges, and esteemers of matters, we must be content, to hear, as well what can be said against them, as what can be said for them. Now against the generality of this consent alleged, there be three exceptions objected by the Atheist. The first, that there is no such general consent, as is pretended; no not, even among Nations, and much less, among persons. The second, that if there were, yet were not this a natural, but an artificial consent. The third, that there have always been some men of a contrary opinion, who could not be denied to have been very learned, and counted among the number of Philosophers: howsoever by them blemished with the name of Atheists. Plut. l. 1. de Pl●cit. c. 7. To. 2. Mor. p. 14. All which Objections must both be opened and answered, before our cause can be sufficiently confirmed. 2 First therefore, for the first of them. It is familiarly known, The Atheists Reasons that all men believe not There is a God. unto those that are conversant in the writings of Tully, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 190. that he, Ibid. p. 192. oftentimes, under the person of an Academic, doth play the part of a very Atheist. He bringeth this praecognition and anticipation of God, as a very good argument, to prove, There is a God: and he again bringeth Exceptions against it, seeking utterly to disable it, playing so upon both sides, and abusing the liberty of that licentious profession (which was to speak for and against every thing) to the utter overthrow of all Religion. And he beginneth with the infringing of this natural praenotion, which is the first foundation of all piety and Religion. The sum of his exception against it, is this. That it is, cum leue per se, tum etiam falsum: That it is, both a light argument, and a false. The lightness of it, he lightly overpasseth: but upon the falseness of it, he somewhat more insisteth. And that he seeketh to prove by these four reasons. First, because we cannot know the opinions of all Nations. Vnde tibi notae sunt opiniones Nationum? Secondly, because he was verily persuaded, that there were diverse Nations, which had no opinion of God. Multas esse gentes sic immanitate efferatas, ut apud e●s, nulla suspicio Deorum sit. Thirdly, by the naming of diverse special Atheists, that openly denied, that There was a God: where he pointeth upon Diageras', Theodorus, and Protagoras. And fourthly, by the instance of sacrilegious and perjured persons, and such like wicked livers: who, if they had believed, that there were a God, they would never have dared to be so impious and wicked. — Tubulus si Lucius unquam, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 192. Si Lupus, aut Carbo, aut Neptuni filius— Putasset esse Deos; tam periurus, aut tam impius fuisset? This is the short sum of his whole Objection. 3 Let us now come to answer it, The Atheists Reasons against the general consent in Religion, answered: Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 112. and every part of it. And first, for his Leave, that it is but a light argument: I am sure, that this is but a light answer unto it. An answer, than which there cannot be a lighter: which he would never have given, if he had had a better. He himself, in another place, maketh this argument as weighty, as here he makes it light. Firmissimum hoc est cur Deos esse credamus: quòd nulla gens tam est fera, nemo omnium tam immanis, cuius mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. This is the strongest argument, that can possibly be brought, why we should believe, that there is a God: because there is no Nation so uncivil, no person so vile, whosi mind is not possessed with the opinion of some God: Here you see no light account made of this Argument: but a great and weighty testimony for the weightiness of it. And therefore, all the lightness is rather in the disputant, than it is in the Argument, that turns off that so lightly, which he here esteems so weighty. This is lightness indeed. For if he had any weight, when he alleged it for weighty; then hath not it, but he lost his weight, when he accounts so lightly of it: contrarying his own preceding judgement. So that the same censure, which he passeth of Antiochus, may as justly be passed upon himself: that Quanuis fuerit acutus ut fuit, Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 22. tamen inconstantia levatur authoritas: that though he were very witty (as he was indeed most certainly) yet by his inconstancy, he lighted his authority. And therefore, passing over his Leave thus lightly, let us now come to his Falsity, that it is not only Leave, but also Falsum: which may truly be affirmed to be a false Exception. But yet this he seeks to prove, by four several Arguments: unto which it is behooveful, to give their several answers. The first whereof is this, That we cannot come to know the opinions of all Nations: and therefore cannot say, that all agree in one. But, unto this I answer, that we may as surely know the Religions of all Nations, as they can know their Regions. For the same means, which can serve to instruct us in the one, can with the same facility instruct us in the other. For, whereby doth the Atheist know, that there be such and such Countries, Scythians, Barbarians, Indians, and other such like Nations, whose eyes he never saw? If he answer, that he knoweth it by the credible relations of Histories, and Travellers, that have seen them with their eyes: we may answer him again, That by the self same Authors we know also their Religions: yea, and their general consent, in this general ground, that they all will have a God: Cap. 4. as I have already proved. Now, for his second proof; that there be such savage Nations, as he verily is persuaded, not to have so much as the least conceit of God: as he affirmeth it very weakly, Equidem Arbitror: so he confirms it much more weakly, Cap. 4. Sect. 1. naming not so much as one; which evidently proveth, that he had not one to name. for else, he would as well have recited the several names of particular Nations, as he doth, in the next, of particular persons. And we may note the same defect in Pliny likewise: Plin. l. 2. c. 7. p. 2. who saith, that, aliis est nullus Deorum respectus: that with some there is no respect, no reverence at all of God. But yet he nameth none (though he affirmeth some) neither there, nor yet throughout his whole Book; though in all other matters, he be mostly very curious. But indeed, he could not name any particular Nation: and therefore contents himself with this general assertion, of aliis; without adding any instance. Now here must needs be very small store of good proofs: when as Arbitror, and aliis, are the strongest Arguments. Cap. 4. Sect. 1. For I have showed before, that there is not, in the whole world, any Nation of Atheists: No Author, either old, or new, doth certainly report it. And therefore it is Liberum Arbitrium indeed, upon his own bare Arbitror, to affirm it. For his third proof, Cic. l. 3. De Nat. Deor. p. 227. by instance of diverse named Atheists, I will quit him with his own words, even in this very case. Placetnè igitur tantas res, opinion stultorum, iudicari? Are Fools, the fittest judges, to determine so great matters? This Objection he himself maketh, against both the general consent of all men, and prescript of all time, as though all the world (excepting only Atheists) were now turned fools. Are all those wise Lawgivers, who have given Laws and orders to all people and nations, on a sudden become fools; because they believe a God? And are all the great Philosophers, whose wisdom and learning the whole world admireth in all other matters, become also fools, for this only cause? And is only the Atheist wise, because he denieth God? Is this the only wisdom, to deny there is a God? We should then have a wise world. Arist. l. 4. Metaphys. c. 5. To. 2. p. 1406. For than it would fall out indeed (as Aristotle imagined) that if all the world were fools, and but two or three wise men in it; they should be counted fools, and all the rest to be wise. And so it is indeed; if the Atheists be the wise men: for they are condemned for fools, Cap. 14. Sect. 1. by the general consent of all other men: as we shall hereafter see. Now, for those noted Atheists, whom he nameth in that place, Diagoras, Theodorus, & Protagoras: It may be, that none of these could be truly counted Atheists, though they all were called so, by the censure of the vulgar: who strictly examine not the proper application of names unto their things. For, Diagoras (as I find it reported of him) did potius Gentilium Deos ridere, 〈…〉 quam Deum negare: He rather derided false Gods, than denied the true. Morn●●● Cap. 1. De verit. Relig. p. 16. And Clemens Alexandrinus maketh the same defence, for all the rest of them; freeing them all expressly, from the crime of Atheism. For Theodorus, though at the first he was noted of Atheism; Clem. Alex. in Protrept. p. 10. yet at the last, he fell into Autotheisme: professing himself a God, as Laertius recordeth. Now this he could not have professed, if he had maintained that there was no God. Yea, and it may be gathered out of Plutarch, that, even in his former opinion of Atheism, he might be mistaken. Laert. in vita Aristip. p. 73. 77 For, even he himself complaineth of the iniquity of his auditors, that he did rationes suas dextra porrigere, illos verò laeva accipere: Plutarch. l. De Tranquid. To. 2. p. 312. That he delivered his speeches with the right hand, but his hearers received them with the left. In which place also, Plutarch, rendering the reason, why he was called Atheos', allegeth no more, but this, Quòd Deos esse videretur negare: Because he seemed to deny, that there was any God. Was not here a fair proof think you? And, for Protagoras, he neither denied God, no, nor so much as doubted of him. He did but only profess, that he would not as then, entertain the disputation, Whether there were a God or no? Which Coecilius ascribeth not unto his profaneness, Arnob. l. 8. cont. Gent. p. 748. Cap. 5. Sect. 3. but rather to his wariness. He saith, that in declining that slippery Question, he did Consult potius, quam prophanè disputare; as before I have noted. So that none of all his instances doth handsomely fit his purpose. And for his fourth Exception, of sacrilegious and perjured persons; they cannot properly be reckoned in the number of Atheists. They may justly be condemned, Malachi. 3. 8. The jews spo●led then God, and yet denied him not. as profane and wicked persons, who dishonour God, yea and perhaps contemn him: but yet not properly as Atheists, who simply deny him. So that, no part of his Objection concludeth for pure Atheists. CHAP. 9 The second Objection, against this universality of Consent, unfolded: That Religion is no better, but an humane invention. 2. That Objection confuted, by the Antiquity. 3. Universality. 4. Consent. 5. Perpetuity of Religion. AS there is nothing in the world, wherein all the whole world doth so generally consent, as they do in believing that There is a God: so is there nothing again, wherein they do secondarily so generally consent, as they do in the acknowledgement of that general Consent. All men do believe, that There is a God, and all men do believe, that all men do believe, that There is a God. As the belief itself is general: so is the belief of the belief general: the Atheist only exempted: who, as he is an Adversary unto God himself, so is he likewise an Adversary unto this consent. And, as he denieth the one: so doth he likewise deny the other of them: knowing, that if this consent be granted, it will from thence follow, that there needs must be a God: as you shall see hereafter proved in the last Chapter of this Book. And therefore, he fighteth against this consent, with no 〈◊〉 endeavour, than he doth against God: seeking to expugn the verity of the one, by oppugning the Universality of the other. And so, he chardgeth upon this consent, with three several Objections; as it were, with three Bands. The first of his three Objections against it, is a simple and categorical denying of it: that there is not among men any such general consent, as is generally imagined, and commonly pretended: unto which, in the former Chapter, I have answered. The second (unto which I am now to answer) is this: The Atheist's second Objection. That Religion is but an humane invention. That, though there were such a general consent, as is conceived; yet, that this is not a natural, but an artificial consent: not begotten in men's hearts, by a natural instinct, but implanted in them, by the cunning of evil art. For that, all divine religion, is indeed nothing else, but an humane invention; artificially excogitated, to keep men in awe: that they, who will not live virtuously, for the love of i●stice; yet might shun to live wickedly, for the fear of vengeance. This doth the Atheist make to be the true foundation of all Religion: reducing it so, from a divine infusion, to be in truth no better, than an humane illusion. And indeed this is a very sore Objection, striking at the root and the heart of all Religion. Which, though it be in truth but a mere idle fiction, conceived without all ground of truth or reason; yet hath it obtained a far greater credit, with many learned men, than ought to be afforded to so vain a suspicion. Plut. l. 1. de. Placit. Cap. 7. To. 2. Mor. p. 14. Wherein, the chiefest Ringleaders are these three: Euripides, the Poet; Tully, the Orator; and Seneca, the Philosopher. Euripedes, a secret and concealed Atheist, not daring directly to vent out his Atheism, for fear of the law, devised an artificial means, how to broach that impiety in another man's person, which he durst not in his own. And so he suborned, in his Tragedy, the person of Sisyphus, to express all his ungodliness, and to teach it from the Stage: telling by him a long and a formal Tale; How the life of men in old time, was like the life of beasts: the stronger, by violence, oppressing the weaker; until, at last, men were forced to devose severe laws, for the repressing of such injustice. But when they found (upon some trial) that all those laws could do● small good; because they could only take hold upon such, as were open and public offences, and not upon close and secret ones; there step't up among them a subtle politic man, who taught them a mean to provide for that mischief too: and to prevent close offences, as well as open, ones. And that (saith he) is this; If they will but teach the people, and beat in to their heads: Quòd sit perenni vita aliquis vigens Deus, Quicernat ista, et audiat, atque intelligat. An Euerliving One, there is, whom God we call, And he both here's, and see's, and understandeth all. This Tale tells Euripides, by the mouth of Sisyphus: Veritati tenebras mendacio offundens, seeking to obscure the truth with the darkness of his lie (as Plutarch very truly censureth his bad artifice) seeking so to teach the people that impiety from the Stage, which he durst not from the Pulpit: and that by a feigned person, which he durst not in his own. An usual practice of all disguised Atheists (as Plutarch instanceth again in the person of Herodotus) who secretly intending to blaspheme the gods, Plutar. lib. De Herodoto To. 3. Mor. p. 630. he expresseth his own impiety in the person of Solon; Dijs maledicens sub persona Solonis: Railing upon the gods, under Solon's name.— And so likewise doth Lucian. Lucian In love 〈◊〉 p. ●02. He suborneth in one place, Item ●n lo●e Tragoedo, p. 109. Cyniscus, a Cynic; in another, Damis, an Epicure, to dispute against God, in the person of jupiter. But, in this kind hath Tully played his part, most artificially. For he, (fearing the rigour of the Laws among the Romans, as Euripides did before among the Athenians) hath imitated his policy, in expressing his impiety: and suborned Cotta, as an Academike, to dispute against God: who, by the liberty of that licentious profession, Cic. l. 2. De Divinat. p. 285. might more safely do it. For, the sect of the Academikes would determine nothing: but yet did profess, that they would freely dispute, both for, and against every thing. And so, by that occasion, he divulged that impiety, in the person of Cotta, which he durst not have done, in the person of Cicero: as even he himself, in a manner, confesseth. For, being demanded, An sint Dij? he answereth, that it is, Difficile negare, si in concione queratur; Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 192. sed in privato sermone et confessu, facillimum. If the Question (saith he) be moved, Whether there be a God? it would be dangerous to deny it, in the presence of the multitude: but yet, safe enough, among the wise and learned. Whereby he insinuateth, that the most part of the learned did propend to that opinion; though, for fear of the multitude, they durst not publish their irreligion. And therefore, by the forenamed Cotta, he insinuateth, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. D●or. p. 200. that there were not a few; Qut dixerunt, totam de Dijs immortalibus opinionem, fictamesse ab hominibus sapientibus, Reip: causa; ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium Religio duceret: There be diverse, that have affirmed, that this whole conceit as concerning God, is indeed nothing else, but a witty invention, devised by wise men, for the public good, to hold those men in their duty, by the awe of Religion, that would not be restrained by the rule of reason. Yea, and Seneca giveth countenance unto the very same Opinion: ascribing unto them, the title of wise men, that were the first Authors of that invention. Ad coercendos animos imperitorum, Senec. l. 2. Nat. Quaest c. 42 p. 35. sapientissini viri indicaverunt inevitabilem metum, ut supra nos aliquid timeremus. V●ile erat in tanta audacia scelerum, aliquid esse, adversùs quod nemo sibi satis potens videretur, Ad conterrendos igitur eos; quibus innocentià, nisi metu, non placet, posuêre, super caput, vindicem, et quidem armatum: wise men have invented, for the terror of the ignorant, That there is above their he●ds a power greatly to be feared, and not to be avoided. For it was indeed convenient, that in so huge a licence and boldness of offending, men's minds should be possessed with a certain persuasion; That there is a Nature omnipotent, which cannot be resisted. And so, for the terror of those men that regard not virtue but only for fear, they have placed above them, not only a most rigorous and severe revenger, but him also armed with lightning and thunder. These be the chiefest Patrons of this impious fiction, That Religion is no better than an humane invention. Let us now proceed to answer them. 2 Now, that it is but a mere fiction [That Religion should be a fiction] having neither any substance, nor good colour of Reason; it appeareth by many Reasons: as namely, by these four, among diverse other, to wit, the Antiquity, Universality, Consent, and Perpetuity of Religion. All which are Arguments of the Verity of it: and that it is not a fiction devised. First, The Antiquity of Religion. Cap. 5. Sect. 1. for the Antiquity of it: that may be considered two several ways: either particularly, as it is in every several man: or generally, as it is in the generation of all men. Both which two Antiquities, do notably confute the fable of Euripides. Cap. 3. Sect. 1. & 2. For the first of those Antiquities, I have showed you before, that there is no notion so ancient in the mind of a man, as is the notion of Religion. Arnob. l. 1. Cont. Gent. p. 476. Which Arbobius affirmeth to be begotten in us, even whilst we are in the womb of our mothers, ipsis penè in genitalibus Matris. Where, I am sure, we could hear no such politic old Tales, as Euripides affirmeth to be the first be●●tters of Religion in us. Yea, jamblic. l. de Myster. c. 1. p. 5. Cap. 3. Sect. 2. and jamblicus, an Heathen, affirmeth of Religion; that it is implanted into the mind of a man, Et●am ante omnem rationis usum: Even before he have any use of reason: as before I noted of him. Which, if it be true, then could not Religion be a politic invention, to beguile the simpler sort of men. For, how could it then be imprinted into Children? yea, and that before they have the use of reason? When as Aristotle affirmeth of politic doctrine, that it is too high for the reach of any young men: Arist. l. 1. Ethic. c. 3. To. ●. p. 605. then much more of young Children. For, if Iwenis be not idoneus auditor civilis Disciplinae; then much less is Infants. And therefore it hath not any colour of reason, that Religion (being so timely begotten in them) should be first implanted by the means of such a fabulous instruction. There is (I say) no colour of reason in this reasonless fiction. Now for the general Antiquity of Religion, and that ancient possession, which it hath had in the world, Plutarch. 〈◊〉. Stoic. To. 3. p. 564. Plutarch saith, that it is so ancient, that no man can tell the first original of it. And he applieth to this purpose those verses of Sophocles: Non nunc enim, neque heri sunt ista prodita: Semper valuêre, nec quando inierint, liquet. These things were not of yesterday or lately brought to pass: They ever were, and no man knows when their beginning was. But, for the true Antiquity of it, let us but follow the steps of it, as they be expressed to us in the word of God, and we shall find, that Religion is more ancient, than any fiction; and the practice of piety, than any devised lie. For, when there were but three men in the universal world, Gen. 4. 3. 4. we read, that two of them offered up their sacrifices unto God: when as yet there was neither cause of the making of laws against public oppressions, nor, of divising such fables against secret offences. And therefore, Religion could not grow from either of those causes. Nay, it appeareth even in their examples, that oppression (though per accidens) grew rather from religion, than religion from oppression. For, before those two Brothers had offered up their sacrifices, there was no oppression: but when they were once dispatched, it presently followed; the one brother violently oppressing the other; yea and that merely upon this one emulation, because he was better accepted in his religion. Whereby it appeareth, that religion is almost as ancient as man; nay, altogether as ancient. For the very first man is said to be cre●ted in the image of God: Gen. 1. 27. Eph. 4. 24. Iames 1. 27. Exod. 28. 36. which the Apostle Paul expoundeth to be, in righteousness and holiness: which are the two essential parts of religion, his matter, and his form. Nay, religion is yet more ancient. It is more ancient t●en man. It is as ancient as the Angels: as is plainly insinuated in the book of Io●. Where wast thou, job 38. 7. when the stars of the morning praised me together? and when all the sons of God shouted for joy? Here was the vs● and practice of religion, even before the making and creation of man. And therefore, religion could not be an humane invention, unless either there was a man, before there was a man; Tert. l. de Testimon. 〈◊〉. c. 5. p. 86. or that man was able to invent, before he was made. For, as Tertullian hath very well observed: Prior anima, quam litera; & prior sermo, quam liber; & prior sensus, quam stilus; & prior homo, quam Philosophus, & Poeta. There was a soul, before there was a letter; a speech, before there was a book; a sense, before there was a style, a man, before there was, e●her a poet, or philosopher. And yet, there was Religion before there was a Man. And therefore, it could not be an huma●ne invention. So that Time, which prescribeth against all humane inventions, and which challengeth the honour of Antiquity from them; yet itself is prescribed against by religion, and loseth the honour of priority with it: because religion is as 〈…〉 Tertul. l. de Virgin. veland. c. 1. p. 188. latuit: Tertul. l. 2. cont. Martion c. 2. p. 368. semper illuxit: etiam ante Romulum, saith Tertullian. Yea, and ante Homulum too, as before I have showed you. God hath been known from all beginning: he never lay hid: he ever was manifest, even before the first King: even before t●e first thing. And therefore, if his own Rule be true: Idem esse verum, Tertul. l. cont. P●axeam c. 2. p. 494. quod●unque primum; id adulterinum, quodcunque postcrius: That that which is the ancientest, must needs be the truest: then cannot Religion be an humane invention: because it is more ancient then man. And consequently, that Euripides his Tale, whereby he seeks to discredit Religion, must needs be a false, and an idle f●ctio●, without ground of truth, or reason: it being but a late, and a posteriour invention. Yea, and such, as hath ●or it, not any, either known or certain Author, to credit it. So that, it may more justly be numbered among thos● Be●●eselenas, Plutarch l. 1 de Placit. c. 7. To. 2. Mo●. p. 15. those headless Old-wives Tales, which Plutarch in the same place so justly derideth; then Religion itself can; which it seeketh to deride, under that very name. But, the true Antiquity of Religion doth free it from any such base imputation, and declare it to be a lesson of Gods own first teaching: Iust. Mart. l. Quest. & R●spons. Quaest 73. 74. 70. 3. p. 104. 105. b●cause it was practised by Adam, the first man, who could have no other man to ●each him. From which obse●ation, justine Martyr collecteth, Quòd, ante errorem, veritas obtinuerit: That Religion is more ancient than superstition. Yea, and in the same place, he bringeth this substantial reason; that Malum posterius est bono: qui●, nihil est aliud, nist boni depravatio: That evil is posteriour unto good, because it is nothing but the corruption of good. So then, the Antiquity of Religion doth prove, that it cannot be an humane invention. 3 Yea, and so doth likewise the Universality of it. For there was never yet any humane invention, so generally spread, as the use of Religion: no not those, that seem most necessary for the use of men. Not clothing of our bodies, which is for mere necessity: nor covering of our shames, which is for public honesty. For, we meet with diverse nations, among the west Indians, Fet. Mart. Decad. 1. l. 5. p. 30. b. which neither cloth their bodies, nor cover their shames; and yet can meet with none, but that they have their gods. Which sense of Religion, could not possibly be implanted into every Nation, either by imitation from their neighbours; because some be so wild and savage, that they do not admit of any entercouse or commerce: Nor yet by institution among themselves; unless we should imagine, that in every Nation, there should suddenly step up such a politic wise man; and (as it were by fate) tell the same Tale of Religion: or that Euripides his man had compassed the whole world about, like the Sun, and read his profane lecture in every Nation. Both which suppositions were idle and ridiculous. And therefore it is apparent, that Religion cannot be of humane institution; but that the same common Nature, which hath given unto all men their hearts, hath also given Religion into all their hearts, Lactan. l. 3. c. 10. p. 143. Item l. 2. c. 3. p. 75. to be among them, as common, as their natural form. For so indeed doth Lactantius esteem it. He accounteth Religion, to be the most proper and essential difference, between a man and a beast; more, than either Risus, or Ratio, or Oratio; then either Laughing, or Speaking, yea, or Reason itself. All which he there proveth to be (in some degree) communicated unto Beasts; but Religion to be proper and peculiar unto Men: and yet common unto all men. But, that, neither by domestical instruction at home; nor yet, by mutuation, or imitation abroad: but only, by that natural instinct and disposition, which God hath engrafted, into the hearts of all men: as Alexander ab Alexandro, Alex. ab Alex. l. 6. Genial. Dier. c. 26. p. 384. b. hath very truly observed: Primi mortales, nulla doctrinae schola, Ratione, aut Lege; sed suo quisque ingenio, numina coluerunt. The first men, were neither taught by any learning, nor persuaded by any reason, nor compelled by any law; but only, of their proper and natural inclination, betook themselves unto the worshipping of gods. Yea, and that so generally, throughout the whole world; that there is not any nation under heaven excepted. Which universality of religion, declareth that it is not an humane invention, but a divine impression; yea, and a Divinity-lesson, of Gods own heavenly teaching. As we may see by his schooling of the first man Adam, Gen. 3. 3. whom he catechised unto the obedience of God, both by giving him a commandment, and by annexing to it a punishment. 4. And the same may likewise be proved by that uniform consent, The Uniform Consent in Religion. which is among all men, as concerning Religion, of whatsoever degree or condition. Which in this one thing is far greater, than it is in any other of what nature soever: as I have showed before. We see by experience, Cap. 5. that not only diverse Nations have diverse fashions, and diverse conceits, and opinions in most things; but that, even in the same Nation, that diverse Cities have diverse guises, behaviours, habits, speeches, and manners: as our Countryman Sir, S. 10. Mandevile part 2. c. 24. Eng. V●yag. p. 45. john Mandevile well observed, in his travel. And yet, in believing that There is a God, there is no difference at all, throughout the whole world: no City jars with City, no Country with Country: but among them all an universal agreement: wherein, both the learned and unlearned do consent. Tertul. l. de Praescrip. c. 28. p. 209. From which head, Tertullian concludeth the verity of Religion. For, Quod apad multos unum invenitur, non est erratum, sed traditum. The consent of all men, as concerning God, doth show it to be no erring humane invention; but a most certain divine tradition. For, if Religion were no better, but a politic device and invention of man, it was a very marvelous felicity in lying, that he had, which first devised the tale of Religion: that he should tell his fable in such a fortunate hour, as to beguile the whole world with it, and that for ever after. This was a cunning juggler indeed, that could cast so cunning a glaucoma, Plaut. Mil. Glor. Act. 2. Sce. 1. p. 467. and such a 〈◊〉 missed before the eyes of the wisest; as to dazzle, Lact. l. de Ir● Dei, c. 10. p. 462. not only the unlearned and simple Idiots, but also the wisest and gravest Philosophers: as Lactantius well observeth. Quae tanta felicitas mentiendi, ut 〈…〉 indoctos, sed Platonem quoque & Socratem fallerent? & Pythago●am, Zenonem, Aristotele●, Maximarum Sectarum Principes 〈◊〉 facile deluderent? What a strange kind of efficacy had that man in his lying, that could bewitch with one Tale, not only the unlearned; but also Plato, and Socrates, and Pythagoas, and Zeno, yea, and Aristotle himself, the principallest Masters of all the learned Sects? This lie was begotten in a strange constellation, if it were a lie, that one wise man should make fools of all the wise men of the world: and yet, by all their wisdom, never be descried. Therefore, we may conclude with Seneca, Senec. l. 4. de Benefic. c. 4. p. 49. that if Religion were a siction; Non in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent, alloquendi surda numina, & inefficaces Deos: Surely, all the whole world would never have conspired in this madness, to call upon such deaf and idle gods. Beside, as Lactantius truly noteth in the very same place, (where he doth, ex professo, dispute this very case) He could not be a wiseman, that was the Author of this so false a fiction. For the end of true wisdom is to draw men out of error, and not to lead them into it, as this false impostor did. And therefore he concludeth from this so general a consent in Religion, that it could not be possibly an humane invention. 5 And yet the same may be further declared by the perpetual succession, The Perpetuity of Religion. and propagation of Religion: which hath thriven, from the beginning, with such admirable prosperity, that it hath not decayed in any Country, or City: but, wheresoever it hath been planted, there hath it ever flourished, and could never be supplanted. Which showeth it to be a Plant, both by God himself first planted, and graciously ever since, with the dew of his blessing, watered. For, Mat. 15. 13. as Christ himself teacheth us, Every plant, which the heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted out. And therefore, if Religion had been but a plant of man's planting and setting, it would long since have been blasted, yea, and utterly starved. For, no humane invention, had ever, either such a prosperous increasing; and such a long, & a firm continuing in the world, as Religion hath had: but all the conceits of men, though for a time they may shoot-out, and have a kind of flourishing; yet do they quickly decay again; time blasting and withering them, Ps. 129. 6. Cic. l. 2. Offic. p. ●69. as the grass which grows upon the tops of houses. For, as the Orator hath very truly noted: Ficta omnia, celeriter, tanquam flosculi, decidunt: All feigned devices, come quickly to an end, as flowers shattered by the wound. And again in another place unto the same purpose: Opinionum commenta delet dies, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. D●or. p. 201. Naturae iudicia confirmat: Time destroyeth all those fancies, which have none other ground, but only humane opinion; but, it strengtheneth all those judgements, which are founded upon truth, and sound natural reason. As for example. The particular conceit of all the heathen gods, hath time now devoured; because that was nothing else, but opinionis commmentum: But, the general belief, that There is a God, it hath in all places confirmed; because this belief is Naturae iudicium. And therefore Religion, which thus grows stronger and stronger by time, and hath continued so firmly, from the very beginning, without any decaying, must needs have a better ground, Senec. Epis. 121 p. 307. than a mere humane opinion. For, as Seneca hath well observed; Falsa non durant: False things continue not. And therefore this thriving of religion, and this perpetual succession of it, have even the Heathen collected, to be a true argument, of the infallible truth of it: and that it is impossible, that it should be no better than a fiction devised: Quòd, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 227. et omnium esset, et quotidiè cresceret: because it was both so generally received, and believed of all men, and so prosperously continued from the very beginning: concluding no less, from the Perpetuity of it, then from the Universality; that it is a plant of natures own breeding: and therefore cannot be any politic invention. And consequently, that Euripides, in his forged invention, That Religion should be nothing but an humane invention, did (as Plutarch truly censures him) mendacio veritati tenebras offundere: Plut. l. 2. de Placit. c. 7. To. 2. Mor. p. 14. He sought only, to obscure the truth, with a lie. And therefore, for this his profaneness, in this his device against religion and piety, he better deserveth that enured note of Tully [Capitalis Euripides] then for his injustice against right and equity, Cic. l. 3. office p. 387. in that his other sentence: Nam si violandum est ius, regna●di gratia Violandum est; aliis rebus, pietatem colas. If justice may be wronged at all, then for a Crown it may: Except a Kingdom's case, in all, let Piety thee sway. Here yet was, in some things a conservation of equity: but his Tale against Religion imported in all things, an extirpation of piety: as the Orator observeth, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. dear. p. 200. and that very truly: Qut dixerunt totam de Dijs immortalibus opinionem fictam esse— Omnem Religionem funditùs sustulerunt: They that shall affirm all opinion of the gods to be but a fiction, do utterly take away the sum of Religion. Now these things considered, it evidently appeareth, that it is not Religion, that is a fraudulent invention, to beguile and deceive men: but rather this slander of Religion, that it should be but a fraudulent invention, this is a fraudulent invention indeed: yea, and that a very wicked one: as even Tully himself insinuateth, Cic. l. 1. de. diuin. p. 241. nay plainly expresseth, when he saith of their Religions; that, Periculum est, ne, aut his neglectis, impia fraud, aut susceptis, anili superstitione obligemur: That there is no little danger, lest either on the one side, by neglecting of Religion, we be circumvented by the fraud of Atheists; or on the other side, by accepting of Religion, we be entangled with the superstition of old wives. Where I cannot imagine, what other fraud of Atheists he should rather mean, than this, of their affirming, that religion is nothing else but an humane invention: which is indeed a very fraudulent suggestion, and a fable artificially invented, and composed against religion: But, so is not religion against the truth. It is not, fabula, arte composita, as S. Peter truly teacheth. 2. Pet. 1. 16. But that this was falsely feigned, I hope I have plainly proved. CHAP. 10. The third Objection against the Universality of Consent in Religion, propounded: viz. That is hath been oppugned, by diverse both wise and learned Philosophers, though called by the name of Atheists. 2. That Objection answered from the smallness of their number. 3. The weakness of their learning. 4. The mistaking of their opinion. 5. And their inconstancy in their assertion. THere is yet a third Objection behind, The Atheists third Objection: oppugning the universality of consent in Religion, by their own dissenting. which may be made by the Atheist, against the Supposition of this so universal a consent in Religion: and that is this following: That though it could not be denied, that both all Nations, and all professions of men in the world, do believe There is a God: yet that it cannot be affirmed, that all several persons have also therein consented. Because, there be recorded, in the writings both of Heathens and Christians, the very names of diverse men, that have directly denied it; yea, and openly defended, That there is no God. Amongst whom, though they have been branded with the name of Atheists, as with a note of infamy, as crossing the current of that general opinion with among other men was received, & believed most confidently; yet were they not denied to have been both wise and learned; as ranked, even by their adversaries, amongst the number of Philosophers. And therefore, their opinion cannot (in common reason) but have far greater weight, than the whole multitude of the unlearned: because (as Lactantius very truly observeth, Lactan. l. 2. c. 19 p. 124. Plus est momenti in paucioribus doctis, quam in pluribus imperitis: There is a great deal more weight, in a few, that are learned; then in a many, that are ignorant. So that, a multitude of the vulgar, are not able to counterpoise so much as one Philosopher: their judgement being branded with that note of infamy, Cic. l. 1. D● Divinat. p. 274. that Nihil est 〈◊〉, quam nihil sapere, vulgar: That there is nothing so common, as for the common people to understand nothing. And therefore, notwithstanding all the cry of the vulgar (who obtain their opinions, not by reason, but by clamour) that may fall out in this case, Cic. l. 8. ad A●●ic. ● p. 3. p. 309. which is noted by the Orator: ut altera res verbosior sit, altera verior. That the one part may be the truer, though the other be the louder. 2 But now unto this Objection, The number of Atheists very small. I answer three things. First, that for their number, the Atheists do well not to stand upon that plea; but to disclaim it utterly, and not to vie with their Adversaries in that point, for the victory. For the number of those that have denied God, is so little, in comparison of those that confess him, that (to use the Orator's comparison) it is but stilla muriae, Cic. l. 3. De fin. p. 73. ad mare Aegeum: but as one drop of brine unto a whole Ocean. Their multitude is so great, and so infinite above their opposite. Neither these only, a multitude of the ignorant and unlearned, but also even of the wise and learned. All the learnedest Philosophers, and all the wisest Sages, that ever were in the world, may be numbered in this multitude, that confess there is a God. So that if any cause can gain any estimation, either by the number, or honour of those that defend it; or by the fewness, and baseness, of those that oppugn it; no cause hath more advantage, in both these points, than this. For first, as concerning the number of those Atheists, it is so poor and contemptible, that it is an infinite disgrace, and reproach unto their cause, to have been, in all men's eyes, so abject, and profligated, as to be able to get no more defenders, since the world was first created: especially, being taught by such learned Philosophers, as they would insinuate. This is a foul disgrace unto their cause, that so great learned Teachers, could get so few Disciples; especially being followed by so many Auditors: as Laertius observeth in Bion of Boristhenis, one of the chiefest Atheists, that; Nemo illius Discipulus inscribitur, cum tot habuerit auditores. So that, in all ages, there have been but very few, either Masters or Scholars in the doctrine of Atheists. And this Tully objecteth unto Epicurus, Cic. l. 1. de fin. p. 58. another of their principallest Atheists. In vestris disputationibus, historia muta est. Nunquam audivi in Epicuri schola, Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari; qui in or● sunt caeterorum omnium Philosophorum: All history is mute in the school of the Epicure. We hear there, no naming of Lygurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, or Epamniondas; which use to rattle in the mouths of all other Philosophers. Atheists could never get any such men to be their Disciples: no, nor yet any other, that had either worth, Aug. in Ps. 52. To. 8. p. 509. or number. S. Augustine saith of them, that it is, Rarum genus hominum, Bedai● Cap. 17. job. To. 5. p. 792. qui dicunt, Non est Deus: It is rare to finde any man that denieth There is a God. And Beda likewise, unto the same purpose: Exceptis paucis, quibus natura nimiùm depravata est, universum genus hominum, Deum, mundi huius fatetur authorem: Except only a few of a depraved nature, all mankind doth acknowledge both a God, and a Creator. Yea, and he addeth there this reason: Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali, iam ratione utenti, non omnin● ac penitùs possit abscondi: This is the power of the divine nature, that it will not be hid from any reasonable creature. By which testimonies of these Fathers, it evidently appeareth, that the number of Atheists hath been but very few: but Pauci, saith Beda; nay Perpauci, saith Augustine, in the place that before I cited out of him. Lactaentius affirmeth, that there were but two or three of them: Lact. l. de Ira. c. 10. p. 461. Exceptis duobus, tribusuè calumniatoribus vanis, constat, Divina providentia Mundum regi: Except only, two, or three vainglorious Cavillers, all the whole world believeth, that the world is ruled by providence. And that this is not an artificial diminution, of an extenuating Christian; it is expressly confirmed, Max. Tyr. Serm. 1. p. 6. by the testimony of an Heathen. In universo aevo (saith Maximus Tyrius) duo, aut, ad summum, tres exortisunt, etc. There have, of those Monsters, two, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 112. or three (and not above) been brought forth, in all ages. Nay, Tully saith, There have been none: Nemo omnium tam immanis, cuius mentem non imbuerit Dcorum opinio. So that now, they are brought unto a very low ebb: their number is so little, that they are now, nullo numero. And indeed, This Chap. Sect 4. in fin. if we speak of Atheists strictly, and properly, for such as have simply denied all divinity, and denied it constantly; Tully's sentence is most true, that there never was any such creature in the world (nay never any such Monster) as simply and constantly to deny God. The name of an Atheist in this sense, is but, Nomen ociosum; A name without a thing. If we speak of Atheists in a larger sense, for such as have openly (though not constantly) denied the Divinity; Maximus his sentence is true, that, of such professed Atheists, there have not been past two or three. Nay, if we speak of Atheists, in the largest and most extended sense, for such as have either not denied God's essence, but only certain of his properties, as his providence, his justice, his goodness, and such like: or, if they have denied it, yet have done it but weakly, rather upon some sudden passion, than any settled resolution: yet, even so, their number hath scarcely amounted unto a dozen, or a score; I mean of such open Atheists, as have made any public profession of their Atheism, though but even in these secondary points. As we may partly see in Aelian, Aelian. l. 2. var. Hist. c. 31. p. 395. who hath made a list of them, and named all he knew: and yet (God knows) they are but very few. There be not above six of them: who yet, all of them did not deny God himself; but some of them, his providence, and some other his predictions; as appeareth by those Dogmata, which, in that place, he recounteth. Now, if we should search into the monuments of all Antiquity, both of Greeks and Latins, we should scarcely be able to add half a dozen more, unto those that are named by Aelian before. Whereby it appeareth, that, for their number, they be miserable: God, in his merciful providence, ordai●●i●g, that there should not, in all ages, be found many Atheists; as not many Basilisks, and destroying Serpents. 3 And, as their number was but little, The learning of Atheists not very great. so their learning was not great. They were of no great value, neither numero, nor pondere. The value of their wisdom they have showed, in the choice of their foolish opinion: which hath made them no less scorned then abhorred of all men, and justly to incur that note of derision, which the Prophet David hath imprinted upon them, Psal. 14. 1. that they justly may be esteemed, to be rather Fools, then wise men. At the leastwise, far unworthy of the name of Philosophers: as Laertius (for the like cause) censureth the Poet Orpheus. L●ert. in proem. p. 2. Equidem is, qui de Dijs talia commentus est; an Philosophus appellandus sit, nescio. Videant certè, qui ita volunt, quo sit censendus nomine: Surely he, that devised such things of the Gods, I know not whether he justly may be called a Philosopher. Let them look unto it, that will have them so called, whether that name be fit and properly applied. And for their learning, though it cannot be denied, but that diverse of them were learned; yet was not their learning in any such excellency, as was able to sustain their impiety and arrogancy. And beside, if they be compared with those learned men, of the contrary opinion, which either lived with them, or before them, or after them, their learning will come as short in proportion, as the light of a candle doth, of the brightness of the Su●ne. For what comparison can Diagoras hold with Pythagoras? or Protagoras with Anaxagoras? or Euemerus with Empedocles? or Theodorus with Theophrastus? or Bion with Chilon? or Epicurus with Epicharmus? or Pherecides with Parmenides? To be silent of Socrates, and Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno, Xenocrates, and Demetrius, Cleanthes, and Democritus, Diogenes, and Melissus; and very many others, which can find no parallels, among all the Atheists, being so eminent above them, Quantùm lenta solent inter viburna Cupressi: Virg. Eclog. 1. p. ●. As much as loftiest Cedars show, The lowest Shrubs do overgo. So that, if this cause be esteemed, by either Number or Learning▪ the Atheists (as you see) can hold no comparison. Lact. l. De Ira Dei. c. 10. p. 461. Non est enìm quisquam (saith Lactantius) qui Diagorae, Theodorique sententiam praeferre audeat, vel authoritati illorum septem priorum, qui sunt appellati sapientes; vel Pythagorae, vel Socrati, vel Platonis, caeterorumque summorum Philosophorum, qui esse Prouidenti●m iudicaverunt: There is no man that dares prefer the foolish opinion of Diagoras & Theodorus before the authority of those seven that are called the Wise men: no, nor yet before either Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato, or the rest of the Philosophers which have all of them acknowledged and confessed a divine Providence. So that, whether we consider their Number, or their Learning, their cause reapeth both ways an infinite disreputation, their Adversaries do in both points so mightily oversway them. Lactantius censuring Diagoras and Theodorus (which were the chiefest Patriarches of the Atheists) he saith, that they lived but in an age of ignorance; cum iam Philosophia defloruerat, Lactan. l. De Ira c. 9 p. 455. when Philosophy had lost the chiefest lustre of her glory; and that they themselves were accordingly but only Minuti & inertes Philosophi, a simple and an ignorant kind of Philosophers. And Tully passeth (in effect) the very same censure upon Epic●rus, another of their pillars. For he saith, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 211. he was a man without all manner of learning. Homo sine arte, sine literis, insultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine authoritate, sine lepore. A man without Art, and without all good learning, and yet insulting over all men: but, without any wit, without any gravity, and without any good conceit. Yea, Lactan. l. 3. c. 17. p. 164. and Lactantius saith of him, that, Hoc sano & vige●e, nullus aeger ineptiùs deliravit: No man ever so doted in his raging sickness, as this man did in his flourishing health: deriding L●cretius for bestowing such enormous commendations upon him. These were their very Principals, and the Leaders of the others. Now if their chiefest were none other, the rest (surely) were no better. So that, as the smallness of their number bringeth great disadvantage, so the weakness of their learning bringeth but small advantage, unto the cause of Atheists. 4 But now, The noted Atheists were no true Atheists. Cap. 8. Sect. 3. it may be doubted (yea, and that not without some probability of reason) whether those men, whom the Heathen have so branded for Atheists, were pure Atheists indeed, or no? For the pure Atheist (according to the propriety of that name) is he, which generally and constantly denieth all Divinity; Psal. 14. 1. Ille propri● est Atheos' qui nullum Divinitatis sensum habet, & omne 〈◊〉 qualecunque 〈◊〉, ridet. Calu. in Ephes. 2. 12. and believeth, as he saith. The Prophet David affirmeth in general, that the Atheist is a Fool, which saith in his heart, There is no God. And indeed, he that properly is an Atheist, must both say generally, There is no God; and believe it constantly in his heart. For, if either he believe any one God, though he deny all the rest; or confess God in the end, whom in the beginning he denied; he cannot truly and properly be said to be an Atheist. But such an Atheist was none of all those, whom the Heathen have called Atheists, and whom they have proclaimed to deny all that is called God. There was none of them, such pure and absolute Atheists, as simply to deny all Deity. As we may easily see, if we will but look into their causes; and examine (but even by their own records) those several crimes and actions, that have been laid against them, in their several judgements. And first, for Diagoras; who was (in their reckoning) the most noted man of all of them, and the first Antistes of their impious profession: all the rest of the Atheists being counted but his followers, Theod●ret, l. 2. De Provide. To. 2. p. 523. Diagorae sectatores, as Theodor●● affirmeth: insomuch, that his name was grown proverbial among them. For, when they would note any profane and impious person, they would call him proverbially, Suidas in voce Diagoras. p. 231. Diagoras the Melian. Diagoras Melius, de prophanis, & per●idis, & impijs dicitur, saith Suidas. And yet, the Action which the Athenians commenced against him, was no more but this; that he did eliminate, and divulge the mysteries of their gods; Theodorusdixit, eos impi●tatis teneri; qui Mysteria nondum initiatis aperirent. La●rt. in Aristip. p 78. and, joseph. l. 2. cont. Apion. p. 914. by deriding of them, avert and turn men from them, as he noteth in the same place. Which two crimes, though very far in nature differing; yet were (among the Heathen) indifferently comprehended, under the name of Atheism; as though they were both one; which is a very large acception of Atheism. So that Diagoras his crime was not, that he denied all Gods: but, that he derided the Athenian gods. For so josephus reports it: Aduersùs Diagoram, talentum decreverunt, si quis eum occideret; quoniam eorum mysteria deridere ferebatur: They appointed a talon to him that should kill him; because he derided their Religion. Now this he might justly do, and yet not be an Atheist. He might justly deride the foolish Orgies of their false gods (as Elias did the follies of Baal's Priests) and yet therein not be an Atheist, 1. Kin. 18. 27. 28. as Elias was not. For their Rites were so unholy, and their sacrifices so bloody, that any man might (even by common reason) collect, that he, which was delighted with such a wicked kind of worship, Arnob. con. Gent l. 8. p. 749. could not be possibly indeed a true God: because they were, Sacra, Sacrilegijs omnibus tetriora: Holies, more unholy than Sacrilege itself: as Coecilius speaketh, Lact. l. 1. c. 20 p. 51. though to another purpose. Of which impure Holies, Lactantius hath given us a notable instance, in the feasts of their Floralia. And therefore, Plutarch, in some sort, excuseth those men, that have revolted unto this kind of Atheism, upon the contemplation of the filthiness of their Ceremonies, and the barbarousness of their Sacrifices: affirming direct Atheism to be a better religion, than so lewd and profane a kind of worshipping. Lustr●tiones impurae, Plut. l. De Superstit. Tom. 1. Mor. p. 391. sordidae castimoniae, Barbarica & iniusta in Templis supplicia, occasionem praebuerunt nonnullis, dicendi; Praestare, nullos esse Deos, quam qui talia probent, ijsque delectentur: Their impure purgations, their unchaste chastities, their cruel and unjust Sacrifices, have given many men occasion to say; that it were better, That their should be no Gods, than such as are delighted with such profane worships. Yea, and in the same place, he seemeth to allow of their sentence. So that Diagoras, by these means, might easily discover, the Heathen gods to be but false; though (perhaps) he could not light upon, and find out the true one. Which yet, gave him just occasion, to scorn and deride them, as Lactantius well observes: Lact. l. 2. c. 3. p. 75. Impugnatae sunt a prudentioribus falsae Religiones; quia sentiebant esse falsas: sed non est inducta vera; quia qualis, aut ubi esset, ignorabant. Wise men have always impugned, and derided false Religiòns; because they perceived them to be false: but yet have not always found the true one; because they neither knew it, nor where they should seek for it. But, that Diagoras was not a mere Atheist, it evidently appeareth in the beginning of his Verses; where he maketh this profession (which is the foundation of all Religion) Quòd a Numine summo, Mornae. l. de Verit Relig. c. 1. p. 16. reguntur omnia: That all things are ruled by one most high God. Which, (if it be true) Diagoras could not possibly be such an absolute Atheist, as he was commonly reputed. Let us therefore come from Diagoras, unto Protagoras, whom the Athenians, in like sort, condemned for an Atheist: yet not for denying God; but for seeming to doubt of him: Because, in the beginning of his book he propounded this problem: De Dijs quidem statuere nequeo; neque an sint, nec ne: Adding there also this reason: Laert. in vita Protagorae p. 320. Sunt enim plurima, quaeid scire prohibeant; quip & summa rei incertitudo, & brevis hominis vita. As concerning the gods, I cannot resolutely determine, neither whether they be, nor whether they be not; Because there be many things, that let the knowledge of it; namely, both the uncertainty of the thing itself, and also the brevity and shortness of man's life. This report doth Laertius make of his doubting. Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 192. But, by Tully it is expressed, a great deal more favourably. But yet, by this his seeming doubtfulness, the Athenians were so incensed, that they mulcted him with exile, and decreed, that his books should be publicly burned. And yet, that Protagoras was not a pure Atheist, we may probably gather, by two Arguments, out of that description of his life, which is written by Laertius. The first of them, that he maketh precationem [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉], Laert. ubi supra p. 321. that is, Prayer, and Invocation to be the first fundamental part of an Oration: which I have formerly showed, Cap. 1. Sect. 3. to have been put in practice, by all the most renowned Orators. Therefore, he could not think, that there was no God. For, he would never pray to nothing. If he had been persuaded, that the name of God, were but an idle name, and that there were no thing, that were answerable to it, he would never bestow his prayers upon it. Again, among his works, there was one of his Books inscribed, De ijs que sunt apud inferos. Ibid. page 322. Now, if he thought that there were Inferi, he must needs think that there were Superi. For Infra, and Supra, have so necessary a relation, that the one of them can neither stand, nor yet be understood without the other. And therefore, in admitting of the one, he must needs admit of both. As Socrates plainly proveth: If there be Damones, there must needs be Deus. Plato in Apologia. p. ●13. Eiusdem viri est, Daemonia simul, & Divina putare: It necessarily belongeth unto the same man, that will believe there be Devils, to believe, that there is a God. 〈…〉 verit. c. 1. p. 18. And, as Mornaeus reporteth, unto the same purpose Legimus, quibusdam, qui non nisi visa crederent, arte Magica Daemonas exhibitos: his conspectis, Deum etiam credidisse: As we read of some men, who would believe nothing but what they have seen; that, Devils being showed them by the power of Art Magic, they then presently believed, That there was a God. So that, for any thing that hath hitherto been said, Protagoras was no Atheist: he was not a denier, but a doubter of the gods, at the most. Now, doubting implieth not Atheism. For, diverse of the Prophet's themselves, have sometimes doubted. job, in one place, doubteth of God's all-seeing providence: How should not the times be hid from the Almighty? job 24. 1. And David, in another place, Psal. 73. 13. doubteth of his justice and uprightness; Verily, I have Alense● my heart in vain, and washed my hands in vain. This doubting, might argue their weak faith in God (especially for the present) but it could not conclude their denying of God. And, no more could it in him: especially his other writings implying, that he believed him. Let us yet proceed further, and consider of Euemerus: who was condemned for an Atheist, no less than Diagoras: whose opinion Theodoret affirmeth to have been prophanam indeitatem, a profane denying of God: coupling him with Diagoras, Theod. l. de Principijs, To. 2. p. 498. and Theodorus, the most infamed of the Atheists. But yet it appeareth, that his crime was not a general denying of all Gods, but only a denying of the heathen gods: and an affirming of them, to have been but men: as Saint Augustine noteth of him: affirming that he had imprinted into Virgil the same opinion, Aug. Epist. 44. To●. 2. p. 154. by reading him. So then, Euemerus his Atheism was no more but this, that he affirmed of Saturn, jupiter, Plut. l. de Iside To. 2. p. 174. Hercules, and th● rest (whom the Heathens adored, and worshipped for their gods) that they were indeed no gods: but either mighty Kings, and Emperors; or great Captains by Land; or great Admirals by sea; or such like great persons, in their times. And this (he saith) he read with his own eyes, written in Golden letters, among the Pancheans, and Triphilians. Whose report, though Plutarch there doth seek to discredit; imagining the name of Triphilians, to be but a trifling and an imaginary name, there being no such Triphilians in the world; yet therein indeed he discrediteth himself. Str●. l. 7. p. ●68. For, Strabo, both affirmeth that there was such a Nation, and describeth the place of their habitation, and giveth a reason of that appellation. Yea, Lactan. lib. de falsa relig cap. 11. p. and Lactantius giveth credit to the relation of Euemerus: and affirmeth, that Enntus followed his authority, in his History. So that from hence there lieth no exception, no not against his relation; much less against his opinion. Which was indeed a most true one. For, if that opinion were Atheism, than were all Christians Atheists, who confidently hold, that the gods of the Heathen were no better than men. Nay, then were the greatest part of the heathen themselves, Atheists: especially the wisest part of them. For they did all of them hold the same opinion. And, though they durst not openly publish it; yet did they certainly believe it; & now & then they would secretly confess it, where they might securely do it. As appeareth by that letter, which King Alexander sent unto his mother. Aug l. 8. de Civit. D●i. c. 5. To. 5. p. 442. Wherein he reporteth, that, in a private conference with an Aegyptian-Priest, he secretly confessed unto him, that those, whom they worshipped for their gods, Athenag. legate. pro Christ. To. 8. Bib. Pat. p. 21. yet were indeed but men. Yea, and Athenagoras affirmeth, that diverse of them confessed as much unto Herodotus. Herodotus, & Alexander Philippi filius, in Epistola ad Matrem (qui utique in diver sis civitatibus Aegypti, Heliopoli, Memphi, & Thebis, in colloquium cum Sacerdotibus venisse dicuntur) homines illos fuisse, ex iis se cognovisse aiunt. Which Herodotus himself expressly confesseth: Herod. l. 2. p. 165. Deos in Aegypto, fuisse Principes; That the gods of the Egyptians, were but their Kings. Yea, and Tully (under the same benedicity) telleth Marcus Brutus▪ Cic. l. 1. Tus. p. 112. That all those, whom they worshipped as Gods in heaven; yet had been (in their times) but only men upon earth● and that this he might safely impart unto him; because he was initiated into the secrets of their mysteries. Quid? totum propè coelum— nonnè humano genere completum est? Si verò scrutari vetera, & ex iis, quae Scriptores Graeciae prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipsi illi maiorum Gentium Dij qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in c●elum reperientur. Quare, quorum demonstrantur sepulchra in Graecia, reminiscere: (quoniam es initiatus quae tradantur mysterijs) tum denique, quam hoc latè pateat, intelliges. The whole heaven, is, in a manner, replenished with men. And if we would search out Antiquities, & gather those secrets together, that have been bewrayed by the greeks unto us; we should find, that even the greatest of all the gods, have from us been translated into the heavens. Wherefore, remember but with yourself, whose Sepulchers the greeks show us (for you are now initiated into the mysteries) and then you shall perceive, how far this truth stretcheth. Which observation, that here he delivereth so covertly, is expressed by Xenophon a great deal more openly. For he apertly professeth, that Saturn, jupiter, and Hercules, were but men: and that every country had both a Saturn, a jupiter, and a Hercules of their own: the first King, in every nation, being called their Saturn; the next, his Son, their jupiter; and the third, his Nephew, their Hercules. Saturni dicuntur, familiarum nobilium, Regum, qui urbes condiderunt, Xenoph. l. de Aequivocis in Antiquit. Author. p. 64. antiquissimi; primogeniti eorum, Ioves, et junones; Hercules verò, Nepotes eorum fortissimi: Patres Saturnorum, coeli; Vxores, Rhea, et Coelorum V●st●e. Quot ergò Saturni, tot Coeli, Vestae, Rheae, junones, Ioues, Hercules. Therefore, to hold this, that the Heathen gods were men, was no profaneness, or impiety; but a solid verity: which though it might not be publicly professed; yet was it privately understood, and believed. Whereby it appeareth, that Euemerus his Atheism, was not to Diuulge any untruth against the true God; but to diuulge a truth, against the false gods. And, the rather may this be believed to be true; because Theophilus Antiochenus reporteth, Theophil. Antioch. l. 3. ad Autolic. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 156. that Euemerus did hold, not only Animae immortalitatem, but also Dei unitatem: not only the immortality of the soul, but the unity of the Deity. Neither of which points can congruously be held, by him, that holdeth There is no God. The word indeed which Theophilus there useth, is but, disputarit. But, that he disputed it; not problematice, but assertinè, concluding there was a God; it appeareth by this; because he saith, that therein he was contrary unto himself, in his former denying him. Which, though he do there impute unto his inconstancy; yet may it be probably thought, to have been his palinody: if he ever before had held, That there was no God. For I will not peremptorily define, neither for him, nor for any of the rest, that they were no Atheists; but only dispute the contrary, upon probable grounds: and that the accusations which have been laid against them, do not neccessarily convince, that they were absolute Atheists; or that they generally denied all gods, though they denied those, with whom they were charged in their accusations. And this interpretation, I desire to be applied both unto all those Atheists, that have gone before; and unto all those, that do follow after. Let us therefore now proceed. For Theodorus, Theop. Antioch. l. 3. ad Autolic. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 156. and Bion of Boristhens: though it should be granted (as it is of them reported) That they generally denied, There was any God, yet can it not be affirmed, that they constantly denied it. For, the one of them, Theodorus, fell, in the end, into that madness, Laert. in vil. Arisstip. p. 77. as ridiculously to profess that He himself was a God. Laert. in vita Bion●s. p. 144. The other of them, Bion, fell into that repentance, as to confess those gods, at the last, whom, at the first, he had denied. And therefore, neither of these two (being such apostates from their Atheism) can justly be reckoned in the number of Atheists. But both him, and Diagores, and Euemerus, and diverse others, (whom the greeks accounted Atheists) doth Cl●mens Alexandrinus nominatìm excuse, Clem. Alex. in Protr●pt. p. 10. as men of good life, and of a deeper insight in discovering the false gods, than the rest of their Neighbours. As for Epicurus; he denied not God's essence; he denied only his providence. Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 191. He granted, that there was a God; though he thought him to be such an One, as did neither evil nor good. Placet Epicuro esse Deos; Quia necesse sit, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 207. praestantem esse aliquam Naturam, qua nihil sit m●li●●s: The Epicure is induced to believe, There is a God: Because there must needs be, an excellent Nature, which is superlatively good. Yea, and (as it appeareth again out of Tully) he himself writ a book, instructing men unto Piety: which he inscribed, De Pietate adversùs Deos: Of Religion and Piety towards the Gods. Which argueth, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. D●or▪ p. 199. that he thought there were gods. Nay, in that same Book he spoke so religiously, and holily of the gods; Vt Coruncanum, aut Scaevolam, Pontifices maximos, le audisse dicas (as in the same place he reporteth) as if it had been spoken, by Coruncanus or Scaevola; who were their high Priests. And for Pherecydes; Aelian. l. 4. de var. Hist. c. 28. p. 428. who denied to give worship unto any of all the heathen gods (whom he might easily discern to be no true gods) he was therein not an Atheist, (if he went no further:) For Daniel refused to worship god Bel; Hist. of Bel. v. 4. 5. D●n. 3. 18. and the three children refused to worship the golden idol: yet made them that, no Atheists: neither likewise did it him: but, in their false opinion. And that his Atheism was nothing else, but only an inu●ighing against the heathen Idols, it appeareth by Laertius; who, in his life, reporteth that his Position was; Laert. in vit. Pherecidis p. Neque aurum, neque argentum honorandum: That neither Gold, nor Silver, is to be worshipped: and that Hercules had commanded him this in a dream. Now this is no Atheism. For, the Apostle Paul telleth us the very same, Act● 17. 29. That the Godhead is not like unto Gold or Silver; nor any other such like matter. Senec. Epist. 31. p. 50. And Seneca likewise unto the same purpose: Non potest, ex h●c materia, imago Deo exprimi similis: speaking of Gold and Silver: There cannot of such matter, be any image framed, that is like unto God. Again, that he was not a pure Atheist, may be gathered from the testimony of Theopompus: who saith, that he was, Primus omnium, qui scripsit de Dijs: that he was the first man, that wrote of the Gods. And, that he handled that Argument not profanely, but religiously, it may likewise be gathered, in that they called him not Atheos', Laert. ibid. p. 43. Ficin. Argument. in l. ●. Platon. de Repub. p. 616. but Theologus: not an Atheist, but a Divine: Yea, and Ficinus asserteth him, inter summos Theologos, & moribus divinos: among the chiefest Divines, and of the best life. And so likewise for Dionysius; he in deriding of those Idols, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 238. 1. Kin. 18. 27. whom his Countrymen did worship, was not therefore an Atheist; as Elias was not in his deriding of Baal, and in his spoiling them, he was not so much an Atheist, as diverse of those that seem to be their most devoted worshippers: who yet make no scruple or religion, not only of deforming them, but even of basely transforming them: De Saturno in Cacabulum, & De Minerva in Trullam, Tertul. Apog. c. 13. p. 36. as Tertullian writeth of them, which is the foulest contempt that can be offered unto them. So that even the most infamous and notorious Atheists (for any thing that hath been proved against them) might all of them have been rather deriders of the false gods, then deniers of the true. Whom, though they perfectly knew not, yet might they ignorantly worship; as the Athenians did their unknown God. Act 17. 23▪ Whom you ignorantly worship (saith S. Pau●●) him show I unto you. They might, I say (that they did so, I say not) either worship the true God ignorantly; or some other false gods idolatrously: though they renounced those gods which were worshipped in their countries. Either of which, if they did, they could not be counted Atheists. And; that some of them did so, it evidently appeareth in the example of Socrates: whom when the Athenians accused of Atheism, he renounced that crime, and openly pronounced, that though he did not acknowledge their City gods; yet that he believed there were other Gods. Ego Deos esse puto: neque omninò sum absque Deo. Neque in hoc iniustèago: ●lato in Apog. p. 472. quan vis, non eos, quos habet civitas, sed alios esse doceam: I do believe that there be Gods: neither am I myself without a God. Neither in this do I offend; though I hold not those to be my gods, whom the City holdeth to be theirs. He disclaimeth the general denial of all Gods, though he proclaimeth his particular denial of their gods: And therefore could not justly be numbered among Atheists. For (as Laertius truly noteth) Impius non est, Laert. i● vit. ●picuri. p. 370. qui tollit mul●itudinis Deos, sed qui Dijs, multitudinis opiniones applicat. He is not an Atheist that denieth the gods, whom the people do imagine; but rather he that appl●eth the imaginations of the people unto the gods. And therefore it followeth not, that Socrates did generally deny all gods, because he particularly denied the Grecian gods. And the same may be likewise observed in Damis: in whose feigned person, profane and impious Lucian hath vented all his Atheism. For though by him he derided all the gods of the Gentiles, not sparing even jupiter himself: yet when Timocles objected, that he was a general despiser of all the gods, and a general enemy to their Altars and Religions; Lucian in jove Trag●●●lo. p. 210. a. he detested that crime, and protested unto him; Haud omnes aras subverti cupio, O bone Timocles: I do not desire an utter subversion of all Religion. So that (for any thing that I can find) there is none of those Philosophers, whom the Heathens have pursued with such an Hue-and-Crie for most damnable Atheists, but that, if their cause be indifferently examined, they may probably be thought to have acknowledged a true God, in some measure and degree: howsoever they derided and declaimed against the false. Yea, and even their renouncing of those false gods, was also (in some degre●) a confessing of a true. Tertul. Apolo. get. c. 15. p. 39 For (as Tertullian collecteth) Subiacet intelligi, verit ●tis esse cultores, qui mendacij non sunt; nec errasse ampliùs in eo, in quo errasse se r●cognoscendo cessaverunt: It may well be conceived, that they are followers of the truth, that are not followers of lies: and that they will therein err no more, wherein they have acknowledged their former error. At least (as Clemens Alexandrinus collecteth, Cle●. Alex. in Pro●rept. p. 10. even in this very case.) This finding of their own error, in worshipping those false gods, was, non parvum semen, ad excitandam scintillam, intelligentie veritatis: it was (as it were) a seed, or a sparkle to kindle the knowledge of the truth. Now if none of all those men, that have been most noted and renowned for Atheism, not only by the writings of Pagans, but also of Christians, yet were not truly Atheists indeed; but that, notwithstanding their derision of those false gods, they might well believe that there was a true one: then can none of their examples (no nor all of them) serve to infringe the generality of our former position: that There is no man in the world, but that at some time or other, in some degree or other, he believeth There is a God: no, not even the Atheists themselves excepted. Who (as you have partly seen here, and shall more fully hereafter) do directly confess, Cap. 13. Why they were condemned 〈◊〉 Atheists. That there is a God. But here now, two Questions do come to be discussed. First, that if these men were no true Atheists indeed, why were they so condemned? and why have they been infamed for such, if they were not such? Whereunto I briefly answer: that this was only through the jealousy and tenderness of the Heathens, in defending of their Countrey-gods: over whom they were so tender, that whosoever denied them, they held that he held none: and though he professed that he believed others; yet they held, that he rejected all, if he received not theirs. And this we may plainly see, in the judgement of Socrates: Xenophen l. 1. de factis Socrat. p. 157. in whose very accusation, they laid to his charge, that he did, Priscos Deos non colere, & novos introducere: That he denied their old gods, and brought them in new. Item Plato in Apologia p. 471. Idem in Euthyphrone p. 54. P●ato ibid. p. 473 Where, though they confess, that he believed certain new gods; yet they condemned him, as an Atheist, for rejecting of the old: as though that had been to reject all. And though Socrates justly taxeth th●m, as clean contrary to themselves, in the two main heads of their accusation; to charge him with Atheism, that is, a denying of all gods, in the one head; whom they discharge in the other, by objecting his new gods: deriding this foolish intoxication, to be (in effect) as if they should have said: Contra leges agit Socrates, Deos non putans, sed Deos putans; yet their zeal in their religion prevailed so far, as to work his condemnation: accounting it not much less impiety, to assert any new gods, then to deny all gods. As we may see also by their catching at the speech of S. Paul: Act. 17. 18. He seemeth to be a setter-out of strange Gods. And it is like enough, that if he had stayed there, it might have cost him his head. For, though his new God were, in truth, the true God; yet, because he disliked their old gods, they would have held him for an Atheist: Athenag. Orat. pro. Christian. apud Iust. Mart. To. 1. p. 234. as they did (for the same cause) the whole sect of Christians: as Athenagoras reporteth. Illi nobis Atheismum impingunt, propterea quod non eosdem, quos ipsi nôrunt, arbitremur esse [Deos:] They object even to Christians, the crime of Atheism; because they do not worship the same gods with them. For, this was their account, that he which rejected their gods, could not know any other; and therefore rejected them all together. And● it may be they erred not, but that diverse of those Atheists, which rejected their gods, did it of a profane humour, not regarding any other: and therefore were justly condemned by them, of impiety and Atheism. But if there were any such (as I will not obstinately contend, but there might be some) yet this I hold of them, that they did not constantly hold out their opinion: but that oftentimes they so checked themselves, that they could not but inwardly believe there was a God, though they outwardly denied it. Yea, and it may be likewise, that diverse of them, upon vain glory, or upon study of singularity, that they might seem to be wiser than other men, have outwardly professed (though not inwardly believed) that There is no God. But then, here the second Question cometh to be resolved. To what end, this whole work serveth, which is written against Atheists, if they be few, or none such? Whereunto, though I have partly answered in the preface to the Reader; yet, I here will add this further: That though there be but few such Atheists (or rather indeed none) as resolutely and constantly believe with their hearts, that There is no God; yea, and not many such, as profess it with their mouths, though not believing it constantly: Yet be there very many, that believe it weakly: and, that being overcome by sudden passions and temptations, do oftentimes doubt, and distrust; whether there be any God? As we see it ingeniously confessed, by Ouid.— Ignoscite fasso; Solicitor, Ovid l. ●. Amor. Eleg. 8. p. 209. nullos esse putare Deos. Confess I do, and pardon crauc; I tempted am, No gods to have. Yea, and the same is acknowledged by Claudian, a Christian. Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem; Claudia● l. 1. in Ruffin. p. 51. Curarent Superi terras? an nullus inesset Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia casu? This troublous thought hath oft perplexed, and plunged my doubtful mind; Whether a God, or whether none, or whether Fortune blind Did care the Earth, and rule the World, and actions of Mankind? And few men can escape the very same temptations. Therefore, of this sort of Atheists, there is as great a plenty, as of the first sort, a scarcity. Nay, there is almost no man, but at some time or other, he falleth within the compass of this doubting. Aug. in Psal. 52. To. 8. p. 509. So that (as it is truly observed by Saint Augustine) Hoc intellectu discusso, invenietur esse in plurimis, quod in paucis, & raris, & penè in nullis, esse putabamus: In this larger signification, we shall find this sin of Atheism to be in very many, which we thought before, to be almost in none, or (at the most) but in a few. Therefore, many may reap profit, by the reading of this book, Note. not only by exempting them from all impiety of doubting, but also by instructing them, in the most point of Religion, which, in some place or other of it, present themselves to be discussed. And, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Cap. 15. Sect. 5. whereas in diverse passages of it, we affirm, that there be no Atheists; and yet, in other places, do acknowledge many, and dispute against them: for the avoiding of offence by this seeming contradiction, Nec assiduè repetendum est quod superiùs iam dixi: sed hoc recolendum, ubicunquè isla locutio in meis literis invenitur Aug. l. 1. Retract. c. 4. To. 1. p. N●uatian l. de Trim. c. 8. Apud Tertul. p. 626. I desire the Reader to carry along with him this distinction: that I be not often driven to make this repetition: namely, that when we deny that there be any Atheists, as be properly so called, which generally and constantly believe There is no God, and hold so unto the end: (Of which sort there can be none, though many have been so reputed and taken: because (as it is truly observed by Novation) Deum, mens omnis humana sentit, etiamsi non exprimit: There is no man, but in his soul he doth inwardly feel, That there is a God; though he do not outwardly confess it.) When we confess, There be Atheists, and dispute against them; we understand only such as deny there is a God, rather by outward profession, then by inward persuasion: or, if they have indeed any such inward persuasion, it is but only upon some sudden passion: which vanisheth as suddenly, as it was conceived fond. And of these sudden and passionate eruptions, may that place of the Psalmist be understood: Psal. 14. 1. The Fool hath said in his heart, There is no God: if we will refer it unto practical Atheism. 5 And such were indeed all those renowned Atheists, Atheists hold but weakly their opinion of Atheism. whom we find to be most celebrated, in the monuments & writings, not only of heathens, but also of Christians. There was not one of all them, that could constantly hold out, & maintain his opinion, though he outwardly professed it with never such a colour and show of resolution. We see among Philosophers, that many other of their opinions (though very strange, and almost monstrous) yet have been, with great pertinacy, defended by them, & stiffly persisted in, even unto the end. But so was never Atheism. There was never Atheist yet, which entertained that impious opinion against God, that could ever hold it mordicùs, and defend it constantly unto the end. But, even whilst they held it, they both believed it so weakly, and left the belief of it so easily, that it could not, in common reason, Laert. in vit. Bionis p. 145. be accounted their opinion: as Laertius inferreth upon the recantation of Bion of Boristhenes. Si quidem illud dogma tueri perstitisset, meritò dicendus esset, sensisse, ut visum fuisset, et si malè visum esset: If he had held out his opinion unto the end, he might justly have been said to have meant, as he said; though his meaning were but bad. But now, by his revolting, he insinuateth, that his Atheism could not justly be said to have been his opinion. For, opinionem omnem sequitur fides: nec fieri potest, Ar●st. l. 3. de Anima c. 3. To. 1. P. 828. ut iis quisquam non credat, quorum habet opinionem: saith Aristotle. Every opinion begetteth a believing. And therefore, where there is a leaving of our belief, there also ceaseth to be an opinion. Now it is Plato's observation, that all Atheists, who profess in the beginning, Plato l. 10. de Legibus p. 871. that they believe, There is no God; yet still do forsake that belief in the end; and so quit te their opinions. Nullus eorum, ab adolescentia usque ad senectutem, in hac opinion, Quòd Dij non sunt, presever avit: There was never yet any man, which believed, There was no God, that was able to hold out, and maintain that opinion and belief unto the end. Which position of Plato's is notably confirmed, by Tullus Hostilius, a great derider of the Romane-gods, and of that Religion, Plut. in vita Numae. p. 156. which Numa had brought in. But yet (as Plutarch observeth of him) In hoc audaci instituto non perrexit: sed morbo gravi & multiplici, ad mutandam sententiam compulsus est. He was not able to maintain and to hold out his Atheism: but was enforced by sickness, to change it into superstition, the clean contrary extreme. For the contrary conclusion [That there is a God] is so deeply rooted in the hearts of all men, that sooner shall they be able to pluck out their hearts out of their bodies; then to pluck that conclusion out of their hearts. Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 1569. Which Aristotle illustrateth, by this witty comparison, that, as Phydias, that renowned Carver of Images, did grave his own image into the buckler of Pallas, with such singular Art and cunning, that it could not by any means be removed; unless the whole work itself were defaced: so God hath stamped his image, so deeply and firmly into the world, and especially into the heart of a man, that it cannot be removed, unless the heart itself be dissolved: though it be with never such cunning dissembled. Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 203. Unto which conceit of Aristotle, Tully seemeth to have a kind of allusion: when he telleth us, that it is not only, Innatum; sed etiam in animo insculptum, esse Deos: It is not only naturally bred in the mind; but it is also artificially engraven into it, That there is a God. It is (as the Prophet jeremy speaketh) not only written in man's heart, jer. 17. 1. with a pen of iron; but also graven there, with the point of a Diamond. A conclusion, which cannot possibly die, so long as the soul itself doth live. 〈…〉 To. 1. p. 195. For, Ibid. p. 204. the very first truth which God hath engraven into the soul of a man, is, That there is a God. And, as the Schoolmen teach us: Nulla res, qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius: There is nothing, that can possibly be understood, unless we first understand, That there is a God. This is Primum verum: the very first truth, which God hath taught unto the soul of a man. Cic. l. 4. de 〈◊〉. p. 83. Now, Natura suae primae institutionis non obliviscitur: saith the Roman Orator. Nature can by no means forget her first lesson. And therefore, though the Atheist do never so carefully or cunningly dissemble it; yet can he not but know, that There is a God. He cannot but inwardly know it, Philo. jud. l. ●e Giga●●ibus p. 401. though he outwardly dissemble it. For, Quis est adeò rationis expers aut animae, (saith Philo judeus) ut nulla unquàm de Optimo illo, Maximoa, eum volentem nolent emuè subirit cogitatio? There is no man so devoid of either sense, or reason, but that he sometime thinks of God, either willing or nilling. Name, & nolentes sciunt, & fatentur inviti: saith Maximus Tyrius. Max. Tyr. Serm. 1. p. 7. They, even against their wills, do both know it, and acknowledge it. And therefore they cannot constantly deny it. Yea, and Clemens Alexandrinus rendereth a very good reason, why God cannot be unknown unto the soul of any reasonable man: because it was inspired into him by God. Clem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 274. 〈◊〉 in voc● Poesis p. 725. The Souls first generation, was Gods immediate inspiration. And therefore saith he; Long abest, ut sit homo expers divinae notionis, quem scriptum est fuisse participem inspirationis in generatione. So that, as Lucilius observeth of Homer: that— Nemo qui culpat Homerum, Prepetuò culpat:— there's none, that Homer's name Still constantly doth blame: So may it be truly affirmed of God too; that, Nemo, qui Deum negat, Perpetuò negat: That, No man which denieth God, doth constantly deny him. No, nor confidently neither. Tertuli de carne Christi. c. 23. p. 311. Impudently they may: but confidently they cannot. They do, but Dubitatiuè pronunciare, as Tertullian speaketh. They speak inwardly, but doubtfully; though outwardly more stubbornly. Their denial of God, is no settled resolution. It is but a weak, and a flickering opinion, which suddenly passeth through the heart of a man, and suddenly vanisheth again; having no rooting, nor footing, no not even so much as in their own persuasion. But is like unto those weak and unperfect assents, which drunken men give unto things in their dreams; or mad men, in their frenzies. Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 19 Which the Orator expresseth unto us, in this manner. Dicimus, non eandem esse vim, neque integritatem, dormientium, & vigilantium. Ne vinolenti quidem, quae faciunt, eadem approbatione faciunt, qua sobrij. Dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum; hisque quae videntur, imbecilliùs assentiuntur. We may truly affirm, that there is not the same power and perfection of sense, in men, when they sleep; and in the same men, when they wake. Neither do men, in their drunkenness, any thing with that assurance, that they do in their soberness. They doubt, they stagger, they call back themselves; and they yield but a feeble assent unto all things. And such is that assent, which the confidentest Atheist giveth unto his Atheism. He so assenteth to it, that he doubteth of it: or rather, by a contrary assent, clean supplanteth it. So that, no man believeth; That there is no God, with that confidence and assurance, that all men believe, That there is a God. No man is carried into Atheism, with that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and fullness of persuasion, that he is into a sense of God, and Religion. From which (as Tertullian observeth) there is nothing that can hinder him. Anima, Tertul. Apol●●. ●. 17. p. 42. licèt carcere corporis pressa, licèt institutionibus pravis circ●mscripta, licèt libidinibus & concupiscentijs evigorata, licèt falsis Dijs exancillata: cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula; ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, & sanitatem suam patitur, Deum nominat. The soul of a man, though it be shut up in the prison of his body, though depraved and misled by corrupt and wicked teachers; though weakened with manifold lusts and concupiscences, though 〈◊〉 trained up in the service of false gods: yet when it once begins to recollect itself, and to lift up his head, as it were, out of his drunkenness, his sleep, or his sickness, and attaineth his true health, than it thinketh, and calleth upon God. This is the proper and natural motion of the soul, to move upwards towards God. And this course it holdeth, sometimes, even in the very Atheists, as well as in others. And, though clogged with all the forenamed impediments; yet breaketh it oftentimes through them all, to look God in the face. For (as Orosius truly teacheth) Mens ratione illustrata, 〈◊〉 ●. 6. Hist. c. 1. P. 212. ●. in medio virtutum, quibus genuino favore (quamuìs vitijs inclinetur) assurgit, scientiam Dei, quasi arcem, prospicit: The soul of a man being enlightened with reason, and assisted by virtue, unto which it hath a natural liking, raiseth up itself, and mounteth upward, to obtain the fuller sight and clearer knowledge of God. So that, their profane Atheism, being Motus contra naturam, A motion against nature; and coming but now and then, only by fits unto them, may more justly be esteemed, to be but only their frenzy, or their dream, then to be their elected or resolved opinion. For so Tully calleth some of their opinions; which were a great deal better settled in them then this, Portenta & miracula, 〈◊〉. 1. de. 〈◊〉. D●or. p. 186. non disserentium Philosophorum, s●d somniantium. The monsters and miracles of dreaming Philosophers. And yet, I deny not, but that there may be some men so foolish and impious, as to say, even in their hearts, That there is no God. For the Prophet David saith it: a man worthy to be believed: The Fool hath said in his heart, Ps. 14. 1. There is no God. Yea, and some may have their hearts so hardened in profaneness, as not only to gibe at God with scoffs and derisions, as did the Tyrant Dionysius; 〈◊〉. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. P 238. but also seriously to dispute against him, as did the Epicure Velleius; 〈◊〉. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p 186. etc. Ibid. p. 199. yea, and Epicurus himself, who, even in that same book, which he wrote, De pietate adversus deos, Of piety towards the gods; yet praevaricated most impiously against the gods: Non manibus (ut Xerxes) sed rationibus, deorum immortalium templa & arras evertens: as is noted in the same place; He overthrew the temples, and altars of the gods, not by force and arms (as Xerxes) but by force of Arguments. But especially Diagoras, who wrote certain Orations against the gods: wherein he reposed so singular a confidence, Suidas in voce Diagoras. p. 231. that he gave them the title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quasi turrium destructrices, The destroyers of Towers. Whereby it appeareth, that in these men, their Atheism was (for the time) a settled opinion; and not any light or flickering cogitation. But unto all this, I answer with the Roman Orator. Quid attinet glorio●e loqui, ●ic. l. 2. de Fin. p. 61. nisi constanter loquare? What booteth it to speak gloriously, if a man speak not constantly, and stick not firmly unto that which he speaketh? As neither David's fool doth, who denied God; nor Diony sius, who derided him; nor Diagoras, or Epicurus, who writ their books against him. There is none of all these, if they intended their speeches in general, against all Gods (and not rather in particular, against the Heathen-gods, Cap. 10. Sect. 4. etc. * as some have coniecture●) that can constantly and resolutely think as they speak. There is not the lusti●st and most resolute Atheist, that ever lived, that can resolutely and constantly believe, there is no God. There be many, that sometimes (in a fit of jollity) affirm, There is no God: yea, and seek wholly to forget him; that so they may wallow more securely in all sin. But yet still, when the heat of that lust and lustiness is past, and they be come again unto their cold blood, they do then say in their hearts, that, Surely there is a God. Yea, and then they believe it too, more firmly, than they would. They do then, with the Devils, lamb. ●. 19 both believe it, and tremble at it: fearing God's severe judgement, and their own due punishment for the denying of it. So that it may truly be said of Atheists, that though they do, amplè, & elatè loqui; yet do they, Ci●. l. 5. Tus●. p. 170. but humiliter, & demissè sentire: though they speak lustily, yet they think but basely. They do but, hoc in labijs, Aug. Epist. 20. To. 2. p. 588. non in cord dicere: as S. Augustine speaketh: They speak it but with their lips, they believe it not with their hearts: at the least, not with a constant assent unto it. For, as he noteth in another place, Aug. in Psal. 52. To. 8. p. 509. Difficile est, ut incurramus in hominem, qui dicit in cord suo, Non est Deuse It is a hard thing to meet with any man, that can say in his heart, There is no God. We may meet with many that can say so with their mouths▪ but with very few, or none, that do think so in their hearts, though it be but by short spurts, Anselm. in Prosolog. c. 2. 3. To. 3. p. 29. as Anselmus plainly proveth. So, that the Atheist, for the greatest part of his life, is no Atheist indeed. He is an Atheist but by fits, in the time of some passion; but he is no Atheist all the calmer time of his living. And therefore it may be said of Atheists (as well as of Epi●ures) That, Cic. l. 2. De sin. p. 60. as all other Philosophers say better than they think: so these think better than they say. For they say, There is no God: but they think, There is one. Yea, and they can do no otherwise. For, Anselm. in Prosologi●. c. 3. ●om. 3. p. 29. Deus utique sic verè est (saith A●selmus) ut ne● cogitari possit, Non est: For, God so truly hath his being; that it cannot once be thought, he should have no being. As for the Atheists deriding of God; it is nothing else, but Risus Sardonius: A forced and faincd laughter; 2. Cor. 5. 12. A rejoicing in the face, and not in the heart: as the Apostle Paul expresseth it. For they cannot by all their scoffing at him, extinguish that knowledge of him, which they have within them. For (as Tertullian truly noteth) Illum reprehendere magis possunt, Tertul l. 2. cont. Martion c▪ 2. p. 368. quam negare: They can sooner reprehend him, then truly deny him. And Orosius likewise unto the same purpose: Deum contemnere, quilibet hominum, ad tempus, Oros. l. 6. Hist. c. 1. p. 212. B. potest; nescire in totum, non potest: Every man may, for a time, contemn and scorn God: but yet no man can totally be ignorant of him. Even then, when they scorn him, yet they cannot but know him, and fear him too. And therefore their deriding him, is but the disguising of their inward fear, with the counterfeit semblance of a lying countenance: such, Euripid. In jone p. 819. as in a like case is described by Euripides. Vultus quidem iucundus; interiora verò Tristia. Quis enìm beatus, quis foelix, Qui in metu est; & qui suspectam habens vitam, Vitam degit? Their countenance is smooth and fair; but inward parts are sad, For who can pleasant be, and blest, that lives in fear and dread: And having life suspected, doth it still suspected lead? And yet, such is the state of the Atheist, even when he seemeth the pleasantest. He still feareth that God's vengeance will overtake his pleasa●ce●: thereby inwardly acknowledging him, though he outwardly deny him. And for the Atheists disputing against him: it is indeed no better than a mere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1. Tim. 6. 4. an idle altercation, and contention about words. He denieth the name of God: but he granteth the thing; as he showeth by his fearing. So that his heart never thinks that which his tongue speaketh. For, when his tongue saith outwardly, that, There is no God: his heart saith inwardly, that, There is a God: and so his heart telleth his tongue, that it lieth. And when he seeks, Persius' Satyr. 5. p. 11. by Reason, to prove there is no God: Stat contra Ratio; & s●cretam ganuit in aurem: A stronger Reason stands against, and whispers in his e●re, His Nay is naught:— and tells him, There is one. So that, the persuasion of Atheism is but weak, and without all firmness; but short, and without all continuance; but unconstant, and without all assurance. And therefore, even the very Atheist himself, is no important or material instance, to give a just exception, against the universality of consent in Religion: as (beside all the forenamed arguments) I purpose to declare, by diverse others, in the next ensuing Chapters. CHAP. 11. The two Ends of Atheism; Not to serve, and, Not to fear. 2. The Atheist in the first of these two ends, is disappointed; becoming a base servant unto all his own vices. 3. But more especially, unto his ambition. 4. And his Belly. 5. All which service he referring to himself, he becometh thereby, A God unto himself. I Have showed, The two Ends of Atheism. in the former chapter, that the Atheist doth but weakly believe, There is no God: if he believe so at all. But there by many strong Arguments, whereby it may be proved, that indeed, he doth strongly believe, There is a God: though he outwardly dissemble it. He believeth it not, with such a belief of faith, as is able to save him: but yet with such a belief of knowledge, as is able to condemn him. And this he plainly showeth, not only by his ●eeds, but also by his words. By his deeds, in an oblique and direct confession: by his words, in a very direct and express one. His deeds, whereby he confesseth, that There is a God, be two: the enormous excess of his love unto himself: and that inward griping fear, which he feeleth within himself. For I find it observed among the learned, that the destinate ends, which the Atheist propoundeth unto himself, in the choice of his impious and damnable opinion, are principally these two: Non seruire, and, Non metuere: That he may not serve, and, That he may not fear. The first of which two Ends, is instanced by S. Augustine. Quidam, Aug. de v●ra 〈◊〉. c. 36. To. 1. p. 702. propterea putant, nihil colendum esse, ne seruiant. Some men will needs believe, there is no God to be served, because they would not serve him. The second of them, 〈◊〉 l. de 〈◊〉. To. 1. Mor. p. 381. is instanced by Plutarch. Finis, non credendi Deum esse, est, metu vacare: The end of men's not believing a God, is, to be free from fear. And for the attaining of these two ends [that he may not serve, and, that he may not fear] will the Atheists needs believe (even beyond all belief, fide sine fide) That there is no God. For, no man would ever engage himself in Atheism (so odious and so detestable an opinion) but only to free himself from serving, & fearing. But indeed, he is greatly deceived in them both; & utterly frustrated of his hoped end. For, no man serveth more, no man feareth so much. So that he manifestly proveth, by both these two means, that he thinks There is a God; by which he seeks to prove, that he thinks there is none. And so (as the Orator observeth of Philo the Academic) In idipsum se induit, 〈◊〉. l. 4. Acad. Quaest p. 13. quod timebat: He t●rusteth his head into the very same snarewhich before he feared. So that he may truly say with job▪ a far more holy man; The thing that I greatly feared is fal●e upon me: and that which I was afraid of, is come unto me. 2 For the first end of the Atheist, which is, joh. 3. 25. The Atheist serveth many masters. Non seruire: there is nothing more certain, then that the Atheist entertaineth his impious opinion, especially for this end: that so he may attain to be A free man; and not either to serve, or to observe any other man: no nor any God neither. As it evidently appeareth in Pherecides Syrus; who shamed not to glory (but his glory was his shame) That he had never served any of the gods, Aelian. l. 4. var. 〈◊〉. c. 28. p. 428. all his life, and yet h●d always led a very pleasant and merry life. So that, this was the end which he aimed at, in his impiety, that he might not live servilely; as he accounted that he should, if he worshipped any God: reckoning Piety to be Servility: which is indeed, clean contrary*. D●o parere libertas est. Sen●●. l. De vita beat. c. 15. p. 115. It is the only true Liberty. Hoc ipsum, Philosophiae serulre, libertas est. Senec. Epist. 8. p. 10▪ 2. Cor. 3. 17. 2. Pet. 2. 19 For, as S. Paul testifieth, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. And their impious Liberty, is indeed true Servility; according to that of S. Peter: Whilst they promise to others liberty, they themselves are the servants of corruption. And the Holy Ghost adds a reason: For, of whom a may is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage. They make themselves servants, unto all the corrupt fancies of their own addle heads; and to all the corrupt desires of their own idle bellies. For these two be the Atheists chief and principal masters: whom they serve, with more base and abject servility, than ever ●ny slave served, in the cruelest captivity. And well may they be so. For, according to the Paradox of the Stoics, mentioned by the Orator: Omnes improbi, Cic. Paradox. 5. serui: All wicked men are slaves. They that will not serve God himself, who is their only true master, are given over, by God's justice, to serve two other Masters, exacting vile services, The Ambition of vain glory, and, the lusts of their own belly. Two most unjust & imperious masters: insulting, and domineering over them, as over slaves: commanding, & enjoining them every base thing: & yet enforcing them to obey them, with no less exactions than the Egyptian taskmasters. E●od. 5. 10. 11. etc. The first of them, compelling them, as it were to gather straw, by serving the vain breath of the people's fond applause: the other of them compelling them to labour in the Brick-kilne; by serving the burning lusts of their own wicked bellies: thus detaining them in more than Egyptian slavishnes. So that, in their declining of the service of God, they gain not that freedom, which they hoped, and propounded; but fall into that thraldom, which they desired to avoid: as Saint Augustine hath truly, and wisely observed. Nego, esse quenquam istorum, qui nihil colendum existimant; qui non, Aug. l. de V●●a 〈◊〉. c. 38. To. 1. p. 702. aut carnalibus gaudijs subditus sit, aut potentiam vanam foveat, aut spectac ulo aliquo delectatus insaniat. Ita nescientes diligunt temporalia, ut inde beat●tud●nem expectent. His autem rebus, quibus quisque beatus vult effici, seruiat necesse est, velit, nolit. There is none of all those men, which desire to serve nothing; but that he, either serveth his own carnal desires, or his vain ambitions, or his giddy pleasures. So loving these outward and temporal things, that they think to find in them a perfect happiness. Now, every man serveth all those things, will he, nill he, whereby he is in hope, to attain unto felicity. Concluding in the same place, that Sua sibi vitia dominari patiuntur; vellibidine, vel superbia, vel curio sitate damnati: They suffer, even their own vices, to domineer, and rule over them; their lust, and their pride, and their curious ambition. And this (as Saint Paul teacheth) falleth out, Rom. 1▪ 24 25. 26. 27. 2●. 29. by the hand of Gods most just vengeance, that They who refuse to serve their Creator, should by him, be given over, unto their vile affections; yea, even into a reprobate sense, to serve their own lusts, and uncleanness, and all manner of unrighteousness; fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, debate, deceit; and a number of such like, which, even there, he reckoneth up. And therefore the Atheist is very far, from that supposed liberty, which (in choosing of his Atheism) he promised unto himself: being thereby made a servant, not only of many Masters, but also of most base and unworthy Masters. Turpissimus seruus, Dominorum turpiorum: a most base servant, of more base Masters. 3 But yet more particularly of Vainglory, The Atheists base serving of his own Ambition. Cic. l. 1. Tus●. p. 113. and of Luxury. These two, above all the rest, are most served, by the Atheist. For, first, for Vainglory. It is noted by the Orator, that of all sorts of men, there is none of them transported, with the wind of ambition, more greatly, than those persons, which have been of greatest name among the Philosophers. Who, even in those Books, which they have written against Vainglory, as openly condemning it; yet have added their own names, as secretly affecti●● it. A●d therefore, Tertullian giveth them deserved titles, 〈…〉. 1. p. 26●. when he calleth the Philosophers, but Gloriae animalia, and Famae negociatores. The Creatures of ambition, and the Traders for a name. In 〈◊〉. c. 4●. p. 72. Unto which two, Hierom addeth, Hier. Epis●. ad julianum To. 1. p. 2●7. that they be, Vilia popularis aurae mancipia: The base Slaves of the People's praise. But yet, of all the Philosophers, I do not find any, so infinitely possessed, with the wind of Vainglory, as those men, that have been most possessed, with Atheism: as we may see, 〈◊〉. in vita ●ionis. p. 142. for an instance, in Bion of Boristhenes. Who, seeing that by all his Lectures of Atheism, he could not gain, so much as one Disciple to follow him: that he might not seem, so utterly deserted and despised, he hired a company of Sailors, to follow him up and down, in the habit of Scholars, through the chief streets of the Town, and with them he went jetting towards the Schools, as if he had been followed, with a great train of Disciples. Now, what a miserable servant of Ambition was this man, that durst thus impotently affect it, where he might so easily be detected? And the same servile affectation of Vainglory and Ambition, Lact. l. de Ira Dei. c. 9 p. 455. may likewise be observed, in all the rest of them. Insomuch, that Lactantius maketh their ambition, to be the very fountain of their impiety, and Atheism. And, he giveth there for instance, Diagoras, and Theodorus, who, having not the wisdom, to give honour to themselves, by any new invention of their own; they sought to climb unto it, by confuting the received opinions of others. And so chose, for the subject of their contradiction, that most ancient, and most generally approved opinion, That there is a God. And this (for their glories sake) they would needs confute. In the second of which two, that is, in Theodorus (who, for his notable impiety, was called cognomento, Atheos') it is a thing that is very worthy of observation; that, as by mere ambition, he was led unto his Atheism: so by the same ambition, he was led to renounce the same again. Lae●t, in vita Ari●tip. p. 77. And that by this witty strategeme. The Philosopher Stilpo, on a time, came unto him: and, being willing to make a trial, whether he could inwardly be persuaded (as he outwardly pretended) That there was indeed no God? he set upon him, with this Question. Tell me (o Theodorus) whether thou be such a one indeed, as thou art commonly esteemed? He, thinking that he had meant; Whether he were indeed, a true Atheist, or no? answered him; He was so: that he was the very same, that the people esteemed him. Why then (saith Stilpo) thou art surely, no Atheist; but thou art, indeed a very God: artificially insinuating, that so the people esteemed him. With which idle conceit, Theodorus being tickled, and loath to repel so glorious an asscription; he thought it better to renounce his former opinion. And so, from thence forward, he held, That there was no God; unless that he himself were (haply) a God. By which his ambition, he cast himself into so great a scorn; that he, which before was called in detestation, Theodorus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Laert. in vita Aristippi. p. 73. Theodorus the Mock-God; was called afterward, in derision, Theodorus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Theodorus the Mockt-God. Whereby it appeareth, that the Atheist is truly a very slave of Vainglory; serving it more basely, then ever any servant did the cruelest Tyrant. For, Tyrants can compel their servants, but unto outward observance: but they cannot enforce them, unto any inward opinion, as you see Vainglory can. It can compel the Atheist, not only to accept, but also to reject his Atheism. And therefore, the Atheist cannot be a free man. He gaineth not his liberty, by all his impiety. But, though he renounce God's religion; because he would not serve him: yet serveth he much more basely, unto his own Ambition. And in serving of it, he serveth the Devil himself: because he will not serve God. For Ambitionis via, est Diaboli adoratio: Bernard in Psal. 90. Serm. 6. p. 291. if we may believe Saint Bernard: The way of ambition, is the Devil's adoration. So that now, the Atheist hath not only a Master, but also a God to serve: though, by the choice of his Atheism, he sought to exempt himself from both of them. But in them both, he is entangled. For that, being a base servant, he must needs have a Master, and he must needs have a God. And so, renouncing the true one, he hath light upon another, that is more worthy of him. A base God, and a base Master, for a base servant, and a base worshipper. 4 But, as yet we have not seen all his baseness, in his serving. For, The Atheists base service of his Belly. beside his own ambition, he serveth yet another Master; yea, and with no less devotion. And that is, his idle Belly. For, the serving of whose appetite, it is incredible, what base and servile pains he doth take. He riseth up early, and he goeth to bed late; he sweateth, he freezeth, he toileth, he laboureth, he lieth in wait to spoil the heaven of all her fowls, the earth of all her beasts, 〈…〉. To. 2. P. 106. the sea of all her fishes. And all this, to s●rue his Belly: that so (as Saint Hierom speaketh) he may, ex cibis quam preci●sis, stercus confi●ere. That he may turn the costliest meat, into the vilest 〈◊〉. For (as Sen●●a truly noteth) Omnia ist●, tam sollicitè scrutata, vari●● 〈◊〉, cumsubicri●● ventrem, una atque eadem foeditas occupat. All these delicacies, that are sought so carefully, and sauced so daintily, when they come into the belly, they are wrapped up together, in one and the same foedity. Is not this a noble service? And yet all this, 〈…〉. To. 1. p 103. and much more, doth the Atheis● most basely offer unto his belly: serving it not only with many dishes, but also with many ranks of dishes. Struices con●innat patinarias (as the Comic speaketh) He maketh such upheaped piles of dishes. 〈◊〉. Epist. 111 p. 2●0 Yea, and not only with wholesome and natural meats, 〈…〉 A●t. 1. Sec. 1. P. 4●9. to satisfy his true appetite; but also with curious and artificial sauces, to procure a false appetite: provoking lust itself, further than it provoketh him; 〈…〉 and even oppressing it with his services, and thinking that he hath never served it enough. But (as Seneca well observeth) Non sunt ad P●pinam dentibus, & ventre, & ore contenti: oculis quoque gulosi sunt. They are not content, to be Epicures, only in their teeth, or in their bellies, or in th●ir mouths; but they affect to be gluttons, even in their eyes. Sen●c. ● 3 nat. Qu●est. c. 18. P. 51. Yea, and even Solomon observeth the same kind of Epicurism: * Pro. 23. 31. Sen●●. apost. 93. p. 217. Look not thou upon the wine, when it is red, etc. Now, he that thus servilely attendeth to his Belly, must needs be very far from the state of true Liberty. For, Nemo liber est, qui corpori seruit; saith Seneca. Nay, Multis seruiet, qui corpori seruit: as in another place he addeth. He cannot be a freeman, that is a servant to his body. Nay, he that serveth it, is a servant to very many. Epist. 14 p 21. Aug. l. de vera 〈◊〉. c. 38. To. 1. c. 38 To. 1. p. 702. Omnibus mund● partibus seruiunt (saith Saint Augustine) qui proptere● nihil colendum esse putant, ne seruiant: They become the base servants of all the Creatures in the world, who, for the fear of serving, do refuse to worship God. Now, in thus serving his belly with such a Religion, he maketh it, in effect, to become a god unto him. Nay, who among all the heathen, doth worship any God, either so carefully, or so costly, as the Atheist doth his belly? Who maketh his Kitchen, his Temple; his Cook, his Priest; his Cauldron, his Sensor; his Nidor, his Incense; his Table, his Altar; his meat, his Sacrifice: and he offereth it up unto his own idle Belly; as it were, Hugo. de. Scto. Vict. l. 2. ● Claustro Anim●. c. 19 To. 2. p. 37. unto the idol Bel, or Dagon: as Hugo de Scto. Victore, hath allegorized very wittily. Solent Dijs, Templa construi, Altaria erigi, Ministri ad seruiend●● ordinari, pecudes immolari, thura a concremari: Deo siquidem ventri, Templum, est Coquina; altar, mensa; ministri, conqui; immolatae pecudes, coctae carnes; fumus incensorum, odor saporum. And, as Ter●ullian further addeth (who lighteth into the very same Allegory, and maintaineth it most excellently) Deus illi, venture est; & pulmo, Templum; & aqualiculus, Altar; & Sacerdos, Coquus; & Sanctus spiritus, Tertul. l. cont. 〈◊〉 c. 16. p. 598. nidor; & condimenta, charismata; & ructus, prophetia: His Belly, is his god; his Lungs, his Temple; his Stomach, his Altar; his Cook, his Priest; his holy spirit, the fume of his meat; his Sauces, his Graces; and his belchings, his Prophecies. And so (as it followeth but a little after) Apud illum Agape, Cap 17. in caca●is seruet; fides, in culinis calet; spes, in ferculis iacet: His charity, boileth in his K●ttles; his faith, fryeth in his victuals; and his hope, lieth in his dishes. And thus, that which Varro affirmeth of the Epicures, is true also in the Atheists: that, Ganeonibus, ●●lina est vivendi modulus: that the walls of their Kitch in, Nonius in voce Culina, p. 514. are the bounds of their living, and their lust their only desire of life. For, this may be generally observed in all of them: that he, that is an Atheist in his opinion, he is always a belly-god for his Religion. And he, that hath no other God, he will always have his own belly for his god. Which the Apostle teacheth plainly, in telling us, there be some men, Whose god is their Belly. And Gregory delivereth in a very fit allegory, Phil. 3. 19 Greg. l. 31. Mor. c. 26. T●. 1. p. 195. 4. King● 25. 10. that Princeps Coquorum destruxit muros Jerusalem: as it is recorded in the last book of the Kings. Nabuzaradan the chief Steward (or, after some translations, The chief of the Cooks) destroyed, and cast down the walls of Jerusalem, that is, (in his mystical exposition) The lust of the belly destroyeth all Piety. Quis enìm Coquorum princeps, nisi venter accipitur; cui diligentissima, a coquentibus, cura seruitur? Who is this Prince of the Cooks, but only the belly; unto whom so many Cooks do attend, with such servility? Muros igitur Jerusalem, princeps Coquorum destruit: quia virtutes animae (dùm non restring●tur) venture perdit. Then the Prince of Cooks destroyeth the walls of Jerusalem, whilst the belly being pampered, overthroweth the virtues of the mind. So that, where the belly is a god, there it will have nove other God; and where there is none other God, Non potest D●minum Deum suum dice●e is, cui ve●ter est Deus. Orig. in c. 1. Rom. To. 2. p. 463. Pl●. de ora. defect. To. 1. p. 674. Cic. l. 2. de Divinat. p. 268. C c. l. 5. Tu●c. p. 171. there the belly is a god. As Plutarch Observeth in blasphemous Polyphemus: who professeth, he contemned all the other gods; and yet confesseth, that he sacrificed to his Belly, as his God: which he calleth, Geniorum maximum: the greatest of the gods. And the Orator exemplifieth the same, in Epicurus: who being once grown unto that profaneness and impiety, that he did, but, Deos ioc andi causa, introducere: that he made mention of the gods, only by way of sport: he was led from thence, into that wantonness and luxury, that he did, with Metrodorus, Omne bonum in visceribus medullisque condere: that he placed both his God, and all his good, in his Belly. Yea, and Aristophanes insinuateth the same thing unto us: when he maketh Diagoras (a known Reviler of all their other gods) yet to be a true worshipper of the drunken God Bacchus. — jaccum cantu celebrant, more Diagorae. With solemn Songs, Aristoph. in R●nis. Act. 1. Sce. 7. p. 250. they Bacchus grace, After the manner of Diagoras. Thus the Atheist (as you see it directly proved) is neither without Master, nor a God: but is indeed, a base servant, both of many Masters, and of many gods. For, though he do most impiously reriounce all others gods; yet serveth he, most basely, these three Belly-gods; Bacchus, Ceres, Venus. All whom, the Comical Poet conjoineth in one sentence: Sine Cerere, Terent. Eunuch. Act. 4. Sce. 5. p. 82. ●. & Libero, friget Venus. Poor Venus staru's with cold, & soon will dye, If Wine, and Belli-cheere, make not supply. So that, though all other gods do frigere, with the Atheist; yet those three forenamed Belly-gods, do incalescere plus satis: his service of the first two, of Bacchus, and Ceres, drawing in (of necessity) his service of the third; his service of Venus: as you see it expressed in the former sentence. For (as Saint Hierom well observeth, unto the same purpose) Luxuria matter libidinis est, Hieron. Epist. Am●ndo. To. 3. p. 135. ventremque distentum cibo, & vini potionibus irrigatum, voluptas sequitur genitalium. Est pro ordine membrorum, & ordo vitiorum. Riotousness is always the mother of wantonness. For the belly being filled well with meats, and watered with wines, begetteth the pleasure of her neighbour parts. And so there followeth an order in the vices▪ according to the order of the members. And Tertullian also unto the same purpose, Tertul. l. cont. 〈◊〉. c. 1. p. 590. Monstrum haberetur libido, ●ine gula; cum duo hec tam unita, atque concreta sint; ut si disiungi omnino potuissent, ipsi prius ventri pudenda non adhaererent. Specta corpus & una r●gio est. Denique pro dispositione membrorum ordo vitiorum: It were a plain monster to see lust without Belly-cheer. For these two vices are so straight conjoined, that if you ●nd●●uour to have them disjoined, you must cut off the parts of lust from your bodies. Consider of your bodies, and of their several Regions, and you shall find the order of those vices, to follow the order of those members. Thus the Atheist, though he seek to make himself a freeman, by the choice of his Atheism: yet is he, in very deed, the greatest bondman in the world; serving his own most base and refuse parts, with all most denout and humble service; compelling the most excellent and imperial parts of his soul, to serve the most abject and ministerial parts of his body: and honouring (in a sort) those parts, as his gods, which are scarcely worthy to be his servants. Which is indeed, a true servitude, yea, and a most base one too. 5 But it may be here objected, That in all this, The Atheist is a base slave unto himself. Cic. Paradox. 5. p. 424. he serveth but himself, and not any other thing. And therefore is truly and properly a freeman. Because, Libertas, est facultas vivendi ut velis: Freedom, is nothing else, but only a faculty, to live as we please. So the Orator defineth it. And so the Poet confirmeth it. An quisquam est alius liber, 〈◊〉. Satyr. 5. p. 10. b. nisi ducere vitam, Cui licet, ut voluit; Licet ut volo vivere; non sum Liberior Bruto? Can any man be free, but he, that may live as he list? Le me live, so; then I as free, as Brutus as the best. But unto this I answer, that it may fitly be added, which there followeth in the Poet: — Mendosè colligis, inquit Stoicus hic, aurem mordaci lotus aceto. You gather wisely, saith the Stoic here, Whose Ear is steeped in biting vinegar. Nay, it is a false collection, not only in the judgement of those rigid Philosophers, but also of all sober, and wisely-iudging Christians. For, first, he is not a freeman, that doth scruire sibi; but rather he, that doth sibi imperare: He is not a freeman that is a servant to himself, but he that is a master over himself: that doth, cupiditatibus suis imperare; that ruleth & commandeth over his own lusts and appetites: as the Orator observeth in the forealleged place. Where he describeth a freeman by these commanding actions. Refraenct prius libidines, spernat voluptates, iracundiam teneat, coerceat avaritiam, caeteras animi labes, repellat. Tum incipiat aliis imperare, cum ipse improbissimis dominis, dedecori, & turpitudini parere desierit. Dùm quidem his obedierit, liber habendus omnino non erit. L●t him restrain his lusts, refrain his pleasures, curb his impatience, repress his covetousness, and repulse his other vices. And then let him begin to rule over others, when he hath learned, not to obey those forenamed dishonourable and most wicked masters. For whilst he obeyeth them, he cannot be a freeman. Agreeable unto that sentence of Solomon: He that ruleth his own mind, Pro. 16. 32. is better than he that winneth a City. Again, it is to be observed, that he defineth not, Liberty to be a faculty, to live as we lust; but to live as we will. Now between lust, and will, there is this substantial difference: that, Lust is a faculty of the unreasonable soul: as Aristotle affirmeth, Fit in participe rationis voluntas; & in ratione vacante cupiditas atque ira: The will is in the reasonable part of the soul: but anger and desire in the unreasonable part: as we may see in brute beasts: who being wholly led by lust, their actions accordingly be filthy and beastly. But the Will is a faculty of the reasonable soul: as we may see in men, that are guided by discretion. For, Arist. l. 3. de A●ma. c. 9 10. 1. p. 839. Voluntas (as Aristotle expressly defineth it) est appetitus bonicum ra●ione: The will is an appetite or desire of some good thing, directed according unto reason. Quis igitur vivit ut vult (saith the Orator) nisi qui recta sequit●r? No man then liveth as he would, Est voluntas intellectus exte●sus. Scaliger. Ex. 307. 3. p. 923. unless he doth follow the thing that is good: So that, Aris●. 1. Rhetoric. ad Theodec. c. 10. To. 2. p. 1210. those things which a man doth according to his will, he always doth according unto reason: Cic. ubi. supra. Rome▪ 7. 19 20. but those things that he doth according to his lust, as they most times are contrary unto reason; so sometimes they be contrary, even unto his will. As we may evidently see in the Apostle S Paul: I do not that good thing that I would; but the evil which I would not, that do I. Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but the sin that dwells in me. So that, his will, that led him unto good: his lust, and his appetite (which in that place he calleth the law of his members) that led him unto ill, contrary to his will. Neither may this be seen only in the Apostle S. Paul, whose will was regenerated and directed by religion; but also, in diverse of the unregenerate Heathen; who were directed only by their reason. Phaedra, in Seneca, Se●ec. in Hippol. Act. 1. Sec. 2. p. 176. complaineth in this fashion. — Quae memoras, scio Vera esse, Nutrix: sed furor cogit sequi Peiora: vadit animus in praeceps sciens, Rem●aque frustrà, vana consilia appetens. I know those things thou sayest, are true, good Nurse: But fury forceth me to follow worse. My mind is hurried headlong up and down, Desiring better counsel, yet finds none. And we may see the same conflict in Medea, Ouid. l. 7. Metam. p. 249. in Ouid. Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque cupido, Mens aliud suadet. Video melior●, probóque, Deteriora sequor.— Strange violent forces draw me on unwilling, Reason persuades me this, my love rebelling. I see, and know the better. Here's my curse: That, notwithstanding, I embrace the worse. And so likewise, Plaut. in 〈◊〉. Act. 3. S●e. 2. p. 736. Lesbonicus maketh his complaint, in Plautus. Sciebam, ut esse me deceret: facere, non quibam, miser. Ita vi Veneris victus, otio captus, in fraudem incidi. I knew, poor soul, what me became: But yet I could not do it. Mine idle lust me overcame: And led me captive to it. Where he confesseth directly, that he yielded unto th●m, as a slave and a Captive; and not as a free man. Yea, and the Apostle S. Paul confesseth the same thing, Rom. 7. 23. that the law of his members, rebelling against the law of his mind, did lead him captive into sin. Now he that is a Captive, he surely is a bondman: He cannot be a free man. As Tully plainly proveth, in the forealleged place, enforcing it out of the definition of Bondage; that, Seruitus est obedientia fracti animi, & abi●cti, & arbi●r●o carentis suo. Slavery is the obedience of a vanquished and a broken mind, 〈◊〉 Parado●. 5. p. 425. which hath not the freedom of his own will and judgement. From whence he there inferreth, Quis igitur neget, omnes leaves, omnes cupidos, omnes d●mque improbos, esse servos? Who can therefore deny, but that all light, all covetous, and all wicked persons, must of necessity, be servants? because these be the desires, not of their wills, but of their lusts, leading them violently as Captives. Neither doth his willingness to continue in this service, Senec. Epist. 47 p. 73. prove him to be no servant: but rather to be a more servile servant. For, Nulla turpior est seruitus, quam voluntaria: saith Seneca. There is no so vile slavery, as that, which is voluntary. Because this argueth that even his v●ry will is subdued, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈…〉 and forced to yield unto it; and that the most Princelike and Hegemonical part of his foul, which ought to rule over all, is now itself become servile, and a slave unto all. So that, his willingness to serve such base things, Ex. 21. 5. 6. is the great brand of his slavishnes: as it was among the Israelit●sh servants; wh●n they were content to continue still in their Bondage. When the Servants Professed, that they so loved their Masters, that they desired not to be free from their service; then the Master was appointed, to boar their ears through, with a Nawle: and so to mark them, for perpetual servants. So that the Atheists willingness, is the very note of the extremity of his baseness; and that he is no better, than a perenni-seruus: as the Comic speaketh, 〈◊〉. in Persa. Act. 3. s●e. 3. 4. 640. 640. a branded and a perpetual Servant. For, as the Apostle Paul teacheth us: To whomsoever we give ourselves as servants to obey, (though never so willingly) his servants we be: Whether it be of sin unto death, Rom. 6. 16. or of obedience unto righteousness. As for that Objection, that the Atheist bestoweth all this service, upon none other thing, but only upon himself: I have showed, that to be otherwise. But let it be granted, that the Atheist indeed, both intendeth, and extendeth all his actions, counsels, and endeavours, but only to himself; making so his own self, the very end of himself: Yet, even from hence it will follow, that this his excessive love of himself, in thus honouring and serving himself, above all things; and regarding nothing else, but only himself, and for himself; doth make him become a very god unto himself. And so, even this way too, he● is not without his god. For it is a true rule, that is given by Origon, that, Orig. Hom 2. in jud. To, 1. p. 341 Quod vnusquis● praecaeteris colit, & quod super omnia miratur, ac diligit, hoc illi Deus est: What thing soever any man doth most affect, and what thing soever he honoureth and loveth best, that same is unto him a God. Which sentence is so agreeable both unto truth and Godliness, that it is confirmed by diverse other of the fathers, Ma●●●. H●m. ●3 p. 474. almost in the same words. Ad qu●mcunque remcor alicuius devincitur, & quo cupido eius trahitur, illa res est eius Deus: saith Macarius. To what thing soever a man most straight tieth the desire of his heart, that same is unto him his God. And so likewise, S●dulius: Non potest Deum suum dicere is, cui venter est Deus, aut cui gloria seculi, 〈◊〉 in cap. 1. Rome p. 3. a. Item Origen▪ in c. 1. Rom. To. 2. p. 463. & pompa mundi, aut potentia rerum caducarum Deus est: reckoning up nominatum, all the Atheists forenamed gods. He cannot truly say, The Lord is his God, that hath his Belly for his god, or that hath the glory of the world, and the pomp of these earthly things for his God. What then? He presently addeth, Qu●c quid unus quisque, sup● a caetera colit, hoc illi Deus est. Whatsoever a man loveth and honoureth most, that he always makes his God. And so the Atheist, loving and honouring himself most of all things, doth thereby make himself his own● God. For, the principality of our love and our service, is so peculiar unto God, that he which hath it not, is not to us a God, although he be the true God: and that he, which hath it, he is to us a God, although he be a false God. Why then, the Atheist, giving the principality of his love and service, only to himself, doth thereby become a God unto himself. And therefore cannot be said, to be without a God. For, in making himself an Idol-God, he becometh both an Idol-maker, and an Idol itself, & an Idol-worshipper: offending so, most grossly, in all the three several degrees of Idolatry. So that, howsoever the Atheist denieth God i● words; yet, even by his self-love, he confesseth him in deeds, which is a more real, and a powerful confession. For (as Leo truly noteth) Multo validiora sunt exempla, quam verba; & pleniùs opere docetur, quam voce. Examples & actions, are more forcible than speeches; and works are a great deal better teachers, Leo Serm in fest. St● Laurent p. 176. than words. And therefore the Atheist, affirming in his deed, That there is a God; & denying it but in word, we may justly reject his denial, with that scorn, Cic. l. 3. Tusc p. 147. Quid verba au diam, cum facta videam? What should I hear his words, when as I see his deeds? CHAP. 12. The Atheists second end, is, to free himself from fear. 2. Yet no man feareth more: as he bewrayeth, at three times. 3. When he dreameth. 4. When it thundereth. 5. When he dieth. 6. This his fear, is a clear Argument, that he thinks, Th●re is a God. AS the first end, which the Atheist propounded, in the choice of his Atheism, The Atheist de●● 〈…〉 fear Plut. l. De supers●it. To. 〈◊〉 p. 281. is, Non seruire: To free himself from saruing; so his second end in it, is, Non metuere: To free himself from fearing. Which (as the Orator hath well observed) is another kind of servitude. Omnis metus servitus est. All fearfulness is a kind of slavishnes. Serui enim est timere: saith Diogenes: He is but a slave, Cic. Pa●●d. 5. p. 425. that liveth in fear. Yea and a base slave too. For (as the Orator observeth) Habet humilitatem metus: L●e●t. in vita 〈◊〉. p 201. Cic. l 3. Tus. p. 143. All fearfulness hath in it a kind of humble baseness. Cic. l. 5. de. 〈◊〉. p. 106. And there is indeed no slavery, which the soul doth naturally more detest and abhor, than it doth to live in fear. Neither is there any liberty, that it desireth more earnestly, than it doth, to be freed from fearfulness and dread. Insomuch that Democritus esteemed it true Happiness, for any man to have Animum terrore liberum: To have his soul, free from all terror and fearing. Without which security, it cannot enjoy so much as a shadow of any fe●citie; nay, not of any comfort, or of any contentment: as it is very truly observed, 〈…〉 by Plutarch: Anino, gaudium aut laetitiae ingenerari non potest, 〈◊〉 vacuitatem metus, & fiduciam, ac tranquillitatem is pro fundamento substernat. The soul cannot have in it, any true joy, and comfort; unless the s●me be founded, both in security, and in confidence, and in tranquillity. All which do imply a vacuity from fear. And therefore, the Atheist indeauoureth by all means, to shake off this yoke of fearing, as well as he doth the former yoke of serving: hoping then, to be indeed an absolute freeman. But this freedom from fear he can never attain, as long as he harboureth in his heart, any sense of Religion. Because, Religion itself is a kind of fear. Religion is nothing else, but the fear of some God: as the Creator himself hath expressly defi●ed it. Religio est, Cic. l. 2. 〈…〉. p. 98. & 84. quae superioris cuiusdam Naturae (quam Divinam vocant) curam ceremoniamque aff●rt. Religion is an affection, which begetteth a care of worshipping a certain superior Nature, which is commonly called God. Yea and (as in the same book he teacheth) This care is not without a fear. Religio, in metu & ceremonia Deorum est Religion consisteth in the fear and worship of the Gods. Mark, not only in the worship, but also in the fear of God. For indeed wheresoever there is any Religion, or any opinion, that There is a God; there goeth (upon necessity) a fear of him with it. And therefore, it is the great complaint of all Atheists; that the religion of the gods, is a very oppression unto the souls of men. Lucretius complaineth, that there was a time: Humana a●te oculos foedè cum vita iaceret, l▪ ●●ret. l. 1. p. 3. In terris oppressa▪ gravi sub Relligione: When as with shame, man's life on earth did groan, Pressed down with burden of Religion: until a certain Greek, a very deep wise man, began to plant in men a contrary opinion; and so to free their minds from the terrors of their gods. And Metrodorus likewise (as Tully reporteth of him) clamat, Dijs omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas: He cryeth out, 〈…〉 Deo●. p. 195. that the received opinion of the Gods, hath filled all men's minds with fears, and affrightments. Yea, and Epicurus himself complaineth against all the Philosophers, that, by their believing of a provident God, Ibid. p. 191. they did, imponere ceruicibus nostris sempit●rnum Dominum, quem dies & noctes timeremus. They have set upon our shoulders an everlasting Master, whom both day and night we cannot choose but fear. Adding in the same place: Quis enim non time●t omnia providentem, & cogitautem, & animadvertentem, & omnia ad se pertinere putantem; curiosum, & plenum negotij Deum? For, who can choose but fear, a provident, a remembering, and an observing God; a God so curious, and so full of business, that he thinketh all things to belong unto himself? And therefore, the Epicare, to free himself from this fear; though he be forced by strength of reason, to confess, There is a God: yet hath fancied such a god, as need not to be feared: making him to be one, that neither giveth regard, nor taketh account of the actions of men: Nec quicquam alieni curans, nec sui: Neither regarding his own, nor any other man's businesses, Cic. l. 2. de Divinat. p. 278. 〈◊〉 p. 36. more negligent and supine than Aesop's Incuriosus, that cared for just nothing. So, by denying God his Providence, seeking utterly to extirp all his fear out of himself. For, he that regardeth no body, needeth not himself to be regarded of any But this is to be, but a Semi-Atheist. And therefore, the perfect Atheist, knowing, that if a God be granted, his Providence cannot, with any reason, be denied; therefore (to make all sure, and to secure himself from fear) he thinketh it the 〈◊〉 way, to deny God's essence, as well as his Providence: and simply to pronounce, that There is no God. For then it will follow, that he nedde not to be feared, if at all he be not. 2 Thus the Atheist, to rid himself from that inward fear, which rideth on his conscience, God hath planted a fear of himself in all men. and which naturally accompanieth the opinion of God, if that once be admitted; he affirmeth, There is none: yea, and striveth to believe it too. But yet all this in vain. For, as God hath engrafted into the minds of all men, a notion of himself; so hath he likewise, a fear of himself: as a sense of his being, so a sensible fear of him. As even Lucretius himself confesseth. He that will not confess, that There is a God; yet, confesseth, 〈◊〉. l. 5. p. 226. that all men have a fear of God in them. — Est mortalibus insitus horror; Qui delubra Deûm nova toto suscitat orbi Terrarum, & ●estis cogit celebrare diebus. There is an inbred fear in all men's hearts, Which hath begotten this, on all men's parts; T'erect new Temples, and new Holidays Unto their gods, to celebrate their praise. Making this inward fear, to be the first beginning, of all piety and religion. Yea, Aug. l. de vera Relig. c. 17. To. 1. p. 688. and so likewise doth Saint Augustine. Psal. 111. 10. ●actan. l. de Ira Dei, ●. 11. p. 465. Pietas timore inchoatur, charitate perficitur: True Piety is begun by fear, but perfected by charity. Yea, and the Psalmist, in effect, confesseth the same: where he tells us, that, The fear of God is the beginning wisdom. And, Lactantius confirmeth it, when he saith, that, Religio nulla esse potest, ubi metus nullus est: That there can be no Religion, where there is no fearing. And therefore, Isidore deriveth the Greek word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth God, Isidor. l. 7. Orig. c. 1. p. 977. from another Greek word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth Fear: Quòd, eum colentibus, sit timor: because, they that worship him, do also ●eare him. And so likewise doth Festus. In which signification of the name of God, Fes●us, in voce, Deus. p. 279. they may seem to allude, unto that appellation, of the Patriarch jacob; where he calleth the true God, Gen. 31. 42, 53. (as it were by periphrasis) The fear of Isaac his Father. Because, as God hath imprinted into the hearts of all men, a natural persuasion, That there is a God: so hath he likewise implanted in them, Ter. l. de Testim. Ani. c. 2. p. 85. a natural reverence, and fear of that God. So that, Terfullians' question hath an easy solution. Vndè naturalis timor animae, in Deum? Whence cometh this natural fear of a God, which every man feeleth within his own mind? Surely, it cometh only from that God, who ought only to be feared, as the Prophet jeremy hath expressly testified. And therefore, ler. 32. 40. Statius affirmeth, that by this inward fear, the Heathens first were moved, to believe, and worship God. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor. Fear was the first, S●atius l. 3. Thebay. p. 243. that gods begot: Till fear began, the gods were not. And so likewise doth Dares Phrygius: who calleth Fear, the father of the gods, D●o r●m Genitorem. Quip, Dares Phrygius l. 1. 〈◊〉 Bello Ir●iano. p. 6. D●ûm Genitore Metu, mens caca creavit Ditem Vmbris, Coelo Superos, & Numina Ponto. Through god-begetting Fear, Man's blinded mind did rear, A Hell-god, to the Ghosts; A Heau'n-God, to those Hosts; Yea, gods unto the Seas; Fear did create all these. Whereby it appeareth, that the fear of God, is as naturally engrafted, into the minds of all men, as is the opinion of his being: this being a true consequent unto that, and following it as naturally, as the shadow doth the body: And that generally in all men, without exception. But yet, The Atheist feareth God more than any other man. most specially in the Atheist, above all other men. They ●aue, indeed, the true fear of God which begetteth Religion, a great deal less than any other men: but, that servile fear, which begetteth confusion, a great deal more. It is not all their Atheism, that can free them from his slavish fear: but it begetteth it in them rather. There is no man that feareth God so much, as they that would seem to fear him least: no man so basely feareth him, as those men that seem the most to contemn him. For, it is the work of God's justice, that they which refuse to fear him as his Sons, shall be compelled to fear him as his slaves. And so indeed they do. For (as Eliphas teacheth in the book of job) There is a continual sound of fear, in his ears▪ and a contin●●● sword before his eyes: the fear of God's wrath, job. 15▪ 20. 21. 22. and the sword of his justice: Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p. 175. which, like Dam●cles his sword, hangeth still over his head. Yea, and not only so (for these things they have great and just cause to fear) but (as the Psalmist further teacheth) They are oftentimes afraid, Ps. 53. 5. Pro. 28. 1. where no fear is. So that (as King Solomon observeth) The wicked flieth, even when no man pursueth: Omnia tuta timens: being chased by the terrors of his own guilty mind, as it were, by hellish furies. Thus be there no such base cowards, as those lus●y Gallants be, which would seem so courageous, as not to fear even God himself: whereas indeed, they fear the shaking of every little leaf. For, God himself seemeth, even in scorn and derision, to sport himself, with the Atheists, his enemies; and with that panic fear, which he hath cast upon them, I will also laugh at your calamity: I will mock when your fear cometh. Pro. 1. 26. Lucret. l. 5. p. 228. and appointed continually to infest, and to chase them. Vsque adeò res humanas vis abdita quaedam Obterit, & pulchros fasces, saeuásque secures Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur, saith the Poet. There is a certain secret power unknown, Which humane powers treads and tramples on. It Princes Sceptres, Crowns, all State of men, But scorns, and spurns, and makes a sport of them. For, as the Psalmist plainly teacheth, When the Kings of the earth, and Princes of the world, Ps. 2. 2. 4. do band themselves together against God, He that dwelleth in the Heaven, doth laugh them to scorn, and the Lord he hath them in derision. And this is also confessed by another Heathen Poet: Ergo Deus, quicunque aspexit, ridet, & odit. God, 〈◊〉 Sat. 1●. p. 68 ●. which beholds it, he doth it deride, Not only so, but hateth it beside. So that, God is not feared by any of his creatures, with greater terror & horror, than he is by Atheists. For, it may truly and generally be affirmed of Atheists; which Caecilius very falsely affirmeth of Christians; that, Deos, quos, negant, reformidant: That though in words they deny God, Arnob. l. 8. Cont. Gen●. p 752. yet in their hearts they fear him: and consequently confess him. And this fear the Atheist bewrayeth, at three special times, more eminently and evidently, than he doth at any other; as I have observed out of learned Writers. Namely, first, when he sleepeth: secondly, when it thundereth: and thirdly, when he dieth. At these three special times, when he hath not the command of himself, to use that artificial obluctation, and facing out of the matter, which he doth at other times; but that his soul appeareth naked, in his true and simple form, without any a●ting, or feigned palliation; then showeth it most plainly that inward fear of God, which before it dissembled, and artificially veiled. 3 For the first of which three times: to wit, The fear of Atheists in thei● dreams. the time of their sleeping: it is most certain, that no man can endure so great trouble in his waking, though pressed with never so many outward evils; as the ungodly man endureth in his sleeping, by those fearful dreams and visions, which at that time seize upon him, and make even sleep itself, with Euripides calleth, Morbi levamen suave— Plut. l. de Supers●it. To. 1. Mor. p. 382. The sweet asswager of ●ll other grief: yet to become unto them, a grievous terror and vexation. We may partly see this in job: who complaineth in his Book, that, job. 7. 13. 14 15 when he thought within himself, that his Couch should relieve him, and his bed bring comfort to him: that then he was so feared with dreams, and astonished with visions, that his soul desired rather to be strangled, then with so great anxieties to abide in his bones. So that sleep (even to this good man) was but, Aug. l. 22 De●iu●t. D●●. ●. 22. To. 5. p. 1374. Quies inquieta; a restless rest (as S. Augustine speaketh) because of those fearful dreams, wherewith it was disquieted. Then must it needs much more be so, for their punishment and torment. It is surely true in them; which Plutarch hath observed, that, Somnus, corporis quide est requies, animo interim terrores obuersantur, somnia & tumultus. Their sleep is indeed a kind of rest, Plut. l. de. virtut. & vit. Tom. 1. Mor. p. 226. unto their bodies; but, in the mean time, they do find no rest in their souls, but terrors and dreams, and perturbed cogitations. As we may plainly see, in those dreams and visions, that molested the Egyptians, in the time of their dreadful darkness; with which they were so troubled, that their very souls fainted: as it is reported, Wis. 17. 13 etc. in the Book of Wisdom: where he notably describeth them. So that (as Plutarch very truly observeth) Somnia, & spectra, & oracul●, & de coelo seru●tiones, Plut. l. de his qui ●erò 〈◊〉. To. 2. p. 229. & quic quid aliud divinitùs obijci videtur, tempestatibus & t●rroribus percellit malè bi conscios. Dreams, and Visions, and Oracles, and ●ignes in the Heavens, and such like divine tokens, do terrify the minds of men of evil conscience. And this fear groweth unto Atheists, from a double cause; which both of them are founded in their servile fear of God. The first is the conscience of their own impiety and wickedness: which they needed not to fear, if they thought there were no God. The second is, the terror of those nocturnal apparitions, that represent themselves unto them in their dreams: which they might easily contemn, for vain and idle fancies; but that they are printed deeper, then can be blotted out, with all their artificial and forced irrisions. For the first of those two causes, that is, the conscience of their own wickedness: though they can easily pass it over in the day time, when they wake; yet returneth it unto them in the night time, when they sleep: and then tormenteth and afflicteth them, with the fear of those punishments, Plato. l. 1. De Repub. p. 532. which they doubt may expect them after their deaths. As Plato truly noteth: Qui multas habet, in vita, iniquitates, ex ipso somno (tanquam puer●) frequenter excitus, extimescit, & in pessima spevivit. Those men, that are guilty of many iniquities in their life, are often times (like fearful Children) wakened out of their sleep, and lead their lives with very little comfort. And therefore Tully (by a kind of moral exposition) interpreteth those Furies, which are represented in Tragoedies, affrighting the minds of impious and ungodly persons, to be nothing else, Cic. 1. De Leg. p. 317. but the affrightments of their consciehces which fall upon them in their dreams. Impietatum nulla expiatio est—. Sed impios agitant, insectanturque Furiae; non ardentibus t●dis (sicut in fabulis) sed angore Conscientiae, fraudisque crucialu. There is no satisfaction, no sacrifice for Atheism. For the minds of all Atheists, are tormented by Furies; yet, not with burning Torches (as we see it, in Tragoedies) but with the grief and anguish of their own guilty Consciences. Now, what reason can be alleged, why they should be so perplexed and affrighted with their Consciences (especially in their secret and hidden transgressions) but only, that they know, that they will be their accusers, to lay them all open, unto the great judge? This then is the first night-torment of the Atheist; the terror, which he sustaineth, from a corrupt and guilty Conscience. The second is, the terror of diverse strange dreams, and fearful visions; wherein God doth sometimes, only confer and talk with them: and sometime beside, plainly show himself unto them, not only conferring, but also appearing. For the first of those two sorts, job telleth us in his Book, that God will speak unto a man, job. 33. 14 15. once or twice, though he see it not, in dreams and visions of the night. As we may see in King Abimelech: with whom God conferred, Gen. 20. 3. and talked in a dream, and threatened him with death, for detaining of Abraham's wife away from him. And these interlocutory and dialoguising dreams, were not unknown, even to the very Heathens; as it evidently appeareth by that position of Possidonius: That, Cic. l. 1. De Divinat. p. 251. Dij cum dormientibus colloquuntur: That the Gods do oftentimes talk with men in their sleeps. Of the second of those kinds; wherein, not only a voice is heard, but also an image and resemblance seen; we also read in the Book of job: where Eliphaz giveth himself for an instance, job. 4. 12. 13. &c saying: In the thoughts of the visions of the night, when sleep falleth upon men; Fear came upon me, and dread, which made all my bones to tremble. And the wind passed before me, and made all the hairs of my flesh to stand up. Then stood one; and I knew not his face; an image was before mine eyes, and in silence I heard a voice. And this kind of apparition was likewise known unto the Heathen: as appeareth in jamblicus: who describing the visions, which are sent from God, he saith, that they do commonly come between sleeping and waking: and that then, jamblic. l. De Mysteriis. c. 22. p. 52. Breves audiuntur voces, quid agendum sit admonentes; & aliquando Spiritus quidam, non corpulentus, non tractabilis, se iacentibus circumfundit. Qui tamen non perspicitur, sed alio quodam sensu, & animaduer sione percipitur. We hear certain short voices: which, of diverse things admonish us: Yea, and sometimes certain Spirits (though not corpulent, nor palpable) do compass round about us: which, though they be not visibly discerned, yet may they, by another kind of sense, be perceived. The like appeareth in Lucretius. who numbereth these fearful visions, among the first causes, which begat in men's minds, an opinion of the Gods. Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant, Lucret. l. 5. p. 226. Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auctu. Their waking mind, in hideous dreams, doth see a wondrous shape, Of Bodies strange, and huge in growth, and of stupendous make. By which appearance of God, so immediately unto the mind, the best men are oftentimes much perturbed and troubled: though there be none other cause, but only the Majesty of the Creator, striking a natural fear and awe into his Creature. As we may evidently see, in that example of Eliphaz who confesseth, his own vision to have been with fear and trembling; though it contained nothing, but a most gracious and mild instruction. Then must it needs appear, both with terror, & horror unto the Atheists; when it giveth them signification of God's wrath and judgements. Their visions, must needs be such, as the Orator describeth, that, Cic. l. ●. de Divinat. p. 281. Visa somniantium, sunt perturbatiora, quam insanorum: That the visions of such men, in their dreams, are oftentimes more perturbed, than the ragings of madmen, in their fits. As we may evidently see, in Nebuchadnezzares dream when he saw the watchman coming down unto him, Dan. 4 10. 11. 14 ●. and crying, Hue down that great Tree: He confesseth that his dream made him sore afraid, and troubled his thoughts, upon his bed. And, of this kind, are all those dreams and visions, which appear unto Atheists. They be always the Messengers of God's wrath and judgements. And therefore they are always tormented with them, and (as it were) set upon the very rack by them. As the Poet Iwenal hath notably described them, comprising both the two forenamed causes of their fear, together in one sentence, namely, both the guiltiness of their own corrupt conscience, and the fearful apparitions of strange sights and visions. Nocte, brevem si fortè indulsit cura soporem, ●●●enal. Satyr. 13. p. 60. B. Et toto versata toro iam membra quiescunt; Continuò Templum, & violati Numinis arras: There is the torment of his terrifying conscience. Now followeth the torment of his visions. Et, quod praecipuis mentem sudoribus urget, Deorum apparentium magnitudo totum ●●●lum occupare v●detur. Te videt in somnis, jamblic. l. De Myster. c. 19 p. 36. tua sacra, & maior imago Humanâ, turbat pavidum, cogitque fateri. Here is the torment of his terrifying visions. The sum of which verses, is, in effect, thus much. If once his nightly cares spare him a little sleep, If once his restless limbs their rest on bed do seek; Then strait appears a sight of his impiety, Temples, and Altars of the wronged Deity: And that, which most affright's his soul; in sweeting Agony, Thee God he see's, in fearful dream's, thy sacred Majesty: A far more glorious form of thine, than any mortal face; The which, such terror forceth him confess to be thy Grace. Yea, and Plutarch hath likewise well expressed the same Argument: instancing in the very same two causes of fear in the superstitious, that I have expressed before of the impious. So that, Atheism and Superstition, the two extremes of Religion, Plut. l. de Supersti●. To. 1. p. 382. are made equal in their fearing. Obliviscuntur herilium minarum serui dormientes: qui in compedibus sunt, iis vincula somnus allevat: inflammationes, vulnera, saevacarnis & serpentia ulcera, doloresque, acerrimi somno mitigantur. Soli huic, nullae sunt per somnum induciae, neque unquàm quiescere animum patitur, neque se colligere, acerbis & molestis, de Numine, opinionibus dimotis: sed, veluti in impiorum regione, simulachra terribilia, & visa monstrosa feruntur. All servants, in their sleeping, forget their Masters threatening. Prisoners, forget their shackles. Diseases, wounds, and cancers, by sleep are greatly eased. Only, unto these men, their sleep can bring no quiet, nor freedom from those fears, which they conceive of the gods. But, as if they inhabited in the Region of impiety, fearful visions and apparitions do infest them continually. Yea, and this fear, which these men have of God, begetteth a fear in them, of every thing in the world: as Plutarch, Plut. ibid. p. 381. in the same place, hath truly observed. Qui Deos metuit, omnia metuit: terram, mare, aërem, coelum, tenebras, lucem, rumorem, silentium, somnium. He that servilely feareth God, he servilely feareth all things: the earth, the sea, the air, the heavens, darkness, and light, noises, and silence; but especially his own dreams: than which nothing is more troublesome, nothing more grievous to him: partly, out of the consciousness of his own impiety and wickedness: and partly, by those fearful apparitious and visions, which God purposely sendeth him, to revoke and deter him from that his ungodliness. 4 Neither feareth he only in the time of his sleeping; The fear of Atheists, in ● lightning and thunder. when he may seem to be destitute of his reason to comfort him: but also oftentimes, even whilst he is waking; when he hath all his senses and reason about him: especially, when it happeneth to thunder, and lighten. Iwenal, having before described those notable terrors, which afflict the Atheists; partly out of the conscience of their own impiety against God; and partly out of their fearful apparitions in the night; he proceedeth, to show, his mind to be no less perturbed in the● day; especially, if it begin to thunder and lighten. Hi sunt qui trepidant, Iwenal. Satyr. l 13. p. 60. b. & ad omnia fulgura pallent. cum tonat, exanimes, primo quoque murmure coeli. These be the men, that trembling quake, appalled at every lightning: Every flash them lifelesses strikes, and crack of every thundering. Yea, and in the same place, he directly telleth us, that all this their fear of lightning and thunder, proceedeth from none other cause, but only from their inward fear of God's vengeance; though they outwardly dissemble it, and seem to contemn it. Hi sunt qui trepidant; & ad omnia fulgura pallent. Non quasi fortuitò, nec ventorum rabie: sed Iratus cadat in terras, & vindicet ignis. Lo these be those, that with each Thunderclap do shake. Not so, as if blind Chance such fearful noise should make: Nor, ●s if rageful winds should bring this rattling sound: But, lest to take revenge, God's fire should fall to ground. Neither is ●his the foolish fear of the simple and base people; who (not able to reduce things unto their true causes) are easily terrified with every uncouth accident: but it is a fear, that seizeth upon the greatest and mightiest Kings, and affrighteth them, as well as their meanest Subjects; if they be impious Atheists. As even Lucretius himself confesseth. For he saith, that, when the Heavens do begin once to lighten: — Et magnum percurrunt murmura coelum; Lucret. lib. 5. p. 228. Non populi gentésque tremunt? Regesque superbi Corripiunt Di●ûm perculsi membra timore: Nè quod, ob ad Missum foedè, dictúmve superbè, Poen●rum graue sit soluendi tempus adactum? When rattling Thunders run along the Cloud's; Do not both People poor, and Princes proud, A terror feel, as struck with fear of God? Do not their trembling joints than dread his Rod? Lest, for foul deeds, and black-mouthed Blasphemies, The rueful time be come, that vengeance cries? Out of which sentence of Lucretius, we may gather many Arguments; that even the most impious Atheists in the world, do inwardly believe, That there is a God; though they outwardly dissemble it. For he saith, that th●ybe, Diuûm perculsi timore: that they be strucken, with a terror and fear of the Gods. Ergò, they must needs believe, That there be Gods. For no man feareth, that which he believeth not to be. Nay this testimony of Lucre●ius, if it be well examined, containeth twelve main Articles of the Atheists Creed: which are all of them so true, The Atheists Creed. so Orthodox, and Christian, that no man can disclaim from any one of them. Whereby it will appear, that though the Atheist would deny both God, and all Religion, yet that he is inwardly enforced to believe them: and to ho●d (even against his will) many notable points of Christian Religion, in despite of all his obstinate resolution for Atheism. All which may naturally be collected, from his evident fear of lightning, and thunder. As namely these which follow. First, he believeth, that, There is a God: or else he needed not to fear him. Secondly, he believeth, that, God is such an one, as is to be feared: or else he would not (nay, he could not) fear him. Thirdly, he believeth, that, God is not an incurious God, (as the Epicure conceiteth him) who sitting idly in heaven, regardeth nothing that is done upon the earth: but that he is a most curious and observing God; both seeing all that is done, and hearing all that is spoken: or else, he need not fear the punishment, neither of his admissa, nor of his superbè dicta. Fourthly, he believeth, that God is present in all places: or else he could neither see his evil deeds, nor hear his evil words. Fiftly, he believeth, that God doth not only look upon things as an idle beholder; but also as a just rewarder; for else he needed not to fear his beholding, if afterward he intended to do nothing. But he feareth him as a just Revenger, to execute judgement upon every offender. He believeth, both that God is, Heb. 11. 6. and that he is a just rewarder: as it is in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Sixtly, he believeth, that God is of that power, as is able to humble, and to inflict due punishment, upon the greatest Prince and Pote●tate of the World. Seventhly, he believeth, that Lightning and Thunder do not come, either by Chance, or by Nature: but that they have God himself for their maker. For else, though he feared them, yet he needed not to fear him. Eightly, he believeth, that God hath made those creatures, as the instruments of his wrath, to strike and to punish, when he purposeth to take vengeance. Ninthly, he believeth, that Impiety and wickedness do justly deserve Gods heavy wrath and judgements. Tenthly, he believeth, that God is just: and therefore will pay them, according to their desert. Eleventh, he believeth, that there is a time appointed, when this payment shall be made. And twel●ly, he believeth, that when it lighteneth and thundereth, than that appointed time is come; and that God will certainly take vengeance upon him. All these consequents do follow, by necessary connexion, upon the Atheists fearing of thunder and lightning, especially, as the arrows of God's wrath and vengeance. And thus, the Atheist, who denieth, there is a God: yet is forced to believe many truths concerning God. He believeth his Essence; he believeth his Power; he believeth his Providence; he believeth his Omnipresence; and he believeth his justice.. All this he believeth, though not with a true faith, to further his salvation: yet (as the devils themselves do) with an invincible persuasion, jam. 2. 19 which worketh in them both a Fear, and a Trembling. And, this we may plainly see, not only by the testimony of these forealleged Poets, in a general speculation: but also by the testimony of the most approved Histories, Exod. 9 27. giving particular instances. Pharaoh, that proud King, who was as stiff, and as untractable, as a rock, against the stroke of many other plagues; so that they could not make any impression into him: yet, when the plague of Lightning and Thunder fell upon him, (which is able to break even the hardest stony rocks) that also broke him, and pierced his stony heart; diminishing his former confidence, and forcing him to confess, that now he saw, that the Lord was just; but that both himself and his people were wicked. This powerful operation had, with that profane man, the fear of Thunder and Lightning. And the like effect is reported by Suetonius, to have been wrought in the Emperor T●●erius: whom he censureth, to have been, Su●ton. in vit. ●ib●r●. c. 69. ●. 55. Negligentior circa D●os, & R●ligi●nes: A very great neglecter of the Gods, and their Religions. And yet, that whensoever it happened to thunder, he was terrified and afraid, beyond 〈◊〉 and measure. In so much, that he was wont to encompass his head 〈◊〉 a Laurel Garland, to defend him from the stroke; Because it is a commonly received opinion, that the leaves of the Bay-tree cannot be touched with Lightning. But above all other, most notable is the example of Caligula, Su●eon. in vit. Caligu●ae, c. 22. p. 161. the Emperor T●●●rius his next and immediate successor, who so greatly despised all the other gods, that he himself would needs be honoured for no less than a god. To which end, he commanded a Temple to be erected, Sacrifices appointed, Ceremonies ordained, and all honour to be exhibited, to this new jupiter La●ialis: the old jupiter Olympius, being so despised by him, Senec. l. 1. de Ira. c. 16 p. 34. that he would oftentimes scoff, Hom●r. ●. 3. Il●ad. p. 122. Gracolat. and oftentimes rail at him, calling him the most pernicious and 〈◊〉 of all the other gods. And yet, this new god, when he heaad the true God to thunder, he would oftentime hide himself underneath his bed, for fear. Qui Deos tantoperè contemneret, ad minim● tonitrua & fulgura, co●●ivere, caput obvoluere: ad verò maiora, proripere se è strato, sub l●ctumque cond●re solebat. He that so little regarded the Gods, Sueton. ubi. sup●. ● c. 51. p. 68 yet feared so greatly the least thunder and lightning, that he would wink with his eyes, and wrap up his head, so escape the terror ●f the clap: But, if it chanced to be a little more vehement, he would rise up from his bed, ●nd hide himself underneath it. Now what a miserable and a slavish fear did this wretched man endure? He could not so effectually, have declared his true belief of a God, by building unto him a thousand Temples, as he did by thus fearing his Lightnings and Thunders. 5 But yet there is another time, The ●●are of Atheists in their sickness, & after death. L. 2. c. 5. Sect. 4. wherein much more he feareth him: and that is, in his sickness, and at the time of his death. For, when he feeleth himself attached with any grievous sickness; though he have not, as yet, the apprehension of death, yet beginneth he to think that (surely) that sickness is sent unto him from God, to punish and to scourge him, for his former blaspheming and denying of him. And this point is likewise delivered by juvenal, as well as both the former. For, juvenal. Satyr. 13. p. 60. b. he there hath accumulated all the three of them together. Praeterea, lateris vigili cum febre dolorem S●co●pere pati; missum ad sua corpora mor●um, Infesto credunt a Numine: sax● Deorum H●ec, & tela putant.— If they but'gin to feel an Agues fit, That roughly shakes them; strait they construe it, A sickness sent them from some angry god: These are Gods arrows: this (say they) Gods rod. For so job indeed, job. 6. ●. calleth his sores and his sickness: The arrows of the Almighty are in me, The venom thereof doth drink up my spirits; and the terrors of God fight against me. And so likewise doth the Psalmist: T●●ne Arrows stick fast in me, Psal. ●8. 2. 3. and thine hand presseth me sore. There is no ●ealth in my flesh, because of thy displeasure: neither is there any rest in my bones, 〈…〉 of my sins: So that, even the very Atheist, in the time of his 〈◊〉, hath a right conceit, both of God, and of his sickness. Of God; that he 〈◊〉 a punisher of wickedness, and impiety: Of his sickness; that God punish●●● him for it, by that weakness, and infirmity. And thus, even the very Atheist, who in the time of his health, and of his perfect strength, groweth wanton against God, and suffereth his tongue to rove through the world, setting his mouth against heaue●, and against God himself: yet in the time of his sickness, Psal. 73. 9 11. is brought unto a far better temper; and to thi●●e more seriously of Religion and piety: as even Lucretius himself observeth: Mult●que, in rebus a●erbis, Lucr●t. l. 3. p. 92. Acriùs advertunt animos ad Relligionemque And a little after: Nam verae voces, tum demùm, pectore ab i●●o Eijciuntur; & eripitur persona, manet res. Men insad taking, bittered with affliction, Better attend, and mark, and mind Religion. For then, true Voices issue from their hearts: Then speak they what they think, in inmost parts. The truth remains. They cast off ●ayned Arts. And so likewise Solon: Nos verò mortales ita cogitamus: idem valet bonus, Solen in Ele●●s p. 232. & malus. Quam sententiam, unusquisque tam diû retinet, Donec aliquid patiatur: tum rursùm luget. We men imagine, in our jollity; That 'tis all one; or good, or bad to be. But then anon, we alterre this again: If haply we feel the sense of pain. For then, with are turned into mourning strain. But now, if their sickness do chance to bring unto them, but any little impression, or apprehension of death; no tongue can express with what a terror it striketh them; not only, of their own present death, though that be terrible enough of itself; but also, much more, with a terror of God; and what shall become of them after they be dead. This thought is that, which troubleth them. This afflicteth, and tormenteth them. No dream, no vision, no thunder, no lightning, doth so affright the Atheist, as the thought of death doth; and what will follow, after death. Because, Lightning and Thunder do represent unto him, but only a present, and a bodily death: but the cogitation of a state after death, doth strike him, with a fear of an eternal death. As is noted, S●obaeus Serm. 42. p. 279. by Zaleucus, in the proem of his laws: Morituros omnes, iniuriarum, quas commiserunt, memor●s, poenitentia invadit; & vehemens cupiditas, qua vellent, exactam sibi vitam omnem ●uisse iustam. All men, when they begin to draw on unto their death, have in them, a fresh remembrance, of all those wrongs and evils, which they have done in their life: and there presently invadeth them, a grievous repentance and sorrow, for committing them: and then, they feel in their hearts, an earnest with and desire, that all their former life had been virtuous, and pure. Yea, and the same obser●●●●● is also confirmed, by Plato. Certò scias (ò Socrates,) saith Shafalus) 〈…〉 devenit aliquis, ut breuì iam moriturum se opin●tur, Plato l. 1. de Repub. p. 532. incidit in 〈◊〉 timor, & cura quaedam, eorum, quae in superiori vita neglexit. Etenim fab●● qu● de Inferis dicuntur, quemadmodùm eos, qui iniustè egerunt, poenas illìc d●re op●rteat, irrisaehactenùs, movent tunc animum, ne fortè verae sint, suspicantem. Know this (ò Socrates) for a certain, that when a man is once come so far, that beseeth, he needs must die; there rusheth a marvellous fear upon him▪ and 〈◊〉 anxious care, of very many things, which before, in his former 〈…〉. For then, he beginneth to doubt with himself, whether those reports, that he had often heard, of Hell, and of Devils, and of infernal punishments (which before he was wont to deride, as mere fables) now may not (haply) be truths: which thought, doth very greatly afflict, and vex his mind. So likewise, Tully: Morbo gravi & mortifero afflictis, C●c. l. 1. de diuin. p. 251. occurrunt plerumque 〈◊〉 'gins mortuorum: tùmque vel maximè laudi student, eosque, qut secùs quam 〈◊〉, vixerunt, p●●●lorum suorum túm maximeè poenitet. When they draw ●nto their death, there do walk before their eyes, the images of dead men: then they only think of virtue, and then they deeply repent, of all those sins and offences, which before they have committed. Thus they, that will not fear God, in the time of their life, are driven to fear the Devil, at the time of their death, and to tremble at the thought of that eternal punishment, which they fear to be after death, decreed for them, by God. As we may evidently see, in Bion of Boristhenes: who seeing himself to be near unto his death, he was so afraid of it, that he would have endured any torment, rather than to have di●d. For, Laërt. in Vita Bion. p. 145. as Laertius reporteth it: Morbo tabescens, & mori pertimescens; qui, Deos non esse, dixerat, Fanum non viderat, Mortalibus qui illudebat, veris dùm Dijs immolarent; nec, Peccavi, dixit: cuncta tamen perpeti magis, quam mori, paratus erat. ●is sickness increasing, and his health diminishing, and ●e fearing much to die: Though he had denied the Gods, despised all their Temples, derided all their worshippers, ●nd never once said of himself so much, as, I have sinned: Yet was h● ready, to have suffered any kind of grievous torment, rather than to have died. And why so? Not so much for the flare of death itself (though it be very fearful) as because he feared, that after his death, he should be committed by God (whom he had always despi●●d) into the hand of the Devil, to be tormented. And therefore, at his dying, he put out his hand unto him, to bid him welcome; seeking to leni●●● him, towards him, with this flattering salutation: Salve, Pluto, salve: Welcome Devil, welcome. And this is that, which maketh the cogitation of death, of all other t●rribles, to seem the most terrible, Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 6. To. 2. p. 634. even to the wicked Atheist; because, after his death, he feareth a judgement &, a punishment. This is that, which affecteth him. This is that, which afflicteth him. This is that which tormenteth him. And this maketh, not only death itself to be fearful unto him, at the time of his dying; but also, the very remembrance of death, to be bitter unto him, Ecclus. 41. 1. in the time of his flourishing. o Death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee, unto a man, that liveth at rest, in his riches? Bitter, not only for the loss of all those good things, which he respecteth; but also, much more, for the fear of those evil things that he expecteth. As Tully observeth of Epicurus: that, though no man seemed more to contemn, both God, and Death; yet that no man feared more, 〈…〉. both the one, and the other. Non quenquam vidi, qui magis, ea quae timenda esse negaret, timeret: Mortem dico, & Deos. Thus you see, that, howsoever some men in the time of their health, may so hoodwink their conscience, and so obscure their own knowledge; as (for some short time) to think, There is no God: yet that mist is soon dispelled; and the contrary opinion hath many returns unto them; and cannot be repelled by them: but, as the Poet very truly observeth: Naturam expellas furcâ 〈…〉. tamen usque recurret. Though thou do Nature strive, with fork and force t' expel, Y●t still she will retire, and all thy force repel. But much more, when the mind is (as it were) enforced, either by fearful visions, or by terrible thunders, or by the dread of death. At these three times especially, the Atheist is compelled, to bewray his inward fear, of that God, whom he outwardly would seem to hold in great contempt. 6 Now, ●he fear of the Atheist, sheilah, that he thinks, Th●re is a God. t●is inward fear, which the Atheist hath of God, and outwardly bewrayeth, upon so many occasions, is no less an Argument, that he believeth, There is a God, t●en if he should plainly confess it, in word. Nay, indeed a far greater. For, this is a real confession of God; whereas the other is but verbal. That fear of God, which the Atheist hath, when he dreameth; that fear of God, which he hath, when it thundereth; that fear of God, which he hath, at his death; are so many real, and effectual confessions, that he believeth, There is a God. And so is likewise, his fear of the Devil. For (as Sen●ca well collafirth) Non leue m●mentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, 〈…〉 118. p. 295. aut ●imentium inferos, aut colentium, The consent of men, in either fearing o● worshipping of Devils, is an effectual Argument, to prove, that there be such. And so is it likewise, to prove, There is a God: at the least, in their opinion, that so either fear, or worship them. Their worship, showing it directly; their fear, indirectly. But yet, no l●sse effectually: nay, indeed a great deal more. For, those sudden s●ares, breaking out at those times, with so great a violence, through all those artificial disguise, which they had purposely prepared to cover and hide it, are a more substantial proof, to confirm it; then if they should openly, in express words, confess it. As the Orator collecteth (upon the like grounds) against the Catilinarian Censpirators. cum illa ●●rtissima visa sunt argumenta, 〈…〉. atque indicia s●el●ris; tabulae, signa, manus, denique uniuscuiusque confessio; tum t●la mul●ò certiora; colour, oculi, vultus, taciturnitas. Though those were very strong Arguments, and indications of their wickedness; their letters, their scales, their hands, and their confessions: Yet these were much stronger; the paleness of their colour, the heaviness of their eyes, the sadness of their countenance, and the sullenness of their silence. And then, he proceedeth to declare, certain other signs and tokens of their guiltiness; which he concludeth for more strong and evident Arguments, than their open and direct confessions. And so may it likewise be concluded, for those fears and affrightments, Max. Tyr. Se●. 1. p. 7. which I have before unfolded. And thus (as Maximus Tyrius observeth) we may; Per illos, ex obliquo, Dei vestigia conspicari: We may behold, even in the Atheists, by a kind of obliquity, diverse manifest footestepps, and acknowledgements of a Divinity: Whom, though they would seem artificially not to know; yet do they, by their fear, Nazian. Tract. 51. de Fide. p. 832. acknowledge: as Nazi●●zan well noteth. Quem nesciunt, & metuendo sciunt. CHAP. 13. That, beside the forenamed indirect confessions of Atheists, diverse of them, have directly and expressly confessed God. 2. Some of them, unwittingly 3. Some of them, unwillingly. 4. And some of them, both wittingly, and willingly. I Have showed, in the two last preceding Chapters; that (beside the confessions of all other sorts of men, of all nations and conditions whatsoever) even the Atheist himself, though he directly deny God; yet indirectly confesseth him: partly, by his own excessive self-love; whereby he maketh himself, a God unto himself, serving nothing but his Belly, and the neighbour parts of his Belly, Ventrem & Venerem, as the Poet noteth of him: — Nihili pendunt animi bona; Palinge● in Sagit. p. 262. solaque ventris Et Veneris (pecudum ritu) oblectamina quaerunt. They nought esteem the goods of mind: 'tis only Belly-cheer, And beastly lusts, their sought delight: as if brute beasts they were. As I have largely showed before, in the whole eleventh Chapter. And partly again, by his inward fear; whereby he confesseth another God, beside himself. Whom, though in some sudden fits of bravery, he do sometimes deny, and would resolutely seem at all times to contemn; yet by other sudden fits of fear, seizing violently upon him, and quashing all his formerly pretended jollity, he really confesseth him, whom he verbally denieth. Yea, and that in far more base and abject manner, than any other man in the world, whosoever. There is no man, that professeth the fear of God, which feareth him so slavishly, as the Atheist doth, who yet would seem to contemn him most confidently. As I have likewise declared in the whole twelfth Chapter. But yet, this is not all that the Atheist doth, Three sorts of confessions of God from the Atheist. in acknowledging of a God. For, if we look further into the Atheists life, and survey the tenor of it unto his death, we shall find, that (beside those oblique and indirect confessions, expressed in the forenamed Chapters) even the most resolute and dissolute of all that impious rank, which glory to be counted the deniers of God; yet have sometimes confessed a God, as directly, as any that ever adored him most religiously; as expressly, in plain and apert terms, confessing him, as ever they used in their denial of him. Which confessions of the Atheists, may (for distinctions sake) be ranged into three diverse orders and ranks: that Some of them be made unwittingly, and beside their will; Some of them unwillingly, and by an extorted will; and Some of then both wittingly, and willingly, by a free-working will. 2 For the first of those three kinds, Unwitting confessions of Atheists. the Prophet David telleth us, that, There is not a word in the tongue of man, but that the Lord knoweth it, yea, Psal. 139. 4. and maketh it too. For King Solomon plainly telleth us, that Though the preparations of the hear●●e of man, P●o. 16. 1. yet that the answer of the tongue is of God. So that no man is master of his own tongue, to speak at all times what he himself speaketh: but he oftentimes speaketh that displeaseth himself, to speak what God pleaseth. He always speaketh what God pleaseth, though not always what pleaseth God: no, nor what pleaseth himself neither. For, God oftentimes openeth the lips, even of the wicked, and maketh even their mouth to show forth his praise. And, though they themselves do sometimes vainly boast, Psal. 12. 4. that their tongues are their own, and that they will speak, for who is Lord over them? yet they are deceived in all, for their tongues are not their own, neither can they speak what they would; but they have a Lord over them, who oftentimes compelleth them to speak as he would, though sometimes that which they themselves would not. This we may evidently see, in the covetous Prophet Bal●am, who, though he were a false Prophet, yet delivered he true Prophecies, both as concerning Christ, Num. 24. 17. 5. and as concerning the Israelites. Whom, though he intended for money to have cursed; yea, and had conceived a curse already in his mind, yet could he never bring it forth: but still, in stead of a cursing, ●here came out a blessing; his tongue rebelling against his own private spirit, and obeying the command of a superior Spirit. Insomuch, Ve●s. 13. that he himself professeth, that he had no power to pass the commandment of the Lord, were it good, or were it bad: no not, though the King would give him an house full of Gold. And yet, he well declared, that he would have done all, whatsoever he could, for Gold. And the same we may likewise observe, even in Atheists; and in those that have been the deriders of God; that oftentimes, when they think to curse, and to blaspheme him, God so confoundeth their language, and maketh their tongue, so to falter within them, that in the same sentences, they do oftentimes confess him. Let me give an example, or two, to this purpose. There be certain Atheists, mentioned in the book of job, who make but a scoff at the Omnipotency of God; ask there most profanely, I●b. 21. 15. Who is the Almighty, and why they should serve him? and what profit they should reap, if they should pray unto him? And again, 22. 17. a little after: What it is, that the Almighty is able to do for them? Where, there evidently appeareth a manifest confusion, both of their speech, and of their reason. For, what can be greater madness, then either to call him Almighty, of whom they ask, What he can do for them? or, to deny that God can do any thing for them; when as they acknowledge him to be Almighty? Their purpose was to deny his Omnipotency: and yet the Omnipotent so overruled their tongue, that he made it, in the same sentence, to confess his Almightiness: sending a spirit of giddiness, into the minds of his enemies; and enforcing them to speak for him, even with the same breath, wherewith they intended to speak against him. As we may further see, by another sort of Atheists, mentioned by David: who made but a scoff at the Omniscience of God, demanding very scornfully; whether there were any knowledge in the most High? Where note the strange precipitancy of their tongue; Psa. 73. 11. job. 22. 13. 14. how grossly it crosseth and thwarteth itself. They deny him to have any knowledge in him, whom yet they acknowledge to be the most High. Things, that cannot cohere. For, he that is the most High, (as the Prophet David testifieth) beholdeth all those things, that are done here below. Who is like unto the Lord our God, Psal. 113. ●. 6. who hath his dwelling so high; and yet hum●leth himself, to behold the things, that are done here below? Yea, and even Wisdom itself affirmeth, Ecclus. 24. 3. that she came out of the mouth of the most High. Which even the Heathens themselves, do symbolically shadow out, in feigning Minerva (who is the goddess of Wisdom) to have been bred in jupiters' head; who is their highest god; and unto whom they give the title, Lucian. Dial. Vulcani & ●ouis. p. 22. not only of Optimus, Plaut. Menech. Act. 5. Sec. 2. p. 446. and Maximus; but also of Summus. — Summum jovem — Detestor— I call the most high jupiter, In this to be mine Arbiter. So that, in their calling of God, The most High, they directly confess, not only his being, but also his wisdom. They confess that same Omniscience, which they intended to suppress. And the same intoxication may yet again be seen, Wisd. 2. 2. 6. in another sort of Atheists; of whom there is mention in the Book of Wisdom; who make but a scoff at the Providence of God, affirming, that all things do fall out, at all adventures: holding with Epicurus (in all natural things) that there is, Nihil ratione in natura factum: and with Theophrastus (in all civil matters) that Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia: There is nothing in the world, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 196. done according to reason: Cic. l. 5. 〈◊〉. p. 170. but that man's life is ruled by fortune, not by wisdom. Thus ascribing all to Fortune, as though there were no God at all in heaven. And yet, in the same place, they by and by confess him. Come therefore (say they) and let us chierefully enjoy the creatures of God. They that before affirmed, that all things fell out by chance, as though there were no God; now directly confess, that all things in the world are the creatures of God. Thereby plainly acknowledging, both that there is a God, and that he is also the Creator of the world. There confessing his Essence, where they would deny his Providence: nay, there confessing his Providence, where they would deny his Essence. And a like involution, is observed by Laertius, in Theodorus, called Atheos'. Who, though he were persuaded, that there were no gods; yet he, railing upon one, that before had offended him, he told him in his passion, that he was one that was hated of all the Gods. Thus pleaseth it God oftentimes to inebriate the minds, Laert. in vit. Aristip. p. 78. and to confound the tongues of Atheists. And so to make them in one and the same place, with one & the same breath, to confess him, when they think to blaspheme him: and directly to speak for him, when they think indirectly to speak against him. Which manner of speaking the truth so unwittingly, Lact. l. 6. c. 8. p. 333. Lactantius interpreteth to be a kind of prophecy. Ego quidem, eos, qui vera imprudenter loquuntur, sic habendos puto, tanquàm divinent, spiritu aliquo instincti: I verily think of them that speak the truth they know not, as if they were inspired with some divining spirit. And we may see his observation apparently verified, Io. 11. 50. 51. in Caiaphas his prophesying: who delivered a most excellent prophecy of Christ: and yet he knew not what he said. 3 Now, Vnwillingconfes●●io●s of Athei●s. as God sometimes worketh his enemies to confess him, by confounding of their tongues, and making them to speak unwittingly against themselves: so doth he it oftentimes, by enforcing their confessions, and extorting them from them against their wills. Thus dealt he with King Pharaoh; who was at the first so irreligions, that, when as Moses charged him in the name of God, Thus saith the Lord; he presumptuously demanded, Ex. 5. 2. Who is the Lord? as holding scorn to obey him. But yet, afterward, he being scourged by the righteous hand of God, and brought unto some better understanding of himself, he was forced to confess, that the Lord was just, Ex. 9 27. 8. 28. and righteous; but that both he, and his people, were wicked and impious: Yea, and beseech Moses, to pray for him, unto the same God, whom before he had most impiously contemned, and despised. Thus dealt God likewise with Herod Agrippa: who, josep. l 19 Antiquit. p. 565. Act: 12. 21. 22. 23. araying himself, one day, in most glorious Apparel, spangled all over, and spread with plates of gold and precious Stones, assembled all the people, to speak unto them, in a solemn Oration: wherein he purposely so disposed himself, that the shine of the Sunbeams should reflect upon his foresaid Spangles, and jewels: through which artificial reflection, he seemed to shine more bright than the Sun. With which glorious sight, and his eloquent Oration, the people being stupefied, they gave him this impudent acclamation; that His speech then unto them, Act. 12. 21. etc. was the voice of a God, and not of a man. Unto which their impious assentation, he more impiously assenting, God sent his Angel, presently to strike and to punish him. Who, quickly finding this stroke to be mortal, and that it was inflicted upon him from heaven; though before he was silent, and would not confess God, but was well enough contented, that the people should substitute him into his stead: yet now, he confessed him, most humbly; acknowledging both the people's error, and his own mortality. Whose repentant confession, joseph: ubi supra. is notably expressed by josephus, in these words. Conuersis in amicos oculis; En (inquit) Ille ego, vestra appellatione, Deus, vitam relinquere iubeor; fatali necessitate, mendacium vestrum coarguente: & quem immortalem salutâstis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda est voluntas coelestis Numinis. He casting his eyes, upon his flattering friends: Now behold me (saith he) whom, but even now, you saluted for a God; how I am commanded to forsake this world: my fatal necessity convincing your flattery of a lie. He, whom you blazoned to be immortal, am now carried violently unto my death. But it is meet, to be subject, unto the will and pleasure of the highest God. This notable confession, he made before he died: which, if he would have made in time, he had surely lived. Thus likewise, God dealt with Antiochus Epiphanes: who was so madded with malice, 1. Mac. 1. 46. against the God of Israel; that he blasphemed his Name, overthrew his Altars, destroyed his Temple, violated his Laws, and persecuted his People; yea and that with all the immanest examples of the bloodyest cruelty, that he could possibly devose. No Atheist, in simply denying of God, could be so great an enemy unto him, as this profane King was, in fight against him. But the hand of God so seized upon him, and smote him with so sore and incurable a disease, that it forced both his pride and his malice to submit; and to begin his forced submission with this humble Confession; 1. Mac. 9 10. 11. 12. etc. It is meet to be subeict unto God, & that a man, who is mortal, should not think himself equal unto God through pride. Making many vows and supplications, unto that same God, in vain, whom before he had compelled all his people to blaspheme. And a very like example is reported by Eusebius, of the Emperor Maximinus, as furious a persecuter of the Christians, as Antiochus was before of the jews. Whom he answered so exactly, both in his Impiety, and in his Calamity, and in his palinody; that a more perfect parallel, can hard●y be found in all Plutarch's Lives, than was between these two profane & bloody Kings. For first, for their Impiety. As Antiochus, in a profane contempt of the Israelits true God, 1. Mac. 1. 50. caused diverse Temples to be builded, Idols to be form, and Altars to be erected, unto the Heathens false gods: so likewise did M●ximinus too. He did, 〈◊〉 8 Eccl●. Hist. c. 16 p. 108 Templa erigere, & delubra, temporis prolixit●te ●iruta, studiosè restaurare, & simulachrorum sacerdotes in omnibus locis constituere. He erected new Temples, and repaired the old ones; and appointed, in all places, new Priests for his Idols. Secondly, as Antiochus forbade unto all the jews, the use of their own Laws, 1. Mac. 1 13. ●1. Euseb. l. 9 Hist. c. 2. p 110. and the exercise of their Religion: so likewise did Maximinus too. He did, Christianis libertatem in coemeterijs conveniendi, praetextu quodam adimere. Under colourable praetences, he denied unto Christians, their common assemblies. Thirdly, as Antiochus commanded the jews to worship his Idols: so likewise did Maximinus to the Christians. Which he calleth a returinig unto their right minds: 1. Ma. ● 45. Reditionem ad rectum animi propositum. Fourthly, Euseb. l 8. Hist. c. 18. p. 109. as Antiochu● persecuted all those that refused it, with all the exquisite torments that could be devised: so likewise did Maximinus too; burning them, killing them, drowning them, hanging them, and whatsoever a wicked wit could invent to torment them: Ignem, ferrum, 1. Mac. 1. 63. ●4. crucifixiones, feroces bestias, maris fundum, membrorum amputationem, & adustionem, oculorum expunctionem, totius corporis mutilationem, Euseb l. 8. Hist. c. 16. p. 108. famen praetereà, & vincula. Fire, sword, crucifying, devouring by wild beasts, drowning, cutting off the limbs, burning, boring-out the eyes, laming the whole body, famishing, and shackling. Yea and as he addeth, in another place, Euseb. l. 1. De vit. Constantini c. 51. p. 139. Novorum suppliciorum inventione, seize insolenter efferens: He seeking to excel all other men in cruelty, took a pride in inventing of new torments, as yet unknown. And thus, in all the several points of Impiety, there was so full and exact an agreement, Gen. 49. 5. as though they had been two Brothers in evil: so precisely did this latter tread the steps of the former. So that it was a wonder, that he, seeing himself to follow him, in all the several degrees of his wickedness, did not fear he should follow him, in all the several degrees of his vengeance. As Tully expressly noteth in the very same case. Te miror, Antoni, Cic Philip. 2. p. 553. quorum facta imitere, eorum exitus non perhorrescere: Imeruaile, Anthony, thou shouldest not fear their falls, who hast followed all their faults. For, Mirum non est, Eurip. in Oresic. p. 53. pati gravia eos, qui patrant. It is no marvel, that they should suffer grievous things who have committed grievous sins. And he had good cause to fear it, as the sequel plainly showed. For, there was no one stroke of God's vengeance, inflicted upon the one, but that the same was after, inflicted upon the other. So that, they might seem to have been Brothers in this evil too, as well as in the former: in malo poenae, Tertu●. l. 2. cont. Martion. c. 14. p. 375. 2. Mac. 9 5. Euseb. l 8. Hist. c. 17 p. 1 8. 2. Mac. 9 5. as well as in malo culpae; in malo supplicij, as in malo delicti: as Tertullian distinguisheth them. For first, as Antiochus was strucken with the revenging hand of God: so likewise was Maximinus too. Corripuit eum supplicium, divinitùs ill atum. A punishment from heaven did suddenly attach him. Secondly, as Antiochus his plague was seated into his bowels, 1. Mac. 9 5. Euseb. ibid. which tormented him with an 〈◊〉 torture: so likewise was Maximinus his too. Sub●ta illi accidit in medijs corporis arcanis suppuratio. A sudden putrefaction did seize ●pon his 〈◊〉 Ulcer: so his most secret parts. Thirdly, Ibid. as Antiochus his plague break out into a 〈…〉 likewise did Maximinus his too. He had, in imis partibus, ulcus sistulosum. He had a festered ulcer in the bottom of his belly. Fourthly, 2. Mac. 9 9 as there issued out of the body of Antiochus, an infinite multitude of most loathsome worms: so did there likewise, Euseb▪ ibid. out of the body of Maximinus: Indicibilis mul●itudo vermium ebullijt: An innumerable multitude of worms crawled out. Fiftly, 2. Mac. 9 9 as those worms of Antiochus bred so noisome a stink, that they made him odious, both to himself, and others: so likewise did Maximinus his too. He did, Euseb. ibid. p. 109. laethi fi●um foetorem exhalare, ut Medicorum aliqui incredibilem foetorem ferre non valentes, occiderentur. He breathed out a deadly stink: insomuch that diverse of his Physicians not being able to endure his abominable savour, were killed with the very air. And, in these miserable torments, they both of them exhaled their execrable souls. Thus exactly did God proceed, 2. Mac 9 28. from point to point, in all the several degrees of their punishment; equalling the one of them unto the other in their vengeance, as they had equalled themselves together in their wickedness. Thereby plainly declaring, Ecclus. 5. 4. Heb. 11. 6. that he is (though a patient) yet a most just Rewarder; proportioning exactly the measure of his justice, according to the measure and proportion of the wickedness. But to proceed on to the third part of our comparison; which is their confession, and repentant recantation, the point which most properly belongeth unto our present Treatise. As those two profane Kings did answer one another, Pro. 27. 19 as exactly, as two faces use to do in the water, both in their impiety, and in their calamity; so did they likewise in their palinody. For first, as Antiochus, being seized upon, by God's justice, b●gan straightway to see his own injustice, 2. Mac. 9 11. E●seb. l 8. Hist. c. 18. p. 109. and wickedness: so likewise did Maximinus too. cum tantis malis afflictaretur, tandem sentire coepit, quae contra pios Dei cultores gesserat. When he once was afflicted with so many evils, than did he begin to have a sense of those evils which he himself had inflicted upon God's holy Servants. Secondly, as Antiochus was inwardly persuaded, 1. Mac. 6. 12. 13. that all those evils invaded him, only for his impiety against the God of the jews, in persecuting his servants: so was Maximinus persuaded, that all his evils happened, only for his impiety against the God of the Christians, in persecuting his servants. Haec se, Euseb. l. 9 Hist. c. 10. p. 116. proper insantam contra Christum praesumptam, meritò, & ultionis vice, perpeti confessus est. And this he confessed to have been justly inflicted for his impious presumption and fury against Christ. Thirdly, as Antiochus, repenting of his wickedness, published new edicts, in favour of the jews: so likewise did Maximinus, 2. Mac. 9 14. 15. juseb. l. 8. Hist. c. 18. p. 109. in favour of the Christians. Praecepit, ut a persecutione Christianorum cessaretur; legeque, & edicto imperiale, Ecclesiae eorum restaurarentur. He commanded, that persecutions against Christians, should be inhibited; and their Churches again repaired. Fourthly, as Antiochus prayed unto that same God, 2. Mac. 9 13. Euseb. ibid. whom before he blasphemed: so likewise did Maximinus. He did, Deo omnium, delicta sua confiteri. He confessed his sins unto the great God. Fiftly, as Antiochus besought those same jews, whom before he had persecuted, to supplicate, and pray unto th●ir God for him: so likewise did Maximinus, E●s●b. ibid. to the Christians. Deo suo pro salut● nostra supplicent. He entreated the Christians, to pray and entreat their God for his health. Sixthly, 2. Mac. 9 17. as Antiochus now religiously vowed, that he would not, from thenceforth, have any other God, but the God of the jews: so Maximinus professed, that he would have none other, but the God of the Christians: Quem, verum esse Deum, ipsa experientiase ●omperisse, I●useb. l. 1. d 〈◊〉 Consta● fini c. 5●. p. 140. Ibid. testatus est: Whom, by 〈◊〉, he had ●ound, to be indeed the true God. And thus (to conclude with our own point, of his palinody, and confession) Christianorum Deo se 〈◊〉 con●iteri; & qu●s contra Deum pugn●s sus●●perat, pala● elocutus, palmodiam 〈◊〉: as he not 〈◊〉 the same place. He confessed himself openly unto t●e Christians God; acknowledging the persecution, that he h●d stirred up against him and making a solemn ●ecantation. These notable confessions, did God, by his plagues and punishments, extort from the mouths of these two his most notable enemies: the one of them, for the credit of his Law: the other, of his Gospel: so triumphing by his justice, over their impiety and wickedness. Another such like extorted confession, 〈◊〉 l. 6. c 2 p 511. did God again force, from the Emperor jultan; although proceeding from a far unlike passion. H●e, being sometimes a professed Christian, and afterward revolting from his faith and Christianity, obtained to himself, the name of Apostata, in a kind of singularity. Yea, and that very justly. For he, not contented to renounce the saith of Christ, but boiling with an unplacable hatred against him, spent all the whole time of his wicked Apostasy, in persecuting of Christians, with all extreme cruelty. Until, at the last, he being drawee by God's vengeance, into a dangerous warr●, against the Persians, was there suddenly slain; and yet no man can tell by whom. But the himself, being privy unto his own impiety, and to that inwar● hatred, which he bore against God, confessed it, to be the stroke of his hand; and the judgement of that Christ, whom, in his members, 〈…〉 persecuted. And therefore, he objected it unto Christ, and to none other: against whom, he threw up his own blood into the air, ending his wicked life, with this true confession in his mouth: Vicisti, Galiaee. Thou hast no● overcome me, o thou I●sus of G●lilee. Therein, both confessing his own wickedness and impiety, in fight against Christ; and Christ's most glorious victory, in subduing such an enemy. Simul tum confessus, Theod. l. 3 hist. Eccl●s. c. 20. Ta. ●. p. 256. & Victorium, & blasphemi●m: as Theodoret noteth of him. Which confession of his, drew another like confession, from another of the Heathen: and yet proceeding from another passion. For, when it was reported, in what a strange fashion, that Emperor was slain; one of the Heathen, that then heard it, spent this biting scoff upon it. Quomodò Ch●istiani di●unt, H●er. l. b. ● jam Habae. c. 3. ●06 p. 243. Deum suume esse patientem, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Nihil ir●cundius, nihil ho● suror● pr●sen●ius: ne m●dico quidem sp●tio, indignationem suam differre po●u●t. How can the Christians truly say, that they have a pati●nt God? when ●e plainly see him so angry and impatient, that he could not de●e● his anger, so much as for 〈◊〉. Thereby plainly confessing (though in scurrilous heathen fashion) that it was the God of the Christians, that gave that blow to I●lian. In which three last examples, it is not unworthy of our observation, to note the several humours, wherewith they were possessed, in making those confessions: The first of them, making it, in mere sorrow and contrition: The second, in stomach and indignation: The third, in lightness and derision. But yet, — Ridentem dicere verum, Ho●a●. Serm. 1. p. 129. a. Quid vetat?— Why may not he that laughs, Laugh out a truth? Thus, God directed all their several passions (yea, even the profanest of them) to draw from all of them, a true confession of him. Another like confession, did God also enforce out of the mouth of Tullus Hostil●us: Who succeeding to Numa in his Kingdom, Plut. in 〈◊〉 Numae. p. 156. and being a martialminded man, made a scorn and derision of all Numa's religion, as tending to nothing else, but only the effeminating and weakening of men's minds. But he, being smitten with the stroke of God's justice, & cast into a grievous & a dangerous sickness; in the end, repented him of his profaneness, renouncing his former ungodly opinion. Morbo gravi ac multiplici, ad mutandum sententiam compulsus est. Yea, and (as Livy expresseth his mutation, a great deal more ful●y) Adeò fracti simul cum corpore, Livy l. 1. p. 12. sunt spiritus illi feroces, ut qui nihil ant● à ratus esset minùs regium, qu●m sacris dedere animum, repentè, omnibus magnis parvisque superstitionibus obnoxius degeret, religion●búsque populum impleret. The extremity of his sickness, did so both abate his strength, & so abase his spirits; that he, who before thought nothing more unworthy the majesty of a King, then once to stoop unto any action of Religion, now grew, upon the sudden, most servile, & slavish unto all superstition: which he not only observed himself, but also transfused into all his Subjects. But yet, he, not seeking unto the true God, but changing one kind of superstition for another, was at the last, destroyed by Lightning and Thunder. Yea, Eutrop. l. 1. p. 401. and (as Eutropius reporteth it) Fulmine ictus, cum domo sua, are sit. He was not only himself consumed by Lightning; but also his whole house and family with him. Yet another like confession (and by the like means) did God again extort, out of Bion of Boristhenes: who was so confirmed and obstinate an Atheist, Laert. in vita Bion. p. 144. etc. that all the time of his health, he denied there was any God: but in his age, he being strucken with a most grievous sickness, and finding it to be the finger of God: inductus est, poenitentiam agere super iis, quae peccârat in Deum: He was thereby induced to repent him of all his impieties against God. Whose folly and madness, Laertius in the same place very sharply perstringeth. Stultus qui mercede voluerit, esse Deos. Quasi tum demum Dij essent, cum illos B●on esse voluerit. Was not this a fool (saith he) who would think, there should be Gods, when he would have them, and none, when he would none? Thus, all those professed and noted Atheists, have expressly confessed a God in the end; though in the beginning, they most obstinately denied him: detesting and renouncing that impiety at their death, which they practised in their life: and then, with all humility, acknowledging their profaneness: as thieves use to confess their offences at the Gallows, For, as I observed before out of Lucretius: Verae voces, Lucret. l. 3. p. 92. tum demum pectore ab imo Eijciuntur: & eripitur persona; manet res. For then, true words ascend from out the depth of heart: The mask is taken off, the truth than plays his part. And therefore God at that time exacteth his testimony, when (of all other times) it is most ponderous, and weighty: Enforcing them unto their con●ession by tortures, as he sometimes forced Devils: and, Mat. 8. 29. as Magistrates use to force Malefactors to the question, by stretching them upon the Rack. Yea, and even the very Heathen themselves, do insinuate, that the justice of God so presseth the Atheists (though they be his most hardened, and confirmed enemies) that it not only enforceth them to confess him upon earth; but al●o to proclaim him out of Hell itself. And from thence to confess, both their own sin and wickedness, and Gods most just vengeance: exhorting all others to take heed by their examples. This Pindarus insinuateth in the person of Ixion, whom he maketh to call out in the midst of his torments, Pindarus in Pythijs Ode 2. p. 181. To take heed of unthankfulness unto our Benefactors, and to avoid that odious vice, that had brought him unto that place. Deorum mandatis, Ixionem aiunt, hae● mortalibus dic●re, dùm in alata rota circumqu●que volutatur: Benesactorem placidis remunerationibus excipientes, persolvere gratiam. And this (he saith) the Gods compelled him to proclaim. And, Virgil likewise, in the person of Phlegyas, shadoweth out the very same. — Phlegyasque miserrimus, Virgil 6. Aeneid. p. 264. omnes Admonet, & magna testatur voce per umbras: Discite iustitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos. Most miserable Phlegyas warns all men, And amongst the ghastly Ghosts thus skriching cries, With hellish voice: Admonished now ye been, Learn justice, and the Gods not to despise. Thus doth he preach both God & godliness out of Hell; who renounced them both, while he lived upon earth. Yea, and our Saviour Christ himself representeth the very same point, Luk. 16. 27. 28. in the historical parable of Dives; who being tormented in Hell himself, yet desired to have his brethren forewarned of that wickedness and ungodliness, which had worthily brought him unto that misery and wretchedness: The meaning of all this is no more but this; that God will force the tongues of those men, to confess him, that have been most ungodly and impudent in denying him. He that made the Devils confess him upon the earth, will make the Damned confess him out of Hell. 4 But yet we may meet with diverse other wicked ones, Willing confessions of the Atheists. with whom God hath taken a more mild and gracious course: not enforcing them to confess him by his justice and judgements (as he did the former) but inducing them unto it by his mercy and goodness: enlightening their minds with his heavenly knowledge, and so bringing them to see their own former blindness. Thus dealt he with jethro, an Idol-Priest of Midian: who, Ex. 18. 1. 11. though he were not in the highest degree of Atheists, in denying of all Gods; yet might he be numbered in an inferior degree of them, in denying the true God, and worshipping profane and wicked Idols in his stead. But yet he wisely obabseruing those great plagues and judgements, which God had poured down upon the Egyptians, for the deliverance of his servants, he thereby received instruction, and openly broke forth into this notable confession: Now I know, that the Lord is greater than all the Gods. For as they have dealt proudly with them, so are they recompensed. Thus dealt he likewise, with the Apostle Paul, Act. 9 1. 3 4. as furious a persecuter (in his small authority) as ever the Church had any. But yet Christ, in his great mercy, appearing unto him, and, out of heaven, reproving him; he likewise received instruction: and, reforming his former error, became afterwards, as zealous a Preacher, as ever before he had been a persecuter. In so much, that it passed of him, as a Proverb, that, He which persecuted them, in times past, now preached the faith, which before he destroyed. This blessed Apostle, Gal. 1. 22. Theod. l. 3. Eccle. Hist. c. 2 p. 247. holding a diverse course, from that cursed Apostata; who destroyed the same faith, which before he had preached. And yet, in the end, was enforced again, to confess the same faith, Sect. 3. hu●us Cap. which he sought to have destroyed: as before I have declared. The like Confessions, and recantations, may be here accumulated, of divers other of the Heathens: who have plainly renounced their impieties and profaneness: and, in the end, acknowledged a God, whom at the beginning they denied. It is reported of Diagoras, the most renowned of all that are called Atheists, that he began his Book of Poems, with this Exordium: Quòd a Numine summo reguntur omnia: Morn●us. l. De verit. Relig. c. 1. p. 16. That all things are ruled by the highest God. Which may probably be thought, to have been the recantation of his former opinion. For, his Atheism and impiety (if it were truly such) he had from the common opinion of his country, the Island of Melos: which held a scornful opinion of all the Greekish gods. And therefore this so direct a contradiction of his former opinion, cannot otherwise be construed, then as his retractation. And the like may be thought, as concerning Theodorus; who, for the opinion of his impiety, was likewise named Atheos'. And yet Laertius affirmeth, La●rt. in vita 〈◊〉. p. 77. that even he himself had seen a Book of his, entitled De Dijs; and that it was, Liber non contemnendus. Which judgement he would never have passed upon it, if he had handled that Argument, as an Atheist. For then, both the Writer, and the writing, had been very worthy to be contemned: which Laertius denieth. And therefore that Book, being censured, to be a work not worthy to be contemned; yea, and that by the same man who before had taxed him for his Atheism; may also probably be thought, to have contained a retractation of his former opinion. And so likewise Euemerus, whatsoever his opinion was, which among all the Heathen was so condemned for Atheism: Whether it were a general denying of all the gods; or but a particular denying of the Heathen gods: yet evidently appeareth, out of Plutarch, that when he grew old, he grew cold, in defending it. A manifest Argument, that he repented of his broaching it. Which his coldness in asserting it, bred also a like coldness in the people's assent unto it. As it evidently appeareth in those verses of Callimachus, Plut. l. 1. de Placit. c. 7. To. 2. p. 14 wherein he perstringeth the impiety of Euemerus. Venite frequentes, ante muros, in fanum, Vbi, qui vetustum, ex aere, tonantem formavit Senex loquax, cum libris impijs friget. Come hither thronging, and approach this wall. Enter this Temple. Where, now, find you shall Th'old prattling fellow; which so scornful was, And called the thunderer, but a piece of Brass: For all his former fire, and stately Looks, Well cooled now, with all his impious Books. Meaning those Book (saith Plutarch) which before he had composed, to prove There was no God. Hos dicit, quos composuit; Non esse Deos, docens. Which coldness, from the heat of his former opinion, may be interpreted, as (in some degree) a recantation. For, I rather apply those verses unto his own coldness, in pursuing his former opinion; then unto the coldness of the people, in following it; though this might also be intended. But, unto him I apply it: because Theophilus Antioch nus (as I have formerly observed) reporteth it for his opinion, Cap. 10. Sect. 4. The●phil. A●●●och. l. 3. ad ●utolic. 〈◊〉. Pat. To 5 p. 156. that he defended, Dei unitatem; not Nullitatem. Which evidently proveth, that he, not only believed, that There was a God; but also, The unity of the Godhead. From whence, it must needs follow, that either the heathen were utterly mistaken, in their conceit of his opinion; and that he never was indeed an Atheist: or, if sometimes he were one; yet, that, at last, he recanted it. For Socrates; though he died for Atheism: yet that he died not, an Atheist; it appeareth by this, Plato in Ph●do● c. p. 520. 〈◊〉. ●polo. c. 46. p. 75. that, at his death, he appointed that a Cock should be offered to AEsculapius. Which Tertullian observeth in him, as a renouncing of all his forme● irreligion. And so likewise, Aristotle though all his life long, he had ascribed all things, but only to their inferior and secondary causes: yet lifting up his mind much higher, at his death, he implored the mercy of the highest and first cause: Prime causae misericordiam intentiùs implorabat: as Caelius Rhodiginus writeth. It is likewise reported of Numa Pompilius, Coel. Rhodigin. l. 17. c. 34. p. 814. that Priestlike King of the Romans: who (like another Moses) was the first author and institutor of all their holy Ceremonies; yet that, Plinius, l. 13. ● 13. p. 195. in the end he retracted all those false religions, Ilem Plut in vit. Numae. p. 155. which himself before had instituted: writing a Book against them, and commanding it to be buried in his Sepulchre with him. Which Book was not found until five hundred and five and thirty years after Numa was dead; written only in paper; and yet no where perished. Which, even Pliny himself ascribeth to a miracle: No doubt, that the confutation of that false religion, might not be decayed, until it were published. And, though that Book of his, was, by the Commandment of the Senate, Lact. l. 1. c. 2●. p. 62. in public, burned: Yet (as Lactantantius well observeth) the cause of the burning of it, being publicly known to be his disclaiming of their Religion, who was the first founder of it, it might greatly uncertain the minds of the people about it, and breed in them a just suspicion, that they were not rightly founded in the true Religion. All these notable recantations of Atheists and Idolaters, disclaiming and renouncing their irreligious & false religions, I find in the writings of classical Authors. Which are evident demonstrations, that true Religion hath far stronger rooting in the mind of a man, than either hath Atheism, or Superstition. For otherwise, men, when they dr●w near unto their 〈◊〉 would never, with such fervency, seek after the true religion, and 〈◊〉 their false. But then (if ever) it most of all importeth them, to find out the tr●th: then, when, if they miss it, they shall never after find it. And, that before they had not found it, (no not in their own persuasions) they manifestly show, by their forenamed recantations. Which, yet, may be further seen, by the recantation of Orpheus: which (above all the rest) is most noble, and ingenuous. For he, having before been educated, in the idolatrous religion of the Gentiles, accordingly expressed the same, in his Poems. But, johan. Francis●. Pic. 4. Epist. Scto. Lu●ensi. To. 2. p. 882. after he had read the writings of Moses; and from them, received some light of the truth; he renounced his former errors, confessing them so humbly, and retracting them so willingly, and delivering the truth so plainly, that I wonder not, to find, that his notable confession, Clem. Alex. in Prot●●pt. p. 26. Iust. Mart. O at. a● Ge●t. To. 1. p. 55. in diverse of the fathers, Idem▪ lib. de Monarchia p. 106. so much insisted on. For it is indeed most excellent, both for matter, and for form. And he beginneth it thus; as his Cygnea cantio, or last exhortation, unto his Son Musaeus. Solis canto pijs; omnes procul este prophani; Tu, Musaee, audi, Luna prognate silenti. Perniciosa prius, vitaeque infesta futurae, Ex me cognôsti: sed nunc te vera docebo. Respectans verbum Divinum, huic totus inhaere. Pectoris, hoc, mentem s●cri, gressusque guberna; Incedens rectà, Regemque hunc orbis adora. Vnicus est, per se existens, qui cuncta creavit. I only sing to godly souls. Profane men, all, be gone. O my Musaeus, hearken thou, the Moon's beloved Son. Thou heretofore hast learned of me, things most pernicious, Contrary to the life to come, stark false, and vicious. But now, i'll teach thee truth indeed. Respect Gods sacred word. Cleave wholly to it, it alone. And this to it afford; To make it th'only Guide, and Rule, of all thy thoughts and ways. And look thou walk in upright paths, before him, all thy days. This King of all the world adore; whom thou mayst Only call: He only being of himself, who hath created All. And then, he proceedeth, with a notable description of the only true God; of his Providence, his Greatness, his Mercy, and his justice; more like an holy Prophet, then like an heathen Poet: as plainly will appear, unto such as please to read it. Thus, doth God oftentimes produce, a direct and an evident confession, out of very Atheists; & thereby, very notably, both manifesteth and magnifieth his own divine glory. For, what greater glory can be given unto him, then that the same mouth should be forced to confess him, which had armed itself, with all obstinacy, to deny him? In which examples likewise, we may evidently see, Plat●. l. 10. de Legibus. p. 871. the infallible truth of Plato's observation, That never any Atheist continued always constant, in his impious opinion: but that, though perhaps he maintained it stiffly, sometime in his life; yet, that he still renounced it, at the time of his death. So that, the main ground of this first book, is so generally true [That all men believe, That there is a God,] that even the Atheist himself is not from thence exempted: but that, howsoever he may, for a time (upon some passion or bravery, or some other ungrounded fancy) run against 〈◊〉 ●ommon stream, in denying of God; yet that still in the end he closeth wit● all other men in directly confessing him. CHAP. 14. That, though Atheists should never have confessed, neither directly, nor indirectly; but always, most obstinately, have denied him: yet, that there is no reckoning to be made of their opinion. 2. Because, in the opinion of all wise, and Learned men, they are esteemed no better, than either Fools. 3. Or, Mad●e●. 4. Or, Monsters of Men. THE opinion of God, is so generally rooted, in the minds of all men; that th●re is none, but doth believe it: none, but (at sometime or other) doth confess it: no not, even the very Atheist. Who, though he do not constantly, and piously confess God, as those men that do religiously believe him: yet is he oftentimes enforced to confess him; even then, when he striveth most of all to deny him. For, the belief of God planted in the heart of man, is like a burning fire, that cannot be quenched; but flameth out the more, the more men seek to smother it: being kindled more vehemently, by that Antiperistasis of a contrary renitency, in those that endeavour to suppress it: and so, flashing out, like the Lightning, when it is in danger to be choked. And this we may evidently see, in the two holy Prophets, David, and jeremy; who, Psal. 39 1. 2. 3. jer. 20. 9 whenas they had obstinately resolved with themselves, to make no more mention of the name of God; but to suppress it, in their hearts: yet, Incaluit animus, exarsit ignis: Their soul waxed hot, and the fire flamed out. Their inward belief of God, being like a raging flame, which, by a secret scorching, compelled them to confess him. Crediderunt, & propterea locuti sunt: They bele●ued, and therefore they could not but speak. And so is it likewise, 2. Cor. 4. 13. even with the Atheist too. He inwardly believeth That there is a God: yea and ●e cannot do otherwise. And therefore he cannot choose, but sometime confess it, for all his endeavour to suppress and smother it. So that, even Atheists themselves, who profess to be the Deniers of God; yet are found oftentimes, to be confessors of him: believing, with a stronger and more serious persuasion, That there is a God; then they can believe, That there is none: though they vendi●ate this, as their selected opinion. For, they deny God, but wantonly; but they confess him, seriously: yea, and, even in their denying him, they do but, contra fidem credere, ●il. in ps. 52. p. 368. Cap. 10. Sect. 5. as is noted by Saint Hilary: They do but seem to believe that which indeed they believe not: as I have showed before. But, be it that the Atheist had always constantly believed, as he confidently pronounceth, That there is no God: Be it, that he had never, at any time, neither directly, nor indirectly confessed any: Be it, that he had always stuck as close unto his received opinion, as an Oyster unto that Rock which it groweth upon; and neither in his life, nor at his death recanted it: yet could not all this infringe the Catholic and universal verity of this general position, that, All men believe, That there is a God. For, he that denieth, there is a God, may justly be denied, to be a man, 〈…〉 in Lactantius his opinion. Non poorest rationem hominis obtinere, qui Deum, animi sui parentem, nescit: Then much less, Qu● negat. He cannot justly be ranked into the condition of a man, that is ignorant of God, who is the father of his soul. But, 〈…〉 what is the Atheist then, if he be not a man? I find it affirmed, in the writings of the learned, both of Divines, and Philosophers, both of Christians and Pagans; yea, and that by full consent; that all impious Atheists, and deniers of God (how vainly soever conceited of themselves) yet are, in very deed●, no better than mere Fools. Who, being destitute of reason, (the true specifical difference of a man) cannot truly be called men, but in an abusive and unproper acception. And therefore, Psal. 14. 1. 74. 18. the Prophet David affirmeth in express and plain terms, that the Atheist is a Fo●le. The Fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Which, that it may appear to be no sudden censure, b●t a thing well concocted, and meditated by him, he iterateth (in another Psalms) the same words again: The fool hath said in his heart, Ps. 53. 1. An●el. in Prosolog. c. 3. Tom 3. p. 24. There is no God. Et ●ur d●xit ins●peens, quòd non est Deus? saith Anselmus, Cur, nisi quia stultus, & insipiens est? Why is it, that the fool doth s●y, There is no God? Forsooth, even f●r this ●●use, because he is a fool. But why saith he in his heart, rather than in hi● mouth, that There is no God? Quia, Hilar. in Ps. 52 p. 368. si vel● hoc verbis eloqui (saith Saint Hilarte) Stultus esse (●●cut est) publi●i assensus iudicio ●rgueretur: Because, if he should utter it in his words, as he smothers it in his thoughts, he should publicly be known to be a feole, as he is; and so be commonly esteemed by a general consent. For, what other account can there justly be made of him? who (as Saint Bas●l observeth) is so notably besotted with his own gross opinion, that he doth, Neque oracula Dei audire, Basil. in Ps l. 2● To. 1. p. 239. n●que Naturae suae sensum recipere: That he neither will hearken to the word of God, without him, nor yet to the voice of his own nature, within him. For, both these do● teach him, that, There is a God: both the word of God, and the vo●ce of Nature. And yet, the Atheist (contrary to both these) will impudently affirm, that There is no God. And therefore, very worthily, is reckoned but a Foole. For, as Aristotle observeth out of the Poet He siodus: He that is neither able to find out the truth himself, Arist. l. 1. E●●. c. 4. ●o. ●. p. 606. He●iod. opera & D●es p. 16. nor willing to receive it when it is found out by others; may worthily be ranked in the high●st degree of Fool●s. Neither do the Scriptures only, or Ecclesiastical Writers, account of Atheists, as no better than very fools: but, even Heathen Writers also condemn them for the same. Caecilius, the Poet, expressly affirmeth that, Deum, Cic. l. 4 Tus●. p. 164. qui non summum pu●et; Aut Stu●tum, aut rerum esse imperitum, existimes. Who thinks, There is no God above, that all did make; Him for a fool, or silly Soul, thou well maist●ake. This censure he pronounceth upon him, that acknowledgeth not their Cupid, for a God. Then, much more must he be such, that will acknowledge no God. He must needs be an extreme Fool, Clem. Alex. in Protrept. p. 11. as you heard before, out of Aristotle. For (as Clemens Alex●ndrinus very truly affirmeth) Imp●etas, & Superstitio, sunt ignorantiae extrema: Atheism, & superstition, are the two extremities of folly and ignorance. And therefore Plutarch defineth Atheism to be Stup●r quid●m, D●os non sentientium: A kind of senseless sottishness, without all touch of godliness. Here, Plut. l. de Superstit. To. 1. p. 325. he maketh it, not folly, but plain stupidity. Yea, ●●d in another place, he is carried with so great a detestation, against Atheists, that he protesteth it to be a kind of violence and wickedness, to ascribe unto such men, Plut. in Gryllo. p. 102. any faculty of Reason. Improbum est, & violentum, rationem iis ascribere, qui notitia Dei ●arent. So that he counteth all them, Fools, that count not Atheists to be Fools; and all them to be violently wicked themselves, that do not abhor their impiety and wickedness. Yea, and Maximus Tyrants passeth yet, a more base and abject censure of them. For, he saith of all Atheists, Max. Ty●. Serm. ● p. 6. that they are, Abiectum genus hominum, & sine sensu. Vide caetera. An abject kind of people, and without all sense: denying unto Atheists, not only all use of Reason, but also of very sense too. And so likewise doth 〈…〉 videntur, mentem, sensum, oculos denique ipsos, non habere: They neither have reason nor sense, no nor eyes. And it is true indeed, Arnob. l. 8 Con●. Gent. p. 757. Quis enim, mundu● contuens, Deum esse non sentit? saith Saint Hilary. How can a man possibly, Hilar. in Ps. 52. p. 368. look upon the world, but he must needs conceiu● presently, that, surely, There is a God? And therefore, Auicenna also affirmeth (as I find him cited, by learned Du Plessis) that, Mornaeu●. l. De verit. relig. c. 1. p. 3. Quicunque Deum, aut Numen non agnoscit; non ●antùm ratione, sed eti● sensu caret. Whosoever confesseth not, that there is a God; he is not only destitute of the reason of a man, but also of the very sense of a beast. For, as Plutarch well observeth, Plut. in Gryllo. To. 2. p. 102. There is no beast, that differeth so much from man by nature, as one man differeth from another: especially the Atheist, who differeth from all men, and that in the main ground, both of religion, and of reason. And therefore, is not worthy to be numbered among men. Thus you see, how base and vile account all Atheists have had, at all times, amongst all wise and learned men: who have esteemed them none otherwise, than a kind of vainly conceited fools. Which is the worst kind of folly, and the least to be hoped of. Seest thou a man that is wise in his own conceit? there is more hope of a fool, Pro. 26. 12. then of him: more hope, even of a mere Natural: for such is the wiseman's fool here. And though perhaps, those Atheists, in the height of their pride, and thickness of their ignorance, make as small account of wise men, as they can do of them; accounting them for the fools, and themselves to be the only wise: yet matters it nothing, whom they that be fools, do either esteem to be fools, or to be wise men: but whom wise men so esteem. For (as the Orator very truly observeth) Statuere quis sit sapiens, Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 11. vel maximè videtur esse sapientis: To judge who is a wise man, doth specially belong unto the judgement of a wise man. And Xenophanes likewise unto the same purpose. Sapiens sit necesse est, Laer●. in vita Xenoph. p. 310. qui norit explorare sapientem. It is fit, that he himself should be a wise man, that will assume to judge, who is a wise man. He is not a wise man, whom a fool accounts a wise man: but he is a fool, whom a wise man accounts a fool: then much more, whom all wise men. And therefore, whenas Atheists do either deny God, or make a mock of him, they do but as fools do, who make a mock of every thing: yea, even of sin itself. The Fool (saith the wise man) maketh but a mock of sin, Pro. 10. 23. yea, and that even of Atheism, which is the greatest sin: yea, and of God himself too. They make but a mock of God, as though there were no God. Upon whom have ye jested, Isai. 57 4. upon whom hau● ye gaped, and thrust out your tongue? saith the Lord by his Prophet. Are ye not rebellious children, and a false seed? Thus impudently, do Atheists make a mock of God himself. But yet, as the Philosopher, when it was told him, Hi t● rident: Plut. l. De 〈…〉 To 2. p. 2 ● 5. These men deride thee: very wisely answered: Ego autem non rid●or: But I am not to be derided: So may it be truly said of God: that though such fools do mock at him, yet God himself is not mocked, as the Apostle plainly testifieth: Gal. 6. 7. but is infinitely superior unto any such contumely, or scurrility. And therefore, in their mocking of God so foolishly, they make but fools of themselves, and bewray unto the world the extremity of their folly; giving to others just occasion to deride and mock at them: yea, even to God himself. Who (as the Psalmist testifieth) laugheth them to scorn; having both them, Psal. ●. 4. 〈◊〉 4. and their folly in extreme derision. Yea, and the same is likewise affirmed, Cap 12. sect. 2. even by the Heathen Poet: as before I hau● observed. — Deus quicunque 〈◊〉. Satyr. 15. p 68 aspexit, ridet, & odit. What God soever sees it, C●c. l. 2. Epist. ●am. Ep. 15 p. 20 The same derides, and hates it. He doth, in Stomacho ridere, as the Orator speaketh. He hates them, as wicked men; and yet laughs at them, as fools. Yea and, as they befools ●ooles, so he makes them known for fools. He both knoweth them, to be fools himself, and maketh them known to be fools of others: Yea and so to be esteemed throughout the whole world. Which is a greater scourge unto those proud fools, that so ambitiously affect to be counted wise men, than the whip itself is: Which, the wise man affirmeth, to be properly belonging unto the back of fools. And, Prou. 26. 3. Atheists be madmen. as all wise men do account of Atheists, as fools: so many of them have esteemed them, as distracted and mad men. They make them to be, Ex stultis insanos: as the Comic speaketh. Nay, Tere●t. 〈◊〉. Act. 2. S●●. 2. p. 61. in that they be fools, they be therein also madmen. For it is indeed an Orthodox; though it be numbered as a Paradox; that, C●c. l arad. 4. p. 423. Omnes Stulti insaniunt: that All Fools are mad, and men deprived of their wits. And so are likewise all Atheists. They be indeed both fools, and madmen: though in their own conceit, they be the only wise men, with whom wisdom doth surely live, and after whom it will surely d●e. But what reckoning soever, I●b. 12. 2. those men make of themselves, and of their own high wisdom; yet wisemen indeed have ever reputed them, Act. 26. 11. for no better than madmen. Saint Paul calleth it his madness, that he had ever been so impious, at to persecute the Christians. Whilst he was in that madness, john. 16. 2. he counted it his wisdom, and imagined that he had done high service to God therein. But when God hath endued him with the light of true wisdom, than he saw it was madness in him. And if it be a madness, but to persecute God's servants; then is it much more madness, to deny God himself: which is the highest kind wherein he can be persecuted. And therefore, not only Christians, but also the very Heathens, have censured all Atheists, and deniers of God, to be indeed, but mad. Plutarch saith, that, Deos esse, omnes sana ment praediti, Plnt. l. de Hols. ●o. To. ●. p. 106. arbitrantur: That all, which have their wits, do believe, that there be gods. From whence it must needs follow, that they, which deny, that there is a God, are indeed out of their wits. They be not, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. D●or. p. 207. sana ment praediti. Which, the Orator also affirmeth expressly: Esse Deos, ita perspicuum est, ut illud qui neget, vix 〈…〉 It is a thing so evident, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. 〈◊〉 p. 207. that there is a God; that whosoever denieth it, is (surely) out of his wit. Which, as in this place he confi●meth: Quis potest esse tam aversus a vero, Cic. Orat. 3. in 〈◊〉. p. 3●9. tam precepts, tam me●te captus, qui neget, haec omnia, quae videmus, Deorum immort●l●m nutu, atque, potestate administrari? Who can there be possibly, such an enerve to all truth, nay of such an he ●ddy rashness, nay of such a frantic madness, 〈◊〉 to de●●e, that all those things, which we see with our eyes, are ruled by the pleasure, and power of the Gods? He reckoneth of such men, not only, as o● rash men, but also, as of madmen. And so likewise did Socrates, Xenoph. l. 1. De ●at. Soerat. p. 157 as appeareth in Xenophon. Si qui sunt, qui nihil a divina providentia putant pendere, 〈◊〉 ille asserebat insanire. Those men that deny the power of God's pro●idence, he plainly affirmed, to be out of their wits. And so likewise did Euripides. Eur●p. in Heracl●d●s. p. 729. — Non convenit unquam, hoc privari, Vt colas Deos: qui negat verò, Ad insaniam vertitur. This holy Rule to leave, were too too bad, To worship God: whom who denies, is mad. Yea, 〈…〉 To. 3. p. 50. and that in the highest degree of madness; as S. Chrysostome affirmeth. Deum vel non esse, vel malum esse, opinari; non san● hominis sed insani potius, imò ultimo furore perciti, meritò dixerimus. He that either denieth God to be at all, or affirmeth him to be the author of evil, he is not (sure) a wise man, but rather a mad man, Yea one that is enraged, not with frenzy, but with fury. And thus Atheists (as you see) in the opinion of all wise men, are esteemed not only as fools, but as madmen. Yea, Philo. judaeus. l. Quòd mundus incorrupt. p. 1274. and as Philo judaeus pronounceth in another like case; not only Insani, but also insanabiles: Not commonly mad, but incurably mad. Now how little account is to be made of mad men, or of any thing, whatsoever they can either do, or say, we may evidently see, in the Prophet David, when he feigned himself mad: Of whom, when as Achish very greatly rejoiced, 1. Sam. 21. 14. 15. at his first sight and coming; yet whenas he appeared unto him to be mad, he was angry with those, that had brought him before him, and asked, Whether they thought that he had any need of madmen? So that, if Atheists, be no better than madmen: as their professing of God, could bring him no honour; so their denying of him, can bring him no dishonour: But to proceed yet one step further. 4 As many wise men have reckoned and esteemed of Atheists, Atheists ●e Monsters of men. some to be fools, and some to be madmen: so diverse have esteemed them, to be no men at all; but very monsters of men, Lactant. l 7. c. 9 p. 404. or beasts in men's form. So Lactantius. Illos, qui nullum omninò Deum esse dixerunt, non modò non Philosophos, sed ne homines quidem suisse dixerim: qui, mutis simillimi, ●x solo corpore constiterunt, nihil videntes animo. Those men, that have affirmed, that there is no God; I dare boldly affirm, to have been no men; much less to have been Philosophers; who like unto brute beasts, as if they were all body, could s●e and understand nothing at all with their mind. Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 215. So Tallie. Quis hunc, hominem dixerit, qui, cum tam certos coeli motus, tam ratos astrorum ordines, tamque inter se omnia connexa & apta viderit, neget in his inesse rationem? Who can esteem for a man, that seeing so constant a motion of the heavens, so orderly a course and progress of the Stars, and so apt a fitting and knitting of one thing unto another, can deny this to be done, by the strength and power of Reason? Which is the usual word, whereby Philosophers express the working power of God's divine Providence. Now, if Atheists be not men, what can they be else, but monsters of men? who have the outward shape and lineaments, but want the inward faculties and habilements, that is, the light of the mind and understanding; which is indeed the true and proper nature of man. Cic. l. de som. Scip p. 307. For, mens cuiusque is est quisque: and which whosoever lacketh, he is not properly, but equivocally, a man: as Scaliger collecteth out of Avenrois: Scalig. Exercit. 9 p. 49. because he hath not man's proper and specifical nature, Te tul. l. de corona. c. 5. p. 181. and so may justly be reputed a monster. For, omne quod contra naturam est, monstri meretur nomen: saith Tertullian. Whatsoever is contrary to the order of nature, that doth justly deserve the name of a Monster. Now, what can be more contrary unto the order of Nature, then to have the outward shape, and figure of a man; and yet to lack reason, which is his inward form? This much better deserveth the name of a monster, than many of those do, at which men so much wonder. It is a far greater monster, then, if either a man, should be borne with four feet; or a beast, but with two. And indeed Palingenius, alluding to this comparison, he called such impious persons, but a kind of two-footed Asses. Paling. in Pisc. p. 358. O bipedes Asini etc. specifying more particularly, what kind of monsters they be, in his fancy: as if they were no better then mere 'scapes and errors of particular nature, and unnaturally degenerating into beasts. And therefore, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 113. if Consensus omnium be vox naturae, as the Orator affirmeth; what can they be then, but monstra naturae, who refuse to hear the general voice of nature, teaching There is a God? Especially, Theodoret Ser. 1. de Provide. To. 2. p. 577. seeing it calleth out so loud unto them, not only Loquendo, but tantùm non Clamando, as Theodoret affirmeth: and telleth them so constantly, by all estates, and degrees, and conditions of men, that there must needs be one. This is, most evidently, a monstrous infidelity. And therefore, Saint Augustine doubteth not, for this hardened obstinacy in their impiety, Aug. l. 2. de C●u●t. Dei. c. 8. To. 5. p. 1339. to call them by the name of monsters directly. Magnum est ipse prodigium, qui, mundo credente, non credit. He, surely, is a monster, and that a very great one, that refuseth to believe, A. Gel. l. 17. c. 1. p. 236. whenas all the world beside believeth round about him. And so likewise doth A. Gellius. Quidam fuerunt monstra hominum, qui, de Dijs immortalibus, impias falsasque opiniones prodiderunt. There have been certain monsters of men, that have broached their false and impious opinions, against the Gods. Yea, and Tully, he goeth farther. For he not only denieth him to be a man, that denieth there is a God; but him also, that confesseth him, if, upon the consideration of his infinite goodness, he return not unto him, Cic. l. 2. de Leg. p. 322. all possible thankfulness. Quem astrorum ordines, quem di●rum 〈◊〉 vicissitudines, quem memsium temperatio, quem ea quae gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogunt; hunc, hominem omninò numerari, neque decet. He, whom the order of the stars, the interchange of days and nights, the temper of the seasons, and the benefits which we reap and receive from all these, enforce not unto thankfulness, he ought not to be reckoned in the number of men by us. Note the notable piety, even of the very Heathen; that those, whom they noted of impiety to their gods, they likewise exterminated out of the number of men. Now, these varying opinions of so many learned men, both Christians, and Heathens, against the Atheists, in thus calling them both Fools, and Madmen, and Monsters of men, doth evidently declare, that they wanted words, to express their conceits of them, and to deliver unto the full, that notable detestation, and abject estimation, wherein they held them. So that, to recollect our intended Argument from the sentences before recited: As it may truly be affirmed, that all men in general, have the gift of reason; though Fools, and Madmen, and Monsters have it not (who yet, in a gross and common acception, are numbered as men:) so may it as truly be generally affirmed, that All men believe, that there is a God; though the Atheist deny it. Because he is to be accounted none other, then either as a Fool, or a Madman, or a Monster: as hath been showed before. CHAP. 15. That God, hath at all times, poured down his just judgements, upon the heads of Atheists: b● them sensibly declaring, That there is a God. 2. Examples, out of Scriptures. 3. Examples, out of Eccle●iasticall Histories. 4. Examples, out of Heathen writers. 5. An Objection answered, concerning the punishment of those Atheists. BUT let us suppose, that Atheists were neither Fools, nor Madmen; but the wisest, and learnedest, of all other men. And again, let us suppose, that they were not such a poor handful, and so contemptible for their paucity, as they be; but multiplied, and increased, unto the number of an army. Let us yet suppose further, that they had ever most obstinately maintained their opinion, without either any wavering, hesitation, or doubting; and that they had never confessed any God, neither sleeping, nor waking; neither in thought, word, nor deed; neither directly, nor indirectly; neither in their lives, nor at their deaths: (all which I have evidently showed, to be very far otherwise.) Yet God, by his exemplary punishments inflicted upon Atheists, more severely, and more constantly, then upon any other wicked ones, doth evidently declare, not only, that There is a God: but also that he is the King and Ruler of the world: a God, that both heareth, and seeth all their wickedness, and that knoweth well how to revenge him upon all his enemies, but specially, upon Atheists his deniers, and blasphemers; for whom, he hath reserved his selected plagues and punishments. So that, though they deny him in words: yet he confesseth himself in deeds: and, by their punishments, both enforceth diverse of those Atheists to confess him, who before had denied him: and all the godly to rejoice, Ps. 58. 10. 11. who before had confessed him. The righteous shall rejoice, when he seeth the vengeance (saith the Prophet David:) he shall wash his feet in the blood of the wicked. And men shall say, Verily there is a reward for the righteous; Doubtless, there is a God, that judgeth in the earth. For, if we look with judgement, into the lives and deaths, of those profane persons, that have been Gods most direct and professed Enemies, and most gloried and triumphed in their impieties and blasphemies, as though there were no God at all to regard them; we may easily observe, that non● of them hath escaped the revenging hand of God, but that all of them have constantly fall'n into great calamity, and evermore ended their ungodly lives, with unnatural, untimely, and unfortunate deaths. Which constancy, in those men's so certain infelicity (more than in other men's, that are in other kinds wicked) doth openly proclaim, that this their punishment cometh not out of the dust; job. 5. 6. neither is sent unto them by blind chance and fortune (for, there is no such constancy,) but that it only proceedeth from that divine providence, which both heareth, and seeth, and knoweth all things: Yea, and taketh special notice of those that are Atheists, as of his most daring and audacious enemies: culling them out by the head, from among all other men, to be the selected spectacles of his wrath and indignation. That they who disclaimed him in their lives, yet might proclaim him in their deaths: declaring unto all men, that the God, whom they denied, had now, by their punishment, proved himself a God indeed: As though he had made them to no other purpose, but to glorify himself, by taking just vengeance upon their ungodliness. As he himself professed unto Phar. oh, King of Egypt: For this cause have I appointed th●e, Ex. 9 16. to show my power in thee, and to declare my Name throughout all the world. For, as the wise man also expressly testifieth, Pro. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked man against the day of vengeance. 2 And indeed, Atheists punishments recorded in Scriptures. God hath so notably inflicted his vengeance upon Atheists, and so directly poured down the full vials of his wrath, upon the heads of them; that there can almost none of them be named, neither in the holy Scriptures, nor in Ecclesiastical Histories, nor in Heathen Writings; but that it will appear, that the judgement of God hath brought them unto a fearful and an abhorred end. As I will declare unto you, by some two or three instances, in every one of the three forenamed Heads. The most renowned, for professed ungodliness, are these. In the Holy History; King Pharaoh, and Antiochus, the King of Tyrus, and the two Herod's. In Ecclesiastical History; Caligula, Domitian, Maximinus, and julian. In profane History; Protageras', Diagoras, Theodorus, Socrates, Epicurus, Bion, Pherecides, and Dionysius. Of all whom, there was not one, that died in his nest, of a fair and kindly death, 2. Pet. 2. 3. saving only this last; Whose damnation yet slept not: being, though respited, yet not removed. But for all the rest of them, there was not any one, but he ended his life, by the stroke of God's justice; either mediately pronounced by the mouth of a man; or immediately inflicted by the hand of God. For the first of them, King Pharaoh: as he was a notable mirror of obdured ungodliness so was he likewise a mirror of Gods most just vengeance: being purposely designed, and appointed by God, unto none other end, 〈◊〉. 9 16. but only to be an example of note, and eminent document, unto the whole world, that, Whosoever contemneth, and despiseth God, be he never so great and mighty a Potentate, shall, for his impiety, be most severely punished. For, so indeed he was: yea, and that not with one punishment; but with all the varieties of Gods most heavy judgements: which were by God inflicted, not only upon himself, but also (for his sake) upon his people and subjects. Who were, Ex. 7. 20. 21. all of them, plagued, by blood in their waters; by tempests in their corn; by Caterpillars in their fruits; by Grassehoppers in their grass; by Murrain in their cattle; by Flies, and Lice, and ulcers, Ex. 7, 20, 21 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 28. in their own bodies; by the sudden death of all their first borne Sons; and finally, by the drowning of themselves. Who (as Moses expresseth their destruction in his Song) did sink down unto the bottom like a stone. And all this fell upon them, Ex. 15. 5. for the only impielie of their Prince; the hardened profaneness of an impious King, bringing a general plague upon his whole Kingdom. Which plagues were so exemplary, and so immediately from heaven, that even the very Sorcerers, who were set to affront Moses, and to show that all his miracles were but sophistical delusions; yet were forced to confess, that they were Gods immediate plagues, and judgements: This is the finger of God. Thereby plainly declaring, Ex. 8. 19 not only There is a God; but also, that He is a God of so omnipotent a power, that he is able to subdue the most proud and potent of all his enemies, by the basest and meanest of all his creatures: by Frogs, Flies, Lice, and such like contemptible worms. A notable Example of that fearful curse, denounced by Moses; that such, as will not fear and obey the Lord, shall, in every part of their estate, be cursed: Cursed in the Town, Deut. 28. 15. cursed in the field, cursed in their basket, & cursed in their dough, cursed in the fruit of their bodies, in the fruit of their land, and in the fruit of their cattle; cursed in their going out, and cursed in their coming in. All which curses fell apparently upon the Egyptians, as the vengeance of God, for their wicked King's ungodliness. Now, for the second of them, Antiochus, whose sacrileges and profaneness can hardly be recounted, they were so many and so heinous: there was never any man, whom the judgement of God did cast headlong down, from a greater arrogancy into a greater misery. For, he purposing, in the height of his impiety and profaneness, 2. Mac. 1. 2. etc. 1. Mac. 1. 22. S●●das in voc● 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 18. Cic. Orat. 6. in Ver. p. 166. to have robbed the Temple of El●m●is, in Persia; as he had done before of Jerusalem in judea: and so to have trussed up, Sacra in saccum, as it is in the Proverb; to have sacked, and ransacked, and made good prize and booty, of all consecrated and holy things: he was shamefully beaten, and repelled by the Citizens (as Verres, in the like attempt, was by the Agrigentines.) And understanding in P●rsia, of the overthrow of two of his Armies in judea: he, breathing out fire against the jews, and hasting towards them to take his fierce revenge; he was cast down from his Chariot, to the bruising of all his bones. But the vengeance of God not having yet done with him, struck him with a most odious and incurable sickness, which so corrupted and putrified his body, 2. Mac. 9 3, 4. 7, 5, 9, 10. 8, 28. that loathsome worms crawled out of it, in exceeding great plenty: whereby, the smell of his rottenness grew so exceeding grievous, that it made him odious both to his friends, and to himself. And so (as the book of Maccabees concludeth his story, noting both the two forenamed points, of his Arrogancy and his Misery,) He that a little before, thought that he might command the stoods of the Sea (so proud was he beyond the condition of a man) was now cast down to the ground. And thus the Murderer and Blasphemer suffered most grievously, and died a miserable death in a strange Country. They be the very last words of his story. For the third of them; the King of Tyrus: who, in the pride of his heart, called himself a God, Ez. 26. 2. 6. and thought himself equal unto the highest God: the highest God telleth him, V. 8. that He will bring him down, and that he shall die the death of those, that are slain in the midst of the Sea: Who are not only killed, but also commonly drowned, and cast into the waters, as a prey unto the fishes. So that, though he boasted himself to be a God; yet should he find himself, Ez. 28 9 to be but a Man: yea and a miserable man, in the hand of him, that was appointed to kill him. Which fore-threatened destruction, was afterward fulfiled, upon that whole kingdom. Yea, and that, with so great a desolation, and such incredible cruelty, as the like was never exercised before, upon any City. Insomuch, that the Calamity of the Tyrians, did pass as a Proverb, in men's ordinary speech. Quae, ex antiqua Tyro. These things are more grievous, Er●s. C●●l. p. 966. than those that are reported of the ancient Tyrus. Of whose fearful destruction, Ezeckiel foretelleth, that it should be lamented, with this pitiful eiulation. Quae, est, ut Tyrus, quae obmutnit in medio mari? What City is like Tyrus, Ezech. 27. 32. destroyed so fearfully, in the midst of the Sea? For the fourth of them, King Herod the great; who was indeed the greatest persecutor, that ever the Christians had (for all other persecutors did but only persecute Christ, Mat. ●. 13. in his members; but he persecuted Christians in their head) he struck at the very head of Christianity, and persecuted Christ in his own immediate person: His impiety escaped not God's just, and heavy judgement. For, as he intended, most cruelly to have murdered the Son of the living God: so God abused his cruelty, to the murdering of his own sons. Whereby, he became so infamous to the world, that it went of him, Macrob. l. 2. Satur. c. 4. p. 237. as a common Proverb, that, Melius est, Herodis esse porcum, qu●m filium. It is better to be Herod's Swine, than his Son. But yet, here the judgement of God left him not: but struck him with so many, and so grievous diseases together, that to read, it, it is a wonder. Which josephus expresseth, in very fearful manner. His words thereof, be these. Regi, morbus factus est gravior, poenam impietatis exigente Numine. Lento enim calore torrebatur, josep. l. 17. Antiquit. p. 503. qui non tam externo tactu deprehenderetur, quam intùs popularetur v●scera. Aderat & vehemens voracitas, cui necesse esset continuò cibos suggerere. Simulque vexabatur intestinorom exulceratione, & colicis passionibus. Pedes tum●bant flegmate humido & pellucido, similiterque inguina. Ipsa quoque verenda putrefacta scatebant vermiculis, accedente foeda, nec minus molesta tentigine, non sine foetore gravissimo. Super haec omnia, nervorum contractione laborabat, & difficultate anhelitus. Quamobrem, constans erat, inter Divinos & Fatidicos opinio, Regem laesae tot modis pietatis, Deo poenas expendere. Hitherto josephus. The King's sickness grew every day more and more grievous; God punishing him severely, for his former impiety. For first, he was scorched and broiled with a lingering fire; which though it could not outwardly be felt with men's hands; yet did it inwardly eat and consume all his bowels. He was taken, beside, with a doggish Appetite, which called for meat almost every moment. Further, his intestines broke out into putrid ulcers, and grievously tormented him with colique passions. His feet and flanks, swelled with a phlegmatic humour, and his secrets were possessed with an unnatural tumour: corrupting most loathsomely into worms, and exhaling continually most odious stinks. Yet further, he was grievously vexed with the cramps and convulsions, and greatly tormented with shortness of ●reath. All which things considered, it was constantly resolved, amongst all Divines, and South sayers, That they were nothings else, but th● strokes of God's vengeance, inflicted upon him for his former ungodliness. Here was a perfect pattern of a miserable man tormented under the hand of God: having none of all his members exempted from his plagues; but every several part, having his several torment: dying, in a living death; and living, in a dying life. A mirror of that infernal punishment, which God hath in hell appointed for the Atheist. And, not much an unlike judgement, fell likewise upon the fifth of them, H●rod called Agrippa: Who making (upon a time) an eloquent Oration; the people (after the manner of their hyperbolical flattering) applauded him with this blasphemous encomion, Act. 12. 21. 22. 23. That he spoke, like a God, and not like a man. Which excess of commendation, Cic. l. 3. Offic. p. 386. though he knew to be most impious; yet (as the Orator speaketh in another like case) Alieni facinoris munus●ulum non repudiavit: He would not refuse their present unto him, though he knew it was their sin: It being so kindly offered he would not unkindly refuse it; josep. l. 19 Antiquit, c. 7. p. 566. but (though it were their blasphemy) yet did willingly accept it. Hanc impiam adulationem nec castigans, nec repellens, as josephus punctually observeth: Neither repelling, nor rectifying, this their impious adulation. But God who is jealous of his honour, and, who will not give his glory unto any other, Isai. 42. 8. he sent his Angel to punish that impious intruder: who smote him with so grievous a disease, that his body corrupted all into worms. And thus was his end. 3 Let us now proceed unto those other Examples, Atheists pnnishments recorded in Ecclesiastical Histories. which before I have named out of Ecclesiastical Histories. Of whom, the first, Caligula; as he was a cruel Tyrant, in all his other government: so, in the end he grew unto that madness, as to assume the highest divine honours unto himself. Whose impiety and profaneness, joseph. l. 18. Antiquit. c. 9 p. 535. josephus expresseth in these words unto us. Inflatus potentiae magnitudine, oblitus est se esse hominem; & contumeliosus in superos, ad reliquam insaniam, divinos etiam honores usurpare ausus est. He being puffed up with the greatness of his power, forgot himself to be a man: and growing proud against the gods, added this unto all the rest of his madness; that he presumed to appoint unto himself divine honours. Sueton. in vit. Caligula c. 22. p. 61. Templum numini suo proprium, & sacerdotes, & excogitatissimas hostias instituens: as Suetonius, addeth. He appropriated a special temple unto his own godhead; Yea and appointed both Priests and sacrifices for it: accepting even the title of jupiter Latialis. But, what was the end of all this wicked glory, and of his profane consecrating himself for a God? Did God leave it unrevenged? No. But, as Solomon, 1. Kin. 11. 14. 23. 26. when he had forsaken God, God likewise (in some degree) forsook him, and out of his own Servants stirred up many dangerous adversaries against him: so did he likewise with this man; permitting him to fall into their hands, Sueton. in vit. Calig. c. 58. p. 69. joseph. l. 19 An●tiquit. c. 1. p. 551. and to be murdered of them, with no less than thirty grievous wounds; as josephus reporteth them. Confecerunt eum, illatis certatìm crebris ictibus. For the second of them; Domitian; whom Eusebius affirmeth, Euseb. l. 3. Hist. Eccles. c. 15 p. 34 Aurel. Vict. in Domitian. p. 387 to have been the true successor of Nero, for his impiety, and theomachy: and who (as Aurelius Victor reporteth) more Caligulae, Dominum se, Deúmque vocari, coegit: Who, like impious Caligula, commanded himself to be called, both Lord, and God: but with the same success. For, as he was an imitator of Caligula's impiety: so was he likewise his successor in his misery: Suet●n. in vita D●●●tian c. 17. p. 120. being murdered (as he was) by his own servants, and slain, with no fewer, then with seven deadly wounds. And this was the end of that immortal god. For the third of them, Maximinus, a perfect aemulus of the bloody King Antiochus, both in the impiety of his life, and in the misery of his death; I have largely extended that parallel between them, Cap. 13. Sect. 3. in many points of the comparison: both of them being strucken with most horrible sicknesses; and both of them confessing, the stroke to be Gods. Only, with this note of difference, that this Maximinus, before his loathsome sickness, by which he lost his life, was strucken from heaven with lightning; by which he lost his eyes. Euseb. l. 1. de vit. Constant. c. 51. 52. p. 1. 40. And this (as Eusebius affirmeth) was the stroke of God's justice. That he, who before had burned out the eyes of many faithful Christians, should now himself have his own eyes burnt out. And for the fourth of them, julian; whose infamy will never die, for his blasphemy against Christ, S●zomen. l. 6. Hist Eccles. c. 2. p. 511. and cruelty against Christians: he was very strangely killed, in his war against the Persians; being suddenly strucken with an uncertain hand, but yet making a certain wound. Peraduentnre by one, who, in his simplicity, shot his arrow at random; not purposing, either to hurt him, 1. King 22. 34. or to hit him (as it fell out in Ahab, another profane King:) but, without peradventure, God directing the shooter, and levelling the shot, at his own appointed mark: which he failed not to hit, and to strike home, so sure, 1. Sam. 26. 8. that (as Abishai said) having strucken himonce, he need to strike him no more. And so there he died, directly ascribing his death unto Christ: as before I have observed. 4 And diverse such like fearful judgements, Cap. 13. Sect. 3. Atheists punishment recorded in secular writers. do even the Heathens themselves report, to have happened unto Atheists: as may evidently be seen, in all those men, whom before I have reckoned up, by their names; as infamed in their writings, for the principallest Atheists. For the first of whom, Protagoras; though his fault were nothing else, but a seeming to doubt, whether there were a God? yet, even that sceptical impiety, escaped not the censure, of the Areopagitas; but, by their decree, received the punishment, not only of infamy, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 190. but also of banishment; they sentencing, that his books should be publicly burned, and himself perpetually exiled. Yea, and where humane punishment left him, 〈◊〉 in vit. Protag. p. 322. there divine overtook him. For sailing over the sea, in the time of his banishment, he was by it devoured, and swallowed up. For the second of them, Di●goras: who is noted, as one of the principallest Atheists, in the writings, not only of Christians, but of Heathens. He, in his impiety, was so public, and notorious, that he was not only condemned, but also proscribed, Suidas in voce Diagor. p. 231. by the people of Athens: Who propounded a Talon, unto any man, that should kill him; and two, unto any, that could bring him forth alive. Which punishment, though, at that time, he escaped by flight; yet could he not escape from the punishment of God. No flight could save him from it. For, he attempting diverse times to have taken the Sea, it ever, upon his first entering into it, grew so raging and violent, that he still was forced again to forsake it. Until, at last, he adventuring, and putting all unto the hazard, to avoid the cruelty of his fierce pursuers; he (as Protagoras before) was swallowed up of the waves: God taking his punishment, into his own hands. For this, Athenaeus l. 13. p. 455. even Athenacus observeth, as the work of God's justice, inflicting due punishment upon his ungodliness. Yea, and Tully reporteth, that, when he was in the tempest, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 239. and before he was drowned; those that were in the ship with him, objected it unto him, that it was for his ungodliness, that that tempest so afflicted them: (even as in a like case, the Sailors objected it, jonah 1. 6. 7. unto the Prophet jonas.) And though for the present, he turned it off, with a scoff; yet he paid for that profaneness, with the loss of his life: All the rest of the Company, being punished by God, for one Atheists impiety. A thing, which so commonly falleth out, Xenop. l. 8. de Pedia Cyri. p. 110. that (as Xenophon observeth) all men, in their sailing, desire, for their Companions, to have rather religious persons, than Atheists. Qui navigationem eligunt, cum pijs potius eligere solent, qu●m cum iis, qui impium aliquid perpetrârunt. And they do wisely in it; lest through other men's impiety, they be punished for company: as it fell out, Act. ●7. 24. 43. 44. both with jonas, and Diagoras. Whereas, on the contrary, S. Paul's piety preserved all his Company. For the third of them, Theodorus; who, Athenaeus vb● supra. Item Laert. in vit. Aristip. p. 77. Psal. 60. 3. for his notable profaneness, was surnamed Atheos', as (before him) was Diagoras: he, for that his impiety, being questioned publicly, was, by the sentence of the judges, both condemned, and executed; being forced to drink a cup of deadly wine, as it is in the Psalm. For, that was the punishment appointed by their Laws, for the death of such profane and impious persons: That they, which had made others drink in the poison of their wicked opinions, should themselves, by drinking poison end their own wicked lives. For the fourth of them, Socrates; though he were a man, so rare and excellent, for all moral virtues, Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p. 168. that he is said to be the first, that ever called Philosophy down out of heaven, and brought it to be familiar, and to converse among men: yet, because his moral virtue was not seasoned with the Theological virtue of true Piety; but, that he was esteemed (though falsely) to be a derider of all the Gods; the same Law, which before had seized on Theodorus, took hold likewise on him: and sentenced him to the same condemnation, whom it held to be guilty of the same crime. And so, he drinking of the very same Cup, did end his life also with a draught of poison. Now, if any man do think, that the judgements of those forenamed persons, are not rightly ascribed, to be the judgements of God; because they were pronounced, by the mouth of men; he is greatly deceived, in his opinion. For (as the Prophet Moses very truly affirmeth) The judgement is the Lords, Deut. 1. 17. Psal. 82. 1. whose soever the mouth be. He (as the Psalmist testifieth) not only standeth among the Gods; but also judgeth among the Gods: as not only present with them, but also precedent among them. So that, though their judgement was framed in the Council of men; yet was it decreed by the counsel of God. He it was, that decreed the sentence, though he appointed the mouth of a man to pronounce it. The same God, who gave the sentence; that, Levit. 24. 14. that Blasphemer should be executed, among the jews; was he, that gave the sentence, that Theodorus, and the rest, should likewise be executed among the Athenians. So that, though they died by the judgement of man; yet died they, not without the judgement of God. But, to proceed with the rest. For the fifth of them, Epicurus: though he denied God's providence, yet he died not without God's providence: but had such a death befallen him, as was most repugnant unto his opinion. For, whereas he placed his whole felicity in pleasure; he ended his days in most miserable torture; being tormented in the Bladder, for fourteen days together. For the easing of which pain, he so excessively drank wine, that thereof he died drunken: as Laertius testifieth in his funeral Epigram. — sitientiùs hausit Suave merum: Laert. in vit. Epicuri. p. 346. hinc Stygias cbrius ●ausit aquas. Whilst he sweet wine full fast did swallow down: The Stygian Lake his drunken soul did drown. And so, as he lived like a Swine, he died like a Swine: wallowing in all filthy pleasure in his life, and dying drunken at his death. For the sixth of them, Bion, a great derider of the gods: he was smitten with a very grievous, and a most painful sickness. Of which, after many painful remedies attempted in vain, he finally died in extreme pain and torture: baert. in vit. Bion p. 144. ascribing all his torments to be Gods most just vengeance, for his former ungodliness. For the seventh of them, Pherecides; who boasted himself in the presence of his Scholars, Aelian. l. 4. var. Hist. c. 28. p. 428▪ That though he never offered unto any of the gods, yet would he lead as happy, and as pleasant a life, as those that should sacrifice their fattest Hecatombs: he upon this his vainglorious and blasphemous ostentation, was suddenly strucken with a most horrible sickness; so grievous and so loathsome, that he was fain to avoid the society of men, and to shut up himself (as it were) in a close prison. So that, whenas any of his friends resorted to visit him, he was grown so deformed, and so ashamed of himself, that he would never be seen of them. But when they called to him, and inquired of his health; he would show them his finger through the rift of a door, most miserably consumed and eaten up with louse: and then tell them that his whole body was just in the same case. And this, AElian reproteth as the just vengeance of God, inflicted upon him for his former impiety and irreligion. And, for the eighth of them, Dionysius; it is true, that he was a most impious and notorious Atheist: and that he had not only sacrilegiously despoiled, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 238. but (that which is worse) irreligiously derided all the sorts of their gods, not sparing even jupiter himself. And it is also true, that he was so prosperous, and so fortunate in his wickedness, that he was never punished, neither by fire, nor sword, nor sickness, by any of the gods; though he had blasphemed them all. In so much, that Tully pleadeth his prosperity in his impiety, as a notable instance against divine providence: insinuating, that if there had been any, it would surely have revenged such sacrilege and blasphemy. But yet, for all that, Valer. Max. l. 1. c. 2. p. 19 Valerius Maximus observeth, that his profaneness scaped not, but had his due punishment: which fell upon it, in the time of his Son, though it did not in his own. Tame●si debita supplicia non exoluit; dedecore, tamen filij, mortuus poenas rependit quas viws effugerat: He sustained that punishment after his death, which he escaped in his life, and had it paid home in the person of his Son, which fell not immediately upon his own person. For, his Son being driven out of his Kingdom, and carried away (as a Captive) to Corinthus, was forced to live there (as a private man) inglorious: and in the end, to take upon him, the teaching of a School, for lack of better ●●intanance. From which, Aelian. l. 9 var. H●st. c. 8. p. 453. he being also expelled for his notable tyranny and plagosity; he was forced (for his last shift) in most contemptible manner, to beg his living from door to door, with a Pipe and a Taber. Now, what death, or what torment could have possibly been so bitter unto that old Tyrant, as to see this great misery of his Son, if he could have foreseen it. No drowning, no burning, no rotting, of any of all the forenamed Atheists, could have been so grievous unto his own person, as this great calamity, which fell out unto his own Son. For, it is the heaviest of all Gods heavy punishments, when he visiteth the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, especially in the next generation. And such eminent calamity of the children, Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 10. 11. To. 2. p. 612. 613. doth Aristotle himself affirm to be effectual, if not evacuate, yet greatly to shake the felicity of their Parents, even after their deaths. So that, none of all the forenamed Atheists escaped the stroke of God's revenging hand; but all of them have died such miserable deaths, as were due unto their wicked and ungodly lives. Now, Psal. 55. 23. when God striketh men with such untimely and unnatural deaths, that they be not permitted to live out their days, it is a great argument of his wrath: as the Prophet Moses, in this very case concludeth: If these men die the common death of all men; or, Numb. 16. 29. 30. if they be visited after the visitation of all men; the Lord hath not sent me. But, if the Lord make a new thing, and the earth open her mouth, and swallow them up, with all that they have, and they go down quick into the pit; than ye shall understand, that these men men have provoked the Lord. Concluding, that their strange and uncouth death, is, not only the work of God, but the work of his wrath. Yea, and Plutarch (upon the like occasion) insinuateth the same. For he noteth it, as the judgement of God, not only upon Tullus Hostilius (who was an open Atheist) but also upon all those other his Successors, that were wicked Kings; thar, Plut. in vi●. Num. p. 156. Nullus eorum obijt, secundùm Naturae leges: That none of them had their deaths according to Nature's laws. Which may, much more generally be affirmed of Atheists, then of any other sort of unjust and wicked persons: that none of them do die fair and natural deaths; but all violent and unnatural. By which immediate judgements of God, falling down so certainly, and so directly upon the heads of Atheists, more than upon any other wicked ones; yea, and so generally too, upon every one of them, without all exception; God doth much more effectually prove himself to be, in the evidence of those works; then all the Atheists in the world can prove God not to be, by the efficacy of their words. 5 But, here it may be objected, that diverse of those men, An Objection answered concerning those Atheists. whom I here condemn of Atheism, and produce, as examples of God's wrath against Atheists, have been heretofore, by myself excused, and proved to be no Atheists indeed: howsoever in the received opinion, Cap. 10. Sect 4 they were commonly so esteemed. Whereby it may be thought, that either there or here, I have done wrong unto the truth. For, if they were not Atheists; why were they by God punished? If they were indeed Atheists; why were they by me excused? For the better removing of which semblance of contradiction, I answer; that mine excusing them in that place, was not simply to free them from all those degrees of Atheism, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Item Cap. 10. Sect. 4. which God might in justice punish; but only to free them from that highest degree of Atheism, which in the vulgar opinion was imputed unto them: Namely, from being such desperate and obdured Atheists, as simply & constantly denied there was any God. For, it is very true, which Plato affirmeth, that there was never in the world any such kind of Atheist; but that, Plat. l. 10. De Leg. p. 871. All of those who denied God in the beginning, yet still confessed him in the end. And that therein he held a very true opinion, I plainly exemplified, by all those known Atheists, that have been most noted and branded for such: who have all of them, at sometime, and some of them, at all times acknowledged some gods: notwithstanding they denied the gods of their own countries; to be truly gods. So that, mine excusing of them, was not, to free them a toto, but a tanto. Not to free them universally, from the whole sin of Atheism; (which hath a great latitude, and is a body consisting of many parts and members: as I purpose, Lib. 8. God willing, hereafter to make plain) but to free them from the crime of denying all gods; which is the highest pitch, and (as it were) the ●ead of it. And yet, even this also, not by peremptory assertion, but by probable collection, only out of those heads of their accusations, which have been most enforced against them, by their enemies. Now, though they were not guilty of this highest degree of Atheism, in generally & obstinately denying all gods: yet might they be guilty of many other inferior degrees of Atheism; for which God might justly punish them: and, by their example, teach others to beware of them. For, as it followeth not, on the one side, that, because they denied their false gods, that therefore they must needs deny the true God too: so followeth it not, on the other side, that, because they denied their false gods, they must needs confess the true. For first, they might deny their false gods to be Gods; and yet never seek further to find out any other, upon a mere dulness, & negligence of Religion. And so live, without any opinion at all of God. At the least, for the most part, though totally they could not. As those men, of whom the Apostle speaketh, that they were, Eph. 2. 12. without any God in the world. Which is a privative kind of Atheism▪ ●or which, God might as justly punish those Heathens, as he did his own people, Host 4. 6. whom he suffered to perish, for their lack of knowledge. Secondly, they might deny their false gods; & yet therewithal, deny the true God too. Which is a positive kind of Atheism; by having an opinion There is no God: as the ●ormer was a privative; by having no opinion, That there is a God. Of which sort of Atheists, the Prophet David speaketh, when he telleth us, that, The Fool saith in his heart, Psal. 14. 1. There is no God. Which wicked opinion, though none of them all can constantly maintain, but hold it weakly and infirmely & with many interruptions: yet might God (even for this impiety) as justly punish them as he did that blasphemer, Levit. 24. 14. who offended but in passion. And, though diverse of those Atheists, whom before I have named, have both repent, & recanted; whereby they might divert the severity of God's judgement: yet might either their repentance be too weak to turn away the decree of their punishment; as King ahab's was: or it might come too late; as Antiochus his did: or, 1. Kin. 21. 29. 22. 38. they might, for the present submit & confess; and yet afterward return unto their former wickedness; ●. Mac 9 13. as King Pharaoh did. All whom, notwithstanding their former confessions, Ex. 9 27. 34. yet he iusty punished, for their former blasphemies. Thirdly, they might deny their false gods, and seek about for another; and yet not hit upon the right: because they sought him no, wthere they should, that is, Athen ●g. Legat. pro. c●r bib. Pat. ●o. 8. p. 6. in his own most holy and sacred word. As Athenagoras observeth of the Poets, and Philosophers. Deum inquirere, tanqu●m inventuri, nimia de se fiducia, conati sunt: non tamen illum vel reperire, vel animi cogitatione complecti potuerunt. Et meritò quidem: Quòd Dei notitism, non ab ipso peterent Deo, sed intra se quisque cum disquireret. The Poets and Philosophers did, ●●th of them, seek God, praesuming that they could not miss him. But yet, indeed they could not find him, no nor understand him neither. Because they sought not the knowledge of God, by God; but only by confidence▪ in themselves. So that (as Lactantius hath very well observed) It was easier for them, Lactant. l. De ●ra c. 11. p. 464. to discern their own gods to be false, than it was, to find out, who was the true. Tullius dissoluit publicas religiones: sed tamen veram, quam ignorabat, nec ipse, nec alius quisquam introducere potuit. Vt ipse testatus est: Falsum quidem app●rere, veritatem autem latere. Tully (saith he) could dissolve the false religions: but yet, he could not find out the true; neither he himself, nor yet any other of them: because it was unto them unknown. Insomuch that be professeth, That falsehood still appeareth, but Truth always lurketh. Fourthly, they might (in some degree) find out the true God, and yet ascribe his works unto other false gods: as the Heathen did, the ruling of the heavens unto their jupiter; of the Sun, unto Apollo; of the Seas unto their Neptune; and, Ex. 32. 4 28. as the Israelites themselves did, their deliverance, unto their Golden Calf. Which their dishonouring of him, he punished, with the death of about three thousand of them. And might therefore, as justly, punish the same sin, in the Heathen. Fiftly, they might deny their own false gods, to be gods; and yet accept of others, as false. As we may plainly see, Plato. in Theag. p. 12. in Socrates: who openly denied the Athenian gods; and yet believed his own familiar spirit, to be a god, which was, indeed, but a Devil. Now, X●noph. l. 1. de fact. Socrat. p. 157. this was not to renounce his false Religion: but to exchange one false Religion for another, wherein, his latter impiety, was greater than his former. For which exchange of superstition, even Plut●rch pronounceth of Tullus Hostilius; that he was justly destroyed, Plut. in vit. Num▪ ●. p. 156. by lightning. Sixtly, they might deny their false gods, for a time; and yet relapse unto them again. As Socrates again did. Who, Plato. in Phae. done. p. 520. notwithstanding his former denying of all the Athenian gods: yet at his death, commanded a Cock to be offered for him, unto Aesculapius. All these ways (and many more) might those men be impious, against the true God; though they both denied, and derided their false gods. For the least of all which manifold impieties, God might, in his justice, take vengeance upon them, as upon the true Enemies of his true Religion: though they were not in the highest degree of Atheism. And therefore, there is no wrong done, neither unto the truth, in excusing them, from some degree of Atheism; nor yet unto God's justice, in punishing them, for other some. CHAP. 16. That the general Consent of all men, in agreeing so fully, That there is a God; is an infallible Argument, That there is one, indeed. 2. That, to this end, it is alleged by those Authors, that have observed it. 3. In making it, The Law of Nature. 4. In making Consent, a Symptom of Truth, in all things. 5. In making it, the chiefest Argument, that can be brought in this Cause. THE main purpose of this first book, is, to prove, There is a God: yet, neither by the view of his works; nor by the voice of his word: but only, by that inward praenotion, and persuasion, which nature hath implanted in the mind of every man; That a God (surely) there is. A Lesson, not taught from one man to another, but imprinted in all of them, by the same common nature. It is (as the Orator assevereth, in another like matter) Non scripta, 〈…〉 sed nata lex; quam non ●idicimus, accepimus, legimus; verùm ex ipsa Natura arripuimus, ●●usimuo, expressimus. It is not a Law, that is written in Tables; but a Law, that is originally begotten within us. A Law, which we have, neither learned, nor received, nor read; but which, by very Nature, we have inwardly bred. A Law, as largely diffused into the hearts of all men, as the very humane nature is communicated unto them. Cap▪ 4. For (as I have formerly declared) there is not any Nation, neither Greek, nor Barbarian, neither Christian, nor Heathen, but that they have their God; their Priests, their Temples, their Altars, their Sacrifices, and other such like naturals of Religion. And yet, all these, so differing one of them from another, that it evidently appeareth, that none of them have learned their Religion, from their Neighbours; neither by institution, nor yet by imitation: but only erected it of themselves, from these two general grounds of Nature: That there is a God; and, That he is to be worshipped. Again, Cap▪ 5. that, as there is no Nation of men, in the world: so be there no men of any condition, in the world, but that they have their God: neither superior, nor inferior; Magistrate, nor Subject; learned, nor unlearned: as I have largely declared, by particular instance, both of Poets, Lawgivers, Philosophers, Cap▪ 6. and Artisans. Nay, yet again, that, there is no particular person, in the world, but, in some degree or other, at some time or other, he believeth, There is a God: yea even those men, that do seem the most to contemn him: Swearers, Blasphemers, & Idolaters. Nay, Cap. 11. 12. 13▪ even the very Atheists themselves, who make it their profession, to profess, There is no God: yet do evidently enough confess him, in their deeds; though they deny him, in their words. They do really confess him; both by that excessive self-love, whereby they idolise themselves; and by that inward fear, which they have of another God, above themselves. Yea, and sometimes they are driven to confess him in words too: and openly, both to acknowledge and to renounce their former ungodliness. Finally, that, though none of all the Atheists should ever have confessed God; neither verbally, nor really; neither directly, 2. Tim. 2. 13. nor indirectly: yet that God, who is faithful, and cannot deny himself, he confesseth himself, by those remarkable, and exemplary punishments, which he notoriously and constantly inflicteth upon Atheists; more evidently, then upon any other sort of Offenders: Thereby, even proclaiming himself, both to be, and to be unto the Atheist, a professed enemy. So that, there is no part of all the universal, from God unto the Devil, but that it proclaimeth God: no part of nature so disordered, or distorted, but that in this one point it retaineth his rectitude, to believe there is a God. Yea, even the Devils themselves, in whom the greatest aversion is. Which admirable consent of all the parts of the world together, in this one position, more than in any other, Cap. 3. hath been noted and observed, almost by all the learned: as I have formerly declared. 2 In which their allegation, The Consent of all men in believing a God is alleged by Authors as an Argument of the truth of it. this may further be observed (which I have purposely reserved, for the close of this first Book) that the Authors there alleged, have not only related it historically, that such a general consent there is, in believing that there is a God: but they have also pleaded it logically, as a good and a sound Argument, to prove, that therefore there is one indeed: inferring the truth of the thing so believed, from the universality of men's consent, in believing it. In which their probation, we may observe this Gradation, consisting of three degrees. First, that they affirm this general consent, and agreement of all men, without the dissent of any man whosoever, to be the very voice of nature. Secondly, that they affirm, a general consent, in any other matter whatsoever it be, to be a good Argument of the truth. And thirdly, that they affirm, that in this particular truth, which is questioned by the Atheist, it is the strongest Argument, that can be brought to prove it. 3 For the first step of which Climax, That this general consent of all men, in believing There is a God; is not, either any casual, To believe a God is of the Law of Nature. Cap. 3. and accidental agreement; nor any politic composition, made by mutual stipulation: but the simple and uncorrupted voice of nature, working alike in all men, and speaking unto them, with one and the same tongue, though they be of diverse tongues, it is expressly affirmed, by diverse learned Authors; both Philosophers, and Divines; both Heathens, and Christians. Tully saith expressly, that, Omnium consensus, est Naturae vox: That the consent of all men, is the voice of Nature. Nay further that it is, not only the voice of Nature, pronouncing; but also, the very Law of Nature, prescribing. Omní in re, consensio omnium Gentium, Cic. 1. Tusc. p. 113. 11●. Lex Naturae putanda est: The general consent of all Nations, in all matters, is to be reputed for none other, then for the very Law of Nature. Which general definition, he pronounceth in that place, upon this particular occasion, that, Omnes, esse vim, & Naturam divinam, arbitrantur; That all men generally hold, That there needs must be a God. Yea, and in another place, he reckoning up the parts of the Law of Nature, he instanceth Religion, to be the very first of them. Naturae ius est, quod nobis non opinio, sed quaedam innata vis asserat: ut, Religionem, Cic. l. 2. de Invent. p. 84. Pietatem, Gratiam, etc. The law of nature is that, which is not implanted into us, by other men's opinion; but begotten in us, by an inward sense of our own: as Religion towards God; Piety, towards our Parents; and thankfulness, towards our Benefactors. Where he maketh religion, to be more natural unto us, than that natural love, which we owe unto our parents. Yea, Xenoph. l. 4. de 〈◊〉 Socrat. p. 207. and so likewise doth Xenophon. Lex apud omn●s homines unaest, & prima, ut Deos colas: &, ut Parents item honores. This is one general Law, among all men, and the first of all, To worship the Gods; and to honour our Parents. Where he also maketh Religion towards God, the very first branch of the Law of Nature; and Piety towards our Parents, but the second. Yea, and in another place, he inferreth, that, because it is of the Law of Nature, it is also a truth. An tu putas, opinionem hominibus a Dijs innatam fuisse? Sufficientes eos ad benè vel malè agendumesse, Xe●oph. si non essent sufficientes? Ac arbitraris, homines perpetuò deceptos nunqu●m sensisse? Do you think that the Gods would ever have implanted this opinion into the minds of men, that they are of power to do both good and evil, if they 〈◊〉 not of such power? Or can you once imagine, that men should sir ever in this point be deceived, and yet never find their error? Concluding, that because it is an inbred opinion, that therefore it is a truth. And the rather, because no man, as yet, could ever prove it false. Neither is this the judgement only of Heathen Philosophers, but also of diverse of the learnedest Christian Fathers. Tertullian saith, that Ipsum Deum, secundùm naturam, prius novimus: Our first knowledge of God, Tertul. l. De corona. c. 6. p. 181. is by the inward teaching and instruction of Nature. Which therein hath lessoned us so perfectly, that, as he there addeth, in another like matter: Quaeres igitur Dei legem habens communem istam in publico mundi, in naturalibus Tabulis? We need not to seek it in the law of God: we may read it so plainly in the law of the world, in the natural tables of our hearts. Inferring in the Chapter following, Agnoscant interim Naturae authoritatem, communis parentis nomine: Let them therefore acknowledge the authority of Nature, as of their common Mother. Insinuating, that this lesson, is of her first teaching. So likewise Gr●gorie Nazianzen, Esse Deum, cum ipse nos asp●ctus, tum Naturae lex, docet: That there is a God, Nazian. Orat. 2. De Theolog. p. 24 not only the visible sight of our eyes; Lactan. l. 6. c. 9 p. 333. but also the very law of Nature, job 12. 7. 8. Isal. 43. 20. Cem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 274. doth teach us. So likewise, Lactantius. Naturalis legis caput primum est, ipsum Deum nósse: The very first Chapter of the law of Nature, is to know, There is a God. Yea, & this law of nature is so largely diffused, that it is infused even into very Beasts: as God himself professeth. Yea, and as Xenocrates Carthaginensis also confesseth; Qui non omn● spem abiecit, quìn ethan in rationis expertibus animantibus, sit Dei notitia: He was not without some hope, but that, even the brute beasts had some knowledge of a God. So that he stretcheth this Law of Nature, to as large an extent, justin. l. Institut. Tit. 2. p. 16. as the Emperor justinian doth in his Institutions: who saith, that Ius naturale, non est humani generis proprium, etc. He maketh the law of Nature not to be a law peculiar unto the nature of man; but to be a common law, unto every living thing: as the natural conjunction of male and female, the procreation of young, and such like. Unto which extended signification of the law of Nature, yet this first head of it, concerning the knowledge of God, extendeth itself no less, than those his named instances. Nay, indeed much further; as Proclus affirmeth. For he saith, that not only things endued with life, but also things without life, have every one, in his kind, not only a knowledge, but also an acknowledgement of God; unto whom they all do sing with such a voice, Proclus l. de. Sacrisicio. p. 275. as he hath given them. Cuncta pr●cantur, hymnòsque con●inunt, ad ordinis sui ducem; alia, intellectuali modo; alia, ration●li; alia, sensiti●o; alia, naturali. All things do both pray and sing unto their Captain, and to the Author of their order. Some, after an intellectual kind and manner, as Angels; some, after a reasonable, as Men; some, after a sensible, as Beasts; and some after a natural, as insensible Creatures. Yea, a 59, b 82▪ c 81, 79, ●58, ● 6●, f SIXPENCES 78, h 7●. S●ng of the 3. 〈…〉. 148. 1. 2. 3. etc. and the three Children, in their Song, allude unto the same: when they call, not only upon a Angels, b Men, and c Beasts; but also upon the d Heavens, the e Stars, the ● Winds, the g Waters, the h Hills, and the Mountains, to bl●sse the Name of the Lord, to praise him, and to magnify him for ever. Yea, and the Prophet David doth also the very same. Yea, and even the very Devil's themselves (as the Apostle james teacheth) do not only believe God, but also tremble at him, Yea, jam 2. 19 and as S. Matthew testifieth, Mat. 8. ●9. They do also confess him. Which though they do not willingly or purposely to honour him, Ma●. 1. 24. yet do they therein (though unwillingly) honour him. So that this law of Nature is so forcible in every creature, that it compelleth all of them to acknowledge their Creator; yea, even those that are the most unwilling to do it; the Devil, and the Atheist. Now, how cometh this law of Nature to be so forcible in them, as to be able to enforce them? Surely, only by that reason which Zeno hath alleged, that The Law of Nature is the very Law of God: Naturalem legem, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 189. esse Divinam. This is that which compelleth them to confess him: That he hath given it for a law unto all his creatures, Ps. 148. v. 6. 2. 7. Apoc. 12. 3. which they cannot pass: even from the very Angels unto the very Dragons: yea, even to the great red Dragon. This then is the first collection, from this so general a consent, in believing There is a God; that it is nothing else, but that Law of Nature, which God hath imposed upon every creature; that they shall in some degree, both know him and confess him. And to this very purpose it is alleged, by the forenamed Authors. 4 Now, as the forenamed Authors have esteemed of his so full a consent, in believing There is a God, to be a branch of the Law of Nature, A general Consent is an Argument of truth in all things. and consequently an infallible truth: so have diverse others collected it to be a truth; because there is so full a consent in it. The former sort, deducing the Consent from the Truth; and the second sort, arguing the Truth from the Consent. For the same Nature which doth Nihil facere frustrà, it doth also, Nihil dicere frustra too. For, Nullius rei vel sine causa est ortus, Arist. l. 1. De Coelo. c. 4. To. 1. p. 556. vel sine ratione praenotio: as Plutarch truly affirmeth, There is no generation, without a cause; nor no praenotion, without a reason. So that, Plut. lib. de EI. 1. To. 1. Mor. p. 685. Nature neither saith, nor doth any thing in vain. And therefore, if Nature say, That there is a God, it is not vainly said: but there is surely one indeed. Now, that which all men affirm, they say it not of themselves; but it is Nature that saith it in them. For, as I have showed out of the Roman Orator, Consensus omnium, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 113. est Naturae vox: The Consent of all men, is the voice of Nature in them. And therefore many learned Authors, both of Heathens and Christians, do reckon such Consent, to be always a concomitant of the truth: yet not following after it, as an ordinary servitor; but going before it, as a Gentleman Vsher. For, it followeth not, that such a thing is true, and therefore there is a general Consent in it. But it followeth, There is in such a thing a general Consent: and therefore it is true. For as Aristotle observes: Quod universis videtur, id, esse, Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 2. To. 2. p. 730. dicimus. That which all men affirm, is taken of all men, to be true and firm. And, in another place, he ascribeth as much certainty to Consent, as unto any thing, Arist. To. 1. p. 907 Lib. de pr●●sen●●one per somnum. that hath been found to be true, by experiment. Quod omnes aut plures autumant, adducit homines, ut existiment, hoc ipsum dici, tanquam usu perceptem, aut experimento cognitum: That which all, or the greatest part of men, do believe, may justly be believed, to have been found (upon trial) an experimented truth. Yea, and in another place, he citeth the testimony of the ancient Poet Hesiodus, Arist. l. 7. Etbic. c. 13. p. 699. unto the same purpose, Hesiod. Opera▪ & dies p. 42. Quam populi celebrant, omninò fama perire Nulla potest— What all men speak, and Fame doth crown, That cannot easily be laid down. And therefore is not likely, to have been rashly tak●n up. Certus abest Author; Martial. l. 7. Epigr. 5. p. 1●2. sed vox hoc nuncia● omnis. Credo tibi, verum dicere▪ Fama, soles: saith another to like purpose. There is a constant rumour runn's; Ye● vows a certain 〈◊〉. But, Fame, thou usest to speak truth: I credit thee, the r●ther. Now, if a common fame be such an Argument of the truth, which many men divulge against their inward persuasion: then, how much more is the inward persuasion itself, when it is universal, and begotten in the mind, not by any outward fame, but by a natural inward working? As it is in this persuasion; That there is a God. Here, the persuasion groweth not out of the fame; but the fame out of the persuasion. And yet, is the fame as large as the persuasion: as Aristotle, in plain words, doubteth not to affirm. Vetus est fame, Arist. l. de. Mundo. To. 2. p. 1566. & quidem haereditaria, mortalium omnium; Vniversa, a Deo, & per Deum, nobis esse constitu●a. It is both an ancient, and a natural fame, universally diffused into the minds of all men; that from God, and by God, proceedeth all our good. Alleging this universality of consent, to be a good argument, of the undoubted truth of it. The same Philosopher defineth that to be probable, Arist. l. 1. Topic. c. 1. To. 1. p. 235. which seemeth to be true, either unto all men, or to the most men, or, at the least, unto wise men. Probabilia sunt, quae aut omnibus aut pluribus, aut sapientibus videntur. Then, must that needs be more than probable; Quod, & omnibus, & pluribus, & sapientibus videtur: as this doth, That there is a God. This can be thought no less than a necessary truth. For (as Seneca observeth) Multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum. Veritas argumentum est, Senec. ●pist. 118. p. 295. idem omnibus videri. We use to ascribe much unto a general persuasion. It is an argument of a truth, to seem a truth unto all men. Nay, it is more than an argument of a Truth. It is (as Tully too affirmeth) a very necessary truth. De quo omnes consentiunt, id verum esse necesse est: That, whereon all men are agreed, Cic. l. De. Nat. D●o●. p. 190. that must needs be true indeed. Neither do these Heathen men only, give this great ascription, unto the consent of all men: but diverse Christian Divines, do also the very same. Chrysostome Chrys●st. Hom. 1. in Mat. To. 2. p. 11. saith, that it is Grande indicium veritatis, cum vnoore idem pronuncient. It is a great argument of the truth, when many do speak the same. things, with one mouth. Pleading this, for the consent, even of the Holy Evangelists: and out of their consent, concluding their truth, as by a firm Argument. And Hierom saith likewise, that, Etiam si Scr●pturae authoritas non subest; Hieron. Dial. cont Lucifer. To. 2. p. 139. tamen orbis consensus instar praecepti obtin●●. That though there ●e no express warrant of Scripture, yet the consent of the world, is as good as a precept. Which, though he there pronounce, in the person of an Heretic: yet in the person of the Orthodox, he doth not revoke; confirming by his silence, what he reproves not by his speech. So great an estimation, ●aue all learned men ascribed, unto the consenting of all men. Yea, and diverse of them have been so zealous, in defending it, that they set a stigma, and a note upon all that impugn it. Aristotle censureth them, to be a carping and captious kind of men, who love to reprove all other men's opinions, and yet can bring ●o better themselves. Qui fidem [consensus] tollit, Ari●t. l. 10. 〈◊〉 c 2. To▪ 2. p. 730 non valde probabiliora dicet. Tully goeth a step further, and passeth an harder censure; imputing v. to them not boldness, but malipertnesse. For, though he were one of the academics himself, who challenged unto themselves a Liberty of speaking, both for and against every thing: yet decayeth he, even to academics the liberty of speaking against Consent: pronouncing that, to be, not liberty or and a city, Cic. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. p. 185. but petulancy and procacie. Tum demùm mihi procax Academia vid▪ b●tur, fi omnes consenserint: Yea, and Caecilius censureth it, to be such a kind of boldness, as he cannot so much as think on, without great impatience. cum omnium Gentium, Arnob. l. 8. cont. Ge●t. p. 747. de Dijs immortalibus, quanuìs incerta sit vel ratio, vel origo; maneat tamen firma consensio; neminem fero, tanta audacia, tamque irreligiose, nescio qua prudentia, tumescentem, qui hanc religionem, tam vetustam, tam utilem, tam salubrem, dissoluere, aut infirmare nitatur. Seeing there is a generally received opinion of God, through all the nations of the world, wherein the consent of them all is most certain; though both the reas●n, and original thereof, be uncertain; the boldness of those men is not to be endured, nor their profaneness to be suffered, who (swelling with an opinion of th●ir own proper wisdom) dare presume, to impugn so ancient, so profitable, and so wholesome a Religion. Clem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 274. Clemens Alexandrinus taxeth those men (which consent not with all other men, in this general and natural belief of a God) to be not insolent, or malapert; but to be plainly impudent: and saith, that they do, Omnem exuere pudorem, Zach. Mytile●. l. De Mundi create. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 751. adverùs veritatem. And Zacharias Mytilenensis, he censureth them, to be no better than madmen. Commun●m omnium sententiam destruere, est dementissimum. To impugue the common opinion of all men, is the action of a Madman. Thus you see, how great Authority, all learned antiquity doth ascribe unto Consent; and how tender they be over it, making it so certain an Argument of truth, that they cannot brook any man, that doth seek to oppose it. 5 Now, as this general Consent of all men, is an Argument of truth, Consent in the strongest Argument to prove, There is a God. in every other thing: so is it most of all, in this our present Question. To prove, There is a God. For though many other Arguments may be brought ●o confirm it; and so be, by learned Writers, both of Heathens, and Christians: yet is none of them all, of greater weight, and importance. Tully saith, that, Firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 112. cur Deos esse credamus; quòd nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cu●us mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. This is the strongest reason, why all men should believe, that there is a God; because all men do believe it: And, because there is not any, either Nation so fierce, or Person so savage, but that his mind is endued, with some opinion of the Gods. And again in another place. Intelliginecesse est, esse Deos; quoniam insitas eorum, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 190. vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus. We must needs believe, that therefore there be Gods; because the opinion of them is so generally engrafted, or rather indeed inbred in our minds. And again, in the same place. Esse igitur Deos, Cic. ibid. consitendum est:— quoniam ferè constat inter om●es, non Philosophos solùm, s●d etiam indoctos. We must needs confess, that therefore there is a God: because, both Philosophers and ignorants do so generally agree in it. Pressing still this consent, as a good Argument to conclude it. Yea, and Velleius, observing, with how great an applause, this natural anticipation, and presumption of a God, was received and urged by all the Philosophers; he seeketh cunningly to derive the whole credit of the first invention of this Argument, unto his Master, the Epicure: affirming, that though diverse other Philosophers had observed, that a general consent there is, in believing a God: yet that only Epicurus was he, that collected, that this Consent had the force of an Argument, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 190. to prove it. Epicurus solus vidit primùm, esse Deos; quòd, in omnium animis, eorum notionem impressisset ipsa Natura. Other Philosophers, do but only report, and note this Consent; that we may know that such a thing there is. But the Epicure notes this of it, that a sound and firm conclusion may be gathered from it. Which, his so strong ambition, to make his Master, the Epicure, to be the first Author of this subtle invention, doth evidently show his great conceit of it; and how strong, and invincible an Argument he thought it. But, Co●●●, the Academike incountereth Velleius, in that his assertion, and will not suffer him to steal away the glory of this Argument, only unto Epicurus, from the rest of the Philosophers: which he ascribeth unto them, as well as unto him. Commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam Philosophorum, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 192. This is a common Argument with other Philosophers, as well as with Epicures. And, that he spoke no more than the truth in it, we may evidently see in Plato: who, among diverse other arguments, to prove There is a God, nominatìm instanceth, in this generality of Consent. O amice, facile est veritatem hanc ostendere; Plato. l. 10. de Leg. p. 870. Quòd Dij sint.— Primùm enìm, Terra, Sol, Sydera, ipsúmque Vniversum; temporum quoque ornatissima varietas annis men sibusque distincta id ostendunt; Graecorum praetereà Barbarorúmque omnium Consensus, Deos esse fatentium. It is easy (my good Friend) to make evident this truth, That there needs must be a God: The Earth showeth it, the Sun showeth it, the Stars showeth it, the World showeth it, the most beautiful variety of times and of seasons, of years and of months showeth it: And, the general Consent both of Greek; and Barbarians, confessing a God, that likewise showeth it. Where it evidently appeareth, that he not only reporteth, that there is a Consent, both of greeks and Barbarians, that There is a God: but also, from thence collecteth, that therefore there is one indeed: pressing this Consent, as a principal Argument, which proveth the truth of it. And the same we may likewise see, Cap. 3. Sect ●3. in all those other Authors, whom before I have alleged to be the Reporters of this general Consent; that all of them intent it, to this only end, to urge it as an argument, to prove, There is a God. So then▪ the whole sum of this first book, may be contracted into this short Syllogism: That, which hath at all times, and in all places been believed of all men, that cannot possibly be false, but needs must be a Truth. But, That there is a God, hath at all times, and in all places been believed of all men. Ergo, this cannot be false, but must needs be a Truth. The Mayor is proved to be true, because, Consensus omnium, est v●x Natural. The Consent of all men is the Voice of Nature: which is not the voice of Error. The Minor hath been proved, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 113. through the tract of this whole Book. And therefore, the Conclusion cannot be denied. The End of the first Book. The second Book: Of the Grounds of Arts. CHAP. I. That all Arts lead to God. 2. The Metaphysics, by two Arguments. 3. The first is, the limiting of all finite things: as of natural Bodies. 4. And of their natural faculties. 5. And yet not by the Sun, which itself is limited: 6. Both in his working: 7. And in his moving 8. By the limiting also of ●ll artificial faculties. 9 And finally, by the limiting of all spiritual Graces. I Have in the former Book instructed the Atheist, out of The voice of Nature; and proved unto him, That there is a God, by that natural persuasion, which is generally begotten in the hearts of all men. Which, like a private and domestical Schoolmaster, teacheth the Atheist that Lesson, by a secret suggestion, as it were, the A, B, C, and first elements of Religion. The force and power of which inward instruction, the very Atheist himself feeleth sensibly within him. For, there is no Atheist in the world, so obdurate and hardened, but he is oftentimes enforced to confess, There is a God. Yea, & that not only against his will, by the stroke of God's judgements, which extort an unwilling confession from him; but also sometimes, by his will, and of his own free motion, without any violence or outward compulsion, only by the force of this inward persuasion. Nay, there is none of them all, so desperately wicked, but that, at some time or other, in some sort or other, he will serve some God, though he pretend to contemn all. Or, if he refuse to serve him; yet he cannot choose but fear him, even because he serveth him not: as being conscious unto himself, even by Nature's inward lessoning, that his service is due unto him. And that therefore, for his neglect of it, he is subject to due punishment: which is a real confession of him, yea, and that a very strong one. Thus forcible an operation, hath this inward voice of Nature, in the hearts of all men, even in the wickedest among them. Now, having thus, in the former Book, All Arts lead to God. instructed the Atheist in this first principle of Religion, by the voice of his own Nature, as of a domestical and private Instructor: in this Book I intent to bring him out, a little further, and to send him abroad unto the Heathen Philosophers, as unto the School of more public and expert Teachers. For that, which dame Nature doth but only affirm upon her bare word, that do the Philosophers both confirm by reasons, and declare by sensible Demonstrations. And though none of all those Arts, which they invented, do purposely propound to entreat of God, as of their proper subject; neither any of them have this our present position [That there is a God] for one of their principles, as Theologie hath: Yet is there none of them, but that it affordeth us some matter or other, from whence we may collect, that there needs must be a God. As we may evidently see, in all the several parts of Philosophy. Let me give you but a taste of some few, for all the rest: because the Argument is not popular. And therefore, it is but equal, that my stay upon it should be the shorter. The instances whereupon I will chiefly insist be these: Two, out of the Metaphysics: The bounding and limiting of all finite things; and the extending of men's appetites beyond all bounds and limits. Two, out of the Physics: The first Cause, and, The first Mover of all natural things. Two, out of Physic: Diseases, and their Remedies. Two out of the Politics: the growing, and decaying of Kingdoms, and Empires. Two, out of the Ethics: the way to Felicity, and Felicity itself. Four, out of the Mathematics: Punctum in geometry; Vnitas in Arithmetic; Ordo in Astronomy; and Harmonia, in Music. Finally, there is no Art, neither liberal, nor illiberal; but it cometh from God, and leadeth to God. And this is the substance and oeconomy of this second book. Arist. l. 4. Meta p●ys. ●. 2. To. 2. p. 1399. 2 Let us first begin with the Metaphysics; which Aristotle calleth, The first Philosophy, Primam Philosophiam: and so by degrees, descend down unto the rest. The Metaphysics arguments for God. It affordeth us two considerations: from whence we may collect, even by the light of nature, that There needs must be a God. The first is, The bounding and limiting of all finite things. The second, The boundless and unlimited appetite of men's souls. 3 For the first of which two points; look through the whole world, The bounding of natural bodies is the work of God & through all the sensible bodies, therein contained, & you shall evidently see, that though many of them be great, yet that none of them is infinite: there is none of them so great, as to be without his limit. As even Aristotle himself, both affirmeth and proveth, in his first book, De Coelo. Arist. l. 1 de Coelo c. 7. To. 1. p. 559. Where, he plainly and categorically setteth down this conclusion: Corpus infinitum, in ratione rerum, esse non posse. That it is a thing, contrary to the nature of things, that there should be any body, without his terms and limits; No, not even the body of the universal world itself: as, Ar●st. Ibid. p. 564. in the conclusion of the same chapter he expressly inferreth. Vniversi corpus, infinitum esse non posse, ex iis, quae diximus, patet. Then much less can any part of the world be infinite, if the whole be not. Unless we should make the whole to be less than his own part: which were utterly absurd. And therefore all the parts of the world, must needs be limited, & determined. Let me give you an instance or two, Arist. l. 4. Phys●. c. 5. To. 1. p. 462. to this purpose: and that out even of Aristotle himself. Terra in Aqua; haec, in Acre; Aer, in Aethere; Aether, in Coelo est collocatus. Ipsum verò Coelum, nullo in alio corpore est ulteriùs collocatum. The Earth, that is bounded and limited with the Water; the Water with the Air; the Air, with the Fire; the fire with the Heaven. The heaven is not bounded, with any further Body. How then is the Heaven bounded, if it be not boundless? Why thus. Every one of the lower heavens is bounded or limited, by the concave, or hollow part of his higher: until we come to that, which is the highest of all, and containeth all the rest, being contained of none. And yet, even that is not without his bounds, but is limited and determined, within his own convexe or swelling superficies: as a man is, by his skin●e, or a bubble of water, by his thin film. So that, there is not, in Nature, any Body, that is infinite, nor any that is without all limit. To be unlimited and boundless, is only the Prerogative of the Maker of all things: as Prosper very well, and truly observeth. Nílque adeò magnum est, Prosper. l. de Provide. p. 181. ●. quod non certus modus arcet. Et Coelum, & Terras, & totum denique mundum, Limbs habet. Meta est altis, & meta profundis. Sed nusquam non esse, Dei est: qui totus, ubíque, Et penetrat Mundi membra omnia liber, & ambit. there's nought so vast, as to be void of limit. Both Heaven, and Earth, and all the world hath bounds. All heights and depths have terms, is we esteem it: Height ne'er so high, be Depth ne'er so pro●ound. Unlimited, and no where not to be, Agrees to God alone: Who wholly is The whole World through, and every least part: He Within doth pierce, without doth compass this. So that, there is not any Body, in Nature, so infinite, but that it is pre●●●ed within some bound and limit. Now, every finite Body, being thus bounded & limited, it must needs have had those bounds prescribed unto it, by some other thing, and not by itself. For, every thing, by nature, being desirous of scope, and seeking to enlarge itself, as far as it is able; if it had the setting of his own bounds and limits, it would set none at all; but would be as infinite, as God himself is: who hath the setting of limits unto all things. And therefore (as you see) hath set none unto himself: but is illimitable, and boundless. Nullis neque finibus, neque Hilar. in Ps. 118. p. 516. spacijs ●oarctatus: as Saint Hilary teacheth: Being no way straitened, by any space, or place. And so would it be with all other things too; if they had the assigning of their own bounds and limits: they would all of them, be boundless. Because all bounds, be like bonds, and like shackles, unto all things: which they would never put upon them, if they could be without them. For (as Scaliger well observeth) Vnicuique enti, Scalig. Exercit. 9 p. 52. insita est appetitio infinitatis, There is in every thing, an appetite to make itself infinite. The Sea, if it could eat up the whole Earth, and make all the Globe, Sea (as it once was) it would surely do it. For, the waters do desire, Ps 104 9 6. to stand above the mountains; Ps 104 9 6. as the Prophet David testifieth. Again, the Earth, if it could utterly close up the Sea, and make all the Globe, dryland, 2. Esdr. 4. 13. etc. it would surely do it; as Esdras notable expresseth in a witty apologue. I came (saith he) into a Forest, in the plain, where the Trees held a Council, and said; Come let us fight against the Sea, that it may give place to us, and that we may make us more woods. Likewise, the floods of the Sea took counsel, and said; Come, and let us go up, and fight against the Trees of the wood, that we may get another Country for us. But the purpose of the wood, was vain: for the fire came down and consumed it. And the purpose of the Sea, was also vain: for the sand stood up, and stopped it. Whereby it appeareth, that there is, in all things, a desire to dilate, and to ingreat themselves. And therefore would never shut up themselves, within bounds and limits, as it were, in a prison; if they themselves had the setting and appointing of them. Therefore, as it is true, S●●l. Exercit. 6. Se●. 3. p. 27. that Nullum ens finitum, est a se: so it is likewise true, that Nullum ens, finitum est a se. As nothing, that is finite, is of itself: so nothing that is, is finite of itself. But all the finite things, in universal nature, have both their being, and their bounding of some other. And they all do feel within them, the imperial power of a superior Nature: which hath appointed, and prescribed those limits▪ unto them: and therefore are well content, to contain themselves within them: as obeying the command of him, that ruleth over them. Nonnè vides (saith Claudian) operum, Claudian in 4. Con●alat. Hono●●. p. 186. qui se, pulcherrimus ipse, Mundus amore ligat? nec, ut connexa, per aevum, Conspirant Elementa sibi? quî, limit Phoebus Contentus medio? contentus littore Pontus? Et quî perpetuò terras ambítque, vehítque, Non premat incumbens oneri, nec cesserit aër? See'st not the World, of Nature's work's the fairest, well I wot, How it, itself together ties, as in a truelove's knot? Nor see'st how th' Elements, aye combined, maintain one constant pl●●? How th' midst of Heaven contents the Sun? and Shore contains the Sea? And how the Air both compasseth, and carrieth still Earth's frame? Yet neither pressing burdens it, nor parting leaves the same? This abiding of those things within their bounds and limits, clean contrary unto their natural Appetites, doth evidently declare, that those bounds were never set unto them by themselves, but appointed unto all of them, by some other, whose prescribed law they are compelled to bear. Now, who can this be, that thus circumscribeth all things, within their set limits, but only God himself: who is, both the Maker, and Ruler of all things? For, what other could set bounds, both unto Heaven and Earth, but only the Creator and Maker of them both? who, must needs be God. And therefore he it is (as the Prophet David testifieth) that hath both a Psal. 24. 2. founded the Earth, upon the waters; b Psal. 33. 7. and bounded the Sea, within his banks; c Psal. 104. 2. 9 and spread out the Heaven, as it were, a curtain. He it is (as the Prophet Isay testifieth) that doth, Isay 40. 12. Palmo, coelos; pugillo, aquas; digitis, terras metiri: that counteth out the heaven, with his span; and measureth the waters, with his fist; and comprehendeth the dust of the earth, in a measure; and weigheth the mountains in a wait; and the hills, in a balance. So that, the bounding and limiting of all the forenamed things, is the work of none other, but of God, their Creator: who (as Boetius truly calleth him) is Principium, ●oet. l. 3. de consolat. M●tro. 9 p. 1042. Vector, Dux, Semita, Terminus, idem. The first Beginner, and the Bringer on, The Guide, Path, Term and all, is God alone. A●d this is confessed, not only by Christians; but also by diverse of the Heathens themselves. Ovid, describing the creation of the world, he ascribeth it expressly unto a God, though he could not tell what God. But he numbereth as his works, all the forenamed particulars; Of compassing the earth about, with the water; that, Ovid. l. 1. Me●am p. 4. 5. with the air; and that, with the heaven; of the bounding of the Seas within their shores; of the stretching out of the fields; the raising up of hills; the pressing down of valleys; the growing up of woods; and diverse such like. All which, he pronounceth to be the works of God. Yea, and that, not only in respect of their creation, and making: but also, even of their circumscribing, and limiting. — Limitibus, dis●revit omnia, certis. With bounds distinguished, all things are limited. Insisting, nominatìm, upon this point of their limiting. So likewise, Orpheus. Tu mundi terminos habes Vniuer si. Th●u, Pausa▪ l. de. Oscul●. ●. 63. p. 364. God, Idem. ibid. c. 20. p. 101. hast in thy hands, Of all the world the bounds. So likewise Pindarus: Sed discriminat omnia, interminata vis & potentis. Itself a boundless power is, That setteth bounds to all things else. And, that this was not the idle fiction of Poets, we may see by the graver sentences of the learnedest Philosophers: who casting about, with the best wit that they had, from whence this limiting of things should proceed; have, at the last, been constrained, to ascribe it unto God. Anaxagoras affirmeth, that there is, a certain infinite Spirit, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 187. [Mens] whose power and understanding hath given bounds and limits, unto every finite thing. And of the same opinion was likewise his master Anaximenes; as Tully reporteth, in the very same place. Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus, omnium rerum descriptionem & modum, Mentis infinit●e vi ac ratione, designari, & confici voluit. And, indeed, Anaxagoras did so totally ascribe, Laërt in vit. Anaxagor● p. 47. all the noble works of nature, unto the working of this M●ns (which was his Philosophical appellation of God) that they used to call him, men's, in derision. Yet, and, even Aristotle himself, seemeth to tax him, for it: and, yet, Arist. l. 1. De Anima. c. 2. T●. 1. p. 786. & 787. Arist. l. 3. Phys. c. 4. To. 1. p. 447. he agreeth with him in the very same point. For he saith, that there is, Quid. dam infinitum, cuius non est principium: sed hoc, principium caeterorum, quòd, & continet ipsum omnia, & gubernat. There is (saith he) a certain infinite thing, which is itself without all beginning: and yet is the beginner of every other thing: yea both their maintainer, and their governor. So that, this Infinitum, is both the beginning, from whence all things do proceed; and (as it were) the place, wherein all things are contained; yea, and the very Governor, by whom all things are ruled. And this Infinitum (which doth thus finire, & continere omnia) he calleth afterward, Divinum, that is, a Divine thing. Yea, and this, in the same place, he plainly affirmeth, to be the common Tenet of all the Philosophers. Omnes, Ibid p. 446. qui dignè Philosophiam tetigisse putantur, de Infinito sermonem fecerunt. Ac omnes, ipsum, ut principium quoddam eorum quae sunt, posuerunt. All those, that have been worthy to handle Philosophy, make mentiom of that Infinitum. Yea, and all of them confess, that infinite thing to be the first beginner, and original of all things. And that it may appear, that he reciteth not this opinion, as reproving or disliking it, he, in plain words, confirmeth it: and saith, that it was, with great reason, that they affirmed it. Principium omnes, infinitum ponunt, Ari●t ibid. p. 447. cum ratione. Now Aristotle was a man, as greatly addicted, unto his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; as Anaxagoras was, unto his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: ascribing all things, so absolutely, unto the power of Nature, as if he had been hired to write in her behalf. Insomuch that, as he called Empedocles, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2 p. 1569. Naturae interpretem: Suidas in●●oce Aristoteles. p. 138 The interpreter of Nature: so Suidas calleth him Naturae Scribam, The Scrivener of Nature. And therefore, he would never have transcribed this circumscribing power, from his beloved Nature, unto any such supernatural cause, as that Infinitum Divinum was; if, with the Egyptian Sorcerers, Ex. 8. 19 he had not been constrained to confess, that in this work, is the finger of God. Which yet, in another place, he more plainly affirmeth. For he saith, that, God is therefore called, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Id est, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 157●. circumscribi omnia: & quia nihil in rerum natura sit, quod in infini●tum ex●urrat. God is called Peproméne, from his bounding of all things, and leaving nothing vndefined, without his bounds and Limits. For, nothing can exceed those terms and limits, which Fate hath prescribed. Which work, Philolaus also ascribeth directly unto God: affirming expressly, Vn●versa, tanquam in carcere, ●theuag. legate. pro Christ. B. b. ●at. 10. 8. p. 4. a Deo contineri: That all things are shut up, by the appointment of God, within their bounds and limits (as it were) into their prisons. And this work, of thus bounding and limiting of all things, do the Greeks acknowledge, to be the work of God, in calling their great God jupiter, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Limiferum, or, Rerum terminos afferentem, Homer in Hym●is. p. 827. Gaecolat. as Homer's Translator renders: him that is, The appointer of limits unto all things. And the Romans likewise, do seem to acknowledge the very same, in calling the same God, jovem terminalem: that is, jupiter the Limiter, or the Bounder of all things. Thus, 〈…〉 the bounding and limiting of all natural bodies, doth lead us, by the hand, unto the knowledge of a God. 4 And so doth likewise, the bounding of their natural powers and faculties. For, in these inferior parts of the world, The bounding 〈◊〉 natural faculties, ● the work of God. we may observe a fivefold difference among the Creatures: every one of them, having their proper and peculiar faculties, so defined and circumscribed, that none of them can exceed the bounds of his own nature, nor exalt itself to the state of his superior; but abideth in his own; and can go no further. By which Hierarchy of the Creatures, we may easily ascend, and climb up unto God, as it were by an Ascendent, consisting of five steps. For, (as the Orator truly affirmeth) Simo a primis, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. De●● p. 205. inchoatísque naturis, ad ultimas perfectâsque volumus procedere; ad Deorum naturam perveniamus, necesse est. If we will first begin with the unperfect works of Nature, Theodoret. l. De Provident. To. 2. p. 530. and by degrees ascend unto those that are perfecter; they will lead us, by the hand, to know the nature of God. And therefore, Aug. in Ps. 144. To. 8. p. 1673. this Argument is much insisted on; Gr●g Hom. 8. in czech. To. 2. p 71. b. both by Tully, the Orator, in the forealleged place; and by Plotinus, the Philosopher, as Theodoret recordeth; and by the learned Fathers, S. Augustine, and S. Gregory: and yet, most fully, by Raymundus de Sabunde. Wherein, I have observed, that every one of them, Raymundus de Sabunde in Theolog naturali Tit. 3. though they handle the same matter; yet, have put upon it a several form. And therefore, I will not tie myself, unto any one of them: but (imitating their example) will cast the Argument, into a mould of mine own. Now, those five degrees of Creatures, be these. That some things have bare essence and being, allotted unto them; and yet not either life, or sense: as, in si●ple bodies; the Heavens, and the Elements: in compound bodies; Stones, and Metals, and such like. Some other things, have both Being, and Living▪ and yet not either sense, or motion: as Trees, and Plants. Some other things, ●aue both Being, and Living, and Feeling; and yet have no proper, or animal-motion: as Oysters, and Muscles, and such other like conchylia; which have no natural motion of their own, but are only carried, as the water driveth them. And therefore, Aristotle, very wittily, calleth them, Arist. l. 3. de generat. Ani●al. c. 11. To. 2. p. 354. Aquatiles plantas; A kind of Waterplants: as he calleth earthly plants, Ostreaterrena; A kind of Land-Oysters: because they have no more selfe-motion, than these, Arist. l. 5. de Hist. Animals. 15. To. 2. p. 90. I mean Lation, or local-motion from one place to another. Some things again, have both Being, and Living, and Feeling, and Moving; and yet have no Reason, nor Understanding: as Birds, and Beasts, and Fishes, and such like. And some things again, have all these powers and faculties united in one, both Essence, and Life, and Sense, and Motion, and Reason too: as we see they be in Men. And these distinctions of Creatures, are so obvious to all men, that he, which notes them not, is more worthy to be numbered among beasts, then among men. Now, if it should be demanded; Why a Stone hath not life, as well as a Tree? or, a Tree, not sense, as well as a Beast? or, a Beast, not reason, as well as a Man? wha● other reason, can be given of all this, but only, that those powers are not in their own power, to take so many of them, as they themselves think good: but, that they be limited and assigned unto them, by a nature far above them: even the same nature that made them. And that they therefore have them not; because that Nature gave them not. From whence, there follow these two Conclusions. First, that all those forenamed faculties and powers, though they be in those things, that have them; yet they be not of those things, that have them. They have them, in themselves; but they have them, not of themselves. For then, all would have all of them, and none would content themselves with any part, were it never so great. Would a Tree (think you) be content to stick fast in the earth, as a dead and rotten stake; if it could give itself motion? Surely, no. The blind man, in the Gospel, that thought he saw men walking like unto Trees, Mar. 8. 24. should surely see Trees walking like unto men, if they could take unto themselves the faculty of moving. Again, would a Beast be content, to be so subject unto man, if it could give itself Reason? Or would a Man be content, to live here upon the earth, if he could flee up into heaven, and make himself a God? Surely, he never would. That which Tertullian affirmeth of the Roman Emperors, is true also, in all others, that; Si ipsi, Tertul. Apol. c. ●1. p. 33. se Deos facere potuiss●nt; certè quidem, homines nunquàm fuissent. If they could have made themselves Gods, they would never have continued Men. And so in all other things, as well as in these, they would all have all those faculties, if they could give them to themselves. Therefore, seeing that, which hath only Being, cannot give itself Life; and that, which hath only Life, cannot give itself Sense; and that which hath only Sense, cannot give itself Reason; this evidently showeth unto all that have any Reason, that the ampliating, or restraining of those natural endowments, is not in their own free disposition, or election: but in his only power, who freely bestoweth them. This is the first conclusion. The second, That seeing those forenamed faculties are not in the power of the things themselves, that have them; therefore they must needs proceed from some other power that gave them; and that hath in itself, the whole power of dispensing them. And that can be none other, but a divine and heavenly power. For, that nature must needs be supernatural and divine, which is the fountain and wellspring both of Being, and Living, and Moving, and Sense, and Reason: and which hath the power, to derive the streams of those divine graces, unto all other creatures, in such differing degrees, limiting and proportioning unto every several creature, that power and faculty, which standeth best with his pleasure: To some of them dispensing, but only one faculty▪ to some two; to some three; to some four; to some five: as the householder, in the Gospel, Mat. 25. 14. 15. distributed his Talents unto his servants. This inestimable treasure of so many precious Talents, and this admirable wisdom, which is used in dispensing them, Gen. 1. 1. 9 ●0 21. 2. 5. cannot, in reason, be ascribed, but only unto God. He it is, that made the heaven, the earth, the sea, which have only being: the trees, the herbs, Gen. 1. 27. the plants, which have both being and living: the birds, the beasts, the fishes; which have both living, sense, and moving: Yea, and Man himself too; which (beside all these forenamed) hath also understanding. As Mo●es plainly showeth in the Book of Genesis. Yea, and the Apostle Paul confirmeth it, Act. 17. 28. in his affirming, that it is only God, in whom we live, and move, and have our being: naming in express terms, three of those five properties, which before were named by us, Living, Moving, and Being. Yea, and adding for the rest, which he hath not named (as a general conclusion, to this particular enumeration,) Act. 17. 25. Philo. jud. l. de lingu. confus p. 479. that it is he, which giveth unto all, both life, and breath, and all things. So that it is God (as Philo judaeus noteth) qui suas potentias cincundedit rebus omnibus, tanquàm fortissima vincula; & hijs, eas indissolubiliter astrictas esse voluit. God hath given unto all things, their natural powers, with which he hath bound them, as it were, in strong bands; so that they have no power to enlarge themselves. Yea, and even the very Heathen themselves, have (by reason) been compelled to confess, as well in this point, as they did in the former, that this must needs be the work of God, and not of any other. Arist. l. De Mundo. To. 2. p. 15●9. Aristotle saith expressly, that; Omnes, Aeris, Terrae, Aquae, res, Dei opera dicere possis: Dei (inquam) qui mundum continet. We may truly affirm of all things, which are either in the Air, or in the Earth, or in the waters, that they be the works of God: Yea, even of that great God, which containeth the whole world. Psal. 95. 4. In whose hand (as the Psalmist teacheth) are all the corners of the earth. Yea, and Aristotle in the same place, confirmeth his own assertion, by the testimony of Empedocles, who hath plainly delivered as much in his verses, recounting all these things following, nominatìm, as God's works. Omnia quae fuerant, quae sunt, Arist. ibid. ubì supra. quaeque ipsa sequentur, Plantarum genus, atque hominum generosa propago, Atque ferae, volucres, pisces in fluctibus alti. What things or have been, be, or what things ever shall, Of Plants the kinds, man's noble race, beasts, birds, and fishes all. [May, all of them, be numbered as the works of God.] Yea, & Virgil affirmeth the same thing, though in other words▪ where speaking of the powerful spirit of God, which pierceth through every part of the world, he saith, that: Ind hominum, pecudúmque, genu●, vitaeque volantum, Et quae marmoreo fert monstra sub aequore pontus; 〈…〉. p. 267. Igneus est ollis vigour, & coelestis origo. From him, both men, and beast's, and birds, and fishes too proceed, And whatsoever Monsters strange, in marbly Seas do breed: All have a vigorous kind of warmth, by an eternal law: And all their first original from heavenly powers draw. But yet, not from the Heavens, as of their proper influence; but from the Ruler of the heavens, as of his grace and goodness. For (as Proclus truly t●stifieth) Q●icquid bonum, Pro●lus l. de d●●ua p 19●. ac salutare competit animabus (yea and animalibus too) caus●m a dijs definitam habet. What health or good soever there cometh to the creatures, it is definitely appointed unto them by God. For (as Aristotle affirmeth unto the same purpose) Et virent, 〈…〉 & occidunt, divinis parentia de●retis▪ They both sourish and perish by the decree of God. I might be plentiful in this point, if I would pursue that multitude of testimonies, both of Po●ts & Philosophers, which every where occur, ascribing unto God the creating of all things; both of those that have more, and of those that have fewer Talents. But these now alleged, are (for a taste) sufficient. 5 Only here, let me answer unto one Objection; which hath crept into the heads of diverse learned men, The Sun is not the 〈◊〉 of natural facalties. as concerning the limiting of those last named faculties: before I proceed unto the rest of the instances; and that is briefly this: That though it be apparent, that those forenamed Bodies, be so distinguished by their natural properties, that some have only being; some other, life, and motion; and others, sense and reason: yet doth it not appear, that it is only God, that hath so distinguished and distributed those faculties; we see not, that God doth it: but we see that the Sun doth it: Whom Aristotle calls, Authorem rerum procreandarum: Arist. l. 2. d: Generate c. 9 l ●. 1. p. 674. The very Author and Parent of all generation: And unto whom Trismegistus ascribeth, Omnium reram, in m●ndo, opificium; ut qui imperet omnibus, & faciat omnia: the making of all things in the world, as to him that ruleth all, and to him that doth all. We see, that the Sun begetteth daily in the earth, not only Stones and Metals, which have only being; but also Trees and Plants, which have also life; yea, and Flies and Worms too, Diodor. Si●ul. l. 3 p 69. which have both sense and motion: 〈◊〉 in Arc. p. 322. yea, and if we should believe the reports of the Heathen, it hath also begotten Men, with their Reason and Understanding. So that this great work, which we ascribe unto God; and which we use as an Argument, to persuade men, that there is a God; aught rather to be ascribed unto the Sun: by whom we see it apparently done. And therefore doth not lead us by any consequence, unto Gods unless we will acknowledge the Sun to be God. But unto this objection I answer: that if the Sun perform this by his own power and virtue, it must then needs be a God; as performing that work, which is proper unto God. For who can give life and motion, and sense, and reason, unto things, by his own power, but only the Maker and Creator of all things? Who by those very works declareth himself to be a God. So that our forenamed instances, in leading us unto the Sun, do lead us unto a God; if he be the giver and distributer of those powers, by his own strength and power. But, if the Sun do this not by his own proper power, but only by the delegated power of his Maker and Creator, who useth him but as his minister: then do our forenamed instances lead us unto a God; who is above the Sun, and is the God of the Sun. Yea, 〈◊〉 ibid. and this, even Trismegistus himself confesseth, in the very same place. For, though he professed of the Sun, that he doth, Hunc colere, ipsumque opificem agnoscere: Yet he addeth this restriction; Post primum illum, & unum: That though he acknowledge him, to be the Maker of all things; yet that it is, but under another, who is far superior; being the first, and the only, before all the rest. So that, both ways, the limiting and distributing of those natural faculties, in such diverse measures, unto diverse subjects, do necessarily lead unto a God: either unto the true one; or unto one in opinion. Which against the Atheist, is fully sufficient. That, by way of supposition. But now, for our position: it must be resolutely held, that, though the Sun doth perform diverse of those great works, in giving those faculties unto certain bodies, according unto their several capacities: yet that it neither giveth them all (for it giveth not Reason, which is the chiefest of all) neither yet those which it giveth, doth it give, by his own virtue; but only by a kind of limited faculty, which God his Creator hath given unto it, to work thus and thus, as the matter is prepared. So that, if the Sun (the supposed giver of all those other faculties) could but take unto itself the faculty of speaking, it would certainly make the very same protestation, which was made by Saint Peter, in another like matter. Ye men of Israel, why marvel ye at this, or why look ye so steadfastly on us? Act. 3. 12. 13. 16. as though we, by our own power, had made this man to go. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and jaacob, he hath glorified his Son.— And his name it is, that hath made this man sound. And this same profession which the Apostle here maketh, for giving motion unto this Lame man, would the Sun also make (if it were able to speak) for his giving of motion unto any other thing. Yea, La●t. l. 2. c. 5. p. 84. and even for his own motion. For (as Lactantius truly teacheth) Inest syderibus ratio, ad peragendos meatus suos apta: s●d Dei est ill a ratio, qui & fecit, & regit omnia; non ipsorum syderum quae moventur. The Stars have a mean and a power in them, to dispatch their own motion. But it is only God, that hath given that power unto them; Who is both the maker, and ruler of all things. It is not a power that is proper to the Stars. And therefore, Trismegistus, Trismeg. in As●lep. c. 10. p. 523. though he ascribe much to the Sun; yet he calleth him, but, Secundum Deum, hunc mundum gubernantem: But a second Governor of the world, under God. Whereby it appeareth, that the Sun is not that infinite limitour, which giveth several gifts, and setteth several bounds, unto all other things; being itself boundless; but, that it must be numbered, among things limited. Yea, and that a great deal more straight limited, than many other things, that seem inferior unto it. And this may evidently be seen, both in his Working-power; and also, in his Moving-power. 6 For first, The Sun is limited in his working. for his working-power; it is most plain and evident, that the Sun is two ways restrained in it, that is both, in the Matter, and in the Manner of his working. By both which it appeareth, that he hath not an omnipotent, but a limited power in him. And first, for the matter. We see this by experience, that it is not in the Sun's power, to put every form upon every matter: but is confined, to the hability and capacity of the matter, as it is either prepared, or unprepared by nature. The S●nne cannot, by that heat, put hardness upon wax, by which, he putteth hardness upon a stone: Nor, by that heat, put softness upon clay, by which he both softeneth and dissolveth the Snow. This cannot be done by him: because the matter will not suffer him. Again, the Sun hath not power to give every natural property, unto every natural body. He cannot give 〈◊〉 unto a Tree, upon that hard Rock, where yet he giveth Being unto a Stone: Neither can he give being unto a Stone, within that soft Dunghill, where yet he giveth both being, and Living, and Moving, and feeling, unto a Worm. These things, he can work in one place; because the matter is prepared for him: in another he cannot; because the matter is unprepared for such and such a form. For, he cannot work any where beyond the possibility or receptivitie of his matter. Which evidently showeth that the Sun is not the first and unlimited limitour, which distributeth those faculties, as he himself pleaseth: but is a mere servant, that is limited himself, to do no more than his Master pleaseth. Now, who is it, that limiteth this power unto the matter; that some matter should only be capable of life; some other both of life, and sense; some other (beside these) of motion; and some of none of these, but only of simple Being? This distribution the Sun cannot make, in every matter, but only where the hability thereof will suffer. Therefore, the limitour of this susceptive power unto the matter, in such differing degrees, and measures, and manners, can (in truth) be none other, but only that omnipotent Creator of the Matter: of whom it is said, Gen. 1. 1. 2. in the beginning of God's Book; that, In the beginning, God made Heaven and Earth: and the Earth was void, and without form. God having therefore made the matter, without any certain form of his own, that it might be capable of every other form. And yet, not delegating so large a power unto any Creature, as to superinduce any form whatsoever, but only as he limiteth the capability of the matter. And yet, unto himself he hath reserved an infinite power, to put any form upon any matter. Which he always findeth pliant, and obsequent to his pleasure, even against the propriety of its own particular nature. Euseb. l. 4. De Praepar. c. 8. p. 155. For (as Eusebius citeth out of Dionysius) Penitùs nefandum est, si quis putet (sicut Artificem) ad materiae aptitudinem, primam se causam accommodare. It is not to be spoken, that the first cause of all things, should (like an Artificer) be tied to the aptness and hability of his matter. For, he can easily work, beyond all the power and possibilty of it. He can give weight unto the fire, which is the lightest of all things; and make it to fall perpendicularly down, as it were a shower of rain; as he did upon the Sodomites. He can give hardness, and consistence, Gen. 29 24. unto the soft, and fluid waters, and make them to stand as stiff as a wall▪ Ex. 14. 22. as he did unto the Israelites. He can make dirt and clay, joh 9 6. a Collyrium for the eyes; Num. 2 ●. 28. as he did unto the blind man. Mat. 3. 9 He can make the mouth of a dumb Ass to speak, as he did unto Balaam. Yea, and he can; of very Stones, 〈…〉 Supartium. p. 339. raise up Children unto Abraham. Though Galen deny that power unto him. But yet the Scripture ascribeth it: which is of greater credit. Yea, and even the Heathens Mythology attribut●s it, in Deucalion's transformation of Stones into men. Inque brevi spacio, 〈◊〉 l. 1 Metam. p. 29. superorum numine, saxa Missaviri manibus, faciem traxêre virorum, In little space, by God's high power, which all things makes, Stones, cast from out Man's hand, put on men's shapes. So that God, who is the true limiter and distributer of these faculties, is not limited himself unto any matter, 〈…〉 though Plato think he be: but, he can make, at his pleasure, Ex quovis ligno Mercurium. He can make, Quidlibet ex quolibet: which the Sun cannot. And therefore, it is God alone (and not the Sun) that is both the Determiner, and the Dispenser of those natural faculties, unto their natural bodies. Giving where, and when he pleaseth, a passive possibility unto every matter, of receiving every form. Which power he hath not left, in the power of the Sun. Now for the manner of his working, it may again be demanded: Who it is, that hath so co●fined, and circumscribed the power of the Sun, that, out of such a matter, he should be able to produce only life; and yet, out of another matter, to produce both life, and sense? This evidently showeth, that the Sun is not able, to work and effect what it will, where it will; but, like a mere Artificer, is co●fined to the hability, or imbecility of his matter, and can go no further. Which showeth that he is not an omnipotent worker, as is God the Creator. 7 And, The Sun is limited in his 〈…〉. as the Sun is restrained in his working-power; so that he cannot effect, what he will: so is he likewise in his moving-power; so that he cannot go, whither he will. But is, as strictly tied unto his set-motion, as a Mill-horse to his Mil●: which cannot go possibly out of his Circle. For, when he cometh to a certain point Northward, he can go no further that way; but returneth back again. And, when he cometh to a certain point Southward, he can go no further t●at way; but returneth back again. Whereupon those two points are called his two Topics, or his two Returns. Between which two points, he spendeth his whole time, moving this way and that way, in going and returning: as the Sea doth, in his ebbing and flowing. And, when he is come unto his period, he can go no further: but obeyeth the law of God his Creator. As the Sea likewise doth. For the very same God, which hath set bounds and limits unto the Sea, and given it a commandment which it cannot break: job 38. 11. Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further, and here shalt thou stay thy proud waves: hath also given the same commandment to the Sun. Which it obeyeth accordingly. Yea, and that, by so strong and invincible a necessity, that (as B●laam professed, in a very like case) it hath ●o power to transgress: Num. 24. 13. It cannot exceed the commandment of the Lord. By whose law and commandment, it is more narrowly confined unto a strict motion, than any other planet is, in all the whole heaven. For, it is, as it were, imprisoned in the Ecliptic line, johan. de sacro Bosco. c. 2. p. 23. and tied fast unto it, as with a chain of Adamant: so that it hath no latitude at all in the Zodiac. Now, who is it, that bindeth the Sun, with such a necessity, but only God himself? who (as the Apostle expressly testifieth) hath both assigned the times, Act 17. 26. and set down the bounds of the habitations of men. Here is plainly, jupiter terminalis: the true setter of bounds, and limits, unto things: whose bounds and limits, though the Sun itself have no power to alter; yet God, the setter of them, hath. He can change and alter them, at his pleasure. As he plainly gave good proof: first, unto joshua; josh. 10. 13. in so holding the Sun from moving, that he could not go forward: and secondly, unto Ezechias; 2. Kin. 20. 11. Eccle. 48. 24. in so withholding, and pulling him, that he made him go backward. Which manifestly showeth, that the Sun, in his moving, is not in his own power, but under the command of a superior Ruler: who turneth him, and returneth him, at his own will and pleasure. So that, the Sun, of itself, hath not so much scope and liberty in his motion, as many a man hath: nay, not, as any Beast hath. For they can run, either this way, or that way, at their pleasure: but so cannot the Sun. He is moved by another; by whom he is so tied unto a strict and unalterable motion, that Astronomers can surely tell (unto the very minute) all the Eclipses, that shall ever fall out, so long as the world itself shall last. As the Roman Orator hath expressly observed. Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 224. Defectiones Solis & Lunae, praedicataeque in omne posterum tempus, quae, quantae, quandò futurae. The Eclipses of the Sun and Moon, are both known, and can be prognosticated, for all ages to come; both in what fashion and in what quantity, and at what time, they shall happen. Now, these predictions could not be so infallible, but that the Sun is tied unto a course unalterable. Which notable captivity of the Sun, more than of any other of God's Creatures, is excellently described, and set out by Prudentius. solemn certa tenet regio, Prudent. c. nt. Symmachum. p. 235. b. plaga certa coërcet. Temporibus varijs distinguitur, aut subit ortu, Aut ruit occasu, latet aut sub nocte recurrens. Non torquere facem potis est, ad signa Trionum; Orbe nec obliquo, portas Aquilonis adire; Nec solitum conversus iter revocare retrorsum. Hic erit ergo Deus, praescriptis lege sub unae Deditus officijs? Libertas laxior ipsi Concessa est homini: formam cuiflectere vitae, Atque voluntatis licitum est: se●tramite dextro Scandere, seu laevo malit decurrere campo: Sumere seurequiem, seu continuare laborem, Seu parere Deo, sive in contraria verti. Ista, ministranti regimen solenne dierum Haudquaqu●agrave; m Soli datur, a Factore potestas. Sed famulus subiectus, agit quodcunque necesse est. The sum and effect of which verses, is thus much. A certain Region doth restrain the Sun, Which is designed for times distinction: It never wanders past the Tropics Line, It's either rising, or it doth decline, Or else, by night, lies hidden and returning, And never varyes from its common running. It cannot wreath itself to th' Northern Star's, Nor can it reach, in oblique Orb, so far As to the Southern Lists; nor change it place, Nor once call back again it wont race. Can he then be a God, whom one law ties, And servant makes, to such set offices? Surely, a greater freedom granted is, And much more large, to every man, than this. For he can change his ●orme of life at pleasure, And move which way he will, to every measure: Whether the up, or down, he lust to take; The right hand, or the left, to sleep or wake; Whether to labour he intent, or rest; God to obey, or not; what likes him best. This liberty th' All-maker hath not lent Unto the Sun, whose glorious regiment All days solemnize. It doth subject stand, And still attends Necessity's command. So that, though diverse of the Heathen have foolishly collected, from the constancy of his motion; that the Sun must be a god: Yet Prudentius (as you see) a great deal more prudently, collecteth the contrary: Concluding, that this argueth him rather to be a mere servant, than a god. Yea, and so likewise doth Lactantius. Lact. l. 2. ●. 5. p. 83 Argum●ntum illud, quo colligunt, universa coelestia, Deos esse; in contrarium valet. Name, si Deos esse idcircò opinantur, quia certos & rationabiles cursus habent, errant. Ex hoc en●m appa●et, Deos non esse; quòd ex orbitare, illis, a praestitutis itineribus, non licet. Caeterùm. si Dij essent, hûc atque illûc passim, sine ulla ●ecessitate serrentur: si●ut animantes in terra: qu●rum, quia liberae sunt voluntates, hûc atque illûc vag ●ntur, ut lib●it: &, 〈◊〉 means duxerit, eò fer●ur. That argument, from when●e the Heathen do collect, that the stars must needs be gods, doth most plainly prove the contrary. For, if they take them to be gods, b●cause of the certainty of their courses, they b● therein much deceived. For this plainly proveth, that (indeed) they be no gods: because they be not able to depart from their courses. Further, if they were gods, they would move, both this way, and that way in the heavens, as freely, as living creatures use to do upon the earth. Who, because they have the liberty and freedom of their will, they wander up and down, whither they themselves will. From whence he there concludeth, Non est igitur astrorum motus voluntarius, sed necessarius: quia praestitutis legibus officijsque deseruiunt. The motion of the stars is not voluntary, but necessary: because they be so tied unto set laws and offices. Which Zacharias Mitylenensis also expressly confirmeth. For he saith of the Sun, Zach. Mitylen. l. De Mundi Create. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 739. that, Habet motum voluntatis expertem, velut seruus: That his motion is involuntary, like the motion of a servant: which must be directed by his master's commandment. Now, if the Sun be but a servant, both in his working, Ps. 19 4. 5. Hugo de S. Victore l. 7. Erudit. Didasc. c. 8 To. 3. p. 19 and in his moving: who is then his Lord and Master, that setteth him so on doing? The Prophet David clears that question. It is God that hath set a tabernacle for the Sun, in the Heavens, and appointed him as a Giant, to run his race. Quis, solemn per hiberna descendere signa praecipit? (saith Hugo de Victore) Quis rursùm, per aestiva eum signa ascendere facit? Qui●, eum ab oriente in occidentem ducit? Quis iterùm, ab occidente in Orientem revehit? Haec cuncta sunt mirabilia: sed soli Deo possibilia. Who commandeth the Sun to descend and go down into the signs of the Winter, and who, to ascend back again into the signs of the Summer? Who leadeth him along from the East into the West? And who fetcheth him again, from the West into the East? These works to us are wonderful: but only to God are possible. So that the Sun is so far from giving bounds and limits unto other things, that itself is the most straight bounded and limited of all things. And that (as before I noted) not only in his working, but also in his moving. In his working: because (as Zacharias Mitylenensis observeth) Nihil potest vel efficere vel operari, Zach. Mitylen. ubi supra. quam quod constitutum sit a Deo, ordinis Dictatore: He can neither do, nor work any thing, but as God, the prescriber of order, hath appointed him. In his moving: because (as in the same place he affirmeth) Continuum faciens motum & modulatum, non excedit terminos, ab Opifice sibi impositos. Though he be in a continual and perpetual motion; yet doth he not exceed those bounds, that are prescribed him by that workman that made him. So that God alone is the limiter of the Sun: and consequently of every other thing: Act. 17. 25. Giving unto all, both life, and breath, and all things: as the Apostle plainly testifieth. And therefore God may more properly be called the Sun, for doing those things as the principal Agent; then the Sun can be called God, for doing them none otherwise, but only as God's instrument. For, those things, though instrumentally they be wrought by the Sun; yet are they originally wrought, only by God. And therefore, as Boetius very wittily collecteth: Quem, Bo●l. l. 5. de Consol. metro 2. p. 1100. quia respicit omnia solus, Verum possis dicere Solem. Whom, for he solely every thing doth see, Thou mayst well say the true Sun for to be. But to proceed. 8 As it is in all the forenamed natural powers, that they be limited and dispensed, All Arts are limited. according to the will and pleasure of the giver: so is it likewise in all artificial faculties. There is no man, adorned and endowed with all of them. But some man hath one, and some man another, but no man hath them all together. Non enìm omnia pariter, Hom. l. 4. Iliad. p. 441. Dij hominibus dare consueverunt: saith Homer. Nor all at once, nor all alike, nor ever hath it been, That God should offer, and confer his favours upon men: but dispenseth them by degrees, as he himself pleaseth. Which may as evidently be seen, in his dispensing of Knowledges, of Arts, and of Sciences; as as in any of the forenamed natural faculties. For, though all the several Arts and Sciences in the world (which are in number infinite) have been devised, and invented by the wit of man: yet had never any man so infinite a wit, as to know and understand the depth of all of them. Nay, no man of many of them. Nay, no man of any of them. No, not of that one Art, which by himself is professed, and wherein he desireth to be accounted excellent. All which notwithstanding, are so limited by God, that they are not, either confounded or coincident: yet is our capacity so much straitlier limited, that it cannot reach to any of their limits. Let me insist a while upon the several steps of this gradation: and give some light, by instances, in every one of them. That no man hath the knowledge of all Arts and Sciences, but is still limited and confined, No man hath the perfect knowledge of all Arts. either unto some one, or else (at the most) but unto some few of them: we may evidently see, if we will take a survey, either of the Mechanical, or of the liberal Arts. First for the Mechanical, and manuary Arts: we see by experience, that the Ploughman knoweth not, what belongeth unto the Ship; nor the Shipman, unto the Blow. But, as it is in the Poet. Navita, Propert. l. 2. Eleg 1. p. 193. de ventis; de Tauris, narrat Arator; Enumerat Miles, Vulnera; Pastor, Oves. The Seaman, doth discourse of Winds; The Ploughman, talk of Oxen find's; The Soldier, doth recount his knocks; The Shepherd, reckons up his flocks. Nay, even in those inferior and ministerial Arts, which are subjected unto others, as to their Architectonicals; we see, by like experience, that all of them are limited, within their own precincts: and none of them acquainted with the mysteries of others: No not, though they all depend upon the same head and principal. As namely, for example. The Art of the Saddler, although it be ordained unto the art of the Rider; yet hath not the Saddler any skill in Riding, but only in making of Saddles to ride in. And so likewise, downward. The Rider hath not the Art of making his own Saddle, nor his Bridle, nor his Horse-shoe, nor his Bit: but there be several Arts belonging to all these; and yet all of them subseruing unto the Art of Riding: whereof all they be ignorant: as the Rider, of all these: and each of these of others. And so it is likewise, in both our former instances. The Shipwright, though he have the art of making a ship; yet hath he not the art of guiding a ship: No more than the Sailor hath the art of the Ship-maker. And the same we may likewise see, in the Ploughman; which is our second instance. Plato. l. 2. De Repub. p. 550. Non sibi Agricola aratrum conficit, neque ligones, & rastros, etc. sed sunt fabri lignarij, & ferrarij; saith Plato. The Husbandman makes not his own Blow, neither his own Plowshare, nor his Rakes: But they are the works of Carpenters, and Smiths. So that, though the Ploughman have the knowledge of the ploughing of his ground; yet hath he not the skill of making his own plough: but that belongeth to the Carpenter's occupation: who yet, hath not the skill and art of ploughing. Now, who is it, that thus distributeth, and limiteth these meaner, and inferior arts unto men? It is only God himself, by the Heathens own confession. Maximus Tyrius affirmeth, that, though all those men forenamed, be every one ignorant of another's art; yet that God is not ignorant of any one of them: but hath the perfect and general skill of them all, imparting unto men, but certain small parcels and fragments of those knowledges, and reserving to himself, as his own prerogative, to have the full and perfect knowledge of all of them. Non enìm, Max Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 270. si aerarius faber, architecturae faciendae minimè sufficiat; aut, si agricola, nauticae sit artis ignatus; si navicularius, medicine; aut alius quispiam terrestrium munerum peritus, maritimis; ac vicissìm, maritimorum, terrestribus ineptus sit; ita etiam Deus, ab unatantùm circumscriptus est arte. It followeth not (saith he) that though the Brazier, be ignorant of the Art of the Carpenter; or, the Ploughman, of the Shipman's; or, the Pilo●, of the Physicians; or, any other that is skilful in the affairs of the land, be utterly unfit for the affairs of the Sea; that therefore God should be so limited, as to have the knowledge but only of one Art: because we men have, of no more. For, (as he there addeth, a little after) Deus, singulas Artes, tanquam haereditatem possidet; & tradere potest. God possesseth all Arts, as his proper inhaeritance, and so ●e delivereth them to others. And, as it is in those illiberal Arts; so is it likewise in all liberal Arts, that no man hath all of them. For, though they all be thought to be linked all together, Cic. l. 3. De Orat. p. 195. Quintil. l. 1. c. 10. p. 59 as it were, in a Chain; or rather, that they all do make one single Ring, in that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereof the Philosophers do so pleasantly dream: yet the Astronomer, is ignorant of the art of Music; and the Musician of Astronomy; the Geometrician, of Arithmetic; and the Arithmetician, of Geometry. And yet, all of those, be Mathematicians. And so likewise, in those four Arts of speaking, which dwell, all of them, in the tongue; Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetry. The Grammarian, is ignorant of the Art of Logic; the Logician, of Rhetoric; the Rhetorician, of Poetry; notwithstanding their near affinity. So that, no man can attain unto the knowledge of all of them: but is confined to his portion, as unto his Dimensum; which, in comparison of the whole, is (God knoweth) a very little one. Now, who is it, that limit●th these artificial faculties unto men, as well as the natural; but only God himself? It is he, and none else: as even Homer plainly testifieth. Coelestes etenim, Homer. l. 8. Odys' p. 53. non omnibus omnia praebent. Eloquium, Ingenium, Membrorum gratia, Vires, Non uni eveniunt.— God hath not all his gifts bestowed on all, or any one. Words sweetness, and Wits sharpness, beauty, strength of bone, These rarities of mind and parts, do all concur, in none. Where, he rendereth the true Reason, why all men have them not: because God, who is their Giver, bestows them not. Nay, the strength of the body, and the sharpness of wit, are seldom, by God in any one man conjoined: as by many learned men, Diodor Sicul. l. 17. p. 572. I find it oftentimes observed. Haud facilè fit (saith Diodorus Siculus) ut quisquam, & ingen●es corporis vires, & ingenium subtile habe●t. It falls not commonly out, that the same man should have, both strength of body, and strength of wit. But (as Maximus Tyrius observeth) Qui mininè validus est ad gerendum negotium, Max. Tyr. S●rm. l p. 83. ad obeundam speculationem, expeditum nactus est ingenium: contra, qui speculationem non sustinet, acriter agit. He that is but weak for action, is commonly good for contemplation: and he that is but dull in contemplation, is often vigorous in action. Rarò, falling. in Libra p. 199. utrumque Deus cuiquam largitur; ut idem Sit sapiens, & sit robusto corpore pollens: saith Palingenius. It's seldom seem, that God should give, both these, all men among; That one should be both wise in mind, and of a body strong. But, as Cato affirmeth on the one side; that, Consilio pollet, Cato l. 2. Distich. p. 22. cui vim Natura negavit: He commonly excels in Counsels reach, Whose outward valour, Nature doth impeach So Palingenius again affirmeth on the other side; that, Ingenio plerumque caret, Palingen. ubi sup●a. qui robore praestat. He for the most part, wanteth wisdom's Lore, In Body's strength, that others goes before. Nay, even in the gifts of the body only; we see, that he, which is excellent in some one, is, oftentimes, defective in many other. Corporum vires (saith Seneca) non ad omnia, Senec. l 3. Controuc●san pro●●m. p. 74. quae viribus perficiuntur, ●ptae sunt. The strength of the body, is not apt for all those things, that are done by strength only. And he illustrateth his position, by diverse pregnant instances. Illi, nemo, luctando, par est: ille, ●d tollendam magni ponderis sarcinam, praevalet: ille, quicquid appre hendit, non● emittit; sed in proclive nitentibus vehiculis, moraturas manus imicit. One man, is very strong in wrestling: another's strength lieth all in bearing, in listing, and carrying of great and weighty burdens: another's strength lieth all in holding whatsoever he casteth his hand upon; as in staying of heavy carts, Homer l. ●. Odyss. p. 53. and wagons, when they are running down the steepest hills. As Homer notably illustrateth, in describing the games of the Phaeacians, in Running, Wrestling, Leaping, Coyting; he nameth a several Victor, in every one of them. But no man, could win in Two: much less, in All of them. Now, who is it, that hath given this strength unto men, in so strange and differing both measures and manners? Homer answereth that question, in Agamemnon's expostulation with Achilles: Quòd singulari, Homer. l. 1. Iliad. p. 6. praeter caeteros, robore praeditus es; id verò non Tutibi, sed Dij ded●runt. That thou in strength art singular, and others dost excel; Thou not thyself, but God to thee, hath given it, know we well. It is the Lord that is our Strength: Psal. 28. 7. as the holy Scripture also teacheth us. Psal. 59 17. Yea, Senec. ubi sup●a. and Seneca, in the former place, goeth further, and showeth, that those faculties are limited, not only unto men; but also unto Beasts too. As, in dogs; some of them are only strong in fight, some others, in running. And so in Horses too; some of them are only strong in riding; some other of them, in only drawing. And this gift, thus limited, even to these brute beasts, doth God plainly assume unto himself. Hast thou given unto the horse his strength? job. 39 22. saith God unto job: meaning, that this was not the work of a man, but the proper and immediate work of God. Thus God, who hath the free disposing of all excellent gifts, in his own only hands, bestoweth them as he pleaseth, both unto men and beasts: giving unto some of them, more, and unto others of them, f●wer; after the only motion of his own goodwill and pleasure. But all of them he hath not given, unto any one man. Nay, not all, to any Nation. All nations are not eloquent. All nations are not Warlike. All nations are not learned. And yet, as God hath given all gifts unto none: Senec Suasor. 2. p. 227. so hath he deprived none of all. But as Seneca observeth) Omnibus sua decora sunt. Athenae, eloquentia, inclytae sunt; Thebae, sacris; Sparta, armis. Athens is glorious, for her eloquence; Thebes, for her holia●●se; and Sparta, for her arms. And the like may be said of diverse other C●●●tries, unto whom God hath given to excel, in diverse particular gifts: But, to excel in all, to none: much less to any Man. For, as Homer again testifieth: Alij tribuit Deus bellica opera; Homer l. 13 Ibid p. 49● in Grae●ola. God hath taugh the●● hand to war● and them singers to fight. Psalm 144. ●. alij saltationem; Alij cytharam, & cantum: aliis— animum p●udente●. God gives some, force of Arms, and arts of war; To others active nimbleness to dance; These in the Harp, and singing, skilful are; Those have a soul to wisdom's height advanced. Which sentence of Homer, implieth these two things. First, that all these forenamed things, are the only gifts of God. And secondly, that he poureth them not lavishly, upon all men, without diser●tion; but disp●nseth them advisedly, according to his wisdom. For (as Tertullian very truly observeth) God is not a Lavisher, Tertul l. 1. cont 〈◊〉. c. 24. p. 862. but a Dispenser of his blessings: Dispensator bonitatis, non Profusor. But here it may be objected, that Elaeus Hippias had the knowledge of all Arts. For he openly professed: Cic l 3. de Orat. p. 208. Nihil esse, in ulla arte, ●erum omnium; quod ille nesciret. That there was nothing in any Art, of which he was ignorant, instancing, not only in liberal and ingenious Arts, but also in fordid and ignoble: As namely, that he had made with his own proper hands, both the Cloak upon his shoulders, and the Rings upon his fiugers, and the Shoes upon his feet. Whose vain ostentation is worthily scoffed with scum of the Orator, Cic. ibid. Scilicet nimìs hic quidem progressus est: He surely went a step or two, too far. And the like vain profession, did Gorgias also make: whose custom it was, to call openly upon all men, to come and oppose him in any thing: for that he was well prepared, to dispute of every thing: yea and to say all, of all matters, that could possibly be said of them. And so likewise Demecri●us, Cic. l. 1 de ●● 137. who began his speech thus: Haec loquor de universis. Nihil excipit (saith the Orator) de quo non profiteatur. Cic l. & de 〈◊〉 p. 2●. Quid enìm esse potest extra universa? I speak this of all things, he excepteth nothing. For what can be with out the compass of All things? 〈…〉 Much is also reported of the Emperor Hadr●an, for the great variety of his learning. But much more is reported of the wise King Solomon; and much more truly too▪ whose knowledge was so general, that there was not almost any thing, whereof he had not spoken. Whereby it appeareth, that though many men have attained but to few arts; yet that some men have attained unto many. Yea almost unto all. For so it is reported of Democritus; 〈◊〉. in vit. Democriti. p. 316. that he was, in Philosophia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: quia & Naturalia & Moralia, & Mathematica, & liberalium disciplinarum rationes, Artiumque omnium peritiam callebat. That he was, in all Philosophy, an absolute man: having an excellent knowledge, both in the Physics, and Ethics, and the Mathematics; and in all the rest of the liberal Arts. But unto this I answer, with the Roman Orator: Cic. l. 3. de Orat. p. 204. That a slight and perfunctory knowledge, may easily be attained, of many of those Arts: but a full and perfect, scarce of any; and much less, of all. So that, for those men forenamed; it rather may be thought, that they knew many Arts superficially, than any substantially. For, if they knew so many, they knew them not all fully; much less knew they all absolutely. They knew, perhaps, more than others: but they kn●w not so much, but they might have learned more themselves. Their knowledge was but such, as Simo reporteth to have been, in his son Pamphilus, that he knew, Terent. Andrea Act 1. Sce. 1. p. 4. Nihil egr●giè praeter caete●a: sed omnia mediocriter, They knew many things indifferently; but nothing exactly. For first, for Elaeus Hippias, that vainglorious Sciolus; how great his knowledge was, there is no man ever testified, but only he himself. He saith or himself, that he was ignorant of nothing. But Tully censure●h this, in him, to have been nothing else, 〈◊〉. l. De Orat. 〈◊〉. 208. but his boasting and ostentation. Cuncta penè audiente Graecia, gloriatus est. For Leontinus Gorgias, that bombasted Sophister, the greatness of his learning was rather in the people's false opinion and ascription; then in his own true possession: 〈…〉 H●st. c. 23. P. 377. as Aelian noteth of him. Veterum Graecorum aetate, s●mmae gloria floruerunt Gorgias Leontinus, & Protagor as Democriti filius: saptentia vero, tantum abfuerunt, quantum a viris pueri. In ancient time, among the Greeks, there were not men more renowned, than Gorgias, and Protagoras: Who yet came as short of many other, for their wisdom, as the weakness of a child, from the strength of a man. So that, for all their great fame, yet were they, in truth, but of a little learning. And for the Emperor Had jan, whose variety of learning is set out unto the full, Aurel. Vict. 〈◊〉 vit. Hadr. p. 389 〈◊〉. ●part. ubi suprà. both by Aurelius Victor; and by Aelius Spartianus: yet if it were no greater than is there reported, it came so far short of an universal knowledge in all Arts, that it might truly be said of him, that, th● greatest p●rt of those things which he knew, were indeed, but the least of those things which he knew not. And for King Solomon though he had a singular prerogative in wisdom, 1. Kin. 3. 12. yet was he so far r●m attai●●● unto the perfection of all knowledge, that he ingenuously professeth, Eccles. 1. 13. 17. 18. that he was 〈◊〉 utterly tired, in se●king that which he had not: and notably vexedly that, Eccles. 2. 12. which he had ●ot. So that, for all these we cannot yet meet with any man, but that he had all his learning and knowledge limited out unto him: yea, and that by a scant scantling And therefore the va●rting of Hipp●as, & Gorgias, of such an universal knowledge, that they would 〈◊〉 all that 〈◊〉 be spoken; was rather an argument of their folly, than it was of their 〈◊〉; as even Aristotle expressly hath censured such vainglory. De omnibus eniti quidpiam dicere, nihilque praetermittere insgnis stultitiae 〈◊〉 videbitur esse, Arist l 2. de Coelo. c. 5. Tom. 1. p. 583. aut animi valdè parati. To endeavour to speak unto curry n●atter, and to leave out nothing, is either an argument of exceeding folly, or of very rare learning. Scoffing at their vanity, that imagined themselves to know all things so perfectly. Therefore, Let us now come unto the second step of our forenamed Gradation: No man can have the perfect knowledge of many Arts. X●noph. l. 8. De Paedia Cyri. p. 112. and there we shall see the truth of this conclusion, a great deal more plainly. For it is not or ely true, that, No man can have the perfect knowledge of many Arts. Which Xen●phon directly, in express terms affirmeth: Non potest fieri, ut qui multis v●●●ur ●rtibus, is homo omnia pulchrè faciat: It cannot be, that if any man apply himself unto many several Arts, he should practise them all, either cunningly, or comely. In which his opinion, Plato likewise concurreth with him: yea, and goeth one step beyond him. For the same impossibility, which Xe●●phon ascribeth unto the learning of many Arts, doth Plato ascribe unto the learning, but of any two of them. Duas arts, aut studia duo, 〈…〉 diligenter exercere, human● naturae non potest. It is above the power of our humane nature, for any one of us, to be excellent, in either two Arts, or two Studies. No, not even in two mechanicals. And therefore he appointed it for a law in his Commonwealth, Vt n●mo, aerarius simul & lignarius saber sit— sed sing●l● opifi●●s, singulis artibus vacent. That no man shall be both a Brazier, and a Carpenter: but that every several workman, shall have his several occupation. Which law he would never have ordained, but that he was persuaded, that two Arts together, cannot perfectly be learned. And therefore, Tully is deceived in both the parts of his sentence, when he saith, that, Interdictum non est, aut a rerum natura, Cic. l. 2. De Orat. p. 1148. aut a lege aliqua, tque more, ut singulis hominibus, non ampliùs, quam singulas artes nosse, liceat. That it is not forbidden, neither by Nature, nor by law, that any man should be learned, but only in one Art. For Xenophon affirmeth, that Nature hath forbidden it; Fieri non potest: and Plato hath appointed a Law to forbid it. Yea, and that upon this ground, because Nature hath forbidden it; Humana natura non potest. And this we may plainly see verified, even in Tully himself, to go no further for an instance. For, if any two Arts can be perfectly attained, by one and the same man; it is Oratory, and Poetry: because these two are so near, that they be all one in a manner. Ci●. l. 1. De Orat. p. 133. Est sinitimus Oratori Poëta: A Poet is the very next Borderer unto an Orator. Nay, there is not only a very near neighbourhood, but also a kindred between those two Arts: Cic. l. 3. de Orat. p. 197. Poetis, est proxima cognatio cum Oratoribus: as Tully himself confesseth. And yet, he himself, endeavouring to attain unto both of them, both with as great a wit, and as great a study, as ever did any man, came so far short, in the one of them; that, that censure of Cat●●lus (with a little deflection) might very fitly be applied unto him, that he was, Tanto pessimus omnium Poëta, Catul. ad M. T. Cic. p. 33. Quanto— optimus omnium Patronus. Of all the Poets, he the worst by much; Who, of all Orators, was the true None-such. So that, for all his excellency in Oratory; yet could he scarce attain to a mediocrity in Poetry. Which his weakness and deficiency, the Poet juvenal, in his Satire, derideth very bitingly: giving instance in that noted verse of his: O fortunat●m natam, Iwenal. Satyr. 10. p. 46. me Consul, Romam: O Rome, thou fortunate, While I thy Consul sat: And scoffing at it there, with this bitter Sarcasmus, Antoni gladios potuit contemnere, si sic Omnia dixisset.— If Tully's pleas, Had all been such as these; He might defy, The sword of Anthony. Yea, and Seneca observeth the very same defect in him: and compares him with another: who being a very rare and excellent Poet; yet proved but a mean, and a very silly Orator. Virgilium, illa felicitas ingenij, oratione soluta reliquit: Ciceronem, eloquentia sua, in carminibus, destituit. Yea, Senec. l. 3. contro. in Proam▪ p. 74 and he proceedeth in the same place, unto other examples. Orationes Salustij, in honorem historiarum, non leguntur. Eloquentissimi viri Platonis oratio, qu●e pro Socrate scripta est, nec patrono, nec reo digna ●st. Virgil's happiness of wit forsook him in his proof: and Tully's eloquence, him, in his verses. Salusts' orations, are no honour to his history; and Plato's made for Socrates, is utterly unworthy. So that, Virgil was a good Poet; but he was no goo● Orator: Tully a good Orator; but yet no good Poet: Sallust a good Historiographer; but no good Declamer: Plato a good Disputer; and yet no good Orator. All which, with all their wit and labour, yet could not attain to be excellent in two Arts: though both, almost of one nature: and though they sought after them, with great study and endeavour. And therefore Seneca, in the forealleged place, sets it peremptorily down, as his resolute opinion, that, The excellentest wit, that ever was, yet cannot get to excel, in any mo●e, then in one thing. Magna quoque ingenia, quando, plus, quam in uno, eminuerunt op●re? When did the greatest wits, excel, in any more, then in one only Art? Nay, No man can have the p●●fect knowledge of any one Art not in any one Art, to the full perfection of it: which in our Gradation, is the third, and the last step. For, no man ever yet had any Art so perfect, but that he still found, that he could learn somewhat more in it: and that there was somewhat, which, as yet, he had not learned. So that he had not attained unto the last quiddities, and uttermost bounds of it. Which Hypocrates insinuateth, Hi●p●crat. Aphorism. ●art. 1. ●. 9 in the first of his Aphorisms: Where, he seemeth to complain, that man's life was so short, that he could not reach the fullness and perfection of any Art. Cic. l. 3. De Orat. p. 20●. Vita brevis, Ars longa: Man's life is but short; but Art is very l●ng. Yea, and that so long: Vt discentes vita deficiat: as the Orator observeth, even in t●is very case. And therefore, Theophrastus was wont to complain of nature's injustice, that she had given so long a life unto Crows, Cic. l. 3. Tus●. p. 150. and unto Stags, that could make no good use of it; and denied it unto men, that could so profitably employ it. All which their complaints, are builded upon this ground, that, by the shortness of our life, we are cut off, from attaining unto any one single Art, in his full & true perfection. Whereof Xenephon hath given usa very pregnant instance, but in a manuarie-Arte; yea, and that, one of the meanest, to wit, the Art of Shooemaking; wherein, a man would think, that there were not such deep skill, but might easily be attained, by the shallowest skull. And yet, even in this mean Art, he there observeth, that no man was perfect in in all the works of it: but that, Calceos facit, hic quidem, virorum; ille, m●lierum. Some are Shoemakers for men; Xenoph. l. 8. De Paedia Cyri. p. 112. and other some, for women. As it is with us in Tailors: that some are men's, and some are women's: and hardly one is excellent in both. And yet, maintaineth himself well, by that his mutilated skill; though it be, in very deed, but a piece of an Arte. Yea and he glorieth greatly too, if he can excel, but even in that: as Xenophon observeth in the forealleged place. Satis est, etiam una, cuique, Ars, ad alendum; ac saepè, ne t●ta quidem una. One Art is sufficient to maintain every man: ye●, 〈◊〉 that, oftentimes not a whole Art, but a piece of one. So hard a thing is 〈…〉 full perfection, but of any one Art; though it be but a mean 〈◊〉▪ As we may likewise see, in Plato's forenamed instances of his Smiths, 〈◊〉 his wright's: how many several Arts there be, under both these 〈◊〉. Some, Goldsmiths; some, Braziers; some Blacksmiths; some, Farriers; some, Locksmiths. And so likewise, in the other of these heads. Some, Housewrights; some, Shipwrights; some, Cartwrights'; and some, the loyners of smaller works. And yet all of these, but one Art, of Wright-Craft; and one Art, of Smiths-Craft: though no man can attain to be excellent in all of it. Which Tully also showeth, even in his own Art of Rhetoric: and in those six persons, whom in his Books, De Oratore, he made his Interlocutors: Crassus, 〈◊〉. l. 3. De Orat. p. 197. and Antonius, Caesar, and Catulus, Cotta, and Sulpitius. Who had, every one of them, a several form of eloquence of his own, and yet was, as good as Nobody, in any of the kinds of any of his fellows. And the like he there declareth, by diverse instances, both of Greek, and Roman Orators. Who, though they all professed the same Art of Rhetoric; yet could none of them attain, unto all the graces of it. Nay, none indeed to many: but every one had his own; an● that was commonly but one. Suavitatem, Cic. ibid. Isocrates; subtilitatem, Lysias; acumen, Hyperides; sonitum, Aeschines; vim, Demosthenes habuit. Quis eorum non egregius? tamin, quis, cuiusquam, nisi sui similis? I socrates, had his sweetness; Lysias his slyness; Hyperides his sharpness, Aeschines, his voice, and Demosthenes, his force. Every one of which Orators, were excellent, in their kinds: and yet none of them like any, but only like themselves. And he exemplifi●th it, yet further, by diverse other instances, among the Roman Orators. Gravitatem, Africanus; Lenitatem, Lelius; asperitatem, Galba; profluens qu●ddam habuit Carbo, & canorum. Qui● horum, non princeps, temporibus illis, fuit? & suo tamen quisque in genere princeps. Africanus, had his gravity; Lalius, his mildness; Galba, his austerity; Carbo, his profluence. Every one of all those, were the principals of their times: and yet every one excelled but only in his own kind. Whereby it appeareth, that, even this one Art of Rhetoric though it be an art, concluded within his definite terms; Canco●lis circumscripta scientia; Cic. l 1. De Orat. p. 132. as even the Orator himself acknowledgeth: yet is a faculty, of so large and, so wide an extension, that all the bounds of it, could never yet be reached, or touched by any man: but that, every one thought it, to be glory enough for him, if he could but attain to any reasonable portion: though in diverse others parts, he had many great defects. Which Seneca also observeth even in this very Case. Senec. l. 3. Contro in pro●●. p. 74. In ipsa oratione, quanvis una materia sit; tamen ille, qui optimè argumentatur, negligentiùs narrat: ille, non tam benè implet, quam praeparat. In pleading (saith he) though the Art be all the same; yet some man argueth excellently, who openeth the cause, but negligently: another hath the art to stir up his hearers, unto diligent attention, and cannot hold them, when he hath done. And he giveth, for an instance, his friend Passienus. Passienus noster, cum coepit dicere, s●cundùm principium, slatim fuga fit: ad epilogum, omnes revertuntur: media, tantùm quibus necesse est, audiunt. Whenas Passienus pleadeth, all his Auditors forsake him, when he hath done his exordium: and yet all return again, to hear his conclusion: but ●is middle part no man heareth, sluing only those men, unto whom it belongeth. Whereupon he there concludeth, that, Magna, & variares est eloquentia: 〈◊〉 ulli sic indulsit, ut tota contingeret. Sat●s foelix est, qui in aliqu●m ●ius p●rtem est receptus. Eloquence is a faculty, of an exceeding great variety; whi●h yet hath never been so favourable unto any, as to give itself unto him entirely, 〈…〉 and wholly. That man is well, for his part, that can get but a piece of it. So that (as Saint Hilary admonisheth very wisely) Non tantum confidendum est, ●n prudentia humana, ut perfectum se quis putet, sapere quod sap●at. No man should be so confident, of his own high wisdom, as to conceit, that he hath attained unto a perfection. And, as it is in pleading: so is it also, in disputing: Suid●s reporteth of Heraiscus: 〈…〉 That he could excellently confirm a truth, but he was not able to convince a lie. And Hierom reporteth of Lactantius: That he could be●●●r conf●●e a lie, then confirm a truth. utinam tam nostra confirmar● potuisset, quam facile aliena destruxit. Now, who is it, that thus narrowly confineth this faculty of the tongue, which no man can ●ame, God is the only 〈…〉 3. 8 〈…〉 50. 4. ●. x. 4. 10. etc. but wildly runneth throughout the whole Earth; but only God himself? He it is (saith the Prophet) that giveth unto men, the ●ongue of the learned: and that bestoweth eloquence, upon whom he pleaseth: as even he himself professeth, unto Moses. For when he detrected his going into Egypt, upon a pretence, that he was not eloquent: God presently asked, Who it was, that had given the mouth unto man? and who had made the deaf, and the dumb? Insinuating thereby, that it was only he. And this we may evidently see to be true, in those strange tongues and languages, which were by him bestowed, upon the Apostles. For, when the Holy Ghost descended upon them, they began, every one, to speak in a strange tongue: yet not, as they themselves were pleased; but, as the Holy Ghost permitted. They spoke with other tongues, Act. 2. 4. as the Spirit g●ue them utterance: he that gave them the gift, giving also limits to it. So that, both their languages, and their utterance, were the gifts of God: yea and limited unto them, in one and the same measure: but unto some of them, in one; and unto others, in another. For, the Apostle Paul professeth, that he spoke with diuer● tongues, 1. Cor. 14. 18. more than all his others fellows. And, that we should not suppose, that he got those tongues by study, as it is with us, he expressly ascribeth that gift, unto none other, but only unto God, as to the proper Author. To one, there is given the diversity of tongues; to another, the interpretation of tongues; by the very same Spirit. And therefore, he bese●cheth the Colossians, to pray to God for him, Coloss. 4. 3. that a door of utterance might be opened unto him. Whereby he plainly acknowledged, that both the diversity of tongues, and the measure of utterance, are the only gifts of God. Yea, and the self same is likewise acknowledged, even by the very Heathen. Among all those graces, which Homer affirmeth to be the gifts of God, and by him to be diversely distributed unto men, the first of them, is, Eloquium, that is, Homer l. 8. Odies. p. 53. B. Eloquence of tongue. Y●a, and Pindarus also, in express terms, acknowledgeth, God himself to be the only giver of Eloquence. A Dijs, & prudentes, & forts, & loquentes nascuntur. Or wise, Pindar. in leyth. Od. 1. p. 167. or strong or eloquent, Both one, and all, from God are sent. Yea, and even profane Lucian (for all his scoffing spirit) yet affirmeth, that, Eloquence is given us, 〈…〉 by the Spirit. He saith that men do, vim & potestatem dicendi, a Spiritu acciper●. Meaning there, the Holy Ghost; though he would seem● to deride it. But God (that giveth the tongue) overruled his tongue, and made it speak the truth, against his will. Yea, and all the Orators themselves, bo●h of the greeks, and Latins, do plainly confess the same: when, in the beginnings of their solemn Oratio●s, they call upon God, to give them good success. And so do Poets likewise: Lib. 1 Cap. 1. Sect. 3. H●siod Op●● a & Dies p. 1. ● 〈…〉 p 130. when they invocate the Muses, and ●aine them to be their god jupiters' Daughters: They plainly therein confess, that their faculty of Poetry, is given them, by the gods. Deceived they are, in the particular, of ascribing that gift, unto their false gods: but yet, right, in the general, of ascribing it, to God: unto whom, it is, indeed, of right, 〈…〉 2. Bib Pa●. 10. 1. p. 308. to be ascribed. As Pacianus hath plainly, and truly affirmed: Dic, oro, ●rater, Musae literas repererunt? Nun per Dominum omnia? & a Deo omnia? Tell me (o my good Brother) were the Muses, the first inventors of learning? Is it not from God, and by God, that a man knoweth every thing? Yes, surely. For (as it is affirmed, in the book of job) Though there be a spirit in a man; Io● 32. 8. yet is it the inspiration of the Almighty, that giveth him understanding. Then it is not, either the spirit of the Muses, nor the spirit of his Masters, nor yet his own private spirit, that teacheth a man any thing: but it is only God's Spirit; 1. joh. 2. 27. by his only anointing. Vnctio vos docet omnia: Ye need not (saith S. john) that any man should teach you, any thing; For the anointing teacheth you all things. john 16. 13. He is the Spirit of truth: and he it is, that leadeth a man, into all truth; as well in Philosophy, as he doth in Divinity. And (as Plato well observeth, unto the same purpose) If any man be not taught by him, Plato. in Epinom p 918. it is but in vain, V●tur 〈◊〉 Deus, ca●sis 〈◊〉. Quod autem bene s● habet, ipse in si●gulis agit. Plato in Timao p 723. that he giveth himself to learn. For, Nemo docebit, nisi Deus adiwer it. No man can ever teach us, if God himself do not help us. So that, all a man's knowledge, in all the Arts forenamed, is only infused into him, by God, and by the breathing of his spirit; sometimes, working with his labour: yea and sometimes, without it. For it is generally true, which the Orator hath affirmed, that, Nemo, vir magnus, sine aliquo afflatu divino, unquam fuit. That no man ever was excellent, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 225. in any one Art, if we were not inspired, with a special spirit for it. So then, it is God likewise, that limiteth unto every man, all his Arts. And it is God likewise, that limiteth unto every Art, all his faculties. Plato in jone. p. 172. For (as Plato truly teacheth us) Cuique Arti, facultas a Deo tribuitur, certi cuiusdam operis indicandi. God hath given a faculty unto every Art, to judge but of his own● prop●r and definite work. Neque enìmea, quae gubernatoria arte cognoscimus, medicina quoque percipiemus; neque etiam, quae medicina perspiciemus, arch●ectura animadvertemus. We know not those things, by the Art of the Pilot, that we do by Physic; nor yet those by Physic neither, that we do by Architecture: but every Art is tied unto his own proper matter: and is precisely limited, both to his Subiectum in quo, & to his Subiectum cirea quod. And this Limiter, he affirmeth expressly to be God. And thus the limiting and bounding, not one of all natural bodies, and their natural powers; but also the limiting of all humane Arts, and Sciences, is the work of God: who (as justine Martyr noteth) doth, Iust. Mar●. l. Cont Dog●ata Arill. To. 1. p. 280. & Naturae, & Arti, finem ponere: give limits, both to Nature, and to Arte. Yea, and the contemplation of it, doth lead us, by the hand, unto the knowledge of a God: who is, both the Author, and the 〈◊〉 of them, by the direct confessions even of the very Heathens. 9 Th●n, 〈…〉 much more, must needs the limiting of all spiritual graces be his, which are immediately ●men, by his own most gracious hands. A●l which though 〈◊〉 ●iueth very liberally, and bountifully: yet doth he not give them, either all, without measure; or unto all, in the same measure: but unto every one such a proportion, as seemeth best unto his divine wisdom. As Saint Paul plainly declareth in the first of his Epistles unto the Corrinthians, where he han●leth that Argument, 1 Co●. 12. 8. 9 etc. ex professo. Unto one (saith he) is given by the Spirit, the word of Wisdom; to another the word of Knowledge, by the same Spirit: to another, is given faith, by the same Spirit; and to another, the gift of ●●aling, by the same Spirit; and to another, the operations of great works; and to another, prophecies; and to another, the discerning of Spirits; and to another, the diver 〈◊〉 of tongues; and to another, the interpretation of tongues. And all these, worketh even the sel●e same Spirit, distributing to every man severally, a● he will. Out of which place o● Saint Paul●, we may observe these three things. First, that none of all those graces, can be assumed of any man, as he himself pleaseth: but they must be given to him, as their bestower pleaseth. Secondly, that they are not a●l given unto any one man: but some of them unto one, and some unto another; as God doth all his works; Wisd. 11. 20. in number, weight, and measure. Thirdly, that the measure of all those Donatives and Graces, is only at the absolute will of their Giver. But who is then this Gi●●, that in such sort disposeth those graces, as he pleaseth? That also the same Apostle, a little before expresseth. 1. Co●. 12. 4. 5. 6. There are diver s●ties of gifts, but the same Spirit. There are diver s●ies of administrations, but the same Lord. There are diversities of operations, but ●od is the same, who worketh all in all. So then, the Limiter of all those graces, is the Spirit; and that Spirit is the Lord; and that Lord is God. It is the Spirit of God, and God the Spirit, who is the limiter and disposer of all spiritual gifts unto men, in that manner and measure, as he pleaseth to bestow them. Russ●●. in Psal. 73. To. 2. p. 175. ●. 〈◊〉 erìm Deus gra●iam suam, quam dat Ecclesiae suae ad mensuram, saith ●uffine. Non 〈◊〉 proficit unusquisque in virtute, & grat●a quantum ●upit, sed quantum pl●et ei●d●uider, qui ●erminos pon●t. For, God limus all th●se 〈◊〉, which he bestones upon his Church: not giving to every man so much as he desires: but only so much, as he 〈◊〉 Giver pleaseth. And this Tertulli●n very notably confirmeth, Tertul. l. 5. c●nt. Marc. c. 8. P. 463 by comparing this p●ace of S. Paul the Apostle, with another like place of Isaiah the Prophet: where this limiting and confining Spirit, Isa●. 11. 2. is called by that Spirit: The Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of Wisdom and understanding; the Spirit of counsel and strength; the Spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord. By a parallel of which two places, he peremptorly concludeth, ●h●t the Apostle and Prophet, speak both of the same Spirit. Compara species Apostoli, & Isaiae: Alij (inquit) datur, per Spiritum, sermo s●●entie: statim & Es●●as, Spiritum s●p●entiae p●suit. Alij, sermo sc●●●tiae: hic erit intelligentiae, & consilij. Aly fides in eodum Spiritu: hic erit spiritus religionis, & 〈◊〉 Domini. Alij● donum c●rationum; alij, virtutum: hic erit valentiae spiritus. Alij, prophetia; ali●, distinctiones spirituum; alij, genera linguarum; alij, interpretat to li●guarum: hic erit agn●tionis Spiritus. Compare the Apostles place with Isaies'. To one (saith the Apostle) is giu●n by the Spirit, the word o● wisdom: the Spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of wisdom. To another (saith the Apostle) is given the word of knowledge: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of understanding, and couns●ll. To another (saith th● Apostle) is given fa●th, by the same spirit: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of Religion, an● of the 〈◊〉 of God. To another (saith the Apostle) is given the gift of healing; to another, the operation of great works, by the same spirit: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of power and strength. To another (saith the Apostle) is given prophesy; to another, the discerning of spirits, to another, the diversity of tongue's; to another the interpretation of tongues: the Spirit (saith the Proph●t) is the spirit of knowledge. And he concludeth with these words: Vides Apostolu●, & in di●tributione facienda unius spiritus, & in 〈◊〉 interpretand●, Prophet●●●●nsp●rantem. Thus you see, that the Apostle, both in distributing the several gifts of one and the same Spirit, and in specifying by interpretation, who was that one Spirit, doth fully conspire and agree with the Prophet. And so indeed, they do●● speaking both of them the same things in differing words: yea, and sometimes not in differing words neither▪ but in the very same words. So then, it is none other but the holy Spirit of God, that is the giver and distribut●r of all spiritual graces'. Which, as he severally dispenseth unto several persons; so doth he likewise, in several manners. As we way evidently see, in all the forenamed instances. This Spirit distributed Wisdom and Knowledge, unto many: but in such measure as unto Solomon, 1. Kin▪ 9 1●. not unto any. It distributed faith unto all th● believers: but yet, it distributed it in differing measures. The C●nanitish woma● is commended, Ma●. 15. 28. 16. 8. for a great faith. The Apostles themselves are reproved for a little one. It distributed unto diverse, the power of working miracles: but it distributed it unto them in differing proportions. The rest of the Apostles healed but where they were present: ●ct. 19 12. but the Apostle Paul, even where he was absent: The rest, but by ●heir bodily touching; Act. 5. 15. 2. King 13. 21. 〈◊〉 48. 14. Num. 12. 6. 7. 8. Act. 2. 4. 1. Co●. 14. 18. but P●ter, by his only shadowing. The rest of the Prophets, but only whilst they lived: but Elish●, after he was dead. It distributed unto all the Prophets, the high gift of prophesying: but in such measure, as unto Moses, it gave it unto none of them. It distributed the gift of tongues, unto all the Apostles: but yet unto Saint Paul, more largely then to them all. Thus the holy Spirit of God is both the only giver of all spiritual gifts, unto men; and the only distributer of them all among men; and the only limiter of the same in all men. And thus, the limitation of all finite things, both of natural bodies, and of their natural powers; and of artificial faculties; and of spiritual graces; do all of them conclude, That there is a God: unto whom, and to none other, that work can be ascribed: And this, both by the consequence of natural reasons; and also, by the testimony of the weightiest authorities▪ both humane and divine. Which is the fi●st Metaphysical Consideration. CHAP. 2. The immensity of men's appetites doth show, T●ere is a God. 2. The immensity of natural appetites. 3. 〈…〉 appetites. 4. The immensity of intellectual or spiritual appetites. 5. The immensity of Desire. 6. The immensity of Anger. 7. The immensity of will. 8. And yet God is able to fill them all. THe second Metaphysical consideration, from whence we may collect, that There is a God, is taken, from a place of a contrary Nature unto the former. For, as the former concluded it, from the limited and bounded circumscription of all finite things; which cannot be the work of any other Agent, but only of God: so this concludeth it, from the unlimited and unbound extension of the Appetites of Man; which can have none other sufficient and replenishing Object, but only God. The defining and circumscribing of all finite things, doth show, There is a God; by whom they have been limited. And the dilating and extending of man's infinite appetites, doth show There is a God; by whom they must be filled. For an infinite appetite, cannot be replenished, but by an infinite Object. So that, though the Soul of a man, have many diverse powers and faculties in it, which represent unto us, diverse notable images of Gods divine properties (as shall, God willing, be declared in a special Treatise intended to that purpose: Viz. lib. 4. ) yet is there none of them all, which repr●senteth Gods Infinity, but only that one faculty, which by Philosophers is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, the burning Appetite, and Desire of the Soul. Which is a thing so spacious, and in some sort so infinite, that it cannot be filled with any finite Object: as the Prophet Habakuk hath expressly declared: who, in this respect, compareth it unto Hell, and unto Death, Habak. 2. 5. that cannot be satisfied. From whence, it must needs follow, that, seeing no finite Object is able to fill up that gaping Chasma, and insatiable gulf of the Souls appetite; that therefore there must needs be some infinite Object provided for it; Pro 30. 15. which is able to fill it, until it cry, Enough. For (as Aquinas well observeth) Quael●bet potentia appetit obiectum sibi conveniens. Aqui●. 1. Qu●●st. 78. Art. 1. 3. p. 168. Every faculty, in nature, requireth such an Object, as is fitting unto it. And therefore Appetitus and Appetitum, must be fitted, as just together, as Locus and Locatum: or else there should be Vacuum in rerum natura: yea, Arist. lib 1. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604. and Vanum too. For, if the appetite be never filled, and never attain his end; then (as Aristotle observeth) Inanis, & vanus erit Appetitus: Our appetite shall both be vacuus, and vanus. And therefore, that Nature, which hath made the appetite so large, if it had not appointed some fitting and proportionated Object unto it, whereby it may be filled; it hath framed and fashioned it so large in vain, and transgressed in her proportion. But, that, Nature hath not done. She hath made, in all her works, neither vacuum, nor vasum: Arist. Prob. Sect. 8. 〈◊〉. 9 To. 2. p. 461. She hath made nothing in vain, as Aristotle in plain terms expressly affirmeth. For first, for vacuum; he saith, that, vacuum esse, Naturae ratio non patitur: The very nature of Nature, will not suffer any Vacuum. And secondly, 〈◊〉. l. 1. De Coel●●. 4. 10. ●. p. 556. for Vanum; he expressly saith again, that, Deus & Natura, nihil faciunt frustra: That neither God nor Nature, doth any thing in vain. But the largeness of the appetite, should in vain have been created, if there were not in all nature, some Object to fill it. Which, no finite Object can possibly perform. And therefore, it followeth, There must needs be some Infinite. And that can be nothing, Aquin▪ 1. Quest. ●. Art. 2. p. 14. but only God: as Aqui●as plainly proveth. 2 Now, look into all the several appetites of Man, of what nature soever; and you shall find them all, Natural Appetites are unsatiable. to be of an infinite, and unsatiable nature: and such, as that none of them can be filled, with that ordinary Object, which, in common understanding, is appropriated unto it: but expecteth, yea and exacteth, some other, of a more extended, and infinite, nature; before it can be filled, 〈…〉 p. 127. 〈◊〉 Quaest 60. Art●. ●. ●. 129. and throughly contented. Aquinas divideth the general Appetite, into these three special kinds: that, Some of them, be natural; Some, sensible; and some intellectual, or Spiritual. In all which, we may see an infinite aviditie: and such, as cannot be satisfied, with any finite Object. Let me give you, in every head, some Examples, to illustrate it. And first, for Natural Appetites: Aristotle, in one place, giveth instance, of three of them; Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 11. To. 2. p. 640. which are, the most common, and familiar unto all men. And they be, the Appetites of Eating, of Drinking, and of Sleeping. And yet, none of them all, is able to content the appetite of the soul. As King Solomon, nominatìm, giveth instance, in all of them. For eating and drinking; he expressly affirmeth of them, that though all the labour of a man, be only for his mouth; Eccles. 6. 7. yet that (for all that) the soul is not filled. Whereby he insinuateth, that though the Belly may be filled, both with eating and drinking; yet the appetite of the Soul, is not filled, with either of them. And we see his observation to be verified, even to sense, in the daily practice of Gluttons, and Drunkards: who lose not their appetites, with the filling of their stomaches; but, even then, when their Bellies are distended, and full; yet their appetites are ieiune, and empty; and still desire more, even when they have too much: yea, and even provoking their oppressed Stomaches, to eat yet more, with their sauces; and to drink yet more, Deut. 29. 19 Isai. 5. 11. Plaut● in Menech. act. 1. S●e. 2. p. 421. with their salt● meats so, adding thirst unto drunkenness: rising up early, to follow it, and sitting up late, at it: as the Prophet complaineth, Yea, even, ad diurnam stellam matutinam potantes: as the Comic speaketh: drinking down the Evening st●rre, and drinking up the Morning star; making so their ipsum vivere, to be nothing else, but Bibere. Nec sitis est extincta prius, Ouid. l. 7. M●● tam. p. 28. quam Vita, bibendo. His Thirst, yea and his Life, in drink, Were quenched together, and extinct. As though they had purposely been made, for nothing, but only, for the actions of eating, and drinking. And therefore Aristotle very truly calleth them: Furentes circa ventrem: Men out of their wits, with the pampering of their bellies: Arist. l. 3 Ethi●. c. 11. To. 2. p. 640 Arist. ibid. c. 10. giving a notable instance, in the Glutton Polyxenus; who wished, that his neck were as long as a Cranes, to prolong his pleasure, in eating, and drinking. And yet, Haggai. 1. 6. that curse of God doth continually pursue them, that though they eat much, yet they have not enough; and though they drink much, yet they are not filled. Their stomaches may be filled: but so are not their appetites. For (as Solomon truly noteth) Vente● impiorum, est insaturabilis: The righteous eateth, to the satisfying of his soul: Pro. 13. 25. but the belly of the wicked ever wanteth. And so it is likewise, in the third of his instances: the appetite of sleeping: which is, as unsatiable, as any of the rest, if a man do give himself unto it: as Solomon also observeth in it: who, so elegantly characterizeth the drowsie-headed Slug guards, that no Character in Theophrastus, is more graphically described. Which he hath done, in the form of a short Colloquy or Dialogue, by an excellent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Wherein first, he rouseth him up, and calleth unto him, to wake him out of his slothful and heavy sleep. How long wilt thou sleep, o Sluggard? P●o. 6. 9 10. 11. and when wilt thou arise out of thy sleep? Then, he bringeth in the Sluggard, very earnestly entreating him, that he would not molest him, but yet a while permit him, to have a little further sleep, a little longer slumber, a little more folding of the hands together. And finally, he plainly threateneth him, that if he continued in that Lethargy of his sleeping, his poverty would presently overtake him, as a Traveller; and seize upon him, like an armed Soldier. And yet would not all this serve the turn. He was so deeply possessed with his veternus, and sleeping sickness, as if he had been metamorphosed into a very Dormouse. So that, this drowsy humour likewise, is not diminished, by feeding it: but rather (like a dropsy) it is the more increased. 3 And, Sensible appetites be insatiable. as it is in natural appetites: so is it, in sensible appetites too. They cannot be satisfied, no more than the former. But even, when they have what they would, they yet still call for more. And this also, King Solomon illustrateth, by two direct instances; in Seeing, and in Hearing. The eye (saith he) is not filled with seeing, Eccles. 1. 8. nor the ear with hearing. The Eye, I grant, may be wearied with seeing: but filled it cannot be. As Musaeus expressly noteth: Intuens defessus sum; satietatem non inveni aspiciendi. My sight is wearied out with looking on; Musaeus de Herone, p. 342. And yet myself, satiety have none. For, Pro. 27. 20. as the Grave and Destruction cannot be filled, so cannot the eyes of a man be satisfied: saith Solomon again, in another place. And so likewise the Eare. It may be wearied with hearing: but yet it cannot be filled neither. As Socrates likewise expressly observeth. Aures suscipiunt voces omnes: nunquam verò implentur. Xenophon, l. 1. de sact. Socrat. p. 166. Our ears do receive all manner of voices: and yet be there none of them, that be able to fill them. And the like may be said, of all the rest: as I partly have showed before, in the Taste: and that, both in our eating, and also in our drinking. Whereof Tully hath given us a very notable instance, in the Persian King Xerxes: who, having tired himself out, with all ancient, and known pleasures, propounded great rewards unto the inventors of new: whereof when he had tasted; yet could he not with all of them, be contented. Praemium proposuit ci, Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p 170. qui invenisset novam voluptatem; qua ipsa, non suit contentus. 4 But in a man's intellectual, All intellectual appetites are insatiable. or spiritual appetites, (for so, in a large sense, I account of all, which any way have their seat in the Soul) the same may a great deal more evidently be showed. Them, Aristotle reduceth, unto these three heads: Cupiditas, Ira, Voluntas: Desire Anger, and Will. All of them, Arist. l. 1. Mag. Moral. c. 13. To▪ 2. p. 931. having their place in the soul: and yet every one, in a several part of the soul. For, whereas the Soul is divided into three parts, or powers, or faculties: 〈…〉 Concupiscibilis, Irascibilis, and Rationalis: in every one of these several faculties, there be placed, by nature, their several appetites. Cupidit is, in Concupisc●bili; Ira, in Irascibili; and Voluntas, in Rationali: In the Concupiscible part or faculty of the soul▪ is seated the appetite of Desire; in the Irascible part, the appetite of Anger; and in the reasonable, the appetite of Will. So that (as, in the same place, he concludeth) Si anima dividatur in tres parts; in earum vn● qu●que inerit appetit●●: If the Soul be divided into his three parts; you shall find, that every part hath his own proper appetite. Yea, and all of them too, in their nature, to be infinite. 5 And first, The 〈◊〉 of a man's desire. for Cupiditas, or Desire: there be four principal Objects, about which it is chiefly occupied: namely Power, Honour, Riches, and Pleasure. In all which, it bewrayeth itself to be infinite, and such as cannot be contented and satisfied. Whereby we may see it plainly verified, which Aristotle hath observed, that, Cupiditatis natura est in finita: that A man's desire is of an infinite nature. 〈…〉 For first, as concerning Power; 〈…〉 if a man do but once set his appetite upon it, he hath left himself no power to cast limits about it: but it will grow to be so infinite, that all the power of the world will not be able to content it. As we may evidently see, in Alexander the Great. Whose appetite of Power, was so infinitely great, that when he heard, Democritus to hold, There were many Worlds; he fell into great sorrowing, because that, as yet, he had not conquered one. Aelian l 4. var. Hist. c. 2. 9 p. 429. Whereby it is evident, that all the power of one world, could not satisfy his appetite, though he might have had it all. Nay, though there had been as many worlds, as Democritus dreamt of, though he might have had all of them, yet would they not all have contented him. For, as the Tragical Poet hath truly observed, Auidis, duidis, natura parumest. To such as are ambitious, and so greedy, Senec. in Herc. Oe●●o. Act. 2. S●e. 2. p. 77. All Nature self doth seem to be too needy. Which Petronius Arbiter very notably exemplifieth, in the unsatiable ambition of the Romans. Orbem iam totum, victor Romanus h●bebat: Quâ mare, Petron. Arbit. 〈…〉. vet. Poet. p. 393. quâ terrae, quâ sidus currit utrumque Nec satiatus erat.— The conquering Romans got into their hand, The whole world's compass; even as far as Land, Or any Sea●, or Heaven itself extended▪ And yet this Nation could not be contented. For, H●bakuc 2. 5. Li●ie decade. l. 1. p. 71. the ambition of the proud enlargeth itself, like Hell; and is like unto Death, that cannot be satisfied: as the Prophet observeth. Yea and Livy also not obscurely insinuateth. Animus hominis insatiabilis est, eo quòd fortun● spondet. The mind of a man, will not be satisfied with any thing, if fortune do still promise, to bestow more upon him. Neither was this the particular humour of those men forenamed; whose greatness of ambition, might easily be bred in them, by the greatness of their Fortune: but it is the general humour of all men, be they never so mean. For (as Isocrates very truly affirmeth) Vniver si mortales, Isocrates Orat. de Pace. p. 391. in eo elaborant, ut plus aliis possint. It is the common desire and endeavour of all men, to have prerogative of some greater power, than there is in other men. Insomuch, that every man, be he never so good, yet desireth a power, if it be but to do evil. And though he never mean to use it; yet he desireth to have it. — et qui nolunt occidere quenquam, 〈…〉 10. p. 45 b. Posse volunt.— saith the Poet. who have to hurt, nor heart, nor Will; Yet wish ● have power, even to kill. So Pilate, though he had no intention to hurt Christ; yet boasted unto him, that he had power to do it. 10. 19 1●. Knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and have power to lose thee? And yet he used all means to save him. Yea, and ●●ban, Gen. 31. 29. though his power was by God himself restrained, yet he boasted that he had it. To conclude, a man hath not less power over himself in any thing whatsoever, than when he once fixeth his appetite upon Power. And so it is likewise, Ambition o● Honour 1. unsatiable. in the next Head of Honour. If a man do chance, to set his desire upon that, it groweth, by and by, so infinite, that he cannot be contained within any bounds and limits, neither of Reason, nor of Duty; no, nor of his own Safety. As we may see by examples, in all these several heads. For the first of them. The bounds of Reason, how grossly they oftentimes transgressed by ambition, Cic. l. 1. 〈◊〉 p. 113. 〈…〉 the Orator hath pointed us, to a notable instance, in the Heathen Philosophers. Of whom, though there were diverse so rigid, and stern, as to publish whole Books in contempt of Vainglory, yet was the taste of that Vainglory so delightful to themselves, as that in the same books, they published their own names. Which manifestly showeth, that howsoever they outwardly would seem to contemn it, yet they inwardly affected it. So they affected glory in writing against Glory; and showed themselves vain, even in calling it Vain. Which folly they would never have committed so evidently against their outward profession, but that their Reason was dazzled, and blinded by ambition. And the like may be seen in the ambition of old men: who (contrary to all reason) are as greedy of Honour, in their decrepit old age, when they must by and by forgo it; as they were ever in their youth, when they might long enjoy it. 〈◊〉 l. 2. p. 124. For (as Thucydides well observeth) Sola dulcedo Gloriae, ●en senescit. The only humour of ambition, doth never grow feeble, or old in any man: but even in those that are the oldest, and most decayed men, yet their ambition is still young. Yea, and he reproveth in the same place, that usual proverb, as a very false position: that, In senecta, lucrari magis delectat, quam honore affici: That all men, in their age, are rather delighted with gain, then with fame; with riches, then with honours. This he holdeth to be false. And we may see the truth of it, Plut in vita Mary To. 2. p. 94. in old Caius Marius: whose ambition sprouted green, when his body was dry and withered, and in effect, half dead. Which manifestly showeth, that though old men's experience do teach them many other things; yet that this is a lesson which it can never teach them: To set down a stint unto their own ambition. So far doth it transgress all the lines and bounds of Reason. And so doth it of duty too: yea, and that in a very high degree. Whereof two Tragicks have given us two notable instances, in two ambitious brothers, or rather indeed monsters, E●eocles and Polynices; who were both of them so inflamed with the rage of ambition, and carried so violently through all the bars of duty, justice and virtue, that Euripides bringeth in one of them with this execrable sentence: Nam si violandum est ius, 〈…〉 387. Regnandi gratia, Violand●●n est: aliis rebus, pictatem colas. If justice may be violate, for any cause at all, Then surely, for a Kingdom's sake, this violence may fall. In all things else, keep Piety inviolated you shall. Thereby plainly declaring, that the ambition of honour is more violent than any other: breaking all the bonds of duty, both to justice and piety. Which yet in his brother, may be seen much more plainly. For him Seneca bringeth in with another sentence, as impious as his brothers was, and a great deal worse: — Pro regno velim Patriam, 〈…〉. 4. Sce. 4. P. 286. Denates, coniugem stammis dare. Imperia, precio quolibet, constant ben●. I could well, for a Kingdom, be content, To see my country, gods, and wi●e ybrent. All cost to get a Kingdom, is well spent. Whereby it plainly appeareth, how immoderate the desire of glory and Honour is: contemning all the bonds of all the strictest duties that are between either God, or Man, and us. And, as ambition leadeth men, to transgress and violate all the bounds of duty: so doth it oftentimes, to transgress the bounds likewise, even of their own Safety. Whereof, Homer hath left a notable example, in the ambition of Achilles: Hom. l. 9 Iliad. p. 101. B. who, having the condition propounded unto him; either of a short life, with great glory; or of a long one, with little; he was so ambitious of praise and commendation, that he preferred the short life before the long. But Dion Nic●eus hath left us a more notable example, in Agrippina, the Empress: Dion Nic●us, in Ncron●. p. 147. who being foretell, that if Nero her son ever came to be Emperor, he would surely kill her: yet she was so ambitious of being mother to an Emperor, that she presently answered: A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Let him be a murderer, so he first be an Emperor. Thus for the love of Vainglory, she despised her own safety. But Laertius hath left us a most notable example, Laert▪ in vi●d Empedoclis p. 295. in the Philosopher Empedocles: Who, having by the cure of a dangerous disease (which was held for incurable) obtained great credit, and by certain vain people, hyperbolising his fact, being palpably flattered; that he could never (sare) have done it, if he had not been a god; he grew by their flattery, into that madness of conceit, as to hope, that he might so art it, as indeed to be taken and believed for a god. And so, sleeping one night in the open fields, with diverse of his neighbours, he s●ily stole away, & cast himself secretly into the mouth of burning Aetna; hoping by that his sudden dispearing, and never being heard of among men again, to have confirmed the growing opinion of his godhead. But he was greatly deceived: for the violence of the fire casting back again his pantofle, discovered the fraud, & bewrayed which way he went, and so was he foully frustrated of the opinion of his Godhead, which now he had a great deal too dear bought. So infinite and unsatiable was his ambition of Glory; that in comparison of it, he despised his own safety. Yea, and Horace is of opinion, that if it were yet to do, he would do it again. He would again destroy his life, upon hope of that foolish glory, which he sought for in his death: — Deus immortalis haberi, 〈…〉 Dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam Insiluit— Nec semel hoc fecit, nec si retractus erit, iam Fiet homo, &c ponet famosae mortis amorem. While proud Empedocles would a God, immortal seem to be, And so be thought, into the flames, of Aetna leapeth he. Nor this so done, the same recalled, and made to draw new breath; The Man would not depose the love, of such a famous death. Thus unquenchable is the thirst of ambition, 〈…〉 p 379. if it once be throughly grounded, and rooted in any man. And the like Suidas reporteth of Heraclides Ponticus. And, The desire of 〈…〉 as a man's appetite is infinite after Honour: so is it no less, after Riches, and Treasure. For, if he once do settle his desire upon it, the Riches of the whole world, will be too little for it. Nec Croesi fortuna unquàm, Iwen. Saratyr. 14. p. 67. b. nec Persica regna, Sufficient animo,— saith the Heathen Poet. Nor all King Croesus wealth, nor Persian Kingdoms can Suffice the greedy mind, of th'auaricious man. And therefore (saith Lucilius) Qu● credimus, 〈…〉 p. 734. divitias ullas animum expl●re posse? How can we believe, that the abundance of any Riches, should be able to satiate a covetous man's mind? Abundance of Riches, may well, inflare animum: but, it can never, implere: It may well be able, to puff up the mind (for so the Apostle Paul insinuates it doth) but yet, for all that, it can never ●ill it. 1. Tim. 6. 17. Cic. 1. Parad. p. 421. For, ● Nunquam expletur, nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis, saith the Roman Orator: The covetous man's thirst, cannot possibly be quenched. But it groweth upon him, like the thirst of a Dropsy, which is the more increased, by drinking, to extinguish it. For, Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops, ●●rat. l. 2. 〈◊〉. Od. 2. p. 28. a. Nec sitim pellit,— saith another Poet. This cursed Dropsy, by ind●●lgence, grows To such a thirst, as no repelling knows. No, nor replenishing neither: though, even the covetous man himself, at the first, Arist. l. 2. Po●t. c. 5. To. 2. p. 773. thinks it may. For (as Aristotle observeth) Primò, dicunt pauca sufficere, atque minima: mox verò, ubi illa sunt consecuti, plura semper appetunt quousque in infinitum procedant. At the first, themselves imagine, that a few things will content them: but, when they have gotten them, they still seek for more, after them: until at last their appetite groweth in them to be infinite. And so likewise, Aristophanes: Nec quanquam hominum [Pluti] caepit satietas: Aristoph. in Plut. Act. 1. Sce. 2. p. 32. Nam si quis acci piat talenta tredecim, Auidiùs contendit parare sedecim. Si & hec confecerit, quadraginta appetit. And so is infinitun. There never yet was man, with wealth so well content, But though he had attained to treasure competent, He yet would strive still more his state for to augment. For, as the forealleged Poet hath truly observed: Crescit amor nummi, Iwenal. Satyr. 14. p. 63. b. quantum ipsa pecunia crescit; Et minùs hanc optat, qui non habet.— The love of wealth increaseth still, as wealth doth self improve; And he loves Riches ever lest, that hath the least to love. For, he that most loveth them, is always least able to be satisfied with them. Cupit hic gazis implere famem; Senec. in He●c. Oetao. Act 2. Sceva 2. p. 77. Nec tam●n omnis plaga gemmiferi Sufficit Istri, nec tota sitim Lydia vincit, saith the Tragical Poet. A man, with Treasure, seeks to stake That hunger, which doth Riches rake. But all the gemm's of Ister shore, Nor all the gold of Lydia's store, Can fill the greedy Appetite. It is a thing, so infinite. For (as Solomon affirmeth of it) He that loveth money, Eccle. 5. 10. he will never be satisfied with money. Never. Take himself for an example of his own position: yea, and that, a very good one. It is reported of him, that he had congested and amassed together such infinite moneys, that, Silver, in his time, was as common, 1. Kin, 10. 21. as Stones. 1. Kin, 10. 27. And yet, for all this his unmeasurable store, 1. Kin, 10. 22. he still had a desire of getting more and more. To with end, he still continued his new-begunne Trade, unto the land of Ophir: furnishing out a new Navy, every third year. Which is a manifest Argument, that his appetite, with all that he had was not satisfied. For, as the Poet hath very well collected: — nondum implevi gremium, Iwenal. Satyr. 14. p. 67. a. si panditur ultrà. He hath not filled his lap, that still doth hold it open. Yea, and (as before I noted, of the appetite of Honours) that it breaketh all the duties both unto God, Senec. l. 4. Nat. Quaest c. 18. p. 84. and Man: so doth Seneca set the same note, upon the appetite of Riches. Per hominum Deorumque iras, ad aurum ibitur. We run madding after Gold, contemning all the anger both of men and God. Whereupon Virgil truly noteth: — quid non mortalia pectora cogis, Auri sacra fames? Virgil. l. 3. Aeneid. p. 166. Of cursed Gold the hunger. starved love, What is't, whereto man's heart it cannot move? And, The desire of Pleasure 〈◊〉 unsatiable. as unsatiable as is the desire of Treasure: so unsatiable, is also, the desire of Pleasure. For, if a man do but once set his appetite upon it, let him ingurgitate himself never so deep into it; yet shall he never be able to fill his desire with it. 〈…〉 p. 51. For, as Aristotle also in this head observeth: Voluptatum appetitio, est insatiabilis. There is nothing whatsoever, that is able to satisfy the appetite of pleasure. And Tully likewise, unto the same purpose. Vnum n●scio, quomodò possit, qui luxuriosus est, finitas habere cupiditates. This one thing (saith he) I cannot understand: How a man, that is intemperate, should have his desire and concupiscence finite. Whereof, Eusebius yields an instance, in the Emperor Maxentius, 〈…〉 c. 27. p. 134. of whom, he reporteth, that, Quamuìs infinitas ferè, liberas & ingenuas mulieres, per vim, flagitiose violasset; nullo tamen pacto, poterat intemperantem & effusam animi sui libidinem explere. Although he had defiled an innumerable number of matrons & freewomen; yet was he never able to satisfy the appetite of his filthy unmeasurable lust. And the same we may see likewise, in Messalina the Empress: a wonder, nay, a monster, for her following of filthy pleasure. For, she was so prodigiously given unto it, that she might truly say, as it is in the Poet, In me, Horat. l. 1. carm. Odd 19 p. 17. a. tota ruens Venus, Cyprum deseruit. That Venus had forken her famous kingdom Cypress, And wholly placed her seat, in this lascivious Empress. For she, because she would even glut herself with fleshly delights, conveied herself once into the common Stews, and there enjoyed her filthy pleasure, until she was never the nearer. Her lewd and filthy appetite was still as greedy of it, as it was before. So that, at her parting, she was forced to complain that she had wasted, and wearied herself, in vain: being, as that Poet noteth, but only, — Lassata vitis, Iwenal. Satyr. 6. p. 22. nondùm satiata— Not filled, only tired, with pleasure she desired. Neque enìm unquàm finem inveniet libido: Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p. 170. saith the Roman Orator. Plato in Philebo p. 90. For lust is an Appetite, that can never find an end: It being, indeed, infinite; as Plato affirmeth of it. Voluptas est infinita, eiúsque generis, quod nec principium, nec medium, nec finem in seipsa, suapte natura, continet, aut aliqundò continebit. The appetite of Pleasure is infinite; and of that nature, that it knoweth nor beginning, nor middle, nor ending in itself; nor doth, nor can, nor will content, or contain itself. 6 And, The desire of Revenge, is insatiable. as our appetite is unsatiable in matters of Concupiscence; which is Aristotle's first head: so is it also, in matter of Revenge; which is his second head. A thing so sweet unto our corrupt nature, that, as it is observed, by the Heathen Philosopher: Seneca in Proverbijs p. 278. Inimicum ulcisci, vitam accipere est alteram: For a man to be revenged of his enemy, seemeth as sweet as to receive a second life given him. As it doth evidently appear, in King Nabuchodonozer: who, having conceived a grievous displeasure, against some of his Neighbours, judith ●. 1, 2, 3. he calleth out his Captains, and giveth them a charge, to go out, and to revenge him upon all the whole earth, and to destroy all flesh, that would not obey the command of his mouth. Thereby, plainly declaring, that, as the Tragic noteth, — Arma non seruant modum, 〈…〉 3. p. 17. Revenge extreme, can hold no mean●. But, as in another place, he describeth it. It is,— Nulla dolour Contentus p●ena; querens supplicia horrida, Seneca in Herc. 〈◊〉. Act. 2. S●c. 1. p. 65. In●●gitata, infanda; junonem docens Quid odia vale●nt; nesciens iras●t satis. Revenge is such a grief, as no pain can content, But seek's out horrid, strange, and uncouth punishments, It teacheth juno rage, and angers rudiments. As we may evidently see, in those immane cruelties, which diverse have exercised, even upon men's dead bodies. A notable example of which barbarous inhumanity, there is recorded unto us, by Tully, in those notable immanities', which Dolabella exercised, upon the body of Trebonius: of whom he thus writeth. Suam insatiabilem crud●litatem exercuit, Ci●. Philip. 11. p. 605. non solùm in vivo, sed etiam in mortuo. Atque in eius corpore lacerando, atque vexando, cum animum satiare non posset, oculos pavit suos. He exercised all his unsatiable butchery, both upon him alive, and upon his dead body: seeking to feed his eyes, by renting him in pieces, seeing he could not fill his appetite, Herodotus in Thalia p, 190. with any cruelty of punishment. And, Herodotus reporteth the like, of Cambyses: who so hated King Amasis, that he caused his dead body to be taken out of his grave, Deinde, verberibus caedi, ac vellicari, & stimulis pungi, omníque contumelia insestari: Then to be lashed, and drawn, Platina in vita Sergy terij. p. 149. and stuck, and stabbed, and infested with all reproaches, and unworthy usage. And the like cruelty, did Pope Sergius practise upon Formosus: whom he digged out of his grave, and judicially condemned, as if he had been alive: and cast out into Tiber, as unworthy of any Sepulchre. 7 And, The appetites of a man's will are unsatiable. as it is in matters of Revenge; which is Aristotle's second head: so is it also, in matters of Will; which is his third head. Which will, though it belong unto the reasonable part of the Soul; yet doth it oftentimes, so far exceed all the lines and bounds of reason, that Aristotle perstringeth it, for this absurdity, that it oftentimes desireth things of mere impossibility. Arist. l. 1. Mag. moral. c. 18. To. 2. p. 933. Voluntas, eorum etiam est, quae fieri non possunt. Our will and affection reacheth oftentimes to such things, as cannot possibly be done. We oftentimes desire those things, that are unlawful: yea, and sometimes we desire those things, that are impossible. And he giveth this for instance; That we desire to be immortal; although both God and nature hath made us purely mortal. Neither doth our will only transgress the prescript lines of reason, in desiring of those things, which, in themselves, are unlawful: but also, in desiring even of those things, which are lawful: when we desire them, in unlawful either manner, Ouid. l. 10. Metam. p. 399. or measure. As for example, the love of Children unto their Parents, is both natural and lawful. And yet, the love of Myrrha unto her Father, was wicked and unlawful: Arist. l. 7. Eth. c. 3. To. 2. p. 690. because she loved him, in an unlawful manner. And so was likewise, the love of Satyrus, unto his: because he loved him in an unlawful measure. Whereupon, he was called Patris amator: The lover of his Father: as it were, by a nickname. And so is it likewise, on the other side too: when the love of the Parents is too great unto their Children; 1. Sam. 2. 29. as Niobe's was to hers. A vice, which, in old Eli, even God himself reproveth. Thou honour'st thy Children, above me. Now, Arist. ubi suprà. these excesses, in our intellectual appetites, doth Aristotle condemn, for mere exuperances', and vices. So that, these intellectual appetites, are oftentimes no less excessive and immoderate, then either the natural, or the sensible. Let me give yet one instance more, of a truly intellectual object, exactly adequated and proportioned unto the intellectual appetite. And that is Learning, and Knowledge. Upon which, if a man do but once set his mind, it carrieth him after it, with so infinite an appetite, that the more he getteth of it, the more he still desireth it; and yet can never be filled with it. Ecclus. 24. 21. For (as Ecclesiasticus observeth of it) He that eateth of wisdom, shall have the more hunger; and he that drinketh of her, shall have the more thirst. A thing, which even the very Heathen have likewise observed, of Knowledge, and Learning. That though it be, of all things the most sweet and pleasant: yet that it cannot possiby either glut, or fill the Appetite: Nec poteris artibus animum saturare, Theognis. p. 7●0. nec sapientia explere: saith Theognis. Thou canst not glut thy soul with learning; thou canst not fill it with wisdom and understanding. Non enìm possunt Praeceptores, quemadmodùm qui in vas infundunt, implere mentem▪ saith Philo judaeus: Philo judaeus l. De sacrificio Abel. p. 198. No master can fill the mind of his Scholar, as men do use to fill a vessel with water. For there is no part of learning, that can fill the Soul, though there be no part of it, but that greatly delighteth it. Tully noteth of Philosophy: that there was in Cato, inexhausta aviditas legendi, quae satiari non poterat: There was in him, an insatiable avidity of reading, which could not be satisfied, Cic. l. 3. De Fin. p. 67. Whom therefore he calleth, Plutar. lib. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum. To. 2. p. 155. Helluonem Librorum; A devourer of Books. Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 216. And Plutarch observeth the same of Histories. Quae etiamsi animum oblectant; tamen perpetuum veritatis studium non explent: Though Histories do much delight and please the mind; yet can never replenish that infinite avidity, end desire of the truth, which in them the soul seeketh. And Tully again affirmeth the like of Astronomy, and the motion of the Heavens: Quorum contemplatione, nullus expleri potest animus: With the contemplation whereof, it is impossible that the mind should ever be satisfied. So that, no part of learning (no nor all of it, together) is able to fill the mind. When a man hath once settled his appetite upon it. Thus all the Appetites of man do carry him headlong, beyond all the bound both of virtue and reason. And yet, when he hath followed them, until he be tired with them, he can find no sound contentment in any one of them. Take King Solomon himself, for an example of examples, in all of them. For so he seemeth to propose himself, in every one of the forenamed instances. For he ingenously confesseth, that one while he set his mind upon nothing, Eccl. 2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 but on pleasure, and to pass his time merrily, in pleasance and jollity. But he found himself quickly to be wearied with that, and to grow into so great a dislike of all mirth, that he said unto Laughter, Thou art madness. Again, another while he gave himself wholly unto Eating and Drinking. Another while, to Building. Another while, to Planting & Gardening. Then, to Water-works, Eccles. 2▪ 7. 8. 12 and Fishing. Then to pomp in great House-keeping: entertaining a huge train of servants, and followers. Then, another while, to privateness and heaping up of Riches. Another while, to the study of learning and Wisdom. And thus was he driven to shift and change his desire, from one thing unto another, finding solid content in never a one of them: but (after some small experience) great irksomeness in them all. So that, his poor soul (like the Dove, which was sent out of the Ark of No) could find no sure footing upon any one of them. Whereupon, he pronounceth of them all, without exception, that there is nothing in them but Vanity and Vexation. Thus, all the appetites of man, though they be almost innumerable, yet are all of them unsatiable; Pro. 30. 15. and do, all, with Agurs horseleech, cry nothing but Give, Give. And yet, when you have given them all that ever you can, they are still as bare and empty, Gen. 41. 20. 21. as were Pharaohs lean kine: being, for all they do devour, yet never a whit the fatter, never a whit the fuller. So that, as S. Bernard noteth of all of them: Fit ut per varia, & fallacia mundi oblectamenta, vagabundus animus, Bernard. lib. De diligendo Deo, p. 1096. inani labore discurrens, fatigetur; non satietur. It cometh to pass, that the mind of man, wand'ring over the world, through diverse delightful and deceitful pleasures, and spending her strength and travel in vain, is at last wearied and wasted out, is surfeited, and yet not satisfied with them. 8 Now, what is the end of all this long discourse, God is able to fill all our appetites. but only that, which I noted in the beginning of the Treatise? That seeing God hath made the appetite of man, of such an infinite extent in every branch of it, that none of all these objects is able to content it, which are supposed to be the most natural unto it; that therefore there must needs be some supernatural Object appointed for it; which is able in every corner to fill it: or else it must be unfilled: which were to bring a vacuum and emptiness into the works of God. Which is utterly absurd. For as God in his providence did never make any belly so great, but that he provided sufficient meat to fill it; yea, even the great belly of that great beast Behemoth; job. 40. 10. 15. which himself so greatly magnifieth: so likewise, in his wisdom, would he never have made a man's appetite so great, but that he hath appointed some object that can fill it: yea, and every corner of it. Now, that the whole world is not able to do. As may be well understood, by this hierogliphical conceit: That the world is of a circular form: but the heart of a man is of a triangular. And therefore, as if we should put a circle into a Triangle, we can never so fill it, but that all the corners will be empty in it: so if we should put the whole world into a man's heart; yet could it never fill it, nor reach into every corner of it. And therefore the only object that is able to fill this three cornered heart, cannot be any thing else, 1. Io. 3. 20. but only the Holy and undivided Trinity. This is an all-filling object, that is greater than our heart: and therefore is easily able to fill it, Psal. 23. 5. and to radiate into every corner of it. Yea, so to fill a man's appetite, in every channel of it, until, like David's Cup, it even run over. For he is able to fill all our natural appetites, Psal. 145. 16. both of eating, and drinking, and sleeping, and such like. For, Psal. 127. 2. He openeth his hand, and filleth with his blessing, every living thing. And He it is, that giveth unto his beloved sleep. And, Psal. 81. 10. though the mouth of our appetite do gape never so wide; yet he openeth his hand wider, Psal. 17. 14. and filleth both the mouth, and the belly, with his hidden treasure. And so likewise, for our sensible appetites, of Hearing, Seeing, and Tasting, 1. Cor. 2. 9 and the rest: he can easily fill them too. For, he hath provided such excellent things for us, as neither Eye hath seen, nor Ear hath heard, nor yet, by the heart of man can be conceived. He can fill all our intellectual appetites, 1. Pet. 5. 4. both of Power, and Honour, and Treasure, and Pleasure. For he hath provided for us, 1. Pet. 5. 4. an incorruptible crown of glory. And, In his presence, is the fullness of joy; Ps. 16. 11. and, at his right hand, are pleasures for ever more. Thus (as the Psalmist noteth) God can, Ps. 36. 7. 8. Replere in bonis, de siderium nostrum: He can, even fill our desire, Ps 10 2. 5. with every good thing. And therefore, in another place, he professeth, that, Psal 73. 34. 71. 4. There is nothing in heaven that he desireth, but him; nor any thing on earth, in comparison of him. He fixed his whole desire upon God: because he alone could fill the whole of it, without any diminution. As the Psalmist again, in another place, confesseth: I will behold thy face, in righteousness: and when I awake, Psal. 17 15. I shall be satisfied with thine image. God is a fantasme, that can fill the fantasy; and an Object, that can still the appetite. Which, nothing in the world can do, without him; no, not the whole world, nor all that is in the world: but only God himself. For, as S. Augustine truly writeth. Aug. in Manua●● c 3 To. 9 p. 793. Si cuncta, quae fecit, Deus dederit, non sussicit, nisi s●●●sum dederit. Though God should give thee all he hath, yet would all that be n●thing, if he gave thee not himself. Whereupon he professeth in another place, that Quicquid igitur mihi vult dare Dominus meus, Aug. in. Psal. 26. To. 8. p. 141. auferat totum, & se mihi det. There is nothing in the world, that unto me seemeth pleasant, but only God. And therefore, if God would give unto me, all: that ever he hath; let him take all that away, and give me only himself. For, there is nothing else, that can fully content us, Aug. l. 1. Confess. cap. 1. To. 1. p. 61. as in his Confessions he plainly professeth: Domine, quia fecisti nos ad te, inqutetum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. O Lord (saith he) because thou hast purposely made us for thyself, therefore our heart can no where find any quiet, until it do come to rest in thyself: Not in all the honours, not in all the riches, not in all the pleasures of the world. As is likewise very notable observed, by S. Bernard: Bernard. Serm. De bonis de serendis. p. 1146. Ad imaginem Deifacta animarationalis, caeteris omnibus occuparì potest, repleri non potest. Capacem Dei, quicquid Deo minus est, non implebit. Ind est, quòd naturali quidem desiderio, summum quivis probatur appetere bonum; nullam, nisi adepto eo, requiem habiturus. The soul of a man, being made unto the image of God, may be busied about many other things, but can be filled with nothing but with him. For that, which is capable of God himself, cannot be ●illed with that, which is less than God himself. Hence every man naturally desires the chiefest good, and can never rest, until he have found it. For, as Bellarmine B●llars. l. De 〈◊〉 grad 3. c. 1. p. 76. very aptly and wittily illustrates it, As the body of a man, cannot rest in the air, be it never so wide; nor yet in the water, be it never so deep; but still sinketh down, until it come unto the earth, because that is his proper and natural place: so the Soul of a man can never find repose, neither in the aereal & stickering Honours, nor in the earthly and dirty Richeses, nor in the watery & softening Pleasures of this present world; but only, in God alone, who is indeed, the proper place, and true Centre of man's Soul, in whom it can only repose itself securely. I will lay me down to rest, and sleep in peace, (saith the Psalmist) for it is the Lord only that maketh me dwell in safety. Psal. 4. 8. Here is the true repose, and natural rest of the Soul, when it lodgeth up itself, under the shadow of God's wings. Psal. 17. 8. 57 1. 61. 4. 63▪ 7. And therefore, David beseecheth the Lord, that he would hide him, under the shadow of his wings. Professing in another place, that, under the shadow of his wings, should be his refuge. And in another, that, his trust should be, under the shadow of his wings. And in another that, he will rejoice, under the shadow of his wings. Thus, under the shadow of God's wings, the Soul finds her true reposedness, her refuge, her assurance; and her fullness of joy: so that when she is come thither, she can desire no more. For, as a Bubble (saith Gregory Nyssen, Greg. Nyssen. in 〈◊〉 Orat. 11. p 407. using a contrary comparison unto Bellarmine's) cannot stay itself below, in the bottom of the water; but, by degrees, ascendeth up, until it come unto the top: and, when it is come thither, it than strives no longer to ascend up any higher; but there breaking his thin film, poureth forth itself naturally, into the open air: so likewise, a man's Soul cannot content and stay itself in any of these earthly and inferior things; but naturally ascendeth upward, until it come to God: Whither when it is once come, it than hath no desire to ascend up any further, but there naturally resteth; Yea, and like the Bubble, beforementioned, (with the Apostle Paul) desireth, P●il. 1. 23. to be, even dissolved, that it may be with God. And here a Man's desire hath his uttermost stint. For God (as Nazianzen Nazian. Orat. 31. De Athanasio. p. 524. truly teacheth) is, Intelligibilium omnium summus vertex, in quo desiderium omne consistit, ac defigitur, nec, supra eum, usquàm fertur. God is the highest pitch of all our understanding, and the total sum of all our desiring. So that our understanding can desire to fly no higher, because he is the highest; and our appetite can desire to comprehend no more, because he is the greatest. Aug. l. de Spiritu & Anima, cap. 55. To. 3. p. 895. Nec aliquid est quod extra illum quaeratur, quia totum in illo invenitur quod desideratur, saith S. Augustine: We need not to seek for anything out of him, because all that we desire we may easily find in him. 1. Cor. 15. 28. Bed. in 1. Cor. 15. To. 6. p. 571. For (as S. Paul teacheth us) God is, Omnia, in omnibus: all, in all. From which very place, Beda draweth this conclusion, that therefore, Deus est finis desideriorum nostrorum: That God is the last end of all a man's appetite. For, he that hath God, hath all. And he that hath all, he can desire no more; because there is no Object for his desire to covet. And therefore (saith he) when God promiseth unto us, Ego ero illorum Deus; he saith all one in a manner, as, Ego ero unde satientur; I will be their God, that is, I will fill their appetite. Now, Hugo. de Victor. l. 7. Erudit D●das c. 8. To. 3. p. 19 X. saith Hugo de Victore, Cogita qualis esse possit, qui omnium vi●entium sensus fabricat, appetitus create, ac in singulis quibusque an●mantibus, & quid appetere, & quantum appetere debeant, ordinat. Consider with thyself (saith he) what an one, be must needs be, that hath both given unto all living things, all their senses; and created in them all, all their several appetites: yea, and further hath appointed unto every one of them, both what, and how much, they must desire in everything. Surely, he that hath created so many infinite appetites, in so infinite many things, and yet is able to suffice them all, can be none other, Gen. 17. 1. Irenaeus. l. 2. c. 1. p. 95. but that one infinite Object, which is God all-sufficient. Who (as Irenaeus truly teacheth) is, omnium rerum pleroma, that is, the true plenitude, and fulfilling of everything. Thus the infinite appetite of the soul, which cannot with any finite thing be fully satisfied, doth lead us directly unto God. Aug. l. De Spir. & Anima. cap. 59 To. 3. p. 898. For (as Saint Augustine well observeth) Mens, dumb inhianter cogitanda appetit, & repentè denuò cogitata fastidit, docetur, quòd aliundè pendet. Ad Deum quippe suspensa est, a quo solo formata est. Man's soul (saith he) whilst it greedily desireth every thing that it thinketh of, and by and by despiseth what before it was greedy of, is taught, by this loathing of every inferior creature, that it hath his whole dependence upon a superior Nature; that is, only upon God, by whom only it was made. Whereupon, he there concludeth, that Quia omne, quod infra appetit, minus est; iure ei non sufficit, quicquid Deus non est. Because a man's appetite is so great and so infinite, that all earthly things are too little for it, it must needs from thence follow, that that which can suffice it, can be nothing else but God. And therefore (as Pisanus very Christianly exhorteth us) cum, Laurentius Pisanus in Enchirid. Orthodoxograph p. 915. sine Deo, nulla Creatura sibi satis sit; qui studet sibi sufficere, Deum quaerat. Seeing no Creature is sufficient for itself, without God: let him that would suffice himself, seek his sufficiency in God. 2. Cor. 3. 5. For (as Saint Paul truly teacheth us) We are not of ourselves sufficient for any thing, but all our sufficiency is of God. And here only, the soul of man doth find his, Ne plus ultra: Because, God only is both Summum verum, who can fill the understanding, and Summum Bonum, who can fill the affection. This is the second Metaphysical consideration, which leadeth a man unto the knowledge of God; the infinite avidity and extent of his appetite, which cannot be satisfied, but with an infinite object, which nothing is, but God. CHAP. 3. That, every thing in Nature, hath a Cause of his Being. 2. That, nothing can be the Cause, of his own Being. 3. That, among the Causes, there is one first, and supreme Cause, which is the Cause of all the rest. 4. That, this first, and supreme Cause, is nothing else, but God. IN the two former Chapters, I have unfolded, two Metaphysical considerations, from whence we may collect, That there is a God: Namely, the limited circumscription of all definite things; and the unlimited dilatation of men's infinite appetites. In these two next Chapters, I purpose to unfold two Physical Considerations, which import the same inference. The first is, a C●usa, that is, from the first cause of all natural things. The second is, a Motu, that is, from the first Mover of all movable things. Both which do conclude, That there must needs be a God: as being indeed nothing else, but two Philosophical terms, in sense aequipollent unto the very name of God, and so oftentimes promiscuously used. For the first of which two heads, to wit, The first cause of all thing; I will fashion the argument into the form of a Sorites; wherein we may ascend, by four steps, and degrees, unto the very presence, and intuitive vision of God. The first of them is this, That there is nothing in Nature, but it hath his Cause. The second, That nothing in Nature, is the Cause of itself. The third, That among all the Causes, there is one supreme and first Cause, which is the true Cause of all the rest. The fourth, That the first Cause of all things, is nothing else, but God. All which four positions, are held and maintained, by a general consent, both of Christians, and Heathens, with great confidence and assurance: yea and that, not as questionable, or disputable problems; but as most undoubted, and irrefragable axioms. For the first of which four points, Nothing is without a Cause. Plato in Timae●. p. 704. That there is nothing in Nature, but it hath his Cause: Plato directly affirmeth it, in express and plain terms. Quicquid gignitur, ex aliqua natura necessariò gignitur. Whatsoever is begotten, is begotten, is begotten of something. Yea, and Tully confirms it, almost in the same terms. Quicquid oritur, Cic. 2. de Divinat. P. 27●. qualecunque est, causam habeat à natura, necesse est. Whatsoever thing is bred, of what sort soever, it must needs have some cause of his breeding in nature. 〈…〉 c. 5. p. 1487. Item Trismegis. Pimand. Dial. 2. p. 385. For, Ex nihilo nihil fieri, That nothing can be made of nothing, (as Aristotle testifieth) is a common Principle, among all the Philosophers. Non enìm est, vel cogitari potest, ut sit aliquid, non per aliquid: saith Anselmus: It cannot be imagined, that there should be any thing, which hath not his beginning and being, from something. For, Nullius rei, sine Causa, est ortus: saith Plutarch: There can be no being, where there is no Cause of being. And so likewise Tully. Nullius rei, Causa remota, reperiri potest origo. Take away the Cause from any thing, and you take away the beginning of his being. And therefore, in another place, he peremptorily pronounceth, That nothing can be made, without his Cause: Illud exploratum habeto, Nihil fieri posse, sine Causa. Which, Palingenius also expressly affirmeth, — sine Causa, Esse potest nihil, Auselm. in Monologio. c. 3. To. 3. p. 3. 〈…〉 To. 1. p. 685. Cic. de universitate p 427. Cic. l. 2 de Divinat. p 271. aut fieri— Without a Cause, nor being, nor aught can have beginning. And thereupon, Tully derideth it for a gross and a palpable absurdity, and a paradox against the very grounds of Philosophy, to affirm that there can any thing (without a Cause of it) be either made, Cic. l. 1. de finibus p. 39 or done. Nihil turpius Physico, quam fieri, sine Causa, quicquam dicere: There can be no fouler error in a natural Philosopher, then to affirm this, That any thing can be done or made, without a Cause. And, it is a very foul error indeed. For, to say, that any thing is made without a Cause, is to say, it hath a being, and yet no power of being. For, Ramus l. 1. Dialecticae, c. 3. Plato. in Ciuil●. p. 210. Causa is defined to be, cuius vi, res est: A Cause is a power, whereby every thing hath his being. And, as Plato affirmeth directly to that purpose: Causa est, qu●● principaliter rem facit. So that, for the truth of this first position, that every thing in Nature hath a Cause of his being: you see it, to be clearly put out of all question, by the consenting testimonies of many learned men. Yea, & the most of them, no way engaged in our Religion; but following only the light and guidance of Reason. 2 And therefore, let us now proceed unto the second; That nothing in nature can be the Cause of itself. Nothing can be the Cause of itself. Which is a position, as evidently true, as that Nothing can be the Maker of itself. For (as a Christian Philosopher hath very well collected) Quod facit, est actu; quod fit, non est actu. Non magis igitur potest aliquid facere seipsum, Vallesius l. de sacra Philosophia c. 1. p. 31. quam simul & esse, & non esse. That which maketh any thing, must needs be actually in being: that which is but in making hath as yet, no actual being. And therefore, it is as impossible for any thing to make itself, as it is at the same time, to have both being, and no being. For, if it be impossible (as Aquinas affirmeth) Vt aliquid sit simul & actu, & potentia, Aquin. 1. Quaest 2. Art. 3. p. 5. secundùm idem: than it is much more impossible. Vt aliquid sit simul & actu, & non actu; or that Aliquid simul & actu sit, & actu non sit. Trisinegist. in Pimand. Dial. 14. p. 470. A necessary disconuenience, Greg. Nyllen. De Infantib. praematurè abroptis p. 133. where any thing is allowed to be cause of itself. And therefore Trismegistus sets it down for a peremptory position, that, Nihil, quod est genitum, a se genitum est. Yea, and Gregory Nyssen directly subscribeth unto him: Nullam rem sui ip sius principium & causam esse. That nothing can be the beginning or cause of itself. Yea, and Palingenius, genius also expressly confirms it. — nil se gignit, P●ling▪ in Scorp. p. 206. nil provenit a se: Nilque sui causa esse potest.— there's nothing, that itself begets, or from itself proceeds: there's nothing of itself is cause, nor aught that causeless breeds. The Reasons, wherefore nothing can be the cause of itself, be principally two. The first, because, every cause is a several thing, in nature from his own effect. The Cause, and his Effect, are so by nature severed, that they cannot be confounded. For, Arist. l. 2. mag. Moral. c. 8. To. 2. p 962. Causa, & cuius est Causa, aliud est, saith Aristotle. The Cause is one thing, and that whereof it is a cause, is another. And so likewise Palingenius, in the forealleged place. — causa, necesse est, Paling▪ ubi supra p. 205. Vt suo ab effectu distet, diversaque res sit, Needs must the cause be differing: And from th' effect a diverse thing. Yea, and Plato likewise expressly confirmeth it: not resting in the bare position: Plato in Hippia maiore. p. 115. but forming it into a very strong reason. Aliud, est causa. Neque enìm causa, ipsius causae causa esse potest. Causam enìm efficientem esse constat. Ab effeciente verò effictum fit, non efficiens. Aliud autem est efficiens, aliud effectum. Non ergò caus●, ipsius causa est; sed eius, quod ab ipsa efficitur. The cause is of one nature, and that, which is of the cause, is of another. For, the cause is not the cause of a cause, but of an effect: because the cause is an efficient: and an efficient bringeth not forth another efficient, but only an Effect. Now, an effect is always a thing different from his efficient. Therefore, a cause is not a cause of a cause, but of an effect, which is made by that cause. This is the first reason, why nothing can be the cause of itself: because then, it should differ from itself, and should not be the same thing with itself. The second Reason is: because the cause is always before his effect. Causam, causato, dicimus esse prius. The cause, before the caused, we do ever assevere to be. Efficiens & effectum unita quidem sunt invicem (saith Trismegistus) sic tamen, Trismeg. in Pimand. Dial. 14. p 470. ut unum praecedat, alterum verò sequatur: The efficient and effect are united together, by a mutual dependence one upon another: and yet is the one of them before the other. Zach. Mytilen l. de Mundi Create. Rib. Pat. To. 5. p. 746. For (as Zacharias Mytilenensis observeth) Oportet effectorem antiquiorem esse effectu, & opificijs Opificem: siquidem, id quod fit, secundum est ab co quod efficit. The Efficient is more ancient than his own effect; and the Workman, than his work. For, whatsoever thing is made, must needs be posteriour unto his Maker. So likewise Palingenius: Causa, Paling. in libra. 167. suo effectu prior est, Authòrque, opere ipso. The cause doth always his effect forego: Before the Work, the Workman is, we know. Yea, and so Aristotle himself. Effector opificium praecurrere debet. Nihil autem, scipso, Arist. l. De communi Animalium motu. To. 1. p. 916. prius & antiquius est. The Workman must needs be more ancient than his Worke. But nothing can be more ancient than itself. And therefore nothing can be the work of itself: and consequently, nothing the cause of itself. For (as Aquinas from this place very truly collecteth) Impossibile est, Aqu●n. 1. Quaest 2. Art. 3. p. 5. ut aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius: quia sic esset prius seipso. It is merely impossible, that any thing should be the cause of itself. For than it should be before itself. Yea, and Aristotle again presseth the same Reason; yea, and backeth it with another not inferior: that if any thing were the cause of itself, it should not only be before itself, but it should also be superior unto itself. For, Arist. l 10. De. Theo●eg. ●. 17. the cause is superior unto his effect. Whereupon he there inferreth, that, Nequaquam convenit, quòd aliquid nuncupetur, vel sit, causa sui: ut falsum est, quòd aliquid Prius, quà prius, sit posterius seipso; & superans, quatenus tale, sit superatum. It is utterly absurd, that any thing should be called, or be the cause of it own self: as it is false, that any first thing, as it is first and priour, should be posterior to itself, and that the excelling, in as much as such, should be the excelled. So that, nothing can be the cause of itself: no not even God himself. who is the cause of all things. For, if he were the cause of himself, then must he be also the Effect of himself; which destroyeth his Omnipotency: he must be another from himself; which destroyeth his Unity, and Immutability: he must be after himself; which destroyeth his Eternity: Yea, he must be the Work and Creature of himself; which destoyeth his Infinity. But none of all these can fall into God. For (as Hilary truly noteth) Neque aliud est, Hilar. l. 6. De Trinit. p. 64. neque aliundè, quod Deus est. God can neither be another from himself; not of any other, but himself. Therefore God, though he be the cause of all other things; yet can he not be the cause of himself; for the forenamed inconveniences. It cannot be denied, but that God is of himself: but not, as of a cause. He is of himself: Aquin. 1. Quaest 2. Art. 4 p. 7. 2. Art. 4 p. 7. because his Being, and Himself, are indeed all one; his Essence, and his Esse, as Aquinas proveth plainly. For, his subsisting of himself, Eusel. 7. De Praeparat. c. 8. p. 115. is indeed, his very substance: as Eusebius proveth out of Dionysius. Non-genitus Deus, per se est: ut, ipsum nongenitum esse, substantia sua est. The unbegotten God subsisteth of himself; and his being unbegotten, is indeed his very substance. And therefore, when Seneca saith, Senec. La●. l. 1. c. 7. p. 19 that, Deus ipse, se fecit: and Lactantius, that Deus est ex seipso procreatus: their meaning is no more but this; that he is, ab alio nullo factus, aut procreatus. He is therefore said to be the Maker and begetter of himself; because he had none other maker, nor begetter but himself: no, nor indeed himself neither, but is altogether unbegotten. And so, Lact. ibid. when God is called by Apollo, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and by Sibylla, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, one that is made of himself, and begotten of himself: the meaning is no more but this; that he is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: that is, Unmade, and unbegotten: as it followeth in the same place: Neither made nor begotten, of any other, no, nor of himself neither. For (as justin Martyr truly writeth) he is neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Iust. Martyr. in Confut. Graecar. Respons. To. 1. p. 336. nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: He is neither produced out of himself, nor yet out of any other thing but himself. He is neither ex se; nor ex alio; no nor ex nihilo; as Anselmus addeth: yea, Anselm. Monologo. 5. To. 3. p. 3 and proveth very wittily in his Monologie. Where he summeth up all these things together, unto the same reckoning, that I have done before: that seeing he is not made, or begotten of any thing; that therefore he must needs be unmade and unbegotten. Id. ibid. c. 17. p. 9 Quoniam igitur nec per se, nec ex se, nec per aliud, nec ex alio; nec per nihil, nec ex nihilo, habet principium; nullo modo habet principium sedneque finem habebit. Because (saith he) God hath his beginning, neither by himself, nor of himself; neither by any other thing, nor of any other thing; neither by nothing, nor of nothing; it followeth therefore, that he hath no beginning: as he shall have no end. And the truth of this doctrine is expressly confirmed, even by the very Heathen: 〈…〉 who hold it for a Maxim, that God is unbegotten. Quaecunque gignuntur, procedunt ab altero: saith Trismegistus. Est ergo aliquis factor istorum; atque is ingenitus, ut genitis sit antiquior. Those things that are made, are made by some other: and therefore they needs must have a Maker, who must needs himself be unmade; because he is more ancient than any thing that is made. Thales likewise confirms the same unto us. Lac●●. in vit● Th●le●● p. 12. Deus est antiquissimus: est enìm ingenitus. God must, of necessity, be the ancientest of all things; because he is not made, or begotten of any thing. For, Ingenitus praevenit omnia genita: saith Philo judeus: Philo. judaeus l. de Sacri●i. Abel. p. 199. That which is unmade must needs be more ancient than those things that are made. Now, if nothing be without a Cause (as I have proved, in the former paragraph,) and yet nothing can be the cause of itself, (as I have proved, in this;) then must it needs follow, that every thing that is, hath the Cause of his being, without itself: saving only God himself, who hath no cause of his being: but is himself all one with his own being: john 5 26. as life itself is all one with its own living. Anselm. 〈◊〉 monologio. c. 5. To. 3. p. 4. For, God is nothing else but Life. Tu es ipsa vita, qua vivis; & Sapientia, qua sapis: saith Anselmus: Thou art the Life itself; whereby thou livest; and the Wisdom itself, whereby thou knowest. And therefore, as Life is not the cause of its own living, but the very same identity with its living: so God is not the Cause of his own being, but one and the same thing with his being. 3 Now, There is among the Causes but one first cause. if nothing can be the Cause of itself; then must every thing needs have a cause without itself, which is another thing from itself. For, we see by experience, that there daily be produced, many strange and notable effects in the world: which all of them proceed not from one and the same cause: and yet none of them is brought forth without his cause. And therefore, it cometh, in this place, to be discussed; Whether, among those Causes, there be no first Cause at all, but an endless proceeding and going on, in infinitum? or, whether, among them, there be many first Causes? or, whether, there be but one which is Causa causarum, that is, The true Cause of all the rest, and whereof all other Causes are but mere Effects? For the first of which three problems, were may daily see by sense, how one Cause produceth, and begetteth another; and that, another; and that, another: and, that every one of these, though it be a cause of some inferior effect; yet is it an effect of his own superior Cause. As for example: the beating of the Sun upon the Earth, worketh in it an heat; that heat produceth many kinds of fruits out of it; those fruits beget nourishment, both in men and beasts; that nourishment begetteth that Semen genitale, whereby young ones are begotten, in all their several kinds: and so from generation, to generation, continued. Now, in this connexion and series of Causes, if we ascend upward, we must needs either ascend in infinitum, without all end: or else, in the end, to arise unto some highest Cause; where we must be forced to rest, and can go no further: because there is no higher. To proceed in infinitum; Cic. Orat. Pro. Q. Ros●●o. 〈…〉 p. 137. Anselm in Monologio. c. 4. 〈◊〉. 3. ● 3. that (as the Orator speaketh) is Auribus Animisque hominum absurdum: It is an absurd thing, both to the ears and minds of all men of understanding. And (as Anselmus pronounceth, even in this very cas●) Hoc, nemo non putat obsurdum, n●si qui nimis est absurdus: There is no man, but thinks this very absurd, if himself be not too grossly so. And therefore, Palingenius very truly affirmeth, that there cannot be, in Causes, an infinite progress. — Ergo infinitus In Causis processus erit? 〈◊〉. in Sco● p. p. 206. Minimè, sed oportet Nimirùm esse aliquid primum: a quo maximus ordo Causarum incipiat; qui a summo tendit ad imum. What then, in Causes can there be an infinite process; And can no End be found? Oh no. There can be nothing less. But there must needs some first main Cause of all the rest be set: Which th' order great of Causes all beginning doth beget; And in which, Highest, Lowest, Midst, are all together met. Thus he rejecteth this innumerability of Causes, & fixeth them, at last, in some one, that is the first. So that (as Aristotle himself affirmeth) Est principium aliquod: neque sunt infinitae entium causae: Arist. l 2. Metaphys. c 2. To 2. p 1385. There is some first cause, & the causes of of things are not infinite. For if there should be, in causes, an infinite proceeding, and no first cause among them; Aquin. 1. Quaest 2. Art. 3. p. 5. then (as Aquinas very wittily collecteth) there could be no second neither, nor no third, and so none at all. For these numeral terms of First, Second, Third, and so forward, are not only names of number, but also of order. So that, as nothing can be first, which hath any thing before it: so nothing can be second, which hath not a first before it; nor third, which hath not a second, and so on, in all the rest. From whence it must needs follow, that, if there be no first cause, there can be no second, nor third, and by consequence none at all. But we see by experience, that there be second causes; and therefore by necessity, there must needs be a first. We see there be inferior causes, and therefore there must needs be also some superior; and by consequence, from which they all descend, and upon which they all depend. For (as Aristotle himself affirmeth) Necesse est, quod prius est, Causam esse eorum, Arist. l. 2. Metaphys. ●. 2. To. 2. p. 1386 quae post illud sunt. In the series of Causes, that which goes before, is always the cause of all them that follow after. But now, cometh the second Problem, that, If there must needs be some supreme and first cause: Whether there be Many of them; or, Whether be but one? That there cannot be Many Firsts, the very name of First doth necessarily import. For, if any thing be either before that, or with that, which we intent to be First; then cannot it truly be called the First. If any thing be before it; then is it not Primum, but Secundum. If any thing be with it; than it is not Prius, but Simul. So that, if it be first, it can be no more but one. Besides, if there should be many firsts; there would follow another very great inconvenience, For then (as Palingenius observeth) Tunc discordabunt inter se, ac magna ciebunt Praelia, tot Reges: quia Regni summa potestas Non patitur plures. Sic, mundus non erit unus, Nec pulcher: namque est Ordo, pulcher●ima rerum. So many Kings would ne'er accord, but raise a grievous broil, For supreme Power suffers not that many rule the soil: And so the World itself nor one, nor beautiful should be; As lacking Order: Order 'tis doth all things beautify. But, we evidently see, those things to be clean contrary. We both see, that there is but one world, and not many: and yet, that it is full both of order and beauty. And therefore it cannot have many first Causes in it: as Palingenius, in another place, concludeth. Quare, Paling. in Libr. p. 168. non possunt plura esse exordia rerum, Ast unum; quia perfectum non amplius uno est: A quo, sicrerum aeternus ducitur ordo: Vt monade a prima, innumeri generantur. Wherefore, more first beginnings cannot be Of things that ordered are, but one prime Cause: Because no more but One is perfectly; From which, all order take's eternal Laws. As from a single union, who sees not; Innumerable numbers are begot? Yea, and Trismegistus, from the forenamed inconveniences, expressly concludeth: Impossibile est, Trismeg. in Pimand. dial. 1. p. 437. duos aut plures esse factores: neque enìm ordo unus probaretur in multis. Praeterea, qui inter illos imbecillior esset, potentiori invideret. It is impossible, that there should be two or more Creators: for one and the same order would not be approved of many. Besides, he that should be the weaker and more impotent, Cyprian in Praefat. ad Cornelium. p. 482. would ever envy the more potent and mighty. So Cyprian. Non potuerunt multa & diversa rerum esse principia. Quia, nisi ad unum oninia respicerent, discordia & infinita cuncta volverentur in chaos. There could not be many and diverse first causes of Creatures. Because, unless all had respect and reference unto one prime and supreme cause, all would return into their fist Chaos. Anselmus, our learned Primate, hath, of set purpose, disputed this point: and proved, by strength of reason, that, among all the Causes, which are in the world, though they be in number infinite, yet, that there can be no more of them, Anselm. in Monologio, c. 3. To. 3. p. 2. but only one First. His reason is this following. Quicquid est, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est unum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt. Quòd si sunt plura, tunc aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquod, per quod sunt; aut eadem plura singula sunt per se; aut ipsa per se invicem sunt. At, si plura ipsa sunt per unum, iam non sunt omnia per plura, sed potius per illud unum, per quod [illa] plura sunt. Si verò illa plura singula sunt per se, utique, est una aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se, quam habent, ut per se sint. Non est autem dubium, quòd per illud unum sint, per quod habent, ut sint per se Veriùs ergò, per ipsum sunt cuncta, quam per plura, quae sine illo uno esse non possunt. Vt verò plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio: quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est, ut aliquares sit per illud, cui dat esse. The whole sum of whose reason, is, in effect, thus much: Whatsoever thing hath being, must needs have it, by Something. And that thing, which giveth it being, must needs be, either some one special thing asunder, or else many things together. If many things concur, to give being unto any thing; then must they needs be such, as that either all of them have their being, from some one other thing; or, that all of them have their being, every one of himself; or that all of them have their being, every one from another, by a kind of interchangeable and mutual power. Now, if all those manythings do themselves receive their being from any other Onething; then are not all things made by those manythings; but rather by that onething, which made all those manything▪ Now again, If all those manythings, have every one of them his being of itself; V●●e drift. de l●eis ins●cabilibus. To. 2 p. 1595. then must there needs be one certain power or Nature of Selfe-being; by participation whereof, they all have their being of themselves. And then, they must needs be, all of them, only by that Onething, by which they do all receive their selfe-being. Therefore, all things have their being more truly from that onething, then from those supposed manythings, which themselves do receive all their being from that Onething. As for that other opinion; that many things should mutually give, each to other, his being; that is clean against all reason. For it is a senseless imagination, that any thing should from that receive his own being, unto which itself hath given a being. A very good, and a sound reason; though somewhat, perhaps, perplexed unto the vulgar understanding, through the often iteration, and implexed application of the terms, of One, and Many, and Being, and Selfe-being, so intricately woven into so many several parts and branches of the sentence. But unto those that be learned, it is clear enough and liquid. So that, though the Series of Causes be never so long, yet must we needs, at last come, by degrees, unto some first; which is the true Cause of all the rest: and cannot be the effect of any: because all other are of it. For, as Palingenius writeth: Ens primum, causa est, & non effectus: at imum Effectus tantùm debet, Paling. in Scorpio. p. 206. non causa, vocari. Quae media existunt, his nomen adhaeret utrumque. In Nature, and in order of all things in their respect, The first and highest called is a Cause, and no Effect: The last and lowest an Effect: but not a Cause at all. But those that stand 'twixt first and last, thou mayst by both names call. Both Causes, and Effects. Causes of their inferiors, and Effects of their superiors. As in the Series of the Categories, the highest, is only a Genus, and not a Species; the lowest, is only a Species, and not a Genus; the subalterns, are both, in their diverse relations; Genera, to their inferiors; and Species, to their superiors. But the highest can be no Species. And, no more, can the first Cause, be the Effect of any other: because it is not under any form or higher: Arist. l. 3. Metaphys. c. 4. To. 2. p. 1393. but is the highest itself: and is Ingenitum, as Aristotle teacheth. And therefore Trismegistus expressly affirmeth, that, Ex uno principio cuncta pendent. That all things have their being, Trismeg. Pimand. dial. 20. p. 426. and beginning, of one thing. And that, in the same place, he affirmeth, to be God. And this, Nyssen Nyssen. affirmeth to be the received opinion of all men. Constat inter omnes, ex una causa pendere res omnes. It is confessed of all men, that all things depend upon the supreme Cause. And therefore Aristotle biddeth us, that, in searching of the causes, we should, Arist. l 2. Phys. c. 3. To. 1. p. 433. Greg. l. 16. Mor. c. 18. To. 1. p. 95. semper exquirere summam causam: That we should never cease, until we are come, unto the supreme and the first cause. And so Gregory likewise, unto the same purpose: In omni causa, solus ipse intuendus est, qui principaliter est. In every cause, he only is to be eyed, that is the principal, and principally is. For, upon it do all the rest depend, as jamblicus likewise expressly teacheth. Ab una causa integra, tota dependet multitudo: S●o●aeu● l. 〈…〉 Phys. c. 9 p. 13. Adque summam causam, plures alia referuntur. The multitude of all inferior causes, depend upon one entire supreme cause: and to that, which is the highest, are all the rest referred. Thus, the multitude of these inferior causes do lead us unto one supreme and first Cause: which can be nothing else, but God: which is the sum and substance of the fourth, and last paragraph. 4 Now, That first and supreme Cause, is nothing else, but God. if every thing that is, must needs have a Cause: and, if nothing can be the Cause of itself; and, if, among all the Causes, there can be but one first, and principal Cause; which is the true Cause of all the rest, and of all those Effects which proceed from all of them: then must needs that first Cause be nothing else, but God. For, what can that be, which giveth being unto all things, Damasc. l. 1. de Orthod fid. c. 12. p. 184. but only God? whom Damascene calleth, Infinitum quoddam essentiae pelagus, that is, A boundless Ocean of pure and simple being▪ which out of his fullness, imparteth their being unto all other things, as the Ocean doth his waters, unto fountains and rivers. For, if this first Cause, which hath given their being unto all the innumerable things of this world, be something else, and not God: then, what hath God done? or, what hath God to do? to whom hath God given any being? or, how can he possibly be a God, which hath given being unto nothing? or, how can that be any other thing than God, which hath given their being unto all things in the world? Therefore, whosoever yieldeth, that there is a first cause, he must needs yield, by consequence, that, that first cause is God. And this we may see verified, by a general consent, both of Christians, and Heathens. Of whom, some do call this first Cause, by such titles and appellations, as do necessarily insinuate, that it must needs be God. Some collect it, by such reasons, as do necessarily conclude it. And some, in direct and express terms, affirm it. For the first of which three heads, to wit, the titles, that are given to this first Cause, Palingenius (as before I showed) calleth it, Ens primum: Ens primum, Paling. in Scorp. p. 206. causa est, & non Effectus.— The first Ens, is a pure mere cause, it cannot an Effect be called. Both which two titles, are the titles of God: both to be, Ens; and to be, Primum. For first, for Ens. Demascene expressly affirmeth, that, of all Gods other names, Damasc. l. 1. Orthodox. fid. c. 12▪ p. 184. the name of Ens, is most proper unto him. Ex omnibus nominibus, quae Deo tribuuntur, nullum aequè proprium videtur, atque Entis nomen. Of all the names, which are attributed unto God, there is none so proper, as is the name of his Essence, or Being: he being named from his own Being, I am. And for Primum: even Aristotle himself affirmeth, that God is, Et primum, & principale principum: Arist. l. 11. Metaphys. c. 6. To. 2. p. 1409. both the first, and the principal principle of all things. Yea and, even God himself challengeth both the same titles directly unto himself. For he calleth himself, Exo. 3. 14. I am: which is all one, with Ens: and he calleth himself, The Ancient of days: Dan. 7. 9 which is all one, with Primus. Nay, Primus, in express terms: Primus, Isay 41 4. & novissimus, Ego sum. Yea, and Aristotle further affirmeth, this primum Ens, to be, Ipsum quid est: Arist. l. 7. Metaphys. c. 1. To. 2. p. 2433. which is all one, with I am: and to be, not an Accidens, but a Substance. Now, Aristotle, in another place, giveth to this first and supreme Cause, another title, which is as proper unto God, as either of the former. Arist. l. 4. Metaphys c. 1. To. 2. p. 1397. And that is, To have his being of itself. Suprema causa, est Natura, per se: The highest cause, is such a kind of Nature, as hath his being of itself. Orig. Hom. in lib. Reg. To. 1. p. 362. Which, (as Origen teacheth) is proper and peculiar unto God. Tu solus es, ●ui, quod es, a nullo datum est: Thou only hast a being, who hast not thy being given thee, by any other thing. So that, this title of, Natura per se, is the proper and peculiar title of God: Trismeg. Asclep. c. 11. p. 525. as Trismegistus expressly affirmeth. Solus Deus, & meritò solus, in se, & a se, & circum se, totus est plenus, & perfectus: isque, sua firma est stabilitas. It is God (saith he) and nothing else but God, that hath, both in himself, and of himself, and about himself, his fullness and perfection: and it is only he, that is his own strength and stability. Yea, and Plato affirmeth of this, Plato. in Sophis●a p. 188. Natura per se; that, Ab eo, quod verè est, non abest, nec motus, nec vita, nec anima, nec sapientia: That thing which truly is, and hath his being of itself, hath also both his moving, and his living, and his spirit, and his wisdom, and all, of himself. Which are the mere properties and attributes of God: joh. 5 26. who (as the Scripture testifieth) Hath his life in himself. This is proper and peculiar unto God, to be, Natura per se. All other things are, Natura, per aliud. There is none of all them, that have either their living, or their moving, or their breathing, or their being, of themselves; all which nominatìm, Plato ascribeth unto the first Cause: but all these things they do only receive from God, as the Scripture nominatìm affirmeth of all of them. In him they live, Act. 17. 28 and move, and have their being. And he it is, that giveth unto all, Act. 17. 25. both life, and breath, and all things. Who (as Palingenius affirmeth,) Est per se vivens, sapìensque, bonúsque; Anullo accipiens quod habet, Paling. in. Libra, p. 169. verùm omnia ab illo Accipiunt: igitur quod habent, amittere possunt, etc. He by himself alone doth live, self wise, self good he is: From none receiving what he hath: but all receive of his: And therefore they, whate'er they have, have power it to lees. Trismegistus giveth it another title, which is likewise the proper title of God. For he calleth it, Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 10. p. 426. Vnum principium, ex quo cuncta dependent. And in another place (as though he had not yet spoken enough) he correcteth himself. Ex uno cuncta pendentia, ex eo potius defluentía. He saith, that there is but one principal Cause, Asclep. c. 8. p. 505. upon which all things do depend; or rather indeed, from which all things do descend. Now, this can be nothing else but God. For (as Anselmus very well collecteth) Id quod per se est, Anselm. in Monologio. c. 4. To. 3. p. 3. & per quod alia cuncta sunt, summum esse omnium existentium, ratio docet. That which hath his being of itself, and which giveth being unto every other thing, must needs be, even in reason, the highest and most principal thing that hath a being. Now, God hath his being only of himself: and he likewise giveth being, unto every other thing: for there is nothing in the world, which hath any being, but it hath it, by participation from him. So that, nothing indeed can primarily and properly be called Ens, but only God. Every other thing, as it hath his dependence upon this first Cause, so can it be called Ens, but in an unproper and secondary acceptance: as the Accidens, which hath his whole Esse in his Substance. And this, even Aristotle himself expressly confesseth. Caetera Entia dicuntur, eò quòd, Arist. l. 7. Metaphys. ●. 1. To 2. p 1433. Entis propriè dicti, quaedam, sunt Quantitates; quaedam, Qualitates; quaedam, Passiones; quaedam, aliud aliquid tale. The other Categories, are called Entia, Being's; as being some, Quantities; some, Qualities, some, Passions; and the like; of that Ens, or Being, which is properly so called. And that is the prime and only Predicament of Substance. And so it is, between the first Cause, which hath his being of itself; and all other things, which have their being from it. They be indeed, but as Accidents, in comparison of it. And their being, unto his, is no better than nothing: O●●●. Hom. in l●b. Reg. To. 1. p. 362. as is plainly and directly affirmed by Origen. Et quae in Coelo sunt, & quae in Te●ra, quantum ad naturam Dei pertinet, non sunt. Neither the things in Earth, nor the things in Heaven, in comparison of God, have any true being. And immediately above. Name, & umbra, ad comparationem corporis, non est; & fumus, ad comparationem ignis, non est. The shadow being compared with the body, hath no being; and no more hath the smoke neither, being compared with his fire. So that, all other things, in comparison of God, are, but Fumus, & Vmbra. And therefore this Vnum Principium, ex quo cuncta dependent, is nothing else, but God. Whom, even the Scriptures themselves call (as Dionysius Areopagita affirmeth) Causam omnium, Dionys. Areop. l. De Diuin. Nom. c. 1. p. 194. & Principium, & Essentiam, & Vitam. The cause, Beginning, Being, and the Life of all. Ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, saith Seneca: Senec l. 2. Nat. Quaest c. 45. p. 36. Of whom all things depend. Yea, and in the same place, he affirmeth, that only of him, Sunt omnes causae causarum. That God is such a cause, as produceth the causes of all other things. For, all other causes bring forth nothing but Effects: but God is such a cause, as bringeth forth causes. Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 10. p. 426. He is tale Principium, quod quidem movetur, ut rursus extet principium: as Trismegistus affirmeth. He is such a cause, as, by his moving, produceth another ●ause. For he is, Causa Causarum: and no cause could have his operation, as a cause, but only by the power of his gracious assistance. Psal. 65. 11. It is only God's blessing, Psal. 68 9 which giveth unto all causes their proper operation. The Heavens, which drop down fatness upon the Earth, do it only by the virtue of the blessing of God. For, it is only he, that sendeth a gracious rain upon his inheritance, and refresheth the same, when it is weary. And so likewise, Heb. 6. 7. the Earth though it drink in the rain, yet can it bring forth no fruit, unless it receive a blessing from God. And so likewise the Father, which begetteth his Child, receiveth all his generative power of God. Behold children are the inheritance of the Lord, and the fruit of the womb is his reward: Psal. 127. 3. saith the Prophet David. Yea, and Euripides likewise, unto the same purpose: A Dijs, dantur liberi mortalibus. Eurip. ●n lone. p. 814. Children are given to men: It's God that giveth them. So that, not only all things in the world, are the works of God, but also all the causality, which is to be found in any of those things, is only the Effect of God, the first cause. Nay, as Bradwardine very truly teacheth; All the Effects, which are wrought in things by their second causes, yet are more immediately wrought by God, who is the first cause, than they be by their nearest causes themselves. Bra●●a●d. l. 1. c. 3. p. 1●1. Nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo. Et nulla res potest aliquid sacere, nisi Deus, per se, & immediatè faciat illud idem; imò, & immediatiùs, quolibet alio faciente. And thus the very titles, which Authors have given unto the first cause, do necessarily imply that it must needs be God. But yet, Damasc. l. 1. Orthod. Fid. c 3. p. 166. diverse of them go further, and collect the very same, by way of Argument. Damascen proveth, that the first cause of things, must needs be God, by this Sorites. Quae mutabilia sunt, etiam creata sunt. Quae autem creata sunt, dubium non est, quìna quopiam creata sunt. Conditorem porrò increatum esse, necesse est. Nam si ipse quoque creatus est, a quopiam quoque creatus est. ldque tantisper locum habebit, quòad ad aliquid minimè creatum pervenerimu●. Increatus est ergò summus ille opifex, atque immutabilis. Hoc autem, quid aliud esse qu●at, quam Deus? Whatsoever things are mutable [as are all, that be sensible] they must needs have been created. Whatsoever is created, is created of some Creator. That Creator himself must needs be uncreated. Or, if he also be created, he must be created by something. And this holds on, so long, until we come at last unto something uncreated. Therefore that great workman, that is the maker of all things, must needs himself be both uncreated, and immutable. Now what can that be else, but only God himself? This is Damascenes reason: whereby he doth conclude, that the first cause of all things, can be nothing else, Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 14. p. 468. but God. Trismegistus, in like sort, doth press the very same Argument, in matter fully agreeing, though in words somewhat differing. Quae sensu percipiuntur, facta sunt omnia; Genita non a seipsis, sed fiunt ab altero. Est ergò aliquis factor istorum, atque is ingenitus, ut genitis sit antiquio●. Those things that are subject unto sense, have all of them been made. Those things that are made, have not been made of themselves, but of something else. And therefore, they must needs have had some maker. And he must needs be unmade: because he is more ancient, than any thing that is made. He there proceedeth further, disputing much, both of the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness, of this First cause, and Creator: and of his Dominion over every creature: being much solicitous, by what name he should call him: whether by the name of God, or of Maker, or of Father, or of all these three together? And he resolveth his own doubt: that he may worthily be called, Deus, propter potentiam; Factor, propter actum; and Pater, propter bonum: A God for his power; a Creator, for his work; and a Father, for his goodness. This is that Heathen man's discourse, upon the first cause. And Seneca he bringeth in, another Argument, unto the same effect: which, though in the passage it be somewhat different; yet, in the conclusion, it fully agreeth with it. For he reckoneth up five differing causes of the world. Senec. Epist. 66. p. 106. Id ex quo, Id a quo, Id in quo, Id ad quod, Id propter quod: that is, The Matter, the Efficient, the Form, the Exemplar, and the End. But the power of all these he ascribes unto the Efficient: making it, in effect, the only true cause: and all the rest, to be rather as instruments unto it, than Concauses with it. Quae nunc retuli, non sunt multae & singulae Causae, sed ex una pendent; ex ea quae facit. It is only the Efficient, whereupon they all depend. The Efficient is that, which praepareth the Matter, imposeth the Form, conceiveth the Pattern, and propoundeth the End. And this Efficient of the world, he expressly affirmeth, to be nothing else, but God. Faciens hic, Deus est. And thus, they do not only insinuate, The first Cause to be God: but also, by Argument, they endeavour to prove it. Yea and diverse of them, in express terms, affirm it: which is our third head. Senec. l 4. de Benefic. c. 7. p. 50. Seneca, whom I last named, shall be the first of them. He saith expressly of God, that, Senec. Epist. 66 p. 1●7. Ille est prima omnium Causa, ex qua caeterae pendent. God is the first and chiefest Cause of all things, whereupon they all do hang. And again, in another place. Quaerimus quae sit Causa? Ratio faciens, id est, Deus. Do we inquire what is the Cause? Even the Reasonable Spirit; that maketh it. And that Reason or Spirit, Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 14. p. 470. is God. The second is Trismegistus, whom I named next before him: who saith, that, that Efficient which is more ancient than any Effect, is nothing else but God. Efficiens & Effectum, unita quidem sunt invicem: sic tamen, ut unum praecedat, alterum verò sequatur. Praecedens sanè Deus Essiciens: sequens verò, id quod est effectum. The Cause and his effect are always united: yet so, that the one of them goeth before, and the other followeth after. The Cause which goeth before, is nothing else but God: the thing which followeth after, is the Effect of that Cause. Yea, and in another place, he defineth God to be nothing else, but only a general Cause of all things. Deus profectò mens non est; Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 2. p. 386. at verò, ut sit mens, Causa est: nec spiritus; sed causa, qua spiritus extat: nec lumen; sed causa, qua lumen existit. God is not understanding; but the cause of Understanding. job, 32. 8. [It is the inspiration of the Almighty that giveth understanding] God is not a spirit, but the Cause of all spirits; Heb. 12. 9 [The Father of Spirits] God is not a light, but the Cause of all light. [The Father of Lights.] So that, in his verdict, this first and chiefest Cause, is nothing else but God. james 1. 17. Whom, in another place, he calleth, Bonum efficiens, Bonafaciens omnia: That good Efficient Cause, which bringeth forth all good Effects. Trismeg Pimand. Dial. 5. p. 403. The third of them, is Aristotle; whom I named before them both: who expressly affirmeth, that Deus est rebus omnibus & Causa, & Principium: that, Arist. l. 1. Metaphys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1372. God, is unto all things, both a Beginner, and a Cause. Yea, and in another place, he affirmeth, 〈◊〉. l. de Mun●o. To. p. 1506. that he is, causa, quae continet omnia: making him, not only the first and chiefest Cause, 〈◊〉. l. de Pla●●●. ● 3. To. 2 p. 7. but also, the general cause of all thing. The fourth is Pythagoras; 〈…〉 who calleth God directly, causam & efficientem & formantem. Both the Efficient, & the Forming cause. The fifth is, Macrobius: who writeth thus of God: Macrob. l. 1. in Som. c. 14. p. 47. That Deus, qui prima causa & est & vocatur, unus, omnium quae sunt, quaeque videntur esse, princeps, & origo est. God, who is both called the first cause, and is so indeed; he is, both the Ruler, and Maker of all things. Unto which five forenamed, I will only add a sixth. And that is Pindarus: Pind. in Pyth. Od. 5. p. 263. who directly affirmeth, that God is the Efficient, and Author of all things. Omni rei Deum Authorem superponere oportet: We must acknowledge God to be the Author of all things. The Greek word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And thus (as you see) the yielding of a first Cause, (which we must yield of necessity) doth forcibly draw us on, to the yielding of a Deity. CHAP. 4. That these sensible and second motions, direct us unto a first. 2. That a first motion, doth necessarily imply, a first Mover. 3. That this first Mover, is the cause of all the motions in the World. 4. And, that therefore, this first Mover, is nothing else, but God. I Have already dispatched the first of those two physical considerations, which I purposely selected, to declare, There is a God: taken from the first Cause, and Causer of all natural things. I am now come to the second: (which is taken from the first Motion, and Mover, of all movable things. Wherein, I may be the shorter, because this Argument runneth almost in the same tract, which was traced by the former. But it is an Argument, so much insisted on, both by Philosophers and Divines, that I know not any other, that is either urged oftener, or enforced further. And therefore, for the better understanding of our order in proceeding, I will contrive this Argument, into this gradation. Fir●●●hat second motions direct us, by necessity, unto a first. Secondly, that this First Motion, doth lead us yet further, unto a first Mover. Thirdly, that this first Mover is the only cause, of all those several Motions, that are found in all things. And, fourthly, that therefore this first Mover, can be nothing else; but God. For the first of those four Steps; There is a first motion. That these second and inferior Motions, do lead us by degrees, unto one first and supreme Motion; Plato proveth by this reason. Plato l. 10. de Leg. p. 874. Quandò aliud ab alio movetur, illúdque rursum semper ab alio▪ eritnè in talibus aliquid, quod primò movetur? At, quomodò id, cum ab aliquo moveatur, eorum quae moventur primum erit? Certè, impossibile id est. Sed quandò aliquid, seipsum movens, aliud quoque movebit, illúdque aliud, & sic deinceps plurima movebuntur; an aliud totius motus principium erit, quam mutatio eius quod seipsum movet? When as one thing is moved by another, and that still by another, and so in infinitum; can there then be any thing, that hath a first motion? [no, surely, there cannot.] For how can that be the first moving of all other, which itself is moved by another? This is a thing impossible. But, if we grant, that there is something, which is moved only by itself, and not by any other thing; if that move another thìng, and that another, and so there be many things moved in their order; then, the first beginning of all those motions so moved by others, can be nothing else, but only the Impulsion of that one first Mover, which moveth of himself. Out of which discourse of Plato, we may gather these two Aphorisms. First, that, if there should be in those motions, which are moved by another, an infinite progress, there could none of them be first. Secondly, that, we must needs come, in the end, unto some such thing, as is moved only of itself, and not of any other thing. And thirdly, that, this on● thing, which thus moveth of itself, is the true cause of motion, unto every other thing. Aristotle, in like manner, though, in many other points dissenting from his Master; yet, in this point of Motion, he consenteth fully with him: yea, & presseth the same reason, almost in the same form. Omne quod movetur, ab aliquo moveri necesse est. Arist. l. 8. Physic. c. 5. To. 1. p. 528. Et, aut ab eo quod movetur ab alio, aut ab eo quod non movetur ab alio. Si ab eo movetur, quod ab alio motu cietur, movens aliquod esse primum, quod ab alio non movetur, necesse est. Fieri enìm non potest, ut in infinitum proficiscatur id, quod movet, atque movetur ab alio: Quip, cum infinitorum nihil sit primum. Whatsoever thing is moved, must needs be moved of something; and that thing which moveth it, must needs itself be moved, either of another, or not of another. If it be moved by such a thing as is moved of another, we must come, by necessity, unto a first mover, which is not moved by any other. For it is impossible, to go still on for ever, in those things that are moved by another. Because, in those things that are infinite, there can none of them be first. And therefore, where there is granted to be any first thing, there cannot be held to be an infinite proceeding. Yea and again, a little after. Fieri non potest, ut id, quo motus affertur, moveat absque eo quod movet a seipso. It cannot be, that that which is moved by another, should be moved but by that which is moved by itself. And he giveth these examples. Baculus movet lapidem, & movetur a manu, quae ab homine movetur. The Staff moves the stone, the hand moves the staff, the man moves the hand: and the man is moved (in some sort) of himself. For (as the Roman Orator affirmeth) Quod animal est, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 116. motu movetur interiore, & suo. Every living thing is moved, by an internal motion of his own. So that the sum of those two forenamed Reasons, which I have above set down in their Authors own words, is (in effect) thus much. That, Whatsoever thing is moved must needs be moved by something: and that thing, must either be moved by itself, or by some other thing. By itself can no inferior or second thing be moved, but always by some former and superior. For, as it subsisteth not by itself, but by another; so moveth it also, not itself, but by another. Motum enìm suum non sibi debet, Hilar. l. 3. De Trin. p. 31. sed Authori, (saith Hilary.) It oweth all his motion, not unto his own power, but to his Author and first Mover. So that no inferior thing is moved of itself, but only by the power of the supreme and first Mover. Now, if all these sensible and inferior things be moved of some other (as we plainly see they are,) then may we, by them, ascend, as by steps and degrees, from the lower to the higher, until we come at last, unto that first Mover. For, in those things that are moved by another, we cannot proceed in infinitum; but must, at last, stay in one, which is the Mover of all the other and yet itself is moved by none other, but hath both his motion, and his being, of himself. And therefore must needs be God. This is the whole sum a●d effect of that Argument. Whereby this first point is evidently cleared: That the contemplation of these secondary motions, do lead us, by necessity, unto a first. Aquin. 1. Quaest 2. Art. 3. p. 5. Yea (and as Aquinas very wittily observeth, as well in Motions as in causes) There can be no Second, if there be no First; no inferior, if there be no superior; no posterior, if no prior; nay, no last, if no first. And this holdeth, not only in these relative denominations, but also in the true existence of the very things themselves. So that, the motions of these inferior Bodies, which we see, by sense, must lead us, of necessity, either to grant a first Mover: who is the Author of all the motion in the world: and therefore must needs be God: or else, to yield, in motion, an infinite proceeding: which is absurd, even to Reason, and utterly destroyeth all order in things: or else, to hold, that There is no motion at all; as Melissus did, Motum non esse, sed videri esse: Which is the greatest absurdity of all. An absurdity so gross, Laërt. in vita Melissi, p. 312. as is confuted, even by sense. As Diogenes very wittily proved, against a Philosopher, maintaining that error, that There was no motion. Behind whom he slily coming, whipped him suddenly about the Legs. And then, whilst he was running, he scornfully asked him, Whether now he thought there were any motion? Not esteeming him worthy to be confuted by reason, but only to be derided by that sensible demonstration. joseph. l. 2. Cont. Apion p. 902. For (as josephus very well observeth to this purpose) Insen satos, decet, non verbis, sed operibus arguere: or rather indeed, verberibus, as Diogen●s did: The best kind of arguing with mad men, is, with a word and a blow; not with reason, but with stripes. And yet, even this gross absurdity would follow, unless, from these secondary motions, we should arise unto some first. For, Si primum nihil est, omninò causa nulla est, saith Aristotle, If there be no first cause, Arist. l. 2 Metaphys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386. there can be no cause at all. And so, If there be no first motion, there can be no motion. Which, sense showeth to be false. And if there be any second motion, there must needs be a first. This, Reason showeth to be true. Arist. ibid. And therefore, for this first point, I conclude it with Aristotle, that, Si media sunt, necesse est finem esse. If there be any mean motion, there must needs be an end of them. Arist. l 3 Meta. c. 4. To. 2 p. 1393. And if an end, than a beginning. Neque enìm infinitus est a●●quis motus, sed cuiusque finis: saith he, in another place: There is no motion so infinite, but, in the end, it hath an end; and consequently, a beginning. For, as the Poet hath truly observed, — Finisque ab Origine pendet. Manilius. l 4. Astron. p. This is a Rule, That every End, On some Beginning must depend. 2 Let us therefore now ascend, There is a first Mover. from the first step, unto the second; that, If there be any first motion, then must there needs be a first Mover, which moveth only of himself, and not by any other. For, in every motion there be three things to be considered: The Mover, The Motion, and The thing moved: And these three things are never confounded, though they ever be conjoined. But, as the Motion is one thing, and the Moved another; so is it likewise between the Moved, and the Mover. For (as Picus Mirandula observeth, very truly) In quolibet moto, johan. Pic. Mirand in Conclusi inibus su●s, To. To. 1. p. 58. Motor est alius are mobili. In every motion, the Mover is distinguished from the thing that is moved. Yea, and Aristotle himself, unto the same purpose. Quod movet, & quod movetur, divisum esse videtur. Arist. l. ●. Phys. c. 4. To. 1. p. 526. That which moveth, and that which is moved, are a diverse thing, and plainly divided. But yet, though these three be joined all together; yet is the Mover, in order, before either of the other, even by the law of Nature. The Motion cannot be before the thing moved; nor yet the thing moved before the Mover of it: but always, the thing moved is before his motion; and always the Mover before either of them. For, as Philo judaeus affirmeth of the Motion; that Fieri non potest, Philo jud. l. De O●i●ic. Mundi. p. 7. ut motus rem motam praecesserit: It cannot be, that any motion be, before the thing moved, be. And so Aristotle affirmeth also of the Mover; that, Arist. l. de comm●ni An●malium motu. To. 1. p 916. Motor rem mobilem praecurrere debet. The Mover must forego the thing moved. Now, if the Mover be distinguished both from the motion itself, and from the thing that is moved; yea and so distinguished, that it is before them both: then, as every Effect doth argue his Cause; so doth every motion, argue his Mover: and consequently the first motion, his first Mover: Whom, though we do not see with the Eyes of the body; yet may we easily collect by Reason, Cic. l 2 de. Nat. Deor. p. 215. the Eye of the mind. To illustrate this point, by that familiar comparison, which the Orator pointeth at, in explication of this Reason. We see, by experience, in a Clock (which is, as at were, an Artificial Heaven, measuring out unto us the divisions of time) that every Wheel is moved every one of them by another, until at last we be brought unto the weight itself, which moves them all together. Whither when we be come, we can proceed no further by sense; and therefore, must collect the rest by reason. Now, Reason plainly teacheth us, that though the weight do move all the wheels of itself; yet that it could not tie itself unto the line: but that, that must needs be done, by some other thing. And that therefore, there must needs have been some Author, and contriver of that cunning piece of work: who first conceived in himself, by a mental Idea, the whole reason and conveyance of all these several motions; and then accordingly disposed all the wheels, and weights, into their several places. So that, the motion of the wheels, in every Clock, doth manifestly tell us, that there must needs have been an Author of that curious work: whose artificial workmanship and contriving, is that, which hath given, unto all those wheels, their motion. And, as it is in a Clock (which I called before an Artificial Heaven, because it measureth unto us the divisions of time) so is it also in the Heavens themselves: which may as fitly be called a natural Clock, for their measuring, by their motions, the distinction of time. We see, by experience, in them, that all these inferior and elementary Bodies, do receive their motions from the Heavens, their superiors: and so likewise, even in the Heavens themselves, that the lower is still moved by his next higher, until we come, by degrees, unto the highest of all, called Primum mobile; that is, the first movable body, which moveth all the rest. Now, when we are come thither, sense can lead us no further. But yet Reason can. For then, we must collect, that as the wheels in a Clock could not set themselves on moving; but that this must needs be the work of their Maker: so likewise the Heavens, though they move without all ceasing; yet have not taken unto themselves their motion, but have had it given them, Arist. l. 2. de Generate. c. 10. To. 1. p. 676. by their Author and Mover. For, as Aristotle truly teacheth, Si motio cietur, necesse est, praeesse motorem aliquem: Wheresoever there is motion, there must needs have been some Mover before, and some Moderator and guider of that motion, from whom, at the first, it received his beginning. So that, Primum Mobile doth necessarily imply, that there is a Primus Motor; which must needs be God: be he who, or what soever. For, Quodnam erit, Nazian. Orat. 2. de T●eol. p. 28. obsecro, (saith Nazianzen) a quo universum hoc movebitur? Quidnam illud vicissìm movebit? Quid item illud? Idque adeò in infinitum? What, I pray you, is that which doth move the whole world? What is that, which moveth it? And what again that, which moveth it? and so in infinitum? Even Aristotle himself resolveth that Quaestion: Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 529. that Omne quod movetur, a superiore movetur: Whatsoever thing is moved, is moved by some superior Mover. From whence it must needs follow, that even Primum Mobile itself, which the Orator calleth, Cic. l. 2. De. Nat. Deor. p. 215. Extremam oram, & determinationem mundi, that is; The furthest coast, and frontier of the world: though it be, among the Heavens, the highest of all other, yea, and that, which moveth them all together; yet hath it, above it, a superior mover, by whom itself is moved: Which can be nothing else, but God. And thus, the first Mover may necessarily be gathered out of the first motion, even by consequence of Reason. Yea, and so it is likewise, Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1 p. 528. even by Aristotle himself. Si quid ab eo movetur, quod ab alio motucietur, movens aliquod esse primum, quod ab alio non movetur, necesse est. If anything be moved, by that which is moved of another, it will bring us, at the last, unto a first Mover, which moveth only of itself, and not by any other 3 Let us now come to the third step: The first Mover is the first Cause of all Motion. that, If there be a first Mover; as hath formerly been proved; and, if he have the fountain of all true motion in himself; as is generally confessed; that then, he must needs be the first Cause of motion, unto every other thing. And this is likewise testified, by the principal Philosophers, Plato l. 10. de Legib p. 874. with an uniform consent. Plato saith directly, that, Initium omnium motionum, primumque motum, illum, fateri necesse est, quo quid seipsum movet. Et, hanc esse antiquissimam omnium, potentissimamque motionem. We must needs confess, that the very first motion and beginning of all motions, is only that motion, whereby a thing moveth itself. This is both the most ancient, and the most potent motion. Now, there is nothing in the world, that moveth of itself, but only God himself. No not, even the soul of any living thing, Arist. l. 2. de Anima. c. 1. To. 1. p. 799. if we will properly speak. For, though it be defined to be, Actus primus corporis naturalis, that is, the very first act of a natural Body: yet must that be understood, but only of his own body: yea, and that only, but in respect of our sense. That is therefore said to be, Actus primus; because there is not evident any sensible mover of it, as there is in bodies: but in respect of this invisible first Mover (which is its Author and Creator) it is but Actus secundarius. Not a thing that is moved by his own proper power, but only by a power received from another, namely from this first Mover, who is Actus prìmus indeed, and in whom the Soul hath only both his Living, Act. 17. 28. Moving, and Being. And so is it likewise in every other thing. There is no motion in any thing, but it floweth from this first Mover, as from his first fountain: as Tully affirmeth in express and plain terms. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 116. Quod seipsum movet, caeteris quae moventur fons est, & principium movendi: That which moveth of itself, is the fountain of motion unto all other things. So Aristotle likewise, Arist. l. d● communi Animal. 〈◊〉. To. 1. p. 912. almost in the same words. Id, principium aliarum motionum est, quod sibi motum affert. That is the Beginner of other motions, that is the Giver of motion to itself. And again, in another place: Fier● non potest, Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 528. ut id, quo motus affertur, moveat, absque eo quod movet a seipso. There is nothing can be moved, but only by that, which is moved by itself: meaning, as by the first Cause: though not, as by the Next. And again, in an other place, he giveth direct instance, that, In Medijs, that is, in second and subaltern motions; that which is inferior, is always moved by his next superior; and that, Arist. l. Metaphys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386. by his next; and that therefore all the rest must be moved by the first, from the highest unto the lowest. Mediorum, quorum, extra, aliquid primum & ultimum est, necesse est, quod prius est, Causam esse eorum, quae post illud sunt: In those middle motions, which have any first, the former is always the Cause of the latter: and so by consequent, The first, of all the rest. And this, in another place, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 1567. he directly affirmeth to be God. Natura divina, de simplici quodam rei primae motu, virtutem proximis largitur: atque, de iis iterum, ad remotiorae; quoàd per universum trans●at. The divine Nature, from a certain simple motion of the first thing, giveth a moving virtue to the next; and so, by them, unto the more remote, until it have pierced and passed throughout all the whole world. For, as Plutarch well observeth, Plut. l. de Pythiae Or●●ulis. To. 3. Mo●. p. 493. to this purpose: though, Quaeque res suo movetur modo: yet, unicum est, quod movet omnia. Though every thing move, after his own proper manner; yet they all of them are moved, by one first and general Mover. A●d that we should not think, that there can be in motions a perpetual ascent, which can never find an end; that Aristotle rejecteth, as an absurd conceit. Non est enim generatio to infinita sursum versùs. And so not Motio neither. But, Arist 2. Metaphys c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386. as in another place he directly affirmeth, We must needs, at the last, ascend up unto some first. Non in infinitum hoc proficiscitur, sed stabit tandem alicubi; atque er●t quidpiam, quod primò Causa erit ut omnia moveantur. Arist. l. 7. Phys. c. 1. To. 1. p. 511. We cannot proceed unto infinity in Motion: but we must stay ourselves at last, and come unto some one thing, which is the first Cause of the motion of all things. And this (as in another place he affirmeth) is not only his own particular opinion, dissenting, upon sigularitie, from others; but the general Tenet, of all the Philosophers. Consid●rare oportet, utrùm sit causa motus & principium, Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 1. To. 1. p. 530. id, quod motu seipsum ciet; an id, quod ab alio ●gitatur? Illud, omnes vt●que ponent. He moveth the question, Whether of the twain is the beginning of motion? That, which moveth of his own power; or, That, which is moved of another? And he resolveth it, that, All men do agree upon the former. So that, by the general Consent of all men, it appeareth, that the first beginning of all motion, must be by some such Mover, as is not moved by any other: but hath all the power of motion shut up in his own power. And that therefore, this First mover must needs be God, and none other. Which is the forth step of this Chapter. 4 For, The first Mover is God. if these secondary and lower motions do lead us up unto a higher: and those unto an higher, until at last we ascend unto some highest Mover; which is the Cause of motion unto all the lower: then, what can this highest Mover be else, which moveth all other things, but only God himself? This Tully, in plain and express terms, affirmeth: where he putteth both those properties, which before I have named, into the very definition of God; that he is, Cic. l. 1. Tusc p. 116. both Omnia movens, and Ipse praeditus motu sempiterno. He is both the Author of motion unto all other things, and the Cause of motion in himself. Both these he affirmeth to be the properties of God. And so Aristotle affirmeth, that Local motion, Arist. l. 12 Metaphys. c. 8. To. 2. p 15▪ 5. in what body soever, doth only proceed from some divine Power. Si namque Latio Lationis Causa erit, illam quoque oportebit aliorum gratia esse. Quare, cum non ●it processus in infinitum, finis omnis Lationis, erit divinorum corporum aliquod, quae in Coelo feruntur. If one Local motion should be the cause of another; than it also should be caused and be from others, and for others sake. Wherefore, seeing there is no infinite progress in things movable; the end of all Lation (or Local motion) must be some one of those heavenly Bodies, which are carried about. Yea, and that we should not think, that, by those Divine Bodies, he meaneth any of the Stars: in another place he affirmeth, Arist. l. 12. Metaphys. c. 10. To. 2. p. 1508. that this first and supreme Mover, is a thing, above all sense; whereas all the Sarres are sensible. For, si non erunt alia, praeter sensibilia (saith he) non erit principium, nec ordo, nec generatio; sed semper principij principium: If there should be no other than sensible things; then should there be no beginning, nor order, nor generation of things: but always a Principle to every Principle. Whereby he insinuateth, that the first and supreme Mover, is not of a sensible, but of a divine, and a spiritual Nature. Yea, and Tully expressly affirmeth; that it is God, which giveth motion, even unto the very Heavens. Dedit autem Divinis, duo genera motus, Cic. l. de Vnivers. p. 431. etc. He hath given to the Heavenly bodies, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 1567. two kinds of Motions, etc. Yea, and Aristotle again in another place, compareth God unto those Players with Puppets, that by the pulling of one string, can set the whole Engine, and every part of it, on moving. Which Anaxagoras plainly acknowledgeth, when he maketh his men's, Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 529. to be Principium motus: Trismeg. pimand. Dial. 1. p. 369. by which word, Laert, in vita Zenonis p. 253. he meaneth nothing else but God. Mens ením est Deus: saith Trismegistus. God, which is men's, is the beginning of 〈◊〉 motion. And, as Zeno likewise expressly affirmeth, this title of men's, is but the Philosopher's name and appellation of God. Deum unum esse, ipsúmque Mentem appellari. There is but one God, and he is called men's. So that, when Anaxagoras called this first Mover, men's; his meaning, by men's, is nothing else, but Deus. And, that we impose not a forced sense, upon that word, by other men's expositions; the same may be gathered, even out of his own writings: and that, by two substantial reasons. First, by those titles and appellations, which he bestoweth upon it: and then, by those works, which he ascribeth unto it. Both which, are peculiar and proper unto God. The titles, which he bestoweth upon his men's, be these Mentem, Arist. l. 1. De Anima. c. 2. To. 1. p. 787. esse Principium omnium, solámque, rerum omnium, ipsam esse simplicem, & non mistam, & puram esse sinceramque. Atque eidem Principio haec utraque convenire, Cognitionem, & motum; Vniversumque mentem hanc movisse. This men's (saith he) was the first Beginning of all things, being itself most simple, and without any mixture, most pure, and most sincere. And having, in itself, the true and real possession, not only of knowledge, but also of motion: yea, and that all the whole world is moved by this mind, and by this Spirit. Now, these be the peculiar properties of God: in whom (as the Apostle testifieth) are all the treasures both of knowledge, and Wisdom. Yea, Col. 2. 3. and of motion too: for, Act. 17. 28. in him we both live, and move, and have our being. So that, by this description, his men's must needs be God. Yea and so is it likewise, by his ascription too. For he ascribeth unto this men's, the very making of the world: which is the work of none other, but only of God. cum omnia simul essent, Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 1. p. 519. atque infinito tempore quiscerent; mens movit, ac segregavit. When as all things had lain quiet, for an infinite space together, it was men's that first moved and ordered them asunder: alluding unto that confused Chaos, wherein, as the Poet speaketh, there were, Non benè iunctarum discordia semina rerum, Ovid, l. 1. Metam. p. 1. There disagreeing seeds were clearly seen, Of things which had not well conjoined been. Now, this was the proper work of God. Yea, and this was the proper Spirit of God, that did it: as even Plutarch, in plain and express words, recordeth it. Anaxagoras dixit, initio constitisse corpora, Dei autem mentem ea digessisse, Plut. l. 1. de Placitis c. 7. To. 2. Mor. p. 15. atque omnium rerum ortus effecisse; Anaxagoras said, that there were bodies in the first beginning; but that the mind and hand of God digested and ordered them, and effected the original of all things. Mark, Dei mentem. This m●ns, the Primus motor, which first gave things their being, and reduced them into order, was nothing else, but Dei mens, The wisdom, and the Spirit of God: Pro. 8. 27. etc. who (as it is also testified in the holy Scripture) when he prepared the heavens, was ther●, and when he set the compass upon the deeps. Yea, and this was not the singular opinion of only Anaxagoras; but the common opinion of the most of the Philosophers. Yea, and of the Poets, too. Virgil saith in express terms, that the first mover of the world, was only this men's: Mens agitat molem, Virgil. l. 6. Aen●●d. p. 267. & magno se corpore miscet. Yea, and that we should understand, that under the name of men's, he vnderstandeth nothing, but the Creator of the world, he addeth in the next words: Indè homìnum, pecudúmque genus, vitaeque volantum. That massy Chaos bodies huge was moved by this men's. And men, Beasts, Birds, and Creatures all forthwith proceeded thence. All which works, in another place, he expressly attributeth unto God, under his own express name. He is the mover of the World, he is the maker, both of men, and beasts, and birds. — Deum namque ire per omnes Virgil. l. 4. Georg. p. 94. Terr●sque tractúsque maris, calúmque profundum. Hìn● p●cudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum. etc. God walketh through the World, in every Coast, And goes the winding Seas Tract uttermost: Yea, and the most high Heavens. From him, all living Both men, and Beasts receive their life, and being. Thus, that which before he shadowed, under the name of men's, he plainly now expresseth, under the name of God: making him the first mover, and Creator of the world. And so likewise doth Plato. For he saith, that there is a certain Anima, Plato, l. 10. de Leg. p. 875. or Spirit, which doth, in omnibus, quae moventur, habitare, & coelum & cuncta gubernare: which dwelleth in all things, that have any motion, and which governeth both heaven, & every other thing. So that, though he alter Anaxagoras his term; yet he means the self same thing. For, as Parmenides affirmeth, Laert, in vita Parmenidis, p. 311. Anima & mens idem sunt: Though they differ in name, yet are they one, and the same thing. Yea, and Plato, in the same place, affirmeth this Anima, which is the mover of all things, to be God, and nothing else. Deumesse, omnes arbitramur. We all suppose, There is a God. And so likewise doth Theophrastus: who denieth, even Nature itself to be the first mover, even of natural bodies: ascending up higher, and ascribing all their motion unto a superior and more divine power. Theophra●●i, in Metaph. c. 1. Apud Aristot. To. 2. p. 1539. Hoc, alij cuidam meliori ac priori relinquendum est potestati. We must ascribe this, unto another, and a better, and a superior power. Now, what is there either better, or superior to Nature, but only the God of Nature? Yea, and a little before, he expressly affirmeth, that this first mover, and Beginner, is indeed nothing else, but the very God of Nature. Divinum omnium principium existit, per quod & sunt, & permanent universa: That first Beginner, from whence all things have both their consisting, and existing, is a divine power and Nature. To conclude this whole Chapter. All those Arguments, which Tully bringeth, to prove the Soul to be immortal, are much more concludent, to prove God to be aeternal, whose Motion is both of himself and perpetual. For, there he plainly telleth us, that there is a certain thing, which moveth only of itself, Cic. l. 1. Tosc. p. 116. and yet giveth motion unto all other things. Quod caeteris fons est, & principium movendi. And therefore is, both without all beginning; quia, Principij nulla est origo: Of a Principle there is no Original: and without all ending; quia, Quod seipsum movet, quontam nunquàm deseritur a se, nunqu●m moveri quidem desinet. That which moveth itself, inasmuch as it never deserteth itself. it never desisteth to be moved: and consequently must needs be eternal. For, Quod seipsum movet, aeternum est. That which moveth itself (and is mou●d of no other) is aeternal: Now, none of all these properties, which here he setteth down do agree unto the soul, but only in some comparison. For, the Soul hath neither his motion of itself, nor yet giveth motion unto all other things, nor is aeternal or without all beginning. This is proper and peculiar unto God himself alone, whose title is, The eternal. Gen. 21. 33. As for the Soul, though it may be called Immortal; yet can it not, eternal. Immortal it is, because it hath no end: but eternal it is not, because it had a beginning. But God is truly the mover of himself, and the giver of motion unto all other things. He is truly eternal, both without all beginning, and without all ending, as one that hath all his being only of himself: and therefore can never cease to be, because he cannot forsake himself. quicksands quid enìm per se est, Paling. in. Libr. p. 169. semper durare necesse est, cum nullo indigeat, cum solo pendeat a se; cum vi non possit, cum nolit sponte perire, saith Palingenius. What e'er subsisteth of itself, must needs be everlasting, As needing other none; and self-dependence never-wasting. And therefore perish cannot it by an external sway, Nor by internal vnfor'ct mind will perish or decay. So that, all those high properties, which both Plato and Tully do apply, Plato. in Ph●dro p. 450. but unproperly, unto the Soul; may, most truly and properly, be applied, unto God: That he, both hath all his motion of himself, and giveth all motion unto all other things, and that he hath neither beginning nor ending; but is truly eternal from all everlasting: being not only The first Mover, but the sole- mover of all things, in whom, all other things have their only motion, and from whom they do all of them receive their only being. So that, we may truly affirm, as it is in the Epigram, that, Principium Deus est Mundi, quo cuncta moventur, Prosper. Epigr. 58. p. 169. Et quae permittit, vel iubet, Author agit. The World's beginning, lo, 'tis God, by whom all things are moved: And what he suffers, or commands, he doth, as Author proved. Especially in Motion (as Bradwardine very notably declareth in these four true positions: that, Qualibet Creatura movente, Bradwardin. l. 1. c. 4. p. 172. 174. Deum necessariò commovere, That what Creature soever moveth, God always moveth with it. The second: That nothing can move any other thing, except God himself do properly move the same thing. The third: That nothing can move any other thing, except God do immediately move the same thing. The fourth: That nothing can move another, except God move it more immediately, than any other second Mover. So that; to recapitulate the sum of this whole Chapter; If these second and inferior motions do lead us unto a first, and that unto a first Mover, which is the very fountain of motion in all other: then must needs this First Mover, be God himself, & none other. But, the first of these three points hath been sufficiently proved, in the first three Sections of this Chapter. And therefore, the Conclusion followeth necessarily from them; That this first Mover must be God, as we have seen in this fourth. Yea, and that (beside the force of the consequence) by diverse direct Testimonies, both of Heathens, and Christians. Which is the second Consideration, borrowed from the Physics, whereby it may be proved, That there is a God. CHAP 5. That the true cause of Sickness, is Sin against God. 2. That God, for this cause, doth threaten, to send Sickness. 3. That he sendeth it according to his threatening. 4. That Physicians observe the stroke of God's Vengeance, to be in many Sicknesses. I Have hitherto unfolded certain Considerations, from whence we may collect, that There is a God: first, out of the Metaphysics; and then, out of the Physics. Let us now come unto Physic. For, Vby desinit Philosophus, ibi incipit Medicus. Where the Philosopher endeth, there the Physician entereth. And therefore, let us propound some Considerations, out of it. For, it hath many in it. But in this, as in the former, I will insist, but upon two: letting pass all the other: that is, upon Diseases; and, upon their Remedies. Both which are acknowledged, to be the proper and peculiar works of God, almost by the general confession of all men, both Christians and Heathens. For our better, and more orderly proceeding wherein, I will reduce this first discourse as concerning Diseases, unto these four heads. First, that they both confess, the first and original cause of sickness, to be only men's sins. Secondly, that God, for this cause, hath oftentimes threatened to punish men, with sickness. Thirdly, that accordingly, he hath sent diverse kinds of grievous sicknesses, unto many. And fourthly, that even Physicians themselves do find in many sicknesses, that they be divine punishments. For the first of which four Heads: What is the true Original cause of sickness: S. Chrysostome telleth us, Chrysost. Serm. 10 in Rom. To. 4. p. 100 that it is the part of every good Physician; inquirere semper in morborum radic●m, tque ita pervenire ad ipsum mali fontem: to s●arch into the root of diseases and sicknesses, and so to proceed unto the fountain of those evils. And S. Basil he telleth us, that it is the part of a discreet and wise patient, not to leave this inquisition only to the Physician, but he himself also to search into a the causes of his own diseases, that so he may the better attain to know their remedies. Nos, Basil▪ Asceticis. To. 2. p. 292. plagas a Deo suscipientes, qui benè & prudenter vitam nostram moderatur; principio quidem inquiramus cognitionem rationis, ob quam nos flagellet. Whensoever we are scourged and chastised by God who guideth our whole life by his wisdom and goodness, we ought first to search carefully, for what cause he so correcteth us. For, the cause being once found, the Remedy is half found, and the cure, in a manner, already half performed. Medici, Cic. l. 3. Tasc. p. 142. causa morbi invent●, curationem esse inventam, putan●. Physicians, having once found out the cause of a disease, they think they have found the cure. Now, for the true cause of diseases, Sin is the first cause of Sickness. and Sicknesses; Plut. l. 5. de Placitis. c. 30. To. 2. Mor. p. 65. Hi●ron. in c. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209. though it greatly have puzelled, Item Sto●aeus Serm. 98. p. 542. both the greatest Philosophers, Et Serm. 99 p. 545. and the learnedst Physicians, to find out, what it is: some assigning them, unto the excess or defect of the primary Qualities of Heat, Cold, Moist, Drye: some, unto the impurity and corruption of our meats: some, unto the infection of unwholesome and putrid airs; and to diverse such other Material causes; wherein they be greatly divided amongst themselves: Yet is there a full agreement, both of Heathens, and Christians, that God is the first Efficient cause of them; and that Sin is the true Impulsive cause, which enforceth him to send them. This the Prophet David expressly declareth, when he called Sickness, The Rebuke of God: and affirmeth, Psal. 39 11. that, For sin, he inflicts it, upon man. When thou, with rebukes dost chasten man for Sin, Rom. 5. 12. thou makest his beauty to consume away. This also the Apostle Paul expressly declareth, when he telleth us that, By one man, Sin entered into the world; and Death▪ by Sinne. And again, in another place; 1. Co●. 11. 30. where he telleth the Corinthians, that, for their Abuses in receiving the Sacrament, they were strooken by God, with diverse kinds of punishments: some of them, with Sickness; some of them, with Weakness; and some of them, with Death. Yea, and this our Saviour Christ himself expressly declareth, when he biddeth the sick-man, whom he had lately cured, to go, joh. 5. 14. and sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto him. Thereby plainly declaring, that his Sin was both the cause of his former Sickness, and would be also of his future, if he sinned any more. And, that Sin is indeed the true cause of diseases, we may see it plainly verified, in all these memorable Sicknesses, that are recorded unto us, in the Holy Scriptures. The Botches, Ex▪ 9 10. wherewith the Egyptians weary smitten, was, for their rebellion against God, and their oppression of his People. The Leprosy wherewith the Prophetess Miriam was smitten, Num. 12. 8. 10. was, for being so envious against the Prophet Moses. Num. 25. 1. 2. 9 The Pestilence, wherewith the Israelites were smitten, was for their adultery with the Daughters of Moab; and for their idolatry with their profane god. 1. Sam. 5. 6 9 The Emerods', wherewith the Philistines were smitten, was, for their Impiety in detaining the Ark of God. And so generally, in all the rest. There is almost, in no place, any mention of any grievous and exemplary Sickness, but there is, in the same place, some mention of that Sin, for whose punishment it was sent. In which forenamed instances, we may observe these two things. First, that, not only the pestilence, and leprosy, and such like grievous and infectious Sicknesses (which are called Morbi Sontici, that is, mischievous diseases) are the scourges, A. Gellius. l. 20. c. 1. p. 280. b. and strokes of God: but also all other inferior diseases, as Emerods', & Botches, and such like smaller annoyances, Deut 28. 27. as even he himself professeth in another place. Secondly, that those diseases are sent by God unto men, to correct and chasten them, for their sin. Neither is this the testimony of the Holy Scripture only, but also of the Heathens, even in their own Histories. Wherein, we may observe, that whensoever there befell them, the public calamity of any general sickness, they still imputed it unto their sins, provoking the anger of some or other of their gods. As may be manifestly showed, Herod. l. 1. p. 51. by manifold instances. Herodotus ascribeth that grievous sickness which was sent upon the Scythians, to their sacrilege, Pausan. in Achaicis, p. 279. in sacking the Temple of Venus. Pausanias ascribeth that devouring sickness, which was sent among the jones, unto the profane lust of Menalippus, Idem, in Arcadicij, p. 313. and Comaetho: And that general abortion, which happened among the Caphyens wives, only unto the cruelty of their bloody husbands; in stoning (for a ●leight cause) certain young and wanton Children. The hand of divine justice inflicting their punishment, in the very same subject, wherein they had offended. Their cruelty exercised upon other men's Children, being justly punished by the death of their own, in a most equal retaliation. Idem in Beot●cis p. 353. The same Author ascribeth the dropsy and lousie-sicknesse of Cassander, Herod. l. 1. p. 66. unto his cruelty and infidelity unto Alexander his Master. And Herodotus again reporteth of the Persians, that they generally held, that whosoever was smitten with the leprous infection, he was surely a profane person; and had (doubtless) committed some great and grievous sin, against their god, the Sun: though they knew not what it was. And therefore, they banished them, out of all their Cities: collecting from the sickness, the stroke of God's justice, even in an unknown Cause. And this, which we have seen in the Histories of the greeks, we may see yet more plainly, in the Histories of the Romans. For, Plut. in vit. Romuli. p. 67. Livy l. 6. p. 112. Plutarch ascribeth that destroying plague, which happened among them, in the time of Romulus, unto the treachery, which was practised in the murder of Tatius. And Livy ascribeth another such like plague, which followed the condemnation of Manlius Capitolinus, unto that injustice, which was used in his death. And thus have, even the Heathen, been taught, in the very School of Nature, without going any further, that the true cause indeed of all sickness and diseases, are only men's sins, provoking God's justice to take vengeance of their wickedness. Psal. 38. 3. As David plainly confesseth in one of the Psalms, There is nothing sound in my flesh, because of thine anger; neither is there rest in my bones, because of my sin. 2 Which Lesson, may, God threateneth sickness for men's sins. Levit. 26. 16. 15. Deut. 7. 15. yet a great deal more perfectly, be learned, in the holy School of God. For there, he himself threateneth (and that, in many places) that, if men do refuse to obey his Commandments, he will punish their disobedience, with diverse grievous sicknesses. Of which places (for example) I will instance but in one: which is, indeed, most excellent; and which, very sufficiently, may serve for all the rest. It is, in the Book of Deuteronomy. Where, God threateneth most severely, Deut. 28. 15. etc. that, If they will not obey the voice of the Lord, to keep, and to do his commandments, and ordinances: that then all these Curses shall come upon them, and overtake them. Cursed shall they be in the Town, and cursed in the field. Cursed in their basket, and cursed in their dough. Cursed in the fruit of their body, in the fruit of their land, and in the fruit of their Cattle. Cursed when they go out, Deu. 28. 21. 22. 27. 28. 35. 59 and cursed when they come in. Yet further. That the Lord will make the Pestilence to cleave unto them, until he have consumed them. That he will smite them, with the consumption, and with the fever, and with the burning ague, and with the fervent heat, and with the sword, and with blasting, and with mildew. And with the botch of Egypt, and with the Emerods, and with the scab, and with the itch; so that they cannot be healed. And with madness, and with blindness, and with astonyi●●●● 〈◊〉. And that he, will smite them, in the knees, and in the thighs, with a sore botchy▪ so t●●t they cannot be healed; even from the sole of the foot, unto the ●●ppe of the he●d. And that he will make their plague's wonderful, and the plagues of their seed, even great plagues, and of long continuance; and sore diseases, and of long durance. So that, they shall want that common comfort of all sicknesses; Si longus, levis; si gravis, brevis, that if it be long, Cic. l. 2. De ●in. p. 62. it will be the lighter; and if it be fierce, it will be the shorter. But he threateneth such a sickness, as shall be, both Longus and Gravis: both fierce, and of continuance. And he brought such a one, 2. Chro. ●1. 13. 14. etc. upon the King jehoram: whom, for his cruelty and idolatry, God threatened to plague, with an incurable sickness, which should exhaust and consume him, by the rotting of his bowels. Which sickness, being sent accordingly unto him, it dispatched him not at once (as it did Herod, and Antiochus) but, Acts 12. 23. 2. Mac. 9 9 held him in grievous torments, for the space of two whole years. Now, thus many threats of so many sicknesses, God would never have made, but that he knew his own power, and could command all manner of diseases, at his will & pleasure. For, to threaten, is ridiculous; but even among us men, where, there is not a power, to inflict, what one doth threaten? 3 But, that he threatened not more in word, than he was well able to perform in deed, God sendeth all kinds of sicknesses unto men. we may evidently see throughout the whole tract of the holy history. Where there is so particular mention, of all those same diseases, to have been really inflicted by God, which, before, by name are mentioned, that it manifestly appeareth, that God is both mindful and true of his word▪ most faithfully performing, not only what he promiseth, but also what he threateneth And therefore saith S. Augustine. Nemo dicat, in cord suo; Verum est, quod promittit; falsum, quod minatur. Nam sicut, quod promittit verum est; sic quod minatur, certum est. Let no man once surmise, Aug. in Psal. 94. To. 8. p. 1070. that God is true, in his promises; but false, in his threatenings. For, as that, which he promiseth, is true: so that, which he threateneth, is sure. As we may evidently see, in all those particular diseases, which, in the forealleged place, God reckoneth up unto us. For the first of them, the Plague: God inflicted that sickness, upon his own people, Num. 16. 41, 46. the Israelites, for their grudging and murmuring against the Prophet Moses. For the second of them, the Consumption: he inflicted that sickness upon the wicked King jehoram: of whom it is recorded expressly, that he was, Longa consumtus tabe. Yea, 2. Chro. 21. 19 in Vulgata. and the good King David was also touched with it, as it may be gathered out of his own complaint: I am even consumed by the stroke of thine hand. For the third of them, Psal. 39 10. the Fever: he inflicted that sickness, both upon Peter's wives mother, and upon Publius his father. For the fourth of them, The fervent heat: he inflicted that sickness, at another time, upon the Israelites. The inhabitants of the Land, are burned up, and few men are left. Yea, Isay. 24 6. and even herein also he spared not his own beloved David. Psalm 38. 7. Who complaineth again, That his Reynes are full of burning, and that there is nothing sound in his flesh. For the fifth of them, Exod. 9 10. Boyles and Botches: Isay, 1. 6. though they be called in that place the Botch of Egypt; yet inflicted he it, not only upon the Egyptians, but also upon the jews. From the sole of the foot unto the head, there is nothing whole, but wounds, and swelling, and sores: full of Corruption. For the sixth of them, 1. Sam. 5. 9 12. the Emerods': he inflicted that disease, upon the Philistims. For the seaventh of them, the itch and the scab: he inflicted that disease, job. 2. 7. 8. upon his servant job. For the eight of them, Madness: he inflicted that evil, Isai. 19 14. upon the Princes of Noph, by mingling among them, the spirit of giddiness. For the ninth of them, Blindness: he inflicted that evil, Gen. 19 11. 2. both upon the Sodomites, Kin. 6. 18. and upon the Aramites. And for the tenth, and last of them, that is to say, Amazement and Astonishment of heart: he inflicted that disease upon King Antiochus. 1. Mac. 6. 8 9 1● When the King had heard these words, he was astonished and sore moved: therefore he laid him down upon his bed, and fell sick for sorrow: confessing that his sleep was departed from him, and that, for very care, his heart failed within him. So that, there is none of all the forenamed sicknesses, which he threatened in word, but he showeth that he had power to inflict the same in deed. By all which memorable instances, it evidently appeareth, that there is no sickness at all, neither so great nor so little, but that God can inflict it, both when, and where he will. Yea, and even the very Heathen confess also the same. For, even their own Histories, as well as the Scriptures, do number all the forenamed diseases to be nothing else indeed, but only divine punishments. For the first of them the Plague: that memorable Pestilence, which Homer so describeth to have fallen among the greeks, in the Troyans' war, is by him ascribed unto Apollo's anger: Apollo, plenus irarum, Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 3. noctique ipsi assimilis. Apollo, full of wrath and rage, Seems like an hideous night's praesage. And that fearful plague, Thucid. l. 2. p. 130. which Thucydides describeth to have fallen upon the Athenians, in the Peloponnesian war, is ascribed by him also, unto the anger of Apollo. And that wasting and devouring pestilence, which Ovid describeth to have fallen upon the Aeginets, is by him ascribed unto the wrath of juno: Dira lues populis, Ovid, l. 7. Metam. p. 278. irâ junonis iniquae, Incidit.— A cursed Plague upon the People fell, It was, cause juno was not pleased well. And that destroying plague, which fell again upon the Athenians, for their condemning of Socrates, is ascribed by another unto the wrath of jupiter. Pro jovis offensa, Pestis accessit. Max. Tyrius Scr●. ●9. p. 485. Where he calleth it expressly, the judgement of God. Eiusmodi iudicijs utitur Deus. They all of them directly reputing the Plague to be nothing else, but the vengeance of God. They were wrong in the particular, in ascribing those sicknesses unto their false gods, who being but dead men, were not able to do them either good or harm: but yet right in the general, in ascribing them to God; for God indeed was he that sent them, though haply he used the Devil's ministry in them. For the second of them, the Consumption: Pausanias reporteth of Phyallus, 〈…〉 p. 390. Captain of the Phocenses; that he first was threatened by Apollo in a dream, that he should consume, as bare as a certain brazen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which was consecrated unto him, in his Temple, by Hypocrates. Which miserable consumption, he afterward accordingly did bring upon him. For the third of them, the fever: Quintus Curtius reporteth of Alexander Magnus, Quint. Curt. l. 10. p. 415. that he, abusing the consecrated vessels of Hercules, in the very same City, yea and in the same manner, as 〈◊〉 had before, Dan. 5. 2. 3. etc. in his abusing of the vessel's Gods holy Temple: he was suddenly strooken, in the midst of his Banquet, even as he was in drinking. Nondùm Herculis Scypho epoto, repentè, velut telo confixus, ingemuit. He suddenly cried out, as if he had been shot with a deadly dart. Which stroke was none other, Sabel. Aeneid. 4. l. 6. p. 807. but only the sudden blow of a fever: Sueton. in vit. ●iti. c. 10. p. 115. as Sabellicus relateth his disease. And with the same disease was Titus also smitten, as Suetonius reporteth: Yea and that no less suddenly, in his returning from their plays. Which struck he well perceiving to be inflicted by God himself upon him, he ca●e his eyes up unto heaven, most pitifully complaining, that he had most unjustly and without his desert killed him. For the fourth of them, the fervent heat: Ovid reporteth, that together, with that grievous plague, which juno inflicted upon the men of Aegina, there was joined with it, so fervent a heat, that when they cast themselves upon the earth, to have cooled their bodies, the earth itself was so suddenly and so vehemetly heated by their bodies, that they could receive no benefit, nor comfort at all, from it. Dura sed in terra ponunt praecordia: Ouid. l. 7. Metam. p. 279. nec fit Corpus humo gelidum: sed humus de corpore feruet. They cast their naked bodies on the ground; Their bodies by the Earth not cooler found: But th' earth from bodies doth with heat abound. And thereupon another Poet calleth the plague, — Pestem flammiferam. For the fifth of them, Cic. l. 4. ●cad. p. 25. Boils, and Botches: Aurelius Victor reporteth, that Galerius Maximianus was smitten with that disease: whereby (as he relateth it) Defecit, Aurel. Vict. in vita Gallery p. 395. consumptis genitalibus. But Pomponius Laetus describeth his disease, more silly to the purpose. Pompon. Laetus p. 445. Incidit in morbum: ulcus inguinibus innatum virilia exedit: marecescente tota illa corporis parte, vermes pullulârunt: remedia deerant: medici desperaverunt. He fell into a foul disease. An ulcer, bred in his secret parts did eat off his privities: and all that part of his body, rotting away, and full of crawling worms, perished. Noremedies were present. All Physicians despaired. And this his grievous sickness, Eusebius affirmeth, to be nothing else, but the stroke of God's vengeance: Vltio divinitùs illata. For the sixth of them, Euseb. l. 1. de vita Constan. 〈◊〉. c. 50. p. 139. the Emerods': Cael. Rhodigin. l. 6. c. 1. p. 228. Caelius Rhodiginus reporteth, Volateran. l. 23. p. 547. that Philoctetes was smitten with it, Bap. Egnat. l. 2. Ror●. 〈…〉. p. 703. for his kill of Paris. Pausan. in Ac●aicu p. 281. For the seaventh of them, the Scab: Volateran reporteth of the Emperor Copronymus, that he was strooken with it, and died of it. Perijt, Elephantiae morbo. And Baptista Egnatias addeth, that he died of it in great extremity of torment. Post infinita flagitia, exquisitissimo cruciatu consumptus. For the eighth of them, Madness: Pausanias reporteth, that the Calidonians were strucken with it, by Bacchus, at the earnest prayer of his Priest, Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 3. Cor●sus: as the greeks were, with the Plague, at the like request of Apollo's Priest, Chryses. And this sickness (as the Poet Caecilius affirmeth) is absolutely in God's hand, to inflict where he pleaseth. Deo in manu est, quem esse dementem velit, Cic l. 4. T●sc. p. 1●4. Quem s●pere, quem sanari, quem in morbum inijci. Sic enìm Lambinus. Whom God will have a fool, or wise be found, He shall be so, and so; or sick, or sound. For the ninth of them, Blindness: Herodotus reporteth of Phero, King of Egypt, Herod, l. 2. p. 1●6. that he was suddenly smitten blind, as by the dart of God. And for the tenth of them, Astonishment, and Stupidity of mind: Aelianus reporteth that the Celtish nation were so possessed with it, Aelian. l. 12. var. Hist. c. 23. p 481. that they would not so much as run out of an house, when they evidently saw it, either falling upon their heads, or burning about their ears: but would rather choose, voluntarily to perish, then wisely to withdraw themselves from their death. Which, though that Author ascribe unto a kind of valour: yet may it, much more truly, be reduced to Stupidity. And thus, even the Heathens, as well as we Christians; and secular Histories, as well as Holy Scriptures, do number all the forenamed sicknesses, to be nothing else, but the punishments of God. Yea, Plut. de iis qui se●o puniun●ur, To. 2. p. 233. and so do they also, all other, not named. As Plutarch, in the Delphians giveth an express instance; Deum iratum hominibus, omnis generis tetros m●rbos intulisse: That, their God being angry and offended with them, sent all m●nn●r of grievous disease's, among thom. Whereby it appeareth, that diseases and sicknesses do not come unto men, by blind chance and fortune, 1. Samuel, 6. 9 job, 5. 6. as the Philistims would fain imagine: but (as they found unto their cost) they be sent unto men by the ordinance of God. They come not out of the dust: as job teacheth in his book, that is: Not only from their second and inferior causes, but from God their first Cause. Who, as sometimes he worketh with those natural Causes, by infecting the air, and corrupting the water; and blasting our fruits, Deut. 28. 22. with unwholesome dews and mildews, as he himself professeth: so worketh he oftentimes without them, by his own immediate stroke: As when he sent his Angel into the host of Seneherib, 2. Kings, 19 35. and, in one night destroyed to the number of an hundred and fourscore and five thousand. And therefore Saint Hierom, enquiring into the true cause of all sickness, he flieth above those inferior and natural concauses, unto the supreme and supernatural Cause. Non dubitemus, ista dicere, vocem flagellorum esse: Licèt nonnulle, haec, Hieronym, in c. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209. c. vel ex corrupto aere, vel ex escarum & corporum diuer sitate, accidere dicant. Let us not doubt, but that sickness is the lash of God's scourge: though some men do impute it unto the corrupnes of the air, or to the uncleanness of our meats, or to some one divesity or other in our bodies. But the true, and the first cause, indeed, is only God. For, as Stobaeus hath noted, out of Euripides: Morbi mortalium alij, nostraculpa, fiunt, Stobaeus Serm. 98 p. 539. Alij divinitùs immittuntur. Some sicknesses, by men's own fault; and some By God's just judgement, sometimes on us come. Nay always by God's judgement. And then, most of all, when they come by our fault; whether our fault in feeding, or our fault in living; they still come by Gods sending. For as the Tragical Poet hath very truly noted: Quicquid patimur, Senec●. 〈…〉 Act 5. See. 2. p. 257. mortale genus, Quicquid facimus, venit ab alto. whate'er we suffer, or what e'er we do, Comes from above, and is not bred below. And another of them, unto the same purpose: Deo volente, quisque, 〈…〉 in 〈◊〉 p. 17. & ridet, & dolet. As God will, so Men laugh, or weep. For, as S. Ambrose, to this purpose, very truly observeth, Omnia, 〈◊〉. in Psal. 118. Serm. 10. To. 4. p. 66●. iudicio Dei fiunt: ut aegrum corpus aliquis habeat, aut salubre; ut diues, aut pauper sit; ut iwenis moriatur, aut senex. All things do fall out, by the judgement of God. Whether a man be sick, or in health; whether he be rich, or poor; whether he die young, or old. All these, are appointed unto him by God. 4. Ye●, and that Sickness is nothing else, but the very stroke of God, sometimes instructing us, Sickness is nothing else but the Sroke of God. Lib 1. Cap. 12 Sect. 5. Basil in As●●ticis. To. 2. p. 292. not to sin; and sometimes correcting us, for our sin: S Basil plainly teacheth us. Saepe, disciplinae gratia, in morbos incidimus. And a little after. Saepe, peccatorum sunt flagella, infirmitates. Sicknesses are often sent us, for our instruction sake. Ofttimes, our sorrows and infirmities, are the scourges of our sins and iniquities. And this we may further see, by the judgement of Physicians; unto whose art it more properly belongeth, to search out the true causes of all diseases. For, they oftentimes do find, in many Sicknesses, that, beside the disor'red and peccant humours of men's bodies, which are the material cause of all Sickness, there is in it beside, the special stroke of God's hand. Whereunto they are enforced to reduce it, as unto his true and proper Efficient. Because they see it oftentimes to fall out that many diseases, which they, at the first, thought to be but slight and contemptible; yet do prove, in the end, to be mortal, and incurable: do they all what they can; the power of their medicines, being manifestly hindered, from their natural working, in the body of this man, which yet work most kindly, in the body of another man. For (as Solon observeth, to this very purpose: Saepè, è modico dolore, Solonin Elegijs, p. 134. morbus fit magnus: Quem nemo soluerit, blanda remedia praebens. Ofttimes we see, from small green wounds, and from a little grief, A greater Sore and Sickness grows, then will admit relief. So that, as another Poet, in the same case, Ovid. l. 1. De Ponto Eleg. 4. p 160. b. observeth: Non est in medico semper, relevetur ut aeger: Interdum, docta plus valet arte, malum. It is not always in Physicians skill, To cure the Patient, that is sick, and ill. For sometimes sickness on the Patient's part, Prou's stronger far, than all Physicians Art. Yea, and in another place, he confirmeth his own observation, by a real demonstration, Ovid. l. 7. Metam. p. 278. in the plague of the Aeginets: Exitium superabat opem, quae victa iacebat. The Poison of the Malady, Was stronger than the Remedy. The malice of the sickness surpassing all the help of the most approved medicines. And this incurableness in every sickness (which is, indeed, the very soul of the sickness, whereby it liveth, though the Patient dieth) doth himself challenge, Deut. 28. 27. 35. to be his own peculiar work. Ecclus. 21. 3. The Lord will smite thee, with the Botch of Egypt, and with Emerods', and with the Scab, and with the Itch; so that thou shalt not be healed. And therefore, Hypocrates giveth this good counsel unto all Physicians, that when they come unto their Patients, they should consider with themselves; Hypocrates. l. 1. Praenotionum, c. 2. p. 366. whether there be not, Divinum quiddam, in morbis: The stroke of God, in the Sickness. Because, than it should seem, that he held his case for desperate: and that it was but in vain, to apply any medicine. For, Cic. l. 16. ad Attic. epist. 339. p. 408. as the Roman Orator hath recorded of him: Desperatis, Hypocrates vetat adhibere medicinam: Hypocrates forbiddeth the Physician, to apply any medicine, to a desperate man. But yet, by the leave of that learned Physician, the Case is not so despereate. For then, no sickness should be cured. Because, in every sickness, there is the stroke of God. There is no sickness so little, but God hath a finger in it, if it be but the aching of thy little finger. For, Plutarch in A●●atorio. To. 3. p. 403. though there be in the body, but only one disease, that is called Sacer morbus: yet is it most certain, that there is, Sacrum quiddam, in omni morbo: There is the stroke of God in every sickness. And yet every sickness is not unto death, Io. 11. 4. as our Saviour Christ testifieth. But, that sicknesses and diseases, are nothing else, but God's stripes, we may see it plainly verified, both by God himself, who challengeth it; and by the Scriptures, which ascribe it; and by the Fa●thers, who teach it; and by the very Heathen themselves which confess it. For the first of which four proofs, to wit, the challenge of God: The Lord himself expressly threateneth in the forealleged place, That he will smite them with the Consumption, and with the ●euer, Deut. 28, 22. & with the burning Ague, and with the fervent Heat, and with the Sword, and with Blast, and with Mildew. Mark, God will smite them, with all these. Thereby plainly insinuating, that all those diseases are as truly Gods smiting, as his smiting with the Sword, which he numbereth there among them. And again he threateneth, in the very same place, that he will smite them, with the Botch of Egypt, Deut. 28 27. and with the Emerods', Deut. 28 28. and with the Scab, and with the Itch. And yet again: that he will smite them, with Madness, and with Blindness; and with Astonying of heart. So that, all those Sicknesses, he challengeth and assumeth to be his strokes, and his Smitings. Yea, and the Scriptures themselves ascribe the same unto him, yea, and under the same name: and that in both Testaments. In the Old, the Lord denounceth against King Pharaoh, Ex. 4. 14. that if he will not let the Israelites depart, he will send all his plagues, upon his heart. The words of the Text are (as Arias Montanus hath ad verbum, translated them) Mitto omnes plagas meas, in cor tuum: I will send all my strokes, upon thy heart. Therefore all the Egyptian plagues, were nothing else, but Plagae, that is to say, God's smitings. So again, in another place; the Leprosy is called, Deut. 24. 8. Plaga Leprae, that is, the stroke of Leprosy. And so the Prophet David beseecheth the Lord, to take his plague away from him. Amove a me plagas tuas Calling his diseases, Psal. 39 10. plagas, that is, the strokes of God. And so likewise, in the New Testament; diseases and sicknesses are called Gods scourges: Flagella, his whips, or his rods. The Evangelist Saint Mark, calleth the woman's bloody issue, her scourge, or her rod. And, in another place, he saith, that there pressed upon Christ, but only to touch him, so many as had plagues. Mar. 5. 29. The Greek signifieth Scourges. Mar. 3. 10. And so likewise, the Evangelist Saint Luke he saith, that our Saviour cured many, of their sicknesses, and plagues. The Greek again is, Luke, 7 21. Scourges. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: He cured them of their Scourges. Therefore Sickness are Scourges. Yea; and the Fathers, in their writings, do perpetuate the same phrase. S. Basil calleth Sicknesses, Plagas, Basil, in As●eticis To. 2. p. 292. & flagellationes Dei: The strokes and Stripes of God. Hieron. in Cap. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209. And Saint Hierom he calleth them, Flagella Diaboli; The Scourges of the Devil: In corporis malis, flagellum Diaboli intelligimus. The one Father, from the Author, calleth them, the Scourges of God: the other, from the Instrument, the Scourges of the Devil. As we see they were, in job: and, job, 2. 7. in that crooked woman, Luke, 13. 16. whom our Saviour Christ healed. But yet, the Author of both their infirmities, was God: because the Devil could do nothing, but as he was fore-limited. And therefore, even the Heathen, who before confessed sickness to be sent from God, yea and to be sent, as a punishment, for sin, against God, do also acknowledge it, to be the Stroke of God. The Philistims call their Emerods', 1. Sam. 6. 9 the stroke of God's hand: even as plainly and directly, Psal. 39 10. as David himself doth: I am even consumed, by the stroke of thine hand. Yea, and the Poet Iwenal affirmeth of all the Heathen in general, that, — missum ad sua corpora morbum, Iweval, Satyr. 13. p. 60. b. Infesto credunt a numine. Saxa Deorum Haec, & tela putant.— If they but feel a little Sickness sent, To touch the body: Then they think it meant Even from some angry God, whom they have grieved, For Sin inflicted. And being thus mischieued. They deem and name Diseases, miseries, The Slings and Darts of wronged Deities. This he reporteth for the common opinion of all the Heathen, that all of them believe, both that God is the sender of all kinds of sicknesses, and that they be the Strokes of his darts, and arrows. Which, we may further see confirmed, by that Censure, which Homer giveth of the plague of the greeks: which he both ascribeth unto their God, Apollo; and calleth it there expressly, Telum Dei. A title, which, even the Scripture itself giveth also, Homer, l. 1. Iliad. p. 18. in Graecolat. to that Sickness: Thou shalt not be afraid of the fear of the night; nor yet of the arrow, Psal. 91. 5. 6. that flieth by day; nor of the pestilence, that walketh in the darkness: expressing in the latter words, what he meant in the former, to wit, that, by that arrow, he understood, the pestilence. Neither is this Sickness only, called one of God's arrows: Psal. 38. 2, 3. but all other Sicknesses too. Thine arrow's light upon me (saith the Psalmist of his Sicknesses) and there is nothing sound in my flesh, because of thine anger, neither is there any rest in my bones, because of my Sins. Which place of the Psalmist, expresseth in effect, the whole sum of this Chapter, and of every Branch of it. First, naming the Cause of his sickness, to be Sin Secondly, the Effect of his sin, to be God's anger. Thirdly, the fruit of God's anger, to be his sickness. And fourthly, the form of his sickness, to be (as it were) the stroke of an Arrow. Now (to form this whole discourse, unto our present purpose:) If the true cause of sickness, be only Sin against God: If God himself do threaten, for this cause to send sickness: If he truly hath performed, as much as he hath threatened: And, if sickness be nothing else, but the Stroke of God's hand: Then must there needs be a God, which worketh all those things. But all the forenamed points have sufficiently been proved, not only by Scriptures, and the doctrine of Christians; but also by the testimony, even of the very Heathen. And therefore, That there is a God, doth need no further proof. This first consideration of Physic, of the nature of Sickness, is proof more then enough. CHAP. 6. The God is the giver of health unto men. 2. That he is the preserver of it. 3. That he is the restorer of it. 4. Both by giving medicinable herbs unto men. 5. And by teaching them the right uses of them. 6. And by joining his blessing unto their working. THat sicknesses and diseases do not come to men by chance, nor 〈◊〉 out of the dust; but are sent by the justice and judgement of God, either to correct men for sinning, or to restruine men from sinning; I have already proved in the former Chapter. Now, that the Remedies of diseases are also sent from God, and from none other author, I take to prove in this Chapter. A thing, which followeth, in a manner, upon the granting of the former. For, if we grant, that God is the Author of diseases; we must also grant, that he is the Author of Remedies. Or else, we shall be forced to yield unto the one, of these two gross absurdities: Either, that there be two Gods; or else, that something, which is not God, yet is better than God. For, if we yield, that diseases come from one Author, and their Remedies from another; then do we make two diverse Authors: Duo Principia, Plut. l. De Iside. To. 2. p. 190. Two Principles, and two Gods, as Zoroastres did. And if we hold, that that Author, from whom Remedies do come, is not God; then hold we, that something is better than God. For, it is better to give Remedies, than it is to give diseases: as it is better to give good things, than it is, to give evil. So that, except God be the Author of Remedies, as well as of diseases, he shall not be the Sovereign fountain of Goodness, but shall have a more base and inferior office, than some of his own creatures. And so, God shall not be God: But that other, which is the giver of good things; Plato, l. 2 De Repub. p 554. shall be God. For, (as Plato truly teacheth) Bonorum, solus Deus, causa est: malorum verò, quamlibet aliam, praeter Deum, caus●m quaerere decet. It is only God, that is the Cause of all good things: but evil things have not God, but some other thing, for their cause. Therefore, for the clearing of this doubt; that there be not two diverse Authors and Princes in the world; the one sending diseases; the other, their Remedies; but, that both of these do come from one Author, who is God, and none other; it is evidently anounched, in the Holy Scripture, as it were of set purpose, for the preventing of this error. Thus the Prophet Moses telleth the Israelites, that, Deut. ●. 15. If they will obey all Gods holy commandments, the Lord will both take from them, all their own in firmities, and will not put upon them, any Egyptian diseases. Thereby plainly insinuating, that it is absolutely in God's power, both to impose diseases, and to send releaseth. Thus Eliphaz, without all insinuation, job. 5. 18. affirmeth in express and plain terms: God maketh the wound, and he bindeth it; he smiteth, and his hand maketh whole. Thus Hannah, in her song, The Lord killeth, 1. Sam. 2. 6. and maketh alive; he bringeth down unto the grave, and heraiseth up. Thus Moses, in his Psalm, Psal. 90. 3. Thou turnest a man unto destruction; Again thou sayest, Return, ye sons of Adam. Host 6. 1. Thus likewise Hosea: The Lord hath wounded, and he will bind us up. By all which Testimonies, it evidently appeareth, that there is not one God which striketh us, and another which healeth us: but it is one and the same God, which doth both these unto us. una manus nobis vulnus, Ouid. l. 1. De Remed. Amor. p. 292. opemque feret. As it is in the Poet. All is but one, and self same hand, that thus, Both one while hurteth, and that helpeth us. It is but one and the same God, Tertul. l. 3. cont. Martion. c. 24. p. 400. Qui & caedit, & sanat: as it is in Tertullian Who both killeth and cureth. Who yet is not good in the one action, and evil in the other; but truly good in them both. Just, when he afflicteth, which is one kind of Goodness; and Merciful when he releaseth, which is another kind of Goodness. Nay, then also merciful, even when he afflicteth: being Deus, ad inferos usque misericors. And therefore, Optimus, si reddit placatus, quod abstulerat iratus: as it followeth in the same place. He is such a God, as is merciful, even down unto hell. And therefore must n●edes be very excellently good, if he restore that health again, when he is appeased, which he took away when he was displeased. So that the very necessity of Reason inferreth, that if God be the sender of diseases unto men (as I have formerly proved him) then must he also be the sender of remedies unto them. Else can he not be God; nay, else can he not be Good. For how can he be either God or good, who is willing to hurt us, if he know, that he hath not the power again to help us? But God is truly and perfectly good, and hath in this point as great a power, as he hath in any other; and extendeth it as graciously unto the benefit of all men: being indeed both the Giver and the Preserver, and the Restorer of health unto them; from whose only grace and favour, all these heavenly blessings come. For the first of which three points: That God is the Giver of health unto men, God is the Giver of health. the Prophet David expressly affirmeth it, Psalm. 28. 7. in calling God in one place, Psalm. 27. 1. His strength; Psalm. 94. 5. and in another, His salvation; and in another, The strength of his salvation. The Fathers they acknowledge it: Philo judaeus delivereth his opinion in these words: Philo jud. l. 2. de leg. allegor. p. 131 Sic opinor, Sanitatem meram, quam nullus morbus praecessit in corpore, Deum, pierce, solum largiri: liberationem autem a morbo, etiam per artem, aut medicinam; ipse sanans vel per haec, vel citra horum operam. This is mine opinion, That pure and perfect health, which hath not been attainted with any sickness, is given immediately by only God himself. But a release from any sickness, he oftentimes worketh by the means of Physic; yet healing us, as he pleaseth, either with it, or without it. Acknowledging God directly, not only to be the bestower of health, but also the deliverer from sickness. So likewise Gregory Nyssen: Hoc est perfectae Providentiae opus, Greg. Nyssen, l. de Infantibus praematurè abreptis p. 138. non solùm contractos curare morbos, verùm etiam prohibere, antequam contrahantur. This is the work of God's perfect Providence, not only to cure Diseases, when they are come upon us, but also to prevent them, before they come unto us. So likewise Saint Augustine: Salus Hominum, Aug. in Psal. 35. To. 8. p. 270. à quo? A Deo. Tell me, from whom it is, that health cometh unto men? He answereth that Question, that, It only comes from God. Aug. l. 5. de Civit. Dei c. 11. To. 5. p. p. 303. And again, in another place. Deus dedit carni, originem pulchritudinem, valetudinem, propagationem, foecunditatem, membrorum dispositionem, salutem. It is God that hath given unto the body of a man, both his beginning, and his beauty, his strength, and his foecunditie, his comeliness, and his Health. Yea, and even the very Heathen acknowledge also the very same. Critias saith expressly. — bonam valetudinem, Dij, munus iucundissimum, Athenae●, l. 10. p. 323. dederunt hominibus. It is God that hath given good health unto men, Which, of all other gifts, is most sweet unto them. To this end, the Romans did consecrate, Salus, among their other gods: Insinuating thereby, ●iuie, l. 10. p. 170. that it is God, that is the Giver of all health, and all safety. And therefore, among those other titles, which they bestowed upon God, they called him * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cicer. Orat. 4. in Ver. p. 105. Sotera, that is to say, A Saviour, quia Salutem dat: as the Orator expoundeth it. Is nimirùm Soter est, qui salutem dedit: He only is a Saviour, that giveth health unto men. By which very name, they worshipped, Pausan. in Corinthiacis, p. 97. even jupiter himself, among them; as Pausanias instanceth, in the Troczenians: Adesi & I●vcs fanum, ●●gn●mine Seruatoris. They have a Temple of jupiter, surnamea the Saviour. A title so essential and proper unto God, that Basil reproveth it, Basil. as a kind of profaneness, for any man to give it unto his Physicians, and to call them, Saluatores, or Saviour's: though, by them, they have been saved, from never so grievous sicknesses. Because all Physicians, even then, when they cure their Patients, yet do it not by their own power, but by the power of God, who is the true Saviour: yea, and the only Saviour too. For, Beside him there is no Saviour. Isay, 43. 11. Aelian, l. 12. de var. Hist. c. 51. p. 489. And therefore, King Philip of Macedon did justly deride the dotage of Menecrates, a fantastical Physician, for calling himself jupiter, that is, A helping Father: as that name is etymologized by the Roman Orator: jupiter id est, Iwans Pater: as though he (like another jupiter) had, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 210. in his hand, a full power, to bestow health and safety, upon any man whomsoever. Which folly that wise King derided very savourly: and, in that his derision, acknowledged, that Health cometh only from God, Cic. Orat. Pro Quinto Ligario, p 541. and not from the Physician. And therefore saith the Orator, that, Homines ad Deos, nulla re propiùs accedunt, quam salutem hominibus dando. That Men not come nearer unto God in any thing, than they do, in giving of health unto men. But yet, this is not enough, to make them called Suiours. For he that properly is a Saviour, must save, only by his own power: as our Saviour Christ did. Who, Mat. 11. 5. both healed all infirmities, Mat. 10. 1. 8. and gave all kinds of healths, by his own only power: Sight, unto the blind; Strength, unto the lame; Hearing, to the deaf; Cleansing, to the Lepers; and life unto the dead: as is expressly testified. So that, even in this respect (though there were none other) yet might he truly and properly be called a Saviour & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: as indeed he is. But, Luk 2. 11. as for his Disciples, though they did, all the same works; yet could none of all them properly be called a Saviour: joh. 4. 42. because they did them, not by their own power, Act 3. 7. and 5. 15. &. 19 12. but by his. As the Apostle S. Peter ingenuously confesseth. Ye men of Israel (saith he, Act 3. 2. 6. 2. 7. 12. 16. when he healed the Cripple, at the gate of the Temple) why marvel ye at this thing? or why look ye so steadfastly upon us? as though we by our own power, had made this man to go. It is only the name of jesus, that hath made this man sound. Not, that the name of jesus (though it signify, A Saviour) doth carry with it any necessary Charm, Mat. 1 21. for either healing of diseases, or casting out of devils, as some men vainly have imagined: for in the sons of Scaeva the jew, the contrary was plainly proved: but, the Name of jesus, Act. 19 13 etc. that is to say, the power of jesus, hath given this man his strength. For, all the miracles, which his disciples wrought, were done only by his power; As is expressly testified, by plain words in the Scripture: He gave them power, against unclean spirits, Mat. 10. 1. and to heal every sickness. They had all their power, but only by his gift. But he wrought all his miracles, only by his own might. They wrought theirs, but Precando: but he his, Imperando: as Hegesippus distinguisheth. Hegesip. l. 2. de excidio urbis. c. 12. p. 261. And therefore, though they saved many from very grievous sicknesses: yet they, doing those works, not by their own power, but only by our Saviour Christ jesus his power; not they, but he meriteth the name of a Saviour: as being the very fountain, from whence all health springeth unto every man. So that, it is, neither the strong constitution of our parents, nor the well-tempered complexion of ourselves, Ps 3. 8. Wi●d. 16. 7. that is the true fountain of our health: but as the Psalmist very truly acknowledgeth, Domini est salus, It is only the Lord that is the giver of our health. Who therefore is worthily called a Saviour. 2 And, as God is the only Giver of health unto men, so is he likewise the only Preserver of the same. It is none of all those things, God is the Preserver of health. whereof Tully giveth instance, as the principallest means for the preservation of health, that are able to continue it; if God himself put not under his gracious hand, to sustain & uphold it. Neither, Cic. l. 2. Oss●c. p. 376. Notitia sui corporis; nor Obseruatio, quaeres aut prodesse soleant aut obesse; nor, Continentia in victu atque cultu; nor, Praetermissae voluptates; nor, Ars eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent. Neither the knowledge of our own bodies; nor the Observation, of either helpful, or hurtful things; nor abstinence in meat; nor continency from pleasures; nor the art of Physicians: No, nor yet, those other helps, Cic. l. 16. Epist. sam. Epist. 18. p. 180. prescribed by him also, unto his servant Tiro: neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: neither the procuring of ready concoction, not the avoiding of wearisome labouring, nor the entertaining of moderate walking, nor the disposition unto liberal recreation, nor the benefit of facile and soluble egestion: no nor any thing else, that can preserve health unto us, if God himself do not sustain us. But, notwitstanding all those helps, yet, if we want his special help and blessing, we shall soon be driven to complain with job, job. 30. 15. that, Our health doth vanish away like a Cloud. And therefore the Prophet David, with thankfulness, professeth, that, It is the Lord only, that maketh him dwell in safety, that is, Psa 4● which preserveth and continueth him in health. Of whose fatherly protection, in preserving of his from sicknesses, he hath composed a notable Psalm, wherein he giveth men assurance, Psal. 91. 4. 7. that they are kept so safe under the shadow of God's wings, that the Plague shall not come near them, though a thousand should fall at their side, and ten thousand at their right hand. And therefore job calleth him, job. 7. 20. Custodem hominum, The Preserver of men. What shall I do unto thee, o Thou Preserver of men? Which Tittle he there giveth him, not only, because he preserveth men from sickness; but also upholdeth them in their health. Without whose special providence, in keeping them, they shall never be able, to perserue themselves, though they use never so great carefulness, or have, at their elbows, never so great Physicians. For, Hier. in Cap. 26. as S. Hierom very truly teacheth us; Nisi Dominus custodierit Civitatem, Isai. To. 5. p. 110 frustrà vigilavit, qui custodit eam: sic nisi Dominus custodierit Sanitatem, in vanum custodiunt, qui praecepta Salutis custodiendae edunt. Except the Lord keep the City, the Watchman watcheth but in vain: And so, except the Lord keep thy safety, the Physician lesson's thee in vain. The Lord, that first hath given it, he also must keep it: else both thou and the Physician, do, but in vain, endeavour it. Yea, and even the very Heathen do hold, in their Religion, that God is not only the Giver of health, but also the Preserver and maintainer of it. The Mantinenses dedicated two Temples unto their great god jupiter: the one of them, Pausa. in Arcadi cis, p. 300. jovi Datori; the other, jovi Servatori. The one of them, unto God the Giver; the other of them, unto God the Preserver. And therefore Menander bringeth in certain persons making of this prayer. Deos omnes coelestes precamur, Athenaeus Lib. 14. p. 491. — nobis ut salutem dent. Integram valetudinem, bona multa: Et eorum, quae iam parta sunt, Laetum ac commodum usum. We pray the Gods, that safety they And perfect health would grant to us; With all the many Gifts, that may Men happy make. Not only thus, But this beside we further crave, A joyous Use of what we have. Ascribing to their gods, not only the giving, both of health and all good things, but also the continuing of the prosperous use of them. And so likewise Terence, he bringeth in, another, making, in effect, the same Prayer: — O jupiter, Terent. Eunuch. Act. 5. See. 9 p. 96. Serua (obsecro) haec nobis bona. O God, these goods which we possess, We pray, with thy praescruing bliss. Acknowledging the continuing, as well as the giving of all good things, to be only of God's goodness. But, above all the rest, the continuance of our health. For, as Tully recordeth; among jupiters' other Titles, he was called, Salutaris, that is, The Giver of Health. Of which his appellation, he rendereth this reason; Cic. l. 3. de. Fin. p. 76. Quia salus hominum in eius sit tutela: Because all a man's safety, is only in his custody. Yea, and even the profane Emperor and Persecutor Maximinus, though otherwise most irreligious; yet ascribeth it only unto Gods especial goodness, Euseb.. l. 9 Hist. c. 7. p. 112. that the corruptions of the air do not infect all of us: quòd corrupta coeli temperies squallentia corpora in mortem non conijciat. Thereby plainly confessing, that it is God only, and none else, which is the Preserver, and Maintainer of man's health. 3 Now, as God is both the Giver, God is the Restorer of Health. and Preserver of health: so is he also, the Restorer of it. He both gave it unto us, when we had it not: and preserveth it unto us, whilst we have it: and restoreth it unto us, when as we have lost it. And this point may also, as clearly be demonstrated, by the Testimonies, both of Holy Scriptures, and of Heathen writers, as any of the former. Of which Testimonies, some be such, as do only express their opinion, in words: some such, as declare the strength of it, by deeds: and some such, as demonstrate the truth of it, by effects. For the first of which three heads: the Prophet Moses assureth the Israelites, Deut. 7. 15. that, if they will obey Gods holy Laws and Ordinances, he will, not only take all infirmities from them, but also, will not put any evil disease upon them. Thereby plainly declaring, that God hath a power in him; both to preserve men in their health; and to bring them unto sickness; and to deliver them from sickness. The Prophet David likewise expressly confesseth, that it is the Lord only, Psal. 103. 3. which both forgiveth all our iniquities, and healeth all our infirmities. Taking first away the Cause of our Sickness, which is only our sin: and then applying his own healing grace, as a sovereign Medicine. And so likewise jehoram King of Israel confesseth, by insinuation, even the very same thing. For, when the King of Aram writ unto him, that he should heal the Leprosy of Naaman: he asked in great passion; 2. Kin. 5. 7. Whether he were a God, 2. Kin. 5. 15. that he should do this great thing? Thereby manifestly insinuating, that the power of healing is the work of a God, and not of a man. Yea, and even Naaman himself, when the work was done, acknowledged, that God was the only doer of it: Now I know, there is no God, in all the world, but in Israel. And how came he to know this? He knew it, by the miraculous healing of his sickness. For, as Ecclesiasticus directly testifieth: The power of healing, Ecclus. 38. 2. cometh only from the most High. Yea, and even the very Heathen do hold the same opinion. Coelius Rhodiginus reporteth out of Plutarch's Symposiaches, Coel. Rhodigin. l. 19 c. 11. p. 1354. Plut. l. 4. Sympos. Quaest 1. To. 3. Mor. p. 239. of a very notable and learned Physician, named Philon; that he, having confected diverse excellent Medicines, Regia quaedam, & auxiliaria medicamenta; called those his Medicines, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, the hands of God. Which glorious appellation, whether he do irreligiously apply unto his own medicines, as though they were able to procure a man's health, as well as Gods own hands; or religiously, as not being able to work any health, without the help of God's hand: yet both ways, he acknowledgeth, the working of health, to be the power of Gods own hand. And so doth Tully likewise, Cic. l. 14. Epist. Fam. Ep. 7. 162. when he writeth thus, unto his wife: Statim ita levatus sum, ut mihi Deus aliquis fecisse medicinam videatur: I was suddenly so eased, as if a medicine had been sent unto me from God. Thereby plainly acknowledging, that the hand of God is the most sovereign Medicine. And thus, both Christians and Heathens have delivered their opinions, in express and plain words: That it is only God himself, that is the Restorer of men, unto their health. And, that this is not, in them, only a verbal profession, or a volant and fleeting imagination, but a very strong persuasion, both inwardly settled and deeply grounded in them, as a sprout of natural Religion; they have, both of them, declared, as well by their deeds, as they have by their words: which is the second sort of our Testimonies. For, ever, when they have been afflicted with any kind of sickness, either public, or private, they have still sought, to obtain their remedy from God, by offering up unto him, both Supplications, and Sacrifices; as unto the only Restorer of their health. Thus did Moses; when, Num. 11. 1, 2. by the fire of God, very many of the Israelites were devoured and consumed, he sought for the remedy, only at his gracious hand: using prayer, for his water, to extinguish that fire. Thus likewise did Aaron; when a grievous plague was sent by God himself, among them, he sought only for the remedy, Num. 16. 47, 48 at that hand which had smitten them, by offering up incense, for a savour of rest, and making an atonement for the people, with God. And thus likewise did King David; when, 2. Sam, 24. 25. at another time, another like plague happened, he sought for the remedy only at the hand of God, by appeasing of his wrath, with Burnt-Offerings, and Peace-Offerings. Yea, and even the very Heathens themselves, in all their like Calamities, have ever held this, for the chiefest of their Medicines, to obtain release of God, by their prayers and supplications. Whereof, even their own Histories afford us both great plenty, and great variety of Examples. In that great plague, Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 5. B. which happened in the Camp of the greeks, at the siege of Troy; they sought only, for their remedy, at the hand of God, by lenifying his anger, with sacrifice and prayer; precibus & sacrificijs. In that great plague, which happened unto the Aeginets; their King sought for remedy, at the hand of God only. Ipse ego sacra jovi pro me Patriáque, Ouid. l. 7. Metam. p. 280. &c: Even I myself, do, for myself, and for my Country's sake, To jupiter by sacrifice, our whole atonement make. In that great plague, which happened among the Athenians; they consulted with Apollo, what should be their best remedy: unto whom, when he answered; That they should purge and cleanse their City: whenas they were devising how to do it, La●r &. in vit. Epimen. p. 39 by other means; Epimenides advised them to perform it by sacrifice: which is indeed the best purgation, and the most certain expiation. Yea and the Roman Story affords no less variety: as we may evidently see, in many places of Livy. In that great plague, which happened among the Romans, in the time of Tullus Hostilius, they all of them went into this opinion: Vnam opem aegris corporibus relictam; si pax veniaque ab Dijs impetrata esset: That there was but one Remedy, Livy, l. 1. p. 12. for those that were sick; and that was, to obtain peace and pardon of God. And that their practice was suitable unto their opinion, he hath given us, in another place, a very notable instance, Livy, l. 5. p. 91. in that great plague, which happened in the time of Camillus. Where their expiation was performed with so great a solemitie, as equalled almost that of josias, 2. Kin. 23. for ceremony. Which in these words is described, and set out, by Livy: Tristem hi●mem (sive ex intemperie Coeli, raptìm mutatione in contrarium facta) gravis pestilensque omnibus animalibus aestas excepit. Cuius insanabilis perniciei, quandò nec causa nec finis inveniebatur, Libri Sibyllini, ex Senatusconsulto, aediti sunt: duumviri, sacris faciundis (lectisternio tunc primùm in urbe Romana facto) per dies octo, Apollinem, Latonámque, & Dianam, Herculem, Mercurium atque Neptunum, tribus (quam amplissimè tunc apparari poterat) stratis lectis, placauêre. Privatìm quoque id sacrum celebratum est: tota urbe patentibus ianuis, promiscuóque usu rerum omnium in propatulo posito: notos ignotósque passìm advenas in hospitium ductos ferunt, & cum inimicis quoque benignè & comiter sermones habitos, iurgijs & litibus temperatum. Vinctis quoque dempta in eos dies vincula; religioni deinde fuisse, quibus eam opem Dij ●uli●●at, vinciri. There followed, after an heavy winter, a most contagious Summer: Whether it grew from the unwholsomnesse of the Air, occasioned by many sudden alterations, or from some other cause: but pernicious it was unto all living things. Of which incurable evil, whenas they could neither find out any cause, nor perceive any end, the Senators decreed; that the books of Sibylla should be searched; that two officers should be appointed, to look to the performance of their holy service: their holy feasting in their Temples (which they call their Lectisternium) being at that time first ordained in the City of Rome; for eight whole days together, they appeased the anger, both of their God Apollo, and of his mother Latona, and of his sister Diana; and of Hercules, Mercurius, and Neptunus: the Feast being held as sumptuously, as in those days could be possibly, in three several places. Yea, and the same Feast was kept holy, as well privately, as publicly. All the doors in the City were then set wide open: All things, for the time, were used in common: all men, both known and unknown, yea and even the very Strangers, were ●alled into their houses: Loving conferences were used, even with their very enemies; and an utter cessation of all suits, debates, and quarrels: Yea the Prison doors were opened, during all those high feast-days. And those, that, by the benefit of their gods, were then released, were never after that (upon mere Religion) imprisoned. Thus far proceedeth Livy. Out of which his narration we may observe these two things. First, that though this great plague might, in part, be attributed unto the often and sudden alteration of the air, as unto an immediate and inferior Cause: yet that they looked higher, unto the first Cause, and ascribed it to God, from whom it came indeed. Secondly, that, as they acknowledged the disease to come from God: so they sought for their remedy, no where else, but of God. So confessing him directly, to be both the sender of sickness, and the Restorer of health. As we may evidently see, in the very same Author, by diverse other instances, in diverse other places: as namely. Lib. 7. p. 121. 129. Lib. 10. p. 187. Lib. 27. p. 308. Lib. 38. p 482. Lib. 41. p. 528. In all which places, Livi. he, reporting of very grievous plagues, showeth still, that they sought for their remedy at God, by appeasing of his wrath, with their Sacrifices and prayers. This sense hath God engrafted both into Christians, and Heathens. Neither doth Religion only teach them, to seek their remedy at God, in such public calamities, but also even in their private sicknesses. King David, Psal. 41. 4. being afflicted with a dangerous sickness, maketh this request to God, Heale me (o Lord) I have sinned against thee. Thereby plainly insinuating these three things unto us. First, that only sin is the cause of all sickness. Secondly, that only God is the restorer unto health. And Thirdly, that only Prayer is the means of obtaining that grace. And though it may seem a very strange request, to desire God to heal him, because he had sinned against him: which was the very cause, for which God had smitten him: yet it is not so indeed, if the words be well resolved. For his meaning is no more but this: that God, who had stricken him, for committing of his sin; should now again heal him, for confessing of his sin. As if he should say, as it is in the Orator, Cic. Epist. Octaviano, p. 223. Sit erranti medicina confessio. Let my confession be my Medicine. Or, as in other words He expresseth it, but to the same effect: Let my prayer ascend up before thee, as incense; and the lifting up of my hands be as an evening Sacrifice. Thus, Psal. 141. 2. in his private sickness, as well as in the public, he sought for all his help, at the only hand of God. And the same disposition is also engrafted into the minds of the Heathen: Who (as Iwenal observeth) if they chance but to feel the least touch of a fever, they straightway interpret it the effect of God's Anger: and therefore they do presently betake them to their vows, and seek to appease him by the promise of some sacrifice. They do, Iwenal. Satyr. 13. p. 60. B. — Pecudem spondere sacello Balantem, & Laribus cristam promittere Galli. They vow unto the Shrine, a bleating sheep, And to the Gods that do their Houses keep, They vow their Cock's heads, etc. Thus have they been taught, even by the light of Reason, that, if the disease have proceeded from God, the ease must also be sought for at his hand. For (as Aquinas hath very well observed) The Remedy must always be proportionated unto the Meladie: else will it do● no good. Medicus (saith he) non tanto magìs sanat, quanto maiorem dat medicinam; sed quanto medicina est morbo magìs proportionata. The Physician doth not always then heal the most strongly, when he giveth the strongest medicines; but when the medicine, which he ministereth, is best tempered, and proportioned unto the quality of the sickness. And therefore, if the sickness have proceeded from God, it is but Medicina proportionata, that is to say, a Medicine made in his due proportion, that the Remedy should also be fetched from him. And, that, in thus doing, they have not been deceived, neither in their practice, nor in their opinion, God himself hath declared, by evident demonstration: by sending a present release from every sickness, whensoever they entreated it by their prayers and supplications, This Chap. this Sect. prec●d. as all the forenamed Authors, in all the forenamed places, have left testified unto us: which is the third rank of our testimonies. For in all the self same places, where there is mention made both of the diseases to be sent from God, and of help to have been entreated of him; there is also mention made, that, at their supplications, it hath been sent unto them. As the Reader may plainly see, in all the forealleged places, both of the holy Scriptures, and of the secular writers. Unto whom, for brevity's sake, I refer him. By all which Examples and Testimonies, Nonius in voce, preca●tur. it appeareth that the most sovereign Medicine, for the cure of any sickness, is, uti Serapi medicina, & quotidie precari: as Varro adviseth: to use the medicine of Serapus; and to pour out unto God, our continual and daily prayers. And therefore the wise King Solomon, in that solemn and excellent prayer, which he made when he dedicated his new built Temple unto God, 1. Kings, 8. 37. etc. he made this request for one; that, if either Famine, or Pestilence, or Blasting, or Mildew, or Grasshopper, or Caterpillar, should at any time afflict them; if they came into that house, and there should powreout their supplications unto God; that their prayer might be accepted, and their punishment released. Thereby plainly insinuating, that Prayer unto God, is Panchrestum medicamentum, Cic. Orat, 5, in Ver. p. 137. as the Orator speaketh, A salve for every sore, and a Cure of every sickness. A probatum est, whereof we may see in Hezechiah, who being attatched with a dangerous sickness (some think it was the Plague) yet did heal himself more sound by his effectual prayers, 1, Kings, 20. 2. etc. than could a whole College of the learnedest Physicians. And therefore the Patient, he is appoined to pray: My son, Ecclu. 3●. 9 fail not in thy sickness to pray unto the Lord, Ecclu. 3●. 14. and he will make thee whole. The Physician, he is appointed to pray: They shall pray unto the Lord, that he would prosper that which is given for thine ease, and their Physic for the prolonging of life. And the Congregation they are appointed to pray: Is any man sick among you? Let him call for the Elders of the Church, and let them pray for him, james, 5. 14. 15. and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord will raise him up: and if he have committed any sin, it shall be forgiven him. In which place is congested, the whole sum of all those heads which before I have collected, both in this present Chapter, and also in the former, namely; First, that Sin is the true cause of sickness, upon whose forgiveness there followeth a release, as Matthew, 9 2. Secondly, Matthew, 9 2. that God for this cause, sendeth sickness unto men. Thirdly, that God is not only the sender of sickness, but also the restorer unto health. And fourthly, that the principal means to recover, is earnest and hearty prayer; our own, our Physicians, and our faithful Ministers. So that, in this Case, it is not amiss (though Tully deride it, Cic. l. 2. Te Diuin. p. 263. as a kind of madness) ad aegros, non Medicos adducere▪ sed Vates, & Ariolos: to bring unto the Patient, 2. Kings, 20. 5. 7. not a Physician, but a Prophet. For so did God himself unto Hezechiah, in his sickness. He sent unto him, not Medicum, but Vatem, the Prophet Isay to visit him: by whom notwithstanding he was both comforted, and cured. Thus God (as I have showed you) is both the Giver, and the Restorer of Health; yea, and that oftentimes immediately of himself, without all external means: sending it down sometime immediately out of heaven, 1. Kings, 18. 36. etc. by the only power of prayer, as he did Elias his fire. Thereby plainly declaring, that it was both a false & impious opinion, which was held by Leogorus: Se fortuitò potius, quam Dei voluntate, valetudinem recepisse: Suidas in voce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 278. That he recovered by Fortune, rather than by God's blessing. For, it was not by Fortune, that even Pheraeus jason recovered health, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 236. when his Enemy smiting him chanced, to break his imposthume. This was only God's blessing. He was his Physician. 4 Yea, God is the Giver of all Medi●in●● unto Man. and so is he likewise unto all other men, even when they use their best means: because all the virtue of them is only given by him. He it is, that hath given all medicinal herbs and plants unto man. He it is, that hath given the Art of the Physician, and the skill how to use them. And he it is, that only giveth all the efficacy unto them, by joining his blessing with them. And all this is confessed, as well by the very heathens, as it is by us Christians. For the first of which three points: that God is the giver of all medicines unto Man; we see this by experience, that there is a sanative and medicinable power given both unto herbs, and unto roots, and unto stones, and unto minerals; yea and even unto diverse kinds of pure & simple earths; called Terrae sigillatae, because they be printed and sealed for diverse several uses in man's sicknesses and infirmities. With all which several medicines the body of the earth is so every where replenished, yea and the surface of it so every where over-strewed, as if the whole earth were nothing else but a great bolus, or mass of sovereign medicines, made up, by God himself, for man's several diseases. Now the Question is, whence this healing virtue cometh, unto all the forenamed Simples? whether, from the quality of the earth, wherein they grow? or, from the influence of the stars, whereby they grow? or, from some inward nature in themselves? or, from fate? or, from chance? or, from divine providence? For, it needs must proceed from some one of these. But that it cannot come from any one of the five first imaginary causes; it is (by divine providence) most evidently declared, in the Book of Genesis: Where, it is expressly testified (as it were for the preventing of this fond opinion) that God made every plant of the field, Gen 2. 5. before he put it into the Earth; and every herb, before it grew. A work of so great carefulness, as he hath not expressed in any other of his Creatures: man himself alone excepted. Now this place dischargeth all those forenamed causes of doing any work in this notable effect. The Earth, that hath not given this virtue unto plants: because they all were made before they were put into the Earth. The Stars, they have it not given unto them: because all the plants were made before them. For the plants of the Earth were made the third day: but the Planets of Heaven were not made before the fourth: no, Gen. 1. 12. 13. 14. nor the sixth Stars neither, as appeareth in the Scripture. Their own power and nature hath not given it unto them: because they had not their very being of themselves, but received it of another, even the Divine Creator. Fate, that hath not given it unto them: because they always possess it not, neither work, by necessity, unto their own effect. Chance, that hath not given it unto them: because then, the remedies could not have answered so aptly unto the diseases, nor so constantly, in all places. Now, if neither Earth, nor Heaven, nor Nature, nor Fate, nor Fortune, have given those qualities unto Herbs, and Plants: then must Providence needs have done it. For, Plut. l. 1. de Placit. c. 1. To. 2. p. 4. as Plutarch collecteth, in the very like case, that, Omnia quaeneque fortuitò fiunt, neque necessariò, neque divinitùs, res sunt naturales: so may we collect, from the very same division, using a little inversion: that, Quae neque fortuitò fiunt, neque necessariò, neque naturâ, ea fiunt divinitùs. Those things, which are neither done by Fortune, nor by Fate, nor by Nature, they must needs be done by Providence. And, for our present instance; that the virtues of herbs are given to them by Providence, we may further collect, by two other Observations. The first whereof, is this: That the body of a man is not subject unto any sickness, though never so dangerous, but that it hath some remedy provided for it; if man were as skilful, in discerning of them as God hath been bountiful, in providing of them. And therefore saith Bachiarius: Ab sit hoc a fide mea, Bachiar. Epist. de lapsis, 〈◊〉. Pat. To. 1. p. 419 jer. 9 22. ut aliquam dicam esse plaga●, qu●e non haebeat consolationem: cum mihi Propheta proclamet: Nunquid Medicus non est in Galaath? aut resina non est illùc? far be it from me to believe, that there can be any malady, which hath not his remedy: seeing that the Prophet calleth out unto me; Is there no balm in Gilead? and is there no Physician there? Whereby it appeareth, that those medicinal qualities were bestowed upon plants, by such a providence as was full of all goodness, entertaining a general care for all of us; yea and for every disease that might befall any of us; that there should not be any one, but that it had his medicine. The second of those observations is this: That those medicinable plants are so graciously disposed, in all the parts of the earth, that, as there is no sickness, but it hath his redress: so is there no place, but it may be found in it: no region but it hath a natural medicine, to cure every sickness that is naturally bred in it, if man, in his ignorance, did not mistake it. Yea and that so universally, that (as Pliny observeth) Ne Syluae quidem, Plin. l. 24. c. 1. p. 350. horridiòrque naturae facies medicinis carent; sacra illa parente rerum omnium nusquam non remedia disponente homini. Even the woods themselves, and the roughter face of Nature, be not without their medicines; the holy Parent of all things providing helps for men, in all coasts, and all places. Whereby again it appeareth, that those Medicines were ordained, by such a kind of Providence, as both had infinite wisdom, to understand, what medicines were fit, for what diseases; and infinite power, to produce them, in all places. For, as Galen, Gal. l. 3. de usu partium. no less religiously, then wisely, collecteth: Invidere nulli● bona, est perfectae bonitatis; invenire cunctis bona, est summae sapientiae; sed efficere cunctis bona, est, insuperabilis potentiae. To envy good to nothing, is a note of perfect goodness; To find out good for all things, is a note of perfect wisdom; But to do good unto all, is a note of perfect power. So that, as concerning those medicinable plants, it is very true, which S. Basil observeth, that, Non sponte sua ex Tellure germinant Herbae, Basil, in Asceticis. To. 2. p. 291. quae contra quoscunque morbos accommodae sunt: sed, eae, voluntate Opificis, ad nostram utilitatem productae sunt. Those Herbs which men use for the cure of all diseases, do not grow out of the earth of themselves: but, by their Creator's goodness, they were made to profit us. And so likewise Theodoret, unto the same purpose: Creator rerum, Terram quoque, Theodoret. Serm 4. De Provident. To. 2. p. 592. multas Herbarum species, non advescendum modò, sed & eas, quae esui inutiles sunt, germinare iussit: quandoquidem non alimento modò, verùm etiam valetudinis ●ura, nobis opus est. The Creator of all things commanded the Earth to produce all kinds of Herbs; not only such herbs, as are fit to be our meats; but also such Herbs, as be unfit for that purpose: because a man stands in need, as well of medicines, as of meats. So that, all kinds of Herbs, with all their virtues, Ecclus. 38. 4. whether nutritive, or sanative, they be only the gifts of God unto Man: Who (as Ecclesiastic●● testifieth) hath created all the Medicines of the Earth: and he that is wise, will not abhor them. Yea, and even the very Heathen confess also the same. Tully reckoneth up this, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 221. as one of the greatest bounties of Nature, that there be, in all places great store of wholesome medicines: Medicamentorum salutarium plenissimae Terrae. And Pliny speaking of simple medicines, Plin l. 24. Cap. 1. p. 350. referreth their frequency unto Nature's benignity. Naturae placuit, esse remedia parata vulgo, inventu facilia, ac sine impendio. Nature hath provided, that all her wholesome Medicines should be ready at hand, easy to be found, and not dear to be purchased. Adding a little after, that, Remedia vera, pauperrimus quisque coenat. That the best, and truest Medicines, are every day eaten, even by poor men, in their Suppers. As for exotic and compounded medicines; he affirmeth, in the same place, that they have only been invented by the fraud of Physicians, rather to give a false credit to their Art, then to bring any true benefit unto their Patient. Now, though both these two Authors, do ascribe the making of those plants unto Nature: yet, under that word, they understand God. When they praise the benignity & bounty of Nature, for giving such medicinable plants unto men, they do mean, The divine Nature. Or if they mean by Nature, any settled and fixed order of generation; then, when they ascribe those plants unto Nature, they mean only in respect of their present propagation; and not in respect of their first Creation. For, that themselves confess to be the work of God: as Trismegistus expressly acknowledgeth; Constat, Trismeg. As●lep. Cap. 13. p. 537. de Herbis, de Lapidibus, de Aromatibus, vim Divinitatis naturalem in se habere: It is certain, both in Herbs, and in Stones, and in Spices, that they have a natural force of Divinity in them. So that, it is so natural, that it is also divine. It is natural, in respect of their present propagation; which holdeth a natural course, in their generation; but it is supernatural and divine, in respect of their first Creation. It is so, Vis naturalis; that it is also, Vis Divinitatis; as he plainly there affirmeth. 5 And, God is the Giver of all skill in Physic. as the Heathen acknowledge, that medicinable Qualities are given unto plants; and plants, with their Qualities, are given unto men, only by the gift of God: so do they also confess, that the finding out of those Qualities in them, and the skill how to use them, is only the work of his goodness unto man, and not the effect of Man's own invention. Mirari licet (saith Tully) quae sint animaduersa a Medicis Herbarum genera, Cic. lib. 1. Dediu●●a. p. 242. quae Radicum▪ ad morsus bestiarum, ad oculorum morbos, ad vulnera: quorum vim atque naturam ratio nunquàm explicavit. It is a wonder to consider, how many sorts of Herbs, and how many kinds of Roots are observed by Physicians for the biting of Serpents, or other hurtful Beasts, the diseases of the Eyes, and the healing up of wounds. The nature and power of all which several plants is so infinite an invention, as could never have been found out by Man's wit and reason. Now if the wit of man could not find out this great secret: what was it then, that hath found it out? Surely nothing else, but a divine illumination, and inspiration of God. And this, even the Heathen themselves have confessed. Deorum fuisse apparet (saith Pliny) aut certè divinum, Plin. lib. 27. cap. 1. p. 387. etiam cum Homo inveniet. It is apparent that this was God's invention, or, at the least, that it was a divine invention, even though it were invented and found out by man: But he resolveth, that this is so high a skill and understanding, as was rather given by God, then ever found by man. Eandem omnium parentem, & genuisse hac, & ostendisse, nullo vitae miraculo maiore, si verum fateri volumus. That universal Parent and Creator of all things, who first created those Medicines for man, hath also declared the use of them unto him. A thing most strange and miraculous, if we will confess the truth. And, a little before, he rendereth a reason, why the knowledge of those things must needs be rather the teaching of God, than the invention of man. Because, if God hath only given those virtues unto plants; and man, without God, hath found them out; man hath done the greater work, and God the less: Superata hoc modo videri posset naturae ipsius munificentia, si humani operis esset inventio. And therefore, a little after, he concludeth, that, Si quis illa fortè ab homine excogitari posse credit, ingratè Deorum manera intelligit: If any man do think, that such things could have been found by the wit and reach of man, he is an unthankful interpreter of the gracious gift of God. Unto whom Homer also ascribeth this blessing, that for all kind of Medicines, it is only he that possesseth them: Pharmaca cunctorum Iupiter unus habet: St●ba● l. Eclog. Phys. c. 3. p. 3. God only hath the remedy, For every kind of malady. And thus, even the very Heathens themselves do expressly acknowledge, both the plants themselves to be the works of God, and the knowledge of their uses to be the gift of God. Neither stay they only here, in this particular branch of Physic; but they acknowledge the whole Art, Coel. Rhodig. l. 29. c. 11. p. 1353. to be the gift of God. Hypocrates affirmeth it, in express and plain words; Medicam facultatem Deorum esse munus. And so Tully likewise: Cic. l. 1. de Diuin. p. 142. Medicinae utilitas Deorum immortalium inventioni est consecrata. The Art of Physic, is of so great a profit, that the invention of it, is ascribed unto God. So Pliny: Dijs inventores suos assignavit. Yea, Plin. l 29. c. 1. p. 416. and it is expressly affirmed by Homer, Plut. l. de Homero. To. 11 p. 145. to be both a divine Science, and greater than any other. Ast, Medicum, reliquis divina scientia, maior Instruit. Yea, and Apollo, one of their chiefest gods, doth boast of this invention to be his, Ou●d, l. 1. Metam. p. 39 and none others. Inuentum Medicina meum est, opiferque per Orbem Dicor: & Herbarum est subiecta scientia nobis. The Art of Physic, it is mine Invention, and an Art Divine. And I am called, the World all o'er, The common Helper of their sore. The Nature of all Plants is known Only to Me, it is mine own. And therefore they called Apollo, Vlion, Salutiferum, and Artemidem; ex eo, Strab●, l. 14. p. 347. quòd integros faceret, as Strabo reporteth: because he made men whole. But Plutarch reduceth this Art, a great deal higher, referring it, not to Apollo, Plut. l. contra St●icos, To. 3. p. 566. but even unto jupiter, or if there be any God, who is greater. For he condemneth it, as one of the greatest absurdities of the Stoics, that they do ascribe this Art, unto any of the petty and inferior gods, and not rather unto him, that is the chiefest of them. Wherein he erred not. For it is, indeed, the gift of the greatest God. It is he (saith Ecclesiasticus) that hath given men this knowledge, Ecclus 38. 6. that he might be glorified, Ecclus 38. 1. in his wondrous works. And therefore he exhorteth us, To honour the Physician, because of necessity. Adding there this reason: For the Lord hath created him. He hath created him; not only as he is a man; but also as he is a Physician. As it is expressly testified, by Saint Augustine. Illa corporis medicina ●on invenitur, Aug. l. 1. de Moribus Eccles. c. 28. To. 1. p. 738. unde ad Homines manare potuerit, nisi a Deo: Cuirerum omnium status salusque tribuenda est. It cannot be found out, from whence the Art of Physic should come unto men, but only from God: unto whom the health and safety of all things ought to be ascribed. So Basil: Ars medica, Basil. in As●●ti●●●, To. 2. p. 291. Theodoret. Ser. 4. de Providen. To. 2. p. 592. à Deo, vitam nostram moderante, concessa est. The Art of Physic is given us of God who only ruleth our whole life. So Theodoret: Quia Deus, qui te mortalem in hac vita condidit, scivit, te morbis quoque exercendum fore, simul medicam artem te docuit: cuius scientiam morborum incur sionibus opposuit. Because God, who made man mortal in this present life, foresaw, that he needs must be exercised with sicknesses, he therefore taught him the Art of Physic: opposing that knowledge, Ephraem Syrus, Serm. de Fide, p. 81. against the assaults of all kinds of diseases. And so likewise Ephra●m Syrus, comprehending in one sentence both these last forenamed points; Deus, Herbas, & Terrae pharmaca, & Medicorum studia, ad morbos corperis curandos concessit: God hath given us, both Herbs, and other wholesome Medicines; and beside, both the study, and skill of Physicians, to cure all the maladies, and diseases of our bodies. So that, it is only he, which hath given both all medicinable plants unto the Earth, and all skill to the Physician, in what manner to use them. And thus, both the Heathens, and Christians agree, that both the Physic, and the Physician, are the only gifts of God, for the health, and good of man. 6 But yet, neither of both these can do any good unto him, if they be not assisted with God's special blessing. For first, God's blessing is it, that healeth, more than the Medicine. for the Physician: that it is not in his power, with all his skill, to make any sick-man whole; we may see it, 2. Ch●on. 16. 12. in the old Testament, by the example of King Asa: whose too great confidence in his Physicians, and too little in his God, was that which brought him unto his end. And the same we may likewise see, Mar. 5. 25, 26. in the new, in the woman diseased with the bloody issue: Of whom it is testified, that though she had suffered many things from her Physicians, and continued long with them, and used great change of them, and spent all she had upon them; yet was she never the better for them, but rather much the worse. And the like is also reported of the Emperor Adrian; that he, Dion Cassius in Hadriano. p. 135. at his death, was forced to complain, that, Turba Medicorum interfecit Regem: The multitude of Physicians had brought the Emperor unto his death. Whereby it appeareth, that no Physician hath power to heal any man, if God do not give a special blessing unto him. As the Philosopher Taurus insinuated to that Physician, A. Gel. lib. 18. cap. 9 p. 263. that came to heal A: Gellius. Cum Dijs bene volentibus, opera tua, sistas hunc nobis sanum. Implying, that his labour and God's blessing must work both together, before the sick-man could recover. For, as Ecclesiasticus expressly testifieth, Neither the Apothecary can finish his own work, in making of the Medicine; nor yet the physician, his, in applying of the medicine; if they be not assisted, with God's special blessing. The Apothecary (saith he) doth make a confection: and yet he cannot finish his own work. For of the Lord cometh prosperity, and wealth, ou●r all the Earth. Then he cometh from him, unto the Physician: Give place to the Physician, Ecclus 38. 8. 12. 13. 14. for the Lord hath created him. Let him not go from thee: for thou hast need of him. But what? can he heal thee when he list? No. But he addeth: The hour may come, that their enterprises may have good success. But how? He addeth further: For they shall pray unto the Lord, that he would prosper that which is given for ease; and their Physic, for the prolonging of life. So then the Physician toucheth: but it is God that healeth. There is greater efficacy unto health, in the Physicians prayer, than there is in his power: the whole prosperity of the medicine depending upon God's blessing. And therefore saith S. Hierom: Hier. in. cap. 26. Isai. To. 5. p. 110. De omni infirmitate dicendum est, quòd absque misericordia Dei, medendi ars nihil valeat. In all a man's infirmities, without God's special goodness, the art of the Physicians is of very little worth. And in another place, he confirms his own assertion, by the forenamed instance, of the diseased woman. Hier. in cap. 7. Am●s To. 6. 124. Quis Medicorum sanare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 potuit, nisi tu solus? ad cuius contactum fimbriae, flatìm redijt sanitas. which of all the Physicians could heal that diseased woman, but only thou alone? Who wast able to restore her health unto her, by touching, but only, the hem of thy vesture. Yea, and the same Father again reporteth of Hilarion: that, when a like diseased woman was brought unto him, desiring to be cured, and complaining that no Physic could do her any good, that holy Father replied: Si quae in Medicis perdidisti, Pauperibus dedisses, Hier. in vita Hilar. To. 1. p. 144. curasset te verus Medicus jesus: If that, which thou hast lost upon thy Physicians, thou hadst bestowed upon poor and needy persons, jesus Christ, the true Physician, would have cured thee long agone. And therefore S. Basil hath given us a good Caveat: not to repose so strong a confidence in any kind of Physic, be it never so good; because all is but weak, Basil. in Ascetici● To. 2. p. 291. without the blessing of God. Satagendum est, ut h●c Arte, si quandò illa opus est, ita utamur, ut non omnem illi causam sanitatis ascribamus. We must take heed, that when we use the help of Physic; yet that we ascribe not all our health unto it. For, as he addeth a little after: Irrationale est, p. 292. propriae salutis spem in manus ponere Medicorum. It is against all reason, to put all the hope of our health in the hand of the Physician; who hath it not in his hand: as before I have showed. And, as it is not in the Art of the Physician to give health unto the sick-man: so is it not also in the power of any Medicine. For, as it is affirmed in the Book of Wisdom (speaking of those Israelites that were stung and bitten by the fiery Serpents) It was neither Herb, Wis. 16. 12. nor Plaster that healed them, but the word of the Lord, that healeth all things. Nay, it was not the Brazen Serpent that healed them, though for that very purpose it was specially appointed; but it was only God himself that healed them by it, as is expressly there affirmed: Wise. 16. 7. He that turned towards it, was not healed by that thing which he saw, but by thee, o Saviour of all. Whereby it appeareth, that it is not the outward medicine, but the inward blessing, that healeth. And that, as S. Augustine observeth, our health cometh unto us, only from God, the Creator: Aug in. Psal. 34. To. 8. p. 250. even then, when we receive it, by means of the Creature. De Creatura mihi salus est? A Deo est. And this we may see verified, both in the old, 2. Kin 20 ● 5. and new Testament. God appointed King Hezechiah, to apply a plaster unto his sore▪ but, in the same place, he telleth him, that it is he, that doth heal him. And, ja. 5 14. 15. S. james biddeth the Elders, to anoint the sick m●n with oil; but, in the same place, he addeth, that it is the Lord, that doth raise him up. So that, as S. Augustine very well observeth, Aug. l. 4. 〈◊〉 D●●● 〈◊〉. 16 〈◊〉. 3. p. 79. Corporis medicamenta, quae hominibus ab hominibus adhibentur, non, nisi iis, prosunt, quibus Deus operatur salutem. Qui, & sine illis mederi potest; cum, sine ipso, illa non possunt. Those bodily Medicines, which are applied by men, do profit none but those, unto whom God himself doth work, for their health. Yet he can heal, without any Medicine: but so cannot any medicine without 〈◊〉. And this also is confessed, 〈…〉 p. 281. Psal 107 2●. 〈◊〉 16 12. 〈…〉 291. Mat. 8. 3. Psal. 3. 8. even by the very Heathen: Etiam, sine Medico, medicinam dedit Minerva. God can heal any Sickness, even without a Physician. He can heal, even by his only word. He sent his word, and healed them. Nay, he can heal, by his only will, as is noted by S. Basil. Sola voluntate contentus. And he giveth this for instance. Volo: mundare. I will: Be thou clean. Thus, it is only God that healeth, whether it be with the Medicine, or without the medicine. For, All health is of him; as is testified in the Psalm. Now, to recollect all these Heads; and to apply them unto that, which is our main purpose. If God be both the Giver and the Praeseruer, and the Restorer of health: if he have both given us all those Medicines, that uphold and maintain it: and taught us, the true and right uses of them: and given his blessing, to assist their working: then must there needs be a God, that procureth all this good. But, that the first of these is true: it appeareth in the several sections of this Chapter. And therefore, the second must likewise needs be true. CHAP. 7. Little Cities do rise to be great. 2. Great Cities do fall to be little. 3. Yet is not this the work, of either Fate, or Fortune: 4. But of Gods own Providence, and Praeor dination. 5. Who limiteth their powers. 6. Boundeth their Dominions. 7. And praescribeth their continuance. THe next Consideration is taken from the Politics: and therein from the rising and falling of Cities, of Kingdoms, and Commonwealths. Which great and notable works, though diverse of the Heathen have partly ascribed to Fate, and partly unto Fortune; yet falsely unto both of them: as being in very deed the only work of God. Who, as sometime he raiseth poor men, out of the very dust, Psal. 113. 7 8. and lifteth up their heads, to make them sit with Princes, calling them (as he did David) A caula ad aulam: so doth he oftentimes, Psal. 78. 70. &c with Cities, and Nations, advancing them from poor Originals, to be great and mighty Monarchies. Carthage, which at last grew so mighty and potent, as to fight with Rome itself, Cic. l. 1. Offic. p. 346. for the Empire of the world: Virgil. l. 1. Ae●●id. p. 123. yet was, Plut. in Vit. Remuli. p. 49. at first, no larger than could be encompassed with the thongs of a Bulls hide. Yea, and even Rome itself, which obtained that Empire, and Lorded it over all with an iron Sceptre: yet was extended no further by Romulus, but only to the number of a thousand houses. In so much that the Italian Poet wondereth at the wonderful increasings of it: Aspice, nec longè repotam, Sil. Ital. l. 15. p. 186. modó Roma minanti Impar Iüdenae contentáque crescere Asylo, Quò se extulerit dextrìs. Lo; but of late, how little Rome; To what a greatness now She's come! Yea and Venice, at this time the Venus of all Cities, and the strongest Fortress and Balwarke of all Christians; yet was, Will. Thomas, p. 86. at first, but a Marish, inhabited by poor Fishers. And the like may be observed, almost of all those other renowned and famous Cities: whose glorious gests and victories have so greatly ennobled them, in the register of Histories: they have, most of them, been raised from such ignoble and contemptible originals; that, when they view themselves in the ruff of their greatness, they are utterly ashamed, to think of their first littleness. 2 And, as we may observe diverse poor and little Cities, Great Cities fall to be little. to have grown great and potent, being raised from the dust, to sit among the Stars: so may we likewise observe, on the contrary part, diverse great and potent Cities, to have become very little ones, being plucked down from the Stars, to sit down in the dust. Obadiah, v, 4. God threateneth against Edom, that though they exalted themselves like unto Eagles, and placed their nest among the Stars, yet would he bring them down. And he calleth unto Babel, that proud Monarch of the East: Come down, o Daughter Babel, and sit in the dust: sit upon the ground: for there is no more throne,— Sat still, Isay. 47. 1. and get thee into darkness: Isay. 47. 5. for thou shalt no more be called, The Lady of Kingdoms. And, that this his threatening was not brutum fulmen, an idle flash of Lightning; but that it had his full effect, upon that proud City, we may evidently see, by comparing this place of the Prophet; wherein she is said to be, Tender and delicate; with another place of the Psalmist, wherein she is said to be, Psal. 1378. A●ias Monta●us. a City wasted with misery. Babel vastata. Whereby it appeareth that this threatened devastation, had, even in those days, begun to seize upon them. Which happeneth oftentimes so suddenly, Isay, 15. 1. that that which in many years was not builded, yet is, in a moment, destroyed: as Isaiah giveth instance both in Are, and Kir: which both were destroyed, and brought to silence, in a night. And Phavorinus observeth the same of Helice, and Bura: that they were suddenly swallowed up. Absorptae sunt, & tanquam navigantes perierunt: & perished in a moment, as Sailors do, Stob●ns Serm. 103. p. 564. by Shipwreck. And the like may be observed, of diverse other mighty Cities, heretofore the Imperial seats of great and potent Monarches; that now they are so utterly demolished, as that, even their very places can no more be found, nor no man say, that, Here they stood; as Ninive, Susis, Ecbatane, and diverse others recknoned up by Pausanias. Mycenae, Pausan. in A●cadicis, p. 325. quae in bello Troiano imperârunt Graecis; Ninus deinde, in qua Assyriorum Regia fuit; tertiò, Th●bae Boeoticae, quae principem olìm locum in Graecia obtinuerunt: hae omnes ad internecionem usque sunt desolatae. Mycenae, which, in the time of the Trojan war, was the head of all Greece; and Ninus, where was sometimes the Royal Palace of the Assyrian Monarches; and Thebes of the Boeotians, one of the chiefest Cities of all the Grecians, are now quite destroyed and made utterly desolate. Upon which occasion, he entereth a meditation of the notable fragility of all humane prosperity; giving, in that place, diverse other very pregnant and remarkable instances, of Thebes in Egypt, and Orchomenus, sometimes two rich and populous Cities, but now reduced beneath the fortune of diverse private persons: So likewise of Delos, sometimes the most frequented and common Mart of all the Grecians, now utterly deserted and forsaken of all Nations: So likewise of Babylon, sometime the greatest City that ever the Sun looked upon; but, at that time, so little, that there was nothing there left, but a Wall, and at Temple. chose, of Alexandria, and Seleucia; which, though they were builded but even the other day; yet started up so suddenly to great wealth and glory. Whereas Chryse and Hiera, sometimes two famous Islands, at that time lay drowned, and buried in the waters. Concluding his meditation, with this epiphonema: Sic res mortalium sunt momentaneae, & nulla ex parte firmae: Thus the things of mortal men, are both of small continuance, and subject unto great mutability of chance. And it should seem this meditation had made a deep impression into diverse other of the Heathen, and not a little troubled them. Ovid, lighting into it, addeth diverse other instances unto those of Pausanias: Nunc humilis veteres tantummodò Troia ruinas, Ovid, l. 15. Me●amo●p. p. ●19. Et pro divitijs tumulos ostendit avorum. Clara fuit Sparte, magnae viguêre Mycenae, Necnon & Cecropis, nec non Amphionis arces. Vile solum Sparte est: alta cecidêre Mycenae. Oedipodioniae, quid sunt, nisi nomina Thebae? Quid Pandioniae restant, nisi nomen, Athenae? Now humbled Troy is turned to dust, and nothing hath to show, But rubbish, for her riches; and the ruin'd Toombs, I trow, Of ancient Inhabiters. So Sparta famous was; And Mycenae great, and glorious; and Thebes a stately place; Renowned Athens was the like. But now, fair Sparta is A Soil most vile; and Mycenae high is fall'n full low, I wis: And as for Thebes and Athens both; to both betides the same; For both, and all, have nothing left, besides a naked name. So that, Obadiah, v. 16. as the Prophet Obadiah speaketh, They are now become, as if they had never been. Strabo, l. 16. p. 572. And Strabo noteth the same of diverse other Cities, about the mount Carmel: which, he saith, are nothing now, but Oppidorum Nomina, mere names of Cities: ut Sycaminorum civitas, & Bubulcorum civitas, & Crocodilorum civitas: As the City of the Sycamines, and the City of the Cowherd's, and the City of the Crocodiles. And that, which these Authors have observed of Cities, Philo judaeus, l. Quod Deus sit immutabilis, in fine, p. 445. hath Philo judaeus observed of whole Kingdoms. Quòd si non libet singulorum fortunas perquirere, vide regionum integrarum & gentium mutationes, &c, If you list not to insist upon the particular fortune of Cities, consider the mutations of whole Countries, and Nations: how (as Lucr●tius also observeth:) Augescunt aliae gentes, Lucret. l, 2. p. aliae minuuntur. Some Nations flourish, Other some do perish. 3 Now, The rising and falling of Cities is neither by Fa●e nor Fortune. whence cometh this rising, and falling of Cities; and why doth this happen rather unto the principals, than it doth unto others? It appeareth in Plutarch, to be an old conceit, to attribute this to Fate, and to a kind of Destiny bestowed upon those Cities, in their genethliacks, and nativities, by the aspects and positure of the Stars. Plut. in Vita Romuli. p. 52. But this the Psalmist rejecteth, in express and plain terms: Psal. 75. 6. Promotion (saith he) cometh neither from the East, nor from the West, nor from the North, nor from the South. It cometh not from the East, from whence the Stars do come in their diurnal motion: nor yet from the West, from whence they come again in their natural motion: nor yet from North, or South, from whence they go and come in that motion of theirs which is called Trepidation. From none of all these motions doth Promotion come. But (as it followeth in that Psalm) It is God, that is the judge; he putteth down one, and setteth up another. And this is true, as well in the fortunes of Cities, and Nations, as of particular persons. As we may evidently see in the prophecy of Isaiah. Behold (saith he) it is the Lord that maketh the earth empty, Isai. 24. 1. and he maketh it waste; He turneth it upside down, and he scattereth abroad the Inhabitants of it. And therefore Plutarch derideth this opinion of the Stars, Plut. in Vita Romuli. p. 52. that they should give fortune unto Cities: and reckoneth it among the number of Fables. Yea, and that very worthily. For, if it were fatal for those Cities to rise, how come they to their fall? Is there now crept in a mutability into Fate? Is it now become contrary unto itself; to depress the same thing, which before itself advanced? Or, have things two Fates? the one, whereby they be advanced, and the other, whereby they are depressed? These things do not cohere. And therefore some have run a clean contrary course, Manil. l. 1. p. 16. & ascribed all to Fortune. So Manilius. — Quoties Fortuna per orbem, Seruitium, imperiúmque tulit, varieque revertit? How oft hath Fortune, through the world, think I, Brought Slavery, borne Empire, and wheeled diversely? So Seneca. Imperia sic excelsa Fortunae obiacent, Senec. Oedip. Act. 1. p. 220. Pausanias' in Arcadieis. p. 325 So highest Empires stoop to Fortune's feet. So Plutarch, who ascribeth all the prosperity of the Romans, only to their Fortune: writing a Book of that Argument: De Fortuna Romanorum. So Pausanias, who affirmeth, Vniversa, tum firma, tum imbecilla, quaeque recèns facta sunt, quaeque perierunt, a Fortuna immutari, eiúsque arbitratu, summa vi & necessitate, omnia trahi. All things, both weak, and strong, both things done now of late, and things done long agone, are subject unto Fortune: she drawing all things after her, at her own will and pleasure. And he giveth, in that place, diverse fit and pregnant instances, as well in the rising, as falling of Cities. For the rising of them, he there nameth Alexandria, and Seleucia, of whom he affirmeth, that, Ideo ad tantam magnitudinem & felicitatem excreverunt, quòd Fortuna eos, tanquam manu, duxerit: That they therefore grew unto such greatness and felicity, because Fortune led them to it, as it were, by the hand. In the falling of Cities, he nameth these before mentioned, of Thebes, My●enae, Delos, Babylon, and the rest: of whom he addeth this Conclusion, that they all were destroyed, by the iniquity of Fortune: Et haec quidem prorsùs Fortuna abolevit. So that he ascribeth, as well the rising, as falling of Cities, to be the work, not of Providence, but of Chance. But, that herein he is deceived, it appeareth by this argument: That both the rising, and falling of many Cities, have been truly and certainly foretold: Which they could not have been, if it had been by Fortune. For, these things which are fortuitous, cannot be foreseen by Providence: & therefore not foretold. Who can foretell, that at such a time, such a man shall have a fall? No more could any man foretell, that at such a time such a kingdom should have his fall, if it were merely casual. But we see, by experience, that both the rising of some Cities, and the falling of others, have been certainly foretold, by diverse of the Prophets. Dan. 2. 31. etc. The Prophet Daniel, not only foretelleth, both the rising, and the falling, of the four grand Monarchies; but also graphically describeth them, by their several properties: yea and paints them out, unto our eyes, in two lively emblems: the one, of the foure-parted Image; the other, Dan. 73 etc. of the four fearful Beasts. Yea, and in the translation and succession of those Monarchies, he plainly describeth the falling of one of them, and the rising of another, under the figure of a Battle, between a Ram, Dan. 8. 3, etc. and a Goat: wherein the Goat prevailed. Which Goat, he there affirmeth, to be the King of the Grecians; as he doth the R●mme, to be the King of the Persians. Where, if the event had fallen out contrary unto his predication, Dan. 8 20. 21. he being so definite, and confident in his asseveration, he had been utterly shamed, Deut. 18. 21. 22. and had justly incurred the note of a false Prophet. But he knew whom he believed, 2. Tim. 1. 12. and that he could not be deceived: because these things were by God himself revealed; by whom they were both foreknown, and fore-appointed. So likewise, the Prophet jonas, in his foretelling of the destruction of Niniveh, was as definite and peremptory in appointing the certain days, as Daniel was before, in naming the certain Nations. Yet forty days and Niniveh shall be destroyed. jonah. 3. 4. Which final destruction (though the means be unknown) yet had certainly happened, if by their earnest repentance, it had not been averted. Another like destruction, there is also foretold, by the Prophet Balaam; to happen from the Grecians, Num. 24. 24. or Romans, unto the Kingdom both of the Assyrians, and of the Hebrews. The Ships shall come from the Coasts of Chittim and shall subdue Assur, and shall subdue Heber, & he also shall come to destruction. A very true prophecy, though uttered by a false Prophet. For, whether we take Chittim for the Greeks, or the Romans, (as it is sometimes for both,) by those two Nations, were those two Kingdoms subdued; and the latter of those Kingdoms, by the latter of those Nations, was not only subdued, but also subverted, according to the prophecy in that place delivered. Now these things could not have been thus certainly foreshewne, if they had not been as certainly foreseen. And that they could not have been, if they had fallen out by Fortune. So that, as concerning Fate; Solon excludeth that, in one of his Elegies, Demost, Orat. de falsa legate. To. 24 p. 63. cited by Demonsthenes. Nostra quidem Fato jovis urbs non occidet unquàm: Our famous Cities glorious State Shall never fall by force of Fate. And, for Fortune, Cic. in. Fragment p. 298. Tully excludeth that: Nostris vitijs, non Cas● aliquo, Rempub. ●misimus. We have lost our State, by our offences, and not by any Fortune. Nay even Pausanias himself, in the very same place, where he so resolutely ascribeth this work unto Fortune; yet (as either forgetting himself, or remembering his error) hath plainly confessed, that it is the work of God. Minimè mir●r, Megalopolin omnia ornamenta ac pristinam felicitatem amisisse, Pausan. ubi suprà. cum Deum sciam novis semper rebus delectari. I marvel not, that the magnifical City Megalopolis, hath lost all her ornaments, and ancient eminence; whenas I consider, and know well, how God delighteth himself, with the changing of Cities and States. Nay, Luke, 4. 6. even the Devil himself, in assuming the disposing of all kingdoms unto himself, even there asserteth them unto a kind of providence, and denieth them both unto Fate, and unto Chance. 4 Therefore we must hold this, as a fixed and certain truth, that both the rising and falling of Cities, The Rising and Falling of Cities is only of God. Kingdoms, and Common wealths, are the decrees and appointments of Gods only Providence. Wherein we have many very pregnant and clear testimonies: Yea, and that not only of the Holy Scriptures, Pro. 8. 15, 16. but also of Heathen and Secular Writers. King Solomon saith, in the person of God: By me King's reign, and Princes decree justice. By me Princes rule, and Nobles, and all the judges of the Earth. For, as Tertullian truly teacheth, Indè est Imperator, undè est & homo, Tertul. Apolog. c. 30. p. 59 antequàm Imperator: indè potestas illi, undè Spiritus. By him a man is made a King, by whom he was made a Man, before he was a King. He gave him his dominion, that gave to him his breathing. Act●, 17. 25. Now that is only God: who (as the Apostle testifieth) hath given unto all men, both life, and breath, and all things, He it is (saith the Prophet Daniel) that hath power over the Kingdom of men, Daniel, 4. 32. and that giveth it, unto whom he pleaseth; yea, even unto the very abjects. Whom afterward, if they grow proud, he casteth down again. Dij & secunda elatos fortuna, qu●m celerrimè, cum velint, evertere, & abiectos excitare facilè possunt, saith Xenophon. God quickly can, at his pleasure, depress those, X●noph. l. 3. de Cyriminor. exped. l p. 301. Sabellicus Ae●eid 8. l. 1. To. 2. p. 425. that are prided with prosperous Fortune; and easily advance those, that are dejected with adverse. Yea, and it was Plato's opinion (as Sabellicus reporteth it) Nullam posse Ciuitat●m, sine favore Numinis, vel prosperè constitui, vel constituta feliciter administrari. That there cannot any City, either, at the first, be happily planted, or afterward, be prosperously governed, without the special blessing, and favour of God. And this may be observed, to be particularly affirmed, of all those four great Monarchies forenamed For the Babylonian Monarchy; the Prophet Daniel expressly ascribeth that unto God. Daniel, 5. 18. The most high God (saith he) gave unto Nabuchadnezzar, both a Kingdom, and Majesty, and honour, and glory. For the Persian Monarchy; King Cyrus himself ascribeth that unto God. For he saith, Ezr. 1. 2. that, The Lord God of heaven, had given him all the Kingdoms of the Earth. Yea, and Themist●cles likewise confessed it, in plain words, unto Artabanus, one of the Persian Princes. Plut. in vita Themistoclis p. 265. Ego parebo vestris legibus, quandò ita visum Deo, qui Persas extulit: & propter me plures, quam nunc sunt, erunt, qui vestrum Regem adorent. I am ready to obey your Persian Laws, seeing God hath so ordained, who hath so greatly exalted the Persians. And I myself will be a mean, that many more, than now do, shall give honour to your King. For the Grecian Monarchy; Daniel, 7. 6. the Prophet Daniel again ascribeth that unto God. For he saith, that the third Beast, which was like unto a Leopard (wherein the Grecian Monarchy was prefigured,) had his power, and dominion given unto him. And therefore he had it not of himself: as Hananias, one of the seventy two Interpreters, very plainly proveth unto King Ptolomeus, by this familiar reason. Apotheg. Hebrae●o●um. l. 2. p. 39 Non quenquam esse Regemex sese, inde patet, Quia omnes cupiunt consequi hanc dignitatem, sed non possunt: cum Dei donum sit. It appeareth, that no man can make himself a King, because all men do desire it, and yet cannot attain it; because it is God's gift. As Seneca acknowledgeth in the person of Nero: Munus Deorum est, ipsa quòd seruit mihi Roma, & Senatus. It is God's gift, that the City and the Senate are subject to me. And for the Roman Monarchy; Plutarch ascribeth that directly unto God. For, Plutarch. in 〈◊〉 Camilli. p. 282. he saith of Rome, that it could never have grown, á tam vili & paruo initio, ad tantam gloriam & potentiam, sine Numinis praesentia: From so despicable and poor a beginning to so admirable a power and glory, without the presence & providence of God. And this he there reporteth, not as his own single and particular opinion, but as a vulgar and common, received and maintained among the most of them. And, Plutarch l. de Fortuna Romanorum, To. 2. p. 409. 411. in another place, he affirmeth of Rome, that, Fundamenta Romae iecit Tempus cum Deo: That the Foundation of Rome was laid by God and Time. It was laid by God, to continue for a long time, as he wittily there expresseth, by this fit device and fiction: That Fortune quickly flew over both the Persians, and Assyrians, and Macedonians, and Egyptians, and Syrians, and Carthaginians: but, when she came unto the Romans, she then put off her wings, as purposing to stay with them, and not to fly from them. So that God gave them their beginning, in laying their foundation: and he upheld their continuing; in given to them Time. This is Plutarch's judgement of them. Yea, and Tully likewise ascribeth all the Roman greatness, unto none other cause, but only to the bounty and goodness of their gods. Quis est tam vecors, qui, cum Deos esse intellexerit, non intelligat, eorum numine, hoc tantum imperium esse natum, & auctum, & retentum? Who is there so mad, but knowing there is a God, he must also understand, that by his special goodness, the great Empire of the Romans is both founded, and increased, and continued? Yea, and in the same place he ascribeth the dilatation of their Empire, rather unto their religion, Cic. Orat. de Arusp. Respons. p. 405. then either unto their valour, or unto their wisdom. Nec numero, Hispanos; nec robore, Gallos'; nec calliditate, Poenos; nec artihus, Graecoes; nec hoc ipso huius Gentis ac Terrae domestico nativoque sensu, Italos Latinosque: sed pietate, & Religion● atque hac una sap●entia, quòd Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi, gubernarique perspeximus; omnes gentes nationésque superavimus. We have not overcome the Spaniards, by our number; nor the French, by our power; nor the Carthaginians, by our policies; nor the Grecians, by our Arts; nor the Italians, or Latins, by the natural sharpness, and fineness of our wits: but it is only our piety, and religion, and this special wisdom of ascribing all things to the government of the gods, that hath subdued unto us so many Countries, and Nations. Thereby plainly insinuating, that the greatness of their Empire was bestowed by God upon them, only as a reward of their piety, and religion. Which Caecilius also expressly confirmeth. For he saith of the Romans, Arnob. l. 8. cont. Gent. p. 746. that, Imperium suum, ultra Solis vias, & ipsius Oceani limits, progagârunt, dùm exercent in armis virtutem religiosam: The exercise of virtue, and of Religion, was that which enlarged the Roman dominion. For (as he addeth a little after) Dum universarum Gentium sacra suscipiunt, etiam Regna meruerunt. While they receive the Religions of all Nations, they deserve also their Dominions. This he falsely ascribeth unto their false religion: which yet may truly be ascribed unto the true one. And Camillus, Liv. l. 5. p. 103. in his Oration recorded by Livy, expressly affirmeth, that all the calamities of the Romans sprung only from their offences against God; as, on the contrary, all their prosperity grew only from their piety. Which is true, in very deed, if it be rightly understood, and be referred, as it ought, unto to the true God. Ecclus. 10. 22. For (as Ecclesiasticus very truly affirmeth) It is the fear of the Lord, which causeth, that the Kingdom faileth not: but a Kingdom is lost, by cruelty and pride. And therefore King Ochus, being asked by his son, by what means he had preserved his kingdom so long? answered, Atheneus. l. 12. p. 407. That this was done, Pietate, in Deos; et iustitia, in Homines: By his Piety, towards God; and his equity, towards men. job. 36. 17. For (as Elihu truly telleth us) judgement and equity maintain all things: P●o. 16 12. Yea, even the very throne itself, as King Solomon acknowledgeth; The Throne is established by justice.. But it is supplanted Ecclus. 10. 8. and overthrown by wickedness (as Ecclesiastcus) observeth Because of unrighteous dealing, and wrongs, and riches gotten by deceit, the Kingdom is translated from one people to another. So that, as King Solomon himself in another place affirmeth, Pro. 14. 34. justice exalteth a nation: but sin bringeth a people to confusion. A notable example whereof, God himself hath left unto us, jer. 25. 12. in the Babylonians: whose kingdom and Nation he professeth that he will bring unto utter desolation, for their sins and iniquities. And this we may observe to have been a strong notion, very deeply imprinted in the minds even of the Heathens: That, as nothing praeserueth Kingdoms more firmly, than virtue; Au. Gell. l. 20. c. 1 p. 281. so nothing destroyeth them more certainly, than vice. A. Gellius ascribeth the rising of the Romans only unto their virtues. Omnibus virtutum ganeribus exercendis, colendisque, Populus Romanus, è parua origine, ad tantae megnitudinis instar emicuit. The Romans (saith he) ascended from their low and mean beginnings, to such an height of greatness, only by their practice of all kind of virtues. And Tully on the contrary, he saith: They lost their greatness by degenerating from their ancient virtue unto vice, in the forealleged place: Nostris vitijs, non casu aliquo, Rempub. amisimus; It is not by chance, but it is by our vice, whereby we have decayed and lost our commonwealth. And therefore in the same place, he pronounceth, that, There is, Cic. in Fragmentis. To. 4. p. 298. 297. Nihil tam inimicum Civitati, quam iniustitia; quae, sine magnae iustitia, nec geri, nec stare potest. That there is no such Enemy unto any City, as injustice is, and injury: because, without great justice, there cannot any City be either well governed, or safely praeserued. For, as the Tragical Poet hath very truly noted: — Vbi non est pudor, Senec. in Thyes●e Act. 2. Sce. 1. p 296. Nec cura iuris, sanctitas, pietas, fides; Instabile Regnum est. Where is nor modesty, nor equity, nor sanctity, No piety, no verity, no, nor civility, In such a Kingdom, certainly, There can be no stability. Which sentence of the Tragic, is also confirmed, by another of the Comic: Where he bringeth in a servant, disputing with a Virgin, about the fortification and munition of their Town. — Vt munitum muro, tibi visum est oppidum? saith he. How like you here, the warlike strength of this our walled Town? Unto which she answered presently. Si incolae benè sint morati, pulchrè munitum arbitror. Plut. 〈…〉. 4. p. 644. Perfidia, & peculatus ex urbe, & avaritia si exulant. Quarta invidia, quinta ambitio, sexta obtrectatio, Septimum periurium, octava indiligentia, Nona iniuria, decimum (quod pessumum aggressu) scelus. Haec nisi urbe aberunt, centuplex murus rebus seruandis parùm est. If Citizens be mannered well; well manned and walled, I deem it. If City Sins be banished all; then strong, may all esteem it. If Treachery, and Robbery, and Avarice be gone, If Envy, and Ambition, and Backbiting he none; If Perjury, if Idleness, if Injury be out, And truly, if that villainy, the worst of all the rout. Unless these Vices banished been, what ever forts you have, An hundres Walls together put, will not have power to save. Because, by those vices, they do even enforce God to overthrow their Walls, as sometime he did Hiericoes. For, as Bacchylides truly affirmeth, Iosh 6. 20. Athenaeus. l. 2. p. 31. — Alta a coeli sede Diruit oppida— superba, Qui summum in Omnes imperium tenet. It's God, that ruleth over all, Who gives proud Cities such a fall. Nay, wicked Citizens, by their vices, do overthrow their own Cities, and dig down their Walls, as Solon well observeth. Nostra quidem Fato jovis urbs non ●ccidet unquàm, Propitijsque Dijs, salua manner potest. Moenia sed cives stolidi, cupidíque lucrorum, Demost. Orat. de fal●a Legat. To. 2 p. 63. Ardua, subverti, per sua facta student. It is not Fate our City can destroy: We may, long time, in safety it enjoy, The Gods to us being propitious. But Citizens themselves, so vicious, So foolish are, and covetous; that they Their own walls raze, and utterly decay. And therefore saith Theognis unto the same purpose: Nullam unquam (Cyrne) boni Civitatem perdiderunt viri. Sed quando, Theognis. p. 8. contumeliosis esse, malis placuerit, Populúmque corruperint, iudiciaque iniustis dederint, Propriorum lucrorum causa, & potentiae; Existima, non diû illam civitatem quietam fore, Et si nunc manet al●a in quiet. Good men did ne'er their Cities ruin bring. But when evil men shall injuries begin, Not caring to corrupt and violate The judgements seats, for their own Lucres sake: Then look, that City cannot long have peace, Though for the present it have rest and ease. Now, this consent of the Heathen, in thus generally ascribing the rising of Cities and Commonwealths, unto virtue; and their falling, unto vice; implieth, that they believed, that God is the Author and worker of both these. Because he is the Rewarder of virtues, and the punisher of vices: who for the transgressions and wickedness of men, both abateth and abaseth, and transformeth, and transferreth all their Kingdoms and Commonwealths, as he himself pleaseth. Of all which, the Holy Scriptures have left us evident examples. He abated the Kingdom of the Israelites; when he took from Rehoboram, ten of the twelve tribes, and bestowed them upon jeroboam. 1. Kings, 12. 16, 17. He abased the Kingdom of the Chaldeans; Isay. 47, 1. when he called unto Babel, to come and sit down in the dust: and drove out their proud King from the company of men, compelling him to live among the brute Beasts: And all that, to teach him but this very lesson, which I now am in proving: That the most High beareth rule over the Kingdoms of men, and that he disposeth them, Daniel, 4. 22. as it seemeth best unto him. He transformed the Kingdom of the Israelites; when he changed it from their judges, unto their Kings: as he likewise did the Romans, from their Consuls, unto their Emperors. In which change of that State, it is worthy observation, which is written by Plutarch: That God, Plutach, in vita Bruti. p. 863. determining to alter the Commonwealth of the Romans, from their optimacy, to a Monarchy; he purposely suffered Brutus to be overthrown by Octavius, lest he should be a mean to overthrow that government, which God then determined to set up, he being a known Enemy unto the state of a Monarchy. And finally, he transferred them; the kingdoms of the Canaanites, unto the Israelites; of the Israelites, unto the Chaldeans; of the Chaldeans, unto the Medes, and Persians; of the Persians, unto the Grecians; and of the Grecians, unto the Romans. All which, have, in the Scripture, their particular testimonies, to be the works of none other, but only of God himself: who (as job affirmeth in his book) both looseth the Collar of Kings, and girdeth their loins with a girdle; both increaseth the People, and destroyeth them; job, 12. 18. both enlargeth the Nations, job. 12. 2. and bringeth them in again. Daniel, 2. 21. And (as Daniel addeth, unto the same purpose) He both setteth up Kings, and taketh away Kings. So that (as Tertullian well collecteth) Ille Regna dispensat, cuius est & orbis qui regnatur, & Homo ipse qui regnat.— Ille Civitates extollit, & deprimit, Tertul. A●ol●ge. c. 26. p. 57 sub quo fuit aliquandó sine Civitatibus genus humanum. He disposeth of Kingdoms, whose both the World is that is ruled, and the Men that rule it. He both exalteth and depresseth Cities, whose Subjects men were, before they had any Cities. And this was understood, even of the very Heathen: as we may gather out of that prayer, which King Darius made, before his battle with great Alexander: which Plutarch thus reporteth. Dij natales, atque regij, id primùm vos precor, Plut. in vita 〈◊〉 p. 562. Quam mihi Persarum fortunam dedistis, came restitutam ego uti posteris relinquam; uti victor, Alexandro rependam, quae in meos, mea calamitate ictos, contulit beneficia. Sìn fadale adest tempus, itaque visum est Nemesi, & rerum vi●issitudini, uti Persarum regnum cesset; ut nemo hominum, praeter unum Alexandrum, in Cyri sedeat solio. Oye immortal Gods, that are men's Creators, and Kings Protectors, first of all I beseech you, that I may leave the same prosperity of the Persians unto my Successors, which from you I received by my Predecessors; that so I may repay unto Alexander, those great benefits and favours, which, in this time of my calamity, he hath royally bestowed upon my dearest friends. But, if the fatal period of time be now come, wherein the Persians Kingdom must needs change, and be undone; then again I beseech you, that the succession of King Cyrus his Throne may fall unto King Alexander, and unto none other. In which prayer it appeareth, that he verily believed, as well the preservation, as translation of Kingdoms, to be seated in the power of God. So that, for this point, of the rising and falling of Kingdoms and Commonwealths; it seemeth utterly absurd, not only to the religion of well believing Christians, but also to the reason of understanding Heathens, to refer and ascribe it unto any other cause, then only to God's providence. Especially not to chance. For, can we think, that that providence, which is so precisely curious, as to mark and observe the falling of Sparrows, should be so supinely incurious, as to slight and neglect the falling of Kingdoms? Matthew, 10. 29. This were absurd to think. For; (as Saint Augustine collecteth from diverse other the like works of providence:) Qui non solùm Angelum, & Hominem, Aug. l. 5. de Civit. Dei c. 11. T●. 5. p. 303. sed nec exigui & contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia dereliquit; nullo modo credendus est, regna Hominum, eorúmque dominationes, & seruitutes, a suae providentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. That God, who hath made, not only Men, and Angels, but hath also ordered, with so great a convenience, the very entrails of the least and most contemptible ●east, the feather of every Bird, the flower of every Herb, and the leaf of every Plant; cannot in any wise be thought, to leave without the laws and compass of his providence, the dominions, and slaveries of Kingdoms, and Commonwealths. 5 And this may further be seen, by an other observation: that God hath encompassed all the Kingdoms of the earth with a threefold restraint; to wit, God limiteth the power of all Kings and Kingdoms. a limitation of their powers; a circumscription of their bounds; & a prefinition of their periods. There was never, as yet, any kingdom in the world; which either for his power, was illimitable; or, for his place, universal; or, for his time, perpetual. But, God, in his providence, hath so encompassed all of them, that evermore their powers, have been reduced unto measures; their dominions, unto bounds; & their continuance, unto periods. As we may see, by plain examples in the holy Scriptures. And first, as concerning the restraint of their powers: that may evidently be showed, in three Eastern Kings. The first of whom, is Saul: who pursued the Prophet David, 1. Samuel, 26. 20. 21. with such implacable hatred, that he hunted him in all places, as a Partridge in the wilderness. And yet, when he offered himself into his hands, he had no power to hurt him; but (as Esau in the like case pursuing his brother jacob) though he came out against him with a purpose to kill him; Gen. 32. 6 7. yet, Gen. 33. 4. contrary unto his purpose, he both lovingly & humbly reconciled himself unto him. So that, it might be said, as it is in the Tragic: Otium è tanto subitum tumultu Quis Deus fecit? Senec. ● Thy●st. Act. 3. Sce. 3. p. 3. p. 309. What God, so soon, so great a calm Could bring, from out so great a storm? Surely even the same God, who, (as a King testifieth) hath the hearts of all Kings in his hand, Pro. 21. 1. and who turneth them, like rivers of waters, whither he thinketh good. He it was, that so restrained the power of this wicked King Saul, that he had no power in him, once to touch his Anointed, Psal. 105. 15. or to do his Prophet any harm. The second of those kings, is Nebuchadnezzer: who was so vainly inflated, with the conceit of his own power, that he commanded his Captains to go fortn, and to see him avenged upon all the earth, judith 2. 1. 3, 7. to fill all the face of the earth with his Armies, judith 3. 8. and to destroy all flesh that obeyed not his commandments: yea to destroy all the gods of all other Nations, a●d to set up him to be worshipped for the God of the whole world. And thus he projected to extend his own power, beyond all due measure, and to advance his own honour above humane Nature. So that (as the Heathen Poet speaketh) he did Coelum ipsum petere stultitiâ. Horat. l 1 Carm O●. 3. p. 7. He sought, in his deep foolishness, To climb into Heaven's Holiness. But, what was the event of this his proud conceit? Surely this his exorbitant and unmeasurable ambition, and impotent desire of inlardging his power, beyond humane condition, was, by a superior power, restrained, and himself of all vain purposes defeated. His Captains were destroyed, his army dispersed: His honour blemished, by the hand of a woman. Yea, jud. 14. 18. and even his own person was banished from among the society of men, jud. 15. 2. etc. and forced to live wild among the beasts of the field. Dan. 4. ●0. So that (as Olympias complained Aeliand. 13. var. Hist. c. 30. p. 504. over her son Alexander, in the very like case) Whilst he affected the honour of a God, he was deprived of the honour of a man. And all this (as even he himself confessed) did fall out unto him, Dan. 4. 31. etc. by the appointment of God. The third, and the last of these Kings, is Senaherib; propounding unto himself the like amplification of his power and dominion, fell himself into the like, or a greater confusion. For he sending out all his warlike forces and powers to the siege of jerusalem; 2. King. 18. 17. 33. 34. 35. 29. and there, by the mouth of his grandiloquus Orator, insulting over all the gods of the Heathen; yea and not forbearing the very God of Heaven: when he had even devoured that kingdom in hope, and swallowed it down, for as good as his own: God himself putteth his hook into the nose of that Lion, and brought him back again the same way that he came, destroying, 2. King 19 28. 35. 36. 37. in one night, an hundred fourscore and five thousands of his Soldiers, and giving him to be destroyed, by the hands of his own Sons. Thus God, who always resisteth the proud, 1. Pet 55. resisted the attempts of these three proud kings; curtailling their power, and restraining their ambition; and thereby evidently showing them, that, Mat. 6. 27. as No man can add one cubite to his stature; so no man can add one inch unto his power, be he never so great a King. For (as the Apostle Paul teacheth us) there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God. Rom. 13. 1. Iust. M●rt l. de Monarchia Dei To. 1. p. 205. Yea, and this the very Heathen themselves confess likewise. Summi est potestas omnis, & gloria Dei: as our Saviour Christ testifieth. And, no man hath either kingdom, Mat 6 13. or power, or glory, but only from him. And therefore king Solomon hath given unto kings a very good exhortation, to remember whence their rule and power cometh. Give ear ye that rule multitudes, and glory in the number of your people. Wi●d. 6. 2. 3. 4. For the rule is given you of the Lord, and power by the most High: adding, that they be but the officers of his Kingdom. 6 And, God circumscribeth all Kingdomed within Bounds as God hath limited unto all kingdoms their powers: so he hath also circumscribed their dominions, reducing them into compass, and confining them within their own bounds and limits. For, as he hath given unto no king or kingdom an infinite power; no more hath he given them an infinite Dominion. infinity is Gods own property: which is so peculiar unto the divine Nature, that it is not communicable unto any Creature whatsoever. Much less to any man, whose largest dominion cannot reach beyond the Circle of the Earth: which is but as a prick. And yet even this Earth, as small as it is, was never yet allowed unto any one King, were he never so great: no, nor yet a quarter of it. It is true indeed, that the mighty Roman Monarchy was amplified so exceedingly by certain of the Romans, as though they had gotten the whole world into their hands: and, as though it might truly be affirmed of them (as it is of God himself in the Psalm) that in their hands were all the corners of the Earth. Psal. 95. 4. Tully saith of the Roman Empire, that it was, Orbis Terrarum terminis definitum, That it had no other limits, but the limits of the world. Cicero. Orat. pro P. Seslio. p. 442. And, in another place, he, speaking of those notable victories, which the Romans had obtained by Cn. Pompeius, he affirmeth of them, Cicero. Orat. 4. in Catiline. p. 315 A●no●●ius. ●. ●. cont. Gentes. p. 746. that they were, ijsdem, quibus Solis cursus, regionibus ac terminis contentae: contained, within no fewer Regions, than the Sun incompasseth in his course. This seemed not enough unto Caecilius. For he saith, that the Romans did, Imperium suum, ultra Solis vias, propagare: They enlarged their dominion beyond the course of the Sun. And Ovid, he cometh not a step behind them, in this their exaggerated amplification. For he saith, that if God should look down from heaven upon the earth, he could see nothing there, without the power of the Romans. Ovid. l 1. ●astor. p. 3. b. jupiter, arce sua, totum cum spectet in Orbem, Nil, nisi Romanum, quod tueatur, habet. Yea, Egesip. l. 2. de Excid. o Hieros. p. 244. and (as Egesippus recordeth) there were many, that thought the Roman Empire so great, and so largely diffused over the face of the whole Earth, that they called, Orbem Terrarum, Orbem Romanum: they called, the Globe of the Earth, the Globe of the Romans; the whole world, the Roman World. And the same folly, which possessed the Romans for their power, possessed also the other Monarches for theirs. Nebuchadnezzer the Monarch of the Chaldeans, Daniel, 3. 31. 2. 38. conceited, that he had under him, all nations, and languages. And Cyrus, the Monarch of the Persians, professed, that he was the Lord of the whole world: The Lord God of Heaven, hath given me all the Kingdoms of the Earth. Thus blind and bewitching a thing is Ambition, that it dazzleth the sight of common sense and reason. For, Ezra. 1. 2. all this great ostentation is indeed nothing else, but, either the rhetorical amplification of hyperbolising Orators; wherein there is truly audacia Tropi; or, the vain imagination of those forenamed Monarches, doting upon their own greatness. For, the two first Monarchies of the Chaldeans and Persians, were both of them shut up, within the lists of Asia, and scarcely touched the skirts of either Europe, or Africa. The Grecian Monarchy wrought Eastward into Asia too: which, though it stretched further then either of the former; yet were there many great Countries, even in Asia itself, both Northward, Southward, and Eastward, where it never so much as touched. The Roman indeed stretched furthest of all the rest, as being possessed of large Kingdoms and Dominions, both in Asia, Europe, and Africa. But yet, for all that, they were so far from obtaining the Empire of the whole world, that they could never get wholly any of these three parts of it: but there were in all of them diverse Regions and Countries, Vbi nec Pelopidarum facta, neque famam audiebant: Cic. l. 15. Epist. ad Attic. Epist. 326. p. 394. Where they never so much as heard, Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 10. p. 111. either the facts or the fame, of either Grecians, or Ronames. As Macrobius ingenuously acknowledgeth: Gangem transnare, aut Caucasum transcendere, Romani nominis fama non valuit. The fame of the Romans, as great as it was, yet was never so great, as either to be able to swim over the River Ganges, nor yet climb over the mountain Caucasus. So that, even their Fame came far short of those swelling amplifications, which before you saw used, by their Orators, and Poets. But their Dominion came much shorter: as is expressly affirmed by the forealleged Author, Totius Terrae, Macrob. ibid. quae ad Coelum puncti locum obtinet, minima quaedam particula, à nostri generis hominibus, possidetur. That though the whole Earth, compared with the Heavens, be no bigger than a Centre in the midst of a Circle; yet that scarce the least parcel of this little Earth, did ever come into the hands of the Romans. Thus, even these great and mighty Monarchies, which were the highest Columns of Majesty upon the Earth, yet have, all of them, been reduced within their bounds and limits: yea and those very straight ones. And therefore none of the minor and inferior Kingdoms could be left without limits. As Tertullian plainly proveth, by a particular enumeration of the greatest, and most famous of them. Si Solomon regnavit, in finibus tantùm judeae; à Bersabe usque Dan, termini eius Regni signantur. Si verò Babilonijs & Parthis regnavit Darius; non habuit potestatem ulteriùs, ultra fines Regni sui, non habuit in omnibus gentibus potestatem. Si Aegyptijs Pharaoh, vel quisque ei in haereditate Regni successit, illìc tantùm potitus est Regni sui dominium. Si Nabucodon●sor cum suis Regulis, ab India usque Aethiopiam, habuit Regni sui terminos. Si Alexander Macedo nunquam Asiam universam, & caeteras Regiones, postquàm devicerat, tenuit. Si Germani adhuc usque limites transgredi non sinuntur. Britanniae, intra Oceani ambitum, conclusae sunt. Maurorum gens, & Getulorum barbaries a Romans obsidentur, ne Regionum suarum fines excedant. Quid de Romans dicam, qui de legionum suarum praesidio imperium sunm muniunt, nec trans istas Gentes porrigere vires Regni sui possunt? If Solomon reigned as a King, yet was it but only in the Kingdom of judea: the borders of his Kingdom extended no farther than from Dan unto Beersheba. If Darius reigned over the Babylonians and Parthians; yet had be no dominion beyond the bounds of his own Kingdom: he could not command over every other nation. If Pharaoh and his Successors reigned over the Egyptians, yet all his dominion was only over them. If Nabucodonosor and his Princes have reigned from India unto Aethiopia, yet there his Kingdom ended. So Alexander himself could never obtain whole Asia, nor yet long retain those Regions which he there had conquered. The Germans are not suffered to go beyond their limits. The Britain's are shut up within the compass of the Sea. The Moors and Getulians' are kept in by the Romans, so that they cannot come without their bounds. Nay, the Romans themselves are fain to guard their dominions with their Garrisons and Legions, and cannot extend their Empire over all nations, at their pleasure. And that which he affirmeth of those forenamed Nations, may likewise be obseru●d in all others. There is no Kingdom in the world, but it is shut-up and included within some limits: yea and those oftentimes but very mean and weak ones: sometimes, a shallow River; someties, a narrow Hill; sometimes, a field of sand. So weak means of inhibiting so strong desires, and so feeble, of resisting so unbridled ambitions, that it is utterly impossible for so weak and simple bounders, to be able to keep in such men within their bounds, if God himself were not the Bounder of them. But he, as he hath by his power appointed, that a little weak sand should stop the rage of the swelling waters; so hath he likewise appointed, that such weak terms and limits should keep in the proudest and most ambitious Princes, as it were raging Lions, with their grates, job, 38. 11. and cages. As if God, that hath said unto the Sea, Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further; and here shalt thou stay all thy proud and swelling waves: should likewise have said unto Kings, and their Kingdoms, (as Seneca well expresseth it) Vltra Istrum, Dacus non exeat. Isthmus Samothracas includat. Seneca, l. 1. not Quaest ●a Praesat, p. 2. Parthis obstet Euphrates. Danubius' Sarmatica ac Romana disterminet. Rhenus' Germaniae modum faciat. Pyrenaeus medium inter Gallias & Hispanias iugum extollat. Inter Aegyptum & Aethiopia's arenarum in●ulta vastitas iaceat. Let the Dacians be contained within the river Ister. The Samothracians within their proper Isthmus. The Parthians within Euphrates. Let Danubius distinguish between the Romans and Sarmatians: and Rhenus restrain the daring Germans. Let the mountain Pyrenaeus divide the French, and Spaniards: and the wilderness of Sand the Aethiopians, from Egyptians. And in like manner also be all other Kingdoms: they are bound within their bounders, as it were in bands; and shut-up within their limits, as it were in prison. Now the Bounder of all these, Cap. 1. is only God himself: who (as I have before showed) is the Bounder of all things. And this also appeareth by the liquid and clear testimonies, both of Holy Scriptures, Deut. 32. 8. and of Heathen writings. The Prophet Moses affirmeth, that it is The most High God, that divided unto the Nations their inheritance, and separated the sons of Adam, and appointed the borders of the people. And Ecclesiasticus affirmeth, That it is God, that appointed a ruler over every people, when he divided the Nations of the whole Earth. Ecclus. 17. 15. So that, both the erecting of Kings, and separation of Kingdoms, are the only works of God. And therefore Trismegistus calleth God, Terrarum distributorem; The distributer of Countries. Trismeg. Pimand. Dial, 13. p. 464. And Demosthenes citeth this sentence, out of the inscription of an Altar, that — jupiter ipse Rex superûm medius limit signat agros. Demost. Orat. de Halonesa, p. 26. God jupiter himself, I ween, the King of Gods, is he, That causeth Countries, by their Lists, distinguished to be. And this to preserve the people from contentions: as in the same place, he affirmeth. For, where there be not such limits to distinguish them, there all ways do the people contend about them. As Sallust exemplisieth by a notable instance, 〈…〉. between the Cathaginians, and the Cyreneans. Who hawing long contended about their limits (and yet for a vast field of unfruitful bar●rea Sand) when they had even wearied themselves with diverse mutual slaughters, in the end (for the ending of all contention) they fell upon this Conclusion. That they should both of them send forth at a certain prefixed time, certain Messengers from their borders; and that the place, where they should meet, should be the Bounds of both Nations. The Carthaginians sent for them two Brothers called Phileni: by whose speed and diligence, they obtained great advantage. Which, when the Cyrenians challenged, as being fraudulently gotten, by their setting forth before the appointed time; they offered them this condition; that, either the Phileni should be content to be buried quick, in the place where they met, and which they challenged for other limits; or else they should permit the setting of their limits unto those Cyrenians, under the same condition which was propounded unto them. Which condition (though unaequall) yet the Phileni accepted: and so were both of them in the place buried quick. Unto whom, for their valour the Carthaginians there erected, and consecrated an Altar: as an eternal monument, both of the limits of their Dominion, and of the honour of these two noble Brethren, by whom they had obtained the same. Out of which memorable history, we may draw these three obseruatious, to our present purpose. First, that where there be no known limits between Kingdom and Kingdom, there be always contentions and quarrels about them. Secondly▪ that the way to quench those quarrels, is, there to set up some artificial limits, where there be no natural. And thirdly, that even those casual and accidental limits, yet are in those places fixed by the secret decree and appointment of God: which, both this Altar of the Phileni insinuated, and the forenamed Altar of Demosthenes expressed: — jupiter ipse. Rex superûm, medius limit signat agros. 7 And, God giveth the times of continuance unto Kingdoms as God hath circumscribed the dominions of all King, within their bounds and limits: so hath he also prescribed unto all Kingdoms and Empires the times of their continuance. Both which points the Apostle Paul hath expressed in one sentence. God hath made, of one blood, all mankind, to dwell upon all the face of the Earth: Act. 17. 26. and hath assigned the times, which were ordained, and the bounds of their habitation. He both appointeth the bounds of their habitations; which was our former point: and assigneth the times of their continuance, which is our present point. The same God, which hath determined the days of all men, and kept the just number of their months with him, job. 14. 5. appointing them their bounds which they cannot pass; he hath also appointed set periods of time, as well unto Kingdoms, as unto private persons: to some a time; to some, two times; to some, Daniel, 7. 22. 12. 7. half a time; to some, all these together, at his own will and pleasure. Which times and periods being fulfilled (as the days of a man when they are expired) they are by and by dissolved. And this we may see verified as well in the great and mighty Monarchies; as in the smaller and inferior kingdoms. — sublimes fregit Spartanus Athenas: Atque idem Thebis cecidit: Cloutian. l. 3. in laudes Stilicon. p. 273. sic Medus ademit Assyrio: Medoque tulit moderamina Perses. Subiecit Persen, Macedo: cessurus & ipse Romanis.— The Spartan spoiled th' Athenian State; the like befell to Thebes: The Medes destroyed th' Assyrian Stock; the Persian slew the Medes. The Persian Monarch was subdued by that great Macedo: The Macedon must shortly yield unto the Roman foe. And the same may be seen in divers other Kingdoms, as Bartus exemplifieth by many notable instances. So that, as in the same place he observeth: As when the Wind the angry Ocean moves, Wave hunteth wave and billow billow shoves: So do all Nations justle each the other, Bartus in his Colonies. p 442. And so one People doth pursue another. And scarce a second hath the first unhoused, Before a third him thence again hath roused. Thus the greatest Kingdoms for force, yet have been of small continuance, being successively cut off by the sword of their enemies. But yet that, not by chance, but by God's special ordinance: who, when the number of their days were expired (that is, Gen. 15. 16. when they had fulfiled the measure of their wickedness) then sent upon them, the sword of other Nations, for the punishment of their sins. For the swords of men are but the Rods of God, whereby he scourgeth them that rebel against him: as he himself affirmeth, both of the Assyrians, and of the Babylonians, calling the one of them, the rod of his wrath, and the other his Hammer and his weapon of war, wherewith he will break down nations and destroy Kingdoms. So Isa. 10. 5. So that though they whet the sword, Jer. 51. 20. yet it is God that strikes the stroke. It is he that breaketh in sunder those Kingdoms with his hammer. Which yet he doth not before their appointed time be fulfilled. For (as Ecclesiastes expressly affirmeth) Unto all things there is an appointed time. A time to plant, Eccles. 3. 1. 2. and a time to pluck up. And the appointer of those times is only God himself as by this one Argument it evidently appeareth; that he is so peremptory and definite in foretelling the certain times of the continuing and falling of diverse Kingdoms. He foretold of the great and mighty Kingdom of Babylon that it should continue but only unto the third generation, jer. 27. 6. 7. and that then it should utterly be undone. I have given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzer the King of Babel my servant— And all Nations shall serve him and his Son and his Son's Son, until the very time of his Land also come, and then many Nations and great Kings shall serve themselves of him: what could be more definite? And that he neither deceived nor was deceived in it, the event which followed, openly declared. For in the time of Belshazzer Nebuchadnezzers' Sons Sons, Dan. 5. 28 30. 26. the Babylonian Monarchy was dissolved, and that by the written decree of God, who there professeth that the number of that Kingdom was fulfilled. And as definite as he was in appointing the set time of the dissolution of Babylon, so definite was he also in appointing the set time of the jewish Captivity under them. jer. 25. 11, 12. This whole land shall be desolate and an astonishment, & shall serve the King of Babel seventy years. And when the seventy years are accomplished, I will visit the King of Babel and that Nation etc. Which he did accordingly perform. For first, for the deliverance and manumission of the jews, it is expressly testified, that that was fulfilled, as soon as the time, foretell by jeremy, was finished. 2. Chro. 36. 22. Ezra. 1. 1. And, for the second part of the Prophecy, concerning the destruction of the Babylonian Kingdom; it followeth by consequent upon the former. For Cyrus, who, in the first year of his reign, gave order for the return of the jews, was one of those Princes, who were the overthrowers of the Babylonians. As concerning which Prince, in giving his name, almost an hundred years, Isay. 44 28 before he was borne; Isay. 45. 1. there is so great an evidence of God's foreseeing providence, that a parallel to that prophecy, cannot be given, in all the secular History. And as God hath been definite, in foretelling the very time of the destruction of Babylon; so hath he been likewise, in foreshowing the destruction, both of the Ephraemites, and of the Egyptians: pointing down precisely, upon the very number of the years: Within threescore and five years, Ephraem shall be destroyed, from being a Nation. Isay, 7. 8. And for Egypt, he saith: I will make the land of Egypt desolate, for forty years etc. But, at the end of forty years, I will gather the Egyptians from the people, Ezech. 29. 12. 13. where they were scattered. Now, this so peremptory assigning of a definite time, as well of their captivity, as of their liberty, doth evidently show, not only that those times are certainly appointed; but also that this appointment is only made by God. Who (as our Saviour Christ teacheth us) hath in his own power the seasons of all times: Acts, 1. 7. and who (as the Prophet Daniel teacheth us) is he, Daniel. 2. 21. that changeth those times and seasons, and that both taketh away Kings, and setteth up Kings. And this also was not unknown, even to the very Heathen. For, jason, in Xenophon, expressly affirmeth, that it is God only, which doth, Et homines extollere, & potentes deprimere: Xenoph. l. 6. Rerum Gracarum p. 462. That both lifteth up the needy, and casteth down the mighty. So likewise, He siodus: — homines sunt pariter obscurique, clarique, Hesiod, Opera & Dies, p. 1. Nobiles, ignobilesque, jovis magni voluntate. Facilè enìm extollit, facilè etiam elatum deprimit. Facilè Praclarum minuit, & obscurum adauget. Men are obscure, or eminent, They noble are, or base: But all is God's appointment; Who gives the humble grace, Exalting them that are but low, And lofty ones depressing, Abating of the prouder show, And poorer sort increasing, So Homer: Facile est Dijs, Homer, Odyss. l. 16. qui coelum latum habitant, Et gloria illustrare mortalem hominem, Et malo afficere. The God of Heaven, he easily can Immortalize a mortal man, with glory and with fame: The same God, even as easily may Afflict a mortal man, I say, with sorrow and with shame. And Simonides affirmeth, that God hath not only the power of the thing, but also the power of the Time. He both can do the thing, and appoint the Time. O Filled, penes se habet Iupiter altitonans, finem Omnium quae fiunt, Smonides cum H●siodo, p. 164. & pro arbitrio suo disponit. The Ends of all, in God's sole power rest, Which he disposeth, as him pleaseth best. So that (to conclude this discourse with Tertullians' sentence,) I'll vices dominationum, ipsis temporibus, in seculo ordinat, qui ante omne tempus fuit, & Seculum corpus temporum fecit. Tertul. Apologet. Cap. 26. p. 57 He it is, that ordained the interchange of dominions and Empires, in their times, who himself is more ancient than any time, and who hath made an eternity of the body of time. Now, if Cities grow great, and little, neither by Fate, nor Fortune; but by God's praeordination; if he limit their powers, circumscribe their dominions, and measure out their continuance; then must there needs be a God, who performeth all these works. But the Antecedent is true; as hath been proved in this Chapter. And therefore, the Consequent must needs follow after. CHAP. 8. God is, both the Physical, and ethical last end of all things. 2. He giveth us all virtues, which are the way unto perfect Blessedness. 3. He implanteth in us all good affections, which are the praevious dispositions unto virtues. 4. He giveth unto us the true and perfect Blessedness. 5. Nay, he himself is, our true and perfect Blessedness. LET us now proceed forward, from the Politics, unto the Ethics; which afford us many Arguments, to prove There is a God: and that by the confession, even of the very Heathen. For, as the Physics do infer, that there needs must be a God; because there is no more but one Primum Efficiens, Arist. l. 2. Phys. c. 3. To. 1. p. 433. but one first Efficient Cause, from which all things do proceed: so the Ethics do enforce the same conclusion unto us; because there is no more, but one ultimus finis, but one last final cause, unto which all things are referred. Which last End; as Aristotle himself teacheth, both in his Physics, Arist. l. 1. Ethic. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604. and in his Ethics; must needs be Summum bonum, ipsumque adeo Optimum: that is, The chiefest and most sovereign good of all things. For, Quanto est posterior, tanto est praestantior omnis Finis.— Paling. in l. conc. p. 103. Among all Ends, the Latter, is evermore the better. And consequently, the last must needs be the best. And so must needs be God. Or else there should something be better than God. Which were utterly absurd. For, he is the best of all. His title is, to be, Optimus. And therefore, as God is that Primum Efficiens, Lib. 2. Cap. 3 Sect. 4. by whom all things were made: so is he also, that Vltimus Finis, for whom all things were made. As the Scriptures themselves have expressly testified. The Apostle Paul telleth us, that All things were made, not only of God, but also for God too. Of him, and through him, and for him are all things. Rom. 11. 36. So that he is not only their Primum Efficiens, that is, Their first Author from whom they came; but he is also, their Vltimus Finis too, that is, Their last End, for whom they came. Both which points, King Solomon confirmeth in his Proverbs, in express and plain words: The Lord hath made all things for himself; Pro. 16. 4. yea even the wicked, for the day of evil. The Lord hath made all thing: therefore he is their Efficient. He hath made them for himself: therefore he is their End. Sic Deus est finis postremus & ultimus, Palingenius▪ in Le●ne. p. 103. in quem Omnia contendunt, propter quem mundus, & omnis Res mundi est: siquidem, propter seipsum, omnia fecit. saith the Christian Poet. God is the End, yea that last End, Unto which One, all things contend: For which the world, and all therein. Was made: For he made all for Him. And, as God is Finis rerum, condendarum, that is, The last End, for which all things were created: so is he also, Finis rerum expetendarum: The last End for which all things are desired. Whom have I in Heaven but thee? (saith the Prophet David) and there is none upon Earth that I desire in comparison of thee. Psal 73. 24. So that, God is not only the natural end of all his Creatures; but also the moral end of all men's actions and affections. And this also may be concluded, by the reason afore-framed. For, Aristotle, affirmeth in the forealleged place, Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604. that, Si finis est quispiam rerum agendarum, quem, propter seipsum, caetera autem propter hunc volumus; constat hunc talem Finem summum esse Bonum, ipsumque optimum. If there be any such end of all humane actions, which we only desire in respect of itself, and other things but with reference unto it; it is apparent, that such an end must be that, which we call the supreme, and chiefest good. Now, that must needs be God: unless something which is not God, should be better than God: unless some other thing should be Summum Bonum, and God himself: be but Inferius Bonum. But that God himself, and nothing else, is both the last end of all humane actions, and that chiefest good, which is aimed at in all of them, it is generally taught, in the Schools of all the Heathen. Who deliver unto us these four special Doctrines, as the principals of their Morals. Yea, and that, with as great and as uniform a consent, as in any other of their doctrines can readily be found. First, that Virtue, which is the way unto Felicity, is given us of God. Secondly, that good Affections, which are praeparatives unto Virtue, are also given by him. Thirdly, that Felicity, which is the salary and reward of Virtue, is given us of God. And Fourthly, That God himself, is our only true Felicity. 2 For the first of which positions, Virtue is the way unto Felicity. and the first branch of it: it is a thing, which is agreed upon, among the very Heathen, that the end of the Ethics, and Moral Philosophy, is to bring men, by virtue, unto the true Felicity. Felicity is the end of all men's actions and desires: but Virtue is the way, whereby men come unto that end. As Tully exemplifieth in the person of Hercules. 〈…〉. p. 113. Abijt ad Deos Hercules: sed nunquàm abijsset, nisi, quùm inter Homines esset, eam sibiviam munivisset. Hercules is gone unto the gods: but he never had come there, if he had not made his way, whilst he lived here. He had never come to Heaven, if he had not by his virtue paved himself a Causey thither, whilst he lived among men. And therefore Seneca bringeth in Hercules, speaking thus of himself, and of his own virtues: — Virtus mihi In astra, Senec. in Herc. 〈…〉. 4. Sce. 4. p. 126. & ipsos fecit ad superos iter. My Virtue 'tis, hath made a way for Me, Into the Heau●ns among the gods to be. For, as he addeth, in another place: Nunquàm Stygias fertur ad umbras Inclyta Virtus.— Sen●●. in Herc. Oclaeo. Act. 5. Sce. 5 p. 128. Virtue ne'er led to dwell Among the Ghosts in Hell And that, which Seneca affirmeth of Hercules, doth Ennius of Romulus: Romulus in coelo cum Dijs agit aevum. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p 112. Romulus now liveth in Heaven, among the gods. But how came he thither? That Tully expresseth in another place. Quibus tandem gradibus Romulus ascendit in coelum? By what steps, did Romulus ascend, Cic. 1. Parad. p. 421. and climb up into heaven? He answereth his own quaestion: Rebus gestis, atque virtutibus: By his nobles Acts, and by his virtues. And, that Virtue is the direct and compendious way unto Felicity, Aristotle himself defineth plainly, in his defining of it to be, Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 7. To. 7. p. 609. Operatio per virtutem in vita perfecta: A working according unto virtue in a life every way perfect. But now, Virtue is not of Nature, Art or Industrie all the Quaestion is, Whence this virtue is? Whether it be, by natural inclination, from our Parents? or, of artificial institution, from our Masters? or, of moral acquisition, from ourselves? or, of supernatural infusion, from God? For, one of these four ways it must needs come unto us. For the first of which four ways, to wit, for Natural inclination, Tully standeth; 〈…〉. p. 70. who setteth down these positions: Omnia officia, a principijs Naturae proficisci: That all good offices and duties do only arise, out of the principles of Nature: And therefore, omnia officia eò referri, ut adipiscamur Principia Naturae: Ibid. p. 69. That all our duties do aim only at this end, to bring us to the first principles of our Nature. For, as in another place he affirmeth, Est virtus, Cic. l. 1. Acad. p. 5 Cic. l. 1. de leg. p. 313. quasi perfectio Naturae: And yet again: Est virtus nihil aliud, quam in se perfecta, & ad summum perducta, Natura. Virtue is nothing else, but Nature brought unto her perfection & height. And therefore he setteth down this for a Conclusion, that, Nature alone can lead us unto virtue, if we follow her direction: Cic. l. 1. de. leg. p. 314. p. 326. in Lambini Edit. Naturam ducem nactus, non est quisquam hominum, qui ad virtutem pervenire non possit. Which sentences, in some sense, may be admitted, with good acceptance, if they be interpreted of our original & uncorrupted. Nature. But, consider of our Nature, as it is now depraved in us, and by the corrupt Conduits of our sinful Parents traducted unto us; and there is nothing more contrary unto our nature, than virtue; nothing more consonant and agreeable, than vice. Arist. Prob. Sect. 10. prob. 44. To. 2▪ p, 473. And therefore Aristotle affirmeth, that, Natura etiam prauè omnia facit: that, Nature doth all things out of order. And, in another place, he, disputing, which of the two extreme vices, is most contrary unto the middle virtue, he sets down this for a general rule; that, That vice is always most opposite unto virtue, Arist. l. 2. Eth. c. 8. To. 2. p. 625. unto which our own nature doth lead us most willingly. Ea namque, medio contraria magis esse videntur, ad quae nos ipsi quodammodò sumus propensiores. Arist, l▪ 2. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 616. Which manifestly proveth (as he also, in another place, expressly concludeth) Nullam fieri virtutem morum, in nobis, naturâ: That no moral virtue is bred in us, by nature. For the second Opinion, that it is framed in us by Art, and by the instruction of our Teachers; Plut. To. 2. Mor. p. 252. Plutarch not only approveth it, but also hath written a Book to prove it, and, Vertutem posse doceri, inscribed it. Which (as Aristotle well distinguisheth) is true indeed in intellectual virtues: Arist. l. 3, Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 615. as in Arts, and Sciences: they may be taught us. But in Morals, it is false. As out of the very name of moral virtues, in the same place, he collecteth: That name importing, not institution, but custom; and that such virtues are gotten, not by learning, but by practising. And therefore Socrates professeth (yea and proveth too) quòd virtus nusquam discatur, Plato, in Protagora, p. 231. nullóque praeceptore percipiatur: That virtue, can neither be learned, nor taught. So that, as Tully is confuted by Aristotle; That virtue is not of Nature: so is Plutarch, Max. Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 263. by Plato; That it is not of Art. Which Maximus Tyrius also confirmeth. Non fit ab Arte, quòd evadunt boni, sed potius beneficio jovis: It is not by Art, that men are made good; but rather by the grace and blessing of God. For, as Saint Ambrose very truly observeth, Vera virtus nihil requirit, nisi Dei gratiam: Ambros. l. 2. de jacob. c. 4. To. 4. p. 298. True virtue requireth nothing else, but only God's grace. So that, it is neither of Nature, nor of Art, as Plato in another place expressly affirmeth, rejecting both those two forenamed causes, in one sentence: Apparet virtutem, Stob●us Serm. 1. p. 27. nec disciplinâ, nec natura; sed divinâ sorte suis possessoribus accidere. It neither comes by nature, nor by learning, but only by Gods giving. And for the third opinion, That it is gotten of ourselves, only by industry and practice; that apparently is Aristotle's, in the forealleged place. Neque naturâ, neque praeter naturam, Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 616. virtutes in nobis efficiuntur: sed idonei quidem ad suscipiendas sumus, naturâ: Suscipimus autem ipsas, atque perficimus, per consuetudinem. Virtue's are begotten in us, neither by nature, nor beside nature: But Nature giveth us a fitness and hability to receive them. But it is only practise and custom, Pindarus in Nemeis Od. 6. p. 405. that ripens and perfects them. But yet (as Pindarus truly noteth) All our practice and custom, will but a little profit us, if God do not give his blessing unto us. Ad summitatem virtutis pervenerunt, qui labores experti sunt. Cum Dei autem favore etc. There be many that have attained to the highest pitch of virtue, by their labour and endeavour. But yet by the assistance of God's grace and favour. And therefore Pythagoras giveth us advice, not to rely too confidently upon our own endeavours, but to join our prayers unto them, for God's help and assistance. — ad opus accede, Deos, P●thagor cum 〈◊〉, p 124. ut id perficiant precatus. Lay hand unto thy work, with all thy wit, But pray, that God would speed and perfect it. Otherwise, all thy pain shall be taken in vain. For, as Saint Bernard truly teacheth: Bern: Serm. 22. in Cant. ●. p, 55●. In cassum quis laborat, in acquisitione virtutum, si aliundé eas sperandas putet, quam a Domino virtutum. In vain do men labour to attain unto virtues, if they look for them elsewhere, then from the Lord of virtues. It is he only that giveth them, because he only possesseth them: as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth: 〈…〉. Serm. 22. p, 271. Virtutem, quam possidet, tribuit Deus. And therefore Theocritus adviseth King Ptolemy, 〈◊〉, Fidyl. 17. p, 120. that he should, Virtutem a Deo petere; Pray for virtue, at the hand of God. So that, none of all the three forenamed are the causes of virtue: neither Nature, Art, nor Industry. It is true, that all these, in some degree, may be helps: but yet only as God's inferior and ministerial instruments. Nature may plant it, Art may prune it, Industry may water it: but, 1, Cor. 3. 7. as the Apostle Paul teacheth us, Neither is he that planteth, any thing; nor yet he that watereth, but only God, that giveth the increase. And, he that giveth the increase unto plants, is he, that giveth the increase unto virtues, which are his heavenly plants: as even Homer acknowledgeth: jupiter virtutem viris augetque, Homer, l. 20. minuítque, Prout quidem voluerit. Iliad. p, 742. God giveth virtue his increase, And lesseneth it, even as He please. And therefore, God is the Giver of virtue unto men. Theophil, Antioch. l, 2. ad A●to lic. Bib. Pa●. To. 5. p, 134. it is confessed with one mouth, by all the Heathen, Pindar. Olimp. Odd 9 p, 109. that it is God, Theognis cum 〈◊〉. p, 14. that is the giver of virtue unto men. Proverb, 16. 4. Which is the second Branch of our first position. Simonides saith expressly, that, Nemo, sine Dijs, virtutem accepit, neque urbs, neque Homo: That neither Man, nor City, without God's special grace, could ever attain to virtue. So likewise Pindarus, Boni & sapientes, ex Deo solo proveniunt: Men are made both wise and good, only by the help of God. So likewise Theognis, Nemo hominum, neque malus, sine numine, neque bonus: There is no man made either good, or bad, but only by God. According to that of Solomon, that, God hath made all things, for himself; yea, even the wicked, for the day of evil. And yet is not God the cause of men's wickedness. Because he maketh them not evil, inserendo malitiam, Aquin, 1. 2. Quaest 79. Art. 3. p, 160. but only, subtrahendo gratiam, as Aquinas distinguisheth, Not by inserting into any man the motions of sin, but by withholding his grace, which is the bridle of sin: which being withdrawn, men rush violently of themselves, like untamed horses, into all kind of wickedness. But, though God give not vice, inserendo malitiam; yet giveth he virtue, inserendo gratiam. And therefore the Romans (as Saint Augustine observeth) did consecrate virtue for one of their gods. Aug. l, 4. de Ciuit. Dei, c. 20. To. 5. p. 252. Thereby plainly acknowledging, that Virtue is of God: yea The free gift of God, as Saint Augustine there affirmeth. Virtutem quoque Deum fecerunt, quae, quia Dea non est, sed donum Dei, ipsa ab illo impetretur, a quo solo dari potest. They have named Virtue, for one of their Gods. Which because it is no God, but the gift of God, it must only of him be sought, who hath only power to give it, that is to say, of God: who (by the consent of the chiefest Philosophers) is the only bestower of all virtues. Anax●goras saith, that, Mens (which is his word for God) is, Arist. l. 1. de Anim. ●. c. 2 To. 1. p. 786. Proclus l. de Anim ●. p. 193. Bonirectique causa: The cause of all goodness. And so likewise, Proclus: Quicquid bonum & salutare competit animabus, causam a Dijs definitam habet. Whatsoever is good and healthful to the soul, it hath his cause defined and appointed of God, Yea, and he addeth there also the opinion of Plato. Virtutum omnium, corporaliúmque bonorum, velut sanitatis, roboris, institiae, temperantiae exemplaria, Plato probat procedere penès Deum. Plato proveth the Patterns of all virtues and of all corporal endowments, as of Health, of Strength, of justice, of Temperance, to proceed from God. Yea, and as Plutarch observeth, God hath given unto virtue a kind of natural sweetness, whereby it is no less delightful unto such as do practise it then it is unto those, among whom it is practised. Plut. l. de ira cohibenda. To. 2. p. 292. Deo adiwante, placidi, mansueti, & humani mores, nemini eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ita grati, iucundique sunt, ut ei ipsi, qui iis est praeditus. And this God doth, to allure us unto virtue, by the sweetness of it. L. 2. c. 8. Sect. 3. jamblic. c. 31. p, 100 Yea, and as jamblicus observeth, God doth not only provoke us unto virtue; but also revoketh us from vice. Ad iusta quidem adiwans, ab iniustis revocans. And this we may evidently see in the Scriptures, by diverse notable examples. Gen. 20. 6. For when Abimelech intended to have corrupted Abraham's wife, 1. Sam. 25. 26. 3●. God withheld him from it. And when David intended to have destroyed Nabal, God withheld him from it. And Opheus in his hymn unto Venus (by whom he understandeth Divine and heavenly Love) he maketh a prayer unto her, to withhold his mind from all filthy and vicious love. O Dea, nam ubíque habes audiendi acumen, Stob. Serm. 61. p. 390. Exaudi; & laboriosam vitae meae viam Dirigas, tuis, o veneranda, iustissimis telis, Profanarum extinguens horrendam libidinem cupiditatum. O Goddess, hear; for thou canst, whate'er, where I pray; Direct me, by thy righteous helps, in my life's tedious way, Quenching profane and fearful lusts, that lead my mind astray. He prayeth to God, to withhold him; because he could not withhold himself. And so, Homer. l. 1. Ilid. p. 7. when Achilles intended to have killed Agamemnon, Pallas withheld him from it, as Homer also testifieth: by that fiction, implying this unfeigned truth, that it is God, which withholdeth us from evil, as well as which helpeth us in good. Both which points together, we may evidently see, in the prayer of the Pharisee: Luk. 18. 11. 12. O God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers. Here be the vices, from which God had withheld him, and for which he thanketh him. He proceedeth on, unto those virtues, wherewith God had adorned him. I fast twice in the Week, and I give tithe of all that ever I possess. So that, if a man be not infected with all kind of vice, he may thank God for it. And, if he be endued with any kind of virtue, he may thank God for that too. For it is only by the grace of God, 1. Cor. 15. 10. that he is, as he is. In which action of the Pharisee, we may evidently see, a direct confutation of Tully's observation, that, Nemo quòd bonus vir esset, gratias Dijs egit unquàm. And again in the same place, Cic. l. 3. de. Nat. Deor. p. 238. that Virtutem, nemo unquàm acceptam Deo retulit: That no man had ever thanked God, that he had made him a good man. For we see the plain contrary, in the prayer of the Pharisee: He expressly thanked God, that he had made him so good. So that here is a confutation of his first position. His second is this, That no man ever acknowledged his virtue to have descended unto him from God. Which we see again confuted, by all those several testimonies, that before I have recited. For they all have professed, that Virtue is God's gift. As for the reason, which in that place he bringeth, to fortify his position; That men are praised for their virtues; which they could not justly be, if it were the gift of God, and not gotten by themselves: That is a very false and insufficient reason. For, men are praised, both for their Beauty, and for their strength of body. And yet are both these the good gifts of God, and not purchased or gotten by ourselves. And therefore, as error is always unconstant, and never true unto itself; so he, in another place, both renounceth his own position, and confuteth his own reason. His position he renounceth by a contrary position, directly affirming, that, Si inest, in hominum genere, Mens, Fides, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 212. Virtus, Concordia; Vnde haec in terram, nisi a superis, defluere potuerunt? If there be among men; either Wisdom, or Faith, or Virtue, or Peace; Whence could any of these come to men upon earth, but only from the God of heaven? Naming Virtue, among the rest. And his Reason he confuteth by the instance of Metellus, Maximus, Marcellus, Africanus, Cato, Scipio, Laelius, who were the most virtuous, and the most praiseworthy persons of the Roman Commonwealth. Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 225. And yet he affirmeth of them all, that Horum neminem, nisi iunante Deo, talem fuisse, credendum est. That none of all these, could ever have been such a man, as he was, if he had not been helped and assisted by God. So that he ascribeth their Virtues, and consequently their praises, unto God. Thereby plainly over-throwing, the ground of his position: and showing, that virtue may be praised, although it be of God. Thus you see the great agreement, which the Heathens Philosophers have with the Scriptures, in ascribing unto God, to be the Author of all Virtues. 3 Neither is God only the Author and giver of grown and perfect Virtue, God is the Giver of all good motions and affections. when it is form into an habit; but also of all those good motions, and affections, which are, as it were, the praeparatives unto it: or rather indeed the inchoations of it. Those good inclinations, and virtuous propensions, which (being adult and grown up) do prove the true substance and bodies of our virtues, are indeed not in us any natural dispositions; (as Tully would have them:) Sunt ingenijs nostris semina 〈◊〉 virtutum quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam Natura perduceret. but supernatural inspirations, Cic. l. 3. Tusc. and Gods own celestial seminations; Deut 30. 6. as the Prophet Moses expressly affirmeth: Phil. 2. 13. The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, that thou mayst love him, with all thy heart, & live. So that the first motions of our love towards God, are only the motions of his love towards us. He moveth us to love him, that we may live with him. Without whose grace thus moving us, we could have no motion in us, at the least not unto good. For, the Apostle plainly teacheth us, that, it is God, that giveth us both the will, and the work. He both giveth us the virtues, and the feed of them too, which are good affections. For, as the same Apostle in another place telleth us: We are not able of ourselves, so much as to think any thing, but all our sufficiency is of God: 2. Cor. 3. 5. So that, with the Prophet Isaiah, we may truly profess: O Lord, thou it is, that hast wrought all our works for us. And this even the Heathen themselves do acknowledge: Isai. 26. 12. running through all the steps of the Apostles former doctrine. One of them telleth us, that, Lucan. l. 9 p. 127. b. Nil agimus, nisi sponte Dei. By us there can be nothing done, But by the will of God alone. Another of them, that we speak nothing, but by the will of God. Natura humana, nec rationem, nec orationem de Dijs suscipere potest, sine Dijs; ●●mblic. c. 26. p. 1●. nedum divina opera perficere, sine illis. The nature of man, can neither conceive, nor utter any thing of the nature of God, without the help of God: much less can it do any work of God, without him. Another of them telleth us, that we cannot think any thing, without him: because all our cogitations and thoughts do come from him. Talis enìm mens est terrestrium hominum, Homer, lib. 18. Odies. p. 528. Qualem quotidiè ducit pater, virorúmque, Deorúmque. saith Homer. Such thoughts Men have, on earth that live; As Men may crave, but God doth give. And so likewise Archilocus, unto the same purpose: Mortalium mens— — talem praebet identidem Seize, Plut. lib. de Homero, To. 1. p. 129. Tonantis summa qualem Quotidie exhibuit voluntas: Man's mind doth daily such itself explay, As Gods great Will doth frame it every day. So that all the good motions and affections of the mind, the very Heathens do profess, to proceed from God. And therefore Orpheus, in his hymme unto Nemesis, prayeth to that Goddess, to give a virtuous and good mind unto men, and to remove all evil cogitations from them. Da verò mentem bonam ut habeant; Stob. Serm. 9 p, 100 Extinguens odiosas cogitationes, profanas, nimis suprebas, & scelestissimas. Give, Nemesis, o give a virtuous mind to men, Repressing odious, base, and vile, proud thoughts in them. Acknowledging all good motions, to be God's inspirations. And so likewise, on the contrary, they again profess, that all those wicked and depraved affections, whereby the mind of a man is corrupted, and so led headlong into all kind of vice, are indeed nothing else, but the suggestions, and temptations of Devils, and wicked spirits. Daemon ultor (saith Trismegistus) ignis acumen incutiens, sensus affligit, Trismeg. in Pimand. Dial. 1. p. 376. & ad patranda scelera armat hominem; ut turpioris culpae reus, acriori supplicio sit obnoxius, eúmque, sine ulla intermissione, ad insatiabiles concupiscentias inflammat. The revenging spirit, inflaming the mind with a quick and sharp fire, afflicteth our senses, and armeth a man unto all kind of wickedness; that so he being guilty of a greater fault, may be obnoxious to a greater punishment. And therefore he ceaseth not to kindle in our minds unsatiable concupiscences. And again, in another place: Nocentes Angeli, Trismeg. in Asclep. c. 9 p. 515. humanitati commisti, ad omnia audaciae mala miseros (manu iniecta) compellunt: in bella, in rapinas, in frauds, & in omnia, quae sunt animorum naturae contraria. The hurtful Angels, insinuating themselves into men's minds, do hale-on poor wretches, as it were by the collars, into all kinds of evils; into wars, into robberies, into frauds, and into all those vices, which are contrary unto the true nature of our souls. So likewise Orpheus: Daemons humani saevi hosts, atque maligni, Aug. 〈◊〉 lib. 〈…〉 Philoso▪ ●. c. 33. p, 474. Qui nostris animis vacuis infanda ministrant, Vt semper diram vitam cum crimine ducant. The Devils, men's fierce and cruel Enemies, Object unto their minds strange villainies, To make their li●es cursed with Impieties. Which is largely and notably laid open by Porphyrius, ●usib. l. 4. de 〈…〉. 11. l, 98. out of whom it is transcribed, by Eusebius. Thus, even the very Heathen, do both believe, that there be Devils; and, that they be man's most hateful and cruel enemies: and, that they pierce, and insinuate into the minds of men: seeking there, with all kind of wicked lusts to corrupt them; that so they may bring them unto utter destruction. And so, on the contrary, they do likewise believe, not only that there is a God; but also, that he is the Author of all good: both giving unto us all kinds of virtues, and giving unto virtues all their growth and increase; yea and their first seeds too, by inspiring into our minds good thoughts and affections. Sto●●ns▪ Serm. 101. p, 554. Insomuch, that Hippodamus affirmeth, that Homines habent virtutem, propter divinitatis commercium: That men attain unto virtues, only by the commerce and conversation of the Gods. Who not only help us unto virtue, by furthering and cherishing our good motions & affections: ●ib. 2. Cap. 8. Sect. 2. but further, by extinguishing those wicked lusts and concupiscences, wherewith the Devil endeavoureth to extinguish virtue in us. For, that also they add: Adsum ego Mens, iis (saith Pimander in Trismegistus, who professeth himself to be the spirit of God, Trismeg. Pimped. Dial. 1. p. 375. 367. Mens divinae potentiae) qui boni, pij, puri, religiosi, sanctique sunt: praesentia mea fert illis opem. I am present with those men, that are good, and godly, pure, religious, and holy: And that my presence giveth them great help and assistance. In what manner, he showeth after. Ipsa Mens, ianitoris munere fungens, incidentes in insidias corporis, haudquaquam permitto finem consequi suum. Aditus enim, per quos turpes blanditiae manare solent, iugiter intercludo, libidinùmque●omites omnes extinguo. The Spirit (performing the part of a Porter) when as any of them fall into the snares of the flesh, will not permit and suffer them to finish their design, but shutteth up the passages of all flattering enticements, and extinguisheth the incentives of all filthy lusts: By faith thus quenching the fiery darts of the Devil, as the Apostle speaketh. For, this Spirit is water: in quo, omnia ignita illius peruer si tela extinguuntur: Eph: 6. 16. Nazian. Orat. 40 〈◊〉 sanctum Baptisma. p, 621. as Nazianzen observeth. He is a Water, that extinguisheth all the darts of the Devil, because they be of fire. And, as this good Spirit (like a Porter) repelleth evil spirits, that they cannot enter: so he also (like a Soldier) expelleth them again, if they chance to enter. He taketh from those strong men, the armour, wherein they trusted, and casteth them out of the house, Luke, 11. 21, 22. which they possessed. And this also, the Heathen than have expressly confessed. jamblic. c. 30. p. 97. Dij vera bona dant bonis, quibuscum versantur (saith jamblicus,) suoque commercio pravitatem, passionémque longè ab iis propulsant; suoque splendore, tenebrosos indè spiritus arcent. Mali enìm spiritus, intrante Deorum lumine, velut sole, tanquàm tenebrae subterfugiunt. The Gods do give to good men those things that are truly good, when they come unto them; expelling by their presence, all passions, and vices; driving from them, by their light, the Angels of darkness. For the light of the Gods, when it entereth men's minds, driveth away the Devils, as the light of the sun driveth away darkness. So that though the Devil be never so malicious, in seeking to do men hurt; yet is God no less gracious, in seeking to do them good: the Devil, by evil temptations, seeking to corrupt them, and so bring them to misery: God, by good inspirations, seeking to correct them, and so bring them to felicity, Which is our next point. 4 For, as the Heathen do confess, that God is the Giver of all Virtue, God is the Giver of felicity unto men. and Goodness: so do they likewise confess, that God is the Giver of all Felicity, & Happiness. He giveth us Virtue, as the way of Felicity: & he gives us Felicity as the reward of Virtue. And therefore, the Apostle Peter telleth us, 2. Pet. 1. 3. that God hath called us both unto virtue, and unto Glory: to Virtue, as the way; to Glory, as the reward. For, so, Aristotle himself hath termed it expressly, Praemium, finisque Virtutis, optimum, divinúmque quiddam, atque beatum esse constat. Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 9 To. 2. p. 611. It is most certain, that the reward, and end of virtue, is such a thing, as is both the best of all other things, and a divine thing, and a blessed thing. He calleth the reward and end of virtue, Beatum, that is to say, a blessed thing: because it is Blessedness itself. He calleth it, Optimum, that is to say, the best thing: because there is nothing that is better than Blessedness. And he calleth it, Divinum, that is, a divine thing: because it is given by God himself unto us. And this is plainly confessed, both by Christians, and Heathens. jam. 1. 17. Plato. in Euthryp●one. p. 59 The Apostle james telleth us, Hesiod. in Theogonia. p. 82. that Every good gift is given us of God. And Plato confirmeth this testimony to be true. Nihil nobis est bonum, quìn Dij praebeant: We have nothing that is good, but it is given us of God. And therefore Hesiodus calleth the gods, Bonorum Datores: The givers of good things. Homer. l. 8. Odies. p. 218. Plut. l. de Homero To. 1. Mor. p. 119. And so likewise doth Homer, Lamblic. c. 47. p. 176. Plaut. Bacchid. Act. 4. 〈◊〉. 4. 343. in the very same words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which Plutarch also observeth in him. But jamblicus goeth further. For he calleth the Gods not only Datores, but also Largitores bonorum: Yea &, Omnium bonorum, The bountiful bestowers of all good things. God giveth all good things: and he giveth them not sparingly: not digitulis duobus sumens primoribus; as the Comic speaketh; not taking up a little between his thumb and his finger: but in a far larger manner. He giveth to the full, with an open hand. He openeth his hand, Psal. 104. 28. and filleth all things with his goodness: measuring out his blessings, Plaut. Prologue. in Menech. p. 416. not modio, nor trimodio; but ipso horreo; as the Comic speaketh, in another place: not by the bushel, nor by the sackful, but by the whole Barnefull. For all the Barnes-full in the world, are nothing else, but God's bounty, and Gods gifts unto their Possessors. So that, he may be called truly Largitor bonorum, he giveth them so largely. And yet, as Turtullian truly noteth, God is not, Tertul. l. 1. cont. Marc. c. 24 p. 362 Tertul. lib. 2. cont. Martion. c. 5. p. 370. Profusor bonitatis; but Dispensator. He is not a rash powrer-out of his benefits; but a wise Disposer of them. Because, as in another place he addeth, Nec ratio, sine bonitate, ratio; nec bonitas sine ratione, bonitas est. Neither is reason, without goodness, reason; nor goodness, without reason, goodness. And therefore God, Plat●. in 〈…〉 p 913. Arist. l 1. 〈…〉 9 To. 2. p. ●11. who is not irrationabiliter bonus, not good without reason, disperseth his good things, with a liberal hand: but he disperseth them, with an exact and upright judgement. Now, if God be the giver of all good things: then must he needs be the giver of Felicity too, which is the principal good thing: If of the smaller and lower goods, then much more of Felicity, which is the greatest and highest. 〈…〉 For Plato maketh that collection. Ipsum bonorum omnium authorem cur non maximi etiam boni causam arbitrabimur? He that is the Author of all good, why should he not be the Author of the greatest good? Yea, and Aristotle himself inferreth the same conclusion: Si aliquod aliud Deorum est munus hominibus, consentaneum est rationi, & felicitatem a Dijs ipsis dari, & eò magis, quò 〈◊〉 humanis bonis est praestabilius. If God hath given unto men any other gift or bounty, then stands it with reason, that he should also give felicity: yea, and that so much the more, by how much that gift is better. Whence he concludeth, that Felicity is given to men by God: because it is the best of all other gifts. As Plato, from the same ground, concludeth the same, for wisdom, in the place before alleged. Which, in another place, Plato in 〈◊〉. p. 256. he affirmeth directly, to be the true Felicity. Sapientia, ipsa felicitas est: Quod puer quivis intelligat. Wisdom is the true felicity: as every Child may understand very easily. And therefore, Homer doubteth not to affirm expressly that it is only God himself, that is the giver of Felicity. jupiter ipse distribuit felicitatem Olympius hominibus. Homer. l. 6. Odies. p. 168. The highest God, is th'only He, That gives to Men felicity. And Solon prayeth unto the Muses, to obtain felicity for him, from the Gods: — Musae? Felicitatem a Dijs immortalibus mihi praebete. Solon. in Eleg. p. 130. cum He●iodo. O Muses, bring me happiness, Which must come from God's Holiness. For, as Eu●ipides truly noteth: Nemo, Dijs invitis, vel felix est vel infelix. Sio●. l. Eclog. Phys. cap 9 p. 11. No man, against God's will, Is either well, or ill. And, Aug l. u. de Ciuit De●. c. 18. To. 5. p. 249. as I observed before of Virtue, so may I now again observe of felicity that the Romans consecrated it, for one of their Gods: thereby plainly insinuating, that as Virtue, so Felicity, is the only gift of God. Both which points are affirmed, by Maximus Tyrius, in express and plain words: Ex jovis nutu, Max. Ty●. Serm. 23. p. 363. actiones virtutis, felicitatésque hominum pendent. Both the actions of virtue, and all humane felicity, do absolutely depend upon the beck of God. Thus the Heathens confess, that not only Virtue, which is the way unto felicity; but also that Felicity, which is the reward of Virtue, are both of them, the gifts of Almighty God. And therefore they must needs confess, There is a God, 3 Nay, God is the true Felicity of Man. they go yet further. For, they not only teach us, that There is a God: and that he is the Giver of Felicity unto men: but also, that he himself is the true Felicity of them. Which the Romans employed, in consecrating Felicity, for a God. For, thereby they insinuated, not only that Felicity is of God: (the point before noted:) but also that God is the only true Felicity: the point now in hand. Which they demonstrate unto us, by a Gradation, of three degrees. First, that Virtue and Godliness do so strictly unite a man unto God, that, in some degree, that it maketh him partaker of the divine and heavenly nature. Secondly, that this near conjunction of man unto God, doth bring him unto heaven, which is the place of God's dwelling. And thirdly, that there it maketh him partaker of Gods most blessed and beatifical vision; which is the highest summitie of all true felicity. And all these three points are so taught by the Heathens, as though they had been catechised in the School of Christians. For the first of which three points, it is the constant doctrine of the wisest of the Heathen, that man's felicity, consisteth especially, in conforming himself unto the nature of God, and in making himself to be like unto him. So saith jamblicus: Felix est, qui Deo, quatenus fieri potest, similis est. S●ohaeus, Serm. 101. p. 453. He is an happy man, that maketh himself as like unto God, is he possibly can. So Syrianus, the master of Simplicus: Boni causa est, ut cum Deo similemur: It is the cause of all good, to make a man's self to be like unto God. Now, A●g. ●ugub. l 10. de pere●. Philos. c. 18 p. 590. that likeness with God, cannot be attained, by any thing else, but only by justice, Virtue, and Goodness: as Seneca truly teacheth. Parem Deo pecunia non facit, sed animus; & hic rectus, bonus, magnus. It is not thy money, Senec. Epist. 31. p. 53. but it is thy mind, which maketh thee conformable and like unto God; if it be a just, and upright mind, a virtuous, and good mind, a noble, and a great mind. This virtue makes a man, not similem Deo, but parem Deo, saith Seneca: not like unto God, but, in some sort, even equal with God. For Aristotle citeth it, Arist. l. 1. Eth. ●. ●. To. 2. p. 685. as a common opinion, that, Ex hominibus Dij fiunt, ob virtutis excellentiam: That by the excellency of virtue, even men do attain to a kind of Divinity. A very excessive and hyperbolical speech: but yet diverse such there be used not only by Heathens, but also by Christians, to express that great affinity, and near conjunction, which virtue maketh between God and man. Saint Augustine saith, that it maketh a man partaker of God. Dei sunt participatione foelices, quicunque sunt veritate, non vanitate, foelices. Aug. ●ib. 4. de 〈◊〉. Dei c. 11. p. 303. They that have indeed the true possession of blessedness, and not the false imagination of it, are blessed, by a kind of participation of God. The Apostle Peter saith, that it maketh a man partaker of the divine and godly nature. 2. Peter, 1. 4, 5. Euseb. l. 4. de praepar. cap. 11. p 97. For, as Porphiry observeth of wickedness and vice; that it transformeth a man into the nature of a Devil: so is it also true, of virtue and goodness; that it conformeth a man unto the nature of God. Yea, and some have gone so far, as to say, it makes us Gods. So saith Hierocles, that, Finis vitae, est, Aug. Eugub. ubi supra. Deum facere, ex homine: The end of man's life, is, to make a man become a God. So Seneca, Senec. ubi supra. in the forealleged place. Animus rectus, bonus, magnus, nihil est aliud, quam Deus in humano corpore hospes: A good, and virtuous mind, is indeed nothing else, but a very God, abiding for a time, in the body of a man. Neither have Christians themselves abstained from these exaggerated amplifications; the better to recommend virtue, and goodness unto us. The Apostle Paul telleth us, that, He which is joined to the Lord, is but one spirit with him. 1. Cor. 6. 17. And Boetius telleth us, that God only is our blessedness: and that therefore, whosoever by God is made blessed, Boet. l. 3. de Consolat. prosa 10. p. 10. 49. he is made by him, A God. Deum esse ipsam Beatitudinem, necesse est. It is absolutely necessary, that God himself should be man's Felicity. So likewise Palingenius: — Deus ipse supremum est, Paling. in Le●. p. 107. Eximiumque bonum, propriè, vereque vocandus. Quem qui habet, is debet foelix dici, atque beatus. God is the only supreme good, so properly expressed, Whom whosoever hath, he may, be happy called and blest. And so it is indeed: because Felicity is Summum Bonum, that is, The supreme and the chiefest Good. And therefore, if God were not The true Felicity, he should not be The supreme good: but should have a superior good above him, and himself be but a second and inferior good. Whereupon he addeth but a little after, that if God himself be the supreme Good, that he which obtaineth that same supreme good, he therewith obtaineth to be made a God: Quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati; & beatitudo vera est ipsa divinitas; divinitatis adeptione fieri beatos, necesse est; sicut iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientia, sapientes fiunt. Omnis igitur beatus Deus. Because, by the getting of blessedness, men are made blessed; and true Blessedness is nothing else but God; therefore, by the getting of God, men get to be blessed, as by the getting of justice to be just, and of Wisdom, to be wise. Therefore whosoever is blessed he also is a God. Nazian. Orat. 6. de Sp. Set. p. 174▪ 175. So Nanzianzene proveth the Holy Ghost to be God, because otherwise he could not make him a God. Si eodem mecum est in ordine, quo pacto me Deum reddit? And his Expositor, Elias Cretensis, delivereth his sense in the same height of words. Nimirùm Spiritus Sanctus, quum natura sua & sanctus sit, & Deus; nos homines sanctificat, ac Deos reddit. The Holy Ghost being by nature both holy, & God, by sanctifying us men, maketh us become Gods. Dionys. Areopag. lib. de Eccles. Hierar. c. 1. p. 90. So likewise Dionysius: Salus non aliter existere potest, nisi ij, qui salutem consequuntur, Dij fiant: A man cannot otherwise attain unto salvation, then if he first be made a God. Which exaggerations of those fathers, and Scriptures, must not be expounded, according to the letter, as though men could be made to be Gods indeed: for that is a thing impossible: But the true meaning of them is, that by our imitation of God's virtue and goodness, we are made so like unto him, and so nearly joined with him, that we may be said (in some sense) to be made partakers of his divine nature: because all those virtues in him are nature. 1. Peter, 1. 4, 5. And therefore we may observe, in all the forenamed places, that there is a mollification used, to reduce the forenamed Apotheosis and Deification, within the compass of this sense. Dionysius Areopagita, where he saith, that, All they which shall attain the salvation of God, must first be made Gods: addeth (for explication:) Dei porrò effectio, est Dei, quoad fieri potest, imitatio, & cum eodem coniunctio, atque (ut ita dicam) unio. The being made a God, is nothing else, but the imitation of God, and a conjunction with him, and (that I may so speak) a very union. Elias Cretensis, where he saith, that the Holy Ghost doth make men Gods, addeth, that it is, per adoptionem, & gratiam: that this making of them Gods, is but only Gods adopting them, by grace, to be his Son, So Nazianzen expoundeth, His being made a God, to be nothing, but only, His conjunction with God. Quo pacto me Deum reddit? vel quo pacto me coniungit Deo? Which conjunction with God (as Trismegistus teacheth) is only effected by religion, and godliness. Trism●g. As●p. c. 2. p. 479. Propè Deos accedit, qui ment, qua Dijs iunctas est, divina religione Dijs iunxerit. That man cometh near unto God indeed, that joineth his soul unto him, by piety and religion. So likewise Boetius, where he saith, that, Beatus omnis, Deus: Th●t every one which is blessed is thereby made a God: he addeth for the qualification of that speech: Sed n●tura quidem unus, participatione verò nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos: Yet there is but one God, by nature, but there may be many Gods, by participation. Not by the true participation of his natural deity, but of his virtue, and of his felicity. Yea, and even the Apostle Peter himself doth use a further modification, even of this participation. For, where he telleth us, 1. Pet. 1. 4. 5. &c that there be great and precious promises given unto us, That we should be partakers of the Godly nature: lest we should misconstrue this participation, to be intended of God's true nature or deity, he expoundeth himself plainly, that this participation of the divine nature must be gotten, by flying of corruption, by joining virtue with our faith; and with virtue, knowledge; and with knowledge, temperance; and with temperance, patience; and with patience goodliness; and with godliness, brotherly kindness; and with brotherly kindness, love; Which is the bond of perfection, Col. 3. 14. and tieth a man strictly unto God. And this is the first degree of our felicity with God, which is afforded unto us, in this present life. There be two degrees more: which come not unto men, before the life to come. The first, that virtue brings us up to Heaven, which is the place of Gods own dwelling, and there maketh us to live eternally with him. A thing plainly confessed, even by the very Heathen. Pythagoras affirmeth, in his verses, that: — Si, relicto corpore, ad purum aethera perveneris, Pythag. 〈◊〉 Hesiodo. p. 129. Eris immortalis Deus, incorruptibilis, nec ampliùs mortalis. When as our Souls our Bodies shall forsake, And to the Heavens they shall themselves, betake; Then shall we be, as Gods immortal been, All incorrupt; no longer mortal men. For we shall then enjoy God: who is our very life: Deut. 30. 20. Cic. l. de. Amicit. p. 396. as the Prophet Moses testifieth: yea the life of our life, our vita vitalis, as the Orator speaketh whereas this our present life, 2. Cor. 5. 1. is but vita mortalis: a transitory and a mortal life. But this (saith the Apostle Paul) we know, that if our earthly Tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building given us of God, which is an house, not made with hands, but eternal in the heavens. And therefore saith Musonius, that Vir bonus, est civis urbis jovis; quae constat, ex hominibus, & Dijs. That he, which is a good; Stobae. Serm. 38. p. 234. man, shall be a Citizen of the City of God; which is a City, common unto Gods with men. Which is a probable aiming at the Heavenly I●rus●lem: which in the Book of the Apocalypse, is described unto us. I saw the Holy City, Apoc. 21. 2. 3. new jerusalem, come down from God, out of heaven, praepared as a Bride, trimmed for her husband. And I heard a great voice, out of Heaven, saying: Behold the Tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself will be their God with them. Upon which our cohabitation with God, Cic. l. de Vniversitate. p. 432. Tully saith, that we are, Deorum quasi Gentiles; the Countrymen of the Gods: Nay generis divini, the Kinsmen of the Gods, as he addeth in that place: of their own generation: as Aratus speaketh. Act. 17. 28. And therefore Tully, in another place, speaking of the state of God, and virtuous men after this present life, he saith, that they shall live among the Gods: Qui in corporibus humanis, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 119. vitam sunt imitati Deorum, his, ad eos, a quibus sunt profecti, facilis reditus patet: Such as have lived the life of a God in the body of a man, shall find an easy passage unto God: because from him they have descended. So that, God calleth those men to live with him in heaven, with whom he himself hath lived upon earth. Now the way, whereby they ascend up into Heaven, there to live with God, is, by instructing themselves in the knowledge of God: As some, even of the Heathens themselves, Trismeg in Pimand. Dial. 10. p. 426. have taught us. Trismegistus saith expressly, that, Vnica salus homini, est cognitio Dei: & haec ad Olympum ascensio. The happiness of man is the knowledge of God: and this is our way, of ascending into heaven. Agreeing well with that of our Saviour Christ: This is life aeternal to know thee, john, 1 ●. 3. to be the only true God, and whom thou hast sent, jesus Christ. For, as Bernard truly noteth, Summum bonum hominis, est plena & perfecta agnitio Creatoris: Ber. Ser. 2. super Salu● Regina, p. 1355. The happiness of the Creature, is the knowledge of his Creator: Not a naked, or an idle knowledge; but a knowledge, which is joined with the practice of virtues. 2 Pet. 1. 5. As the Apostle Peter teacheth us. joins with virtue knowledge. For, if they be not joined, they can neither of them profit. Nihil enim prodest exercere virtutes, Hieron. Epist. Fab●ol●e: To. 3. p. 42. nisi noveris Creatorem: saith S. Hierom: Nec Dei veneratio proficit ad salutem, nisi praecepta Conditorts impleveris. It profiteth nothing, to exercise virtue, without the knowledge of God: and it profits as little, to have the knowledge of God without the practice of virtue. We must therefore join theorical and practical virtues together, Apoc. 2. 7. and by them, as by two legs, ascend into Heaven. Which is the true Paradise, where man's blessedness dwelleth. As Stobaeus allegeth, out of Sophocles: In jovis tantùm hortis, beata felicitas. Stob. Se●m▪ 101. p. 552. The Paradise of God, Heaven, only is: The only happy place of perfect bliss. And unto this heavenly Paradise, it is virtue that bringeth us. And that by the confession, even of the very Heathen. For, — Locum Virtus habet inter Astra, Senec. in Herc. Oetaeo. Act. 4. Sce. 4. p. 112. saith the Tragic Seneca: Virtue enjoys her place among the Stars. And she giveth to the virtuous, their place above the stars, seating them among the Gods. As they instance, in the Examples, both of Hercules, and Romulus: which before were touched by us. Lib. ●, c. 8. Sect. 2 As the same Tragic in the same Tragedy affirmeth expressly: — cum summas Exiget horas consumpta dies, Senec. Herc. Oetaeo. Act. 5. Sce. ult. p. 128. Iter ad superos gloria pandit. When the last hour is out, of the last wasted day, Then Virtue's glory is that, which unto Heaven makes way. And this is the second degree of our Felicity with God; that, by virtue, men are brought to live eternally, in Heaven, which is the place of Gods own dwelling. The third of them, is this; That, by virtue, we are brought to enjoy God's blessed presence: whereby we enjoy that infinite happiness, that cannot possibly be conceived by us. As the Apostle Paul teacheth us: Those things, 1. Cor. 2. 9 which the eye hath not scene, neither the ear heard, neither came into man's heart, hath God prepared for them that love him. The particulars whereof, if they cannot be conceived, they cannot be expressed. Only the Psalmist (in the general) expresseth thus much, that, In his presence is the fullness of joy, Psalm, 16. 11. and, at his right hand, there are pleasures for evermore. And therefore, our Saviour Christ placeth the highest pitch of the blessedness of man, in the sight of God: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Matthew, 5. 8. And S. Chrysostome, he placeth the highest pitch of the misery of man, in the deprivation of this beatifical vision. Satius est enìm, mille fulmina sustinere, Chrys. Hom. 24. in Ma●. To. 2. p. 233. quam vultum illum, mansuetudinis pietatísque plenum, nos tamen aversantem, videre; & illos oculos placidissimos, nequaquam, nos aspicere, sustinentes. It were better, to suffer the fearful flashes of a thousand lightnings, then to see that sweet countenance (so full of piety, and mildness) to be offended at us, and those amiable eyes, not enduring to behold us. This is worse, then to endure a thousand torments, and a thousand Hells: as he writeth, in the same place. Therefore, as no tongue can express the torment and misery of condemned souls, in being shut out from God's blessed presence: so can no tongue express the comfort and blessedness of the souls of the righteous, by enjoying the light of Gods most gracious countenance: which yieldeth more joy and comfort to the heart, then can be conceived by the heart. Whereupon the Prophet David prayeth unto God, that he would but show him the light of his countenance, and he should be saved. For, Psalm, 8. 3. 7. 19 Deum videre, est vita animae: saith Gregory Nyssen. The very life, Nyssen, lib de Infallibly premature abreptis, p. 134. whereby the Soul is maintained, is only the beholding of the glorious face of God. And this is a Doctrine, which is not altogether hidden, even from the very Heathen. Who teach, that, the enjoying of God, and of his gracious presence, is the absolute perfection of all humane happiness. So saith Ovid: Felice's illi, qui non simulacra, sed ipsos, Quique Deûm coram corpora vera vident. Ovid, l. 2. de ●●onto. Eleg. 8. p, 182. Thrice happy such as see Their Gods, in person true, As in themselves they be, And not in painted hue. Groping at that Divinity Doctrine, that, Man's blessedness consisteth in beholding of God's countenance: not in a specular, and enigmatical vision; 1 Cor. 13. 12. but in a clear, Aquinas, ● Quaest 12. Art. 2. and immediate one, as Aquinas, or rather indeed, S. Paul himself, speaketh. And this was that, which Aristotle aimed at, if he could have hit it: when he so much preferred the Contemplative Felicity, Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 8. To. 2. 739, 740. before the Active: because the Object of it, is God. And therefore affirming of contemplative persons, that they be Dijs immortalibus amicissimi: The best beloved of God. Because, Aug. Epist. 222. To. 2. p, 860. as S. Augustine affirmeth, By Contemplation, they look God in the face: which there he calleth, Summitatem contemplationis: The highest ascending of our contemplation. Aug. Epist 56. To. 2. p, 260. Hence the Platonics affirmed, that, Frui Deo, est summum hominis bonum, that, The Blessedness of man, is, to enjoy God. An ancient Doctrine among the Heathens: as appeareth in Trismegistus: who delivereth the same sentence, Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 1. p, 377. Aug. l. 8. de Civit. 〈◊〉▪ 8. To. 5. p, 449. almost in the same words: Summum bonum animorum, est Deo frui. Which fruition of God, S. Augustine, in another place, expresseth to be, Non sicut corpore fruitur, aut seipso animus, aut amico amicus; sed sicut luce oculus. That enjoying, which good and godly men have of God, is not like that enjoying, which the soul hath of the body; nor like unto that neither, which it hath of itself; nor like unto that, which a friend hath of his friend: but like unto that, which the eye hath of the light. Which is indeed so great, that, without it, the eye hath no use of itself, but is as good as dead. And so is the soul too, without the sight of God. And therefore saith Boteius, Felix qui potuit, boni Fontem visere lucidum. Boeti●s, l. 3. de Consolat. metro. 12. p, 1●62. That man is blest, that can behold, and ever come to see The blessed God, the Fountain clear of all good things that be. For, With thee (saith the Psalmist) is the fountain of life, Psalm, 36. 9 and in thy light shall we see light. Thus, both Christians, and Heathens do confess, that God himself is Man's true happiness, and the rich reward of all true godliness: as S. Augustine truly teacheth: Aug. in Sententijs, To. 3. p, 1488. Deus, est cultus sui, merces. God is the true recompense of his own service. And Beda Beda, in 1. Cor. c. 15. To: 6. p, 571. likewise, unto the same purpose: Praemium virtutis, est ipse▪ qui virtutem dedit. Our best reward of virtue, is, even he himself, who is the giver of virtue. Yea, and this, even God himself professeth of himself. For he telleth Abraham, that, He is his buckler, and his exceeding great reward. Now, if God be both the giver of virtue, and the rewarder of virtue with felicity, yea and felicity itself, Gensis, 15. 1. which is the reward of virtue; then must there needs be a God. But, the former of these is proved, both by Holy Scriptures, and by Heathen Writers. And therefore the latter followeth. CHAP. 9 The Mathematics show, that there is a God. 2. And more particularly, Geometry. 3. Which, by a Geometrical prick, doth lead men unto some knowledge of God. 4. Of whom (in diverse powers) it hath a kind of resemblance. WE have now passed over, Mathematicus circa Abstracta speculatur, tollendo omnia sensibil●a. both the Metaphysics, Physics, Physic, Politics, and Ethics: in all which several learn we have learned, There is a God; both by Reasons, and Authorities. We are now come to the Mathematics: Which, as they are something more abstracted from sense, Arist. l. 11. Metaphyl. c. 3. To. 2. p, 1485. and from sensible Objects, than any of all those forenamed Sciences; so can they no● yield us such sensible Arguments, to prove this great Conclusion, Arist. l. 11. Meta. c. 4. p, 1486. & Seminar. Philos. p 797. as the former can. For the proper subject of the Mathematics (especially of those two Arts, of Geometry, and Arithmetic; which I handle in this Chapter, and in the next after) is only to consider, of Quantum, secundùm se: Of Quantities by themselves, Ficin. Argument in. l. 7. Platonis de repub. p. 616. abstracted from their subjects. And therefore we must not look from them, for either discourses, or demonstrations, or positions, directly & categorically to this purpose. But yet we may draw, per obliquum ductum, similitudes, and resemblances from both those two Sciences: whereby we may ascend in our contemplation, even unto divine and celestial knowledges: as by the shape of the shadow, we may gather assuredly, the shape of the body, For, as Ficinus hath truly observed, to this purpose; Mathematica ita se habent ad divina, ut umbrae ad corpora: Ficin. Argument. in Platonis Theaete●. p. 134. Mathematicals are proportiooned unto divinity, as the shadow to the Body. And therefore saith Alcinous that, Mathematicorum consideratio, est praeludium ad divinorum contemplationem. The consideration of the Mathematics, is as it were, a praeludium; Alcin. c. 2. Seminar. philos. To. 2. p. 580. unto the contemplation of divine and heavenly things. For, the very end of the Mathematics (as Plato teacheth) is nothing else, but this; Vt ad divinam naturam considerandam, nos conferamus: quatenùs hanc hominibus inspiciendam Deus largitus est. Plato in Epinome. p. 918. Quam nunquam sine his artibus assequemur. The end of the Mathematics, is, to lead us men intentively to consider of the nature of God, and to contemplate of it, so far, as it is lawful to inquire into it. Which we can never compass, without the knowledge of Mathematical Arts. And therefore Aristotle calleth the Mathematics, Divinam mathe sin, that is, a divine learning: Arist. l. 1. Mete●r c. 3. To. 1. p. 691. because they lead men unto the knowledge of divine and heavenly thing. Now, under the name of Mathematics are comprehended four Arts: Geometry, Arithmetic, Arist. 1. 2. Metap. c. 3. To. 2 p. 1388 Astronomy, and Music, Which Mathematical Arts and sciences (as some of the learned have wittily observed) were practised by God, in his creation of the world. He used Arithmetic, in knitting all the innumerable parts of the world, Vide Coel. Rhodigin. l. c. 2. p. 6. in one body together: Geometry, in giving unto every one, his proper form and figure: And Music, in joining them, in so concent-full an harmony, each of them with another. Unto which Mathematical conceit, Wisd. 11. 17. Coel. Rhodigin. l. 1. Ant, lect. c. ●. p. 6. doth Coelius Rhodiginus think that place in the Book of Wisdom directly to allude: That God hath made all things, in Number, Weight, P●●t. l 8. Sympos. Quaest 2. To. 3. p. 336. 337. and Measure: referring Number, to Arithmetic; Weight, unto Music; and Measure, to Geometry. And Plutarch, interpreting that position of Plato: Deum semper Geometriam exercere, saith, in express words: That God made all things, Ratione, & Mensura, & Numero: in Wisdom, Measure and Number. Out of certain grounds in all which Arts, we may collect, That there is a God though not Mathematica certitudine (which, Mathematica certitudo non est in omnibus quae●enda. as even Aristotle himself yieldeth, is not in all things to be required) yet more than Dialectica probabilitate, Arist. l. 2. Metaphys. c. 3. To. 2. p. 1383. I will give you but a little taste, in every one of those forenamed Arts: because these Mathematical Subjects, being mere abstracts from sense, they cannot so familiarly, Influere in sensus, nor be so plausible to the vulgar understanding, as other more popular Arguments can. 2 Let us begin with Geometry: Geometry leadeth a man to God. which (as Plato affirmeth) doth Animum attollere ad veritatem; atque ita ad Philosophandum praeparare, ut ad superior a convertamus quae nunc (contrà quam decet) ad inferiora deijcimus. ●l●t. l. 7. de Repub. p. 623. Geometry (saith he) erecteth a man's mind, unto the searching of the truth; and so praepareth his thoughts unto Philosophy, that it maketh him to direct them, unto those things, which are above; which now he directeth unto the things which are below. Performing that office, whereunto the Apostle Paul so earnestly exhorteth us: to make us seek for those things, which are above. Col. 3. 1. Plutarch is more definitive, and punctual, in this point; expressing more particularly, what those Superiora be: namely, that, by them is intended the very nature of God. For he saith, that the very end of Geometry is nothing else, but only to sublime men's minds above their senses, ad naturae sempiternae contemplationem: to the contemplation of God's eternal Nature. Plut. l. 8. Simposia●. Quaest 2. To. 3. p. 336. Ibid p 337. Ma● T●r. Serm. 21. p. 260. Whereupon Max. Tyrius calleth Geometry; Nobilissimum Philosophiae membrum: The most noble part of Philosophy. And the Greek Philo calleth it, Principem & Metropolin reliquorum: The prime and Metropolitan of the Mathematical Sciences: because it doth, Intellectum veluti repurgare, & paulatìm a sensibus liberare. It purgeth men's understandings and refineth them from the dross of their senses. As we may see, in Pythagoras; who having found out the truth of a certain Geometrical Conclusion for which he had a long time before been studying, Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 239. he offered up a Sacrifice unto the Muses: thereby insinuating, that his illumination came from above: and so, by his Geometry, was led unto the worship of the Deity; though under the title of the Muses. And therefore, saith Aristotle, that Qui dicunt, Arist. l. 13. Meta c. 3▪. 2. p. 1513. Mathematicas scientias, nihil de bono & pulchro dicere, falsum dicunt. Dicunt enim, & maximè ostendunt. Name, etsi non nominant; cum tamen opera & rationes ostendunt, nonnè dicunt de iis? Those men that affirm, that Mathematical sciences do no way entreat of either Goodness, or Beauty, they affirm it very falsely For the Mathematics do discourse of them both. And, though they do not expressly name them; yet, when they entreat both of their works, and of their reasons, do they not then entreat of the things themselves? So that, though the Mathematics do not entreat directly of God, who is that Bonum, and Pulchrum; yet, in that they do speak & entreat of his works, they do obliquely speak of him. And though they conclude not so directly & peremptorily, in this subject of divinity, as they do in their own proper subject of Quantity; wherein, as the Orator observeth they do not persuadere, sed cogere; Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 30. yet, even here, they do afford us such apt and fit resemblances, as, though they do not cogere, yet may they well persuadere: Such as well may induce us, though they do not enforce us. 3 And first for Geometry, Punctum in Geometry leadeth men to God. there is one main position in it: which though it be proper and natural unto that Art; yet leadeth it us, by consequence, unto that eternal and supernatural power, which is called God. And that briefly is this: Arist. l. 1. Metaphys. c. 7. To. 2. p. 1383. that, Punctum est principium omnis lineae. So that, all magnitudes and continuities are deduced from one original prick. And therefore Proclus calleth Punctum, magnitudinis parentem, & authorem: he calleth a Prick the parent of all magnitude. Which position, as it hath his Mathematical truth, Proclus in Euclid. l. 2. c. 11. Serm. Philos. To. 2. p. 765. in Geometry; so hath it his Physical truth, in natural Philosophy. From whence it must needs follow, that all those so largely extended lines, in the greatest bodies of the world, do lineally descend from one only prick; which, in itself, is indivisible. Now, what can be this one indivisible prick or point, which is the Author of all those huge magnitudes, which are evidently seen in those vast, and extended bodies of the world, the heavens, and the elements, but only God himself? Can all those huge dimensions of those immense bodies, such heights, such bredths, such depths, and such thicknesses, be possibly deduced from any other prick, then only from God? who, though he be both higher than heaven, deeper than hell, broader than the sea, and thicker than the earth; yet is he, like a prick in every line of all of them; and, as utterly uncapable of any division, as is the very prick of the Mathematician, which cannot be divided, by the egg of very thought. Unto which Mathematical conceit, of deducing all magnitudes, and all their dimensions, from God, as from their true Original point; the Apostle Saint Paul doth seem to allude, when he exciteth us, Eph. 3. 18. to comprehend, what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, etc. 4 And indeed, Punctum in Geometry resembleth in some sort the nature of God. if we consider of the nature and power of a point or a prick in a line, and in all other continuities whatsoever, whether solides or plains; we may easily perceive, that there is in a prick, a very great similitude and resemblance of God. For first, as a point or prick is the very first fountain of every line, which is indeed nothing else, but only fluxus Punctotum: so this whole universality of things, which we call the World, is indeed nothings else, but a production, and elongation, and dilatation of the natural goodness of Almighty God. The goodness of God is the only true point, from which all created things do proceed. Dionys. l. de coelesti Hierarch. c. 4. p. 29. For, as Dionysius Areopagita very truly teacheth: Deus, bonitate ductus, omnes naturas in lucem protulit. God, being only led by his own natural goodness, was thereby induced to create and make all things. This is the true Centre of all good things, which are but as the radij, that be drawn from it. And this is that, which the Pythagoreans aimed at, Arist. l. Metaphys. c. 5. To. 2. p, 1375. in holding this position, that, Mathematicorum principia, sunt omnium rerum principia. That the Principles of the Mathematics, are the beginnings of all things. Secondly, as in every line, and in every part of it, wheresoever you cut it, you shall surely find a prick; which was a communis Terminus unto both the divided parts, being the beginning of the one, and the end of the other, and which knitted, and united them both together: so, in every part of the world, which soever you contemplate, you shall find the mighty power of the Spirit of God; which, like a common bond, knitteth all the several parts of every thing together, and uniteth them all, in one common nature. And this is manifestly acknowledged, even by the Heathen Poet: Principio, Coelum, ac Terras, camposque Virgil. l. 6. Aeneid. p, 267. liquentes, Lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra, Spiritus intus alit: totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem, & magnose corpore miscet. From first beginning, there hath been a certain inward Spirit, Supporting Heaven, and Earth; and Seas, Moon, Stars, and all things by it. Which Spirit, like the Punctum is in Mathematic body, And so transfused in all the World, through all the parts that may be: That, as the Soul (for such it is) by moving can be proved, So all the World's vast body is, by this Soul, ever moved. Thirdly, Arist. l. 11. Metaphys. c. 2. To. 2. p, 1484. as a prick is the end of every line, Linearum terminus, as Aristotle speaketh, the extreme point, wherewith it is shut up and determined: so is God the end of all his Creatures. He is both, that Terminus à quo, from which all things do proceed; and that Terminus ad quem, unto which they all are referred; and that medium per quod, by which they are all of them united. And all this is confessed, even by the very Heathen: who do all affirm of God, with one general consent, that it is he only, which doth, Et principium, & media, Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p, 1572. & finem rerum omnium tenere. That God holdeth in his hands, both the Beginning, and Middle, and End of all things. Yea, and this also, the Apostle Paul directly affirmeth, though in somewhat other terms, when he telleth us, Rom. 11. 36. that, Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things, Of him as of their Beginning: Through him; as by their Middle, tye, and Bond; and, To him; as to their End. For so, Origen Orig. l. 6. Cont. Celsum p, 766. expressly interpreteth those threetermes. Ostendit, Principium omnium, ex ipso; Conseruationem, Per ipsum; Et Finem, In ipsum. So that, God is that Punctum, in every part of the world, from whom, every Creature in the world doth proceed; by whom, they are preserved; and unto whom, they be destinated. And this is that resemblance, which Geometry affordeth, to adumbrate the nature of God unto us. CHAP. 10. Unity in Arithmetic, doth lead men unto God. 2. Which is affirmed by Philosophers, to be the Original of all things. 3. Yea directly affirmed to be Gód himself. 4. With whom, it hath, indeed, a very great resemblance. THE second of those Mathematical Arts, is, Arithmetic: wherein we do find another parallel position unto that, Vinity in Arithmetic leadeth a man to God. which formerly we found in Geometry. For, as Geometry teacheth us, that Punctum, est Principium omnis lineoe: so Arithmetic teacheth us, that Vnitas, est principium omnis numeri. As all magnitude ariseth, from one only prick: so all multitude ariseth, from one only unity. Arist. l. 1. Metap. c. 7. To. 2 p, 1383. For Punctum, and Vnitas, differ no more but thus; that Punctum, est Vnitas sine numero; and Vnitas, est punctum sine loco. And therefore, Zaratas, the Pythagorean, Arist▪ l. 13. Meta. c. 8. To. 2. p, 1522. called Vnitatem, numeri patrem. He calleth an unity, the father of all numbers. Because (as Boetius very truly teacheth) Omnis pluralitas est ex unitatibus: All numbers are nothing else, but a conjunction of unities. Now, Arist. ibid. Plut. lib. de Aninac procreate, To. 3. Mor▪ p, 93. if unity be the parent of all multiplicity, it must needs from thence follow, that all this multiplicity, ●oet. lib. de Vnitate. p, 1276. and variety of so infinite many things, as we see in the world, do draw their original, from only unity. For, one unity is the beginning of all plurality, as well in numero numerato, in that which is numbered, as in numero numerante, that which numbereth: as Trismegistus expressly testifieth. Bradwardin. l. 1. de causa Dei c. 1. Correllar. 40. p, 135. Omnes res ab uno fuerunt, iuredicatione unius; & fuerunt nataeres omnes, ab hacreuna, aptatione. All things proceeded from One, by the Law of that One; and all things came of that One, by the adpatation of all unto that One. And this was that, which the Pythagoreans aimed at, in holding this one opinion so stisfly: Cic. l. 4. Acad. p, 30. Ex numeris, & Mathematicorum initijs, omni proficisci: That all things proceed from numbers, and from the first principles of the Mathematicians, that is, from Punctum, and Vnitas. Which are prima, and (as it were) minima naturalia, in the two principals of all Mathematical Arts. Punctum, in all Geometrical continuities; and Vnitas, in all Arithmetical numbers. These two, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, are the very first beginnings, and originals of all things. But especially this latter, especially this Unity: which they make the only cause of the whole university: maintaining this position (as Aristotle reporteth their opinion) Numerorum elementa, Arist. l. 1. Meta. c. 5. p, 1375. entium quoque cunctorum esse elementa. That the Elements and first 〈◊〉 of Numbers, are also the prime principles and originals of all thi●●g. Now this Numerorum Elementum, this beginning and principle of all Numbers, Plut. l. 1. de ●lacit. c. 3. To. 2. p, 7. is only Unity. And this Pythagoras made the original cause of all things. Unto which he referred both the motions of the Heavens, and the generations of living Creatures, Plut. l. de Homero. To. 1. p, 123. and finally all things. Omnia numeris ac●epta ferebat, tam conversiones syderum, quam ortus animalium. He derived all things from Numbers; as well the revolution of the Stars, as the original of all Creatures. 2 Yea, and as it is held by the consent of Philosophers, that Arithmetical Unity is the cause of all numbers: Unity is the Author and original of all things. Stobaeus, lib. Ecl●g. Phys c. 9 p, 13. so is it held by them likewise, Idem ibidem, c. 13. p, 27. that Metaphysical Unity is the general cause of all things. Trismeg. Pimand●Dial. 10. p, 426. jamblicus saith, that, Quaecunque sunt, per unum sunt. What things soever are, are all by One. And Trismegistus saith, that, Monas, est omnium, principium, radix, & origo. Unity is the beginning, root, and original of all things. And again, that, Exuno prin●ipio, cuncta dependent: Principium, ex uno. That all things depend upon one first principle: and it, upon the unity of itself. And that which he saith, Anselmus plainly proveth in Monologio, as I have partly touched before. Yea, and so doth Hugo de Victore too, Anselm. Monolog, c. 3. To. 3. p, 2. by this invincible reason; that, Si diversa intùs consilia praesidentium essent, ipsi se forìs rerum cursus ab invicem aliquandò dividerent: Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Sect. 3. nunc autem, omnia dum sic concorditer ad unum finem currunt; profectò indicant, quòd unus est fons, & origo, unde procedunt. Hugo de Sct. Victore, lib. 7. Erudit. didasc. c. 19 To. 3. p, 21. X. If there were diverse Authors, there would be diverse counsels; if diverse counsels, diverse courses: whereas now all things running in an uniform course, unto one, and the same end, do thereby evidently show, that they all do proceed from one and the same beginning. Arist. l. 13. Metaph. c. 8. To. 2. p, 1521. 1520. Aristotle he saith, that, Vnum, est Dualitate prius: That Unity, is before all Duality: which followeth by necessity, upon the order of very nature. For Principium, is, by nature, before his Compositum. Now duality is nothing but a composition of two unities. Yea, and in the same place, Arist-ibid. it appeareth again, that there were certain Philosophers, which held this opinion, that there is, Quoddam unum, which is Primum omnium unorum. That there is a certain One thing, which is the first cause of All things. Which opinion, though he there do pretend to confute; yet doth he indeed confirm it. For he himself saith expressly, that, unitas, est, naturâ, Causa, ut multa sint Entia. So that, unity is not only before all Plurality, but it is also, the Cause of all Plurality. It is before it, as the cause is before his effect. Now, what can be that Vnitas, the Cause of all unities, Romane●, 11. 36. but only that Vnus Deus; of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things? Who (as Boetius observeth) because he is but one in himself, he hath therefore given unto every thing that he hath made, to be but one. Boet. l. de Vnitate, p, 1274. Dionys. 〈…〉 lib. de Diuin. Nom, c. 13. p, 328. Quaa Creator unus est, ideo rebus, quas condidit, hoc in munere dedit, ut unaquaeque esset etiam una. Insomuch that (as Dionysius Areopagita observeth) even those numeralls themselves, which seem to be contrary unto Unity, yet have their existence and being, by Unity. As we say, una duernio, & Dec●s una, & unum dimidium, & una tertia pars, etc. As we say, in common speech, One Couple, and one Tenth, and one half, and one Third part. All which have their particular being, by being but One. And so, there is nothing in the world, created by God, that is any more than One. God himself, by that created unity, stamping upon every Creature, an image of the Unity of his own divine nature. For (as Boetius addeth, in the former place) Prima Vnitas, quae est unitas sibijp si, creavit aliam unitatem, quae est infra eam. The first Unity, which is one in itself (that is, God the Creator) hath created another unity, which is beneath itself, which is, unity in the Creature. Whereby, both every thing is at one within itself and every part of the world hath unity with another: they agreeing all most lovingly, as fellow members together. Dionys. Areopag. lib. de Diuin. nom▪ c. 1. p. 192. Hence Dionysius calleth God, Vnitatem, unitatis omnis effectricem: An Unity, which is the efficient of all unities. Yea, and in the same place, he allegeth two substantial reasons, why God may truly be called One. The first is, Propter simplicitatem vacuitatis partium (which Boetius before calleth, Vnitatem sibijpsi:) Because God is so pure, Ibid. p, 195▪ and so simple an essence, that he is not compounded, so much as of any parts: but is every way one, without any mixture or concretion. The second, Quia vi untiatis, quae unum facit, unum efficimur, dividuisque nostris dissimilitud●nibus, ac diversitatibus, singulari modo connexis, in monada; quae divinam speciem refert, ac unitatem, quae Deum imitatur, colligimur & concrescimus: Because, by the force of unity (whose work it is to make things one) all those diversities and differences, whereby we are divided, be, after a special manner, conjoined, repraesenting in that unity, an image of the Deity, which is, Eorum, quae coniunguntur, coniunctio, & unitas: The conjunction, and unity of all those things that are joined and united together. Which deity, is that unity, not only whereby all things are made one, but also whereby all things were made. There is no one thing in the world, but it is both made, and made one, by the unity of the Deity. And therefore Pythagoras maintained this opinion: Sine unitate, nihil esse factum: That it is Unity, and nothing else, that is the maker of all things. Yea, and the preserver of them too: as Boetius affirmeth. For, Tamdiû est unumquodque, id quod est (saith he) quamdiû in se unitas est: cum autem desinit esse unum, desinit esse id quod est: Every thing continueth so long in his being, as it continueth in his unity: Epip●. l. 3. Haeres. 80. To. 2. p. 519. Boet. l. de unitate, p, 1274. and when it loseth his unity, it ceaseth also to be. Whereupon he there concludeth, that, Sicut unitate res ad esse ducitur: sic &, in illo esse, custoditur. As by unity, all things are first brought unto their being; so are they all, by unity, preserved in the same. Nec quicquam invenire possis (saith Dionysius) quod non uno (ex quo omnis divinitas nominatur) & sit id, quod est, & absoluatur, Dionysius ubi suprà p, 330. & custodiatur: Neither can any thing be found, which is not both made, and perfected, and preserved by unity: which is the very title of the Deity. Now, that, by this unity, Pythagoras understood nothing else but God; it evidently appeareth, in that he both maketh his unity the Maker of all things: A quo sic rerum aeternus ducitur ordo: Palingen. in Libra. p, 168: Vt m●nade à prima innumeri numeri generantur: as Palingenius expresseth it: From whom all things proceed, by an eternal Law, As from the power of Unity all numbers we may draw. And again, in that he maketh it likewise, The fountain of all goodness: Omnium bonorum principium. Plut. l. de Homer To. 1. p. 123. For, both those two attributes, both to be the Maker of all things, and the Giver of all good things, are ascribed unto God, in the Holy Scriptures, by the two Brother-Apostles. The first of them, by S. john: By him were all things made. john, 1. 3. james, 1. 17. And the second, by S. james: Every good gift cometh from the Father of light. So that, God only is that unity, which Homer also not obscurely insinuateth, when he doth, Vnitatis naturam p●nere in bono: binarij in malo: When he placeth the nature of unity, in good: Plut. ubi suprà. and of Duality, in evil; making unity, the Cause of all kind of goodness, both natural, moral, and civil: as, in the same place, he proveth, by diverse pregnant instances. Vnitatis natura (saith he) si aeri insit, bonam temperiem; ●i animo, virtutem; si corpori, sanitatem; si civibus & familijs, pacem, & concordiam praestat. Contra, Bin●rij natura, aeri tempestatem; animo, uítium; corpori, morbos; civitatibus & familijs, seditiones & odia insert. The nature of unity is such, that, if it be in the air, it maketh a good temper; if in the mind, it bringeth virtue; if in the body, health; if in the City, peace. But Duality, clean contrary in the air, procureth storms; in the mind, vices; in the body, diseases; and in the City, distractions. So that Pythagoras his unity, which is the fountain of all goodness, cannot otherwise be construed, but to be God himself. 3 But we need use no circuit, to prove this unity, to be God, The first unity is nothing else but God. in the opinion of Philosophers. For they themselves affirm it, in direct and express terms. Trismeg. Asclep. c. 8. p. 505. Trismegistus saith of God; that he is, unum illud principium, ex quo cuncta dependent, vel ex quo potius defluunt: That God is that one original cause, on which all things do depend; or rather, Item Pimand. Dial. 11. p, 438. from which all things do proceed. And again, in another place: That there is but Anima una, & vit● una: & quisnam ille praeter unum Deum? qui unus singula facit in multis. There is but one soul, and one life: and what is that One, but only one God, who being but One, yet doth all in all. Eph. 4. 6. Agreeing exactly with the Doctrine of S. Paul: That there is but one God, and Father of all, which is above all, and through all, and in all. So likewise, Plut. l. 1. de Placit. c. 7. To. 2, p, 16. both Socrates and Plato, they both affirmed of God, that he was: Vnum▪ singularis, & per se subsistentis naturae; solitarium, & revera bonum. God (say they) is but one thing; of a singular nature, and by itself subsisting; truly good, and without any companion. All which names, and titles, (as Plutarch there reporteth) they referred unto Mentem, to a Spirit endued with understanding: which must needs be God: because nothing else hath his being of itself. Mornaeus, lib. de ve●i●. Relig. c. 3. p, 44. And therefore ●ayth Simplicius, that, Vnitas, and Principium, and Bonum, and Deus, do Vnam & idem sonare, do signify One, and the very same thing. Plutarch, he proveth God to be Vnum, but One, out of those two letters, E. I. which were written upon the Gates of Apollo's Temple: which sound as much as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Plut lib. de E, I, To. 1. Mor. p, 695. or, Vnum es. Non enìm multa sunt numina, sed unum. For there are not many Gods, but one God. And jamblicus saith of God, That, jamblic. lib. de Mysterijs p, 29. Vnitas in Diis adeo superat, ut illorum esse sit unitas quaedam. Unity in the Gods, is in so great an excellency, that their very being, is only to be One. So that, though by the error of his religion, he were led to affirm, that there were many Gods; yet, by the strength and power of very reason, he was forced to yield, that there was nothing in God, but a most pure and simple unity: which is indeed Gods Esse, cui totum est, esse unum: whose only being is to be One: as Hugo de Victore noteth. Hugo de Vict l. 7. Erud. didas. c. 19 To. 3. p, 21 X. jamblic. ubi suprà p, 152. Which Unity, in another place, jamblicus affirmeth, to be the cause of the whole University. Est Vnitas excelsa omnium causa. Now, what can this sublime Unity be, which is the cause of all things, but only God? There is not any other thing, that is the cause of all things. And therefore Xenophanes (as Aristotle reporteth) looking up into heaven, Arist. l. 1. Metap. c. 5. To. 2. p. 1376 unto this sublime Unity, affirmed it to be nothing else, but God. Xenophanes àd totum coelum respiciens, ipsum unum ait esse Deum. Yea, and diverse of the Philosophers have gone so far, as not to think it enough to say, Deum esse Vnum: but Deum esse Vnitatem: because Vnum is concretum; whereas there is nihil concreti in Deo. So that, (as Citadimus very wittily collecteth in his objections against Mirandula) Pic. Mirand. Obiect. 3. p, 181. God may more properly be said to be Vnitas, then Vnus. Hence Pythagoras affirmed (as Epiphanius reporteth) Deum esse Vnitatem: Epiphan. l. 3. To. 2. p, 519. That God is that one thing, without which there is nothing. And Oenod●pes likewise (transposing only the terms) Vnitatem esse Deum: as Athenagor●s reporteth. Athenag. Orat. pro Christ apud Iust. Martyr, To. 1. p. 223. He maketh Unity to be a Deity. The reason of which their curiosity of speaking, was; because though all of them found a true Unity in God, How God is not one. yet found they it to be such, as could not be expressed by any word. But the nearest they could come unto it, was the name of Abstract Unity. For though God be one (as is confessed by them all) yet is he not so one, as any other thing is one: but so, as nothing else is one: as S. Bernard in his fi●t Book de Consideratione, hath expressed very excellently. Where he giveth instance, of eight several ways, whereby things are said and made to be one. And yet none of them doth fully express the Unity of the Deity. Bernard. l. 5. De Considerate. p, 1408. Est Vnitas, quae collectiva dici potest, ut cum (verbi causa) multilapides faciunt acervum unum. Est unitas constitutiva, cum multa membra unum corpus constituunt. Est Vnitas coniugativa, qua fit, ut duo iam non sint duo, sed caro una. Est & nativa, qua anima & caro unus nascttur Homo. Est unitas potestativa, qua, homo, virtutis non instabilis, non dissimilis, sed unus sibimet semper nititur inveniri. Est consentanea, cum per charitatem, multorum hominum est cor unum, et anima una. Est & votiva, cum anima votis omnibus adhaerens Deo, unus spiritus est. Est & dignativa unitas, qua limus noster, à Dei verbo, in unam assumptus est personam. There is an Unity, which is made by collection; as when many Stones do make but one heap. There is an Unity, which is made by composition; as when many members do make but one body. There is an Unity which is made by conjunction; as when man & wife are now no more two, but become one flesh. There is an Unity, which is made by stability; as when a man is constant in his virtue, whereby he is always one, and like unto himself. There is an unity, which is made by consent; as when, through Christian charity, there is found but one heart and one mind in many. There is an unity, that is made by devotion; as when the soul adhaering unto God by piety and religion, is thereby made but one Spirit with him. And there is an unity, which is made by vouchsafing; as when God the word vouchsafed to assume the nature of man, into the identity of his own person. These be the eight kinds of S. Bernard's unity: wherein I will not censure, either any impropriety, or any coincidency: because they all may well pass for several kinds of Unity, in the popular capacity. But yet he affirmeth of them all, that all these unities are but to little purpose if they be compared to the Unity of the Trinity; much more than being compared to the Unity of the Deity. Haec omnia (saith he) quid ad illud summum, atque (ut ita dicam) unicè unum, ubi unitatem consubstantialitas facit? All these unities are as good as nothing, in respect of that unity, which is found in the Deity, by Consubstantiality. Huic uni, quiduis illorum si assimiles, erit quoquo modo unum: si compares, nullo. To this unity, if you do but liken any of those forenamed unities, they may, in some degree, be said to be unities: but, if you compare them, in no degree at all. Whereupon he there concludeth: Igitur, inter omnia, quae rectè unum dicuntur, arcem tenet unitas Trinitatis: quâ, tres personae una substantia sunt. Among all the unities, that can be called unities [of which Suidas nameth ten.) Boetius reckoneth up, Suidas in unce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 297 Boet. l. de unitale p, 1276. fourteen several sorts) The unity of the Trinity is the very chiefest: Whereby three distinct persons are united in one substance. Aquin. 1. Quaest 11. Art. 4. ●. p, 21. Which sentence of S. Bernard's, Aquinas attributeth to Boetius: being, a little perhaps, mistaken in the Author; but nothing at all, in the authority. Whereby it appeareth, that the Unity in the Deity is so perfect and absolute, that the world cannot afford a fit comparison to express it. Hugo, de Sct. Vict. l. 7. Erudit. Didascal. c. 19 To. 3. p, 21. X. Which Hugo de Victore acknowledgeth expressly, handling the very same point. God (saith he) is not one, either by Collection; as a flock is said to be one, which consisteth of many Sheep: Nor one, by Composition; as a body is said to be one, which consisteth of many members: nor one, by Similitude; as the same word is said to be one, when it is uttered by diverse mouths. But God is one, essentia, & identitate; as the soul of a man, which is but one in one body. Nay, God is more purely one, than the soul of any man. For, though the soul of a man be verè unum, yet it is not summè unum, as he noteth in that place: It is, unum essentraliter; but it is not, unum invariabiliter. And therefore, not summè unum. For, that which is variabiliter unum, that may be quickly made Alterum: as a man in his sickness is from a man in his health. For, Senec. Epist. 59 p, 95. as Seneca truly noteth, Nemo nostrûm, idem est in senectute, qui f●it i●uenis: nemo est manè, qui fuit pridiè. But God, is both essentialiter, and invariabiliter unus. james, 1. 17. He never altereth from himself. In him there is no change, nay, no shadow of change. Yea, and this, have some, even of the Heathen themselves, found: as we may plainly see in Plutarch: who pleadeth very earnestly, for the Unity of the Godhead, Plut. l. de E, l. To. 1. p, 695. against all supposed plurality. And yet denieth, that this unity of the Godhead, is either such a kind of unity, as is among men; who though he be but one, yet is he a congeries, ex infinitis diversissimisque affectionibus variè commixta: A mass of many unlike and repugnant affections: but God is one in the most pure simplicity of his essence and being: so as nothing else is. Whereby it appeareth, (as before I noted) that there is not any unity in the world, sufficient to express the Unity of God. But that (as the jews believe in their Creed) There is, ●uxdorfius in Synagoga judaica. c. 11. p, 3 talis unites in Deo, qualis non reperitur in ullo alio. There is such a special unity in God, as cannot in any other thing, be found. For (as Dionysius very truly observeth) Deus est tale unum, quod cogitationem superat omnem: Dionysius Arcopag. lib. de diuin Nom. c. 1. p, 192 Dionys. ibid. c. 13 p. 330. Io. Pic. lib. de Ente & Vno, To. 1. p, 272 God is such an unity, as passeth all man's cogitation exceedingly. And therefore Dionysius, in another place, saith of God, that he is not unum; but he doth ipsum unum superare: He surpasseth One itself: or (as Mirandula expresseth it) he is, Super-bonum, Super-verum, and Super-unum: a Super-good, a Super-truth, a Super-one, a very Super-superlative-one, as surpassing all other bonity, and Verity, and Unity. But how then can God be said to be One, if no created Unity be sufficient to express him? How God is One. Unto this point, I answer, that God may be said in a special manner, to be One, three several ways: as I find it observed by learned writers. For his Simplicity, for his Singularity, and for his Universality. The first way, whereby God is said to be One, is, for the purity and simplicity of his substance: which is not compounded with any thing else. For, that is most truly and properly one, which is nothing but itself, and hath none other thing mixed with it. Vnum enim quod est, syncerum est, & mixtionis purum, saith Plutarch. Plut. lib. de E, I. To. 2, p, 695. And such an one is God: who is so pure and simple an essence, that he is not compounded so much as of parts. But, as I noted before out of Dionysius, he is truly called Vnus, propter simplicitatem vacuitatis partium. Dionys. Arcopag. lib de diuin. Nom. c. 1, p, 192 He is truly called One, because he hath no parts in him: but is solely and wholly of his own self a●one, without any mixture, so much as of matter, as Plutarch affirmeth in his description of him. Deus est Mens, & species separata, Plut. lib. de Placit. c. 7. To. 2. p, 16. syncera ab omni materiae admixtione, perpessionibus obnoxiae. God is a separated mind, or form, who is pure from the mixture of any matter, which may subject him unto any kind of passion. Yea, and Tully confirms the same in his description: which though in words it differ, yet, doth it not in matter: For he defineth God to be, Mens soluta, & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, Cic. lib. 1. Tusc. p. 118. B●et. l. 1. de Trim. p. 1122. etc. So likewsse Boetius: Divina substantia, sine materia, forma est: atque ideò unum. So that, all of them run upon this common notion: That God is a pure substance, without any mixtion. Which his uncompounded simplicity, is the the true matter of his Unity: For, wheresoever is mixture, there must needs be number. Diversitas enìm, cum differentia enti● ponitur: saith Plutarch: Plat. l. de E, l, p, 695, Where there be diversities, there must needs be differences: and consequently, numbers. And therefore Trismegistus saith, that, Every compound body, is a multitude of bodies. Eorum, quae in mundo insunt, corporum, unumquodque est multitudo. Trismeg. Piman. Dial. 12, p, 452. And, In corporibus, quae composita sunt, corporis cuiusque numerus est. So that, there is a number in every mixture. And so, if there were any mixture in God, he could not properly be one. Whereas now, his simplicity is the true cause of his unity. Quia nulla in eo diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, Boet. lib. 1. De Trinit. p. 1122. nulla ex accidentibus multitudo; atque ideo nec numerus. As Boetius well collecteth. There is in God no diversity, and therefore no plurality; no multitude by accidents, and consequently no number. And this simplicity of his substance, is the first of those three reasons, for which God is called One. The second is, from his Singularity; as the first was from his Simplicity. Because there is no more Gods, but one; God is not only one, but he is also, The only One. He is such an one, as hath no companion. Both which titles are expressly ascribed unto God in the Scriptures: both that He is One, and that he is The only One. The first of them, by the Prophet Moses: Audi Israël, Deut. 6. 4. Dominus Deus noster, Deus unus est. The Lord our God is One God. The second by the Prophet Isay: Isai. 43. 10. Before me there was no God, neither shall there be any after me. So that God is so one, that he is The only one. He is not only unus, but also unicus: or, to use S. Bernard's word, Bernard, l. 5. de Consid. p, 1047. Si dici potest, unissimus est. If that word may be used, he is of all things, the Onest. And in respect of this his Singularity, because he is One, without any companion, is God called, Plut. l. 1. de plac. c. 7. To. 1. p, 16. One, even of the very Heathen. Socrates and Plato, as before I noted, in their definition of God, ascribe unto him Unity, with particular respect unto his Singularity. For, they define God to be, Vnum, singularis, & per se subsistentis naturae: To be one, of a singular and incommunicable nature: To be by nature one, Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p, 188 and of himself subsisting. So likewise Antisthenes, who directly affirmed, Populares esse Deos, multos; naturalem, unum. That, though there were many Gods, in popular opinion; yet that there is in nature, but only one. Plut. l. de E. I. To. 1. mor. p. 695 So likewise Plutarch: Macrob. l. 1. Saturnal. c. 23. p. 224. Non multa sunt Numina, Luin. moral. poet. p, 1223. sed unum. There be not many Gods, but One. Which one God, he there thinketh to be the Sun: as Macrobius likewise doth: who applieth all the names of the other Gods, only unto him, as if he only were all of them. Deus unus, & omnes, as Varro speaketh: and they all, nothing else, but his several names. Yea, and Plutarch, in that place, collecteth the very same, out of two several names of the Sun. The first, that he is called, Apollo: Quòd Vnicus sit, (of Aprivative, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,) Voce multitudinis negationem arguente. The second, that he is called jeius: Macrob. l. 1. Satur. c. 7. p, 200 Varro. lib. 4 de Lingua Latina, p. 13. which soundeth as much as unicus, Item Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p, 233. & solus. Though Macropedius interpret that name otherwise. So that there is but one God, as there is but one Sun: which therefore the Romans called solemn, quasi solum, that is to say, The sole One. And so may God be called; likewise, for the very same reason: as Boetius very wittily observeth; Quem, quia respicit omnia, Solus, Verum possis dicere Solem. Boet. l. 5. de Con. Metro. 2. p, 1100 Whom, 'cause he looks to all, Being solely one, Thou mayst him truly call, The very Sun. And this is the second reason, why God is called One: in respect of his Singularity, because there is no other God, but Herald The third is, Ruf. Comment. in Symbol. To. 1. p, 172. 1. Cor. 15. 28 Act, 17. 28 Io. Pic. Mirand. l. de Ente & ●no, p, 172 in respect of his Universality, because God is One, Non numero, sed Vniversitate: Not so much by his Singularity, as by his Universality: as Ruffian distinguisheth. For he is indeed, all things. He is All in all: as the Apostle speaketh. And as he is in all things: so all things are in him. In him they live, move, and have their being. So that, as Picus Mirandula observeth out of Dionysius: Vnum dicitur Deus, quia unicè est omnia. God may be called one; because he only is all things. An opinion maintained, by many of the Heathen. baert. in vita Xenoph. p, 310. Trismeg. Asclep. c. 1. p, 475. Xenophanes affirmed directly: Deum esse omnia: That God was all things. And so likewise did Trismegistus; Omnia esse unum, & unum omnia: ut quae in Creatore fuerunt omnia, antequàm creasset omnia. He saith, That All things are One, and One is all: because they all were in their Maker, before the time that he made any of them. And thereupon he concludeth, that the name of God is, Omnia, that is, All things. Nec immeritò ipse dictus est omnia, Trismeg. Asclep. c. 8. p, 506. cuius membra sunt omnia. His name is justly called, All things, whose parts and members are all things. And again, in another place. Necesse est, aut omnia esse eius nomen; aut ipsum, omnium nominibus nuncupari. Either his name must be All things; or else, he must be named, by the name of all things. So likewise, Stob. l. Eclog. Phys c. 1. p, 2. both Zeno, and Melissus defined God to be, Et Vnum, & omne: To be One, that is All things. Which speeches of the Heathen, in making God All things, and in calling him by all names; lest it should seem to imply an utter confusion of the Creator with the Creature; Dionysius expresseth them both, in a more qualified manner, bringing a commodious exposition, to mollify the hardness of the position. Dionys. l. de Diuin. Nom. cap, 1. p, 201. For he saith, that God is, Omnia quae sunt, & nihil eorum quae sunt: He is, in some sense, all things that be; and yet, in another sense, none of all the things that be. Now, in what sense it is, that he calleth God, All things; he expoundeth himself, in the very same place: because, God is both in mundo, circa mundum, & supra mundum: He is, both in the World, about the World, Ibid. c. 13. p, 130. and above the World. And somewhat more fully, in another place: because, in divina unitate, singillatìm collecta & coniuncta sunt omnia, praestanti modo, & antè, eximiè insunt. Because all things had a being in God, after a special, and most excellent manner, before they had any being in themselves. And in this sense it must be taken, when they say; God is, Omnia. And so likewise, Ibid. c. 1. p, 200. for his name: he saith, that God may be praised by us; hoth ut nomine vacantem, & ut omni nomine: both as having no name, and yet as having every name: Because every thing that hath a name, is the work of God. Aug. lib. de vera Relig. c. 1. To. 1. p, 675. So that, to conclude this point with the sentence of S. Augustine: Vnitas illa, à qua, omnis universitas & inchoatur, & perficitur, & continetur, est Vnus Deus. That Unity, from whence the Universality is both begun, and prefected, and praeserued, is only the unity of the Godhead. Wherein, though there be a Trinity of persons; yet is there but an unity of substance: yea and that an indivisible Unity too. Dionys. l. de Diuin. Nom. cap. 2. p, 204. For the Unity of the Trinity, is, not only, Vnitas coniuncta; but also, plusquàm coniuncta: as Dionysius truly noteth. It is not an unity conjoined, of things by nature differing: but more then conjoined, of things in nature consenting. 4 Thus, Unity hath in it a resemblance of God. Arithmetical unity, being rightly understood, and fitly applied, doth lead us, by the hand, unto the knowledge of God. Yea, and as I showed before, of Punctum in Geometry; that it hath diverse lines, as monogrammall draughts of the image of God: so may the same be showed in Arithmetical unity. First, it hath a resemblance of God's omnipotent power: whereby he both maketh and destroyeth all things, at his pleasure. For, as the Prophet David affirmeth of God, Psalm, 104. 198. that, When he sendeth forth his Spirit, all things are created; and when he but turns his face, they are all again destroyed: so may it be truly observed of unity; that it hath the like power, among his numbers, that God almighty hath, among his Creatures. For, all numbers have, not only their greatness and perfection, but also their essence and being, from One. But it, from none. As for example. If you desire to make Two, or a Binary, which is the first number: add, but One, unto One, and you make Two. If Three, or a Ternary; add but One, unto Two; and you make Three. And so, in infini●um. Nay, the very name of all other numbers, implieth no more, but so many Ones. An Hundred, A Thousand, a Million, doth signify no more, but an Hundred, a Thousand, and a Million of Ones. Stob. l. Eclog. Phys. cap. 2 p, 3. For, Numerus is defined, by Moderatus Pythagoricus, to be nothing else, but Mon●dum congeries: All numbers are nothing, but a multitude of Ones. So that, the very essence and being of all other numbers whatsoever, whether odd, or even, dependeth but on One. Yea, and so doth likewise their destruction, and dissolution. As we may evidently see, if we will but walk rerograde, the same way back again. For, take but One, from Three; and you not only utterly destroy the oddness, but also the essence of that number. Si quis a numero unitatem abstulerit, alius relinquetur nume●us. Arist. l. 1. de Anima, c, 4. To. 1. p, 792. Plut. l. de E. I. To. 1. p. 686. And so likewise, from any other. From what number soever, you shall take but one, you destroy his nature. And to what number soever, you shall add but one, you make it another. Take one from the greatest number, and you make it less. Add one to the least number, and you make it greater. Take one from an odd number, and you make it even. Add one to an even number, and you make it odd. Vnitas, pari addita, imparem; impari, parem conficit numerum, saith Plutarch. And therefore, in another place he calleth Unity, Plut. l. de Animae, procreate, To. 3. p, 102. common principium, Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 12. p, 452. & parium, & imparium: the common principle, of even, and odd. So that, both the creation, and destruction of all numbers, dependeth wholly, upon One. One is the maker, and One is the marrer of every number. Vnitates quippè gignunt, atque augent numerum: rursúsque solutae inse numerum retrahunt: saith Trismegistus. Unities added together, beget and increase numbers: and again dissolved asunder, reduce every number into themselves, and make of them unities. Whereby it appeareth, that, as God doth all, among his Creatures: so likewise doth Unity, among all numbers: which are, as it were, his Creatures, produced only out of itself, by its own foecundity, without borrowing any thing thereto, out of any other: as God, in his Creation, produced all his works, out of his own omnipotent power, and did not borrow any thing, from any Creature. For, Mathematicians affirm that, Numerus par est mas; impar, foemina: The even number is the male; Macrob. l. 2. de Some: Scip. cap, 2. p, 88 and the odd the female: but, that, Monas est, & par, & impar: Unity is, both even, and odd; masculine and feminine: and so that all numbers are begotten of it, tanquàm a mare & a foemina: as of a male and a female. Now this fruitful Monas, which begetteth all things, is nothing else, but God: as Trismegistus affirmeth; Deus utriusque sexus foecunditate plenissimus, semperque voluntate sua praegnans, Trismeg. Asclep. c, 8. p, 506. parit, quicquid voluerit procreare. God who is filled with the fruitfulness of both sexes, and always pregnant, according to his will produceth whatsoever his will is to have produced. So that, c, 1. p, 475. as in another place he affirmeth, he is Vnus omnia: Such an One as is all things. Thus, in this point also, between Deity, and Unity, there is a great affinity. Secondly, there is in Unity a representation of God's abolute perfection. For, as God hath his whole subsisting of himself, so that he cannot be made either greater, or lesser, by any of his creatures: so likewise hath Unity. It hath his own subsistence, absolutely in itself. For thong the essence of all other numbers dependeth upon One; yet the essence of one dependeth upon none. You cannot take any thing from one, to make it less: and you cannot add any thing to one, to make that one greater. For, as Aristotle truly teacheth: Arist. l. 13. Met. c. 8 To. 2. Vnum, as it is not a p, 1522. Divisibile: so is it not b p, 1520. Combinabile. Unity can neither be divided nor increased. For, when One is added unto One, there is by their conjunction, produced another number; but yet neither of these two unities, is in itself, made greater, but abideth firm and steadfast, in his own stable nature; as God himself doth. And therefore, justin Martyr, even in this respect, Iust. Mart. lib. Quaest & R●sp. Quaest 113. To. 3. p, 137, compareth Unity unto God. Quemadmodùm unitati, id nihil confert ad perfectionem, quòd principium sit numeri: (Nam etiamsi principium numeri non esset, perfecta tamen esset: & cum principium eius facta sit, non aucta tamen est) sic Deus quoque, ante creationem perfectus erat, & post creationem auctus non est. As it bringeth no perfection unto an Unity, that it is the fountain and beginning of numbers: (For though it were not the beginning of any number, yet is an unity perfect in its own proper nature: and being the fountain and beginning of some number, it is thereby perfected never the more) so God, who was perfect before the creation, yet is not made more perfect by the creation. And this is the second degree of their comparison. Thirdly, there is in Unity, a draught and resemblance of God's immutability. For, as God is always like unto himself, and not subject to so much as to a shadow of Change: no more is Unity neither. It is not variable, by parity; ja. 1. 17. or imparity; by multiplicity, or paucity; as all other numbers be: but it still continueth, in its own nature, immutably. An Unity is always at unity with itself, Io. Pic. Mirand. in Heptaplo. l. 3. c. 1. p, 17. and never varieth from itself. Est Vnitas (saith Mirandula) omninò semper, à se perfecta, non egreditur se, sed individua simplicitate, & solitaria sibi cohaeret. Unity is simple and perfect in itself, never going out of itself, but sticking unto itself, unchangeably, only by its own sole and natural simplicity. So absolute is the nature of One, in itself, that it cannot be changed; and so omnipotent toward others, that it changeth all numbers. So that Monas (as Trismegistus observeth) tanquam principium, Trismeg Piman. Dial. 41. p, 396 radix, & origo, omnem numerum continet, a nullo contenta; omnem gignit, a nullo genita. Unity containeth all numbers, being contained of none; and it begetteth all, being begotten of none. Fourthly, there is in Unity, a true resemblance of God's Eternity, or Antiquity: who is named in the Scripture, Dan. 7. 9 The Ancient of Days. For, as God is before all his creatures; so likewise is Unity before all numbers. Sine uno, multitudo non erit, Dionys. l. de Nom. Diuin. c. 13. p, ●. 9 saith Dionysius: Vnum autem erit, sine multitudine: Vt Monas omnem numerum multiplicatum & auctum antecedit. There can be no multitude without one, but one may be without a multitude: for, unity is before any multiplied number. Which antecedencie of Unity, in the same place, he applieth unto the Deity. 330. Vnum illud, quod est causa omnium, est omni uno, & multitudine, omni toto, & part, omni termino, & determinationis privatione, omni fine & infinitate antiquius. That one thing, which is the beginning of all things, is, in Nature before both all Ones, and all, Manyes, all wholes, all parts, all terms, and all indeterminations, all finites and all infinites. It is more ancient, than all these. Yea so ancient, that (as Macrobius affirmeth) it is without all beginning. Macrob. l. 1. in Som. Scip. c. 6. p. 16. And therefore he hath reduced it directly unto God, Haec monas, initium, finisque omnium, neque, ipsa principij finisque sciens, ad summum refertur Deum: That one thing, which is, both the beginning, and end of all things; and yet hath neither beginning, nor end, in itself; cannot otherwise be referred, but unto the most High God. Who (as Mirandula observeth out of Dionysius) ita rerum omnium principium est, Io. ●ic. Mir. l. de Ente & Vno. p. 172. sicut omnium numerorum principium Vnitas est. God is so the first beginning of all things, as unity is the first beginning of all numbers. And thus, as Philo judaeus observeth, Vnitas, est prime Causae & primi Authoris imago. There is in unity, Phil. jud. l. De special. Leg. p. 1987. a true image of the Deity who is the first Cause and first Author of all things. And who, in respect of his own most inexplicable and incomprehensible Unity, may truly be called by us, both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: both One, and, The only One. CHAP. 11. That the motion of the Heavens, and Stars, is not natural. 2. Which yet is so orderly, as if it were artificial. That the order of their motion, hath the resemblance of a Dance. 4. That the Heavens themselves, do make Music, to this Dance. That this orderly Motion of the Stars, hath led diverse men, to seek for a God, above the Stars. 6. Because their orderly Motions, can neither be from Chance, nor from their own Wills: But only from God's Wisdom, who is the Maker of them. THe third of the Mathematical Arts, is Astronomy: whose Object is, the Motion of the Heavenly Orbs, and Stars; wherein there be many Arguments, which may lead men, by the hand, to understand, There is a God. But because I have instanced, Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Sect. 1. but only in Order: I will therefore keep order and will only stand to it. And yet, in this place, I will but lightly touch it: because in the seaventh Book, there falleth out a more apt, and more ample consideration of it. First therefore, as concerning the Motion of the Heavens, it hath troubled the Heads of the wisest Philosophers: of what Nature this Motion of the Heavens should be? Tully greatly approveth of Aristotle's division, as concerning Motion; Cic. l. 2, de Nat. Deor. p. ●07. That, Whatsoever things are moved, they must needs be moved, either by their own natures; or, by force from others; or by a will in themselves. Now, for the Heavens, he concludeth, that their motion cannot be natural, because the Motion of all natural Bodies, whether Simple or, Compound, is either Upward, or Downward. For, all Bodies are, either Light or, Heavy. If Light, Arist. l. 2. Phys. c. 9 To. 2. p. 440. they move directly upward, If Heavy, they move perpendicularly downward. And, there is not any natural Body in the world, which is so equally compounded of Light, and Heavy, that it can hang in the midst, and propend neither way. And therefore, the Heavens, if they were left unto the motion of their own proper natures, they would either move upward, or downward, as the Elements do; or else they must stand still. For, other Motion, from their matter, they can have none, as they be natural Bodies. No, nor yet from their Form neither, as they be teret and round Bodies. For, though their Rotundity doth give them an aptitude and disposition to be carried about in their circular motion; yet giveth it not the motion itself unto them. As we may see in a wheel: which (for all his roundness) stands as still as a stone, if it have not some other means to help it unto motion. It may be objected; that the weightiness of the wheel doth settle it upon his Axis, as in his proper place, where all things do stand still. But it may also be answered; that the Heavens are in their proper place: and therefore should stand still, yea though they had in them the principle of motion: much more, they having none. As indeed they have not, if they be of such a temper, as is neither Heavy, nor Light. For, if we could imagine, that nature had made any thing, so equally tempered, and indifferently poised, of Heavy, and Light, that neither were predominant; it must needs hang in the midst, and not move itself, either upward, or downwards. Neither could it move about, in a circular motion; unless it were impelled, by some other thing. For, Nature hath made nothing, which hath, in itself, the proper principle of circular motion. I mean, not as it is a Body. The rotundity of their form, that giveth only, unto them, an hability to that motion (as before I noted) but, the act, it giveth not. Neither can the vacuity of both Heaviness and Lightness, give unto them that motion: because, that is rather the principle of station, Iust. Mart. in Con●utat. dogmat. Aristot. To. 1. p, 303. then of Motion. And (as justine Martyr very well collecteth:) If the absence, or privation of both Heaviness and Lightness, were a formal cause of circular motion; then, Materia prima (which Aristotle maketh, to be neither light, nor heavy) should, from all eternity, have moved circularly: and so there should have been a motion, before there was any Heaven. Which he derideth there, most justly, as a gross absurdity. But, if we should grant: as Palingenius would have us: — Coelestia corpora, per se, Palingen. in Aquario. p, 329. Atque suis formis; ut terra, ignisque moveri: That Heavenly bodies, of themselves, by their own forms do move, As doth the Earth, that is below; and Fire, that is above. Yet he teacheth us, in the same place, that, it is only God, that giveth them their forms. Nempe suis, res, a formis, tales generantur: Quales praecepit, qui formas condidit ipsas. Yet such are things, by their own forms begotten, As He that made their forms,, doth please t'allot them. And therefore, the Orator proceedeth on further, unto the other two members, of his forenamed division of Motion. That this spherical motion of the heavens, not proceeding, in them, from any natural principle, inhaerent in their bodies, it must needs, either be a violent motion, put upon them by an external force, from some others; or else, a voluntary motion, occasioned by an internal will in themselves. For, other principle, can be none, of this circular motion. But, that it cannot be a motion, enforced upon them, he assumeth from this ground: That there cannot be any force, without them, that is strong enough to compel them: there being no force that is greater than their own. Cic. ubi suprà. Quae enim vis potest esse maior? What force can be greater? And again, Quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod impellat, atque moveat? What power can be greater, than the power of the world, that should be able to move it? He supposeth (though falsely) that there can no such power be. And therefore he concludeth, That the motion of the Heavens, must be, of necessity, a motion merely voluntary, proceeding from nothing else, but only from their own wills. Whereupon he there inferreth, that, Haec qui videt, non solùm indoctè, sed etiam impiè faciet, si Deos esse neget: That, this being admitted, he must not only be ungodly, but also unlearned too, if he deny them to be Gods: meaning, The Heavens and Stars. This is the sum of his reason, from the motions of the Stars. Wherein, though he lead us never so far about; yet, at last, he bringeth us home unto our Conclusion: That there needs must be a God: and, that the Heavens, by their motion, do plainly prove the same. An Argument largely handled by the Prophet David in the 19 Psal. Psalm 19 And though Tully, in that place, do bring the whole Argument unto a false issue, building upon a false ground; That the motion of the Heavens is voluntary, and of themselves; and that therefore, They be Gods: though, I say, it be false, in the particular, That the Heavens and Stars, be Gods; yet it is true in the general, that it proveth most certainly, that There needs must be a God; and, that this motion of the Heavens, cannot possibly be stirred by any other cause, but only by God himself. For, if the motion of the Heavens (being admitted to be voluntary) do conclude them to be Gods; then must needs the same motion (being admitted to be compulsory) much more conclude, that he, by whose force they be so violently compelled, must needs be God. As, even Plato himself hath plainly confessed: from whom the former Argument of Tully's is borrowed. Cogitemus (saith he) quî fieri possit, ut tanta magnitudo, ab aliqua possit natura, Plato, in Epinome p, 915. tanto tempore, circumferri? Ego igitur assero, Deum causam esse, nec aliter posse fieri. Let us consider (saith he) how it can possibly be, that the Heavens, being of so great and so vast a body, should, by any power of nature, ●e driven so impetuously. And therefore (saith he) I do confidently affirm, that only God himself can be the mover of them. This is his determination, as concerning the Heaven's motion. And where is now that Soul of theirs; which, but a little before, he made the mover of them? 2 But let us now proceed further, and come from the nature of their motion to the Order. The motion of the Stars is very orderly. Which is so great and excellent, that even Aristotle himself (who subiecteth all other matters, with a kind of Tyranny, unto the power of his reasons) yet here (leaving reason) he suddenly breaketh out, into a passionate admiration: Arist. l. de Mund. To. 2. p, 1565. Quid unquàm poterit aequari coelesti ordini, & volubilitati? cum sydera convertantur exactissima norma, de alio in aliud seculum. What can ever be compared unto the order of the Heavens, & to the motion of the Stars, in their several revolutions? Which move most exactly, as it were, by rule and square, from one generation to another. Which rule of their motion, David affirmeth to be God's law, that he hath set them. Psalm 1486. Plato, in Timaeo. p. 710. God hath made them fast for ever; he hath given them a law, which they cannot pass. And so likewise doth Plato. For he saith, that God, when he had made the Stars, he did, Singulis leges fatales edicere: He gave unto them fatal & unchangeable Laws. And indeed, the very name of this Art, whereof we now entreat [the very name of Astronomy] in exact signification, importeth, that the Stars observe a law in their motion. Which law is given unto them, by none other, but only by God himself, who is their true Lawgiver. He is both their Maker, and their Lawmaker. Yea, and this law of his, they observe so exactly, that (as the Orator observeth) there is in all their motion, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 207. Nihil temerarium, nihil varium, nihil fortuitum: They neither justle rashly, one upon another; nor yet decline casually, one from another; no, nor vary in the least point, from their prescribed order. Macrob. l. 2, de Som. S●p. c. 1 p. 83. For (as Macrobius likewise noteth) In Coelo, constat, nihil fortuitum, nihil tumultuarium provenire; sed universa illìc divinis legibus, & stata ratione procedere. There is nothing done casually, nothing disorderly, in the heavens: but all things prescribed by most exact reason; and determined by order of most divine laws. So that, he ascribeth all the order of their motion, unto that law, which God hath prescribed them. And so likewise doth Seneca: Senec. l. de prou. c. 1. p. 1▪ ● he saith, that the Stars do, aeternae legis imperio procedere: They move by the appointment of an eternal Law, that is, by the law of an eternal God. Both of them agreeing with the Prophet David, that the only cause of their orderly motion, is that exact law, which God hath prescribed them. In which point, Tully also consenteth fully with them. For he, rendering a reason, why certain of the Stars be called Planets: that is to say, Wanderers: yet affirmeth, that it is not, because they wander in their motion, but, because of that variety, which they have above others. As for their own motions, they keep so strict an order, and so great a constancy, in observing of them, that they swerve not from that law, which God hath prescribed them. Et, Cic. l. ●. de diurn. p. 243. si stellarum motus, cursusque vagantes Nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae. Quae verbo, & falsis Graecorum vocibus, errant; Revera, certo lapsu, spacióque feruntur: Omnia iam cernes, divina ment notata. Mark, Omnia, divina ment notata. Wouldst thou the motions of the Stars, and various courses know; Which fixed are, and which are said to wander to and fro? How e'er the Grecians name them such; in very truth, they run In certain tracts and distances, not wand'ring up and down: But all directed thou mayst see, by God's prescription. But, Manilius, in this point, goeth far beyond them all; both expressly acknowledging, that the Stars, in their motion, observe a law prescribed them: and that this Lawgiver, is none other, but only God, their Creator. Nec quicquam, Manil. l. 1. p, 15. in tanta magis est mirabile mole, quam Ratio, & certis quòd legibus omnia parent. Nusquàm turba nocet, nihil ullis partibus errat. There is not aught (a wonder 'tis) in such a wondrous mass, More wonderful or strange than this, that Reason bring's to pass: That all obey their certain laws; which he doth still prefer; No tumult hurteth them, nor ought in any part doth err: From whence, by and by inferring, Ac mihi tam praesens ratio non ulla videtur, Quâ pateat, mundum divino numine verti. To me, no reason stronger seems to prove, The world, by power divine, thus still to move. And a little after, p, 16. ask the quaestion, At cur, dispositis vicibus, consurgere signa, Et, v●lut imperio, praescriptos reddere cursus, C●rnimus, ac nullis properantibus ulla relinqui? Whence is it, that we see, the Stars in turns to rise, And, at Command to stoop, and keep their ordered guise? etc. He giveth this for an Answer of their immutability: that, it is the work of the immutable God. — Deus est, qui non mutatur in aevo. And indeed, it is a wonder, that these Planets, still running sometime in diverse, and sometime in adverse courses; yet should all of them observe, so unchangeably, their order, that they never should impeach, or hinder one another. Senec. Herc. Fur. Act. 5. p. 52. But though they do, Transuersos agere cursus: as the Tragic noteth, in one place: yet do they, Act. 4. p. 37. Inoffensos, as he noteth in another. They run in cross courses; and yet do not cross one another, in their courses. Plato in Epinome. p. 915. Nec errant (saith Plato) nec praeter antiqunm ordinem revoluuntur. Neither do they run random, nor are they rolled, beside their ancient order. Which orderly motion of the Stars, both proveth, There is a God; yea, and that this is his work; by so necessary a consequence, that whosoever seeth it not, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 209. him, Tully affirmeth to be, without all sense. Coelestem admirabilem ordinem, incredibilemque constantiam, qui vacare Mente putat, is ipse mentis expers habendus est. He which thinketh the admirable order and incredible constancy of the Heavens to be without a Spirit, he may be thought himself to be without spirit or understanding. 3 And indeed, The motion of the Stars hath the resemblance of a Dance. the motions of the Stars, are in so great Variety; and yet observed, with such order, and constancy; that they have resemblance of a well measured dance: some running directly, and forthright, in their courses; some dancing round about, in their Epicycles. Yea, and that with great variety, and change of their motions, in Directions, Stations, Retrogradations, and such like: wherein they do seem, as it were, to tread the Maze and (in their kind) to dance their Measures. Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 208. Of which, Tully giveth instance, in the Planet Saturnus. Saturni Stella, in suo cursu, multa mirabiliter efficiens, tum antecedendo, tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delitescendo, tum matutinis rursùm se aperiendo; nihil tamen immutat sempiternis seculorum aetatibus, quìn eadem ijsdem temporibus efficient. The Planet Saturn, doth make many strange and great wonders, in his motion, sometimes going before, and sometimes coming after, sometimes withdrawing himself in the Evening, and sometimes again showing himself in the morning: Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 208. 215 And yet changeth nothing, neither in the order of times, nor in the nature of things. And the like may be seen, in the rest of the Planets: as he himself showeth, in that very place. So that, Aristophanes his observation of the Clouds, Aristop. in Nub. Act. 1. Sce. 3 p, 169. Plato in Timaeo, p, 709. is much truer in the Stars: that they do, Arte choream instituere. They make in their motions, an artificial kind of Dances. Plato affirmeth, that God hath purposely provided the Sun to give the Stars light, the better to perform their well ordered motions: which he calleth there, Their Dances: where he also calleth their Courses, Deorum choreas, The dances of the Gods. For so he indeed esteemed of the Stars: But Philo judaeus more truly, Philo jud. l. de Cherub. p, 157. Divinas choreas, Divine and heavenly dances. For so, in a sort, they may truly be called: Divinas revera choreas agittantes, nec unquam ordinem deserentes. They daune in God's presence (as David did before the Ark) and yet, 1. Sam. 6. 14 neither break their orders, nor stray from their place. So likewise Palingenius: — Nec se collidunt, Palin. in Aquar. p, 323. concutiuntque, Occurrendo sibi, sed certa lege, modóque, una eadémque v●a, leni, vertigine pergunt; Et choreae in morem, placidè, taciteque feruntur. Nor do they dash together, nor make shock, By meeting one another. But are locked Unto a constant law, and one set way; From which their smooth sweet windings never sway; But run, as if they danced a Roundelay. Whence, Max. Tyr. S●r. 25. p, 303. Maximus Tyrius calleth God, Coeli compositorem harmonicum, and Astrorum circulationis, & chorea, supremum moderatorem: ascribing unto him, the melody of the heavens, and the dancing of the stars. And therefore Plato again, Plate, in Epinome p. 915 in another of his Dialogues, he saith of the Stars, that they do Chorea optima uti, omniumque chorearum magnificentissima: that they dance a most stately and magnifical dance: harping still upon their dancing. From whence, he there concludeth, That therefore they have within them, Mentem: a certain spirit, or soul, that directeth them. And it is true, in very deed. But it is not their own spirit, as he falsely supposed: it is only God's Spirit. Psal. 33. 6 By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them, by the breath of his mouth: saith the Prophet David. And so likewise holy job: job 26. 13. His spirit hath garnished the Heavens, and his hand hath form the crooked Serpent. So that, the Spirit, which giveth unto the stars their motion, is only the Spirit, which giveth them their being. It is only that divine Spirit, Act. 17. 28 in which all things both live, and move, and have their being. Yea, and this is also confessed, even by the very heathen. For, Tully affirmeth, Cic. l. 1. Acad. p, 7. that Soul of the world, to be nothing else, but god: and that by the Platonists own doctrine. Animam mande dicunt esse Mentem, perfectamque sapientiam, quem Deum appellant. Plut. l. 1. de plac. c. 7. To. ●. p, 16 So Plutarch Mens est Deus: That soul is God. And again, Democritus ait, Deum in igne globoso, esse mundi animam. Democritus saith, that God in the fiery globe, is the soul of the world. Yea, and Virgil, speaking of that men's, or Spirit, which giveth motion unto the heavens, he giveth such a description of it, as an agree to no Spirit, but to the Spirit of God. Principio Coelum, Vir. l. 6 Aeneid▪ p, 267▪ ae terras, Campo'sque liquentes, Lucentémque globum Luna, Titaniaque astra, Spiritus intùs alit: totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem— He saith, the Heavens, the Earth, the Waters, and the Stars, Receive their Motions, and whate'er they are, From an internal Spirit; which th' Eternal is, That unto all of them their Motion gives. Now, what Spirit can this be, in all those great Creatures, but only the Spirit of God their Creator? Of whom, the prophet jeremy affirmeth, that, he filleth both Heaven and Earth. jer. 23. 24. Wis. 1. 7. And the Wiseman in the Book of Wisdom: That he not only filleth them, but also maintaineth them: answering to Virgils-alit. This Spirit, that made those Creatures, doth also guide their motions. And their moving, in so exact both a number, measure, and order, doth evidently show; That God himself is their Mover. Max. Tyr. Serm. 21▪ p. 256. That God himself is their Mover. Whom even the Heathen imagined, to be delighted which their dancing, in such an order, before him. Yea, and that, something too much: as the Tragic seems to challenge him; Curio tibi tanta est cura, Senec. Hippolyt. Act. 3. Sce. 4. p. 206. perenn●s Agitare vias aetheris alti? Why art thou so much taken up, oh why, In those perpetual motions of the sky? Yea, and even among us Christians, that renowned Poet, Bartas, though he go not so far, yet he affirms that, — sacred Harmony, Bartas in his Columns. p. 493. And numbrie law did then accompany Th' Almighty most: When first his ordinance Appointed Earth to rest, and Heaven to dance. 4 And therefore, The motion of the Heavens produceth an Harmony. Cap. 12. Sect. 1. diverse of them, as they ascribe a rhythmical motion, unto the Stars; so do they an harmonical, unto the Heavens; imagining, that their moving produceth the melody of an excellent sweet tune. So that, they make the Stars, to be Dancers; and the Heavens, to be Musicians. An opinion, which of old, hath hung in the heads, and troubled the brains of many learned men: yea, and that, not only among the Heathen Philosophers; but also even among our Christian Divines. The first Author and inventor of which conceited imagination, Arist. l. 2, de Coelo. c. 9 〈◊〉. 1. p 588. was the Philosopher Pythagoras. Cic. l. 3. De Nat. Deor. p. 229. Who broached his opinion, Plut. l. de Musica. To. 2. p. 707. with such felicity & happiness, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 205. that he won unto his part, Plato. l 10 De. Rep. p. 670. diverse of the most ancient, and best leaned Philosophers: as Plutarch reporteth. Plato, whose learning Tully so much admireth, that he calleth him, The God of all Philosophers: Deum Philosophorum, he affirmeth of the Heavens, that Every one of them, hath sitting upon it, a Sweet-singing Siren, carolling-out a most pleasant and melodious song, agreeing with the motion of her own peculiar heaven. Which Siren, though it sing of itself, but one single part; yet all of them together, being eight in number (for so many Heavens were only held by the Ancients) do make an excellent Song, consisting of eight parts: wherein, they still modulate their Songs, a agreeable with the motions of the eight celestial Spheres. Which opinion of Plato's, Macr●. b. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90. is not only allowed by Macrobius; but he also affirmeth of this Sirens Song, that, it is a Psalm, composed in the praise of God Yea, and he proveth his assertion out of the very name of a Siren: which signifieth (as he saith) as much as, Deo canens, A singer unto God. But Maximus Tyrius, he affirmeth of the Heavens, that (without any such help, Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p, 256. of those celestial Sirens) they make a most sweet harmony, even by their proper motions: wherein they do, Omnes symmetriae numeros implere; contrarióque nisu, divinum sonum perficere: They, by their contrary moving, do fill up all the parts of a most Divine and heavenly Song. Which, he affirmeth to be most pleasant unto the ears of God; though it cannot be heard by the ears of men. Lucian., lib. de Astrologic▪ p, 166. B. Yea, and the Sages of the greeks, insinuate also as much, by placing of Orpheus his harp, in Heaven: implying, in the seven strings of his well turned harp, that sweet tune and harmony, which is made in heaven, by the diverse motions of the seven planets, as Lucian interprets it. Unto which his opinion, there may seem to be a kind of allusion, in the Book of job, as the Text, in the vulgar translation, is rendered: Concentum Coeli quis dormire fac●et? job. 38. 37. Who shall make the Harmony of the Heavens to sleep? For so, likewise, the Divines of Douai translate it. Pliny indeed, as concerning this Harmony, doth write somewhat doubtfully; whether there be, Pliny lib 2. cap, 3. p, 1. in truth, any such thing, or no? suspending his own opinion, with Non facilè dixerim. So that, as he doth not defend it, for a verity; so doth he not again deny it, as a falsity; but leaveth it, as uncertain. Whose doubting of it (he being of so acute, and enquiring a wit) is rather a credit, than a discredit unto it. But, much more is Aristotle's deriding of it: because (in the end) he was forced to retract in. For, though in his Book, De Coelo, he confute it, and make, in a manner, but a scoff, and scorn of it; yet, Arist. l. 2. de Coelo, c. 9 To. 1. p, 587. in his book, Arist. l. de Mundo, To. 2. p. 1569. De Mundo, he alloweth of it, and confesseth it to be the proper work of God. For, there he saith expressly, that, God doth, In mundo, rerum omnium concentum continere: That he keepeth that Harmony, which is to be found, in all the several parts of the world. And so likewise, Tully; although, in one place, he do scoff at this Harmony, that Mundus should ad harmoniam canere: Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 229. That the World should sing unto a tune: yet, in another place, he not only subscribeth unto it, but also, ascribeth unto the working of it, all those benign & gracious influences, which, from the Heavens, descend upon these inferior bodies. Stellarum tantus est concentus, ex dissimilimis motibus, ut cum summa Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat: Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218. His interiecta jovis, illustret & temperet. infraque Martem duae, Soli obediant: Sol ipse mundum omnem sua luce complete, ab eoque Luna illuminata, gravidates & partus afferat, maturitatemque gignendi. There is so great an Harmony, and consent of the Stars, arising from the diversity of their motions; that, as Saturn cooleth, so Mars heateth, and jupiter (which is between them) he tempereth them both. The other two Planets, which are below Mars, are both of them obedient unto the Sun; which filleth the whole world with the cheerful light of it: Wherewith it illumining the body of the Moon, by it giveth power of increase, and generation. Concluding, with these words, his former observation: Quae copulatio rerum, &, quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem, coagmentatio naturae, quem non mo●et; hunc, horum nihil reputasse, certò scio: This consent and agreement of those natural things, so greatly advancing the good of the whole world, if it do not move any man, it is only from this cause; That he never well considered them. Resolving, that no man could ever observe them, but that th●y would make a great impression in him. But Macrobius (leaving all those Allegorical allusions) asserteth this Harmony, unto a true and real melody indeed; occasioned by the various motions, and differing magnitudes of the Heavens. Which, he saith▪ must needs produce, Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 1. p. 83. etc. . sonum dulcem, & musicum; non ineptum, & asperum: A sweet, and delightful; not a harsh, and distasteful sound: as, by invincible reasons, he saith, may be collected. Which point, he indeed hath laboured exactly, Ibid. c, 1. 2, 3, 4. with much fineness and subtlety. Unto whom I refer them, that desire a more curious discourse upon this Theme. Neither is this an idle fancy, begotten only in the heads of conceited Philosopher's; but it is also entertained, for a certain truth, by diverse learned Christians. Bed● allegeth this opinion, of the Harmony of Heaven, Beda, lib. de Musica practica, To. 1. p, 417. for the credit of Music. Which he would never have done, if he had not allowed of it. Boetius doubteth not, directly to affirm it: yea, and to prove it too: Boetius, l de Musica. c. 2. p, 1374. Non potest, ab hac coelesti vertigine, ratus ordo modulationis, absistere. But, above all, Anselmus, though otherwise a severe and a very austere man; yet is so sweetened, and mollified with the conceit of this Music, that he, Anselm l. de Imagine Mundi. cap. 24. To. 3. p, 300. not only assevereth it; but also indeauoureth, with great pains and labour, to set out the true musical proportion of it: as Macrobius before did. Now, it is no less unprobable, that so many learned men, of so many differing bot●●ages and nations, should concur, with such an harmony, in defending of this Harmony, if it were merely feigned; then it is, that there should be such an Harmony, indeed. Neg, enìm hunc, tam certum syderum cursum, Senec. l. de Providentia, c, 1. p, 1. atque discursum, forturti impetus esse dixerim: saith Seneca. These so certain both courses, and recourses of the Stars, cannot possibly be the works of blind Fortune, and Chance; but must needs be Gods own ordinance: because they do not, sine aliquo Custode stare; but, aeternae legis imperio procedere: as he noteth in the same place: They neither keep their stations, without a Keeper; nor move their motions, without a Ruler: whose eternal law they faithfully obey. And, it was a thing no more hard unto God, to make the Heavens to move with a sweet melodious harmony, then to make them move without it. For, if Queen Cleopatra, when she came unto Antonius, Plut. in vita Anton. To. 3. p, 148. could instruct the Oar-men, and Rowers of her Barge, to strike all their strokes, in such order and number, that they made a most sweet harmony and consent, upon the water, as exactly agreeing with her musical instruments, as the sound of a Taber agreeth with his Pipes (an Art also in practice sometimes, among the greeks, Max. Tyr. Serm ●3. p. 280. as may be collected, Wis. 11. 17. out of Maximus Tyrius:) then much more can God do so: who ordereth all his works, both in Number, Weight, and Measure. It is not hard for him, in such sort to moderate, yea and to modulate, the Heavens, as to make them, to send fo●th a sweet harmony, in their motions. Yea, and it is not incredible, that he hath also done it. For, seeing it is impossible, that this so huge and vast a fabric of the Heavens, being truly material and sensible bodies, and whirled about with such incredible swiftness, should move without some noise: Arist. l. 1. de Coelo, c. 9 To. 1. p, 567. as Pythagoras well collecteth: and that noise (as Macrobius truly inferreth) must be of necessity, either sweet and melodious, Arist. l. 2. de Coelo, c. 9 To. 2. p, 587. or harsh and absonous [aut musicum, aut asperum:] it is far more probable, that, that sound, which God hath chosen to sound continually in his divine Ears, Macr●b. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 1. p. 83. should rather be tuned, like the sound of sweet Music, then harsh and confused, like the creaking of a Cart. For (as Macrobius in the same place, observeth) Fragor turbidus, & inconditus, offendit auditum. An harsh and rude crashing of things, offendeth the ear. And therefore it is not likely to be found in the Heaven. In which, as there is Nihil fortuitum: so is there, Ibid. Nihil tumultuarium: As there is nothing done rashly; so there is nothing done disorderly. And, it cannot, in any probability, be thought, that God, who hath appointed us, in our singing upon Earth, To make a pleasant melody, Eph. 4. 19 and to sing unto him with a grace in our hearts; Col. 3. 16. would admit into the heavens themselves, any such untuneable and incomposed noise, as hath neither any grace nor melody in it. But this I do not affirm, as a certainty; but only propose as a probability: leaving every man unto his own liberty, to believe it, or not to believe it, as he findeth himself most inclined in his mind: Apologizing for myself, as Gregory Nyssen doth in a like case; That herein I do but, Ingenium, ad m●ntem nostram, Greg. Nys●in ●●exam. p, 222. in propositis exercere, non doctrinam expositricem posteris relinquere: I do but only propound it, for the exercise of wit, as a probability; not commend it, for a sealed and infallible truth, unto all posterity. Therefore, be this opinion of the Harmony of the Heavens, as it may; be it, but Lepidè quidem, Arist. lib. 2. de 〈◊〉. c. 9 To. 1. p. 587. & musicè dictum, factu autem impossibile, as Aristotle censureth it: that is: but a pleasant and musical conceit: Yet this so excellent a consent and agreement in the heavens, to keep so constantly, their several ranks and orders (notwithstanding the diversity of their courses) is a work, which by themselves, cannot possibly be done, no more, than any musical Instrument can put itself into tune. It is God the Musician (as Plutarch before calleth him) that keepeth all in tune. Plut. lib. de primo frigido. To. 2. p. 615. His power keepeth them all in obedience: His wisdom guideth them all in their courses: and, his goodness maketh them to produce those good effects, which they work in the earth, and in these inferior Bodies. And therefore, even Aristotle himself, who derideth so much the Harmony of the Heavens, in any real sounds; yet, in respect of this harmonical consent in the creatures, he so much admireth it, that he compareth God, in his working of it, unto a Preceptor in a Choir: who both appointeth and moderateth all the Songs, Arist. l. de mundo. To. 2. p, 1570. that be sung there. All which things declare, that God, as he is delighted in order, so is he likewise delighted in number: Yea and in musical number too. In which opinion Anselmus is carried so far, that he, not only affirmeth, that God hath given to the heavens an harmonical number, in their motions; but also from thence collecteth, that God hath, in his kind, an harmonical motion even in himself. Anselm. in prosolog. cap. 17. To. 3. p, 32. Habes haec in te, tuo ineffabili modo, qui ea dedisti rebus, a te creatis, suo sensibili modo: Thou hast this harmony, in thyself, after an unspeakable manner, which thou hast given unto thy creatures, after a sensible manner. Yea, and even the very Heathen were in the same opinion: Com. ●atal. l. 9 Mythol. c. 7. p. 982 who believed, all their Gods, to consist of Numbers, and musical proportions. ● But, The motions of the Stars have led many unto God. to leave this harmonical motion of Heavens, as a problem, and not to determine it, as as position: yet, certain it is, that the Heavens do move, in such an exquisite order, that the contemplation thereof, hath led many to believe, that none other, but only God, can be possibly their Mover. Suidas affirmeth, that, even Abraham himself, was first occasioned, Suidas in voce Abraham p. 6. to seek after God, by considering the motion of the Stars. For, he being by nation a Chaldean, (who, as Aristole observeth, Arist. l. 2. De Coelo. c. 12. To. 1. p. 590. are naturally given to that kind of contemplation) and observing, in their motion, a wonderful order, and variety, and yet no less a constancy, he presently collected, that these strange revolutions could not possibly be performed, if they were not directed, and guided, by some God. So that, his first motive, to seek after God, was, that orderly motion, which he saw the Stars observed. Yea and Orpheus himself insinuateth also as much. Vnus praeterquam, cui derivatur origo Chaldaeûm ex genere, is noscebat sydera Coeli, Clem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 282. Illorúmque vias, & quî moveatur in orbem Sphaera, & tellurem circumvertatur in axem, Spiritus & regat hanc, & in aere, & in aequore fuso. One only Man there was of old, and he from Chaldee sprang, Who knew the Natures of the Stars, and courses that they ran, And how the Heaven doth wheel and ring all round about the Earth, The Spirit also that rules all these, and Air, and Sea beneath. Which description of Orpheus, is referred unto Abraham, by Clemens Alexandrinus. Yea, Ibid. and Philo judaeus collecteth, Philo judaeus. lib De Gigant. p. 408. that this his sublime and celestial disposition, was ominously foretold him, in his very name. For, Abram (as he interpreteth that name) doth signify, as much, as, Pater sublimis, that is, A sublime and high-spirited man: because his spirit did not only mount-up into heaven, but also unto God, who is higher than the Heaven: and that chiefly, by the observation of the Stars, and their motion. By which he was led, as it were by the hand, to understand, There was a God. And so was likewise, Nigidius Figulus: of whom Lucan writeth thus. Lucian. l. 1. p. 13. At Figulus, cui cura, deos, secretaque Coeli Nosse, fuit, quem non Stellarum Aegyptia Memphis Aequarel visu, numerisque moventibus astra. Wise Figulus, whose searching care, was perfectly to know Heaven's secrets, & the Gods themselves: Whom no Egyptian sage Surpassed in his skill, nor could more exquisitely show The motions of the Stars and Orbs, in numbered equipage. He, being a great Astronomer, and observer of the Stars, was led, by his curiosity, in observing of their motion, to search after God, who was the Mover of them. Yea, and Lucian interpreteth the fable of Bellerophon, Lucian. l. De Astronom. p. 167 (wherein he is said, to have mounted up to Heaven, upon a winged Horse) to have been nothing else, in truth, but only the ascending of his mind, in divine contemplations▪ occasioned by considering the motion of the Stars. Which carried him up, in a sort, into Heaven: but, not Equo, but Animo: not by Horse, but by Heart; as he mythologizeth upon that fiction. And Tully reporteth, Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 214. out of Aristotle, that, If there were a subterraneous generation of men, who had never once beheld the light of the Sun; and had but only heard, that there was a God; if these men, upon the sudden, should be brought out of their den, and but set to behold the wonderful motions of the Heavens and Stars, they would praesently believe, both, that there were a God, as before they had heard; and, that these so regular and orderly motions, cannot be any others, but only his works. Haec cum viderent, profectò, & Deos esse, & haec tanta opera, Deorum ●sse, arbitrarentur. To conclude this point. Seneca allegeth the orderly motion of the Stars, Seneca. lib. De Provodent. c. 1. p. 1. as a visible Argument, to demonstrate God's providence. And Cleanthes was not only led, Cic. l. l. de. Nat. Deor. p. 203. by the very same Argument, to believe, There is a God: but he also allegeth it, as a sensible demonstration, to induce all other men to believe the same. Where, though he congest diverse other great reasons unto the same purpose: yet ascribeth he the greatest force unto this: Quartam Causam esse (eamque vel maximam) aequabilitatem motus, conversionem coeli, Solis, Lunae, Syderumque etc. And, Plutarch affirmeth, generally of all men, that the very first motive, which led them unto God, was that orderly motion, whereby the Stars are carried. Plut. l. 1. de Placitis. c. 6▪ T. 2. p 13. Homines coeperunt Deum agnoscere, cum viderent stellas, tantam concinnitatem efficere: ac dies, noctesque, aestate, & ●reme, suos seruare statos ortus, atque obitus. Men began first to acknowledge a God, when they considered the Stars to maintain such a comeliness, and both day and night, in Summer and Winter, to observe their designed risings and settings. By contemplation whereof, a man is not only led, to know There is a God: but also is sublimed, in some sort, above the nature of a man: as I have noted formerly, Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 38. out of Tully. Erigimur, & latiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, contemplantésque supera, atque coelestia, haec nostra, ut exigua, & minimums, contemnimus. We are lif●d up and enlarged, we despise things below; in our contemplation of Heaven and things that are above, we trample under foot these our base and inferior fortunes, as being of very little of no esteem. Bradward. l. 1. c. 1. p. 137. So that, as Bradwardine observeth out of Ptolemy: Scientia Astrorum; assimilat hominem suo Creatori. The knowledge and understanding of the Heavenly Creatures, doth make a Man like unto his Creator. 6 And, The motion of the Heavens, is not by Chance. Arist. ●. 2. Phys. c. 8. To. 1. p. 439. Natura duplex. Al●era quidetm, 〈◊〉 Ma●eria▪ altera, ut. F●rma● Nihil est tam contrarium ra●●●▪ & constantiae, quam Fortuna. no marvel. Cic. l. 2. De Divinat. p. 265. For indeed this motion of the Heavens (if it duly be considered) cannot possibly proceed from any other Author, but only from God. As it appeareth by this reason: That, this motion of the Stars, must needs be, a motion, either proceeding from their own nature; or beside their nature. It must needs be amotion, either secundùm Naturam; or praeter Naturam. But, that their motion, is not of their own proper nature, I have already proved, in the first Section of this Chapter: because it hath no beginning, neither from their Matter, nor yet from their Form. And, other Nature have they none. Now, if it be beside their Nature; th●n must 〈◊〉 be, either by Chance, or by Prudence. By Chance it cannot be: for then, they would neither move so orderly, nor so constantly: because nothing is more contrar●● 〈◊〉 Chance and Fortune is, to constancy, and reason. And therefore, th●●r motion, being so constant and orderly, must needs be directed, not by Fortune, but by Wisdom. From whence, it must needs follow, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218. that the opinion of the Epicure, who ascribeth all the motions of the Heavens, unto Chance; is an opinion, not only impious and odious, but also foolish and ridiculous. As the Orator maketh it plain, by two notable Examples, of two Artificial Spheres, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p, 117. made to the imitation of the heavenly Orbs: Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 213. the one of them, Non●●● in voce Explicate. p, 1654. by Archimedes; the other of them, by Possidonius: and both of them, with such singular Art, and cunning, that they did, (as Varro speaketh) vias stelligeras aetheris explicare, aere cavo. They showed, by their hollow brazen wheels, all the several motions, of the Starry Heavens. Now (saith the Orator, in that place) If either of these Spheres were showed unto the barbarous Britain's, yea▪ or unto the very Scythians; they would, neither of them, doubt, but these works were wrought by reason: then, much more, must the Heaven's themselves (for they are much perfecter) Nisi Archimedem arbitramur plus valuisse, in imitandis Sphaerae conversionibus, quam Naturam, in efficiendis. Unless we should imagine, that Archimedes could show more Art, in imitating the motions of the Heavens, than nature could do, in making of them. Which were utterly absurd: as Lactantius collecteth, Lactan. l. 2. c. 5. p, 84. even from this very instance. Deus, illa non potuit vera, machinari & effìcere, quae potuit solertia hominis imitatione simulare? Shall not God be able to do that, in truth, which a Man is able to counterfeit, by art? Qûi igitur convenit (saith Tully, Cic. ubi suprà. in the last alleged place) Signum, aut Tabulam pictam, cûm aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem; cumque procul cursum nauìgij videris, non dubitare, quìn id ratione, & arte moveatur; aut cum solarium vel descriptum, vel ex a qua contemplare, intelligere, declarari horas arte, non casu: Mundum autem, qui & has ipses arts, & earum artifices, & cuncta amplectitur, consilij & rationis expertem putare? What reason is there, that, when we look upon, either a Statue, or a Picture, we should know, that it must needs be ruled, by art; and when we look upon a Clock, or a Dial, we should know, that that must needs be made, by art: and yet to think, that the World, which containeth all those Arts, yea, and their Artificers too, should be framed without art? Cic. l. 2. de Leg. p, 322. For, as he well inferreth, in another place, Neminem esse opportet, tam stultè arrog●ntem, ut in se rationem & mentem putet inesse, in Coelo Mundo▪ non putet. There ought no man to be so foolishly arrogant, as to think, that, in himself, there is a spirit, and reason; and yet, that, in the heavens themselves, there is none. Which are so far from being made without reason, that their making cannot be conceived without great reason: as the Orator well observeth. From whence he truly concludeth, that he needs must be a mad man, that ascribes them unto Chance. Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218. Haec omnis descriptio sydenum, at▪ hic tantus Coeli ornatus, ex corporibus, hûc & ill●c casu & temere cursantibus, potuisse effici, cuiquam sano videri potest? This whole description of the Stars, and this so great beauty of the Heavens, can it possibly seem to any man, that is well in his wits, to be an effect of certain Bodies, moving up and down by chance, and at all adventures? So that, with him, it is out of question; that the Heavens are moved; ●●t by Fortune, but by Wisdom. But yet, The motion of the Stars, is not by their own will, but by Gods. a greater Question remains still behind: By whose wisdom it is, that the Heavens and Stars be moved? For, if they be moved by Wisdom; then either by their own, or by some others above them. As Horace insinuateth, in the part of his division: Stellae, Horat. l. 1. Epist. Ep. 12. ad Icci●m, p, 111. sponte sua, iussaenè vagentur, & errent? The Stars all in their courses, move they still, Or by their own, or their Commanders will? Yielding, that, if it be not by the former, then, it must be, by the latter. But, by the former, it is not. It is not by motion, of their own will, or reason. For they have none in them. They are so far from being, either the Authors, or Directors, of their own proper motions; as that they understand not, so much, as that they move at all: as even Lucretius himself directly affirmeth: Lucret. l. 5. p, 199. Nam certè, neque consilio primordia rerum Ordine se quaeque atque sagaci ment locârunt: Nec, quos quaeque darent motus, pepigêre prosectò. Things, at the first, they did not certainly Themselves dispose, by counsel orderly: Nor did they, by a composition, Appoint themselves their proper motion. It was, a much wiser, and intelligent Author, that disposed all these things, in so exquisite an order: jay, 45. 9 Ieren●y, 18. 6. Romans, 9 21. which were in his hand, but merely passive, as Clay is in the hand of the Potter; that neither understandeth, of what form, it is made; nor yet, for what use, it is provided. And, no more do the Stars, in what manner they be moved. For, though they should make such an excellent Harmony, as before I have described: yet do not they themselves understand that they make it, Lyr● egregiè resonantes non sentiunt. Diogenes. Stob. Serm. 23. p, 190. no more than an harp, or other musical instrument understandeth the tune that is played upon it. And, though they do produce many notable effects, and benefits, in the earth, by that interchange of seasons, which they occasion by their motions; yet do not they themselves understand that they do it: no more than the wheels in a mill do understand, what manner of Corn they grind. So that, the Heavens do grind for us; yea, and find for us too▪ and yet they themselves do not know what they do: because they do, volutatione haec, non voluntate facere: Iust. Mart. lib. cont. D●gmata Aristot. T●. 1. p, 304. Dionys. Arepag. l. de Diuin. Nom. c. 4. p, 227. as justin Martyr well observeth: They do this, by their motion; they do it not, by their meaning. Dionysius exemplifieth, by instance of the Sun: that, Sol, non cogitation, aut voluntate, sed, eo ipso quod est, omnia illustrat, The Sun imparteth his light unto all things; but, not by any will or purpose, but by being a light-some substance; as a Candle likewise doth: Unto which there is no man so simple as to ascribe a will. Neither can they to the Sun. It is not, by his own will, that it shineth upon all things: but, it is only, by the Goodwill of that God, which made it: who hath commanded and appointed it, Mat. 5. 45. to shine upon the bad, as well as on the good: as our Saviour Christ testifieth. And this was not unknown, even to the very Heathen. Senec. l. 4. de Benefic. c. 25. p, 60. Gratuitos habemus Deos (saith Seneca:) Nam & sceleratis Sol oritur, & piratis patent maria: The Gods are most gracious, and bestow their blessings freely: For the Sun doth shine upon the wickedest persons, and the Seas are open to the cruelest Pirates: Ascribing the shining of the Sun, not to his own will, but to the gracious will of God, as our Saviour before did. And as it is in his shining; so is it likewise in his moving. His motion is by God's will; Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Sect. 6. Psal. 104. 19 and not by his own. And though it be said, by the Prophet David, that, The Sun knoweth his going down: yet, that must be taken, not to be a proper, but a figurative speaking: Implying, that the Sun observeth his prescribed motion, (which here, by Synecdoche, is expressed by his setting) so precisely to the point, that in the least jot, he never erreth from it. And therefore (by the figure, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) he is said, Genebrard. in locum Psalmi. Basil. in Psal. 103. To. 2. p. 253. to do the same upon knowledge and understanding. Non quòd animatus sit, aut ratione utatur (saith S. Basil, upon this place) sed quòd, iuxta terminum divinitùs praescriptum, ingredients semper eundem cursum seruat, ac mensur as suas custodit. Not that the Sun h●th any soul, or use of understanding, but that it keepeth his courses and measures exactly, according to God's prescription. So that, the Sun's knowing his going down (as Baruch in his Epistle expresseth it) is nothing else (in true propriety of speech) but, his obedience to God's ordinance, Baruch, 6. 59 in his going down. Which he likewise affirmeth, of all the other Stars: who yet have no more sense or knowledge of their several motions, than an arrow in the air knoweth, whither it flieth; or, a ship in the water, whither it saileth; or, a Chariot on the earth, whither it runneth. And yet, as when we see an arrow, to fly directly to any mark, whereunto it is aimed; though we see not the Archer, by whom it was shot; yet must we know, in reason, that it surely was directed by some skilful person; because it goeth so directly, having yet no skill to direct itself: so, when we see the heavens to produce upon the earth, so many good effects, by yielding unto it such fruitful season. Gen. 8. 22. and bringing out of it such plenty and variety of excellent fruits, whereby both men and beasts are nourished: and that they, aiming at this end, do never fail to hit their mark: we needs must understand (if we have any understanding) that this course is directed, by some heavenly Sagittarius, endued with excellent skill, and reason. For, as Aquinas well observeth, insisting upon this very comparison: Aquin. 1. Quaest 105. Arct. 1. p. 218. Sicut motus Sagittae ad determinatum ●inem, demonstrat apertè, quòd sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscent: a certus cursus natur alium rerum, cognition carentium, manifestè declarat, mundum ratione aliqua gubernari. As the flying of a shaft unto his certain mark, declareth, that it was shot by one, that well knew, whereunto he had aimed it: so the certain moving of all natural things, which know not themselves any thing of their own motion, declareth, that they are moved, by on● that hath understanding. And so likewise, for the other two comparisons. When we behold a ship, to wind, and to turn, and to fetch about, so diversely; and yet to come, at last, into that very haven, which it intended, at the first: we must needs know as certainly, that it is guided by the reason of some skilful Pilot, as we certainly know, that it hath no proper reason of it own, to guide it: as Theophilus Antiochenns observeth, insisting upon this second Comparison. Quemadmodùm enim, Theoph. Antioch. l. 1. ad Autolic. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 125. si quis cernat navem, suis armamentis instructam, mare sulcare & in portum appellere; certè credet aliquem, a quo gubernetur, in ea esse gubernatorem: Sic certè; nemo adeò abiecti est animi, quìn credat, Deum esse gubernatorem omnium, quamuis oculis carnalibus eum non assequamur. As when a man shall see a Ship, rigged out, with all her tackle, to sail through the Sea, and directly to arrive at her desired haven; he must needs know, she hath, within her, some cunning and skilful governor: So, no man can be so abjectly minded, but he must needs know, God to be the Governor of all things, though he do not behold him, with his bodily eyes. And so likewise it is, in the moving of a Chariot. It cannot go whither it is purposely intended, if it have not some skilful driver, to direct it. In like case, the Heavens themselves, they could never move, so orderly, and directly, in their courses, if God himself were not the ruler, & director of their motions: quasi Auriga, habenas, & gubernator, clavum tenens (saith Philo judaeus, insisting upon this third comparison) holding their raynes, like their Driver, and their helm, like their Governor. So that, though we grant, that the motion of the Heavens; Philo jud. 〈◊〉. de Mundi opific. p. 13. is performed by excellent art and wisdom; yet is it not, by their own wisdom; but, by the art and wisdom of that ruler, Lact. l. 2. c. 5. p. 8. 4. that guideth them. As Lactantius plainly showeth, by the Sphere of Archimedes. Wherein, though there were great art and wisdom used, to make that Sphere move so artificially, and orderly; yet was not that wisdom in the Sphere itself; but, in the Maker of it, that so cunningly contrived it. And so is it likewise, with the Heavens. Their turning, and returning, so swiftly, so orderly, so constantly, to so many good effects, as they bring forth in the earth, doth manifestly show, that their motion must needs be ruled by providence and wisdom. But yet, that wisdom, is not in themselves, that have those motions; but, in their maker, that gave them. There is not in themselves, Sensus officij sui, sciens: any sense, or understanding of those offices, Ibid. p. 83. Ibid. p. 84. which they perform. But they compass all their motions, Non suo consilio, sed Artificis ingenio: as he addeth in the same place. From whence he truly concludeth, that, Inest syderibus ratio, ad peragendos motus suos: sed Dei est illa ratio, qui & fecit, & regitomnia; non ipsorum syderum, quee moventur. The Stars do show great wisdom, in the performing of their motion: but it is none of their own. It is the wisdom of God, who both made, and ruleth every thing. So that, it may truly be said of the Heavens, as it was of a carved wooden head: that there is in them, Artis multum, sed sensus nihil: There is a great deal of Art and cunning, in their making; but yet no sense at all of their own moving. Aesop. fab. And, though Seneca deride it, as a foolish opinion, to think, that so constant, and so orderly a motion, can either be done, by Fortune, or by any such Nature, as is ignorant of his own doing: Senec. l. 1. Nat. Quaest▪ in praesa● p 3. [vel temeritate quadam, vel natura n●sciente quid faciat] yet, to think the contrary, is, indeed, a greater folly: unless, by Nature, he mean, Naturam Naturantem, The God of Nature: and not, Naturam naturatam, The Creature of God. For, Natura naturans, he both knoweth, and ordereth all their motions, though they themselves know them not, no more than the wheels do in a Clock. And therefore Tully himself (even from this very comparison) concludeth, that it needs must be from God, that they receive all their motion. An cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut Sphaeram, ut Horas, ut alia permulta, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 2 15. non dubitamus quìn illa opera sint rationis; cum autem impetum Coeli, cum admirabili celeritale mou●ri, vertique, videamus, constantissimè conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias, cum summa salute, & conservation rerum omnium; dubitamus, quìn ea, non solùm ratione fiant, sed etiam excellenti, divináque ratione? Mark, Divina ratione. When we see anything moved by an artificial engine, as a Sphere, or a Clock, or any other such like thing, we never make any doubt, but that those Works were wrought by reason: And, can we then doubt, when we see the heavens to move, with such incredible celerity, and yet to keep their yearly courses, with such admirable constancy, procuring unto all things, both their health, and safety, that this must be the work, not only of reason, but also of Divine, and most excellent Reason? Ascribing the regularity of their motion, not unto their own, but unto Divine Wisdom. In which sentence, though it should be thought, that Tully doth but Platonize, implying [by Divine Wisdom] none other, but their own, as reckoning the Stars themselves, to be Gods: yet, even so, it proves the Cause: that the motions of the Heavens being so constant, and orderly, cannot otherwise be stirred, but by the wisdom of God. And consequently, that it showeth, that there needs must be a God. Yea, and in another place, he goeth further, affirming of this so apt and orderly a motion, that it not only cannot be performed, in the natural heaven, without the power and wisdom of a God; but also, not to be imitated, by Archimedes, in his Artificial heaven, without a divine illumination from God. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p, 117. Quod si in hoc mundo fieri, sine Deo, non potest; ne in Sphaera quidem, eosdem motus, Archimedes, sine divino ingenio, potuisset imitari. Which sentence of his, cannot be understood, of the forenamed Star-Gods; but of that God, which ruleth both the Heavens, and the Stars: which is the true God, as Arrianus truly noteth. Sto●eus, lib. Eclog. ● hys●e, 5. p, 7. He it is, Qui solemn & fecit, & circumducit. He it is, that made the Sun, and he it is that moveth the Sun: Yea, and the Heavens, wherein they move too. As for the forenamed dotage of opinion, that The Stars should have their souls, and by them be moved, in those orderly courses, upon their own voluntary wills; even Plato himself, the strongest defender of that groundless fancy, yet speaketh of it, but weakly, and doubtfully. For he, (not knowing, what well to determine) affirmeth of those motions of the Heavens: Impossibile esse, Pla●●. in Epin●me, p, 915. Coelum stellasque omnes, adeó exquisita ratione, annis, mensibus, diebúsque circumvolui, nobisque, omnibus bona omnia facere, nisi anima singulis aut adsit, aut in sit: That it is impossible, that the Heavens, and the Stars should move, in so excellent an order, distinguishing, by their motions, both years, and months, and days, and so yielding unto us all good and comfortable things, vnl●sse every one of them, had either a spirit present with it, or a soul within it: Not determining this latter, but leaving it in suspense, whether it may not be the former. But, Aristotle derideth it, as a mere fable, that the Heaven should have a soul; Arist. l. 2. de 〈◊〉, c. 1. To. 1. p, 578. and that their motion, from that principle, should draw his beginning. Which he proveth to be false, by the force of two reasons, The first whereof, is this: That, if they had this perpetual motion, from their soul; it would be wearisome and irksome, to be occupied still, in doing one and the same thing: Neque talis animae vita, sine dolore, beataque esse potest. And the life of such a soul, cannot be but full of grief, and clean destitute of bliss. Max. Tyr. Serm. 32. p. 392. For, Natura varietate delectatur, The soul is delighted with variety. It is dulled with identity. Especially, if it have no intermission, no alternation of rest. Ibid. p. 577. It will then be, Negotium, ab omni voluptate mentis semotum; si requies non est. Yea, and, Eò magis laboriosum, quò magis perpetuum: as he addeth, in that place: That work can have but a little pleasure, that never giveth leisure: but is so much the more painful, by how much the more perpetual. Whereupon he inferreth, That such a perpetual doing of one and the same work must needs be as painful unto the soul, as Ixion's turning upon his wheel. For, if the Stars be gods, and moved by their own eternal souls; they can neither have honour, nor profit, nor pleasure, in running still one course perpetually, without any variety. For, Qualis honour, vel quale lucrum, vel quanta voluptas, Paling. in Aquar. p, 328. Esse potest Divis, versantibus aethera semper? Nun decet potius libertas maxima Divos? Vt quocunque velint, faciles accedere possint, Ne, tanquam dura devincti compede, nusquàm Ire queant, semperque loco teneantur eodem? Aut tanquàm figuli instantes operí▪ rotaeque, Nunquam decedant scamno, nunquàm otia captent? Esine illis adeò dulcis labour ill● rotandi? And labour ille potest Divis nunq●àm esse molestus? What good, what gain, what honour, or what pleasures, Can any gods take in their turning Measures? Wherein theyare always tied to move the Sphere? The greatest freedom them most fitting were. As that, wherever they would, they might apply Themselves, with pleasure and facility. Lest they might sleme, as chained to one set place, And not elsewhere have l●aue to take their race: But even as Potters, tasked to tedious labour, From stall, and wheel, and work do ne'er give over. What, is that toil of whirling Spheres so sweet, Or, can that toil be still for gods so meet? This must needs be very irksome, to continue still in one and the same motion, without any alteration: especially, to any thing, that hath a soul, endued with either sense, Plato in Civili. p●duobus a principio folijs. or reason. And therefore, Plato affirmeth, that, Seipsum semper convertere, fermè nihil potest; praeter id, quod cursum, agitatis omnibus, praestat. That nothing can endure, to turn about itself ever; but only that one thing, which giveth motion to all things. Whereupon, he there concludeth: Mundum seipsum non convertere semper: putting the doubt, out of doubt: That the motion of the Heavens is not voluntary of themselves. His second Reason, Arist. l. de Coelo c. 8. To. 1. p. 587. is this; that, Nature hath not given a voluntary or animal-motion unto any thing, but she hath also given it fit means and instruments, to exercise the same: as feet, unto Beasts; wings, unto Birds: and sins, unto Fishes; and such like. But, unto the Stars she hath given no such instruments, but made them round and teret, like a globe, as if she had purposely deprived them of all the means of voluntary motion. Vniversa videtur, tanquam de industria, abstulisse, quibus per se procedere ipsa possent. From whence he collecteth, that Nature never intended to bestow upon them any voluntary motion. Nequeo enim animalia ipsi curae ●uêre, adeò verò praestabiles res despexit. Unless we should imagine, that Nature, which hath showed such a care over these earthly Creatures, would carelessly praetermit, or despise those Heavenly. This is the whole sum of Aristotle's reasons, to prove, that the Stars have no voluntary motions. Plato indeed rendereth a reason, Plato. in Timaeo. why the Heavens have no need of any instruments of motion; as Legs, or Feet. But they be such, as show plainly, that their motion is not voluntary. Now, to recollect the sum of this long Chapter: If this regular, and orderly motion of the Stars, be, neither naturally given unto them, either by their Matter, or by their Form: nor accidentally fallen upon them, either by Chance, or Fortune: nor voluntarily composed by them, out of their own election: then must it needs be imposed upon them, by divine constitution: as Plutarch truly collecteth: Plut. l. 1. de placit. Philosoph. c. 1. p. 4. accounting this for a sufficient enumeration. But, the three former branches are largely proved, in three Sections of this Chapter. And therefore, the Author of their motions, must needs be God himself. It can be none other. Whom Boetius truly calleth, — Terrarum, Coeli▪ satorem, — qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernat. Boet. l. 3. De Consolat. Metr. 3. p. 1042. Earth's planter and Heaven's placer, who, World's vast circumference Both made, and doth maintain and rule, by lasting providence. So that, for this point, I conclude with Lactantius; that, Tanta rerum magnitudo, tanta dispositio, tanta in s●ruandis ordinibus temporibusque constantia, non potuit, autolìm, sine provido Artifice, oriri, aut constare tot seculis, ●ine incola potenti, aut in perpetuum gubernari, sine perito & sciente Rectore. Quod ratio ipsa declarat. Such a greatness, in the Creature; such a comeliness, in their order, such, a constancy, in observing both their courses, and their seasons; could never, either, at first, have been framed, without a cunning hand; or, so long have been praeserued, without a powerful inhabitant; or, so wisely have been governed, without a skilful Regent. As, even Reason itself maketh it plain and evident. CHAP. 12. That God hath made all his creatures, in Harmonical proportion, and in a kind of Music. That all creatures are naturally deloghted with it. 3. That they praise God in their kinds, with their natural Musics. 4. That Artificial music is the gift of God to men. 5. That the chiefest end of it, is to praise God with it. WE are now, at the last, come unto the last of the Mathematical Sciences: which is the Art of Music: of which I purpose not to discourse, as a curious Musician, but as a Divine. And therefore, I will not, Artem Musicam in trutina examinare, as Aristophanes speaketh. Aristoph in Ranis. Act. 3. Sce. 1. p. 271. I will not strictly examine every crotchet and quaver, as it were, upon the balance: but (looking directly upon mine own mark, with a steadfast eye) I will only unfold those five points, unto you, which I have summed up before, in the contents of this Chapter. And that but very lightly; to avoid all curiosity. First therefore, for the first of them. It was Pythagoras his position: Vniversi, naturam Musicis fuisse rationibus fabricatam: Athenaeus. lib. 14. p, 471. That the frame of this whole world, is made, in a kind of natural Music. And the most of the old Philosophers (as Plutarch reporteth) concurred with him, Plut. lib. de Musita. To. 2. p, 708. in the very same opinion: A Deo omnia fuisse instituta, secundùm Harmoniam: That God hath made all his works, exactly, unto the due proportion of a Musical Harmony. And we may see it plainly verified, if we will take a Survey, of all the Creatures of God; beginning which the highest, and so, by degrees, descending the lowest. And first, for the Heavens, the highest of God's works: I have partly showed before, The Harmony of the ●eauens lib. 2, c. 11. Sect. 4. in the former Chapter, what an excellent Harmony God hath bestowed into them, both actually, in their motions; and virtually, in their influences, I do leave the former of those Harmonies, to the liberty of the Readers, to believe, or not believe, as it pleaseth themselves. But, this latter of them, is a thing so evident, of their gracious influences upon these inferior Bodies; that he must needs be destitute, both of sense, and reason, that denieth it. Neither, do the Philosophers, only believe the body of the Heavens, Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Sc●p. c 3. p, 9● 92. are made, in musical proportion; but also, that their souls and Intelligences, from whence they have their motion, are also made, by the same composition. Plato in Timaeo, p, 707. Plato, describing the Creation of the Soul of the world, he setteth down exactly, all the several substances, whereof it is compounded: and nameth there praecisely, both all the particular Ingredients, and all their several doses. Macrob. ubi suprà, c. 2. p, 87. 89. In which Argument Macrobius likewise hath taken great pa●nes, to express more plainly, that which was delivered by Plato more obscurely; as concerning both the Matters, and the Measures, of the Souls composition: which he reduceth exactly, unto Musical proportion: Yea and further ascribeth, all the Musical Harmony of the Heavens themselves, only unto that musical composition, which God gave unto the soul of the Heavens, in his first Creation. Ergò, Mundi anima, quae, ad motum, hoc, quod videmus, Vniversitatis corpus impellit, contexta numeris, musicam dese creantibus concinnentiam, necesse est, ut sonos musicos, de motu, quem proprio impulsu praestat, efficient. The soul of the World, which stirreth the body of the World unto motion, being itself made of such numbers, as beget in itself, a musical Harmony; must needs, in all those motions, which itself procureth, produce a musical Harmony likewise. Yea, and a little after, he attributeth unto this musical Composition of that soul, not only the Harmonical motion of the Heavens, but also, all that delight in Music, which all living Creatures does take, here upon the earth. jure igitur, Ibid. c. 3. p. 91. Musicá capitur omne quod vivit; quia coelestis anima, qua animatur universitas, Originem sumpsit ex Musica. By right, must every thing that hath life, be delighted with Music; because the soul of the world, which giveth them their life, is itself compounded of a kind of Music. This is the conceit, which the ancient Philosophers have had, of the Music and Harmony of the Heavens, not only in their Bodies, but also in their Souls. All of them proceeding only, from that divine and heavenly Harmony, which Anselmus affirmeth to be in God himself; A●selm. ●rosol. c. 17. To. 3. p, 32. Lib. 2. c. 11. Sect. 4. as I have before observed. I censure not their opinion, but only note it, to declare, how strongly they were possessed, that all things in the world are compounded, in a kind of Harmony, by God; yea, even the Soul of the world itself. Let us therefore now come down from the Heavens, unto the Elements. For, The Harmony of the Elements. Plut. l. de primo Frigido, To. 2. p, 615. Vt Artifex erga ar●em, sic D●us se habet erga Harmoni●m, Arist●us. Sto●. lib. Eclo●. Phys. cap, 24. p, 45. in them also the Philosophers have observed diverse Harmonies. Plutarch, in his Book, De prìmo Frigido, reporteth an old opinion, that God is called, by the name of a Musician. Which appellation he interpreteth to be given unto him, for his skilful proportioning of the Elements, and their qualities, in the mixture and temper of all compound bodies. Aeris mutationes, & effecta, quia temperat Deus, Musicus appellatur. God is called a Musician, for his skilful tempering of the air, and his effects, in these mixed Bodies: Non, quòd gravia acutis, aut alba nigris accommodet, interque ea consonantiam efficient: sed, quód caloris, & frigoris, in mundo societatem, dissidiumque ita gubernet, ut, & coeant, & diseedant moderatè; & (nimia utrique, vehementia adempta) in rectum modum componat. God is called a Musician; not, for his skilful mingling of either flat, with sharp; or white, with black; and so making up his Music: but, because he so guideth the contrary qualities of Heat, and Cold, in the World; that be maketh them, both to come together, and to depart asunder, in a very wholesome and temperate manner. This calleth he, God's Music: which is, indeed, most pleasant, yea, and no less profitable, than it is delightful. Because God hath so graciously tempered the contrary Qualities of the Elements together, that, as Manilius truly noteth: Frigida nè calidis desint, aut humida siccis, Manil▪ l. 1. Astro●●. p, 5. Spiritus aut solidis; sitque. haec discordia concors. That neither cold things want their hot, nor moist things miss their dry, Nor sad things lack the Spirits power, to quicken them thereby: So making Musical consent of contrariety. Which Comparison, Ovid l. 1. Me●am. p, 35. Ovid likewise useth, unto the same purpose, only changing the terms; and, for his Discordia concors, concording discord, putting— Concordia discors, discording Concord. And so likewise doth Horace, Hora●. Li. Epist. ad I●cium, p, 111. a. Seneca l. 7. Nat. Quaest c. 27. p, 117. keeping the same terms. — Rerum concordia discors. Yea, and Seneca expresseth the very same thing, by the very same comparison: Tota huius mundi concordia, ex discordibus constat: The whole concordance of the world consists in discordances: maintaining still the same Musical conceit, for the aptness and propriety of it: Whereby they insinuate, that, howsoever the Elements have a discord in their nature; yet have they a concord in their mixture: Quae nexus habiles, & opus generabile tingit, Manil. ubi suprà. Atque omnis partus elementa capacia reddit: Which concord knits the Elements, in wholesome links together, And makes them able to produce, even all this whatsoever: as Manilius observeth in the forealleged place. And, as he ascribeth the Generation: so Aristotle ascribeth the Conservation of all things unto this Harmonical mixture of the Elements. For he saith, Arist. l. de Mundo, To. 2. p, 1565. that, That power which created the World, did, Naturas maximè contrarias, ad mutuam cogere convenientiam, & per hac salutem parere universo. It joined things together that were contrary in nature: and yet thereby provided for the safety of the whole World. Stobae●. Serm. 101. p. For, as Hippodamus truly noteth, Nisi Harmonia & Providentia divina Mundus regeretur, non possent ampliùs in bono statu permanere quae mundo continentur. If the world were not governed by the Harmony of God's providence, there could nothing in the world continue in good estate. Yea, and Aristotle, in the former place, he goeth one step further; ascribing to this Harmonical mixture, not only the conservation, but also the Creation, Arist. ubi suprá. and exornation of the world. Rerum omnium constitutionem, Coeli, inquam, & Terrae, universique mundi concretionem, uno exornavit & instruxit concentu. It adorned the general Creation of all things, both of Heaven, and Earth, and of the whole world, only by this sweet mixture, and harmonical consent. Hugo de Victore. l. 7. didasc. Erudit. c. 4. To. 3. p, 18. N. And, Hugo de Victore observeth the same thing: yet speaketh of it, more divinely, as being a Christian. Si Vniversitatis huius machinam intuitus fueris; invenies, quam mirabili ratione, & sapientia, compositio rerum omnium perfecta sit, quam apta, quam congrue, quam d cora. In qua, non solùm concordiam servant similia; s●de tiam quae (cre●nte potentia) diversa, & repugnantia, ad esse prodierunt, dictante sapientia, ad unam quodammodo amicitiam, & foederationem conveniunt. If you well consider of the frame of this world, you shall find, with how great wisdom, the same hath been wrought, and how aptly, how fitly, and decently, composed. For therein, not only like things preserve peace and unity; but also things contrary do join league and amity. And then he proceedeth to exemplify his meaning, by our present instance of the Harmonical mixture of the Elements. Quid repugnatius esse potest Aqua, & agne? quae tamen, in rerum natura, ita Dei contemperavit prudentia, ut, non solùm ad invicem societatis vinculum non dissipent, verùm etiam, noscentibus cu●ctes, ut subsistere possint, vitale nutrimentum subministrent. What is more contrary in Nature, than Fire, and water? which yet are so far from breaking the bond of their common conjunction, that, by a joint consent, they minister unto all things, their vital food, and nourishment? This is the Harmony of the Elements, consisting all of Concord's. Now, beside this, they have another, which consisteth all of Discords. And that is, when any one of them doth either exceed their due proportion, which worketh a discord in all those bodies, that are compounded of them, and tendeth directly unto their dissolution: or, when they digress from their right and natural uses, and turn their benefits into punishments. Which oftentimes is done, Exod. 9 31. & 7. 19 20. 21. & 8. 24. 13. 14. for the sin of man. As it was, to the Egyptians: when the fire descended, and destroyed their fruit: the water putrified, and turned into blood: the air was poisoned, with noisome flies: and the earth corrupted, with the stink of their frogs. Here was a great change, from that sweet and melodious tune, which God intended in their first Creation, into an harsh and unpleasant one. But yet, even in this change of their tune, they kept still a good harmony; and harmony concording with God's severity, though somewhat discording with his mercy. As the Wiseman observeth, in the book of Wisdom, Wisd. 19 17. where be expresseth that perturbation, by this very comparison. The Elements (saith he) 'greed among themselves, in this change, as when one tune is changed upon an instrument of Music, and yet the melody still preserved. These be the two Harmonies of the Elements. Let us now descend, as yet one step lower, unto those compounded Bodies, which are made of their mixtures: and we shall see, that God hath given the like Harmonies unto them. First an Harmony of Concord's; which evidently appeareth in that amicable and loving agreement, that is seen between all the parts of their bodies, in serving, and cherishing, and comforting one another: which they do, and perform, with that true sympathy & compassion, 1. Cor. 12. 26. that, if one member suffer, all the rest do suffer with it: &, if one be had in honour, all the rest rejoice with it. And diverse other notes there be of a singular symphony and agreement between them. Hugo. de vict. l. 7. Erudit. didasc c. 4. To. 3. p. 18. N Wherein, as Hugo de Victore noteth, Omnium membrorum iuncture tantam invicem seruant concordiam, ut nullum omninò possit inveniri membrum, cuius officum alteri non videatur afferre adminiculum. All the members of the body, are joined together, in so loving an unity, that there is not any of them, but that in discharging his own proper office, it bringeth also some help unto his other fellow-members. Whereupon he there concludeth: Sic omnis natura se diligit, & miro quodam modo plurium dissimilium in unum redactorum concordia, unam in omnibus Harmoniam facit. Thus everything, by nature, is loving to itself, and by joining things unlike in true concord together, after an admirable manner, it maketh, in the whole body, a most sweet and pleasant Harmony. This Harmony of Concord's hath God generally disposed, into the parts & members of all compounded bodies. Now, he hath also placed among them, another kind of Harmony, consisting all of Discords: in mixing of things of contrary natures, throughout all his works. The Harmony of compounded Bodies. For, there is none of all his Creatures, but God hath created something contrary unto it; which contendeth with it, by the contrariety of Nature, as one Enemy fighteth with another. And yet, all of them together, beget in the world, a most sweet & wholesome Concord. I mean, not only of those Sympathies, and Antipathies, which God hath planted in diverse of his Creatures; Phrygius. l. 8. Physic. p. 165. &c Plut. Symposiac. l. 2. Quaest 7. To. 3 Mor. p. 200. Aelian. l. 8. De Animal. c. 27. whereby some of them amicably embrace one another, as most loving friends; others of them hatefully decline one another, as most mortal enemies; (A secret in nature, whereof the learnedest men were never yet able to give any reason (as Plutarch truly noteth, Aelianus confirmeth) but, even in the other most common & ordinary works of God, we shall find none of them so free, but that it hath in nature, in some sort, his contrary. So that, the frame of the whole world, doth seem to benothing else, but only a mixture & composition of Contraries: striving still together, (though in more orderly manner) as they did in the mass of their confused Chaos: wherein, as the Poet describeth it, Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis, Ovid. l. 1. Metam. p. 2. Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus. Cold things with hot, moist things with dry did fight, Soft things with hard, and sad things with the light. And such is still the fight and conflict of contraries, even in this well ordered and beautiful world, though the same hand, which then distinguished them into their several orders, doth now so moderate and keep them in order, that their contraries and repugnancies tend, both unto the safety, and beauty of the world; and not, either to the hurt, or to the blemish of it. In which respect, S. Augustine compareth that Natural order, which God hath taken, in mingling of Contraries, through all the ranks of his Creatures, to that artificial order, Aug. l. 11. de Civit. Dei. c. 18. To. 5. p. 630. which Musicians ofttimes take, in the making of their Songs. Deus ordinem seculorum, tanquàm pulcherrimum carmen, ex quibusdam quasi Antithetis, honest avit. God hath framed and compounded the order of the universe, in the manner of a curious & elegant verse; artificially adorned with members, all of Contraries. Like that sentence of S. Paul's: By Honour & dishonour by evil report, 2. Cor. 6. 8. etc. & good report; as deceivers, & yet true; as unknown, & yet known as dying, & yet behold we live; as chastened, & yet not killed; as sorrowing, & yet always rejoicing; as poor, & yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things. Terent. E. unuch Act. 2. Sce. 2. p. 61. a. Not unlike that of Terence: Omnia habeo, neque quicquam habeo, nihil cum est, nihil deest tamen. Whereupon S. Augustine, in the same place, concludeth, that, Sicut contraria contrarijs opposita sermonibus pluchritudinem reddunt; ita, quadam, non verborum, sed rerum, eloquentia, contrariorum appositione, seculi pulchritudo componitur. As contraries, opposed unto contraries, do yield a kind of grace & beauty to the speech, so God, by placing contraries against their contraries, in a kind, not of verbal, but of real eloquence, hath given a great grace and beauty to his work. Which conceit of S. Augustine, delivered by him, Tertul. l. 1. cont. Martion. c. 16. p. 357. but in general terms, is illustrated by Tertullian; by the apposition. of many very notable particular instances, and those very fit and apposite. Tota operatio Dei, ex diversitatibus constat; ex Corporalibus, & incorporalibus; ex animalibus, & inanimalibus; ex vocalibus & mutis; ex mobilibus & stativis; ex genitalibus & sterilibus; ex aridis, & humidis: ex calidis & frigidis; etc. The whole workmanship of God is compounded all of Contraries, of things corporeal, and incorporeal; of things living, and without life; of things loquent, and silent; of things movable, and unmoveable; of things fertile, and sterile; of things dry, and moist; of things hot, and cold; etc. And the same that he hath showed, by those instances, in the great world, he proceedeth to declare, in Man also, the little world. Sic, & Hominem ipsum diversitas temperavit, tam in corpore, quam insensu. Alia membra fortia, alia infirma; alia honesta, alia inhonesta; alia gemina, alia unica; alia comparia, alia disparia. Perindè, & in sensu: nunc laetitia, nunc anxietas; nunc amor, nunc odium; nunc ira, nunc lenitas. In like case, Man himself is made by God of merely Contraries: and that not only in his body, but also in his soul too. Some parts of Man be strong, & some again be weak; some comely, some homely; some double, some single; some equal, some unaequall. And so likewise in his mind there is sometimes mirth, and sometimes grief; sometimes love, and sometimes hate; sometimes fierceness, and sometimes mildness. So that, the whole world is, Ecclus. 33. 3. in effect, nothing else but only a massy Coagmentation of Contraries. As Ecclesiasticus also directly observeth. Evil is against good, & death against life; the Godly against the sinner, Ecclus. 33. 14 & the unjust against the faithful. And so, in all the works of the most High, thou mayst see, that there be ever Two: and the one of them, is against the other. Neither is this, the only Observation of religious Christians; but also, of the irreligious Heathen. Wherein, many of the most learned have exactly concurred, affirming, that God (like a skilful Painter to show the grace of his work the better, hath composed the whole world of opposite parts; as it were, of Lights and shadows. Which as Trismegistus noteth, is a matter, of so pure and absolute necessity, that, without it, the world could have had no beauty. For, if Contraries had not been thus mingled together, the curious works of Nature could not have been distinguished one of them from another. Trismeg. Pimand. Dial. 10. p, 424. And therefore he pronounceth, that, Ex oppositione & contrarietate constare omnia, necesse est: neque alitor se habere, possibile est. For, as in a Picture, if all were black, or all white, there could be no grace or beauty in the work: so in all the works of Nature, if all were good, or all bad, there could be no grace or sweetness in any of them, because no distinction. And therefore Pythagoras (as Varro observeth) maintained this opinion: Omnium rerum initia esse bina: Varro l. 4. de lingua. Lat. p, 5. ut, sinitum, & infinitum; bonum, & malum; vitam, & mortem; diem, & noctem. That the first Principles of all things in all kinds, are two contraries: as Finite, and Infinite; Good, and Evil; Life, and Death; Arist, l. 1. Metaphys. cap. 5. To. 2. p, 1376. Day, and Night; and such like. Whose opinion, is by Aristotle expressed more fully: who setteth down distinctly, ten several combinations of Contraries, which the Pythagoreans defended, to be the first Principles and Originals of all things: As namely these following. Finitum, & infinitum; Par, & Impar; Vnum, & Plura; Dextrum, & Sinistrum; Masculinum, & Foemininum; Quiescens, & Motum; Rectum, & Curvum; Lumen, & Tenebras; Bonum, & Malum; Quadratum, & Longum; that is, Finite, and Infinite Even, and Odd; One, and Moe; Right hand, and Left; Male, and Female; Resting, and Moving; Strait, and Crooked; Light, and Darkness; Good, and Evil; Square, and Long. These Contraries, they not only held to be in the world; but also, to be the working Principles of all things in the world. And therefore their Effects must needs be contrary, Arist. ibid. as well as their Causes. In which opinion, Al●meon conspired so fully with them; that Aristotle doubteth, whether he borrowed his opinion from them, or they theirs from him. Yea, and in another place he confesseth, that it is the common opinion of all the Philosophers: That the first Principles of all thing must needs be mere Contraries. Arist. l. 1. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p, 419. Omnes, Contraria Principia faciunt. But he himself handleth this point more exactly, than any, & brings it home more properly unto our present purpose. That, in this mixing of Contraries, in all sorts of Creatures, Nature delighteth herself pleasantly, as with a most sweet Harmony: Natura, Arist. l. 1. de Mundo. To. 2. p, 1564. ad contraria, miro fertur desiderio; atque concentum ex his facit. Nature is strangely carried with a strong desire, of joining contrary things together; and yet maketh of them a delightful and most melodious tune. And this he illustrates in that place, by very pregnant instances, both in Civil, and Artificial, and Natural things. For Civil things; he giveth these instances: That every City, though never so well composed, and in never so great concord; yet consisteth of persons of contrary conditions; some poor, some rich; some young, some old; some weak, some strong, some good, some bad. All which, though they be many, yet make they but one City: and though, in nature, they be unlike; Ibid. p, 1564. yet make they a sweet concord, in the Civil State. In Artificial things he observeth, that, Ars, adimitationem Naturae, se componens, idem praestat. That Art, as it imitateth Nature, in many other things; so doth it also in this, that it maketh all her works of a mixture of contraries. Whereof he giveth these instances: The Art of Painting mixeth contrary colours in her Pictures: as black, with white; and red, with yellow. The Art of Music mixeth contrary sounds in her Songs: as Sharps, with flats; and briefs, with Longs. And the Art of Grammar mixeth contrary letters in her words: as vowels with mutes: and such like. In Natural things, he giveth these instances, that, Ibid. p, 1565. Vis quaedam, per omnia dimanans, & transiens, siccitatem humori, calorem frigori, leave gravi commistum, & rotundo rectum; Terram omnem, Mare, Aethera, solemn, Lunam, & Vniversum exornavit Coelum cum Mundum frabricata esset, ex diversis, & nullo modo immistilibus, aere, terra, igne, aqua, & imagine una, quae globos comprehendit. There is a certain power, which pierceth, and disperseth itself, through the whole world, joining dry things, with moist, and hot things, with cold; light things, with heavy; and crooked, with straight: and yet, by this contrary composition, very excellently beautifying, both the earth, and sea, and sky, and Sun, and Moon, and generally all the heaven: making the frame of this world, of things of far unlike nature, and such as refuse to be mingled together; air, and earth, and fire, and water; and Heaven, which comprehendeth all these Spheres, in his figure. Now all this commixtion of things, so contrary, do not tend to the defacing, but adorning of the world; as Concord's, and Discords do, unto the better tempering of the Harmony in Singing. For, by that very Comparison, doth Aristotle express them. Ibid. p, 1565. Natura & Coelt, & terrae, universique mundi concretionem, principiorum maximè contrariorum, uno exornavit, & instruxit concentu. Nature hath compounded, both heaven, and earth, and all the whole World, of contrary Principles, to adorn it more beautifully, with a concent-full Harmony. Thus (as Seneca observeth, Senec. Epist. 108. p, 269. joining instances of all the forenamed heads together) Nu●ilo, serena succedunt; turbantur maria, cum quieverunt; noctem, Dies sequitur; pars coeli consurgit, pars mergitur. Contrarijs, rerum aeternitas constat. After a storm, there comes a calm; the Seas be troubled, after they have rested; after the night, there appeareth day; One part of the Heaven riseth up, another goeth down: The whole frame of the Universe, is compounded of Contraries. And thus (as Trismegistus observeth) Rerum singularum ordo, Trismeg. Asclep. c. 6. p, 495. concentum quendam, melo divino dulcisonum, conficit. The very natural order of things, produceth a pleasant Harmony, composed in a kind of divine and Heavenly melody. And therefore he affirmeth, that, Musicam nosse, nihil aliud est, quam cunctarum rerum ordinem scire: To know Music, is nothing else, but to know the natural order of things. Max. Tyr. Serm. 27. p, 319. For, as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth, Natura, est perfectissima Harmonia. There is no Harmony better, than the order of Nature. Thus God hath made an Harmony, in all his Creatures: by the joint observation, both of Christians, and Heathens. 2 But, the testimony of neither of them, All Creatures are naturally delighted with Music. no, nor of them both together, doth so evidence the matter, as the things themselves do; by that incredible delight, which all of them do naturally take, in the sweetness of Music. For, there is nothing whatsoever, endued with a living and a sensible spirit, but it is ravished, in a sort, and carried out of itself, with the bewitching sounds of Music. I omit the fabulous narration of Amphion: as a Poëtical fiction: that the power of his Music was so great, that he could, Saxa movere sono testudinis; Horat. l. de Ar●e Pocl. p. 174. B. &, prece blanda, Ducere quò vellet.— With Lutes alluring sound, and his sweet tunes, he could Move the hard Stones, and make them stir where be he would. Which, though it be but an Hyperbole, and Excess of speech; yet the Poet made choice of it, of set purpose, thereby to express, with a greater Emphasis, the incredible power of Music, unto us. Which, indeed, is very great yea, and not only with us men; but also with every other living thing: both with Birds, and with Beasts, and with Fishes; yea, and even with very Worms. As we may see, in all of them, if we will but look upon them. First, for Birds: there is no man, but may observe, by his daily experience, with what a singular delight, they use to solace, and entertain themselves, with their natural Music; chaunting-out their sweet melody, upon the pleasant branches of every green tree. A thing expressly noted by the holy Prophet David: Psal. 104. 12. 24. and by him there ascribed, to be the work of God. Neither are they only delighted with their own natural Music; but also with Man's artificial Music. As we may evidently see, in Thrushes Linnets, and Blackbirds, and such like, with what attention they will listen, unto the pleasant sounds of Musical Instruments: yea, and how perfectly they will learn the tunes of those Songs, that be whistled unto them. Which artificial notes, they could never possibly either learn so quickly, or render so exactly, but that the seeds of true Harmony, be sown in their souls, as well as in men's. Yea, and their delight in Music is so great, that they oftentimes forget their very safety itself, in comparison of it. As it is noted, by the Poet: Cato. l. 1. p. Pistula dulce canit, volucrem dùm decipit auceps. The Sweetness of the Fowler's pipe, Deceives the Fowl, with his delight. Yea, even Bees, when they swarm, and are upon the wing, ready to take their flight, whither either the wind driveth them, or their Captain leadeth them: yet, by the sounds of tinkling brass, are settled again, and retarded from their course: held only, by that delight, which they naturally take in it; Plin. l. 11. c. 20. Aelian. l. 5. de. Animalae. 13. as Pliny observeth. Gaudent plausu, atque tinnitu aeris, eóque convocantur: Because they are delighted with that tune and tinkling, they are therewith called together. Yea and Aelianus likewise saith, Crepitaculis sonoris, tanquàm Syrenibus, retrahuntur: They are recalled, and as it were charmed, with those shrill sounds. Now likewise for Beasts: though their spirits be more dull, and their senses not so subtle, Aelian l. 7. De Animal. c. 23. as is the sense of Birds; yet have they no less a sense of Music. For tame Beasts: Aelian giveth instance in the Arabian Sheep; that they grow fat, much more by their Music, than they do by their Meat. And again in Elephants; Idaem. l. 12. c. 41. that they are allayed from their greatest rage, by the alluring sounds of Music. And, of a contrary effect, doth job give instance, in the Horse; job. 39 28. who being enraged with the warlike sounds of Music, despiseth both wounds and death: and hearing the Trumpet, he rejoiceth at it, smelling the battle afar off, and saying in a jollity, Ha, Ha: as in that place he expresseth it. And Aelianus in another description fitly paralleleth it. Yea, & yet again, 〈◊〉. l. 6. De. An●●al. c. 10. 〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 41. of another contrary passion, in the Libyan Mares; that by the sounds of a certain Hymenaean song, they are accended unto Venery: Which otherwise they decline. And, for Wilde-Beasts: Horace giveth an instance, in Orpheus; that, by the power of his enchanting Music, he did — Lenire Tygrides, rapidosque Leones. Tame and make gentle Tigers fierce, 〈…〉. And soften Lions furious. Which, though the Poet there apply to an allegorical interpretation: yet doth Aelian confirm it, by an Historical narration. For he maketh report of diverse sorts of WildBeasts, Aelian. l. 18. de Animal. c. 46. p, 269. that be so far mollified, with the enticing sounds of Music, that they be made by it, forgetful, both of their young ones, and themselves. As he proveth, in that place, by the practice of the Tyr●heans: who use to draw Wild Boors, and Hearts, into their Nets, by the only sweetness of certain Musical instruments. And Macrobius confirms the same, Macrob. l. ●. de Som. 〈…〉. p. 91. by the like observation: who reporteth, that, Nonnullae, vel aves, vel terrenae, & aquatiles belluae, invitatae cantu, inretia sponte decurrunt. He saith That there be many, not only Birds, and Beasts (which were our two former instances) but also Fish's too, (which is our third instance) that being enticed with the pleasing sounds of Music, do voluntarily rush into the very nets. As Aelian giveth instance, Aelian. l. 6. de. Animal. c. 30. in those kind of Crab-fish, which are called Paguri: which will follow the sound of Music, even out of the waters: and so are taken when they come to the land: And again, in another kind of Fishes, Idem. l. 17. c. 16. Plin. l. 11. c. 37. called Pastinacae. And Pliny also proveth, by experience, in the Dolphins: of whom he writeth, that Et cantu mulcentur, & capiuntur, attoniti sono. That they are alured by Songs, and taken, whilst they be astonished with their sounds. Which delight of theirs in Music, Plutarch affirmeth, to be a thing delightful unto God. Plut. l. de Sol●rtia Animal. To. 3 p. 90. And he allegeth to that purpose, certain verses of ●●indarus: who compareth his own desire of writing, unto the vehement incitation of a Dolphin: Quem, placido è Mari, Suaviss excivit Tibiae sonus. Whom, out a peaceful Sea, the pleasant sound Of well-tuned Pipe, did force to come aground. Yea, and how greatly those Fishes be delighted with Music, we may see by Herodotus his narration of Arion, Herodot. l. 1. Item Plut. In Conviv●o. To. 1 p. 373. whom a Dolphin (being alured, by the seewtenesse of his Music) received upon his back, and permitted to bestride him, as it were his horse, bearing him safely to Land, out of the midst of the Seas. The credit of which report if any man suspect, he confirmeth the truth of it, by the assertive testimony, both of the Corinthians, and the Lesbians; who searched the truth of it: beside the monument of Arion himself, which he offered unto the Gods, for his wonderful deliverance: a monument of brass, in the form of a man, riding upon a Dolphin. Yea, Plini. l. 9 c. 8. and Pliny, in his History, yieldeth his assent to this narration of Arion; being thereunto induced by many other instances of Dolphins, more stupendious. Which he received, by report of persons, of great & unsuspected credit: as Maecenas, and Flavianus, and Flavius Alfius: men, as, of great nobility; so likewise of great gravity, and of undoubted testimony. Whose wonderful narrations, of the great familiarity between men and Dolphins, and of the singular delight which they take in Music, Plut. in Conuivio, 7. Sap. To. 1. p, 377. (affirmed also by Plutarch) would exceed all credibility; but that they be reported, by men of such authority. Item lib: de Solert. Animal. To. 3. p, 90, etc. But to come unto our fourth instance of Worms, and creeping things: though they be, but of an unperfect generation, and of an heavy sense; yet we see diverse of them, that practise a natural kind of Music, with no little delight. The Cricket, by the fire; the * Stobaeus Serm. 29. p, 209. Grasshopper, in the field; and the Frog, in the water, do all recreate themselves, with their natural Songs: though they be no better, then mere creakings, and croakings. And thus Musical harmony (in all kinds of Creatures) doth, Arist. l. 8. Pol. c, 5. To. 2. p, 902. Animum abstrahere, & quodam modo rapere, as Aristotle testifieth: It even rapteth the soul, and abstracteth it from itself. Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p, 91. So that (as Macrobius truly noteth) Nullum est tam immite, tam asperum pectus, quod non oblectamentorum talium teneatur affectu: There is not any so untractable or ungentle a breast, but it receiveth some delight, by the alluring sounds of Music. Which, above all other Creatures, is most evident, in man: who is so naturally delighted with the Harmonies of Music, that it transporteth his soul, into any affection, whatsoever it will. It comforteth him, in pain. It tempereth him, in pleasure. It solaceth him, in trouble: and, it qualifieth him, in Anger. As Athen●us observeth, Athenaus, l. 14. ●, 465. in Clineas Pythagoricus: who ever, when he was angry, would go play upon his Harp: and being demanded, for what cause he did it? he said, that he found, that it allayed the raging fierceness of his mind. And the like effect it had also, with King Saul: in whom, the raging of his furious spirit, I. Samuel, 16. 23. was calmed, and allayed, by the enticing sounds of Music. And a contrary effect it had, with Elizeus; in whom, the drooping of the prophetical spirit was excited and stirred up, 2. Kings, 3. 15. by the melodious tunes of Music. The contemplation of which strange effect, so rapt the Poet Bartas, into admiration of it, that it made him to break out into this passionate exclamation, of the might power of Music: O what is it, that Music cannot do? Bartas in his Colum. p, 495. Sith th' all inspiring Spirit, it conquer's too: And makes the same, down from th' Imperial pole, Descend to Earth, into a Prophet's soul: With divine accents, tuning rarely right, Unto the rapting Spirit, the rapted spirit. So that, the sweetness of Music, as Ovid noteth of it, can — trahere superis sedibus arte jovem. Ovid l. 3. Fast. And so is it likewise, in all other affections. Music hath a dominion over every one of them. Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p, 91. So that, as Macrobius truly observeth, Omnis animi habitus cantibus gubernatur: All the several habits and dispositions of the mind, are disposed and overruled by the Imperial power of Music. For Music, Arist. l. 8. Pol. c. 5. To. 2. p, 902. as Aristotle affirmeth of it, hath, Naturalem quandam voluptatem; per quam, illius usus, cunctis aetatibus, cunctisque moribus est acceptus. It hath in it a natural kind of pleasure; whereby the use of it is made acceptable, unto all sorts of persons, of whatsoever either ages, or manners. As we may see by plain experience; how Countrymen do use to lighten their toiling; oldwives, their spinning; Mariners, their labours; Soldiers, their dangers; by their several musical harmonies: and all other sorts of men, their griefs; as Ovid truly noteth: Hoc est, cur cantet vinctus quoque compede fossor, Ouid. l. 4. Trist. ●leg. 1. Indocili numero cum grave mollit opus. Cantat & innitens limosae pronus arenae, Adverso tardam qui trahit amne ratem. Quíque ferens pariter lentos ad pectora remos, In numerum pulsa brachia versat aqua. Fessus ut incubuit baculo, saxoque resedit Pastor, arundineo carmine mulcet oves. Cantantis pariter, pariter data pensa trahentis, Fallitur ancillae, decipit●rque labour. etc. Hence 'tis, the Delver bound and clogged in clouted buskin, sings, By untaught tunes his heavier task to easier pass he brings. So he, that grovelling streynes, and draggs on muddy shore his boat, That comes aslugg against the stream, help't-on with singing note. And he, that bending slowly brings his tarrying Oar to breast, His winding Arms keep stroke with songs, while he the water beats. The wearied Shepherd, as on staff he leans, or sitt's on Stone, Doth sweetly charm his flock with pipe, which doth himself bemoan. And thus the maid that sings and spins, and plies her distaff fast, By songs deceives the tediousness of her praescribed task. Yea, even sucking Infants, who have not almost any sense of their life, yet have a sense of Music. For, when they are in their strongest passion, and most fiercely crying; yet are they presently stilled with their Nurses singing, and so charmed with it, as if they were enchanted with some Circe's cup. Whence Maximus Tyrius collecteth, Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p, 252. Plato. l. 3. de Repub, p, 564. Animum esse Musicae alumnum: That the soul is, as it were, the very Nurse-Child of Music. So that, as Plato truly noteth: Rithmus & Harmonia, animi interiora, & penetrant, & pulsant: The Harmony of Music doth pierce, and affect, the very bowels of the mind. Whereby it doth, Athenaeus l. 14. p, 471. Animum plurimùm allicere, ut ea meritò gaudeant, qui audiunt: It delighteth the mind, with so strong an allurement, that all, which come to hear it, do rejoice, and cheer at it. From whence, Aristotle collecteth, that there is, Arist. ubi supra. p, 903. Quaedam cognatio nobis cum Harmonijs: There is a kind of Affinity, between the Soul and Harmony. Insomuch that diverse of the ancient Philosophers, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. held strongly this opinion: Animam, aut esse Harmoniam, aut habere Harmoniam: That, either the Soul is nothing else, but an Harmony itself; Seminar. Philosoph. To. 2. p, 415. or else, at the least, hath an Harmony in it. From whence, Ficinus collecteth, that, Harmonia qui non est delectatus, non est harmonicè compositus: That he, which is not delighted with Harmony, he surely, is not made according to harmony. Balthasar de Aulico. l. 1. p. Yea, and Balthasar, in his Courtier, passeth an harder Censure: For he saith, that, he is either Insensatus; or, that he hath Spiritus discords, & invicem repugnantes. He is either a senseless, and a simple Fool; or, a man compounded of repugnant Spirits. Yea, and Music hath not only a kindred with the Soul; but also, a kind of affinity with the Body. For, there be diverse diseases in it, which are healed and cured, Macrob. vblsupr●. by the pleasant sounds of Music. As Macrobius observeth in the forealleged place. Corporum quoque morbis medetur. Beda instanceth, in the pain of the Head, Beda. l. De Musica Practic. To. 1. p. 418. and the Heart. Athenaeus, in the Sciatica and pain of the Hips: and Aulus Gellius, in the biting of vipers. So that, Music hath in it, Athenaeus. l. 14. p. 465. a Sanative virtue, not only against the perturbations of the Soul; but also against the diseases of the Body. A. Gel. l. 4. c. 13. p. 71. And therefore, no marvel, if every living thing do naturally take a delight, and pleasure, in it. 3 And, All Creatures praise God with their Natural Musics. Lib. 1. Cap. 16. Sect. 3. as God hath created all things in a natural Harmony; Proclus l. de. Sacrific. p. 275. and given unto all of them, a natural property, to be delighted with Harmony: so have all of them also, a natural instinct, to praise the same God, with their natural Music; and to spend that his good gift, in the honour of him that gave it. Proclus affirmeth of all God's Creatures, that, Omnia precantur, Hymnósque concinunt, ad ordinis sui ducem: alia, intellectuali modo; alia, rationali; alia, sensitivo; alia, naturali. All creatures make their prayers, and sings praises, to their Ruler: some of them, in a manner, which is merely intellectual; some of them, in a reasonable; some of them, in a sensible; and some, only in a natural. By Intellectual Singers, he understanding Angels; by Reasonable, Men; by Sensible, Birds, and Beasts; and by Natural, Trees, and Plants, and such insensible Creatures. As it evidently appeareth, even by his own instances. Where, for Birds, he giveth an example of the Cock; whose crowing, he interpreteth, to be his saluting of the rising Sun, and his hymn unto Apollo. For plants, he giveth instance in the Heliotropium: whose turning continually towards the Sun, he interprets, to be his service unto him: setting down, Bartas. Day. 5. p. 175. in the same place, a notable hymn, wherein he imagineth it to invocate and praise him. As, our noble Poet Bartas, doth the like of the Lark, in a notable fiction: whose singing so constantly, in the morning, and evening, he construeth to be, Plin. l. 8. c. 1. her Morning and Evening Song, and her daily sacrifice in her Creator's praise. And, for Beasts, Pliny giveth instance, in the Elephants; that they have not only a sense of Religion, but also use a kind of Ceremony in their practice of the same. Yea, and Aelian affirmeth of them (as Proclus before did, of the Cock) that they do, Aelian. l. 7. de Animal. c. 39 Exorientem Solem venerari; proboscidem, tanqu●m minum, adversùs Solis radios alleu●ntes: They worship the rising Sun, and they lift up their Trunk, in honour unto him. Concluding there his Chapter, with this notable increpation of Atheists, and such like ungodly men: Ergonè Deum Elephanti venerantur? Homines autem, rationis participes, Sitne Deus, necne sit, dubitant? tum, si sit, Humanasnè res, curatione & administratione dign●tur? Shall an Elephant, a Beast, adore and worship God? and shall a Man, a Creature endued with reason, doubt, whether there be a God, or whether he regardeth the doings of Men? The like Religion, Aelian. l. 4. De Animal. c. 9 he affirmeth, Elephants to practise towards the Moon. Thus, even in the opinion of the very Heathen, all the Creatures of God, in their several kinds, do praise him. And, that in their opinion they be not mistaken, it may evidently be seen, in the 148. Psalm. Where, even the Psalmist exciteth all the forenamed sorts of Creatures, to offer unto God, their prayers and invocations. Psal. 148. 2. Praise him, Psal. 148. 11. all ye Angels: his Intellectual Creatures. Praise him, all ye People: his Reasonable Creatures. Praise him, Beasts and Cattle, Creeping things, Psal. 148. 10. and flying fowls: Psal. 148. 4. his Sensible Creatures: Psal. 148. 3. Praise him, Psal. 148. 9 Heavens, and Stars, Mountains, and Hills, Fruitful Trees, and Cedars: his Natural and insensible Creatures. All these he calleth upon, to praise the name of the Lord. Which, he would not have done, but that all these Creatures, in their several kinds, do, in their several manners, sing-out his due praises. Psal. 174. 7. Yea, Psal. 174. 8. even the very Worms: as Dragons, and Creeping things; whom he also calleth-upon, in the very same Psalm: as he there doth also, upon both Fire, Hail, and Snow, mere insensible things, Neither speaketh he this, Psal. 98 4. only in a Rhetorical Prosopopoia, Psal. 98 7. as in the 98. Psal. 98 8. Psalm where he calleth upon the Earth, Psal. 98 1. to make a noise; the Sea, to roar; the Floods, to clap their hands: & the Mountains to rejoice; and all these together, to sing a song, in God's praise. He useth not, in the former, any such Poetical Figure: but simply and plainly, in the fervour of his spirit, he calleth upon all the Creatures forenamed, to sing unto the Lord, with those several Harmonies, which he hath given unto their several kinds. Te●tul. l. co●t. Hermo●. c. 44. p. 243. And thus (as Tertullian truly observeth) Deo, etiam inanimalia, & incorporalia, laudes canunt. Not only Angels, who have no Bodies; but also other Creatures, which have no souls; yet do, in their kinds, sing-out Gods due praises. 4 Now, for Man: he hath not only a natural delight in Music, as other Creatures have; and a natural ability, to express all the parts of it, more than other Creatures have, Ecclus. 40. 21. by the sweetness of his tuneable and melodious voice, far excelling the sweetness of all musical instruments: But he hath also enlarged his natural Music, with all the several kinds of Artificial Music, both Vocal, and Organical. In which work, although he hath laboured, Gen. 4. 21. and taken great pains, from the very beginning: yet could he never have brought it unto any perfection, if God himself had not been a Schoolmaster unto him. And this is acknowledged, even of the very Heathen: who have expressly affirmed, that Music is not the Invention of Man, but the very gift of God. Plut. l. de. Musica. To. p. 688. Plutarch affirmeth directly: Non Hominem aliquem repertorem fuisse Musicae, sed omnibus virtutibus ornatum Deum Apollinem: That no man was the first inventor of Music, but Apollo their great and honourable God. Yea, and, in the same place, he addeth, that Music ought to be honoured; because it is the invention of a God. Veneranda prorsus est Musica; Deorum inventum cum sit. In which his opinion, he was not alone, but had diverse others, Plut. ibid. p. 694. of the chiefest Philosophers concurring with him. Aristotle saith of Harmony: that it is, Res Coelestis; eiusque natura, & divina, & pulchra: That Music is an heavenly thing, and of a nature, not only pleasing, but also divine. Theophrastus setteth down, three original Causes: whereby Music was first begotten in the mind of a Man; Plut. in Sympos. l. 1 Quaest 5. To. 3. p. 168. Dolorem, voluptatem, & instinctum divinum: The allaying of his grief, the procuring of his pleasure, and the inspiration of a divine and heavenly motion. But he acknowledgeth this instinct to be the chiefest of the rest. Yea and Plato affirmeth, without all circuition, Musicam esse Hominibus, Plut. l. de Supersl●t. To. 1. p. 384. a Deo, datam: That music was first given unto men, by God. But Macrobius handleth this point, Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90. a great deal more prolixely, than any of the rest do: proving, by many Arguments, that Music, was not first invented upon earth, but descended down from Heaven. Yea, and that, in the opinion of the very Heathen, delivered expressly in their mystical Theology. His Reasons be these following. Hesiod. in Theogon. p, 80. First, that Hesiodus; who writeth the generation of their Gods, recording exactly, from whence they first sprang, calleth one of their Muses, Urania; which signifieth, Heavenly. Insinuating thereby, that there is Music in Heaven: and, that from heaven it first was brought, by the Muses, unto men. In whom also we may observe, that he maketh Harmonia, Ibid, p, 128. to have been the Daughter of Mars, and Venus, two of the Heathen Gods: thereby again implying, that Harmony was first begotten in Heaven. Another of his Reasons is, that Hesiodus calleth another of the Muses, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: her name being given, for the sweetensse of her voice; as Vrania's was, from the highness of the place. Thereby again implying; that The sweetness of voice, hath the highest place in Heaven. Another: that the Heathen called Apollo, who was one of their greatest gods, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: quasi Ducem, & Principem Musarum: The Prince, and Ruler of the Muses. Another: that, even their very Rustics, called the Muses, Camoenas, quasi Canenas; Acanendo dictas, that is, Singing Damosels. Now, the Muses (as they all confess) descended first from Heaven. Another: that, in all their funeral pomps, and solemn exequys, they still carried-out their dead, with musical instruments: Mat. 9 23. which was likewise in practice, even among the jews. And this, he saith, they did, to signify that their souls were now departed, unto the original house of Music: Ad originem dulcedinis Musicae, idest, ad Coelum: in their own interpretation. And this, again he saith, is the true Cause, why every man's soul is so much delighted with Music upon earth: Quia in Corpus defert memoriam Musicae, civius in Coelo fuit conscia: Because it bringeth down with it, into the Body, a remembrance of that Music, whereof, in Heaven, it had a full fruition. These, and diverse such like Arguments he congesteth, in that place, to prove, that Music descended first from Heaven. Of which, though some be not greatly strong; yet they strongly show, that, even the Heathen held this, as a sacred opinion, that Music is God's gift, and not man's invention. Yea, and that which the Heathen have so ingenuously acknowledged, of the whole body of Music; they likewise acknowledge, of both the kinds of it; both of Vocal, and Organical. For Vocal Music. Homer expressly affirmeth of the Singer Demodocus, (the most excellent in those times) that the Sweetness of his voice, whereby he so greatly delighted all men, was a special gift, which God had given unto him: — divinum Cantorem Demodocum: Homer, l. 8 Odies. p, 202. huic quidem Deus excellenter dedit cantilenam Ad oblectandum, quocunque animus ipsum impulerit canere. A most divine, and heavenly Songster, Demodocus was: Who did, in most delightful lays, all other men surpass. What ere his mind did lead him to, he did excel in singing: And all this excellency of his, was given by God unto him. And, that, which he affirmeth particularly of him, doth Seneca affirm, in general, Senec. l. 4. de Benefic. c. 6. p, 50. of all men. Ille, Deus est, qui non calamo tantùm cantare, atque agreste & inconditum carmen, ad aliquam tantùm oblectationem, modulari docuit: sed tot Artes, tot vocum varietates, tot sonos, alios, spiritu nostro; alios, externo, cantus edituros, commentus est. It is God that hath taught men, not only to play, upon rude and homely pipes, fit for rude and Country song's; but that first hath invented all those Arts, all those varieties of voices, and all those sounds, whereby, either with our own breath, or with others, we express all those songs. And therefore the Psalmist concludeth the book of Psalms, with this Epiphonema: Psal. 1506. Let every thing that hath breath, praise the Lord. That so God, who gave those instruments unto men, might, with his own gift, be praised by them. For so is Organical Music, as well as Vocal: it also is God's gift. Yea, and that also by the Confession, even of the very Heathen. For so, Homer affirmeth in express and plain words: Alij, Homer, l 13. Iliad. p: 494. In Graecolat. tribuit Deus, bellicaopera; Alij, autem saltationem: alij cytharam, & cantum. God gives to one, the feats of Arms; t' another, art of dancing; He gives another, skill to harp; another, voice for singing. So that, both playing and Singing he acknowledgeth, to be the gifts of God, unto men. Max. Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 264. Yea, and Maeximus Tyrius reproveth the Musician Demodocus, whom before I named; because he ascribed not unto God, his gift in playing, as well as in singing: Neque fide dignus Demodocus, cum de seipso dicit: Ipse mihi Doctor: tribuerunt Numina vocem. Demodocus is not to be believed, when he vaunteth of himself; That the Gods indeed had given him his voice: but, as for all his cunning, he learned that, only of himself. This arrogancy he reproveth, as unto God injurious; from whom he received the gift of them both. He was, indeed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and therefore not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as he boasted of himself. Neither did the Heathen, only ascribe unto God, to be the giver of the skill of playing upon all sorts of Musical instruments; but also, to have been the first inventor of making the very instruments themselves. Plut. l. de. Music●. To. 2. p. 682. Heraclides affirmeth of Amp●ion (who was jupiters' son) that he was the first in the world, that ever taught men the use of the Harp. But he addeth there further, that he himself had learned that skill of his Father: Patre nimirùm docente. p. 689. But Plutarch himself reduceth it higher; not allowing of any mortal man to be the first inventor, so much as of the Pipe; but ascribing, even it (as well as the Harp) to be the invention of the learned god Apollo. But Bion more distinctly referreth those instruments, unto those several gods, that we●● their several inventors; not heaping the glory of all upon one; but reserving unto every god, the glory of his own invention. — ●●stulam obliquam, Bion Eidyl. 3. p. 318. Pan invenit: Minerva, tibiam: Tes●ud●●em, Mercurius. Et Cytharam, dulcis Apollo. The crooked Pipe, was Pan's device: Minerua's was the Flute. The Harp Apollo did invent: and Mercury the Lute. Thus, not only Music itself, of all kinds; but also all Musical instruments, of all sorts, are (even in the judgement of the very Heathen) confessed to be the gifts of God unto Men. Which, though they be made by the hand of man; yet were they directed by the wisdom of God. And therefore the Heathen have justly ascribed them, not unto him that wrought them, The chiefest▪ end of Music is to praise God with it. but unto him that taught them. 5 Now, as God hath given unto man, a natural kind of Music, wherewith his soul is delighted; so hath he also given him a natural sense, and instinct to worship God with it, as a tribute, due to him, from whom it was first given. As may be evidently seen, by the general practice both of Christians, & Heathens. Who, as they do agree by the light of Nature, in worshipping of God; so do they likewise agree, by the same light of Nature, to use Music in his worship. For the practice of Christians: the whole Book of Psalms is an evidence of it. Which, as it was daily sung in the old Church of the jews; so is it still daily sung in all the Churches of Christians, through the whole world of Christianity. In which Book (being penned by the Holy Ghost) we may observe, three remarkable things. First, that, as God hath appointed unto man, a Sabbath day, wherein to praise and serve him: so hath he also appointed them to serve him, Eph. 5. 19 Col. 3. 16. with hymns, and psalms, and spiritual songs. Yea, and, among them, hath selected certain special Psalms, from among all the rest, as specially appropriated unto those Sabbath Days: As may be evidently seen, by the title and inscription, of the 92. Psalm; A Psalm, Psal 92. or Song, for the Sabbath Day. Secondly, that he hath further had a special care, not only of the Ditty, but also of the Tune too. As it likewise appeareth by the Titles and inscriptions of diverse other Psalms. Magistro Symphoniae ad pneumatica instrumenta. Psal. 4. 5. 6. 9 Magistro Symphoniae fidium ad gravem symphoniam. Magistro Symphoniae acutae ad medianam: and diverse others such like. Thirdly, that, not contented with the Music of men's natural voices, he hath further added to them (for the quickening of devotion) the help of all sorts of Musical instruments. Psal. 150. 3. 4. 5. Praise him, in the sound of the Trumpet. Praise him, upon the Lute, and Harp. Praise him, with Timbrels, and Flute, with Virginals, and Organs, and with high sounding Cymbals. Thus, God himself hath required, to have his Service furnished, with all the several sorts of Music, Aug. l. 2. de Doct. Christ. To. 3. c. 17 Isidor. l. 2. Orig. c. 18. both Harmonical, rhythmical, and Organical. And therefore Boetius ascribeth unto the Art of Music, a principal honour, above all the other. Inter septem Artes Liberales, principatum oblinet Musica. And Beda, who reporteth his opinion, allegeth for it a good Reason: Beda, lib. de Musica Practia. Tom 1. p. 417. Because it, of all other Arts, hath only the honour to enter into the Church; and there to be used, in Gods own immeditate service. For, this is an Art so Heavenly and divine, that it seemeth to have been given by God, unto men, to this special end; that by it Men might set out the glory of God. And therefore Plutarch affirmeth, Plut. lib. de Musica To. 2. p. 707. that, Primum, & pulcherrimum Musicae officium, est, grata aduers●m Deos remuneratio: The first, and the fairest office of Music, is the return of our thankfulness unto God, Psal. 116, 12, 13 for his goodness. Which office the Prophet David accordingly put in practice. What can I return unto the Lord for all his benefits? I will take unto me, the Cup of salvation, and will call upon the Name of the Lord. Here is the best return, that by man can be made to sacrifice the true thankfulness of his soul unto God; as for all his other inestimable Benefits, so for this among the rest, for giving us so Musical and tuneable a voice, whereby we have a mean to praise him for all the rest. Pium est enim, Plut. ubì suprà. p. 681. & praecipuum hominum hoc studium (saith Plutarch again) Laudes canere Deorum, qui soli ipsis articulatam vocem sunt largiti. It is a pious and a principal duty of man, to sing praises unto God; who only hath given him that articulate voice, whereby he is able to sing unto him. Thus this learned Philosopher, both deriveth the Art of Music from God, as from his original beginning; and referreth it unto God, as to his principal end. And this was not his opinion alone, but the very Religion, of all the rest of the Heathen. As may be evidently seen, not only in Hesiodus, but also in Trismegistus: Hesiod in Theogon. p 78. two of their chief Divines. For the first of them: Hesiodus, he maketh the Muses (who were the Authors of Music) the Daughters of jupiter: and therefore, to draw their original from God. And he maketh them again, to sing always before him: and therefore to refer all their Music unto God. And Trismegistus likewise, expressly delivereth, both the very same points. Trismeg. in Asclap. c. 5. p. 490. For the first of them: he saith that, Musarum chorus, est a summa Divinitate demissus, ne terrenus mundus videretur incultior, si modulorum dulcedine caruisset: That the Choir of the Muses, was sent down from heaven, from the highest of the Gods; lest this terrene and inferior world should be barbarous and rude, if it lacked the delight and sweetness of Music. And, for the second of them, he addeth: Sed potius, ut modulatis hominum cantilenis concelebretur laudibus, qui solus dat omnia; ut Pater est omnium. But yet the higher end of music was, that, by men's delightful music, he might be only praised, who is the Giver of all; as being indeed the very Father of all. So then Music was first given by God to Men; that Men might, by it, give due praises unto God. For the true use of Music (as Athenaeus observeth) is principally this, Athenaeus. l. 14. p. 471. Deorum laudes Musicis Canticis personare: To chante out God's praises with musical Songs. And therefore the ancient Music (as Plutarch recordeth) was only used in the Temples, for the worship of God; Plut. ubi. sup. p. 697. and not in theatres, Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90. for the vain delight of men. Plut. ubi. sup. p. 689. For the Custom of the Heathens (as Macrobius reporteth, and Plutarch by many special instances confirmeth) was, to use Music and Songs, in all their public prayers. Yea, and Plato well approveth it: Rectissimum erit, ut Hymni laudésque Deorum, precibus mixtae, canantur. He would always have Hymns, intermixed with prayers, and especially, with their solmne sacrifices. Whence, Maximus Tyrius, calleth Music, Optimum in Sacrificijs comitem: A sweet companion, Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p. 257. in all their sacrificing. Yea, and there addeth further, that it doth, Mysteria sanctificare: That it addeth a further Holiness, unto their holy mysteries. Arist. l. 8. Pol. c. 7 To. 2. p. 905. Which opinion of his, Aristotle also confirmeth; who affirmeth of Music, that it hath a power in it, both purgative, and sanative: whereby a man's mind is made both pure, and humble, and devout. And therefore we may observe, in the practice of Heathens, as well a●of Christians; that they have not thought it sufficient, to worship God only with prayers & invocations, but also with Hymns, and Odes. Aelian recordeth an Hymn of thanksgiving which Arion made to Neptune, Aelian. l. 12. De Animal. c. 42. p. 268. for his deliverance by the Dolphin. Galen Galen. l. de usu part. upon the contemplation of the admirable workmanship in the body of man, breaketh out into an Hymn, in the praise of him that made him. Hìc compono Canticum, in Creatoris nostri laudem. And Trismegistus upon the like contemplations, Trismeg. setteth down diverse Hymns, which he made in God's praise. Yea, and Homer hath made a set Book of Hymns, wherein he setteth out the praises of all their Gods. Which kind of Hymns, (as Macrobius recordeth) were usually sung, Macrob. ubi suprà. in the Temples of the Heathen, per Stroph●m, & Antistropham; for the stronger elevation of their minds toward Heaven. As our holy Hymns are, in the Churches of Christians, by Verses, and Antiphonies, answering one another: And the like we may observe, to have been also in use, in the Church of the jews. As appeareth in all the Psalms; from the 146. unto the end of the Psalme-Booke. Where, as every Psalm beginneth with an Allelu-iah, or, Praise the Lord, by Stropha: so doth it likewise end, with an Allelu-iah, or, Praise the Lord, by Antistropha. And the same order of singing is observed, even in Heaven. Where Saints, and Angels, be the Choristers; and God himself, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; who beareth also his part, in this Divine and Heavenly Harmony. As evidently appeareth, Apoc. 19 1. in the Book of the Apocalyps. Where, a Multitude of Saints, singing unto God's praise, and beginning their Allelu-iah, by way of S●ropha, they were answered again, by the Elders, and four Beasts, with another Allelu-iah, by the way of Antistropha. And again, they both were answered, 4. 5. 6: 7. with a voice from the Throne, with another Allelu-iah, rebounding, and echoing from another place of Heaven. And, when they all had thus sung, their several Allelu-iah, by themselves, asunder; then they joined in one, and sung it altogether. Here is an adumbration of the Choir of Heaven: and the form of the singing of Saints, and Angels therein. Whereby it appeareth, that God hath not only appointed, that Men should here praise him, with holy Harmonies, in this present life; but also, with Heavenly Harmonies, in the life to come. And this also was both known, and acknowledged, by the very Heathen: As it evidently appeareth, by the testimony of Pindarus. Animae piorum Coelos colentes, Theod●r●t lib. de Martyr. To. 2. p. 541. Cantu, beatum & magnum in Hymmis cannut. The Souls of godly blessed Saints inhabiting the Heavens, Do chant and sound their blessedness, in holy Songs and Hymns. Yea, and Porphiry reciteth a certain Oracle of Apollo: wherein he affirmeth, that God hath created a certain order of Angels, which do nothing but praise him, and sing continually before him. Praetereà, Porp●yr. lib. 10. Respons. apud Pausam. lib. de Osculo. cap. 40. p. 202. tertium quoddam genus Regum creâsti; Quite semper canunt, carminibúsque laudant, Volentem Te ipsi cupidi, praedicantque & nunc, & semper. Thou God created haste a kind of glorious Angel-Kings, Whose spirit, in celestial Choir, thy praises ever sings. By all which forenamed Reasons, it evidently appeareth, that this Heavenly Art of Music is the gift of God, to men. And therefore, must necessarily infer, that, There is One. CHAP. 13. The other Liberal Arts, do, all of them, show, That there is a God: they being, all of them, acknowledged, to be the gifts of God. 1. Grammar. 2. Logic. 3. Rhetoric. 4. Which three Arts have apparently, an adumbration of the Trinity. THIS second Book proving, That there is a God, from the grounds of Arts, hath now grown very great and prolix, under mine hand: yea, and that, far beyond both mine expectation, and intention. Wherein, I am not ignorant, that the vulgar Reader can take but small delight: the nature of this Argument is so far out of his Element. Neither yet can any other, but only a professed Scholar, unto whom these grounds of Arts are common, and familiar. And therefore, all the rest, which are as yet behind, I will but only touch, and that with a light finger, to make the way shorter, unto other more plausible and popular matter. Now the residue of the liberal Arts, be these three in number Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. Which, all of them, are acknowledged, even by the very Heathen, to be Gods special Gifts and Blessings unto men. And first, as concerning Grammar. That is defined, to be, Arts rectè Loquendi, Lily Grammatica. atque scribendi; An Art of rightly Speaking, and Writing. So that, the natural, Grammar showeth There is a God. and, as it were, the homogeneal parts of Grammar, be two, Orthology, and Orthography. In both which parts of it, God hath had a special hand; as, even by the Heathen themselves, is acknowledged: in the first of them, Orthology; in teaching men the right imposition of names: in the second of them, Orthography; in teaching them the rare invention of letters. Two works of so divine and heavenly an invention, that, without them, humane life were nothing but confusion. For the better, and more clear demonstration whereof, we are to know thus much. That the faculty of speaking is not natural unto a man, no more then to a Beast. A man hath no more given speech unto himself, than he hath given himself the Tongue, wherewith he speaketh. But God is the giver of them both. And the tongue of a man, would be altogether as dumb, as the tongue of a Beast; if God himself, at the first, had not taught it how to speak. Therefore, this gift of speaking, as it was at the first habitually infused into Adam, so hath it ever since been propagated from him, by only imitation. I know, it is an old received opinion, that (notwithstanding this great variety of several languages, which we see entertained in diverse nations) yet that man hath a natural speech of his own, as he is a man: which language he would speak by nature, if he were not taught some other. But this is but a dream: and hath been twice refuted, by a double experiment. The first was, Herod. l. 2. p. by Psammeticus, a King of Egypt: who desiring to understand, which was man's most ancient and natural language, he caused two Children to be sequestered from all society of men, and to be nourished only by sucking two shee-goates, forbidding all speech unto them. Which Children, continuing for a long time dumb, at last uttered, Bec, Bec. The King being informed, that, in the Phrygian Language, Bec, signified Bread, imagined that the Children called then for Bread: and from thence collected, that, because they spoke that language which no man had taught them, that therefore the Phrygian language was the natural speech of man. A silly proof, Plut. l. 1. de Placitis, c. 17. To. 2. p. 15. God knoweth. His conceit of Bec, Bec, well deserving to be numbered with those Becceselenae, those doting old tales, which have ever been contemned of those that are wise. For the children's Bec, Bec, (as is probably collected) was only that language which they learned of their Goat-nurses, when they came to suck their teats. Who, receiving of them some ease by their sucking, saluted them with Bec, the best language which they had. From whom the children learned it. And so much as they heard, just so much again they uttered, & no more. And if they had not heard it, they could never have pronounced it. As we may evidently see, by an other experiment tried upon other Infants, Purchas, Pilgrim▪ lib. 1. c. 8. p, 40. (which is our second instance) by Melabdim Echebar, whom they call The great Mogor. He likewise (upon the forenamed error) that Man hath a certain proper language by Nature, caused thirty Children to be brought up in dumb silence, to find out, by experience, whether all of them would speak one and the same language? having inwardly a purpose, to frame his religion, conformable to that nation, whose language should be spoken: as being that Religion, which is purely natural unto man. But the Children proved all dumb: though there were so many of them. And therefore they could not speak because they were not taught. Whereby it appeareth, that Speaking, which is the first part of Grammar, is not in man by Nature. But the first man had it, by only divine infusion; and all his posterity, only by imitation. Now the first element and original of all speech, is the Imposition of Names. Without which, there can be no distinction of things. I mean, not, quoad nos; though, quoad naturam, they be sufficiently distinguished, by those substantial properties which are their essential and specifical differences. But yet, they could have no distinction in speech, if they were not divided by their several names. No, nor in use neither. For, if things were not separated by their proper names, Luke, 11. 11. 12. then if a man should ask for Bread, they might give him a Stone; if for a Fish, a Serpent; if for an Egg, a Scorpion. And so in all other things, there would follow like confusion. As we may see, in the building of the Tower of Babylon: how when the Labourers understood not the names of those things, for which the Builders called, the work was brought unto a stand, and could not go forward. So that, the right ordering of all humane affairs dependeth chiefly upon the distinction of names, without which, Aug. l. de Magistro. c. 5. To. 1. Cicero de Fini●us p. 142. b● there can be no knowledge of things. For, Nomen est a noscendo dictum: as S. Augustin giveth the notation of that name: and, Nomina be but Notaererum: as the Orator noteth of them: Names be the notes & marks, whereby we do know things; which cannot be known, if they have no 〈◊〉. Gen. 2. 19 Whereupon, even God himself, as soon as ever he had made a man he brought all things before him, that he might put names upon them. Full well foreseeing, in his divine wisdom, that it was a thing most necessary for the use of man. Else would he never have appointed it so timely to be done. And therefore, even the Heathen have reckoned this nomenclature, and imposition of names, Stobaus Serm. 101. p. 556. for one of Gods own works: holding it, for an invention, above humane understanding. Euriphanus, though he ascribe the work itself unto Man, yet he holdeth it to be done, Cic. lib. 1. Tusc. by divine illumination: agreeing therein with the truth of the Scripture itself. And Tully, reckoning up certain admirable inventions, far transcending the highest pitch of the capacity of man, he numbereth this for one, The imposing of names so aptly upon things. Which (as Plato acknowledgeth) Rerum istarum inventio, Plato, in Cratylo. Aug. l. 2. de Do●● Christ. c. 18. To. 3. acutius ingenium quam nostrum, exigit. The invention of these things, exacteth a more piercing wit, then is ours. Which, all the Heathen in general, ascribed directly unto their God Mercury. So that, for Orthologie, the first part of Grammar, you see, that even the Heathen have two ways averred it, for a divine invention. Which doth necessarily conclude That therefore there is a God. Now for Orthography, the second part of Grammar, teaching the Art of writing. That hath also in it another strange invention: which, even by the very Heathen, is reputed to be Divine. And that is, the invention and divising of Letters. A thing so essential and proper unto Grammar, that the whole Art hath his name and appellation from it. For, Grammatica (as S. Augustin observeth out of Varro) doth signify Literatio: Aug. l. 2. De Ordine c. 12. To. 1. Haec Literarum ●lementa● invenit. Theod. Serm. 4. de provide. pro pesinem. or, (as he refineth it) Litertura, that is, The cunning and skill of Letters. Ipso se nomine profiteri literas clamans: Proclaiming, even in his very name, that it professeth the knowledge of Letters. So Tully. Studium Literarum profitentur ij, qui Gramm●tici vocantur. They which are called Grammarians, profess the Study and knowledge of Letters. Now the first devising and finding out of Letters, is one of the rarest and most heavenly inventions of all that are in use in humane society. Cic. l. de. Orat. 85. B. Nizol. Yea, and that, whether we respect the notable subtility, or Utility of it. For the first of which two points. It is almost a miracle, that a mean could be invented, whereby words and sounds, which naturally be the Objects of the Ear, should be made the Objects of the Eye. As we see the one is, by Letters, in writing; the other, by notes, in singing. This is indeed an admirable invention, that sounds and voices should, by the power of certain Characters (as it were by Charms) be stolen away from their own proper sense, and conveyed unto another, by Leger●du Maìn, and so made an Object of the same. This (I say) is a very wonder: and, among all the senses, not to be found, in any other. No invention ever yet could make the Object of Seeing, the Object of Hearing; nor the Object of Hearing the Object of Smelling; nor the Object of Smelling, the Object of Feeling. Only the Object of Hearing, by this invention of Letters, is made (in some sort) the Object of Seeing. And this, by the goodness of God unto man, for the increase of his knowledge and understanding. Which is the second point, that I observed in it. For, by this rare invention of writing, it cannot be numbered, how many great Benefits be unto men conveyed. By writing, we may give direction for ourforaine Businesses, though we stay at home: and for our domestical, though we be abroad. By writing, we may confer with our absent Friend, as freely, as with our present Neighbour; communicating all our counsels as secretly and closely, as if we should whisper one in another's ear: yea though we be divided many miles asunder. Ita ut absens ultra Maris aequora, Res, quae illìc gerantur in aedibus, Stob. Serm. 79. p. 469. omnes rectè intelligant: as Euripides noteth, even in this very case. But writing, we may record those things that are past, as freshly, as when we remembered them present. By writing▪ we have the monuments of ancient times communicated with us, and all good Arts and Learning derived unto us. Yea (and that which far surmounteth all that hitherto hath been said) by writing, we have the comfort of the holy word of God: which, from writing, receiveth his denomination, in being called Scripture: which is, nothing else but, Writing. Finally (to come home unto this our own purpose, Theod. Serm. 4. de Provident. with Theodoret's instance) by writing we are furnished with invincible Arguments, to fight against the Atheist, who armeth himself to fight against God. These, and infinite like blessings, are conveied unto men, by the benefit of writing. Beside which, this invention of writing, and the conveying of the voice unto the eye from the ear, which I mentioned before, beguiling one sense of his Object, to furnish another with it, doth (by intermingling the Offices of those two diverse senses) minister no less delight in expressing their uses, by way of Questions and Riddles, then are usually made upon incestuous marriages. As for example. If it should be demanded: How a voice may be seen? It may be answered: By writing. How a man may speak, after he is dead? By writing. Et moriens liberis aliquot literas Scribendo animum aperiet. Stobaeu● Serm. 79. p, 469. Saith Euripides: Of dying man, his living mind, By Written deeds, his Children find. How two may talk together, without any word spoken? By writing. How two may speak together, that are many miles a sunder? By writing. — peragunt Linguae Charta manusque vices. Where distance setteth on tongue a tie, Ovid, l. 5. de Trist. There hand and paper make supply. How a man may teach his hand to speak? By writing. How a man may hear another speak, though he should stop his ears? By writing. How a man may remember that which he hath forgotten? Stob. Serm. 79. p, 496. By writing. Ibid. p, 468. Whence Euripides calleth it, Remedium oblivionis: The remedy of oblivion. And Aeschilus', An help of memory: Literarum autem compositio memoriam produxit. And many such like may the wit of man find out, many other ways expressing the great uses of writing. All which have their dependence, upon the first invention of letters. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. And therefore the Roman Orator, as he ascribed before, the imposition of names: so again he ascribeth the invention of letters, only unto God: as being an invention above the reach of man. And so likewise doth Euriphanus, Stobaens Serm. 101. p, 556. whom I cited before, joining both inventions together. Yea, and Plato expresseth of which of the gods: affirming of the Egyptians, that they challenge the invention of letters, unto one of their own gods, Plato. in Philebo. p, 85. Item in Phaedro. p, 463. namely to their god, The●th: whom they held for the author of all good Arts among them: as letters are the beginning of all good learning. Others ascribed this invention to the Muses. But Pacianus directly asserteth it to God: Pacian. Epist. 2. ●ib. Pat. To. 1. p, 30●. to whom it is due, indeed. Dic, or●, Frater, Musae literas repererunt? Nun per Dominm omnia, & a Deo omnia? Thus Grammar, not only, by the imposition of names; but also, by the invention of letters, doth lead us, by the hand, to believe, There is a God. 2 Yea, Logic proveth, There is a God. and so doth Logic too. By the help and means whereof, both names were first imposed, and letters first invented. For both these are done, according to reason. And Logic (which is the Art of reasoning) is indeed nothing else, but the practice of reason: Disputare is nothing else, but Ratione uti. Roding●● in Dialecticam Ra●i. It is nothing else, but Oratio ratione conclusa: as Tully speaketh: A speech concluded with Reason. Therefore not only Grammar; and Rhetoric (which is nothing else but a dilated kind of Logic, Cic. Aca. p. 45. a. Cic. de Clar Orat. 194. a. Nizol. Dialectica dilatata, as Tully calleth; it: and as Zeno exemplified it by his fist and his hand: Quòd latiùs loquerentur Rhetores, Cic. l. de Fin. p. 68 a. Nizol. Aug. l. 2. de Ordine c. 13. To. 1. p. 489. Dialectiei autem compressiùs) but also all other Arts, were both at the first invented, and after perfected, and ever practised; yea, and now, both taught, and learned, by the help of Logic. As S. Augustine expressly affirmeth of it. Haec docet docere: Haec docet discere: Haec sola scientes potest facere: Cic. l. de Fin. p. 68▪ a. This is the Art, which only teacheth men how to teach: and which only learneth men, how to learn: and which only is able to make a man understand. And therefore he calleth Logic, Disciplinam Disciplinarum: The Art of all Arts: The Art, whereby all Arts are both taught and learned. For, as Tully also noteth, Haec una continet omnem, & perspiciend quid in quavis re sit, scientiam; & iudicandi quale quidque sit, ac ratione & via disputandi. Insomuch that, Stobaeus. Serm. 81. prope finem. as jamblicus hath truly observed: Nulla Philosophiae pars, absque Dialectica ratione, comparatur: There can no part of Philosophy, be perfectly attained; without the help and assistance of Logic. As Aristotle showeth in his Topickes: Arist. l. 1. Topic. cap. 2. where he reckoneth up the principal uses of it. Yea, and it hath also as great an use in Divinity, as it hath in Philosophy. Logic teacheth the Preacher to Analize and divide his Text. It teacheth to collect true and proper Doctrines from it. And it teacheth him to discover those false, or idle Doctrines, which are wrongly built upon it. Ang. lib. 2. de Ordi●●. c. 13. To. 1. Nam hanc de finiendo, distribuendo, ●olligendo, non solùm digerit, atque ordinat, sed etiam ab omni falsitatis irreptione defendit: saith S. Augustine, comprehending in one sentence, all those three forenamed uses. The Art of Logic, by D●finitions, Divisions, and Collections, doth not only digest things, and bring, them into Order, but also defendeth them from those captious falsities, which otherwise would oftentimes creep into them. For, as the Orator also observeth: Cic. lib. de Fin. p. 105. ●. Nizol. Cic. lib. de Orat. p. 123▪ a. Habet Dialectica rationem, nè cui falso assentiamur, neuè unquàm captios ● probabilitate falla●nur. For it is, Ars, vera & falsa iudicandi: as he again noteth, in another place: It is an Art of discerning truth from falsehoold. Again (another use) it assisteth the Preacher, both in confuting of Heresies, and in resolving of all doubts and questions: as S. Augustine again, in another place, observeth. Aug. l. 2. de Doct. Christ. c. 32. To. 3. Disput ati●nis disciplina, ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in literal 〈…〉 & dissoluenda plurimum valet. The Art of Disputing 〈◊〉 of a spe●●●● 〈◊〉, for discerning and deciding of all manner of Qu●stion●, which any where wise, through the whole Scriptures. For, it doth 〈…〉 intelligention: as the Orator noteth: It yieldeth a certain knowledge of things doubtful. Yea, and the use of it is so general, in all the parts of Divinity, that jamblicus affirmeth of it very resolutely, that, Omnia, quae considerantur de D●●s, Stobae. Serm. 79. p. 47●. Dialectica ratione astruuntur: That every thing, which any way belongeth to God or Religion, is grounded upon, and confirmed by some Logical Reason. Ficin. Argum. in Euthyd●mo. Whence Plato himself (as Ficinus observeth) useth the word Dialectica, promiscuously, for Theologia, in many places of his writings; as being equivalent, and all one, in sense. And therefore, jamblicus affirmeth of Logic, that it is Deorum munus: A gift and token of God unto Men. Yea, and so it is indeed: and that a very great one. Yea, and in the same place affirmeth expressly: Stobaeus Serm. 7a. p, 471. Reverà, Deus quispiam fuit, qui Hominibus Dialecticam monstravit, & coelitùs demisit. Certainly, it was some God, which showed Logic unto men, and sent it down from Heaven. Which some ascribe, to Mercury; some to Calliope; and some to Apollo: who (as there he reporteth) did purposely deliver all his Oracles, in obscure and aenygmatical terms, to excite men thereby unto the study of Logic; which is the only Art whereby they can be opened. Cuius opera quicquid ambiguum, & aequivocum est, dijudicatur: By the help of which Art of Logic, whatsoever is ambiguous and doubtful, is cleared and distinguished. 3 And that, Rhetoric is the Gift of God. Lib. 2. c. 1. Sect. 8. fin. which the Heathen have confessed both of Grammar and Logic, they confess likewise of Rhetorics: That it is also a special gift of God, For if Grammar, which is but the Art of speaking, be so, then must Rhetoric, which is the Art of Pleading, much more be so. It is a far higher gift, to plead then to speak. To speak, is every man's gift; but to plead, the gift of few. And therefore; as Plato collecteth in another like Case; If God be the Giver of the lesser blessings, Plato in Epinom 913. p. then much more of the greater. Ipsum bonorum omnium Authorem, cur non maximi etiam boni causam arbitramur? And therefore Dionysius Areopagita expressly affirmeth, That both these Arts of Speaking, are Gods special gifts. Deus, & dicendi, & benè dicendi munus, Dionys. l. de. Diuin. Nom. c. 13. p. 332. concessit. It is God, that hath given, both the Art of Speaking, and the Art of Well speaking. Tully, that great Orator; speaking of the Art Oratory, affirmeth it, not to be a gift of Nature, but to descend from God, as from the first Author: Primus eius Artis Antistes esse, Deus putatur. The first Author of that Art is believed to be God. And though, in the same place, he be driven to confess, Cic. l. 1. de. Orat. p. 146. that the benignity of Nature hath no little sway in it; yet there he further addeth, that even, Idipsum, quod est hominis proprium, non sit partum per nos; sed divinitùs ad nos delatum: That, even that natural hability, which any man hath unto it, is not gotten by himself, but is given him by God. It is God that giveth the Tongue of the learned: Isai. 50. 4. as the Prophet Isay testifieth. And therefore the same Orator, in another place, affirmeth; not following any other man's opinion, but delivering his own; That it is only God, that is indeed the Maker of every good Oration, by his divine infusion. Mihi quidem nè haec notiora, Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 117. atque illustriora, career vi divina videntur: ut Ego, aut Poetam, grave plenúmque carmen, sine coelesti aliquo mentis instinctu, putem fudere: aut eloquentiam, since maiori aliqua vi fluere, abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibúsque sententijs. He professeth, that he is persuaded, that neither any Poet can make a good Poem, nor yet any Orator a good Oration, if he be not infused with a divine inspiration. Pindar. Pythi●rum Od. 1. p. 187. For, as Pindarus also confesseth, unto the same purpose: Et sapientes, & eloquentes, Dei benignitate, fiunt. It is only God's blessing, that giveth unto men, both eloquence and wisdom. So Origen. Quòd verba quis fecerit, Orig. contra Celsum. l. 6. 4. fol. aet. finem. quae persuadendi vim habeant, id Dei munere fit; quod verò suadeaetur, non semper ex Deo procedit. The power of persuading is always the gift of God; though the thing persuaded sometimes be not. Yea, and God himself expressly challengeth the same to be his gift. Yea the whole Trinity challengeth it, who have all a true right in it. God the Father, he challengeth it, unto the Prophet Moses: who when he detrected his return into Egypt, upon pretence of his stammering, Ex. 4. 10. 11. God himself demanded of him: Who it was that had given the mouth unto man? Is it not I the Lord? God the Son, he challengeth it, unto his Disciples: forbidding them to be careful, when they came before Magistrates what answer they should make them; Mat. 10. 19 20. and assuredly promising, that, in that very hour, it should be given to them. And the Holy Ghost, he challengeth it, Act. 2. 4. assuming unto himself, that gift of strange speaking, wherewith the Apostles amazed all their hearers: They began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. By all which specialties, this Conclusion is proved, 4 Thus, all those three Arts, Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, are all of them given unto men, by God. Yea, and that by God the Word: who is the wisdom of his Father: 1. Cor. 1. 24. lo. 1. 9 and who is the true light, that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. And this also, by the Confession even of the very Heathen. Euseb. l. 13. de Praeparat. c. 7. p. 278. For it is Epicharmus his Tenet: that, Divinum Verbum omnes Artes hominibus suggerit: It is only God the Word, which giveth men the knowledge of all Arts and sciences. Which if it be generally true, in all Arts; then is it most specially true, in those Arts. For, all those three Arts, do carry upon them, the very name of that God, who is the Giver of them. For, as God the son is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so likewise is every one of those forenamed Arts. There is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Verbum: and that is Grammar. There is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ratio, and that is Logic. And there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Oratio: and that is Rhetoric. So that, as God the Son doth carry upon him, Heb. 1. 3. the Character of his Father: so do those threearts the Character of their Author. Every one of them is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as God the Son is. So that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in general, is like the nature of the Deity, which is common unto all the three persons of the Trinity: and so is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unto all those three arts. So that as in the Trinity it may truly be said; That the Father, is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost, is God: So may it be said, in the Trinity of those arts; That Grammar, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Logic, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & Rhetoric, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Here they are all conjoined together as in one common nature. And, as in the Trinity it may again be said; That the Father, is not the Son; nor the Son, the Holy Ghost, nor the Holy Ghost, the Father: so may it be said likewise, in those three arts, and sciences: That Grammar, is not Logic; nor Logic, Rhetoric; nor Rhetoric, Grammar. Here again disjoined. And yet, in another respect again conjoined. For, as in the Trinity, the Father doth beget the Son, and they two produce the Holy Ghost: so, in this other Trinity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ratio, doth beget 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Verbum; and they two produce out of them, an other third 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is Oratio. So that those three arts are not only affirmed to be the gifts of God, by the testimony of the Heathen, but they also declare it, by their very name. CHAP. 14. Philosophy leadeth a Man unto God. 2. It hath in it a kind of resemblance of God. 3. It is acknowledged to be the Gift of God. 4. And so likewise is Poetry. 5. And so all other Arts in general. 6. Yea even the Mechanical. HAVING now dispatched the liberal Arts and Sciences; and showed, how all of them do lesson us to God; it resteth, that we should ascend by them (as by certain streams) unto Philosophy itself: which is the Fountain, and Springhead, from whence they all do flow. Cic. l. 1. de Orat. p. 127. Damasc. l. de Logica, c. 3. p. 419. Tully calleth Philosophy, The Mother of all good Arts: Omnium laudandarum Artium procreatricem quandam, & quasi parentem. And Damascene calleth it, The Inventer of them. Per quam, Ars omnis & Scientia inventa est: By which all Arts and Sciences were first found and invented. So that, what good soever we have received, from all, or any of them, in teaching and instructing us, to know, There is a God; all that we owe only unto Philosophy: which is the first Fountain from whence it was derived: though by them, as by Channels, it were brought and conveied. Nay, that which they taught us but obscurely, and indirectly, as occupied properly in another subject, that doth Philosophy teach plainly and directly, as having God himself for his natural Object. As we may evidently see, not only by the notation of the Name, but also by the definition of the Thing. Both of them implying, that Philosophy, in truth, is a kind of Divinity: whose Object is only God. And therefore, Theaetetus, in Plato, calleth Philosophers, Plato, in Sophist. princip. by the name of Divines. Omnes Philosophos, Divinos appello. And Socrates well approveth his calling of them so. Yea, and the very name of Philosophy, being rightly expounded, implieth, that his principal Object is God. For, by interpretation, Philosophy signifieth, The love of Wisdom: as the Orator give th' the account of that name. Now, The beginning of Wisdom, Psal. 111. is the fear of God: as, is plainly affirmed, by the Prophet David. Nay, true wisdom itself is nothing else, but, Cognitio Numinis, Stobaeus. Serm 1. p. 15. rerúmque. Divinarum: The knowledge of God, and of those things that belong to him: as Architas Tarentinus expressly defineth. Nay, God himself is indeed the truest and highest wisdom. So Aristotle: God is an Essentia de Sapientia perfectissima. Arist. l. 3. de Theolog. c. 4. Pansa. c. 45. Arist. l. 1. Metaph. c. 1. And this is further yet confessed, by the learned est of the Heathen: as Pansa reporteth and proveth. Aristotle again, speaking of wisdom, saith, that it is not an humane possession, but an honour which is proper unto God. And he citeth Simonides, for confirmation of it. So that, if Philosophy be truly the love of Wisdom; then is it the love of God, who is the truest wisdom. As diverse of the Fathers have, from this ground, collected. Clem. Alex. l. 6. Strom. p. 298. So Clemens Alexandrinus. Philosophi apud nos dicuntur, qui amant Sapientìam, quae est omnium opifex, & magistra, hoc est, Filij Dei cognitionem. They be called Philosophers with us, that are lovers of that Wisdom, which is the Creator and Ruler of all things: that is, in very deed, that are lovers of the knowledge of the Son of God. Damascen. l. de Logica, c. 3. p. 419. I. So Damascen. Vera Philosophia, est Sapientiae amor: vera autem Sapientiae, Deus est: Ex quo conficitur, Amorem erga Deum, veram esse Philosophiam. True Philosophy is nothing else but only God himself: Aug. l. 8. de Civil. Dei, c. 9 To. 5. p. 450. From whence it must needs follow, that True Philosophy, is nothing else but the true love of God. In which point S. Augustine consenteth fully with Damascene: Id est Philosophari, amare Deum. And Theodoret, Theodoret in Hist. Sanctorum Patrum To. 2. fin. he fully consents with them both. Quiestre vera Philosophus, iure vocari poterit pius, & Dei amans. He that indeed is a Philosopher, may justly be called by the name of God's Lover. As the Patriarch Abraham, was called, God's Friend. Yea, and some of the Heathen have confessed also the same. Trismegistus Trismeg. Asclep. c. 6. p. 494. Plato in Lyside. sin. defineth True Philosophy, to be nothing but Religion, and divine contemplation. And therefore Plato affirmeth of evil men, That they do not philosophise: Mali non philosophantur: because, even in their being evil men, they put on a contrary nature upon them. For the Nature of Philosophy is, by loving of God, to make men become good. And, in this nature, every man ought to be a Philosopher: Iust. Mart. Dial. cum Tryphon. To. 2 p. 30. Arist. l. 1. Ethic. c. 7. Deum scilicet amando: yea even the simplest man that is, as justin Martyr teacheth. For this is the chiefest work of man, even as he is a man. This is that Opus Hominis, quatenus Homo: Whereby he is made blessed: His truly loving God. And therefore, this, every man ought to make his first and chiefest work: and all the rest, but seconds, and thirds: as justine Martyr noteth, in the forealleged place. So that, Philosophy teacheth a man to love God, even by his very name. And therefore it must needs assume, That there is one. Again, Aristotle Arist. l 2. Metaph. c: 2. calleth true Philosophy, Scientiam veritatis: The knowledge of the Truth: and affirmeth, that The end of it, is only Veritas, that is, to attain unto the truth. Now, God is, prima veritas, God is the first Truth, as Trismegistus affirmeth. Stobaeus, Serm. 11. p. 134. Primam veritatem, aio, Vnum, & solum illum, qui non est ex m●teria, corpore non continetur, sine colore, sine figura, mutationi & alterationi nulli obnoxium semper existentem. I call the first truth, that one and only thing, which hath neither body, nor matter, colour, nor figure, never subject to alteration, and yet ever in perfect being. All which attributes, can agree unto nothing else, but only unto God himself. Whom the Scriptures likewise call, john 14. by the name of the Truth: I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. And this is that Truth, which we first ought to seek for; as being the Way, which leadeth us unto Life. This is everlasting life, to know thee to be the only true God, john 17. and whom thou hast sent jesus Christ. And the knowledge of Truth, Arist. l. 1. Rhetor. add Theodect. c. 1. m. is the very end, for which man was created: as even Aristotle himself hath expressly affirmed. Homines ad veritatem nati sunt. Men are borne for nothing else, but to seek for the Truth. So that, whether Philosophy be the love of Wisdom; as Pythagoras intended: or, the knowledge of the Truth; as Aristotle intended: yet both ways it leadeth a man unto God, who is both the highest wisdom, and the chiefest Truth: Yea, and that, by virtue of the very name. Now come we from the notation of the name, unto the definition of the Thing: and we shall see it there again. For Philosophy, is defined to be, Omnium rerum, divinarum, Cic. de Orat. p. 103. a. Item in lib. de Vniverso. Senec. Epist. 14. atque humanarum scientia: The knowledge of all things, both divine, and humane. Whence Seneca affirmeth, that, Nomen Philosophiae, est non solùm venerabile, sed etiam sacrum. The very name of Philosophy, is both honourable, and holy: Honourable, in things humane; and Holy, in things Divine. Now, if Philosophy teach us the knowledge of the things of God; then must it needs lead us, to the knowledge of God himself. And so indeed, true Philosophy doth. For, there is none other way to come unto God, Psalm 37. 27. but by eschewing of Evil, and doing of Good. And both these lessons doth Philosophy teach us. For it is, both Expultrix vitiorum; and Indagatrix virtutum: The Expeller of vices; and Searcher-out of virtues. First, it expelleth vices, as skilful Physicians do peccant and vicious humours. And therefore, Cic. Tusc. 228. b. 191. a. 177 a. in another place, he calleth Philosophy, Medicinam Animi● The Physic of the Soul: and in another, Culturam Animi: The Husbandry and manuring of the Soul: which rooteth out all vices, as noisome and hurtful weeds. So that, for the first part of the way unto God; which is Flying of evil; Philosophy, not only points it out unto us, but also, in a sort, doth lead us in it by the hand. Whereupon, in the forealleged place, he calleth Philosophy, Cic. Tusc. 228. b. Cic. de Fin. 90. b. Cic. in Pison. 95. a. The Guide of our life: Ducem vitae. And, for the second part of the way; which is Doing of Good; he calleth Philosophy, Artem vitae: The Art of man's life. Which Art containeth in it (as in another place he noteth) Et virtutis, & officij, & benè vivendi disciplinam: A full and perfect instruction both in all virtues, and in all manner of well living. Neither doth it only teach the knowledge thereof unto men; but it also exacteth the practice of them. For, as it is observed by the Roman Orator: Omnis optimarum rerum cognitio, Cic. de Orat. 148 a. atque in iis exercitatio, Philosophia nominatur: Not only the knowledge of every good thing, but also a working and exercise therein, is that, which can worthily be named Philosophy. Finally, whatsoever godly Lesson is taught us, either in the Metaphysics, or Physics, or Physic, or Ethics, or Politics, or Mathematics, or Grammar, or Logic, or Rhetoric, or any other Art; all that is taught us by Philosophy. For, all these are nothing else but the parts of Philosophy. And therefore, when the Apostle exhorteth us, to take heed, that no Man deceive us through Philosophy; he speaketh not against true Philosophy: for that deceiveth no man: as is truly observed by the Heathen Poet. Nam neque decipitur Ratio, neque decipit unquàm. For true Philosophy, Manil. l. 2. praeserueth men From all deceit, and not deceiveth them. For, Cic. l. de Divin. p. 125. a. Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. 75. b. in true Philosophy, there is, Nihil commentitijs fabellis loci: There is no place for Fables. And true Philosophers be not, fabularum, but, rerum authores: as the Orator teacheth us. Therefore, it is not true Philosophy, which the Apostle there reproveth: but certain false, and sophistical Doctrines, which many Impostors obtruded to their hearers, under the false name of Philosophy. He speaketh but of that Philosophy, which is falsely so called. For, true Philosophy is the gracious gift of God. 2 Yea, and I find it observed, by some of the learned, that; as Philosophy hath in it, an image of God's goodness, in bringing so many, and so great good things unto us: so hath it in it also (in diverse other respects) an image and resemblance, not only of the Deity, but also of the Trinity. As I see the lines drawn in Zeegedinus his common places. Zeeged. loc. come. p. 10. Which though it be but, as it were, a monogrammal description, and a kind of rude draught, as it were with a Coal: yet, because a man so learned, hath thought it worthy to be published, I will not think it unworthy to be here represented. His conceit thereof, is this: That Whereas Philosophy hath three general parts; Natural, Rational, and Moral; Natural Philosophy, which handleth the causes of all things, representeth God the Father, Acts 17. 25. who is the Creator, and the general Cause of all things. Rational Philosophy, which teache●h of reason and understanding, 1. Cor. 1. 24. representeth God the Son, who is the wisdom of his Father, and the sweet disposer of all things. And Moral Philosophy, which is the rule of well living, john 16. 13. representeth the Holy Ghost; who is the preserver, and the guide of all men into truth, and virtuous life. Yea, and the same resemblances may also be seen, in all the minor parts of the forenamed Philosophies, as well as in their totals. For first, as concerning Natural Philosophy: the parts thereof be three, The Metaphysics, the Mathematics, and the Physics. The Metaphysics, considering the pure essence of things, doth therein resemble God the Father; who is nothing else but a pure and simple essence, and the very first principle of all other things. The Mathmetickes, considering of forms and figures, do therein resemble God the Son; Hebrews 1. 3. who is the character and engraven image of God the Father The Physics, considering the motions and operations of all natural bodies, do therein resemble God the Holy Ghost; who is that divine spirit, by which all things both live, Acts 17. 28. and move, and have their being. Now secondly, for Rational Philosophy: that hath three parts too: Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. Grammar, which teacheth the forming and expressing of words, resembleth God the Father; who formeth (like a mind) and expresseth, (like a mouth) the eternal Word, his Son. Logic, which teacheth the power of reasoning, resembleth God the Son; who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The high Reason, and Wisdom of his Father. And Rhetoric, which teacheth the faculty of persuading, resembleth the Holy Ghost; who both giveth unto men the power of persuasion, and the motion also to be persuaded by speaking. And thirdly, for Moral Philosophy; that likewise hath three parts: Ecclesiastickes, Oeconomickes, and Politickes. The Ecclesiastickes, treating of the knowledge of God the Creator, represent God the Father, in the authority of his Creation. The Oeconomickes, treating of private life, and of those provisions which belong unto it, represent God the Son, in the charity of his Sustentation. And the Politickes, treating of Regiment, and well governing, represent God the Holy Ghost, in the goodness of his Preserving. This is Zeegedin's comparison, as concerning that resemblance of the Holy Trinity, which shineth in every part of Philosophy. 3 Now the Heathen, though they could not go thus far, as to see in Philosophy an image of the Trinity (because that is a Mystery, far above their Capacity) yet they could go so far, as to see, that Philosophy is the gift of God, and not the invention of any mortal man. Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 117. Tully calleth it expressly, both Inventum Deorum, and, Donum Deorum, that is, both a spark of Gods own divine Wisdom; and also his gracious gift unto men. Which when he sent unto them, he sent together with it, all other Arts and Sciences, to attend upon it. Clem. Alex. l. 1. Strom. p. 136. As Clemens Alexandrinus hath truly observed. Apparet, ill as liberales Graecorum disciplinas, unà cum ipsa Philosophia, venire devinitùs ad Hominem. It appeareth, that even the liberal Arts of the greeks, were sent down out of Heaven, together wi●h Philosophy itself, unto men. So that, as the Orator very truly affirmeth: Hoc bono, nullum optabilius, nullum praestantius, Cic. l. de Vnivers. p. 204. a. neque datum est mortalium generi, Deorum concessu atque, munere neque dabitur. Then which the●e was never any greater good, nor more to be desired, either given, Senec. Epist. 14. or can be given by God unto Men. Yea, and Seneca proveth it, by this excellent reason▪ That, if Philosophy were not given unto men by God, they should be more beholding unto Philosophy then to God. For they receive so many good things, by the means of Philosophy, as they do from nothing else, but only from God himself. This is that high opinion, which hath been held of Philosophy, even by the very Heathen. 4 And, Poetry is the Gift of God. as they have thought of Philosophy: so have they likewise of Poetry: That it is also the gift of God, and not a skill by any man invented. And this is, Cic. de Divin p. 97. b. not only by the Roman Orator confirmed: but also, even by the Poets themselves acknowledged. Democritus affirmeth directly: Neminem, sine furore, Poetam magnum esse posse. That no man can attain, to be a great Poet, unless he first be rapt with some divine and heavenly spirit. And Plato, he saith, Plato in Io●e. pr. That Poets use to make all their excellent Poems; non arte, sed divino affl●tu capti; not by their own Art, but by the inspiration of some divine spirit. And Maximus Tyrius, speaking of Homer, and of his excellent gift in Poetry, he saith: That he was, surely, taught, by some of the Muses, if not by god Apollo himself, Max. Tyr. Serm. 16. p. 194. Illum docuit vel Musa jovis, vel pulcher Apollo. And again, p. 195. a little after: Et Homeri & Hesiodi carmina, universaque illa antiqua, Musa, divinitùs erat afflata. And that which these Philosophers affirm, the Roman Orator confirmeth. Cic. Orat. pro Archia Poeta. p. 189. a. Poeta, quasi divino quodam spiritu afflatur. Every Poet is inspired, with a kind of heavenly spirit. Yea, and Apollo, the Poets special god, assumeth it unto him: That Poesy is his gift. — Per me concordant carmina nervis. Ovid l. 1. Metam. p. 39 The Poet's strings, And what he sings, That all agree, It is by me. Yea, and even the very Poets themselves (stripping themselves of all the glory of that divine invention) do industriously maintain the very same opinion: partly, by indirect insinuation: and partly, by direct confession. By insinuation, in their invocations to Apollo, and the Muses in the beginning of their Poems. So Homer, in his Iliads. Iram cane, Hom. l. 1. Iliad. Dea, Pelidae Achilles. O Goddess, do thou strain, Achilles' angry vein. So again in his Odysseys. Odies. l. 1. Virum dic mihi, Musa, versutum. Help me, o Muse, to sing of such a man, As was so wise a Poli●ian. Insinuating, that he could not tell what to say, if the Muse should not teach him. So Virgil, his Ape: Dic mihi, Musa, virum. Prompt me the Man, my Muse. So Nonius, in his Dionysiaca: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— Tell, Goddess, tell. So Ovid. Ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen. Yea gods draw on, perpetuate my rhyme, From World's first being, to my present time. And, as in the beginning of their poems, they use to insinuate, that they cannot go forward, without the help of God: so, in the end of their poems, oftentimes, they ascribe their felicity, in going so well forward, unto his help. Euripides, in many of his Tragoedies, prayeth for victory: thereby insinuating, that victory and excellency in Poetry, is only of God. Which, Agatho the Poet, in a very religious manner, expressed. For he, having, in the Olympiacke, Plato, in Convivio. p. 417. obtained the victory, by his Tragedy; he out of his thankfulness, the next day, sacrìficed unto the Muses. Neither do the Poets, by these Insinuations only, acknowledge, that their faculty is given to them by God: but also by their direct, and apert Confessions. So Virgil: Virg. Eclog. 1. p. 1. — Ille Ludere quae vellem calamo permisit agresti. That God of mine is he, That granteth this to me, To sing, and pipe, and play, My pleasing country lay. So Horace. Deus, Horat. p. 18. Deus nam me vetat. God, God doth me forbid. So Ovid. Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo, Ovid l. 6. Fast. Imp●tus hic sacrae semina mentis habet. There is a God in us, and by his power we live, This power of his the seed● of sacred mind do give. So Ovid again, in another place: Est Deus in nobis, Ovid. l. 3. de Arte Amandi. sunt & commercia Coeli. Sedibus aethereis spiritus ille venit. A God there is in us, and with us Heavens commerce, And thence that Spirit comes, that helpeth out our verse. Otherwise, as Theocritus Theocrit cidyl. 10. p. 110. ingenuously confesseth: Arduae sunt Poetarum viae, absque Musis, Et lovis consilio. The paths that Poets trace, full uncouth prove, Without I●ues aid, and Muses, from above. Thus, All A●t● acknowledged to be the gifts of God. even the Heathen confessed, not only Philosophy, but also Poetry, to be a Divine gift; and to be sent unto men out of Heaven, by God. But this point I now pass over; because I have touched upon it, before. 5 And the like they acknowledge of all other arts too. Yea, and that (as in the for●●er) both indirectly, by Implication; and directly, by Confession. The ●reekes insinuate, that all Arts come from God; in making 〈◊〉, Daughter of jupiter: and to have had her generation, in his Diu●eb●●●●. For, thereby they imply, that all Arts were first bred in jupiters' own head. Sallust, in Ciceron. For Minerva was the Mistress of all good Arts: as Sallust, in his invective against Tully, insinuateth: where, in derision, he affirmeth him to be a man, Quem Minerva omnes Artes edocuit: Whom Minerva had adorned with all her Arts and Sciences. Yea, Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 212. and the Romans do also insinuate the same: in consecrating men's, among their other Gods. Whereby again they imply, that all understanding is given to men by God. Neither do they only by Insinuation imply it; but also directly, in express words confess it. So Orpheus — jovis omnia munus. L. Apuleus, l. de Munde. Pansa, p. 97. All goods are Gods: His gifts they are. So likewise Pythagoras. — sacrum genus est hominibus Quibus sacra natura p●ofere●do in lucem omnia monstra●. Pansa. c. 3. p. 10. He saith, the holy God doth bring to light, Whatsoever M●n doth understand aright. So likewise Aratus. — nos, ille benignus Fausta docet— It's he alone, Stobaus Eclog. Phys. c. 3. p. 3. even he, the God beningne, That us instructs, in every blessed thing. Yea, and as Philo judaeus observeth; when he begins to teach men, he teacheth them to purpose. Phil● jud. p. 198. Quandò Fons Sapientìae, Deus, Scientias tradit humano generi, sine mora hoc facit. Whenas God, who is the fountain of all wisdom, delivereth any Art or Science unto men, he quickly doth dispatch them. H● doth it, not, instillando; but, infundendo. He doth it, not by instillation, but by infusion. He droppeth it not in; but he poureth it in. As we may see in the Apostles, when he gave them the gift of tongues. And therefore it is a very false position, which is maintained by Xenophon: That all Arts have been found out, rather by the wit of man (using the benefit of long time) then by God's special blessing. Non Dij mortalibus principio oftendêre omnia: sed melius quaerentes tempore longo invenêre. Stob Eclog. Phys. c. 11. p. 17. It is true indeed, that God doth not always, upon a sudden, power knowledge into men (as he did into the Disciples) but teacheth them by degrees, in distance of times: but yet, men were not able, to get knowledge of themselves, though they should labour for it, with never so great pain, and never so long time; if they were not assisted, with his special blessing. And therefore Orpheus, in the forealleged place, he ascribeth unto God, not only the beginning; but also the proceeding, in all kind of learning. jupiter est Caput, Orpheus in Pansa c. 19 p. 79. & Medium: jovis omnia munus. God is the Beginning, and God is the proceeding: and All is of Gods giving. For Every good giving cometh down unto us from the Father of Lights. james 1. 17. And, It is only in his Light, that we see Light. It is he (saith the Prophet David) that teacheth a man knowledge. Psalm 36. 9 94. 10. It is he (saith the Prophet Daniel Daniel 2. 21. ) that giveth wisdom, unto all that be wise; and understanding, unto all that understand. He gave to Ananias, and his fellows, their knowledge and understanding in all manner of learning. Daniel 1. 17. 1. Kings 3. 12. 4 30. 31. 32. 33. He gave unto King Solomon, all his excellent wisdom, which reached unto all the parts of Philosophy. And no man hath any thing, which he hath not of his teaching: no nor can have neither. For he giveth, not only the possession of all Arts; but also all possibility of attaining unto them. He both teacheth men; and he giveth them the capacity to learn. He giveth docility, together with his doctrine. It is he (saith the Prophet) that giveth an ear to hear, Isay 50. 4. as the learned. Yea, and this also, even by the Heathen themselves, is acknowledged. Strepsiades, Aristoph in Nub. Act. 1. Sce. 2. p. 163. Aelian p. 423. when he entered into the School of Socrates, to learn his abstruse Arts; he prayed unto the gods, to lend him their assistance. So that, though Docility may seem to be a gift of Nature; yet, even that nature is, the gift of God. Nature may give the gift of docility to us: but God giveth the gift of docility to it. So that, all our capability of receiving any Art, is taught, even by the Heathen, to be given of God. And we must fly above nature, if we will rightly reduce it, to his true Original Author. God both giveth all knowledge, unto them that have it; and all capacity to receive it, unto them that have it not. And thus (as Eusebius hath truly observed) it is, Euseb l. 13. de Prapar. c. 7. p. 278. Lib. 2. c. 1. Sect. 8. Divinum verbum, quod omnes Artes hominibus suggerit; ●is only the Divine word, which gives unto all men, all manner of Arts and knowledge. But this point hath also been touched by me, heretofore. And therefore I will not press it, in this place, any more. 6 Let us therefore now come down, to the lowest degree of Arts: that is, Manuary and Mechanical: Mechanical Arts are the gifts of God. and we shall see, that even they, as well as the liberal, are, by the Heathen, confessed to be the gifts of God. Trismegistus Trisineg. Pimand. Dial. 10. p. 424. saith of all kinds of knowledge in general: that, Scientia est Dei donum: That all manner of knowledge, is the gift of God; And Seneca, of all humane Arts in particular: Senec. l. 4. de Benesic. c. 6. p. 50. Neque enim nostra, haec, quae invenimus, dixeris; non magis quam quòd crescimus. Insita sunt nobis omnium Artium semina. Sed Magister, ex occulto, Deus producit ingenia. Do not call those things our works, which we seem to have invented: no more than it is our work, that we grow up. The seeds indeed of all good Arts, are sown in our minds. But yet there is a secret Master, within us, which giveth us our wits. And that is God himself. So Clemens Alexandrinus unto the same purpose. Cl●m. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p, 281. Artes omnes divina Ratio docet. Non enìm homo Artem aliquam invenit: sed Deus affert. Hominis enìm ratio, orta est a divina ratione. It is only God's wisdom, that teacheth all Arts and Sciences unto men. For man cannot find out any Art of himself: it is God that brings it to him. But be it that man invented them; why yet all humane reason doth draw his Original from Gods divine wisdom. So that all is due to God. For, as job, job 32. 8. in his Book, teacheth us: Though there be a Spirit in a man; yet it is the inspiration of the Almighty, that giveth understanding. Though a man have, by nature, a spirit in him; yet hath not that spirit the light of understanding, unless the Father of Lights inspire the same into him. And this, even Aristotle himself also teacheth: who expressly affirmeth; That, though God have given docility into men's souls, by nature; yet hath he not given them doctrine itself, by nature: but giveth that of himself, out of his own special grace. Arist. l. 12. de Theol. cap 15. A Natura non inest homini nisi docilitas; non autem doctrina: eiusque animus creatus est, non eruditus, sed erudibilis. Man hath only, by Nature, the power of docility, he hath not, by nature, the habit of doctrine. His soul is created to be capable of learning: it is not actually created learned. And therefore, as he noteth in another place: In all a man's learning, Arist. l. 8. de Theol. cap. 8. Intellectus operatur, ut agens secundum; ac; per primum efficit, quicquid efficit: His understanding worketh, but as a second Agent; and doth all it doth, by the virtue of an higher understanding, which is above it. And this, even the Heathen acknowledge to be true, as well in all inferior and Mechanical Arts, as in the liberal and ingenuous. And therefore they have ascribed the invention of all the several manuary Arts, unto their several gods: As namely, Plato. in Convivio. p. 428. to Hercules, Pol. Virg de. Invent. l. 3. c. 6. p. 227. the first invention of the purple dye: Virg. l. 1. Georg. p. 36. Agriculture, Diod. Sic. l. 6. to Ceres: Prima Ceres Ferro mortales vertere terram Instituit:— Navigation to Neptune: as Diodorus Siculus writeth: whence his name is etymologized by Tully: Neptunus à nando: He is named Neptune from navigation. Whereby it appeareth, that, even they themselves thought, the invention of the meanest Mechanical Art, to proceed from a more divine understanding then dwelleth in the heart, or in the head, of any man. And thus far they went right. But now, here again, they err; that they ascribed those Arts, unto their false gods, which of right do belong unto the true God. For, all those Arts, are only his gifts. He is their true Author, and Inventor. So that, without sacrilege, they cannot be ascribed, unto any other. And therefore God himself, Who will not give his honour unto any other, calleth home all those Arts, and challengeth them by name, to be his own inventions. He taught the first Shipwright, Gen. 6. 14. Psal. 127. 1. how to make his Ship. He teacheth the Carpenter, how to build his house. He teacheth the Husbandman, how to plow his land. Ille colit terras: Virg. Eclog. 3. p. 8. He tilleth the Earth. The Earth Man tilleth, As God him teacheth. He teacheth the Art of Graving, in all kind of metals; and of Carving, in either Wood, Ex. 35. 32, 33. or Stone. He teacheth the Arts, both of Weaving, 35. and Imbroydering; and of curious working, in all kind of Needle work: and of all such like other cunning inventions; as he addeth in that place: shutting-up his own enumeration, with that general Conclusion, that no other particular should be left out of it. All these several Artificers, he professeth, that he filleth with the spirit of knowledge, Ex. 35. 31. and understanding; in all their several Arts. Yea, and that which is very worthy the noting, he assumeth to himself, to give the Art to teach them, as well as to practise them. Yea, 34. and though he be, The most High: yet he challengeth the invention, even of that simple Art, which among the rest may seem the most low: I have created the Smith, that bloweth the Coals in the fire, Isay 54. 16. and him that bringeth forth an Instrument, for his work. Theodoret. Ser. 4. de Provident. To. 2. p. 591. Zanch, l, de Operibus Dei p. 61●● But this point is largely handled, both by Theodoret, and by Zanchius. And therefore I will prosecute it no farther. Thus now we see, who is the true Author, of all those Arts and Sciences, which the Heathens have ascribed unto their false gods. And withal, that there is none of them so mean, which he hath thought unworthy to be his own invention. So that now it appeareth, that there is not any Art, neither Liberal, nor illiberal, from the Metaphysics, to the Mechanics, from the highest, to the lowest, but that some way or other, it leadeth a man to God. Which is the main scope, and intent of this second Book. here we should proceed to the third probation of our first general head, argued, and urged, from The Structure of Man's body, etc. But the Hand of Almighty GOD, at this present, on mine own Body, here stayeth my Hand. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. FINIS.